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41–945 PDF 2008

COSCO BUSAN AND MARINE 

CASUALTY INVESTIGATION PROGRAM 

(110–112) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 10, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York, Vice Chair 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TED POE, Texas 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Salerno, Rear Admiral Brian, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, United States Coast Guard ....................................... 5 

Richards, Anne, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Homeland Security ... 5 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland ............................................................... 54 

Pelosi, Hon. Nancy, of California, and Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 65 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Richards, Anne L. .................................................................................................... 67 

Salerno, Rear Admiral Brian .................................................................................. 74 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Salerno, Rear Admiral Brian, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, United States Coast Guard: 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 17 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 20 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 25 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 30 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 32 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 35 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 38 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 40 

Response to request for information ................................................................... 48 

Responses to questions from the Subcommittee ................................................ 83 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

San Francisco Department of Emergency Management, Vicki Hennessy, Acting Executive Director, written statement ......................................................... 97 

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(1) 

HEARING ON COSCO BUSAN AND MARINE 

CASUALTY INVESTIGATION PROGRAM 

Thursday, April 10, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Elijah E. 

Cummings [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Subcommittee will now come to order. 

Today’s hearing gives us the opportunity to receive the report de- veloped by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General in response to a request made by Speaker Pelosi and 

myself for a comprehensive examination of the circumstances surrounding the allision of the COSCO BUSAN with the San Francisco Bay Bridge on November 7th, 2007. We made that request following a special field hearing held by 

this Subcommittee in mid-November in San Francisco, during 

which we began our examination of this incident. At the time of 

that hearing, I promised that our Subcommittee would continue to 

follow up on this incident until we understood the facts surrounding it and, more importantly, had identified the lessons from 

it that needed to be applied to improve the safety of the maritime 

transportation industry. We continue to fulfill that promise today. 

A number of investigations of the COSCO BUSAN allision are 

ongoing, including a critical review by the National Transportation 

Safety Board which is examining issues surrounding probable 

cause that we are not in a position to examine here today. We look 

forward to reviewing the results of those investigations when they 

are available. 

Today, we specifically examine the Inspector General’s findings 

regarding the role of the Vessel Traffic Service in the COSCO 

BUSAN allision, the adequacy of the Coast Guard’s post-accident 

investigation, and the infectiveness of the response to the oil spill 

mounted by the Coast Guard and by State and local officials. We 

will cover all aspects of the report during the course of our hearing 

and look forward to the testimony of Ms. Anne Richards, Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits, who is representing Inspector General Skinner today. 

However, let me say at the outset that I am deeply disturbed to 

learn that the Marine casualty investigators who responded to this 

incident were not qualified as casualty investigators and that the 

2 

apparent lack of job knowledge caused them to fail to secure certain critical evidence. I cannot believe that the Coast Guard would 

ever send someone who was not qualified, as a pilot of a plane or 

a helicopter. Yet, we have a circumstance here in which the individuals who were not qualified as casualty investigators were sent 

to examine a marine casualty that involved a 900-foot ocean-going 

vessel that had just hit the San Francisco Bay Bridge and was 

leaking thousands of gallons of oil into the San Francisco Bay. 

During the second half of today’s hearing we will focus on the 

tragic loss of a fishing vessel, ALASKA RANGER, which sank on 

Easter Sunday, March 23rd, 2008, resulting in the confirmed 

deaths of four crew members and the presumed death of a fifth 

crew member. Our prayers go out to the families of those who perished: Captain Eric Jacobson, Chief Engineer Daniel Cook, the 

mate, David Silveira, crewman Byron Carrillo, and Fishing Master 

Satoshi Cono of Japan, whose body has not yet been recovered. 

Each time we confront one of these terrible tragedies, we are reminded of Sir Walter Scott’s observation: it is no fish you are buying, it is men’s lives. But we rejoice that 42 of the 47 crew members aboard the ALASKA RANGER were saved through the efforts 

of its sister ship, ALASKA WARRIOR, and by the truly amazing 

rescue operations mounted by the United States Coast Guard. During those operations, helicopter crews battled severe weather conditions to reach the vessel and rescue swimmers braved terrible conditions in the water to lift the crew members to safety. I especially 

commend Aviation Survival Technician Third Class Abraham Heller, who voluntarily stayed behind in the water in a small life raft 

to make room for additional survivors on the helicopter during that 

rescue. 

ALASKA RANGER was one among a fleet of approximately 60 

vessels known as head and gut fleet operating in the Gulf of Alaska 

and the Bering Sea. It was participating in an alternative compliance and safety agreement created by the Coast Guard to enable 

these ships to continue to operate as fish processors while requiring 

them to make significant and overdue safety improvements. This 

Alternative Compliance Program was created specifically because 

these vessels were too old to meet the standards that would otherwise have been required of them, including classification by a recognized class society and the acquisition of a load line. 

While the development of such a partnership is an effort to improve the safety of one part of our Nation’s deadliest profession, it 

is an initiative we applaud. It is deeply troubling that ALASKA 

RANGER appears to have been underway with major structural 

and watertight integrity issues that still needed to be corrected. 

This raises serious questions about the implementation of this Program, including the quality of the inspections of the vessels for 

compliance with the Program standards, extensions of exemptions 

from safety standards, and the lack of sufficient resources dedicated to the Marine Safety Program. We hope that Admiral Salerno 

can shed some light on the Alternative Compliance Program and 

specifically the ALASKA RANGER’s participation in it. 

As I close, I want to draw our focus to the broader issue here, 

one that is a theme continuing to concern this Subcommittee and 

certainly to the Chairman of the Full Committee, Congressman 

3 

Oberstar, and that is the ability of the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program to effectively and efficiently regulate an increasingly 

complex marine industry and to respond to marine casualties. The 

Inspector General’s report on COSCO BUSAN paints a picture of 

a Marine Casualty Program in Sector San Francisco that was not 

ready to respond when the bell rang. We await the Inspector General’s comprehensive examination of the Coast Guard’s Marine 

Casualty Program, which is now almost a year overdue. The report 

cannot be issued soon enough. 

While I know that the Commandant has announced important 

changes to the Marine Safety Program, including the creation of 

276 new billets, it will take significant time to train new personnel 

to achieve their qualifications in marine safety. Further, I understand that the Coast Guard wants to ensure that the Marine Safety Program is structured appropriately within the environment of 

a military service. The needs of that military structure should 

never be allowed to shortchange the needs of the regulatory program on which the maritime industry and the public count to ensure the safety of maritime transportation. 

With that, I now ask that the Speaker of the House—I see that 

she has graciously joined us, thank you, Madam Speaker—joined 

us at this Subcommittee of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation for our hearing today. Although it is the Committee practice to limit participation in Committee hearings to Members of the 

Committee, I ask unanimous consent to allow the Speaker to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

If the minority leader, Mr. Boehner, wants to participate in some 

future hearing, I am sure that we will extend the same courtesy. 

I know that the Speaker is on a very, very tight schedule, so, 

without objection, we will now hear from the Speaker. 

Speaker PELOSI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To you, to Ranking Member LaTourette, thank you for your hospitality this morning so that I could express my appreciation to 

your Subcommittee and this Full Committee. 

Thank you, Mr. Coble, for being here this morning to this issue 

of concern to people of our area and important to our Country. 

I want to thank Congresswoman Tauscher for being in the lead 

on this issue that affects the San Francisco Bay area as she has 

been over and over again. I know she is a valued Member of the 

Full Committee and I thank her for her attention, as I do Mr. 

Larsen. 

What an honor for the Chairman of the Full Committee to be 

here, an honor for us that he is here. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar, for 

your knowledge, your wisdom, your attention to these important 

issues. 

And to you, Mr. Cummings, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much 

on behalf of the people of the Bay Area for whom the San Francisco 

Bay is a value system in addition to it being an eco system. It is 

something we care deeply about and everyone feels very possessive 

of. 

So when this incident occurred and the Chairman came almost 

immediately to California and held a hearing so that we could get 

the facts—you saw the turnout—hundreds of people turned out to 

see him, to express appreciation to him and to this Committee beVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:21 Jun 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41945 JASON
4 

cause basically the point is we don’t want this to happen again. It 

is not about finger-pointing; it is about how do we prevent this 

from happening again. 

Ms. Richards, thank you for the report from the IG. It was something that was called for by this Committee. And I am pleased that 

when I met with the Commandant yesterday, Admiral Allen, he 

concurred with all nine of the Inspector General’s recommendations. Please give my best wishes to Inspector General Skinner and 

good wishes that his mother is healthy and well soon. 

And again to Admiral Salerno, thank you to the Coast Guard, as 

I mentioned, the Commandant, for providing your full cooperation 

in this investigation and for the Coast Guard service to our Nation. 

I am going to submit my fuller statement for the record, having 

expressed my appreciation to all concerned and my view that what 

is valuable about this for the people of our area is that lessens will 

be learned, it won’t happen again there, and, broader than that, 

that it will be useful in terms of preventing it from happening elsewhere in the Country. 

And, with that, I ask unanimous consent to submit my statement 

for the record—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Speaker PELOSI.—with the deepest appreciation to Chairman 

Cummings for his tremendous leadership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Madam Speaker. Thank you. 

We will now hear from the Ranking Member, Mr. LaTourette. 

And I want to thank Mr. LaTourette and the other side for your 

courtesy. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Madam Speaker, to the Subcommittee. If you have 

been on this Committee for a long time and Jimmy Miller calls you 

in the morning and says the Speaker has a tight schedule, you follow that and you move forward and do something else. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing. Five 

months ago this Subcommittee held a field hearing to review the 

events which resulted in the release of more than 58,000 gallons 

of bunker fuel into the San Francisco Bay. The spill, as we all 

know, caused environmental and economic damage throughout the 

region but, thankfully, these impacts were decreased by the Coast 

Guard’s rapid response in conjunction with its Federal, State, and 

local partners. 

While the response was successful in removing a sizeable percentage of the retrievable oil from the Bay waters, the first hearing 

raised several important questions on how the response efforts 

could have been improved through better communication with local 

officials and the general public. 

I thank the Chairman for calling today’s hearing to continue our 

examination of this and other questions, and look forward to using 

today’s hearing to identify ways to further enhance the Service’s response and investigation capabilities. 

The Coast Guard and the National Transportation Safety Board 

have opened an official investigation into the factors that caused 

the COSCO BUSAN to strike the Bay Bridge. It is my understanding that this investigation is still underway and we will not 

5 

receive the final report for some months. However, I hope the witnesses will provide the Subcommittee with any preliminary findings that have been identified and any lessons learned that could 

be used to prevent and better response to similar incidents in the 

future. 

I remain concerned that the Coast Guard’s current funding and 

personnel levels may be hampering the Service’s capabilities to successfully carry out its marine safety missions, including oil spill 

prevention and response in maritime casualty investigations. In 

our previous hearing, Rear Admiral Craig Bone testified that while 

the Coast Guard’s marine safety personnel were not lacking in 

technical capacity, the Service is not receiving the necessary funding to support the numbers of marine inspectors and investigators 

necessary to keep up with the continued expansion of maritime industries and port operations in the United States. The President’s 

fiscal year 2009 budget is a good first step, but this Subcommittee 

may need to look at additional options to strengthen the Coast 

Guard’s performance in these critical missions. 

Lastly, I hope that the witnesses will address the perception that 

the Coast Guard did not adequately communicate the severity of 

the COSCO BUSAN spill to the State and local officials early in 

the response process. I know that the Coast Guard did an extensive 

internal investigation of its response and I believe that the Inspector General is currently looking at those actions that took place. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing this morning and I look forward to your testimony. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette. 

