UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHELLE BEST-WILLIE, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, * Defendant–Appellee. No. 12-4069 (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-00176-PMW) (D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before LUCERO , Circuit Judge, PORFILIO , Senior Circuit Judge, and MATHESON , Circuit Judge.

* In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the defendant-appellee in this action.

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 26, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-- 2 Michelle Best-Willie appeals from an or der of the district court affirming the denial of her application for disability be nefits under the Social Security Act. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm.
I In January 2007, Best-Willie began expe riencing right-sided abdominal pain. Over the next several months, she sought medical care from num erous providers and underwent medical work-ups including CT scans of her abdomen and pelvis, upper endoscopy, colonoscopy, capsule enterosco py, urological testing, and multiple chemistry panels. Her medical testing did not reveal abnor mal findings and the etiology of her abdominal pain could not be determined. Best-Willie filed for disabili ty benefits in June 2007. She claimed that due to her abdominal pain, she could not sit for mo re than an hour, walk without assistance, travel, or do any lifting. She was forty-three years old at th e time of her application. She has a bachelor’s degree a nd has worked in customer service technical support as an end-user consultant, and previously as a photocopy m achine operator. In August 2007, the Commissioner de nied Best-Willie’s application. Best-Willie continued seeking treatment for her abdominal pain, which was ultimately determined to ha ve a psychological component . In February 2008, she began treatment with a psychiatrist who di agnosed her with depression, anxiety, and-- 3 a somatoform pain disorder 1 and prescribed medication. Her application for benefits was denied on reconsideration in August 2008. In August 2009, an administrative la w judge (“ALJ”) found Best-Willie not disabled at step four of the controlling five-step sequential an alysis. See Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining five-step process for evaluating claims for disability benefits). The ALJ confirmed that Best-Willie had not worked since her alleged onset of disa bility, January 25, 2007, through her date last insured, December 31, 2012. She found Best-Willie had the following severe impairments: mild degenerative disc dis ease of the spine, mo rbid obesity, sleep apnea, left carpal tunnel syndrome, asthma, major depr ession, generalized anxiety disorder, and somatoform pa in disorder. However, th e ALJ concluded that these impairments did not meet or equal the listings for pr esumptive disability. The ALJ also found Best-Willie not cr edible and determined that her impairments left her with a residual func tional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) , with some postural limitations and moderate mental limitations . Relying on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and

1 A somatoform disorder ex ists when there are “[p]hys ical symptoms for which there are no demonstrable organic findings or known physiologi cal mechanisms.” 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.07. A somatoform pain di sorder is indicated where pain is the predomin ant complaint, warra nts clinical atte ntion, and causes significant impairment in so cial or occupational functions . Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Ma nual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 485, 498 (4th ed. 2000).-- 4 testimony of the vocational e xpert, the ALJ concluded at step four that Best-Willie was not disabled because she could still perform her past re levant work as a photocopy machine operator. Continuing to step five, the ALJ determined in the alternative that Best-Willie po ssessed the RFC to perform other work in the national
economy. Best-Willie’s request for review was denied by the Appeals Council, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003). Th e district court affirmed th e Commissioner’s denial of benefits, and Best-Willie appeals.
