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RULEMAKING PROCESS AND THE 

UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 6, 2008 

Serial No. 110–177 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California, Chairwoman 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MICHONE JOHNSON, Chief Counsel 

DANIEL FLORES, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MAY 6, 2008 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Linda T. Sa ́nchez, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Commercial and 

Administrative Law ............................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Utah, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law ........................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Susan E. Dudley, Administrator, Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Peter L. Strauss, Professor, Columbia Law School, New York, NY 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 42 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 44 

Mr. Curtis W. Copeland, Ph.D., Specialist in American National Government, 

Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 62 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 64 

James L. Gattuso, Esq., Senior Fellow in Regulatory Policy, Roe Institute 

for Economic Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 104 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 105 

Mr. Rick Melberth, Ph.D., Director of Regulatory Policy, OMB Watch, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 108 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 110 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Utah, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Commercial and Administrative Law ........................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Article submitted by the Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in Congress from the State of Utah, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 

Commercial and Administrative Law ................................................................. 128 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from the Honorable Susan E. Dudley, 

Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC .............................................................. 142 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Peter L. Strauss, Professor, Columbia Law School, New York, NY ........................................................................... 152 

Page

IV 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Curtis W. Copeland, Ph.D., Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 155 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from James L. Gattuso, Esq., Senior 

Fellow in Regulatory Policy, Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, 

The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC ...................................................... 158 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Rick Melberth, Ph.D., Director 

of Regulatory Policy, OMB Watch, Washington, DC ........................................ 165 

(1) 

RULEMAKING PROCESS AND THE 

UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY 

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL

AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Linda 

Sa ́nchez (Chairwoman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sa ́nchez, Johnson, Cannon, and Keller. 

Staff present: Susan Jensen, Majority Counsel; Daniel Flores, 

Minority Counsel; and Adam Russell, Majority Professional Staff 

Member. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. This hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law will now 

come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing at any time. 

I will recognize myself for a short statement. 

A year ago last February, this Subcommittee held a hearing on 

President Bush’s Executive Order 13422. This new order substantially amended President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, an 

order that had guided the OMB regulatory review process for the 

preceding 13 years. 

Specifically, the order requires agencies to identify specific market failures or problems that warrant a new regulation. Furthermore, agency heads are now required to designate a presidential 

appointee as an agency policy officer to control upcoming rulemaking. 

Many are very concerned that Executive Order 13422 would further politicize regulations, several of which were specifically created by experts to protect the health and safety of our citizens. 

I am concerned that the main thrust of this new order appears 

to be intended to shift control of the rulemaking process from the 

agencies, the entities that have the most substantive knowledge 

and experience, to the White House. 

The New York Times, for example, reported that President 

Bush’s order strengthens the hand of the White House in shaping 

rules that have, in the past, often been generated by civil servants 

and scientific experts. Commentators observed that it represented 

just another clandestine power grab by the Administration. These 

2 

thoughts and concerns were not just expressed by the so-called ‘‘liberal media’’ or partisan operatives. 

The independent fact finding arm of Congress, the Congressional 

Research Service, for example, says the revisions made by Executive Order 13422 represent a clear expansion of presidential authority over rulemaking agencies. 

CRS also notes that the order can be viewed as part of a broader 

statement of presidential authority presented throughout the Bush 

administration from declining to provide access to executive branch 

documents and information to creating presidential signing statements indicating that certain statutory provisions will be interpreted consistent with the President’s view of the unitary executive. 

Under this theory, the President, and only the President, can 

and should make the final decision. That is a rather serious observation coming from a preeminently nonpartisan source. 

Today, more than 1 year later, our concerns are even greater, as 

illustrated by the latest controversies involving the rulemaking 

process. These issues range from the Administration’s overriding 

the EPA’s proposed air quality standards for ozone levels to efforts 

by the Vice President to delay the promulgation of a rule protecting 

Wright whales from annihilation. 

Accordingly, I very much look forward to hearing the testimony 

and appreciate the witnesses’ willingness to participate in this 

hearing. 

At this time I would now recognize my colleague, Mr. Cannon, 

the distinguished Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, for his 

opening remarks. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I would like to extend a welcome to all of our witnesses today, 

including Ms. Dudley, and want to point out that this topic is really of great importance to our country. And I would like to thank 

you all for coming to share your ideas with us. 

Before I start, I would like to invite everyone to take a step back 

and to take a look at the big picture with me. Seventy-five years 

ago, the modern administered state exploded upon us with Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and continued to mushroom to the Fair 

Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society. 

By the time we reached the late 1970’s, Congress had enacted an 

enormous Federal bureaucracy, producing an equally enormous 

number of regulations. They had done this largely by delegating to 

that direction much of Congress’ own legislative power. By the time 

of the Carter administration, Congress’ ability to write broad 

framework statutes mandating that bureaucracy write legislative 

rules, filling in the details of Congress’ decisions, had risen practically to the state of a very high arm. 

What was the result? A weakened Congress, an immensely 

strengthened but wholly unaccountable Federal bureaucracy, a skyrocketing Federal budget and a staggering regulatory burden on 

our citizens and our economy, spreading in every direction as far 

as the eye could see or the mind could imagine. 

It took the executive some time, but eventually it woke up to the 

need to restore sanity to this situation, and starting with the 

Reagan administration, the Executive Office of the President began 

3 

to assert increased presidential control over myriad rulemaking activities in the Federal agencies. 

In 1981, through Executive Order 12291, President Reagan consolidated new regulatory review authority in the Office of Management and Budget. Much of this authority was housed in OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. 

In 1985, through Executive Order 12498, President Reagan also 

consolidated in OIRA White House review of agencies’ regulatory 

development agendas. The administration of President George 

H. W. Bush continued this basic framework, and with some moderate adjustment, so did the Clinton administration. The Clinton 

administration’s refinements occurred largely through Executive 

Order 12866, issued in 1993. 

The administration of the current President Bush has followed 

substantially this same framework. It has also brought within that 

framework the agencies’ burgeoning production of guidance; guidance often used by agencies to embellish their regulatory regimes 

while avoiding judicial review. 

There are those who say 25 years into this reaction by the presidency that the Bush administration has gone too far. They claim 

that the current President has unduly cut into the authority of 

Federal agencies. They say that Congress should step in to curtail 

executive authority over the executive branch. 

I see a very different picture in which over time Congress excessively delegated its authority to unelected officials in executive 

branch agencies, in which the executive wisely and consistently 

saw a need to restore order and accountability, and in which the 

solution to any overly zealous leadership of the executive branch by 

the executive is not the clipping of the executive’s wings but the 

strengthening of Congress. 

And on that point, I think we should have bipartisan agreement, 

because if a weak Congress foists off on the Nation a weak executive, all we will be left with is an uncontrolled Federal bureaucracy 

and no one, no one, can want that. If the executive is not within 

its rights in leading executive branch agencies, then what has become of the Constitution? 

So how do we strengthen Congress? Easy. We just pick up the 

tools Congress already has at its disposal and we use them with 

vigor. We legislate instead of delegating our legislative rights to the 

Federal bureaucracy. That is, Congress should vote on regulations 

before they become law. We also ought to make our laws clear 

enough that they don’t need vast amounts of interpretive regulations. 

We vigilantly oversee the executive through our oversight and we 

legislate in response to what we find. The fact is, we have been 

woefully inadequate for many years in oversight staff and oversight 

activities. We emphasize our power of the purse, sending strong 

signals to the executive about how we want him to lead the executive branch. And we at long last realize the promise of the Congressional Review Act, to pick up and disapprove agency rules that we 

think violate the substantive laws we pass, the Administrative Procedure Act or other procedural laws. 

What will the result of all of this be? A strong and accountable 

Congress pitted against a strong and accountable executive, and a 

4 

robust debate that can be only good for the country, which is precisely what the framers of the Constitution intended. 

I thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cannon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRIS CANNON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

I’d like to extend a welcome to all of our witnesses. 

This is a topic that is of great importance to our country. I’d like to thank you 

all for coming. 

But before we start, I’d like to invite everyone to take a step back and look at 

the big picture with me. 

Seventy-five years ago, the modern administrative state exploded upon us with 

Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. 

It continued to mushroom through the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great 

Society. 

By the time we reached the late 1970s, the Congress had erected an enormous 

federal bureaucracy, producing an equally enormous number of regulations. 

And they had done this largely by delegating to that bureaucracy much of Congress’ own legislative power. By the time of the Carter Administration, Congress’ 

ability to write broad framework statutes, mandating that the bureaucracy write 

legislative rules filling in the details of Congress’ decisions, had risen practically to 

the state of high art. 

What was the result? A weakened Congress; an immensely strengthened but 

wholly unaccountable federal bureaucracy; a skyrocketing federal budget; and a 

staggering regulatory burden on our citizens and our economy, spreading in every 

direction as far as the eye could see. 

It took the Executive some time, but eventually it woke up to the need to restore 

sanity to this situation. 

Starting with the Reagan Administration, the Executive Office of the President 

began to assert increased presidential control over myriad rulemaking activities of 

the federal agencies. 

In 1981, through Executive Order 12291, President Reagan consolidated new regulatory review authority in the Office of Management and Budget. Much of this authority was housed in OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. In 1985, 

through Executive Order 12498, President Reagan also consolidated in OIRA White 

House review of the agencies’ regulatory development agendas. 

The Administration of President George H.W. Bush continued this basic framework, and, with some moderate adjustments, so did the Clinton Administration. The 

Clinton Administration’s refinements occurred largely through Executive Order 

12866, issued in 1993. 

The Administration of the current President Bush has followed substantially this 

same framework. It also has brought within that framework the agencies’ burgeoning production of guidance—guidance often used by agencies to embellish their 

regulatory regimes while avoiding judicial review. 

There are those who say, twenty-five years into this reaction by the Presidency, 

that the Bush administration has gone too far. They claim that the current President has unduly cut into the authority of the federal agencies. They say that Congress should step in to curtail the Executive’s authority over the Executive Branch. 

I see a very different picture in which, over time, Congress excessively delegated 

its authority to unelected officials in Executive Branch agencies; in which the Executive wisely and consistently saw a need to restore order and accountability; and 

in which the solution to any overly zealous leadership of the Executive Branch by 

the Executive is not the clipping of the Executive’s wings, but the strengthening of 

Congress. 

Because, after all, if a weak Congress foists off on the Nation a weak Executive, 

all we will be left with is an uncontrolled federal bureaucracy—and no one can want 

that. 

And if the Executive is not within his rights in leading Executive Branch agencies, then what has become of our Constitution? 

So how do we strengthen Congress? Easy. We just pick up the tools Congress already has at its disposal—and we use them with vigor. 

We legislate instead of delegating our legislative rights to the federal bureaucracy. 

That is, Congress should vote on regulations before they become law. We also ought 

5 

to make our laws clear enough that they do not need vast amounts of interpretive 

regulations. 

We vigilantly oversee the Executive through our oversight—and we legislate in response to what we find. 

We exercise our power of the purse, sending strong signals to the Executive about 

how we want him to lead the Executive Branch. 

And we at long last realize the promise of the Congressional Review Act to pick 

up and disapprove agency rules that we think violate the substantive laws we pass, 

the Administrative Procedure Act, or other procedural laws. 

What will the result of all this be? A strong and accountable Congress, pitted 

against a strong and accountable Executive, in a robust debate that can only be 

good for the country—which is precisely what the framers of the Constitution intended. 

I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I thank the gentleman for his statement. 

Without objection, other Members’ opening statements will be included in the record. 

I am now pleased to introduce the witness for our first panel of 

today’s hearing. Our witness on the first panel is Susan Dudley. 

On April 4, 2007, Ms. Dudley was appointed to serve as the administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

OIRA, of the Office of Management and Budget. Prior to her service at OIRA, Ms. Dudley served at the nonprofit Mercatus Center 

at George Mason University, where she directed the regulatory 

studies program from 2003 to 2006. 

As an adjunct professor at the George Mason University School 

of Law, she designed and taught courses on regulations and led 

regulatory clinic. Ms. Dudley also served as a career civil servant, 

working as a policy analyst at the Environmental Protection Agency from 1984 to 1985, an economist at OIRA from 1985 until 1989 

and an economist advisor to the Commodities Futures Trading 

Commission from 1989 to 1991. 

From 1991 until 1998, she was a consultant to government and 

private clients at Economists, Incorporated. 

Ms. Dudley has authored more than 25 scholarly publications on 

regulatory matters ranging from e-rulemaking to electricity, health 

care, the environment and occupational safety. 

I want to thank you for your willingness to participate in today’s 

hearing. Without objection, your written statement will be placed 

into the record, and we would ask that you limit your oral remarks 

to 5 minutes. 

You will notice that we have a lighting system that starts with 

a green light. At 4 minutes, it will turn yellow, warning you that 

you have about a minute left. And at 5 minutes, the light will turn 

red. If you are mid-thought when your time expires, we will of 

course allow you to finish your last thought. 

After you have presented your testimony, Subcommittee Members are permitted to ask questions subject to the 5-minute limit. 

So, with that, I would invite Ms. Dudley to please proceed with 

her testimony. 

6 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. DUDLEY, ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. DUDLEY. Thank you, Chairwoman Sa ́nchez and Ranking 

Member Cannon. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

As administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and as you mentioned, Madam Chairman, as someone who 

has served as a career economist on the OIRA staff in the 1980’s, 

I am pleased to be here today to talk with you about OIRA’s role 

and the history of executive oversight of the regulatory process. 

OIRA was created as part of the Office of Management and 

Budget by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, more than 25 

years ago. Staffed almost exclusively by career civil servants, OIRA 

has served Administrations both Democratic and Republican, for 

decades, by providing centralized oversight and interagency coordination of Federal information, regulatory and statistical policy. 

Even before Congress created OIRA, though, Presidents had established regulatory oversight mechanisms within the executive office of the President. For example, President Carter relied on several EOP agencies, including OMB, to implement his executive 

order on improving government regulations. 

Each President since then has built on that foundation and over 

the course of more than three decades, regulatory analysis has 

emerged as an integral part of government accountability, a valuable tool for understanding the likely effects of regulations. 