I ask unanimous consent that Mrs. Tauscher, a Member of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and one who 

played a very, very significant role, as the Speaker has said, with 

regard to our hearing in San Francisco, may sit with the Subcommittee today and participate in this hearing. Without objection, 

so ordered. 

I also ask unanimous consent that all Members may have five 

legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 

insert extraneous materials into the hearing record. Without objection, so ordered. 

We are very pleased to have Rear Admiral Salerno and Ms. Richards. I want to thank both of you for being here. We will now hear 

from Rear Admiral Salerno. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL BRIAN SALERNO, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY AND STEWARDSHIP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; AND ANNE RICHARDS, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral SALERNO. Good morning, Speaker Pelosi, Chairman 

Oberstar, Chairman Cummings, and distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee. It is my honor to appear before you this morning to 

discuss the motor vessel COSCO BUSAN oil spill which occurred 

on November 7th, 2007, and how the Coast Guard conducts is Marine Casualty Investigations Program. 

6 

The Coast Guard has broad responsibilities to ensure the safety 

and security of the Marine Transportation System. In executing 

these responsibilities, the Coast Guard relies upon the information 

that it develops through detailed investigations of significant incidents. This information may be used to create new standards or 

update existing standards so that we can better prevent 

recurrences, improve marine safety, and protect lives in the marine 

environment. Equally important is sharing the lessons learned 

from accidents with all maritime stakeholders with whom we partner to achieve levels of safety that frequently exceed regulatory 

minimums. 

Our investigation into the COSCO BUSAN incident is ongoing. 

The investigators are currently reviewing the evidence and finalizing their conclusions and recommendations. Once complete, the 

release of the report will be closely coordinated with the Department of Justice and the NTSB. At the same time, as you know, 

DHS Office of Inspector General and the National Transportation 

Safety Board are also investigating the COSCO BUSAN incident, 

including the Coast Guard’s performance. These independent reviews are extremely important. We welcome the scrutiny and we 

are committed to ensuring full transparency. 

Protecting lives at sea is at the very core of the Coast Guard’s 

identity. Whenever lives are lost, it causes us to look very closely 

at the circumstances so that we can understand how it happened 

and how we can better protect lives in the future. We are saddened 

by the recent sinking of the fish processing vessel ALASKA RANGER, with the loss of five lives in the frigid waters of the Bering 

Sea. We in the Coast Guard would also like to express our condolences to the families of the lost crewmen. 

We are committed to finding out how it happened. To do so, we 

have convened a formal Marine Board of Investigation. The Marine 

Board is comprised of senior Coast Guard and NTSB investigators. 

Leading the Board is the Chief of the Office of Investigations and 

Casualty Analysis at Coast Guard Headquarters, Captain Mike 

Rand. This investigation is still in the early stages of evidence collection and witness interviews. Upon completion of its work, the 

Board will report their findings and recommendations in a formal 

report that will be released to the public. 

The COSCO BUSAN oil spill and the sinking of the ALASKA 

RANGER illustrate the challenges faced by Coast Guard investigators each day. The diverse nature of incident types, the kinds of 

vessels involved, even the geographic locations highlight the importance of having well trained responders and investigators who can 

be on scene quickly, backed up by specialized capability from 

around the Coast Guard that can be brought to bear as needed. 

To ensure that the Coast Guard maintains the investigative expertise and capacity necessary to meet these challenges, the Commandant has devised his plan to enhance marine safety within the 

Coast Guard and has delivered it to Congress in September of 

2007. I and many others have been working to execute this plan. 

One of the plan’s key elements is the addition of 276 marine inspectors and investigators for fiscal year 2009. The number of fulltime field investigator billets will increase by approximately 50 percent. 

7 

Included in the plan is the establishment of two new investigative centers of expertise. The centers will provide advanced training on casualty investigations and also on the suspension and revocation process. Preventing marine casualties is one of the main 

goals of the Coast Guard and the maritime industry. Marine casualties threaten the lives of mariners and citizens, and often result 

in damage to the environment. Marine casualties also cause delays 

in the marine transportation system, adversely impacting the flow 

of domestic and international commerce. 

More often than not, marine casualties can be prevented if the 

factors leading to them can be identified, understood, and properly 

address. We would much rather prevent an accident than respond 

to one, which is why the investigative process is so integral to our 

plan to improve marine safety mission execution in the Coast 

Guard. 

Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to testify today, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

We are going to hear from Ms. Richards, but I just wanted the 

Committee to understand that I wanted the witnesses to give their 

opening statements while the Speaker is still here, and we will 

come back to the Committee for any opening statements you may 

have. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Richards, thank you. 

Ms. RICHARDS. Good morning, Chairman Cummings and Members of the Subcommittee and Speaker Pelosi. I am Anne Richards, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits for the Department of 

Homeland Security. I am here today on behalf of the Inspector 

General, Richard Skinner, who unfortunately could not be here due 

to a family emergency. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard’s response to the November 7th, 2007—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Richards, excuse me. Some Members have 

said that they can’t hear you. Can you speak just a little louder? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you pull the mic a little closer to you? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right, there we go. 

Ms. RICHARDS. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the 

Coast Guard’s response to the November 7th, 2007 allision of the 

motor vessel COSCO BUSAN with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay 

Bridge. 

I would first like to express our appreciation to the Coast Guard 

for their timely and thorough responses to my staff’s many requests for information and documentation over the past 90 days. It 

is fair to say we would not have completed our review in such a 

timely manner without their complete cooperation. 

My testimony today will address our primary findings as they relate to the actions of the Coast Guard’s San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service before and immediately after the mishap, the Coast 

Guard’s post-accident pollution assessment and marine casualty investigation, and the adequacy and execution of the San Francisco 

Area Contingency Plan during the first 24 hours after the allision. 

8 

Concerning the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service, the primary 

question we addressed was whether there was anything the Coast 

Guard’s VTS could have done to prevent the mishap. Our review 

determined there was nothing the VTS could reasonably have done 

to prevent the allision. The VTS watchstanders followed their operating procedures for monitoring the transit of the COSCO BUSAN 

from the time it left Pier 56 until it allided with the San FranciscoOakland Bay Bridge. 

The watchstanders acknowledged the pilot’s intention to get underway and his intended route, and appropriately notified the pilot 

that visibility was reported to be between one-eighth and one-quarter of a mile. The watchstanders also provided the COSCO BUSAN 

with traffic advisories and queries the vessel when they became 

concerned about the vessel’s heading. Given the current operating 

procedures and hardware and software capabilities of the VTS 

equipment, there were no additional actions the VTS 

watchstanders could reasonably have taken to prevent the allision. 

During our review, we identified two areas for improvement in 

the Coast Guard’s VTS program. The Coast Guard does not have 

a national standard operating procedure to guide the actions of 

VTS personnel. For example, the VTS watchstanders on duty during the mishap were not tested for drugs and alcohol due to a lack 

of awareness of drug and alcohol testing policies and the VTS program manager’s practice of conducting such tests following a mishap. Administering the drug and alcohol tests could have ruled out 

impairment of the VTS watchstanders as a contributing factor to 

the incident. 

The second area concerns VTS’s authority to limit vessel movement. The San Francisco VTS has the authority to institute and 

enforce measures to enhance navigation and vessel safety, and to 

protect the marine environment. This authority includes managing 

vessel entry, departure, and movement within a VTS area during 

extreme weather conditions, including periods of restricted visibility. However, San Francisco VTS’s operational procedures currently do not provide watchstanders with the criteria necessary for 

determining what actions to take and when to take them. 

To their credit, the Coast Guard and the San Francisco Harbor 

Safety Committee, whose members include the Coast Guard and 

San Francisco Bay pilots, and other State and local stakeholders 

are taking a proactive approach to preventing future occurrences of 

maritime mishaps similar to the COSCO BUSAN’s allision. The 

Harbor Safety Committee has formally adopted new guidelines for 

vessels operating in the San Francisco Bay during periods of reduced visibility. Speed restrictions are also under consideration. 

The Coast Guard has indicated it intends to incorporate the new 

guidelines into the San Francisco VTS standard operating procedures. 

In the area of post-accident pollution assessment and marine casualty investigation, the first question pursued was whether the 

Coast Guard’s initial report of 142 gallons of oil spilled had impacted the timeliness and completeness of the response. The second 

question focused on the conduct of the initial post-accident marine 

casualty investigation. 

9 

The initial spill estimate was inaccurate and should not have 

been made public. The Coast Guard admitted that it erred in releasing this information. Under the Area Contingency Plan, it was 

the responsibility of the State of California’s Oil Spill Prevention 

and Response Division to estimate the amount of oil discharged. 

OSPR personnel were available, but did not have timely transportation to and from the allision site and the COSCO BUSAN. This 

further delayed release of the corrected pollution assessment. A 

more accurate and timely estimate, however, would not have altered the response of the Unified Command, since the Area Contingency Plan called for assuming a worst case scenario and assets 

were deployed accordingly. 

Concerning the marine casualty investigation, the level of training, experience, and qualification of the casualty investigators assigned to the COSCO BUSAN investigation was generally inadequate. The three Coast Guard investigators initially assigned to 

the incident were not fully qualified. This may account for the 

shortfalls in the marine casualty investigation, such as not immediately securing or collecting potential evidence such as the charts 

used by the bridge team, the vessel’s data recorder, or the shipboard navigational systems. 

While the voyage data recorder information was later recovered 

and used by the investigators to recreate the vessel’s track line before the mishap, the failure to independently test shipboard navigation and collision avoidance systems, as well as the radar beacons 

affixed to the Bay Bridge, could prevent the Coast Guard and the 

National Transportation Safety Board from identifying all of the 

circumstances and conditions that led to the mishap. 

Finally, we reviewed the adequacy of the San Francisco Area 

Contingency Plan and whether the Coast Guard properly executed 

the Plan during the 24 hours following the mishap. The San Francisco Area Contingency Plan is adequate to guide the response to 

an oil spill of this magnitude. However, some changes could be 

made to improve future responses. One area is seeking increased 

attendance by local jurisdictions in area committee meetings to update the Plan and participation in response exercises. These actions 

would help ensure better preparedness. Also, a location for the incident command post was not predesignated in the Plan. Preparedness would be improved by identification of a predesignated command post location and its use in oil spill response exercises. 

Overall, we were fortunate that the Unified Command guided by 

the San Francisco Area Contingency Plan was successful in retrieving the amount of oil spilled from the COSCO BUSAN that it did. 

This effort is a credit to those who led the Unified Command, including the Coast Guard, the State of California Oil Spill Prevention and Response Division, the responsible party, and the myriad 

of volunteers who were integral to the response effort. However, 

like any other complex activity, there is room for improvement. 

The Coast Guard faces many challenges to effectively perform its 

marine safety and maritime homeland security missions. The Commandant, Admiral Salerno, and their staff are well aware of these 

challenges and are making progress in addressing them. We will 

continue our oversight of the Coast Guard to help facilitate solutions and improve its mission readiness. 

10 

Madam Speaker, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, 

this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer 

any questions you may have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Madam Speaker, again, thank you very, very much. We really 

appreciate your being here. Thank you. 

We are very pleased to be joined by our distinguished Chairman 

of the Full Committee, who has just been a champion with regard 

to all of our Subcommittees, but in particular this one. He has just 

provided very tremendous guidance to me as a new Committee 

Chairman, and I really do appreciate that, Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Madam Speaker, for joining us. It shows your deep appreciation of the significance of this accident to the people of the Bay 

Area. Madam Speaker so properly described as having a very special affection for the Bay. 

And you, Mr. Chairman, have done a superb job. You have been 

a great student of the issues of the Coast Guard and master of the 

subject matter, as has Commodore LaTourette, who similarly took 

over new responsibilities and has provided great bipartisan partnership here. Mr. Coble has long had an interest in the Coast 

Guard as a Coastie, in fact. 

I needn’t belabor the issues. I think the Inspector General did a 

splendid job of describing the issues. The Coast Guard did a phenomenal job; risked lives in the daring and dangerous rescue of the 

fishermen of the ALASKA RANGER. There could have been much 

greater loss of life without them. But they did a bad job of investigating the COSCO BUSAN. 

As we looked into this issue and gathered the facts and evaluated the situation, I was astonished that five of the six Coast 

Guard casualty investigators, uniformed personnel, were not qualified for the task; they had not completed the basic training course 

to prepare them for this task. Now, the Coast Guard did propose 

a program called the Alternate Compliance and Safety Agreement. 

A good idea; we like that concept. We included the establishment 

of similar program for fishing vessels in the Coast Guard authorization bill, which we will bring to the House floor next year. I just 

received confirmation from the majority leader that we will have 

floor time to manage this bill. 

But the problems of adequacy of standards, enforcement of 

standards, sufficiency of Coast Guard personnel, sufficiency of 

funding for the Coast Guard to carry out these responsibilities, 

simply underscores the need for the provision that we have included in the Coast Guard authorization to revamp the safety certification of the responsibilities of the Coast Guard. It is a comprehensive proposal. It is not everything that I thought we ought 

to do. I think it is a very balanced compromise with what the Coast 

Guard would like to see, at least Commandant Admiral Allen. And 

we are going to chart the Coast Guard on a new course. We have 

to substantially increase the number of personnel. 

When I was elected to Congress in 1974, my first Committee assignment was the then Public Works Committee and my concurrent Committee assignment was on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which included jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. And the first 

11 

authorization bill that we considered for the Coast Guard, Mr. 

Chairman, we had 39,000 Coast Guard personnel authorized. Here 

we are, 37-some years later, and we have only about 4,000 personnel above that number. It is no fault of the Coast Guard. It is 

the fault of the Congress; the fault of subsequent administrations. 

We—by we I mean Congress and Executive Branch—signed into 

law 27 new functions and responsibilities for the Coast Guard and 

never funded them adequately, never gave them adequate personnel to carry out those responsibilities. So the Coast Guard loves 

to say we are a multi-mission agency and we pride ourselves in 

being able to carry on multiple tasks. Well, sure, because you have 

been forced into that. Heaven forbid that there was a different attitude. But semper paratus is not enough. We have to give you the 

wherewithal to be prepared. And we are going to do that. We are 

making a major step in this legislation to move the Coast Guard 

in that direction. 

I will withhold further comment and submit my entire statement 

for the record. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. 

Good to have you all with us, Admiral and Ms. Richards. 

Mr. Chairman, I think each of us holds the Coast Guard and its 

service to our Nation in the highest regard. So even as we ask 

questions about how to best ensure commercial fishing vessel safety in Alaska, none of us should ever forget the heroic efforts, as has 

already been mentioned, of the brave Coast Guard men and women 

in darkness and severe weather to rescue the crew members of the 

ALASKA RANGER. 

Even as we take a critical look at the COSCO BUSAN oil spill 

incident, we should not lose sight of the fact that, as the Inspector 

General has said, the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service 

watchstanders carried out their duties as expected and couldn’t 

have done anything more to prevent the COSCO BUSAN allision 

with the Bay Bridge. 

We should also not fail to praise the Coast Guard pollution prevention personnel for their prompt and effective response to protect 

the environment of the San Francisco Bay. 

And as an aside, Mr. Chairman, I have either read or heard that 

there were two other vessels that were berthed in the general vicinity of the COSCO BUSAN that day, and the skippers of those 

two vessels elected not to get underway, for what bearing, if any, 

that might have on the subsequent allision. 

We in the Congress have had a dialogue for some time now, Mr. 

Chairman, on the importance of marine safety, and the last time 

we broached this subject the Commandant announced a number of 

changes that he had directed the Coast Guard to implement regarding marine safety. Under the very able leadership of Admiral 

Allen, the men and women of the Coast Guard continue to examine 

and improve upon the Coast Guard’s marine safety role, and I support these efforts heartily. 

As I mentioned at the previous hearing on this subject, Mr. 

Chairman, despite each of our best efforts, there is always room for 

improvement, and this issue is no exception. I continue to believe 

12 

the Coast Guard is unique because of its structure and flexibility. 

On a daily basis, Coast Guard men and women focus on drug interdiction, environmental protection, migrant interdiction, port security, search and rescue, homeland security, and maritime safety. 

The list is almost endless. Each of these roles, in my opinion, compliments the other. 

I continue to support the efforts to provide stakeholders an opportunity to voice their concerns, provide constructive feedback, 

and work together to improve the marine safety aspect of the Coast 

Guard. Incidents such as the COSCO BUSAN allision and the 

ALASKA RANGER, while unfortunate, provide an opportunity for 

self-examination by all stakeholders. 

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I firmly believe that we should 

give the Coast Guard the time, opportunity, and resources to improve and expand upon its maritime safety efforts. 

Mr. Oberstar is gone, but I wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Oberstar—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, he is still here. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Norm Mineta, known to all of us, always addresses me affectionately as Coastie, so you have joined good company with Secretary Mineta. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. I thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to thank you, Mr. Coble. Mr. Coble, let 

me just say this just very quickly. What you just said I agree with. 

This Subcommittee has consistently complimented the Coast Guard 

on the many great things that they do. At the same time, we are 

looking with that critical eye so that they can be in a better position to do all of those things that you talked about. So we are going 

to continue to work very closely with them to try to make sure we 

get the billets that they need and get the resources that they need 

so that they can be effective and efficient. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, 

I have two other hearings; I may have to come and go into each 

of them. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand. 

Mr. COBLE. But I thank you for that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Ms. Richardson? Mrs. Tauscher. 

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank you so much for allowing me to join your Subcommittee 

today and for inviting me to make a brief statement. I would also 

like to, on behalf of my constituents and the entire Bay Area delegation, join with the Speaker in thanking you and your staff for 

coming to San Francisco so quickly and playing such a leading role 

in the Speaker’s request for a field hearing in November. You have 

shown dedication to oversight of the Coast Guard and to protecting 

our environment from future accidents. I thank you very much for 

your leadership and commitment. 

I would also like to acknowledge the very strong role of the 

Speaker in moving so quickly to get not only the field hearing, but 

13 

her strong commitment to the environment and health of the Bay, 

which is unwavering. 

Today we will examine the Coast Guard’s immediate response to 

the COSCO BUSAN accident. The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General has concluded that the Coast Guard’s response was sufficient, but contained critical flaws. These flaws include the lack of timely drug and alcohol testing and the inexperience of the marine casualty investigators. 

Personally, I was most alarmed by the lack of experienced investigators in the San Francisco Bay Area. The IG report states, ‘‘The 

lack of trained experience and qualified marine casualty investigators at Sector San Francisco is a major concern given the Sector’s 

area of responsibility and the volume, type, and size of vessels that 

transit the Bay each year.’’ I know that my constituents and the 

people of the Bay Area are pleased to see that the Inspector General’s report highlighted this and that the Coast Guard is moving 

quickly to make sure that these inadequacies are fixed. 

The San Francisco Bay is one of the busiest harbors in the Nation. When coupled with severe weather, like thick fog, it becomes 

a unique and dangerous environment for ships. It is unacceptable 

that we do not have investigators assigned to the Bay that do not 

meet Coast Guard standards, and I very much thank Rear Admiral 

Salerno’s comments that this is going to be mitigated. 

I would also like to make note of the recent released recordings 

of the conversation between the COSCO BUSAN’s pilot and captain. These recordings paint a chilling story of the moments leading 

up to the allision. They provide evidence that the pilot was completely unaware of the vessel’s location and unable to read the 

ship’s electronic charts. 

I have introduced a bill that allows the Coast Guard to require 

pilots to carry their own electronic charts. The use of portable pilot 

units is an increasingly common practice which will increase 

awareness and reduce risk. When the Coast Guard reauthorization 

bill comes to the floor, I will seek to add my language to this bill, 

and I expect that the Coast Guard will take advantage of this new 

authority. It is clear that some ports, including San Francisco, 

should require pilots to carry their own navigational devices. If the 

pilot of the COSCO BUSAN had carried one on November 7th of 

2007, it is possible that this accident could have been prevented. 

We have learned many lessons from this incident. I hope that the 

Coast Guard will wake up and take action on this lesson before another tragic accident happens. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your leadership and your 

friendship, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mrs. Tauscher. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Now that we have already heard from you all, we will go into our 

five minutes round. 

Let me ask you this, Admiral Salerno. Recent media reports indicate that the pilot on the COSCO BUSAN had a DUI. Do you know 

about that? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, I am aware of that. 

14 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand that a number of assessments must 

be made of an individual’s fitness for duty in that circumstance. I 

also understand that during the assessment period the individual 

is ineligible for credential. Was Mr. Coda’s credentials ever suspended because of his DUI? And under what circumstance did the 

Coast Guard determine he was fit for credentials? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, when Mr. Coda applied to renew his license in 1999, he did report that he had a DUI, as required. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. He did or did not? 

Admiral SALERNO. He did. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Admiral SALERNO. That fact was noted by the regional examination center. At that time, his license was voluntarily deposited with 

the Coast Guard, it was not renewed, pending a program of treatment, which Mr. Coda underwent. There is a procedure within the 

Coast Guard whereby an individual who was subject of a DUI can 

go through a treatment program such as AA. Mr. Coda completed 

the AA program in a ten and a half month period, at which point 

cure was established and he was reissued his license. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So if he were to get another DUI, say, since 

1999, is he under an obligation to notify you of that, notify the 

Coast Guard? 

Admiral SALERNO. He is under obligation to report any DUIs 

which have occurred since the last issuance of his license. The license is renewed in five year intervals, so upon application for renewal he is obligated by regulation to report that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So someone could have their license renewed— 

let’s say they have it renewed. They can literally go out two weeks 

later, be convicted of a DUI—or let’s say three months later, because it takes them a little while to get to trial, and he would not 

be obligated to report that until four years and nine months later? 

Is that the case? 

Admiral SALERNO. That is the case, sir. That is the way the regulations have been established. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you think that is right? It seems like it goes 

against the very purpose of—it seems like it just goes against what 

you are trying to accomplish here. I am not asking you to defend 

the regulations, I am just asking how you feel about that. I am just 

curious. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, I understand the question and the 

concern, and it does concern me that that could happen. Unfortunately, the way the regulations are constructed, that is the system 

we have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And might it make sense that even if a person 

has to report—it seems to me if a person has to report, in other 

words, to report immediately, for example, a DUI, they could get 

some kind of treatment immediately and still be in a position to 

safely carry out their job. But when you go for a four-year-plus period, a lot of things can happen during those four years. I guess 

that is my point. Somebody will need to take a look at that for the 

safety of all, including the employee. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. I would add, though, that as a 

licenseholder, a pilot or any licensed individual is required to participate in a random drug screening program, so that there are 

15 

some controls along the way. The marine employer also has responsibilities, if somebody is exhibiting signs of intoxication or not capable of performing their duties, to take some action. So it is not totally left to that five-year interval; however, from a regulatory 

standpoint, there is nothing that requires somebody to put themselves on report. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right, let me go to you, Inspector Richards. 