II “In reviewing the [Commissioner’s] deci sion, we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of th e agency.” Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Ci r. 2004) (quotation omitted). Rather, “[w]e review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whethe r the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and wh ether the correct legal standards were applied.” Watkins v. Bar nhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10t h Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (citation and quota tions omitted). Best-Willie raises the fo llowing challenges to the Co mmissioner’s decision: the ALJ erred (1) in rejecting the opinions of her treating physic ians, Drs. Hall and-- 5 Charlat; (2) in concluding that she did not meet Listing 12.06 (Anxiety Related Disorders); (3) in evaluating th e credibility of her complaints of pain; (4) in failing to consider the lay witness statement of her hus band; and (5) at step s four and five of the sequential analysis. A Best-Willie challenges th e ALJ’s evaluation of medical source opinions offered by her treating physic ians, Drs. Hall and Charla t. When analyzing the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ fi rst considers “whether the opinion is wellsupported by medically accepta ble clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is consistent with the othe r substantial eviden ce in the record. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300 (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If so, the ALJ must give the opinion “controlling we ight.” Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300. If the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ should weigh the opinion considering the six factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) 2 to determine “whether the opinion

2 These factors include: (1) the length of the treatment re lationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and exte nt of the treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and th e kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which th e physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4) consis tency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to supp ort or contradict the opinion. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 13 01 (quotation omitted).-- 6 should be rejected altogether or assigned some lesser wei ght.” Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007). Finally, “[i]n all ca ses the regulations require that the ALJ give good reasons in the no tice of determination or opinion for the weight that is given the treating phys ician’s opinion.” Doyal, 331 F.3d at 762 (quotation omitted). Dr. Hall was Best-Willie’s primary car e physician who treated her for asthma, diabetes, acid reflux, musculoskeletal pa in, and right-sided abdominal pain from January 2007 to December 2007. 3 Dr. Hall’s March 2009 “Doctor’s Opinion” form and RFC form noted that Best-Willie su ffered from right lower quadrant pain, fatigue, depression, and anxiety. He dete rmined that Best-Wi llie’s pain symptoms would interfere with her attention and con centration, and that she was incapable of even low-stress jobs. He li mited her to sitting for thirty minutes at a time, standing to one hour at a time, sitting and standing/wa lking to less than two hours in an eight hour work day, needing to walk every ten minutes for ten minutes at a time, needing to shift postural positions, needing to keep her legs elevated up to two hours per day, never lifting or carrying any weight, and rare ly stooping, crouching, or climbing. He also noted that due to her im pairments, Best-Willie would miss more than four days of work each month.

3 Other than these records, Dr. Hall wrot e a “to whom it may concern letter” in February 2009, opining that Best-Willie had diabetes and arthritis , and would benefit from the use of a wheelchair a nd transportation accommodations.-- 7 Best-Willie argues that the ALJ “sum marily dismissed” Dr. Hall’s 2009 assessment of her functiona l limitations without providi ng sufficient support. We disagree. Before evaluati ng Dr. Hall’s opinion, the ALJ thoroughly addressed the medical evidence provided by other physicians who had exam ined Best-Willie for her complaints of abdominal pain and other is sues related to back and neck pain. Referencing records from Drs. Foley, Batist a, Hall, Durbin, Sadiq, and several other clinics, the ALJ noted that these medical records reve aled Best-Willie’s “ongoing [medical] office visits and em ergency room visits for abdom inal and bowel issues, as well as orthopedic and breathi ng issues.” Moreover, the AL J observed that “despite extensive workup, which has included mu ltiple chemistry panels, multiple CBCs, multiple CT scans, urologic evaluation, endoscopy, colonoscopy, small bowel follow-through, capsule enteroscopy and IVP x-ray, all findings have been within normal limits and the etiology of her abdomin al pain is still unknown.” Our review of the record re veals the same. The ALJ also discussed issues concerni ng Best-Willie’s left wrist pain, neck pain, back pain, and associated neurological issues and noted th at diagnostic findings and EMG studies were within normal lim its. The ALJ considered an October 2007 report by Dr. Sadiq, a neurolog ist, who found that Best-Will ie’s neck and back pain were stable and she had mild external pe ripheral neuropathy. As pointed out by the ALJ, there was no further ev idence submitted after this report concerning treatment for neck and back issues.