The nonpartisan nature of this principled approach is reinforced 

by the fact that during the current Bush administration we have 

continued to operate under President Clinton’s Executive Order 

12866 with some minor amendments that I would be happy to discuss. 

Over the last 7 years, the Bush administration has further built 

on these foundations to enhance the oversight and accountability of 

the regulatory process. First, we have enhanced OIRA’s transparency. We have taken advantage of the Internet to list on our 

Web site all regulations under review. We also provide on our Web 

site lists of any meetings held with outside parties on rules under 

review. 

Second, over the last 5 years e-rulemaking has transformed access to Federal Government rulemaking process. Regulations.gov 

has brought government-wide information together and made it 

searchable and accessible for anyone with access to the Internet. 

Third, OIRA has undertaken several initiatives to improve the 

information and analysis on which new regulations are based. 

These are summarized in my written testimony, so today I will 

focus on two initiatives in which this Committee had expressed an 

interest in the past. 

One, the first, is the final bulletin for Agency Good Guidance 

Practices. And the other is the January 2007 amendments to Executive Order 12866. While I was not at OMB when these were 

issued, I can provide you with an update on how they are being implemented. 

In January 2007, after soliciting and responding to public and 

interagency comments, OMB issued a final bulletin for agency good 

7 

guidance practices to increase the quality, accountability and transparency of agency guidance documents. Most agencies have substantially complied with these requirements by updating their Web 

sites so the public can know what guidance applies to them and 

have the opportunity to provide feedback on significant guidance. 

For example, EPA and the Department of Labor have done outstanding jobs of making their guidance documents available to the 

public. Other agencies have made a lot of progress, but have not 

met all of the bulletin’s requirements, and we are continuing to 

work with the agencies. But overall, we are pleased with their 

progress. 

On the same day that OMB released the final bulletin, the President issued Executive Order 13422, which amended EO 12866, to 

clarify OMB’s authority to coordinate interagency review of agency 

significant guidance documents. Before issuance of these amendments, OMB reviewed some agency guidance documents, but the 

process was not as systematic. 

EO 13422 also made several process amendments to EO 12866 

to encourage good government practices, and I would be happy to 

discuss implementation of those if you would like. 

But in conclusion, let me wrap up by observing that the executive oversight of agency rulemaking has a long history that transcends party lines. It is important for a well-functioning, accountable regulatory system that meets the needs of the American people. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dudley follows:] 

8 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. DUDLEY


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Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, Ms. Dudley. 

We will now begin the questioning, and I will begin by recognizing myself for 5 minutes of questions. 

I am interested in knowing, Ms. Dudley, what your view of the 

power of the President is to determine the substance of final rules? 

Do you think that that is appropriate? 

Ms. DUDLEY. I am not a constitutional lawyer, but I believe the 

role of executive oversight, as they have been established by President Carter and subsequent Presidents. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. If Congress says that an agency and not the 

President should promulgate regulations in a particular area, 

should the President be able to substitute his or her judgment for 

that of the agency to whom Congress has delegated the rulemaking 

authority? 

Ms. DUDLEY. Executive Order 12866 that we operate under now 

that was issued by President Clinton in 1993, it gives the agencies 

primacy in writing their regulations. And my office’s role is coordination, review, to ensure consistency with the principles in the executive order. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. So if I am understanding your answer correctly, 

the agency would have the final determination of the rulemaking? 

Ms. DUDLEY. That is how Executive Order 12866 is characterized, yes. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. Because my understanding is that in Section 7 of Executive Order 12866 the President will resolve differences between the agencies and OIRA unless otherwise prohibited by law, and I am sort of interested in knowing how you view 

that restriction. 

For example, could Congress prevent the President from making 

the final decision on an agency rule? 

Ms. DUDLEY. I would probably have to defer that to a constitutional lawyer. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. You don’t have an opinion either—— 

Ms. DUDLEY [continuing]. In my long experience in this in the 

regulatory world, but that wouldn’t be my expertise. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. No opinion on the—— 

Mr. CANNON. She is asking can we limit the President’s authority. We do that all the time. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I am asking somebody who has inside knowledge 

whether or not it—because there is this discussion whether Executive Order 12866 is significantly different from 13422. And I maintain that there is quite a large difference in the two executive orders, that they are—the point that I am trying to get at is that Executive Order 12866 gives agencies, I think, primary authority. 

And that Executive Order 13422, by the subtle changes, the 

changes that it has made, is trying to take away some of that agency power and put it into the hands of the executive office. And that 

is my concern. So I am interested in knowing—— 

Ms. DUDLEY. I could comment on that. Actually, that language 

in Executive Order 12866 is unchanged. So it is the same language 

in both, as is the appeals process. 

There is a change in the appeals process that we can discuss if 

you like, but that language remains unchanged. 

38 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. In your written statement, you mentioned 

the efforts of your predecessor, John Graham, to increase the transparency of OIRA reviews. Dr. Graham, however, also said that 

OIRA has its greatest impact on agency rules during information 

reviews and that agencies should not disclose the changes that are 

made to rules during this period, at OIRA’s suggestion, even after 

the rules have been published in the Federal register. 

How, then, can you say that OIRA is transparent when it is not 

transparent about the most important part of the process? 

Ms. DUDLEY. Informal review of rules is something that agencies 

might initiate before they have a draft that is really ready for 

primetime. And so at their request we will begin to look at pieces 

of regulations before it is ready to be formally submitted. 

As I understand it, that is not a new process that John Graham 

created. That is something that has been ongoing in the Clinton 

administration as well. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I understand that, but how can you say that the 

process should be more transparent if indeed there is a great 

amount of changes that happen during the informal process? 

Ms. DUDLEY. During the informal process, that is a time when 

often the agency itself is also working on the regulation. I don’t 

know when would be the bright line to draw and when any draft 

or idea should be made public. 

A decision has been made that when a regulation is submitted 

formally for OMB review, we provide both that draft and we also 

provide the draft regulation as it leaves OMB, at the conclusion of 

review. 

So that is something that I think it is quite a bit of transparency. 

There is always a struggle to balance the need for public to get information and the ability for frank discussions of a deliberative nature before something is complete. And I think that is the balance 

that has been made. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Final question before time runs out. In your written statement, you mentioned OMB Circular A4 and OIRA’s increased emphasis on cost-benefit analysis. In your opinion, does 

OIRA apply that circular equally among the agencies? 

Ms. DUDLEY. Circular A4 is actually a—it is based on best practices that were issued in the Clinton administration. It is applied 

to the extent that statutes permit, and there are some statutes that 

the full range of things discussed in A4 can be applied and others 

that cannot. 

So, no, it would not be applied equally. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. My last point was going to be that most of the 

rules from the Department of Homeland Security have not had 

monetized cost and/or benefits, yet they have been approved by 

OIRA, while at the same time rules from EPA have been rejected 

by OIRA because they hadn’t fully monetized the costs or benefits. 

And I think that there is—the question that I have is why would 

the two be treated differently, if the intent is that that circular 

would apply to all of them? 

Ms. DUDLEY. I guess I am not sure I agree with the premise that 

EPA regulations have been rejected if they don’t fully monetize 

costs and benefits. The fact of the matter is, EPA is very good at 

doing regulatory analysis. They have been doing it for longer, and 

39 

they do a very good job of their regulatory analysis, which includes 

cost-benefit analysis, but not exclusively. 

Department of Homeland Security is a newer agency and we are 

working closely with them. There are struggles. Some of the benefits and costs of Homeland Security regulations are difficult to get 

a handle on. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. But if the goal is to have everybody doing the costbenefit analysis and some rules are being rejected because it is not 

adequate and others that are less forthcoming about information, 

about the costs and benefits, are being allowed to pass, there seems 

to me some disparate treatment of rules from different agencies. 

Ms. DUDLEY. And that is where I can’t agree with you. I don’t 

think that you could find—maybe you could. I don’t think that EPA 

rules are being rejected because the cost-benefit analysis is not 

adequate. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. We will have to agree to disagree. 

I will now recognize Mr. Cannon for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

In your good guidance practices, you talked about transparency. 

Do you encourage agencies to create transparency in requests for 

guidance as well as the guidance that is given by the agency? 

In other words, if a person says, ‘‘I need to know how you are 

going to implement the law in my case,’’ he explains the case, is 

that going to be made available to other people who might have 

similar questions? 

Ms. DUDLEY. So do you mean people might ask for clarification 

and a letter that provides clarification? 

The good guidance practices applies to significant guidance. Significant in economically significant. That might not be classified as 

a significant guidance if it applied only to one company or a small 

group of entities. So it may not cover that. 

Mr. CANNON. I have a problem with significant, a word that has 

some kind of content but it is hard to describe what it actually is. 

And in a world where Google makes information freely available, 

significant seems to me to plummet, and it actually bumps into 

the—it may irritate bureaucrats at some point in time, but if you— 

I am just going to give a little bit of counsel that I hope you will 

take kindly. And that is that I think that agencies should be much 

more transparent and open. And that if an individual has a question that is important to him or his company, the fact that a bureaucrat can say this is not significant, may be the basis for actual 

persecution, something that we have actually seen among my constituents, and I suspect everyone else’s constituents has as well. 

So I would hope that in the pursuit of transparency, we recognize 

the radically lowered cost of information. 

And with that, Madam Chair, I appreciate your questioning, and 

I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. The gentleman yields back. 

At this time I will recognize Mr. Keller, the gentleman from Florida, for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Administrator Dudley, thank you for being here today. 

Executive Order 13422 and its accompanying good guidance bulletin have now been in effect for 15 months. What, in your view, 

40 

has been the overall impact of this executive order and the bulletin? 

Ms. DUDLEY. I would say the main impact of both is that guidance documents are—the public has a greater opportunity to see 

and comment on guidance documents. They should be placed on 

agencies Web sites with easy access so that the public can not only 

see what applies to them, but see comments on that. 

And in terms of the executive order, it is the guidance provision, 

because those guidance documents, the most significant of them, 

OMB knows about them and when necessary we conduct interagency review. 

Mr. KELLER. Aside from the public nature of the guidance documents, what in your view has been the chief practical differences 

in OIRA and agency practices since the executive order and the 

good guidance bulletin were issued? 

Ms. DUDLEY. Of the non-guidance provisions, I would say the requirements for the regulatory policy officer. Regulatory policy officers were a component of the original executive order, and what 

the January 2007 amendment did is it made them—required that 

they be presidential appointees. 

We now know who they are. It is posted on our Web site, the list 

of both the office as well as the individual serving in that capacity, 

for every agency. And I think that has made it more transparent 

for the public and for us. 

Mr. KELLER. Mr. Copeland, who will testify in a little bit, suggests in his written testimony that Executive Order 13422 eliminated the requirement that regulatory policy officers report to their 

agency heads. Is that suggestion correct, in your view? 

Ms. DUDLEY. No. We provided implementation guidance for the 

executive order and the good guidance and made very clear that 

the regulatory policy officer, it is a presidential appointee, but he 

is serving in an agency. So it is the general counsel of an agency, 

the deputy secretary, sometimes the assistant secretary for policy. 

So these are existing positions who have their existing reporting 

framework through the director of the agency. 

So as always, it is the head of the agency that has that ultimate 

authority. 

Mr. KELLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Copeland also suggests, I think, that Executive Order 13422 

amendments to the regulatory review process will somehow slow 

down the process. Are you aware of any evidence that that has 

happened? 

Ms. DUDLEY. I don’t have any evidence of that. We are reviewing 

the same number of regulations that we were before the executive 

order was passed. I have statistics. And we have been reviewing 

about 600 regulations a year since the nineties, since 1993. 

Mr. KELLER. Okay. Thank you. 

And Madam Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. 

I want to thank Ms. Dudley. You may now be excused and we 

will take a short recess to allow our second panel of witnesses to 

be set up and to come forward to the dais. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. The Committee is now resumed. 

41 

I am pleased to welcome our second panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Professor Peter Strauss. Professor Strauss is 

the Betts professor of law at Columbia Law School. A renown 

scholar of administrative law, Professor Strauss has taught that 

subject at Columbia for the past 36 years, just a short period of 

time. 

Professor Strauss clerked for Associate Justice William Brennan 

and Chief Judge David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 

It is an honor to have you testify before the Subcommittee again, 

Professor Strauss, and we want to welcome you. 

Our second witness is Curtis Copeland. Dr. Copeland is a specialist in American national government at CRS. His expertise appropriately relevant to today’s hearing, is Federal rulemaking and 

regulatory policy. 

Dr. Copeland has previously testified before this Subcommittee 

and he is one of three CRS experts who are assisting the Subcommittee in the conduct of its administrative law project. 

Prior to joining CRS, Dr. Copeland held a variety of positions at 

the Government Accountability Office over a 23-year period. 

It is good to see you again, Dr. Copeland. Thank you for being 

here. 

Our third witness is James Gattuso. Mr. Gattuso is a research 

fellow in regulatory policy for Roe Institute for Economic Policy 

Studies at the Heritage Foundation. Specifically, Mr. Gattuso handles regulatory and telecommunications issues. Previously, Mr. 

Gattuso served as a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation 

with responsibility for a broad range of issues, including telecommunications, transportation and anti-trust policy. 

Prior to joining Heritage, he was vice president for policy at the 

Competitive Enterprise Institute. In that position, he oversaw 

CEI’s policy work and supervised the overall management of the 

organization. 

Before joining CEI in 1997, Mr. Gattuso served as vice president 

for policy development with Citizens for a Sound Economy from 

1993 to 1997, where he directed the research activities of that organization. From 1990 to 1993, he was deputy chief of the Office of 

Plans and Policy at the Federal Communications Commission. 

So welcome to you, Mr. Gattuso. 

Our final witness is Rick Melberth. Dr. Melberth joined OMB 

Watch in November 2006 as director of Federal regulatory policy, 

a program which works to protect and improve the government’s 

ability to develop and enforce safeguards for public health, safety, 

environment and civil rights. He directs all activities related to policy, advocacy, analysis, research, monitoring and public education. 