The Subcommittee and Chairman Oberstar have obviously had 

deep concerns about the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program, 

and I am deeply disturbed by the findings of the Inspector General’s report that five of the six individuals assigned as marine casualty investigators in Sector San Francisco were unqualified for 

these positions. Similarly, I am disturbed to hear that all three of 

the investigators who responded to the COSCO BUSAN were unqualified as marine casualty investigating officers. Therefore, I 

want to begin by just asking you a few questions examining the 

issue. 

Your report indicates that five of the six individuals assigned to 

marine casualty billets were not qualified for these positions. Can 

you explain what the qualification standards are and what qualifications these individuals actually had? I am also curious as to any 

of these five unqualified individuals were in the marine casualty 

investigative billets in San Francisco completed even the basic investigating officer training course at the Coast Guard’s training facility in Yorktown. Of course, my concern about that, if we send 

somebody out to investigate, for example, in Baltimore, a homicide 

and they have no training in homicide, it seems like we have got 

major problems. I am just curious. 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. The three investigators who reported to 

the COSCO BUSAN that morning had not completed all the qualifications as marine casualty investigators. Of the three, one had 

completed the basic training course at Yorktown, the other two had 

not. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. How significant is that? 

Ms. RICHARDS. It is a basic training course. It should be early in 

their training as marine casualty investigators. As to the total significance, I would have to plead that I don’t have the details with 

me and get back to you on that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Please do. 

Ms. RICHARDS. The qualifications for becoming a marine casualty 

investigator include prerequisite training in a number of areas as 

a hull or machinery inspector and a small vessel inspector, or as 

a harbor safety officer or facility safety officer or as a boarding officer. They also include on-the-job training, which involves completing specific tasks involved in a marine casualty investigation, 

as well as the basic training course. Each of the three marine casualty investigators who were on the COSCO BUSAN that morning 

were in the process of meeting the pre-qualifications to become a 

qualified marine casualty investigator. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral Salerno, would you comment on that? 

Chairman Oberstar talked about the Guard being stretched. Is this 

part of that problem, that we have got people going out doing investigations who may not be qualified to do them; therefore, the integrity of the investigation being impaired? I am just curious. 

16 

Admiral SALERNO. Well, sir, let me echo your sentiment about 

being disturbed about what was in the IG report. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. First of all, do you think it is accurate? 

Admiral SALERNO. It is accurate. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Admiral SALERNO. And disturbing. I am very disturbed by it. It 

should not have happened. It conflicts with established doctrine 

within the Coast Guard that marine casualty investigations be conducted by qualified individuals. There are trainees, obviously, and 

as we rotate people and transfers, but as they conduct their training activities, it is to be done under the direction of a qualified investigator. That did not occur here. I see that as my responsibility 

to fix, and I will fix that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And how are you going to go about doing that? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I am going to re-enforce established doctrine. I am going to communicate that fact to our field commanders 

and establish a program that if they do not have the resources they 

need to conduct an investigation, that they seek them out from 

other sources within the Coast Guard. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want you to understand that part of the problem here—I mean, this is not just limited to an incident such as 

this; it goes even further. As you well know, I have a tremendous 

concern about the administrative law judge system. Let me tell 

you, if we don’t have the right people investigating matters, it 

seems to me that it basically goes against the integrity of any kind 

of evidence that might be presented. 

If you don’t have the right people doing the right investigations— 

and it is not a pointing finger kind of thing, but I do want us to 

learn from what has happened so that we can correct it. And we 

have got mariners who are complaining that they are not being 

treated fairly, and then I hear about—as I tell my staff, when I see 

a problem, I don’t just worry about the problem, I worry about 

what I don’t see. So I am just concerned about that and I would 

really like to—your remedy, has it been put in writing? 

Admiral SALERNO. It will be very soon, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What is very soon? 

Admiral SALERNO. I intend to put something in writing within 

the next week or two. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You plan? Will you get us something within two 

weeks, please? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, I will share that with you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is two weeks enough? I don’t want to hold you 

to something you can’t do. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, two weeks is enough time. 

[Information follows:] 

17 


41945.013
18 


41945.014
19 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Mr. LaTourette. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I talk about the COSCO BUSAN, Admiral, I just want to 

ask you about the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. The Trust Fund, 

as you know, provides funding to pay for the cost of oil spills, not 

only to reimburse for response activities, but to pay for natural resource damages. The information we have is that the Fund was estimated to be approximately $903 million at the end of fiscal year 

2008. 

Three questions. Are the amounts in the Fund sufficient to deal 

with what they are required to deal with in anticipation of a major 

catastrophic oil spill in U.S. waters? Have the incidents of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina impacted the fund? Have any claims been 

filed as a result of that and how long do people have to file a claim 

with the Coast Guard or the EPA? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, if you would permit me, I would like to 

answer that for the record. I don’t have the detailed information 

before me, but I will get back to you with those specific numbers. 

[Information follows:] 

20 


41945.015
21 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. I appreciate that. 

To the COSCO BUSAN, just a couple of things, Ms. Richards. As 

I understood your testimony, it was the conclusion of the Inspector 

General that the VTS performed its function as it was required to 

perform its function, but you found that drug testing and alcohol 

testing might be helpful in the future. But there is no indication 

in your report that anybody at the VTS was drunk or on drugs, 

right? They did the job well, but, going forward, it would be nice 

to test them for drugs and alcohol? 

Ms. RICHARDS. That is correct. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. 

Ms. RICHARDS. We, of course, were not there that day. We did review the actions of the watchstanders and concluded that they had 

operated in accordance with their procedures. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Similarly, the Coast Guard’s early release of 

142 gallons, as opposed to the resultant 58,000 gallons, although 

that was cited as an error in your report because the plan in place 

called for a worst case scenario, nothing bad happened as a result 

of 142 gallons being in the press release, as opposed to the actual, 

because people were prepared for this, right? 

Ms. RICHARDS. That is correct. The Area Contingency Plan was 

designed to deploy a response to a worst case scenario, so the public release of the inaccurate estimate did not affect the response. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. And Mr. Cummings, the Chairman, asked a 

little bit about the pilot’s previous DUI. Admiral, was the pilot following the collision subjected to a drug screen? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, he was tested by the pilot’s association, as required for marine employers. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. And are you aware of the results of that? 

Admiral SALERNO. My understanding is the results were negative. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. And did that screen for not only drugs, but alcohol as well? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. 

Now, the VTS that is mentioned in the Inspector General’s report, the Vehicle Traffic Service, a lot of people, I think, have the 

view that it is like a TRACON or an air traffic controller that is 

directing ships within the harbor, but that is not the VTS’s function, is it, Admiral? 

Admiral SALERNO. No, there are substantial differences between 

VTS and an air traffic control system. VTS is an advisory system; 

it does not give course and rudder directions to the ship, it advises 

the ship of conditions that are present in the harbor, the presence 

of other traffic and so forth so that the bridge crew has adequate 

awareness of other activity in the harbor. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. But the responsibility for driving the ship, if 

you will, is that of the pilot? 

Admiral SALERNO. That is a responsibility of the pilot and the 

master. There is a shared responsibility on the ship. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Obviously, the most alarming thing to a lot of 

us is this training issue, and you have talked about that. And I 

heard Ms. Richards talk about what the training was or what some 

pieces of it were. I am reminded, when I was in college, I was four 

22 

hours short, and the four hours I was short was medieval English 

literature, which I don’t think prevented me from launching a career later in life. I have heard that there is basic training, there 

are hours you have to go out and be experienced. Were there 

pieces, specific—what were these people missing, first of all? And, 

second of all, whatever they were missing, did that compromise the 

investigation that followed after the collision of the COSCO 

BUSAN? 

Admiral SALERNO. There are a number of prerequisite requirements, as Ms. Richards mentioned, marine safety specific requirements that are needed for all investigators. There is a system of 

training that includes on-the-job training, performance qualification system where specific tasks need to be performed under the 

direction of a qualified investigator, and there is resident training 

at our training center in Yorktown, Virginia. 

All of those elements need to be completed for someone to be designated a fully qualified investigator. Each of these investigators 

had completed portions of the training program. The individual 

who looked at the radar system on the bridge, for example, had extensive experience at sea during his Coast Guard career, eight or 

nine years; he knew what he was looking at. 

But were there failures? Yes, there were. The information in the 

voyage data recorder that should have been secured immediately 

was not, as Ms. Richards pointed out. So that is a failure and illustrates the reason why we need fully qualified investigators to perform these tasks. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Aside from that feature, have you identified 

any other failures in the investigation? 

Admiral SALERNO. That was the most significant failure that I 

have been advised of. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Ms. Richards, two years ago, actually, two years 

ago December, our Committee asked the IG to undertake a marine 

casualty report inquiry and provide a report to the Committee. It 

is way overdue. Can we expect to have this document by the end 

of next week? 

Ms. RICHARDS. The IG is committed to make completing that report a top priority. It, unfortunately, was a resource issue. When 

the request to complete a review of the allision of the COSCO 

BUSAN came up, we needed to shift resources. At this point, the 

IG has committed to make that his top priority. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We have a hearing in another Subcommittee of 

this Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Aviation 

Subcommittee, on reauthorization of the National Transportation 

Safety Board, and I would like to have that document available for 

us in time for that hearing, which is on the 23rd of April. 

Ms. RICHARDS. Again, I can repeat that the Inspector General 

has committed to make this a top priority, and I will convey your 

concerns directly to him. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Admiral Salerno, five of the six Coast Guard casualty investigators, uniformed personnel, as I said earlier, were not qualified for 

23 

the task—you admitted to that—have not completed the basic 

training course. How is it that the Coast Guard assignment officers 

were able to assign these personnel to this task? Did they not have 

other qualified people to assign? Did they know these people had 

not completed the course work, were not prepared to undertake 

this investigation with the skills and experience needed? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I don’t have an explanation for that. The 

way the process is supposed to work is that qualified people are 

placed into duty billets. We do have quite a significant number of 

people who complete the training program every year; there are 

four courses at Yorktown, about 25 persons per course. About 100 

people a year go through this course. So there is throughput 

through the program. At this point, today, I can’t explain to you 

why a qualified person was not assigned to the unit, but I will look 

into that, sir, and get back to you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It is very troubling to me, particularly in light of 

our hearing last week in the Full Committee on the aviation safety 

investigation and oversight of maintenance in the airline industry. 

That follows on several years earlier, when we found that the Federal Railroad Administration was engaging in an operator-friendly 

arrangement with the railroads, called the Rail Advisory Safety 

Committee, where they sat down with the railroads management 

and said tell us what you are doing and we will see whether you 

have some problems; maybe we can look the other way and let you 

fix them, instead of saying this is an enforcement activity; you have 

failed to inspect your journals on your box cars properly, you failed 

to inspect switches and rails properly, you failed to fix them properly; now, get out there or we impose a fine on you or worse. I 

think hearings conducted in this very hearing room caused the 

FRA to turn around. Now we find the FAA being operator-friendly, 

cozy, treating the airlines as customers. 