-- 8 In addition, the ALJ evaluated medi cal evidence regard ing Best-Willie’s mental impairments. She discussed Dr . Swaner’s February 2008 psychological consultative examination, in which Dr. Swaner diagnosed Best-Willie with an adjustment disorder with depressed mood, a pain disorder associated with both psychological factors and a general medical conditi on, and assessed a global assessment function of sixt y-five, which the ALJ stated “indicate[d] no more than mild symptoms/impairment.” 4 The ALJ also discussed Best-Willie’s psychiatric treatment beginning in Febr uary 2008 with Dr. Charlat. Dr. Charlat’s records revealed that by April 2008 Best-Willie expe rienced with medication an alleviation of her depressed mood, goo d suppression of her anxiet y and somatoform pain disorder, and good prognosis for returni ng to regular employment. Dr. Charlat’s November 2008 treatment note, the last tr eatment note for psyc hiatric care in the record, was essentially the same. As to Dr. Hall, the ALJ stated that his opinions concerning Best-Willie’s “extremely limited residual functional cap acity” and inability to work were not entitled to controlling weight because the opinions were not supported by medically acceptable clinical and diagno stic techniques. Moreover, the ALJ found Dr. Hall’s opinion inconsistent with medi cal evidence in the record as well as with his reports

4 The ALJ’s assessment is correct. Under DSM-IV, a global assessment function of sixty-five indicat es “some mild symptoms (e .g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning . . . , but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” DSM-IV at 34.-- 9 because his examinations and diagnostic tes ting were within normal limits. Thus the ALJ afforded Dr. Hall’s opi nion “little weight.” Nevertheless, Best-Willie argues the ALJ did not “specifically identify what other evidence allegedly contradicted Dr. Hall’s assessed limitati ons.” We discern no error. As discussed above, the ALJ th oroughly discussed the medical evidence in the record, which demonstrated that th ere was “very little objective evidence to support claimant’s very severe and extrem e alleged functional limitations due to her physical and mental impairments.” Although there was not a contemporaneous discussion of this evidence in discounting Dr. Hall’s opi nion, in reading the ALJ’s decision as a whole, it is evid ent Dr. Hall’s opinion is in consistent with the record. Best-Willie also argues that the ALJ su mmarily rejected Dr. Charlat’s opinion without sufficient support. Again, we disagree. The AL J stated that Dr. Charlat’s opinions concerning Best-Wi llie’s “extreme mental lim itations in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace” and hi s opinion that she would miss more than four days per month due to mental im pairments were not entitled to controlling weight. The ALJ found Dr. Charlat’s opi nion unsupported by me dically acceptable clinical and diagnostic techni ques and inconsistent with th e record. For example, Dr. Charlat’s June 5, 2008 RFC evaluation wa s inconsistent with his treatment note on June 6, the next day, in which he conc luded that with medication Best-Willie had “alleviation of her depression, suppression of her generali zed anxiety, suppression of her somatoform disorder [and that the prognos is was good for] being able to return to-- 10 regular employment.” In general, the ALJ stated that tr eatment notes and examinations “show a degree of limitation but not to the point suggested by Dr. Charlat.” The record demons trates that Best-Willie’s so matoform pain disorder was suppressed with medication, and the ALJ appr opriately considered this in discounting Dr. Charlat’s opinion.
B Best-Willie also clai ms error at step three. Sp ecifically, she asserts that the ALJ failed to conclude sh e met Listing 12.06 (Anxiety Related Disorders) because the ALJ “failed to acknowledge” Dr. Ch arlat’s opinion that Best-Willie had a complete inability to function indepe ndently outside of her home. “At step three, the determination is made whether the impairme nt is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairment s that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activ ity. If the impairment is listed and thus conclusively presumed to be disabling, the claimant is entitled to benefits.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1085 (citations, quot ations, and alteration omitte d). A claimant will only be presumed disabled if an impairment, or a combination of impairments, meets or equals all the requirements of a listing. Sullivan v. Zebley , 493 U.S. 521, 530-31 (1990). Further, a claima nt has the burden to presen t evidence establishing her impairments meet or equal listed impairme nts. Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 733 (10th Cir. 2005).-- 11 Best-Willie was diagnosed with gene ralized anxiety disorder, which is compared to Anxiety Related Disorders, the impairment listed under 12.06. For the ALJ to have found that Best-Willie’s ment al limitation met th e required level of severity under 12.06, Best-Willie had to satisfy requirements under 12.06(A) and 12.06(B), 5 or alternatively, 12.06(A) and 12. 06(C). See 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.06. Under 12.06(C), paragra ph C, Best-Willie was required to show that the mental limitation “[r]esult[s] in comp lete inability to f unction independently outside the area of one’s home.” § 12.06(C). The ALJ determined Best-Willie did not meet these criteria. We reject Best-Willie’s claims that the ALJ failed to acknowledge Dr. Charlat’s opinion that she could not functi on outside of her home, and that the ALJ provided no explanation for her determinati on that paragraph C was not satisfied. Although the ALJ did not expressly address the opinion of Dr. Charlat in her step three analysis, the ALJ’s findings in ot her parts of the decision support her determination that Best-Willie is not pres umptively disabled at step three. See Fischer-Ross, 431 F.3d at 733 (“[A]n ALJ’s findings at other step s of the sequential