Prior to joining OMB Watch, Dr. Melberth was the director of internal planning and formerly the associate director of the environmental law center at the Vermont Law School. He helped design 

the curriculum and taught courses in the Master’s program. 

Dr. Melberth has written several pieces about decision-making in 

government and environmental issues during his academic career 

and while working as an independent consultant and policy analyst. 

42 

I want to thank you all for your willingness to participate in today’s hearing. You have heard about the lighting system. I am just 

going to remind you, you have 5 minutes for your testimony and 

you will get a series of lights; green when you begin your testimony, yellow when you have a minute remaining, and red when 

your time has expired. 

I am going to apologize because I am going to need to go to the 

floor to debate a bill of mine, and so we will have somebody else 

filling in in the Chairman position, and that will be Mr. Johnson. 

But at this time I would invite Professor Strauss to begin his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF PETER L. STRAUSS, PROFESSOR, 

COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, NEW YORK, NY 

Mr. STRAUSS. Chairwoman Sa ́nchez, Ranking Member Cannon, 

Congressmen Keller and Johnson, I am deeply honored to be 

present today for this important hearing. 

You have got my prepared testimony and it doesn’t make much 

sense to read the bulk of it. You ought to appreciate from the excellent submissions of others and what your experience has also 

taught you, which is that presidential oversight of rulemaking has 

been with us for more than three decades. Indeed, the academic 

community and my impression as well is that Congress is in agreement that, within its limits, at least, the practice of executive oversight is a sound one. 

At the same time, and responding to Ranking Member Cannon’s 

remarks about delegation, it seems to me that Congress commits 

limited tasks to administrative agencies, and when it does so it expects them to be performed with fidelity to scientific judgment and 

observance of the limited factors that Congress may have made relevant. 

The present difficulties in my judgment arise from presidential 

practices that threaten these limits. Maybe next year, with former 

senators in the White House, respect for Congress’ work will return 

to a greater degree than one now sees. 

We all do understand that the Constitution creates a single chief 

executive officer, the President, as the head of government. Congress defines the work that its statutes detail. We have a unitary 

executive. Disagreement is about what the President’s function is. 

But once Congress has created a government agency and said 

what its responsibilities are, we know that the roles of Congress 

and the court are to oversee the agency in its assigned work, not 

actually to perform that work. 

When Congress authorizes the EPA to regulate pollution or 

OSHA to regulate workplace safety, can the President decide these 

matters? Or is he too only to oversee the agency’s decision processes? 

Our Constitution it seems to me is quite specific about this. It 

recognizes that departments will have duties. It permits Congress 

to assign duties to administrative agencies rather than the President. And when it does, the President is not the decider of these 

matters. Attorney General Wirt back in 1823 told President Monroe that the President’s role is to give general superintendence to 

those to whom Congress has assigned executive duties as it could 

43 

never have been the intention of the Constitution that he should 

in person execute the laws himself. 

Were the President to perform a statutory duty assigned to another, he would not only not be taking care that the laws were 

faithfully executed, but he would be violating them himself. That 

is, the assignment of decisional responsibility to others is a part of 

the laws to whose faithful execution the President is to see. And 

when agency officials treat the President as the person entitled to 

decide matters the Congress has committed uniquely to their judgment, they too fail in their obligations to the law. 

They do have to consult with him. The Constitution is quite specific about that. But at the end of the day, they are the ones responsible for deciding any matters that Congress places in their 

charge. 

I do want to be clear. These are not simple issues. We have a 

single chief executive. The President’s politics stand behind appointments to high office and he properly claims opportunities to 

discuss his Administration’s policy preferences with his appointees. 

Indeed, the Constitution’s text is explicit that he can demand consultation, in writing, on matters within. But then this is the word 

the Constitution uses—the duties of their offices. They are the ones 

with the duties. 

The right to discipline any appointee, even an independent regulatory commissioner who refuses to consult him and hear his views, 

is the President’s. And insofar as it creates a framework for consultation, Executive Order 12866 reflects a sound view of executive 

authority, and it would do so even if it were fully extended to the 

independent regulatory commissions, as many of us have recommended. 

The difficulties arise when the President reaches past consultation to demanding particular decisions. This is the subtle ground 

between hearing out the President and obeying him. And this is 

the issue that concerns me here. 

Chairwoman Sa ́nchez made some reference to the matters that 

have been in the papers in recent weeks. They are only examples, 

and I don’t think my limited time permits me to go into them, but 

they do suggest that a fair amount of bending science is going on. 

Or to put it another way, that the President has been injecting into 

the decision process factors that Congress has specifically forbidden 

the agencies responsible for these decisions to take into account. 

The courts have said, responding to your instructions, and on arguments from the solicitor general, that costs are not a part of the 

EPA’s business. They have tolerated the delegation to the EPA of 

the vast authority that it has on the understanding that it won’t 

be considering costs. But what is motivating the apparent interference with EPA’s judgment about ozone standards? 

Mr. JOHNSON. [Presiding.] Professor Strauss, your time has expired. If you would wrap up. 

Mr. STRAUSS. Yes, absolutely. Just one other thing that I would 

like to say, if I may, which is to suggest that among the possible 

responses the Congress might have is the one that I heard Ranking 

Member Cannon mention, the power of the purse. 

When the House attempted to exercise that power last summer 

in connection with the President’s remarkable amendments to ExVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:03 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\050608\42214.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42214
44 

ecutive Order 12866, I understand that OMB responded with the 

claim that a failure to appropriate funds for OIRA would be an unconstitutional intrusion on the President’s constitutional authority, 

the power of the unitary executive. What a laughable claim that is. 

The President, like the King of England in his battles with Parliament, has got to rely on you for the funds he desires, and if you 

find him abusing his authority, you can withhold those funds. 

Thank you again for the privilege of testifying today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Strauss follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER L. STRAUSS


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Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Professor Strauss, and it has come to 

our attention that you have to depart early from this hearing, but 

your testimony has generated such interest that we would like to 

take the opportunity to question you prior to us hearing from the 

other witnesses. So I will begin. 

Dr. Copeland says that there may be little difference in practice 

between the unitary executive position in which the President can 

and should make the final decision and the traditional or presidential oversight perspective since even in the traditional perspective, the President can have the last word if he is willing to fire 

someone and take the political heat. 

How do you respond to that? 

Mr. STRAUSS. Well, this goes in part to my concerns about the 

regulatory policy officers, which I expressed to this Committee at 

its hearing shortly after Executive Order 13422 was promulgated. 

It is the regulatory policy officer who is going to be fired, the 

presidential appointee who is directly responsible to OIRA, and this 

is not necessarily a person in the position that the head of an agency is in political terms to take the political heat, would be involved 

in standing up to the President and saying, ‘‘If you want to displace 

my judgment, Mr. President, you are going to have to send me 

home.’’ 

That political heat has been felt on numerous occasions and it 

constrains Presidents. If they have to operate in public by firing 

someone, that is quite a different setting, at least in my judgment, 

from the psychology that attends and understanding that I have 

the legal obligation to do what the President tells me to do—if an 

administrator understands that at the end of the day it is her judgment and she has the right to make that judgment, it will often 

be the case that the President will not respond. 

It may indeed often be the case that what she has heard about 

the President wants ‘‘X’’ from a member of the White House bureaucracy will not be anything that crossed the President’s desk or 

the President’s mind at all. There is a terrific piece in the recent 

law school literature by professors at Vanderbilt University Lisa 

Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh detailing conversations they 

had with senior officials at EPA during both the Clinton and the 

first Bush administrations. And what she reports was that they 

were hearing from many different groups in the name of the President in the White House and in many different ways. It is not just 

one person. 

I think getting clarity—it is going to be the President who fires 

the administrator of the EPA if that is what happens—getting clarity and getting the political heat that will attend that—we can all 

think of occasions where the President has indeed let the administrator of EPA go. Ann Gorsuch comes to mind. And then in the 

wake of that, Congress’ authority over who would replace her creates a decided restraint on the kind of environmental policy that 

the presidential administration is able subsequently to carry forward. 

So I just don’t agree with the proposition that these are equivalent. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Professor Strauss. 

60 

I will now yield the balance of my time and yield to Mr. Cannon 

for questions. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you. 

I appreciate the fact you asked a question about firing, because 

it seems to me that as coarse as that is, that really is one of the 

clear authorities of the President and is now well-established historically. 

So in considering your testimony, Professor Strauss, I find that 

we have very few differences. Hardly anything of substance. I 

would characterize the President’s authority to fire exactly as you 

have. It is a heavy-handed kind of thing. 

I think personally it would be wonderful if the President said I 

am going to change my administrators regularly and often, and 

allow people to come in with a fresh perspective and do something 

and then move on in their lives. 

I mean, if you can shorten the time frame of getting a message 

from Washington to Boston and back as much as we have from 

horseback to e-mail, we ought to be able to move administrators 

back and forth. That would take the support of the Senate, I think, 

and that would be nice, if we could work together in that regard. 

And I appreciate, by the way, your explanation. I was going to 

ask you about Article 2 and how that, the faithfully executed 

clause, how that works, and I think that your view—that you have 

dealt with those things quite well. 

Probably the only place where we really disagree is in how this 

relates to the practice of this Administration or the last Administration. I am not sure it is a partisan thing, but what we have— 

in fact, I am intrigued by your last comment, when you were talking about many people talking with people at EPA in the name of 

the President. The problem is, the President can’t possibly know 

what all those people think or what their personal agendas are. 

But it is the complexity of government that leads us to the point 

where we have that lack of clarity. 

But the problem with many people and many ideas and one 

President’s name is a problem that relates to the complexity of government. Aren’t we better off focusing on how we can change that 

complexity, for instance taking agencies—I would not at this point 

suggest EPA, by the way, but something like, say, for instance, the 

Surface Coal Mining Administration—that is already operated by 

States, and turning that into an interstate compact and letting the 

States deal with that so that they can decide policy and not have 

the President and his minions or his delegates interfering? 

Mr. STRAUSS. Well, I think that cooperative federalism is often 

a useful way to go. One has to be careful not to try to use it in 

situations where States will be attempting to take advantage of one 

another but where you can reliably see that all have the same interests, for sure. 

Mr. CANNON. I suspect when you say taken advantage, are you 

suggesting that if they had an interstate compact instead of Federal control, some States might want to make it cheaper and easier 

to produce coal than other States? 

I am joking here a little bit, because I actually was at Interior 

and oversaw the writing of those regulations, both for reclamation 

and enforcement. 

61 

But my point is that it may actually be healthy to have the debate in States. Do we want to have lower standards of reclamation 

or do we want to preserve the quality of our State. I think that the 

States are pretty much, in that particular case and generally 

speaking, going to demand a higher standard than I think even the 

Federal Government would demand. 

Mr. STRAUSS. It is entirely possible. 

The risk in interstate compacts that the framers foresaw and 

which has often come up in the past is that North Carolina apple 

producers will want to do something that puts Washington apple 

producers at a disadvantage. That is the matter against which you 

have to be—— 

Mr. CANNON. And hence the founders’ requirement in the Constitution that we do it by Federal legislation. See, that is the context. 

Mr. STRAUSS. Right. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you. 

Let me just point out, I think that the other place where—I don’t 

think that we have actually disagreed, but as a matter of emphasis, I think sort of the core of your statement goes to what is forbidden by Congress, is a term you used. Isn’t that really our problem, 

to be clear in how we delegate? Because if we say the administrator 

of EPA will make this decision, we have the ability to limit the 

President, he is then left with the Constitutional context but with 

a stronger position as to the decision he makes, and ultimately fire 

me if he disagrees with the President. 

Mr. STRAUSS. I think we are getting into here into what may 

seem a subtle disagreement between myself and the current dean 

at the Harvard Law School, Elena Kagan, who has taken the position, which is a respectable position in academic circles, that it 

ought to be presumed that when Congress passes a statute empowering the head of EPA or whomever to do something, that actually 

the President does have the right to call the shots, but that Congress could always say, ‘‘No, no, we mean explicitly the head of the 

EPA and, Mr. President, you stay out of it.’’ 

My position rather is when you pass a statute that says to the 

EPA you are to set Clean Air Act standards, and we want you to 

set Clean Air Act standards following the following criteria, which 

don’t happen to include cost, that is enough, because if it once gets 

into the White House, you are never going to have that control over 

is it just the science, is it just the best available technology, or is 

somebody figuring out that, well, this would be less costly for the 

economy, which wisely or not you in Congress have taken out of 

EPA’s consideration. 

Mr. CANNON. I think that I probably agree with Ms. Kagan on 

that particular point, but it is narrow. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. STRAUSS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

And thank you for your testimony, Professor Strauss. 

Mr. STRAUSS. I won’t have to leave for another 45 minutes. I will 

stay at the table, if you don’t mind. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. 

62 

Dr. Copeland, please begin your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF CURTIS W. COPELAND, Ph.D., SPECIALIST IN 

AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. COPELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Cannon. 

Thank you very much for inviting me here to discuss Federal rulemaking and the unitary executive principle. 

Since 1981, the center of presidential influence on rulemaking 

has been OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

which must approve most significant rules before they are published in the Federal register. 

OIRA’s role has varied by presidential administration, but during 

the current Bush administration it has returned to the gatekeeper 

role that it had during the Reagan years. That gatekeeper role has 

been manifested in various ways, including an increased emphasis 

on cost-benefit analysis during OIRA reviews, an early increase in 

the use of return letters, the increased use of informal OIRA reviews of agency rules, extensions of OIRA reviews for months or 

even years beyond the 90-day time limit, the development of OMB 

bulletins on peer review, risk assessment and agency guidance 

practices. 

Also, Executive Order 13422, among other things, eliminated the 

specific requirement that agency regulatory policy officers report to 

agency heads and gave those officers the general authority to control rulemaking activity in the agencies. The order also expanded 

OIRA’s reviews to include significant agency guidance documents. 

And taken together, all of these actions by the Bush administration 

represent what appears to be the strongest assertion of presidential 

power in the area of rulemaking in at least 20 years. 

There seem to be at least three perspectives regarding presidential power and rulemaking. One is the unitary executive principle position, which asserts that the President should be able to 

make the final decision regarding substantive agency rules, even 

when Congress has assigned rulemaking activities to the agencies. 