Now we find that the Coast Guard, the preeminent safety agency, isn’t fully prepared, find shortcomings in a number of areas, 

and particularly in this investigation. The IG’s report said the investigating team did not secure what we call in investigations—and 

I have done this for 25-plus years—perishable information—the 

radar printouts, the voyage data recorder—to ensure that drug 

testing, as required, was completed on the crew members, and they 

failed to conduct drug and alcohol tests on the VTS watchstanders. 

What is happening here? Is this a shortage of personnel, inadequate numbers of people? Is it a laxity in your training in oversight and preparation? 

Admiral SALERNO. Certainly, sir, turnover of people contributes 

to the issue, which is why we, in our Marine Safety Improvement 

Plan, do fully intend to institute a greater number of civilian inspectors and investigators so that there is always that stability at 

every port in the Country. There will be a cadre of people who do 

not rotate and there will always be a trained person or persons 

available in every port. So I see that as part of the way ahead and 

part of the solution to the problem. There are other issues, obviously, with assignments, as you just mentioned, that we need to 

address as well, to make sure that qualified people fill duty billets. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, you answered rightly. Turnover of personnel and inadequate numbers. Not only that, but inadequate 

24 

numbers of trained personnel. And one of the key elements of our 

Coast Guard so-called reform updating provisions in the authorization bill is to establish a career civilian staff under the management of a uniformed Coast Guard officer who has skills and qualifications and is trained, is completely adequate to carry out the responsibility, who has at least the skills and qualifications of the 

ABS standards, and as the Corps of Engineers does, have a uniformed officer in charge of the district engineer unit and a career 

staff of trained, skilled personnel who have continuity so there isn’t 

turnover, so that you don’t have persons undertaking work who are 

not qualified for the job. That is a cornerstone of the provisions we 

are going to bring to the House floor next week. 

Mr. Chairman, I will withhold further questions at this time because other Members want to. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I was at a Judiciary hearing back and forth. You may 

have been asked this, but I don’t think you have. What steps has 

the Coast Guard taken since the COSCO BUSAN oil spill? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, as you mentioned, or as has been discussed, there have been a number of investigations, including what 

we call an incident-specific preparedness review, which looked at 

the actual response by the Coast Guard and its partner agencies 

and the private sector, and there are a number of lessons that have 

come out of that. We are sharing those lessons with all of our field 

units so that they can upgrade their Contingency Response Plans 

in ports around the Country. 

About a month or so after the incident, we issued an All Coast, 

a message that went to all units in the Coast Guard listing some 

very quick lessons learned that addressed issues such as incorporation of volunteers, actions to be taken by investigating officers, and 

so forth, that were lessons from the COSCO BUSAN. 

As we address some of these other issues regarding the training 

of investigators, more needs to be done, but the lessons that come 

out of the IG’s report, we concur with those and we will take the 

action that is indicated. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. There has been a great deal of discussion before this Committee and the Subcommittee regarding the 

Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program. During this dialogue, what 

has the Coast Guard done to improve the Marine Safety Program? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, the Commandant has put together a plan 

of action to improve the Marine Safety Program. It does include a 

provision in fiscal year 2009 to increase the numbers of inspectors 

and investigators by 276. We will be establishing centers of expertise that will assist in the training of our inspectors and investigators. There is a greater emphasis on outreach to the marine community so that we understand where problems are emerging and 

we can resolve problems in a more expeditious way. There is a long 

list sir. I can provide you with each item in our—— 

Mr. COBLE. I would like to have that. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. 

[Information follows:] 

25 


41945.016
26 


41945.017
27 

Mr. COBLE. And finally, Mr. Chairman, let me ask you this, Admiral. Do vessel traffic centers have the authority to direct and/or 

manage the movement of vessels in their respective regions? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, a VTS does have the authority to direct 

a vessel to take specific action, yes, sir, we do have that authority. 

Typically, it is given in the form of a desired outcome. In other 

words, a vessel may be directed to proceed to a certain anchorage 

and anchor. What it would not do is give the course to take in 

going to that anchorage. But we do have that directive authority, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I actually got here after some other 

Members. If you don’t mind, I will waive my time and turn. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. 

Mr. Larsen 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you might imagine, 

I probably have a few more questions about ALASKA RANGER 

than I do COSCO BUSAN, but I also note I will be meeting with 

Coast Guard folks about noon to discuss some of the other issues 

with ALASKA RANGER. 

But while I do have you all here, I will ask a few questions, if 

I might, Admiral. Regarding the ACSA program and specifically 

with the requirements that vessels enrolled in the ACSA meet the 

requirements sometime in early January. But as I understand, the 

ALASKA RANGER was not one of those vessels in the ACSA program that had met all the requirements? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, the ALASKA RANGER was in fact enrolled in the ACSA program. There were still a number of outstanding requirements that needed to be completed. That was to 

done by January 1st. The vessel had been examined in dry dock 

in Japan by qualified Coast Guard inspectors. A long list of requirements were issued, including watertight integrity items, watertight doors, stability information, and so forth. When the vessel 

returned to the United States, it was examined again in Dutch 

Harbor. 

Most of those requirements were cleared; there were still a few 

that remained outstanding. In February, the Coast Guard sent a 

letter to the owner requesting a status of those outstanding items 

and expected a return within 30 days of what is the status and 

what is your plan to complete them. That is, unfortunately, about 

the time frame when the vessel was lost. 

Mr. LARSEN. I was just reading through the agreement from 

June 2006 that Districts 13 and 17 prepared, or it might be a MOU 

or MOA. Was there any requirement or any lever the Coast Guard 

had to prevent a boat from going out that had not completed the 

requirements of the ACSA? 

Admiral SALERNO. It is important to keep in mind, sir, that this 

is an uninspected vessel, essentially. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral SALERNO. And although it is a head and gut vessel, as 

the Chairman mentioned, it was conducting activities on board that 

28 

made it more of a processor, so we created this program so that 

they can continue to operate as a processor. We could have been 

very inflexible and said January 1st, you comply or you cannot operate. What that would have done, realistically, is just force them 

to operate as a fishing boat, which they could have done legally, 

without any requirement to upgrade the safety of the vessel. So 

what this program does in a cooperative way is help elevate the 

level of safety by forcing them to—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Don’t confuse my questions with being critical of the 

ACSA. I was just asking specifically if there was any mechanisms 

within the agreement to implement the ACSA to prevent a boat 

from going out that had not fully met the requirements. 

Admiral SALERNO. If a vessel were to present an immediate hazard to its crew or to the environment, yes, the Coast Guard can 

take Captain of the Port action and hold it to the pier until those 

corrections are made. 

Mr. LARSEN. Whether they are a part of this program or any 

other program? 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct. 

Mr. LARSEN. So it went to Dutch Harbor but not all of the items 

on the work list defined in Japan had been resolved, but many of 

them had? 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. What were the outstanding issues, do you recall? 

Admiral SALERNO. As I recall, there was some work on an interior bulkhead in the forward part of the vessel. To my knowledge, 

based on the testimony received so far in the Marine Board, none 

of the outstanding items appeared to be linked to the flooding of 

the vessel, which occurred in the after portions of the vessel. 

Mr. LARSEN. And I understand the investigation is ongoing. 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. And your assertion might change, depending on further investigation for all we know. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. New information will be developed in 

the next phase of the Marine Board’s activities, which will occur in 

Seattle. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right, right. And the ACSA program is developed 

specifically for this region? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, it is. It was an agreement between 

District 13, based in Seattle, District 17 in Alaska, and the fleet 

operators themselves. It is, as the Chairman mentioned, about 60 

vessels that operate in this fleet. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. Did you not receive a response back from the 

vessel owner based on the Dutch Harbor evaluation? 

Admiral SALERNO. I believe we did receive a letter back from the 

company that listed all of the vessels that they owned that were 

in this program and the status of the outstanding requirements 

and when they expected to complete them. 

Mr. LARSEN. And how many were outstanding? I am sorry, how 

many vessels had outstanding issues, do you recall that? 

Admiral SALERNO. For this particular company, sir, or overall? 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Admiral SALERNO. I don’t recall for this particular company. 

There were several. 

29 

Mr. LARSEN. There were several. Okay. I see my time is up. I appreciate it. I have further questions and I will be meeting with 

some of your folks at noon, and we can talk through some of these 

then. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. Overall, about a little over 30 vessels 

still needed to complete the ASCS program. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

For the Committee’s information, we have got about six minutes 

left before the vote expires. We are going to hear from Ms. Richardson and then we are going to take a recess for the three votes, and 

we will be back in about 40 minutes. 

Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try and be 

brief and cut it down to three questions. 

Ms. Richards, you mentioned one of the problems is the lack of 

a national standard operating procedure; the Coast Guard does not 

have a VTS national standard operating procedure. Do you foresee 

any objections or barriers of why we couldn’t establish this? 

Ms. RICHARDS. No. The Coast Guard has replied to us that they 

are in the process of developing the national standard operating 

procedures. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. And, Admiral, are you aware of when we expect that to be implemented? 

Admiral SALERNO. It is in clearance within Coast Guard Headquarters. I don’t have a firm date for you, but I can provide that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay, if you could provide that to the Committee. 

[Information follows:] 

30 


41945.018
31 

Ms. RICHARDSON. My second question also to you, Admiral, the 

Inspector General’s Office recommended in its report that the 

Coast Guard assessed the possibility of either employing experts 

who can quantify the size of an oil spill or potentially upgrading 

the training provided to pollution investigators to enable them to 

assess the size of the spill. Can you comment on this recommendation and can you explain why pollution investigators do not already 

receive the training they need to employ multiple techniques for assessing the size of an oil spill? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes. The pollution investigators actually perform a very distinct subset of the overall investigation process. 

What they are out there to do is establish the elements of a violation. There is a strict liability provision in the law, and what they 

do is establish that there is oil in the water, it is a harmful quantity, and so forth. Typically, for assessing the quantity, there would 

be a qualified marine inspector or qualified investigator who is 

more familiar with ship systems, how to read ship’s plans and so 

forth, who can work with the ship’s crew and make that determination. The critical point here is that the response is not held up 

pending an assessment of what the spill quantity was. We assume 

that the tank had full contents and we base our response on that. 

So it is something that is not critical to the response effort; it is 

something that can be refined later. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, with all due respect, Admiral, I was at 

the original hearing, and if I am not mistaken, it was originally reported that the spill was of a much smaller size; and then when 

other people actually got out there, they saw it was significantly 

larger. That is, I would disagree with you, very important. It may 

not be important to you, but to environmentalists and people who 

are left to clean up the beaches and the fowls and everything that 

we lost, by not having a clear understanding of the size is a critical 

point. 

So I am down to now two minutes and we have votes, but I 

would ask the Chairman if you would please provide to this Committee—I think it is a legitimate concern, and if it is not your responsibility to determine the appropriate size, then someone else 

needs to be assigned to do that. And there was a recommendation 

for you of including—and I already read it very briefly to you of 

who that could be. 

Admiral SALERNO. If I might, ma’am, the actual response capabilities that were deployed within hours was vastly in excess of 

that initial false estimate; the rated capacity of the equipment was 

in the 50,000 gallon range that was deployed that very day. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. So will you work with our Chairman to 

get us that information? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, ma’am. 

[Information follows:] 

32 


41945.019
33 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

My last question is, Admiral, can you comment on whether San 

Francisco’s VTS will receive the upgrade to the PAWSS tracking 

system, and will all other VTS centers, such as Seattle, not currently utilizing this system also receive the upgrade? 