5 Under 12.06(B), Best-Willie’s limitation had to result in at least two of the following: (1) marked restriction of ac tivities of daily living; or (2) marked difficulties in maintaining social func tioning; or (3) marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4) re peated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. See 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.06(B). The ALJ concluded Best-Willie did not meet the criteria of § 12.06(B). Best-Willie does not argue on appeal that she meets these criteria.-- 12 process may provide a proper basis for upho lding a step three conclusion that a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal any listed impairment.”). For example, in determining Best-W illie’s RFC at st ep four, the ALJ considered medical opinion ev idence, including Dr. Char lat’s determination that Best-Willie had a complete inability to func tion independently outsi de of her home. Though the ALJ did not expressly state this opinion in her decision, she did state that she considered all of the evidence in the re cord and the medical evidence in accordance with the regulations. As is our ge neral practice, we take her at her word. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005). Importantly, the district court confirmed, as we have above, that the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Charlat’s opinions concerning Best-Willie ’s alleged extreme me ntal limitations. See Fischer-Ross, 431 F.3d at 733-34 (noting harmless error applies when confirmed or unchallenged findings made elsewhere in the ALJ’s deci sion confirm the step three determination under review). Further, in evaluating Best-Willie’s RF C, the ALJ considered Dr. Swaner’s February 2008 psychological consultative examination. Best-Willie admitted that depression is not a primary debilitator, and Dr. Swaner found that Best-Willie exhibited normal social functioning skills and attention skills. Moreover, the ALJ addressed Dr. Charlat’s medical report th at Best-Willie’s mental impairments, including her generalized anxi ety, were controlled by medi cation. In reviewing the ALJ’s analysis at other st eps of the sequential analys is, we conclude the ALJ-- 13 properly determined that Be st-Willie’s generalized anxiet y did not meet or equal a listed impairment. Id. at 733. Best-Willie nevertheless contends th at the ALJ should have considered whether the combination of her impairments equaled any of the listed impairments, and obtained an updated opinion from a medi cal expert in dete rmining whether her mental impairments were equi valent in severity to a li sted impairment. She argues this was necessary because there was new medical evidence submit ted, specifically the assessments by Drs. Hall and Charla t, after the state agency physicians’ consultations had taken place. 6 We discern no error. In March 2008, a state agency psychologist reviewed the medical evid ence, completed a Ps ychiatric Review Technique Form, and concl uded that Best-Willie’s ment al impairments were not severe and did not equal a listing. The ALJ did not err in relying on this evaluation. See SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *1-3; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(c). Contrary to Best-Willie’s claim, an AL J is only required to obtain an updated medical opinion from a medical expert “when additional medi cal evidence is received that in the opinion of the [ALJ] . . . may change the State agen cy . . . psychological

6 Best-Willie does not expr essly state what “asses sments” by Drs. Hall and Charlat were not in the record at the time of the state ag ency physicians’ review. We assume, however, that she is referring to Dr . Hall’s February 2009 assessment, and treatment records from Dr. Charlat between February 2008 and November 2008. Regarding Dr. Charlat, the record contai ns a total of five treatment notes: February 22, 2008; April 4, 2008; J une 6, 2008; August 8, 2008; and November 14, 2008.-- 14 consultant’s finding that th e impairment is not equiva lent in severity to any impairment in the Listing of Impairments. ” SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3-4. C Best-Willie next challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination with respect to her subjective complaints of pain. “Credi bility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we w ill not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evid ence.” Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1173 (quotation omitted). “However, findings as to credibility shoul d be closely and affi rmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Id. (quotation and a lteration omitted). “To be disabling, pain must be so seve re, by itself or in conjunction with other impairments, as to preclude any substantial gainful employm ent.” Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). “[ A claimant’s] statements regarding the intensity and pe rsistence of the pain must be consistent with the medical findings and signs.” Gossett v. Bo wen, 862 F.2d 802, 80 6 (10th Cir. 1988). In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s statements re garding pain, an ALJ should consider an individual’s da ily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; the dosage and effect iveness of medications taken to alleviate pain; and any other factors concerning th e individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms . Hamlin v. Barnha rt, 365 F.3d 1208, 1220-- 15 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1993) (listing other factors such as frequency of me dical contacts). The ALJ found the level of pain sever ity claimed by Best-Willie unpersuasive. She determined that Best-Willie’s allega tions of pain “far exceed any acceptable, objective medical evidence of a physical source for the degree of impairments alleged.” Recognizing that Best-Willie has a history of abdominal pain and orthopedic issues but that all diagnostic testing had been within normal limits, the ALJ noted that Best-Willie’s physical and mental impairments were treated with conservative care, required no surgery or ex tended hospitalization, and required little physical therapy. The ALJ considered th at the pain associat ed with Best-Willie’s mental impairments was controlled with medication. See Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1220 (noting that in evaluating cr edibility, ALJ may consider ef fectiveness of medications taken to alleviate pain). The ALJ also noted that Best-Willie received no recent treatment for her physical and mental impairments. 7 Further, the ALJ properly considered that Best-Willie’s daily activities were inconsistent with her allega tions of severe pain. Best -Willie reported that she could care for her personal needs, do some house hold chores, handle her finances, watch television, and spend time wr iting her family’s genealogi cal history. Although an

7 In evaluating the documentary medica l evidence, the ALJ had previously noted that Best-Willie’s la st treatment record for phy sical impairments was in October 2007 and that the last treatment re cord for mental heal th care was November 2008.-- 16 ALJ may not rely on the performance of mini mal daily activities alone as substantial evidence that a claimant does not suffer disabling pain, see Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1490, the ALJ appropriately considered several factors in making her adverse credibility determination and tied that fi nding to specific evid ence in the record. Finally, we reject Best-Will ie’s claim that the ALJ di d not address her obesity. The ALJ considered Best-Willi e’s obesity impairment but concluded that complaints of disability due to obesity were not credible because Be st-Willie repeatedly ignored medical advice to lose weight. After examining the record as a whole, we conclude that the ALJ’s negative credibility finding is linked to substantial evidence and thus find no error. See Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1173.
D Best-Willie next challenge s the ALJ’s failure to consider a lay witness statement, a letter from her hus band. Mr. Willie’s letter di scussed his wife’s inability to sit for more than two hours at a time before needing bedr est, lack of concentration, and inability to travel certain distances due to pain. Mr. Wi llie’s letter is cumulative of Best-Willie’s testimony concerning her lim itations and reports of pain, which the ALJ discussed and found not credible. We conclude that although the ALJ’s decision does not expressly address this lay witness ev idence, any error in failing to do so is harmless because “the same evidence that the AL J referred to in discrediting [the-- 17 claimant’s] claims also discredits [the la y witness’s] claims.” Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 560 (8th Cir. 2011).
E Best-Willie also alle ges errors regarding step four of the sequential analysis. Step four is compri sed of three phases. In the first phase, the ALJ must evaluate a cl aimant’s physical and mental residual functional capacity (R FC), . . . and in the second phase, he must determine the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. . . . In the fi nal phase, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the ab ility to meet the job demands found in phase two despite the mental and/or physical limitations found in phase one. . . . At each of these phases, the AL J must make specific findings. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 ( 10th Cir. 2008) (cit ation and quotation omitted). Those findings mu st be supported by substantia l evidence. See Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1299. Best-Willie first claims error rega rding the ALJ’s RFC assessment. “In determining a claimant’s physical abilities, the AL J should . . . assess the nature and extent of the claimant’s physical limita tions and then determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity for work activ ity on a regular and continuing basis.” Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F. 3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation and alteration omitted). This involves c onsideration of the claimant ’s “impairment(s), and any related symptoms . . . [that] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what [the claimant] can do in a work se tting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).-- 18 The ALJ concluded that Best-Willie ha d a RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F. R. § 404.1567(b) , 8 with an option to sit/stand at will; postural limitations restricting her to only occasiona lly climbing ramps or stairs, balancing, kneeling, stooping, and crouching, and never crawling or climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolding; fingering with the left hand no more than frequently; avoiding moderate exposure to hazards such as machinery and heights; and moderate limitations in her ability to maintain extended attention and c oncentration and respo nd appropriately to work pressures. In conclusory fashion, Be st-Willie claims that the ALJ did not include “many of the limitations” identified by her treating physicians, Drs. Hall and Charlat, in her RFC assessment. But Best-Willie does not state what limitations should have been included. As discussed above, the ALJ proper ly considered the opinions of Drs. Hall and Charlat and accorded them little wei ght because they were unsupported by the