Another is the traditional or classical perspective, which says the 

President cannot make the final decision on rules assigned to the 

agencies, but can attempt to influence agency officials up to and including firing them if they disagree. 

The third position, as Professor Strauss just said, is one advocated by Dean Elena Kagan of Harvard University, in which the 

President can determine the substance of agency rules, but not if 

Congress has specifically prohibited or limited the presidential 

intervention. 

Ultimately, though, these three positions may represent distinctions without a substantive policy difference, for in all three the 

President can ultimately dictate the outcome if he is willing to pay 

the political cost associated with the dismissal of an appointee. 

One of the clearest examples of presidential power in the area of 

rulemaking occurred in relation to a recent EPA rule on ozone. It 

was clear from the memoranda and letters later released that EPA 

initially resisted but ultimately adopted OIRA’s and the President’s 

position on the rule. 

63 

Notably, the President’s authority to make the final decision in 

agency appeals of OIRA decisions was established by executive 

order during the Clinton administration. 

The EPA ozone case was somewhat unique in that it pulled back 

the curtain on how final regulatory decisions can be made under 

presidential review. However, in many cases it is very difficult for 

outsiders to know what effect OIRA or the various presidential initiatives have had on particular rules. 

For example, although OIRA says it has its greatest impact on 

rules during informal reviews, it also says that agencies should not 

disclose the changes made during those reviews to the public, even 

after the rules are published in the Federal Register. 

Also, it is currently unclear what effects recent changes in risk 

assessment, peer review, guidance documents and regulatory policy 

officers are actually having on agency rules. 

Although all regulations start with an act of Congress, Congress 

has been arguably less active than the President in recent years in 

controlling the rulemaking agenda. If Congress decides it wants to 

asserts more authority in agency rulemaking, it would have a number of options. 

For example, it could, one, ask nominees during the confirmation 

process how they would react to presidential rulemaking direction 

that was contrary to statutory requirements. Two, consider giving 

agency heads ‘‘for cause’’ removal protection. Three, consider restricting the ability of OIRA to review certain types of rules. Four, 

specifically indicate that the agency head, not the President, has 

final rulemaking authority in certain areas. Five, increase the 

transparency of OIRA’s review process. And, six, be more specific 

in its delegations of rulemaking authority to the agencies. 

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to conclude my prepared statement. 

I would be happy to answer any questions at this time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Copeland follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF CURTIS W. COPELAND


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Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Dr. Copeland. 

Mr. Gattuso, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES L. GATTUSO, ESQ., SENIOR FELLOW IN 

REGULATORY POLICY, ROE INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Mr. GATTUSO. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me here today to discuss this important 

topic. 

President John Kennedy is said once to have told a petitioner in 

his office, ‘‘I agree with you, but I don’t know if the government 

will.’’ And that statement encapsulates in many ways the questions 

being discussed today. To what extent can or should the President 

be able to ensure that his views and priorities are reflected in the 

decisions of the executive branch. 

Charged in the Constitution with taking care that the laws be 

faithfully executed, Presidents often find their efforts frustrated by 

the machinery of the executive branch which they themselves head. 

Nowhere is the challenge greater than in the area of regulation. 

Over 50 agencies produce thousands of new rules each year, and 

some 70,000 pages in the Federal Register. 

That is why starting a generation ago Presidents began to establish systematic review processes for the promulgation of regulations. 

Since the first review processes were established, seven Administrations, five Republican and two Democratic, have built upon 

them. Each has changed the system in various ways, most improving upon that of its predecessor, but none has challenged its basic 

utility or legitimacy. 

The debate over the Constitutional status of the system is joined, 

however, when that system conflicts with congressional assignments of responsibility or discretion to others within the executive 

branch. In such cases, some have argued, including the earlier witnesses today, that the President may not substitute his judgment 

for the judgment of the officer selected by the President to perform 

a particular duty. In other words, the President is not the ‘‘decider’’ 

but merely the ‘‘overseer’’ of decisions by others. 

In my view, the problem with this contention is that the Constitution invests executive power in a President of the United 

States of America, not in plural Presidents, not in a President and 

other officers designated by Congress, but in a President. The idea 

that the executive power is shared or can be unbundled is contrary 

to the common sense meaning of the language of Article 2. 

It also would be a surprise to millions of people voting today in 

Indiana and North Carolina to hear that their votes are not for a 

President who can decide issues, a President who can set policy, 

but merely an overseer of decisions by others, a consultant, someone who guides but does not lead. I think that is contrary to the 

common understanding of our political system. 

That said, I believe also that the theoretical differences in the debate over the unitary executive may not come down to much in 

practical application. There may be less here than meets the eye. 

105 

1The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 2Quoted in Elena Kagan, ‘‘Presidential Administration,’’ 114 Harvard L. Review 2245 (2001). 

Critics of the unitarian executive concept largely recognize the 

President’s power to articulate priorities and views, request adherence to them and dismiss those that do not help carry out his agenda. Conversely, most proponents of the unitary executive view accept Congress’ power to assign initial responsibility and duties to 

other officers in the executive branch as long as the President has 

ultimate authority over the policies that are set. 

In practice, executive branch officers, being appointees of the 

President, in the vast majority of cases accept the articulated priorities of the President, and when they do not, resignation or dismissal is the next likely option. 

When that resignation or dismissal is not on the table explicitly, 

it is always on the table implicitly. As I think anyone who has 

served in the executive branch would realize, that if they explicitly 

contest a specific decision of the President or someone who is representing or speaking for the President, they can do that, but they 

had better have their bags packed just in case. 

And frankly, this is as it should be for many reasons. The most 

important of these, and perhaps counter-intuitively, is the check 

that clear responsibility provides over presidential power. A President cannot simply mumble, ‘‘My hands are tied,’’ when he is ultimately responsible for decisions. I think that limits presidential 

power and is good for our political system. 

Critically, however, none of this means that Congress has no authority in regulatory policy. In fact, it still has primary authority. 

This can be exercised in several ways. Congress can simply make 

a statute more explicit. Or, even better, make its intent clear in the 

first instance when legislating. Secondly, under the Congressional 

Review Act of 1996, a particular regulatory decision may be specifically disapproved by Congress under expedited rules of procedure. 

Thirdly, Congress’ influence over regulatory policy could be expanded through the creation of institutions within Congress, such 

as a congressional regulation office. Such an office, which would be 

similar to the Congressional Budget Office, could review the regulatory impact of legislative proposals and report on the effects of 

rules adopted by agencies. In this way, a congressional regulation 

office could act as both a complement to and a check on the power 

of OIRA. 

Thank you for your time. I will be glad to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gattuso follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES L. GATTUSO

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: thank you for inviting me 

here today to discuss this important topic.1

‘‘I agree with you, but I don’t know if the government will,’’ President John Kennedy is said to have once told a visitor.’’ 2 Kennedy’s lament encapsulates in many 

ways the questions being discussed today. To what extent can—or should—a president be able to ensure that his views and priorities are reflected throughout the executive branch? 

It’s not just a matter of constitutional principle. Perhaps the greatest challenge 

faced by presidents in this regard is a practical one. Charged by the constitution 

with ‘‘tak[ing] care that the laws be faithfully executed,’’ they often find their efforts 

frustrated by the machinery of the executive branch which they head. Reflecting 

106 

3 Ibid. 

4See, Murray Weidenbaum, ‘‘Regulatory Process Reform: From Ford to Clinton,’’ Regulation 

(1997). 5 James C. Miller III, Christopher DeMuth, Wendy L. Gramm, Sally Katzen, John Spotila and 

John D. Graham, letter the Honorable Susan M. Collins and Joseph Lieberman, September 20, 

2006. 

this frustration, Harry Truman predicted difficulties for his successor, the former 

general Dwight Eisenhower: ‘‘[H]e’ll say, ’Do this! Do That!’ And nothing will happen.’’ 3

Nowhere is the challenge been greater than in the area of regulation. More than 

50 agencies, ranging from the Animal and Plant Inspection Service to the Bureau 

of Customs and Border Protection, have a hand in federal regulatory policy. With 

nearly 250,000 employees, they produce over 4,000 new rules—and some 70,000 

pages in the Federal Register—each year. 

Managing this regulatory machinery in a way that not only reflects the president’s priorities but faithfully executes the will of Congress and the mandates of the 

courts is no easy task. That is why, starting a generation ago, presidents began to 

establish systematic review processes for the promulgation of regulations. 

The first such process was created in 1971, when President Richard Nixon required regulatory agencies to perform ‘‘quality of life’’ analyses of significant new 

regulations. Supervised by the Office of Management of Budget, the analyses were 

to outline regulatory analyses and their costs.4

Gerald Ford expanded on this process, making control of regulatory growth part 

of his war on inflation, requiring agencies to prepare ‘‘Inflation Impact Statements,’’ 

which were reviewed by the White House Council on Wage and Price Stability. Ford 

also set up a cabinet-level group to focus on other initiatives to control the cost of 

regulation. 

Despite a different party affiliation, Jimmy Carter continued—and even expanded—regulatory review mechanisms during his Administration, continuing the 

practice of conducting economic analyses of proposed regulations and setting up a 

cabinet-level Regulatory Analysis Review Group to review proposed new rules. 

Upon taking office, Reagan established a ‘‘Task Force on Regulatory Relief,’’ 

chaired by Vice President George Bush, to oversee review of the regulatory process. 

In addition, he issued an executive order—E.O. 12291—detailing the review system. 

And perhaps most importantly from an institutional point of view, he charged the 

newly created Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs with oversight of that 

process. 

The Reagan executive order on regulation continued in place during President 

George Bush’s term, with a cabinet-level Council on Competitiveness headed by the 

Vice President taking the place of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief. OIRA continued to manage the review process, although no permanent OIRA chief was ever 

confirmed. 

In 1993, President Bill Clinton replaced the Reagan-era Executive Order on regulatory review procedures with one of his own, E.O. 12866. Among the changes in 

the Clinton order were greater transparency requirements and a limitation of review requirements to ‘‘significant’’ rules. But the basic structure of the review system was kept in place. 

Further reflecting the continuing stability of the review system, President George 

W. Bush has kept the Clinton executive order in place. During his tenure, however, 

OIRA has issued a series of guidance documents for agencies—rather from a ‘‘best 

practices’’ guide for regulatory impact analyses, to expanded requirements for peer 

review—to improve the consistency and quality of reviews under the executive 

order. Most recently, the Administration amended the executive order in several, 

relatively minor, ways——including expanding the role of agency ‘‘regulatory policy 

officers.’’ 

Today—37 years after the first requirements were imposed, and 28 years after the 

creation of OIRA—centralized regulatory review is an almost universally accepted 

part of regulatory landscape. Since the first review processes were established, 

seven Administrations—five Republican and two Democratic—have built upon them. 

Each changed the system in various ways, most improving upon that of its predecessor, but none has challenged its basic utility or legitimacy. 

As six former OIRA Administrators—including Sally Katzen, the administrator 

under Bill Clinton—wrote in a 2006 joint letter: ‘‘All of us . . . recognize the importance of OIRA in ensuring that federal rules provide the greatest value to the American people. In our view, objective evaluation of regulatory benefits and costs, and 

open, transparent, and responsive regulatory procedures, are necessary to avert policy mistakes and undue influence of narrow groups.’’ 5

107 

6Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

7Testimony of Peter Strauss before he Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, April 26, 2007. 8Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, ‘‘The President’s Power to Execute the 

Laws,’’ 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994). 9 Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, ‘‘The Unbundled Executive,’’ forthcoming, University of Chicago Law Review. 10With Congress in turn, having some ability to prevent such dismissals, the limitations of 

which are themselves a matter of debate. 

And, despite early questions by some, the constitutionality of the idea of centralized White House review of rulemaking is today not seriously challenged. As early 

as 1981, in fact, the D.C. circuit recognized ‘‘the basic need of the President and 

his White House staff to monitor the consistency of agency regulations with Administration policy.’’ 6

Moreover, it could be argued that some type of review is constitutionally required 

in order for the president to reasonably meet his constitutional duty to ‘‘take care 

that the laws are faithfully executed’’. 

To the extent there is any debate over the constitutional legitimacy of the process, 

it is when it conflicts with congressional assignments of responsibility or discretion 

to inferior officers within the executive branch. In such cases, some have argued, 

the president may not substitute his judgment for the judgment of the officer selected by Congress to perform a particular duty. As argued by Peter Strauss of Columbia Law School in previous testimony, the president is not ‘‘the decider,’’ but 

merely the ‘‘overseer of decisions by others.’’ 7 While the chief executive oversees the 

performance of other executive branch officers, it is argued, he may not assume the 

decisional responsibility granted to them by Congress. Thus, in this view, the executive order’s provision that disagreements between a regulatory agency head and the 

OIRA administrator be decided by the president is unconstitutional. 

The problem is that this theory flies in the face of the principle that executive 

power under the constitution is not shared—the concept of a ‘‘unitary executive.’’ Article II of the constitution flatly states that, ‘‘[t]he executive power is vested in a 

President of the United States of America.’’ Not in plural ‘‘presidents,’’ or ‘‘a president and other officers designated by Congress,’’ but in ‘‘a President.’’ 

The unitary executive concept is not an exotic theory, but one of the most commonly-held tenets of our constitutional system. As Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna 

Prakash have observed: ‘‘[T]hat the President must be able to control the execution 

of federal laws is easily understood and resonates strongly with the very earliest 

lessons we learn about our constitutional system.’’ 8 And, consistent with those lessons, the framers of the constitution clearly rejected the idea of a shared executive— 

rejecting proposals for a multiple presidency and for a decision-sharing council. 

In modern America, there are of course many examples of non-unitary executives. 

Most states, for example, have one or more elected statewide executive officers besides the governor, ranging from attorneys general to insurance commissioners. 

Christopher Berry and Jacob Gerson of the University of Chicago, in a forthcoming 

article, write in favor of a similar system for the federal government, suggesting the 

possibility of a ‘‘directly elected War Executive, Education Executive, or Agriculture 

Executive.’’ 9 However, even to outline the idea of an ‘‘unbundled executives’’ underscores the fact that that is not the system we currently have. 

Of course, the differences between the sides in the current debate over the president’s powers are not that stark. The unitary executive concept does not deny to 

Congress the assignment of duties to individual officers within the executive branch, 

as long as the president is able to exercise ultimate responsibility. 

Conversely, few advocate a fully unbundled executive for the federal government. 

For the most part, even critics of the unitary executive concept recognize the president’s power to articulate priorities and views, request adherence to them, and to 

dismiss those who do not help carry out his agenda.10

This is important, since in practice the president almost never needs to issue an 

‘‘order’’ to a regulatory officer make a particular decision. Even in cases where the 

president serves as the final arbiter in a dispute under regulatory review process, 

the officers involved—being appointees of the president—almost always accept the 

articulated priorities of the president. And when they do not, resignation or dismissal is the next likely option. 

In this sense, the theoretical differences in the debate over the unitary executive 

may not come down to much in practical application. Under most any view, the 

president can legitimately exercise control over the rulemaking process. 

And this is as it should be, for many reasons. The most important of these—perhaps counter-intuitively—is the check that clear responsibility provides over presidential power. Were authority shared among multiple persons in the executive 

108 

branch, it would be relatively easy for the chief executive to avoid accountability for 

his actions. He would always be able to point his finger to some other officer, and 

mumble ‘‘my hands were tied.’’ But with ultimate authority vested in the president, 

he is held to account for decisions, enabling voters—as well as other policymakers— 

to assign blame or credit. 

It should also be noted that a strong, system of centralized regulatory review, anchored in presidential authority, does not necessarily imply either more or less regulation. It simply means that the president’s priorities—whatever they are—will be 

more accurately represented in decision making. 

Lastly, none of this means that Congress has no role—or indeed does not have 

the primary role—in the regulatory policy. Just as the constitution provides the 

president with executive power, Congress has ultimate legislative authority. If Congress disagrees with how the terms of a statute are applied in rules promulgated 

by the executive branch, it can simply make the statute more explicit (or even better, make its intent clear in the first instance). 

Moreover, under the Congressional Review Act of 1996, a particular regulatory decision may be specifically ‘‘disapproved’’ by Congress. The statute—though so far 

rarely used—provides for expedited consideration by both Houses of a resolution of 

disapproval of a specific rulemaking. If approved by Congress, the resolution can 

take effect, even over a presidential veto, given sufficient support in Congress. 

More generally, Congress’s influence over regulatory policy could also be expanded 

through institutional changes within Congress, including the creation of a ‘‘Congressional Regulation Office.’’ While Congress today receives detailed information from 

the Congressional Budget Office on the state of the budget and on proposals that 

would affect the budget, it has no similar source of information on regulatory programs. A Congressional Regulation Office would help to fill this gap. Such an office 

could review the regulatory impact of legislative proposals and report on the effects 

of rules adopted by agencies. In this way, it could act as both a complement to and 

a check on OIRA. 

Lastly, to minimize the need for White House intervention in agency decisionmaking, policymakers should strengthen the ability of agencies themselves to evaluate the effects of their own regulations. Review and analysis need not be an adversarial process. Ideally, critical examination of the purpose and effects of proposed 

rules begins within the agency itself. To facilitate this, policymakers should ensure 

that each agency has sufficient analytical resources, and well as well-designed internal review office to ensure that those resources are used meaningfully. 

Systematic and centralized regulatory review of federal regulations is not only a 

legitimate use of presidential power, but—given the vast scope of rulemaking—virtually essential to taking care that the laws are faithfully executed. Congress nevertheless retains a primary role in regulatory policy—which can be exercised through 

more explicit legislation, review of specific rulemakings, and by expanding its own 

institutional capability to review and analyze the effects of rules. 

Thank you for your time. I would be glad to answer any questions. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Gattuso. 

Dr. Melberth, would you grace us with your testimony, please. 

TESTIMONY OF RICK MELBERTH, DIRECTOR OF REGULATORY 

POLICY, OMB WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MELBERTH. Mr. Johnson, Mr. Cannon, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. 

OMB Watch has monitored Federal regulatory policy and 

changes for the last 25 years. It is our view that today’s regulatory 

process goes far beyond centralizing regulatory authority and instead gives the President unique and unparalleled authority, thus 

subordinating agency responsibility to implement statutory requirements. 

The application of the unitary theory gives the President control 

over substantive decision-making of agencies. This has the perverse 

impact of injecting and elevating politics into decisions where 

science and rational judgment should prevail. 

109 

In the end, we believe the public is poorly served by applying 

this unitary theory to regulatory decision-making and it threatens 

the Constitutional separation of powers. 

I would like to focus my testimony on one aspect of the changes 

to the regulatory process created by President Bush, specifically 

the changes made by Executive Order 13422 to the concept of the 

regulatory policy officer. 

The role of the RPO as envisioned by EO 12866 was to coordinate and implement agency responsibilities regarding regulatory 

planning and review. The RPO’s role, in practice, was somewhat 

different across agencies, but the essential points are that the 

RPOs were appointed by agency heads, reported to these agency 

heads, and were participants in the regulatory process within the 

agency, not the driver of that process. 

The final responsibility for agency rulemaking rested with a politically-appointed agency head confirmed by the Senate. 

Two of President Bush’s amendments to EO 12866 impact the 

RPO. First, agencies are now required to designate a political appointee as their RPO. Second, the officer’s responsibilities are increased. The RPO is now charged with approving an agency’s regulatory plan, a responsibility previously given to the agency head. 

The responsibilities of these agencies have been substantially increased, yet they are not subject to Senate confirmation in their 

role as RPOs and their actions are not public. Subsequently, the 

RPOs are not likely to be accountable to Congress or to the American people. 

We have also expressed concern that the point at which a rulemaking shall commence is unclear. This ambiguity could allow the 

RPO to exert influence at any stage in the rulemaking process and 

could prevent important scientific research or analysis from taking 

place. Nor do we know when or whether an RPO has prevented a 

rulemaking from taking place or the hurdles that may exist to 

begin or continue a rulemaking. 

What remains among our greatest concerns, however, about the 

RPO structure is the opportunity for unprecedented interference in 

the information that goes into those regulatory decisions. The RPO 

structure has the potential to allow interference in the collection 

and analysis of all types of information necessary to make important public health and safety, environmental and workplace regulatory decisions. 

Having been given the power to initiate regulations, we fear the 

RPO will further decrease agency rulemaking discretion and increase the trend toward OIRA dictating agency rulemaking. OIRA’s 

involvement in agency decision-making is already well documented. 

For example, in September 2003, GAO issued a report on OMB’s 

role in reviewing agency health safety and environmental rules and 

among the findings are that OIRA’s greatest influence, by its own 

admission, is over rules in the period before draft rules are submitted to OIRA for review. 

OIRA made changes to rules regarding tire pressure safety, control of air omissions, hazardous air pollutant listings, and minimizing adverse environmental impacts from cooling water intake 

structures. 

110 

Currently, various White House officials are interfering in a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration rule to extend protections to the North Atlantic Right Whale. In April 2008, documents obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists and released 

by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee show 

that not only is OIRA delaying the Right Whale rule, but it is actively working to undermine the scientific basis for the regulation. 

The documents show that two offices, the Council of Economic 

Advisors and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, reanalyzed aspects of the regulatory science and attempted to use their 

analyses to question NOAA’s findings. Another document shows 

the office of the Vice President questioned the validity of published 

studies NOAA is using as the basis for the rule and contended the 

agency lacks ‘‘hard data.’’ 

This certainly appears to be a situation in which political appointees are attempting to change the result of rigorous scientific 

analysis by altering data to fit a political result where science and 

rational judgment should prevail. Today’s regulatory structure allows political appointees to have greater control over the substance 

of regulations. Politics supersedes scientific and technical information that is critical to protecting our environment and health and 

safety. 

This concludes my remarks. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melberth follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICK MELBERTH

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am Rick Melberth, 

Director of Regulatory Policy for OMB Watch. OMB Watch is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research and advocacy center promoting an open, accountable government 

responsive to the public’s needs. Founded in 1983 to remove the veil of secrecy from 

the White House Office of Management and Budget, OMB Watch has since then expanded its focus beyond monitoring OMB itself. We currently address four issue 

areas: right to know and access to government information; advocacy rights of nonprofits; effective budget and tax policies; and the use of regulatory policy to protect 

the public. 

It is in the context of OMB Watch monitoring federal regulatory policies for the 

past 25 years that I appear before you today. My testimony focuses on 1) a brief 

history of centralized review of agency regulations, 2) the changes to the regulatory 

process made by the Bush administration, 3) issues of concern with requiring Regulatory Policy Officers (RPOs) to be presidential appointees, and 4) a few examples 

of executive branch intrusions into agency decision making processes. It is our view 

that today’s regulatory practices go far beyond ‘‘centralizing’’ regulatory review and 

give the president unique and unparalleled authority, thus subordinating agency responsibility to implement statutory requirements. The application of the unitary 

theory gives the president and a cadre of employees that represent the president 

control over the substantive decision making of agencies. This has the perverse impact of injecting and elevating politics into decisions where science and rational 

judgment should prevail. In the end, we believe the public is poorly served by applying this unitary theory to regulatory decision making, and it threatens the constitutional separation of powers. 

I. History of Centralized Review 

The 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act, among other things, created a small office 

within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), to coordinate the information collection activities of federal agencies. Designed as a good government law, the PRA was used as a vehicle 

by the Reagan administration to reduce government red tape, a Reagan campaign 

promise. It gave OIRA the power to approve any collection of information from 10 

or more people, including paperwork associated with implementing regulations. 

111 

1 Executive Order 12291, Sec. 3(e)(1). Federal Register Vol. 46, p. 13193, February 19, 1981. 2 Executive Order 12498, Sec. 1(a). Federal Register Vol. 50, p. 1036, January 8, 1985. 3OMB Watch, Through the Corridors of Power: A Citizen’s Guide to Federal Rulemaking, 

(Washington, DC: OMB Watch, 1987), p. 26. 4DeMuth, Christopher C.and Douglas H. Ginsburg, ‘‘Commentary: White House Review of 

Agency Rulemaking’’ in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 99, (1986) p. 1081. 5 Ibid., p. 1080. 

6 Ibid., p. 1081. 

In February 1981, a few weeks after taking office, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 (E.O. 12291) which established a major role for OMB—and OIRA 

in particular—in the review and approval of proposed rules put forth by federal 

agencies. Under the order the Director of OMB ‘‘is authorized to review any preliminary or final Regulatory Impact Analysis, notice of proposed rulemaking, or final 

rule based on the requirements of this Order.’’ 1 The other notable condition imposed 

by this order was the requirement that agencies use a cost versus benefits analysis 

to be reviewed by OIRA as an important factor justifying the need for regulatory 

action. 

There have been a number of reports and congressional hearings demonstrating 

how E.O. 12291 shifted the balance of power, giving the White House OMB new leverage over agencies. OMB was known to have changed the substance of agency 

rules and for agencies that bucked the tide, OMB would keep rules under review 

forever, a type of hostage taking. This led to OMB being nicknamed the ‘‘black hole.’’ 

Moreover, E.O. 12291 and the PRA gave OIRA several bites of the same apple. It 

reviewed an agency’s proposed rule, its paperwork to carry it out, and its final rule. 

At any time, OMB could force the agency to do what it wanted. And in the backdrop 

was always fear that OMB also controlled the agency’s budget. OMB carried a big 

stick. 

Still not satisfied that it had enough control over agency rulemaking, in January 

1985, President Reagan issued a second executive order (E.O. 12498) that created 

a regulatory planning process to coordinate the agencies’ regulatory plans with the 

administration’s regulatory objectives. An agency was now to ‘‘submit to the Director 

of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) each year, starting in 1985, a statement of its regulatory policies, goals, and objectives for the coming year and information concerning all significant regulatory actions underway or planned.’’ 2 One effect of this order was to provide OMB with access to agency decision making before 

proposed rules were submitted to OMB for review under E.O. 12291, and before the 

public’s right to comment on proposed rules as set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 

As noted at the time, OMB felt it was too hard to change the substance of rules 

when it did its E.O. 12291 review. They argued that various constituencies and advocacy efforts were already in place. As OIRA Administrator Douglas Ginsburg said 

in December 1984: ‘‘Agencies have been working on proposed regulations long before 

they come to notice and comment. Then we get ourselves in a confrontation with 

the agency over the end product.’’ 3 Accordingly, OMB wanted to intercede in the 

agency process as early as possible. Hence, the idea for E.O. 12498 was born. 

These two orders, combined with the statutory authority granted under the PRA, 

created what we now recognize as centralized regulatory review, i.e., White House 

review of regulations for consistency with the president’s policy priorities. The power 

to coordinate information collection and to review proposed and final regulations in 

a policy office of the White House, made OMB the equivalent of a political censor 

over agency actions. Even if it did not censor, its authority to subordinate agency 

decision making was clear. 

As Christopher DeMuth and Douglas Ginsburg, both OIRA administrators, wrote 

in the Harvard Law Review (March 1986), White House centralized review of regulations was an ‘‘appropriate response to the failings of regulation.’’ 4 They noted that 

regulation tends ‘‘to favor narrow, well-organized groups at the expense of the general public’’ 5 and that centralized review, on the other hand, ‘‘encourages policy coordination, greater political accountability, and more balanced regulatory decisions.’’ 6 Yet our perspective is exactly opposite. Centralized review, as epitomized 

by the role of OIRA, has further politicized the rulemaking process, brought less accountability, and produced less protective rules. 

During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, the Quayle Council on Competitiveness emerged to further politicize the regulatory process by giving the Vice President’s office authority to oversee OIRA’s actions. The Quayle Council also provided 

greater access to campaign contributors and business interests concerned with regulatory burdens—and none of its activities were required to be disclosed. The Quayle 

Council interfered with numerous health, safety, and environmental regulations to 

112 

7 Bass, Gary D., ‘‘Executive Management’’ in Changing America: Blueprints for the New Administration, edited by Mark Green. New York: Newmarket Press, 1992. 8 Executive Order 12866, Sec. 6(a)(2). Federal Register Vol. 58, p. 51735, September 30, 1993. 9 Becker, Jo and Bart Gellman, ‘‘Leaving No Tracks.’’ The Washington Post, June 27, 2007. 

