. . . to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate 

so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, 

piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government 

can condone or support and all must oppose.

—2002 National Security Strategy of the United States

Soon after 9/11, the U.S. Government realized that the willingness of people 

in many parts of the world to excuse or applaud terrorist acts was a critical 

obstacle to combating terrorism. To overcome the attitudes that generate 

support for terrorism, the Bush administration concluded that it would be 

necessary to build a global antiterrorism consensus that the intentional use of 

violence against noncombatants for political ends was evil in itself. 

The question now is how the campaign of ideas can best be structured and 

prosecuted. We still have an unclear understanding of the extent to which 

support for terrorism is a function of rejection of Western values versus 

disagreement with U.S. policy, of the role that the quality and type of education 

provided in various countries affects support for terrorism, and of the causal 

links among poverty, poor governance, lack of democracy, and support for 

terrorism. This volume is an effort to begin overcoming this knowledge deficit.

Edited by Joseph McMillan, with contributions from: 

n Hady Amr, on improving strategic communications

n Scott Atran, on cultural frameworks

n C. Christine Fair, on accessing information in the Muslim world

n Kumar Ramakrishna, on education and radicalization

n Steven N. Simon, on Muslim perceptions of America

n Peter W. Singer, on improving strategic communications

n Mark Tessler, on public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world

n Caroline F. Ziemke, on social factors contributing to terrorism

9 780160 775376

9 0 0 0 0

ISBN 0-16-077537-X For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 0-16-077537-X

ndupress.ndu.edu
“In the Same Light as Slavery”:

Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus
“In the Same Light as Slavery”:

Building a Global

Antiterrorist Consensus

Edited by Joseph McMillan

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

2006
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution 

unlimited.

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standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

"In the same light as slavery" : building a global antiterrorist

consensus / edited by Joseph McMillan. 

 p. cm. 

ISBN 1-57906-075-7 

1. Terrorism—Prevention. 2. Terrorism—Prevention—International

cooperation. I. McMillan, Joseph. 

HV6431.I586 2006 

363.325'17—dc22 

 2006038602

 First printing, December 2006

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512–1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 

Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. For GPO publications on-line, access their Web site at: 

http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/sale.html.

For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, consult the National 

Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu.
Contents

Chapter One

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Joseph McMillan

Chapter Two

Public Opinion in the Arab and Muslim World: 

Informing U.S. Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Mark Tessler

Chapter Three

Muslim Perceptions of America: 

The Sources of Hostility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Steven N. Simon

Chapter Four

Accessing Information in the Muslim World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

C. Christine Fair

Chapter Five

Perceived Oppression and Relative Deprivation: 

Social Factors Contributing to Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Caroline F. Ziemke

Chapter Six

Madrassas, Pesantrens, and the Impact of Education 

on Support for Radicalism and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Kumar Ramakrishna

Chapter Seven

Sacred Values and the Limits of Rational Choice: 

Conflicting Cultural Frameworks in the Struggle 

Against Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Scott Atran

Chapter Eight

Restoring America’s Good Name: Improving 

Strategic Communications with the Islamic World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Peter W. Singer and Hady Amr

Chapter Nine

Influencing Attitudes, Shaping Behaviors:

Implications for U.S. Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Joseph McMillan

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

vii
Illustrations

Tables

	2–1. Multiple Regression Showing the Influence of Islamic

Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in 

Jordan (2000) and Algeria (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2–2. Logistic Regression Showing the Influence of 

Islamic Orientations on Attitudes Toward 

Western Culture and Society in Algeria (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2–3. Logıstic Regressıon Showing Influence of Personal 

 Attributes, Personality and Psychological Orientations, 

 Religious and Cultural Values, and Political 

 Assessments on Support for Terrorism in Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2–4. Logıstic Regressıon Showing Influence of Personal 

Attributes, Religious and Cultural Values, and Political 

Assessments on Support for Terrorism in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

3–1. Views of the United States by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3–2. Views of the United States by Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

4–1. Population Breakdown of Selected 

Muslim Countries, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

4–2. Literacy Rates in Selected Muslim Countries, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

4–3. Freedom House Press Freedom Rankings, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

4–4. Daily Newspapers: Number of Titles and Circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

4–5. Non-Daily Newspapers: Number 

of Titles and Circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

4–6. Countries Producing the World’s 

100 Largest Daily Newspapers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

4–7. Languages in Which the World’s 100 

Largest Daily Newspapers are Published . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

4–8. Internet Usage for Selected Muslim 

and Middle Eastern Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

4–9. Television Receivers per 1,000 People 

for Selected Countries, 1970–1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

4–10. Radio Receivers per 1,000 People for 

Selected Countries, 1970–1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

4–11. Africa and the Middle East: Cable and 

Satellite Television Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

ix
IN THE SAME LIGHT AS SLAVERY

Figures

2–1. Attitudes Toward the United States 

 in Seven Arab Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2–2. Percent of Respondents with Unfavorable 

 Views of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2–3. Negative Impressions of the United States, France,

 and Canada in Seven Arab Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2–4. Impressions of American Society and 

 Policies in Five Arab Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2–5. Impressions of American Society and Policies 

 in Three Non-Arab Muslim Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2–6. Views About Whether Democracy Can 

 Work Well in Several Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2–7. Algerian Attitudes Toward Western 

 Culture and U.S. Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2–8. Percent of Respondents Agreeing that Violence 

 Against Civilians is Often or Sometimes 

 Justified in the Defense of Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2–9. Percent of Respondents with Much or Some 

 Confidence in Osama bin Laden as a World Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2–10. Attitudes Toward Terrorism in Algeria and Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

3–1. Anti-American Political Cartoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3–2. Anti-American Political Cartoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3–3. Anti-American Political Cartoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3–4. Anti-American Political Cartoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3–5. Beliefs About Whether War in Iraq Has Made the World Safer . . . . . . . . 52

3–6. Beliefs About Spread of American Ideas and Customs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

3–7. Beliefs About American Music, Movies, and Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

3–8. Beliefs About Technological Capabilities of Western Nations . . . . . . . . 56

3–9. Beliefs About American Ideas of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3–10. Beliefs About Equality in Western Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3–11. Beliefs About U.S. Objectives in Advocating 

Democracy in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
xi

	 	 3–12. Beliefs About the War in Iraq 

 and the Spread of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

	 	 3–13. Beliefs About Prospects for 

Success of Democracy in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

	 	 3–14. Muslim Attitudes Toward U-S.-Style Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

	 	 3–15. Muslim Attitudes Toward U.S. Freedom 

and Democracy and U.S. Arab Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

	 	 3–16. Beliefs About How the United States Can 

Improve Relations with the Arab World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

	 	 3–17. How Western Contact Affects 

Islamic Opinions about the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

	 3–18. Muslim Opinions About 

Americans as Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

	 	 7–1. Population’s Predicted Use of Violence 

to Oppose Actions Considered Taboo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

	 	 7–2. Palestinian Judgments of Acceptability for a

 Family to Request Compensation (in Dinars) 

 for a Son’s Martyrdom Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

 ILLUSTRATIONS xi
xiii

“In the Same Light as Slavery”:

Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus


Chapter One

Introduction

Joseph McMillan

. . . to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide:

behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and

all must oppose.

—National Security Strategy of the United States, 20021

It did not take long after 9/11 for the American government and public 

to realize that a critical obstacle to combating terrorism effectively was the 

surprising willingness of people in many parts of the world to excuse or, 

worse yet, applaud terrorist acts, depending on the cause in whose name 

they were committed. Notwithstanding the enormity of the attacks on 

New York and Washington and the wave of sympathy for the United States 

expressed in most quarters in the immediate aftermath, simply reaching international agreement on the meaning of terrorism proved impossible once 

someone intoned the mantra that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 

freedom fighter.”

To overcome the attitudes that generated support for terrorism among 

key elements of the world’s population, the Bush administration concluded 

that it would be necessary to build a global antiterrorism consensus. Working from the grassroots up, the United States would persuade people that 

the intentional use of violence against noncombatants for political ends 

was evil in itself regardless of the merits of the cause to which terrorism was 

used. The administration’s recognition of the need to undertake such an 

effort found its most memorable public expression in the words quoted in 

the epigraph above.

In the 4 years since that strategy was unveiled, progress in achieving 

the objective of a strong, effective global antiterrorist environment remains 

uneven. In the West, revulsion at further outrages in Bali, Madrid, London, 

and elsewhere seems to have strengthened antiterrorist attitudes. In selected 

Muslim countries, similar attacks have also generated a backlash, but in 

most instances opprobrium attaches only to attacks by Muslims against 

Muslims. Attacks carried out by Muslims against non-Muslims continue to 

be condoned by a large share of the population, with many in the Islamic 

world still expressing the opinion that the intentional use of violence against 

noncombatants—terrorism—can be justified under some circumstances. 
 McMILLAN

The question that cannot be evaded is why, if this is such a high national 

priority as to be singled out in the President’s National Security Strategy, so 

little headway seems to have been made in attaining the stated goal. 

No shortage of explanations has been offered for this lack of progress. Probably the most widely expressed blames the ineffectiveness of U.S. 

public diplomacy (or strategic communications, depending on the term 

preferred) for the failure to solidify a global antiterrorist consensus. The 

usual implication is that if the United States could just get its communications act together, the problem would readily be solved.2 A plethora of 

studies by institutions ranging from the Council on Foreign Relations to 

the Defense Science Board have addressed the challenge of altering foreign 

audiences’ perceptions of the United States and the issues of concern to 

it, and while many of these studies include valuable recommendations, 

most focus primarily if not entirely on questions of bureaucratic roles and 

missions, processes, and organizations within the U.S. Government.3

Yet a number of other hypotheses purport to explain the persistence of 

support for terrorism within many Muslim societies, hypotheses that have 

nothing to do with the ineffectiveness of American strategic communications. Some, influenced by Samuel P. Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” 

thesis,4 argue that Muslim support for terrorism is one manifestation of the 

inevitable conflict between two fundamentally opposed value systems that 

are being pushed into closer contact through the process of globalization, 

and each of which claims exclusive universal validity.5 While Huntington 

himself did not assert that the clash of civilizations would necessarily be 

a violent one, his memorable phrase that “Islam has bloody borders”6 has 

been widely interpreted as supporting such a view.

A second approach looks to explain terrorism as a function of factors 

internal to Islam as a religion. Terrorism and support for terrorism are seen 

as the byproducts of an ongoing struggle over the “soul of Islam,” although 

how the contending factions should be understood remains unclear—is 

it modernizers versus reactionaries, traditionalists versus revolutionaries, 

moderates versus extremists, or the peaceful versus the violent? Others, who 

also see the root of the problem as internal to Islam, reject all of these dichotomies. They essentially accept the analysis offered by al Qaeda that true 

Islam really is a religion of violence and intolerance, in which there are no 

moderates—those who appear to be moderates simply do not understand 

their own religion. 

Yet a third broad approach asserts that support for terrorism within 

the Muslim community has nothing in particular to do with Islam as a religion but is driven primarily by non-religious factors. Some contend that 

support for terrorism is a function of pervasive unhappiness with one or 
INTRODUCTION 

more aspects of U.S. policy, whether it be support for Israel vis-à-vis the 

Palestinians, the perceived propping up of authoritarian Muslim regimes, the 

invasion of Iraq, or some other grievance. Alternatively, support for terrorism is explained as the result of one or a combination of the various social, 

political, and economic ills afflicting the Muslim world.7 In either case, no 

amount of improved public diplomacy will alter Muslim attitudes toward 

terrorism until the offensive policies or underlying conditions change. The 

strategic implication is that building a grassroots consensus against terrorism is not to be achieved directly through a “war of ideas” but through 

actions on other fronts.

Each of these views has been widely articulated and vigorously promoted since 9/11. Unfortunately, while each of the explanations offered 

may seem plausible, the public debate has been largely based on speculation 

and opinion. When the results of empirical research have been adduced in 

support of one approach or another, it has usually been based on selective 

culling of data to bolster one position against another, and often to preserve 

other equities from criticism. Assertions that poverty in the Muslim world 

is a primary cause of terrorism often are grounded not on research into the 

relationship between Muslims’ attitudes toward terrorism and their socioeconomic status but on the commentators’ previously held opinions about 

the value of foreign assistance. Conversely, when someone denies that there 

is a linkage between terrorism and U.S. policy toward Israel, it usually says 

more about that person’s commitment to the U.S.-Israeli relationship than 

about any factual knowledge of how the two may be connected in the minds 

of people in the Muslim world.

As a result, we still have an unclear understanding of the extent to 

which support for terrorism is a function of rejection of Western values 

versus disagreement with U.S. policy, of how the quality and type of education provided in various countries affects support for terrorism, and of 

the causal links among poverty, poor governance, lack of democracy, and 

support for terrorism. To set off on a project to change people’s attitudes 

without first knowing in considerable detail what those people really think 

and believe—and why they think and believe it—would seem doomed to 

failure, no matter how well organized and funded or skillfully executed the 

project might be.

This volume is an effort to begin overcoming this knowledge deficit. It 

opens with an essay laying down the baseline from which to begin tackling 

the problem of continued public sympathy and support for terrorism in predominantly Muslim regions. In “Public Opinion in the Arab and Muslim 

World: Informing U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Mark Tessler reviews the results 

of extensive survey research in a number of majority Muslim countries, 
 McMILLAN

examining not only what Muslims think about terrorism but also how those 

attitudes correlate with a range of possible factors that might be connected 

with support for terrorism. He finds that polling data do not bear out many 

of the widely asserted associations between support for terrorism on the 

one hand and economic status, education, or personal Islamic religiosity on 

the other. Instead, the factors that correlate most strongly with support for 

terrorism are how a person views U.S. policy and how he views the legitimacy of his own country’s government. 

Steven N. Simon examines the issue of Muslim public opinion from 

a different perspective in “Muslim Perceptions of America: The Sources of 

Hostility,” an in-depth look at the intellectual roots of anti-Americanism in 

the Muslim world and the way Islamist radicals manipulate public attitudes 

toward the United States. He finds that most of the key themes enunciated by both Islamist and non-Islamist critics of the United States are not 

uniquely Islamic but rather reflect a long history of European anti-American 

commentary predating the American Revolution. Comparing these themes 

with the results of surveys conducted in the Muslim world over the past 

decade reveals the strong resonance that they evoke among the target audience, raising serious questions about the potential for strategic communications programs to shift public attitudes toward the United States in any 

fundamental way.

Even assuming that strategic communications can make a difference, 

Christine Fair observes in “Accessing Information in the Muslim World” 

that nearly 5 years after the 9/11 attacks, confusion still exists within the 

U.S. Government about how such initiatives should be targeted. This confusion arises in part from the fact that the Muslim world is enormously 

diverse, embracing significant populations in more than 30 countries as 

well as a large number of smaller communities scattered around the globe. 

Members of these communities differ widely in culture, national identities 

and interests, language, political affiliations, education, social organization, 

and many other ways, including the ways in which they access and consume 

information. They also have very different degrees of access to various forms 

of media. As Fair points out, understanding how Muslims in these disparate communities obtain information is a prerequisite to understanding 

how they form opinions, which in turn is essential when undertaking to 

change how they think about terrorism, Islamic extremism, and the United 

States. Her chapter takes an important step toward filling the void in our 

understanding of this process.

In “Perceived Oppression and Relative Deprivation: Social Factors 

Contributing to Terrorism,” Caroline F. Ziemke examines the complex of 

forces that affects public support for terrorism in the Muslim world. She 
INTRODUCTION 

observes that many of the factors that are assumed in public discourse to 

contribute to terrorism—such as poverty, lack of education, social pathologies, and repressive authoritarian government—turn out on closer examination to have little explanatory power. Instead of grasping at these easy 

monocausal explanations of terrorism, it is necessary to analyze the Muslim 

community in all its complexity, since the elements that make the jihadist 

agenda attractive and its methods acceptable to Muslims vary widely from 

one segment of the Islamic world to another. At the same time, a number of 

cross-cutting social issues, albeit ones playing out in different ways in different places, are essential to this analysis, including relative deprivation, identity crises and alienation resulting from mass migrations, and the inability 

of governments to keep up with rising economic and political expectations. 

In particular, it is important to recognize the modernistic trends by which 

Islam is increasingly being interpreted and articulated in isolation from the 

cultural and intellectual setting in which it has historically existed.

Since 9/11, there has been considerable discussion of the role of education, or the lack thereof, in the development of terrorists and of popular 

attitudes supportive of terrorism in the Islamic world. In “Madrassas, 

Pesantrens, and the Impact of Education on Support for Radicalism and 

Terrorism,” Kumar Ramakrishna investigates the ways in which educational 

systems in much of the Muslim world create the cognitive basis for the stark 

binary worldviews that tend to foster support for extremism. He argues 

that in many traditional societies undergoing rapid sociocultural change, 

widespread cognitive dissonance arises from the collision of modernity and 

traditional value systems. Some people are temperamentally well suited to 

cope with this dissonance, while others find themselves psychologically 

disoriented by the ambiguities inherent in this internal clash of cultures. 

However, the educational systems prevalent in most Muslim societies, with 

their emphasis on rote memorization and discouragement of independent 

analysis and reasoning, do not equip their students to deal effectively 

with these ambiguities. Instead, they lead those who are not inherently 

able to deal with the conflict between modernity and tradition to gravitate to a black-or-white, right-or-wrong, all-or-nothing moral worldview. 

Ramakrishna illustrates the case through an extensive discussion of Islamic 

educational institutions in Indonesia and concludes that American efforts 

to address support for extremism through educational reform can only 

succeed if they enable young Muslims to think more for themselves rather 

than automatically deferring to religious or other authorities to solve the 

problem of meshing tradition with modernity. 

In “Sacred Values and the Limits of Rational Choice: Conflicting Cultural Frameworks in the Struggle against Terrorism,” Scott Atran explains 
 McMILLAN

how Western analysts habitually underestimate the importance of what 

he calls “sacred values” in constraining and shaping individual behavior 

in social conflicts. Drawing on recent psychological and anthropological 

research, he illuminates the dangers of undertaking military and political 

operations in foreign societies without a full understanding and appreciation of the value frameworks within which members of those societies operate. Specifically, he shows that decisions made on the basis of sacred values 

cannot be constructively influenced by the kind of instrumental calculations 

of risk and reward we are accustomed to applying in political conflicts that 

take place within a single cultural milieu. Indeed, attempts to manipulate 

an opponent through cost-benefit tradeoffs when the opponent considers 

sacred values to be at stake actually generate rage rather than accommodation and exacerbate rather than ameliorate the conflict. Atran also explores 

the role of small-group dynamics in reinforcing the blowback that can be 

provoked by initiatives calling sacred values into question. The insights offered by Atran’s work have serious implications for the U.S. campaign to 

propagate democratic norms as a way of countering the appeal of radicalism 

and terrorism, as well as underlining the importance of keeping U.S. words 

and actions toward the Islamic world closely synchronized.

“Restoring America’s Good Name: Improving Strategic Communications with the Islamic World,” by Peter W. Singer and Hady Amr, addresses 

the continuing problems within the U.S. Government in establishing effective programs of strategic communications to offset the precipitous decline 

in America’s image and reputation among the population from which radical Islamist terrorists draw their sustenance and whose political support they 

seek to gain. Amr and Singer argue that, while the administration has paid 

lip service to the need for effective public diplomacy, it has failed to give sufficient attention, resources, and priority to the effort. In 2004, for example, 

barely a quarter of the State Department’s budget for public diplomacy was 

directed toward the Muslim world, even though that audience is the principal battlefield in what is supposed to be the defining conflict of our time, 

the war on terror. Furthermore, the efforts that have been made have been 

hamstrung by a lack of nuance in addressing specific subregional concerns, 

a failure to focus on critical swing audiences, and an insistence on treating 

the new Middle Eastern media, such as al Jazeerah and al Arabiyah, as the 

primary causes of America’s image problems rather than as potential vehicles for addressing those problems. Amr and Singer offer a series of broad 

recommendations to put U.S. strategic communications on the right track, 

as well as a number of specific information initiatives for consideration.

The concluding chapter, “Influencing Attitudes, Shaping Behaviors: Implications for U.S. Strategy,” summarizes the factors that make it so difficult
INTRODUCTION 

to solidify a broad-based consensus against terrorism among members of 

the Islamic community, or umma. Considering the deep-rooted nature of 

negative Muslim attitudes toward the United States, do we need to find a 

different strategic communications approach—one that focuses on delegitimizing terrorism (the objective actually set forth in the President’s strategy) 

rather than on altering the way Muslims see the United States? In other 

words, is there a way to get people to stop trying to kill us without making 

them love us? If so, how could the United States go about attaining this 

more modest objective, and what elements of its other policies would have 

to be adjusted to that end?

There is a growing recognition in the United States that the violent 

Islamist movement, of which al Qaeda is the best-known component, is 

conducting what amounts to a transnational insurgency, one shaped by the 

forces of globalization and calling into question the political foundations 

of the predominantly Muslim states as well as of the wider international 

system. As the Department of Defense’s 2006 National Military Strategic 

Plan for the War on Terrorism recognizes, winning the “long war” against this 

movement depends in large measure on depriving the extremist movement 

of its support base within the worldwide Islamic umma.

8 Indeed, only by 

splitting the people from the insurgents can we resolve the dilemma so astutely pointed out by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2002: how 

do we prevent a new generation of terrorists from arising faster than we can 

deal with the current one?9

The question is not whether there must be an ideological component 

of the war on terror but rather how the campaign of ideas can be most effectively structured and prosecuted. The studies in this volume contend that 

the strategic approach must be complex and nuanced; we cannot prevail 

with arguments at the level of bumper-sticker slogans and slick advertising 

campaigns designed to make Muslims feel good about America. Indeed, 

we must understand that countering ideological support and sympathy for 

Islamist terrorism requires more than merely rhetorical action. It requires 

us to learn the lesson taught by the anarchists of the 19th century, the lesson 

that clearly has been mastered by the likes of Osama bin Laden and Ayman 

al-Zawahiri: that “propaganda by words” must be inextricably bound to 

and reinforced by “propaganda by deeds.” If this book does nothing more 

than to heighten awareness of the complexity of this task, it will have served 

its purpose.
 McMILLAN

Notes

1 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White 

House, 2002), 6. 2 Typical of this genre is Steven Johnson and Helle Dale, “Iraqi Prisoner Crisis: Correcting America’s Communications Failure,” Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum no. 935, 

June 2, 2004. Johnson and Dale, for instance, admit that the actual abuses at Abu Ghraib prison 

caused “skepticism” about U.S. policy, but assert that it was “weak U.S. public diplomacy” that 

allowed this skepticism “to balloon into condemnation.” 3 These include the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Building America’s Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources (Washington, DC: 

Department of State, September 2002); Council on Foreign Relations, Finding America’s Voice: A 

Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 

2003); Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, 

Winning Peace (Washington, DC: Department of State, October 2003); and Defense Science 

Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, September 2004); as well as at least three Government Accountability Office reports in 2003, 2005, and 2006. 4 First set forth in Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, 

no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22–49. 5 See, for example, Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine Books, 

2001). 6 Huntington, op. cit., 35. 7 All the above arguments are made in Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and 

Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library, 2003). 8 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Department 

of Defense, 2006), 7. 9 “Rumsfeld’s War-on-Terror Memo,” USA Today, October 22, 2003.


Chapter Two

Public Opinion in the Arab and Muslim 

World: Informing U.S. Public Diplomacy

Mark Tessler

American public diplomacy seeks to foster throughout the world, 

and particularly in Arab and Muslim countries, a better understanding 

and appreciation of the United States. This has been a priority of the U.S. 

Government since September 11, 2001, by which time it had become clear 

not only that the United States faced a threat from small terrorist organizations claiming inspiration from Islam but also that a large number of 

ordinary citizens in the Arab and Muslim world had a negative view of the 

United States. In many cases, these ordinary men and women were also sympathetic to the terrorists. U.S. public diplomacy has sought to change this 

situation and improve America’s image among Arabs and Muslims. Thus far, 

however, success has been limited. Anti-Americanism remains widespread, 

and although support for terrorism has declined in some countries during 

the last year or so, for the most part it remains at disturbingly high levels. 

Against this background, the present study seeks to shed light on both 

the character and the determinants of Arab and Muslim attitudes toward the 

United States, the West, and international terrorism. It draws upon public 

opinion data collected through surveys in a number of Arab and non-Arab 

Muslim countries, some by international polling organizations and some 

by the author in collaboration with local scholars and institutions. The 

presentation and analysis of these data proceed from the assumption that 

public diplomacy, and efforts to achieve better relations with the Arab and 

Muslim world more generally, will succeed only if guided by a proper understanding of the attitudes and orientations of Arab and Muslim publics. 

Such an understanding requires attention not only to what people think but 

also to why they hold particular views. It also requires that insights about 

the nature and determinants of public attitudes be the result of systematic 

and rigorous empirical investigation, rather than, as is sometimes the case, 

stereotypes about the character of Arab culture and Islam. The present study 

seeks to make such a contribution.

Do They Really Hate Us? 

Ever since the deadly terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and to 

some extent even before, Americans have been looking at Arabs and other 
10 TESSLER

Muslims and asking, “Why do they hate us?” Terrorist attacks against the 

United States and other Western powers are the actions of a handful of 

Arabs and Muslims. But while few Arabs and Muslims condone terrorism—defined as acts of violence against noncombatants for political purposes—and fewer still actually carry out terrorist acts, there is little doubt 

that anger at the United States is intense and widespread in many Arab and 

Muslim countries.

Polls carried out by Zogby International in five Arab countries and three 

non-Arab Muslim countries in spring 2002 and in seven Arab countries in 

fall 2002 document antipathy toward the United States. While the samples 

are somewhat skewed in favor of urban and more affluent respondents, the 

findings are clear and consistent enough to leave little doubt about the views 

of most ordinary men and women in these countries. Figure 2–1 presents 

responses to a question from the fall 2002 survey that asks respondents 

for their overall impression of the United States. The available responses 

are very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, and very 

unfavorable. The figure shows the proportion in each country with a very 

unfavorable and a somewhat unfavorable opinion. In no case do fewer than 

60 percent of the respondents have either a somewhat unfavorable or a very 

unfavorable opinion of the United States, and in all cases but one, that of 

Morocco, those with a very unfavorable opinion greatly outnumber those 

whose opinion is merely somewhat unfavorable. In four of the seven countries—including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, America’s most important strategic 

allies in the Arab world—more than 75 percent of those interviewed have a 

negative view of the United States. Respondents who expressed no opinion 

or “don’t know” have not been included when calculating percentages.

Figure 2–1. AttitudesToward the United States in

Seven Arab Countries

0

20

40

60

80

100

Unfavorable Very Unfavorable

Saudi Morocco

Arabia United Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon

Arab

Emirates

Source: Zogby Surveys, Fall 2002.
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 11

Subsequent surveys by the Pew Global Attitudes Project show that 

America’s image is up slightly in several Arab and Muslim countries but 

overall is still negative, and in some cases very negative. Figure 2–2 presents 

findings from the representative national surveys carried out by the Pew 

project in spring 2004 in two Arab and two non-Arab Muslim countries and 

in spring 2005 in three Arab and three non-Arab Muslim countries. Comparisons between the Zogby and Pew surveys should be made with caution 

since the former are less representative of some segments of the population. 

The basic conclusion to which all of the data point is nonetheless clear and 

beyond dispute: most ordinary men and women in the Arab and Muslim 

world have an unfavorable view of the United States. Figure 2–2 combines 

the proportion with a very unfavorable and a somewhat unfavorable view of 

the United States; respondents who expressed no opinion or “don’t know” 

have not been included when calculating percentages. In only one case, that 

of Morocco in 2005, does less than a majority have a negative view of the 

United States. The proportion of those with an unfavorable image of the 

United States otherwise ranges from 68 percent in Turkey to 95 percent in 

Jordan in the 2004 survey, and from 58 percent in Lebanon to 80 percent in 

Jordan in the 2005 survey. 

There are two common and somewhat interrelated assumptions about 

the reasons for this antipathy toward the United States. One has to do with 

an alleged dislike of American and Western civilization and values. Whether 

presumed to be rooted in sincere distaste for Western norms and lifestyles 

or in some combination of ignorance and jealousy, this view supposes 

that Arab and Muslim antipathy reflects a profound misunderstanding of 

American society and, beyond that, a failure to appreciate all that the United

Figure 2–2. Percentof Respondents with Unfavorable Views

of the United States

0

20

40

60

80

100

Spring 2005 Spring 2004

Jordan Morocco Turkey Pakistan Lebanon Indonesia

Source: Pew Surveys, Spring 2004 and Spring 2005.
States has done to assist Arab and Muslim peoples. This is the assumption 

that gave rise to the State Department’s public diplomacy campaign devoted 

to “shared values.” Videos produced as part of the effort were designed to 

combat stereotypes about the United States and show that America is an open 

and tolerant society that provides opportunities for all, including Muslims. 

The videos were well done, and one might wish that more Americans could 

see them in order to gain a better understanding of Arab-American and 

Muslim-American life. But the campaign was a failure in the Arab and Muslim 

world, as its architects themselves acknowledge, and this suggests that it did 

not address what was really at the heart of attitudes toward the United States.

The second assumption, which is related, asserts that the origins of 

antipathy toward the West are to be found in Islam. According to this line 

of reasoning, Muslims possess and are attached to a civilization that is rich 

but whose core values are antithetical to the progressive and enlightened 

norms of the West—hence the antipathy. The best-known articulation of 

this view probably is Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis.1 

Bernard Lewis earlier used the same phrase when describing tensions between Islam and the West2 in his influential 1990 article, “The Roots of 

Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West and Why Their 

Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified.” Huntington wrote about “Islam’s 

bloody borders” in this connection and stated, more specifically, that “some 

Westerners have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam 

but only with violent Islamic extremists . . . But evidence to support [this 

assertion] is lacking. . . . The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic 

fundamentalism. It is Islam.”3 This thesis has gained wide currency during 

the last decade, to the extent that even the late Pope John Paul II spoke of a 

“clash of civilizations that at times seems inevitable.”4 

Regrettably, no shortage of prominent voices has taken up this theme 

and asserted that Islam is indeed the reason why “they hate us.” AntiAmericanism and anti-Western sentiment more generally are said to flow 

naturally from the basic character of Islam. Thus, for example, Pat Robertson, 

a prominent evangelical Christian leader, declared on a major American 

television network in December 2002 that Islam is “violent at its core.”5

Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham and a well-known Christian evangelist in his own right, said of Islam, “I believe it’s a very evil and wicked religion.”6 Another illustration is the reaction of some conservatives to a plan 

by the University of North Carolina to assign a book on Islam to incoming 

freshmen. The Family Policy Network, a conservative Christian organization, filed suit against the university. Fox News Network talk-show host 

Bill O’Reilly denounced the teaching of “our enemy’s religion” and compared the assignment to teaching Mein Kampf in 1941.7 And most recently, 

12 TESSLER
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 13

a French scholar writing in the New York Times about whether conflict in the 

Middle East fuels hatred of the United States argued that the “true cause” 

of Muslim terrorists is not the crises in Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan, but 

rather, “global Islamic dominion.”8

This is not the place to take up questions about the true character of 

Islam. Muslims themselves, including knowledgeable and devout Muslims, 

do not agree about who is qualified to speak for Islam or about which of the 

competing interpretations advanced in the name of religion are legitimate 

and authoritative. Nor is it necessary to ask about the motivations and reasoning of those who describe Islam as wicked or evil or inherently violent. 

But it is essential to assess the degree to which Islam, either as a religion or 

as a civilization, is at the root of the widespread anti-Americanism in the 

Arab and Muslim world. In part, this is to avoid myths and stereotypes out 

of a sense of fairness, and also because we are demanding, quite properly, 

that Arabs and Muslims strive to avoid stereotypes in their thinking about 

the United States. As expressed by columnist Nicholas Kristof, if we expect 

Muslim leaders to confront the stereotypes and prejudices that are common 

in their societies, we must confront the equivalent stereotypes and prejudices here in the United States.9

In the context of the present chapter and the volume of which it is a 

part, however, another reason is even more important. If we are to establish 

meaningful relations with Arab and Muslim societies, and particularly if we 

are to fashion public diplomacy and other policies that succeed in reducing 

the undeniable antipathy in these societies toward the United States, it is 

essential to have an accurate view of what is fueling this antipathy. Alternatively, if our policies and outreach programs are influenced by assessments 

that are wide of the mark or, worse yet, by stereotypes and myths, there is 

little chance of making things better and a risk that our actions will make 

things even worse. 

Additional analyses of the Zogby data and other survey data provide 

an opportunity to explore some of these propositions about the reasons 

for anti-Americanism. The data are not definitive, and the findings they 

yield may not convince those who are wedded to civilizational analyses or 

convinced of a particular position regarding the character and influence of 

Islam. But the in-depth information about what ordinary men and women 

think about the United States and why they think that way that the data 

provide offers little or no support for the explanations of anti-Americanism 

summarized above.

The Zogby survey from fall 2002 asked respondents for their impressions 

not only of the United States but also of several other countries, including 

France and Canada. Figure 2–3 presents respondent views of the United States
14 TESSLER

Figure 2–3. Negative Impressions of the United States, France, and

Canada in Seven Arab Countries

0

20

40

60

80

100

Saudi Morocco

Arabia United Egypt Jordan Kuwait LebanonArab

Emirates

France United States Canada

Source: Zogby Surveys, Fall 2002.

and two other Western countries. If negative views of Western civilization 

are at the heart of the anti-Americanism reported in figure 2–1, impressions 

of France and Canada should be negative to approximately the same degree 

as those of the United States. This is not the case, however. Figure 2–3 shows 

that in every case, views of France and Canada are less negative than those of 

the United States, and in most cases much less negative. It thus seems clear 

that respondents are bringing to their judgments of the United States something other than, or more than, a dislike of Western values and lifestyles.

Data from the spring 2002 Zogby surveys offer insights about what, if 

not a dislike of the West in general, might be at the root of anti-Americanism. 

The interview schedule asked respondents for their impressions of various 

aspects of American society and policy. Figure 2–4 presents the impressions 

of men and women in five Arab countries about American science and technology, education, democracy, television and movies, and policies regarding 

the Arab world in general and the Palestinian problem in particular. Figure 

2–5 presents responses to the same questions of men and women in three 

non-Arab countries. The figures show, not surprisingly, that there is consistent dislike of American policy toward the Palestinian issue. The figures 

also show that dislike of American policy is broader, however, extending to 

U.S. policy toward the Arab nations as a whole. It is notable that these 

views characterize citizens in non-Arab Muslim countries as well as those in 

Arab countries. 

Perhaps less widely appreciated and most relevant to the present analysis is the fact that negative impressions of the United States do not extend to 

American society and culture or to American democracy. In all eight countries
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 15

Figure 2–4. Impressionsof American Society and Policies in Five

Arab Countries

0

20

40

60

80

100

Education Policy toward Arab Nations Policy toward Palestinians

Science Democracy Movies and Television

Kuwait United Arab Emirates Saudi Arabia Egypt Lebanon

Percent Favorable

Source: Zogby Surveys, Spring 2002.

Figure 2–5. Impressionsof American Society and Policies in Three

Non-Arab Muslim Countries

0

20

40

60

80

100

Education Policy toward Arab Nations Policy toward Palestinians

Science Democracy Movies and Television

Pakistan Iran Indonesia

Percent Favorable

Source: Zogby Surveys, Spring 2002.

represented in figures 2–4 and 2–5, with the partial exception of non-Arab 

Iran, well over half of the respondents, and in many cases three-quarters or 

more, have a favorable impression of American science, democracy, television and movies, and education. Perhaps attitudes relating to science and 

technology are not relevant for drawing conclusions about whether a clash of 

civilizations is at the heart of Arab and Muslim anti-Americanism, but positive 
16 TESSLER

views of American democracy, media, and education would seem to make 

clear that explanations of antipathy toward the United States that emphasize 

cultural issues and civilizational conflict are at variance with the views that 

ordinary citizens in the Arab and Muslim world actually hold.

The 2005 Pew survey does not explore these attitudes toward Western 

society and politics, with one exception: attitudes toward democracy. The 

survey asks respondents: “Some people in our country feel that democracy 

is a Western way of doing things that would not work here; others think that 

democracy is not just for the West and can work well here. Which comes 

closer to your opinion?” Figure 2–6 presents responses to this question for 

the three Arab and three non-Arab Muslim countries in the survey. Those 

who expressed no opinion or “don’t know” are excluded from the calculations. As with the Zogby surveys, there is some variation but, overall, assessments of the concept of democracy are usually high in absolute terms 

and always high relative to the views about U.S. policy noted earlier. The 

proportion believing that democracy can work well in their country ranges 

between 83 percent and 90 percent in the 3 Arab countries, a level of support that is even higher than that recorded in the Zogby surveys. Again, if 

anti-Americanism really did reflect a clash of civilizations, one would expect 

a very different pattern of responses.

Available survey data can also be used to examine the assertion that 

Islam itself is the source of much of the anti-Americanism in the Arab and 

Muslim world. Attitudes toward democracy are one indicator of views about 

Western norms related to societal organization, and in the Arab world, 

support for democracy is broad and deep. Not everyone supports democracy, 

Figure 2–6. ViewsAbout Whether Democracy Can Work Well in

Several Countries

0

20

40

60

80

100

Democracy Can Work Well Here

Jordan Morocco Turkey Pakistan Lebanon Indonesia

Source: Pew Surveys, Spring 2005.
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 17

however, and perhaps those who are less favorably disposed toward democracy are more religious or otherwise attached more strongly to Islam. 

Should this be true, it would support those who argue that Islam is an important source of antipathy toward the West. But the data suggest that this is 

not the case. A number of recent studies, based on 10 data sets collected over 

the last 15 years in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey, 

consistently show that there is no relationship between Islamic involvement 

and attitudes toward democracy.10 The analyses are based on different samples collected at different points in time and in countries whose character 

and circumstances vary considerably. The survey items used to measure attitudes toward democracy and involvement with Islam also vary significantly. 

Even given the possibility that aspects of research design or measurement 

may unintentionally bias findings and obscure existing relationships, it is 

significant that in not one case was there a statistically significant relationship between attitudes toward democracy and the personal involvement 

of Muslim respondents with their religion. An example of these findings, 

based on regression models from Algeria and Jordan, is shown in table 2–1. 

The data are from the World Values Survey, conducted in Jordan in 2000 

and Algeria in 2002.11

Not many representative sets of survey data from the Arab world, 

other than those focusing on democracy and governance, include items on 

both personal religiosity and attitudes toward Western culture and society. 

But with support from the National Science Foundation and the American 

Institute for Maghrib Studies, the author conducted a survey in Algeria in 

2004 that provides such data. Algeria, one of the largest countries in the 

Arab world, has been subject to strong Western influences, primarily from 

France, longer than any other Arab country. It is also a country with a deep 

attachment to Islam, in which Islamic political movements have found fertile ground in recent years. Algeria is thus an instructive case with which to 

explore the influence (or absence thereof) of Islamic attachments on views 

about Western culture. 

The data again show that personal religiosity has no explanatory power. 

Those with a deeper attachment to Islam who are more likely to rely on the 

religion for guidance in personal affairs are no more or less likely than others 

to have either a positive or a negative view of Western culture. Two questions 

are dependent variables in the analysis: “Do you agree or disagree that the

culture of the United States and other Western countries has many positive 

attributes?” and “Do you agree or disagree that while U.S. policies toward 

other countries are sometimes bad, most Americans are good people?” 

Figure 2–7 presents the distribution of responses to these questions. Sixty-two 

percent of the respondents agree with the first proposition, and 56 percent
18 TESSLER

Table 2–1. MultipleRegression Showing the Influence of Islamic

Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in Jordan

(2000) and Algeria (2002)

Favorable attitude 

toward democracy

Jordan Algeria

Greater mosque involvement .039

(.692)

-.058

(-1.158)

Persons holding public office should be religious .062

(1.684) 

.063

(1.551)

Religious leaders should not influence how people vote .016

(.440)

.070

(1.794)

Positive evaluation of government leaders .102

(2.716)* 

.137

(3.500)*

Higher education .073

(1.800)

.018

(.385)

Older age -.009

(-.227)

.039

(.817)

Male .108

(1.923)

-.003

(-.062)

Higher income .057

(1.510)

-.058

(-1.455)

Resides in larger town -.078

(-2.106)**

.161

(4.085)*

The table shows standardized coefficients (betas) and gives t statistics in parentheses.

*p < .01, ** p < .05 

agree with the second. These percentages are not as high as Americans and 

Europeans might wish, but they are nothing like the very low numbers that 

result when respondents are asked about American foreign policy. Responses 

to two additional questions, also shown in figure 2–7, make this clear and 

echo the Zogby and Pew findings noted earlier. Respondents are asked, “In 

general, do you agree or disagree that the United States is following good 

policies with respect to other countries?” and “Do you agree or disagree that 

the American administration is pursuing the right policy in Iraq?”

Table 2–2 presents the results of regression analyses that show the relationship between personal religiosity and the two items from figure 2–7 

pertaining to Western culture and American society. Religiosity is measured by
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 19

Table 2–2. Logistic Regression Showing the Influence of Islamic

Orientations on Attitudes Toward Western Culture and

Society in Algeria (2004)

Agree that cultures 

of the United States 

and other Western 

countries have many 

positive attributes

Agree that while 

U.S. policies toward 

other countries are 

sometimes bad, most 

Americans are good 

people

Lesser Islamic involvement .100

(.067)

.123

(.064)

.038

(.066)

.114

(.084)

Lesser satisfaction with political and 

economic situation

-.199

(.088)*

-.262

(.087)***

Higher education .222

(.060)***

.283

(.283)***

-.076

(.061)

-.043

(.080)

Older age -.056

(.032)

-.013

(.041)

-.083

(.033)**

-.068

(.041)

Female sex .099

(.135)

.205

(.176)

-.100

(.137)

-.026

(-.176)

Note: Dependent variable is coded 0 = less positive attitude; 1 = more positive attitude. 

Table presents logit coefficients (B) with standard errors in parentheses.

* p < .05, **p < .02, ***p < .01

an index composed of two correlated items. One asks whether, and to what extent, the respondent finds comfort in religion. The other asks respondents how 

often they would consult various persons for guidance if they had a personal 

problem; the extent to which they would consult “an imam” is the second item 

in the religious involvement index. The regression models presented in table 

2–2 include sex, education, and age as control variables. The religiosity index 

is not significantly related to either dependent variable, indicating that the data 

do not support assertions that posit Islam as a major source of anti-Western 

sentiment. An interesting point, to be explored more fully in the next section, 

is that a lack of confidence in the domestic political and economic situation 

does promote antipathy toward the West. To show this, a second model has 

been run for each dependent variable. These models, which are also included 

in table 2–2, include a domestic satisfaction index constructed by combining 

four interrelated items from the interview schedule: 

■ “People have different views about the system for governing this 

country. In your opinion, how good a job is the government doing?”

■ “How much respect is there for democracy and human rights 

nowadays?”
20 TESSLER

Figure 2–7. AlgerianAttitudes Toward Western Culture and U.S.

Foreign Policy

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Agree

U.S. Policies in

Iraq Are Good

U.S. Foreign 

Policies Are Good

Americans Are

Good People

Western Culture

Has Many Positive 

Attributes

■ “Do you think the circumstances of the country will improve or get 

worse during the next 5 years?” 

■ “I am going to name a number of public and civic institutions. For 

each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in it: a great deal 

of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, a little, too little, or none at all?” 

The implications of these analyses for U.S. efforts to reduce anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world are both clear and challenging. They 

are clear, first, in that they demonstrate the limited utility of civilizational 

analyses that see anti-Americanism as flowing from a dislike of Western 

norms and values and, equally, of assessments that posit Islam as the source 

of hostility toward the West. Such analyses also are based on flawed reasoning that directs attention away from the heart of America’s strained relations 

with Arabs and other Muslims. The second way in which the findings are 

clear is in demonstrating that a judgment that U.S. policies and actions are 

detrimental to the interests of the people in these regions is the single strongest factor in producing anti-Americanism. The findings are challenging 

as well as instructive, however, in that changes in fundamental U.S. policy

toward the region, even if desirable, are beyond what can be addressed 

through public diplomacy. Perhaps public diplomacy can be used to persuade Arabs and Muslims that they misjudge U.S. policy toward their part 

of the world, but it certainly will not be easy, in part because it is not selfevident that U.S. policy is in fact radically different than what people in 

the Arab and Muslim world believe it to be. In any event, at a minimum, 

public diplomacy needs to find a way to talk about perceptions of policy, 

and perhaps about policy itself, if it hopes to engage Arabs and Muslims on 

concerns that are the most important sources of anti-Americanism.
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 21

Why Some Support Terrorism

Of course, having anti-American attitudes does not automatically lead 

to support for terrorism conducted against the United States and its allies. 

What is it that prepares so many people in the Arab and Muslim world to 

tolerate, or even support, terrorist attacks against America?

Efforts to understand what makes terrorism possible, and thereby to 

develop productive approaches to combating it, require attention to the 

attitudes of ordinary men and women. Popular support for terrorist acts 

directed at Western targets, or at least a willingness to “understand” and to 

that extent tolerate such acts, is not uncommon in the Arab and Muslim 

world. Such support varies from country to country and also rises and falls 

in accordance with events. But many of the polls discussed above report a 

significant level of approval for events like 9/11, for the principle of “armed 

jihad” against the West, and for al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Figures 2–8 

and 2–9 summarize a few of the findings from the Pew surveys conducted in 

2005 and earlier. The figures present responses to questions about whether 

violence against civilians is justified in defense of Islam and whether or not 

respondents have confidence in Osama bin Laden as a world leader. Support for terrorism measured by either item varies substantially from country 

to country and also from year to year, suggesting that context and circumstances are probably more important than enduring factors like religion and 

culture in shaping these attitudes. Nevertheless, support for terrorism has 

been and remains substantial. With the exception of Turkey, over 45 percent 

of the respondents in every country expressed a positive attitude toward 

terrorism in response to at least one item in one survey.

Ordinary citizens’ attitudes toward terrorism are, or should be, a central 

concern of the war on terrorism for two reasons. First, like other rebel or

Figure 2–8. Percentof Respondents Agreeing that Violence

Against Civilians is Often or Sometimes Justified in the

Defense of Islam

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Jordan Morocco Turkey Pakistan Lebanon Indonesia

2003 2005
22 TESSLER

Figure 2–9. Percentof Respondents with Much or Some Confidence

in Osama bin Laden as a World Leader

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Jordan Morocco Turkey Pakistan Lebanon Indonesia

2003 2005

insurgent movements seeking to challenge those in power and upset the 

existing political order, terrorist organizations require at least a passively 

supportive society in which to hide and from which to obtain the resources 

necessary for survival.12 In many instances, as in the case of insurgents in 

Iraq, they also depend on the information and intelligence they derive from 

broad popular support.13 Thus, as succinctly expressed by Mao Tse-Tung, 

a guerrilla movement can “neither survive nor flourish if it separates itself 

from [the people’s] sympathies and cooperation.”14

Second, if terrorist organizations are to become strong enough to 

challenge established power structures, they, like other rebel movements, 

need to recruit people to provide infrastructure support and to become 

combatants. Quite naturally, recruits are most frequently drawn from those 

with a favorable attitude toward the organization and its actions.15 For 

example, a Singapore government study reports that the first stage of an 

18-month recruitment process into Jemaah Islamiya involves identifying 

highly sympathetic individuals from large religious classes.16 Research in 

Egypt, Jordan, and several other Arab countries points to a similar process.17 

It is possible in this connection to think of the contest between terrorist organizations and legal authorities as a competition over popular support.18

Popular support not only is vital for terrorist organizations; it is often 

a strategic objective as well. This reflects a realization on the part of the 

insurgent movement’s leaders that their opponents cannot be defeated by 

conventional means. As expressed by Osama bin Laden, “Due to the imbalance of power between our forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means 

of fighting must be adopted. . . . In other words, [it is necessary] to initiate 

a guerrilla war.”19 Moreover, terrorism is frequently a means of generating 
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 23

popular support and attracting recruits.20 Writing about the anticolonial 

struggle in Algeria, for example, Frantz Fanon pointed out that fighting back 

was itself a goal of terrorism; it served to free an oppressed people symbolically and thereby demonstrated the possibility of resistance.21 This is a 

common theme among organizations that use terrorism, including those 

that operate in the name of militant political Islam.22 Al Qaeda documents 

emphasize that terrorism is a means of overcoming “the degradation and 

disbelief which have spread into Muslim lands.”23

Counterterrorism experts also recognize the importance of popular support for terrorist organizations.24 In a review of homeland security 

policies, Scott Atran argues that the most important line of defense against 

terrorism may be finding ways to reduce popular support for terrorist organizations and activities.25 Direct military responses, by themselves, appear 

to be relatively ineffective, particularly in combating groups with a global 

network. The experience of Israel in forecasting and combating terrorism by 

Palestinian groups lends support to this assessment. According to Reuven 

Paz, organizations like Hamas are highly responsive to the will of the Palestinian people.26 Similarly, according to Ami Ayalon, former head of Israel’s 

security services, reductions in Palestinian terrorism between 1995 and 

2000 were not a consequence of Israeli security policies but were rather a 

response to Palestinian public opinion. Because of the correlation between 

popular support and militant actions, Israel has been able to use public 

opinion surveys to forecast decreases and increases in Palestinian terrorism 

with substantial accuracy.27

The preceding makes clear that it is important to understand what 

leads some ordinary citizens in the Arab and Muslim world to approve of 

terrorism against the West, or against members of their own society for 

that matter. There are obvious security and intelligence dimensions to the 

struggle against terrorism, and these are of primary importance in the short 

run. In the long run, however, nothing may be more important than the 

front of public opinion, than finding ways to reduce the extent to which 

terrorism finds tacit support among significant segments of the population 

in the Arab and Muslim world. Thus, identifying the factors that give rise to 

such attitudes among Arab and Muslim publics is essential. Civilizational 

analyses and assertions about the role of Islam are again common in this 

connection. Although some are diatribes rather than scholarly analyses, they 

echo the clash of civilizations arguments summarized earlier and assert that 

hatred of the West is inherent in Islam.28 Some also point out that terrorist 

organizations often seek to demonize and foster antipathy toward Western 

culture in order to build support among the broader public.29

Although many recent surveys have investigated support for terrorism 

in Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, only a few of these surveys ask 

enough questions to permit an examination of the determinants of this 
24 TESSLER

support. Two data sets that may be used for this purpose are from large and 

representative national surveys conducted in Algeria and Jordan in 2002. 

These two countries present an instructive contrast with respect to both their 

experience with terrorism and their political and economic circumstances. 

Since they differ in many important ways, a comparison of findings from 

the two countries approximates a “most different systems” research design. 

Similarities between them, if any, will suggest that the observed relationships are probably at least reasonably generalizable since they will have 

been found to obtain under widely differing conditions. The timing of the 

surveys is probably advantageous as well. Both surveys were conducted after 

September 11, but not so soon as to reflect the shock of the day’s events. 

Rather, given that the research in both countries was carried out in the late 

spring and summer of 2002, the immediate emotional impact of the attacks 

had presumably dissipated to a significant extent, to be replaced by more 

typical attitudes and opinions. Similarly, given that the surveys preceded the 

U.S. invasion of Iraq, responses were not influenced by the heightened anger at the United States and the heightened sympathy for the Iraqi resistance 

that were widespread in the Arab world in 2003 and 2004. 

Attitude toward terrorism is the dependent variable in this analysis. A single item asking directly about September 11 was used to measure this attitude 

in the Algerian survey. Two highly interrelated items were combined to form an 

index measuring attitudes toward terrorism in the Jordanian case. These items 

are given below. Response distributions are presented in figure 2–10.

Algeria: As you know, a group of religious fundamentalists hijacked four 

civilian airliners in September and crashed them into buildings in New York 

and Washington, DC, killing several thousand people. What is your opinion 

of this action: strongly approve, approve, disapprove, strongly disapprove?

Figure 2–10. AttitudesToward Terrorism in Algeria and Jordan

0

20

40

60

80

100

Positive View of Terrorism Negative View of Terrorism

Algeria 2002 Jordan 2002
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 25

Jordan: I would now like to read you the names of some international 

figures. As I read each one, please tell me whether you believe he is very 

trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or haven’t you heard or read enough about them to say?

(The questions called for evaluations of 10 different individuals. 

Among these, in addition to Osama bin Laden, were United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, U.S. President George W. Bush, Saudi Arabian 

Crown Prince Abdullah, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.)

As you may know, after the military campaign in Afghanistan began, 

some people called on all Muslims to join in armed jihad against the United 

States. Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or 

strongly oppose this call to armed jihad? 

The Algerian data permit inclusion of a large number of independent 

variables. These are grouped into nine conceptual categories:

■ personal demographic attributes, including gender, age, education, 

and whether family is able to save or has to either draw upon savings or 

borrow money

■ personality and psychological orientation, measured by three interrelated questions that ask whether the respondent (1) is happy, (2) believes 

that most people are basically good, and (3) feels at ease in expressing self 

and interacting with others

■ religious involvement, measured by two interrelated questions that 

ask about (1) frequency of mosque attendance and (2) frequency of spending time with friends at mosque

■ attitude toward the relationship between Islam and politics, measured by three interrelated questions that ask whether the respondent 

believes that (1) it would be better if more men of religious learning held 

public office, (2) the shari’a should be the only basis of law, and (3) religion 

limits democracy

■ conservatism-liberalism in the interpretation of Islam, measured by 

a scale based on three interrelated questions that ask whether respondent 

believes that (1) Islam prohibits coeducation at universities, (2) Islam gives 

the same political rights to Muslims and non-Muslıms, and (3) a country 

that is truly Islamic should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws 

■ attitude toward democracy, measured by three interrelated questions 

that ask whether the respondent believes (1) a democratic political system is 

a very good way of governing, (2) Western democracy is the best political system for Algeria, (3) despite problems, democracy is the best political system
26 TESSLER

■ evaluation of Western culture, measured by a question asking whether 

respondent believes exposure to the culture of the United States and other 

Western countries has a harmful effect on Algeria

■ evaluation of Algerian political system, measured by scale based on six 

interrelated questions asking about degree of confidence in Algeria’s parliament, political parties, police, military, civil service, and large corporations 

■ evaluation of U.S. foreign policy, measured by whether respondent 

believes some or most U.S. policies toward other countries are good or 

whether almost all U.S. policies toward other countries are bad. 

The Jordanian interview schedule contained items pertaining to most 

of the same independent variables. The two exceptions are personality and 

psychological orientation and attitudes toward democracy. The Jordanian 

data set does contain measures of all of the religious and cultural orientations present in the Algerian survey.

Regression analyses showing the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable are presented in tables 2–3 

(Algeria) and 2–4 (Jordan). In both analyses, responses to the dependent 

variable have been dichotomized and binary logistical regression has been 

employed. In the Algerian case, the dependent variable has been divided 

into the categories of “approve” and “disapprove” of the attacks of September 11, 2001, with, as shown in figure 2–10, 23 percent approving and 77 

percent disapproving. The dependent variable has also been dichotomized 

in the Jordanian case. The division is between the 33 percent of respondents 

who express very strong support for both Osama bin Laden and armed jihad 

against the United States and the 67 percent who express less support for 

one or both. The findings shown in tables 2–3 and 2–4 are strikingly similar, 

which is all the more notable given the two countries’ different experiences 

with terrorism and the two differing interview schedules employed.

