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*********************************************** 
CONNEX CREDIT UNION v. MICHELLE

M. THIBODEAU

(AC 43830)

Alvord, Cradle and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a secured party, sought to recover monetary damages from

the defendant debtor, for breach of a retail installment sales contract,

secured by an interest in the defendant’s vehicle. After the defendant

defaulted, the plaintiff took possession of the vehicle and sent the defendant a presale notice regarding her right to redeem and the notice of

sale. The defendant took no steps to redeem the vehicle, and the plaintiff

sold it in an arm’s-length transaction. Following the sale, the plaintiff sent

the defendant a postsale notice advising her of the sale and informing

her that the sale price was less than the amount that she owed and that

the plaintiff may seek a deficiency judgment. The defendant did not pay

the amount allegedly due. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded certain damages, and the

defendant appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court did not err in determining that the plaintiff properly

provided notice of the right to an accounting as required by article 9

of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as the provision of an actual

accounting in lieu of a statement of a right to an accounting was enough

to satisfy the requirements set out by the applicable statute (§ 42a-9-

613 (1) (D)): although the statute only requires a statement that the

debtor is entitled to an accounting, additional information is permitted

and exact language is not required, and providing an actual accounting

in the notice is the type of additional information that the statute allows;

moreover, providing the actual accounting, especially when provided

free of charge, served as a consumer focused means of meeting the

statutory purpose of notification to the debtor; accordingly, the plaintiff’s

presale notice, which provided detailed information, including details

of the defendant’s debt and the amount she owed to the plaintiff, and

actively invited questions, adhered to the requirements of the UCC and

thus satisfied the accounting provision of the statute.

2. This court declined to reach the merits of the defendant’s claim that the

trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff properly provided a

telephone number from which the defendant could learn the full amount

she would need to pay in order to redeem her vehicle as required by

article 9 of the UCC, the claim not having been properly preserved for

appellate review; the defendant did not raise this issue until her posttrial

brief, and this court’s careful review of the record revealed the issue

was not raised at trial and was not addressed in the court’s memorandum

of decision, of which no further articulation was sought, and, because

the court did not consider the issue, the factual record was wholly

inadequate for review.

3. The trial court did not err in determining that the plaintiff satisfied the

requirements of the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (RISFA)

(§ 36a-770 et seq.) regarding the repossession and sale of a motor vehicle.

a. The defendant’s claim that the postsale notice failed to provide a

proper itemization as required by statute (§ 36a-785 (e)) was not properly

preserved for appellate review, the defendant having failed to raise this

issue until her posttrial brief, and the record was unclear how, if at all,

the issue was raised at trial since the issue was not addressed in the

court’s memorandum of decision.

b. The plaintiff did not violate § 36a-785 (g) when it credited the defendant

with the actual sale price of the vehicle, an amount lower than the

statutory fair market value as determined by the formula in § 36a-785

(g); the purpose of § 36a-785 (g) is not to calculate an amount that a

creditor must credit to a debtor’s account but, rather, to provide the

debtor with the tools to defend herself in a deficiency proceeding brought

by a secured party, and, where a secured party seeks a deficiency judgment following a calculation pursuant to subsection (g) of the statute,

the secured party may rebut the presumed value of the vehicle with direct
in-court testimony, which the plaintiff did here, presenting testimony

regarding how the sale price represented the actual fair market value

of the vehicle due to damage sustained in an accident that prompted

the defendant’s surrender of the vehicle, and, additionally, the defendant

did not offer any evidence as to the vehicle’s value.

Argued September 16—officially released November 30, 2021

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for breach of contract,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New Britain, where the defendant

filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the matter was tried to

the court, Aurigemma, J.; subsequently, the defendant

withdrew the counterclaim; judgment for the plaintiff,

from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Garrett A. Denniston, with whom, on the brief, was

Marisa A. Bellair, for the appellant (defendant).

Robert C. Lubus, Jr., with whom were Andrew S.