‘‘Because of Cheney’s intervention, the government reversed itself and let the water flow in time 

to save the 2002 growing season, declaring that there was no threat to the fish. What followed 

was the largest fish kill the West had ever seen, with tens of thousands of salmon rotting on 

the banks of the Klamath River.’’ 

the benefit of regulated businesses.7 It even imposed an extended moratorium on 

regulations in 1992. All this contributed to a highly centralized reviewing authority 

cloaked in secrecy. To the public, Congress and the courts, the agency issuing the 

regulation was held accountable; yet the White House, through OMB and the 

Quayle Council, was pulling the strings. 

On the first day that President Clinton took office in 1993, he ended the Quayle 

Council and called for a more accountable and transparent rulemaking process. Several months later, in September, he revoked the Reagan orders but consolidated 

their requirements in Executive Order 12866. This is the executive order, with 

amendments, that provides the framework for the current regulatory process. 

Most of the elements of centralized review as defined by the Reagan orders remained intact, including the use of cost-benefit analysis, annual regulatory planning, the preparation of regulatory impact analyses, and the prohibition on any 

agency action on a rule until after it has been reviewed by OIRA. The biggest 

change was in limiting the regulations to be reviewed to the most significant rules, 

whereas the Reagan orders required all regulations to be reviewed by OIRA. In addition, the order requires greater transparency on the part of OIRA regarding communications about proposed rules with those outside of government. It also requires 

each agency head to establish a regulatory policy officer ‘‘who shall report to the 

agency head.’’ 8 Note the requirement that it is the agency head who shall appoint 

the RPO and the agency head to whom the RPO reports. 

II. Bush Administration Regulatory Changes 

President George W. Bush has made two amendments to E.O. 12866 during his 

presidency. The first, in February 2002, received little public attention and only had 

a minor impact on the regulatory process. E.O. 13258 removed from the Clinton 

order the roles assigned to the Vice President and reassigned those duties to the 

Director of OMB and other senior policy advisors. E.O. 12866 had the Vice President 

playing the role of mediator between the agency heads and OMB when disputes 

arose over a regulatory policy decision. 

Even though the Vice President’s role was removed by the Bush order, it turns 

out that Vice President Cheney has played an active role in shaping selected regulations. In a Washington Post series about the Vice President, the paper recounted 

his personal involvment in overturning an Endangered Species Act decision affecting the Klamath River basin in Oregon, among others.9 Later in this testimony, I 

provide more evidence of the Vice President’s involvement. 

The second change came on January 18, 2007, when President Bush issued 

amendments to E.O. 12866 which continued the shift toward further centralizing 

regulatory power in OIRA. These amendments, prescribed in E.O. 13422, shift 

power away from the federal agencies, which are given regulatory power by legislative enactments, and usurp congressional powers. It is another brick in the foundation this administration has been building for a unitary theory of the presidency, 

one in which not only the executive branch is superior to the other branches in our 

constitutional system but that the White House exhibits significant control over the 

agencies. 

After E.O. 13422 was issued, OMB Watch issued an analysis of the changes and 

expressed our concern about this continued accretion of power in OIRA. We wrote 

that among the changes: 

• The executive order shifts the criterion for promulgating regulations from the 

identification of a problem like public health or environmental protection to 

the identification of a ‘‘specific market failure (such as externalities, market 

power, lack of information . . . that warrant new agency action.’’ 

• It makes the agencies’ Regulatory Policy Officer a presidential appointee and 

gives that person the authority to approve any commencement or inclusion of 

any rulemaking in the Regulatory Plan, unless specifically otherwise authorized by the agency head. 

113 

10OMB Watch, A Failure to Govern: Bush’s Attack on the Regulatory Process, March 2007, p. 

3. Available at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3774 11Testimony of Gary Bass, Executive Director of OMB Watch before the House Committee on 

Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigation & Oversight, April 26, 2007, on 

Continued 

• It requires each agency to estimate the ‘‘combined aggregate costs and benefits 

of all its regulations planned for that calendar year to assist with the identification of priorities.’’ 

• It requires ‘‘significant’’ guidance documents to go through the same OMB review process as proposed regulations before agencies can issue them. 

• It also requires ‘‘economically significant’’ guidance documents (those that are 

estimated to have at least a $100 million effect on the economy, among other 

criteria) to go through the same OMB review process as ‘‘significant’’ regulations.10

I want to focus my testimony at this point on one aspect of these changes created 

by E.O. 13422, the regulatory policy officer. 

III. The Regulatory Policy Officer (RPO) 

As noted above, the regulatory policy officer is a creation of the Clinton era executive order. Under Section 6 of E.O. 12866, Centralized Review of Regulations, the 

responsibilities of the agencies and of OIRA are outlined. Section 6(a)(2) states: 

Within 60 days of the date of this Executive order, each agency head shall designate a Regulatory Policy Officer who shall report to the agency head. The Regulatory Policy Officer shall be involved at each stage of the regulatory process 

to foster the development of effective, innovative, and least burdensome regulations and to further the principles set forth in this Executive order. 

The role of the RPO as envisioned was to coordinate and implement agency responsibilities regarding regulatory planning and review of regulations. These responsibilities are described in the preceding paragraph of the order and include: 1) 

allowing ‘‘meaningful’’ public participation in the regulatory process, 2) informing 

stakeholders of pertinent regulations, 3) providing OIRA with a list of planned regulatory actions, 4) providing OIRA with cost-benefit analyses for significant regulatory actions, and 5) making available to the public information on proposed and 

final regulations. 

The RPO’s role in practice was somewhat different across agencies. Not every 

agency maintained one designated RPO. The Department of Agriculture (USDA), for 

example, had various officials serving as de facto RPOs. Issue expertise determined 

where responsibilities rested on a specific regulation. In the Department of Energy, 

the RPO functioned as an agency counselor. The RPOs were not necessarily political 

appointees in all agencies, but the final regulatory decisions within agencies were 

in the hands of political appointees ultimately, usually the agency head or his or 

her designee. The essential points are that RPOs were appointed by agency heads, 

reported to those respective agency heads, and were participants in the regulatory 

process within the agency, not the driver of that process. The final responsibility 

for agency rulemaking rested with the politically appointed agency head, confirmed 

by the Senate. 

Two of President Bush’s amendments to E.O. 12866 impact the RPO. First, agencies are now required to designate a political appointee as their RPO, and were to 

do so within 60 days of the issuance of the amendments. New text also requires 

OMB to verify this designation. 

Second, in addition to changing the requirements of the designated RPO, the Officer’s responsibilities are increased. The RPO will now be charged with approving an 

agency’s Regulatory Plan, a responsibility previously given to the agency head. The 

amendments state that ‘‘no rulemaking shall commence nor be included’’ for consideration in the agency’s regulatory plan without the political appointee’s approval. 

The Regulatory Plan includes the most important regulations which an agency 

plans in a given year. 

In OMB Watch testimony in April 2007, we expressed concern about the increased 

politicization these changes may have introduced into agency decision making: 

By requiring the Officer to be a political appointee, the amendments suggest a 

further politicization of the regulatory process. OMB Watch is concerned that 

by installing a political appointee as the RPO and increasing the responsibilities, that appointee will significantly affect an agency’s ability to regulate in 

a fair and nonpartisan fashion.11

114 

‘‘Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation?’’ Available at: 

http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4096/1/360?TopicID=7 12Skrzycki, Cindy, ‘‘Bush, Congress Battle to Control Bureaucracy,’’ Bloomberg News, July 17, 

2007. 13 In an April 25 memo instructing agencies on how to comply with the E.O. and the Final 

Bulletin, OIRA included the following definition of ‘‘commence’’ as it pertains to agency rulemaking: ‘‘The point at which a rulemaking commences may vary from one agency to the next, 

depending on each agency’s procedures and practices, and may vary from rulemaking to rulemaking. As a general matter, a rulemaking commences when the agency has decided as an institutional matter that it will engage in a rulemaking. At the latest, the rulemaking will commence 

when the rulemaking receives a Regulation Identification Number (RIN).’’ M-07-13, Implementation of Executive Order 13422 (amending Executive Order 12866) and the OMB Bulletin on Good 

Guidance Practices (April%, 2007), available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/ 

fy2007/m07-13.pdf 

In late July, 2007, OMB released a list of RPOs for each agency. Of the 29 RPOs 

on the list, 27 have been confirmed by the Senate in their agency roles but not in 

their role as RPOs. The remaining two are political appointees who did not require 

any Senate confirmation. Nine of the sixteen cabinet level RPOs are General Counsel positions. 

OIRA Administrator Susan Dudley framed this as a good government measure because one person will be accountable for major regulatory decisions in each agency.12 This could not be further from the truth. The responsibilities of these officials 

have been substantially increased, yet they are not subject to Senate confirmation 

in their role as RPOs and their actions are not public. Subsequently, the RPOs are 

not likely to be accountable to Congress or the American people. Given the ability 

to significantly impact regulatory outcomes, these people should be confirmed by the 

Senate for these additional job responsibilities—responsibilities not foreseen when 

they were confirmed for their current positions. 

We also have expressed concern that the point at which ‘‘a rulemaking shall commence’’ is also unclear. OIRA has provided a vague and unhelpful definition and has 

acknowledged the commencement of a rulemaking may differ from agency to agency.13 This ambiguity could allow the RPO to exert influence at any stage in the rulemaking process and could prevent important scientific research or analysis from 

taking place. Nor do we know when or whether an RPO has prevented a rulemaking 

from taking place or the hurdles that may exist to begin and continue a rulemaking. 

If the current RPO approach is not changed by the next president, we encourage 

Congress to investigate how RPOs perform their responsibilities, and to establish 

disclosure policies to close the gap in transparency of this aspect of the rulemaking 

process. 

In some agencies, the amendments related to the RPO may have little effect on 

regulatory development. In the case of the Department of Energy, the RPO is already a political appointee albeit without the sole responsibility to initiate regulations and without final decision making authority over regulations (unless one or 

both powers have been delegated to the RPO by the agency head). The White House 

is unlikely to have a greater or lesser impact on the way in which regulations are 

formulated within that agency. Similarly, the process in the Department of Labor 

is likely to go unchanged. 

In other agencies, however, the RPO change will likely centralize the regulatory 

process and create OIRA-like structures within agencies even though OIRA has 

been criticized over the years for exerting political influence. In the case of USDA, 

this change, if followed, will end the process of dividing regulatory authority based 

upon experience and expertise. Instead, the RPO will ultimately be responsible for 

all regulatory decision making and be involved in regulatory discussions from the 

beginning of agency considerations. Furthermore, installing a political appointee 

where one did not previously exist will facilitate White House input into agency regulatory matters. 

We acknowledge that a president has the right to oversee agency decision making 

and hold accountable those agency heads to whom he has delegated responsibility. 

Professor Peter Strauss has pointed out in his testimony before this Subcommittee 

and in other testimony and writings—and others have addressed as well—the distinction between making that decision and delegating that decision to accountable 

political appointees. This debate is an important one to have and to constantly revisit as each president makes his or her mark upon the institution of the presidency. 

When Congress, however, explicitly legislates that a regulatory decision shall be 

made by an agency head and that decision shall be based on specific criteria, there 

is virtually no basis for reasonable people to disagree that the president does not 

have the authority to make the decision. The instance of President Bush overriding 

115 

14General Accounting Office, OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews. September 2003. Available at: www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03- 

929. 15This case was challenged in court. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari and 

will hear this case in its new term. 

the EPA decision in the ozone rulemaking that Prof. Strauss discusses is one such 

example of constitutional overreaching. 

What remains among our greatest concerns, however, about the RPO structure as 

required by E.O. 13422 is the opportunity for unprecedented interference in the information that goes into those regulatory decisions before policy makers are rightfully involved in the final agency decision. For agency experts to do their jobs as 

mandated by Congress in statutory delegations to agencies, information critical to 

those policy decisions must be free from political interference. The RPO structure 

has the potential to allow interference in the collection and analysis of all types of 

information necessary to making important public health and safety, environmental, 

and workplace safety regulatory decisions. 

But, of course, the public will never know the extent to which RPOs have stopped, 

delayed, or interfered with the quality of decision information because there is no 

transparency and accountability imposed on the RPOs. There are numerous documented instances where OIRA has interfered in agency decisions and in the information used to make those decisions, as this testimony documents below. 

To what extent will the RPO be a de facto OIRA official sitting in the agency coordinating and carrying out the responsibilities of the OIRA desk officers during the 

pre-rulemaking stage? Having been given the power to initiate regulations, we fear 

the RPO will further decrease agency rulemaking discretion and increase the trend 

toward OIRA dictating agency rulemaking. Transparency can prove our fear is 

groundless. 

IV. Executive Office of the President Intrusions into 

Agency Decision Making 

As I mentioned above, the involvement by OIRA in agency decision making is 

well-documented. For example, in September 2003, the General Accounting Office 

(GAO) (as the Government Accountability Office was then known) issued a report 

on OMB’s role in reviewing agency health, safety, and environmental rules.14

Among the findings are that OIRA’s greatest influence over rules is in the period 

before draft rules are submitted to OIRA for review, and that rules from EPA and 

the Department of Transportation were the rules most significantly changed and returned. Among the changes OIRA made were to rules regarding: 

• tire pressure safety (mostly to do with changing the cost-benefit analysis), 

• control of air emissions rules (by changing language that EPA was ‘‘considering’’ adoption of standards from ‘‘proposing’’ the adoption of standards, thus 

affecting the cost-benefit analysis) 

• hazardous air pollutants from wood product coatings (by delaying the compliance dates of the rule from 2 to 3 years after the date of the final rule) 

• proposed nonconformance penalties for heavy-duty diesel emissions (by changing EPA’s choice of discount rates, fuel prices, and changing language regarding assumptions) 

• listing manganese as a hazardous waste (OIRA deferred action on listing 

manganese thus killing the rule outright) and 

• minimizing adverse environmental impacts from cooling water intake structures (by making changes to which industries would be covered by the rule 

by changing scientific and engineering standards).15

More recently, we have seen many more examples of OIRA’s work to delay, weaken, or override agency regulations proposed by agencies, and continued interference 

in generating the information that goes into these decisions. The ozone decision is 

but one instance, although perhaps the most blatant, of executive branch interference at the decision making level. 