Table 2–3. LogisticRegression Showing Influence of Personal

Attributes, Personality and Psychological Orientations,

Religious and Cultural Values, and Political Assessments

on Support for Terrorism in Algeria

Personal Attributes

Female -.136

(.340)

Older -.228

(.159)
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 27

Better educated .028

(.077)

Draws upon savings or borrows .347

(.206)

Personality and Psychological Orientation

Is happy -.169

(.221)

Believes other people are basically good -.012

(.317)

At ease interacting with others .262

(.289)

Personal Religious Involvement

Higher mosque interaction .160

(.159)

More frequent religious service attendance .117

(.086)

Islam and Politics

Not want more people of religion in public office -.027

(.134)

Not more important than law from shari’a -.148

(.156)

Not believe religion limits democracy -.098

(.170)

Interpretation of Islam

Islam does not prohibit coeducation -.036

(.110)

Islam does not require inferior political rights for non-Muslims -.071

(.112)

Islam does not prohibit having a parliament that can pass laws -.185

(.109)

Democracy and Governance

Democracy is a good way to govern -.245

(.252)

Democracy is the best political system .071

(.198)
28 TESSLER

Western democratic system is best for Algeria .114

(.177)

Western Culture

Western culture is harmful to our country -.190

(.167)

U.S. Foreign Policy

Almost all U.S. foreign policies are bad * .631

(.292)

Confidence in Algerian Political System and Institutions

Lower confidence * .327

(.155)

Note: Dependent variable is coded 0 = less support for terrorism, 1 = greater support for terrorism. Table presents logit 

coefficients (B) with standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05

Table 2–4. LogisticRegression Showing Influence of Personal

Attributes, Religious and Cultural Values, and Political

Assessments on Support for Terrorism in Jordan

Personal Attributes

Female .119

(.348)

Older* -.019

(.009)

Better educated -.061

(.080)

Personal Religiosity

Prays more often .114

(.203)

Visits mosque more frequently .044

(.199)

Relies on religious teachings more often to guide daily decisions .373

(.190)
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 29

Islam and Politics

Sharı’a should be the only basis of law .377

(.329)

Political leaders should be selected by clerics .003

(.010)

Interpretation of Islam

Islam prohibits men and women from working together .117

(.123)

Non-Muslims should not hold important positions in Muslim states -.061

(.100)

Islamic country should not have parliament that passes laws -.131

(.107)

American Society and Culture

Negative impression of American values -.006

(.006)

Western culture a threat to Jordan’s culture -.008

(.100)

U.S. practices democracy in its own country -.126

(.116)

Confidence in Jordanian Political System and Institutions

Lower confidence** .554

(,237)

U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. violates human rights around the world*** .288

(.110)

U.S. treats Jordan with respect* -.252

(.109)

Note: Dependent variable is coded 0 = less support for terrorism, 1 = greater support for terrorism. Table presents logit 

coefficients (B) with standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p<.02, ***p>.01

Turning first to Algeria, a notable finding concerns the large number 

of relationships that are not statistically significant. None of the four demographic attributes bear an independent and statistically significant relationship to support for terrorism. Nor do any of the three questions pertaining 

to personality and psychological orientation. And again, none of the three 

questions pertaining to democracy bear an independent and statistically 

significant relationship to support for terrorism. 
30 TESSLER

Findings about the independent variables pertaining to religion and 

culture are of particular interest in light of the civilizational analyses that 

are often advanced to explain support for terrorism. The finding that not 

one of these independent variables has significant explanatory power is thus 

important. As noted above, the analysis includes eight independent variables measuring three different kinds of orientations pertaining to Islam: 

religious involvement, attitude toward the relationship between Islam and 

politics, and conservatism-liberalism in the interpretation of Islamic law. In 

no instance is the relationship between one of these independent variables 

and support for terrorism statistically significant. This is also the case for 

the item asking whether exposure to the culture of the United States and 

other Western countries has a harmful effect on Algeria. Those who answer 

this question in the affirmative are no more likely than others to express 

approval of the attacks of September 11.

The last two categories of independent variables are related to support 

for terrorism to a statistically significant degree. The first of these concerns 

views about U.S. foreign policy. Not surprisingly, respondents who believe 

that almost all U.S. policies toward other countries are bad are more likely 

than other respondents to express approval of the attacks of September 11, 

2001. The second category concerns judgments about the Algerian political 

system. The interview schedule contains a battery of questions asking about 

confidence in various political and public institutions, including parliament, political parties, police, military, civil service, and large corporations. 

Responses to these items have been combined to form an index, which 

is strongly related to support for terrorism. Specifically, respondents with 

lower levels of confidence in these institutions, and hence a more unfavorable evaluation of the Algerian political system, are much more likely than 

others to approve of the attacks on the United States. Thus, in contrast to 

orientations pertaining to religion and culture, discontent with the Algerian 

political system clearly predicts and helps to explain approval of the attacks 

on the United States.

The findings from Jordan are strikingly similar. Although the Jordanian 

analysis has fewer independent variables, the data set does permit the inclusion of measures of the three categories of orientations pertaining to Islam, 

assessments of Western culture, judgments about U.S. foreign policy, and 

confidence in the Jordanian political system, as well as personal demographic attributes. None of the demographic variables are related to the dependent variable to a statistically significant degree. Nor is even 1 of the 11 

different independent variables pertaining to religion and culture. At least 

some of these relationships should be statistically significant if support for 

terrorism is indeed fostered by religious and cultural values in the Arab and 

Muslim world. As in the Algerian analysis, however, this is not the case.
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 31

By contrast, again as in the Algerian case, judgments about American 

foreign policy and evaluations of the domestic political system are related 

to support for terrorism to a degree that is statistically significant. Jordanians with a more negative attitude toward U.S. foreign policy, measured by 

an index composed of items that ask about the American president, U.S. 

handling of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, and U.S. policy toward Iraq, are 

more likely than others to express favorable views about bin Laden and 

armed jihad. So, too, are Jordanians with lower levels of confidence in the 

country’s government and parliament. Given that Algeria and Jordan are 

very different societies, it is striking and significant that in both cases, religious and cultural orientation has no ability to account for variance in 

attitudes toward terrorism but that political judgments, domestic as well as 

foreign, do have significant explanatory and predictive power. 

Conclusion 

A remarkably consistent set of conclusions emerges from this diverse 

array of data and analyses. The data discussed in this study were collected 

in 12 different countries, in some cases on several different occasions. They 

were collected by different polling organizations and researchers, and they 

used different questions when asking about the same topic or theme. And 

yet, despite this diversity, the same findings emerge in the areas of particular 

concern to the present analysis. 

Consistent findings come through in three interrelated areas, which 

constitute the principal lessons and contribution of the present investigation. First, anti-Americanism in Arab and Muslim countries is primarily 

a reflection of antipathy to U.S. foreign policy, as it is or at least as it is 

perceived, rather than a rejection of Western norms and values. Some Arabs 

and Muslims do reject Western norms, but this is not the view of most of 

those who have a negative impression of the United States. Second, religion and culture have little explanatory and predictive power. Explanations 

and predictions of anti-Americanism and support for terrorism derived 

from the clash of civilizations hypothesis, the reification of Islam, or other 

civilizational analyses are not supported by the data. Third, assessments of 

political and economic circumstances do have explanatory and predictive 

power. Anti-Americanism and support for terrorism are fostered to a significant degree by unfavorable assessments of those factors, both domestic and 

international, that Arabs and other Muslims believe to be responsible for 

the political and economic status quo. 

The implications of these findings for U.S. public diplomacy are clear 

on the one hand but challenging on the other. They are clear in that they 

suggest that strategic communications policies and programs with a focus 
32 TESSLER

on normative considerations, including religion, are unlikely to have a 

significant impact. They are challenging because the alternative, addressing 

issues of U.S. foreign policy and political economy, will not be easy and may 

not be possible at all. At the very least, however, those responsible for American public diplomacy must have a realistic understanding of the nature and 

dynamics of public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world. To the extent 

possible, American officials must also struggle to find acceptable and productive ways to engage ordinary Arabs and Muslims on the political and policy 

concerns that are shaping views on issues important to the United States. 

Notes

1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, “If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms 

of the Post–Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (November/December 1993), 186.

2 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the 

West and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified,” Atlantic Monthly 266 (September 

1990), 47; Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

3 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 209, 217.

4 Associated Press, November 29, 2002. 

5 Richard W. Stevenson, “As Ramadan Draws to a Close, Bush Praises Muslims for ‘Spirit 

of Tolerance,’” The New York Times, December 6, 2002, A18.

6 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Bigotry in Islam—And Here,” The New York Times, July 9, 2002. 

7 “A Conservative Christian Group Sues the University of North Carolina for Assigning 

a Book on Islam,” Democracy Now! August 8, 2002, available at <webactive.com/pacifica/demnow/dn20020808.html>.

8 Olivier Roy, “Why Do They Hate Us? Not Because of Iraq,” The New York Times, July 22, 

2005, A19.

9 Kristof.

10 Mark Tessler, “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious 

Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries,” Comparative Politics

34 (April 2002), 337–354; Mark Tessler, “Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes 

and Evidence from Survey Research,” International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 2 (May 1, 2003), 

175–180; Mark Tessler, “Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the 

Arab World: Evidence From the World Values Survey in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria,” 

International Journal of Comparative Sociology 2 (Spring 2003), 229–249; Mark Tessler, “Islam 

and Democracy in the Arab World: Evidence from Opinion Research in the Maghrib,” in Amin 

Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, Democracy and Peace in the Middle East (Tokyo: United Nations 

University, 2003); Mark Tessler and Ebru Altinoglu, “Political Culture in Turkey: Connections 

Among Attitudes Toward Democracy, the Military, and Islam,” Democratization 11, no. 1 (February 2004), 21–50.

11 Ronald Inglehart, Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 

1999–2002 Values Surveys (Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 2004).

12 Nelson Kasfir, “Dilemmas of Popular Support in Guerrilla War: The National 

Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981–86,” available at <duke.edu/web/licep/6/kasfir/kasfir.pdf>; 

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Policy Research 

Paper 2355 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000); J. Weinstein, Resources and the Information 

Problem in Rebel Recruitment, available at <armedgroups.org/index.php?option=content&task=v

iew&id=28>. 

13 Barry R. Posen, “Fighting Blind in Iraq,” The New York Times, June 7, 2005, A23. 

14 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961). 
INFORMING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 33

15 Harvey W. Kushner, “Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no. 4 (October–December 1996), 329. 

16 White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: 

Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003), available at <www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid=667&t

ype=4&root=0&parent=0&cat=0>.

17 Diane Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements,” in Islamic 

Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana 

University Press, 2004); Carrie R. Wickham, “Interest, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt,” 

in Wiktorowicz; Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim 

Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).

18 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5; Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 18.

19 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

20 Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science 

Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003), 343–361.

21 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1967).

22 Jeremy Ginges, “Deterring the Terrorist: A Psychological Evaluation of Different Strategies for Deterring Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 170.

23 Gunaratna. 

24 See Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299, no. 5612 (March 7, 

2003), 1534; Jerrold M. Post, “Rewarding Fire With Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist 

Group-Dynamics,” Terrorism 10 (1987), 23–25.

25 Scott Atran, “The Strategic Threat from Suicide Terror,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center 

for Regulatory Studies, December 2003, available at <aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.

php?pid=410>.

26 Reuven Paz, “Is Hamas Reevaluating the Use of Terrorism?” International Policy 

Institute for Counter-Terrorism, December 28, 1998, available at <ict.org.il/articles/articledet.

cfm?articleid=50>.

27 Ami Ayalon, “Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Front Line,” in The Battle of Ideas in 

the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004).

28 Robert Spencer, Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World’s Fastest Growing 

Religion (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002); Mark A. Gabriel, Islam and Terrorism: What 

the Quran Really Teaches About Christianity, Violence, and the Goals of Islamic Jihad (New York: 

Charisma House, 2002).

29 Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” and Ehud Sprinzak, “The 

Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen,” in Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
35

Chapter Three

Muslim Perceptions of America: 

The Sources of Hostility

Steven N. Simon

Burgeoning anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is widely recognized in the United States, where it is often assumed to be the product of 

a particular religion and culture. Although these anti-American sentiments 

certainly reflect language and ideas that are specific to Islam, many key 

themes actually come from outside the Islamic tradition. In some instances, 

these criticisms of America align with values embedded in Muslim experience and intellectual life, while in others they seem to be force-fit into an 

Islamic mold. Understanding and responding to Muslim anti-Americanism 

requires a grasp of its multiple, exogenous secular sources as well as its specifically religious origins.

Intellectual Sources of Anti-Americanism in the 

Muslim World

Muslim attitudes toward the United States are rooted in or influenced by non-Muslim perceptions of America predating the intensive U.S. 

encounter with the Arab world that began in the early post–World War II 

period.1 Some of these primarily European attitudes toward North America 

preceded the establishment of the republic. From the time of the early 

European settlement of the New World, natural scientists and writers presented an understanding of the continent as essentially uninhabitable by 

cultured people. The educated, if uninformed, view of the continent was of 

a vast miasmic forest, hostile climate, and savage indigenous population. 

The undeveloped state of the native culture was held to be the result of 

the effluvial and toxic atmosphere. It was presumed that European settlers 

would fall victim to the noxious environment and swiftly descend to the 

primitive level of the autochthonous peoples. Indeed, a cultivated French 

traveler to North America in the late 1700s, Cornelius de Pauw, titled his 

description of the colonial settlers, “On the American’s Moronic Spirit.”2

Negative images of North Americans persisted even after wide acquaintance with actual conditions on the continent became a fact in Europe. In the 

late 18th and early 19th centuries, with a few notable exceptions, European 

The author is indebted to Amir Stepak and Sara Moller of the Council on Foreign Relations and Jeffrey 

Martini of Georgetown University for their assistance in preparing this chapter.
36 SIMON

commentators derided life in the colonies and then in the independent 

United States as uncultured, coarse, corrupt, and doomed to political 

and social failure. American towns and cities were portrayed as squalid, 

religious practice as hopelessly unexalted, separation of church and state 

as unsustainable, and politics as geared to the lowest common denominator of a low society. These sharply critical views of Americans and their 

new republic did not fade with the evident success of the state. They 

were combined with a new source of fear and disgust, namely a populist, 

Whiggish set of political values, rejection of the monarchy as a legitimate 

institution and, more generally, of traditions derived from established 

European political practice and social organization. The American project 

was perceived as a threat to European stability and existing political prerogatives. As a result, Americans and their politics were scorned both in 

the popular European press and in the somewhat more elevated discourse 

of national elites.

An image of the United States as a dangerous wellspring of radicalism 

gained greater traction during the revolutions of 1848. Not all Europeans 

were appalled by American values. Those who manned the barricades had 

as an inspiration not only the French revolution but also the republicanism 

of the United States. 

Gradually, these views of the United States evolved into two opposing 

censorious images. Among the European right, America was seen as a radical juggernaut inspiring revolutionary sentiment in Europe and degrading 

the high culture of the old regime. On the left, America was held to be the 

avatar of unregulated capitalism, from which emerged robber barons, large 

corporations, and widespread exploitation of labor. The Russian Revolution 

of 1917 and its long aftermath reified these negative images, particularly 

those that reflected a leftist critique of American politics and society. The 

key characteristics attributed to the United States were derived from Marxist 

analysis, but they incorporated preexisting prejudices. This is unsurprising, 

especially given the alluvial way in which negative stereotypes of the United 

States had accumulated and coalesced since the earliest European settlement 

of the continent. Thus, America was predatory, instinctively imperial, and 

aggressive; an oppressor of its own working class as well as the population 

of countries it sought to devour; racist, self-righteous, and inimical to the 

human spirit. American capitalism trampled the values of dignity and selffulfillment, while celebrating self-centeredness and consumption for consumption’s sake. Indeed, it was essential that an obsession with consumption be instilled, lest ordinary Americans wake up to the spiritual emptiness 

of their lives and their exploitation at the hands of their capitalist masters. 

Moreover, Soviet propaganda embraced prevailing anti-Semitic motifs, specifically those asserting a connection between Jews and capital, which had 
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 37

originated in medieval images of the Jew as usurer. In this narrative, Jewish 

financiers who were said to congregate in New York City were connected to 

a larger conspiracy of capitalist states to dominate the world. (A variation 

of these beliefs was systematized in the “Protocols of the Learned Elders of 

Zion,” a late 19th-century Russian fabrication describing a Jewish conspiracy 

to subordinate the world’s population to Jewish objectives, which drew on 

an earlier French work along the same lines.)

The right made a contribution as well. The Nazi propaganda effort adopted earlier European elite characterizations of American society as mongrel and its culture debased. The key concepts deployed by the Nazis related 

to racial and ethnic mixing, the degrading influence of African-American 

and Jewish artistic expression, and, as in Soviet propaganda, the malign 

presence of Jews in the American financial industry.

Apart from the way in which Soviet theoreticians reframed older critiques of the United States and linked American rapacity to Jewish greed, 

the Soviet Union used its vast propaganda network to reinforce antiAmericanism, especially in Western Europe, and, after World War II, 

throughout the Third World. In Europe, negative images of the United 

States resonated strongly, especially on the left. This was due in part to the 

fact that Soviet propaganda encompassed anti-American themes that had 

been circulating among European elites for over a century. The leftist tinge 

of much of the European intelligentsia, combined with a strong sense of 

European cultural superiority, was also a factor. In the Third World, Soviet 

propaganda was effective because it meshed well with the profound anticolonialism that had begun to emerge in South and Southeast Asia as well as 

the Middle East during the interwar years. The more closely the United States 

could be linked to European colonial occupation or informal imperialism, 

the more persuasive this critique would be.

American support for national self-determination in the wake of 

World War I, however, combined with Washington’s critical stance toward 

the colonial commitments of its wartime alliance partners after World War 

II, helped to preserve a positive image of the United States, especially in 

the Middle East. The Truman administration’s decisions to vote in favor 

of partition of Palestine in 1947 and then to recognize Israel in May 1948 

could scarcely have been expected to ingratiate the United States in Arab 

capitals. Yet Washington’s self-imposed distance from the Jewish state, which 

stemmed partly from a desire to avoid outraging Israel’s regional neighbors 

(especially Saudi Arabia) and partly from its suspicion of Israel’s socialist 

government and connections to the Eastern Bloc, did much at first to contain anti-American sentiment. 

The Eisenhower administration’s condemnation of the British, French, 

and Israeli military campaign to reverse Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez 
Canal also helped stave off a decline in America’s image in the region. The 

U.S. position took the anticolonial high ground and demonstrated that 

the President had both the will and the power to challenge America’s European allies and their Israeli protégé. However, Gamal abd al-Nasr’s regime, which was arguably rescued by the U.S. vote in the United Nations 

Security Council (along with that of the Soviet Union) to condemn the 

invasion, did not acknowledge the U.S. role, thereby undercutting the 

positive impact Eisenhower’s move might otherwise have had.

Two interrelated cold wars—one between East and West and the other 

between Egypt and Iraq from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s—would 

soon begin to erode America’s standing in Muslim opinion in the Middle 

East. The nationalist revolution in Iraq in 1958 and Qarim Qassim’s repudiation of the Baghdad Pact, and the U.S. break with Egypt over Eastern Bloc 

weapons procurement, recognition of Communist China, and financing 

of the Aswan Dam in 1956 accelerated the corrosive process. Nasr’s panArab project and Syrian and Iraqi Baathism were interlaced with a strong 

socialist impulse, which in turn created a receptive atmosphere for Soviet 

influence and anti-American propaganda. The continuing confrontation 

with Israel likewise created opportunities for Soviet military and diplomatic 

support that translated into influence. Covert Soviet support for regional 

print media ensured that the anti-American tropes of leftist ideology were 

widely propagated within the region. These ideas blended with anticolonial 

sentiment through the linkage of the United States and several of its North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies that had, in an earlier era, divided the region between themselves in secret agreements and, in the case 

of the United Kingdom, still retained a military presence in Yemen and the 

littoral states of the Persian Gulf.3

From the 1960s onward, converging trends would continue to undermine favorable views of the United States: the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; 

the 1973 war in which the United States resupplied the Israel Defense 

Force in the midst of the conflict; the subsequent oil embargo; and the 

Iranian revolution, all of which tended to lend credence to propaganda 

claims, particularly about American neocolonialism and embrace of 

Jewish interests.

In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, the negative regional image of 

the United States that had been derived from the Soviet version of European 

anti-Americanism—the United States portrayed as a soulless, bellicose, 

imperialistic society in league with international capital—was incorporated 

into a more specifically Islamic critique. From the Islamic perspective, the 

faults of the United States lay in its support for Muslim governments that 

radical Islamists regarded as apostate. 

38 SIMON
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 39

Elite Opinion in the Muslim World

Current anti-American discourse among Muslims draws freely on the 

eclectic range of unfavorable characterizations found in European antiAmerican thought and on an explicitly Islamic critique, frequently weaving 

both strands into a unified argument. Osama bin Laden is an exceptionally 

skilled practitioner of this syncretistic rhetorical style.

Key Themes

The basic tropes of the anti-American argument appear frequently in 

print media as text or cartoon, sermons that are either broadcast or distributed in playable formats, in broadcast discussion programs, or, as suggested 

above, in video or audiotapes of famous jihadists. They may also be found 

in popular song, cinema, and theatrical productions. These conventional 

formulations fall into the following categories.

Global Bully. The United States, either alone or in a pact with Israel, is 

set on a program of world domination, starting with the Arab world. Thus, 

a columnist for the pan-Islamist Turkish newspaper Milli Gazete writes in an 

op-ed entitled “America’s Hitler”:

Hitler said that he would establish a new world order if 

Germany won. Bush is after similar invasions. First he targeted 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Later he expanded his invasion map to 

include 22 more Islamic countries where he wants to change the 

order and the borders. He says that he wants to bring the likes of 

Karzai and Allawi [to these countries] to power, and in doing so 

establish his colonial empire. 

When a person goes rabid, there is no stopping him. God forbid, 

if he succeeds in occupying those 22 countries, his lust will 

expand to cover the whole world. Why expand? Because the fivethousand-year-old dream of the Zionists is to grasp the valleys 

of both the Nile and Euphrates and build a Jewish state to rule 

the rest of the world. What I want to say is that the end game for 

the “Sharon and Bush duo” is to build a state that would rule the 

world, just like it was for Hitler.4

In this excerpt, the American drive to dominate the Islamic world 

on the way toward global hegemony aligns with Israel’s desire to rule the 

Middle East. In the author’s assessment, America is motivated by an expansionist compulsion, which he likens to “rabid” behavior. The degree 

to which this component of Muslim anti-American discourse resembles 
40 SIMON

earlier European left-wing complaints about the United States is suggested 

by Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous declaration that America had “rabies.”5

This theme is lavishly illustrated in newspapers by caricaturists who 

use unflattering symbols for the United States that might be found as well in 

Western European and other non-Muslim periodicals. As shown in figures 

3–1 through 3–4, these symbols include the grim reaper, distributing dynamite around the globe; the bronco-busting cowboy trampling the earth; a 

malevolent American eagle sinking its claws into a globe that, having been 

punctured, is beginning to deflate; and as the almighty buck, from which 

the American President reaches out to strangle a poor fellah.

6

In the domain of popular entertainment, Shabaan abd al-Rahim, an 

Egyptian tradesman who achieved unexpected stardom in 2000 with his hit 

song, “I Hate Israel, but I Love Amr Mousa,” scored another hit in “Two 

Faces of the Same Coin,” which was released in 2004.

The song can be downloaded from the Internet as a video, in which 

Shabaan is shown in the foreground singing the lyrics, against a cartoon

Figure 3–1. Anti-American Figure 3–2. Anti-American

Political Cartoon	 	 Political Cartoon

Source: Sherif Hetata, "World Dominations, Inc."Al-Ahram Al-Ahram Weekly, June 26-July 2, 2003.

Weekly, no. 666 (November 27-December 3, 2003),

accessed at <weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/666/focus.htm>.

Figure 3–3. Anti-American Figure 3–4. Anti-American

Political Cartoon	 	 Political Cartoon

Al-Ahram Weekly, November 22-28, 2001. Al-Ahram Weekly, October 16-22, 2003.
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 41

backdrop that shows, among other things, a map suggesting America’s imperial ambitions, President Bush in the Oval Office apparently declaring 

war against Iran and Syria, and a grinning image of an airplane flying into 

the Twin Towers. The imagery then changes, depicting Ariel Sharon pressing 

a button festooned with a Star of David, whereby he appears to launch the 

9/11 attack.

Two faces of the same coin, America and Israel

They made the world a jungle and ignited the fuse.

America spread its wings,

Doesn’t care at all.

No one can stop her,

No one can catch her.

Soon he will say Iran,

And then he will say Syria.

But he is silent about [North] Korea.

About that tower, oh people,

Definitely, his friends were the ones who brought it down.

They were the ones who brought it down.

What terrorism?!

How many years are left,

For America and Israel, acting as bullies.

Day and night Sharon is looking for a fight.

All his life he is a liar and hypocrite,

There are no smuggled weapons or any tunnels. 

A person who hates himself.7

Shabaan’s popular song harnesses the image of a belligerent America 

with other reinforcing motifs, including America’s heedless attitude toward 

the interests of regional states, Washington’s double standard as applied 

to Muslim and non-Muslim countries, the identity between Israel and the 

United States, and a conspiratorial Jewish state with which Washington 

connives on 9/11, presumably to provide a pretext for aggression against 

Muslim states that will benefit both Israel and the United States. 

Intrinsically Violent. A parallel motif, which recalls the image of the 

United States as a cowboy, holds that Americans are instinctively violent. 

Popular impressions of American cities as dangerous places, where gunplay 

and murder are rife, are common in foreign media generally. In this context, 

the belief is useful in explaining why U.S. foreign policy, in the view of 

regional observers, is excessively reliant on the use of force. The underlying 
42 SIMON

assumption is that a violent domestic order will inevitably be reflected in a 

violent approach toward the international order. Such assumptions are not 

confined to Muslim observers of America. U.S. policymakers, for example, 

routinely attribute aggressive intentions to North Korea in part because of 

the atrocious domestic policies of its despotic regime. Thus, a Syrian legislator, Dr. Muhammad Habash, explained American actions to an Iranian 

television interviewer as follows:

When the American adventurer arrived [in America], the good 

Indians carried his luggage and rejoiced while shooing the flies 

from the face of that American adventurer who came to them. 

They did not notice the dagger he concealed. . . . I want to talk 

about the philosophical roots of this condescending culture, a 

culture that realizes the desire for expansion at the expense of 

others. . . . Let me tell you. I must clarify this idea. The culture 

that is exported today, through Hollywood, for example, is a 

culture of violence, a culture of films ending usually with the 

policeman bleeding and the robber hugging his lover and smoking a cigar. These images glorify cruelty, glorify force, glorify the 

man who is victorious because of his might and his weapons. 

This is the language that still controls these people’s culture.8

Habash’s analysis connects a perception of the United States as a 

country with overweening self-esteem to an expansionist foreign policy and 

a culture industry that justifies the use of force to carry out such a policy. 

The example he uses is meant to show that violence in American culture 

enjoys a legitimacy that surpasses respect for the rule of law. In an opinion 

piece from a Turkish newspaper with loose ties to the ruling Justice and 

Development Party, columnist Dr. Husnu Mahalli posited a variation on 

this image of Americans, arguing, “Murdering is genetically ingrained in 

American culture.”9

This theme has also been showcased in popular entertainment. 

Khalid Sawi, of the Haraka theater group in Cairo, scored a hit in 2004 with 

his play “Messing with the Mind.”10 The play begins with actors dressed as 

U.S. Marines running into the audience shouting, “Stay seated; you have 

right to die; turn off your cell phones!” and ends with an American general 

named Fox News yelling, “I hate Arabs!” before being shot in the head. That 

same year, Youssef Chahine, a prominent Egyptian film director, produced 

a melodramatic allegory for U.S.-Egyptian relations, in which an aging film 

director returns to New York to see a lover from his youth and the son he had 

unknowingly fathered. He and the son soon fall out, however, and the director denounces the son, declaring, “The violence that started at Hiroshima 

is in you.”11 More recently, this theme was featured in a popular Turkish 
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 43

television series, “Valley of the Wolves—Iraq,” in which the villain is Sam 

William Marshall, an American Special Forces soldier, who, among other 

atrocities, slaughters a wedding party.12

Satanic. At a rally of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca in January 2006, a 

speaker denounced the United States against a graphic backdrop depicting 

the World Trade Center and a flaming American flag. Quoting Ayatollah Ali 

Khamenei, he declared:

Today, the fleets of arrogance are, once again, using new methods of deceit, in order to perpetuate and strengthen their control 

over the Islamic world. Their slogan of spreading democracy and 

human rights is one of these methods of deceit. The Great Satan, 

who embodies evil and violence against humanity, raises the 

banner of defending of human rights, and summons the peoples 

of the Middle East to democracy.13

The characterization of America as Satan or as satanic is common in 

Islamic clerical discourse. The term shaytan is polyvalent and covers a wide 

semantic range in Koranic Arabic. Shaytan is the one, for example, who can 

cause people to slip (Koran 2:36, 3:155); lead astray (4:60); instill hatred 

and envy (5:91); make people forget (6:68, 18:63); tempt (7:27); and provoke strife (17:53). He is the embodiment of guile (4:76) and is associated 

with abomination (5:90).14 The homiletic application of this epithet to the 

United States efficiently articulates many of the key anti-American themes 

that circulate in other arenas of Muslim political self-expression. The essential qualities are deceit, temptation, and instigation of conflict within the 

umma, the worldwide community of Muslims. By lying, the United States 

conceals its true motivations and impedes the ability of Muslims to fully 

grasp the evil import of American policy. Through temptation, America lures 

Muslims away from the faith that is the source of their strength and ability 

to resist America’s designs. Stirring internecine conflict, either by supporting some Muslim countries against others, or, to cite a common example, 

turning Muslims within Iraq against each other with the aim of dividing the 

country and stealing its wealth, is another means by which America gets its 

way. Hence, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s focus on “the effort by the enemies of Islam to create division in the ranks of the Muslims” 

and “military and political intervention by the regime of the Arrogance [the 

United States]” in his December 2006 speech at the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Mecca.15

Anti-Islam. The United States is widely seen in the Muslim world as 

anti-Islamic. Bashar al-Asad, who is generally eager to denounce American 

policy in the language of anticolonialism and Arab pride in a manner 
44 SIMON

intended to embarrass his regional counterparts, declared at the 2003 OIC 

summit in Malaysia:

Those fanatics [the U.S. administration] revealed their brutal 

vision of human society and started to market the principle 

of force instead of dialogue, oppression instead of justice and 

racism instead of tolerance. They even began to create an ugly 

illusory enemy which they called “Islam,” and made it appear 

as if it is Islam [was responsible] while Islam is completely innocent of it.

In this passage, al-Asad combines two key motifs, namely an American 

obsession with violence as the path to dispute resolution and a tendency to 

demonize Islam, blaming the religion for resistance to American desires, 

rather than the unjust nature of U.S. policy.

Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Muhammad, speaking at the same 

summit meeting, concluded that, “We, the whole Muslim umma, are treated 

with contempt and dishonor. Our religion is denigrated. Our holy places desecrated. Our countries are occupied. . . . All Muslims were suffering ‘oppression and humiliation’ with their religion accused of promoting terrorism.”16

In a more explicitly Islamist vein, a fatwa issued by Shaykh 

Hammoud al-‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi justified the September 11 attacks by arguing that America is “an enemy of Muslim nations”: 

You should know that America is a kufr [infidel] state that is totally against Islam and Muslims. In fact it has reached the peak of 

that arrogance in the form of open attacks on several Muslim nations as it did in Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Philistine [Palestine],

Libya, and others, where it—America—allied with the forces of 

Kufr such as Britain, Russia and others. . . . How then can America 

after all these things not be considered an enemy of the Muslim 

nations and at war with them?17

This view is carried farther by Sheikh Ikrimeh Sabri, Mufti of Jerusalem 

and the senior religious authority in the Palestinian Authority, who said in 

late 2004 that: 

This mad Crusade is not merely a war against the Muslims. It is 

a campaign of hatred currently [being waged] against the great 

Islamic religion. [This campaign] is growing in intensity with the 

aim of distorting the character of Islam, and we have already 

warned about the dangers of this new Crusade 2 years ago.18

 Here Sheikh Sabri distinguishes between American animosity toward 

Muslims, which might conceivably originate in America’s greed for Muslim 
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 45

wealth or land, and asserts a hatred for Islam itself, or, as an American might 

phrase it, a clash of civilizations.

Hypocritical. Muslim governments frequently accuse Washington of 

having “double standards.” At the 2004 World Economic Forum in Davos, 

Switzerland, representatives from the delegations of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 

and Iran all criticized Washington’s campaign for democracy in the Middle 

East as hypocritical, saying the Bush administration ignored Israeli weapons of mass destruction and human rights abuses while pressuring Muslim 

states to disarm and democratize.19

Washington’s alleged hypocrisy on democracy, human rights, and 

nonproliferation is a frequent theme in Arab media and politics. Addressing the West’s criticism of Hamas’ victory in the January 2006 Palestinian 

elections, Dr. Abd-al-Aziz al-Duwayk, Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative 

Council, remarked:

It is odd in general and in the United States and the European 

Union in particular that they want to promote democracy in 

this region of the world and we accepted. To their surprise, the 

Islamic movement in Palestine agreed to the rules of the game 

and we participated in the elections. They already knew that 

HAMAS was competing in the elections and our people—who 

are the most educated in this part of the world—had their say 

and selected their representatives. To the astonishment of the 

whole world, these two entities, these two super powers did not 

accept the final results of democracy. They wanted democracy 

but they wanted a democracy that is tailored. They did not want 

a free democracy. They wanted the outcome of this democratic 

process to be in accordance to their wishes and aspirations.

Of President Bush, al-Duwayk said:

Instead of congratulating the Palestinians and saying that he is 

ready to cooperate with the results of the elections and with the 

representatives of the Palestinian people, he is trying to punish 

the Palestinians. Why? If he really believes in democracy and not 

in hypocrisy, he should engage us in a dialogue.20

The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal and the ongoing controversy over Guantanamo Bay have only served to reinforce this image, as a 

Pakistani journalist noted in late 2005:

In fact the United States has followed the classic policy of ‘might 

is right’ but it has lost moral ground in the process. President 
46 SIMON

Bush must remember that one has to practice what one preaches 

and not the other way round. The Americans have always been 

in the habit of delivering sermons on human rights, freedom, 

and dignity to the rest of the world. This policy lies tattered, as 

the whole world has been made aware of the antics they employ 

when it comes to dealing with difficult situations.21

From this perspective, not only does the United States paint itself as a 

champion of human rights and dignity while itself performing questionable 

practices on prisoners, it also uses every available opportunity to prevent 

Islamic countries from benefiting from scientific and technological advancements. The governments of both Pakistan and Iran frequently remind their 

citizens that while Israel and the West are allowed nuclear technology, the 

United States prevents Muslim countries from obtaining this technology. 

In an April 2006 address to a Palestinian conference, Ayatollah Khamenei 

addressed this theme in a section of his comments titled, “Preventing the 

Progress and Advancement of Islamic Countries”: 

The bullying powers use different excuses to prevent transfer 

of science and technology and progress of the nations of our 

region. They regard our advancement as a threat to the corrupt 

Zionist regime. They do not allow the countries of the region 

to tread on the path to progress and advancement. They even 

oppose indigenous technologies in the Islamic countries and 

interpret any scientific advancement as a threat to the security of 

Qods [Jerusalem] occupier regime.

You can see how they treat our nation that has been able to have 

access to nuclear technology by relying on the innovations and 

creative minds of its own scientists. Nuclear technology is one 

of the primary foundations for progress and serving the people, 

and in [the] not too distant future, nations without this technology will have no choice but to resort to it in order to meet 

their growing energy needs and to use it for other scientific and 

economic purposes.22

Dedicated to Israel, Under the Influence of Jews. The belief that the U.S. 

Government takes orders from Jews/Israelis is well established in Arab and 

Muslim public opinion. U.S. and Israeli objectives are frequently taken to 

be identical, prompting American foreign policy initiatives to be viewed 

through this filter. Thus, the United States is thought to have invaded Iraq 

and overthrown the Saddam Hussein regime in order to remove a threat to 

Israel and promote Israel’s goal of establishing hegemony over the Middle 

East from the Nile to the Euphrates. U.S. claims that the overthrow of the 
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 47

regime was motivated by an American desire to liberate Iraqis from a tyrannical ruler, give impetus to regional political liberalization, or preempt 

future aggression against the United States by a Baathist Iraq are generally 

given little credence. U.S. concerns regarding Iranian nuclear enrichment 

efforts are likewise regarded as motivated by fears for Israel’s security.

Osama bin Laden’s exposition of this view, from his first al Jazeera 

interview in December 1998, cast the U.S.-Israeli partnership as follows:23

It is now clear that it is Israel that is behind all the attacks on 

states in the Islamic world. . . . the Jews were able to employ 

American and British Christians to do the job of attacking Iraq. 

America claims that it is bringing Iraq to account and to justice, 

but the fact is that the Israeli authority and Jewish authority, 

which has become powerful inside the White House as anyone 

can see—the Defence Minister is Jewish, the Secretary of State is 

Jewish, the CIA and National Security officials are Jewish, all the 

biggest officials are Jews—led Christians to clip the wings of the 

Islamic World. Their real target is not Saddam Hussein but the 

growing power of the Arab and Islamic world.24

The U.S.-Zionist conspiracy is a frequent theme of the Iranian leadership and press. In his comments to a Palestinian Conference in April 2006, 

Ayatollah Khamenei outlined the history of this “nefarious” relationship, 

stretching back to Israel’s creation in 1948: “The connected chain of U.S. 

plots against Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon with the aim of establishing its dominance over the Middle East under the auspices of the Zionist regime will never 

succeed and will not earn American leaders anything but fatal ruin.”25

The following month, an Iranian daily described the “Zionist Lobby” 

as the U.S. Government’s “ruling clique” and declared that “this dirty and 

unhealthy mutual bond between the two awfully strong networks of U.S. 

Jews and U.S. statesmen and politicians has created a great and horrendous 

clique that takes the entire world ransom and practices extortion against 

most nations around the world.”26

Similar claims are made regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom and the 

role of influential, highly placed Jews in spurring the United States toward 

war with Iraq in order to advance Israeli interests. An editorial by Arif alAgha in Al-Thawrah, a Syrian newspaper, titled “The Bush Administration, 

the Complete Israelization,” argued that the war was:

in the interest of Israel and its plans for expansion and hegemony, as well as Bush’s plans to colonize the Arab World, dictate 

its policy, and divide it on ethnic and racial lines for the sake of 

U.S. and Israeli interests.
48 SIMON

As for the strategy of preemptive wars against the Arab and 

Islamic world it is a photocopy of the Israeli strategy, which waged 

more than 5 wars against the Arab states under the same excuses, 

which Bush reiterates today with or without reason. Even the 

call for “combating terrorism,” which Bush has come up with 

since 11 September, is a polished copy of an old Israeli policy, 

which it has exploited recently as an abortive cover to justify its 

crimes against the Palestinians and continuous occupation of 

their country.27

In Pakistan, a retired lieutenant general told the Islamabad Khabrain

that the Jews, who “enjoy control [i]n the U.S. administration,” were waging 

war against Iraq for their own existence and “for this, they are using the 

United States.”28

Oil-Obsessed. The United States is thought of as determined to seize 

Middle Eastern oil for itself and as willing to go to any length to do so. Abd 

al-Bari Atwan, editor of the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, summarized this viewpoint in a 2003 interview with al Jazeera:

Arab regimes sell oil at prices said to be determined mainly by 

America, open their countries for U.S. military bases, facilitate 

American control and domination over the Arab world’s economic resources including oil and convert Arab world into a 

huge consuming market for U.S. products. In addition they are 

purported to make unnecessary huge arms deals worth billions 

of dollars which allegedly give them a capacity to suppress 

the people rather than using the money for socio-economic 

department.29

Many Muslims believe Washington’s motive for the 2003 Iraq war was 

the desire to control the region’s oil, rather than the need to eliminate weapons of mass destruction or establish an Islamic democracy in the heart of 

the Arab world. As preparations for war were under way in January 2003, a 

Syrian newspaper, al-Thawrah, published a scathing portrayal of the United 

States as oil hungry:

The odor of oil smells from this “declared war,” regardless of the 

attempts by the decisionmakers in the Pentagon and the White 

House to beautify their statement and coat them in honey to 

pave the way for their real objectives. The destructive war, being an unjust war by all measurements, will not be to the liking 

of peoples in any case. This is because Washington is eager to 

control the natural resources, especially oil, to behave like a 
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 49

great empire against all the peoples of the world, and to blindly 

support Israel’s arrogance and attempts at hegemony, expansion, 

and aggression.30

Similar editorials appeared in the Palestinian daily Al-Hayah alJadidah, which called oil the “motivator of the present [U.S.] civilization” and 

lamented that:

it was for the sake of its [oil’s] stability that the region has been 

split up into states of national minorities and communities 

headed by the State of Israel; the oil, for which terrorism was 

created and is being fought!

It is oil, for whose sake roles are changed, violation of human 

rights is condoned, and the foe becomes friend, the ally an evil 

rival, and Sharon a man of peace.31

“Arab Attitudes Toward Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy, and 

the Media,” an October 2005 survey of Arab public opinion conducted in six 

countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United 

Arab Emirates) by Zogby International and Shibley Telhami of the University 

of Maryland, found that three out of every four persons surveyed believed 

that the main motives behind U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East were 

“oil, protecting Israel, dominating the region, and weakening the world.”32

Corrupt and Licentious. U.S. entertainment exports have contributed to a 

view in the Middle East that the United States is a den of iniquity. Of course, 

many Americans view their country the same way. The conservative Muslim 

critique of American society dwells on these supposed ills. The immorality 

attributed to American behavior at home both explains and contributes to 

a larger picture of a culture out of control and on the loose in the realm of 

Islam. A typical online expression of this view follows:

This is the America that occupies the world with the culture of 

sex and deviation. This is the pagan civilization in Christian 

disguise. . . . This is the American civilization whose object is 

the body and its means is materialism. The spirit has no place in 

the system of American values. They are dressed with Christian 

clothes on hearts that know nothing but stealing, robbing, and 

occupying the possessions of others. Has America left one place 

in our lives as Muslims without corrupting it?33

In his October 2002 “Letter to the Americans,” bin Laden assembles 

the main components of this theme in anti-American discourse. Apart from 

Americans having rejected God’s law in favor of their own, he writes:
50 SIMON

You are a nation that permits the production, trading, and usage 

of intoxicants. You also permit drugs, and only forbid the trade 

of them, even though your nation is the largest consumer of 

them;

You are a nation that permits acts of immorality, and you consider these to be pillars of personal freedom. You have continued 

to sink down this abyss from level to level until incest has spread 

among you. . . .

You are a nation that permits gambling in all its forms. The companies practice this as well, resulting in investments becoming 

active and criminals becoming rich.

You are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or 

advertising tools, calling upon customers to purchase them. . . .

You are nation that practices the trade of sex in all its forms, 

directly and indirectly;

You have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gasses, 

more than any other nation in history. Despite this you refuse 

to sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of 

your greedy companies and industries;

Your law is the law of the rich and wealthy, who hold sway in 

their political parties, and fund their election campaign with 

gifts. Behind them stand the Jews, who control your policy, 

media, and economy.

You have claimed to be the vanguard of human rights and your 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs issue[s] annual reports containing 

statistics of those countries that have violated any human rights. 

However all these values vanished when the mujahidin hit you 

[on 9/11] and you then implemented the methods of the same 

documented governments that you used to curse. . . . what happens in Guantanamo is a historical embarrassment to America 

and its values, and it screams in your hypocritical faces: what is 

the value of your signature on any agreement or treaty?34

The striking thing about this indictment of the United States is its 

largely secular tone. Although the preambular statement condemning the 

substitution of man’s law for the law of God, a core salafi concern, is indisputably religious, much of the substance of bin Laden’s critique is typical 

of both right- and left-wing European rhetoric about the United States. The 

passages omitted from the summary above, which deal with Washington’s 
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 51

refusal to support an international criminal court and to follow through 

on its rhetorical commitment to democracy by recognizing elected Islamist 

governments, only reinforce this impression. Interestingly, bin Laden’s 

assessment of the moral qualities of American society strongly resembles 

the position of conservatives, as well as some liberals, within the United 

States, particularly regarding exploitation of women, drug trafficking, income disparities, corporate corruption, and threats to civil liberties.

The Islamist Critique

While European anti-American discourse stigmatizes America’s public 

piety, religious language, and a supposedly blurred line between church and 

state, Islamist critiques often focus on American secularism. Two themes 

are especially prominent. First, American democracy places man above God 

and substitutes human legislators for the divine source of law. According to 

this view, American secularism is an affront to a divinely ordained moral 

order and a manifestation of extraordinary arrogance. The second theme 

stresses the spiritual emptiness of secular life compared to the personal and 

collective sense of fulfillment that flows from belief in God and obedience 

to his laws. As a corollary to this view, the Islamist critique emphasizes the 

moral corruption and ethical blindness of American society by pointing out 

lewd behavior, homosexuality, wealth disparities, crime, and so forth. 

This Islamist critique is rooted in the writings of Sayyid Qutb, an 

Egyptian Islamist ideologue executed by the Nasr regime in 1966 during 

a purge of the Muslim Brotherhood. In his capacity as an official of the 

Education Ministry in Cairo, Qutb was sent to the United States in 1948 to 

study education at Colorado State Teachers College. His experience in the 

United States was dislocating; he was especially disturbed by what he took 

to be America’s “mad lust for naked flesh, provocative pictures, and sick, 

suggestive statements in literature, the arts, and mass media. And add to all 

this,” he wrote, “the system of usury which fuels men’s voracity for money 

and engenders vile methods for its accumulation and investment, in addition to fraud, trickery, and blackmail dressed up in the garb of law.”35 Qutb 

dubbed the United States the new jahiliyya, the modern-day equivalent of 

pre-Islamic Arabia, a society sunk in ignorance and corruption, redeemable 

only by the advent of Islam.

Resonance Among the Masses: The Quantitative 

Picture

The best source of quantitative data on Muslim public opinion about 

these issues is the annual Pew Global Attitudes survey. Unfortunately, Pew 
52 SIMON

primarily surveys Muslim countries that enjoy relatively good relations 

with the United States or are more easily accessible to and cooperative with 

U.S.-based polling organizations. Nevertheless, Pew’s findings tend to align 

with the qualitative data regarding public opinion. Thus, Muslim views of 

the United States are largely unfavorable. According to the Pew June 2006 

returns, majorities in every Muslim country surveyed held an unfavorable 

view: 70 percent each in Indonesia and Egypt, 73 percent in Pakistan, 85 percent in Jordan, and 88 percent in Turkey.36 In 3 of the countries—Indonesia, 

Jordan, and Turkey—the figures represented roughly a 10 point increase 

in anti-Americanism from the previous year’s results. The slippage from 

the 2005 survey, which had showed a slight gain in America’s standing in 

Muslim countries compared to 2004, suggests that, as Pew Global Attitudes 

project director Andrew Kohut put it, “There will be no quick fix to this. 

There will not be just one good thing that the United States does that will 

bring the image of America back to what it was in the 1990s and earlier.”37

The 2006 findings point to the Iraq war as the overwhelming reason 

for America’s continued poor standing in the Muslim world. When asked if 

removing Saddam Hussein made the world a safer or more dangerous place, 

the vast majority answered the latter (see figure 3–5).

Figure 3–5. BeliefsAbout Whether War in Iraq Has Made the World Safer

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

A Safer Place More Dangerous

Jordan Turkey Egypt Indonesia Pakistan

16

74

8

70

10

70

12 11

54 52

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006.

Prior to the war in Iraq, 61 percent of Indonesians had a favorable 

opinion of the United States This figure fell to 15 percent in 2003 but grew 

to 38 percent in 2005, as a result of U.S. aid to the tsunami-ravaged country. 

But the post-tsunami boost proved to be short-lived, and the figure dropped 

to 30 percent in 2006.38

More than just the Iraq war is to blame for America’s poor standing in 

the Muslim world, however. Other factors, such as America’s preponderant 

power and its policies in the wider Middle East, also contribute to its being 

viewed unfavorably by majorities in the Muslim and Arab world. Even prior 
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 53

to the Iraq war (as far back as late 2001), Pew began to register “growing dislike” of the United States, driven in large part by concerns about U.S. power 

and the way the country was conducting the war on terrorism. The changing 

nature of U.S. power, argues Kohut, is to blame:

Apart from Iraq, one of the concerns about the world is American 

power when America is on the defensive. America was the sole 

superpower even in the 1990s, and there wasn’t discomfort with 

that power because the United States didn’t feel itself under 

attack. [After September 11] the world looks at American power 

as more threatening when America feels threatened.39

Pew also found that in 2005, in all of these countries, apart from posttsunami Indonesia, large majorities believed that U.S. foreign policy did 

not consider other countries’ interests: Lebanon, 65 percent; Pakistan, 61 

percent; Turkey, 86 percent; and Jordan, 83 percent. Indonesian respondents, probably influenced by Washington’s humanitarian assistance, differed; 41 percent thought that U.S. foreign policy did take the interests of 

other countries into account. Except for Jordan, the rather negative results 

actually represented an upturn in opinion, as compared to 2003. In 2005, 

the biggest gains were in Indonesia (35 percentage points), Lebanon (17 

points), Pakistan (16 points), and Turkey (5 points). In Jordan, the result 

represented a 2-point decline.40 As noted above, however, the gains in 

Indonesia from the post-tsunami boost could not be sustained. In 2006, 

backsliding in U.S. approval ratings occurred in every Muslim country except Pakistan, where the share expressing a favorable opinion of America 

actually increased by 4 percentage points in 2006.

A Zogby International poll released in December 2005 confirmed the 

Pew findings that opinion in the Middle East toward America had deteriorated over the preceding year. In both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, more than 80 

percent of respondents said their opinion of the United States had worsened 

since 2004. In Lebanon, 21 percent reported having a more favorable opinion of the United States, while 49 percent said they had more negative feelings toward America. Majorities in Jordan, Morocco, and the United Arab 

Emirates (62 percent, 72 percent, and 58 percent, respectively,) said their 

opinion of the United States had deteriorated since 2004.41

Cross-Currents in Mass Opinion

A July 2005 Pew report found significant demographic differences in 

America’s image in the Middle East. Young people and women tended to 

have the most favorable opinion of the United States (see tables 3–1 and 

3–2). These generational and gender gaps were, with two exceptions, visible 
54 SIMON

in all six Muslim countries surveyed. In Turkey, only 17 percent of those 35 

and older viewed the United States favorably, compared to 29 percent of 

those between 18 and 34 years of age. While only 18 percent of Pakistanis 

age 35 and older had favorable opinions of the United States, the figure was 

29 percent for those between the ages of 18 and 34. Women were also more 

likely to hold a positive opinion of the United States. Of the six countries 

surveyed, Pakistan had the largest gender gap: only 17 percent of men had a 

favorable view of America, compared to 28 percent of women.42

The first half of the present decade has seen a significant slippage in 

the degree of confidence that Middle Easterners have in the ability of the 

United States to deal effectively with regional problems. The deterioration 

of U.S. credibility is visible even from one year to the next. Pew 2005 survey 

returns for Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon found that: 

Table 3–1. Viewsof the United States by Gender

Women (percent favorable) Men (percent favorable) Difference

Morocco 52 47 +5

Lebanon 46 39 +7

Indonesia 40 37 +3

Pakistan 28 17 +11

Turkey 25 21 +4

Jordan 20 21 -1

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 14, 2005.

Table 3–2. Views of theUnited States by Age

Overall Percent Favorable Age Difference

18–34 35+

Morocco 49 53 45 +8

Lebanon 42 46 39 +7

Indonesia 38 36 40 -4

Pakistan 23 28 18 +10

Turkey 23 29 17 +12

Jordan 21 22 18 +4

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 14, 2005.
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 55

■ 50 to 66 percent did not agree that the world is safer without Saddam 

Hussein 

■ 70 to 80 percent believed the world would be safer if another country rivaled the United States 

■ 60 to 80 percent believed that the United States was a military threat 

to their country

■ only 12 to 31 percent support the war on terrorism, with post-tsunami Indonesia an outlier at 50 percent.43

In 2006, the findings were even starker. In Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt, 

7 out of 10 respondents said the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussein had actually made the world more dangerous.44

On cultural issues, survey returns tend to support the anecdotal evidence. Thus, an overwhelming majority of respondents in Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Palestine think that 

the spread of American ideas to their country is bad (see figure 3–6).45

As an indication of how difficult such results are to interpret—or rather, how complex individual attitudes are to such issues—the same survey 

showed that, with the exception of Pakistan and Palestine, small majorities or large minorities in Turkey, Indonesia, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, and 

Morocco agreed with the statement, “I like American music, movies, and 

television” (see figure 3–7).46 Similarly, a 2002 Gallup poll of Saudis found 

that while more than half (54 percent) of all Saudis view the West’s values 

as having had a negative influence on their society, 38 percent said the West 

produced enjoyable films and music.47

Figure 3–6. Beliefs About Spread of American Ideas and Customs

0

20

40

60

80

100

Good Bad

Palestinian 

Authority

Turkey Indonesia Pakistan Lebanon Jordan Kuwait Morocco

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 44-Major Nation Survey (2003) and 2003 21 Population Survey.
56 SIMON

Figure 3–7. Beliefs About American Music, Movies, and Television

Like American entertainment Dislike American entertainment

0

20

40

60

80

100

Palestinian 

Authority

Turkey Indonesia Pakistan Lebanon Jordan Kuwait Morocco

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 44-Major Nation Survey (2003) and 2003 21 Population Survey.

Poll results also corroborate the image of the United States as intrinsically 

violent. A 2002 Gallup poll found that more than 65 percent of Saudis 

thought America had a high crime rate. Two-thirds described the United 

States as aggressive, while almost half (43 percent) said the United States 

was a country easily provoked.48 The same poll conducted a month later 

in Pakistan found similar results. A majority of Pakistanis described the 

United States as “ruthless” (65 percent), “easily provoked” (59 percent), and 

“aggressive” (54 percent).49

The sole positive trait associated with the United States by a majority 

of respondents in the nine countries surveyed by Gallup (Lebanon, Kuwait, 

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Morocco, and Indonesia) was 

America’s level of scientific and technological achievement (see figure 3–8). 

But a majority of the respondents believed the United States was unwilling to share its technology with less developed or poorer nations.50 Here 

too, however, there were demographic differences: those without any formal

Figure 3–8. BeliefsAbout Technological Capabilities of

Western Nations

Percent Expressing Admiration

0 20 40 60 80 100

Indonesia, 82%

Morocco, 82%

Iran, 65%

Pakistan, 65%

Turkey, 86%

Jordan, 94%

Saudi Arabia, 61%

Kuwait, 91%

Lebanon, 94%

Source: Jeffrey M. Jones, “What Do Islamic World Residents Like About the West?” Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing, May 28, 2002.
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 57

Figure 3–9. BeliefsAbout American Ideas of Democracy

0

20

40

60

80

100

Like American Democracy Dislike American Democracy

Palestinian 

Authority

Turkey Indonesia Pakistan Lebanon Jordan Kuwait Morocco

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 44-Major Nation Survey, 2002.

education were less likely to say that Western nations were technologically advanced, that they treat minorities in their societies fairly, or that they 

provide equality for their citizens.51

Attitudes toward American-style democracy, as reflected in the 2005 Pew 

returns, were equally complex. Kuwait was the only country where a majority, 

albeit a slight one, favored American democracy. In Lebanon and Morocco, 

respondents were split, with small majorities saying that they disliked American ideas about democracy. The remainder of the countries surveyed showed 

more widespread dislike: Turkey, 70 percent; Indonesia, 65 percent; Pakistan, 

75 percent; Jordan, 60 percent; and Palestine, 85 percent (see figure 3–9).52 

Similar results were visible in the 2002 Gallup poll, though there was 

greater variation among countries when it came to how Muslims viewed

American democracy. Whereas only 16 percent of Saudis believed citizens 

in Western nations were guaranteed equality and other rights, the figure was 

78 percent among the Lebanese (see figure 3–10).53

Figure 3–10. BeliefsAbout Equality in Western Nations

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Indonesia, 39%

Morocco, 55%

Iran, 24%

Pakistan, 33%

Turkey, 62%

Jordan, 60%

Saudi Arabia, 16%

Kuwait, 46%

Lebanon, 78%

Percent Expressing Admiration

Source: Jeffrey M. Jones, “What Do Islamic World Residents Like About the West?” Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing, May 28, 2002.
58 SIMON

Polls also show that Muslims are skeptical of U.S. democracy efforts 

in the Middle East. The Zogby International/Telhami poll of October 2005 

found that a majority of the respondents in the six countries surveyed (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) believed Washington had objectives other than spreading democracy 

in Iraq. Two-thirds thought democracy was not the real objective, and more 

than half (58 percent) thought the war had resulted in a less, not more, 

democratic Iraq (see figures 3–11 and 3–12).54

Similar findings were revealed in the Pew 2006 report. In every country save one, a majority of respondents said they believed U.S. efforts to 

establish democracy in Iraq would fail: 66 percent in Jordan, 64 percent in

Figure 3–11. BeliefsAbout U.S. Objectives in Advocating Democracy

in the Middle East

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Important objectivewill make a difference

Important objectivegoing about it the wrong way

Democracy is not

the real objective

75%

 14% 4%

Source: Zogby International and Shibley Telhami, Arab Attitudes Toward Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy, and the Media, 

available at <bsos.umd.edu/SADAT/PUB/Arab-attitudes-2005.htm>.

Figure 3–12. BeliefsAbout the War in Iraq and the Spread of

Democracy

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Less democracy Neither More democracy

58% 

 33% 6%

Source: Zogby International and Shibley Telhami, Arab Attitudes Toward Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy, and the Media, 

available at <bsos.umd.edu/SADAT/PUB/Arab-attitudes-2005.htm>.
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 59

Figure 3–13. BeliefsAbout Prospects for Success of Democracy in Iraq

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Jordan Turkey Egypt Indonesia Pakistan

Succeed Fail

66 64 63

52

24

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006.