Marcucci, and, on the brief, Stephanie Ann Palmer, for

the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. This appeal concerns the application of

the statutory schemes that govern a secured party’s

repossession and subsequent sale of a motor vehicle

in a consumer goods secured transaction. Connecticut

has adopted article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code

(UCC), codified at General Statutes § 42a-9-101 et seq.,

which governs secured transactions. Specifically at

issue here is the section that governs a secured party’s

notification to a debtor regarding the repossession and

impending sale of collateral. Connecticut also has

enacted the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act

(RISFA), General Statutes § 36a-770 et seq., an act that

governs installment sales contracts—a specific type of

secured transaction. Specifically at issue here is the

section that pertains to a secured party’s notification

to a debtor regarding the proceeds of the sale of a

repossessed and sold motor vehicle. The underlying

lawsuit arose from the defendant debtor’s default on

her car payments and the plaintiff secured party’s subsequent repossession and sale of that vehicle. In essence,

we are tasked with answering two questions: (1) what

must a secured party tell a debtor prior to the sale of

repossessed collateral and (2) what must a secured

party do after the sale of a repossessed vehicle.

The defendant debtor, Michelle M. Thibodeau, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor

of the plaintiff secured party, Connex Credit Union, in

this breach of contract action. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the trial court erred in determining that the

plaintiff (1) provided notice of the right to an accounting

as required by article 9 of the UCC, (2) provided a

telephone number from which the defendant could

learn the full amount she would need to pay in order

to redeem her vehicle as required by article 9 of the

UCC,1 and (3) satisfied the requirements of RISFA

regarding the repossession and sale of a motor vehicle.

On the basis of these claims, the defendant argues that

the plaintiff was precluded from recovering any deficiency upon resale due to its alleged failure to adhere

to the statutory requirements.2 We affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court in its

memorandum of decision, and procedural history are

relevant to our discussion of the claims on appeal. ‘‘On

April 7, 2014, the defendant . . . borrowed $19,993.12

[from the plaintiff] to be repaid with interest at 4.99

percent per annum over seventy-two months. The retail

installment sales contract . . . signed by the defendant

was secured by a security interest in the defendant’s

2013 Kia Rio [vehicle] . . . . In the [c]ontract the

defendant agreed to be responsible for repossession

and sales costs as well as attorney’s fees.’’

After her October 23, 2017 payment, the defendant
made no further payments on the loan, and the trial

court determined that, as a result, she had defaulted.

The defendant ‘‘contacted the plaintiff on or about January 16, 2018, and advised it that her vehicle had been

in an accident and she wished the plaintiff to come and

take possession of the vehicle.’’

On January 17, 2018, the plaintiff sent a document

titled ‘‘Right to Redeem and Notice of Sale’’ (presale

notice) to the defendant via certified mail. This document noted the repossession date, advised the defendant of her right to redeem her vehicle, explained how

to redeem the vehicle, and listed the details of the defendant’s outstanding debt.3 The defendant took no steps

to redeem the vehicle.

On February 28, 2018, the plaintiff sold the vehicle

in an arm’s-length transaction for $4000. On March 20,

2018, the plaintiff sent the defendant a letter (postsale

notice) advising her of the sale and informing her that

the sale price was less than the amount that she owed.

The postsale notice also informed the defendant that

the plaintiff might seek a deficiency judgment against

her. A named employee, identified as a collections specialist, signed the postsale notice which included the

plaintiff’s mailing address, website address, and phone

number, and closed with the words ‘‘[i]f you have any

questions, please call.’’ The defendant did not contact

the plaintiff with any questions.

In addition to the defendant’s outstanding debt, the

plaintiff incurred $760 in repossession and sales costs.

Along with the sale proceeds, the plaintiff recovered a

total of $1955.99 from the insurance it had on the vehicle. The plaintiff also applied $9 from a savings account

that the defendant had with the plaintiff to the defendant’s outstanding debt.

On August 30, 2018, the plaintiff commenced this

action against the defendant for breach of contract. The

plaintiff sought principal damages of $4495.07, prejudgment interest in the amount of $263.22, and attorney’s

fees in the amount of $674. In response, the defendant

asserted several special defenses, including assertions

that the plaintiff had failed to inform her in its presale

notice that she was entitled to an accounting and had

not credited her with the correct value upon selling the

vehicle.4

The case was tried to the court, Aurigemma, J., on

September 11, 2019. At trial, the plaintiff called J. R.

Roy, the plaintiff’s collection manager. Roy testified as

to the vehicle’s condition and value. The defendant did

not present evidence on the value of the vehicle and

presented no witnesses and no exhibits. The parties

submitted simultaneous posttrial briefs.

On January 2, 2020, the court issued its memorandum

of decision, in which it found that ‘‘the plaintiff [had]

proved all the necessary elements of its cause of action.’’
In addition, the court rejected each of the defendant’s

special defenses. The court rendered judgment for the

plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of

$5432.29. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be

set forward as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court erred

because ‘‘(1) it ignored the plain language of [General

Statutes §§ 42a-9-614 (1) (A) and 42a-9-613 (1) (D)] by

excusing [the plaintiff’s] omission of language stating

[that the defendant] had the right to request a written

explanation of indebtedness and the cost for doing so

(if any); and (2) what the court called an ‘accounting’

in the presale notice falls well short of what the [Connecticut] UCC requires.’’ We disagree.

We first set forth the appropriate standard of review.

Here, the financial amounts listed in the notices are not

in dispute; in resolving the defendant’s various claims,

we are only tasked with determining what the relevant

statutes require of secured parties. Thus, our consideration of this appeal requires only a review of the trial

court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.

‘‘The process of statutory interpretation involves the

determination of the meaning of the statutory language

as applied to the facts of the case, including the question

of whether the language does so apply. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to

ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the

legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine,

in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory

language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including

the question of whether the language actually does

apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text

of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.

If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,

extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall

not be considered. . . . Furthermore, [t]he legislature

is always presumed to have created a harmonious and

consistent body of law . . . [so that] [i]n determining

the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the

provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory

scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.

. . . Because issues of statutory construction raise

questions of law, they are subject to plenary review on

appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson

v. Tindill, 208 Conn. App. 255, 264, A.3d (2021).

The first issue we address is the question of what

information a secured party must include in a notice

to a debtor prior to disposing of repossessed consumer

goods collateral. In consumer goods secured transactions,5 a notification of disposition of collateral requires

a statement ‘‘that the debtor is entitled to an accounting
of the unpaid indebtedness and [a statement of] the

charge, if any, for an accounting . . . .’’ General Statutes § 42a-9-613 (1) (D); see also General Statutes § 42a9-614 (1) (A). The parties agree that the notice in question did not include language expressly stating that the

defendant was ‘‘entitled to an accounting . . . .’’ General Statutes § 42a-9-613 (1) (D). They disagree, however, as to whether the plaintiff’s notification conforms

to the statute’s requirement despite the lack of the specific statement.

The defendant argues that a secured party cannot

merely adhere to the ‘‘spirit’’ of §§ 42a-9-613 (1) (D)

and 42a-9-614 (1) (A), but rather it must strictly comply

with the requirements set out in the statute. The plaintiff

responds that its notice ‘‘exceeded the minimum necessary contents to satisfy the statute by providing the

actual accounting free of charge, rather than the right

to request an accounting and the cost for the fulfillment

of that request, if any.’’ On the particular facts of this

case, we conclude that the plaintiff did not violate the

requirements of the statute.

We begin by setting forth the relevant provisions of

§ 42a-9-614, which governs the contents and form of

notification required before disposing of collateral in

consumer goods transactions, and § 42a-9-613,6 which,

although it governs the contents and form of notification required before disposition of collateral in nonconsumer goods transactions, is incorporated in part into

§ 42a-9-614. Section 42a-9-614 provides that, ‘‘[i]n a

consumer-goods transaction, the following rules apply

. . . .’’7 Subsection (1) governs the information that

must be provided in a notification of disposition. Specifically, a notification of disposition must provide four

categories of information, only one of which is relevant

to this discussion.8 See General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (1).

The relevant and first required category of information

is ‘‘[t]he information specified in subdivision (1) of section 42a-9-613 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (1)

(a). Section 42a-9-613 (1) (D) is the provision at issue

and requires that a notification of disposition contain

a statement that ‘‘the debtor is entitled to an accounting

of the unpaid indebtedness’’ along with ‘‘the charge, if

any, for an accounting . . . .’’ The other three categories of required information in disposing of consumer

goods collateral, listed in § 42a-9-614 (1), are not relevant to this discussion.

Section 42a-9-614 (2) further provides that ‘‘[a] particular phrasing of the notification is not required.’’ Lastly,

although § 42a-9-614 (3) provides an example of a sufficient notification,9 § 42a-9-614 (4) provides that ‘‘even

if additional information appears at the end of the

form,’’ the notice remains sufficient.

We begin our analysis by noting that the question of

whether providing an actual accounting in lieu of a

statement of a right to an accounting satisfies the
requirements set out in § 42a-9-613 (1) (D) is a matter

of first impression in Connecticut. Although the statute

only requires a statement ‘‘that the debtor is entitled

to an accounting’’; General Statutes § 42a-9-613 (1) (D);

including additional information is permitted; see General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (4); and exact language is not

required. General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (2). Providing an

actual accounting in the notice instead of a statement

that such an accounting may be obtained on request is

the type of additional information that the statute

allows. Indeed, providing the actual accounting, especially when provided free of charge as was done here,

instead of a notice of a right to an accounting serves

as a consumer focused means of meeting the statutory

purpose of notification to the debtor.

An accounting is defined, inter alia, as ‘‘the aggregate

unpaid secured obligations’’ and identifies ‘‘the components of the obligations in reasonable detail.’’ General

Statutes § 42a-9-102 (4) (B) and (C). In the present case,

the presale notice stated the principal ($9700.06), the

interest ($114.05 with a $1.33 per diem accrual), late

fees ($30), and cost of towing ($200), for a total outstanding balance of $10,044.11. The notice also closed

with ‘‘[i]f you have any questions, please contact me,’’

and provided a phone number and address. In addition,

the notice provided a three page long description of

the defendant’s redemption rights and outstanding debt.

The plaintiff provided an actual accounting in compliance with the statute, comprised of ‘‘the principal, interest, per diem, late fees, [and] repossession costs . . . .’’

See General Statutes § 42a-9-102 (4).

On these facts, we conclude that the plaintiff’s presale

notice, which provided detailed information, including

details of the defendant’s debt and the amount she owed

to the plaintiff, and actively invited questions, adhered

to the requirements of §§ 42a-9-614 (1) (A) and 42a-9-

613 (1) (D) and thus satisfied the accounting provision

of the statute.

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the court erred

in finding that the plaintiff provided a telephone number

that she could call to determine the total amount that

she would need to pay to redeem the vehicle as required

by § 42a-9-614 (1) (C).10 Because this claim is not properly preserved for appellate review, we decline to reach

the merits of this argument.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution

of this claim. The defendant asserted several special

defenses relating to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

presale notice and postsale notice in her amended

answer. Although the defendant raised other defenses

based upon §§ 42a-9-613 and 42a-9-614, she did not

assert the defense that the plaintiff failed to provide a

number that she could call in order to learn the total
amount she would need to pay to redeem her vehicle.11

See footnote 4 of this opinion. The defendant did not

raise this issue until her posttrial brief, which was filed

simultaneously with the plaintiff’s brief. Further, our

careful review of the record reveals that this issue was

not raised at trial and is not addressed in the trial court’s

memorandum of decision, of which no further articulation was sought.

Because the trial court did not consider this issue,

the factual record is wholly inadequate for our review.

The court did not make findings of fact relevant to this

specific issue. Therefore, in asking us to review this

claim, the defendant is essentially asking us to make

factual findings—a request with which we cannot comply. See Byrne v. Spurling, 105 Conn. App. 99, 103,

937 A.2d 70 (2007). ‘‘[A]n examination of the plaintiff’s

belated arguments demonstrates the need for factual

findings that the record does not contain.’’ Id. For these

reasons, we cannot address the merits of this claim.

‘‘The court shall not be bound to consider a claim

unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .’’ Practice Book § 60-5. ‘‘[T]he

reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise

a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—

after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing

party to address the claim—would encourage trial by

ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and

the opposing party. . . . [T]o permit the appellant first

to raise posttrial an issue that arose during the course

of the trial would circumvent the policy underlying the

requirement of timely preservation of issues.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carroll v. Yankwitt, 203 Conn. App. 449, 479 n.23, 250 A.3d

696 (2021). This court previously has declined to review

a claim raised for the first time in a posttrial brief

because doing so would ‘‘contravene the purpose of

the preservation requirement,’’ noting that it was ‘‘not

surprising that the trial court did not address the defendant’s [claim] in any manner in its memorandum of

decision.’’ AS Peleus, LLC v. Success, Inc., 162 Conn.

App. 750, 759–60, 133 A.3d 503 (2016). Thus, because

the issue was only raised in the defendant’s posttrial

brief and because the record is inadequate for review,

we do not reach the merits of this claim.

III

Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred

by ‘‘implicitly’’ finding that the plaintiff complied with

RISFA, specifically, General Statutes § 36a-785 (e), and

provided the defendant with a ‘‘ ‘written statement itemizing the disposition of the proceeds’ ’’ from the vehicle’s sale. In addressing this claim, we move away from

the adequacy of the presale notice and examine the

defendant’s actions after the vehicle was sold. The

defendant further argues that, even if the plaintiff had

satisfied § 36a-785 (e), the court erred in finding that
the plaintiff credited the defendant the proper amount

from the sale of the vehicle. As to the claim that the

plaintiff failed to provide an itemization in the postsale

notice, the defendant’s argument was not properly preserved, and, therefore, we do not reach the merits of

the claim. As to the argument that the plaintiff failed

to credit the defendant with the proper amount, we

disagree.

A

Similar to the defendant’s claim detailed in part II of

this opinion, the defendant’s claim that the postsale

notice failed to provide a proper itemization as required

by § 36a-785 (e)12 is not properly preserved for appellate review.

Although the defendant raised other defenses based

on § 36a-785 in her amended answer, she did not assert

the defense of failing to provide a statement itemizing

the proceeds of the disposition. See footnote 4 of this

opinion. The defendant did not raise the issue until her

posttrial brief—filed simultaneously with the plaintiff’s

posttrial brief. Again, the record is unclear how, if at

all, this issue was raised at trial since the issue is not

addressed in the trial court’s memorandum of decision.13 The defendant herself acknowledges that ‘‘neither [the plaintiff] nor the trial court addressed the

postsale RISFA argument . . . .’’ Perhaps neither

addressed this argument because each was mindful of

the precept that raising an issue only in a posttrial brief

‘‘circumvent[s] the policy underlying the requirement

of timely preservation of issues.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Carroll v. Yankwitt, supra, 203 Conn.

App. 479 n.23.

Although each party briefed this issue on appeal, we

decline to review the claim as it was neither properly

raised nor considered at trial. Therefore, because permitting this claim ‘‘ ‘would encourage trial by ambuscade’ ’’ and would ‘‘ ‘contravene the purpose of the preservation requirement,’ ’’; id.; we conclude that the

defendant has failed to properly preserve the claim for

appellate review. See AS Peleus, LLC v. Success, Inc.,

supra, 162 Conn. App. 759–60.

B

In addition to the claim that the plaintiff provided no

itemized statement of disposition, the defendant claims

that, even if there were such a statement, the plaintiff

necessarily violated the statute’s mandate by crediting

her with the incorrect value of the vehicle.14 Specifically,

the defendant claims that § 36a-785 (g) requires a

secured party to credit a debtor with the fair market

value as determined by the formula set forth in the

statute (statutory fair market value) at the time the

collateral is disposed of and that the trial court erred

in concluding that the postsale notice properly credited

her with $4000 in actual sales proceeds rather than the
statutory fair market value as required under § 36a-785

(g). We disagree.

For the same reasons set forth in part I of this opinion,

this claim is subject to plenary review. See Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A. v. Fratarcangeli, 192 Conn. App. 159, 165,

217 A.3d 649 (2019).

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of

this claim. At trial, the plaintiff called its collection

manager, Roy, as a witness. Roy testified that the statutory fair market value of the vehicle was $6225. He

also testified, however, that, according to the vehicle

condition report, the vehicle’s driver side front door

and rear quarter panel as well as the passenger side

front quarter panel, rear door, and rear quarter panel

all were scratched and dinged. According to Roy, the

sale price of $4000—not the statutory fair market value

of $6225—represented the vehicle’s actual fair market

value. The defendant did not present any evidence

regarding the vehicle’s value. The trial court found that

the plaintiff rebutted the fair market value presumption

of § 36a-785 (g), and found that the sale price ($4000)

was the vehicle’s actual fair market value.

Section 36a-785 (g), titled ‘‘Fair market value,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the goods retaken consist of

a motor vehicle the aggregate cash price of which was

more than four thousand dollars, the prima facie fair

market value of such motor vehicle shall be calculated

by adding together the average trade-in value for such

motor vehicle and the highest-stated retail value for

such motor vehicle and dividing the sum of such values

by two. Such average trade-in value and highest-stated

retail value shall be determined by the values as stated

in the National Automobile Dealers Association Used

Car Guide [(NADA)] . . . as of the date of repossession. . . . The prima facie evidence of fair market

value of such motor vehicle . . . so determined may

be rebutted only by direct in-court testimony. If such

value of the motor vehicle . . . is less than the balance

due under the contract . . . the holder of the contract

may recover from the retail buyer . . . the amount by

which such liability exceeds such fair market value

. . . .’’ In essence, the statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the NADA value, the statutory fair market

value, is the actual fair market value.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the plaintiff was

required to credit her account with the statutory fair

market value rather than the actual sale proceeds and

was precluded from contesting the statutory fair market

value until the matter was before a court. It is the

defendant’s position that the plaintiff is barred from

recovering a deficiency judgment in this case because

of its failure to credit her with the statutory fair market

value when it sold the vehicle. The plaintiff essentially

relies on the fact that the trial court found that Roy’s

testimony rebutted the presumption of fair market value
in arguing that it complied with the statute.

We disagree with the defendant’s interpretation of

§ 36a-785 (g). The purpose of subsection (g) is not to

calculate an amount that a creditor/secured party must

credit to a debtor’s account, but rather to provide the

debtor with the tools to defend herself in a deficiency

proceeding brought by a secured party. See General

Statutes § 36a-785 (g). Where a secured party seeks a

deficiency judgment, following a calculation pursuant

to subsection (g), the secured party may rebut the presumed value of the vehicle with direct in-court testimony. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (g). In the present

case, the plaintiff presented evidence of the statutory

fair market value ($6225) and then rebutted the presumed value with Roy’s testimony on the vehicle’s sale

price ($4000) and how that value represented the actual

fair market value of the vehicle due to damage sustained

in the accident that prompted the defendant’s surrender

of the vehicle. Finally, although the plaintiff presented

ample evidence to rebut the statutory fair market value,

the defendant did not offer any evidence as to the vehicle’s value. We conclude that the plaintiff did not violate

§ 36a-785 (g).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Despite the phrasing of this claim, we note that the trial court made no

such determination.

2 Because we find that the plaintiff did not violate these statutes, we need

not address the effects of such violations.

3

‘‘The document indicated that the repossession date was [January 16,

2018] and advised the defendant that she could ‘still redeem (get back) [her]

vehicle by curing [her] default.’ It further advised that the defendant needed

to pay $985.48 to the Credit Union for principal, interest and late fees and

$200 to the Repossession agent ‘on or before the REDEMPTION DATE,’

which the document listed as [February 5, 2018].’’

4

In toto, the defendant asserted six special defenses. Specifically, she

argued: (1) the plaintiff did not credit her with the fair market value of the

vehicle, in violation of General Statutes § 36a-785 (g); (2) the plaintiff did

not provide written notice explaining that she was responsible for retrieving

personal property from the vehicle, in violation of § 36a-785 (c) (2); (3) the

plaintiff failed to inform her that she was entitled to an accounting, in

violation of General Statutes §§ 42a-9-613 (1) (D) and 42a-9-614; (4) the

plaintiff failed to provide an accurate description of her liability for deficiency, in violation of § 42a-9-614 (1) (B); (5) the plaintiff’s sale restricted

her right to redeem under General Statutes § 42a-9-623 by requiring payment

by cash or bank teller’s check; and (6) the plaintiff misrepresented her right

to redeem, in violation of § 42a-9-614 (5).

In addition, the defendant brought a counterclaim alleging violations of

various consumer protection statutes. At trial, however, the defendant withdrew her counterclaim.

5

‘‘‘Consumer goods’ means goods that are used or bought for use primarily

for personal, family or household purposes.’’ General Statutes § 42a-9-102

(23).

6 General Statutes § 42a-9-613 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except in a consumer-goods transaction, the following rules apply: (1) The contents of a

notification of disposition are sufficient if the notification: (A) Describes

the debtor and the secured party; (B) Describes the collateral that is the

subject of the intended disposition; (C) States the method of intended disposition; (D) States that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid

indebtedness and states the charge, if any, for an accounting; and (E) States

the time and place of a public disposition or the time after which any other

disposition is to be made. . . .’’

7 The requirements differ depending upon whether the transaction is a
consumer goods transaction or not. See General Statutes §§ 42a-9-613 and

42a-9-614.

8 General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (1) provides: ‘‘A notification of disposition

must provide the following information: (A) The information specified in

subdivision (1) of section 42a-9-613; (B) A description of any liability for a

deficiency of the person to which the notification is sent; (C) A telephone

number from which the amount that must be paid to the secured party to

redeem the collateral under section 42a-9-623 is available; and (D) A telephone number or mailing address from which additional information concerning the disposition and the obligation secured is available.’’

9 General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (3) provides: ‘‘The following form of notification, when completed, provides sufficient information:

‘‘(Name and address of secured party.)

‘‘(Date)

NOTICE OF OUR PLAN TO SELL PROPERTY

‘‘ .... (Name and address of any obligor who is also a debtor.)

‘‘Subject: .... (Identification of transaction)

‘‘We have your .... (describe collateral), because you broke promises in

our agreement.

‘‘(For a public disposition:)

‘‘We will sell .... (describe collateral) at public sale. A sale could include

a lease or license. The sale will be held as follows:

‘‘Date: ....

‘‘Time: ....

‘‘Place: ....

‘‘You may attend the sale and bring bidders if you want.

‘‘(For a private disposition:)

‘‘We will sell .... (describe collateral) at private sale sometime after ....

(date). A sale could include a lease or license.

‘‘The money that we get from the sale (after paying our costs) will reduce

the amount you owe. If we get less money than you owe, you (will or will

not, as applicable) still owe us the difference. If we get more money than

you owe, you will get the extra money, unless we must pay it to someone else.

‘‘You can get the property back at any time before we sell it by paying us

the full amount you owe (not just the past due payments), including our

expenses. To learn the exact amount you must pay, call us at .... (telephone number).

‘‘If you want us to explain to you in writing how we have figured the amount

that you owe us, you may call us at .... (telephone number) or write us at

.... (secured party’s address) and request a written explanation. (We will

charge you $.... for the explanation if we sent you another written explanation

of the amount you owe us within the last six months.)

‘‘If you need more information about the sale call us at .... (telephone

number) or write us at .... (secured party’s address).

‘‘We are sending this notice to the following other people who have an

interest in .... (describe collateral) or who owe money under your agreement:

‘‘.... (Names of all other debtors and obligors, if any.)’’

10 General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (1) provides that ‘‘[a] notification of disposition must provide the following information . . . .’’ Subdivision (C) requires

that such notice include ‘‘[a] telephone number from which the amount that

must be paid to the secured party to redeem the collateral under section 42a9-623 is available . . . .’’ General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (1) (C).

11 The presale notice provides, beneath the list of money past due and

repossession costs: ‘‘In addition to the charges listed above, you will incur

storage fees. Please contact the [r]epossession agent to determine the amount

of the charge.’’ The defendant argues that because the presale notice only

provided contact information for the credit union and not for the repossession

agent, the defendant was not provided with a number with which she could

learn the amount she needed to pay to redeem the vehicle.

12 General Statutes § 36a-785 (e), titled ‘‘Proceeds of resale,’’ provides in

relevant part: ‘‘Not later than thirty days after the resale, the holder of the

contract shall give the retail buyer a written statement itemizing the disposition

of the proceeds. . . .’’

13 After filing the present appeal, the defendant filed a motion for articulation

with the trial court on February 27, 2020. Specifically, the defendant requested

articulation of the trial court’s ‘‘basis for rejecting [the defendant’s] contention

‘[that the plaintiff] didn’t send [the defendant] a written statement itemizing

the disposition of the vehicle’s sales proceeds,’ which violates § 36a-785 (e)

of RISFA and bars recovery.’’ This contention was not raised in the defendant’s

amended answer, but was argued in her posttrial brief. The trial court did
not rule on the motion for articulation and the defendant did not file a motion

to compel the court to issue a ruling.

14 Although the defendant articulates this argument as part of her itemized

statement claim, because this question was, in fact, properly preserved, we

reach the merits of this claim.