A. Interference in Regulatory Standards 

Although the Vice President was removed from the regulatory process by E.O. 

13258, OMB Watch has documented instances in which representatives from Vice 

President Cheney’s office have been involved in high profile environmental and national security regulations during OIRA’s meetings with industry representatives, 

especially in 2007. Not only did someone from the Office of the Vice President (OVP) 

attend meetings about setting the ozone standard, but also attended four meetings 

116 

16OMB Watch, Vice President Reemerging in Regulatory Review Meetings. November 6, 2007. 

Available at: http://ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4067/1/85/?TopicID=2. 17 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions to Reduce the Threat of Ship Collisions with North Atlantic Right Whales, Federal Register, Vol. 71, p. 36299,June 26, 2006. 18The documents are available on the committee’s website at: http://oversight.house.gov/ 

story.asp?ID=1921. 

about Department of Homeland Security (DHS) chemical security regulations. The 

final rules were actually weaker in their reporting thresholds than what DHS proposed. According to information posted on the OMB website, as of November 2007, 

OIRA had held more than 540 regulatory review meetings since E.O. 13258 was 

issued in 2002. A representative from OVP has been present at only 11, about two 

percent. However, eight of those 11 meetings have occurred since February 2007, 

including the four meetings on the DHS chemical security rule.16

Currently, various White House offices are interfering in a National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) rule to extend protections to the North Atlantic right whale. OIRA is serving both as a party to the interference and as a conduit 

through which other offices can exert pressure. 

After initiating the rulemaking in 1998, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service published a notice of proposed rulemaking in June 2006 which, if finalized as 

written, would impose a speed limit of 10 knots on large shipping vessels traveling 

in the Atlantic Ocean during seasons when the right whale is most active. NOAA 

decided to take this course of action because collisions with ships are one of the 

leading causes of death for the North Atlantic right whale. The agency estimates 

the right whale population has dwindled to about 300 with at least 19 deaths 

caused by ship strikes in the past 22 years.17

In February 2007, NOAA sent a draft of the final rule to OMB for review. Under 

E.O. 12866, OIRA is to review proposed rules within 90 days with one possible extension of 30 days. The rule remains under review 440 days later. 

In April 2008, documents obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists and released by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee show that not 

only is OIRA delaying the right whale rule, it is actively working to undermine the 

scientific basis for the regulation.18

The documents show that two offices, the Council of Economic Advisors and the 

Office of Science and Technology Policy, reanalyzed aspects of the regulatory science 

and attempted to use their analyses to question NOAA’s findings. The CEA recalculated statistical models and questioned the validity of published literature in an 

attempt to undermine NOAA’s finding that ship speed bears a relationship to whale 

mortality. Another document shows the Office of the Vice President questioned the 

validity of published studies NOAA is using as the basis for the rule and contended 

the agency lacks ‘‘hard data.’’ 

Nowhere in any of the documents does a White House official express an opinion 

on the rule or present alternative policy options. However, the scientific opinions the 

officials are advancing would weaken NOAA’s scientific argument and allow opponents to more easily assail the rule. Ultimately, this kind of scientific interference 

can lead to weaker protections, or a complete absence of protections. 

B. Interference in Generating Information 

Curtis Copeland from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has provided testimony to the Subcommittee addressing the numerous ways in which OIRA has 

used administrative mechanisms to interfere with the generation of information important to setting standards. I do not wish to repeat Dr. Copeland’s testimony, but 

only to reiterate there have been many mechanisms employed by OIRA to impact 

the quality of information produced by agency experts. Among those mechanisms 

are directives on the use of cost-benefit analysis, peer review guidelines, data quality challenges, and an unsuccessful attempt to impose a one-size-fits-all risk assessment process on agencies. What follows are a few examples of this interference in 

health and safety standards. 

OIRA and other political staff have increasingly waded into the scientific aspects 

of decision making, even before that science becomes relevant for any particular 

rulemaking. Most environmental, public health, and safety standards are based on 

rigorous scientific research and findings. By controlling the scientific information behind these standards, politics can erode the very foundation upon which regulations 

are built. 

One example is EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS). IRIS is a publicly searchable database for studies and information on the human health effects 

of chemical substances. EPA scientists and policymakers use the information in the 

database to make determinations about the risk of various substances. EPA studies 

117 

19Government Accountability Office, Chemical Assessments: Low Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of EPA’s Integrated Risk Information 

System, March 2008. GAO-08-440. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08440.pdf. 20 Ibid. 21See these postings at Climate Science Watch’s website, available at: http:// 

www.climatesciencewatch.org/index.php/csw/details/censoredlcdcltestimony/ 22 Union of Concerned Scientists, Science Integrity Program, Federal Science and the Public 

Good: Securing the Integrity of Science in Policy Making. February 2008. Available at: http:// 

www.ucsusa.org/scientificlintegrity/restoring/scientificfreedom.html. And Interference at the 

EPA: Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. April 2008. Available 

at: http://ucsusa.org/scientificlintegrity/interference/interference-at-the-epa.html. 

both the carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic effects of substances and determines safe 

or tolerable exposure thresholds when possible. IRIS assessments can inform regulatory action intended to protect humans from the harmful effects of certain substances. 

In 2004, according to a GAO report, OMB directed EPA to begin routinely submitting draft assessments to OMB for an interagency review. Previously, the need for 

reviews had been determined on a case by case basis.19 At two points in the current 

IRIS process, EPA must submit drafts of chemical assessments to OMB for review. 

OMB does the bulk of its interfering during these review periods. OMB voices its 

own opinions on the chemical assessment and solicits the opinions of other federal 

agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and NASA. 

EPA is prohibited from proceeding with the assessment until it receives explicit approval from OMB.20

OMB may interfere with the chemical assessments by suggesting to EPA its own 

scientific judgments or by forcing EPA to consider scientific studies that fit OMB’s 

policy preferences. Alternatively, or additionally, OMB can delay work on an assessment. The IRIS process contains no time limits for the OMB review period. 

In April 2008, EPA announced changes to its IRIS procedures which now involve 

OMB at even more stages in the process. The changes emanated from a working 

group comprised of officials from EPA, OMB, the Pentagon, and other federal agencies. All comments from OMB or other agencies will continue to be considered deliberative executive branch proceedings, allowing any incidences of scientific manipulation to evade public scrutiny. 

In another example, in March 2007, a Department of Interior investigation found 

Julie A. MacDonald, the deputy assistant secretary for fish, wildlife and parks, allowed political considerations to taint a number of decisions in which the Fish and 

Wildlife Service (FWS) decided not to consider certain species endangered. Among 

the transgressions, MacDonald leaked internal agency documents to industry lobbyists and intimidated agency staff in order to manipulate scientific evidence. MacDonald resigned in April 2007 as a result of the scandal. In response to public pressure and the scrutiny of the House Natural Resources Committee, FWS decided to 

review eight endangered species decisions by MacDonald. In November, FWS announced it had confirmed impropriety in seven of the eight decisions and is now reviewing them. 

Another example of scientific interference this time coupled with censoring government officials came to light in October 2007. Dr. Julie Gerberding, Director of 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, had her testimony about the threat 

global warming poses to public health substantially cut by OMB before Dr. 

Gerberding was allowed to testify before the Senate Environment and Public Works 

Committee on October 23rd. Seven pages, about half, of the testimony was deleted 

from the draft submitted for OMB’s review. The removed sections included information on extreme weather events and food and water-borne disease, among other 

things. Climate Science Watch obtained a copy of the draft as submitted and the 

censored version and posted the two on its website the day after the hearing.21

Lastly, I would like to recommend to the committee two reports recently issued 

by the Union of Concerned Scientists that have broadly documented examples of political interference in scientific information.22 The first of these, Federal Science and 

the Public Good: Securing the Integrity of Science in Policy Making, documents interference across federal agencies providing specific examples, like the above, of misrepresenting science and the results of research, deleting and editing scientific information, and suppressing science, among other examples. 

The second of these reports has received much greater public attention because 

the voices in the report are those of EPA scientists whose work has been made 

much more difficult by political interference at the agency. Interference at the EPA: 

Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, contains the results of surveys of almost 5500 EPA scientists. Almost 30 percent of the EPA scientists from across the country responded to the surveys with devastating results. 

118 

Nearly 60 percent of the respondents experienced political interference in their work 

and that this interference has been higher in the last five years than previously. 

In the essays accompanying the surveys, the respondents generally cite OMB as the 

source of the external interference. 

V. Conclusions 

It is unlikely that centralized regulatory review will end any time soon. Many 

have argued that it is needed in such a vast and complicated federal government. 

It can provide inter-agency coordination, ensure that regulations are not in conflict 

with existing or other proposed rules, and provide a valuable planning and coordination function. We believe, however, that today’s regulatory practices go well beyond 

the benefits of centralized review. Current practices give the president unique and 

unparalleled power to alter the collection and dissemination of information and to 

shape the substance of agency rulemakings—all behind the scenes. Even more striking is that a small number of OIRA staff have controlled this process all in the 

name of the president. In doing so, the implementation of agency statutory requirements may become secondary to the policies and priorities of the president as interpreted by the OIRA staff. 

The application of the unitary theory as it is practiced in this administration and 

framed in executive branch directives gives the president, and a cadre of employees 

that represent the president, control over the substantive decision making of agencies. As a result, politics is injected and elevated into decisions where science and 

rational judgment should prevail. Political appointees have greater control over the 

substance of regulations; politics supersedes scientific and technical information 

that is critical to protecting our environment and health and safety at home and 

in the workplace. Even if this were not empirically true, the appearance would still 

exist, thereby tainting the public’s perception of the regulatory process. 

The current structure of the rulemaking process has several costs. There is now 

the potential for even greater conflict between the statutory authority delegated to 

the agencies by Congress and executive priorities. When the president has the ability to override this statutory delegation of authority, the balance of power between 

Congress and the Presidency is altered. There is the perception, if not the reality, 

that special interests are favored heavily over the needs of the public. This process 

does not lead to better rules and public protections. When the president makes a 

substantive regulatory decision based on political considerations, scientifically-based 

protective standards are vitiated. Finally, we can be assured that if Congress does 

not act, OIRA will remain the equivalent of a political censor over congressional 

mandates and agency decisions. 

Admittedly, there are grey areas where ‘‘coordination’’ ends and ‘‘substantive interference’’ begins. When OIRA changes a word in a proposed rule, it may help to 

make the regulation more understandable. On the other hand, it may intentionally 

change the very meaning of the rule. While it may be appropriate for OIRA to coordinate, we believe it is wrong to interfere with substantive agency decisions. 

We believe there are solutions Congress can pursue. First, Congress can review 

the role the White House plays in this review process with an eye toward removing 

or limiting OIRA’s powers. Congress could define the powers it is willing to give to 

OMB regarding regulatory review. Since the 1981 Reagan Executive Order, Congress has chosen not to legislate in this area; hence OMB operates through the extension of presidential constitutional authority. Congress could also restrict in legislation OIRA’s ability to review certain rules promulgated under a statute. This 

would require, of course, the ability of Congress to overcome a presidential veto or 

some other administrative recourse the president might exercise. 

Second, Congress could place the statutory responsibility for agency decisions in 

the Senate-approved agency heads, not regulatory policy officers and not OIRA. If 

the review of an agency action is judged to be inconsistent with the priorities of the 

president, the president then should exert influence on the appointed agency head. 

This would also permit Congress to hold the ultimate policy maker accountable by 

removing the authority for regulatory decisions from an unaccountable agency subordinate. Similarly, Congress could choose to move centralized regulatory review out 

of OIRA and into another agency outside the Executive Office of the President. This 

would likely reduce OIRA’s clout and influence over the substantive work of agencies. 

Third, to the extent that centralized review of agency regulations remains lodged 

in OIRA or some other presidential office, Congress could seek mechanisms to hold 

that office accountable. One mechanism for this, we believe, is subjecting OIRA to 

the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. If OIRA makes substantive 

regulatory decisions, it should be subject to the accountability provisions of the APA 

119 

including subject to court actions. Coupled with this increased accountability, Congress could expand the requirements for defining what must be disclosed in agency 

regulatory dockets. Transparency requirements such as this would allow Congress, 

the courts, and the public to know the extent to which the executive has taken control over substantive agency regulatory outcomes. 

Finally, regardless of the extent of partisan control over the legislative and executive branches, we urge Congress to exert its constitutional oversight control and restore the historical separation of powers balance so that unitary expansion of the 

executive branch is held in check. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. This concludes my testimony. 

I’m happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you, Dr. Melberth. 

At this time I will recognize Mr. Cannon. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am intrigued by the testimony. Professor Strauss and I have 

largely agreed with a very tiny disagreement. But I am actually 

going to ask the panel to go in a little different direction, here, because what I am really concerned about is not this issue that is before us today, because I think academically Professor Strauss has 

really nailed it down and it has come down to a fairly close issue. 

But I am wondering what we do in the future in America, because—particularly, Dr. Melberth, in your role—using the Internet 

could be an incredibly attractive way to help focus on government. 

But the way to do it, it seems to me, is to get people more involved. 

Not just in responding to things that they may feel urgent, but actually in overseeing what government does. 

In others words, you have all seen Wikipedia. You have got millions of people that have contributed to articles and there are dozens, millions, of articles on Wikipedia, not all correct, but awfully 

good, frankly, at least in my experience. And it has a self-regulating process for deciding what is good. 

I looked at the Web site for OMB Watch, Mr. Melberth, and you 

tend to be—is it fair to say left in the political spectrum? 

Mr. MELBERTH. Progressive might be the word we would choose. 

Mr. CANNON. Would that mean, like, Socialist? I am just kidding, 

here, although that is historically where I think it would come 

down. 

It seems to me that this issue is not a left or right issue. In fact, 

frankly, it is a more academic issue. 

Are you familiar, Mr. Melberth, with a Jim Harper, who has a 

site called Washington Watch? He would call himself I think right 

and conservative. But are you familiar with his site at all? 

Mr. MELBERTH. No, sir. I am not. 

Mr. CANNON. Take a look at it. Because my point is, left or right 

is not very important. Actually knowing what government does is. 

So you are sitting here and talking about things that bother you 

and using Union of Concerned Scientists, which has a political 

agenda, and very clearly has a political agenda, and doesn’t want 

the funding of its agenda changed, is not so helpful as to say rather 

than conclude, I think the term is—science and rational judgment 

is a term that has been used a couple of times in this discussion. 

Well, that is often used to cover over a political and financial agenda. 

Much better, it would seem to me—and I am lecturing a little bit 

here, but I would like your response in particular, Dr. Melberth— 

much better to get the American people involved in what OMB 

120 

does, in the guts of it, like with Wiki. You have got somebody that 

has an interest in a particular rule, let him take a look at it. 

We asked Ms. Dudley earlier about this, but if you have transparency in the rulemaking process, and transparency means electronic access to anybody with a computer, anywhere with access to 

the Internet, can we not create the new world that I think Mr. 

Obama is showing us with a couple of million donors, that the 

Wikipedia shows up with millions of people participating in sharing 

knowledge? Is this not a noble goal, instead of causing people to 

react to something, that you characterize OMB has done, but rather to guide them into actually helping you look at what is going on 

in the regulatory process in America? 

Mr. MELBERTH. We certainly agree that this process should be 

far more transparent than it is. There is far too much of this that 

is out of the eye of the public and so they don’t know what is going 

on. And the role of the RPO exacerbates that. It doesn’t enlighten 

it. Because no one knows what the RPO is doing. 

It is the decision-making process that the RPO goes through and 

the agency is not required to disclos it. We don’t have knowledge 

of when an agency rulemaking commences. We don’t know when 

that decision might be or how often—— 

Mr. CANNON. Let me interject, because my time is expiring. 

I would really love for you guys at OMB Watch to engage people, 

left or right, progressive or conservative, I don’t care, in the process 

of pushing for transparency and then looking at the data that we 

have. Take a look at the—I think it is called Washington Watch. 

Again, different political persuasion, but I think the goal ought to 

be similar to what you are looking at. 

Is there any reason that you or others see why we shouldn’t be 

using modern Google-type technology to allow us to have virtually 

complete access to everything that happens in government? 

I see Dr. Strauss has a comment, but maybe we can just go down 

the panel. 

Mr. MELBERTH. Mr. Cannon, we have actually been a leader in 

transparency and the use of technology for the 25 years that OMB 

Watch has existed. 

Mr. CANNON. I think you—I have a yellow light. Let me suggest 

that you have done—I am not criticizing you at all. But I am hoping that you will go to the next step, which is draw people into the 

review, the citizen review process, instead of just energizing a base. 

Because I think that what happens, the energized base comes to 

the middle, everybody comes to the middle, and we have a better 

run country. 

Mr. MELBERTH. We are indeed trying to do that, yes. 

Mr. STRAUSS. I couldn’t agree more with the gentleman. At some 

point during your questioning of Administrator Dudley, I was reminded of what has been for a long time my favorite Internet site 

for demonstration to my students, at least, which is a site maintained by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, on which they post all their general counsel letters advise. 

Somebody, Mercedes Benz, Volkswagen, whomever, writes in, asks 

for some advise about the meaning of a rule. 

Every one of those letters is on this Web site, is immediately searchable. What you would have had to pay $5,000 to a WashVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:03 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\050608\42214.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42214
121 

ington law firm to go through those records and find 10 years ago 

you now get in 30 seconds. 

This is the stunning transformation of the field that is occuring 

and whatever the Congress can do to encourage it, it ought to do. 

I know there have been difficulties between Congress and OMB in 

particular over the past few years about the funding of electronic 

rulemaking development that have tended to put the brakes on 

that development. It looks in exactly the direction the Congressman is suggesting, and I hope those difficulties can be resolved. 

Mr. CANNON. I thank the gentleman. I am certainly looking forward to that. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to speak for an additional minute. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Mr. CANNON. And I just want to follow up on what you said, Professor Strauss. 

I have a constituent that has a problem with the IRS. I have gotten involved. I have spoken with the—you have the general counsel 

and then you have got several other deputy general counsel. I have 

spoken with the next senior person in the legal system in the IRS, 

and the system that they use for deciding what to decide is more 

complicated than the decisions they issue. 

It is appalling and it is—the subject in this particular case, I am 

comfortable saying, it is obviously skewed by the desires of individuals instead of by the desire for policy. And if we had transparency 

there—now, that is a lot more difficult than it may be with the 

Transportation Department in one area of their oversight. Nevertheless, if we had that kind of transparency, bureaucrats would be 

much more responsible for what they do and also how they affect 

not just broad policy but individual businesses. 

And in addition to that, all businesses could operate with more 

clarity, because they would have at least the answers that have 

been given by guidance to other people. 

And so you understand that I am on a mission here. It is not a 

partisan mission, not at all critical of OMB Watch, except I would 

like you to draw more people in, because I think more people will 

draw you away from progressive and toward the middle, not that 

progressive is bad or that conservative is good, but if we are in the 

middle, we get a lot more done. And this is an area where we actually really do desperately need to progress, without biting into the 

left meaning of the term, but to progress in America. And it is all 

there and the technology is available. 

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to pontificate 

here, but this is what this Committee should do and this is the 

major jurisdiction of this Committee that we ought to be expanding 

and ought to be pushing. There is no place else in Congress that 

they look at these issues as we do. 

Thank you and I yield back. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Congressman Cannon. 

I have a couple of questions. 

Would anyone wish to comment on Administrator Dudley’s testimony? If not, then Mr. Copeland, I would like to ask you, one of 

the Bush administration initiatives that you discussed is increased 

122 

use of informal OIRA reviews. Can you describe what informal 

OIRA reviews are and why they are important? 

Mr. COPELAND. Sure. Essentially, the formal process is that after 

the agency head has signed off on a rule, the agency will send it 

to OMB for formal review. That is when the 90-day clock starts. 

The executive order says that OIRA has 90 days, essentially, to review the rule. 

Informal review is when the agency will send over drafts of the 

rule, either at OIRA’s request or at the agency’s initiative, for a 

pre-submission discussion. So it is essentially while they are formulating the rule. 

And OMB has said they have their biggest impact on agency 

rulemaking during this informal, pre-formal submission process. 

The problem in terms of transparency is that OMB has interpreted the requirement—there is a requirement in Executive Order 

12866 that says the agency is to disclose the changes made at 

OMB’s suggestion or recommendation. OMB has interpreted that to 

mean only during formal review. I have seen rules that have gone 

back and forth between OMB and the agency several times over a 

several week or even several month process, during informal review, get submitted to OMB, have a 1-or 2-day formal review process, and under OMB’s interpretation, the only thing that has to get 

disclosed is what happens in that 1 or 2 days. 

So the problem is that there is little transparency during the informal review process, and that is the period in which OMB says 

they have their greatest impact. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is the Bush administration the first Administration to use this informal review process? 

Mr. COPELAND. No, sir. The Clinton administration used it. 

Other Administrations back to the start of OIRA in 1981 have used 

it. 

I would say that both the previous OIRA administrator and other 

observers, agency people, have said that it seems to have been 

ratcheted up during this Administration, that there is greater use 

of informal review and that as a consequence there is less transparency about the effects that OIRA has on the agencies’ rules. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Gattuso, do you think it is appropriate for the Vice President, who has no scientific expertise or responsibilities, to delay a 

final rule for more than a year that would provide protection for 

Right Whales? 

Mr. GATTUSO. Well, first off I would point out—and thank you 

for raising that, since it was one of the witnesses earlier who referred to the Vice President as a political appointee, and we do 

have to remember that the Vice President is not a political appointee. He is an elected official, one of two individuals in the country elected nationwide. I think that in that status, the Vice President certainly has every right to ask questions, to ask executive 

branch officials to justify their actions, to convey his own views. 

The question of how long something would be delayed, what kind 

of questions are asked, I think depends entirely upon the subject 

at issue. I am not going to defend every action every Vice President 

has ever taken, but in terms of the Vice President’s right to ask 

123 

these questions and receive answers as to the activities of the executive branch, I think that is entirely appropriate. 

We hear a lot about politicization of the process. It reminds me 

a little bit of the movie Casablanca. Politics. Politics going on in 

the rulemaking process. Much of this is a political process in the 

sense of getting information out, balancing between the unelected 

officials carrying out their responsibilities, the elected officials with 

responsibility to their voters and the country in terms of ensuring 

certain policies and priorities. And those elected representatives, by 

the way, include Congress. 

So short answer, yes, the Vice President has a role. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. And I will yield the balance of my 

time to Congressman Cannon. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you. 

I just have one other question I can’t resist asking this panel, 

and let me ask Mr. Gattuso in particular, but if anyone else would 

like to answer, I know that, Dr. Copeland, we have talked about 

these issues in the past, but if Congress were to make lively use 

of the Congressional Review Act, including our ability to review 

rulemaking agencies’ case by case compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act and other administrative law, don’t you think 

that would go a long way to policing the roles of the bureaucracy 

and the President in Federal rulemaking? 

Mr. GATTUSO. I agree. The Congressional Review Act is probably 

one of the most under-used mechanisms that the Congress has in 

its quiver. I believe it has only been used once in its 10-year history, at least been all the way through the process once, and it is 

tailor-made. 

It was specifically enacted in order to let Congress voice its will, 

to implement its well as to regulations when a regulatory body has, 

in Congress’ view, misinterpreted what Congress had in mind. 

And by the way, it can be used both to further regulation or to 

hinder it. It is not specific as to which direction that pendulum 

goes. 

Mr. STRAUSS. I am going to have to disagree. 

The principle place, I think, for expressing the disagreement is 

to point out that before you can get a regulation under the Congressional Review Act, it must have survived this process. That is 

to say it will have presidential approval at some level or another. 

And consequently, any resolution of disapproval that the Congress might vote is subject to the possibility of presidential veto. It 

is not at all accidental that the one opportunity you have had to 

use the Congressional Review Act was an opportunity that fell between Administrations, a rule issued by Democratic administration 

that was then vetoed by the Congress after the Democratic administration had ceased to exist and had been replaced by a Republican administration whose head agreed with what the Congress 

did in disapproving OSHA’s ergonomics rule. 

Mr. CANNON. We are actually, of course, considering some adjustments to the Congressional Review Act. We have a bill that has 

been passed out of Subcommittee and another one that we think 

will come along fairly soon that would, we hope, change that. 

124 

If we changed it so that we at least had a more political role in 

reviewing regulations, would that change your view? In other 

words, does Congress have a role here? 

Mr. STRAUSS. There have been serious suggestions made by my 

friend and at least area colleague, Paul Verkuil, notably that one 

ought to replace the current technique for rulemaking by something more or less analogous to what I think is done in many European countries, where rulemaking proposals would essentially be 

fast-tracked legislation and would not take effect unless enacted by 

Congress. 

This would dramatically change the landscape generally, whether—is an occasion for a different meeting than today. 

Mr. CANNON. I think we have actually dealt with that, of course, 

in the past, as you know. And there was a large consensus that the 

current act does not work. And so if other panelists would like to 

comment on the possibility of more congressional involvement in 

regulatory processes, I would be quite interested to hear either Dr. 

Copeland or Mr. Melberth. 

Mr. MELBERTH. Well, we do have some suggestions for what Congress can do to be more involved and take some control. We don’t 

believe the Congressional Review Act is an appropriate vehicle to 

do that. But we would look forward to working with Congress to 

find a way in which Congress could be more involved in that process. 

Mr. CANNON. We have actually been working on this, as I think 

Dr. Copeland knows and Professor Strauss, for the last 6 years. Actually, no, we are almost 8 years now into this process. And so we 

have had a lot of academic water under the bridge here and we are 

actually trying to hope we can do something in the short-term. 

Dr. Copeland, did you want to comment at all? 

Mr. COPELAND. I would just agree that it would essentially take 

two-thirds of both houses to overturn a rule that the President 

agrees with. And so you do have this really high hurdle to jump. 

I would point out, though, that there are a number of other options that Congress does have. Greater specificity in their delegations of rulemaking authority to the agencies would make it less 

likely that Congress would object, because the agencies would be 

constrained in their discretion. To the extent that, you know, the 

agencies are regulating separate from what Congress intended. 

Mr. CANNON. Of course, I believe the academic momentum has 

been toward the question that Professor Strauss is close to stating, 

although it was not the point of his comment, which is that it 

would not be an overturning of a regulation, but rather voting on 

regulations before they become law, in which case you don’t have 

a two-thirds majority problem. 

Mr. COPELAND. Correct. 

Mr. CANNON. Now, we are not at a point of making that leap yet 

or jumping into a rubicon that might be too swift for us, but it is 

my view and I think the view of the Chairman of the full Committee and other Members of the Committee that this is an area 

that we ought to be much more aggressively involved in. 

And that, of course, is a very long discussion, and we probably 

should end the hearing since we have a vote. 

125 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Cannon. 

I would like to thank all of the witnesses for their testimony 

today. Without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit any additional written questions, which we will then forward to the witnesses and ask that you answer as promptly as you 

can to be made a part of the record. 

Without objection, the record will remain open for 5 legislative 

days for the submission of any other additional materials. 

Again, thanks for your time and for your patience. 

This hearing on the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

128 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE CHRIS CANNON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. DUDLEY, 

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM PETER L. STRAUSS, PROFESSOR, 

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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM CURTIS W. COPELAND, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC 


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM JAMES L. GATTUSO, ESQ., SENIOR

FELLOW IN REGULATORY POLICY, ROE INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY STUDIES, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM RICK MELBERTH, PH.D., 

DIRECTOR OF REGULATORY POLICY, OMB WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC 


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