Admiral SALERNO. The two systems that the Coast Guard operates, two operating systems, are in fact compatible. There have 

been upgrades already to the system in San Francisco, which is the 

older system. Those upgrades actually bring it up to the same level 

as the PAWSS system, so essentially, regardless of which system 

operators are using, they are receiving the same data. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Admiral, I am not going to tell you how 

to do your job, however, I think this Committee deserves to understand what is the difference between the two and why you are 

using that one, because obviously other people are recommending 

this other system. And our upgraded systems done throughout all 

the systems, which was my last question? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, all of the centers that the Coast Guard 

operates are operating to the same standard, but they are employing different operating systems, essentially two different operating 

systems. But they achieve the same result. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I know we are tight on votes, but I think that I 

don’t know whether it is Ms. Richards or through the Admiral, but 

I think this is of much discussion, the fact of using different systems are all VT, are all of the centers upgraded. I am not getting 

a clear answer from you that they are all sufficiently to the level 

that has been recommended based upon this accident. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. To the gentlelady, when we come back, I will follow up on those questions, because I have some concerns myself. 

I want to see what kind of commitments we can get, if they are 

appropriate, that is, so that we can move this along. 

And I want to clear that up, Admiral, when we come back. 

We are going to be, I said, 40 minutes, but it looks like it is going 

to be probably closer to 25 to 30. That is just an estimate, but as 

soon as we can come back, we will be back. All right? Thank you. 

We stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The hearing is called back into order. I want to 

apologize to you all. We had a new Member being sworn in that 

we didn’t realize—we did not know that—a new Member replacing 

Mr. Lantos. So it took a lot longer than we had anticipated, and 

we do apologize. 

We will proceed with our questions, and we left off with Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez, Congress passed 

the Oil Pollution Act in 1990, and I don’t know if it was a direct 

result of that, but one of the results of that was the starting of an 

outfit called the MSRC, Marine Spill Recovery Corporation. I am 

curious, in reading the transcript here, when they said that there 

was no one available to give a good assessment of the volume of 

the spill, I am looking at the MSRC website and they apparently 

have a branch in San Francisco. At what point were they involved, 

34 

if at all, and to what point does the Coast Guard now rely on the 

private sector for things that they used to do in-house? 

The second thing, for the record, it doesn’t appear that you have 

it today, but I have visited, many years ago, the Vessel Traffic System in San Francisco—and I am talking in the 1970s—and I 

thought it was pretty impressive then. So I am curious when I read 

again in the transcript—and I would hope that you would correct 

it if the staff got it wrong—when they said that you weren’t getting 

instantaneous reads of the speed and direction of the vessel, because the way I remember it from way back then is that it was 

pretty impressive; it looked like the radar you would see on the 

bridge of any ship anywhere in the world. 

I guess the third question would be if that is the case, at what 

point, if any, are your monitors involved in saying, vessel whatever, 

it appears you are getting caught in the current, or are you aware 

that you are heading for the pilots of the bridge? I think it would 

be very important for you to walk the Committee through that because we, as a Nation, have spent a considerable amount of money 

making that Vessel Traffic System available and for me, as a taxpayer, it doesn’t seem to make any sense unless it is actually going 

to be involved in vessel safety. If it is there only to record a mistake in process, we really haven’t accomplished a whole lot. 

So these three things I hope you would address. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. First to the MSRC and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. As I am sure you recall, sir, the provisions of the 

Act require that vessel owners contract with oil spill response organizations, OSROs. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, when you say vessel owners, walk me 

through this. Does that mean every vessel that transits American 

waters or is that only people in the business of transporting petroleum or chemicals as a primary cargo? Does COSCO contribute to 

this? 

Admiral SALERNO. They do. If you will bear with me for a second, 

sir. The Oil Pollution Act originally pertained to tank vessels. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Admiral SALERNO. There was a law passed a few years ago which 

required non-tank vessels essentially to develop response plans 

with essentially the same requirements, that they contract for response resources. The COSCO BUSAN in fact had done that and 

MSRC, I believe, was their designated provider of those resources. 

They did respond—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. How quickly? 

Admiral SALERNO. Very quickly, within two hours. In fact, I 

think it was shorter than that. I can get you the exact time, but 

it was very quick response. 

[Information follows:] 

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41945.020
36 

Admiral SALERNO. There was also another major oil spill response organization, the National Response Corporation, one of the 

major companies in this business. They also responded. So there 

was quite a bit of capability deployed at the owner’s expense very 

early in this response, so it was very, very aggressive response 

early. 

We do hold the responsible party, in this case the vessel, to be 

the primary responder to contract for those resources and to get 

them on scene, and our Federal on-scene coordinator, the Coast 

Guard captain of the port typically, is the one who makes sure that 

they are acting responsibly under the law. So those things did 

occur. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. As a matter of curiosity, did the initial assessment of the spill, of the quantity of the spill, did that come 

from inside the Coast Guard or did that come from MSRC or the 

other outfit? 

Admiral SALERNO. The initial quantity was reported by our pollution investigator on-scene who obtained those numbers from the 

ship’s crew. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Admiral SALERNO. But as mentioned earlier, that had no bearing 

on the magnitude of the response that was mounted. 

Sir, your other question on Vessel Traffic Services, the time delay 

I believe you are referring to is really just the antenna sweep. You 

know, the antenna rotates; it takes a few seconds to make that 

sweep. So the picture that the VTS operator views typically has no 

more than a four second refresh rate, so that is fairly instantaneous given the speed of movement of ships through a harbor. 

The system in place in San Francisco was mid-1990s vintage. We 

call that CGVTS. That is just one of two systems that are operating. The two systems are comparable in terms of the capabilities 

that they present. They each can be upgraded as additional software becomes available. There is a planned upgrade for the San 

Francisco VTS which would allow greater resolution on the electronic chart display within the VTS center. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But Admiral, to the point, if all your watchstander 

is going to do is sit there and be a witness electronically to a collision, then why are we, as a Nation, spending all that money? I 

have got to believe that part of the reason for all of this is that 

someone is there, particularly in bad weather, to make a vessel 

aware of a dangerous situation. 

Admiral SALERNO. You are correct, sir. That is the purpose of the 

VTS. It is not to be a witness, it is to provide advice. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. So what did your watchstander do that morning? 

Admiral SALERNO. Our watchstander contacted the vessel; it was 

tracking its movements through the harbor; talked to the pilot; confirmed the pilot’s intentions. The pilot indicated that, yes, I intend 

to go through this span of the bridge. There was that confirmation 

that took place, so there was dialogue. The reason that call was initiated is it didn’t quite look right to the VTS operator. He was paying attention to the movement and that is what initiated that call. 

And when he received the confirmation from the pilot, the assumption was that he was about to make a turn. 

37 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am curious, given the enormous tidal speed and 

direction within San Francisco Bay, particularly, I would presume, 

near the bridge even more so, do your electronic tracking devices 

co-mingle that information with what is on the radar? Could your 

watchstander have been in a position to say, hey, skipper, you are 

about to go into a five knot current that is dragging you straight 

toward that bridge abutment? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I am not sure the VTS has the capability 

to track the currents electronically. There is current information 

available. I can get back to you on the specific capabilities of that 

system. What the VTS operator will look at and see is the actual 

course made good over the ground. So they will track that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, just one last question. 

Given that the national data buoy center, given that you train 

all of your search and rescue crews in set and drift, how to use the 

tide tables, that this information is available years in advance, but 

you have also got electronic equipment to make up for any variations that may be caused by storms or whatever, particularly in 

a place like San Francisco, why wouldn’t that be a part of the VTS? 

Admiral SALERNO. Well, sir, the way I would answer it is this 

way: we place great reliance on the technical competency of the 

pilot, who has the situational awareness on the vessel, is familiar 

with the currents and the patterns of the harbor, how it is configured and how those currents act within channels, and to maneuver 

the vessel in accordance with those parameters. I can get back to 

you with more detail on all of the data inputs that the VTS operators typically take into account, sir, if you would like. 

[Information follows:] 

38 


41945.021
39 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been very patient. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Richards, I want to go back and clarify something. The VTS 

watchstanders should have been tested for drugs and alcohol, is 

that right? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. According to the policies and the procedures of the VTS program manager. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But they weren’t, is that right? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, as a result, it is now not possible to say for 

sure whether watchstander impairment was or was not a factor in 

the accident, is that correct? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral, I want to go back to the VTS issue. The 

IG’s report states that the San Francisco VTS ‘‘does not have the 

most up-to-date traffic technology’’ and it notes that the current 

system does not allow a watchstander to zoom in and display on 

Bay Bridge columns. Do you disagree with these findings? 

Admiral SALERNO. No, sir, I do not disagree. There is a planned 

upgrade to achieve that additional capability. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So when can we—what is the most up-to-date 

system? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, the two systems are comparable, and as 

software enhancements are available, they are incorporated into 

each of these systems. The San Francisco upgrade is planned, I believe, some time this year. I don’t have a specific date. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you get us a specific date on that? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, I will check with the technical staff 

and get you a date. 

[Information follows:] 

40 


41945.022
41 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, I want to follow up on what Ms. Richardson was asking you. Are these systems going to be—that is, the 

most up-to-date systems in the other areas where we now have 

VTS? You follow what I am saying? I am asking you, Admiral. In 

other words, you just said that very soon we would have the most 

up-to-date system—is that right?—in San Francisco. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. The software upgrades that will be 

put into place in San Francisco will put it on a par with the other 

systems. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So right now San Francisco is behind, is that 

what you are saying? 

Admiral SALERNO. In terms of this one capability, yes, sir. But 

I would like to add that they do meet all of the Coast Guard requirements for VTS systems. There is not a shortfall in capability 

for what it takes for a VTS operator to perform his functions; they 

can still do that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, what do you see as the difference in the 

new improved system as opposed to the one they presently have? 

Admiral SALERNO. Well, you mentioned the zoom system, sir. 

That is essentially this additional capability that will be provided, 

it is the ability to zoom in on a nautical chart, an electronic display, and to see in greater detail up close. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is that significant? 

Admiral SALERNO. For this particular instance, sir, I do not believe it was significant. The operators are very well acquainted 

with the local area; they know where the spans are on the bridge; 

they are acquainted with typical maneuvers in the harbor. The 

VTS operators, one of the things they really bring to the table is 

local familiarity with how ships operate in their geographic area, 

and the system that they have to use in San Francisco enables 

them to make all of those determinations. So I do not believe this 

was a factor. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just want to be clear on something. You said 

in two weeks you are going to get back to the Subcommittee with 

a plan for getting qualified marine casualty investigators into the 

investigative billets. Is that what you said? 

Admiral SALERNO. What I said, sir, is within two weeks I will 

have our guidance to our field units regarding making sure that 

they are using qualified marine investigators to conduct investigation missions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, will you commit to ensuring that every billet for an investigator is filled with a qualified investigator? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, what I would have to do—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In other words, I am trying to figure out when 

do we have qualified people doing the investigations. 

Admiral SALERNO. We need to qualify people to do every investigation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, right now, let’s zero in on this one. 

We had a situation here, am I right, Inspector Richards, where 

there were certain folks who came to the scene who did not have 

the qualifications required, is that correct? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what I am asking you is a very simple question: When can you tell us—and if you have limitations—I want to 

42 

go back to something the Chairman said. If there are limitations, 

we need to know about those limitations. Let me tell you what concerns me. When I see things like Katrina, when I see various 

things—the Coast Guard was great in Katrina, but I am using it 

just as an example. 

We can stretch this rubber band but so far, and you have heard 

me say this before: we stretch and stretch and stretch—that is, the 

Coast Guard—during all these missions and it gets thinner and 

thinner at certain points, and that thinness—in personnel, resources, what have you—I think can lead to a culture of mediocrity. 