8 Light work is defined in the regulations as follows: [L]ifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this cate gory when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factor s such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).-- 19 medical evidence. Having reasonably disc ounted the opinions of Drs. Hall and Charlat, the ALJ did not err in failing to include additional limitations in her RFC assessment. And based on our review of the record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RF C assessment for light work. Best-Willie next argues th at the ALJ erred by failing to make required findings regarding the physical and mental demands of her past relevant work. We disagree. At phase two of the step four analysis, “the ALJ must make findings regarding the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past re levant work.” Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1024. To make such findings, an ALJ must obtain adequate “factual information about those work demands which have a bearing on the medically established limitations.” SSR 82–62, 1982 WL 3138 6, at *3 (1982). Such information regarding work demands may be obtained from the clai mant herself, her employer, or another informed source. See id. The ALJ here did this. As a preliminary matter, we reject Best-Willie’s asse rtion that the ALJ erred by concluding that her past employment as a photocopy machine operator constituted past relevant work without evidentiary support or citing supp ort. Best-Willie testified to her work “doing production printing jobs” at a print copy center and also submitted paperwork confirming this wo rk. The record supports the ALJ’s conclusion, and the ALJ’s failure to expr essly cite evidence in support does not constitute error. The ALJ st ated that she carefully cons idered all ev idence in the record and we take her at her word . See Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1173.-- 20 The ALJ also requested information from the vocational expert regarding BestWillie’s past relevant work. The expert te stified that Best-Willi e’s past work as a technical consultant was classified as a customer complaint clerk which was a sedentary job, and skilled at a specific voca tional preparation (“SVP”) level of five, or as an end user consultant which was a sedentary job, and skilled at SVP seven. The expert further testified that Best-W illie’s job as a photoc opy machine operator was medium in demand as she performed it . But relying on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the expe rt testified that the job of photocopy machine operator as generally performed is cla ssified as light in demand a nd unskilled. Unskilled work is “work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties . . . [which] may or may not require considerable strength . . . and [requires] little specific vocational preparation and judgment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1568(a). Accordingly, the ALJ obtained information concerning the physical and mental demands of Best-Willie’s past relevant work and appropriately relied on the vocational expert’s testimony in her decision. See Doyal, 331 F.3d at 761 (find ing no Winfrey error where ALJ relied on vocational expert’s testim ony in support of ALJ’s pha se two and phase three findings). Finally, Best-Willie assert s that the ALJ erroneously relied on the expert’s testimony to determine, without sufficient analysis, that th e demands of her previous jobs were compatible with her RFC. At the hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the expert, including Best-Wi llie’s postural limitations a nd mental limitations, and-- 21 asked whether such an individual could pe rform Best-Willie’s past relevant work. The expert responded in the affirmative. In concluding that Best-Willie could perform that past relevant work, the ALJ not es the expert’s testimony. We perceive nothing improper with the ALJ’s analysis. Moreover, any legal error at step four is harmless in view of the ALJ’s alternate finding at step five that other jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Best-Willie could perform given her RFC for light work. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 138 9-90 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming step-five finding despite alleged errors at step four). Despite Be st-Willie’s argument to the contrary, we conclude that the ALJ’s step-five evaluation was proper. Best-Willie’s only claim of error is that the ALJ’s hypothetical regarding other jobs available in the national economy was incomplete because it did not include the limitations assessed by Drs. Hall and Charlat. But the ALJ’s hypothetical needed only to include those limitations “borne out by the evidentiary re cord.” Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995). And as we have already confirmed, the ALJ did not err in discounting the opinions of Drs. Hall and Charlat.
III For the foregoing reasons, the judgme nt of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge