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ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES AND COORDINATION 

OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS, 

AND RESPONSE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 1, 2007 

Serial No. 110–33 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS, 

AND RESPONSE 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

CRAIG SHARMAN, Director 

NICHOLE FRANCIS, Counsel 

BRIAN TURBYFILL, Clerk 

HEATHER HOGG, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, 

Preparedness, and Response ............................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Communications, Preparedness, and Response ................................................. 2 

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress from the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 36 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 38 

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress from the 

District of Columbia ............................................................................................. 34 

The Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 40 

WITNESSES

Mr. Bill Devir, Commander of Disaster Medical Assistance Team, Ohio-5, 

Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations, U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Preapred Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. Fred Endrikat, Special Operations Chief, Philadelphia Fire Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27 

Mr. Bob Powers, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Disaster Operations 

Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Preapred Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

Mr. Charles Prather, Chief, Orange County Fire Authority: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

(1) 

ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES AND 

COORDINATION OF THE FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS 

Wednesday, May 9, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, 

PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Cuellar, Lowey, Norton, Christensen, 

Etheridge, Rodriguez, and Dent. 

Mr. CUELLAR. [Presiding.] Good morning. The subcommittee will 

come to order. 

This subcommittee is meeting today to assess the roles and responsibilities and coordination of the federal response teams deployed in the wake of a catastrophic incident. 

Good morning. And, first of all, on behalf of the members of the 

subcommittee, I would like to welcome our panel. 

At the outset, I would like to express concern about the timeliness of receiving the witnesses’ testimony. It is important that all 

witnesses before—the committee rules requires that we receive the 

testimony 48 hours in advance of the hearings so members will 

have ample time to review and develop follow-up questions. I hope 

this rule will be honored in the future. 

For my ranking member, Mr. Dent, if it is okay with you, I would 

ask the committee’s staff to sit down with our FEMA folks and let’s 

go through the process on how this works, what we can do to make 

sure this doesn’t happen again, because it is not the first time. If 

it would have been the first time, we would not be doing this. 

But I would ask that FEMA, the governmental liaison, sit down 

with Graig and the committee staff to go over this because, again, 

if it was the first time, Mr. Dent, I would just make that statement 

and move on, but it is one of those bad recurring dreams that 

keeps coming back and back and back again. 

So I would ask the staff to sit down with FEMA and any other 

Homeland Security part that is under our jurisdiction to make sure 

that we get these procedural issues out of the way. 

On a positive note, we are glad that all of you are here to discuss 

the coordination and the capabilities of the federal response teams 

that are up in response to this type of incident, whether they are 

2 

terrorist attacks or natural disasters. I look forward to hearing testimony from Mr. Powers from FEMA, so we can get an overview 

of how disaster operations will work in the new FEMA. 

I also look forward to an update of how the department’s reforms 

will impact their ability to quickly deploy assets before, during and 

after disasters. Key assets that FEMA can call on in the wake of 

a disaster are the urban search and rescue system and the national 

disaster medical system. These programs form the backbone of a 

coordinated federal response and we need to make sure that they 

have the resources and the management they need. 

Specifically, I am interested in looking at how these teams fit 

into the overall FEMA command structure, especially the NDMS, 

which was transferred from FEMA to the Department of Health 

and Human Services at the beginning of the year. The issues identified in the wake of Katrina highlighted the discrepancies over 

who is responsible for bringing response capabilities to bear in 

these types of emergencies. 

At the same time, there were many success stories that came out 

of that disaster. The work of the urban search and rescue and the 

disaster medical assistance teams were definitely among them. 

Congress must ensure that these teams are fully funded, adequately trained, and that each team member is given the equipment necessary to perform and function at the highest level possible. 

It is unsettling that after the devastating Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 attacks, the Hurricane Katrina, that funding levels to 

support the urban search and rescue systems have drastically decreased from $66 million in fiscal year 2003 to $25 million in fiscal 

year 2007. We can all agree that we need to make and take the 

appropriate steps to provide consistent funding, as these emergency 

responders are vital in preserving and protecting the lives and the 

property of American citizens. 

Finally, it has not gone unnoticed by this committee that the Department of Homeland Security will likely not meet the June 1 

deadline in producing the final version of the national response 

plan, which will reflect lessons learned from Katrina. Again, I emphasize there have been several deadlines that have not been met, 

and this is another one that has not been met by the agency. 

Again, we are interested not in a ‘‘gotcha‘‘-type of politics, but we 

are more interested in how we can work together so we can all do 

our job together. With the 2007 hurricane season only a few weeks 

away, we anxiously anticipate its release. 

I want to thank the witnesses again for their testimony. 

The chair will now recognize the ranking minority member of the 

subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for any 

statement that he might have. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This hearing continues the subcommittee’s oversight of the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to strengthen the capabilities of FEMA and implement the post-Katrina emergency management format of last year. 

One of the lessons learned from the response to Hurricane 

Katrina was that the federal government lacked a clear incident 

3 

command structure, and that information and situational awareness were insufficient. 

The emergency response teams we are going to discuss today 

were established to help improve situational awareness and support state and local response operations. These teams provide federal assistance to help integrate federal, state, local, tribal and 

nongovernmental response efforts in the early stages of a catastrophic incident. It is my understanding that some of FEMA’s response teams will soon be restructured to meet the requirements 

of last year’s reform legislation. 

I look forward to discussing the steps FEMA has taken in the interim to improve its responsiveness with Mr. Bob Powers, FEMA’s 

assistant administrator for disaster operations. I also look forward 

to hearing from him on when and how FEMA anticipates the current emergency response teams will be transformed into incident 

management assistance teams, and how this will affect the roles of 

other existing federal response assets. 

As the chairman has mentioned today, too, also here with us will 

be Mr. Fred Endrikat, the special operations chief of the Philadelphia Fire Department; Mr. Charles Prather, chief of the Orange 

County Fire Authority; and Mr. William Devir, commander of 

Ohio’s disaster medical assistance team. 

So I do look forward to discussing with each of these gentlemen 

their perspectives on the coordination of federal emergency response teams with other response efforts by state and local governments. I also hope to discuss with them ways in which Congress 

can help strengthen this important surge capacity for disaster response and whether legislation is necessary to do so. 

So I thank the witnesses for taking the time to be here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under 

the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I ask at this time for unanimous consent that the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Rodriguez, be permitted to join our hearing and 

ask the witnesses questions. 

Without objection, it is so ordered. 

I now welcome the panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Mr. Bob Powers, who is the acting deputy assistant administrator for disaster operations at the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his current post, Mr. Powers served as the 

operations branch chief, response division for FEMA, where he was 

responsible for incident response. 

Our second witness is Mr. Fred Endrikat, who is the special operations chief of the Philadelphia Fire Department. The chief has 

been a Philadelphia firefighter for 32 years. He also serves FEMA’s 

urban search and rescue national response system in concurrent 

duty assignments as the national task force leaders representative, 

incident support team operations chief, task force leader for the 

Pennsylvania Task Force 1. 

Our third witness is Mr. Charles Prather, who is the chief of the 

Orange County Fire Authority. Chief Prather began serving in this 

4 

capacity in 1997, and is responsible for the daily operations of one 

of the largest fire operations in the state of California. 

Our fourth witnesses is Mr. William Devir, who is the commander for the disaster medical assistance team, Ohio 5, for the 

national disaster medical system for the U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services. Commander Devir is the founding member of 

the Team Ohio 5 and has served as team commander since 1991. 

We are all pleased to have you present. Again, welcome. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full testimony will be inserted 

in the record. 

I now ask each witness to summarize the statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Powers. 

Mr. Powers, if you want to get started? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. POWERS, ACTING DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, DISASTER OPERATIONS 

DIRECTORATE, FEMA 

Mr. POWERS. Good morning, Chairman Cuellar, Mr. Dent, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today. I am 

Robert Powers, the acting deputy assistant administrator for disaster operations at FEMA. I look forward to working with you to 

continue our joint efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency in the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

In May 2006, as FEMA was being scrutinized in the wake of 

Hurricane Katrina, the president nominated and the Senate confirmed David Paulison as the FEMA director. Mr. Paulison’s vision 

for a new FEMA is for FEMA to become the nation’s preeminent 

emergency management and preparedness agency. We are working 

hard, very hard, to achieve this vision, especially as it relates to 

strengthening the full spectrum of disaster operational capabilities, 

including developing more robust national and regional emergency 

response teams. 

The post-Katrina reviews, including those from the White House, 

the Senate, the House, and others, and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management and Reform Act of 2006 identified a number of 

candidate areas to improve our disaster response capabilities. An 

overarching theme among the recommendations was the need to 

strengthen command, control, coordination and unity of effort, and 

to be able to field a new generation of rapidly deployable federal 

emergency teams. 

Drawing upon our extensive disaster response experience, lessons learned, and these recommendations, we are taking definitive 

steps to improve incident management to ensure greater operational awareness and to become more proactive in our approach. 

FEMA employs a network of operations and coordination centers to 

help integrate and manage disaster response, maintain situational 

awareness, and develop a common operating picture. 

These centers facilitate information-sharing, oversee resource allocations, and prepare consolidated, consistent and accurate reports 

on the status of incidents, responses or potential events for use by 

FEMA and department leadership. Operationally, FEMA maintains 

very close connectivity with the Department of Homeland Security 

through the national operations center, as well as with national 

5 

and regional federal, military, state, and local operations centers, 

including our joint field offices responding to a disaster, state fusion centers, and joint terrorism task forces. 

To manage our situational awareness, coordination and alert and 

notification needs, FEMA has a network of centers, including the 

national response coordination center located at FEMA headquarters. It is one of the five component elements of the DHS national operations center. The NRCC is a multiple agency coordination center that integrates overall federal emergency response actions, coordinates FEMA operational activities, and manages disaster response from the federal interagency. 

Regional response and coordination centers are located in each of 

our 10 FEMA regions. The RRCCs are multi-agency centers that 

coordinate tactical response actions and support the regional administrator at joint field offices located within their region, and the 

FEMA administrator. The FEMA operations center located at 

Mount Weather serves as a critical note in the nation’s warning 

and communications network. 

As part of our mandate to provide critical assistance to state, 

local and tribal governments, we can activate and deploy a number 

of response teams and assets. They include a national-level emergency response team called an ERT–N. It is deployed by FEMA 

headquarters for incidents of national significance and major disasters; advanced element emergency response teams, called ERT–As, 

are located in each of the 10 FEMA regions. They can be deployed 

in the early phases of an incident to work directly with the state 

and local officials to assess the disaster impact, to gain situational 

awareness, to help coordinate the federal response, and to respond 

to specific state requests for assistance. 

The federal incident response support team, or FIRST, can rapidly deploy to or work with state and local officials to provide preliminary on-scene situational awareness and provide initial federal 

support at the local incident commander level to ensure integrated 

and interjurisdictional response. Urban search and rescue task 

forces can be deployed to assist in structural collapse rescue. Mobile emergency response support systems, also called MERS, can be 

deployed to provide mobile telecommunications, logistics and operational capabilities. 

As directed by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and adopted as part 

of our continual improvement process, we are developing a nextgeneration of rapidly deployable interagency national and regional 

emergency response teams. Unlike our current emergency response 

teams, which are staffed on a collateral duty basis, these new 

teams will be staffed with a corps of dedicated, permanent, fulltime employees who when not responding to a disaster, will regularly train and exercise as a unit to support state and local emergency response, planning, training, and exercises. 

These teams are designed to provide better management coordination and integration of the federal disaster response, and when 

fully operational will replace the existing emergency teams at both 

the national and regional levels. We are taking FEMA in a new direction, one that reflects a broader mission challenge, a wider set 

of partners, and a greater depth of mission perspective. The new 

6 

FEMA will require new skill sets, a greater investment in people, 

and new tools to help ensure mission success. 

The response team upgrades currently underway will position 

FEMA to more effectively carry out our core missions to protect the 

American public. 

Thank you for your time today. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Powers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. POWERS

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Thompson, Subcommittee Chairman Cuellar, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. 

I am Robert F. Powers, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Disaster 

Operations Directorate at FEMA. I look forward to working with this Subcommittee 

and Congress to continue improvements to enhance the capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA). Based on our experiences and lessons learned over the years, we are building a new FEMA to further improve our Nation’s all-hazards preparedness, protection, response, recovery and mitigation systems and capabilities. We are taking the 

first steps in what will be a multi-year effort to significantly increase FEMA’s core 

operational capabilities and capacity to better serve and protect our Nation and its 

citizens. 

FEMA learned significant lessons from the 2005 Hurricane Season. Following 

Hurricane Katrina, the White House recommended in its report, ‘‘The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,’’ that FEMA strengthen operational 

disaster response capabilities. Similar recommendations were made in General Accountability Office, Inspector General, and the Senate and House of Representatives 

reviews. More recently, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 

2006 (Post-Katrina Act) articulated new expectations for FEMA, established new 

leadership responsibilities, brought an expanded scope of missions, and called for 

FEMA to undertake a broad range of activities involving preparedness, protection, 

response, recovery, and mitigation both before and after terrorist events, natural 

and manmade disasters. Specific responsibilities assigned to FEMA in the PostKatrina Act are the need to: • partner with non–Federal entities to build a national emergency management 

system; 

• improve Federal response capabilities; and • establish national and regional emergency response teams. 

Our goal is to build a new FEMA that will be the Nation’s preeminent emergency 

management and preparedness agency. FEMA is adopting a more forward leaning 

and collaborative disaster response approach and, we are strengthening our capabilities across the full spectrum of operational and support missions. Central to this 

effort will be developing more robust National and Regional disaster response teams 

that will provide the critical support needed to help State, local, and tribal governments respond to disasters. It is my pleasure to discuss with you today in more detail our current disaster response teams and assets, and actions we are taking to 

improve our capabilities to serve the American people. 

BACKGROUND 

FEMA’s primary mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the 

Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other 

man made disasters by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, 

recovery, and mitigation. FEMA has the primary responsibility for leading and coordinating the Federal government’s disaster response efforts. 

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act provides the 

legal basis for FEMA to provide disaster response and recovery assistance. Following a major emergency or disaster declaration by the President, FEMA is authorized to dispatch its own disaster response teams and assets to provide support or 

to issue a Mission Assignment to the National Response Plan (NRP) signatory Departments and Agencies for support. In addition, FEMA can surge assets into an 

area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that is expected to cause a 

significant impact and result in a declared emergency or major disaster. This surge 

allows FEMA to position for a quick response, but actual assistance cannot be provided until the Governor requests and a Presidential declaration is made. 

7 

The Mission Assignment is the vehicle used by FEMA in a Stafford Act major disaster or emergency declaration to order immediate, short-term disaster response assistance from Departments and Agencies to help State, local, and tribal governments that are overwhelmed by the event and unable to perform the necessary 

work. To streamline and facilitate rapid disaster response, FEMA has also approved 

a number of Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs). In 2006, FEMA had a total 

of 44 PSMAs in place for support—16 Department of Defense PSMAs and 28 United 

States Army Corps of Engineers PSMAs. By June 15, 2007, we expect to complete 

an additional 141 PSMAs for a total of 185 to support our disaster response activities. 

Disaster response support is coordinated through one or more of the NRP’s 15 

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs serve as the primary operationallevel mechanism supporting FEMA in providing State and local disaster assistance 

in functional areas such as transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, public health and medical 

services, search and rescue, agriculture, and energy. The 32 Departments and Agencies signatory to the NRP provide substantial disaster response assistance in their 

areas of expertise and in essence become force multipliers for FEMA when assigned 

missions to support the disaster response. In addition, FEMA can surge its own 

teams and assets into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that 

is expected to cause a significant impact and result in a declared emergency or 

major disaster and can turn to other DHS components such as the U.S. Coast Guard 

for assistance. The surge capability allows FEMA to pre-position for a quick response, but actual assistance cannot be provided until the Governor requests and 

a Presidential declaration is made. 

FEMA DISASTER RESPONSE ASSETS 

FEMA has multiple disaster response operations centers and teams that allow us 

to provide and coordinate disaster response assistance. As stated above, our approach is to lean forward aggressively in pushing resources out and sustaining the 

flow of these resources to ensure immediate and continued support to the impacted 

governments. 

OPERATIONS CENTERS 

FEMA manages a network of FEMA operations centers to coordinate and sustain 

response operations, maintain situational awareness and a common operating picture for DHS and FEMA leadership, facilitate information sharing between FEMA 

and non-FEMA entities, and provide internal and external stakeholders a consolidated, consistent, and accurate status of on-going incidents, responses, or potential 

events. The key components of this network are the National Response Coordination 

Center (NRCC) in FEMA Headquarters; the Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) located in each of the ten FEMA Regions; the FEMA Operations Center 

(FOC) located at the Mt. Weather Emergency Assistance Center; the five Mobile 

Emergency Response Support (MERS) Operations Centers (MOC) located in the 

States of Massachusetts, Georgia, Texas, Colorado, and Washington; and the Logistics Response Center at Headquarters. 

NRCC 

The NRCC is a multi-agency center that functions as the operational component 

of the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) to provide overall Federal response 

coordination for Incidents of National Significance, disaster response operations, and 

emergency management program implementation. The NRCC maintains situational 

awareness linkages with the RRCCs, State Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), 

selected local EOCs in each of the ten FEMA Regions, Regional DHS components, 

Regional ESF EOCs, State Fusion Centers, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Regional 

Department of Defense Operations Centers, and other key operational nodes. The 

NRCC routinely supports program implementation and disaster response and resource planning; coordinates incident management operations; monitors potential or 

developing Incidents of National Significance; supports regional and field components; and provides overall response and resource coordination for DHS and FEMA. 

In addition to maintaining a 24/7 Watch Team, the NRCC is augmented by the 

ESFs during disaster operations and is responsible for: 

• Drafting and distributing operational warnings and orders; 

• Monitoring the preparedness of national-level emergency response teams and 

resources; 

• Initiating MAs to other Federal Departments and Agencies; 

• Activating and deploying national-level teams and entities; 

• Tracking and managing Federal resource allocations; 

8 

• Coordinating operational response and resource allocation planning with 

other Departments and agencies, the RRCCs, the Joint Field Office (JFO), including the use of Federal remote sensing/disaster assessment support; and 

• Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information and incident reports on 

resource status. 

The Logistics Response Center is part of the NRCC and manages logistics activities at the Headquarters level. The Mobile Emergency Response Support Operations 

Centers also support the FEMA Regions, DHS Components, State EOC(s) and other 

MERS deployed command and control assets while supporting emergency communications in the field during Incidents of National Significance. 

RRCC 

The RRCCs are regionally-based multi-agency coordination centers that perform 

a complementary role to the NRCC. Operating in the ten FEMA Regions, the 

RRCCs provide situational awareness information, identify and coordinate response 

requirements, perform capabilities analysis, and report on the status of Federal disaster response operations. FEMA is in the process of hiring two new Watch Analysts 

in each Region. The RRCCs deploy liaison officers and the Emergency Response 

Team-Advanced (ERT–A) to initiate Federal support, facilitate initial delivery of 

goods and services to save lives and property and stabilize local infrastructures, and 

facilitate prioritizing ‘‘in theater’’ interagency resource allocation and coordination, 

and support multiple concurrent disaster operations within the Region. NRCC and 

RRCC activations and operations are scalable and based on the nature, scope, magnitude, and potential impacts of the potential or actual incident. 

Operational Planners have been hired at FEMA Headquarters and will be hired 

for the Regions to augment the ability to conduct more sophisticated analyses in the 

NRCC and RRCCs. In addition, ongoing assessments of capabilities are underway 

to identify shortfalls and equipment needs in order to improve coordination and 

connectivity between the Regions and Headquarters. 

FEMA Operations Center (FOC) 

The FOC supports the NRCC with a 24-hour watch. The FOC implements notifications to the Departments and Agencies that support the NRCC as well as activating emergency management staff. The FOC receives, analyzes, and disseminates 

all-hazards information within FEMA and DHS and to Departments, Agencies, and 

disaster response team members. The FOC, in coordination with the National Operations Center, facilitates distribution of warnings, alerts, and bulletins to the emergency management community using a variety of communications systems such the 

National Warning System, the Washington Area Warning System and the Nationallevel Emergency Alert System. 

DISASTER RESPONSE TEAMS AND ASSETS 

To assist State, local and tribal governments overwhelmed in a disaster situation, 

FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate can immediately deploy multiple disaster 

response teams. We regularly test the capability of our teams and systems to execute their mission by participating in multi-agency and State and local exercises. 

Several different types of disaster response teams can be deployed to support disaster response, as discussed below. In accordance with the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA 

is developing a next generation of rapidly deployable interagency National and Regional emergency response teams, tentatively identified as Incident Management 

Assistance Teams (IMAT). These teams will eventually replace existing Emergency 

Response Teams at the National and Regional level and the Federal Incident Response Support Teams (FIRST) and be designed to provide a forward Federal presence to better manage and coordinate the National response for catastrophic incidents. The new IMAT concept is discussed later. 

Emergency Response Teams–National (ERT–N) 

FEMA’s ERT–Ns are deployed by FEMA Headquarters in response to Incidents 

of National Significance and major disasters. Their purpose is to coordinate disaster 

response activities, coordinate and deploy key national response assets and resources, provide situational awareness, and maintain connectivity with key Department of Homeland Security operations centers and components. ERT–Ns are made 

up of approximately 32 individuals from FEMA Headquarters and Regions who also 

have day-to-day responsibilities beyond their team assignments. ERT–Ns are organized according to National Incident Management System/Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS) standards, which provide a systematic, proactive, and coordinated 

approach for governmental and nongovernmental organizations at all levels to effectively prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents. ERT–N members typically provide the initial staffing cadre for a JFO supporting a major disaster/Incident of National Significance. The JFOs and ERT–Ns 

9 

are supported by FEMA’s MERS detachments which provide support in operations, 

communications, and logistics. FEMA is working toward achieving NIMS compliance for all teams. 

Emergency Response Teams–Advanced (ERT–A) 

ERT-As are located in the ten FEMA Regions and can be deployed in the early 

phases of an incident to work directly with the States to assess the disaster impact, 

gain situational awareness, help coordinate the disaster response, and respond to 

specific State requests for assistance. The ERT–As are made up of approximately 

25 individuals from the FEMA Regions, who also have day-to-day responsibilities 

beyond their team assignments, and representatives from the ESF Departments and 

agencies. The ERT–A initially establishes its presence in the State Emergency Operations Center and later staffs the JFO to support the disaster response. The ERT– 

As deploy with basic communications capabilities including cell phones, wireless 

laptop computers, and a limited number of satellite cell phones. As needed, they can 

also be supported by the MERS detachments and their capabilities. A small component of an ERT–A, the Rapid Needs Assessment Team, is designed to collect disaster information in field needed to determine more specific disaster response requirements. 

Federal Incident Response Support Teams (FIRST) 

FIRSTs are emergency response teams consisting of approximately five individuals who can be deployed immediately to an incident or disaster, particularly an Incident of National Significance. We currently have two FIRSTs, one located in Region IV in Atlanta, Georgia, and the other in Region V in Chicago, Illinois. They 

are designed to serve as the forward component of the ERT–A and will provide the 

core preliminary on-scene Federal management that supports the local incident 

commander or area commander to ensure an integrated inter-jurisdictional response. Current Federal incident response support provided by these teams includes 

a command vehicle and communications capabilities consisting of Trac-star, Global 

Star, Iridium, high frequency, very high frequency repeaters, CATV, INMARSAT/ 

BGAN, internet, computers, mobile radios, and GPS Units. The FIRSTs will ultimately be consolidated into the next generation of emergency response teams, tentatively being called IMATs, which are being developed. 

Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) 

The HLT is a small team designed to enhance hurricane disaster response by facilitating information exchange between the National Hurricane Center in Miami, 

Florida, and other National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration components 

and Federal, State, and local government officials. 

Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces 

The National US&R Response System is a framework for structuring local emergency services personnel into integrated disaster response task forces. The 28 National US&R Task Forces, complete with the necessary tools, equipment, skills and 

techniques, can be deployed by FEMA to assist State and local governments in rescuing victims of structural collapse incidents or to assist in other search and rescue 

missions. 

The 28 Task Forces are located throughout the continental United States. Any 

Task Force can be activated and deployed by FEMA to a disaster area to provide 

assistance in structural collapse rescue, or may be pre-positioned when a major disaster threatens a community. Each Task Force must have all its personnel and 

equipment at the embarkation point within six hours of activation. The Task Force 

can be dispatched and en route to its destination in a matter of hours. There are 

three types of task forces. A Type I task force consists of 70 multi-faceted crosstrained personnel divided into six major functional elements: search, rescue, medical, hazmat, logistics, and planning, supported by canines and capable of 

conductingμphysical search and heavy rescue operations in damaged or collapsed reinforced concrete buildings. Each Task Force can be divided into two 35-member 

teams to provide 24-hour search and rescue operations and are completely self-sufficient for 72-hours. Task Forces are also equipped with convoy vehicles to support 

over the road deployments and can be configured into a Light Task Force to support 

weather events such as hurricanes and tornadoes and other similar type incidents. 

An intermediate size Task Force is currently under development. 

The US&R Task Forces have the following specific capabilities: 

• Ability to conduct physical search and rescue operations in damaged/collapsed 

structures; 

• Ability to operate in a known or suspected weapons-of-mass-destruction environment; 

10 

• Ability to provide emergency medical care for entrapped victims, Task Force 

personnel and search canines; 

• Ability to provide reconnaissance to assess damage and needs, and provide 

feedback to other officials; 

• Ability to provide assessment/shut-off of utilities to houses and other buildings; 

• Ability to provide hazardous materials survey/evaluations; 

• Ability to provide structural and hazard evaluations of buildings; and 

• Ability to stabilize damaged structures, including shoring and cribbing; 

In preparation for the 2007 Hurricane Season, the US&R Hurricane Concept of 

Operations has been updated based on lessons learned. Also, in coordination with 

our partner agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, Department of the Interior, 

and Department of Defense, we have expanded the NRP ESF–9 Annex and to reflect 

a broader scope of search and rescue capabilities including water and wilderness 

search and rescue. 

Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) 

Another key FEMA disaster response asset is the MERS System. The primary 

function of MERS is to provide mobile telecommunications, logistics, and operational 

capabilities for the on-site management of disaster response activities. MERS support falls into three broad areas: 

• Operations—Mobile Emergency Operations Centers, quick reaction support, 

disaster preparedness (HAZMAT) officers, and MERS security officers. 

• Communications—satellite, multiple radio vans, High Frequency line of sight 

microwave, land mobile radios, voice, video, and data capabilities, and wide 

area interoperability. 

• Logistics 

• fuel, water, HVAC, life support, transportation, and power. 

MERS provides support required by Federal, State and local responders in their 

efforts to save lives, protect property and coordinate disaster operations. MERS can 

provide prompt and rapid multi-media communications, information processing, logistics, administrative, and operational support. Staged in six strategic locations, 

one with offshore capabilities, the MERS detachments can concurrently support a 

large JFO and multiple field operating sites within a disaster area. The telecommunications function is accomplished using a variety of communications transmission systems including satellite, high frequency, and microwave line-of-sight 

interconnected by fiber optic cables to voice and data switches, local area networks, 

and desktop devices such as personal computers and telephones. MERS Telecommunications assets can be provided for one or multiple locations within a disaster area and can be used to establish or reestablish communications connectivity 

with the public telecommunications system or Government telecommunications networks. Facilities within a disaster region can be interconnected by MERS assets to 

enhance emergency communications interoperability and austere facilities can be 

wired for computer, telephone, and video networks. 

FEMA deploys MERS capabilities to support the JFO and provide for its continuing operational communications and systems needs. FEMA focuses on providing 

seamless emergency communications across the full spectrum of disaster operations. 

To meet this objective, FEMA provides a national, tactical and fixed emergency communications capability for command and control and situational awareness at all 

levels of government during emergencies and incidents. Additionally, FEMA can use 

supplemental assets to provide Forward Area Wireless access (satellite, cellular and 

land mobile radio) to users across the department. This deployment strategy improves our support to State, county, and local first responders. As the Nation’s preeminent emergency management agency, FEMA will extend its sphere of influence 

and assume a leading National role in the field of disaster emergency communications, supported by MERS, and in full coordination with all of the Federal stakeholders and ESFs partners. 

Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) 

The NIRT teams are specialized teams managed day-to-day by the Department 

of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They are operationally controlled by DHS/ 

FEMA when activated to provide expert technical advice and support in disaster response operations and other needs involving: 

• Nuclear weapons accidents and incidents of national significance; 

• Radiological accidents; 

• Lost or stolen radioactive material incidents; and 

• Acts of nuclear terrorism. 

11 

The NIRT consists of assets from DOE and the EPA and, when activated, operates as a DHS organizational unit under the operational control of DHS. The NIRT 

is configured for rapid response to nuclear accidents or incidents. The NIRT interagency specialized teams are a quick deployment advance element with specialized 

equipment and trained personnel that assess situations and advise local, State and 

Federal officials on the scope and magnitude of response needs. NIRT teams have 

the capability to conduct specialized search and detection operations for nuclear 

weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radiological dispersal devices in urban or 

other areas on the ground or by special air support. They support the full spectrum 

of all nuclear/radiological incidents or accidents considered to be Incidents of National Significance including: terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices or improvised nuclear devices as well as reactor accidents (commercial or weapons production facilities). NIRT consists of one or all of the following DOE/NNSA and EPA response assets: 

• Aerial Measuring System: airborne radiological sensing and surveying; 

• Accident Response Group: scientific technical expertise and equipment; 

• Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center: operational and logistic management focused on radiological consequence management; 

• National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability: computer modeling of 

transport, diffusion, and disposition of radioactive and hazardous materials; 

• Nuclear Emergency Support Team: umbrella team encompassing Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team, Joint Technical Operations Team, and the Search Response Team; 

• Radiological Assistance Program: regional first response capability; 

• Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS): cadre of 

physicians, nurses, and other specialists who provide advanced health physics 

and medical assistance and advice needed to treat victims of acute radiation exposure accidents. 

• Radiological Emergency Response Team: provided by the EPA, works with 

other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and international organizations to monitor, contain, and clean up the release while protecting people and 

the environment from harmful exposure to radiation. 

NIRT assets deploy at the direction of the Secretary of DHS in connection with 

an actual or threatened terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency in the 

United States. A U.S. Secret Service liaison is detailed to FEMA Headquarters to 

coordinate NIRT activities and is working closely with DOE and DHS to better define the roles and responsibilities of the multiple agencies involved with the NIRT. 

Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) 

The DEST is another specialized interagency U.S. Government team designed to 

expeditiously provide expert advice, guidance and support to the FBI On–Scene 

Commander (OSC) during a WMD incident or credible threat. The DEST is comprised of crisis and consequence management components and augments the FBI’s 

Joint Operations Center with tailored expertise, assessment and analysis capabilities, providing the FBI OSC with expert advice and guidance in the following areas: 

• interagency crisis management assistance; 

• information management support; 

• enhanced communications capability; 

• contingency planning for consequence management support; 

• explosive devices and their components; 

• chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons/devices and their components and 

radiological dispersion devices; and 

• technical expertise and equipment to operate in a contaminated environment 

to conduct threat sampling, take measurements, and collect tactical intelligence 

and evidence. 

The U.S. Secret Service liaison detailed to FEMA Headquarters who is coordinating NIRT activities is also responsible for coordinating DEST activities. The liaison is working closely with the FBI to better define the roles and responsibilities 

of the multiple agencies involved with the DEST. 

Next Generation Emergency Response Teams—Incident Management Assistance 

Teams (IMAT) 

To further enhance disaster response capabilities and ultimately provide for the 

three national-level response teams and regional-level emergency response ‘‘strike’’ 

teams required in the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA is developing the next generation of 

rapidly deployable interagency emergency response teams, tentatively identified as 

IMATs, designed to provide a forward Federal presence to facilitate managing the 

national response to catastrophic incidents. The primary mission of a FEMA IMAT 

will be to rapidly deploy to an incident or incident-threatened venue, provide leaderVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-33\48908.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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ship in the identification and provision of Federal assistance, and coordinate and integrate inter-jurisdictional response in support of the affected State(s) or US Territory(s). The IMATs will support efforts to meet the emergent needs of State and 

local jurisdictions; possess the capability to provide initial situational awareness for 

Federal decision-makers; and support the initial establishment of a unified command. 

IMATs will meet the multi-disciplinary needs of emergency management and in 

the future may include members from the inter-agency community. For events 

where the Secretary determines, or may determine, that an Incident of National 

Significance exists, a national-level team will lead the response, supported by regional-level teams. The National teams are envisioned to have the capability to establish an effective Federal presence within 12-hours of notification, to support the 

State, coordinate Federal activities, provide initial situational awareness, and to be 

self sufficient for a minimum of 48-hours to augment potentially scarce local resources. 

The new IMATs will eventually subsume the existing mission and capabilities of 

the FIRST and ERTs and their mission and capabilities and will incorporate similar 

leadership, emergency management doctrine, and operational communications concepts. The national-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with a core of permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a collateral duty 

basis; will be fully compliant with NIMS and ICS; and will train and exercise as 

a unit. 

The National IMATs will consist of approximately 26 staff members and the Regional IMATs each will consist of approximately 15 staff members. Both teams can 

be augmented with additional staff as needed. The teams will be supported by 

FEMA’s MERS elements as described earlier. The teams are still being designed 

and decisions on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not yet 

been finalized. When not deployed, the teams will train with Federal partners and 

provide a training capability to elevate state and local emergency management capabilities. The teams will also engage in consistent and coordinated operational 

planning and relationship-building with State, local, tribal, and other stakeholders. 

Initially, our goal is to establish interim Regional and National teams utilizing 

existing personnel within FEMA. The IMATs will be led by a credentialed Federal 

Coordinating Officer (FCO). Our short-term plan is to, at a minimum, stand-up one 

fully operational interim National IMAT and one fully operational interim Regional 

IMAT by June 30, 2007. The interim teams will form the nucleus of FEMA’s next 

generation of emergency response personnel until we hire and train personnel to 

staff permanent teams. Our longer-term plan is to have one permanent National 

IMAT and three permanent Regional dedicated IMATs by September 30, 2007. 

CONCLUSION 

We are taking FEMA in a new direction, one that reflects a broader mission challenge, a wider set of partners, and a greater depth of mission perspective. The new 

FEMA will require new skill sets, a greater investment in our people, and new tools 

to ensure more effective response, recovery and mitigation. We will be more engaged 

in operational planning to improve the capabilities of our disaster response teams, 

work proactively and collaboratively with our Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector partners, and always maintain focus on our core mission to protect the 

American people. 

Thank you for your time today and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Powers, thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Devir to summarize your statement for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. DEVIR, COMMANDER, DISASTER 

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM OHIO-5 

Mr. DEVIR. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dent, and members of 

the subcommittee, I would like to take this opportunity to speak to 

you on behalf of the team commanders and the approximately 

8,000 professionals who comprise the 107 response teams of the national disaster medical system. 

You have asked me to address the role of the disaster medical 

system team commanders and also the coordination of federal response teams with state and local operations. To put this in a globVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-33\48908.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
13 

al perspective, I gave you a copy of the assistant secretary for preparedness’ response mission and vision statements, and also the 

NDMS statements, so you can see the role that NDMS plays within 

ASPR. 

A disaster medical assistance team, or DMAT, provides temporary medical care to the victims of disasters or public health 

emergencies. In addition to the standard team, which deploys as a 

35-to 50-member unit, and is depicted in the slide picture that you 

have, specialized teams and equipment are also available to provide surgical capability, burn, pediatric, and mental health specialties, as well as teams that can operate in hazardous chem-bio environments. 

While DMATs comprise the greatest share of the response teams, 

NDMS is significantly broader in its overall capabilities. The slide 

with the dog shows a veterinary medical assistance team, or 

VMAT. VMAT supports states in the care of animal victims of disasters, but they are also invaluable resources to the DMATs because they are specialists in zoonotic diseases, the same diseases 

which represent the greatest threat to humans as potential biological weapons. 

Disaster mortuary operational response teams, or DMORTs, provide disaster portable morgue units, forensic specialists, and family 

assistance personnel to assist local medical examiners in working 

with the victims of mass fatality incidents and their families. While 

the teams came from a number of origins across the country, 

NDMS has been able to mold these teams so that they are uniform 

in their composition, equipment, credentialing and resource typing. 

Today, team members are appointed as federal intermittent employees, and these appointments provide the process to validate 

and maintain professional credentials, and also give support for the 

extensive day-to-day team operations of training and maintaining 

the specialized equipment that the teams deploy with. Another key 

benefit of this appointment is that it provides the members with 

USERRA rights at a time of deployment. 

In response to your specific questions, the role of the DMAT commander has several key elements. The first is serving as the manager responsible for these intermittent government employees and 

the federal property entrusted to them, but also in representing 

NDMS in the local community. Occupying a public or private professional position in the local community is key because this local 

private position that they have is their primary occupation. Sometimes it can be both complementary and competitive to their role 

as a team commander. 

If they have a disaster in their community, they are certainly 

called on to be a participant in their regular job. But this is, in 

fact, the rationale of the NDMS response teams: the ability to bring 

in outside resources to a community at a time when they are under 

duress because of the stress of having their own disaster. 

When deployed to a disaster, NDMS response teams truly demonstrate their expertise. In a response team deployment, they are 

going to be located near traditional medical care, self-sufficient for 

3 days, and work within the national incident management system. 

This is key because when the local medical infrastructure comes 

back into operation, the team leadership then coordinates the deVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-33\48908.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
14 

mobilization of the teams with the incident command medical officer, HHS regional personnel in the area, and then they work in 

turn with the local, state and local health care officials to decide 

when it is best for the team to withdraw. 

Once in an assignment, the team is often positioned in locations 

where a hospital either formerly operated or where it is operating 

today, but the demands exceed what it can do. The slide that is 

provided with the patients on the litters is actually a shot of the 

New Orleans Airport during Hurricane Katrina, and one of the 

DMAT treatment areas that was set up inside. 

As a federal asset, the role of the NDMS response team, we have 

to come in and maintain control as we operate in the incident, but 

it is not our role to come in and take control of the incident. That 

is kind of an important distinction. 

I would like to address how the members of Congress can support us in our mission. The need for our services and the time that 

we put out over the last 5 years has significantly increased. Unfortunately, I can’t say the same for our resources. In fact, our budget 

has remained flat for several years now. Looking forward, the new 

Pandemic and All–Hazards Preparedness Act actually adds additional tasks for us by calling for us to do specific planning for atrisk individuals, to include the medical reserve corps in our planning and exercises, and also to have additional training in NIMS 

and the national response plan. 

I know the fiscal year 2008 HHS budget calls for a modest $6 

million increase in the NDMS budget. I have to say that in the 

shadow of some of the most significant disasters this country has 

ever witnessed, I think we are in a unique position to argue the 

value of this type of preparedness. 

We in the NDMS deal with citizens one at a time, whose daily 

lives have been shattered by a disaster, either as patients, victims 

or the affected family members. This provides us with a unique 

hands-on perspective on disaster medicine, and it provides the federal government with a very unusual personal role in their care. 

Providing the best care possible under austere conditions is our 

passion, and it is what drives us to prepare for the call. We are 

grateful for this opportunity to serve. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would like to 

thank you and the members of your subcommittee for your attention. I hope I have been able to provide you with a clear picture 

of the role and duties of an NDMS team commander, and I would 

be happy to answer any questions you might have later. 

Thanks. 

[The statement of Mr. Devir follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. DEVIR

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dent, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I would like to take this opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the team commanders and the approximately 8,000 professionals who comprise the 107 response 

teams of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). I hope to be able to convey 

to you in this short time the incredible amount of work and sacrifice these members 

put forth in their service to our nation, and specifically, to the citizens and their 

families impacted by disasters, both natural and man-made. 

You have asked me to address the role of Disaster Medical Assistance Team 

(DMAT) commanders and the coordination of the federal response teams with state 

and local operations. Much of what I will relay to you will be from the perspective 

15 

of my own team’s experiences, or the experiences that I have had working with the 

Management Support Team, a part of the NDMS Incident Command infrastructure 

that supports the teams when deployed in the field. 

Since 1979, I have served in the Fire Service and Emergency Medical Services. 

In my role as a Fire Department EMS Captain, I recognize the need for a disaster 

medical resource outside the immediate state and local community at the time of 

a major disaster. NDMS fills that unique niche with trained, equipped and uniformed disaster medicine specialists. 

I came to the position of DMAT commander 16 years ago, when the Office of Medical Readiness at Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) in Fairborn, Ohio, 

came to the members of the Greater Miami Valley Emergency Medical Services 

Council with a request for our support in the formation of a Disaster Medical Assistance Team in the Dayton, Ohio, area. As a Federal Coordinating Center for NDMS, 

WPAFB was completing contingency planning in the face of thousands of potential 

military chemical casualties returning from the Desert Storm conflict. The reception 

and care of military patients is just one facet of NDMS, while the more common 

use of the teams has been in caring for civilian patients, animals, and the deceased 

following a major disaster. While DMATs comprise the greatest share of the response team assets, NDMS is significantly broader in its overall capabilities. 

DMATs provide temporary medical care to the victims of disasters or public 

health emergencies. In addition to the standard team, which deploys as a 35-40 

member unit, specialized teams and equipment are available to provide surgical capability, as well as burn, pediatric, and mental health specialties, and even teams 

capable of providing care in hostile Chemical, Biological or Radiological environments. 

Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMATs) support states in the care of animal victims of disasters. They are also an invaluable resource to DMATs, due to 

their expertise in the zoonotic diseases, which represent the greatest threat to humans as potential biological weapons. 

Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs) provide Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMU), forensic specialists, and family assistance personnel to 

assist local medical examiners in working with the victims of mass fatality incidents 

and their families. 

I have told you how DMAT OH–5 started, but if you study the response teams 

nationally you find a variety of origins that led to their development. Teams were 

started by university medical schools, as the result of a specific mass casualty incident in the community, or as part of a state’s emergency management planning activity to name a few. Although teams have evolved from a variety of backgrounds, 

NDMS has molded the various teams to be uniform in their composition, equipment, 

credentialing and resource-typing. 

Under the early System, each individual deployment initiated a hiring process for 

team members, who were then terminated upon its completion. Today, team members are appointed as Federal Intermittent employees, essentially employees who 

are on the federal rolls ‘‘on call,’’ who then clock in at the beginning of an assignment and clock out when they return home. These intermittent appointments provide the process to validate and maintain professional credentials, but also allow for 

the extensive day-to-day team operations of training and maintaining specialized 

equipment to be able to deploy a team within hours of activation. 

The experience of my team and its development is unique, but it parallels that 

of other teams. Our initial challenge was the recruitment of medical professionals 

and support personnel to be able to field a team capable of providing medical care 

in an austere environment. With the support of the Greater Dayton Area Hospital 

Association, we were able to staff and train a core group, and most of them still 

remain as members of the team today. The Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) 

in Dayton provided guidance on obtaining surplus medical equipment through the 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, and gave us access to VAMC facilities 

to both store our equipment and conduct exercises. When we achieved the requisite 

staffing and readiness, we became eligible for a federal cache of medical and 

logistical equipment. This brought with it its own challenges to be able to transport, 

store and maintain the equipment. Today, as an Operational DMAT, our team has 

three box trucks and a 6,000 square foot warehouse where we keep our federal vehicles and equipment. 

The Committee’s request for my testimony today asked about the role of the 

DMAT Commander, and how our services are coordinated with state and local operations. 

The role of the DMAT Commander has several key elements, including: 

• Serving as the manager responsible for intermittent government employees 

under his/her command and the federal property assigned to the team. 

16 

• Representing NDMS in the local community; often serving in a leadership 

role in disaster planning for public health and broader emergency management 

functions. 

• Occupying a public or private professional position in the local community: 

Emergency Physician, Registered Nurse, Hospital Administrator or Emergency 

Services Officer. 

This latter local community role is the primary occupation of the team commander. This is important to keep in mind because the local position is both complementary and competitive to the role of team commander. Should a disaster or 

public health emergency occur locally, this individual more often that not has associated duties in that local community. This is in essence the reason for the NDMS 

Response Teams—the ability to bring in outside medical resources to a community 

with insufficient local resources during a disaster. This is further complicated because many of the NDMS teams started as a local resource, and continue to play 

a role in state or local emergency management plans. The disaster medical resources of this nation are limited in nature. Participation of a team member in a 

local employer’s disaster plan, in a state or local emergency management plan, and 

in an NDMS Response Team presents a confusing scenario when determining how 

many disaster medical personnel truly exist. An emergency planner must be careful 

not to count the same responder more than once. 

Because NDMS Response Teams often developed as a local resource, there is an 

associated local attitude of ‘‘ownership,’’ even though financial support and equipment is essentially federal. This has caused some states to turn to creating state 

disaster medical teams in order to maintain command and control over a local resource. Some of these teams then compete for the same medical professionals needed by a DMAT. Better coordination of the state and federal role of a team could minimize this duplication. 

When deployed to a disaster, NDMS Response Teams truly demonstrate their expertise. Teams follow an organized rotation schedule, and several times a year preplan a roster of available personnel to respond as needed to disasters. If a disaster 

occurs, they ‘‘ramp up’’ in anticipation, but wait for deployment orders to activate 

team members. Variables like distance, the medical services required, and whether 

an on call team is impacted by the incident combine to determine what teams are 

sent on a deployment. Some events like a hurricane provide a pre-planning timetable, with the ability to pre-position teams in a response location close to the 

storm’s landfall, but safe from the impact of the storm. In fact, significant NDMS 

resources were pre-positioned prior to the landfall of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 

Wilma, then moved to the impacted areas as needs were identified and the travel 

routes cleared. 

Once in an assignment, the team is often positioned in a location where a hospital 

formerly operated, or where the demand for medical care exceeds what the local 

medical facility can provide. In a matter of hours, the DMAT sets up in a parking 

lot or standing structure, and starts to see patients. The team is designed to have 

sufficient logistical and medical supplies for up to 3 days. In these early hours and 

days, it is easy to define our role in medical care, as we are often the only option 

available. However, if and when the local community sees its infrastructure come 

back into operation, the team leadership works under the direction of the Incident 

Command Medical Officer and the HHS regional personnel, who in turn work with 

state and local officials to reach agreement when the team can withdraw. The team 

commander plays a key role in this decision, providing input on the number and 

acuity of patients seen, and what local alternative resources are available to treat 

patients. Incoming teams are often viewed as the ‘‘cavalry,’’ the federal response 

coming to the rescue in a disaster. Teams easily take charge in this environment 

of chaos because they bring discipline, training, and experience. The role of the 

NDMS Response Team, however, is to maintain control in the incident without taking control of the incident. The teams are a temporary supplement to that local community’s healthcare system. 

Most of the committee members are no doubt aware of the shortage of medical 

personnel across the country. When the members of our teams leave for a deployment, hospitals and employers back home double-up shifts and fill in for those team 

members who are deployed. Although NDMS Response Team members enjoy 

USERRA coverage associated with their deployment, there can still be negative feelings back home, both with employers and the co-workers who cover their shifts. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were especially challenging in this respect because of 

the multiple or extended deployments of team members. Team leadership is often 

faced with explaining to local employers why team members are being utilized, and 

reassuring those same employers that their employees’ NDMS service is essential 

to the disaster response. 

17 

While team members are deployed, family members go without hearing from their 

loved ones, and endure the associated media blitz detailing all the problems and 

dangers in the affected areas. This places stress on the family members, and needs 

to be addressed by the non-deployed team members with a family support structure. 

This was especially important for families during responses associated with the 9- 

11 attacks. 

I would be remiss in my duty to my fellow team commanders, if I did not take 

this opportunity to tell the members of your committee how you can support us in 

our mission. 

Whether it be the response to the events of 9–11, the multiple hurricane responses of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, or the vigilant preparedness of our 

specialized Weapons of Mass Destruction response assets, the need for our services 

and the time and effort expended to improve our readiness have significantly increased over the past five years. Unfortunately, we have not seen our resources increase with these demands. The NDMS program budget specifically has remained 

flat since 2003. Looking forward, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 

(P.L. 109–417) addresses new areas for which teams must prepare: 

• Specific planning for the ‘‘at-risk individuals’’ in a disaster response. 

• Specific planning for inclusion of the Medical Reserve Corps in coordinated 

response plans and exercises 

• Additional training of team members in the National Response Plan and the 

National Incident Management System 

The recent Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 will require VMATs to work with state governments and other national animal service 

agencies to define how disaster responses will coordinate veterinary and animal rescue efforts. 

I know that the FY 2008 DHHS budget request calls for a modest $6 million increase in the NDMS budget. I can tell you from the perspective of the team commander that these funds and more are truly needed, and have the potential for a 

tremendous payback to the taxpayer. In the shadow of some of the most significant 

disasters this country has ever witnessed, I think we are in a unique position to 

argue the value of this type of preparedness. 

The additional provisions of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act are 

equally important with respect to their emphasis on local planning and preparedness. NDMS Team Commanders experience first-hand the ability to integrate operations in an impacted state where robust Department of Health and Emergency 

Management Agency disaster planning exist. Local preparation for known hazards 

is especially important for successful outcomes in the real event. 

We in NDMS are an unusual entity in the federal government, in that many of 

us deal with citizens, one at time, whose daily lives have been shattered, either as 

patients, victims, or affected family members. This provides us with a unique handson perspective in disaster medicine, and provides the federal government with an 

unusual personal role in their care. Providing the best care possible in these conditions is our passion, and it is what drives us to train and prepare for the call. We 

are grateful for the opportunity to serve. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Members of your Subcommittee for your attention. I hope I have been able to provide you with a clear picture of the role and 

duties of an NDMS Team Commander. 

This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Devir, for your testimony. 

Now at this time I recognize Chief Prather to summarize your 

statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES ‘‘CHIP’’ PRATHER, CHIEF, ORANGE 

COUNTY FIRE AUTHORITY 

Chief PRATHER. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent, members of the committee, I am Chip Prather, the fire chief of the Orange County Fire Authority. Thank you for this opportunity to address the committee. 

I also want to thank Congresswoman Sanchez for her role in 

pushing forward issues having to do with the urban search and rescue task force, and drafting and preparing a crucial piece of legislation that should be introduced later. 

18 

My remarks this morning are on behalf of the Orange County 

Fire Authority, but more importantly, the local agencies that sponsor the 28 national urban search and rescue task forces located in 

19 states. For several years, the 28 sponsoring agencies have been 

advocating for legislation that would authorize the task forces 

under FEMA and address an array of administrative issues. It is 

our hope that this morning we are taking a step forward in that 

goal. 

For the last 10 years, I have served as the fire chief of the OCFA 

which provides services to a population greater than that living in 

12 states. My department has been a USAR-sponsoring agency 

since 1991. Before being approached by FEMA to consider USAR, 

we and other major urban areas had begun to independently prepare for major building collapse and search and rescue operations. 

Because of that ready resource of highly trained firefighters, I believe most would agree with FEMA wisely choosing not to have an 

in-house rescue capability of its own. Instead, FEMA recognizes the 

best source of urban search and rescue knowledge and skill resides 

at the state and local level. Back then, not every local agency saw 

value in participating in this new federal initiative. Many saw 

USAR as a potentially costly burden where local agencies would be 

stuck with administering this new program and not receiving a 

commensurate value. 

On the other hand, 28 of us recognized that we and those that 

we serve would be better off with developing the personnel, training, skills and protocols to work together during a large-scale incident. In fact, in California we had just experienced the Loma 

Prieta earthquake and the collapse of the San Francisco Bay 

Bridge, where, by the way, it was my firefighters who traveled 300 

miles to Northern California and rescued the last survivor from the 

I–80 collapse 89 hours after the earthquake. 

This ever-present earthquake risk and our intense preparation is 

likely part of the reason why FEMA saw fit to have eight of the 

28 national task forces located in California. As I stated, FEMA appropriately recognized that local and state agencies have the expertise and knowledge upon which they could build to develop the premier national response system. 

The purpose of USAR is to have a ready and trained force so that 

the 6,000 participants may deploy to incidents across the nation 

within the FEMA-mandated 6-hour target. And they must be fully 

able to sustain themselves for 72 hours after they have arrived at 

the theater of operations. 

Again, let me emphasize, the urban search and rescue task forces 

act as a ready reserve team immediately available to respond at 

the direction of FEMA. Just like we see today in Kansas, with the 

deployment of Nebraska Task Force 1, we provide the first surge 

of personnel and equipment that comes in behind the local first responders to help and expand their capabilities. 

The vehicles and equipment caches are stored safely and secured, 

ready to respond at a moment’s notice when called upon by FEMA 

and the federal government. In fact, because of the operational 

readiness requirements, we are prohibited by our agreement with 

FEMA from using those resources on the local level. That is not to 

say that us at the local level don’t see value in being a member of 

19 

the national response system. In large measure, our job is to develop the protocols and guidelines on how to handle various emergency scenarios. 

Quite often, we are working in multiple levels of government and 

with various agencies. Our participation in the system provides an 

opportunity to develop interoperable strategies and tactical plans 

with other agencies, resulting in a coordinated and effective response to those who we are trying to help. Of course, our firefighters are better trained because of our participation. 

So what are the needs of the urban search and rescue task 

forces? Well, I can probably point to our response to the Oklahoma 

City bombing, the 9/11 attacks, the Gulf Coast and New Orleans, 

where, by the way, members of my task force once again rescued 

the final survivor there. We are in constant need of improvements 

and ongoing support. 

Unfortunately, the last few years have seen a decrease in the lev- els of federal appropriations. The most recent appropriation of $25 

million provides each task force with $700,000. According to a report by FEMA, it costs approximately $1.7 million annually to support a single task force in a full state of readiness. This leads these 

task forces with a $1 million deficit, and requires the local agency 

to decide whether they are going to subsidize the federal program 

or fund their own local important needs. 

Therefore, I would respectfully urge Congress to appropriate the $45 million authorized for 2008 in last year’s appropriations bill. 

Finally, the national response system needs to address certain 

administrative issues. That is why we are happy that the legislation that Congresswoman Sanchez is working on will be introduced, and hopefully if approved, will achieve the following. It authorizes the national USAR system and the 28 task forces under 

our program within FEMA. It would allow FEMA to reimburse 

local agencies for our costs when there is a deployment, particularly in the area of workers compensation when a member is injured on a federal mission. 

It provides protection to our civilian members participating on 

the task force—our doctors, train operators, structural engineers, 

heavy riggers, dog handlers—from losing their private sector job 

when they are engaged in a federal deployment. It also establishes 

an advisory committee, and lastly and most importantly, it authorizes $52 million in funding for the system. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

[The statement of Chief Prather follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES ‘‘CHIP’’ PRATHER

Intro 

Thank you Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Charles Dent and members of the 

Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response for this 

opportunity to discuss the federal government’s capabilities to respond to national 

emergencies. I would also like to thank Congresswoman Sanchez for her role in 

pushing forward the issues of the USAR task forces and introducing crucial legislation, HR —————. 

I’m speaking here on behalf of the Orange County Fire Authority and on behalf 

of all agencies that sponsor one of the twenty eight National Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. For several years the 28 sponsoring agencies have been advocating 

for legislation that will authorize the Task Forces under FEMA, address administrative issues and provide stable funding. It is our hope that we are taking a step forward in realizing these goals today. 

20 

I have had the privilege since 1997 of serving as the Fire Chief for Orange County 

Fire Authority and overseeing the protection of the 1.3 million residents that live 

in the 22 cities and unincorporated portions of Orange County. In addition to providing basic fire and emergency medical service to our residents and businesses, we 

also have within Orange County major tourist attractions such as Disneyland, 

Knott’s Berry Farm and Angel Stadium along with the Ports of Long Beach and Los 

Angeles immediately to our north and the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant directly 

to the south. As with almost all of California we also face the threat of a major 

earthquake. Undoubtedly this has contributed to our belief in maintaining a prepared and well trained cadre of individuals to be a part of the National Urban 

Search and Rescue System. 

USAR Background 

Orange County Fire Authority has been a USAR sponsoring agency since 1990. 

Before being approached by FEMA, we and other major urban areas had begun to 

prepare for major building collapses and search and rescue operations. Local agencies were well suited to provide personnel with a high level of training that lent 

itself naturally to the specialized skills needed to serve as a member of a USAR 

Task Force. I believe most would agree with FEMA wisely choosing not to have an 

in-house rescue capability of its own to administer and operate on a daily basis for 

the sake of responding to the occasional national emergency incident. Instead, 

FEMA recognized that the best sources for urban search and rescue knowledge and 

skills resided at the State and local levels. 

Back then, local agencies were not sure how to approach this new effort and not 

every local agency saw value in participating in this new federal response capability. 

Many saw USAR as a potentially costly burden where local agencies would be stuck 

with administering this new program and not receiving commensurate value. Some 

of us recognized, though, overall we would be better off with developing the personnel, training, skills and protocols to work together during a large emergency incident. In fact, in California we had just experienced the Loma Prieta earthquake and 

the collapse of the San Francisco Bay Bridge. We knew the consequences of not 

being prepared and trained for large urban emergencies requiring specialized resources from outside the immediate capabilities of local agencies. 

This is likely part of why FEMA saw fit to have 8 of the 28 National Task Forces 

located in California. We had been focused on earthquake preparedness for decades 

and were well suited to see the value in having our personnel trained and cooperating with, not just each other, but with federal resources to develop a sophisticated 

response capability. 

As a large agency comprised of over 800 safety personnel, we have the resources 

and ability to make those personnel available for extended deployments responding 

to large scale national incidents. However, we must still rely on assistance from 

other agencies such as the Anaheim Fire Department, Santa Ana Fire Department, 

Orange Fire Department, LA County Sheriffs and Montebello Fire to fully staff 

USAR Task Force 5. In fact, almost all sponsoring agencies rely upon assistance 

from other public agencies or other organizations to staff the 210 positions of a 

USAR Task Force. 

As I state above, FEMA wisely recognized that local and state agencies had the 

expertise and knowledge upon which they could build to develop a national response 

system. Until this time, the federal government had limited response capabilities. 

The national guard was available to provide manpower and security during and 

after incidents but was not trained or equipped to conduct search and rescue in specialized settings, such as a building collapse or massive WMD exposure. 

Local and state agencies, however, had experience dealing with hazardous material exposures, earthquake and hurricane related building collapses and mass casualty incidents that require planning and logistics training. To some degree, whether a building collapses due to natural causes or by acts of terrorism, the response 

is the same. One obvious modification would be the additional use of WMDs in a 

building collapses but, again, our training for hazardous material spills provides 

some background in the specialized training needed for those potential incidents. 

Locally, the value of the USAR Task Forces isn’t that we are given equipment and 

resources that can be used to supplement local resources. Nothing could be further 

from the truth. I cannot stress this point enough as it seems to be a recurring misconception by many who have written reports that the task forces and their equipment supplement local response capabilities. 

The purpose of the USAR Task Forces is to be ready and trained so that they 

may deploy to incidents across the country within the FEMA mandated six hours 

after activation. They must be able to sustain themselves for the first 72 hours of 

21 

operation. None of this would be possible if the sponsoring agencies were using the 

equipment and materials on a daily basis for their local responses. 

Let me speak to the specific arrangement of OCFA’s USAR Task Force-5. In our 

possession are the following pieces of apparatus: 

• Two tractors & 53 foot trailers 

• 2 Box Trucks 

• Suburban and pick-up trucks 

• Forklifts 

• 2 utility vehicles 

• 1 flatbed trailer 

These vehicles are packed and ready with specialized equipment purchased with 

FEMA grant funds or provided directly by FEMA. In Orange County, these assets 

are stored throughout 5 fire stations, where we oversee the logistics and maintenance of the equipment so that it is ready to deploy at a moment’s notice. Again, 

let me emphasize that the USAR Task Forces act as a ‘‘ready reserve’’ team available immediately to respond at the direction of FEMA. We provide the first surge 

of personnel and equipment that comes in behind the local first responders to help 

and expand their capabilities. The vehicles and equipment are not being used by 

local agencies to respond to local EMS calls, fires or other day to day emergency 

incidents. The vehicles and equipment caches are being stored safely and securely 

ready to respond on behalf of FEMA and the federal government. 

In fact, we are prohibited by our agreements with FEMA from using the cache 

equipment unless sanctioned by FEMA such as in a training exercise. Moreover, 

when some suggest that the Task Forces are supplementing local responsibilities, 

it is important to remember that a Task Force would not respond to a national 

emergency in their own backyard. The Task Forces are comprised of first responders 

from local agencies and those persons would be otherwise occupied and committed 

to the incident. For example, during the attacks on the World Trade Center, some 

of the firefighters that comprised NY Task Force–1 were those individuals that were 

running into the towers during their collapse. Those individuals were engaged in 

the immediate response and it is the other task forces from throughout the country 

that were looked on to come in and provide support. Consequently, in case of a large 

earthquake or other disaster in Southern California, we would rely upon the Northern California Task Forces and other out of state Task Forces to respond and assist 

us. 

This is not to say that local agencies see little value from the resources provided 

via our participation in the National USAR System. A large part of our job is developing protocols and guidelines for how to handle various emergency scenarios. Quite 

often, we are working across multiple jurisdictions and with various agencies. Our 

participation in the National USAR System provides an opportunity to develop a fellowship and cooperative understanding with other agencies. The benefits of this relationship extend to FEMA and other federal agencies. Local agencies feel a greater 

level of comfort and trust when they realize that they are receiving assistance from 

fellow local first responders. 

Lastly, local agencies receive immense value in providing higher levels of training 

to their personnel. This training is brought back to the local level and spreads to 

other local and regional agencies. In fact, there are a number of regional and state 

teams across the country that have organized themselves and modeled their training and protocols on what FEMA and the 28 Task Forces have adopted. 

USAR System Needs 

While I can proudly point to our response to the Northridge Earthquake, Atlanta 

Olympic Games, Oklahoma Bombing, Shuttle Columbia, the attacks of 9/11, and 21 

hurricanes including Hurricane Katrina, we are in need of continued and ongoing 

improvement. 

Unfortunately, the last few years we have seen decreasing levels of federal appropriations. The most recent appropriation of $25 million provided each task force 

with about $700,000. According to FEMA, it costs approximately $1.7 million annually to maintain a Task Force. That amount does not take into account responding 

to incidents, which are funded separately, only the cost or training and maintaining 

equipment. 

This leaves each task force with a $1 million deficit. As I stated previously, these 

resources and equipment are not used for local emergency responses. This means 

a local agency must choose to subsidize a program that ostensibly provides the federal government with a response capability or to fund other local needs such as 

training, equipment, vehicles or facilities that can be used for local day to day emergency responses. 

22 

Therefore, I respectfully urge Congress to appropriate the $45 million authorized 

for 2008 in last year’s appropriations bill. 

Finally, the National USAR System needs to address various administrative and 

program issues. That is why I am excited about the legislation that Congresswoman 

Sanchez has introduced which will achieve the following: 

1. Authorize the National USAR System and 28 Task Forces as a program 

under FEMA and allows activation for pre-staging and training activities. Currently, the Task Forces may only be activated during a Presidential declared 

emergency. 

2. Protect task force members and sponsoring agencies by allowing FEMA to reimburse for costs associated with deployment. Specifically, members and sponsors need to be fully reimbursed for costs associated with workers compensation 

and health claims arising from a member’s injury on a federal mission. 

3. Protects civilian members of the US&R System (non-uniformed personnel 

such as physicians, structural engineers, and canine handlers) from employment 

discrimination and retaliation for engaging in federal US&R activities. For example, we faced this situation when one of our heavy riggers, Don Childress, 

faced termination from his civilian employer if he chose to respond with us to 

New Orleans. Fortunately for us, Don came but he did lose his job. 

4. Establish a standing advisory committee comprised of sponsoring agency representatives, technical experts and emergency response professionals to advise 

FEMA and DHS regarding matters affecting the National USAR System. 

5. Lastly, yet most importantly authorize $52 million in appropriations to fully 

fund the system. 

Again, I can not stress how important it is to provide stable funding so that the 

Task Forces are secure in knowing that they can expend current year funds without 

the risk of acquiring equipment or hiring personnel that will not be funded in following years. 

I hope my testimony and information provided will assist the committee in moving forward our legislation and also in your broader deliberations regarding national 

response capabilities. Thank you again Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Charles 

Dent and members of the committee for your time. 

[Attachment follows:] 

23 


48908-1.eps
24 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you for your testimony, Chief. 

At this time, I will recognize Chief Endrikat to summarize your 

testimony for 5 minutes. 

Your fellow chief just took 1 minute of your time. No, I am just 

kidding. 

[Laughter.] 

Chief ENDRIKAT. He is higher ranking than I am. 

Mr. CUELLAR. If he is higher ranking, he can have that extra 

minute. 


48908-2.eps
25 

STATEMENT OF FRED ENDRIKAT, SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

CHIEF, PHILADELPHIA FIRE DEPARTMENT 

Chief ENDRIKAT. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, for this 

opportunity to discuss the capabilities of federal emergency response teams. 

I am speaking today as a first responder, but I also have the responsibility and privilege to speak on behalf of the nearly 6,000 

members of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s urban 

search and rescue national response system. 

In 1990, following the federal government’s responses to the disasters of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, Congress tasked FEMA to develop a national civilian urban search and 

rescue capability. The primary purpose of this system is to provide 

a nationwide network of heavy search and rescue teams that can 

be rapidly deployed to disaster incidents. 

The individual teams are established at the local jurisdiction 

level and can be federalized and deployed by FEMA as needed for 

nationwide response in order to augment state and local resources 

in disaster situations. The 28 USAR task forces are the fundamental units of FEMA’s national response system and they are 

strategically located throughout the country. 

The FEMA response system also provides an overhead management capability for field operations known as the incident support 

team. This team provides federal, state and local officials with 

technical assistance in the acquisition and utilization of federal 

USAR resources through advice, incident command assistance, 

management, and coordination of the USAR task forces. 

The system has played an essential role in the federal response 

to terrorist attacks. Eleven task forces and one management team 

took part in the federal response to the bombing of the Alfred R. 

Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, and 25 task forces and two of 

the standing management teams took part in the response to the 

attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 

11. 

During the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, all 28 of the 

task forces were activated, with 10 being activated a second time 

for the extended operations encountered. These USAR task forces 

were credited with the search of thousands of homes and buildings, 

and the rescue of 6,587 victims. As Chief Prather mentioned, as we 

speak today, Nebraska Task Force 1 and the FEMA USAR incident 

support team are operating in support of state and local responders 

at the site of the devastating tornado that struck Greensburg, Kansas over the weekend. 

Regardless of the triggering mechanism that causes a disaster, 

the FEMA USAR system has been built with a foundation on the 

concept of all-hazard response and preparedness. This program has 

also been at the forefront of the implementation and field use of incident command structures at incidents of national significance, 

which was referenced in last year’s FEMA post-Katrina reform legislation. 

One of the demonstrated strengths of the national USAR system 

has been the ability to coordinate state and local USAR assets and 

quickly fold them into field operations at disaster sites at the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-33\48908.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
26 

quest of the local authorities having jurisdiction. New Jersey Task 

Force 1 and Puerto Rico Task Force 1 were deployed to the World 

Trade Center collapse on September 11. Both of those task forces 

stayed alongside FEMA task forces at the base of operations located at the Javits Convention Center. 

Neither team was or is a part of the FEMA USAR system. They 

technically did not come under the command and control of the 

FEMA USAR incident support team, but at the request of the Fire 

Department of New York, the IST effectively coordinated their operations. 

State and local rescue teams have realized that FEMA has developed the best practices model and that model has willingly been 

shared as far as policies, procedures, training curricula, and technical expertise in an outreach effort by FEMA USAR to first-, second-and third-tier emergency management response elements. 

There are a number of challenges currently before our system. 

The system currently operates under authority drawn from different sections of the Stafford Act, and the system response elements can only be activated during a presidential emergency declaration. As the chief mentioned, annual funding amounts to build 

and sustain the program have varied widely since the program’s inception. Currently right now, each task force is faced with an approximate $1 million deficit, and a lot of that is made up by corresponding soft cost contributions from sponsoring and participating agencies. 

The system has been functioning without an advisory committee, 

and the rechartering, re-seating and active participation of the advisory committee is extremely important for the continued development of the system. Our ability to utilize real-time satellite imagery and sophisticated mapping technology provided by the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency in the field in the response 

to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi made a significant difference 

in our search for buried victims. 

Time and funding must be dedicated to continue initiatives like 

this, as we significantly attempt to advance our operational capabilities with the introduction of new technology. The maintenance 

and new technology upgrades of our original WMD equipment 

cache that was issued to each task force after the September 11 attacks requires significant and stable funding that is currently not 

identified. 

Each federal task force consistently undergoes several methods of 

evaluation, readiness and each task force must submit a self-evaluation and undergo operational readiness evaluations periodically. 

We also undergo audits by the Office of Inspector General. 

They have also illustrated the fact that in these different evaluations that it is impossible for task forces to attain the highest levels 

the program requires without proper program office staffing, adequate sustained funding, and an increased focused emphasis on 

training initiatives. 

The FEMA USAR system has not reached its full potential. Specific legislative authorization and sustained adequate and recurring 

funding for the FEMA USAR system remains one of the larger 

missing pieces of the puzzle of homeland security. In effect, the nation has a proven ready reserve force of nearly 6,000 highly trained 

27 

specialists capable of immediate response to any type of incident, 

with an annual current cost to the federal government of approximately only $4,000 per member. This program is a proven outstanding example of cost-effective cooperation between all levels of 

government. 

I would like to thank committee Chair Cuellar, Ranking Member 

Dent, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee for the 

privilege of appearing before you today. 

[The statement of Chief Endrikat follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRED ENDRIKAT

Thank you Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished members 

of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response 

for this opportunity to discuss the capabilities of Federal Emergency Response 

Teams. 

By way of introduction, I am Fred Endrikat; I have been a Philadelphia firefighter 

for 32 years, and I am currently assigned as the Special Operations Chief for the 

Philadelphia Fire Department’s Special Operations Command. I also serve the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) National Response System in concurrent duty assignments as the National Task Force 

Leader’s Representative, Incident Support Team Operations Chief, and Task Force 

Leader for Pennsylvania Task Force 1. 

I have served in various capacities at the local, state, and federal levels in disaster response operations, including a 40-day field assignment as the FEMA US&R 

Incident Support Team Operations Chief at the September 11th attack and collapse 

of the World Trade Center in New York City and a 30-day field assignment as the 

FEMA US&R Incident Support Team Operations Chief for Hurricane Katrina (Mississippi theater of operations) and Hurricane Rita. 

I am speaking today as a first responder, but I also have the responsibility and 

privilege to speak on behalf of the nearly 6,000 members of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency’s Urban Search & Rescue National Response System. 

Background 

Similar to the rapid advances and extensive development of emergency medical 

services and hazardous materials response capabilities during the 1970’s and 1980’s, 

the field of technical rescue has seen significant improvement in terms of organization and training during the 1990’s through today. New performance standards and 

accompanying training and legislative initiatives for technical rescue operations 

have recently been developed and teams have been assembled with all of the capabilities that are needed for the most complex and challenging incidents. The Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s Urban Search & Rescue National Response System is the product of these efforts. 

In 1990, following the Federal Government’s responses to the disasters of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, Congress tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a national civilian urban search & 

rescue capability. Several advanced Urban Search & Rescue teams had already been 

developed by individual fire departments and within regions where special risks had 

been recognized, such as California with its well-known earthquake potential. 

FEMA, with support from federal, state, and local authorities, fire departments, the 

nation’s top technical rescue specialists, and other interested groups, developed the 

Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) National Response System. 

As you are aware, during a disaster, the Federal Government implements the National Response Plan to provide state and local government with technical expertise, 

equipment, and other resources. These resources are provided by one or more federal agencies. The primary agency responsible for Urban Search & Rescue is FEMA, 

under Emergency Support Function 9 (ESF 9) of the National Response Plan. 

The primary purpose of this system is to provide a nationwide network of heavy 

search and rescue teams that can be rapidly deployed to disaster incidents. The individual teams are established at the local-jurisdiction level and can be federalized 

and deployed by FEMA as needed for nationwide response. The US&R teams provide an organized system of resources to locate, extricate, and provide immediate 

medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures and to conduct other 

life-saving operations. The US&R National Response System is responsible for the 

coordination, development, and maintenance of the Federal effort in providing these 

resources to augment state and local resources in disaster situations. 

28 

The twenty-eight Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Task Forces are the fundamental units of FEMA’s national response system, and are strategically located 

throughout the country. Each Task Force is sponsored by a State or local government jurisdiction and deploys with technical specialists who are divided into management and operational elements. FEMA has the ability to deploy the Task Forces 

in one of two operational configurations: as a Type I Task Force with 70 personnel 

(with a full equipment cache that includes specialized Weapons of Mass Destruction 

capabilities), or as a Type III Task Force with 28 personnel (with a modified smaller 

equipment cache) that is primarily designed to operate in weather-driven disasters 

such as hurricanes. 

To ensure the ability to deploy at any time with the required number of personnel, teams are staffed in all positions ‘‘three-deep’, and carry a total rostered personnel complement of two hundred and ten members. A significant number of the 

sponsoring agencies are municipal fire departments, and firefighters comprise the 

largest percentage of the rostered members within the system. 

The FEMA US&R National Response System also provides an overhead management capability for field operations known as the Incident Support Team (IST). The 

IST provides Federal, state, and local officials with technical assistance in the acquisition and utilization of Federal US&R resources through advice, incident command 

assistance, management, and coordination of US&R Task Forces, and obtaining 

logistical support. The FEMA US&R Program rosters three 21-member Incident 

Support Teams (the Red, White, and Blue teams). Each IST is on call one out of 

every three months, and members must be able to deploy within two hours of receiving their activation orders. 

Each Task Force maintains extensive capabilities within seven major functional 

elements. 

• Search Specialists utilize canines and technical electronic search equipment 

to locate trapped victims. 

• Rescue Specialists are skilled in shoring operations, lifting, and cutting and 

breaching all types of building materials including structural steel and reinforced concrete to extricate trapped victims. 

• Physicians and Medical Specialists (at the paramedic or equivalent level) provide advanced life support capability and pre-hospital and emergency care for 

Task Force members and crush syndrome medicine and confined space medicine 

for rescued victims. Cross-trained personnel 

• Rigging Specialists work in conjunction with heavy equipment, such as large 

hydraulic cranes, to remove heavy debris and expose collapse voids where victims are buried. 

• Structural Engineers (some of them firefighters also licensed as professional 

engineers) perform structural integrity assessments of structures in rescue operations. 

• Hazardous Materials Specialists and Technical Information Specialists provide support to the overall search and rescue mission including planning, hazards evaluation, hazardous materials assessments in rescue operations, and 

technical documentation. 

• Logistics Specialists support the overall search and rescue mission by providing supplies, equipment, communications, and transportation for the Task 

Force and managing the mobilization and demobilization processes. 

In addition to having the above listed capabilities, Task Forces are structured to 

be able to operate under the following guidelines: 

• 24-hour around-the clock operations 

• Self-sufficiency for 72 hours 

• Report to the Point Of Departure within 4–6 hours of activation, and to be 

able to deploy all personnel and the entire equipment cache by ground or air 

(as required) 

• Cross-trained personnel 

• Standardized equipment and training 

• Standardized operating procedures 

• Operate under the Incident Command System (ICS) 

Current Overview 

The US&R System has played an essential role in the federal response to terrorist 

attacks. Eleven of the then 25 Task Forces and one management team took part 

in the federal response to the bombing of the Alfred R. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, and 25 of the current 28 Task Forces and 

two of the current three standing management teams took part in the response to 

the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 

29 

During the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, all 28 of the Task Forces were 

activated, with ten being activated a second time for the extended operations encountered. These US&R Task Forces were credited with the search of thousands of 

homes and buildings and the rescue of 6,587 victims. As evidenced by the FEMA 

US&R Program’s response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and as highlighted by 

Secretary Chertoff in his Report to Congress last year, the FEMA US&R Program 

was one of the federal response entities, along with the United States Coast Guard, 

that was acknowledged for successful response operations. 

Regardless of the triggering mechanism that causes a disaster, the FEMA US&R 

System has been built with a foundation in the concept of ‘‘All-Hazard’’ preparedness. This program has also been at the forefront of the implementation and fielduse of Incident Command structures at incidents of national significance (which was 

referenced in last year’s FEMA Post-Katrina reform legislation). 

One of the demonstrated strengths of the National US&R System has been the 

ability to coordinate state and local US&R assets and quickly fold them into field 

operations at disaster sites (at the request of the local Authorities Having Jurisdiction). New Jersey TF1 deployed to New York City to the attack and collapse of the 

World Trade Center on September 11, and Puerto Rico TF–1 deployed on September 

13. Both Task Forces staged alongside FEMA Task Forces at the Javits Center Base 

of Operations. Neither team was, or is, part of the FEMA US&R National Response 

System, but both are modeled in a similar fashion to Federal Task Forces in the 

areas of personnel rostering and equipment, and training. They technically did not 

come under the command and control of the FEMA US&R Incident Support Team, 

but at the request of the Fire Department of New York, the IST effectively coordinated their operations. 

This positive interaction between the FEMA US&R Program and various levels 

of government is demonstrated not only during disaster operations, but also in the 

preparedness phase of emergency management. The benefit of the FEMA National 

US&R System to the first responder can be demonstrated by the fact that state, regional, and local first responders utilize the FEMA US&R National Response System’s training curriculum, equipment standards, and policies as benchmarks in 

preparation for response to local emergencies. These rescue teams have realized that 

FEMA has developed a best-practices model that they have incorporated into their 

training and operations, and the National Program has willingly shared policies, 

procedures, training curricula and technical expertise in an outreach effort to first, 

second, and third tier emergency management response elements. 

The FEMA US&R National Response System is a proven response entity of the 

Federal government, and is available to provide immediate response to a terrorist 

attack or natural disasters. Since 1991, this system has responded to 28 major disasters, and has also been deployed to support 12 National Security Special events 

(to include Presidential Nominating Conventions, the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt 

Lake City, the G–8 Summit, etc.). 

Challenges 

FEMA currently operates the US&R System under authority drawn from different 

sections of the Stafford Act, and System response elements (Task Forces and Incident Support Teams) can only be activated during a Presidential emergency declaration. 

Annual funding amounts to build and sustain the program have varied widely 

since the program’s inception. The current annual cost to maintain a Task Force in 

a state of readiness has been estimated by FEMA to be approximately $1.7.million. 

At the current level of funding, each Task Force is faced with an approximate $1 

million deficit. A significant portion of this deficit is usually made up by Sponsoring 

Agencies and Participating Agencies who absorb both ‘‘hard’’ costs (such as the payment of vehicle insurance, maintenance, and operating costs), and ‘‘soft’’ costs (such 

as the payment of salaries for members to maintain specialized rescue skills during 

training exercises) related to Task Force expenses. 

The System has been functioning for many years without an Advisory Committee 

(historically comprised of members representing FEMA, Sponsoring Agency Chiefs, 

technical experts, labor officials, and emergency response professionals). In the past, 

the Advisory Committee has brought the diverse views of all stakeholders together 

and provided important guidance and a balanced viewpoint to FEMA with regard 

to the operation and administration of the US&R National Response System. The 

rechartering / reseating and active participation of the Advisory Committee is extremely important to the Sponsoring Agency Chiefs and US&R System participants. 

Time and funding must be dedicated to continue the development of working relationships with other agencies (such as the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency) 

30 

and private partners in the science and technology research fields that will significantly advance our operational capabilities with the introduction of new technology. 

The maintenance and new technology upgrades of the original Weapons of Mass 

Destruction equipment cache that was issued to each Task Force after the September 11th, 2001 attacks requires significant and stable funding that is currently 

not identified. 

National US&R Task Forces are evaluated by several methods in relation to operational readiness parameters. Annually, each Task Force must submit a Self–Evaluation to the Program Office. Selected Task Forces are then identified for a Phase 

II Evaluation. These Operational Readiness Evaluations (where an Evaluation 

Team of Program Office staff and Peer Evaluators conduct a comprehensive on-site 

inspection and review of administrative policies, procedures and documentation, 

logistical readiness, training programs, financial record-keeping, and personnel files) 

are currently being conducted for six Task Forces each year. The System also undergoes periodic extensive audits by the Office of Inspector General. These various evaluation mechanisms have raised the bar of preparedness and readiness to the highest levels, but have also illustrated the fact that it is impossible for Task Forces 

to attain the highest levels this program requires without proper Program Office 

staffing, adequate sustained funding, and an increased focused emphasis on training 

initiatives. 

Summary 

Despite the lessons we have learned from our nation’s response to the attacks on 

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and despite our lessons learned from responses to events similar to the devastating hurricane season of 2004 and the response in 2005 to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Urban Search & Rescue 

System has not reached it’s full potential. 

These responses have increased the urgency for us to continue to improve our 

skills and develop new technologies to mitigate complicated large-scale technical rescue / collapse situations. Specific legislative authorization and sustained adequate 

and recurring funding for the Federal Urban Search and Rescue System remains 

one of the larger missing pieces of the puzzle of homeland security. 

In effect, the nation has a proven ‘‘ready reserve’’ force of nearly 6,000 highlytrained specialists capable of immediate response to any type of incident, with an 

annual current cost to the federal government of approximately $4,000 per member. 

This program is an outstanding example of cost-effective cooperation between all 

levels of government. Legislation that is currently being introduced by Congresswoman Sanchez would consolidate the statutory authority for the System under the 

Stafford Act and would, among other things, for the first time, explicitly authorize 

the US&R System and address the funding uncertainties that this program faces 

every Fiscal Year. This legislation will ensure a strong federal Urban Search & Rescue response capability, with measurable benefits through all tiers of emergency response. 

Again I would like to thank Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee for the privilege of appearing before you 

today. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Chief. 

I want to thank all of you all, members of the panel, for being 

here with us. 

At this point, members will now have an opportunity to ask our 

witnesses questions. I remind each member that he or she will 

have 5 minutes for the set of questions that he or she might have. 

I will now recognize myself for my set of questions. 

This question goes to both Chief Endrikat and Chief Prather. 

After the September 11, 2001 incident, Congress provided substantial increases to the urban search and rescue funding. Federal preparedness funding for the USAR reached a high of $65 million in 

fiscal year 2004, but fell to $30 million in fiscal year 2005, and the 

amount later decreased to $20 million in fiscal year 2006. 

How has this decrease in funding impacted the efficiency of the 

deployed teams and the staffing levels of the work that you all 

have been doing? 

Chief Prather, I think you have the highest rank. Is that correct? 

31 

Chief PRATHER. It is basically what I said in my remarks, sir. We 

need to choose whether we are going to fund our local needs or support this task force. We have chosen to try and balance that. There 

are a number of examples that we make do with what we have. An 

example is our task force is spread around in six different fire stations, as opposed to being in a single secure facility from which we 

can efficiently deploy. 

Many of the task forces are lacking in some of the administrative 

support to take care of the grant funds. Probably the biggest shortfall that we see is the ability to complete the required training and 

to acquire the adequate depth in our resources so that we can deploy and sustain that deployment. 

I think the strength of the system, in spite of the cyclic nature 

of the funding, is, as Chief Endrikat pointed out, you saw that all 

task forces, irrespective of the amount of funding that was available, were able to respond to the Gulf Coast and New Orleans. So 

the system works, but we are making it work. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. 

Chief? 

Chief ENDRIKAT. Mr. Chairman, maybe a word of background on the funding. The $60 million that was appropriated after the September 11 attacks, a good portion of that was earmarked toward 

building our capability and giving each task force the potential to 

be able to deploy two complete elements, so two task forces. And 

a lot of the funding was geared toward procuring a second equipment cache for the task forces. 

We are still in the process of that. That still requires some funding that possibly has not yet been identified. But the goal was to 

give us more depth at the federal level to be able to respond and 

support state and local authorities. 

As I mentioned, I think one of the benefits of this program is the 

level of cooperation between all levels of government. Based on 

what Chief Prather mentioned, we balance or we attempt to balance our local needs with being able to support the federal requirements and the federal mission. Our sponsoring organizations and 

our participating agencies end up absorbing a lot of this soft cost. 

For example, in Pennsylvania, we absorb the soft costs for our 

vehicle insurance, for our vehicle maintenance, for costs along 

those lines, simply because there is not enough budget money annually to go around and to fully keep the task force ready and prepared to respond for a federal mission. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Thank you. 

A question to Dr. Devir. According to the 2005 House Government Reform report on NDMS, after-action reports following the 

2004 hurricane season documented serious breakdowns in planning, supply management, communications, and leadership. Some 

problems included deployment of teams with inadequate supplies, 

lacking essential drugs and equipment. 

Do you feel these types of issues have been resolved, number 

one? And number two, does simply moving NDMS from FEMA 

back to the HHS solve all of the NDMS problems? 

Mr. DEVIR. I would like to thank you for my promotion to ‘‘doctor,’’ but unfortunately I am just a ‘‘mister.’’ 

Mr. CUELLAR. Well, then we will call you ‘‘honorable.’’ 

32 

Mr. DEVIR. There you go. I like that. That is nice. 

[Laughter.] 

As far as the issues related to our response, you sort of have to 

separate the individual response from the nature of after-actions. 

I could probably bring out 10 after-action reports from different incidents, and I could blindfold you and read them to you, and you 

wouldn’t know which was which, because typically the same issues 

come up—command and control issues, resupply, et cetera. 

In terms of have we made improvements, I think we certainly 

have. I know that while we were still positioned within FEMA, significant changes and improvements were made in the way logistical 

resupply was organized. Specifically, some of our folks on working 

groups that were actually in the field sat down and came up with 

plans that there would be automated resupply, instead of waiting 

for somebody to put through the purchase order and ask for additional supplies. 

We knew that if we were seeing a certain level acuity of patients 

in certain volumes that we would run out of certain medical supplies. So there was a system put in place that on the second day 

you would start shipping those supplies in, and on the third day 

you would start shipping additional supplies in. So that was a significant improvement. 

I know there was also some work to supply us with some additional communications equipment. I think we still need to do some 

work in that area, but the ability to add some satellite communications and infrastructure that was outside what you depend on locally that is typically going to be destroyed, certainly helped our response capability. 

As far as moving over to HHS, don’t take this as a criticism of 

our cousins over in FEMA, but it is difficult to do some of the medical things when you are not in the medical community. Anybody 

that has gone to the doctor, you talk to your doctor about what is 

going on, and pretty soon in some sophisticated language, he has 

sort of left you in the dust unless he is an especially good communicator. 

We found that in resupply issues that a lot of times the folks 

that were sincerely trying to do a good job, they just didn’t know 

the medical equipment or some of the medical supplies to be able 

to provide to us what it was we needed. So I think moving over to 

HHS, where we have specialized medical logistics, is certainly 

going to help us in that area. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. Thank you. 

I have a question for Mr. Powers, but since my time is over, I 

will go ahead at this time and recognize the ranking member of the 

subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for any 

questions. I will come back in the second round and ask Mr. Powers some questions. 

Mr. Dent? 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony. 

Mr. Powers, it is my understanding that the national operations 

center has the capability to deploy disaster situational awareness 

teams. There are also emergency response teams that are managed 

33 

or controlled by other federal agencies such as domestic emergency 

support teams and nuclear incident response teams. 

How many types of emergency response teams does FEMA have? 

And how do they relate to one another is really the big question? 

Mr. POWERS. Let me begin from the very beginning of your questions, the DSAT team that the department has. The reason I am 

not answering your question directly is because we have a number 

of teams that I did not mention in my testimony as part of our recovery. There are a number of other things that we deploy. It is 

not just initial response. There are a good number of those. 

The DSAT team is a team that the secretary created after 

Katrina to provide better situational awareness for the department. 

Their purpose was to go on-scene and provide video and audio links 

of what was actually happening back to the Department of Homeland Security so that they did not have to rely on commercial 

media as their only news source of information. 

One of the things that we are intending to do with our incident 

management assist teams, the new teams that were created, is to 

provide them a situational awareness capability where they will be 

able to work with the state and local officials on-scene and provide 

situational awareness not just back to DHS, but also back to the 

local incident command and the state EOC and the regional FEMA 

offices, so that everyone will have the same information at the 

same time, so that we have a good understanding of what the situation is on-scene so we can apply the right resources to whatever 

the incident happens to be. 

Does that answer your question? 

Mr. DENT. Yes. I would like to further elaborate, though. Can 

you explain how it is not duplicative to have both FEMA and the 

national operations center deploy emergency response teams and 

domestic emergency response teams, respectively, at the same 

time? Why is that not duplicative, essentially? 

Mr. POWERS. We are attempting to work together. We respect the 

wishes of the secretary to deploy situational awareness teams that 

he needs for his information. We are changing the way we do business, so we are in a position to provide that information directly 

to him if he needs it. If that meets his requirements, then I would 

expect that his teams will no longer be required. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Questions to Mr. Endrikat and Mr. Prather. Last year, DHS’s Office of Inspector General issued an audit of the national urban 

search and rescue response system, USAR. This audit found that 

the USAR task forces were falling short of achieving the system’s 

set objectives and that there were operational, logistical and management deficiencies. The audit also criticized FEMA for funding 

and staffing shortages that prevented proper monitoring and oversight of task forces. 

From your perspective, has FEMA taken steps to address these 

deficiencies? And how does FEMA strengthen its oversight and involvement with these task forces? 

Chief ENDRIKAT. Congressman Dent, recently the FEMA program 

office in the area of program staffing was just authorized basically 

a doubling of staff. That is something that the sponsoring agency 

chiefs and the task forces have been supporting for years. So the 

34 

national program office at FEMA headquarters, with this increase 

in staffing, should be able to give greater oversight and greater coordination and guidance to the 28 task forces in the field. 

The inspector general audits exposed a number of weaknesses in 

our system. I think a lot of those weaknesses are based on the high 

bar and the high standard that has been set. As I mentioned, we 

have self-evaluations. We have operational readiness evaluations. 

But I think the core issue here is that without adequate sustained recurring funding and guessing each year on how we are 

going to maintain programs and training programs and logistical 

requirements, it is really pretty much a guess each year what we 

are going to able to do in order to maintain that high level of readiness. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

I see my time is up. 

Mr. CUELLAR. No, go ahead. 

Mr. DENT. Mr. Prather, do you want to just quickly answer? 

Chief PRATHER. I would just echo what Chief Endrikat said. I 

think the increased staffing for FEMA and the use of our program 

will be of great help and enable us to roll this forward. They have 

had eight people in there—that is half of what I send to a single 

structure fire—responsible for managing the 6,000 people, not only 

on the administrative side, but also during the support. So we are 

very happy with that. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

The chair would now recognize other members for questions they 

may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our committee 

rules and practices, I will recognize members who were present at 

the start of the hearing based on seniority on the subcommittee, alternating between the majority and minority. Those members coming in later will be recognized in the order of their arrival. 

Also, for the members who came in a little bit afterwards, we did 

grant Mr. Rodriguez, who is also part of the subcommittee on appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security. He also had 

a disaster in Eagle Pass in his district. 

So at this time, just so everybody knows the order we will be following, I will lean over to this side. Ms. Norton will go first. I will 

recognize her in a second. Ms. Christensen will go second. Mr. 

Etheridge, if he comes back, will go third. Ms. Lowey will go next, 

and then Mr. Rodriguez will go after that. If any other members 

come in, we will go ahead and put them in. 

So at this time, just so everybody knows the order that we are 

going, the chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from 

D.C., Ms. Norton, for her 5 minutes of questioning. Ms. Norton? 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Powers, one of the most serious issues in the catalog of problems from DHS following Katrina was the confusion and overlap 

between FEMA officials and DHS officials. Mr. Dent has alluded to 

some continuing overlap in his questions. One thing Katrina taught 

us was that essentially we were not prepared to respond to a WMD 

attack, because there should be no difference. The only difference 

35 

is you don’t get a weather forecast ahead of time telling you that 

an attack is coming, as we did with the hurricane. 

As I understand it, you worked as something called the ‘‘principal federal official’’ during Hurricane Katrina. Is that not true? 

Mr. POWERS. That is not true. I worked as the operational— 

Ms. NORTON. You worked for the principal? 

Mr. POWERS. I worked for the principal federal official during 

Hurricane Rita. 

Ms. NORTON. Not during Hurricane Katrina? 

Mr. POWERS. I did not work in Hurricane Katrina. 

Ms. NORTON. Were you the so-called ‘‘senior DHS official’’ in Hurricane Wilma? 

Mr. POWERS. That is correct. 

Ms. NORTON. The principal federal official is, as I understand it, 

a Department of Homeland Security position. Is that the case? 

Mr. POWERS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. The senior Department of Homeland Security official in Hurricane Wilma was also a DHS official. Is that right? 

Mr. POWERS. That is correct. 

Ms. NORTON. I would like to know what operational role these 

officials have—the principal federal officer, the senior DHS official—what operational role do these officials have that is not or 

could not be played by the federal coordinating official who is the 

lead official under the Stafford Act? 

Mr. POWERS. You are correct. The federal coordinating officer is 

the primary federal official. We are all emergency management 

that is related to Stafford Act issues. The federal coordinating officer is the primary leader in the unified coordination group. He or 

she brings synergy to the federal agencies and is the person with 

the fiduciary responsibility, the FCO, the federal coordinating officer, as given under the Stafford Act. 

The role of the FCO complements the PFO. The PFO has three 

roles. First of all, he is the personal representative of the secretary 

of homeland security. 

Ms. NORTON. Is not the federal coordinating official also the representative of the secretary? 

Mr. POWERS. He is, but the principal federal official is the personal representative of the secretary. 

Ms. NORTON. Is he paid more than the federal coordinating officer? 

Mr. POWERS. It depends on the situation. They may or may not 

be. 

Ms. NORTON. Why do you need two officials who apparently report to the secretary, when in fact that was precisely the kind of 

confusion that we was reported in Katrina? Now, you have somebody being paid at a time when this committee was asking about 

funding that is not available for WMD, for example, in post-9/11 

task forces. We have senior officials over officials who report to the 

secretary. 

You need to explain to me who is in charge. If there is somebody 

who says ‘‘I come from the secretary,’’ and there is somebody else 

who says, ‘‘I am the federal coordinating official,’’ and I am in one 

of these areas which has just had a disaster, who is in charge? 

36 

Mr. POWERS. The person in charge for the federal response under 

the Stafford Act is the federal coordinating officer. 

Ms. NORTON. So why do we need a highly paid senior DHS official and a highly paid principal federal official, alongside the federal coordinating officer, who is the only officer recognized by law— 

the only one recognized by law? And here I am sitting in Podunk, 

Nevada, or someplace—pardon me, Nevada—and these two people 

report. How am I to know who is really in charge? Or am I left to 

try to figure out who I should really relate to? What is the point? 

Mr. POWERS. During an event, there are a lot of people who respond. There are a lot of agencies that respond. There are the state 

coordinating officers, federal coordinating officers. There is a senior 

law enforcement official who responds, who does not report to the 

FCO. And there are other people— 

Ms. NORTON. I know what these other officials do. I am trying 

to find out what the principal federal official does. I understand 

who he reports to. I want to know what he does. 

Mr. POWERS. He is the one who coordinates these groups of various disparate groups. 

Ms. NORTON. That is now what the federal coordinating official 

does, although his word says that he is the coordinating official. 

That is what his title is. 

Mr. POWERS. The way the national response plan is laid out, that 

is his title. I agree with you. But the role of the principal federal 

official is to coordinate all of the responders, all of the senior-level 

responders, kind of the chairman of the board, so to speak, and to 

get the teams to work together. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to note for the record 

that I have tried in my other committee, which also has jurisdiction 

over FEMA, to find out why we have these overlapping officials. I 

am very seriously concerned. I mean it. If I am in some catastrophe 

and these two guys report and salute and say they are representing 

the secretary, I am seriously confused about who it is who is in 

charge. I have no reason to believe that the federal government 

ought to be paying for two people to be in charge post-Katrina. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, Ms. Norton. 

Can you follow up with the staff and let’s see if we can try to 

answer this question at another time, maybe working with Ms. 

Norton, to see if we can sit down and try to get this down as soon 

as possible? If we can try to do it later on this week, it would be 

really good. 

Can you just send me a little note to say that you all have done 

the meeting? Okay. Thanks. 

At this time, the chair will recognize for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen, for 5 minutes of 

questions. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

this hearing. 

My first question would be to Mr. Devir. You responded to Mr. 

Dent’s question about the move back to the Department of Health 

and Human Services. If I remember correctly, during Hugo, that is 

where the DMAT team was to begin with. So it seems to me that 

that is where it properly belongs. 

37 

My question is about the coordination now between HHS and 

DHS. Has that been exercised? Is that operationally seamless coordination between the two? It was back in 1989, but a lot of things 

have changed in FEMA since then. 

Mr. DEVIR. Yes, ma’am. It has been exercised. There is an additional point that impacts that. That is the fact that the assistant 

secretary for preparedness response in Health and Human Services 

is a new under secretary under law. That position has just been appointed, Admiral Vanderwagen, by the president. 

So you are talking about a move within an agency that is sort 

of going under a mini-reorganization, if you will. We are aware of 

the fact that we do have to identify how those folks will interface 

with one another. Going back to your point about Hugo, the medical response has always fallen under ESF–8. So as it relates to a 

medical need, the folks in Health and Human Services, working 

with local officials, determine that there is a need, FEMA had the 

overall responsibility for managing the incident, and HHS always 

had responsibility for serving the medical needs. 

So that coordination has been in place, and we see the same people in our meetings. They just may have a different name tag. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. 

Mr. Powers, I think it was in your testimony—actually, I was 

trying to find where I was reading about the type one or type two 

task forces. Is that in your testimony? Well, in one of the testimonies, the type one task force was described as having specialized 

weapons of mass destruction capabilities. 

I know in my district and other districts, we have the civil support teams of the National Guard that also have special weapons 

of mass destruction capabilities. 

I was wondering, are these two agencies duplicating each other? 

Is there an effort to make sure that their activities are coordinated? Or are they different? Are their responsibilities different? 

Mr. POWERS. Let’s just say that the capabilities of the National 

Guard complement the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of 

the USAR teams. The teams do joint training. We make sure that 

they complement, not compete, with one another because during 

that kind of an event, you probably never have enough resources 

and we need all the resources that we can muster. 

So the resources that the National Guard puts forward, the resources that area available in the active Army and the DOD, plus 

the resources that we have available in the USAR teams, all complement one another. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I see Mr. Endrikat nodding. Let me ask the 

question to Mr. Endrikat and Mr. Prather, and you can respond to 

that question as well. 

Do any of these teams, the search and rescue teams, exist outside of fire departments? Are you aware of any that exist outside 

of fire departments? We have a rescue in each island in the Virgin 

Islands, and to me, they fulfill that role. I was just wondering if 

they would qualify to be one of these task forces, or must it be inside of fire services? 

Chief ENDRIKAT. No, ma’am. Most of the 28 are sponsored primarily by fire agencies, but one example would be Texas A&M University sponsors Texas Task Force 1. In the past, New Mexico was 

38 

sponsored by the University of New Mexico. So there are some 

other agencies. There are also some emergency management agencies at the state or local level that sponsor federal task forces, but 

primarily they are mostly fire-based. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Did you want to add a response to the question about the civil support teams? 

Chief ENDRIKAT. The WMD, I think in my written testimony, I 

spoke to the difference between the type one FEMA USAR task 

force and the type three FEMA USAR task force. The type one is 

the one with the weapons of mass destruction capability. I also referenced in my testimony that right now, we are about 5 years into 

the technological shelf-life of our WMD equipment. We are really 

struggling with how to maintain that capability in the state-of-theart effective way, without sustained funding specifically dedicated 

for that. 

But as Mr. Power said, the civil support teams and the DOD 

teams that operate in a WMD arena, we do coordinate and we do 

have very similar roles as far as the assessment of the WMD event. 

I think our problem for all of our teams is how we mitigate and 

actually engage in hot zone operations. We are still defining that 

concept of operations across the board. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much. 

At this time, the chair will recognize for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I get to my questions, I want to mention an emergency 

response team in my district. In Westchester County, New York, a 

group of fire chiefs have formed a county-wide task force to better 

handle certain emergencies. Members of the task force including 

more than 75 firefighters, fire chiefs, have received specialized 

training, including trench and building collapse, mass casualty, 

HAZMAT, and WMD training. 

This has proven to be a tremendous success. The task force has 

responded to numerous emergencies in the community, and I have 

worked with them for several years to secure federal funds. Last 

year, a team from DHS went to Westchester to document the task 

force’s work and they use it as a prototype to encourage other communities to develop their own teams. 

After personally seeing the success of our local task force, I am 

certainly appreciative of the work of all of our witnesses in urban 

search and rescue teams, and disaster medical assistance teams. I 

thank you. 

Mr. Prather explicitly stated in his testimony that USAR equipment is not used for everyday local events. The equipment purchased is set aside for appropriate emergency use only. What troubles me is that the federal government asks state and local public 

safety agencies to do this, at the same time that the administration 

has repeatedly proposed to cut funding for the program. 

Mr. Prather’s testimony mentions that locals must pay $1 million 

for the federal government’s $700,000 contribution. The federal 

government reaps the benefit, but only pays 40 percent of the cost. 

As an appropriator, I frankly have been far too many examples of 

39 

the department claiming that it fully supports a program, only to 

propose that funds are cut. This is unacceptable. 

I suggest this to Mr. Powers. Why has the administration proposed to cut funds for this program in recent years? And to the 

other members of the panel, how would increased funding assist 

your response to emergencies? 

Mr. Powers can begin, and then we can hear from the others. 

Mr. POWERS. I will have to get back to you on the department 

perspective on that. I can answer from the program perspective, 

but not the department perspective. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay. So you are not aware of cuts in the program? 

Mr. POWERS. I know that the budget was submitted for $25 million in 2008. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay. Do you have an opinion about it? 

Mr. POWERS. Pardon me? 

Mrs. LOWEY. You want to get back to me. Okay. 

Do any of the others care to comment on the fact that the local 

share is so high? 

Chief PRATHER. I think your follow-up question was what would 

be the operational capability if we were fully funded? What difference would it make? 

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay. 

Chief PRATHER. From my perspective, what would be different is 

our second cache would be completed. As Ranking Member Dent 

mentioned, the inspector general’s report identified some areas 

where we were weak and still needed improvement. 

Much of that was based on the need for funds—the depth in 

training, the operational exercises, to conduct those, the readiness 

exercises, and a number of things that would basically strengthen 

the program and allow us to fully fund the federal program, as opposed to the locals having to do something with our money for the 

federal program. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Before anyone else responds, let me throw out some 

other ideas directly related. When a team is deployed, there are 

backfill costs for those on the team who are first responders. If so, 

does FEMA reimburse public safety agencies for backfill costs? Perhaps you can respond? 

Chief PRATHER. Yes. The $1.7 million figure that we are talking 

about is the ongoing maintenance costs. It does not take into consideration the actual costs of response. When we respond, that is 

probably the place that we do get the full funding, not only for the 

cost of the deployment, but also for the backfill. 

One of the things that is a problem there, which would be addressed in the legislation Ms. Sanchez is considering introducing, 

would be the workers comp reimbursements. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Did you want to respond? Yes? 

Chief ENDRIKAT. I just wanted to echo what Chief Prather said. 

I think, Congresswoman, that one of the problems is that the funding varies so much year to year. I am not quite sure who suggested 

it or how we arrived at a fixed dollar amount, but what really suffers is our ability to fully prepare and be ready to go out the door. 

I think increased funding, the one main area that it would impact us and really benefit the citizens would be our ability to train 

40 

the way we should train, and to certify our people the way they 

should be certified and credentialed. 

Mrs. LOWEY. My red light is on, so I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Ms. Lowey. 

At this time, the chair will recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Rodriguez. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank you for allowing me this opportunity to ask a few questions 

and also make a few comments. 

Let me indicate to you that I had the opportunity to be a congressman in 1998, and in 2000 we had floods in San Antonio. The 

major cities like San Antonio can do the match, but little communities like Seguin, Brownsville and those areas have difficulty 

doing that. And so somehow we have to come up with a different 

response to be able for them to react and be able to compete with 

a major metropolitan area when the disaster hits them. I think 

that there is something that we need to do about that. I don’t know 

what the answer is. Maybe you can come up with that. 

Secondly, is it correct to say that FEMA only responds after the 

request for assistance from the state is given? And is there anything proactive that FEMA can do, you know, right after the event 

or during the event? I want to ask a second question also, and then 

I want you to keep that in mind, Mr. Powers. 

The second question is, after a disaster occurs, it is my understanding that infrastructure and personal damage assessments are 

conducted in order to gauge the extent of the damage. These are 

assessments that sometimes take days or weeks. Is there any assistance that FEMA could provide while the assessments are being 

conducted? 

I just went through another disaster in Eagle Pass. As far as I 

am concerned, it took too long to respond. I, prior to being here, 

had experienced a disaster that occurred in El Paso during a flood, 

and that took too long to respond. I want to just give you an embarrassing situation. Ten people lost their lives in the tornado, 

three in Mexico and seven in the U.S., there in Eagle Pass. 

I had gone to Mexico because the military had come to San Antonio when we had some 20,000 people from Katrina, and they had 

come in to feed some of the people there, and they stayed a pretty 

good long time there in San Antonio feeding them. So I went and 

paid my respects to some of the people in Guerra Negros, because 

they actually got hit hard. 

I am here to tell you, I was impressed with them. They had doctors on the field. They had a pharmacy there. They were given tetanus shots. They had mobile units doing X-rays. They were cleaning. They finished up and it was worse on that site. After 7 days, 

my judge down there and my mayor calls me and tell me that the 

state of Cohilla just asked if they could come and help us. Our 

president hadn’t moved yet. 

And it wasn’t because we hadn’t asked, because the governor had 

asked. Senator Hutchison had asked. Senator Cornyn had asked. I 

had asked. We had sent letters. I had personally handed a letter 

to the president on Thursday, and the accident occurred on Monday. And we still couldn’t get a reaction. 

41 

I want you to know those people read the paper on both sides. 

They know how they responded on the other side, and on this side, 

what we were still hearing was—and this is the frustration part of 

it—I go there Thursday after the votes, 3 days later, the response 

is these kind of arguments: ‘‘Well, don’t clean up your area because 

it is going to reflect on your insurance. No, you cannot pick up that 

stuff because you are not going to get reimbursed by FEMA.’’ 

Don’t quote me on this. It might be Red Cross. It could be the 

Salvation Army. ‘‘Don’t accept any money for anything because that 

is going to be deducted‘‘—those kind of stuff going on, when there 

are people that were in need, and everybody was over here, and the 

accident occurred over here. 

And so if you could respond to those two comments, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. POWERS. The first question on the lack of response. The Stafford Act requires us to follow certain protocols, which we attempt 

to do. FEMA has tried very hard over the last 6 months to assume 

a much more proactive posture. In some cases, we have provided 

commodities, as we call them, support things before a disaster is 

declared. But when we do that, we ask the state to sign an agreement, to say that if a disaster has not occurred, that they will either reimburse us for the cost of those materials or will replace 

them in-kind. 

I don’t know the particulars of the incident that you are describing in that particular piece. As far as working with the state, for 

example Eagle Pass, the incident occurred around the 25th of 

April, I think. We had a FEMA person physically with the state on 

the 26th. We started the damage assessments on the 26th. We 

have to do those with the state. We cannot do those by ourselves. 

It has to be a joint thing. 

So many times we are finding that, and I don’t know if it was 

the case at Eagle Pass, but the states are not ready as quickly as 

we are ready to do the— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. You are right. Mr. Chairman, it is a real problem. In this case, we had a good mayor and a good judge, and actually a governor that declared it early. But if the ground troops are 

not experienced or don’t know, they are only going to do based on, 

and it is a first-hand experience. So somehow it is not working. 

Mr. POWERS. During Eagle Pass, we did provide tarps before the 

declaration. We did provide— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I got there on Thursday, and on Thursday the 

first thing I saw was another rainstorm coming and they weren’t 

there, because I asked them to, if nothing else, get those. It occurred Monday. This was Thursday, and whatever little things 

they had. And by the way, I do want to congratulate, because when 

you do get there, your people are very conscientious and they are 

really hard-working. I have nothing but praise. 

But somehow, we need a better system that reacts much quicker. 

If the Mexican government can beat us and take care of it and get 

to the chase, my God, what is wrong with our picture? 

Mr. POWERS. We try to counsel the state. For example, on the 

Eagle Pass, we provided hygiene kits. I personally approved that 

on Saturday afternoon. We did not have a declaration. 

42 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. On the Saturday a week after? But on Thursday, what I witnesses also, and I don’t have any experience in this 

except my other two experiences—and I apologize, I am going out 

of the time—but I am walking the scene. I am walking the scene. 

I am seeing these people go through the mud and stuff looking for 

little pictures. And I know how important that is for someone who 

has lost somebody’s lives, to find a picture. 

And I am also seeing the Red Cross going and giving food. These 

people don’t have any gloves. This is after Monday, Tuesday, 

Wednesday, Thursday. This is the fourth day out there; no running 

water out there. So you know they are not cleaning their hands. 

They don’t have gloves, and this is 4 days after the disaster. 

Those are I would presume things that automatically ought to be 

done from the very beginning. I just figured, look, you have to get 

some gloves for the people because they were giving out hot dogs, 

and they needed the food, and they needed water to drink, but I 

knew that they were going to be dirty, because they were out there 

working. So basic stuff like that. 

And on the Mexican side, I went and toured it. They were lined 

up to get tetanus shots earlier, and they had taken care of most 

of them by then. They had a mobile unit to provide prescription 

drugs and medicines. For rural America, that we don’t, number 

one, anytime you know that 300 homes have been destroyed, you 

are going to find 300 homeless people, because in rural communities you don’t have the housing. In an urban area, you do. In a 

rural community, you can cut to the chase and figure out that you 

are not going to have housing for 300 families. That is an easy assessment to make by any rocket scientist. 

So you also can look at in terms of looking at some of those basic 

needs. So somehow we have to get you down there a lot quicker. 

If somehow you can come back and have some suggestions to us, 

because what you have there is not working. 

Mr. POWERS. The system as it is currently set up requires the 

states to invite the federal government in, and invites having us 

just march into their state. As long as that particular piece is in 

there, our hands are somewhat tied in that we cannot just tell the 

governor we are coming in anyway, unless it is to save lives. We 

can do that to save lives, but just for the response after a disaster, 

we have to wait for an invitation. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, and I understand that. I realize the importance of local control, Mr. Chairman. But there are some states 

that are more equipped than others, and somehow maybe we need 

to come by and be close by and see how we can educate. Or maybe 

we need some response teams that allow that process to occur, because there are some states that would say, ‘‘No, we are willing to 

take care of it.’’ 

By the way, the people were there. The Red Cross was there. The 

Salvation Army was there. Do they get reimbursed for that later? 

Mr. POWERS. No, we do not reimburse them. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Okay. Because I know they were there, and 

what was surprising, some of the dialog that was going on, because 

anytime someone is telling me what a great job they are doing, you 

know, I am going to judge it based on what the people are telling 

me. In this case, if you compare what happened in Eagle Pass on 

43 

our side versus what happened in Guerra Negros on the Mexican 

Side, it is day and night. It is day and night. 

I don’t know whether we are looking at who is going to get the 

contract to clean up or who is going to pay for what as a number 

key issue. I understand that is important, too. I realize it, but 

maybe you can give some thought to how do we correct this situation so that we can cut to the case right away and be responsive. 

Because after living on those sites, the first 2 or 3 days are okay. 

After a week, it gets old. It gets old. Thank God in those communities, you have a lot of relatives, and they go live with their relatives. But in some of the communities, you might not have that 

same kind of support. 

The other one that occurred prior to me being a congressman, 

when I was out there campaigning, in El Paso, the same thing. It 

took 14 days for the president to react. Maybe there is a way that 

after the governor calls it, that you guys can react right away. 

For example, if you have a president that reacts, and you might 

have one that doesn’t, but we could have a situation where the governor calls it, then automatically react, and then you can always 

say, ‘‘You know what? It is not to that level, but they need our assistance,’’ and then come back; versus not going in there until 14 

or 15 days later, when it is no longer an emergency. Somebody else 

has done it. 

Mr. POWERS. In the case of Eagle Pass, it took a few days before 

the declaration was requested. It was approved, I think, in 1 days. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, 1 day for you, but for back home it was a 

week. The Mexicans were already offering work. So I told them, 

‘‘Hey, get that help,’’ and then when I announced in San Antonio 

that the Mexicans were coming to help us, then the president that 

same night did it. I don’t have to do that. There is no need for us 

to be doing that, playing those games. 

Mr. POWERS. Congressman, pardon me for interrupting, we do 

have to wait for the governor to submit the request to us. We can’t 

unilaterally just do that. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I apologize. 

Mr. CUELLAR. No, you just now took your second line of questioning, but go ahead. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. What you just said is a little game that starts 

back and forth. My understanding was that the governor had called 

it earlier, and then I heard that FEMA said, well, they have to 

wait until they not only call it, but then they have to ask for a certain type of help. Is that correct? 

Mr. POWERS. The damage assessment needs to be completed before the president can respond. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me tell you how that sounds, when you are 

on the border and you are reading articles that it is already taken 

care on the Mexican side. We are doing an assessment. That is how 

it sounds. When people are hurting, oh, no, we are doing an assessment 7 days after. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, sir. 

Let me just follow up on what Mr. Rodriguez is talking about. 

I will give you 10 days from today to come up with an outline, 

going through the Stafford Act, going point by point saying, ‘‘There 

44 

is a disaster; this is the first step that takes place; this is the second point, the third, the fourth,’’ and then in between there, if you 

have any suggestions on how we improve the process. 

I can understand that we might wait for the governors and all 

that, but there has to be something we can do to help the individuals that are on the ground. I am talking about the families that 

are up in the water. I know in my place, Laredo, we sent water 

supplies and the fire department did a great job in helping them. 

But there has to be a way, and I can understand that there have 

to be certain steps that we take, but I am just concerned about the 

bureaucratic steps that come into play. 

What I am asking you is to go step by step and where we can 

effect some changes to help you. If you are constrained by certain 

statutory issues, then let us know what it is. I am looking at trying 

to streamline this for the process of trying to bring the assistance 

down to the people on a much faster basis. 

Again, I can understand if there is something that constrains 

you, let us know, because certainly I think Mr. Dent and the members of the committee, working with a member who is on the Appropriations Committee for the Homeland Security Subcommittee, 

we certainly want to work with you to streamline it. 

So I want to make sure you understand: 10 days from today, and 

I want you to include Congressman Rodriguez, and I just talked to 

Graig about this, and with Mr. Dent’s staff, to go step by step, tell 

us where we need to maybe make some changes, and tell us how 

we can streamline the process, simply because I want to have a 

better process on how we can do this, because it looks like time 

after time, we have a situation. 

I can understand where, if you have a hurricane, you have a little bit of advanced notice. A tornado is a little different because it 

just happened. I have never heard of a tornado in Eagle Pass in 

that area, so it was something very new for us on the border. I had 

also asked to see if Mr. Jerry Moran can come in, but I understand 

that he is in Kansas right now on this same situation. I had asked 

Mr. Dent to see if we could get somebody also, because those are 

the two tornadoes that I can think of right now. 

It is always good to have members who are facing that type of 

situation. They are on the ground. I would ask you as you do that, 

to include the committee staff on both sides, and Mr. Rodriguez, so 

we can come up with a response. But I would like to emphasize 

this, Mr. Powers, 10 days from today, I would like to have something in writing. And then after I get that, I would ask that we sit 

down again with the members of the committee so we can go over 

this on how we can improve this. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, will you yield? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me also just—and I have nothing but praise. 

After you get in, you have some great people. I don’t want to take 

that away. I am not here to place blame. I just want to know how 

can we expedite this; how do we make it better. 

I know you need more resources, too. That is part of the problem, 

because we have been having more disasters. Then what do we 

need to do. Do we need to establish more preparedness teams that 

are sent out automatically throughout the country or what? 

45 

So thank you very much. And I do want to thank you for what 

you do when you do get there. Okay? Thank you. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes. Again, I emphasize what Mr. Rodriguez said. 

The committee is interested in how do we work together. That is 

what I want. I want to see practical solutions. I hate playing these 

games of ‘‘gotcha‘‘-type of politics. Nobody is trying to do that. 

We are just trying to say, how do we streamline and make the 

process better? Tell us how we can work together, Mr. Powers, but 

I would like to see a timetable on this 10 days from today, and see 

the response. 

I know we have gone over the time. I will reserve my questions 

to another time, but I would ask Mr. Dent if he has any follow-up 

questions at this time. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few, and I 

will try to keep it pretty brief. 

To Mr. ENDRIKAT AND MR. Prather again, do you believe that legislation is necessary to strengthen the urban search and rescue 

task forces and their role in assisting states and localities as they 

respond to an incident of national significance? Have previous administrative attempts been taken to strengthen these USAR task 

forces? If so, how did these turn out? 

Chief ENDRIKAT. In relation to the legislation, Congressman, I 

think right now we exist under a few sections within the Stafford 

Act. That really allows us to respond, but it doesn’t allow us to do 

some of the proactive things that we just heard from the congressman from Texas that are required to better support the people. 

The way the legislation is right now, our program is statutorily, 

I believe, we are not fully funded, fully authorized, fully empowered to do the things that we are required to do. There have been 

some previous attempts that have never gotten to this point. We 

have never gotten this far before in discussing new legislation that 

would specifically authorize our system and fund it adequately. 

Chief? 

Mr. DENT. All right. I will move on to Mr. Powers again. 

Several of FEMA’s emergency response teams have a communications component to help reestablish communications where necessary and to achieve interoperability among emergency responders. Could you please discuss the communications capabilities of 

FEMA’s emergency response teams? 

Mr. POWERS. The MERS units that you talked about do have a 

very robust communications capability. They have the ability to restore local communications if the communications, for example, at 

the local police or fire department are wiped out due to the disaster, they have the ability to restore that communications using 

their equipment, until the real systems can be put back in place. 

They have the ability to multiplex frequencies that allow responders from various agencies who operate on different radios, different frequency bands, different frequencies, to use their normal 

equipment and have the equipment multiplexed electronically that 

allows them to talk to another agency, another jurisdiction. 

They have a limited ability to restore cell phone systems, to put 

up a temporary cell phone network that links into the national system, until the national systems can be put back into place. 

46 

They have the ability to provide the state EOC or the incident 

command with communications capability via satellite; video teleconference capability; as well as other capabilities that can provide 

some limited access to the Internet and to the FEMA network, also 

via the satellite systems that they have on board. 

They are available for the state and local responders, the state 

operations centers, to use if they so need. 

Mr. DENT. Also, I just wanted to follow up again, too, the House 

and Senate conferees are eventually going to meet to discuss H.R. 

1 and S. 4—those are the 9/11 commission recommendations and 

implementation legislation. They are likely to discuss a provision 

contained in the Senate bill that would establish a strategic technology reserve to pre-position or secure interoperable communications in advance for immediate deployment in an emergency or 

major disaster. 

This technology reserve would be established and maintained by 

the Department of Commerce. It is my understanding that FEMA 

either already has such a capability or is in the process of establishing such a capability. Is this true? And do any of FEMA’s response teams maintain reserve communications equipment? 

Mr. POWERS. We do not have the capability that is described in 

that particular legislation. In fact, we were curious as to why the 

Department of Commerce was doing that instead of FEMA. But we 

know that the government operates in sometimes unusual ways. So 

we are hoping to integrate that into our disaster communications 

and emergency communications system once the equipment is procured. 

Mr. DENT. Just very quickly, how would such a strategic technology reserve be maintained by the Department of Commerce? 

How would that interact with existing capabilities of FEMA’s emergency response teams? 

Mr. POWERS. I do not have an answer to that question right now, 

but I will come back to you with an answer. 

Mr. DENT. Quickly to follow up, how would such a Department 

of Commerce capability be integrated into the incident command 

structure? 

Mr. POWERS. I will again have to come back to you on that. We 

are still in the development stages of all of the mechanics of the 

deployment of the equipment. 

Mr. DENT. Thanks. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for their valuable testimony 

and the members for the questions. 

The members of the subcommittee may have additional questions 

for you, and we ask you to make sure you respond to them on a 

timely basis, in writing to those questions. 

Again, I want to thank everybody for being here. We appreciate 

the work and the public service that you provide. I know that 

sometimes it is difficult, but we are all trying to work together to 

make sure we do our job together. 

Having no further business, the hearing stands adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

47 

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