And when we get into that culture, we are waiting for the rubber 

to meet the road, and when it comes time for that to happen, there 

is no road. 

So I guess what I am trying to figure out is—when Mr. 

LaTourette was asking about the drug tests, you know, well, nothing happened, but it is okay. No, it is not okay. Now I am asking 

about inspectors that are supposed to have certain qualifications. 

There is a reason why those requirements are there. Then we 

talked about the drug tests and going back to another aspect of the 

drug tests, and that is whether we, if we had had qualified inspectors, would they have made sure that the watchstanders had gotten the test. Well, these folks who were doing the investigation apparently didn’t know. Why? Probably because they were not properly trained. 

So what I am asking you is you said a few minutes ago that you 

were going to—you were very emphatic about how you were going 

to come back to this Committee and make sure this stuff was 

straightened out, and I believe you. All I am asking you is when 

can we expect that people who are supposed to be investigating 

these kinds of incidents are qualified. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, they need to be qualified now, and my 

guidance will insist that they are qualified. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When? 

Admiral SALERNO. I will have that guidance out within two 

weeks, sir. Sir, my hesitation was we will have trainees out there 

as well. We have to. How do we train new investigators? We have 

to put them on the job. We cannot just send someone to a school 

and have them become a qualified investigator; they need familiarity with the process. So we pair up our trainees with qualified 

people, and that is what I am saying. We will have trainees, but 

they are going to work for a trained investigator who will be in 

charge of every investigation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Before we go to Mr. Oberstar, I have just one 

last question. Why would the field need guidance on having qualified investigators during investigations? Don’t they know? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, actually, the guidance already exists. We 

have existing policy that establishes that. What I will do is reinforce that and insist upon it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You see what I mean? You are saying exactly 

what I was getting to. You are saying we have got the regulations, 

we have got the guidance, but some kind of way we are not measuring up to the standard. That is basically what you are saying. 

Answer me, am I right or wrong? 

Admiral SALERNO. You are correct. 

43 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And all I am asking you, then, therefore—this is 

getting to the nitty gritty—how do we measure up to the standards? I am telling you, I have gone to these events where you are 

honor Coast Guard men and women for their bravery and what 

have you, and I am telling you they deserve to be properly trained 

to do a job. 

Admiral SALERNO. I agree. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I think it would break their hearts if they 

went out, were not properly trained, something happened, and because of their failure to be properly trained, somebody dies or there 

is harm that comes. I think they would not feel very good. 

Let me let Mr. Oberstar—Mr. Oberstar? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. And thank you for that 

very persistent and thoughtful line of questioning, to which I will 

return later. 

There is authority for the Coast Guard—moving to the other 

issue that we are considering in this hearing—to exempt a vessel 

from load line requirement ‘‘when good cause exists.’’ And the 

Coast Guard, through the Secretary, is authorized to issue a certificate detailing the extent of the exemption. On what basis did the 

Coast Guard issue an exemption to a whole class of head and gut, 

as they are called, boats in which no two vessels are built the 

same, rather than doing it on a vessel-by-vessel basis? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, the program is meant to be conducted on 

a vessel-by-vessel basis, not on a fleet-wide basis. So you are correct. The reason by which the load line requirement would not be 

enforced on a fish processing vessel would be compliance with an 

alternative program which establishes an equivalent level of safety. 

That is what this Alternative Compliance for Safety Agreement is 

designed to achieve. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So you were avoiding the base rule and attributing good cause to the ACSA. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, the base rule, which requires that a classification society class the vessel and issue the load line was, for 

most of these vessels, unachievable. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You mean that they would not be able to be— 

they could not qualify? 

Admiral SALERNO. Most class societies are unwilling, very reluctant to class these vessels primarily due to their age. Remember, 

these are uninspected vessels; many have been in service for 20 

years—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And if the classification society wouldn’t, why 

would the Coast Guard? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, we looked at the special operating conditions of these vessels and felt we could achieve a comparable level 

of safety, keeping in mind that these are uninspected vessels. They 

are operating as processors; they have the option of reducing some 

of the processing functions performed onboard and operating purely 

as a fishing vessel in an uninspected capacity with no obligation to 

meet that class rule or the load line. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And they don’t operate in just calm waters; they 

are operating in a very hostile marine environment—— 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct. 

44 

Mr. OBERSTAR.—as testified to by numerous programs of the 

Weather Channel and the History Channel, which I observe. I call 

it the Coast Guard channel, frankly; the Coast Guard is so frequently engaged. 

But I want to restate the rule of the Committee, that no audible 

signal is to emerge from any phone or BlackBerry or anything else, 

and the person not complying with that will be removed from the 

Committee room. 

There is an e-mail from Sector Seattle to Coast Guard Headquarters, January 25th of this year, extending the compliance 

deadline from January 1st, 2008 has enabled the fleet to operate 

and find the money to complete the repairs and says we are doing 

so on a schedule that preserves the economic viability of this industry. This last aspect, it continues, is central to the cooperation of 

the fleet. If we do not walk this line appropriately, we very easily 

risk the fleet getting their congressional delegation to expand the 

head gut and freeze definitions so that these vessels will never be 

inspected again. 

That sounds hauntingly to me like the customer service initiative 

of the Federal Aviation Administration last week on which a hearing was conducted in this very hearing room. Sounds very industryfriendly and compliant. Those safety regulations in the FAA and 

the Coast Guard and the Federal Railroad Administration are not 

to be based on the economics of the industry, but on the safety to 

the crew in the case of aircraft, passengers on board, and to all 

those who stand to be affected by the disadvantaged environment. 

Should those safety regulations be based on the interest of the 

safety of the crew or on the economics of the industry? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, we want to elevate the level of safety in 

this fleet. This is an avenue to do that. The ships are making improvements in their material condition that would not otherwise be 

made, I am quite confident, if we had simply said, sorry, you cannot meet the requirement for class, you can’t operate as a process. 

We are allowing them to operate that way, but with the requirement that they increase their safety. 

There are 1,200 people operating on these 60 vessels that now 

are benefitting from an elevated level of safety. They are changing 

watertight doors; they are doing things to improve their stability; 

they are conducting drills; they are doing things that, in the past, 

would not have been required. And, as I mentioned, if we insisted 

on the base rule, which they couldn’t meet, their option is simply 

operate as an uninspected fishing vessel with really no additional 

requirements. So there are improvements being made as a result 

of this program to the benefit of those 1200 crew members. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Improvements should be made first, before they 

put out to sea. 

Next week we bring the Coast Guard bill to the House floor very 

probably will be an amendment dealing with the DELTA QUEEN 

to allow it to continue operating, although they have one more year 

on their exemption. Maybe it is just to the end of this year, but, 

at any rate, they have some period of time. The Coast Guard says 

no, and I agree with the Coast Guard. That is an all-wooden vessel. 

They argue, oh, you know, it sails on the Mississippi and it is never 

45 

far from shore. Yet, the worst inland maritime disaster was on a 

river boat on the Mississippi in the 1800s. 

Admiral SALERNO. SALTANA. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. 1867. You know it well. You are not going to say 

to the DELTA QUEEN, you know, that is okay, you fellas just keep 

working on this, spray some more fire retardant on the wood and 

you will be okay. You are not going to do that, are you? 

Admiral SALERNO. No, sir. Fundamental difference—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Is there a fundamental difference, then, between 

that—— 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR.—and the—— 

Admiral SALERNO. There is, and the difference is the DELTA 

QUEEN is an inspected vessel, inspected passenger vessel under 

subchapter (h). The fishing vessels are uninspected. This is a cooperative program that will elevate their safety. The option is they 

just operate not as—they perform a few less processes on board 

and they still operate as a fishing boat. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So they can fish, but they can’t process. If they 

are treated as processing vessels—— 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. There is a big economic difference. 

Admiral SALERNO. There is a difference. Now, the head and gut 

fleet is allowed to perform half a dozen or so processes on fish— 

they can head, gut, freeze, and so forth—without being considered 

a processor, the definition in the law. So they can go up to that 

line; it is just when they cross that and perform additional processing on their catch that they become a processor. So if they just 

step back and don’t cross that line, there is no requirement that 

they meet class or load line rules. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, I think this needs much more deliberation, 

Mr. Chairman and Mr. LaTourette, our Ranking Member. I think 

we need to give this further thought. 

Let me come back to the line of questioning of Chairman 

Cummings, which you had some difficulty with, Admiral. The marine casualty investigators in the sector don’t actually work for you, 

do they; they are not under your direct authority? 

Admiral SALERNO. They work for the sector commander. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. They work for the sector, who reports to the district. 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The district reports to the area. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Who reports to you? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, they don’t—there is not a direct line relationship. What I do—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. They don’t. Do they report to the Commandant? 

Admiral SALERNO. Ultimately, yes, sir, they do, and I work for 

the Commandant, and I establish mission requirements for the marine investigation program. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Should be more direct line of authority, it strikes 

me. As we were crafting the restructuring of the marine safety program, it seems to me that people who inspect vessels and do casualty investigations and don’t work for the Assistant Commandant 

46 

for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, how can you hold 

them accountable if that is your responsibility? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I said—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You can only issue guidance. 

Admiral SALERNO. I set the mission requirements and I perform 

the review every year to make sure that the mission is being accomplished. We have ongoing dialogue with the area and with the 

district chiefs of prevention, and I personally have met with all of 

the sector commanders on marine safety missions, so that that dialogue is there. The resources of my staff are available to all levels 

in the chain of command. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Shouldn’t you have direct line of authority, 

though, if that is your responsibility? Instead of issuing guidance, 

that you should really have a much more authoritative position. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I feel our system actually works quite 

well. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You are not going to answer that question with 

the Commandant looking over your shoulder, I know, and I acceded 

to his request and changed that provision in our bill. I regret it. 

But that will be as it is. 

Mr. Chairman, I will withhold further questions at this point. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LaTourette. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t want to be 

misunderstood about the drug testing and the folks and the VTS. 

If the rules say that they are supposed to be drug and alcohol tested, they should be, but I think when I was listening to the Inspector General’s conclusions, I was reminded of Congressman Barney 

Frank who has a pretty well known story that talks about editorial 

writers sort of being the folks that sit up on the hill and watch the 

battle, and then after it is over, come down to slaughter the wounded. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LaTourette. My concern was that if the rules say that these 

folks should be tested, they should be tested, but I then understood 

the Inspector General’s conclusion to be that even if they were 

drunk they didn’t do anything that contributed to the outcome of 

this particular incident. Is that a fair observation? They did their 

job. 

Ms. RICHARDS. Our conclusion is that they did do their job, they 

followed their operating procedures appropriately. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right. That is what I was trying to get at. 

Admiral, to the ALASKA RANGER, it is my understanding that 

for a good part of its life this vessel was in the Gulf of Mexico before it went to the Bering Sea. 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct, sir. When it was originally 

constructed, it served the oil field as an offshore supply vessel. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. I think what concerns me—and you 

have heard both Chairmen talk about it, and I wrote down two 

words that you used. You know, basically, these 60 head and gut 

boats were not inspected, and when the Coast Guard determined 

that they were doing more than sort of running afoul of the difference between a fishing vessel and a processing vessel, that the 

Coast Guard came up with the ACSA. 

47 

You, at one point, used the word an equivalent level of safety and 

then a couple minutes later said comparable, which I think are the 

same thing. But I guess the question is—and what disturbs me— 

if these head and gut vessels, if the Coast Guard has reached a 

conclusion that in fact they are doing processing, which would subject them to additional regulation, if the ACSA is truly equivalent, 

then it is equal. Equivalent means equal to me. Is it equal or is 

it not equal? 

Admiral SALERNO. In our view, it is equal. We benchmarked the 

requirements of the ACSA against load line requirements, for example, so that they are on a par with each other. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Then why would these vessels fail or not be 

successful in getting the certification as processing vessels? 

Admiral SALERNO. Quite simply, sir, it is a commercial decision 

by the classification societies. They are under no obligation to class 

any vessel; they do that as a business decision. And most class societies are very reluctant to accept a vessel into their system of the 

age of these vessels. Typically, beyond 20 years they see this as a 

risk that they are just not willing to assume. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. But I guess I am getting at—because I 

want to be clear, because to me it is one thing if you have a vessel 

that if you put it to a certain test, it would fail, as opposed to somebody that is in charge of issuing the credential says I just don’t 

want to do this. 

So which is it? If the classification societies were willing to make 

that business decision and say I am going to inspect it to the same 

level of safety requirements for the processing vessels, is it your 

conclusion that for these—and I think you have now 20 vessels 

that have been enrolled out of the 60—is it your opinion that these 

20 vessels that have made the safety improvements would pass if 

the classification systems were willing to inspect them as processing vessels? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, I would say that they would pass. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, just for my information, what percentage 

of the recruits coming in today will do two or more tours in the 

Coast Guard? The number for the Marines is like 70 percent of all 

Marines will do one hitch. I was curious what it is for the Coasties. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I would like to think it is at least that. 

I don’t have that number, but I would say it is a fairly highly percentage. I can provide that for you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. That means only 30 percent of Marines do two or 

more hitches. 

Admiral SALERNO. Oh, I am sorry, I thought you meant 70 percent did two or more. I would say we would be on the high end, 

closer to 70 percent doing two or more. But I don’t know that for 

sure. I can find that out. 

[Information follows:] 

48 


41945.023
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Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, given your manning requirements, I know 

that you are always going to have a steady supply of people in the 

pipeline, new people to train, old people getting ready to leave. But 

I am curious, if we as a Nation are going to go to the tremendous 

expense of having these Vessel Traffic Systems, and if they are 

supposed to accomplish something other than being a witness to an 

accident, within the Coast Guard, what sort of rules do you have 

to have a certain ratio of trainers to trainees? It appeared to be 

pretty light the day of the accident in San Francisco Bay. 

Was that a temporary condition because of a holiday, because of 

sickness amongst the crew, just a seasonal redeployment? How did 

you get to that situation where you were pretty heavy in inexperienced people that morning? 

Admiral SALERNO. For the VTS, sir, or for the—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. On the VTS. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I don’t believe we were understaffed; I 

think they met the proper staffing level at the VTS. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I wasn’t questioning the number of people, but the 

memo I read led me to believe they were fairly inexperienced. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, my understanding is not that, that the 

VTS operators were in fact fully trained. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Admiral SALERNO. One change that the unit has made since the 

accident is they have instituted additional procedures for conditions of fog. So they put an additional watchstander on during 

those conditions, which is a process change. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I am going way back to the 1970s, but I was 

really impressed back then. At least the story was that they could 

look at a blip on the radar screen, and if that vessel had been to 

San Francisco before, they could tell you which vessel that was, 

what its draft restrictions were, ranked overall with where it normally moored and what it normally carried. Is that still the case? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. In fact, with additional systems, the 

systems will tell them what ship that is, it’ll identify it by name. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would the turning radius be one of the pieces of information that you kept on those vessels? 

Admiral SALERNO. On the VTS display? I don’t believe so, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. As far as the characteristics of the ship. 

Admiral SALERNO. That information is available on the bridge of 

the ship for use by the pilot, definitely; that is a requirement in 

our regulations, that it be there. I do not believe that that is immediately available to the VTS. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, now, I going back from hearsay from staff, 

but the hearsay from staff was that the pilot could not read the 

electronic chart and could not distinguish where the center of the 

span was, where the channel was. What did the Coast Guard investigation say about that? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, there was no indication that there was 

anything wrong with the ship’s radar. Our investigation—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is not my question. My question is was part 

of the problem that the pilot could not distinguish on the electronic 

chart where the center of the span was, where the channel was, as 

opposed to where the pilings that support the bridge are? 

50 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, there is a racon on the center of the span, 

so that it is very apparent on a functioning radar system. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Was the pilot able to distinguish that? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, all of the means for the pilot to determine 

that were there. You are asking me to get in his head. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, no. I would hope that was part of the inquiry, 

Admiral. I think that is a fairly common sense question to ask. I 

am going all the way back to the tug and barge that took out the 

bridge near Mobile in the early 1990s because the pilot then 

couldn’t read a radar. And I thought we passed some language 

then that required the ability, the mastery of electronic navigation 

as being one of the prerequisites. That is just for a tugboat operator. So if it is that case for a tugboat operator, I would certainly 

hope that a pilot would have this knowledge. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. I misunderstood your question. Professional requirements for someone to obtain a pilot’s license is 

that, yes, they must pass radar course. They have to be familiar 

with the electronic navigation systems that are required on the 

bridge of a ship. So there are professional requirements. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, so for the record, did the Coast Guard ever 

look into whether or not pilot error, the inability or, as I am told 

by staff, now, the inability of the pilot that day to distinguish the 

opening where the channel was on the electronic charts in front of 

him? Was it pilot error; was the machine at fault? What was the 

contributing factor that day? Has the Coast Guard made a definitive ruling yet? 

Admiral SALERNO. No, sir. The investigation has not been completed yet. But there has been nothing to indicate any mechanical 

failure. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, would you bear with me? 

Let’s go to the vessel off of Alaska. I am curious where the Coast 

Guard differentiation comes in as far as vessel safety as to whether 

or not a vessel stops at a certain point in fish processing. Now, I 

would think that would have nothing to do with the structural integrity of the hull. I would think it would have nothing to do with 

the stability of the hull. I think it would have nothing to do with 

watertight bulkheads. As a matter of fact, it would have absolutely 

nothing to do with the safety of that vessel. So why on God’s green 

earth does the Coast Guard have one set of rules for people who 

stop at one point in the processing system and why do they have 

another for people that go a little bit further in the processing of 

a fish? Is that politically driven? Did that come from within the 

Coast Guard? Because it really sounds to me like an incredibly 

squirrely way for the Coast Guard to do business. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, it is derived from statute. The statute defines—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, so where did the statute come from, was it 

recommended by the Coast Guard? Again, was it a political consideration or did someone in the Coast Guard say this is the way we 

ought to be doing business? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, it echoes back to the late 1980s, commercial fishing industry—— 

51 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, I have got to believe, looking at all that gold 

on your sleeve, that you were in the Coast Guard in the late 1980s. 

So, again, where did that consideration come from? 

Admiral SALERNO. The origins of how it got into statute, sir, I 

don’t know offhand. I would have to research that for you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, again, Admiral, we do respect your expertise, 

but given that that is one of the most dangerous professions in 

America, given that it not only costs the lives of the men and 

women serving on those vessels, but I would imagine the Coast 

Guard spends an enormous amount of the citizens’ treasure. Anticipating those events and responding to those events, wouldn’t it 

make sense for everyone involved, starting with the taxpayers, but 

certainly for the men and women who serve on the those vessels 

and their families, to base our criteria on the risk to the vessel and 

to the crew, and not on what type of activity is going on as far as 

gutting fish? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, we would welcome a requirement for all 

fishing vessels to be inspected. That is not the case now. We are 

working in the authority’s behalf. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I don’t want to get into overkill on this because, obviously, falling overboard in Bay St. Louis, which is seven 

feet deep, in July is significantly different than operating off the 

coast of Alaska during the middle of the winter. You know the difference; I know the difference. 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. A person can tread water in Bay St. Louis for two 

days before hypothermia would kick in. What is it in Alaska, five 

minutes, two minutes? 

Admiral SALERNO. It is not long. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So, again, I would expect the Coast Guard to use 

some common sense when it comes to this. But if that is the most 

dangerous place for a person to be serving on a vessel, I would 

hope that the Coast Guard would make some recommendations for 

the sake of everyone involved that we do a better job. 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, and we are pushing as hard as we can 

within the authorities we have to do just that. We do have a fishing vessel examination program. We work very aggressively with 

the fishing community, especially in Alaska and in other cold water 

areas as well. 

In fact, I would say that the fact that 42 people survived this 

sinking can be attributed to the fact that they had immersion suits. 

Every crew member had an immersion suit. They had a strobe 

light so that they could be found in the darkness by rescue crews. 

They had life rafts that they knew how to deploy. They knew to 

take radios into the rafts with them. 

They called the Coast Guard before the vessel sank. There were 

previous accidents where they didn’t know how to do this; they 

didn’t call the Coast Guard early on and get rescue forces mobilized. So a lot of these things, working with our fishing vessel examiners, even though these are uninspected vessels, contributed to 

saving lives, in my estimation. 

Now, I would point out that this is an uninspected fleet, largely, 

so we don’t have the same degree of assuredness as to the hull envelope and the stability that are critical factors in overall safety. 

52 

Mr. TAYLOR. Under their requirements, were they required to 

have a life boat for every member of the crew? 

Admiral SALERNO. They have life rafts for the crew and immersion suits for every member of the crew when they operate in cold 

water, so that is a distinction between operating in the Gulf of 

Mexico. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions, but I 

had an excellent briefing on some of the facts as they are currently 

known on the ALASKA RANGER as well as getting some answers 

to some of the questions that have been prepared as well, and I appreciate that. I certainly will have further questions as this investigation moves along, but I am obviously very interested in the Pacific Northwest. A lot of the fleets base there before they head up 

north for the fishing season. So I appreciate the Coast Guard’s willingness to share some information. Thanks. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Just one last question. Admiral, I am still kind of concerned 

about the need to re-emphasize guidance that should be already in 

place. How did it happen that the majority of the people assigned 

to the casualty investigator positions in the sector were not qualified? And is that occurring in other sectors? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, I don’t have a good answer for that. It is 

an answer I need to know myself, because I have concerns nationwide. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, how long have you been in your position? 

Admiral SALERNO. I have been in my current position for about 

a year and a half, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you didn’t know that? 

Admiral SALERNO. No, sir, I did not know that. But I know it 

now, and I am going to do something about it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. How long have you known? 

Admiral SALERNO. I read this in the IG report. So within the 

past few days. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you will have something in writing showing 

us how that will be corrected? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Richards, my last question to you is the 

Coast Guard believes that in a multi-mission service all members 

of the service should essentially be able to perform all missions. 

The Coast Guard strongly resists the idea of specialization among 

its members and, as a result, the quality of personnel in some specialties, such as marine safety, is suffering. 

Do you believe it is appropriate that the Coast Guard should 

maintain an organizational model that requires all personnel to be 

able to perform all missions, or does the Service need to create systems that will cultivate specialized skills among some of its personnel? Do you have an opinion on that? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I have been with the Department 

of Homeland Security a very short time, so I don’t personally have 

an opinion. I am aware that our Inspector General has testified on 

previous occasions about his concerns. 

53 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, what we will do is we will submit that in 

writing. How about that? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, with that—Mr. LaTourette, do you have 

anything else? 

Mr. LATOURETTE. No, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. With that, we want to thank all of you for your 

patience and that ends this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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