Turkey, 63 percent in Egypt, and 52 percent in Indonesia. In Pakistan, 38 

percent believed democracy would take root in Iraq (see figure 3–13).55

Nevertheless, Muslims overwhelmingly maintain positive views toward democracy in general. The 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project poll 

found that the percentage of people who believed democracy could work in 

their countries was on the rise. In Jordan, where only 63 percent said they 

believed democracy could work at home in 2002, 80 percent thought so in 

2005. Yet the Iraq war undoubtedly affected the poll’s results. In Indonesia, 

the percentage of respondents surveyed expressing favorable opinions toward U.S.-style democracy dropped from a 1999 high of more than 60 percent to roughly 40 percent in 2003 (see figure 3–14).56

Much of the skepticism surrounding U.S. motives in the Middle East 

concerns Washington’s relationship with Israel. A 2002 Gallup survey found 

that a majority of Saudis (65 percent) believed the United States adopts biased

Figure 3–14. MuslimAttitudes Toward U.S.-Style Democracy

0

20

40

60

80

100

1999 Summer 2002 Summer 2003 Summer 2005

Turkey Pakistan Lebanon Jordan Morocco Indonesia

Percent Favorable

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 23, 2005.
60 SIMON

policies in world affairs. Fewer than 1 in 10 Saudis thought the West displayed “a lot” of concern for better coexistence with the Islamic world. Only 

8 percent thought the West was fair in its dealings with Arab and Muslim 

countries, while just 6 percent felt the West dealt fairly with the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.57

The 2002 Gallup survey, conducted in nine predominantly Islamic 

countries, found only a handful of people who believed the United States 

acts fairly in its dealings with Palestinians. But the Palestinian issue appears 

to have much greater significance in the Arab nations surveyed—Saudi 

Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco—than in the non-Arab nations of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia. Although an unfair stance 

toward the Palestinian situation was ranked high among the respondents’ 

grievances, the United States was also perceived as being unfair toward the 

wider Arab/Islamic world. “Thus,” Gallup’s editors concluded, “it is not 

clear whether the Palestinian issue is the sole cause for the perception that 

Arabs and Muslims are treated unfairly, or whether the Palestinian issue is 

merely perceived as one example of many cases of unfair treatment.”58

Many observers believed that in recent years, the war in Iraq had replaced the Arab-Israeli conflict as the prism through which Arabs viewed 

international events. However, this may once more be changing. In an interview conducted shortly after Hamas’ surprise victory, Shibley Telhami told 

the Beirut Daily Star, “The Arabs in the past 2 years had already viewed the 

U.S. largely through the prism of pain of American policies in Iraq, which 

are almost all seen in negative terms. . . . Now attention is also shifting back 

to American policies in Palestine.”59

Not surprisingly, therefore, on the policy-versus-values question, the 

Zogby International survey of Arab public opinion in 2002 concluded that 

Figure 3–15. MuslimAttitudes Toward U.S. Freedom and Democracy

and U.S. Arab Policy

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Egypt Kuwait Lebanon Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates

Percent Favorable Toward American Freedom and Democracy Percent Favorable Toward U.S. Arab Policy

Source: James Zogby, “What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs, and Concerns” (New York: Zogby International/The Arab Thought Foundation, 2002).
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 61

“What drives down Arab attitudes towards ‘America’ is, quite simply, the 

U.S. policy in the region” (see figure 3–15).60

Many Muslims appear dumbfounded by Washington’s attempts to win 

them over through Arabic language radio and television stations. Writing in 

2005 about U.S. public diplomacy efforts and the appointment of Karen 

Hughes as Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, former Egyptian Foreign 

Minister Ahmad Mahir expressed this sentiment, saying:

I firmly believe that these efforts and attempts will not achieve 

their purpose, because what is required is not publicity campaigns 

and the promotion of films that platonically express love and 

amity, or that promote good but unconvincing ideas—such as 

the claim, for instance, that the United States has fought for the 

sake of the Muslims and Arabs in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 

and Iraq—or that boast about providing aid to Muslim victims 

of the tsunami.

The problem does not lie in an image that some people are trying—as 

the Americans imagine—to distort. Nor does it lie in calling for lofty principles over which no two people would disagree. The problem lies in U.S. 

stands and behavior, which the United States must review, back down on, 

and amend if it genuinely wants to win the friendship of nations—instead 

of taking futile measures—until it finds the answer to the question: Why 

do they hate us? It is a question that has often been asked in Washington 

but the answers that were given to it were wrong; they came in the form of 

strange statements we have heard from senior officials who said, “They hate 

us because we are democratic, because we are progressive, and because we 

love freedom,” and so on.61

The Zogby poll also asked respondents the question, “What can the 

United States do to improve its relations with the Arab world?” Although 

the responses were open-ended, certain themes consistently appeared, enabling the answers to be grouped into four broad categories: general values 

(promote freedom, justice, peace, etc.); approach to the Palestinian-Israeli 

conflict; relations with the Arab countries (respect Islam and Arabs, support 

Arab countries, withdraw American presence from Arab countries, etc.); and 

unspecified (other). The results indicate that a majority in every country 

(with the exception of Jordan) believe the United States can improve its 

image if it resolves the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and respects Arabs and 

Islam. A minority in each country wants the United States to take a more 

active part in promoting general values (see figure 3–16).62

The 2002 Gallup poll found that more exposure to the United States 

and Americans may not necessarily lead to better relations. The poll compared
62 SIMON

Figure 3–16. BeliefsAbout How the United States Can Improve

Relations with the Arab World

0

20

40

60

80

100

General Values Relations with the Arab World Other

Palestinian 

Territories

United Arab Morocco Egypt

Emirates

Lebanon Jordan Kuwait Saudi Arabia

Source: James Zogby, “What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs, and Concerns” (New York: Zogby International/The Arab Thought Foundation, 2002).

the level of exposure that residents of Islamic countries have to the United 

States with their opinions about the West. It found that while those exposed to Western culture tend to be more positive about the West than those 

without such exposure, the effects were modest and the difference often 

minimal. Gallup found that the effect was strongest in Iran, where those 

who know an emigrant to the West are four times more likely to rate the 

United States positively than those who do not. In some cases, exposure 

to the West negatively affected respondents’ attitudes. For example, those 

with Internet access or those who knew a person who had emigrated to the 

Figure 3–17. HowWestern Contact Affects Islamic Opinions About the

United States

0 10 20 30 40 50

Know someone who has emigrated to a Western nation Do not know someone who has emigrated to a Western nation

Iran 32% 13%

 5% 21%

Turkey

 4% 7%

 38% 44%

 17% Saudi 25%

 Arabia 16%

 17%

Lebanon

 28%

 28%

32% 42%

Percent with a favorable opinion of the United States

Source: Jeffrey M. Jones, “Does Western Contact Affect Islamic Opinions?” Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing, May 7, 2002.
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 63

Figure 3–18. MuslimOpinions About Americans as Individuals

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006.

West were more pessimistic with regard to whether Western nations and the 

Islamic world will ever understand each other better (see figure 3–17).63

Discerning differences in Muslim attitudes toward “America” and 

“Americans” is often difficult. In the past, however, while “America” may 

have been disliked, Americans as individuals generally received a higher rate 

of approval. The Pew 2006 findings, however, suggest this distinction may 

be disappearing. Favorable opinions of Americans took a hit in 2003 and 

although in many cases attitudes have since begun to recover, they remain 

well below pre–Iraq war levels. In Jordan, for example, where 53 percent had 

a very or somewhat favorable opinion of Americans in 2002, only 38 percent 

had so in 2006. In Indonesia and Turkey, those expressing positive views of 

Americans dropped by almost half in the 4-year period (see figure 3–18).

Surprisingly, however, one person whose approval ratings have not 

declined in the past few years is U.S. President George W. Bush. In Jordan, 

Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia, the percentage of respondents viewing Bush 

positively is on the rise, though his overall favorability rating is still quite 

low. Between 2003 and 2006, the number of people expressing much or 

some confidence in Bush’s international leadership grew from 5 percent to 

10 percent in Pakistan. Bush’s approval rating also doubled in Indonesia 

from 10 percent to 20 percent over the same period, largely due to U.S. 

tsunami recovery and aid efforts.64

Conclusion

Muslim perceptions of the United States are complex. America is not 

universally despised within the Muslim world, nor do negative views of 

the United States necessarily crowd out favorable opinions about specific 
64 SIMON

elements of American society or culture. Individual Muslims, like F. Scott 

Fitzgerald’s intelligent friends, “have the ability to hold two opposing ideas 

in mind at the same time and still function.”65

One striking aspect of the Muslim critique, however, is its similarity 

to negative images of the United States that have circulated within both 

Europe and the developing world for generations. America’s alleged heedlessness, greed, rapacity, solipsism, materialism, coarseness, penchant for 

violence—indeed, its very size—have stirred the animosity of others for 

centuries, depending on the precise allegation. 

Another intriguing factor is the overlap between the Islamist critique 

and the terms deployed by other religious traditions, especially evangelical Protestantism, to characterize American popular culture, such as a presumed decline in family values and the elevation of man-made law over 

the law of God. In this respect, one need only recall the controversy over 

Alabama’s Chief Justice, Judge Roy Moore, who was removed from office in 

2003 for refusing to relocate a massive sculpture of the Ten Commandments 

from the state Supreme Court building.66 His commitment to this symbolic 

monument stemmed from a belief that domestic law in the United States 

was ultimately rooted in and legitimated by divine sanction. This position 

does not fundamentally differ from the Islamist claim that divine law supercedes human law and that the latter must be grounded in Shari’a if it is to be 

valid. It is worth noting that the idea that moral behavior is unsustainable in 

the absence of faith is increasingly common worldwide, with the significant 

exception of Western Europe. Even this exception is likely to be less stark in 

the coming years as demographic change increasingly introduces a Muslim 

perspective into broader European opinion on the role of religion in society 

and the formation of public policy. 

The accusation of hypocrisy that Islamists as well as non-salafi Muslim 

critics level at the United States does have at least one singularly Islamic dimension that many non-Muslims might not recognize. The term for hypocrite, munafik, and other derivatives of the verb stem occur repeatedly in the 

Koran. It is a freighted word, with a harsher connotation of opprobrium 

than it carries in English. In the Koranic context, hypocrites are punished by 

eternal hellfire and are never forgiven by Allah for their hypocrisy.67 Since 

the implementation of foreign policy frequently demands the subordination of personal moral principle to strategic interest where these two values 

conflict, the charge of hypocrisy will remain a feature of the Muslim antiAmerican repertory and continue to prove difficult to counter convincingly. 

American reliance on authoritarian regimes for cooperation against al Qaeda at the same time the United States advocates the spread of democracy is 

certain to reinforce this trend, as will U.S. rejection of democratically elected 

Islamist governments, such as Hamas in Palestine.
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 65

Another salient attribute of Muslim rhetoric about the United States is 

the way it combines hoary secular canards with Islamic motifs in a seamless 

web of vilification. The full text of the 2002 essay quoted earlier, “America 

that We Hate,” by Tareq Hilmi, is a good example of the way the full gamut 

of political, cultural, and religious grievances can be interwoven to form an 

internally consistent argument that is relatively impervious to attack. The 

multifaceted nature of the anti-American case presents those attempting 

to change opinions about the United States with a serious challenge. The 

bewildering array of media outlets for anti-American rhetoric compounds 

the problem.

The anecdotal and survey data also confirm that U.S. support for Israel 

and corresponding disregard for Palestinian concerns, and the Iraq intervention, fuel anti-American sentiment.68 Grievances stemming from these 

policies both validate and reinforce the view that the United States is nothing more than an instrument to advance the Jewish objective of controlling 

the world. Here, too, there would seem to be little scope for improvement 

given the way events are unfolding.

On a more positive note, the polling data suggest that humanitarian 

U.S. actions can have a powerful effect on Muslim opinion. The upturn in 

favorable opinion of the United States in Indonesia and Pakistan after the 

natural disasters that befell those countries in 2004 and 2005 was almost 

certainly due to the swift and generous American response. The key to this 

effect, however, lay not so much in the speed and scale of U.S. action, but 

in the local perception that the response had no strings attached. This perception undermined, at least briefly, the view of the United States as hypocritical and motivated solely by self-interest, rather than by a sincere regard 

for Muslims. (Those who regularly interact with Arab Muslims will have 

encountered the complaint that America has shown itself to be unworthy, 

even when it carries out actions that would seem to be good for Muslims, 

because it is ultimately acting not altruistically but merely in its own selfinterest. This view can undercut the impact of U.S. policies that worked 

clearly to the benefit of Muslims, such as support for NATO’s intervention 

in the Balkans.) 

Nevertheless, the lesson here is that actions matter. When America’s 

actions align with its professed values, opinions of the United States improve. However, the perceived gap between what the United States says and 

what it does, particularly in the Middle East, will keep America’s standing in 

Muslim opinion low for the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the debate 

about whether Muslims oppose American actions or values will continue 

to cloud the issue. The data show that Muslims infer America’s values from 

its actions. The categories of values and action, therefore, are not separate. 

Rather, they are connected organically and reciprocally in the eye of the 
beholder, especially if he or she is also the object of American action. And 

the current globalization of Muslim identity ensures that a growing number 

of Muslims take the travail of fellow Muslims in far-flung places to be their 

own.69 To the extent that America’s professed values and its actions are differentiated, views of America appear to suffer because the United States is 

seen to be performing in a manner that is inconsistent with—or a betrayal 

of—those traditional values.

Notes

1 This essay focuses largely, but not exclusively, on Arab views. The intersection of Arab 

and non-Arab Muslim opinion has increased owing to the role of mass media, the Internet, and 

long haul travel in forging a globalized Muslim identity. Within this “imagined community” is 

a growing sense of shared destiny, purpose, and views of the other, particularly of the United 

States. On the emergence of imagined communities as “deep, horizontal comradeships,” see 

the classic work of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 

Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991); with respect to Muslims, see Olivier Roy, 

Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004), 117–147, 197–200, and 

passim.

2 Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Hating America (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2004), 10–11. The following précis of non-Muslim anti-Americanism owes much to the 

Rubins’ sophisticated analysis.

3 Britain withdrew from Aden in 1967 and from the sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain, 

Qatar, and the present-day United Arab Emirates in 1971.

4 “Anti-Americanism in the Turkish Media,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, no. 870, 

February 25, 2005, accessed at <memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=middleeast&ID

=SP87005#_edn2>.

5 “Decidedly there is something rotten in America . . . Meanwhile, don’t be surprised if, 

from one end of Europe to the other, we scream: Watch out, America has rabies! We must cut 

all ties with it or else we shall be bitten and infected next.” Cited in Michel Contat and Michel 

Rybalka, eds., Les ecrits de Sartre (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 706–708.

6 Steven Stalinsky, “Anti-American and Antisemitic Cartoons in Leading Egyptian Government Weekly Al-Ahram: 1998–2004,” MEMRI Special Report no. 28, April 2, 2004, accessed 

at <memri.org/sr/sr2804.pdf>. 

7 The video is available at <pmw.org.il/asx/PMW_YaAmAraby.asx>. See also Alaa 

Shahine, “Singer takes a pop at Bush, Sharon,” Al Jazeera, April 5, 2004, accessed at <english.

aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C1E56782-FEC7-40CD-B9EA-F8ADEE5AD3D4.htm>; and Nicole 

Veash, “Pop crooner hits sour note with Egyptian elite,” Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 

2002, accessed at <csmonitor.com/2002/0118/p01s04-wome.html>.

8 “Syrian MP Dr. Muhammad Habash Denounces the American Culture of ‘Violence’ 

and ‘Cruelty’,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, no. 832, December 22, 2004, accessed at 

<memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=middleeast&ID=SP83204>.

9 “Columnist in Turkish Islamic Daily: ‘USA—the God-Damned Country’; ‘Murdering is 

Genetically Ingrained in American Culture’,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, no. 857, February 

2, 2005, accessed at <memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=middleeast&ID=SP85705>.

10 Daniel Williams, “Anti-Americanism a Hit with Egyptian Audiences,” The Washington 

Post, August 20, 2004.

11 Mohamed El-Assyouti, “The personal is political,” Al-Ahram Weekly, no. 713 (October 

21–October 27, 2004), accessed at <weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/713/cu1.htm>.

12 See <valleyofthewolvesiraq.com/web/indexb.htm>.

13 “Iranian Pilgrims in Mecca at Anti-American Rally,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, 

no. 1067, January 10, 2006, accessed at <memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&I

D=SP106706>.

66 SIMON
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 67

14 Encyclopedia of Islam, 2d ed., “Shaytan,” 406–409.

15 “Challenges Facing Islam—Iranian President Ahmadinejad,” MEMRI Special Report, no. 

39, January 5, 2006, accessed at <memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR3906>.

16 Bashar al-Asad, speech before the 10th Islamic Summit Conference Malaysia, October 

15, 2003; Mohamad Mahathir, speech before the Islamic Summit Conference, October 15, 2003.

17 As cited in Reuven Paz, “Islamists and anti-Americanism,” Middle East Review of 

International Affairs 7, no. 4 (December 2003), accessed at <meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/

jv7n4a5.html>.

18 “Recent Anti-American Sermons by Palestinian Authority Preachers,” MEMRI Special 

Dispatch Series, no. 844, January 11, 2005, accessed at <memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archive

s&Area=sd&ID=SP84405>.

19 Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to London at the time, Prince Turki al-Faisal, told the 

assembled diplomats: “Democracy or any semblance of wider participation will have to 

come from within societies,” and he criticized Washington’s refusal to recognize one of the 

region’s only democratically elected leaders, Yasir Arafat. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal 

Kharrazi told the assembled audience that the United States was not even-handed in pushing 

democracy. Reuters, “U.S. democracy drive ‘hypocritical’,” January 24, 2004.

20 “Interview with Dr Abd-al-Aziz al-Duwayk, Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative 

Council,” Al-Quds, April 16, 2006.

21 Azam Khalil, “American hypocrisy: ‘Hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to 

virtue’,” The News, December 14, 2005.

22 “Iran’s Ayatollah Khamene’i Addresses Palestinian Conference, Accuses U.S. of ‘Plots’,” 

IRNA, April 14, 2006.

23 Bin Laden is cited in this article as an articulate expositor of preexisting Arab views of 

the United States, which he has validated and disseminated in a persuasive and robust manner.

24 Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden

(London: Verso, 2005), 67. The attack against Iraq that bin Laden refers to took place in 

November 1998 (Operation Desert Fox).

25 “Iran’s Ayatollah Khamene’i Addresses Palestinian Conference, Accuses U.S. of ‘Plots’,” 

IRNA, April 14, 2006.

26 “Zionism, United States’ Ruling Clique,” Jomhuri-ye Eslami, May 22, 2006.

27 Arif al-Agha, “The Bush Administration, the Complete Israelization,” Al-Thawrah, 

October 19, 2003.

28 Comments by Lt Gen (Ret.) Faiz Ali Chishti cited in Azam Zaidi, “Iraqis should fight 

guerrilla war: the U.S. will flee if only 1,000 troops are killed: Chishti,” Khabrain, March 27, 2003.

29 Abdel-Bari Atwan interview, Al Jazeera, October 12, 2003, cited in Abdallah, “Causes of 

Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: A Soci-political Perspective,” 69–70.

30 “Syrian Paper Commentary Says ‘Oil’ Main Motive for U.S. War on Iraq,” Al-Thawrah, 

January 24, 2003.

31 “Article Comments on Saddam Trial, Sees Oil as Motive Behind U.S. War on Iraq,” 

Al-Hayah al-Jadidah, July 3, 2003.

32 Rami Khouri, “On democracy, Arabs mistrust the American messenger,” Daily Star, 

February 3, 2006, accessed at <zogby.com/soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=12625>. For more on 

the Arab Attitudes Toward Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy, and the Media Zogby/Telhami poll, see <bsos.umd.edu/sadat/pub/survey-2005.htm>.

33 Dr. Tareq Hilmi, “Amrika alati nabghad (America That We Hate),” Al-Sha’b, October 

17, 2003, accessed at <alarabnews.com/alshaab/GIF/17-10-2003/tareq.htm>.

34 Lawrence, 167–170.

35 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random 

House, 2003), 63–64.

36 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China; America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” June 13, 2006, 11, accessed 

at <pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>.
68 SIMON

37 “Global Attitudes Toward U.S. Foreign Policy,” Brookings-Pew Research Center Briefing 

Transcript, June 13, 2006, 4.

38 Ibid., 8.

39 Ibid., 11.

40 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative; American 

Character Gets Mixed Reviews,” June 23, 2005, 4, 12, accessed at <pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247>.

41 “Poll: U.S. image in Arab countries deteriorates,” Middle East Online, December 8, 

2005, accessed at <zogby.com/soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=12394>.

42 “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, Support for 

Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 14, 2005, 14, accessed 

at <pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248.pdf>.

43 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 27–31.

44 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China; America’s 

Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” June 13, 2006, 13. 

45 Pew Global Attitudes Project 44-Nation Major Survey (2002), 136–137, accessed at 

<people-press.org/reports/pdf/185topline.pdf>. Note: Results for Pakistan, Lebanon, and Jordan 

are from the 2002 44-Nation Major Survey. All others are from the 2003 21 Population Survey.

46 Ibid., 139. 

47 Richard Burkholder, “The U.S. and the West—Through Saudi Eyes,” Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing, August 6, 2002, 14.

48 Ibid., 13.

49 Richard Burkholder, “Despite Improved Ties, Pakistanis Cool to U.S.,” Gallup Poll 

Tuesday Briefing, September 10, 2002, 38–39.

50 Jeffrey M. Jones, “What Do Islamic World Residents Like About the West?” Gallup Poll 

Tuesday Briefing, May 28, 2002, 87.

51 Ibid., 88.

52 Pew Global Attitudes Project 44-Nation Major Survey (2002), 137–138. 

53 Jones, “What Do Islamic World Residents Like About the West?” 87.

54 Arab Attitudes Toward Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy, and the Media, 

accessed at <bsos.umd.edu/SADAT/PUB/Arab-attitudes-2005.htm>.

55 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China; America’s 

Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” June 13, 2006, 14.

56 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative; American 

Character Gets Mixed Reviews,” June 23, 2005, 62.

57 Burkholder, “The U.S. and the West—Through Saudi Eyes,” 14.

58 Lydia Saad, “Islamic Views of the U.S.: The Palestine Factor,” Gallup Poll Tuesday 

Briefing, April 2, 2002, 10–11.

59 Khouri. 

60 James Zogby, “What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs, and Concerns” (New York: Zogby 

International/The Arab Thought Foundation, 2002), 64.

61 Ahmad Mahir, “Advice to Bush: Image Improvement Is Achieved by Policies, Not by 

Propaganda,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 3, 2005.

62 Zogby, 83–91.

63 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Does Western Contact Affect Islamic Opinions?” Gallup Poll Tuesday 

Briefing, May 7, 2002, 10–11.

64 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China; America’s 

Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” 11–12.

65 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-up, ed. Edmund Wilson (New York: New Directions 

Publishing, 1945).

66 “Ten Commandments Judge Removed from Office,” CNN.Com, November 14, 2003, 

accessed at <cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/13/moore.tencommandments/>.
MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA 69

67 Cf., “Al Munafikun,” The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. VII, 2d ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 

561–562.

68 For a well-argued alternative assessment of the significance of the Palestine factor, see 

Michael Scott Doran, “Palestine Iraq and American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 

2003), accessed at <foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10219/michael-scott-doran/palestineiraq-and-american-strategy.html>.

69 See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack (New York: Henry Holt, 

2005), 52–53, and Pew Global Attitudes Project, Final Topline, 2002, accessed at <people-press.

org/reports/pdf/185topline.pdf>. 
71

Chapter Four

Accessing Information in the Muslim 

World

C. Christine Fair

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center 

and the Pentagon, the U.S. Government’s awareness of the significance of 

public opinion in the Muslim world has been elevated, and courting Muslim 

publics has been deemed critical to U.S. national security. Efforts to address 

Muslim public opinion have taken different guises and different names such 

as public diplomacy, perception management, information operations, and strategic communications. (Despite the tendency to conflate these concepts, each 

has a specific intent and means to achieve its own objectives.) One of the 

earliest efforts following 9/11 was “Initiative 911,” a mass-media strategy to 

influence Muslim opinion sponsored by Senator Joseph Biden (D–DE). In 

the preface, the authors write that “winning hearts and minds has become 

a national security imperative. Our foreign policy objectives require that we 

reach not just leaders but citizens a well. The ‘Arab Street’ threatens our antiterrorism effort. . . . Hostility, even hatred, toward the U.S. in many Islamic 

countries is at an all-time high and growing.”1

Although over 5 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks, confusion 

persists about the target of such communication initiatives. Is the target 

market the Muslim world? That term would refer, perhaps more imprecisely 

than those who use it intend, to the entirety of the global Muslim population, which is found in large numbers in more than 30 countries and scattered in smaller communities across numerous others. Muslim populations 

are concentrated in countries of the Middle East, sub-Saharan and North 

Africa, East Asia, the Caucasus and Eurasia, Central Asia, and South and 

Southeast Asia, not to mention the concentrations in smaller states that 

are not shown and the minority diaspora populations scattered around the 

globe (see table 4–1). While it has become common to equate the Islamic 

world with the Arab world, Indonesia and India are home to the world’s 

largest and second largest Muslim communities, respectively. Bangladesh 

and Pakistan, two other non-Arab countries, have the next largest Muslim 

populations at about 140 million each. Or is the target market truly the 

“Arab street,” rhetorical shorthand for one segment, albeit an important 

one, within the Muslim world? And does the Muslim world encompass the 

important diaspora Muslim population in Europe and the Americas? 
72 FAIR

The purpose of this chapter is to disaggregate what is often referred to 

as the Muslim world and to highlight both the similarities and differences in 

how the people who comprise it access the news and other information that 

shape attitudes toward the United States, U.S. policy, radical Islam, and terrorism. Countries that are predominantly Muslim or that have large Muslim 

minorities tend to have large youth cohorts ranging from 26 percent (for 

example, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain) to 49 percent (such 

as Yemen, Somalia, and Mali), but otherwise they differ vastly in geographic 

size, in the size of the resident Muslim communities, and in the percentage 

of Muslims comprising the total population. They also differ in terms of national interests, sectarian beliefs, cultural and ethnic backgrounds, language, 

political alliances, level and complexity of political and economic development, and social organization. Finally, even within any given country, the 

Muslim communities are often diverse and heterogeneous. 

Understanding how persons in the Muslim world access and consume 

information is a critical component of any strategic communications campaign. While knowing where people get their information is not tantamount 

to understanding how they form opinions, it is nevertheless an essential 

first step that must be taken before setting out to alter those people’s views 

on the United States, Islamic extremism, and terrorism. While many varieties of data could be considered in this effort, we focus on such indicators as 

literacy and print capital as well as access to Internet, television, and radio, 

and the types of programming available on electronic mass media. Given 

the importance of American films in the international market, we also present limited data on access to such films in countries for which such data exist. Where possible, we have presented such available data for the countries 

noted in table 4–1. 

Table 4–1. Population Breakdown of Selected Muslim Countries, 2002

Country 

Total 

Population 

(millions)

Percent of

Total Population

Muslim

Percent of

Population

Under Age 15

Afghanistan 22.9 99 43

Algeria 31.3 99 34

Azerbaijan 8.3 93 30

Bahrain 0.7 100 29

Bangladesh 143.8 83 38

China 1,294.9 1–2 24

Djibouti 0.7 94 43

Egypt 70.5 94 35

Eritrea 4 No Data 46
ACCESSING INFORMATION 73

Ethiopia 69 45–50 46

India 1,049.5 12 33

Indonesia 217.1 88 30

Iran 68.1 98 33

Iraq 24.5 97 41

Israel 6.3 14.6 28

Jordan 5.3 92 38

Kazakhstan 15.5 47 26

Kenya 31.5 10 42

Kuwait 2.4 85 26

Kyrgyzstan 5.1 75 33

Lebanon 3.6 56 30

Libya 5.4 97 31

Malaysia 24 No Data 33

Mali 12.6 90 49

Morocco 30.1 99 32

Nepal 24.6 4 40

Nigeria 120.9 50 45

Occupied Palestinian Territories* 3.4 78 46

Oman 2.8 75 37

Pakistan 149.9 97 42

Philippines 78.6 5 37

Qatar 0.6 95 27

Saudi Arabia 23.5 100 39

Somalia** 9.5 100 48

Sri Lanka 18.9 7 25

Sudan 32.9 70 40

Syria 17.4 74 38

Tajikistan 6.2 90 37

Tanzania 36.3 35 45

Thailand 62.2 3.8 26

Tunisia 9.7 98 29

Turkey 70.3 99.8 31

Turkmenistan 4.8 89 35

United Arab Emirates 2.9 96 26

Uzbekistan 25.7 88 34

Yemen** 19.3 100 49

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 1950–2050: The 2002 Revision Population Database (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2002). 

* Combined percentage is derived from data from Gaza with a population of 1.1 million and 98.7 percent Muslim and the West 

Bank with 2 million people and 75 percent Muslim. The overall percentage is derived by taking the total Muslim population [1.1 

million (98.7 percent) + (2 x 75 percent)] divided by the total population of 3.3 million.

** The United Nations assumes that these populations are 100 percent Muslim. 
74 FAIR

As will be apparent, the data available for analysis are not free of problems and limitations. In many cases, information simply is not available 

or is out of date. In other cases, useful information has been collected or 

made available about key states but is in some way incomplete. There are 

surprisingly few current open-source repositories for such information. As a 

result, this chapter cannot claim to provide to the fullest desirable extent the 

kind of empirical baseline on information access that an effective strategic 

communication campaign requires. Nevertheless, we have found important 

(albeit limited) data that go some distance to show how people in different 

countries access and consume information. Moreover, while what we have 

is not ideal, it does demonstrate that with adequate resources, such data 

can be collected. From a programmatic perspective, the analysis argues for a 

substantially greater U.S. investment in data sources that are more comprehensive, current, and inclusive of countries of strategic importance. 

Our effort to detail what we know about the way that people in countries with either Muslim majorities or large Muslim minorities access and 

consume information will begin by looking at a series of metrics that reflect 

access to printed materials. This section takes into consideration literacy 

rates, the estimated “freedom of the press” in countries under analysis, as 

well as data on the availability of a specific kind of printed materials, daily 

and non-daily newspapers. We will then turn to estimates of access to the 

Internet in Muslim countries or those with large Muslim minorities. Next, 

we look at ownership of radios and televisions and survey the kinds of programming available to those who have access to television, including cable 

and satellite programming. We will conclude by considering some of the 

varied implications that arise from this exercise of looking at the data. 

Accessing Printed Information

Table 4–2 has pulled together literacy rates for most of the countries 

identified in table 4–1 for which data are available.2 According to the United 

Nations Development Program (UNDP), a literate person is one “who can, 

with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement related to 

their everyday life.” Literacy rates—to the extent that they are reliable—are 

a potential indicator of how many people in a given country can access 

simply written printed materials by themselves. 

One of the first observations to make about these data is that most of 

the countries shown in table 4–2 (apart from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, 

for which no data are available) have adult literacy rates that are over 75 percent. Only 14 countries (Yemen, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Morocco, 

Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, India, Djibouti, Nigeria, Algeria, Tunisia, and Oman) 

have literacy rates below 75 percent. Another 14 (Iran, Tanzania, United Arab 
ACCESSING INFORMATION 75

Table 4–2. Literacy Rates in Selected Muslim Countries, 2002

Country

Adult Literacy Rate 

(percent, over age 15)

Youth Literacy Rate 

(percent, below age 15)

Female Male Female

Female rate

as percent,

of male rate

Algeria 68.9 59.6 78 89.9 85.6 91

Azerbaijan* 98.8 98.2 99.5 99.9 99.9 99.9

Bahrain 88.5 84.2 91.5 98.6 98.9 100

Bangladesh 41.1 31.4 50.3 49.7 41.1 71

Brunei 93.9 91.4 96.3 99.1 99.3 100

Djibouti 65.5 55.5 76.1 N/A N/A N/A

Egypt 55.6 43.6 67.2 73.2 66.9 85

Eritrea 56.7 45.6 68.2 N/A N/A N/A

Ethiopia 41.5 33.8 49.2 57.4 51.8 82

India 61.3 46.4 69 98 N/A N/A

Indonesia 87.9 83.4 92.5 98 97.6 98.5

Iran 77.1 70.4 83.5 N/A N/A N/A

Iraq ... N/A N/A 99.4 N/A N/A

Jordan 90.9 85.9 95.5 99.8 99.5 100

Kazakhstan 99.4 99.2 99.7 95.8 99.8 100

Kenya 84.3 78.5 90 93.1 95.1 99

Kuwait 82.9 81 84.7 93.1 93.9 102

Kyrgyzstan** 97 N/A N/A 92.1 N/A N/A

Lebanon 86.5 81 92.4 97 N/A N/A

Libya 81.7 70 91.8 97.2 94 94

Malaysia 88.7 85.4 92 69.5 97.3 100

Morocco 50.7 38.3 63.3 88.6 61.3 79

Nigeria 66.8 59.4 74.4 N/A 86.5 95

Occupied 

Palestinian 

Territories

90.2 N/A N/A 98.5 N/A N/A

Oman 74.4 65.4 82 53.9 97.3 98

Pakistan 41.5 28.5 53.4 95.1 42 64

Philippines 92.6 92.7 92.5 94.8 95.7 101

Qatar 84.2 82.3 84.9 93.5 95.8 102

Saudi Arabia 77.9 69.5 84.1 N/A 91.6 96

Somalia N/A N/A N/A 79.1 N/A N/A

Sudan 59.9 49.1 70.8 95.2 74.2 88

Syria 82.9 74.2 91 99.8 93 96
76 FAIR

Tajikistan 99.5 99.3 99.7 91.6 99.8 100

Tanzania 77.1 69.2 85.2 98 89.4 95

Thailand 92.6 90.5 94.9 94.3 97.8 100

Tunisia 73.2 63.1 83.1 95.5 90.6 93

Turkey 86.5 78.5 94.4 99.8 93.2 95

Turkmenistan 98.8 98.3 99.3 99.7 99.8 100

United Arab 

Emirates

77.3 80.7 75.6 99.7 95 108

Uzbekistan 99.3 98.9 99.6 67.9 99.6 100

Yemen 40.0 28.5 69.5 N/A 50.9 60

Source: Most data are taken from United Nations Development Program (UNDP). See “Statistics” at <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/>. 

N/A: Not available.

*For some countries for which UNDP does not publish data, we have turned to other sources such as UNESCO. For example, for 

Azerbaijan, we used data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, which employs an unspecified definition of literacy. 

* *Note that the youth literacy rate for Kyrgyzstan is from 1990. No recent data are available. 

Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Syria, Qatar, Kenya, Lebanon, Turkey, 

Indonesia, Bahrain, and Malaysia) have literacy rates between 75 and 90 percent. Eleven (Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, 

Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan) have literacy rates that exceed 90 percent. In most cases, youth literacy 

rates exceed those of adults. These data suggest that most residents in most 

countries can understand basic printed materials in their mother tongue or 

national language. But they also suggest that print media may not be the 

best way of reaching people in some of the key problem countries, such as 

Yemen, Pakistan, Egypt, and Sudan.

Print Media: Daily and Non-Daily Newspapers 

Data on the accessibility and circulation of print media (daily and 

non-daily papers) within those Muslim countries for which data exist 

are available from the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural 

Organization (UNESCO). While they are the most comprehensive and current publicly available nonproprietary data of this kind, there are serious 

gaps in their coverage. Table 4–3 depicts both the number of daily paper titles available between 1997 and 2000 and the circulation of such papers per 

1,000 persons. Table 4–4 does the same for non-daily papers. For purposes 

of comparability, we have included data for countries that are both identified 

in table 4–1 and for which UNESCO has published such information. 

Several cautionary notes must be made about these data on newspaper 

circulation. First, circulation figures certainly underestimate actual levels of 

readership. This is because in some countries under study, more than one 
ACCESSING INFORMATION 77

person usually reads the same copy of the paper, especially where newspapers 

are relatively expensive in the context of the local economy or are difficult to 

obtain. In addition, in some countries, papers are commonly read aloud in 

social gatherings, which further expands the effective circulation. 

A second point is that, while prima facie these circulation figures may 

index a diversity of sources of information, simply looking at the number 

of such titles and their circulation may be misleading. In many of the countries under study here, official or self-imposed censorship may restrict all 

newspapers to expressing the same basic points of view. Thus, extensive use 

of data of this kind should probably be preceded both by a review of censorship (official and self-imposed) in the country in question and, if possible, 

a content analysis of key papers to determine if the wide variety of papers 

implies an actual diversity of views. While such a comprehensive effort is

Table 4–3. Freedom House Press Freedom Rankings, 2005

Country Ranking Status

Philippines 35 Partly Free

India 38 Partly Free

Thailand 42 Partly Free

Turkey 48 Partly Free

Nigeria 52 Partly Free

Indonesia 58 Partly Free

Lebanon 60 Partly Free

Kenya 61 Not Free

Pakistan 61 Not Free

Jordan 62 Not Free

Morocco 63 Not Free

Algeria 64 Not Free

Egypt 68 Not Free

Ethiopia 68 Not Free

Malaysia 69 Not Free

Kyrgyzstan 71 Not Free

Oman 72 Not Free

Iran 80 Not Free

Tunisia 80 Not Free

Palestinian Autonomous Territories 84 Not Free

Libya 95 Not Free

Turkmenistan 96 Not Free

Source: Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2005 DRAFT Country Reports, “Table of Global Press Freedom Rankings” (New 

York: Freedom House, 2005), available at <freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm>. 
78 FAIR

beyond the scope of this chapter, table 4–3 summarizes Freedom House’s 

assessment of the freedom of the press for those countries detailed herein.3

Freedom House examined 194 countries and territories and assessed the degree to which their governments permit the free flow of information. Based 

upon a scoring scheme developed by Freedom House, the media of each 

country is classified as “Free” (scoring 0 to 30), “Partly Free” (scoring 31 to 

60) or “Not Free” (61 to 100).4 As the data in table 4–3 demonstrate, only 

7 of the 22 countries included in these data tables are classified as “Partly 

Free,” while the others are all classified as “Not Free.”

With these caveats about the utility of these metrics, we next examine 

the data for daily papers for 1999 (the year with the most complete data). 

These data are available in table 4–4. The range on the number of titles is 

surprising. Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, the Palestinian Territories, Kenya, and 

Jordan have five or fewer daily titles each, and all of these states have media 

that are considered “Not Free” by Freedom House. Lebanon, Egypt, and 

Morocco all have between a dozen and two dozen dailies. Iran has over 105, 

Indonesia 225, Pakistan 352, and Turkey has 560. Based on 1998 data, India 

has over 5,000 dailies in circulation. Despite having media that are classed as 

“Not Free,” Iran and Pakistan have some of the highest numbers of daily 

papers in circulation.

However, the number of titles is not the best measure of penetration of 

print media. For this, we turn to a notion of circulation that is standardized 

for the population: total average circulation (or copies printed) per 1,000 

inhabitants. Using this measure, Lebanon (classified as “Not Free”) had the 

highest standardized circulation in 1999, with nearly 66 copies per 1,000 

persons. Turkmenistan, also classified as “Not Free,” has the lowest, with 

fewer than 6 copies per 1,000 persons.

These data also illuminate a discord between availability of print 

media and literacy. For instance, Turkmenistan’s relative paucity of per 

capita newspapers is somewhat counterintuitive given that the country has 

one of the highest reported adult literacy rates of 98.8 percent, well above 

Lebanon’s 86.5 percent. Similarly, “Partly Free” India has one of the highest 

circulation figures for daily papers (using 1998 data) while having one of 

the lowest literacy rates.

Turning to the 1999 figures for non-daily newspapers in table 4–5, the 

Palestinian Territories and Kenya (both considered “Not Free”) have the fewest, with 10 non-daily titles each. Jordan and Turkmenistan (also “Not Free”) 

both have fewer than two dozen. Egypt has 45, Kyrgyzstan has 164—both of 

which are classed as “Not Free.” Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Turkey, and 

Iran all have several hundred. India (using 1998 data) publishes over 38,000 

non-daily papers. Only India and Indonesia are deemed “Partly Free,” while 

the rest are considered “Not Free.” Turning to standardized circulation, the
ACCESSING INFORMATION 79

Table 4–4. Daily Newspapers: Number of Titles and Circulation

Number of Titles Total Average Circulation

(or Copies Printed) per 1,000

Inhabitants

Status Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 1997 1998 1999 2000

Not Free Algeria 18 24 N/A N/A 26.38 27.18 N/A N/A

Not Free Egypt 14 15 16 N/A 32.8 35.75 31.28 N/A

Not Free Ethiopia 2 2 N/A N/A 0.38 0.37 N/A N/A

Partly Free India 5,044 5,221 N/A N/A 48.09 60.04 N/A N/A

Partly Free Indonesia 81 172 225** 396** 24.5 22.89 22.91 N/A

Not Free Iran N/A N/A 105 112 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Jordan 8 8 5 5 76.24 74.23 N/A N/A

Not Free Kenya 4* 4* 4** N/A 9.2 9.1 8.34 N/A

Not Free Kyrgyzstan N/A N/A 3 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Partly Free Lebanon N/A 13** 14** 13** N/A 63.39 65.81 63.25

Not Free Libya 4* 4* N/A N/A 14.39 14.12 N/A N/A

Not Free Malaysia 33 33** N/A 31** 105.31 113.22 N/A 95.26

Not Free Morocco 21 22 22 23 23.67 25.37 25.42 29.06

Partly Free Nigeria 25* 25* N/A N/A 26.04 25.41 N/A N/A

Not Free Oman 5 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Pakistan 359 303** 352 306** 29.71 N/A 39.99 39.26

Not Free Palestinian 

Autonomous 

Territories

N/A N/A 3 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Partly Free Philippines 42 N/A N/A N/A 66.05 N/A N/A N/A

Partly Free Thailand N/A 34** N/A N/A 74.33 196.89 N/A N/A

Not Free Tunisia N/A N/A N/A 7 N/A N/A N/A 18.91

Partly Free Turkey 980 960 560 542 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Turkmenistan N/A N/A 2 2 N/A N/A 5.81 6.79

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Culture, and Communications Statistics. These series are the most current available and 

can be accessed at <uis.unesco.org/ev.php?URL_ID=5208&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201>. 

N/A: Not available.

* National estimation.

**Source: World Association of Newspapers. 

“Not Free” Palestinian Territories are notable for having the highest nondaily paper circulation (over 526 copies per 1,000 persons.) “Not Free” 

Kenya and Pakistan are among the lowest with 3.67 and 12.82 per 1,000 

persons respectively. “Not Free” Egypt’s circulation is about 21 copies per 

1,000, and Indonesia’s is 37 per 1,000. “Not Free” Turkmenistan has 
80 FAIR

Table 4–5. Non-Daily Newspapers: Number of Titles and Circulation

Number of Titles Total Average Circulation

(or Copies Printed) per 1,000

Inhabitants

Status Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 1997 1998 1999 2000

Not Free Algeria 64 82 N/A N/A 43.9 31.01 N/A N/A

Not Free Egypt 46 47 45 N/A 22.96 22.2 20.62 N/A

Not Free Ethiopia 85 78 N/A N/A 5.57 6.45 N/A N/A

Partly Free India 36,661 38,607 N/A N/A 61.35 68.99 N/A N/A

Partly Free Indonesia 94 433 425* 746* 25.26 38.07 37.17 N/A

Not Free Iran N/A N/A 843 906 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Jordan 13 13 17 20 33.55 32.69 N/A N/A

Not Free Kenya N/A N/A 10* N/A N/A N/A 3.67 N/A

Not Free Kuwait N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Partly Free Kyrgyzstan N/A N/A 164 181 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Lebanon N/A N/A N/A 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Malaysia 3 N/A N/A N/A 14.56 N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Morocco 807 693 581 507** 122.25 144.22 130.04 141.12

Partly Free Pakistan 681 N/A 560 N/A N/A N/A 12.82 N/A

Not Free Palestinian 

Autonomous 

Territories

N/A N/A 10 13 N/A N/A 526.01 644.95

Not Free Philippines 47 N/A N/A N/A 2.79 N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Sudan 11 11 N/A N/A 192.01 187.76 N/A N/A

Partly Free Tunisia N/A N/A N/A 29 N/A N/A N/A 98.71

Partly Free Turkey 400 425 610 688 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Not Free Turkmenistan N/A N/A 23 22 N/A N/A 64.48 72.86

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Culture, and Communications Statistics. These series are the most current available 

and can be accessed at http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?URL_ID=5208&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. Last 

accessed April 26, 2005. 

N/A: Not available.

* Source: World Association of Newspapers. Data does not include newspapers published on Sundays only.

**Data does not include non-dailies issued 2 or 3 times a week.

64 copies per 1,000, and “Not Free” Morocco has 130. Many of the contradictory findings of the analysis of daily papers regarding literacy and degrees 

of media freedom obtain here as well. 

We also sought to provide some information about which papers circulate most widely, either in terms of numbers of readers or geographic scope. 

Nonproprietary and public-use data on these issues are not comprehensive, 
ACCESSING INFORMATION 81

but data provided to the authors by the World Association of Newspapers, 

which collects information about the world’s highest-circulating newspapers, 

cast some light. These 100 papers are published in 16 countries and 19 languages, detailed in tables 4–6 and 4–7. There are only two Muslim majority 

states that publish one of the world’s largest 100 papers (Egypt and Pakistan). 

Arabic is ranked twelfth out of 19 languages in which such papers are 

published and Urdu (used in Pakistan and in India) nineteenth. Bengali, 

a language used in both India and in Bangladesh, is ranked 13 of 19. However, it is not possible from these data to know if Indian-origin papers have 

extensive circulation in Bangladesh or if Pakistan-origin papers in Urdu are 

readily available in India. India, ranked third of 16 countries in the number 

of highest-circulating newspapers, has several other languages in the list of 

19. Again, from the data available, it is not possible to determine which, if 

any, of these papers have substantial readership among India’s Muslims. The 

same holds for other countries, such as China and Thailand, with several of 

the world’s top 100 dailies and with small Muslim populations.

These discordant findings between freedom of the media, literacy rates, 

and availability of newspapers may cast doubt on the reliability of literacy 

statistics (which are often government-furnished), circulation figures, and

Table 4–6. Countries Producing the World’s 100 Largest Daily

Newspapers

Ranking Country Number of Top 

100 Dailies

1 China 23

2 Japan 21

3 India 17

4 United States of America 8

5 Taiwan 5

6 Thailand 5

7 United Kingdom 5

8 Germany 3

9 Republic of Korea 3

10 Russia 3

11 Italy 2

12 Austria 1

13 Egypt 1

14 France 1

15 The Netherlands 1

16 Pakistan 1

Source: World Association of Newspapers, World Press Trends 2005.
82 FAIR

Table 4–7. Languages in Which the World’s 100 Largest Daily

Newspapers are Published

Ranking Language Number of Top 100 Dailies

1 Chinese 28

2 Japanese 21

3 English 16

4 Hindi 6

5 Thai 5

6 German 4

7 Korean 3

8 Russian 3

9 Gujarati 2

10 Italian 2

11 Malayalam 2

12 Arabic 1

13 Bengali 1

14 Dutch 1

15 French 1

16 Marathi 1

17 Tamil 1

18 Telugu 1

19 Urdu 1

Source: World Association of Newspapers, World Press Trends 2005.

even upon the methodology used by Freedom House to assess media freedom. These data may also suggest that literacy rates should not be used as 

a simple proxy for the ease with which persons can access printed literature. Nor should published literacy rates be understood to correlate with 

published indicators of access to established daily and non-daily papers, 

which is somewhat counterintuitive. Similarly, circulation figures and 

the numbers of newspapers available should not be seen as a proxy for 

media freedom. 

Internet Usage

Internet usage rates are difficult to determine with any accuracy because of the multitude of methods to access the Internet, including personal 

computers at home; at schools, workplaces, and research organizations; and 

via public computing facilities such as Internet cafes. Moreover, definitions 

of an Internet user per se may differ. Nua.com has compiled data on the penetration of the Internet across the world, despite these challenges. Nua.com
ACCESSING INFORMATION 83

data are reproduced in table 4–8 for countries identified in table 4–1. As 

these data suggest, access to the Internet varies dramatically across the selection of Muslim countries and ones with sizeable numbers of Muslims, such 

as India. In terms of sheer market size, Israel and the countries of South 

and Southeast Asia tend to dominate, with millions of Internet users each. 

Among the states in the Middle East other than Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia 

dominate with nearly 2.5 million users each. The United Arab Emirates, 

Turkey, and Iran also have large numbers of users, with 900,000, 728,000, 

and 420,000, respectively. 

If we look at usage as a percentage of the overall population, a different 

ranking of Internet penetration appears: in half of the 46 countries detailed 

in table 4–8, Internet users are less than 1 percent of the overall population. 

In another 7 countries, Internet users comprise between 1 and 5 percent of 

the total population. In 7 countries, Internet users make up between 5 and 

10 percent of the population. In 3 countries, they comprise between 10 and 

20 percent of the population. Only in 4 countries (Bahrain, United Arab 

Emirates, Malaysia, and Israel) do users comprise more than 20 percent of 

the overall population.

Internet cafés are a growing means of accessing the Internet. For example, in Indonesia, warnets (Indonesia’s version of the Internet café) have 

become a popular means of using the Internet among those who cannot 

afford the hardware or service provider charges. According to the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, there are over 2,000 warnets covering both urban and rural 

areas.5 Moreover, a recent A.C. Nielsen poll found that some 52 percent 

of all of Indonesia’s Internet users access it at warnets. (Thirty-two percent 

access it at work, 28 percent at school, and 9 percent at a friend’s home. 

Only 6 percent accessed the net at their own homes.) The success of the 

warnet has spurred the owners of telephone kiosks to add Internet access 

to their suite of operations.6 As a perusal of travel guides for countries in 

the Muslim world demonstrates, Internet cafés are readily available even in 

remote places. However, while very inexpensive for expatriates, Internet café 

charges remain quite high by the local economic standards of the countries 

in question.7

Television and Radio Ownership

UNESCO publishes data on the number of television and radio receivers in selected Muslim countries per 1,000 persons from 1970 to 1997. 

In many countries in our survey, households include multiple nuclear 

families, so the number of potential viewers per household is considerably larger than would be the case in many Western countries. In addition, 

in many countries, there are kiosks or small storefronts where people
84 FAIR

Table 4–8. Internet Usage for Selected Muslim and

Middle Eastern Countries

Nation Population 

(millions)

Internet Users

 (millions)

Percent of

Population

Internet Service

Providers 

Afghanistan 29.93 N/A N/A 1

Algeria 32.53 0.18 0.55 2

Azerbaijan 7.91 0.03 0.32 2

Bahrain 0.69 0.14 20.37 1

Bangladesh 144.32 0.15 0.10 10

Brunei 0.37 0.04 9.40 2

China 1,310 99.80 7.62 3

Djibouti 0.48 0.00 0.69 1

Egypt 77.51 2.42 3.12 50

Eritrea 4.56 0.01 0.22 5

Ethiopia 73.05 0.02 0.03 1

India 1,080 36.97 3.42 43

Indonesia 241.97 12.86 5.31 24

Iran 68.02 0.42 0.62 8

Iraq 26.07 0.01 0.05 1

Israel 6.28 3.13 49.84 21

Jordan 5.76 0.21 3.68 5

Kazakhstan 15.19 0.10 0.66 10

Kenya 33.83 0.50 1.48 65

Kuwait 2.34 0.20 8.55 3

Kyrgyzstan 5.15 0.52 10.02 N/A

Lebanon 3.83 0.30 7.83 22

Libya 5.77 0.02 0.35 1

Malaysia 24.00 10.04 41.83 7

Mali 12.29 0.03 0.24 13

Malta 0.40 0.06 14.80 6

Morocco 32.72 0.40 1.22 8

Nigeria 128.77 0.10 0.08 11

Oman 3.00 0.12 4.00 1

Pakistan 162.42 1.20 0.74 30

Philippines 87.86 5.96 6.78 33

Qatar 0.86 0.08 8.69 1

Saudi Arabia 26.42 2.54 9.61 42

Somalia 8.59 0.00 0.00 3

Sri Lanka 20.06 0.12 0.61 5

Sudan 40.19 0.06 0.14 2
ACCESSING INFORMATION 85

Syria 18.45 0.06 0.33 1

Tajikistan 7.16 0.01 0.07 4

Tanzania 36.77 0.30 0.82 6

Thailand 65.44 7.57 11.57 15

Tunisia 10.07 0.40 3.97 1

Turkey 69.66 7.27 10.44 50

Turkmenistan 4.95 0.00 0.04 N/A

United Arab 

Emirates

2.56 0.90 35.16 1

Uzbekistan 26.85 0.10 0.37 42

Yemen 20.73 0.02 0.08 1

Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book 2005, available at <cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

N/A: Not available.

collectively watch television.8 These data are presented in tables 4–9 and 

4–10. What is obvious from these tables is that there is a wide spread in 

terms of the television and radio ownership in the surveyed countries. 

In 1997, the most recent year for which UNESCO reported data, 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen had the lowest availability of televisions 

(13, 22, and 29 per 1,000 respectively). At the other extreme were Oman, 

Kuwait, and Bahrain with 694, 505, and 472 television receivers per 1,000 

respectively. 

Looking at trends in television penetration between 1970 and 1997, 

vast differences are once again observed among the countries. Growth in 

this time period was lowest among the states of Southwest Asia, which 

averaged an 85 percent increase in per capita ownership of sets.9 Growth 

was highest in the countries of South Asia (where it almost doubled)10 and 

Southeast Asia (a 92 percent increase). In the North African states (Algeria, 

Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Sudan), television ownership grew by 89 percent 

on average over the course of the decade. Despite these past growth rates, 

however, penetration rates appear to be leveling off in nearly every country. 

As shown in table 4–10, the countries with the highest density of 

radios per 1,000 population in 1997 were Lebanon (907), Oman (607), 

and Bahrain (580). The countries with the lowest figures were Yemen (64), 

Pakistan (94), India (120), and Afghanistan (132). Again, the contrast from 

one part of the Muslim world to another is striking. Moreover, the countries 

with the lowest availability of television sets also rank among the lowest in 

the availability of radio receivers. Nevertheless, in some of these countries, 

such as Afghanistan, radio may still be the most effective way to reach audiences given both the limited availability of television broadcast service 

and the low literacy rates.
86 FAIR

Table 4–9. Television Receivers per 1,000 People for Selected

Countries, 1970–1997

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997

Yemen N/A N/A N/A N/A 26 28 29 29

United

Arab Emirates

N/A 50 88 84 90 104 133 134

Turkey 11 26 79 182 232 309 330 330

Syria 19 30 44 57 60 67 69 70

Saudi Arabia 87 110 219 244 246 257 260 262

Pakistan 1.5 5.1 11 13 17 20 21 22

Oman N/A 2.8 31 632 633 673 682 694

Malaysia 12 37 87 115 148 164 170 172

Lebanon 105 148 281 300 344 366 373 375

Kuwait 134 149 257 372 383 503 510 505

Jordan 20 46 59 58 68 75 81 82

Iraq 37 38 50 59 72 80 82 83

Iran 19 45 51 55 64 69 71 71

Indonesia 0.7 2.2 20 38 57 66 67 68

India 0.1 0.8 4.4 13 32 50 61 65

Brunei 39 87 135 202 233 238 249 250

Bahrain 59 110 259 411 425 466 470 472

Afghanistan N/A N/A 2.8 6.9 9.3 10 12 13

Sudan 3.2 6.2 43 51 75 84 85 86

Morocco 13 31 46 63 77 96 114 115

Libya 0.5 35 61 62 99 111 134 140

Egypt 15 16 32 78 101 110 118 119

Algeria 29 31 52 69 74 89 104 105

Source: 1999 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (UNESCO Publishing and Berman Press, 1999).

Looking at the trend line between 1970 and 1997 in these countries, 

growth in radio penetration in the North African states was the lowest (47 

percent) and highest in South Asia (62 percent)11 and Southeast Asia (59 

percent). Growth in radio penetration in Southwest Asia was 55 percent.12

As is the case with television penetration, growth rates appear to have leveled off by the end of this time series. 

These data may suggest that different mixes of radio and television are 

necessary to reach target audiences in these varied countries. One critical 

piece of data needed to develop an appropriate mix of programming is how 

users of television and radio trade off time across these technologies. Detailed knowledge of how different household members use television and
ACCESSING INFORMATION 87

Table 4–10. Radio Receivers per 1,000 People for Selected

Countries, 1970–1997

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997

Yemen N/A N/A N/A N/A 27 43 64 64

United

Arab Emirates

135 198 236 245 268 272 354 355

Turkey 101 105 113 139 160 163 176 178

Syria 187 188 195 212 254 264 275 278

Saudi Arabia 122 131 260 280 290 301 319 321

Pakistan 46 54 64 84 89 92 92 94

Oman 277 341 487 561 566 594 601 607

Malaysia 138 163 411 421 430 433 433 434

Lebanon 243 477 749 768 882 891 892 907

Kuwait 202 202 284 465 513 681 688 678

Jordan 161 173 188 192 220 235 269 271

Iraq 110 114 161 196 215 224 228 229

Iran 102 120 163 210 238 257 262 263

Indonesia 83 103 119 128 145 149 155 155

India 31 34 38 65 79 119 119 120

Brunei 116 149 212 247 265 272 299 302

Bahrain 296 313 360 508 549 574 579 580

Afghanistan 51 53 75 100 117 122 125 132

Sudan 159 200 225 250 261 271 271 272

Morocco 118 133 155 178 219 231 246 247

Libya 111 139 158 211 231 252 256 259

Egypt 125 126 137 241 302 311 315 317

Algeria 182 187 197 219 233 239 239 242

Source: 1999 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (New York: UNESCO Publishing and Berman Press, 1999).

radio would also allow us to craft a tailored message to the particular demographics using the appropriate media. However, household-level consumer 

data alone will not be sufficient for this task. In many countries, individuals 

access radio or television programming through public and quasi-public 

equipment. For example, one may find listeners clustered around a radio at 

a small kiosk in the bazaar. Throughout South and Southeast Asia, television (and video) parlors are available for public use, often on a nominal fee 

basis. The audiences at these facilities are usually young men. Consequently, 

the penetration rates shown in these tables likely underestimate the degree 

to which young people (particularly men) can actually access radio and 

television programming.
88 FAIR

Satellite and Cable Availability and Programming

Data current as of 1999 on households with access to cable and satellite television in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia (see table 

4–11) suggest that in some countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, 

Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, nearly every household with a television set has 

either cable or, more typically, satellite service. In most other countries, few 

television-owning households have access to either cable or satellite. Because 

these data are often collected by visual inspection or through surveys of 

families with satellite or cable access, actual access may be underestimated. 

In many countries with poor regulation and law enforcement, several buildings will often share satellite services through illegal wiring. In some cases, 

one person in a building with such access will market pirated content to 

other tenants in the same or other buildings. The fact that the practice is 

illegal means that individual surveys of families will not uncover the actual 

number of households involved. Unfortunately, there is no reliable way at 

present to correct for this certain bias.13

Given that Muslims in many countries have considerable access to 

cable or satellite television, it is worthwhile in assessing how these people 

access information to consider briefly the cable and satellite services available to them.

Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC): MBC is owned and operated 

by the Saudi ARA Group International. It is a commercial Arabic-language 

single-channel service initiated in 1991 from London. It provides a middleof-the-road assortment of news, information, and entertainment. It was 

rated in early 1997 as the most watched television service in the Middle 

East, particularly for its news and current affairs programming.14 We have 

no data from which to determine whether this is still the case 8 years later, 

since the rise of the next two services. 

Al Jazeera Satellite Channel: Al Jazeera was launched from Qatar in 

1996. Prior to 2001, Arab media analysts attributed its rise in popularity to 

its unique and unprecedented handling of social and political issues in the 

Arab world, ranging from corruption to polygamy, in an open and forthright 

manner.15 However, its reporting of U.S. military operations following the 

9/11 terrorist attacks propelled it into preeminence. Analysts at the U.S.-

based al Hurra television service compare al Jazeera’s rise since 2001 to that 

of CNN with its 24-hour coverage of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

Al Arabiya: Al Arabiya, based in Dubai’s Media City, was launched in 

March 2003 by a consortium of the Saudi-controlled MBC, Lebanon’s Hariri 

Group, and other investors from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf 

States, for the express purpose of competing with al Jazeera. In contradistinction to its rival, al Arabiya’s bosses pledged at its inception that “we are
ACCESSING INFORMATION 89

Table 4–11. Africa and the Middle East: Cable and Satellite

Television Households

Country Total TV 

Households

(Thousands)

Total Cable 

and Satellite 

Households

(Thousands)

Cable

Households

(Thousands)

Satellite

Households*

(Thousands)

Afghanistan 5** N/A N/A N/A

Algeria 2,045–3,200** 600–1,200** N/A 600–1,200**

Bahrain 94 4 4 N/A

Bangladesh 873 100 100 N/A

Bhutan 3–10 3–10 N/A 3–10

Brunei 

Darussalam

0.133–0.204 0.007 N/A N/A

Egypt 8,313–11,550 150–650** N/A 150–650**

India 54,000b –58,541b 16,080–29,958 15,180b–25,758 900–1,200

Indonesia 26.3**– 30 0.041**–3.513 0.013** 0.028**–3.5

Iran 7,000–10,790 N/A N/A N/A

Iraq 1,600–1,800 N/A N/A N/A

Israel 1,144**–1,500 980–1,120 960–1,100 20

Jordan 256–740** 5.6–111 0.6–1 5–110**

Kuwait 230–675 126 N/A 126

Lebanon 630**–644** 103–265 5 98–260

Libya 800 7 N/A 7

Morocco 3,670–3,720** 901–960** N/A 901–960**

Malaysia 3.1**–3.682 0.229–0.32** 0.013** 0.028**–3.5

Oman 1,395 199 N/A 199

Pakistan 7,289b–9,248 1,003–1,364 8–364b 995–1,000

Philippines 8.6**–10.86 0.63–1.411 0.6**–1.086 0.03–0.325

Qatar 89 77 52 25

Saudi 2,967–2,970 2,070**–2,233 330** 1,740–1,893

Sudan 2,240–3,200 15 N/A 15

Syria 1,042–2,210** 300–440** N/A 300–440**

Tunisia 1,540**–2,380 110**–131 N/A 110**–131

Turkey 10,550**–14,967 1,583–2,288 883**–1,360 700**–928

United Arab 

Emirates

377 282 N/A 282

Yemen N/A N/A N/A N/A

Source: Satellites, Communications, and Broadcasting Markets Survey; 2000 Edition, Worldwide Prospects to 2009, Euroconsult Research Report by Stephane Chenard, May 2000, 254–255.

* Includes individual direct to home and collective SMATV antennas.

**Data from 1998.
90 FAIR

not going to make problems for Arab countries. . . . We’ll stick with the truth, 

but there’s no sensationalism.”16 Al Arabiya claims to cater to Arab audience 

interests in politics, business, current affairs, sports, science, finance, lifestyle, 

talk-show programs, documentaries, and social and educational programs. 

Its programming can be seen in all the Middle East countries, the Far East, 

Southeast Asia, North Africa, Europe, the Americas, and Australia.17

Future Television: This service was launched in 1993 from Lebanon 

and claims to be Lebanon’s fastest-growing station. It has wide reach in the 

Middle East and broadcasts around the clock.18

Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC): LBC was launched in 1985 

as a private organization, the first in the Arab world. This station claims to 

take 60 percent of the Arabic-language market share, a claim that is difficult 

to reconcile with reports that MBC had the highest viewership in 1997 and 

the growth of the newer satellite services since then. In 2000, LBC began 

transmitting to Europe, the United States, Africa, and Asia.19

Orbit Satellite Television and Radio Network: This service was launched 

in 1994 from Rome via the ARABSAT transponder and is owned by the 

Mawared Group of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In 2000, Orbit elected to move its 

operations over time to Bahrain. Its digital technology can support 24 television and 24 radio channels covering the entire range of news, sports, and 

entertainment. The Orbit digital television network reaches 23 countries in 

the Middle East and North Africa and can be received by dishes as small 

as 18 inches. It also broadcasts a number of Arabic-language channels to 

Europe and has plans to expand to Asia.20 

Arab Radio and Television Network (ART): ART is headquartered in Jeddah, 

Saudi Arabia, and Amman, Jordan. It was launched in 1993 with five channels beamed to the Arab world from transmitters in Italy. By January 2000, 

ART offered a wide array of channels: Variety, Sports, Music, Children, 

Movies, Iqraa (a religious channel, from the title of a chapter of the Koran, 

meaning read or proclaim), Knowledge, Cartoon Network/TNT, Ala Keyfak

(as you like it), and ART Promo. It has also launched customized services 

to Europe, North Africa, Latin America, and Asia. ART produces more than 

6,000 live and recorded shows annually including family dramas, series, 

plays, documentaries, music videos, and sports programs. This network also 

has the largest Arabic movie library in the Middle East.21

Showtime: This is a joint venture of Viacom and the Kuwait Investment 

Projects Company. It claims to be the leading digital satellite pay-TV network 

in the Middle East and North Africa and offers more than 51 premium channels of predominantly Western television programming including the Movie 

Channel, MTV, TV Land, Nickelodeon, Sony TV, and guest channels like 
ACCESSING INFORMATION 91

Discovery and Bloomberg. By August 2000, viewers could access dozens of digital channels. In addition, Showtime offers more than 10 CD audio channels. 

It claims to offer more channels than any other network in the Middle East. 22

Arab News Network (ANN): While this London-based service is owned by 

Algeria-based businessman Rafik Khalifa, it is connected to Rifaat Assad, the 

dissident brother of Syrian President Hafez Al Assad, and is chaired by Rifaat 

Assad’s son, Sumar. Since its inception in 1997, ANN has been relentless in 

broadcasting polemics against the Syrian regime.23 ANN’s satellite transmissions reach countries in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Europe. It 

is funded by commercials from both Arab and major international brands. It 

broadcasts 24-hour news coverage and analysis in Arabic. ANN claims to have 

“a firm commitment to democracy and freedom of speech.”24

In addition, consumers in the Middle East who do not have the use 

of a satellite dish can also watch satellite television programming through 

a wide array of cable service providers, such as Dubai Cablevision, Cable 

Network of Egypt, Qatar Cablevision, Global Direct Television, and Emirates Cable TV and Multimedia (E-Vision).

Despite the proliferation of satellite and cable television services, the 

production of content to fill the air time persists as a major barrier to the 

development of Arabic programming. In part, high production costs have 

apparently prompted ambivalence on the part of government and private 

broadcasters with respect to financing new projects. As a compromise, the 

content-hungry service providers gravitate to dubbed versions and reruns 

of old serials. Western programming is also imported for Arab television. 

For example, dubbed novelas (high-end soap operas) from Venezuela and 

Mexico are shown with apparently wide appeal on LBC. Western musical 

formats are also heavily used.25

A comparable comprehensive account of the satellite and cable industries is not available for South and Southeast Asia. Generally speaking, satellite television came to Asia in 1992 with Star Television. Since the advent of 

Star, there have been a number of new entrants, such as Television Broadcasts 

(TVB) out of Hong Kong, Turner Broadcasting (which carries CNN), Home 

Box Office, ESPN, Discovery Channel, Viacom, and Time Warner, as well as 

Australian Broadcasting and Asia Business News.26 Star is a major provider 

of programming content to India and Pakistan. 

In the early years of the development of the South and Southeast Asian 

media market, cultural protectionism posed enormous trade barriers. Turner 

Broadcasting undertook an Asian version of TNT and the Cartoon Network 

to accommodate cultural protectionist sentiment, while Rupert Murdoch 

of Star TV created separate services for the three largest language groups to 

which Star provides service: Mandarin, Hindi, and Bahasa.27
92 FAIR

Analysts of the Asian satellite and cable industry also warn that Western 

broadcasters planning to broadcast in English in Asia will face enormous 

difficulties due to the limited English fluency among the population. Moreover, illiteracy necessitates use of dubbing rather than the less expensive 

subtitling. Documentaries have been found to be particularly suited to dubbing. Perhaps the best example of localizing Western programming is MTV 

Asia on StarTV, which has been adapted locally in India and China.28 

Information is scant about satellite and cable television in Indonesia. 

Cable television is available in limited areas of Jakarta and Surabaya as well 

as in Medan, Semarang, and Bandung. Satellite pay television has been 

available since 1994 through Indovision (Indonesia’s first for-pay direct 

broadcast satellite provider)29 and Indonusa (a cable television provider). 

While transmission previously relied upon a satellite requiring a 9- to 10-

foot dish, Indovision now uses the Cakrawarta satellite that requires only 

a 30-inch dish. However, transmission from other countries is unavailable 

over the Cakrawarta satellite. The proliferation of satellite dishes in the Indonesian countryside does not mean that foreign programming is widely 

watched, as it would in many other places. It is simply a reflection of the 

inability of the government’s television station (TVRI) to reach audiences 

much beyond Jakarta.30 In fact, in a survey of programming that was taken 

in April 1993, 60 percent of the top 20 shows were composed of local 

Indonesian programming.31 However, the Indonesian television market is 

huge: approximately 78 percent of Indonesians—more than 160 million 

people—watch television regularly.32

In the main, these data on the availability of satellite and cable programming demonstrate that the markets in the Muslim world are formidable 

in terms of both the percentage of households they reach in many countries 

and absolute numbers of potential viewers in any case. Also, there is a sizable 

void to be filled in content production for some service suppliers, which is 

often costly and resource-intensive to produce. This suggests that there are 

opportunities for effective long-term strategic communication to be carried 

out under the rubric of content development for regional broadcasters. Moreover, Arabic-language media should not be the only focus of U.S. strategic 

communication efforts. As the data presented here suggest, the huge markets 

in South and Southeast Asia, where the majority of the world’s Muslims reside, mandates production in languages such as Bahasa, Urdu, and Bengali. 

At the same time, the various extant service providers have found that they 

must cater to a variety of specific tastes to be successful. This underscores 

the importance to U.S. strategic communication efforts of understanding in 

much greater detail than we do at present the interests, tastes, and preferences of the various demographic slices of the markets in question. 
ACCESSING INFORMATION 93

While the United States should consider ways of pairing up with local partners to produce content, there are other means of effectively leveraging the demand for content in various Muslim world markets to promote 

the achievement of U.S. long-term strategic interests. In 1997, when the 

author was serving as an intern at the American consulate in Mumbai, an 

officer on the mission staff was specifically tasked with engaging the Indian 

media industry. One of the objectives of this assignment was to attract Indian movie producers and directors to the United States to shoot their films, 

bringing work to American studios that have been hurt by the increasing 

tendency of U.S. producers to make their own movies on location in foreign countries. While the initiative being taken by the Mumbai consulate 

was driven primarily by business considerations, there are significant opportunities for pursuing U.S. strategic communications objectives through 

precisely this same kind of collaboration with regional filmmakers and 

television producers, not just with the Indian film industry but with those 

of Egypt and other regional countries as well. Movies and television are an 

important force in shaping social attitudes in the Islamic world, as they have 

been in the West, perhaps more important in the long run than the news programming on which strategic communications and public diplomacy efforts 

typically focus. This is one reason why Islamists who come to power often 

shut down movie theaters on grounds of immorality, as the Islamist government of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province has done in Peshawar. They 

understand the potential of film to subvert the narrow, rigid social perspective that Islamic fundamentalists seek to perpetuate. Promoting the growth 

of a vibrant cinematographic community in the Islamic world by supporting 

indigenous filmmakers’ use of U.S. commercial filmmaking facilities, technical and artistic collaboration, and possibly subsidization of production costs 

could be an important means of reshaping public attitudes in the Islamic 

world without aggravating the backlash that has arisen against the export of 

“Western” entertainment. Clearly there would be a market for such productions, given the hunger for new and attractive programming content being felt 

by the region’s burgeoning television industry.

Conclusion

This review of how people access information in Islamic countries 

highlights several notable findings. First, published literacy rates do not correlate in many countries with the actual availability of newspapers. This may 

cast doubt on the reliability of literacy statistics, which are often government-furnished. It also suggests that literacy rates should not be used as a 

simple proxy for the ease with which persons can access printed literature.33
94 FAIR

Moreover, it would be wrong to assume that large numbers of newspapers 

correlate with notions of freedom of the press or variety of opinions. Iran 

is a case in point. Despite having some of the most impressive numbers of 

titles of newspapers and circulation figures, the lack of freedom of the press 

should caution one against assuming that these papers necessarily reflect an 

array of views.

Second, it should come as no surprise that people in different parts of 

the Muslim world have different degrees of access to different forms of media. This divergence needs to be taken into account in any communications 

strategy. The Internet, while limited in some places, is becoming increasingly 

accessible and affordable as new service providers come into new markets, 

as the technology becomes better and less expensive, and as Internet cafés 

and university computer labs continue to proliferate. Television globally 

attracts huge audiences, and many of the content providers servicing markets in the Muslim world are hungry for new and attractive content. Those 

Muslims with access to television receive their programming from a variety 

of providers, with satellite services dominating in some markets and cable 

or even traditional over-the-air broadcasting in others. The boom in access 

to television in the Islamic world creates enormous opportunities for U.S. 

strategic communications efforts, but the diverse ways in which programming is received require that the United States not place its entire focus on 

a single method of delivering its message. Moreover, radio and other lowertech media should not be neglected. For instance, Afghanistan will remain a 

country where radio may be the most effective means of reaching audiences, 

given the low penetration of television and low literacy. 

Finally, as a word of caution, this survey of information access in the 

Muslim world is by no means exhaustive. First, it does not address a wide array of outdoor media (for example, advertisements on buses, trains, kiosks, 

and billboards) that have traditionally been the mainstay of commercial, 

social, and political marketing in much of the Islamic world.34 Gimmicks 

such as matchbooks, coffee mugs, shirts, and other such items are used 

in the Islamic world to promote products and messages just as they are 

elsewhere. While these are important means of conveying messages, there 

are no publicly available data sources that provide market breakdowns for 

these media, and therefore it was not possible to include these other media 

within this study. There may be proprietary data available in the advertising 

industry on these media; in any case, U.S. strategic communication efforts 

should not neglect this important sector, even if metrics on it are difficult 

to gather. 

While reliable, comparable data on information access in the different 

countries comprising the Muslim world is hard to come by, it is clear that 
ACCESSING INFORMATION 95

access to information varies from one country to another much more than it 

does from one language to another. Existing strategic communications and 

public diplomacy programs, which tend to be organized by language and 

not by country, may not adequately take account of the extreme diversity 

in how people who speak the same language but live in different countries 

most easily access information. In addition to the fact that people in different countries have significantly varying concerns and opinions, the fact that 

not all who speak a particular language can be effectively reached through 

the same media demands a more precisely tailored and targeted array of 

programming than that traditionally employed.

Notes

1 Joseph Biden, Initiative 911, November 2001. For other references to this concept, see 

“The Message Is America: Rethinking U.S. Public Diplomacy,” a hearing before the Committee 

on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, November 14, 2001, 

available at <129.11.188.64/papers/pmt/exhibits/827/Themessageisamerica.pdf>. See also 

Duncan Campbell, “U.S. plans TV station to rival al-Jazeera,” The Guardian, November 21, 2001, 

available at < guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,604286,00.html>.

2 While we have tried to ensure that tables 4–1 and 4–2 are comparable, there are some 

differences. For example, table 4–1 references West Bank and Gaza. Table 4–2 has data for the 

Occupied Territories. Table 4–2 in some cases does not have data for states listed in table 4–1 

(for example, Afghanistan). 

3 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2005 (New York: Freedom House, 2005), available 

at <freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm>.

4 For a description of the criteria for such judgments and the arithmetic scheme 

employed, see Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2005, discussion of “2005 Survey Methodology.” 

5 Embassy of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, “Recent Economic 

Reports: Internet Slowly Moving Ahead in Indonesia,” 2001, available at <usembassyjakarta.

org/econ/Internet2001.html>. 

6 Ibid.

7 Lonely Planet publishes a number of these travel guides. World66.com, an Internetbased travel guide, also publishes Internet café information for Africa, Asia, the Middle East, 

and elsewhere. There are extensive resources available about Internet cafés on the Internet, such 

as Arab Gateway, available at <al-bab.com/media/internetcafes.htm>; Pakistan Internet Cafes, 

available at <world66.com/world/asia/southasia/pakistan/internetcafes>; and Iran Tour, available at <irantour.org/intercafe.html>.

8 For an account of this phenomenon in Nepal, see Pico Iyer, Video Night in Kathmandu 

and Other Reports from the Not-So-Far East (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988).

9 This figure excludes Yemen, as we only have data from 1990. Between 1990 and 1997, 

television penetration growth was only 10 percent. This figure includes the growth rate for 

Oman and the United Arab Emirates, which really are calculated for 1975 to 1997.

10 Afghanistan has been excluded. The growth in television penetration tripled between 

1980 (the first year for which we have data) and 1997. This increase was enormous because of 

the low penetration observed in 1980.

11 Unlike the figure for television, this figure includes Afghanistan, for which we have 

data spanning 1970 to 1997.

12 This figure excludes Yemen, for which we have data for 1990 to 1997. In this period, 

the growth in radio penetration was 58 percent.
96 FAIR

13 For a history of cable and satellite services in the Middle East, see Jon B. Alterman, 

“New Media, New Politics? From Satellite Television to the Internet in the Arab World,” Policy 

Paper 49 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), and Muhammad I. Ayish, “Arab World Television in Transition: Current Trends and Future Prospects,” 

Orient 41 (2000), 415–434. While satellite dishes are increasing throughout the Arab countries, 

estimating the penetration of this technology is an inexact science. Alterman (1998) reports one 

estimate of satellite access according to which some two-thirds of the population of the Persian 

Gulf has access to satellite television, compared to 20 percent of the Palestinians and nearly 10 

percent of the Egyptians and Syrians. Alterman’s own estimates suggest that somewhere between 

10 and 15 percent of Arabs in the Middle East regularly watch satellite broadcasts. 

14 See Ayish, 418. Ayish does not indicate whether this rating was due to some subjective 

notion of quality or to the number of its viewers. 

15 Ibid.

16 See Peter Feuilherade, “Al Arabiya: A Profile,” BBC News Online, November 25, 2003, 

available at <news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3236654.stm>.

17 For more information, see al Arabiya’s Web site at <alarabiya.net/English.htm>.

18 Ayish, 419.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid. For more and recent information, see Orbit’s Web site at <orbit.net/corporate/

profile/DefaultEN.asp>. 

21 Ayish, 419–420. For more information about ART, see information provided by Allied 

Media at <allied-media.com/ARABTV/art.htm>. 

22 Ayish, 420. For more current information, see Showtime Arabia corporate profile at 

<showtimearabia.com/default.asp?id=8&l=1>. 

23 See Middle East Intelligence Briefing, “Dossier: Rifaat Asad,” vol. 2, no. 5 (June 2000), 

available at <meib.org/articles/0006_sd.htm>. 

24 See Ayish, 420. Also see information about ANN provided through Mosaic at <linktv.

org/mosaic/mosbroad.php3>. 

25 Juliana Koranteng, “Pan-Arab Audiences Turn to Lebanese TV for Entertainment,” 

Advertising Age International, April 1997, I11; Ayish, 425–426.

26 Jonathan Karp, “Cast of Thousands,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 27, 1994, 47.

27 Karp, 48.

28 Ibid.

29 For more information, see the company’s Web site at <indovision.tv/Company.php>.

30 See the section titled “Television and Home Entertainment” at “Living in Indonesia,” 

a Web site for expatriates living in Indonesia, available at <expat.or.id/info/televisi.html>.

31 Karp, 48.

32 See assessment by Indonesia media firm PT Jaring Data Interaktif at <jditeam.com/

profile>.

33 Other metrics may be useful, such as the publication of books, which is also available 

from United Nations Development Program; however, these data too are old.

34 See Richard Earle, Art of Cause Marketing: How to Use Advertising to Change Personal 

Behavior and Public Policy (Lincolnwood, IL: NTC Publishing Group, 2000).
97

Chapter Five

Perceived Oppression and 

Relative Deprivation: Social Factors 

Contributing to Terrorism

Caroline F. Ziemke

A lively debate is evident in the current academic and policy literature 

concerning the degree to which social factors facilitate the spread of violent 

terrorist ideologies and the mechanisms by which they do so. Plenty of 

research exists to back up the notion that one’s behavioral choices are powerfully influenced by one’s social and political environment. An individual 

is, perhaps, more likely to become a terrorist in a repressive society in which 

exposure to violence, poverty, and political disempowerment is a regular 

occurrence than in a relatively free society in which legitimate outlets for 

rage and frustration and prospects for a better life exist. Yet the majority 

of people, even in the harshest of socio-political circumstances, do not become terrorists or give moral or financial support to terrorist organizations. 

Moreover, the vehement militant movements have generally emerged from 

relatively affluent quarters. As we have learned more about terrorism, terrorist organizations, and popular support for terrorists, some interesting 

paradoxes have emerged:

■ Editorial rhetoric notwithstanding, there is little empirical research 

that proves that poverty per se causes terrorism. None of the world’s poorest 

societies have produced organized terrorist movements, and relatively few 

known terrorist operatives have come from grinding poverty. In fact, alleviating poverty generally leads to an upsurge in support for militant movements. 

One outcome of economic reform is usually a downward redistribution of 

wealth that leads to a relative decline in the economic and professional status 

of the generally politically volatile middle and merchant classes.1

■ Nor does illiteracy cause militancy. While promoting literacy and 

free speech is an unambiguous good with undeniable long-term advantages 

for every society, the transition to full literacy is a boon to illiberal as well as 

liberal ideologies. Teaching people to read does not necessarily make them 

wise or moderate.

■ No evidence suggests that terrorists and suicide bombers as a group 

suffer from any particular psychopathologies, and, at any rate, terrorism 

as a phenomenon is not caused by antisocial dispositions of single actors. 
98 ZIEMKE

Group or social psychological factors, however, are extremely important 

facilitators of radicalization, terrorism, and support for terrorist activities. 

The dichotomy between individual and social psychology helps explain 

why public opinion polls can show that the majority says it condemns terrorism in the name of religion while tacit moral and financial support and 

popular adulation of terrorist masterminds and suicide bombers continue 

unabated.

■ While oppression is a common rhetorical theme of terrorist ideology and is another key element of the conventional wisdom, terrorist movements do not thrive (even underground) in truly repressive regimes. In fact, 

periods of liberalization and democratization are far more likely to see the 

emergence of militant groups and supporters than long periods of brutal 

repression. Terrorists do not emerge when nothing changes; they emerge 

when things change too slowly to meet rising expectations, or faster than 

people are able to adapt.

■ Radicalism and terrorism are as much symptoms of the Westernization and modernization of the Muslim world as reactions against them. The 

most dangerous militant Islamic ideologies (and, in fact, militant ideologies 

in most faith traditions) are surprisingly individualistic and probably would 

not have emerged in their current forms without significant cross-pollination from Western intellectual, religious, and philosophical traditions.

■ Religious fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon that appeals to 

modern mentalities, and some of Islamic fundamentalism’s most influential 

theorists have come from outside the Arab core—especially British India and 

Pakistan. One of the most important dynamics contributing to militant ideologies and terrorism is the tension between an emerging “deterritorialized” 

brand of Islamic revivalism on the one hand and traditional cultural and 

national identities and orthodox religious traditions on the other.

The lesson of these paradoxes is not, of course, that the way to build 

a global antiterrorist environment is to promote poverty, spread brutal political repression, maintain widespread ignorance and illiteracy, and shut 

down contact between the Muslim world and the West. What they do demonstrate is that the social factors that contribute to terrorism are complex 

and intertwined in a way that means alleviating one evil can trigger a host of 

unexpected and unintended consequences, not all of which increase stability. Anticipating such unintended consequences will be a key challenge in 

building a durable global antiterrorist environment.

The landscape within which terrorist ideologies spread and the United 

States and its partners in the global war on terror attempt to prevent them 

from spreading is at least as complex. In rough outline, it consists of at least six 
SOCIAL FACTORS 99

concentric circles of Muslim identity. Those in each circle perceive the world, 

their role in it, the challenges of modern life, and the utility of extremist ideologies differently. Each circle also has its own historical, cultural, social, economic, 

and political contexts that shape both its sense of threat and the likelihood that 

significant elements of their populations may be inclined to see extremism as a 

viable solution to its problems. The six concentric circles are:

■ the Arab core (including Arab North Africa)2

■ the non-Arab “greater Middle East”: Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

Turkey

■ traditionally Muslim societies in the non-Arab periphery: Malaysia, 

Indonesia

■ emerging Muslim nations: the Central Asian and Caucasian Republics, 

Bosnia, Albania, the Kurds3

■ traditionally Muslim minorities with deep historical roots: Thailand, 

Singapore, Cambodia, the Philippines, China, Russia

■ the Western Muslim diaspora: Western Europe, the United Kingdom, 

the United States, Canada, Australia, South America.

The goal of this chapter is to outline the links between the social factors underlying terrorism in general, and the relative importance they might 

play in the various concentric circles of Muslim identity. First, it outlines the 

six rings of identity focusing on the key differences in terms of unmet social 

needs and the role that Islam, militant or otherwise, might play in fulfilling 

them. Then it unpacks the paradoxes of social factors and terrorism in an effort to revisit some of the conventional wisdom that dominates discussions 

of the causes of terrorism. This analysis starts from the assumption that 

both everything and nothing explains terrorism. That is, each of the factors 

mentioned above contributes to the problem, but no single one contributes 

wholly, or even primarily, to it. 

Social Landscape of the Global Antiterrorist Project

Formal religious and political rhetoric notwithstanding, there exists 

great diversity within the Muslim world that affects how, where, and to what 

extent militant Islamic movements can, or will, take root. Every Muslim 

society has a unique historical, cultural, and social context within which 

political phenomena, including militant Islam and terrorism, unfold. Each 

society is unique, but this is not the place to delve into that level of detail. 

Instead, we can tackle the problem more generally by revisiting the six 

concentric circles of Muslim identity—the Arab core, the non-Arab greater 
Middle East, traditionally Muslim countries on the periphery, emerging 

Muslim nations, historic Muslim minorities, and the Muslim diaspora—and 

ask some general questions, the answers to which might provide insight into 

social approaches to building a global antiterrorist culture. What threats do 

people in each region think “Islam” can counter? What unmet needs might 

it fulfill? What national, ethnic, or other identities compete with militant 

Islam for loyalty? How strong are those identities? Who are the committed, 

charismatic influence elites who can tip opinion toward or away from support for terrorism? What kinds of messages are likely to resonate in each 

context? What is the social and cultural context within which an antiterrorist culture would have to emerge? What are the important sources of identity 

and cultural sensitivities? The answers to these sorts of questions provide 

important clues not only to how and why terrorism and support for terrorism might spread into a particular country or region, but also where effort 

might best be targeted to alleviate the discontents that facilitate the rise of 

militancy in order to build a global antiterrorist environment. 

The Arab Core

The Arab world is the intellectual and spiritual homeland as well as the 

holy land of Islam, and hence the center of global Muslim identity. Muslims 

the world over will always look to the Arab core as an important source of 

religious identity and will continue to care deeply about political and social 

events that affect the three holy cities: Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem (al Quds). 

In historic terms, the age of the Prophet, the rise of Islam to world power, and 

the cultural and intellectual flowering of the early caliphates—all of which 

took place in the Arab core—are seen as constituting the golden age of Islamic 

civilization. Theologically, the Arab core will always be influential because of 

its status as the birthplace of Islam and the importance Islamic teaching places 

on direct lines of authority from the Prophet, both in historical and familial 

terms. Linguistically, Arabic has traditionally been the lingua franca of Islamic 

intellectuals and the liturgical language of Muslims the world over. 

The historic sources of Arab militancy are familiar: the decline of ArabIslam from its cultural and strategic golden age, the subsequent humiliation 

of the Arab world at the hands of the West and Israel, the widespread disillusionment with secular nationalism, the economic and political stagnation 

of Arab societies under the influence of corrupt and incompetent ruling 

regimes, and the importance of Islam as the source of collective Arab identity. The specific desire to restore the historical glory and power of Islam 

through a resurrected global Islamic caliphate may be characteristic only of 

the rhetoric of global jihadists like Osama bin Laden, but even moderates 

express pain at the extent of the Arab world’s fall from greatness. 

100 ZIEMKE
SOCIAL FACTORS 101

Even in the theological realm, the Arab core has lost some of its former 

dominance. The intellectual center of gravity within Islam, whether militant 

or moderate, has been gradually shifting to the periphery, and most recently 

to the West. Increasingly, Muslim thinkers are writing as well as preaching in 

local tongues with an eye toward reaching a much broader audience among 

those for whom Arabic is merely a liturgical language. And just as Latin 

eventually lost its place as the liturgical language of the Catholic church 

with the grassroots shift toward the use of the vernacular in theological writing and preaching, so Arabic is increasingly being overtaken by English and 

other Western languages as the global umma (Muslim community) comes, 

increasingly, to rely on the Internet for interaction and exchange of ideas. 

Two sets of social factors seem most important in contributing to cultures of terrorism in the Arab core: those related to humiliation (such as the 

loss of status of orthodox Islamic learning institutions, economic stagnation, and poor development prospects) and those related to disempowerment (lack of representative political institutions, lack of free speech, personal economic deprivation, and unemployment). At present, the opinion 

elites who capture the public imagination are those, like bin Laden, who 

can strike out against the oppressors and those who comfort the insecure 

by spinning elaborate conspiracy theories that externalize the Arab world’s 

problems. To counter these factors, what is needed is a cadre of moderate 

voices of empowerment that can energize the Arab world—or, as in the case 

of Lebanon, crystallize and capitalize on the grassroots mood of empowerment—to look to the future, find a way to live peacefully with Israel, and 

take charge of and responsibility for its own fate. That might mean less U.S. 

influence in the near term, but it would lead to greater stability and prosperity in the region in the long run.

Non-Arab Greater Middle East

The non-Arab countries that are generally considered part of the 

greater Middle East—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—have histories that are entwined closely with that of the Arab world, but they maintain 

clear, and often consciously diametrical, cultural and national identities. All 

regard Islam as central to their cultural identity, and all but Turkey (with 

its avowedly secular constitution and political culture) have attempted to 

some degree to structure their societies according to Islamic guidelines. 

But all are also careful to distinguish themselves, culturally and institutionally, from the Arab core. All of these groups also share a problematic 

historical relationship with the Arabs, owing to linguistic, sectarian, and 

cultural differences. In addition, Turkey and Iran have both long pursued 

strategic dominance of the region. These non-Arab societies are also, for 
102 ZIEMKE

the most part, less emotionally invested in the Arab-Israeli conflict than 

are their Arab neighbors. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which has been the 

most active and vehement opponent of the Arab-Israeli peace process, has 

adopted its hard-line stance at least in part to distance itself from the Shah, 

who was a de facto Israeli ally, and to build common cause with Arab public 

opinion, especially in Lebanon.

In addition, these countries’ histories were shaped by their location on 

the borders between Muslim and non-Muslim civilizations. As a result, they 

have historically been less culturally homogeneous and somewhat more 

open to cosmopolitan influences than the Persian Gulf Arabs. Turkey has 

been strategically linked to Europe, Persia to Central Asia and Russia, Pakistan 

to Hindu India, and Afghanistan to Russia and the Indian subcontinent. 

Afghanistan has been, through most of its history, a world unto itself. While 

it became a primary base and staging area for global jihadist terrorism in the 

1990s, it is important to keep in mind that al Qaeda was an import, not a 

native growth. While ideologically sympathetic, the Taliban did not necessarily share al Qaeda’s global jihadi ambitions. The Afghans, through most 

of the period during which militant revivalist Islam emerged, were too busy 

fighting among themselves to think about exporting jihad. They draw a fairly 

clear distinction between their Islamic and cultural identities and those of 

the “Afghan Arabs,” who injected themselves into the war against the Soviet 

Union and then, like bad houseguests, refused to go home.

Within this circle, the terrorist culture is strongest in those societies—Afghanistan and Pakistan—that have weak unifying identities. Both 

countries are constantly teetering on the verge of becoming failed states. In 

both cases, relative deprivation and disempowerment are the social factors 

that contribute most directly to cultures of violence. The best hope for building a durable antiterrorist culture in these two societies is for them to forge 

unifying national visions that define the role of Islam in national life and 

political culture in a positive and relatively inclusive way. Pakistan’s national 

vision has always been “Islamic,” but it has never gelled into something 

more unifying and defining than being Pakistanis because they were not 

Hindus. The emergence of viable national visions, in turn, will depend on 

the emergence of charismatic leaders and civil institutions that can build a 

foundation for assimilation and integration of national identity based on a 

sense of pride and empowerment, but not necessarily cultural homogeneity. 

Both are countries that have too long been held together by external threats: 

Russia for Afghanistan, and India for Pakistan. In both societies, the charismatic leaders and institutions that are most likely to be able to build such an 

identity are religious in orientation, for the simple reason that civil cultures 

and institutions have been weak, corrupt, or nonexistent. In Iran and Turkey, 

the long-term prospect for building an antiterrorist culture will depend on 
SOCIAL FACTORS 103

the emergence of moderate Islamic voices and the ability of those voices to 

speak freely and openly challenge the status quo.

The Traditionally Muslim Periphery

The further Islam spread from its center on the Arabian Peninsula, the 

more diverse it became as local custom, religious practice, law, and superstitions were folded into the local versions of the faith. While the Arab core 

maintained its doctrinal and intellectual influence, which it periodically reasserted through reformist movements like Wahhabism, the Muslim world 

through most of its history lacked a strong social and cultural center. The 

salafist movement, whose name derives from the Arabic expression for “the 

pious ancestors,” advocates strict adherence to the letter of Koranic teaching and Islamic law as it is believed to have been practiced at the time of 

the Prophet and his companions. This movement is at the core of militant 

Islamism on the periphery. Reformist movements that attempted to purge 

the remnants of local pre-Islamic custom have surfaced periodically in these 

regions, but the current emphasis on outward cultural uniformity across the 

global umma is a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, the global umma, 

insofar as it sees the Muslim world as a single cultural entity, is itself a product of the globalization era.

Through most of their history, Muslims on the periphery have been 

culturally, historically, and geographically remote from the historical caliphate and the glory days of Arab political power. The demise of the political 

caliphate had few practical consequences outside the greater Middle East. 

The shifting of trade routes away from the Mediterranean and the ancient 

Silk Road, which marginalized the Arab world and undermined its former 

economic power, had the opposite effect on Muslim societies in South and 

Southeast Asia, which became the new crossroads of trade in the modern 

era, especially after the discovery of oil in Southeast Asia. The awareness of 

Islam’s “humiliation” at the hands of the West has symbolic importance for 

these societies, but it lacks the power of a shared historical trauma that it 

has in the Arab core. 

The social and political challenges that have shaped the political cultures of these traditionally Muslim societies of the periphery are legacies of 

decolonization and military dictatorship. Resentments tend to be focused 

on Western and global institutions that carry the stigma of colonialism or 

cultural and economic imperialism, particularly the World Bank and the 

International Monetary Fund. Islam has always been an important source 

of unity in these heterogeneous societies. In the years since independence 

and, especially in Indonesia, the more recent era of liberalization, Islamic 

identity provides a symbolic departure from both the frustration of colonial 

rule and the corruption of postcolonial secular regimes and martial law. In 
104 ZIEMKE

Malaysia, Islam has been integrated into the secular political culture from the 

beginning, and since 1999, Indonesia is seeing the emergence of a political 

culture (albeit a sometimes turbulent one) in which Islamic and secular nationalist parties work peacefully and effectively side by side. In most of these 

peripheral societies, the extreme tension between Islam and modernization 

has been less widespread, and the taste for puritanical fundamentalism is 

fairly localized. Indeed, by providing reliable cultural and social touchstones, 

Islam in some respects makes modernization, economic development, and, 

most recently, political reform safe.

The Muslim periphery has produced its share of militant Islamic revivalist movements, and both Indonesia and Malaysia have become centers 

of al Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiya activities. Nevertheless, the popular taste 

for militancy seems to be limited, although a lack of continued progress on 

economic and social justice could tip the balance in favor of militant views. 

Attitudes toward the West in general, and the United States in particular, are 

volatile in these societies and can respond quickly and negatively to events 

in the Middle East and U.S. actions in the war on terror that are perceived 

as anti-Islam. On the other hand, attitudes toward the United States saw 

dramatic improvement following military humanitarian operations in the 

wake of the 2004 tsunami (especially since U.S. forces were willing to deliver aid to regions that national governments had neglected, such as Aceh 

in Indonesia). In these societies, it is especially important not to conflate 

anti-Americanism with support for terrorism. 

It is also important, in working with regional governments in building 

an antiterrorist environment, not to link counterterrorism cooperation and 

aid to open endorsement of U.S. policy. For a host of domestic political reasons, regimes are unlikely to declare themselves allies of the United States 

or embrace the global scope of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. For them, 

terrorism is a local, internal security problem.4 Despite dire predictions in 

the late 1990s and the rise of anti-U.S. sentiment since the 1997 economic 

crisis, Indonesia’s democratic evolution seems to be moving toward moderate Islamism rather than either political collapse or “Talibanization,” as 

some predicted. The charismatic leaders in these peripheral Muslim societies 

tend to be pious populists who preach a message of political empowerment 

and self-sufficiency. 

The Emerging Muslim States

Most of these states, like the states in the greater Middle East, have 

histories deeply entwined with the Arab core, but they are histories whose 

continuity was broken by conquest and occupation. Bosnia and the emerging 

Muslim republics in the former Soviet Union have, through most of their 

modern history, found their social, political, and strategic interests closely 

linked with those of non-Muslim societies. The Kurds have struggled to 
SOCIAL FACTORS 105

maintain their unique ethnic identity under the domination of three Muslim states—Iraq, Iran, and Turkey—and have never achieved full national 

independence. As all these states regain their autonomy and strive to build 

new national identities, Islam is an important source of cultural and historical identity, but it has never been bound up with the way people defined 

either their ethnicity or their political culture as it was in much of the Arab 

core and the greater Middle East. Central Asia, moreover, has its own historical tradition as a cultural and intellectual center of Islam and does not, as 

do some of the peripheral Muslim states, look to the Arab core for guidance 

on how to live as Muslims. For the majorities in these societies, militant 

revivalist Islam is too severe, too destabilizing, and, most importantly, too 

“Arab” to gain widespread support or sympathy. 

The danger in these societies, especially those in former Soviet Central 

Asia, is that political and economic reform will move too slowly under the 

current generation of post-Soviet despots, presenting militant preachers and 

groups, who so far have found limited and localized support, with an increasingly target-rich environment as impatience rises. The cynical tendency 

of secular regimes in the region to use the specter of “Islamic extremism” 

as an excuse to crack down on political and economic opposition could 

further polish the image of Islamism in the eyes of a fed-up population. 

For the United States, the challenge in these areas is less to foster a new 

antiterrorist culture than to capitalize on what seems, for now, to be a relatively 

benign public perception of the West, the United States, and the forces of 

modernization and to prevent corrupt and repressive regimes from poisoning 

the well. If the still-repressive post-Soviet regimes do not reform voluntarily, 

popular uprisings to force liberalization and democratization are likely, and 

as events in Uzbekistan in the spring of 2005 clearly demonstrated, regime 

reactions could trigger significant violence. But as things stand, outbursts are 

more likely to follow the political models of Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan—secular, 

populist uprisings to end political and economic corruption—than the rigid 

and extreme Islamist model of Afghanistan. Charismatic leaders with a message of secular nationalism and political and economic reform in a Muslim 

context will find willing audiences in these countries, but these emergent political cultures are still vulnerable, and militant groups like the Hizbut Tahrir 

are poised to step in if reform comes too slowly.

Historic Muslim Minorities

Scattered throughout Asia are pockets of Muslim minorities who, by 

the fortunes of history, find themselves outside the boundaries of neighboring majority Muslim states. In many cases, their existence is an irritant to the 

dominant societies in which they find themselves. For these groups, the social 

factors that shape their attitudes toward militant revivalist Islam, and hence 

have the potential to foster in them a pro-terrorist culture, are simple and 
106 ZIEMKE

primal: physical and cultural security. Each of these groups sees (or has, at 

some time in the recent past, seen) itself under cultural siege because of its 

religious identity. Muslims in India, the Pattani Muslims in Thailand, and the 

Moros of the Philippines have all described themselves as victims of attempts 

at cultural genocide at the hands of religious majorities. In a few cases, the 

use of “genocide” is particularly fitting. The tiny Cham Muslim minority in 

Cambodia was virtually wiped out by the Khmer Rouge: no mosques and 

only a handful of ulamas survived the purge. The Cham have long been isolated from the mainstream Muslim world. They developed their own, unique 

style of Muslim religious practice, which includes elements of Buddhist and 

other local religious tradition, and have only recently gained the attention 

of revivalist Islamist missionaries. In other cases, such as the Moros in the 

Philippines, the Uighurs in China, and the Chechens in Russia, resistance to 

political and cultural domination has been longstanding. 

These Muslim minorities, for the most part, suffer from real economic 

and political marginalization and limited educational opportunities. Many 

lost their traditional livelihoods when agricultural lands were seized by central governments, and most found themselves isolated from their traditional 

economic and trade systems. In many cases, these minority Muslim populations reside in regions rich in natural resources that are exploited solely for the 

benefit of central governments, corporations, or agricultural conglomerates. 

In some cases, such as the Moros, the Uighurs, and the Chechens, government 

efforts to “assimilate” Muslim minorities stem primarily from economic 

motivations; but the rise of Islamist political theory in the early 20th century 

gave what had been a battle between local elites and colonial or government 

authority a new ideological and religious authority. And as has been the case 

in Central Asia, governments in China and Russia have used the “threat” of 

Islamist extremism as an excuse to step up their “assimilation” and crack 

down on resistance with minimal criticism from the West.

The emotionally empowering and charismatic messages of militants—

even those who, like the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, straddle the 

line between ideological and criminal terrorism—have great emotional appeal. In the Philippines, a new movement has emerged, the Rajah Solaiman 

Movement, devoted to the “re-Islamization” of the country. It has met with 

surprising success in converting Filipinos to Islam, at least in part by tapping 

into dissatisfaction with the status quo and presenting a revolutionary vision 

of Islam as a force for building social and economic justice. The jihadist 

groups have also become an important source of operational training,

technology, and logistical support (witness the recent appearance of al 

Qaeda–style improvised explosive devices, remote triggers, and coordinated 

attacks in Thailand and the Philippines, for example).5 It is less clear that the 
SOCIAL FACTORS 107

regional or global jihadi agendas of these militant groups have much political 

appeal with Muslim minority populations. For the most part, the militant 

groups among Muslim minorities fight for local interests—political and cultural autonomy and economic justice—and not for some abstract notion of a 

global Islamist caliphate. What these communities need and want is respect 

and security. Even in those cases in which autonomy is not a realistic option, 

the governments and minorities have to find a common ground of tolerance 

upon which to build and sustain an antiterrorist culture. The messages that 

resonate with these groups are social autonomy, the right to live according to 

their Islamic values and mores, and cultural survival.

The Muslim Diaspora

Like the Muslim minorities, a portion of the Muslim diaspora in the 

West sees itself as a group under cultural and social siege. Unlike the indigenous minority communities in Asia, however, the Muslims in the West 

often lack the strong sense of communal and cultural identity that can root 

a group to a specific tradition and place. Relative economic deprivation (in 

most Western European countries, Muslim populations remain disproportionately poor, less well educated, and politically underrepresented, even 

though they are, for the most part, better off than those who stayed behind 

in their homelands) breeds in them a sense of humiliation and resentment, 

and discrimination adds an additional dimension of personal humiliation. 

Alienated Muslims in Europe, in short, share many of the perceived grievances of Muslim minorities elsewhere (cultural and religious hostility, economic injustice, political inequality, limited opportunities, and no political 

voice) without the strong communal identity (I am a member of a proud and 

cohesive community that has a strong historical identity; and I must conduct myself 

in a way that is consistent with the values and well-being of that community) that 

is necessary to make progress (either by peaceful or violent means) toward 

improving their future.

For these Muslims, a new sort of Islam has evolved to provide a source 

of identity that unifies individuals from diverse cultural, ethnic, and social 

backgrounds. As the experience of Hassidic Judaism demonstrates, the 

de-territorialization of religious identities is an extremely effective way of 

reviving and maintaining religious identity and holding modernization and 

cultural assimilation at bay among a people in diaspora. Ultra-Orthodox 

Jews are virtually indistinguishable culturally (including their dress, manners, and use of the Yiddish language) wherever they live in the world (since 

the Holocaust, primarily in North America and Jerusalem, where they tried 

to rebuild their devastated communities). Individual Hassidic communities 

draw their identity from the rebbe (spiritual teacher) who leads them, and 
108 ZIEMKE

the divisions within the movement are sometimes bitter. Because the community identifies with its leader rather than with a particular place, the community is wherever the leader is. Salafist Islam in the West has developed a 

similar enclave culture. Followers of particular sheiks (teachers, preachers, 

and spiritual leaders who may or may not have formal religious educations) 

live in closely knit and culturally quarantined self-segregation. And just as 

Yiddish replaced Hebrew as the language of Jews in diaspora in the 18th

century, under a combination of influences (the Internet, the emergence of 

second- and third-generation European Muslims for whom Arabic is merely 

a liturgical language, the multicultural nature of the global Islamic revivalist 

movement, and the concentration of some of its most charismatic sheiks in 

the United Kingdom), English is replacing Arabic as the lingua franca of the 

global Muslim revivalist movement.

It is important to draw a distinction between those Muslims—in most 

countries a minority of the Muslim community—who still regard themselves 

as outsiders in exile in a hostile, or at least alien, land and those who have 

assimilated into Western society to some degree and think of themselves 

as European Muslims or Muslim Americans. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 

remain the most segregated ethnic communities in the United Kingdom, for 

example, but they are becoming increasingly economically assimilated and 

have even begun participating in politics at the local level.6 Even the most 

segregated revivalist Muslim enclaves in Europe are largely not involved in 

political violence (most, in fact, shun political involvement of any kind). 

Perhaps more than in any other ring of the Muslim community, it is vital 

that the United States and its allies focus a great deal of effort and thought on 

expanding the antiterrorist culture across the Muslim diaspora. Often lacking traditional community, extended family, and religious ties, this group is 

vulnerable to the messages of individual spiritual renewal, belonging, shared 

identity, and righteous destiny preached by militant revivalist missionaries 

from the Arab core and the greater Middle East. Encouraging moderate voices 

from within the Western Muslim community (including traditionalists and 

even revivalists) and reaching out to the disaffected and deprived immigrant 

communities in large Western cities will be crucial to the overall effort to fostering a global antiterrorist environment. The difficulty in building a sense 

of patriotic identity among European Muslims is attributable as much to the 

nature of European societies as of the Muslim communities themselves. Unlike the United States, where patriotic assimilation is the foundation of national identity and cultural differences are accepted so long as a community 

embraces the dominant civic values, European countries have little history 

of assimilation upon which to build. For them, the presence of “foreign” 

communities that cling to external signs of cultural difference is new and 

threatening to their historical identities. The challenge for Europe is to find 
SOCIAL FACTORS 109

ways to cultivate a stronger patriotic identity among its Muslims that does 

not necessarily require them to submit to total cultural assimilation.

Social Paradoxes of Terrorism

Having considered the characteristics and concerns of the populations 

of each of the six concentric rings of Muslim identity, it is now necessary 

to examine the specific social factors within each ring that contribute to 

participation in and support for terrorism. As noted at the outset, the monocausal relationships that are often posited between such factors as poverty, 

illiteracy, oppression, psychopathology, and religious fundamentalism on 

the one hand and terrorism on the other are not able to withstand serious 

scrutiny. Nevertheless, these factors do have a bearing on the way each ring 

of the Muslim community relates to the terrorist phenomenon, often in 

some quite unexpected ways.

Poverty

One of the most surprising elements of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington was the fact that the terrorist 

entrepreneurs who planned the plot and the pilots who carried it out came 

from relatively well-off, middle-class backgrounds. The 13 “muscle hijackers” who subdued passengers came from less affluent circumstances, most 

from the underdeveloped tribal hinterlands of Saudi Arabia. All were young, 

unemployed, and all but two had no more than high school educations. 

None came from grinding poverty, but all had seen the economic well-being of their families and tribes decline from the heyday of Saudi economic 

largesse.7 It has long been an axiom of the “addressing root causes” school 

that terrorism is a product of the roiling frustration and rage of chronically 

underprivileged and economically deprived people. In truth, in the traditionally Muslim world, poverty turns out not to be a particularly strong 

indicator of radicalization. The assumption of a link between poverty and 

terrorism stems, in part, from the fact that the rise of militant Islam in the 

Muslim world, and especially among Muslim minorities in the West, coincided with the mass migration of Muslims from rural to urban areas, and 

from their homelands to Europe and North America in search of gainful 

employment. This migration resulted in a dramatic and visible increase in 

the number of people living in abject poverty in cities like Cairo and the rise 

of expanding ghettos of underprivileged, semi-assimilated Muslim minorities in the cities of Europe and North America.8

Dislocation stemming from mass migration and the resulting cultural 

and social alienation are, to be sure, important contributing factors in the 

rise of militant Islamic movements. But it is not poverty, per se, that causes it. 
110 ZIEMKE

In fact, none of the world’s poorest societies have produced terrorist movements or even contributed significant numbers of their citizens to terrorist 

organizations. It is more the sense of disempowerment that contributes to 

the sort of rage that leads a person to follow a terrorist or jihadi leader. Two 

other concepts are more useful in thinking about the links between socioeconomic factors and terrorist activity and support: harshness and relative 

economic deprivation. Graham Fuller explains that “harsh conditions will 

routinely produce a higher degree of violent individuals than do comfortable 

societies.”9 Harsh societies are, of course, often characterized by widespread 

poverty and fear, and living in such societies surely contributes to the creation 

of a militant. Cultures of violence—collective worldviews, values, and habits 

of thought that condone or even celebrate violence as a means of vicarious 

empowerment—are the natural outgrowth of such harshness. This is almost 

certainly the case in the refugee camps of Palestine, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, 

where grinding poverty is endemic. Likewise, among separatist Muslim 

communities in Aceh (Indonesia) and minority enclaves in the Philippines, 

Thailand, and Cambodia, poverty and fear are certainly part of the harshness 

of life and contribute to often longstanding separatist aspirations. 

Relative economic deprivation is an important factor in understanding 

the social origins of terrorism on both a macro and a micro level. At the macro 

level, many in the Islamic world perceive that globalization and Western (read: 

U.S.) cultural and economic imperialism have malign influences on Muslim 

societies. According to this worldview, these societies are failing to keep pace 

economically with the West and Asia because of corrupt and incompetent 

regimes shored up by a rapacious West that seeks to plunder Muslim societies 

(particularly their oil) and keep them economically dependent for its own 

economic benefit and material well-being. In the Arab world, the sense of 

relative decline can be traced to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when Arab regimes 

were humiliated by Israel and lost control of Jerusalem and the West Bank. At 

about the same time, the fundamental feebleness of Arab statist economies 

became undeniable, and economic development stagnated. In Southeast 

Asia, the resentments have emerged more recently and have intensified since 

the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Most Indonesians and Malaysians believe 

their collapse from the economic boom days of the “Asian Tigers” in the early 

1990s was triggered by the predatory lending practices of the International 

Monetary Fund and World Bank. 

On the micro level, individuals in many Muslim societies—particularly 

in the Arab world—perceive their present economic and social status as out 

of line with their education, capabilities, family tradition, and customary 

social status. Among historical Muslim minorities, the sense of deprivation 

often stems from three additional factors: the loss of historical status as 
SOCIAL FACTORS 111

independent communities, the disruption of traditional economic and trade 

structures, and the economic exploitation of local resources by non-Muslim 

elites and regimes that often leaves Muslim communities in poverty. The 

result is a class perception of relative social and economic decline, especially 

in the lower-middle and merchant classes. At all levels, fear of becoming 

economically and socially marginal is keen. In this sense, Islamist terrorists 

come from the same socio-political environment that produced fascism and 

other religious extremist movements: the lower-middle class, petty merchant class, and actual or former peasantry. These groups have historically 

been, and continue to be, the ones that live in constant fear of economic 

marginalization and stand to lose the most in the downward redistribution 

of wealth that often results from economic modernization. Terrorist and 

jihadi movements impart to the insecure sons of the middle class, many of 

whom have had to delay marriage and family for economic reasons, the notion that they have a vital role to play and mission to fulfill in a cosmic war 

between good and evil. In a world in which their milieu and their futures 

seem increasingly beyond their control, these men, mostly young, find for 

themselves a glorious destiny and values other than economic achievement 

that separate them from the crowd and, often, from what they see as the 

dreary, spiritually empty lives of their petit-bourgeois parents.

Education and Literacy

The widely held premise that high levels of literacy can be a barrier 

to the spread of militant ideology is true—sometimes. Militant Islam has 

been relatively slow to catch on in the emerging Muslim republics of Central 

Asia and in Bosnia, in no small part because of the nearly full literacy of 

those states—a legacy of the Soviet era. In these cases, not only does literacy 

inoculate the public mind against the simplistic messages of many militant 

groups, it also enables citizens interested in learning more about Islam or 

national affairs to gather and compare information from a number of different sources.10 Moreover, Central Asia’s own long history as an intellectual 

center of Islam has become an important part of the national myths of these 

emerging nations. Despite a century of Russian and then Soviet cultural 

imperialism, Central Asian Islam managed to maintain a strong sense of its 

identity. Ironically, Soviet literacy policy (designed to facilitate the propagation of socialist ideology) enabled underground mosques and Islamic study 

groups to keep the study of Islamic texts alive and even vibrant in Central 

Asia. In the post-Soviet period, Central Asia has not proven the ideological 

and religious tabula rasa that many assumed it would be. Its Islamic intelligentsia regards itself as fully capable of guiding its own faith community 

and has been highly resistant to the “Arabization” of Central Asian Islam.11
112 ZIEMKE

Meanwhile, much has been made in the post-9/11 terrorism literature of 

the role of radical madrassas, many Saudi-funded, in cranking out semiliterate, 

zealous, radicalized prototerrorists burning to take up the sword of jihad (or 

the vest of the suicide bomber) against Israel and the West. These institutions 

are a legitimate source of deep concern and present a particular challenge in 

the stabilization of fragile moderate regimes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

parts of Southeast Asia. It is imperative that the creation of a public education 

system worthy of the name, that teaches a moderate and modern curriculum 

to boys and girls, be a key component of any project to build a durable antiterrorist environment. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the only funding for 

religious education (or, too often, for education of any kind) in the Afghan 

refugee camps, among the tribal populations of Western Pakistan, in remote 

provinces of Indonesia, and among Muslim minorities in the Philippines 

came from Saudi Arabia or militant, often jihadi, Muslim charities. 

The tragic irony is that these Saudi-funded madrassas gradually devolved 

into a virulent variety of Islamic militancy that is not even tolerated inside 

the puritanical Saudi Kingdom. In the majority of these institutions, students 

(all boys) study only Islam—no math, no science, no world history or literature. The boys learn by rote, memorizing the Koran and reciting the Hadith, 

and are inculcated with a dread of modernity and fear and hatred of the 

United States as the Great Satan, a mortal enemy dedicated to the destruction 

of Islam and of all Muslims. In Pakistan alone, some 7,000 madrassas feed, 

house, and teach hundreds of thousands of boys and young men who will 

graduate with an intellectual command of nothing but militant Islam, no 

understanding of the outside world, no analytical or technical skills to function in a modern economy, and a belief that martyrdom for their faith would 

be the highest achievement within their reach.12 In Southeast Asia, religious 

schools (known there as pesantrens, pondoks, or pusakas) have a long history of 

principled resistance to local and imperial authority, but their agendas have 

not necessarily been coopted by the jihadists. Individual militant ringleaders have come out of such schools, but the numbers are small; one survey 

conducted out of Singapore concluded that only 10 of 40,000 such schools 

monitored had avowedly militant Islamist or jihadi curricula, and most of 

those had been closed or reformed.13 The governments in the region monitor 

the curriculums of these institutions, but express concern about the “hidden curriculum”—the culture of hatred and radicalism—that is promoted in 

small social and study circles outside the classroom.

In respect to the global jihadi threat, however, an equally serious 

problem has emerged in higher education in much of the Muslim world, 

including (and perhaps especially) among Muslims educated at Western 

universities. Public education in the Muslim Middle East has traditionally 
SOCIAL FACTORS 113

been state-sponsored and designed to serve state interests. It does little more 

than crank out aspiring mid-level bureaucrats for whom the state can no 

longer provide meaningful employment. With the exception of a very few 

Western-sponsored institutions of higher learning (such as the American 

universities in Beirut and Cairo), there are no private universities to challenge state schools or introduce principles of critical thinking in the intellectual traditions of the region.14 In much of the greater Middle East, religious 

schools provide the only alternative to deficient public education. As a 

result, the number of students pursuing advanced degrees in religious studies has increased dramatically, in some places outstripping the other social 

sciences and humanities. These graduates, in turn, enter the job market in 

their homelands and demand the Islamization of public education in order 

to improve their own job prospects. The Saudi export of madrassas during 

the era of “Petro-Islam” in the 1970s and 1980s provided a valuable alternative job market for religious teachers who might otherwise have posed 

an internal stability threat to the Saudi regime.15 But the problem is not 

just a Middle Eastern one. European Muslims seeking advanced religious 

education have few options, as there are no Islamic universities in Europe. 

The emergence of an indigenous, moderate European Muslim identity will 

depend, in large part, on the ability of European governments and Muslim 

leaders to cooperate to provide educational alternatives to the foreign, and 

too often militant, ulamas and imams sent from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Yemen 

to teach Islam to young Europeans.

Graduates of Middle Eastern Islamic studies programs who find their 

prospects limited at home (due to lack of connections or of skill) have 

taken their diplomas on the road (often with financial support from their 

governments or from Islamic nongovernmental organizations), establishing 

their own madrassas in distant Muslim communities in need of “reform” or 

“Islamic revival.” At first, these itinerant Islamic “scholars” settled in the 

Muslim hinterlands—the Afghan refugee camps of tribal Pakistan, the remote islands of Indonesia, tribal Sudan—but in recent years they have found 

a burgeoning market among the Muslim minority communities of Southeast Asia and Western Europe, the United Kingdom, and North America. 

Global radical and jihadi movements are growing fastest among relatively 

well-educated Muslims, many of whom have been schooled, employed, and 

often radicalized in the West. The result of this export of Islamic studies 

graduates is the emergence of a new, globalized brand of Islam that has 

taken on a distinctly fundamentalist/revivalist and salafist tinge. The movements have thrived and reached their ideological peak in the West largely as 

a result of two factors: the greater academic and religious freedom of Western 

European and American societies, which allows militant sheiks to teach and 
114 ZIEMKE

preach more or less unimpeded (especially in Britain and Spain, a source 

of some tension with their European Union partners),16 and the tendency 

of Muslims studying in the West to pursue technical and engineering programs in which they are less likely to be exposed to Western traditions of 

critical thinking and challenging intellectual authority. 

The driving force of this brand of radicalization is not illiteracy and 

ignorance but the intense anti-intellectualism that characterizes fundamentalist movements of all faith traditions. Historian Richard Hofstadter identified three pillars of anti-intellectualism in America that clearly apply as 

well to the Muslim world: evangelical (or revivalist)17 religion, pragmatism, 

and populism. Anti-intellectualism is suspicious of moral relativism and 

specialized knowledge, especially in the realm of faith and theology. Most 

movements in the West have grown on the backs of religious “entrepreneurs” 

who are brilliant businessmen and charismatic religious figures. Few sell 

themselves as scholars of their faith; rather, they preach an emotional “oldtime religion” and sow suspicion of religious as well as secular “eggheads.”18

Bin Laden is, by all credible accounts, just such a modern, anti-intellectual 

revivalist leader. He is a capable civil engineer, a pragmatic and effective 

man of business, and an untrained but charismatic preacher whose faith 

and piety are emotional rather than intellectual and have been legitimized 

by a deep commitment to jihad in defense of the faith rather than formal 

religious education.19 

Fundamentalist religious education does not encourage critical thinking. A strict emphasis on the letter of scripture and religious law does not 

encourage questions, alternative interpretations, or the incorporation or 

tolerance of other religious and intellectual approaches. This ideological 

rigidity and absolute certainty serve these movements well in the recruitment of young people. Militant ideologies have spread most readily among 

young Muslims raised in urban environments by middle-class, professional 

parents. They received secular education but little or no traditional religious 

training and, as young adults, find their professional prospects limited and 

seek spiritual meaning in their lives. Those who do not want to commit to 

the years of study and seeking necessary to earn genuine religious enlightenment are seduced by the emotional intensity and instant gratification of the 

revivalist movements. The simple, immediate answers and absolute truths 

of revivalism appeal to both their youthful impatience and their often technical educational backgrounds.20

Oppression and Liberalization

History shows that the only guaranteed cure for terrorism is oppressive authoritarianism. In truly repressive societies, the downtrodden masses 
SOCIAL FACTORS 115

develop a degree of fatalism. They may blame their government for their 

sad lot in life, but they are also likely to accept it as the will of God, or 

the natural order of things. “Untouchables,” as Crane Brinton, the dean of 

historians of revolution, wrote, “very rarely revolt against God’s authority.”21

Organized terrorist movements were almost nonexistent in Nazi Germany, 

Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, Fascist Spain, or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as 

they are in North Korea today. As historian Walter Laqueur has explained, 

the reasons for this apparent paradox are fairly obvious: “terrorism [does] 

not stand much of a chance against political regimes able to use unrestricted 

force against them [sic], unhampered by laws, considerations of human 

rights, and public protests.”22 To put it another way, when the government 

itself is a terrorist organization, amateurs stand little chance of entering the 

market and being competitive. 

Still, if actual oppression is not a factor in the rise of terrorism and 

public support for it, perceived oppression certainly is. At the heart of 

the ideology of every terrorist movement is the theme that the community the terrorists purport to represent is under mortal attack. In the 

most extreme cases of millennial terrorist ideologies—those of al Qaeda 

and Aum Shinrikyo, for example—prosaic political conflict is magnified 

and transformed into cosmic spiritual confrontations. It ultimately does 

not matter if the perceived oppression reflects reality, or even if the communities the terrorists claim to protect actually believe themselves in 

need of rescue, let alone see the terrorists as legitimate agents to act on 

their behalf. Militants and terrorists, especially those who believe their 

mandate comes from God, will continue to act as though they and their 

use of violence have popular legitimacy. The more successful their actions are, especially actions against a broadly resented target such as the 

United States, the more legitimate they become in the eyes of the disgruntled 

and alienated.

The most dangerous periods in the rise of major, influential militant 

revivalist movements and, in particular, in the emergence of terrorist organizations with significant popular support are periods of transition: either 

the collapse of an authoritarian regime (the dissolution of the Soviet Union 

in the mid-1990s and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003) or 

the liberalization of an existing regime in response either to internal (Latin 

America in the 1980s and 1990s) or external (Iran in the late 1970s and 

Palestine in the early and mid-1990s) forces. Under authoritarian regimes, 

the rules of the political game are fixed to ensure the continuation of the 

status quo, and for all but the most extreme and zealous opponents, the 

risks of open resistance are too high. That does not mean, of course, that 

reformist sentiments do not exist. Soviet Central Asia is a case in point. 
116 ZIEMKE

During the Soviet era, Moscow suppressed the free and open practice of 

Islam, and Islamic political groups were officially forbidden. But a devoted 

cadre of Central Asian Muslims met and studied underground and stood 

ready to capitalize on liberalization when it finally did occur. Moreover, 

when the pressure of repression is finally lifted, even a little, the opening 

stages are likely to be characterized by a chaotic ideological landscape in 

which extremists compete fairly effectively, at least initially.

Historians of revolution have long understood that the most dangerous periods in the political evolution of nations are not when the society is 

burdened with widespread poverty. They come when people’s lives are getting better but an inept regime is unable or unwilling to ensure that change 

keeps pace with popular expectations. Revolutionary movements are born 

of hope and rising expectations: it happened to the regimes of George III 

and Louis XVI, to Tsar Nicholas II, and to the Shah of Iran—each of whom 

responded to national crisis by making symbolic but wholly inadequate 

concessions to moderate reformers. But history would indicate that a country cannot be a little bit democratic. As Brinton put it, in societies that have 

experienced revolutions, “the governments seem to have been relatively inefficient, and the governed relatively impatient.”23 Especially in the modern 

age of instantaneous communication, greater openness is likely to afford 

populations unprecedented access to the outside world, resulting in a sense 

of relative deprivation even where economic and political realities at home 

are improving dramatically, as was the case in the Peoples’ Republic of China 

in the period leading up to the Tiananmen Square massacre. The difference 

between Iran and China was that, unlike the Shah, the Chinese Communist 

Party leadership was able and willing to give the Chinese people the changes 

they wanted—economic and social liberalization—while keeping the lid 

on expectations regarding political change. One cannot help but wonder 

whether some of the nostalgia for the old communist order in places like 

Russia and East Germany stems at least in part from a desire to return to the 

relative innocence that comes from repression.

Another factor in the rise of militant sentiments is the displacement 

of responsibility—the tendency to blame political authorities and foreign 

manipulation for hardships rather than accepting personal or community 

responsibility for disappointments and setbacks. This sort of displacement 

of responsibility is fairly common in Western democracies and is a major 

trigger for the anti-globalization and anti-immigrant movements that have 

developed increasingly high profiles, even in one of the most self-consciously 

tolerant of Western countries: the Netherlands. In societies undergoing significant political and economic reform with little historical experience of 

the vagaries of the process, during which expectations escalate quickly and 
SOCIAL FACTORS 117

inevitably overtake real progress (which is often halting, at best), it is virtually 

inevitable.24 Militant movements are well placed to capitalize on the smoldering resentments of a disappointed or impatient populace.25 Moreover, the 

intense religious group identity that usually characterizes such movements 

provides a comforting sense of roots and collective identity for societies in 

transition. In the past decade or so, that frustration has been channeled into 

public support for militant fundamentalist and Islamist movements and, to a 

somewhat lesser degree, for terrorist figures. In a more representative Middle 

East, political parties—whether Islamist or not—will find the temptation 

to capitalize on that long-smoldering anti-U.S. sentiment irresistible come 

campaign time. Add to this already unstable mix the fact that the religious 

revivalism underlying many radical and reformist movements is characterized by hyper-emotionalism, and it seems surprising that popular support 

for the militant agenda is not greater across the Muslim world than it is.

So why isn’t it? The reason seems to be that there is a natural ceiling 

to the amount of political capital that terrorists and militants can garner 

through devastating but still largely symbolic terrorist attacks against distant Western targets. Michael Scheuer, among others, has made a persuasive 

(although not yet conclusive) argument that al Qaeda and bin Laden are 

waging not a terrorist campaign but a global Islamist insurgency with the 

strategic aim of forcing the West out of the Muslim world and establishing 

a global Islamic caliphate.26 He is almost certainly correct in his contention 

that there is virtually nothing the United States can do through “public diplomacy” to change negative public perceptions of the United States in the 

Muslim world or the surges of bin Laden’s and al Qaeda’s popularity when 

terrorists succeed in striking Western targets. But his justifiably pessimistic 

assessment of the situation misses one subtle but potentially important factor. Historically, the committed support base for militant movements like 

al Qaeda has been significant, but not widespread. Beyond that committed 

base, public support for the militants is soft—at best tacit, and at worst little 

more than temporary band-wagoning. 

In order to achieve any long-term strategic aims, militant groups have 

to move out of the shadow world of global terrorism and earn (or seize) 

domestic political power. And given their almost universal lack of peaceful 

political experience, the only way militant terrorist groups have seen to gain 

power is to bring the terror campaign home. Yet in every recent case—in 

Egypt in 1997, in Saudi Arabia in 2004, and in Lebanon in 2005—the result 

of a major, high-profile campaign of terrorist violence in the homeland was 

exactly the opposite of what the militants hoped for. In each case, it led 

to a virtual evaporation of “soft” public support for the terrorists and the 

militant movements they represent. Destroying Western embassies, hotels 
118 ZIEMKE

full of Israeli tourists, and even the Pentagon and World Trade Center may 

be interpreted as giddy symbolic victories against a perceived evil oppressor, 

but destroying economic infrastructure and killing innocents and beloved 

public figures at home has turned out to be a bridge too far. This is wholly 

consistent with history. Militant extremists want to reform society and the 

hearts of men to build a moral and political “heaven on earth.” But humans 

and their society are not so malleable. Militant attempts to force change 

through strict legal enforcement, terror, and physical extortion ultimately 

fail, and power eventually settles somewhere well short of the extreme. In 

the long run, in Brinton’s words, “the constant prevails.”27

Psychopathologies and Social-Psychological Contagions. For decades, 

psychological researchers have sought to explain why individuals become 

terrorists or join terrorist movements. Aside from identifying the odd paranoid schizophrenic (such as Shoko Asahara, the founder and leader of Aum 

Shinrikyo) among the ranks of terrorists, psychology has found no convincing evidence that terrorists show any greater tendency toward mental illness 

or instability than the general population. In fact, quite the opposite is the 

case. Terrorist organizations like the Irish Republican Army and al Qaeda 

carefully cull mentally unstable recruits because their lack of impulse control could undermine operational security. The mentally less-than-stable 

may be somewhat more common in the rank and file, particularly among 

the ranks of suicide terrorists, but these individuals (like Richard Reid, the 

so-called shoe bomber, and some of the Palestinian suicide bombers) are 

generally walk-ins or last-minute recruits who are kept on the periphery of 

the movement, isolated from operational planning.

Terrorists, and particularly terrorist elites, do share some basic similarities in their social and psychological development. Most are well educated, often in technical and professional disciplines (engineering seems 

especially common), and are frequently radicalized while still in school 

(most often in their mid-20s to early 30s). They are highly idealistic but in 

an abstract way—most show little remorse or pity for the real people whom 

they injure or kill—and they see themselves not as murderers or criminals 

but as agents of justice and/or righteousness. Many hold the conviction that 

they are avenging wrongs done against their parents and grandparents, and, 

in this sense, their acts of violence can be quite personal.28 While most feel 

deep alienation from society, sometimes bordering on (or crossing the line 

into) sociopathology, they seldom display any outward signs of their rage 

or of their violent predilections.29 Others harbor a deep conviction that they 

are divinely guided and often possess the ability to convince others of their 

unique contact with the divine. 

Whether acting out of vengeance or divine guidance (or both), terrorist elites and their followers dehumanize and demonize the “other”—the 
SOCIAL FACTORS 119

societies against which they aim their violence—as embodiments of evil in 

a great cosmic confrontation. The function of dehumanization is twofold. 

First, it transforms a prosaic enemy into a cosmic threat and thus a target 

worthy of violence and undeserving of mercy or pity. Second, it creates a 

stronger sense of membership in an elite and righteous in-group.30 Jerrold 

Post, among others, has developed detailed psychological profiles and analyses of terrorist elites like Osama bin Laden that provide insights into their 

individual motivations, but these offer few insights that are generalizable 

to the broader movement, let alone to the terrorists’ popular support base. 

They are thus of limited utility in understanding the landscape of social 

factors that lead to the culture of terrorism. 

Terrorism, as Mark Juergensmeyer and others have pointed out, is 

seldom a solitary act. Even if individual masterminds are sociopathic or 

mentally ill, they must have sufficient social skills to identify and capitalize 

on shared anxieties and traumas and enlist and sustain a support structure. 

Thus, most terrorism is the product not of individual psychology but of what 

Clifford Geertz calls a “cultural system”: underlying patterns of thought, 

worldviews, and the ideological or religious meanings that groups attach to 

their actions.31 It is important to keep in mind that most of the rank and file 

of terrorist organizations consists of young adult men, ranging in age from 

late teens to early thirties. Apparently they join jihadi groups for the same 

reasons young adult men forge other social relationships: in pursuit of social 

status, glamour, power, prestige, brother- or sisterhood, and perhaps for the 

financial compensations sometimes promised to their surviving families. 

Alienation, dislocation, desire for meaning in one’s life and actions, and humiliation—common denominators in the cultural systems 

of terrorists—can be found among young adults in almost any society. 

Social psychologists have long understood that while individual character 

traits predispose some people to violence, those traits do not in and of 

themselves explain violent behavior. More important, however, social psychology also provides useful insight into how social contexts lead otherwise 

mentally stable and even highly moral individuals who would normally 

abhor violence to take part in, or tacitly condone, heinous acts of violence 

even against innocents. Group-think and authoritarian pressure (whether 

real or perceived) consistently lead to riskier, crueler behavior and a greater 

willingness to commit or at least accede to violent acts than individuals 

would ever undertake on their own. As social psychologist Stanley Milgram 

warned in 1974: “The social psychology of this century reveals a major lesson: it is not so much the kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in 

which he finds himself that determines how he will act.”32

What are the social contexts that account for the rise in some societies of larger, more complex terrorist organizations and, more important, 
120 ZIEMKE

widespread popular tolerance, support, and sometimes adulation of them 

and their actions among individuals who would otherwise abhor or at least 

not embrace violence? If we must accept that in any society at any time, 

there will be some individuals who act on a predisposition to violence 

by committing terrorist acts, how can we identify the tipping point for 

the emergence of broader terrorism and terrorist support? Why is it that 

a society can live in relative poverty and political repression for years, or 

even decades, and then suddenly produce a mega-terrorist movement with 

widespread social support?

Three key factors contribute to the rise of social epidemics.33 The first is 

the rise of a cadre of committed individuals with particular social gifts: they 

are well and widely connected (through educational, social, political, and/

or religious networks); they are outgoing and eager to talk to their friends, 

families, and acquaintances one to one or in small groups about their ideologies; and at least a few of them are particularly persuasive and are able to 

convince the uncertain that their ideologies are reasonable, attractive, and 

satisfying. The second factor is the emergence of a message that lingers in 

people’s minds. Instead of simply raging at injustice, for example, Osama 

bin Laden and Hamas have propagated an empowering, jihadist message of 

action—what 19th-century anarchists called the “propaganda of the deed.” 

The final factor is the context within which the message spreads. Context refers to not only the broad social environment (although that is important), but also the social and political networks within which the ideology 

is propagated. Intentionally or not, the cellular structure of most radical 

Islamic and terrorist groups is ideally suited to starting and sustaining a 

social epidemic. According to the “Rule of 150,” borrowed from marketing, it is more effective to establish a network of small, targeted movements 

in groups of less than 150 individuals than to attempt to reach an entire 

society with a single message.34 The Rule of 150 is important in the rise of 

radical movements for two reasons: first, 150 seems to be the largest group 

within which individuals can exchange and absorb information effectively; 

second, it seems to be the largest group over which a leader can exercise 

ideological influence and discipline. In this sense, the traditional social 

and religious structures of the Muslim world (especially the tendency for 

believers to affiliate themselves with a specific religious teacher based on 

the congeniality of his message rather than, as in most Christian denominations, based on geographic parish boundaries)—even as they have been 

adapted and mutated in the West—lend themselves to the propagation of 

radical ideologies.

Identity Crises. A reason for the apparent glass ceiling that limits committed popular support for militant Islamic movements in most of the 
SOCIAL FACTORS 121

traditionally Muslim world is that even the highly emotional Muslim revivalist identity must, in Muslim homelands, compete with a hierarchy of 

identities that are often more deeply ingrained: sectarian, national, tribal, 

ethnic, and linguistic, to name just a few. In the majority of cases, conflicts—whether political or military—historically have had more to do with 

those traditional identities than with purely religious ones. One of the main 

reasons pan-Arabist and pan-Islamist movements have consistently failed 

in the past, despite their rhetorical and emotional appeal, is that neither 

could overcome the centrifugal forces of national and ethnic identities. 

Even in those areas, such as Iraq, where the internal political landscape is 

in turmoil, terrorists and militants risk undermining their own cause when 

they are seen to be a threat to those older and broader identities. 

In the January 2005 Iraqi elections, for example, a surprising number 

of ordinary citizens demonstrated an unexpected degree of patriotism in 

their stubborn and courageous resistance to the insurgents’ attempts to disrupt and delegitimize the democratic process. Politically successful Islamist 

parties—including the most extremist ones like Hezbollah in Lebanon and 

the clerical conservatives in Iran—continue to operate almost exclusively in 

the context of national politics, pursue largely nationalist agendas (as they 

define them), and do not embrace an international caliphate as part of their 

political agenda. Even in the case of Afghanistan, the distinction must be 

drawn between the Taliban, which seemed content to inflict its miserable 

brand of puritanical rule only on its fellow Afghans, and al Qaeda, their 

invited but ultimately catastrophic Arab guests.

This rule of multiple competing identities does not seem to apply 

among Muslims in the West, particularly young second- and third-generation children of immigrants. While they may retain a superficial identification with the homelands and native cultures of their parents, they have no 

roots there. Unfortunately, large numbers of young Muslims in the West 

are not fully established in their adopted home societies either. Even where 

governments have made concerted efforts to facilitate assimilation, such 

as in the Netherlands and France, success has been limited, and the effort 

as often results in friction as in mutual understanding. While there are, of 

course, many individual success stories in Western Muslim communities, 

the hard reality is that Muslims in the West, particularly in Western Europe, 

suffer relative economic, educational, and political deprivation. 

This identity crisis sets up a target-rich environment for militant clerics 

and sheiks looking for recruits to their anti-Western and anti-secular cause. 

Increasingly, young Muslims are isolating themselves in ideological ghettos 

in large European cities, which makes them both less likely to assimilate successfully and more likely to embrace violent militant ideologies. The sense of 
122 ZIEMKE

being downtrodden that derives from poverty or low socioeconomic status 

is aggravated by a lack of self-identity.35 The first waves of migration—from 

either rural to urban or Muslim to non-Muslim societies—were not, for the 

most part, meant to be permanent but were seen as temporary economic 

expedients. This self-defined temporary status, combined with the hostility 

or indifference of host societies, prevented assimilation, but as their economic roots deepened, it became more difficult to return home. As a result, 

the second generation had a foot in both worlds. They identified with their 

“homelands” religiously and politically, but had no real experience of living 

in Muslim society (or, in some cases, of even living as Muslims). Those who 

tried to return often found themselves as out of place “at home” as they 

were in their birthplaces in the West. 

The Islamic revival movements from which the terrorist and jihadi 

groups have emerged provide culturally rootless young Muslims a source 

of identity.36 Their conspicuous piety gives dislocated and alienated youth 

a place to fit in and a sense of spiritual and moral superiority over a society 

that they believe has acted disrespectfully toward them, their parents, and 

their faith. The sense of alienation and deprivation is not limited to Muslim 

minorities, and revivalist Islam can be a means of escaping empty lives and 

finding brotherhood and a sense of destiny for lost souls of any ethnicity.37 In the West, militant Islamic movements recruit young adherents in 

much the same way that the religious cults of the 1970s and 1980s recruited 

disillusioned young Americans: they embrace alienated young people 

(they have even had surprising success in converting non-Muslims such as 

Richard Reid and Jose Padilla) and make them part of a small, close-knit 

group that provides brotherhood, support, and status, and enforces ideological conformity; they impose an intricate and all-encompassing moral 

and behavioral code that provides meaning to day-to-day life and breaks 

down individuality; and they instill a degree of self-righteous paranoia in 

which the insiders are the guardians of virtue and the outside world is a 

threatening realm of corruption and evil. In contrast to the traditionally 

Muslim world, these young Western Muslims have little or no grounding in 

more orthodox religious and social structures to counter the influence of the 

militant groups. They are, in sense, ideological free agents.

Fundamentalism and Revivalism. The rise of revivalist religion throughout the world has added a dimension to terrorist movements and their 

support base that the national liberation movements that emerged through 

the 1970s and 1980s did not demonstrate. Increasingly, revivalist religious 

movements have translated social unease and insecurity in the face of 

modernization and globalization into charges of oppression and persecution at the hands of secular society. Secular society is portrayed as corrupt, 
SOCIAL FACTORS 123

sinful, stagnant, and hostile to faith. In contrast, the revivalist fundamentalist movements promote faith as the road to empowerment. The most 

radical and demanding of the religious revivalist movements are creative 

and vibrant and make great demands on the individuals and societies that 

embrace them. The struggle and the sense of righteousness in the face of a 

hostile “world” give life and hardship meaning.38 This phenomenon is not 

unique to observant Muslims; in the last few decades, virtually every major 

world faith has produced at least one radical revivalist movement that has, 

at least on its fringes, embraced terrorism. For these millennial groups—including extreme right-wing Christian and white supremacist movements in 

the United States—the force of evil oppressing the people is a demonic, 

irreligious secular national government. The illegitimacy of secular regimes 

extends to official religious hierarchies, which, because of their dependence 

on the largesse and goodwill of the state, the militants see as corrupt, impotent, and intellectually and spiritually bankrupt. In the United States, 

militant Christian revivalists (the Army of God, the Christian Identity 

Movement, and the Reconstruction Movement, for example) see themselves 

as fighting to free society and establish a new order rooted in Biblical law 

and a spiritual rather than secular social order.39 In the Muslim world, the 

appeal of violent revivalist movements appears to be more widespread, and 

the hierarchy of evil is more complex. While militant revivalist movements 

see their own governments as apostates and enemies of faith and righteousness, the ultimate cosmic enemy is the West and, usually, the United States. 

The militants see America as the real power behind their corrupt and yet 

typically inept local regimes.

As a result, Islam is not the only faith to have produced violent militant 

fundamentalist movements, but so far, it is the only one that has produced 

militants who conduct their terrorist campaigns and entertain strategic ambitions beyond a domestic or regional context. Religious fundamentalism is 

a modern phenomenon that could not have existed prior to the scientific, 

rational age. Fundamentalists, unlike members of orthodox faiths, undertake 

to directly battle the twin evils of scientific rationality and modernism (especially individualism) by embracing the methodologies of the enemy. The 

fundamentalists have transformed religious teaching into literalist dogma 

and have challenged the authority of traditional religious hierarchies (be they 

priests or ulamas) as the sole legitimate interpreters of scripture and religious 

law. As a result, fundamentalist sects are most often led by “enlightened” 

amateurs: individuals whose knowledge of religion comes from sources other 

than formal religious education.40 In the most extreme cases, such as the Taliban, the line between the sacred and the profane disappears, and every aspect 

of every individual’s life becomes a matter for religious law.
124 ZIEMKE

Fundamentalists (of any faith) are, by definition, militant in the sense 

that they challenge both the dominant secular culture and traditional religious establishments. The University of Chicago Fundamentalisms Project 

defines fundamentalism as “a discernible pattern of religious militancy 

by which self-styled ‘true believers’ attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create 

viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors.”41 They believe 

they are warriors for God, condemning accommodations to secularism or 

ecumenicalism. That said, they are not necessarily a threat to national and 

international security.42 Common features of the most extreme revivalist 

movements, such as the salafist schools in Islam, the ultra-Orthodox Jews, 

and some fringe millennialist Christian groups, are the twin goals of quarantining the community of the righteous from contamination by the outside 

world and deterritorializing their religion. Their goal is not necessarily to 

reform national governments to bring them in line with religious law, but 

to divorce the community from governmental institutions (which, because 

they are products of man’s rather than God’s will, are by definition profane) 

altogether.43 Many ultra-Orthodox Jews condemn Zionism and have refused 

to accept the Israeli state (in fact, some have refused to emigrate to Israel) 

because they believe only God can restore the Jewish nation. For man to attempt to do so usurps God’s authority and requires too many compromises 

with the secular world.44

The Tablighi Jama’at, one of the leading Islamic revivalist organizations 

operating in Europe today, sends itinerant preachers to Muslim communities in Hijra to purify them of accommodations to local culture. Founded in 

1926, the Tablighi aimed to cleanse Indian Muslims of Hindu influences. 

Today, its missionaries are active in the West, instructing their followers to 

stay out of local politics, veil their women, resist coeducation, and avoid social interaction with non-Muslims. They do not, however, advocate violent 

jihad or any other attempt to overthrow the status quo.45 Even the most 

recent revivalist movements, as a rule, have no interest in social structures 

and government infrastructures but focus purely on individual piety as the 

means to building a righteous and prosperous society. If every individual 

lives righteously in a way that pleases God, the result will be a peaceful and 

just society that will have no need of governments.

The deculturation and deterritorialization of Islam, which has been 

particularly (and primarily) effective in the Muslim diaspora, speaks directly 

to displaced and alienated young Muslims all over the world, but especially 

in the West. Part of the reason its allure is strongest in the West is that it 

appeals to the Westernized sensibilities of second- and third-generation 

children of Muslim immigrants who have never developed attachments to 

particular local Islamic traditions. It reduces Islam to pure religion with no 
SOCIAL FACTORS 125

meaningful cultural accretions. More important, it focuses on piety as the 

route to individual salvation. Islamic law and the traditions of the Prophet 

provide the basic blueprint for Muslim society but leave deeper interpretations of the meaning and implications for individual spirituality open to the 

diverse views of individual missionaries and preachers. Just as important, it 

insists on complete moral and cultural separation from the surrounding 

society and establishes identifying marks of piety—hijab, personal grooming, religious rituals, and so forth—that further quarantine its followers 

from their cultural surroundings and reduce their receptivity to alternative 

views.46

In the end, this revivalist emphasis on Islam as a road to individual 

identity and spiritual fulfillment—what Olivier Roy has called the “Protestantization” of Islam—may be the most important key to understanding 

the social origins of terrorism. Not only has it freed the individual from the 

traditional hierarchies and social strictures of orthodox Islam (both Sunni 

and Shia), but it also has devalued the traditional clerical and intellectual 

elite and opened the door to individual and iconoclastic interpretations of 

sacred texts by self-appointed religious experts like Osama bin Laden and 

Ayman al Zawahiri. This decoupling of religious piety from its historical, 

cultural, and social base is not unique to Islam; globalization, and particularly the rise of the unregulated Internet, has created a true free market of 

ideas for religious entrepreneurs and extremists of every stripe. It has also 

provided Islamic terrorist organizations with their richest recruiting base: 

like Mohammed Atta, much of the brain trust of global jihadism came from 

relatively secular families, and many were radicalized while receiving secular 

educations, either in their homelands or in the West. In fact, experience with 

Western languages and culture is a prerequisite for participation in complex 

terrorist operations in the West, since operatives who cannot pass for an 

assimilated immigrant run too great a risk of detection and capture. 

In this sense, unfortunately, Westernization may have succeeded to a 

fault, creating a new umma of fully autonomous individuals with few ties 

to their societies of origin and the freedom to recreate Islam in their own 

ideological image and in service to their own spiritual and psychological 

needs.47 Historically, the impetus for ideological change and evolution of 

Islamic mores has most often come from the periphery: first Spain and 

Persia, later Central Asia, and most recently, from Muslim India (Pakistan). 

This trend accelerated through the 1960s and 1970s as Islamic identities on 

the periphery strengthened while they seemed to be undermined by secularism and nationalism in the Arab core.48 The turn of the millennium saw 

the dawn, perhaps, of a new stage in which the West is fast becoming the 

new center of Islamic thought, on both ends of the spectrum—a trend that 

promises to accelerate in the years ahead.
126 ZIEMKE

Notes

1 Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299, no. 5612 (March 7, 2003), 1534.

2 This chapter does not deal explicitly with the social context of terrorism in Palestine. 

Regardless of whether one sees the Palestinian intifada as a legitimate war of national liberation, 

it is clear that the superheated political context of the Palestinian quest for autonomy and the 

Israeli occupation sets it outside any useful generalizations that could be made about the social 

factors contributing to terrorism elsewhere in the Muslim world.

3 The Kurds are not easily categorized, but their essentially ethnic rather than religious 

sense of identity bears the greatest similarity with the emerging independent Muslim nations; 

also, as a minority seeking autonomy, the Kurds share some characteristics with the traditionally Muslim minorities—in particular, the fear of cultural and social absorption by the ruling 

majority.

4 Dato Zainal Abidin Mahamad Zain, Director General, South East Asia Regional Counter Terrorism Center (SEARCCT), address to Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)/SEARCCT 

Seminar on the Dynamics and Structure of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 

Malaysia, April 18, 2005.

5 Rommel Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: 

The Abu Sayyaf Case,” paper delivered at the IDA/SEARCCT Seminar on the Dynamics and 

Structure of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, April 20, 2005.

6 “Special Report: Dim drums throbbing in the hills half heard,” The Economist 364, no. 

8285 (August 10, 2002), 21.

7 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The Complete 

Investigation: The 9/11 Report (New York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 2004), 323–335.

8 Richard W. Bulliet, Islam: The View from the Edge (New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1994), 202; Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: 

The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 128.

9 Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 93.

10 Review of James Thrower, The Religious History of Central Asia from the Earliest Times to 

the Present Day (Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), August 11, 2005, available at <wordtrade.com/religion/islam/centralasiaR.htm>.

11 Zamira Eshanova, “Central Asia: Are Radical Groups Joining Forces?” Eurasia Insight, 

February 25, 2005, available at <eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101102.shtml>.

12 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Education of a Holy Warrior,” The New York Times Magazine, 

June 25, 2000, 32. See C. Christine Fair, “Religious Education in Pakistan: A Trip Report,” U.S. 

Institute of Peace (March 20, 2006), available at <usip.org/events/2006/trip_report.pdf>, for a 

reexamination of the statistics of madrassa attendance in Pakistan.

13 Rohan Guanaratna, paper delivered to the IDA/SEARCCT Seminar on the Dynamics 

and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, April 18, 2005.

14 Bulliet, 198.

15 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 92–93.

16 See, for example, John Kampfner, “Why the French Call Us Londonistan,” The New 

Statesman 15, no. 736 (December 9, 2002), 18; and Stephen Ulph, “Londonistan,” The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 4 (February 26, 2004), 1.

17 This paper uses two terms in characterizing militant Islamic movements: fundamentalist and revivalist. Fundamentalism refers to the various schools of Islamic thought and practice 

that seek to impose a literalist interpretation of Islamic religious and social laws in society, 

but which may or may not pursue a broader political and ideological militant agenda. I use 

revivalism to refer, more narrowly, to that subset of fundamentalism that actively proselytizes, 

politically and religiously, and sees religious revival as the key to social and political empowerment for the global Muslim umma. Islamic revivalism is closely tied to jihadi movements that 

have dedicated themselves to the purification of the umma and the restoration of the imagined 

golden age of Islamic supremacy.

18 Todd Gitlin, “The Renaissance of Anti-Intellectualism,” The Chronicle Review, December 8, 2000, available at <chronicle.com/free/v47/i15/15b00701.htm>.
SOCIAL FACTORS 127

19 See Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of 

America, ed. Michael Scheuer (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2003), 69–73.

20 Roy, 169.

21 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 251.

22 Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century (New York: 

Continuum, 2003), 14–15.

23 Brinton, 36, 250–251.

24 The classic work in this genre is Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution. More 

recently, Fareed Zakaria has given the thesis of the destabilizing effects of democratization a 

more contemporary spin in The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New 

York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2003).

25 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence 

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 210.

26 See Through Our Enemies’ Eyes; and Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is 

Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004).

27 Brinton, 246, 254, 262.

28 Vamik Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New York: Farrar, Straus 

and Giroux, 1997), 43–48.

29 See, for example, Edgar O’Ballance, The Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1979); and Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller, “Profile 

of a Terrorist,” in John D. Elliot and Leslie K. Gibson, Contemporary Terrorism: Selected Readings

(Gaithersburg, MD: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978), 81–95.

30 Juergensmeyer, 116–117.

31 Cited in Juergensmeyer, 13.

32 In explaining his notorious obedience experiments, Milgram wrote that 

with numbing regularity good people were seen to knuckle under to the demands of 

authority and perform actions that were callous and severe. Men who are in everyday life 

responsible and decent were seduced by the trappings of authority, by the control of their 

perceptions, and by the uncritical acceptance of the experimenter’s definition of the situation, 

into performing harsh acts. . . . A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to 

do, irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience so long as they 

perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority.

Quotes available at <stanleymilgram.com/quotes.htl.php>. 

33 This discussion of social epidemics is based primarily on Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping 

Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2000).

34 Ibid., 175–182.

35 Roy, 269–274.

36 Bulliet, 204–207.

37 Roy, 317.

38 Juergensmeyer, 225.

39 Juergensmeyer, 23.

40 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), ix–xvi.

41 Almond et al., 17.

42 Ibid., 14–17.

43 Roy, 232–234.

44 Samuel Heilman, Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry (New York: 

Schoken Books, 1992), 29–30.

45 Roy, 235.

46 Giles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 

2004), 256–257.

47 Roy, 265–269, 302, 308.

48 Bulliet, 195.
129

Chapter Six

Madrassas, Pesantrens, and the Impact 

of Education on Support for Radicalism 

and Terrorism

Kumar Ramakrishna

In late October 2003, in an internal memorandum to senior Pentagon 

officials, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed concern about 

whether radical Islamic education was producing new generations of terrorists filled with violent hatred for the United States and its allies. He wondered if the United States was “capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas [Islamic religious schools] 

and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”1

Rumsfeld’s concern was and is not without foundation. At this juncture in 

the war on terror, education is well recognized as a key factor in generating 

systemic, long-term support for radicalism and terrorism. 

In Pakistan, for instance, some estimates place as many as a million 

students studying in over 10,000 madrassas, although other analyses have 

raised serious questions about these numbers.2 More important than the 

total numbers, however, is the fact that, for a variety of reasons, the largest 

concentration of madrassas is now in the Pushtun belt of the Northwest 

Frontier Province, the area in which radical Deobandi Islam has had the 

strongest following. As a result, many of these institutions have been used as 

“incubators for violent extremism.” Such madrassas allegedly have had links 

with both the ousted Taliban and al Qaeda.3 

Furthermore, schools in Saudi Arabia, which are among the most 

highly developed in the Arab world and consume some 30 percent of the 

country’s national budget, follow an extremist Wahhabi religious curriculum that takes up one-third of the average school day. The Wahhabi mindset 

is suggested by a passage from Geography of the Muslim World, an eighthgrade text that, in spite of its relatively innocuous title, clearly propagates a 

virulent, binary, us-versus-them worldview:

There is no doubt that the Muslims’ power irritates the infidels and 

spreads envy in the hearts of the enemies of Islam—Christians, 

Jews and others—so they plot against them, gather [their] force 

against them, harass them, and seize every opportunity in order 

to eliminate the Muslims. Examples of this enmity are innumerable, beginning with the plot of the Jews against the Messenger 
130 RAMAKRISHNA

and the Muslims at the first appearance of the first light of Islam 

and ending with what is happening today—a malicious CrusaderJewish alliance striving to eliminate Islam from all the continents. 

Those massacres that were directed against the Muslim people of 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims of Burma and the Philippines, 

and in Africa, are the greatest proof of the malice and hatred harbored by the enemies of Islam to this religion. 4

The theme embedded in the above passage—of a global Islamic 

community or umma being subjected to vicious oppression by the 

“Crusader-Jewish alliance”—is one that animates the radical Islamist ideologies driving terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. This chapter seeks to 

analyze the ways in which both secular and religious forms of education lay 

the cognitive groundwork for the eventual emergence of such radicalized 

binary worldviews. Due to space constraints, the essay will focus on how 

education generates support for Islamic radicalism in particular, drawing 

on cases from across the Muslim world. A religious radical in this essay 

will be taken to mean a religious fundamentalist who, dispensing with an 

evolutionary, gradualist program for actualizing his socio-religious agenda, 

opts instead for a more revolutionary strategy for profoundly transforming 

society from the roots up and in as short a time as possible, through religiously legitimated social and political agitation, including violence.

The Socio-Cultural Backdrop

Any analysis of the impact of education on radicalism cannot be 

divorced from the wider sociocultural context. Olufemi A. Lawal, drawing on anthropological research, identifies a few dimensions of culture 

that can be used to analyze different societies, including power-distance, 

uncertainty avoidance, and individualism/collectivism.5 Lawal notes that in 

high power-distance societies, “peoples accept as natural the fact that power 

and rewards are inequitably distributed in society.”6 In collectivist societies, 

individuals are expected to be loyal to the ingroup and subordinate personal goals to those of the collective. Moreover, such individuals may feel 

particularly “threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity.”7 Following Lawal, it 

may be hypothesized that individuals in high power-distance, collectivist, 

and ambiguity-intolerant milieus may be relatively more likely to gravitate 

toward radicalized educational environments. Three tentative reasons may 

be offered for this position. First, individuals in such societies, as Lawal suggests, would accept fairly readily that all authority and “power has been 

naturally concentrated” in the hands of a religious leader who may or may 

not espouse radical views.8 Second, being cultural collectivists, they would 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 131

tend to regard it as psychologically satisfying and their individual duty to 

demonstrate loyalty to the group. Third, being ambiguity-intolerant, they 

would be willing, relatively uncritically, to accept that leader’s clear and 

unambiguous interpretations—couched possibly in religious language—of 

wider sociopolitical developments.9 

Lawal’s cultural dimension of ambiguity intolerance is of direct relevance for our purposes and deserves elaboration. Psychologists argue that 

in general, people have a tendency to organize the environment according 

to simple cognitive structures. More than that, humans, from childhood, 

seem to possess a need for “cognitive closure;” they desire a definite answer to a particular topic “as opposed to confusion and ambiguity.”10 This 

natural human quest for cognitive closure, particularly but by no means 

exclusively in non-Western, collectivist societies (which form 70 percent 

of the world population), has been greatly intensified by the psychosocial 

dislocations caused by globalization. Globalization has been usefully characterized as “worldwide integration through an ongoing, dynamic process 

that involves the interplay of free enterprise, democratic principles and human rights, the high-tech exchange of information, and movement of large 

numbers of people.”11 While “the juggernaut of free enterprise, democracy, 

and technology offers the best chance of wealth creation,” the key to “improving the human condition”—globalization—has other implications.12

By privileging “individualistic, impersonal, competitive, privatistic, and 

mobile” values and attitudes, globalization processes have inadvertently 

undermined traditional social units such as the family, clan, and voluntary 

association.13 More precisely, globalization, which to many non-Western 

societies is synonymous with Westernization, is destabilizing because it 

promotes the de-sacralization of society; encourages religious and moral 

relativism; places the onus on the individual to determine his “values, career, life style, and moral system”; and, most disconcertingly, undermines 

traditional ideas about sexuality and the status of women.14 Michael Stevens 

captures this well:

For communitarian societies, keyed to historical continuity, 

group coherence and security, personal rootedness, and the affirmation of moral righteousness, empowering the individual is 

equated with rending society asunder.

Globalization may thus inadvertently precipitate socio-cultural dislocation at the aggregate level, and psychosocial dysfunction at the unit level.15

Charles Selengut adds that to “follow the West is to become spiritually and 

psychologically homeless, without a transcendental anchor to provide security and safety during life’s journey.”16 
Even within non-Western, collectivist, relatively ambiguity-intolerant societies, one should not imagine that everyone senses or perceives the 

world, and responds to any cognitive dissonance generated by contact with 

the world, in exactly the same way. Personality theorists have postulated two 

basic types of individual: the abstract/intuitive (intuitive) and the concrete/

objective (concretist). According to Ronald Johnson, the intuitive individual 

tends to be creative in solving problems; is willing to explore hunches and 

new ideas; is imaginative; likes change; and is problem-oriented and subjective. Concretists, on the other hand, tend to “prefer a concrete way of 

perceiving the world, are down-to-earth; perhaps simple and possibly simplistic,” and strongly “solution-oriented.” Thus, while intuitives see “what 

could be,” concretists see “what is.”17 The upshot of this is that non-Western, 

collectivist, ambiguity-intolerant societies undergoing accelerated Westernization may well produce individual concretists who are vulnerable to possible psychosocial dysfunction. Quite simply, in comparison to intuitives, 

they would be relatively less equipped cognitively to cope with what Jessica 

Stern calls “a surfeit of choice.” For concretists, too much choice, “especially 

regarding identity, can be overwhelming and even frightening.”18

This is precisely why religious fundamentalism, for example, is so attractive to many concretists. Charismatic fundamentalist leaders “offer their 

constituencies clear, objective, practical, and absolute directives for their lives 

and answers for their theological questions.”19 From the perspective of the 

unsettled concretist, relinquishing “one’s autonomy in return for absolute 

ideological security is a powerful motive.”20 Interestingly, several Singaporean 

militants of the al Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) organization turned 

to leaders like Singapore JI spiritual leader Ibrahim Maidin because—like 

classic concretists—they wished to “free themselves from endless searching 

as they found it stressful to be critical, evaluative, and rational.”21

Understanding why absolute ideological security can be so important 

to concretists requires a brief incursion into the burgeoning new field of 

psychobiology.22 Neuroscientists tell us that the seat of human emotions 

and motivations lies in a primitive area of the brain called the limbic system, 

comprising the hypothalamus and the amygdala. The grape-sized amygdala 

is linked to the human sensory systems and constantly scans the information flowing through them, looking for signs of “threat or pain, whether 

physical or mental.” Researchers have found that the amygdala plays a role 

in many emotions including hate, fear, joy, and love, and “serves as an 

emotional and behavioral trip wire, capable of automatically triggering a 

response before we consciously realize what is happening.”23 

The amygdala is interconnected with another area of the brain 

associated with aggression and defense: the hypothalamus, a small organ 

132 RAMAKRISHNA
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 133

that regulates many of the body’s automatic, stereotyped responses to 

external stimuli. When the amygdala senses danger, the hypothalamus 

activates the pituitary gland lying just below it; the pituitary releases 

an emergency hormone into the bloodstream that flows to the adrenal 

glands, prompting the latter to release stress hormones that galvanize the 

body for action—be it fight or flight.24 The limbic system is very important in our analysis of the psychological (or psychobiological) makeup of 

hard-core concretists. Rush W. Dozier, Jr., explains:

Our limbic system has evolved a powerful tendency to blindly 

interpret any meaning system [emphasis added] that we deeply 

believe in as substantially enhancing our survival and reproduction. Someone who wholeheartedly converts to a particular 

religion or political ideology, for example, is likely to experience 

strong primal feelings of joy and well-being coupled with an exciting new sense of purpose. This is true even if the belief system 

has elements that are bizarre or self-destructive.25

Dozier rightly points out that this tendency of the primitive limbic 

system to identify particular meaning systems as congruent with personal 

well being and survival can result in individuals “decoupling” their behavior from “objective criteria of survival and reproduction.” 26 This insight may 

shed light on the motivations of suicide bombers, for instance. 

This brings us back to the attraction of the dualistic, black-and-white 

certitudes of religious fundamentalism for concretists. The concretist personality, immersed in a rapidly globalizing non-Western sociocultural 

milieu, in search of cognitive closure in the midst of moral and spiritual 

uncertainty, would largely be “limbicly” hard-wired to want certainty and 

closure. Once the concretist has discovered ideological security in a particular fundamentalist religious system, he or she is likely to defend the 

new beliefs with “great emotional intensity.”27 In this respect, scholars like 

J. Harold Ellens regard fundamentalism less as a system of beliefs than as a 

highly problematic thinking or cognitive style. Ellens, to be sure, sees fundamentalist cognitive styles not just within religious systems, but also in 

“political movements, ethical systems, scientific perspectives, and every type 

of profession in which humans engage.”28

Is Education the Cure for Concretists? 

If the problem is the concretist cognitive style, could education be a 

solution? This issue needs to be approached with care. Much evidence suggests that certain types of education—even higher tertiary education—may be 

positively associated with religious radicalism. Daniel Pipes notes that many 
134 RAMAKRISHNA

Islamists have “advanced education” while a “disproportionate number 

of terrorists and suicide bombers” possess a “higher education, often in 

engineering and the sciences.”29 Nor is anecdotal evidence of a connection between science/technical education and radicalism hard to find. 

Ramzi Yousef, the al Qaeda operative who planned the 1993 World Trade 

Center attack, for instance, studied computer-aided electrical engineering 

in Swansea, Wales.30 Some JI members are similarly well educated in technical fields. Indonesian Islamist Agus Dwikarna, who has had associations 

with JI, is a civil engineer by training.31 Malaysian JI operative Shamsul Bahri 

Hussein read applied mechanics at Dundee.32 Yazid Sufaat, who apparently 

tried to acquire anthrax and develop biological weapons for al Qaeda, was 

a 1987 biochemistry graduate from California State University.33 Also of 

note is the late Malaysian Dr. Azahari Husin, the top JI bombmaker who 

wrote the organization’s bomb manual and was involved in the Bali, Jakarta 

Marriott, and Jakarta Australian embassy bombings.34 Husin studied in 

Adelaide for 4 years in the 1970s, secured an engineering degree in Malaysia, 

and later received a PhD in statistical modeling from Reading University in 

the 1980s. He taught at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia before going underground in 2001.35 This is by no means an exhaustive list.

Is any alleged correlation between a technical and hard sciences education and radicalism a wildly simplistic and even irresponsible assertion to 

make? Bahai scholar Moojan Momen suggests, perhaps counterintuitively, 

that “when scientists (especially from the physical sciences) and engineers 

become religious, they often tend towards fundamentalist religion.”36

Psychological research has shown that natural or physical scientists in fact 

tend to be more religious than social scientists such as sociologists and 

psychologists. This has been explained by the so-called scholarly distance 

thesis:

The reason, in psychological terms, is that the natural sciences 

apply critical thinking to nature; the human sciences ask critical questions about culture, tradition, and beliefs. The mere fact 

of choosing human society or behavior as the object of study 

reflects a curiosity about basic social beliefs and conventions and 

a readiness to reject them. Physical scientists, who are at a greater 

scholarly distance, may be able to compartmentalize their science and religion more easily.37

The scholarly distance thesis could explain the strikingly high proportion of Islamist activists worldwide with backgrounds in the hard sciences 

and engineering. For example, on university campuses in Iran and Egypt, 

such activists constitute “25 percent of humanities students, but 60–80 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 135

percent of students in medicine, engineering, and science.”38 Islamic scholar 

Khalid Duran has commented on the “odd” fact that “Islamic fundamentalism” has always had “its strongest appeal among engineers.” He observes 

wryly that in Egypt, “they always say the Muslim Brotherhood is really 

the Engineering Brotherhood.”39 Duran offers his interpretation of this 

phenomenon:

Engineers don’t exercise their fantasy and imagination. Everything is precise and mathematical. They don’t study what we 

call ‘the humanities.’ Consequently, when it comes to issues that 

involve religion and personal emotion, they tend to see things in 

very stark terms.40

This leads the certainty-seeking (concretist) Islamist scientist/engineer 

to engage in what Malise Ruthven calls “monodimensional or literalist readings of scripture,” as compared to their “counterparts in the arts and humanities whose training requires them to approach texts multidimensionally, exploring contradictions and ambiguities.”41 Ruthven is not the only 

one to make this argument. Former Indonesian president and accomplished 

Islamic scholar in his own right, Abdurrahman (Gus Dur) Wahid, in a 2002 

speech in Seoul, made a similar observation about the concretist orientation 

of many young Indonesian Muslims educated in technical disciplines in the 

West:

Because they have not been trained in the rich disciplines of 

Islamic scholarship, they tend to bring to their reflection on their 

faith the same sort of simple modeling and formulistic thinking 

that they have learnt as students of engineering or other applied 

sciences.

Consequently, Gus Dur observed, they take a 

more or less literalistic approach to the textual sources of Islam . . . 

[and] use these texts in a reductionistic fashion without being 

able to undertake, or even appreciate, the subtly nuanced task 

of interpretation required of them if they are to understand how 

documents from the 7th to 8th centuries, from the tribal Arab 

society among the desert sands, are to be applied correctly to the 

very different world that we live in today.

It is significant that Gus Dur warned that if such well-educated but 

concretist and technically minded Muslims are not instructed “to approach 

their faith with the intellectual sophistication that the demands of the 

modern world require of them,” then when they encounter “alienation, 

loneliness and the search for identity” abroad, they will be vulnerable to 
136 RAMAKRISHNA

the “formalistic understanding of Islamic law” that breeds “violent radicalism.” He lamented in this respect that “precious few young Muslims from 

developing nations have the privilege of undertaking liberal arts courses in 

Western universities.”42 Khalid Duran, echoing both Gus Dur as well as the 

logic of the scholarly distance hypothesis, believes that “having an education in literature or politics or sociology seems to inoculate you against the 

appeals of fundamentalism.”43 

Concretist Cognitive Styles, Fundamentalist 

Mentalities, and Binary Worldviews

Gus Dur’s comment about the relationship between a “formalistic 

understanding of Islamic law” and “violent radicalism” is pregnant with 

significance. Precisely because uncertainty is “deeply unsatisfactory to the 

fundamentalist [concretist] psyche,”44 once such an individual discovers 

a religious or ideological system that satisfies his search for meaning, he 

would be limbicly disposed to tolerate “no ambiguities, no equivocations, 

no reservations, and no criticism.”45 Any perceived threat to his closely held 

belief system might even provoke aggression.46 Thus, psychologists like J. 

Harold Ellens consider what he calls “fundamentalism”—in our terms, 

concretism—as a form of “psychopathology,” defined as “a rigid structuralist approach that has an obsessive-compulsive flavor to it.”47 This “obsessive-compulsive” quality of a concretist cognitive style has the potential to 

in turn produce what critical theorist Stuart Sim calls the “fundamentalist 

mentality.” An individual possessing a fundamentalist mentality not only 

displays the “desire for certainty” but also actively seeks “the power to enforce that certainty over others.”48 

This intrinsic rejectionist attitude toward difference, in the final analysis, makes the concretist-minded religious fundamentalist such a potential 

cause for concern, because by definition he would be limbicly hardwired to 

be, in Leon Festinger’s terms, a transformationist. He simply cannot live and 

let live in matters of faith; he can only rest easy when the outside world is 

synchronized with his conception of the perfect society. In other words, he 

would feel compelled to define truth for everyone else around him as well. 

This intrinsic desire to impose a favored vision of a perfect society 

on others, Sim explains, shows that “religious fundamentalism” is “more 

to do with power than spiritual matters,” and “power is a political rather 

than a spiritual issue.” In essence, the fundamentalist mantra—which 

has at its core the concretist cognitive style—is about “control, control, 

control.”49 Political scientist R. Hrair Dekmejian elucidates the links between a concretist cognitive style, a fundamentalist desire for “epistemic” 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 137

control, and intolerance toward difference in his description of the “mutaasib, or Muslim fundamentalist fanatic.” Dekmejian argues that the 

mutaasib tends to be characterized by “rigid beliefs, intolerance toward 

unbelievers, preoccupation with power,” and last but not least, a “vision 

of an evil world.”50 Dekmejian points out that such a “close-minded, rigidthinking dogmatist” is “susceptible to a variety of rigid, and potentially 

destructive, ideologies.”51

The route to such “potentially destructive ideologies” runs from an 

ambiguity-intolerant concretist cognitive style, through a power-seeking 

fundamentalist mentality, and ultimately to a rigidly held binary worldview. 

John E. Mack defines a worldview as “an organizing principle or philosophy” 

that is similar to an ideology, but “broader in scope,” and a sort of “mental 

template into which we try to fit events.”52 Jemaah Islamiyah spiritual leader 

Abu Bakar Bashir’s binary worldview in this respect is of interest. He once 

declared during a sermon:

God has divided humanity into two parts, namely the followers 

of God and those who follow Satan. . . . God’s group are those 

who follow Islam, those who are prepared to follow his laws 

and struggle for the implementation of shariah [Islamic] law. . . . 

Meanwhile what is meant by Satan’s group are those people who 

oppose God’s law, who . . . throw obstacles in the path of the 

implementation of God’s law. 53

Bashir was emphatic in declaring that there was no hope of conciliation between true Muslims who believed in the complete implementation 

of Islamic law and those that opposed this:

We would rather die than follow that which you worship. We 

reject all of your beliefs, we reject all of your ideologies, we reject 

all of your teachings on social issues, economics or beliefs. Between you and us there will forever be a ravine of hate and we will be 

enemies until you follow God’s law [emphasis added]. 54

In sum, within non-Western, collectivist societies experiencing social 

dislocation due to accelerated globalization, religious radicalism may well 

result from a psychological pathway linking a concretist cognitive style, a 

fundamentalist mentality, and a binary worldview. Moreover, secular technical education, even higher education, may not only fail to mitigate but 

also even inadvertently consolidate and reinforce such a pathway. The impact 

of more narrowly focused religious education must now be analyzed against 

this wider sociocultural backdrop for its contribution to the religious 

radicalization process. 
138 RAMAKRISHNA

Ethnocentrism, Religion, and Radicalism

“The human mind,” according to social psychologists, “groups people, 

as well as objects, into categories” that enable individuals to “simplify the 

present and predict the future more effectively.”55 The same social psychologists admit that it is also “a small step from categorization” to “stereotyping 

and favoritism for one’s group.” This ingroup bias exists because individuals define themselves partly by their group membership. Membership in a 

high-prestige group meets basic psychological needs such as “belongingness, distinctiveness,” and “respect.”56 This is especially true for individuals 

with deep “affiliative needs” and an “as-yet incomplete sense of individual 

identity” that generates an intense need to belong. This impels them to 

“submerge their own identities into the group,” so that a kind of “group 

mind” emerges.57 Nevertheless, “taken to extremes,” stereotyping of outsiders, fostered by the establishment of a “group mind” by charismatic religious leaders, for example, can foster dangerous prejudice.58 What is more, 

religion can be exploited to legitimize the group mind and reinforce this 

prejudice against outsiders. Paul N. Anderson’s comments shed light on the 

implications of Bashir’s worldview cited earlier:

An important aspect of religious power is that it creates an “us.” 

It solidifies group identity and appeals to religious certainty, 

eternal consequences, and principled loyalties. [But] Yahweh’s 

warfare against tribal adversaries in Hebrew Scripture, the dehumanization of infidels in the Koran, and the temporal and 

eternal warnings against the unfaithful in Christian Scripture 

function to create an us-versus-them mentality common to 

prejudice and violence. In that sense, the organizing power of 

religion to create intra-group solidarity becomes a devastating 

contributor to inter-group opposition. 59

In short, when “everyday bias” is “supported and legitimated by 

religion,” the “passions of ordinary malcontents” can be “intensified and 

focused.”60 Religious education in this respect can be exploited by radicals 

to ensure that concretist cognitive styles, fundamentalist mentalities, and 

binary worldviews are “intensified and focused,” paving the way for the 

onset of radicalism and possibly even terrorism. This is readily illustrated in 

the case of Pondok Pesantren al Mukmin, the Indonesian religious boarding 

school founded in Solo, Central Java, in 1971 by Bashir and his late associate, Abdullah Sungkar. 

In Indonesia today, there are two main forms of Islamic religious 

schools. The madrassa is an Islamic day school, while the pesantren is a 

boarding school. Indonesian madrassas provide primary, lower secondary, 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 139

and upper secondary education. The majority of madrassas are privately 

run, but some are regulated by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious 

Affairs. Whether privately or state-run, all madrassas, under the Educational 

Law of 1989, are required to teach the national curriculum devised by the 

Ministries of Education and Religious Affairs.61 This curriculum consists of 

70 percent general subjects and 30 percent religious subjects.62 While state 

madrassas and private madrassas run by progressive Islamic teachers adhere 

to the liberal educational thrust of the national curriculum, some private 

madrassas do teach a more “radical educational agenda.”63 In 2001, more 

than 5.5 million primary, lower, and upper secondary students were enrolled in more than 35,000 private and state-run madrassas.64 Madrassas are 

less expensive than public secondary schools and provide basic education in 

rural and lower-income urban areas.65 

Pesantrens, on the other hand, teach at the secondary level only and 

function outside the state madrassa and public school system. In 2001, an 

estimated 2.7 million students were enrolled in 11,312 pesantrens.66 Dating 

back to the late 19th century and the arrival of Islamic modernist currents 

from Cairo, the typical Indonesian pesantren exists “as a community with 

a compound, mosque and boarding system where students and teachers 

eat, sleep, learn, and generally interact throughout the day.”67 The generally 

cloistered pesantren environment is pregnant with significance.

Pondok Pesantren al Mukmin has sought to combine the best aspects of 

two well-known pesantrens, the modernist Gontor (where Bashir has studied) 

with its excellent Arabic training, and the hard-line Persis (Islamic Union) 

pesantren in Bangil, which remains noted for its teaching of shariah.

68 There 

has, however, been a hidden and more insidious agenda as well. In 2000, 

Abu Bakar Bashir spoke about the strategic importance of religious boarding 

schools in particular in strengthening the capacity of the umma to defend 

itself against the “enemies of Islam.” He averred that “religious boarding 

schools are the bulwarks of Islam,” and that “graduates of pesantren” must 

“truly become preachers and mujahideen.” Harking back to the “learned 

men in the early days of Islam,” Bashir opined that aside from “acting as 

scholars, missionaries, and moral teachers, they were also mujahideen who 

were always prepared to go to war and didn’t just sit back in their mosques 

or schools giving lessons.”69 Bashir’s comments show that in his mind, the 

true Muslim must always be prepared to wage both dakwah and jihad in the 

quest to set up a Daulah Islamiyah. His remarks set the context for a closer 

analysis of how religious education in al Mukmin helps fosters radicalism. 

Al Mukmin usually draws students from 12 to 18 years of age, from 

West Java, Sumatra, Lombok, Central Java, West Irian, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, 

Singapore, Malaysia, and even Australia.70 In terms of numbers, al Mukmin 
140 RAMAKRISHNA

enrolls at any time about 2,000 students, including 800 girls.71 The curriculum emphasizes both secular (mathematics, physics, English, business skills, and computers) and religious subjects (fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence], Arabic, and aqidah, or faith). Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, and 

English are spoken in al Mukmin, but most students speak Arabic. During the long school day, which lasts from 3:00 AM to 10:00 PM, students 

pray, read the Koran, attend classes, and take part in sports or physical 

activity such as martial arts, soccer, badminton, mountaineering, and 

even long marches.72 Since this sounds like a description of a regular 

Indonesian pesantren, it may well be asked: in what way does education at 

al Mukmin foster radicalism?

The answer is that radicalized binary worldviews are cultivated not 

so much through didactic means via the formal curriculum as through the 

semi-formal, “general culture” of the institution.73 According to al Mukmin 

alumni, the boarding school nature of the pesantren expedites virtual “24-

hour monitoring” of students by teachers and senior students in all spheres 

of activity: lessons, language, sports, cleaning, and so forth. This close 

contact ensures that the “emotional bond between teachers and students is 

very strong.”74 For instance, journalist Noor Huda Ismail, who attended al 

Mukmin from 1984 to 1990, between the ages of 12 to 17, used to share a 

“dingy student dormitory together with 20 other students and a volunteer 

resident assistant named Fadlullah Hasan” who was 3 years his senior and 

had “a perpetual blue bruise on his forehead from bowing his head to the 

floor as the result of his five prayers per day.” After daily morning prayers at 

the adjacent mosque, Hasan would lead the boys in reading the Koran and 

urge them to “study and proselytize Islam.” Hasan and Noor eventually 

developed a “tight bond.”75 Noor later recounted how such close personal 

ties between teachers and students helped “intensify and focus” embryonic 

concretist cognitive styles and binary worldviews. For example, Koran reading classes were conducted in groups of 20 students of 12 to 13 years in 

age, who were taught the “correct” interpretation of passages by a senior 

student, usually 16 years old, who had himself been taught in the same 

way.76 In addition, al Mukmin organized frequent public-speaking sessions 

on Thursday nights, and the “most popular topic” was “the threats facing 

Islam,” such as “Global Jewish power and Indonesia’s Christian-controlled 

economy,”77 as well as “jihad.”78 

Other ways in which al Mukmin students were drilled into the 

Wahhabi ideological storyline of “a malicious Crusader-Jewish alliance 

striving to eliminate Islam from all the continents” were through halaqah or 

small-group discussions involving students and a teacher; as well as one-way 

lectures, or tausiyah, conducted by ustaz (teachers). In addition, students 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 141

themselves were required to engage in dakwah, or proselytization, exercises 

of their own, going out of al Mukmin to speak within nearby Islamic circles. 

Ismail also recounted how, for instance, during halaqah sessions, the ustaz

would ask students what they intended to do on graduation, and when the 

latter replied that they may go into business, the ustaz would subtly plant the 

idea that perhaps participating in jihad to defend their oppressed Muslim 

brethren would be a better option. Other subtle indoctrination measures 

were used as well: during arduous 6-day marches from Solo to Surabaya, 

and martial arts training, the students would be urged by teachers to “be 

strong” and overcome fear and weakness, as Islam needed to be defended 

from its enemies.79 Additional insidious elements discreetly programmed 

into the general culture of al Mukmin also helped “intensify and focus” 

binary worldviews and Wahhabi ideological perspectives. These included 

in-house martial music such as “Nasyid,” an Arabic song about jihad,80 as 

well as posters and signs proclaiming messages like “Jihad, Why Not?” and 

“No Prestige without Jihad” pasted “on walls, lockers, and walkways leading 

to classrooms.”81 Other graffiti spotted by visiting journalists evinced the 

simmering radicalism being bred within the school. These included messages such as “Bush and Sharon, if you like dead, come to here,” and, less 

elegantly, “Bush is f*cked.”82 Visiting journalist Tracy Dahlby inadvertently 

shed additional light on the highly xenophobic culture of the pesantren simply by glancing at students’ sandals:

When we reached the front steps of the school and I bent down 

to remove my shoes as custom required, I couldn’t help but notice that the dozens or so pairs of cheap plastic sandals scattered 

around the base of the stairs all had interesting little pictures or 

symbols of some kind etched in ballpoint pen on their insteps. 

When I took a closer look, however, my heart gave a thump—the 

little symbols were in fact crude renditions of the Holy Cross and 

the Star of David. 83 

Dahlby’s guide explained: “So students can always step on them.”84

The well-known scholar of comparative religion, Charles Kimball, 

has noted that problems arise within a religious constituency when “charismatic leadership” and an “unwavering commitment to compelling ideas 

and teachings” intersect with the “impulse to withdraw from society.”85 In 

like vein, Jonathan Drummond argues that physical withdrawal enables religious leaders to promote “alternative news sources,” and “closed religious/

ritual systems,” to “pull one away from competing social networks and constructions of reality.”86 Certainly, al Mukmin’s management appears to have 

appreciated the need to insulate the flock from the external environment. 
142 RAMAKRISHNA

Noor Huda Ismail observed that students were required to obey their teachers at all times and were not permitted direct personal contact with the 

outside world. Television, radio, magazines, and the Internet were all offlimits, as they were seen as vehicles of Westernization. Similarly, smoking, 

alcohol, jeans, baseball caps, and contact with females were all prohibited. 

Infractions of these rules would result in the offending student having his 

hair shaven and having to express regret for his act publicly.87 Singaporean 

journalists corroborated Noor’s comments, as they discovered that al 

Mukmin students were warned not to talk to strangers and were punished if 

they did.88 In addition, in line with Drummond’s argument, following the 

August 2003 J.W. Marriott JI attack in Jakarta, a pamphlet entitled “Marriott 

Conspiracy Theory,” which blamed “Israeli and U.S. intelligence agents” for 

the incident, was circulating among the al Mukmin fraternity.89 Al Mukmin, 

in sum, quite apart from intensifying and focusing concretist cognitive styles, 

power-oriented fundamentalist mental orientations, and binary worldviews, 

was seeking to complete the radicalization project by fostering nothing less 

than an alternate reality informed by the destructive al Qaedaist storyline.

Providing Education for De-Radicalization

We have argued that within non-Western, collectivist, ambiguity-intolerant societies undergoing rapid sociocultural changes with the onset of 

globalization and rapid urbanization, there are many individuals who are 

compelled to handle the cognitive dissonance generated by the collision of 

secular capitalist modernity and traditional value systems and structures. 

While some individuals are intrinsically intuitive and are generally able to 

cope creatively with such dissonance through social, economic, political, 

moral, and attitudinal adaptation, there are others, displaying what we 

have termed concretist cognitive styles, who are more solution- than problem-oriented and who seek, above all, answers in the midst of existential 

uncertainty. Especially within collectivist, high power-distance societies, 

including many Muslim countries, such concretists tend to gravitate toward 

charismatic religious clerics, for instance, who are able to articulate the clear 

and unambiguous answers they seek. Once these concretists find a religious 

or ideological system that meets their felt needs at a profound level, moreover, they tend, for psychobiological reasons, to be limbicly committed to 

these belief systems, and may under certain circumstances even be prone to 

violence in defense of these ideas. 

We also saw that it is a small step from concretist cognitive styles to 

power-seeking fundamentalist mentalities, as social networks of concretists, 

inspired and guided by charismatic religious clerics, seek to transform the 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 143

wider society in accordance with what they hold to be “correct” religiously 

justified lines. When such attempts at societal transformation are thwarted 

by wider social and religious forces or a secular state, the result often is 

a rigid binary worldview dividing the world sharply into a “good” realm 

populated by the concretists and the “evil” realm dominated by the unbelievers. At this juncture, radicalization—defined as the desire on the part 

of the concretist-minded religious fundamentalists to affect the profound 

transformation of society from the roots up—sets in. They may either do 

so peaceably, through mass civil society organizations and political parties 

such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or Pakistani Jemaat-i-Islami, 

or more drastically, through violence, such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad or 

Southeast Asia’s Jemaah Islamiyah. At this point, an ideology of resistance 

against either the “near enemy” or, as in the case of al Qaedaism, the “far enemy” of the “malicious Crusader-Jewish Alliance,” is articulated to mobilize 

either political or violent dissent against the existing jahili political order 

and the international interests that prop up that order.90

What is to be done? Some analysts have called for improving the capacity of non-Western, especially Muslim, governments to provide better 

quality and more affordable secular public education, so that Muslim parents need not send their children to low-cost private Islamic schools. This 

suggestion, however, ignores the fact that one of the attractions of religious 

education for Muslim parents everywhere, apart from its low cost relative to 

secular public education, is the former’s emphasis on moral values for “life’s 

hard slog.”91 The real need, therefore, is to improve both secular public 

and private Islamic education. In this connection, the proposed Targeting 

Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, which states that it should be U.S. 

policy to raise “$7 to $10 billion annually to fund education programs in 

Islamic countries,” is a step in the right direction. The International Youth 

Opportunity Fund, currently designed to provide funding aid to improve 

public education in the Middle East, is something that can and should be 

extended to other parts of the Muslim world as well.92

The question is how these funds should be spent. Within non-Western 

countries at the broader, societal realm, an all-important need remains to 

mitigate the social and cognitive implications of collectivist, high powerdistance, and ambiguity-intolerant mass orientations. Simply put, people 

need to think more for themselves and not intellectually subcontract to religious or other ideologues the admittedly difficult philosophical problem 

of meshing traditions with secular, capitalist modernity. This is, of course, 

easier said than done, as the old Milgram experiments demonstrate that 

the urge to obey authority is a very strong one in all societies.93 As the brutal examples of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and the old Soviet Union remind us, 
144 RAMAKRISHNA

the so-called power of the situation can well transform otherwise ordinary 

people into savage mobs blindly following the hate-filled agenda of ethnic 

entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the argument being developed here is that the 

ability to critically analyze social life is a skill that should be inculcated from 

an early age. This is not to suggest that educational reform would be able 

to successfully transform deeply ingrained cognitive styles in toto. The idea, 

however, is to mitigate their worst effects. While intuitives can benefit much 

from the intellectual discipline and drive for the “truth” of the concretists, 

the concretists have much to learn from the intuitives’ ability to cope with 

the amount of ambiguity necessary to modern life. 

As far as the Muslim world is concerned, voices have already been 

raised in support of developing critical thinking skills. Roy Mottahedeh, for 

instance, argues strongly for a liberal arts emphasis in tertiary education, arguing that the “graduates of such an expanded liberal arts education system 

would be forces for economic development.”94 He adds that such education 

should be in the vernacular, so as to “reach the underprivileged, create the 

textbooks and even the language of discourse, and allow a discourse that 

draws on the cultures of these countries.” To this end he goes so far as to 

call for an ambitious new “Fulbright Plan” to establish “well-funded liberal 

arts institutions” teaching in vernacular languages and offering bachelor’s 

degrees in “Cairo, Karachi, and kindred places” throughout the Muslim 

world.95 This is not to assert that science and technology education should 

be underemphasized, as these remain important drivers of industrialization, 

economic expansion, and job creation, especially in view of the so-called 

youth bulge affecting many Muslim countries. As Mottahedeh observes, 

critical thinking and writing should be the norm in “both the human and 

scientific spheres.” This harkens back to the scholarly distance hypothesis 

of Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle. The key is to produce graduates in collectivist 

societies who have been trained to apply critical analysis to both the natural 

and the social worlds. Ameliorating the worst effects of the concretist cognitive style would go a long way toward establishing the intellectual preconditions for “the eventual emergence of a politics at once authentically Islamist 

yet also authentically liberal and democratic,” and ultimately, a “Muslim 

Reformation.”96 

To expedite a Muslim Reformation, moreover, requires reform within 

the more narrowly defined realm of Islamic education worldwide. In this 

respect, former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, a devout Muslim, laments that the original spirit of inquiry, which led Arab Muslim intellectuals 

of the past to attain great heights of achievement in science, philosophy, 

and the arts, has long been absent from Islamic education in general. 

Rather, the general principle in too many religious schools appears to be 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 145

“memorization, stop thinking, stop rationalizing,”97 a view that certainly 

seems to hold in the example of al Mukmin discussed earlier. Even at university level, autodidactic or monodimensional readings of Scripture—consistent with the concretist cognitive style—appear the norm, especially 

on secular, technical university campus environments. To prevent the development of tunnel vision among young Muslim undergraduates in the 

hard sciences and engineering, the latter should be encouraged to enroll 

for properly audited courses that would help them develop sophisticated 

methodologies for interpreting Islamic law. They should also be exposed 

to works by Islamic scholars like Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn 

Sina) that examine how Islam can engage with a real world environment in 

which “sexual equality, human rights, and the development of democracy” 

are burning issues of the day.98

Similarly, contemporary works by scholars such as Indonesia’s 

Nurcholish Majid and Iran’s Abdulkarim Soroush could also be studied at 

university level, as they are “trying to extract the prophetic truths from the 

Koran to show the inherent compatibility of modern-day concerns with the 

sacred texts.”99 The overarching idea, over time, is to develop well-balanced 

Muslim university graduates everywhere who are able to articulate for themselves what Rachid Ghannoushi once called a “realistic fundamentalism” 

or usuliyah waqiyah, rather than a rigid, doctrinaire Islam imported from 

7th-century Arabia and unresponsive to the complexities of 21st-century, 

globalized Indonesia.100 With a properly designed Islamic educational curriculum through cross-faculty cooperation between secular and Islamic tertiary institutions, concretist, monodimensional readings of Scripture would 

have a good chance of being replaced by more sophisticated and nuanced 

analysis. For instance, some devout Javanese Muslims have always felt that 

the preoccupation of Islamic fundamentalists with shariah was “an odd goal 

for a true Muslim to aspire to.” The shariah is not the end, but only the way 

to the true goal: hakikat, or self-mastery, “Islam’s highest level.”101

Tertiary Islamic education aside, there is also considerable scope for 

reform of primary and secondary Islamic education, as Pitsuwan’s remarks 

cited earlier attest. First, there is a real need to broaden if not eliminate the 

binary worldviews promoted by specific constituencies of hate such as al 

Mukmin. In this connection, Farid Ma’ruf, a senior instructor/professor at 

al Mukmin, once asked rhetorically:

There is one community. Then there are some members of that 

community who have done something wrong. Is that community also at fault? 102

This essay answers yes, not because this constituency explicitly advocates violence against outsiders, but because it promotes a worldview or 
146 RAMAKRISHNA

mental template that under certain circumstances may lead certain alumni 

to embrace violence. Hence what is needed, as al Mukmin alumnus Noor 

Huda Ismail argues, is greater institutionalized exposure of the members of 

cloistered constituencies of hate such as al Mukmin to difference. This injunction translates into exposure to different interpretations of key concepts 

such as jihad by visiting ustaz from other aliran (ideological streams); more 

interfaith dialogues; dialogues with alumni who have become successful in 

the secular world; and greater contact with and more access to information 

about the outside world.103 The overarching concern at the level of dealing with specific, physically isolated religious schools, especially boarding 

schools, would be to open up the vistas of its members by humanizing the 

“Other.” When non-Muslims are seen more as fellow human beings than as 

“disembodied” abstractions, the potential for radicalism and ultimately terrorism is decreased.104 Charles Kimball correctly argues that at the heart of 

healthy religion is the willingness of teachers and followers to ask questions 

and to challenge dogma. Claims of absolute truth and blind obedience are 

two signs of corrupted religion.105

It should be emphasized that progress in the educational sphere cannot be divorced from concrete policy elsewhere. Precisely because radical 

Islamist ideologies seek to exploit failures on the part of Muslim governments to provide security, welfare, and justice, Western-led programs to 

improve the overall capacity of these governments for effective governance 

to alleviate poverty, generate economic growth, and eliminate corruption 

in the justice system would go a long way toward reducing the “political 

oxygen” that radical Islamist ideologues exploit to strengthen the virulent 

binary worldviews they seek to propagate. 

Finally, improving the image of the United States around the Muslim 

world cannot be ignored. Part of the problem encumbering progressive 

Muslim scholars as they seek to delegitimize the virulent ideologies and 

binary worldviews of radical Islamists is that U.S. policy toward the Muslim 

world—with which the progressives are often associated in wider Muslim 

opinion—often appears anti-Muslim. Quite apart from stepped-up public 

diplomacy showcasing the ways the United States has sought to help the 

global umma, such as the interventions in Kuwait (1990), Bosnia (1995), 

and Kosovo (1999) to aid oppressed Muslims, care must be taken to ensure 

that stark errors in U.S. policy, strategy, and tactics are minimized. In this 

regard, the notorious and extremely damaging 2004 Abu Ghraib prison 

scandal in Iraq, and the allegations of desecration of the Koran by military 

interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, all helped radical Islamists everywhere reinforce the worldviews that encourage radicalism. In sum, better 

education can only be a necessary, but by no means sufficient, antidote to 

Islamist radicalism.
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 147

Notes

1 Fred Kaplan, “Rumsfeld’s Pentagon Papers,” Slate, October 23, 2003, available at <slate.

msn.com/id/2090250>.

2 Most notably Tahir Andrabi et al., “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at 

the Data,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3521 (Washington, DC: The World 

Bank, March 2005).

3 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools: Madrassas: Background,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, February 10, 2005, 5.

4 Geography of the Muslim World, Grade 8 (1994).

5 Lawal defines power-distance as “the extent to which a society accepts unequal distribution of power,” uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which a society feels threatened by 

uncertainty and ambiguity,” and individualism/collectivism as “the extent to which dominant 

values in society emphasize assertiveness and material acquisition.” Olufemi A. Lawal, “SocialPsychological Considerations in the Emergence and Growth of Terrorism,” in Chris E. Stout, 

The Psychology of Terrorism, vol. 4: Programs and Practices in Response and Prevention (London 

and Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 26–27. Lawal draws these typologies from Geert Hofstede, 

Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 

Publications, 1984), 65–148.

6 Lawal, “Socio-Psychological Considerations,” in Stout, The Psychology of Terrorism, vol. 

4, 27.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 12.

11 Michael J. Stevens, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Globalization: Contextualizing Terrorism,” in Chris E. Stout, The Psychology of Terrorism, vol. 3: Theoretical Understandings 

and Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 37–38.

12 Ibid., 38.

13 Ibid., 39.

14 Charles Selengut, Sacred Fury (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2003), 157–158.

15 Stevens, “Unanticipated Consequences,” in Stout, vol. 3, 40.

16 Selengut, 158.

17 Ronald Johnson, “Psychoreligious Roots of Violence: The Search for the Concrete in a 

World of Abstractions,” in J. Harold Ellens, The Destructive Power of Religion, vol. 4: Contemporary 

Views on Spirituality and Violence (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 200–202. Johnson 

draws these typologies from C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1971).

18 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 69.

19 Johnson, “Psychoreligious Roots,” in Ellens, 207.

20 Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi and Michael Argyle, The Psychology of Religious Behavior, Belief, 

and Experience (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 115.

21 Singapore White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: 

Ministry of Home Affairs, January 7, 2003), 17.

22 Johnson, “Psychoreligious Roots of Violence,” in Ellens, 195; J. Harold Ellens, “Fundamentalism, Orthodoxy, and Violence,” in Ellens, 124. 

23 Rush W. Dozier, Jr., Why We Hate: Understanding, Curbing, and Eliminating Hate in 

Ourselves and Our World (New York: Contemporary Books, 2002), 6.

24 Ibid., 5–8.

25 Ibid., 11.

26 Ibid., 12.

27 Ted G. Goertzel, “Terrorist Beliefs and Terrorist Lives,” in Chris E. Stout, The Psychology 

of Terrorism, vol. 1: A Public Understanding (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 98.
148 RAMAKRISHNA

28 Ellens, “Fundamentalism, Orthodoxy, and Violence,” in Ellens, 120.

29 Daniel Pipes, Militant Islam Reaches America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 56.

30 Malise Ruthven, A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America (London and New York: 

Granta, 2002), 217.

31 “Indonesian Linked to Manila, Jakarta Bombings,” Laksamana.Net, July 6, 2002, available at <laksamana.net/vnews.cfm?ncat=22&news_id=3127>.

32 Michael Day and David Bamber, “Universities Spy for MI5 on Foreign Students,” 

News.telegraph.co.uk, August 28, 2004, available at <telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/

news/2004/03/21/nspy21.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/03/21/ixnewstop.html>.

33 Maria Ressa, “Al Qaeda Operative Sought Anthrax,” CNN, October 10, 2003, available 

at <cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/10alqaeda.anthrax>.

34 Dr. Azahari Husin was killed in November 2005.

35 “Azahari: Professor, Bomb-Maker and Fanatic,” Channelnewsasia.com (Singapore), September 10, 2004, available at <channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/105933/1/.html>; 

Dan Murphy, “Leaderless, Terror Group Still Potent,” Christian Science Monitor, August 18, 2003.

36 Ibid.

37 Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 181.

38 Ibid., 182.

39 See Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: The 

Free Press, 2002), 172.

40 Ibid., 173.

41 Ruthven, 103.

42 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Best Way to Fight Islamic Extremism,” The Sunday Times 

(Singapore), April 14, 2002.

43 Emerson, 173.

44 Ibid.

45 Moojan Momen, “Fundamentalism and Liberalism: Towards an Understanding of the 

Dichotomy,” Bahai Studies Review 2, no. 1 (1992). 

46 Steve S. Olweean, “Psychological Concepts of the ‘Other’: Embracing the Compass of 

the Self,” in Stout, vol. 1, 116.

47 Ellens, “Fundamentalism, Orthodoxy, and Violence,” in Ellens, 120.

48 Stuart Sim, Fundamentalist World: The New Dark Age of Dogma (Cambridge: Icon 

Books, 2004), 29.

49 Ibid., 100.

50 Cited in Neil J. Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (New York: 

Westview, 2002), 199. 

51 Ibid., 199, 211.

52 John E. Mack, “Looking Beyond Terrorism: Transcending the Mind of Enmity,” in 

Stout, vol. 1, 176. I would also like to acknowledge my appreciation of the insights into Indonesian radical Islamist worldviews of my colleague Faizah Samat of the International Center for 

Political Violence and Terrorism Research within the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. 

53 Cited in Sally Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords (Sydney: HarperCollins Publishers, 

2004), 1. 

54 Ibid., 2.

55 Kressel, 211.

56 Michael J. Stevens, “Unanticipated Consequences,” in Stout, vol. 3, 44.

57 Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Walter Reich, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind

(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 33.

58 Kressel, 211.

59 Paul N. Anderson, “Religion and Violence: From Pawn to Scapegoat,” in J. Harold 

Ellens, The Destructive Power of Religion: Violence in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, vol. 2: Religion, 

Psychology, and Violence (London and Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 270–271. 
EDUCATION AND TERRORISM 149

60 Willard Gaylin, Hatred: The Psychological Descent Into Violence (New York: Public 

Affairs, 2003), 244.

61 Azyumardi Azra, “Bali and Southeast Asian Islam,” in Kumar Ramakrishna and See 

Seng Tan, After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Singapore and River Edge, NJ: 

World Scientific Publishing Company, 2003), 42.

62 Martin Van Bruinessen, “‘Traditionalist’ and ‘Islamist’ Pesantren in Contemporary 

Indonesia.”

63 Mochtar Buchori, “RI’s ‘Madrasah’ Producing Techno-Illiterates,” Yaleglobal On line, 

July 3, 2002, available at <yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=194>.

64 Usmar Anza, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on 

Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices,” unpublished paper, March 2003, 10.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Van Bruinessen.

69 Cited in Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords, 14–15.

70 Noor Huda Ismail, presentation on Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin to Institute of Defence 

and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, April 8, 2005.

71 Tracy Dahlby, Allah’s Torch: A Report From Behind the Scenes in Asia’s War on Terror (New 

York: William Morrow & Co., 2005), 230.

72 Noor Huda Ismail. 

73 The phrase is Martin van Bruinessen’s. 

74 Noor Huda Ismail. 

75 Noor Huda Ismail, “Ngruki: It is a Terrorism School?” Part 1, The Jakarta Post, March 15, 

2005.

76 Noor Huda Ismail, IDSS talk.

77 Noor Huda Ismail, “Ngruki,” Part 1.

78 Noor Huda Ismail, IDSS talk.

79 Ibid.

80 Noor Huda Ismail, “Ngruki,” Part 1.

81 Zalman Mohamed Yusof and Mohammad Ishak, “Inside a JI School,” The New Paper 

on Sunday (Singapore), January 4, 2004.

82 Neighbour, 6.

83 Dahlby, 229.

84 Ibid.

85 Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 74.

86 Jonathan T. Drummond, “From the Northwest Imperative to Global Jihad: Social 

Psychological Aspects of the Construction of the Enemy, Political Violence and Terror,” in Stout, 

vol. 1, 76.

87 Noor Huda Ismail, IDSS talk.

88 Yusof and Ishak.

89 Timothy Mapes, “Indonesian School Gives High Marks to Students Embracing Intolerance,” Asian Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2003.

90 The concept of jahiliyya can be understood as “a condition of ignorance and unbelief.” John 

L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 30.

91 Dahlby, 231–232.

92 Blanchard, 6.

93 For details of these famous experiments proving that ordinary people are well capable 

of engaging in antisocial behavior as long as they feel that their actions are legitimized by a 

perceived higher authority, refer to Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View

(London: Tavistock Publications, 1974).
150 RAMAKRISHNA

94 Roy Mottahedeh, “Help Get Education Running Again,” The International Herald 

Tribune Online, February 13, 2002, available at <iht.com/articles/47879.html>.

95 Ibid.

96 Graham E. Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (March/April 

2002), 59. 

97 Surin Pitsuwan, “Strategic Challenges Facing Islam in Southeast Asia,” lecture delivered at a forum organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and the Centre for 

Contemporary Islamic Studies, Singapore, November 5, 2001.

98 Mohamed Charfi, “Reaching the Next Muslim Generation,” The New York Times, 

March 12, 2002, available at <nytimes.com/2002/03/12/opinion/12CHAR.html>.

99 Karim Raslan, “Now a Historic Chance to Welcome Muslims into the System,” The 

International Herald Tribune Online, November 27, 2001, available at <iht.com/articles/40072.

html>.

100 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2001), 108.

101 Dahlby, 265.

102 Maria Ressa, “Jihad Rules in Islamic School,” CNN.com, February 26, 2004.

103 Noor Huda Ismail, IDSS talk.

104 J. Harold Ellens, “Revenge, Justice, and Hope: Laura Blumenfeld’s Journey,” in Ellens, 

vol. 4, 227–235.

105 Kimball, 41–99.
151

Chapter Seven

Sacred Values and the Limits of Rational 

Choice: Conflicting Cultural Frameworks 

in the Struggle Against Terrorism

Scott Atran

Generating a worldwide consensus against terrorism, and thus turning 

the tide of global support (especially in the Muslim world) for violent actions 

against the United States and its allies, requires a profound understanding 

of different cultural points of view. If we recognize that the struggle is not 

merely about control of Afghanistan or Iraq, but rather about meaningful 

cooperation with future generations of Muslims emerging from the massive 

transnational political awakening prompted by easy access to global media, 

particularly the Internet, it is obvious that a deeper understanding of the attitudes and beliefs of these people is essential to success. Moreover, given that 

much of the world’s Muslim population is engaged in a quest for meaning, 

stability, and hope for achievement in an increasingly mobile and rootless 

world that levels history and flattens culture in the name of universal access 

to economic participation and progress, we must also understand not only 

what the cultural values of Muslims are, but also what they are becoming. 

We need to reassess the motivations and objectives of jihadis—America’s 

most implacable foes—but also our society’s own political and popular 

motivations and objectives in meeting the threat. 

Writing in the last century, when the great debates between secular 

ideologies seemed to drive world politics, French resistance leader, stateman, and man of letters André Malraux said: “The next century will either 

be religious or it won’t be.” Malraux’s insight into what politicians and 

pundits—and especially scholars—were missing was an important one. For 

decades, the only attention given to ideas in analysis of the Middle East 

was to the Western isms: colonialism, nationalism, socialism, communism, 

democratic liberalism, and so forth. In Southeast Asia, Muslims who identified themselves as such were labeled by scholars as “statistical” or “nominal” Muslims. Many in the academic establishment completely missed the 

boat, particularly those engaged in postmodernist and postcolonial critical 

studies. Part of the reason may have been intellectual fashion, but probably more significant was a failure to appreciate the power of religious faith, 

which has always colored how most people in nearly all societies believe 

that they ought to act toward others.
152 ATRAN

The power of faith to provide people a sense of community and 

direction is something the current U.S. administration, like much of the 

American public, appears to take to heart at home but not to appreciate 

fully when it is manifested abroad. While many recognize that preempting and preventing terrorism require understanding the conditions and the 

enlistment processes1 that inspire people to give their lives in the name of a 

greater cause, the approaches employed to analyze options for countering 

these forces often assume that adversaries model the world on the basis of 

rational choices that are commensurable across cultures. Such assumptions 

prevail in risk assessment and modeling by foreign aid and international 

development projects run by institutions such as the World Bank and nongovernmental organizations, and by U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence services. 

While the political and economic conditions that are the basis for 

such assessments are important, understanding that people of varying cultures may respond to identical conditions in different ways is even more 

important. Recent work in psychology, anthropology, religious studies, and 

political science relating to social conflicts shows that culturally distinct 

value frameworks constrain preferences and choices in ways not readily 

translatable between cultures. Planning and acting in ignorance or disregard 

of different value frameworks may exacerbate conflict, with grievous loss of 

national treasure and lives. 

The promise of redeeming real or imagined historical grievances 

through a religious (or transcendent ideological) mission that empowers 

the militarily weak with unexpected force against enemies materially much 

stronger is one with age-old appeal. This was true for the Jewish Zealots 

who sacrificed themselves to kill Romans two millennia ago, and interviews 

with terrorists and those who inspire and care for them indicate it is just as 

true for Muslim jihadists today. Individuals who join the jihad, especially 

would-be martyrs (suicide bombers), are often motivated by small-group 

dynamics and noninstrumental values—values that trump rational self-interest because they are seen not as means to an end but as having intrinsic 

worth. Challenges to such values lead to moral outrage and often to what 

outsiders consider an “irrational” need for vengeance. 

The aim of this chapter is to offer a better understanding of the role of 

sacred values (noninstrumental, moral, or protected values) and the limits 

of rational choice in maintaining and helping to resolve seemingly intractable cultural and political conflicts. Sacred values appear to involve behavior that seems motivated “independently of its prospect of success,” often 

involving ethical or religious beliefs. Such values are not sensitive to standard calculations regarding cost and benefit, to quantity, to tradeoffs across 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 153

moral categories (for example, family versus God), or to commensuration 

between different cultural frames. This means that traditional calculations 

of how to defeat or deter an enemy—for example, by providing material 

incentives to defect or threatening massive retaliation against supporting 

populations—might not succeed. For negotiators, policymakers, and others 

who must interact with unfamiliar cultures, it is important to understand 

sacred values to know which social transgressions and offers for tradeoffs 

are likely to remain morally taboo.

Theoretical Background: Sacred Values in 

Religiously Inspired Decisions and Actions

At the same time that Americans, inspired by Benjamin Franklin’s 

credo that “rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God,” were rising against 

England, the English historian Edward Gibbon was writing The Decline and 

Fall of the Roman Empire, attributing Rome’s collapse to religious infection by 

Christianity.2 Ever since, most politicians and ordinary people have continued to praise God, while most scientists and secularly minded scholars have 

continued to bemoan religion’s baneful influence and predict its demise. 

If anything, religious fervor is increasing across the world, including in the 

United States, the world’s most economically powerful and scientifically 

advanced society. An underlying reason is that science treats humans and 

their intentions only as incidental elements in the universe, whereas in 

religion, they are central. That is why Thomas Jefferson’s impersonal deist God and the French Revolution’s neutral deity fell by the wayside, and 

why as much as half the population in the ostensibly godless Soviet Union 

professed religious belief. Religion endures and thrives because it addresses 

people’s deepest emotional yearnings and society’s foundational moral 

needs. No society has ever endured more than a few generations without a 

moral foundation that is considered to be true without question but which 

is nevertheless not rationally scrutable.

In a competition for moral allegiance, secular ideologies are at a disadvantage—particularly one such as post-Enlightenment liberalism, which 

contends that new moral discoveries are constantly being made. If some better ideology is likely to be available in the future, backward induction argues 

that there is no compelling reason other than self-interested convenience to 

accept the current ideology. And if people come to believe that all apparent 

commitment is self-interested convenience or, even worse, manipulation 

for the interest of others, then commitment withers and dies. By contrast, 

religion passionately rouses hearts and minds to break out of this viciously 

rational cycle of self-interest and to adopt group interests that can benefit 
154 ATRAN

individuals only in the long run. In the narrowest case, a married couple 

bound in devotion to one another more easily overcomes personal ups and 

downs than a couple whose marriage is a matter of material convenience. 

In the broadest case, mutual faith in an omniscient and omnipotent agent, 

such as the supreme deity of the Abrahamic religions, mitigates the mentality of “every man for himself.”

Religious behavior often seems to be motivated by sacred values, which 

incorporate moral and ethical beliefs that may motivate action “independently of its prospect of success.” Max Weber, a leading scholar and founder 

of modern sociology and political economics, distinguished the noninstrumental “value rationality” of religions and transcendent political ideologies 

from the “instrumental rationality” of Realpolitik and the marketplace.3

Instrumental rationality involves strict cost-benefit calculations regarding 

goals; ones that are too costly to achieve are adjusted or abandoned. By contrast, as Immanuel Kant explained, virtuous religious behavior (an example 

of a sacred value) is its own reward. Indeed, any attempt to justify virtuous 

behavior based on utility nullifies its moral worth.4 

High-cost personal sacrifices to (non-kin) others in society typically 

seem to be motivated by, and framed in terms of, such noninstrumental values. This includes jihadi conceptions of martyrdom, which involve a moral 

commitment to kill infidels for the sake of God. One review finds that “only 

a minority of human violence can be understood as rational, instrumental 

behavior aimed at securing or protecting material rewards.”5 Historically, violence motivated by religious values tends to underpin the most intractable and 

enduring conflicts within and between cultures6 and civilizations.7

Political scientists and economists acknowledge the role of religious values in coordinating groups for economic, social, and political activities, and in 

providing people with the immunity that goes with action in large numbers.8

From a rational choice perspective, such values operate instrumentally to form 

convergent trust among masses of people with disparate interests and preferences,9 thus reducing “transaction costs” that would otherwise be needed to 

mobilize them.10 Others grant the instrumental value of “ethnicity” and values 

rooted in other ascriptive (birth-based) identities such as religion and language 

but question why ethnicity would be the basis for mobilization at all.11 And 

why does the mobilization of these values energize the most enduring and 

intractable conflicts between groups? The fact that noninstrumental values 

are such powerful motivators to conflict suggests that they possess inherent 

qualities that instrumental values lack, such as passion and obligation. It also 

suggests that these two sorts of values can interact in intricate ways. 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 155

Sacred Values and the Logic of Terrorism

Identifying sacred values in different cultures and how they compete 

for people’s affections is a first step in learning how to prevent differences 

between those values from spiraling into mortal conflict between societies. 

All religions and many quasireligious ideologies that make claims about 

the laws of history or universal missions to reform humanity are based 

on sacred values, which are linked to emotions that underpin feelings of 

cultural identity and trust.12 These emotion-laden sentiments are amplified 

into moral obligations to strike out against perceived opponents no matter 

what the cost when conditions of relative deprivation reach a point at which 

some group members see no acceptable alternative within their society’s 

framework of sacred values.

Such sentiments are characteristic of emotionally driven commitments, 

such as heartfelt romantic love and uncontrollable vengeance, which are apparently arational and may have emerged through natural selection to override rational calculations when confronted with seemingly insurmountable 

obstacles to the attainment of deep-seated needs.13 In religiously inspired 

terrorism, these sentiments are manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters, and trainers, mostly for the organization’s benefit at the expense of 

the individual. In times of crisis, every society routinely calls upon some of its 

own people to sacrifice their lives for the general good of the community. One 

important difference is that for militant jihadis, crisis is constant, and extreme 

sacrifice is necessary as long as there are nonbelievers (kuffar) in the world.

In addition to being an expression of the atavistic cultural elements 

just described, global jihadism is a thoroughly modern movement filling the 

political void in Islamic communities left in the wake of discredited Western 

ideologies coopted by corrupt local governments. The fact that jihadism is to 

some extent a countermovement to the view expressed in the National Security 

Strategy of the United States that liberal democracy is the “single sustainable 

model of national development right and true for every person, in every society” does not make its appeals to Muslim history and calls for the revival 

of the caliphate any less heartfelt.14 At the same time, jihadism’s apocalyptic 

yearnings and born-again vision of personal salvation through radical action 

are absent from traditional Islamic exegesis and, indeed, perhaps as much 

may be learned about such apocalyptic yearnings from the New Testament’s 

Book of Revelations as from the Koran.15 Nor does Islam per se or “Muslim 

civilization” have anything in particular to do with terrorism—no more than 

some impossibly timeless or context-free notion of Christianity, Judaism, 

Hinduism, or Buddhism can be held responsible for the millions of deaths 

that have occurred in the name of these religious traditions.16 
156 ATRAN

Jihadi leaders and ideologues, beginning with bin Laden himself, have 

used the edited snippets and soundbites favored by today’s mass media with 

consummate skill, not as a factual description of the way the world actually 

is or was, or even as a reflection of the ideologues’ own mores, but as a 

means of motivating potential followers to violent action. In the jihadifriendly media, local and historically nuanced interpretations of religious 

canon have been flattened and homogenized across the Muslim world and 

beyond, in ways that have nothing to do with actual Islamic tradition but 

everything to do with a polar reaction to perceived injustice in the prevailing 

unipolar world. At the same time, the historical narrative, however stilted or 

fictitious, translates personal and local ties within and across small groups 

into a profound connection with the wider Muslim community (umma). In 

the competition for people’s allegiance between those who would level history in order to open a global economic playing field and those who would 

tap people’s personal experiences and deeply emotive ancestral narratives in 

the name of access to a purportedly just world, it is not at all clear that the 

message of moderation and modernity wins. 

Yet it is nonsense to claim that al Qaeda and its sympathizers have 

no morality and simply want to annihilate Western civilization. In general, 

charges of nihilism against an adversary usually reflect willful ignorance 

regarding the adversary’s moral framework. At every turn, Osama bin Laden 

has sought moral justification and sanction for al Qaeda’s actions and demands.17 This includes his invocation of a fatwa published in May 2003 by 

the radical Saudi cleric Hamid bin Al-Fahd permitting the use of nuclear 

weapons to inflict millions of casualties upon Americans unless the United 

States changes its foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere in the 

Muslim world.18 One important post-9/11 development is that al Qaeda 

splinter groups no longer consider themselves to be territorially rooted in 

supporting populations. Thus, unconstrained by concrete concerns for what 

will happen to any population that supports them, deracinated jihadis can 

seriously consider any manner of attack, including one leading to fulfillment of Hamid bin Al-Fahd’s apocalyptic vision.19

By helping to provide political and economic opportunity, honest and 

efficient social and economic policies may help prevent some people from 

beginning the downward spiral toward conflict between incommensurable 

moral views of the world. But for some, once that spiral starts, the task 

becomes much more difficult. Once sacred values come into play, negotiated tradeoffs based on balancing costs and benefits become taboo, just 

as selling off one’s child or selling out one’s country is taboo, no matter 

the payoff. In these cases, offers of compromise or exchange are met with 

moral outrage. Counting on military pressure, the imposition of democratic 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 157

institutions, the economic power of globalization, or the Western media’s 

powers of persuasion to get others to give up such sacred values is a vain 

hope. Policymakers from nations that fight sacred terror and hope to defeat 

it need to reach people before they get to the point at which commitment 

becomes absolute and nonnegotiable.

Perhaps equally as important as identifying positive steps that may 

reduce the likelihood of invocation of sacred values in this conflict of 

worldviews is understanding what actions increase the probability of a confrontation between sacred values. Recent psychological research concerning 

the similar concepts of protected values and taboo tradeoffs provides useful 

insights in this regard. 20 Psychologist Phil Tetlock and his colleagues define 

a protected value as “any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly 

treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes 

comparisons, tradeoffs . . . with bounded or secular values.”21 Despite more 

than a decade of research on protected values and decisionmaking, however, 

knowledge of their influence is quite limited. What is clear is that sacred or 

protected values have a privileged link to moral outrage and other emotions, 

especially when a person holding a sacred value is offered a secular value or 

tradeoff such as selling one’s child. The strong negative reaction to a 2003 

proposal by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to set up a futures trading market to predict terrorist attacks is another case in point.22 

Instrumental decisionmaking involves strict cost-benefit calculations 

regarding goals and the willingness to abandon or adjust them if costs for 

realizing them are too high. One claim is that protected (sacred) values are 

associated with deontological criteria—that is, they are matters of moral 

obligation whose importance cannot be measured by consequentialist rules 

such as weighing benefits against costs or linking means to ends. People 

whose sacred values are at stake often say that they have a moral obligation 

to act, independent of the likelihood of success, “because I couldn’t live 

with myself if I didn’t.” But there is little analysis of the mental accounting 

involved in quantity insensitivity or the stability of values across decision 

frames.23 For example, a medical decision framed as a matter of life or death 

may be insensitive to cost, but one framed in terms of a marginal increase in 

prospects for survival may not be.24 Researchers have found protected values 

to be associated with the elimination of otherwise robust framing effects, 

such as favoring choices framed as gains over those framed as losses.25 Beyond this, there is little consensus. Moreover, analyses that have been carried 

out primarily have used “standard” laboratory populations of university students in fictional scenarios—a practice that sometimes produces results that 

do not readily generalize to other populations and methods,26 no matter 

how statistically reliable the results seem to be.27
Some tentative new studies coupled with analysis of world events in 

which people with sacred values engage in self-sacrifice ranging from acts 

of heroism to suicide terrorism underline the importance of morally motivated decisionmaking.28 But significant empirical and theoretical challenges 

remain. For example, people who ostensibly hold sacred values sometimes 

seem to treat them as having infinite utility (for example, in refusing to 

consider tradeoffs). Because infinite utility is incompatible with any sort 

of “preference schedule” (mathematically, one cannot compute expected 

utilities, which are weighted averages, when one of the terms is infinite), 

people who believe their sacred values are of such absolute importance 

should theoretically spend literally all their time and effort protecting and 

promoting them. Yet this does not happen.29 

Thus, some have suggested that such values are only pseudosacred;30 

others have noted that people may engage in indirect tradeoffs despite the 

sacredness of the values involved.31 One may be tempted to think of sacred values as self-serving posturing, but the reality of acts such as suicide 

bombings or a Buddhist monk’s self-immolation undermines this stance.32 

Moreover, it may be that sacred values necessary to an individual’s identity 

take on truly absolute value only when value-related identity seems gravely 

threatened (for example, via humiliation), just as food may take on absolute 

value only when sustenance for life is threatened. 

Although the field of judgment and decisionmaking has made enormous progress,33 much more is known about various facets of economic 

decisionmaking than about morally motivated decisionmaking. In particular, 

there is little knowledge or study of so-called sacred or protected values—that 

is, values that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, tradeoffs, or any 

other mingling with bounded or secular values. The scant research suggests 

that standard political and economic proposals (such as a democratic vote in 

favor of majority interests with just material compensation for the minority) 

rarely succeed in resolving conflicts over sacred values. 

For example, a research team led by Jeremy Ginges recently conducted 

surveys of 601 Israeli settlers and 535 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank 

and Gaza on the relationship between essential or sacred values and support 

for political violence or peace. It found that emotional outrage and support 

for violent opposition to compromise over sacred values are not mitigated 

by offering instrumental incentives to compromise but are decreased when 

the adversary makes instrumentally irrelevant compromises over their own 

sacred values. 

In the representative survey of Jewish settlers conducted in August 2005, 

days before Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, the team randomly presented 

158 ATRAN
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 159

participants with one of several hypothetical peace deals. All involved Israeli 

withdrawal from 99 percent of the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for 

peace. For the 46 percent of participants who believed the “Greater Land of 

Israel” was a sacred value, this was a “taboo” tradeoff. Some deals involved 

an added instrumental incentive, such as money (“taboo plus”), while in 

other deals Palestinians also made a “taboo” tradeoff over one of their 

own sacred values in a manner that added no instrumental value to Israel 

(contextually “tragic”). From a rational perspective, the “taboo plus” deal 

is improved relative to the “taboo” deal, and thus violent opposition to the 

“taboo plus” deal should be weaker. However, the team observed the following order of support for violence: “taboo plus” is preferred to “taboo,” 

which in turn is preferred to “tragic” (see figure 7–1A); those evaluating 

the “tragic” deal showed less support for violent opposition than the other 

two conditions. An analysis of intensity of emotional outrage again found 

that “taboo plus” provoked greater outrage than “taboo,” which provoked 

greater outrage than “tragic” (see figure 7–1C); those evaluating the ”tragic” 

deal were least likely to feel angry or disgusted.

These results were replicated in a representative survey of Palestinians 

in Gaza and the West Bank conducted in late December 2005, one month 

before Hamas was elected to power. In this experiment, hypothetical peace 

deals all violated the Palestinian “right of return,” a key issue in the conflict.34 For the 80 percent of participants who believed this was a sacred 

value, we once more observed that those evaluating a “taboo plus” deal 

showed the highest support for violent opposition, while those evaluating a 

“tragic” deal showed the lowest support (see figure 7–1B). Further, the same 

order was found for two measures ostensibly unrelated to the experiment 

belief that Islam condones suicide attacks and reports of joy at hearing of a 

suicide attack; compared to refugees who had earlier evaluated a “taboo” or 

“taboo plus” deal, those who had evaluated a “tragic” deal believed less that 

Islam condoned suicide attacks and were less likely to report feelings of joy 

at hearing of a suicide attack (see figure 7–1D).35 In neither the settler nor 

the refugee study did participants responding to the “tragic” deals regard 

these deals as more implementable than participants evaluating “taboo” or 

“taboo plus” deals. 

Thus, for both the Israeli settler and Palestinian refugee populations, 

participants in the “taboo plus” condition (which offered the instrumental 

incentive of a tangible improvement in living conditions) showed greater 

hostility to the tradeoff than those in the “taboo” condition (which offered 

no incentive), who in turn showed greater hostility to the tradeoff than 

participants in the “tragic” condition, in which the one side is merely required 

to recognize the other side’s sacred value. This result is precisely the opposite
160 ATRAN

Figure 7–1. Population's Predicted Use of Violence to Oppose Actions

Considered Taboo

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Taboo+ Taboo Tragic

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

Taboo+ Taboo Tragic

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

Taboo+ Taboo Tragic -8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

Taboo+ Taboo Tragic

A B

C D

Figure represents percentage of population predicted to use violence to oppose a peace deal perceived to violate a sacred value (“taboo” condition), the taboo deal plus an added instrumental 

incentive (“taboo plus”), or the taboo deal plus a sacred value concession without instrumental 

value, from the adversary (“tragic”) for (A) Israeli settlers (linear trend F[1,195] = 5.698, P = .018) 

and (B) Palestinian refugees (F[1, 384] = 7.201, P = .008). Parallel results obtained for emotional 

reactions by (C) settlers reporting anger or disgust at an Israeli leader who would agree to the tradeoff 

being evaluated (F[1, 260] = 4.436, P = .036), and (D) refugees reporting joy at hearing of a suicide 

bombing according to the type of tradeoff being evaluated (F[1, 418] = 7.48, P = .007). The trend of 

emotional intensity and support for violence in each case, “taboo plus” > “taboo” > “tragic,” could not 

be predicted by an instrumental rationality account of human behavior.

of what one would expect if calculations were based on straightforward notions of economic or political utility.36

These experiments reveal that in political disputes where sources of conflict are cultural, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or emerging clashes 

between the Muslim and Judeo-Christian world, violent opposition to compromise solutions may be exacerbated rather than decreased by insisting 

on instrumentally driven tradeoffs, while noninstrumental compromises, 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 161

which might seem merely symbolic to outsiders, may actually reduce support for violence.

It would seem reasonable to expect the same pattern of behavior in religiously motivated terrorists. Most terrorists who have been studied, including would-be or captured suicide bombers, fail to show any psychopathology or sociopathy and are generally at least as educated and economically 

well off as their surrounding populations.37 Such findings are often taken 

to support the idea that terrorist action, including self-destruction, derives 

from rational decisions to optimize strategies for attaining sociopolitical 

goals:38 the religious “bargain” of mostly young men dying for a promising 

afterlife;39 ultimate sacrifice as maximizing the goal of improving lives of 

family or compatriots, which offsets the “opportunity cost” of an educated 

life lost prematurely;40 or “trading life” for a social identity that is affirmed 

in death but devalued by continued living.41

These speculations are plausible theoretically, but no study involving structured interviews or experiments with religious suicide terrorists 

has ever put them to the empirical test. Rather than obeying a utilitarian 

“logic of rational consequence,” these actors perhaps more closely follow 

a similar “logic of moral appropriateness”42 to that evinced by the Israeli 

settlers and Palestinian refugees. For example, in recent interviews, a number 

of self-identified recruits for martyr attack from the Hamas Bloc at al-Najah 

University in Nablus (which provides more suicide bombers than any other 

demographic group of Palestinians) as well as a number of active fighters 

in Indonesia from Jemaah Islamiya (JI), al Qaeda’s main ally in southeast 

Asia, who trained in Afghanistan, the southern Philippines, Sulawesi, and 

the Mollucas, were asked such questions as: “What if your family were to 

be killed in retaliation for your action?” or “What if your father were dying 

and your mother found out your plans for a martyrdom attack and asked 

you to delay until the family could get back on its feet?” To a person, they 

answered along lines that there is duty to family, but duty to God cannot be 

postponed. When asked what if their action resulted in no one’s death but 

their own, the typical response was, “God will love you just the same.” When 

these same questions were posed to the alleged emir of Jemaah Islamiya, 

Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, in Jakarta’s Cipinang prison in August 2005, he responded 

that martyrdom for the sake of jihad is the ultimate fardh ‘ain, an inescapable 

individual obligation that trumps all others, including four of the conventional five pillars of Islam (prayer, Ramadan fast, alms, and pilgrimage; only 

the fifth pillar, profession of faith in God and the Prophet, remains on a par 

with jihad). What matters for him, as for most would-be martyrs and their 

sponsors who were interviewed, is the martyr’s intention and commitment 
162 ATRAN

to God, so that blowing up only oneself has the same value and reward 

regardless of whether any of the enemy are killed in the process.43

Such answers are typical of confrontations over sacred values, which 

are not sensitive to standard calculations regarding cost and benefit, quantity, tradeoffs across moral categories, or commensuration between different 

cultural frames.44 This means that traditional calculations of how to defeat or 

deter an enemy, such as by providing material incentives to defect or threatening massive retaliation against supporting populations, might not succeed. 

While this may be an accurate description of the value motivation 

that drives people to become suicide terrorists or to support terrorism, 

the organizations that actually direct suicide terrorism are motivated by 

instrumental rationality to fight the policies they abhor. Al Qaeda deputy 

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri argues in his testament, Knights under the Prophet’s 

Banner, that “the method of martyrdom operations [i]s the most successful 

way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the 

mujahidin in casualties.” Jihadi leaders also point to the sacrifice of their 

“best and brightest” as proof of the movement’s commitment to the Muslim 

community, which increases the organization’s political market share. Furthermore, the decision of the terrorist organization to encourage suicide 

attacks may be driven by a military-technological calculus. In September 

2004, Sheikh Hamed al-Betawi, a spiritual leader of Hamas, told me, “Our 

people do not own airplanes and tanks, only human bombs. Those who 

undertake martyrdom actions are not hopeless or poor, but are the best 

of our people, educated, successful. They are intelligent, advanced combat 

techniques for fighting enemy occupation.” Most of the would-be suicide 

bombers interviewed also say that if a roadside bomb can produce the same 

damage (that is, without causing the deaths of any members of the group), 

then the roadside bomb is preferable.45 

In sum, would-be martyrs and their sponsors appear to use instrumental reasoning when focusing on the consequences of their actions. 

Interviewees would usually agree to the substitution of a roadside bombing 

that would not kill the bomber for a suicide bombing that would, and they 

would also agree to delay a roadside bombing to fulfill a commitment to 

one of the sacred pillars of Islam, such as making a first pilgrimage to Mecca. 

But when the choice before them highlights clashing values, then deontological (moral) considerations seem to trump consequentialist (utilitarian) 

ones. For example, our interviewees also say it is wrong to delay a suicide 

operation for a first pilgrimage or simply to prevent lethal retaliation against 

the bomber’s family. From an instrumental perspective, roadside bombing 

is preferable to suicide bombing, and pilgrimage is preferable to either. 

However, from a moral perspective, suicide bombing was preferable to 

pilgrimage. This resulting “nontransitivity” in reasoning seems inconsistent 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 163

with standard notions of “rationality” that drive most current political and 

economic theorizing. 

In addition, inverse consequentialist reasoning is apparent in populations sympathetic to suicide bombings. That is, the greater certain kinds of instrumental incentive to undertake a suicide bombing (for example, the greater 

the quantity of money offered the martyr’s family for their child’s martyrdom 

action) are, the less those incentives are morally tolerable and the more likely 

they are to be disincentives (see figure 7–2). Of course, one can always recast 

noninstrumental values in instrumental terms, just as one can always frame 

any perceptual or conceptual relationship in terms of “similarity,” but the 

issue is whether, in doing so, explanatory power to predict further judgments 

and decisions is helped or hindered.

Promoting Democracy: The Impact of Sacred Values

Social psychologists cite robust experimental evidence that a realist 

bias is commonly held by most people in whatever culture, including leaders: most people tend to believe that their behavior speaks for itself, that 

they see the world objectively, and that only other people are biased and 

misconstrue events.46 Moreover, individuals tend to misperceive differences

Figure 7–2. PalestinianJudgments of Acceptability for a Family to

Request Compensation (in Dinars) for a Son’s Martyrdom

Operation

1.00

1.10

1.20

1.30

1.40

1.50

1.60

1.70

1.80

1.90

2.00

1,000 10,000 1,000,000

Between-subjects design for a representative West Bank and Gaza sample (N = 1267) shows inverse 

instrumentality (linear trend, p = .01). 65 percent of respondents “strongly support” suicide bombing; 

50 percent associate it most strongly with “joy” (“pride” = 12 percent, other emotions < 10 percent).

Y-axis: 1 = “acceptable”; 2 = “unacceptable”
164 ATRAN

between group norms as more extreme than they really are. The resulting 

misunderstandings—encouraged by religious and ideological propaganda—lead antagonistic groups to interpret each other’s views of events, 

such as terrorism or freedom fighting, as wrong, radical, and/or irrational. 

Mutual demonization and warfare readily ensue. The problem is to stop this 

spiral from escalating in opposing camps.

The current U.S. national security strategy, including its overarching 

strategy for a successful pursuit of the war on terror, is based on the assumption that promotion of democracy ultimately promotes peace and stability 

in the world and protects the United States. In the long run, this may prove 

true. But just as our discussion of the impact of sacred values on individual 

behavior would lead us to expect, history has uniformly and mercilessly 

shown that precipitous or unyielding attempts to impose outside beliefs on 

a foreign society, or to act as if members of that foreign society really wanted 

to believe and act as the outsiders do, lead to strategic failure. 

The error of assuming that others will or want to believe and act as 

we do leads to the fallacy of assuming that the spread of democracy among 

all peoples and nations is an inexorable natural process. In fact, there is 

no more reason to believe this now than there was at the end of World 

War I, when the United States, Western Europe, and the League of Nations 

originally proposed a similar vision for Iraq, the Middle East, and the rest 

of the world. Democratic freedoms are not natural or inevitable parts of the 

human condition. They are not universal, timeless, or absolute; even freedom of thought and expression has public limits that are continually being 

recalibrated through political negotiation. They are instead a reflection of 

the values of the communities in which democracies arise and flourish. 

Democracy grows painstakingly through the dedication of an increasingly 

educated citizenry steeped in a sense of national unity and committed to the 

defense of differences of interest and opinion. At best, a democratic transformation of the Middle East will take many years, perhaps generations. 

It may never come about; or if it does, it can still fail, as it did in France 

and Mexico in the 1800s, Germany and Spain in the 1930s, and Iran and 

Guatemala in the 1950s. 

The objection may be raised that surveys of Islamic opinion consistently show that many people in the Middle East and elsewhere in the 

Muslim world do yearn for democratic choice. But there are no polls or any 

other evidence suggesting that they are prepared to subordinate the interests 

of their own ethnic group or religion to the greater common interest of an 

entire country, a pattern of behavior that has heretofore been essential for 

successful democracy at a national level. The current international system 

of nation-states, enshrined in the United Nations charter, was established 

by Europeans (and derivatives) that had already developed firm national 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 165

identities by the time the United Nations was created. Even those countries 

that did not enjoy democratic governance between the end of World War II 

and the late 1980s possessed strong senses of national identity and solidarity. Thus, it may not be possible to extrapolate the successful democratic 

transitions of countries in South America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia—all 

of which had clear national identities—to Middle Eastern countries that 

neither possess such identities nor the other factors, such as a robust middle 

class, that political scientists have shown to be linked to successful democratic development. 

In Indonesia, for example, the entrenchment of democracy has, if 

anything, weakened the country’s willingness to fight terrorism. Militant 

jihadi groups as well as mainstream Islamic parties that seek to transform 

Indonesia into a state ruled by sharia were banned from serious public 

politics until the downfall of Suharto’s dictatorship in 1998, but their acquiescence or support is now critical to a government in which no party 

controls more than 25 percent of parliament. President Yudyhono, whose 

own party has just 8 percent of parliament, says he cannot submit legislation proscribing Jemaah Islamiya because of insufficient “proof” that the 

organization even exists. The speaker of Indonesia’s parliament, along with 

many of the country’s Muslim leaders, has even visited JI’s leader, Abu Bakr 

Bashir, in jail to show solidarity with this “victim” of U.S. and Australian 

pressure and interference—all this after JI operatives plotted to assassinate 

the previous president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Indonesian intelligence has 

also authenticated a 1998 letter to regional jihadi directors in which Bashir 

declared he was acting on Osama bin Laden’s behalf to advance “the Muslim 

world’s global jihad” against “the Jews and Christians [who] will never be 

satisfied until they see you follow their way of worship.”

It cannot possibly be in the Indonesian government’s interest to 

continue to shelter an organization with such violent intentions, but the 

country’s officials may have concluded that it is even riskier to support 

American policies by taking action against JI. According to the latest survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Indonesian views of 

the United States, which were largely favorable before the invasion of Iraq, 

plummeted to 15 percent favorable right after. In Pew’s June 2005 survey, 80 

percent of Indonesians actually expressed fear that the United States would 

attack their country. 

All that said, the credibility of what the United States sets forth as its 

own sacred values leaves it no option but to continue to promote democratic 

choice. It should do so even if it means accepting governments hostile to 

U.S. interests, provided such governments do not support violence against 

the United States or its allies. But it must not attempt to impose democracy, which may simply backfire or, worse, intensify the spirit of protecting 
166 ATRAN

indigenous values. In any case, simply providing an institutional framework 

for democracy, such as a constitution and courts, may be meaningless if the 

concept is not organically based in local society, history, and culture. Fostering 

the creation of a large and stable middle class is probably necessary, though 

not sufficient. Opening up economic opportunity will help but, again, not 

if the path to economic improvement is widely perceived as undermining 

moral values and inciting a clash between traditional and modern cultures.

The Importance of Small Group Dynamics

Especially after 9/11, nationalist Islamist movements from Morocco 

to Indonesia, which had jealously guarded their independence, spiritually 

united under the al Qaeda logo. Intense public targeting and discussion of 

al Qaeda encouraged homegrown groups only tenuously connected with 

bin Laden, if at all, to claim responsibility for attacks in al Qaeda’s name 

so they would be taken more seriously by friend and foe alike. Abu Mus’ab 

Al-Zarqawi’s Iraq-based jihadi group, whose violently anti-Shi’ite policy was 

never at the top of bin Laden’s agenda,47 is a good example. 

But the terrorist actions that are often attributed to al Qaeda are now 

chiefly executed by self-forming cells of friends that swarm for attack and then 

disappear or disperse to form new swarms. Independent studies by the Nixon 

Center’s Robert Leiken48 and by Marc Sageman49 show that over 80 percent 

of known jihadis currently live in diaspora communities, which are often 

marginalized from the host society. As with the decentralized anarchist movement (including suicide attackers) that terrorized the world a century ago, 

killing U.S. President William McKinley and the Archduke of Austria to spark 

World War I, most jihadis follow whomever they like more than they follow 

orders from an impersonal command hierarchy. Their hard-to-penetrate social networks consist of about 70 percent friends and 20 percent family.

Living mostly in the diaspora, unconcerned by retaliation against 

the populations of the countries in which they live, jihadis who are frequently middle class, secularly well educated but often “born-again” radical 

Islamists (including converts from Christianity) embrace apocalyptic visions for humanity’s violent salvation. Interviews with culturally uprooted 

and politically restless youth elicit expressions of a stunningly simplified 

and decontextualized embrace of martyrdom for the sake of global jihad as 

life’s noblest cause. For the most part, these young people are completely 

sincere and, increasingly, many are as willing and eager to die as they are to 

kill. Not only in Muslim countries, but in nearly every Western European 

city, bright and idealistic Muslim youth, even more than the intellectually 

marginalized and dispossessed, take in the jihadi story. They are the ones 

who most keenly feel their swelling, media-fed aspirations lanced by the 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 167

impoverished reality of the neighborhoods in which their people live—as 

that reality is simplified through the imagery of global jihad. 

Seeking a sense of community and a deeper meaning in life, small 

groups of friends and family from the same area bond as they surf Islamist 

Web sites to find inspiration and direction from al Qaeda’s message. In 5 

years, the number of Web sites carrying Islamist messages has increased 

from under 20 to over 3,000,50 with about 70 avowedly militant sites collectively forming a virtual jihadi university.51 Thus, an October 2005 posting 

by Ahmad Al-Wathiq bi-Llah, “Deputy General Emir” of the Al-Zarqawi–affiliated Global Islamic Media Front, reissued a 2003 announcement for the 

“Al-Qaeda University of Jihad Studies . . . a tangible reality for the enemies 

of the Nation and the Faith; a decentralized university without geographical 

borders, present in every place.”52 Graduates, he explains, pass through “faculties” that advance the cause of a global caliphate through morale boosting 

and bombings, and specialize in “electronic jihad, media jihad, spiritual 

and financial jihad.” Inspiration can be found in the recent online musings of Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, the new global jihadi Web figure and principal 

theoretician of “leaderless jihad.”53

Veteran jihadis may sometimes help trigger the newer groups into 

action, although even information for the sort of do-it-yourself explosives 

used in Madrid and London are available on the Internet.54 And as in the 

case of the Madrid train bombers, the death or capture of all plotters need 

not affect the ability of other groups to organize and stay motivated. Thus, 

the December 2003 Internet tract that foreshadowed Madrid, “Iraqi Jihad, 

Hopes and Risks,” inspired attacks that would force Spain’s withdrawal 

from Iraq, which the plotters hoped would in turn generate “huge pressure 

on the British presence, which Tony Blair could not overcome.”55 But Britain 

didn’t follow suit, so a mix of homegrown talent (three cricket friends of 

Pakistani origin, one married, one in college, one “born again,” later joined 

by a convert from Christianity) fused by foreign-born incitement apparently 

decided they would bomb London to press the matter. Web sites such as 

the Global Islamic Media Front that host these tracts increasingly control 

the distribution of knowledge and resources as physical agents like bin 

Laden once did. (Moreover, they can be modeled and monitored as such.) 

Although Web sites are assuming central actor, hub, and bridge positions 

in the network, the network itself is shifting profoundly to an acephalic 

“leaderless resistance.” 

Most jihadi cells have only a few members. The preferred size of these 

bands of brothers of fictive kin, who are as willing to die for one another 

as a parent is for a child or one sibling for another, is 8 members (about 

the number of intimate friendships that people across the world tend to 
168 ATRAN

develop between the ages of 15 and 30; before then, primary relations are 

mostly with immediate kin and neighbors, and after, few enduring new 

relationships tend to form other than with one’s own affines, such as family by marriage). Although the members of each cell usually show remarkable in-group homogeneity (age, place of origin, residence, educational 

background, socio-economic status, and so on), there is little homogeneity 

across the jihadi diaspora. This renders attempts at profiling practically 

worthless. Cells are often spontaneously formed and self-mobilizing, with 

few direct physical contacts to other cells. But radicalization usually requires 

input from, and interaction with, the larger jihadi community. The Internet 

is taking over from the hands-on gurus of global jihad in radicalizing groups 

of friends into pseudo-families within which each member will give his life 

for the others.56 Without the Internet, the extreme fragmenting and decentralization of the jihadi movement into a functioning global network might 

not be possible. But despite the different modern dimensions of time and 

space characteristic of this information age, from the perspective of anthropology, there is much about terrorism that resembles the patterns of aggression found among hunter-gatherers and other chiefless tribes—particularly 

spiraling wars of revenge based on codes of intercommunity reciprocity 

and retaliation—more than it does the warfare of hierarchical societies.57

From the perspective of psychology, we are unlikely ever to be able to 

prevent terrorist attacks by trying to profile terrorists; they are not different 

enough from everyone else in the source population to make them remarkable. Insights into homegrown jihadi attacks will have to come from understanding group dynamics, not individual psychology. Small group dynamics 

can trump individual personality to produce horrific behavior in ordinary 

people, not only in terrorists but in those who fight them.58 Social psychologists have investigated the “fundamental attribution error,” a tendency for 

people to explain behavior in terms of individual personality traits, even 

when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work. U.S. 

Government and media characterizations of Middle East suicide bombers as 

cowardly homicidal lunatics may suffer from a fundamental attribution error: 

no instance of religious or political suicide terrorism has ever been known 

to stem from the lone actions of a cowering or unstable bomber. Rather, 

they stem from the same kind of group dynamics elucidated by psychologist 

Stanley Milgram’s experimental demonstration of philosopher Hannah 

Arendt’s thesis of the “banality of evil,” using ordinary Americans.59

After the Nazi atrocities of World War II, Milgram wanted to find out 

whether ordinary Americans would also readily obey destructive orders 

under the right circumstances. For his experiments, Milgram recruited a 

number of college-educated adults, supposedly to help others learn better. 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 169

When the “learner,” hidden by a screen, failed to memorize arbitrary word 

pairs fast enough, the “helper” was instructed to administer an electric 

shock, and to increase the voltage with each erroneous answer. (In fact, 

the learners were actually actors who deliberately got the answers wrong, 

and, unbeknownst to the helpers, no electrical shock was actually being 

applied.) Most helpers complied with instructions to give what would have 

been potentially lethal shocks (labeled as 450 volts) despite the learners’ 

screams and pleas. Although this experiment specifically showed how situations can be staged to elicit blind obedience to authority, a more general 

lesson is that manipulation of context can trump individual personality and 

psychology to generate apparently extreme behaviors in ordinary people. In 

another classic experiment from over 30 years ago, the “Stanford Prison Experiment,” normal college-age men were assigned to be guards or prisoners; 

the “guards” quickly became sadistic, engaging in what psychologist Philip 

Zimbardo called “pornographic and degrading abuse of the prisoners.”

If joining the jihad is crucially (though not exclusively) an institutionlevel phenomenon, finding the right mix of pressure and inducements to 

get the communities themselves to abandon support for institutions that 

recruit suicide attackers may be essential to preventing individuals from 

being recruited. One hypothetical way to achieve that goal would be for 

antiterrorist forces to damage the community’s social and political fabric so 

severely that any support by the local population or authorities for sponsors of terrorist attacks collapses, as happened regarding the kamikaze as a 

byproduct of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In today’s 

world, such an approach would not only be morally unjustifiable, it would 

also be impractical given the dispersed and distributed organization of 

terrorist institutions among distant populations that collectively number 

in the hundreds of millions.60 Even in more localized settings, such as the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coercive policies alone may not achieve lasting 

relief from attack and can exacerbate the problem over time. 

For example, in a representative survey of 1,260 Palestinians from the 

West Bank and Gaza carried out by the Palestinian Center for Policy and 

Survey Research in December 2005–January 2006, the following questions 

were asked: 

■ What is the position of Islam in your opinion regarding the bomber 

who carries out the bombing attack (martyrdom attacks to some, suicide 

attacks to others) killing himself with the aim of killing his enemies as some 

Palestinians do? Does Islam allow such action?

■ If a chosen martyr’s father became ill and his family asked him to take 

care of his father, would it be acceptable to delay the action indefinitely? 
170 ATRAN

■ Would it be acceptable to permanently forego martyrdom if there 

were a significantly high chance that the chosen martyr’s family would be 

killed in retaliation? 

■ And what if the bombing attack led to the destruction of olive trees 

and the bombing of his hometown and school and the death of the students? Would it be acceptable to forego the attack in this case? 

Seventy-two percent of respondents said “yes” to the first question, and 

77 percent of those who responded “no” to it also responded “yes” to the 

second question. But 43 percent of respondents who answered in the affirmative to the first question responded “no” to the third and fourth ones, whereas 

72 percent of those who responded “no” to the first responded “yes” to the 

third and fourth questions. In other words, Palestinians who support suicide 

bombing are less likely to support abandoning extreme violence to save a 

whole family or village from destruction at enemy hands than merely to help 

out a family member. These results suggest that those who have become radicalized to jihad (as measured by support for suicide actions) respond to both 

instrumental sticks (enemy counterviolence) and carrots (recall the results for 

Palestinian refugees on “taboo plus” tradeoffs) with even greater support for 

violence. Note also, however, that in our interviews with actual members of 

action groups (for example, Hamas and JI leaders and militants belonging to 

“martyr groups”), there was overwhelming refusal to consider abandoning a 

suicide attack either to prevent lethal retaliation against the family or to help 

out a sick father. This suggests that those who have joined groups committed 

to acting in support of radical jihad may reject all tradeoffs.

On the inducement side, social psychology research indicates that 

people who identify with one side in a struggle use conflicting information 

from the other side to reinforce their sense of antagonism. Thus, trying to 

persuade Muslims who are hostile to the United States to cease their support for terrorism simply by bombarding them with what they will interpret 

as self-serving information may only increase their hostility. On the other 

hand, other research suggests that most people in any group actually have 

more moderate views than what they consider their group norm to be. Inciting and empowering moderates within the Islamic community to confront 

inadequacies and inconsistencies in the community’s knowledge (of others 

as good or evil), values (respect for life), and behavior (support for killing),61 can produce emotional dissatisfaction among other members of the 

community, leading to lasting change in the group norms and enhanced 

influence on the part of the more moderate elements.62 Funding for civic 

education and debate might help with this process, as might interfaith confidence-building through intercommunity interaction initiatives. 

The insights provided by examining terrorist organizations in the 

context of small group dynamics also suggest that efforts could be made 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 171

to foster alternative peer groups for these “cultural orphans” in cities and 

cyberspace, peer groups that would be as committed and compassionate 

toward their own members as are terror groups, but in life-enhancing ways, 

as well as being committed and compassionate to others outside the group. 

Accomplishing this in the context of cyberspace will require careful monitoring of, rather than simply taking down, existing jihadi Web sites. What is 

needed is subtle exploitation of opportunities to create chat rooms as well 

as physical support groups that advance causes that can play to sentiments 

sympathetic to jihadi rhetoric in a constructive way, such as providing faithbased social services. 

Behavior and attitudes in the Muslim world could also be affected by 

directly addressing and lessening the sources of grievance and humiliation, 

especially in Palestine, where images of daily violence have made the confrontation with Israel the global focus of Muslim attention. No evidence, 

historical or otherwise, indicates that popular support for terrorism will 

evaporate without a visible process toward achieving at least some fundamental goals that the terrorists and their supporting communities share. 

Of course, this does not mean negotiating overall goals, such as al Qaeda’s 

quest to replace the Western-inspired system of nation-states with a global 

caliphate, first in Muslim lands and then everywhere. Unlike other groups, 

al Qaeda publicizes no specific demands after martyr actions. As with an 

avenging army, it seeks no compromise. But most people who currently 

sympathize with al Qaeda’s goals do have specific tangible demands for 

which they might be prepared to negotiate.

Conclusion: Using the Soft and Transformative 

Power of Sacred Values

What lessons does an understanding of sacred values hold for combating the new wave of sacred terror that is expanding across the globe? 

First, the sacred values of others, no matter how alien they may seem, 

must not be ignored or disregarded. Such values provide the moral foundations of society and determine cultural identity, which is often the core of 

an individual’s own identity—who that person believes himself or herself 

to be. The perceived violation of core cultural values is usually deeply felt 

as a personal humiliation, even if the person is only a witness to an injured 

party who may live thousands of miles away, such as an Indonesian who is 

provoked to anger by observing events in Palestine on television or over the 

Internet.

Holy wars depend first and foremost on deep pools of such perceived 

humiliation, not on military occupation per se, argues Harvard political 

scientist Jessica Stern, who talks to terrorists and those who sponsor them.63
172 ATRAN

Especially in Arab societies, where the culture of honor applies to the humblest family as it once applied to the noblest families of the American south,64

the abuse of elders in front of their children, whether in the form of verbal 

insults at roadblocks or strip searches, indelibly stains the memory of any 

community member who witnesses such events. What may be considered 

standard police practice in the United States or Europe may warrant undying calls for revenge when carried out in another society, especially when 

the practice involves outsiders humiliating members of the community. The 

power of cultural humiliation to motivate intense hostility is illustrated by 

the extreme example of the torture committed by American solders at Abu 

Ghraib prison. That the U.S. Government initially responded to the news 

of the misconduct with denials rather than apologies has arguably served 

the jihadi cause even more than the invasion of Iraq itself. As far away as 

the jungles of Sulawesi in Indonesia, people sincerely express their determination to fight Americans to the death because “what they have done to 

Muslims they would not do even to animals.” 

Our insistence that such transgressions do not represent true American 

ideals is meaningless to foreign audiences. As a rule, intentions and thoughts 

do not translate well across cultures; people generally pay much more attention to consequences and behavior. For example, who in America really 

cares what motivated the 9/11 bombers? Who in Iraq, or elsewhere in the 

Muslim world, really cares if coalition forces actually intended to kill innocent civilians? It would not be a great sacrifice of American prestige to reverse 

course and show more than token accountability—perhaps even suffer a little 

loss of face—over events such as those at Abu Ghraib, thereby acknowledging the validity of other people’s sacred values even as we highlight the redemptive qualities of our own society’s sacred values of justice and equality 

before the law.

A second lesson is to not try to undermine the values that inspire 

people to radical action directly and not attempt to substitute our own preferred values by forceful imposition or through propaganda. Experiments 

in cognitive and social psychology repeatedly show that such tactics usually 

only incite further moral outrage and extreme behavior.65 Rather, the aim 

should be to show how deeply held sacred values can be channeled into less 

belligerent paths. What has struck me in my interviews with mujahideen 

who have rejected suicide bombing is that they remain very committed to 

Salafi principles. Indeed, even their religious militancy remains steady and 

deep. Instead, those who seem to succeed best in convincing their brethren to 

forsake wanton killing of civilians do so by promoting alternative interpretations of Islamic principles that need not directly oppose Salafi teachings.
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 173

A good example is the recent book by Nasir Abas, Unveiling Jemaah 

Islamiyah.

66 Abas, one of Jemaah Islamiya’s top leaders, trained the Bali 

bombers Ali Imron and Imam Samudra. Much of the book is a rebuttal to 

Samudra’s own published apology for terrorism and what Abas believes to 

be a tendentious use of the Koran and Hadith to justify suicide bombing and 

violence against fellow Muslims and civilians. “Not one verse in the Koran 

contains an order for Muslims to make war on people of another religion,” 

Abas writes, “or that killing women, children and civilians can ever be proper, 

just or balanced. [The contrary belief] has only created discord in the Muslim 

community and has led non-Muslims to regard Islam as sadistic and cruel.” 

He reasons that the best way to turn altruistic suicide bombers, who believe 

that what they are doing is sacred, away from violence may be by promoting 

competing sacred values. Jemaah Islamiya, like many of the militant Salafi 

groups sympathetic to al Qaeda, is riddled with internal divisions over the 

wisdom of killing fellow Muslims and civilians, and sincere alternative appeals to sacred values could widen these fissures to the point of undermining 

consensus for violent jihad. America and its allies should quietly encourage 

this process, while being careful not to strangle it in a public embrace.

A third lesson is to stress the compatibilities between the sacred values of different cultures and to promote them for the common good rather 

than merely for self, or even joint, interests. Our respective religions tell 

us that the highest form of help is given without demands for reciprocity or returns. Muslims and Jews even use essentially the same word for 

such freely given alms: sadaqah (Arabic) or tsadaqah (Hebrew). This was 

the essence of America’s hugely successful Marshall Plan. Such assistance 

is also wise from a strategic perspective, for in the competition for moral 

allegiance, trust vanishes and cooperation is undermined if people learn 

that another’s commitment to them is mostly a matter of convenience or, 

even worse, manipulation for the interests of others. Especially in times of 

vulnerability and stress, social deception and defection in the pursuit of 

self-preservation are more likely to occur, as the great Arab historian Ibn 

Khaldûn noted long ago.67 Noninstrumental or “sacred” values can passionately rouse hearts and minds to break out of this rational cycle of selfinterest and to adopt group interests that may benefit all in the long run. 

The jihadis understand the power of such values in motivating people to act 

beyond their own self-interest. Let us also learn what these values are and 

speak to them, or help those better able than ourselves to do so. That may be 

the most effective and enduring way to wean hearts and minds away from 

terrorizing others. 
174 ATRAN

Notes

1 Direct recruitment plays only a minor role in the global jihadi expansion. Membership 

increases largely through enlistment (that is, self-recruitment). Even in al Qaeda’s heyday, before 

9/11, would-be jihadis came knocking at al Qaeda’s door, rather than the other way around; al 

Qaeda accepted less than 20 percent for significant operations. 2 Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: International Book Co., 

1845, originally published 1776–1788). 3 Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 

24. 4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

1997, originally published in 1788). 5 Roy F. Baumeister, Laura Smart, and Joseph M. Boden, “Relation of Threatened Egotism 

to Violence and Aggression,” Psychological Review 103, no. 5 (1996). 6 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 

1956). 7 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997). 8 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). 9 Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1995). 10 Francis Fukuyama, Trust (New York: Free Press, 1995). 11 Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” Perspectives on 

Politics 1, no. 85 (2003).

12 Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2002). 13 Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: 

Norton, 1988). 14 George W. Bush, introduction to National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2003). 15 For an extreme example of convergence, compare Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights Under 

the Prophet’s Banner (trans. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, London, December 2, 2001, available at <fas.

org/irp/world/para/ayman_bk.html>) and the works of White Supremacist ideologue William 

Pierce: for example, The Turner Diaries (Washington, DC: National Alliance, 1978), which ends 

with the hero plowing his jet into the Pentagon on a successful suicide mission; also see Pierce’s 

analysis of the 9/11 attacks as being carried out for the right reasons by the wrong people, Free 

Speech 7, November 2001, available at <natvan.com/free-speech/fs0111c.html>. Since the closing 

of the Aryan Nation compound in Idaho and several recent leadership changes, these people 

have begun calling their new mission Aryan Jihad: “Before opening up a bit to other races that 

oppose Judaism, it is necessary that ‘the System’ be disrupted and broken down. This is the 

same ‘System’ that not only oppresses Aryans but is also responsible for oppressing all persons 

of whatever race or nationality who oppose the erroneous, Judaic-based authority which is the 

premise for System-rule.” Available at <aryan-nations.org/about.htm>. 16 Arguments by outsiders that militant Islam can be undermined by showing it does not 

reflect the religion’s “truth” or “essence” are likewise vacuous, for there is no “essence” or fixed 

content to any religion: Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan, “Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: 

Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, 

713 (2004). Nevertheless, debates among Muslims about, for example, whether killing children 

is acceptable are critical to how their religion will be interpreted and applied. 17 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2004). 18 Reuven Paz, “The First Islamist Fatwah on the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 

PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad 1, no. 1, May 2003; available at <e-prism.org>. 19 For example, although Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) 

have common roots in Egyptian society, one crucial difference between them is that the EIJ 

leadership under Al-Zawahiri left Egypt to join bin Laden in Afghanistan, whereas EIG remained 

behind in Upper Egypt (Said). The hostile reaction of Saidis to the 1997 EIG massacre of 58 tourists at the Temple of Queen Hatshepsut in Luxor, and to interference by outside jihadis and loss 

of trade, effectively ended EIG’s ability to mount military operations. By contrast, Al-Zawahiri 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 175

continues to urge jihadis everywhere to inflict the greatest possible damage and cause the 

maximum casualties on the West, no matter how much time and effort these operations take, 

and regardless of the immediate consequences. 20 Alan Page Fiske and Philip E. Tetlock, “Taboo Tradeoffs: Reactions to Transactions that 

Transgress the Spheres of Justice,”Political Psychology 18, no. 255 (1997). 21 Philip E. Tetlock, “Coping with Trade-offs: Psychological Constraints and Political 

Implications,” in Political Reasoning and Choice, ed. Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins, and 

Samuel L. Popkin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). 22 Douglas Medin et al., “The Semantic Side of Decision Making,” Psychonomic Bulletin 

and Review 6, no. 562 (1999). 23 Baruch Fischoff, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein, “Knowing What You Want: Measuring Labile Variables,” in Cognitive Processes in Choice and Decision Behavior, ed. T.S. Wallstein 

(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1980). 24 Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic, and Shmuel Sattath, “Contingent Weighting in Judgment 

and Choice,” Psychological Review 95, no. 371 (1988). 25 Carmen Tanner and Douglas Medin, “Protected Values: No Omission Bias and No 

Framing Effects,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 11, 185 (2004). 26 Joseph Henrich et al., “In Search of Homo economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 

Small-Scale Societies,” American Economic Review 91, no. 73 (2001). 27 Douglas Medin and Scott Atran, “The Native Mind,” Psychological Review 111, no. 960 

(2004).28 Linda J. Skitka and Elizabeth Mullen, “The Dark Side of Moral Conviction,” Analyses of 

Social Issues and Public Policy 2, no. 35 (2002); Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” The 

Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004). 29 Jonathan D. Baron and Mark Spranca, “Protected Values,” Organizational Behavior and 

Human Decision Processes 70, no. 1 (1997). 30 Jonathan D. Baron and Sarah Leshner, “How Serious Are Expressions of Protected 

Values?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 6, no. 183 (2000). 31 Philip E. Tetlock, “Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions,” 

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7, no. 320 (2003). 32 Diego Gambetta, Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford University Press, 

2005). 33 For a review, see Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 

Behavioral Economics,” American Economic Review 93, no. 1449 (2003). 34 Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Two-Level 

Game,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 311 (2005). 35 For joy as a neurophysiological correlate of revenge, see Dominique J.-F. de Quervain 

et al., “The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment,” Science 305, no. 1254 (2004). 36 One alternative interpretation of the data is to argue that the Palestinian “sacred 

value” tradeoffs in the tragic condition signaled greater willingness to compromise on their 

part. If that were the case, the “tragic” condition might be superior instrumentally to the other 

two conditions because participants could find it easier to believe that the peace deal would 

be peacefully and successfully implemented. To test this interpretation, participants were asked 

whether they believed that the deal they had been presented with would be “peacefully and successfully implemented.” Responses were scored 1 for “yes,” 0.5 for “not sure,” and 0 for “no.” 

The data showed that this alternative interpretation did not hold. 37 See Alan Krueger and Jitka Malecková, “Seeking the Roots of Terror,” Chronicle of 

Higher Education (June, 6, 2003), available at <chronicle.com/free/v49/i39/39b01001.htm>; 

Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299, no. 1534 (2003); Marc Sageman, 

Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Ariel 

Merari, “Social, Organization, and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism,” in Root Causes of 

Suicide Terrorism, ed. Tore Bjorgo (New York: Routledge, forthcoming). 38 See Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: 

Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); 

Julian Madsen, “The Rationale of Suicide Attack,” Risq, September 2004, available at <risq.

org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=367>. 39 Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
176 ATRAN

40 See Jean-Paul Azzam, “Suicide-Bombing as Intergenerational Investment,” Public 

Choice (forthcoming); Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 

Journal of Political Economy 76, no. 169 (1968). 41 See Mark Harrison, “An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism,” in Terrorism: Challenge 

for the 21st Century? Understandings and Responses, ed. Christopher Ankersen (London: Polity 

Press, forthcoming); George A. Akerloff and Rachel Kranton, “Economics and Identity,” The 

Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 715 (2000). 42 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide 

Attack,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 243 (2004). 43 Scott Atran, “The Emir,” Spotlight on Terrorism (Jamestown Foundation), September 15, 

2005, available at <jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369782>. 44 Granted, instrumental cost-benefit calculations often prevail within a moral frame. 

Most would-be martyrs and jihadi religious leaders interviewed by the author also say that if a 

roadside bomb can produce the same damage without causing the deaths of any members of 

the group, then it is preferable. 45 Scott Atran and Jessica Stern, “Small Groups Find Fatal Purpose through the Web,” 

Nature 436, no. 620 (2005). For a sample set of questions and responses, see Atran, “The Emir.” 

46 Lee Ross and Constance Stillinger, “Psychological Factors in Conflict Resolution,” 

Negotiation Journal 7, no. 389 (1991). 47 For example, Ali Mohamed, in his plea hearing in New York on October 20, 2000, 

described the meeting he set up between bin Laden and the Shi’ite chief of Hizbollah, at which 

it was agreed that Hizbollah would provide explosives training. See transcript of pre-sentence 

hearing, October 18, 2001, available at <cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-78.htm>. Bin Laden also 

praised the Shi’ite group Saudi Hizbollah for the 1996 Khobar Towers suicide bombing of U.S. 

military housing. 48 Robert S. Leiken, “Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 

9/11,” March 25, 2004, available at <nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf>. 49 Sageman.

50 Luis Miguel Ariza, “Virtual Jihad: The Internet as an Ideal Recruiting Tool,” Scientific 

American (January 2006), available at <sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006&articleID=000B51

55-2077-13A8-9E4D83414B7F0101&pageNumber=1&catID=4>. 51 According to the European Interactive Advertising Association, the Internet increasingly represents the essential media for the 15 to 24 age group, which is “the holy grail” for 

most advertisers: “European Youth Ditching TV and Radio for Web,” European Tech Wire (June 

24, 2005), available at <europeantechwire.com/etw/2005/06/24/>. Personal bonds formed 

online without physical contact appear to generate solid reputations for trustworthiness and all 

the deep commitment that physical intimacy does, but it often occurs faster and over a wider 

set of personal relations: Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, “Trust Among Strangers in Internet 

Interactions,” in Advances in Applied Microeconomics, vol. 11, ed. Michael Baye (Amsterdam: 

Elsevier Science, 2002). A recent study of online dating by researchers at the University of Bath 

indicates that the Internet allows men to manifest emotions that cement durable relationships 

in ways more easily than from face-to-face contact: “Internet Dating Much More Successful 

than Thought,” online press release, University of Bath, February 2005, available at <eurekalert.

org/pub_releases/2005-02/uob-idm021305.php>. The Web also lets women enter into chat 

rooms with men who would otherwise shun female contact, and it empowers a minority of two 

in dialogue with the sentiment that they can span the world. 52 Al-Farouq jihadi forum, October 7, 2005, available at <Al-farouq.com/vb/>.

53 The phrase leaderless jihad was aptly coined by Marc Sageman to refer to recent developments in the global Salafi movement, exemplified by Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (also known 

as Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri). A veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war, al-Suri had lived and married in 

Spain and later went to England, where he edited Al-Ansar for the Algerian Groupe Islamique 

Armée (GIA). After the falling out between GIA and bin Laden, in 1997 Al-Suri joined bin Laden 

in Afghanistan and began lecturing in mujahideen training camps on leaderless resistance. 

His collected works were published online in early 2005 in a 1,600-page manifesto, Da’wah 

lil-Muqawamah Al-Islamiyyah Al-‘Alamiyyah (A Call for the Islamic Global Resistance), available at 

<fsboa.com/vw/index.php?subject=7&rec=27&tit=tit&pa=0>. There are striking similarities to 
CONFLICTING CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 177

the original treatise on “Leaderless Resistance,” written in 1983 by Louis Beam, former Aryan 

Nations ambassador and Texas Ku Klux Klan leader; available at <reactor-core.org/leaderlessresistance.html>. Leaderless resistance rejects traditional pyramidal organization in favor of 

a collectivity of ideologically motivated cells with no apparent leader. Cells act on their own 

initiative and based on their own interpretation of ideology to carry out attacks or foment 

violence against the American government (also Jews, blacks, and other non-white Christians, 

supposedly in accordance with the Book of Revelation 12:10). The aim is to protect the wider 

movement from destruction through decapitation, and by absolving it of responsibility for the 

actions of member cells. Beam’s brief tract became the new bible of the cyber-based White Pride 

Movement that extends across the Americas, Europe, and into South Africa, and its philosophy 

of plausible deniability has become the legal foundation for numerous radical and militant 

Internet Web sites that host extreme ideas and plans. 54 Raymond Bonner, Don Van Natta, and Stephen Grey, “Investigators So Far Find Little 

Foreign Involvement,” The New York Times, July 31, 2005. 55 Scott Atran, “The Jihadi Mutation,” Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), 

March 25, 2004, available at <jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_

id=2929&article_id=23646>. 56 Jihadi Web sites are sound and light shows that capture attention with religious narratives set to music of gruesome images of infidels killing and humiliating Muslims followed 

by cathartic images of martyrdom actions. As advertisers and cognitive psychologists are well 

aware, such vivid effects reliably increase the audience’s emotional support for, and trust in, the 

message conveyed. 57 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York: Norton, 1997), 277–278. 58 Philip Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment,” available at <prisonexp.org/>.

59 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Harper & Row, New York, 1974). 60 Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, “Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 211, 

no. 1390 (1981). 61 Max H. Bazerman and Margaret A. Neale, Negotiating Rationally (New York: Free Press, 

1991). 62 Alice Eagly and Shelley Chaiken, The Psychology of Attitudes (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt 

Brace, 1993). 63 Jessica Stern, “Beneath Bombast and Bombs, a Cauldron of Humiliation,” The Los 

Angeles Times, June 6, 2004. 64 Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, The Culture of Honor: Psychology of Violence in the 

South (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); J. G. Peristiani (ed.), Honor and Shame: The Values of 

Mediterranean Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). 65 One reason pro-American news and broadcasts worked in Eastern Europe to undermine communism was that the great majority of Eastern Europeans never wanted to be communists, and there were also varying degrees of familiarity with democratic processes before 

imposition of communist rule. But most Muslims are more attuned to messages that will first 

and foremost help them become better Muslims. 66 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah (Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005). 67 Ibn Khaldûn, The Muqaddimah, 3 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958, 

originally composed in the 14th century).
179

Chapter Eight

Restoring America’s Good Name:

Improving Strategic Communications 

with the Islamic World

Peter W. Singer and Hady Amr

The United States needs to shift its priorities and programming dramatically to enhance and improve its efforts at public diplomacy and strategic 

communications with the Islamic world. Restoring trust in America’s word 

and rebuilding the shattered foundations of understanding between the 

United States and the world’s Muslim states and communities form a critical pillar of success in the war on terror and therefore must be a top priority 

for the current and future administrations. However, America’s efforts at 

strategic communications since 9/11 have lacked an overarching, integrated 

strategy (in part because an overall national strategy that takes full account of 

the complexities involved in combating terrorism is still a work in progress). 

The result has been informational programming that has lacked priority or 

been misdirected; has not been sufficiently nuanced for dealing with diverse 

regional and issue areas; and has not reached out to the swing audiences 

needed to marginalize and root out violent extremists. 

For its efforts at strategic communications to be effective, the U.S. 

Government must move beyond understanding the problem as simply a 

matter of better public relations. Shaping the views and attitudes that foreign populaces hold toward the United States and its policies requires more 

than just trying to reverse steep losses in some global popularity contest; 

it must be a continuing process that directly affects America’s relationship 

with populations and civil societies around the world and with the groups 

and governments they influence. How America engages with the outside 

world, and with what elements in that world, helps determine the success 

or failure of U.S. foreign policy. 

Although better strategic communications and public diplomacy cannot substitute for better policy, they can help America reconnect with moderate and reform-oriented Muslims who share an interest in transforming 

the region and fighting radical militants. Better strategic communications 

can even help engage the region’s conservatives in the effort to defeat violent extremism. The goal of such a campaign is to marginalize the radical 

militants, reversing the present trend in which the U.S. voice is the one being 

marginalized. Moreover, with the spread of bin Ladenism having taken on 
180 SINGER AND AMR

the characteristics of a diffused, decentralized, transnational Islamist insurgency, special attention must be given to the interface between traditional 

means of public diplomacy and the role that the U.S. military can play in 

the effort. 

The Missing Strategy

The deep and rapid deterioration of its image in the Islamic world is 

one of the greatest challenges the United States faces in conducting the war 

on terror. Polls in the Islamic world indicate that, despite slight improvements in the last 2 years, as much as 80 percent of the populace still has 

a negative view of the United States.1 The erosion of the U.S. image in the 

region effectively denies American ideas and policies a fair hearing. In turn, 

the negative lens through which the United States is viewed means that its 

actions are often interpreted in a manner that reinforces the propaganda 

efforts of adversaries. Winning the war on terror depends substantially on 

winning the war of ideas; by most available metrics, however, the United 

States is not winning that war. 

The challenges in this domain were laid out in a self-critical private 

memorandum issued by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to his senior staff in 2003 and subsequently leaked to the media. The media focused 

on his admission of a “long, hard slog” being the state of affairs in Iraq, 

contrary to the overly optimistic predictions made earlier, but more significant were Rumsfeld’s questions on whether we are “winning or losing the 

Global War on Terror.” He described how his department had yet to enact 

a bold, measurable, or systematic plan to win the war on terror, despite 

being 2 years and 2 ground wars into the fight. Rumsfeld’s memorandum 

described as most troubling the manifest absence of a strategy to deal with 

the severe antipathy toward the United States, observing that failure in this 

area effectively keeps a terrorist supply pipeline flowing: 

Does the U.S. need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop 

the next generation of terrorists? The U.S. is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal 

of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is 

against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ costs of millions . . . Is our current situation such that “the harder we work, 

the behinder we get”?2

The significance of this missing strategy is heightened by the fact that 

Rumsfeld’s memo did not yield immediate results. It took more than a year 

before the Department of Defense (DOD) was able to establish the National 

Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism that would link overall strategic 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 181

thinking to the forces that must implement it. More importantly, as long 

as it took, DOD was still making more progress than the rest of the U.S. 

Government. As of mid-2006, although the latest National Security Strategy 

of the United States cites winning the war of ideas as the key to long-term 

success in the war on terror, a detailed strategic plan that brings together the 

overall strategy and facilitates integrated, interagency strategic planning and 

execution remained lacking.3

Many thinkers term the situation facing the United States not as a set 

of discrete attacks and conflicts, but rather as a long-term conflict, akin to 

the Cold War, much of it taking place in the realm of ideas, but still with 

a decidedly tangible security aspect.4 If this comparison is valid, then measured according to a Cold War timeline, the state of development of our 

strategy is circa 1946, as we still struggle to answer the fundamental questions of who and what we are facing in this conflict and what the nature of 

our long-term response should be. 

The role of communications in this strategy is critical to overall 

national security now and will remain so in decades to come, especially 

because much of the threat seems to be coming from terrorists acting in 

an apparently decentralized, self-inspired fashion. However, our present 

security concerns extend beyond the militants in Iraq or terrorists inspired 

by al Qaeda to a longer term issue of grand strategy that may be feeding 

a wider threat of tomorrow. The United States—and the world—may be 

standing on the brink of emerging fault lines, or a “clash of civilizations” 

as Samuel Huntington has warned.5 The widely held view in the Muslim 

world that describes the war on terror as a “war on Islam” is perhaps most 

illustrative of this problem. The deepening divide between the United States 

and the world’s Muslim states and communities is a critical impediment 

to success in goals ranging from running down terrorist groups, their leaders, and supporters, to expanding human development and freedom, the 

absence of which steers the next generation of recruits to radicalism. Failure 

in this effort will not only damage America’s standing in the long term, and 

therefore its ability to lead effectively, but also widen the scope of those who 

would seek to harm the United States in the coming decades. 

Why Our Communication Matters

Striving to be a respected and moral world leader has been central 

to the goals of U.S. foreign policy over the last 50 years. Other schools of 

foreign policy thinking also recognize the importance in maintaining global 

esteem. For example, even an observer who sees the U.S. role in the world 

as an imperial one can admit that the most enduring empires have led by 

persuasion, respect, and the force of ideas, not just by imposing their will 

by the power of military force. Or, if one takes a values-based assessment 
in connecting American morals to its foreign policy, few Americans would 

take pride in being hated, preferring to see the United States respected as a 

world leader. 

An important distinction must be made between public affairs on the 

one hand and public diplomacy and strategic communications on the other. 

In the international context, public affairs is “the provision of information 

to the public, press, and other institutions concerning the goals, policies, 

and activities of the U.S. Government.”6 It is basically reactive, typified by 

the image of a spokesperson answering media questions or coordinating 

“messages for the day.” By contrast, public diplomacy is proactive, longterm outreach toward other states and their people, aimed at building understanding of and support for U.S. policies. As long defined by the United 

States Information Agency (now part of the Department of State), public 

diplomacy is those activities that seek “to promote the national interest 

and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between 

American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.”7 A classic case from the Cold War was the effort to engage European leaders and 

publics on the decision to locate intermediate range missiles within Europe 

(a decision that, over time, moved from being viewed as provocative to being understood as matching and balancing Soviet deployments). In an ideal 

world, these activities are part of an overall program of strategic communications, which undertakes a comprehensive set of outreach mechanisms 

aimed at long-term goals of transforming beliefs and attitudes, so as to create an environment more conducive to policy success.8

Such programming can never be effective when tasked with communicating bad policies, but even good policies can be hamstrung by an 

inept public diplomacy effort. These activities shape the context in which 

American policy operates, and thus can either be an aid, a hindrance, or of 

no effect at all. More importantly, public diplomacy is a major tool through 

which the United States can harness what Joseph Nye, former dean of 

Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, has described as one 

of America’s greatest assets and a cornerstone of American influence across 

the globe: its influence through “soft power.”9 Soft power is “the ability to get 

what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals.” It is 

the most efficient and effective means of power, as it does not require the use 

of force or huge financial expenditures to achieve or sustain policy goals. 

Foreign good will has a direct value to the pursuit of our own national 

security, something that the crafters of our Cold War strategy—particularly 

as exemplified in the design of such programs as the Marshall Plan, Voice 

of America, and the Peace Corps—understood. Good will creates reservoirs 

182 SINGER AND AMR
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 183

of understanding and appreciation of mutual interests that allow alliances 

to endure beyond temporary disputes. Most importantly, good will saves 

the U.S. Government from fighting a series of uphill battles, contrary to our 

professed respect for democracy, to persuade allied or client governments 

to align themselves with us against the democratically expressed opinion 

of their general public. The very real policy blowback from failing in such 

matters was illustrated during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war. The Turkish 

public’s distrust of American intent prevented the United States from opening a true second front in the war and resulted in delays in troop levels early 

in the occupation that may have been crucial in permitting the incipient 

insurgency to take root.10

Obstacles to Communication

We now face a communications challenge that dwarfs any in U.S. history, at a time when our reserve of soft power has dwindled precipitously. 

Unlike prior ebbs and flows of U.S. standing in the world, the present 

situation may be evolving into something more intrinsic. As detailed in 

the previous chapters, relations between the world’s sole superpower and 

one of the world’s largest and most strategically located religious communities—approximately 1.4 billion Muslims—stand at issue for the long term, 

with potentially disastrous consequences for both. 

While the past several years have been marked by American military 

success in overthrowing autocratic, oppressive regimes in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, they have also seen political and diplomatic failure, exemplified by the 

deepening tensions between the United States and the wider Islamic world, 

including Muslim communities in Europe and Southeast Asia. As discussed in 

chapters 2 and 3, polls across the Islamic world suggest a steep decline in esteem for the United States in general, and for U.S. foreign policy in particular.11

Some in the American body politic have argued that such trends 

should be ignored, or even that they are a source of pride.12 Such thinking 

is shortsighted and dangerous (and ignores the lessons not only of history 

but also of strategists ranging from Machiavelli to Mao). Until the chasm 

between the United States and the global Islamic community is bridged, it 

will continue to thwart our attempts to secure the homeland and prevent 

the success of our foreign policy. At the same time, local attitudes toward us 

and our adversaries are key factors as to whether violent radical movements 

flourish. Indeed, terrorist groups have often been highly responsive to local 

opinion at the tactical level; the frequent changes by Hamas in its operations and tactics are illustrative.

Geopolitics is not a popularity contest, but it is dangerous to disregard international public opinion to such a degree as to assist indirectly in 
184 SINGER AND AMR

the recruitment and growth of radical groups through either behavior that 

inspires anti-American hatred (such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal) or 

the absence of a cohesive public diplomacy strategy and apparatus. In the 

wake of the 9/11 attacks and the terrorists’ self-evident violation of all moral 

and religious codes of conduct, the United States should have been able to 

isolate al Qaeda from the broader Islamic public and thus cut it off from 

the support and recruiting structures that would allow it to thrive. Instead, 

we have become isolated and conversely have seen bin Laden and al Qaeda 

rise in stature. 

The present situation is troubling. While the United States and its allies 

have seized some al Qaeda lieutenants and assets, the movement remains 

vibrant and its senior leadership largely intact. More critical, though, is that 

its popularity is greater than ever, its ability to recruit individuals and affiliate organizations to its agenda is unbroken, and its ideology is spreading 

across a global network from Algeria and Belgium to Indonesia and Iraq. 

Of greatest concern is its evolution into a wider, decentralized movement, 

which appears to have maintained its potential to strike at American citizens 

and interests both at home and abroad. As the Madrid and London attacks 

reveal, its capabilities may even be growing, and we may be witnessing the 

transformation of the threat of al Qaeda to the threat of al Qaedaism.13

This evolution of the primary threat from a specific organization into 

a networked ideology is important. The attacks from Bali to Morocco to 

Madrid to London all reveal that the threat has evolved from being highly 

centralized to becoming self-organized, self-inspired, and cellular. That is, 

instead of an attack of the type that occurred on September 11, which was 

tightly orchestrated from camps in Afghanistan and took as long as 5 years to 

conceptualize, we are seeing the proliferation of self-forming cells, inspired 

by al Qaedaism, but composed of small groups of friends and family that 

are difficult to infiltrate and only loosely linked with the organization itself. 

Such groups’ attacks may not be as spectacular as those of 9/11, but they can 

be just as disturbing to the target populations and are even cheaper than 

the notably inexpensive 9/11 operation. (The explosives used in the July 7, 

2005, London subway bombings could be purchased for around $10,000 

on the black market.) The hallmark of such net-centric groups is that the 

sum of their threat is greater than their constituent parts. 

It is important to note, however, that the war of ideas in this global 

insurgency is not a battle already lost. Attitudes within Muslim communities indicate many nuances and subtle bright spots. For example, while 

anti-Americanism has surged in the last few years, the United States stands 

in an interesting position of being hated not because of its values, but rather 

because of the perception of how Americans conduct themselves. While 

there is great anger with U.S. policies, esteem for American values of free-
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 185

dom and democracy, as well as for American education and technology, 

remains relatively high.14 At the same time, fears about the repercussions 

of Islamic extremism and frustration with the tactics of violent radicals are 

on the upswing in many Muslim states.15 This subtle turn clearly cannot be 

viewed as a success for which any American government agency can take 

credit, as most analysts feel the source of this turn is “primarily the actions 

of the terrorists themselves.” 16 Nevertheless, a nascent backlash among 

Muslims against extremist ideology and tactics could indicate openings 

to both improve respect for the United States and defuse tacit support for 

radical militants.

Thus, as we look to our strategy for the future, the lessons gained by 

the bipartisan 9/11 Commission (chaired by former New Jersey Governor 

Thomas Kean and former Indiana Congressman Lee Hamilton) are instructive. In discussing what could be done in the future to prevent similar acts 

of terrorism, one of the three key focus areas the commission identified was 

to “prevent the continued growth of Islamic terrorism,” specifically through 

efforts to “communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world 

through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people including 

students and leaders outside government.” The report went on to say, “Our 

efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies 

during the Cold War.”17 Likewise, in the 2005 National Military Strategic Plan 

for the War on Terrorism, one of the three pillars of action (lines of operation) 

that DOD commanders are directed to pursue is “countering ideological 

support for terrorism.” 

To accomplish these objectives, a far more strategic approach to communication is necessary as part of U.S. policy toward the Islamic world. The 

United States must complement its programs of antiterrorism and engagement with a public diplomacy and strategic communications effort that 

demonstrates its commitment to the values of democracy and human rights 

and support for the forces of progress in the Islamic world, all with the 

goal of undermining the factors that aid radicalism. An integrative strategy 

that weaves communications into the policymaking process will make U.S. 

efforts more effective by standardizing messages, maximizing interagency 

coordination, and generating genuine dialogue between the United States 

and civil society in the Islamic world. 

What Have We Done?

In a January 2005 interview prior to his second inauguration, 

President Bush acknowledged that declining U.S. popularity in the Islamic 

world would be one of his greatest challenges in the subsequent 4 years. 

However, as he depicted it, the problem was merely one of poor public 
186 SINGER AND AMR

relations: “The propagandists have done a better job of depicting America 

as a hateful place, a place wanting to impose our form of thought and our 

religion on people. We’re behind when it comes to selling our own story 

and telling the people the truth about America.”18

This dual response illustrated the problems U.S. strategic communications have faced since 9/11, and why efforts so far have been largely unsuccessful. The evidence of unprecedented levels of anti-American sentiments 

in the Islamic world is undeniable and has therefore pushed the issue of 

public diplomacy to the top of the agenda. Restoring the world’s trust in 

America’s word and rebuilding the shattered foundations of understanding 

between the United States and the world’s Muslim states and communities 

are critical pillars to success in the war on terror and therefore must be a top 

priority for the current and future administrations. 

U.S. efforts at strategic communications since 9/11 have too often 

been understood in the context of public relations. More importantly, 

when it comes to actual programming and implementation, they have 

not been sufficiently rooted within an overarching, integrated strategy. In 

part, this reflects the relatively minor role to which the problem of strategic 

communications was relegated in the February 2003 National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism, a conceptual shortfall that is only now being addressed 

in a systematic way. The result has been public diplomacy and related programming that has lacked priority or been misdirected; has not been sufficiently nuanced in dealing with diverse regional and issue areas; and has 

not reached out to the major swing audiences needed to marginalize and 

root out violent extremists.

The rapid turn against America in the region is striking. Two of our 

closest regional allies made this point in April 2004: Egyptian President 

Hosni Mubarak said that there was more hatred of America today in the 

Arab world than ever before, and King Abdullah II of Jordan warned that 

U.S.-Arab relations were the worst he had ever seen them in his lifetime, 

and he abruptly canceled a meeting with Bush that month.19 A legion of 

independent public voices has echoed these sentiments. A wide array of 

public opinion surveys confirms a similar pattern across the Arab and 

Islamic world: a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiments and loss of the 

confidence of mainstream Muslims in a period in which their actions and 

views are of great importance to our national and security interests. 

Association with America was once seen positively in many respects; 

it is now largely viewed negatively and can be an economic and political 

liability. While the statistics are highly illustrative, anecdotes can be even 

more telling. A leading Kuwait-based conglomerate formed in the 1960s 

adopted the name “Americana”—a thinly veiled attempt to leverage the 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 187

positive image of the United States in the region. The company is now, 

however, stuck with the name, and recently began an advertising campaign 

designed to disassociate itself from the United States: “Americana: 100% 

Arab.” Similarly, the fast-food giant McDonald’s ran a campaign in the 

Arab world pledging a percentage of each sale to Palestinian charities. But 

perhaps more illustrative is the cultural vibe that permeates relations. For 

example, the most popular movie in Egypt at the time of writing is “The 

Night Baghdad Fell,” which describes an American invasion of Egypt, the 

destruction of Cairo, and a faux Condoleezza Rice in a sex scene, while in 

Turkey the most popular film is “Valley of the Wolves,” which fantasizes 

about Turkish troops wreaking revenge on Americans troops, who have just 

shot up a wedding and bombed a mosque (the prime minister’s wife even 

attended its premiere).

These trends were reinforced by the stories of abuses at Abu Ghraib 

and other prisons in the U.S. detention system, which presented the worst 

face of America to the world. Such mistakes were not just contrary to codes 

of conduct, but also had a reverberative effect by reinforcing the propaganda 

put out by radicals; indeed, the fact that these incidents were proven true 

provided fuel to radical attempts to sell claims of even worse abuses so as 

to bolster their narrative of a conspiratorial and inherently anti-Muslim 

United States.20 Moreover, not only have the abuses tarnished the image of 

the United States, they also have made life more difficult for local moderates and reformists who used to look to the United States for support. For 

example, the governments of Indonesia, Libya, Sudan, and even Israel have 

all cited the Abu Ghraib abuses as an excuse for their own questionable 

human rights practices. 

Challenges and Inconsistencies

The present challenge is to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality 

that has characterized policy toward the broader Islamic world, especially in 

the strategic communications sector. Senior officials have frequently spoken 

of the need for democracy and reform across the Arab world and for public 

diplomacy to overcome rising anti-Americanism. However, there has been a 

repeated failure to deal with these issues on a dedicated basis and adequately 

fund public diplomacy programming. The priority of the issue has not been 

matched by actual strategy development and implementation. 

Efforts to respond to spiraling anti-Americanism have been halfhearted at best. The bipartisan Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 

issued a sweeping indictment of the decline in American public diplomacy 

capabilities and offered a range of practical steps that could be taken. Rather 

than seizing the opportunity, the Bush administration declined to request 
188 SINGER AND AMR

sufficient additional funding and has shown little interest in implementing the commission’s recommendations. Congressman Frank Wolf (R–VA), 

who called for the advisory commission, has described the administration’s 

response as “lackluster” and “disappointing.”21

Funding is perhaps the easiest of the multiple metrics that exist for 

measures of activity and attention. Public diplomacy had already suffered 

from steep budget cuts in the 1990s, and since 9/11, many of the remaining 

options to ensure that America’s voice is heard within the region (including American institutes, student visas, and exchange programs) have been 

severely curtailed. The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy argued 

that an effective strategy would require a massive increase in the funding 

and staffing of programs on the ground throughout the region. Instead, 

these programs have languished. Despite bipartisan support, spending on 

public diplomacy programs remains deeply underfunded, especially in 

comparison to the scale of the challenge. Overall public diplomacy funding 

in fiscal year 2004 was $539 million, of which only about 27 percent was 

dedicated toward the Muslim world, primarily through cultural and education outreach.22 This share of funding is not remotely consistent with the 

centrality of global Islamic communities to the key national security issue 

facing America today.

Another measure of seriousness is bureaucratic attention. Faced with 

evidence of America’s collapsing image abroad, President Bush created 

the position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. However, 

the publicity that was given to the establishment of the position was not 

matched by a serious commitment to filling and supporting it. When Under 

Secretary Charlotte Beers resigned in March 2003, the position was left unfilled for 9 months—during the Iraq war and its aftermath, the single most 

important period for U.S. public diplomacy since the days immediately 

following 9/11. Beers’ eventual successor, Ambassador Margaret Tutwiler, 

resigned the post after less than 6 months on the job. As a result, for most of 

the Bush administration’s first term, no one was clearly and consistently responsible for crafting America’s public diplomacy strategy. Nearly a year after 

Tutwiler’s resignation, the President announced that his former campaign 

adviser, Karen Hughes, would be taking over the position. The President’s 

naming of a personal confidant illustrated the importance of the position 

to the U.S. Government, but even so, another 4 1⁄2 months elapsed from 

the time Hughes’s nomination was announced until confirmation hearings 

were held. The very act was the message; Hughes was expert neither in the 

issues nor public diplomacy, and indeed had no experience in international 

affairs at all. But her nomination was meant as a demonstrable signal that 

the problem had been accepted as real and significant.
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 189

Now that Hughes is in place, the true test will not be the actual appointment, but the level of activity (both here and abroad) carried out by 

the appointee and her office, and the amount of support that the programming she seeks to put together gets from the leadership structure. Since 

her appointment, Hughes has traveled to a number of Muslim countries 

including Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 

Turkey, but often for only a few days at a time. She played a leading role in 

arranging for the United State’s Institute of Peace Muslim World Advisory 

Board, composed mostly of American-Muslims, to meet with Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice and others within the administration. She has also 

sought to expand programming and has requested more extensive reviews 

and evaluation of programming underway. Despite the improvement 

over the previous 5 years, there is still far to go in terms of effectiveness 

and impact. 

Missed Opportunities

Outside of planned programming, the United States has frequently 

failed to take advantage of opportunities that presented themselves and 

has shown little interest in actual dialogue and engagement with moderate 

Muslims. For example, when a summit of over 150 top U.S. and Muslim 

world leaders and opinion-shapers—including leading business executives, 

civil society activists, government ministers, and news editors from more 

than 35 countries—met in Doha, Qatar, in January 2004, the United States 

was the only major government that did not send a senior political official. 

Moreover, even U.S. Central Command turned down an invitation to send 

an officer to speak to the group, despite the opportunity it presented to 

explain U.S. military operations in the region to key leaders whom the command had been unable to reach through its own briefings. The Bush administration was even criticized by the pro-Republican journal Weekly Standard

for not seizing this opportunity.23 Nonetheless, the episode was repeated 

the very next year, when a follow-up U.S.-Islamic world leader summit was 

held. Once again, not one currently serving senior leader from the American 

administration made the effort to speak to this influential audience from 

across the Muslim world. It was not until the 2006 forum that the United 

States sent Karen Hughes to speak at the opening event, serving on a panel 

with three Muslim foreign ministers. 

The manner in which the United States engages and communicates 

is also important. In the Islamic world (and elsewhere), the United States 

is widely perceived as lecturing without listening, and often is viewed as 

arrogant and uninterested in the opinion of others. The administration’s 

rhetoric is heard as lacking sympathy for Arab and Muslim concerns, lead-
190 SINGER AND AMR

ing to unintended misunderstandings. Even leaders within the U.S. policy 

structure note that America’s voice has been unclear or muted at a time when 

dialogue and engagement with potentially friendly members of civil society 

in the Muslim world are a strategic necessity. For example, Christopher Ross, 

the State Department’s special coordinator for public diplomacy in the Arab 

world, notes, “We must listen to the world as well as speak to it. The failure 

to listen and to provide more avenues for dialogue will only strengthen the 

stereotype of the United States as arrogant.”24

While there was great fanfare about Karen Hughes’ appointment, U.S. 

public diplomacy has remained in spin mode, treating public diplomacy 

like an extension of an election campaign. Hughes’ limited forays have been 

rife with photo opportunities (a public diplomacy “success story” spun by 

the State Department was Hughes going to a cooking class in Germany), 

and staged meetings with prescreened groups of elites. Too often, even these 

have backfired, such as the infamous lecture given to rich Saudi women on 

their right to drive. Hughes’ speeches in the region also stand as a guide 

on how not to communicate with the Muslim world, veering from pandering references that lack local cultural awareness to finger-wagging lectures. 

As one prominent American Muslim imam describes, “She seems to have 

taken on a very narrow mission of trying to convince people over there of 

how correct the administration is, no matter what people might think.”25 An 

evangelical Christian newsletter in the United States was even more blunt 

in its depiction of the speech she gave at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum in 

Qatar: “America’s relationship with the Muslim world has hit rock bottom . . . 

and we have begun to dig.”26

How the United States interacts with the new media rising in the 

Middle East is a tragic illustration of the shortcomings in our public diplomacy strategy. The breaking of state monopolies on the news, particularly 

by satellite news channels, has provided an opportunity to reach the general 

public with an immediacy not previously available. After 9/11, the Bush 

administration recognized the importance of such news media and made 

the point of sending officials to speak on al Jazeera to explain the administration’s positions. This opportunity has, however, been insufficiently exploited. The administration’s media outreach campaign lacked stamina and 

has since been essentially abandoned, thus yielding more air time to voices 

that condemn the United States and fuel the fires of conspiracy theory. 

The administration has compounded its problems by frequently lashing out at the satellite news channels, al Arabiya and al Jazeera, that are 

most popular among Arabs (al Jazeera has some 35 million viewers, while 

al Arabiya has some 20 million).27 It has declared these stations as major 

problems for U.S. efforts in Iraq and for the war on terrorism and has pres-
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 191

sured the Qatari government to compel al Jazeera to make editorial changes. 

The efforts have backfired, as the channels now identify themselves as being 

locked in a public conflict with the United States (gaining further viewers), 

while the pressure tactics pursued by the United States have undermined its 

own rhetoric in support of a freer press in the Arab world. 

While the content on Arabic-language satellite news channels is often 

genuinely troubling, these channels are not the cause of American problems 

in Iraq and the region. Experts and public opinion polls agree that the expression of anti-American opinions on the Arab satellite media is more than 

anything a reflection of existing Arab sentiments.28 In fact, while al Jazeera 

is often singled out by the Bush administration for fostering anti-Americanism, it was long seen in the Arab world as being too pro-Israeli and proAmerican, because it was the first international Arab station in the region to 

regularly bring on Israeli guests and cover the Israeli parliament. In any case, 

polling has shown that there is no evidence that frequent viewers of Arabic 

satellite news channels like al Jazeera are any more likely to have negative 

perceptions of U.S. foreign policy than others.29

The Bush administration’s public criticism of Arabic satellite news 

channels and its attempts to pressure these stations to make editorial 

changes have only exacerbated the U.S. image problem in the Middle East. 

America appears hypocritical when it speaks of the merits of freedom of 

the press while it asks friendly governments in the region to influence the 

editorial content of the satellite news channels. The United States should 

endorse and encourage a free and professional media, even when it is the 

target of criticism from such media. 

This does not mean that the United States should tolerate hateful 

speech or the distribution of lies in the Arab media; in fact, it should be 

more consistent and focused in combating inaccuracy and incitement. The 

failure of senior U.S. leaders to cite specific footage and broadcast dates in 

lieu of broad claims undermines the accusations. For example, at a 2005 

summit of defense ministers in Southeast Asia, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 

accused al Jazeera of airing videos of terrorists beheading hostages, which 

the station claims it had never done. The truth is clearly one or the other, 

and specificity would prove the point. Similarly, the administration has 

been injudicious in its use of labels such as “incitement,” often reacting to 

a report broadcast read on al Jazeera more vociferously than a very similar 

report broadcast on one of the region’s state television networks. This inconsistency has eroded the perceived legitimacy of U.S. criticisms. In short, 

the United States has neither been able to distinguish between hate speech 

and political opposition in its outreach to those who channel the news and 

influence opinions, nor to make clear to Arab journalists and editors the 
192 SINGER AND AMR

importance of this distinction. 

In one distinct area of activity in strategic communications, the 

United States has invested significant sums in creating American government–backed media outlets, al Hurra television and Radio Sawa. This largely misguided effort was undertaken contrary to the advice of the Advisory 

Commission on Public Diplomacy. Besides taking the bulk of new funding 

in the public diplomacy domain, these stations have reinforced the view of 

many in the region that the United States is interested not in free media but 

only in pro-American media. More importantly, there is no evidence that 

the two outlets—which were never shown to be linked to the sources from 

which people get their news anyway—have altered people’s beliefs on the 

ground or even that they have swayed the information market in any way. 

Al Arabiya and al Jazeera remain the most viewed news channels. Surveys in 

Saudi Arabia found that while al Jazeera and al Arabiya are regularly watched 

by 82 percent and 75 percent of households (as in the United States, households watch multiple channels regularly), only 16 percent regularly watch 

al Hurra. In the United Arab Emirates, only 11 percent of young nationals 

regularly watch al Hurra, as compared to 52 percent for al Jazeera. Only in 

Iraq is al Jazeera not in first place; al Iraqiya, watched by 74 percent of respondents, has the best broadcast footprint. Al Hurra, hampered by the fact 

that only 4 percent of those polled in Iraq consider it trustworthy, comes in 

at 6 percent.30

Moreover, al Hurra and Radio Sawa may have had another little-noted 

effect. Because of al Hurra’s U.S. Government affiliation, American officials 

might be more likely to grant an interview to it rather than another outlet. 

Thus, the stations have further drawn American officials away from appearances on Arabic-language stations that have larger audiences. The end result 

is that U.S. Government–operated news outlets in the Arab world take up 

a considerable portion of the allocations for public diplomacy yet have 

yielded few significant positive results. Given the mediocre payoff, the failure to make similar efforts toward the far greater number of Muslims who 

live outside the Arab world may reflect a lack of nuance in U.S. efforts, but 

at the same time, may be for the best. 

Another serious shortcoming in U.S. strategic communication efforts 

is the failure to engage the core swing audiences that are the most critical 

for defeating radicalism. The political spectrum across the Muslim world is 

quite diverse. In addition to varying regional contexts and concerns (for example, while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict overshadows any discussion of 

political reform in the Arab world, Indonesians care more about U.S. policy 

on Aceh than they do about Palestine), widely differing interest groups and 

demographic sectors exist within each area of the Muslim world. These in-
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 193

clude regime retainers, including members of the army and the bureaucracy; 

secular reformers, the liberal and leftists groups most oriented to Western 

modes but typically lacking local power and credibility; gradualist mainstreamers, typically the largest set of the professional and business class 

who are generally disposed to gradually amending the status quo; Islamist 

social conservatives, who carry the widest support and seek a far greater role 

for Islam in society (and thus are disposed toward both democratic reform 

and anti-Americanism); radical Islamists (who advocate a regime overturn 

and the implementation of full sharia); and, ultimately, militant activists 

and terrorists themselves (those who undertake or provide active support 

to violent action).

Engagement with the Islamic World

Such divisions cannot be described perfectly, but the important point 

is that market segmentation exists within the populations to which the 

United States needs to speak in the Muslim world. As an illustration, the 

rough rubric used by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic 

Communication broke society in the Islamic world into five segments relevant to public diplomacy:

■ Group 1: regime retainers, including members of the army and the 

bureaucracy

■ Group 2: professional and business class

■ Group 3: workers and small business owners

■ Group 4: establishment, nonmilitant Islamic activists

■ Group 5: militant radicals. 

Within each group are members with often divergent interests and 

perceptions of the world, and for each group, the optimal means of communications are different as well. 31

All of these segments of the Islamic world, with the exception of 

militant radicals, need to be engaged, but in different ways. Thus, using the 

Defense Science Board typology, the core of any U.S. public diplomacy strategy must be efforts to engage groups 2, 3, and 4, who comprise what would 

be called the “swing voters” in American parlance in any effort to defeat 

radical forces. This means outreach toward not only moderate, often secular, 

reformers, but also conservatives and nonmilitant Islamists, who form the 

majority of society and carry far greater local credibility than most Westernoriented reformers. Indeed, the conservative segments of society are quite 

significant. In Jordan, Egypt, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, about 

two-thirds of Muslims feel that society should be governed only by Islamic 
194 SINGER AND AMR

law, while in Lebanon and Syria, the figure was one-third. Positive engagement with moderate reformers is key to building a successful coalition for 

progress, but outreach to conservatives is necessary to curb militant inroads 

into their ranks. 

U.S. strategic communications have often failed to appreciate the 

diversity of opinion within and between countries and, worse, have held 

both reformers and conservatives at arms’ length. While reaching out to 

like-minded reformers is simply a matter of increased support and attention, the critical challenge is how the United States will deal with the rising 

power and popularity of Islamist groups. As Shibley Telhami writes, 

The reality shown by Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections 

is this: If fully free elections were held today in the rest of the 

Arab world, Islamist parties would win in most states. Even 

with intensive international efforts to support civil society and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), elections in 5 years 

would probably yield the same results. The notion, popular in 

Washington over the past few years, that American programs and 

efforts can help build a third alternative to both current governments and Islamists is simply a delusion.

These groups not only are far more influential than any other constituencies in local civil society, but they also share a world view that is often at 

odds with U.S. policies and values. However, the groups may be thought of 

as akin to the socialist parties and labor unions of post–World War II Europe. 

The United States certainly may not be able to persuade them to push for 

American policies overnight, but it can and should engage and communicate 

with them in an effort to prevent their cooption by the other side. 

To date, the United States has steered clear of the tough challenges 

involved in engaging such groups and frequently has made the fundamental 

mistake of assuming that any Islamist group is inherently violent and al 

Qaeda–oriented. Failing to appreciate the diversity of groups and ideologies 

in the Muslim world could have the same strategic consequences that the 

lumping together of the Red Menace did in the early Cold War; the mistaken 

assumption that the Soviets, Red China, and anticolonial nationalists were 

all the same groups pursuing the same interests was not fully disentangled 

until President Richard Nixon’s trip to China. At the same time, comparing 

the limited amount of activity in this sector to the scale of the efforts that 

surrounded the Marshall Plan would almost be insulting. 

In sum, if the present trend continues, the Muslim world will view 

the United States primarily through a lens that distortedly emphasizes the 

perceived American threat. The context for American foreign policy will be 

made more challenging, and the ranks of Muslim extremists will grow. If 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 195

the proposed solution is only better public relations efforts to help “sell” 

America, and the problems of priority, focus, and nuance are not dealt with, 

then the terrible dynamic presently set in place will worsen. 

Recommendations for Success: 

Reversing the Trend

By failing to pursue effective public diplomacy, the United States largely 

has conceded the war of ideas in the Islamic world to the radicals. To win this 

war, the administration must recognize the importance of America’s voice 

and good standing as elements of its power and influence in the world. A 

major, integrative initiative in public diplomacy and strategic communications is needed to bridge the divide between the United States and Muslim 

states and communities (ranging from Algeria to Indonesia, and including 

Muslim minority communities extending from Europe to India). 

Strategic communications activities and the war of ideas are essential 

to winning the conflict we presently are fighting. The global war on terror 

is not a traditional military conflict of set-piece battles, but rather is a series 

of small wars and insurgencies in places ranging from Iraq and Afghanistan 

to Pakistan, Egypt, and even England, where the United States must sway a 

broader population from hostility to support if it wants to oust terror cells 

and shut down recruiting pipelines. As the foreword to a proposed revision of 

the famous U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (which sought to update it 

for the 21st century and the global war on terror) notes, “Small wars are battles 

of ideas and battles for the perceptions and attitudes of target populations.”32

Within these wars, nonkinetic tools (as opposed to fielded weaponry) make 

up “the fire and maneuvers of small wars. They frequently are the main effort 

simply because of the criticality of the functions they perform.”33 

Engendering better relations with the Islamic world strengthens U.S. 

national security, but it requires more than Federal pocket change. The 

President must designate the task as an issue of the highest national security 

importance. It should also be integrated into the policymaking apparatus; 

public diplomacy officials cannot simply be seen as a clean-up crew. The 

tactics in the new approach should be innovative, and, at the same time, 

the campaign as a whole must be self-critical, regularly evaluating its own 

performance, and ready and able to change accordingly. 

Five broad principles must guide the strategy to influence foreign publics and, as the official definition of public diplomacy puts it, to “broaden 

dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 

abroad”:

■ There must be an integrated approach among the various U.S. 
196 SINGER AND AMR

Government agencies so as to maximize efforts and resources and speak 

with a credible voice. 

■ The effort must be conceptualized as a dialogue, maximizing jointness of projects and participation with foreign constituencies. 

■ The United States must reach out to the diverse set of regional players and constituencies, including conservatives, rather than “preaching to 

the choir.” 

■ Strategies and programs must be nimble and responsive.

■ The investment in the programming should reflect its strategic priority. 

Integrate the Effort to Maximize the Effect

An integrative communications strategy is required, both across our 

agencies and across the divide between the United States and the region, so 

that the U.S. voice is amplified and resonates. 

Within the executive branch, far better coordination is needed. The 

administration should seriously consider a range of organizational options. 

At the high end of these would be a formal Public Diplomacy Coordinating 

Structure, as proposed by the Council on Foreign Relations’ independent task 

force on public diplomacy. This structure, similar and parallel to the National 

Security Council (NSC), would coordinate more cohesive public diplomacy 

activities across Federal agencies. At the low end would be the expansion in 

responsibilities of the Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National 

Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Global Outreach to include 

coordinating the range of interagency public diplomacy activities. (In the past, 

the position followed a very public affairs–type outreach, coordinating “messages of the day,” but a comprehensive and long-term strategy is needed.) This 

position could then serve as the umbrella for subordinate regional coordinators who would synchronize U.S. Government public diplomacy, public affairs, 

and information operation activities for each region, helping to bring together 

the various State, Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency efforts. The intent 

of such structural change must be not only to provide better visibility for the 

issue at the White House level, but also to ensure that lessons learned through 

dialogue in public diplomacy inform the foreign policymaking apparatus. In 

terms of viability and workability, the latter proposal is the quicker and easier 

to implement and thus should be enacted in the short term, but bureaucratic 

exploration can be made of the broader structure. 

Two-Way Communications Open Doors

A successful public diplomacy strategy must aim to both inform and 

actively engage important communities in the world and shape the context 

in which they experience “America.” When facing an uphill battle in which 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 197

the United States is looked upon with bias, establishing credibility and 

demonstrating respect for the other side will be key. “Dialogue,” as King 

Abdallah of Jordan said at the 2003 World Economic Forum, is “the key 

to the door.” When the United States plans its public diplomacy activities 

without its allies in foreign constituencies, it misses an opportunity to 

strengthen the effectiveness of its programming investments.

Thus, as listening begets listening, it will prove more effective to plan 

joint programming, in which citizens and officials from the United States 

and Muslim countries participate in both the activities and as the target 

audiences, where possible and appropriate. The principle of dialogue and 

the maximization of jointness in planning and execution of programming 

seek to accomplish two tasks: 

■ By involving and thus integrating the audience into the exercise, the 

message is far more likely to be understood and accepted positively. 

■ Feedback loops will be created that better inform policymakers (and 

offer metrics), as well as improve the public diplomacy efforts that follow. 

To yield maximum effectiveness and create a self-sustaining program, 

coordination of such efforts with local institutions and organizations will 

be useful. These groups should be identified by local U.S. Embassies, which 

will have a sense of their credibility. The U.S. Government must be sensitive 

to the particular security and political backlash challenges that such groups 

will face. At all times, the United States must seek to be an enabler, not a 

driver; it must be willing to take a back seat in the short term when it comes 

to setting mandates or getting credit, in order to yield the maximum longterm consequences.

Engage the Full Spectrum

A shift needed in strategic thinking is the realization that much as 

the military attempts to shape battlefields on which it operates, the U.S. 

Government can and should attempt to shape the political environment in 

which it functions. Compared to traditional diplomacy, which focuses only 

on dialogue between governments in pursuit of their respective national 

interests, public diplomacy is the business of communicating with nonstate, 

civil society actors and the general public. The goal is to interact with and 

build support for two proximate reasons. First, they have an ability to influence our national security and prosperity directly either as allies or adversaries in the effort to strengthen American security. Second, civil society actors 

are able to influence our national security and prosperity indirectly through 

their influence on their own governments’ actions. In the long term, such 

efforts should support the structures and institutions needed within the 

wider Muslim world to weather future political, social, and economic chal-
198 SINGER AND AMR

lenges, recognizing that failure to do so will reinforce the frustration and 

anger that feed radical groups. 

While moderates and reformers represent America’s natural core allies 

in the region, extra steps should be taken to include social conservatives as 

we engage in dialogue across the Islamic world. Conservatives are the swing 

voters in this critical effort. They may seem to represent the most convenient 

potential allies for the radical militant extremists, but in fact they must play 

a crucial role if al Qaeda and other radicals are to be marginalized. Our adversaries realize this and, indeed, when al Qaeda releases video or audio 

tapes, they clearly are trying their hardest to sway the conservative segment of 

society. America needs to respond if it hopes to ever neutralize this segment 

of society as a potential support group for the radical militant extremists. 

Excluding nonmilitant conservatives from the process will only alienate 

them further; skillfully including them in dialogue, alongside moderates and 

reformers, will reduce the likelihood of their being recruited by radical militants for either direct or rhetorical support, and even strengthen the efforts 

of our reformist allies. We should be prepared to enter into dialogue with 

any group that is willing to both renounce violence and respect a diversity 

of views. When we lump such groups together with radicals and refuse to 

engage with them because of Islamist ideology, we then aid our true foes. 

Read, React, and Change

On the ground, especially in predominantly Muslim regions, public 

diplomacy efforts should be more responsive to local developments. Like a 

U.S. political campaign, changes in public opinion should be tracked on a 

regular basis, and strategy and tactics should adapt accordingly, as close as 

possible to real time. Additionally, the nature of on-the-ground public diplomacy should shift away from unilateral proclamations toward dialogue, 

which will further mutual understanding and increase public confidence in 

the bona fides of American public diplomacy activities. 

Match Programming to Importance of Task

Overall funding levels for public diplomacy are minimal, with 

$539 million budgeted for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2004, of which 

27 percent (about $150 million) was spent in the Muslim world.34 This 

is a negligible amount for something that has been identified by the new 

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (not to mention various other bipartisan reports) as an essential element for success. If strategic 

communications has been declared a core tool, the budget should reflect 

it. Comparing expenditures on strategic communications with spending on 

the other two strategic pillars (homeland security and operations to attack 

terrorist networks) would be somewhat simplistic, but it is nevertheless obvi-
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 199

ous that what we are spending on strategic communications does not match 

the priority that our evolving strategy supposedly places on it. Developing 

truly effective programming would require a significant budget recalculation, 

potentially of an order of magnitude. 

At the same time, agencies engaged in various international activities and outreach (from the State Department to the National Institutes of 

Health) should be required to ensure that the percentage of their outreach 

programming toward the Islamic world reflects the present strategic importance of this region. Bureaucratic inertia extending beyond the executive 

branch has stalled the focus of many programs on Cold War or post-Soviet 

needs. For instance, the Congressional Fellows program brings in 50 young 

leaders each year to spend 10 months working in Congressional offices. In 

2003, only 1 of the 50 was from the Islamic world (Egypt).35

Specific Initiatives to Strengthen U.S.-Muslim 

Relationships

The success of any program will rely on a centralized vision and 

strategy matched with localized and agency-specific implementation. The 

development of these strategic goals and programs should be carried out at 

the senior levels of the National Security Council and appropriate Executive 

agencies, with input from other interested parties, including legislative bodies, universities, think tanks, and friends in the Islamic world. Advice solicited from bipartisan boards of experts should be built into policy, rather 

than cast aside, as happened with reports ranging from the Congressional 

commission to the Council on Foreign Relations report. In order to ensure 

both high-level support and the durability of the strategy, the ultimate 

findings should be embodied in a National Security Presidential Directive 

that would identify our strategic agenda for building positive relations with 

Muslim countries and movements through strategic communications.

With the strategic goals established, policymakers could then develop 

a more systematic approach to ascertain how far short the United States 

falls from this target state and what is required to attain it. This analytical 

and planning process will also elaborate tangible courses of action in the 

most important issue areas (for example, alleviating the intensity of antiAmericanism in certain core states and increasing levels of cooperation on 

antiterrorist activity). In other words, the objective is not only a methodological approach to evaluating our successes and failures, but also a guide 

to steer the right course in the future. 

Restoring America’s credibility and rebuilding the shattered foundations of trust must be top priorities. Because both style and substance 

matter, changing the style of communication with the Islamic world is key. 
200 SINGER AND AMR

Many Muslims say they feel that senior American officials use an arrogant 

and patronizing style and tone of communication; taking greater care in 

this area could have an immediate impact. As an example, the empathic 

and measured tone that Secretary of State Rice took after the alleged Koran 

desecration incident in 2005 was an example that should be repeated. U.S. 

leaders also need to adopt a less confrontational and hostile attitude toward 

the Arab media, seeking over time to bolster its professionalism rather than 

constantly castigating it for perceived bias. Staffing the office of the under 

secretary for public diplomacy and better integrating it with the range of 

U.S. Government programming is a clear need. The appointment of Karen 

Hughes to lead the public diplomacy effort may have given the post the 

recognition that is required. But the test will be what happens next. The 

effort will need a full rethinking of roles, strategy, and expansion of budget 

to begin to surmount the challenges it faces. 

Finally, Presidential effort is needed to ensure the resources necessary 

to establish a significant American presence on the ground to reach out 

directly to civil society and individual Arabs and Muslims. As the Defense 

Science Board wrote on the need to upgrade strategic communication in 

2004, “only White House leadership . . . can bring about the sweeping reforms 

that are required,” also noting that “nothing shapes U.S. policies and global 

perceptions . . . more than the President’s statements.”36

An overall strategy must also be creative and open to new initiatives. 

Several specific efforts that merit deeper exploration and potential implementation are discussed below. While implementing these recommendations, the five core principles noted earlier need to be embraced. 

Create and Deploy America’s Voice Corps

Perhaps the most shocking finding in the Advisory Commission on 

Public Diplomacy report was that the State Department had only five Arabic 

speakers capable of appearing on Arabic-language television on behalf of 

the U.S. Government. Presidential support is needed for the rapid recruitment and training of at least 200 fully fluent Arabic speakers trained in public diplomacy skills—about 10 per Arab country. A cadre of fluent speakers 

could establish a regular and productive presence in the Arab media as well 

as in two-way dialogue on the ground with members of civil society. Ideally, 

America’s Voice Corps would develop appealing and popular personalities 

who would become prized guests for Arabic-language talk show hosts. It is 

important to remember that most Arabs are Muslim, but most Muslims are 

not Arab. As a result, it is equally important to train speakers in the other languages used. Speakers of Bahasa Melayu, Bahasa Indonesia, Persian, Urdu, 

and Turkish number over 500 million and reside in strategically important 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 201

countries such as Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. 

Establish American Centers in Cities

After World War II, the United States launched dozens of “America 

Houses” in town centers across Germany as focal points to build democracy 

and foster a German bond with America. After 40 years under American 

stewardship, many of these centers were transformed from American entities into German NGOs called German-American institutes.37 

A war of ideas that may last for generations in countries with large 

populations under the age of 25 must target the countries’ youth. The 

frustration that Muslim youth feel with the status quo could be harnessed 

into a progressive demand for reform; the United States must play a role in 

developing and articulating a real alternative to offer this next generation. 

To that end, a revitalization of American youth centers and libraries 

throughout the region is needed. A goal that reflects the Marshall Plan–like 

significance of the task at hand would be establishing at least one public 

American center in every major city in the Muslim world. A similar approach today, creating Indonesian-American, Iraqi-American, or MoroccanAmerican institutes in major cities across the Muslim world, would both 

foster a more local sense of ownership and reduce security concerns. 

They should be staffed in part by members of the America’s Voice Corps, 

and should be a major distribution point for translated works from the 

American Knowledge Library Initiative (discussed below). 

These American centers should offer state-of-the-art English-language 

training programs, seminars, discussions, and a wide selection of current 

periodicals, newspapers, and literature. They should also offer free Internet access and moderated programs that promote direct exchange with 

Americans through the use of modern information technology. American 

centers should not just provide a window into American life, but also enable 

open, critical dialogue on issues of local and international concern, helping 

to spur the values of political discourse. 

An objection may be raised that the security situation in the Islamic 

world is simply too volatile—that any center providing such easy access to 

locals would be a target for terrorists. Some of them undoubtedly would be 

targeted; sometimes we would lose our investment and, more importantly, 

people might lose their lives. This is a reality in all international programming today. But if we are serious about engaging the terrorists on their turf 

instead of ours, we must calculate the losses to be incurred in using this 

weapon in the battle of ideas against those we would incur if we fail to 

do so. Additionally, the concept of jointness in activities and programming 

would give a sense of local ownership, meaning that the attacks would be 
202 SINGER AND AMR

interpreted as attacks not merely on American interests, but also on local 

interests and citizens, potentially backfiring on the terrorists. 

Implement the American Knowledge Library Initiative

The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy pointed out the dearth 

of Arabic translations of major works of American literature and political 

theory. While certain U.S. Embassies do undertake translations of books into 

Arabic, the scale is minuscule compared to the need. The absence of widely 

available translations means that many Arabs are cut off from direct contact 

with American history, political ideas, literature, and science. A project to 

translate 1,000 books a year would soon make such works widely and inexpensively available. Partnerships with Arabic publishers (such as through a 

consortium of Arab and American publishers with the Government contributing to start-up costs such as payment of rights and translation costs) could 

aid public acceptance in the region and enable us to leverage existing distribution channels and marketing capacities. The American Centers proposed 

earlier could also aid in the effort by hosting book groups and discussions of 

the translated works. Again, the same point concerning the vast number of 

non–Arabic-speaking Muslims also applies to this translation effort.

Create a Nonpartisan Center for Strategic Communication

A positive step to energize action would be the creation of a center for 

strategic communication, as endorsed by the Defense Science Review Board. 

One concept is a hybrid organization, modeled after the RAND Corporation, 

established as a tax-exempt foundation with private citizens, government, 

NGO, and business leaders on its board of directors. The center would be 

established for three purposes: to develop self-initiated public diplomacy 

and communications programs; to provide analysis to decisionmakers; 

and to be contracted by the Government to implement public programs 

where appropriate. Creating distance in the relationship between the U.S. 

Government and the public diplomacy programs—similar to that offered 

by the National Endowment for Democracy—could strengthen the credibility of the center with those suspicious of U.S. Government motives. 

The Center would be independent, but, at the same time, the NSC Deputy 

National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and Strategic 

Communication Committee members should provide program direction. 

The Center should also be governed by an independent board appointed by Congress with the Deputy National Security Advisor as an ex 

officio member of the board, which in turn would appoint the Center’s 

director. As part of its program implementation, the Center should have 

a budget allocation for two key areas outside of normal operations and 

programs. The first would be an initiative for intensively gathering public 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 203

opinion data in a systematic fashion (rather than relying as at present on the 

changing universe of public organization polls, which often ask different 

questions of different populations in different years). This effort would not 

generate data for data’s sake, but rather allow rigorous program monitoring 

and evaluation. At the same time, the center should have a modest budget 

for research and development. This would allow experimentation to be 

made with programming to see what works before full deployment, rather 

than developing huge public diplomacy programs and becoming invested 

in them bureaucratically only to discover after the fact they are not useful. 

Privatize al Hurra and Radio Sawa

The overt association with the U.S. Government of the two principal 

U.S. broadcast media operating in the Arab-speaking world effectively delegitimizes them in the eyes of most Arabs. Moreover, challenging the practice 

of government control of media in the Arab world is difficult when the U.S. 

Government is running and funding its own media. The United States has 

invested significantly in creating state-of-the-art facilities for these stations; 

now is the time to let them compete in the Arab media environment on 

their own. America should have a voice in the region, but this voice will best 

be heard if people understand whether it is coming from a government or a 

private source, rather than the perception inspired by the current muddled 

arrangement. As endorsed by the Defense Science Board, more collaboration 

is needed with the private sector, which often is a more credible messenger 

than the U.S. Government itself, and the privatization of al Hurra and Radio 

Sawa is a good place to start.38 

Create C-SPANs for the Islamic World

Credible sources of general, unfiltered information are sorely lacking 

in the Islamic world, even though there is a palpable appetite for them. 

For example, during the Abu Ghraib crisis, Arabic language news channels provided live coverage of U.S. Congressional hearings, and the public 

watched with great interest. Scenes of American policymakers and military 

leaders directly answering probing questions from the legislature and media 

presented a powerful example of democracy in action, a sharp contrast to 

authoritarian practices common in the region. 

Seeking to tap this interest, al Jazeera recently launched a new channel, al Jazeera Live, which features coverage of events that are conducted 

in Arabic as well as of events translated into Arabic from the original languages. But the channel clearly has not saturated the marketplace for ideas 

and information in either the Middle East or beyond. There are multiple 

Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Networks (C-SPANs) and C-SPAN imitators 

within the United States, including local cable equivalents that cover state 
204 SINGER AND AMR

and municipal politics. Similarly, there can be multiple channels that provide live video of public affairs events across the Arab and Muslim world, 

ranging from legislatures to local events hosted by NGOs to book talks at 

the American Centers. By being unfiltered and, ideally, coordinated with 

local organizations, the channels will leap across the credibility gap that 

has undermined Sawa and Hurra. Similar opportunities are available for 

public affairs channels that target the huge number of speakers of other 

Islamic world languages, such as Farsi, Urdu, Bahasa, and Turkish. 

Reach Out to Civil Society

Public diplomacy in the Arab and Islamic world should be targeted 

directly toward civil society and wider public opinion. There is a powerful, 

if thus far narrow, constituency of moderates demanding internal reform; 

polling shows that media and business elites view the United States more 

positively than the general public. These people should be cultivated as 

potential allies. The United States should bring institutions of civil society 

into the reform process and give them the opportunity to express their own 

views to their own people. This would not only aid those fighting for internal change but also bolster our own standing. Such programs must be cognizant of the negative association that too close an alignment to the United 

States can sometimes bring to civil society leaders and ensure modesty in 

our claims; that is, the U.S. Government should portray itself as facilitating a 

long-term constructive discussion, rather than imposing its views and picking winners and losers in its outreach. Presidential leadership is needed to 

make a point of seeking dialogues with a wide range of voices in the region, 

including even those willing to criticize our policies in a constructive and 

tolerant manner (indeed, such meetings will carry a higher value-added). 

The United States must be seen as a positive agent of change rather than an 

impediment to it. 

Bolster Exchange Programs

To improve relations, we must enlist all means in the toolbox and provide a role for every willing American. The administration should increase 

exchanges of youth and young professionals, offer incentives for cooperative 

business ventures, and facilitate cultural and artistic exchanges, cooperative 

media ventures, mutual education programs, investment in development, 

technology, and education initiatives in the Islamic world, and interfaith 

dialogue. Such endeavors need not be restricted to the physical realm; the 

media in the United States and the Islamic world—television, print, and 

Internet—can be used to multiply the effects of these exchanges. Not only 

should exchange programs like the Fulbright and Humphrey programs be 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 205

expanded in size, but other types of virtual youth exchanges also need to be 

developed that harness the Internet and video-conferencing for multiplicative affects. 

Akin to the Cold War programs that built up allies around the world, 

we must expand our people-to-people interaction with the Islamic world, 

not place more obstacles in its path. The current visa procedures often 

impose onerous requirements and delays, such that Washington is seen as 

humiliating Arabs and Muslims from abroad rather than welcoming them 

to visit the United States. These procedures negate efforts to reach out to 

people who could become ambassadors attesting to the reality of American 

good will. We need more efficient visa policies, especially for students where 

the goal is quick processing that weeds out dangerous elements, while providing a clear welcome to the majority. A premium should be placed on an 

increase in foreign exchange programs to bring Arabs and Muslims directly 

into contact with American society.39 

Special attention must be given to integrating official visitor programs 

across agencies. Awkward episodes of one U.S. Government agency inviting visitors from the Islamic world only to have another mistakenly arrest 

them, and high-profile visa delays need to be avoided, not merely out of 

embarrassment, but as part of the overall effort at outreach. Examples of this 

include the case of Ejaz Haider, an editor of one of Pakistan’s most moderate newspapers, who was arrested by the Department of Homeland Security 

agents on visa charges that later proved false. Indeed, Haider was actually 

in the United States at the direct invitation of the State Department. Those 

sympathetic to the United States could only conclude charitably that one 

American hand did not know what the other was doing; unsurprisingly, those 

less favorably inclined took a darker view and made sure to publicize their 

own conspiracy theories. Nor is this an isolated instance. Tariq Ramadan, 

a prominent European Muslim intellectual who had previously been to the 

United States to address U.S. Government audiences in Washington, had 

his visa withdrawn mere days before he was to begin a professorship at the 

University of Notre Dame, with no explanation offered.

Working in conjunction with the other agencies, Homeland Security 

must establish a systematized approach toward weighing the competing 

domestic imperatives of zero-tolerance admissions and the dire foreign 

policy need of maximum outreach toward critical states and communities. 

A particular need is to develop a rigorous and rapid ability to scrutinize 

individual, high-profile cases, such as well-known figures like Dr. Ramadan, 

from which a visa decision in either direction will bring great attention. 

In such cases, visa denials must be based truly on security issues and not 

simply because a pressure group does or does not like the views of a visitor. 
206 SINGER AND AMR

When the United States is willing to host Muslim leaders with whom some 

groups may disagree, we get a chance not only to engage directly with them 

but also prove to the world that we are, as we claim, a tolerant and open 

society, confident in our beliefs and values in a way that other nations that 

resist open debate are not.

Harness Islamic Respect for U.S. Education, Science, and 

Technology

While positive attitudes toward the United States in general and U.S. 

foreign policy in particular hover in the single digits, U.S. science and technology and education are viewed as positive by 80 percent or more of the 

population. The implication here is that even in the countries with the most 

anti-American sentiments, the United States can lead with its most welcome 

and respected institutions to build direct inroads. But new policy efforts are 

needed. First, the post-9/11 environment reduced the flow of students from 

the Islamic world to the United States due to both visa restrictions and fears 

that the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims would be infringed in the United 

States. To remedy the situation, student visas must be processed quickly but 

thoroughly, and the United States needs to do more to convince Arabs and 

Muslims that they will be free from arbitrary government harassment while 

visiting. Second, U.S. universities (which polls show are greatly trusted and 

respected) should be encouraged and funded to create joint programs with 

universities in the Islamic world—to create American studies centers, for 

student video-conferencing, and to strengthen our own Islamic world studies centers through participation of students and teachers from the region. 

For example, for about $20 million per year, the United States could fund 

a handful of indigenous American studies centers at universities across the 

Islamic world in places like Jordan and Egypt where the regimes are friendly 

but anti-Americanism runs high among the population. Such centers should 

not be branded as flag-waving pro-American entities, but simply academic 

institutions where American culture, politics, and history are studied, the 

good together with the bad. Such efforts are likely to be successful and diffuse the appearance of U.S. intervention if the effort is jointly funded and 

planned with local government or business leaders.

Harness Arab-Americans and American Muslims as a Key Bridge

America must leverage the strength of its diversity. At a time when the 

U.S. Government lacks both credibility abroad and the local language speakers to represent our views, the distance between it and the domestic Arab 

and Muslim communities is stunning. For example, the State Department’s 

office for public diplomacy did not include a single American Muslim on 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 207

its staff until 2006. The same diversity problem is repeated across agencies. 

The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State should 

all examine how they can better tap the strengths of these communities, 

both in programming and recruiting. The administration must move beyond symbolic respect for Muslim rituals, such as once a year convening 

Iftar dinners, to actual programming designed to demonstrate it in fact. For 

example, Arab Americans and American Muslims can help prepare and even 

accompany officials when they visit the region, just as political donors and 

corporate executives often join delegations.

Maximize Presidential Leadership in Public Diplomacy

Finally, Presidential leadership is absolutely vital for successful public 

diplomacy. The President himself must make it clear that cabinet and subcabinet level officials must consider America’s standing in the world to be a 

priority for action. They not only should make the effort to conduct interviews with the foreign press on a regular basis, but they also should engage 

in genuine dialogue, even with those who hold negative views of the U.S. 

Government. In other words, public diplomacy must go beyond “preaching 

to the converted.” Visits by senior U.S. officials to the region should include 

meetings with local students, civil society leaders, and reformers, and even 

conservative leaders who might be susceptible to the rhetoric of the militant 

radicals. Similar efforts should be made by Department of Defense civilian 

and military leaders operating at both the Pentagon and regional command 

level, following the Cold War model of a wide engagement strategy to expand 

and deepen relationships with U.S. allies and counterparts in what were then 

battleground states in the developing world. 

The White House must play a key role in bringing attention to the 

major issues confronting the Islamic world and the West and in swaying 

popular views among Muslims. Given the importance of the war on terror 

and the risks of a greater rift between the United States and the Islamic 

world, the office should be utilized to the maximum extent possible in 

reaching out to news media in Muslim-majority countries. Likewise, efforts 

should be made to bring the President into personal contact with reform 

and civil society leaders, which will help bolster both parties’ standing and 

understanding. In addition, the President should make time in his schedule 

for interviews with news media from the Muslim world. President Bush’s 

May 2004 interview with al Arabiya was a good step in this direction, but it 

only occurred after a major scandal—revelations of the Abu Ghraib prison 

abuses—and similar interviews have not taken place in the 2 years since. Outreach to news media in the Muslim world must be proactive and sustained 

rather than merely reactive for damage control after terrible incidents. Nor 
208 SINGER AND AMR

should the President restrict himself to Arabic-language news outlets. There 

are other important outlets in the Muslim world, including the popular and 

independent GEO TV in Pakistan.

Furthermore, the President should use the bully pulpit to condemn 

hate speech, including by American policymakers themselves. Immediately 

after 9/11, the President visited the Islamic Center of Washington, the capital’s leading mosque, to ensure that Americans and the world knew that the 

administration understood that Islam was not to blame for the attacks. Unfortunately, the clarity of this message has been lost. A series of anti-Muslim 

statements have since been made by policymakers and private organization 

leaders who have been either inside or associated with the administration.40

Most of these comments have passed without consequences or condemnation. Bigotry in our midst is not just distasteful, it also directly undermines 

our security. We live in an era where the world constantly watches to see 

whether we actually live up to our ideals. At a time when many in the world 

expect the worst of us, such statements only support enemy propaganda. 

The President must publicly condemn such statements in specific, disassociate himself from their authors, and hold them liable. That would be a 

powerful demonstration of presidential leadership and moral authority. 

The Military Role

Often ignored in discussions of public diplomacy is the vital role that 

the military can play in helping to restore America’s standing. Both diplomats and military leaders often have some discomfort with this concept, 

but the fundamental fact is that the military’s role is to fight and win the 

Nation’s wars. In the 21st century, as in the Cold War, not all wars are conventional. Thus, an important realization in the overall National Security 

Strategy (though not always carried over in implementation) is that the 

United States must shift from state-centric thinking and deal with the new 

challenges of a new century. Specific to the battle against terror, this will 

require a multifaceted strategy aimed at undermining the structures and 

support for networked nongovernmental organizations. Public diplomacy 

is not the primary role for the military, but assisting in efforts to meet this 

latest security challenge is necessary. 

The doctrinal mandate for such action is eloquently laid out in the 

update to the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, which seeks to provide 

guidance to officers facing the challenges of 21st-century wars and the global 

war on terror: 

The prevalence of new information technologies and the pervasive presence of modern media, require that we redouble our 

public diplomacy and educational efforts and begin focusing on 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 209

shaping the informational dimension of the battlespace. Because 

small wars are information wars, it is possible that successful 

shaping operations can be sufficient to accomplish the desired 

end-state and thus can become ‘decisive’ operations.41

Thus, as the military must begin to face the long-term challenge ahead 

of it in protecting American interests and security, discussions of transformation must be about more than precision strikes and gigabytes. Rather, 

the military structure must weigh needs and priorities in areas ranging from 

training to force structure. As an illustration, a great need remains for expertise in Arabic and other Muslim cultures and languages for soldiers and intelligence analysts (with a significant portion of communications with local 

populations being mediated through contractors). This stands in contrast 

to the crash-course mentality that built up great levels of expertise in Slavic 

languages and cultures in the early years of the Cold War. 

Much as Presidential leadership is needed to energize action across 

the U.S. Government, leadership within the Pentagon is also required. The 

questions of how the military can better support and integrate its own public 

diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations require senior leadership to pay heed to the issue. At the simplest level, it requires that leaders 

take seriously and implement the very advice they sought from their own 

advisors, such as the Defense Science Board. At the same time, the leadership must focus on how it can push for and support other agencies to fulfill 

their responsibilities in this area. Too frequently, Pentagon frustration with 

other agencies’ foot-dragging (or its greater funding) leads it to undertake 

programming, with the thinking that “if others aren’t going to do it, then 

we might as well.”42 This can-do attitude is highly laudable, but planners 

should be careful to ensure that it does not lead the military into areas that 

may not be the most appropriate in the long term. 

Options for the Military

As with the general public diplomacy activities previously discussed, 

the military is uniquely suited for a number of activities and initiatives that 

can be explored for consideration. Some (but by no means all) programming concepts include:

Integrate activities into planning. A joke circulating within the military’s 

public affairs field depicts their officers as fire extinguishers behind glass, to 

be broken out only after the emergency. This analogy is a bit extreme but 

does reflect one of the problems in the present institutionalization of public 

affairs/public diplomacy efforts by the military. Such programs are felt to be 

an afterthought to, rather than an inherent part of, warfighting.

This dynamic is worsened by the fact that minimal consideration is 
210 SINGER AND AMR

given to the target set (the audience), so that the audience considered in the 

planning may not be the right one. For example, a planner for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom discussed how the strategic audience he was most concerned 

with (the one whose interpretations were most sensitive in shaping limitations on military plans such as targeting airstrikes) was “Paris, Brussels, 

and Berlin.”43 When thinking about how foreign audiences might view U.S. 

military actions in the war on terror, the swing audience is different than the 

one we thought of during operations in the Balkans in the context of North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approval. Instead, the key audiences 

must be the populations of the Islamic world for whose “hearts and minds” 

we are in competition with al Qaeda and its affiliates, not Europeans residing in the capitals of NATO states without troops on the ground. 

Senior leadership must recognize this gap and link such efforts into 

regional strategic planning (visualizing public diplomacy efforts as part of 

preventive diplomacy and deployments efforts) and most particularly in 

operation planning. For example, in the run-up to the Iraq war, the military 

did an excellent job of implementing and discussing with the (American and 

European) media and public the measures it would take to prevent civilian 

casualties in combat operations, to the extent that the United States put into 

place greater measures aimed at saving civilian lives than in any other war in 

history. But, as with much else, there was no planning in this domain for the 

post-conflict phase. The result in Iraq was catastrophic. The regional interpretation of U.S. operations turned overnight from one of a quick victory and liberation to one of chaos and failure, based largely on the inability of the United 

States to protect the average Muslim civilian on the ground and a failure to 

adequately explain why. The problem was not just that the chaos happened, 

but also that the United States had neither a process to discuss its implications 

nor a contingency plan for how to deal with and mitigate the repercussions. 

Senior leaders must also recognize that they play an important personal role in the overall strategic communications strategy and implementation. The local political context will shape interpretations of much of the 

audience in the Muslim world (most live in states where the military plays a 

dominant role), meaning that they will project their understanding of politics onto the United States. They will often disregard what is said or done by 

politicians or diplomats and instead focus most on what defense officials 

and military officers say and do. This puts a great burden of responsibility 

on senior defense leadership, which is often not understood. 

For example, the aforementioned problem of postwar chaos was worsened by the failure of senior U.S. defense and military leaders to convey 

sympathy and concern for the well-being of the Iraqi people during this 

period, which in turn undercut any benefit from earlier efforts to show that 

the United States cared more for Iraqi civilians than did the Ba’athist regime. 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 211

The problem is often exacerbated by the temptation for senior officials conducting press conferences to utter catchy sound bites for the nightly news 

in the United States. This was perhaps best exemplified by the episode in 

which a senior official responded that “stuff happens” when asked about 

the hardship imposed on Iraqi civilians by the postwar violence, crime, and 

looting. More attention must be paid to the way such statements play out 

with regional audiences and thus backfire on U.S. troops in the short term 

and American prestige in the long term.44

Speak with the same message. As complex as the challenges are that the 

United States faces in the area of strategic communications and public diplomacy, they are only complicated further by the number of agencies and 

personnel operating in this sphere. These range from State Department public diplomacy efforts, U.S. Agency for International Development activities 

on the ground, Central Intelligence Agency information and psychological 

operations, military public affairs at the Pentagon, military information 

operations conducted at all levels from strategic to tactical, and the various other military activities that could be characterized as public diplomacy 

broadly defined, ranging from port visits and humanitarian relief efforts to 

personnel exchanges and training programs. However, bureaucratic firewalls and stovepipes often prevent unity of effort across agencies. Instead 

of the synergy that is necessary for these efforts to have maximum effect, we 

have a system that is barely coordinated. Indeed, in some conflict zones, the 

representatives of each of the agencies engaged in strategic communications 

have never even sat around the same table.45 This underlines our previous 

points about how an overarching strategy is clearly needed, one that not 

only lays out what the goals and activities should be, but also clarifies responsibilities and deconflicts activities and messages. 

Develop our own networks for net-centric warfare. Like all exchange 

programs with foreign audiences, foreign military training and exchanges 

should be seen as a critical opportunity to expand U.S. relationships and 

alliances and build networks of local allies. Despite the fact that association 

with the United States in the general social sphere is viewed negatively in 

the Muslim world today, association with the United States in the military 

sphere is still considered a positive career enhancer; those who participate 

in U.S. military programs typically advance to more senior levels. Therefore, 

the full value of such programs should be exploited so as to ensure that the 

United States develops close working relationships with the next generation 

of military leaders in the Muslim world. These programs not only carry great 

value in terms of official policy, but they also open useful unofficial channels of communication and influence. 

The existing U.S. programs of military-to-military exchanges and con-
212 SINGER AND AMR

tacts should be reoriented to reflect new strategic priorities. We should be 

focusing on greater percentages of rising young officers from military forces 

in the Islamic world, much as we once altered allocations in such programs 

according to Cold War priorities by increasing numbers from Latin America, 

and as we subsequently reflected post–Cold War priorities by increasing the 

slots allotted to the states of the former Warsaw Pact. 

Unfortunately, the Pentagon has been slow to make this shift, evidently 

due largely to bureaucratic inertia. In 2004, for example, 11,832 students were 

trained through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

program. Approximately 20 percent (2,351) came from Muslim majority 

states. These figures become more glaring when broken down. The largest 

number of students worldwide came from Bolivia (1,807, the equivalent of 

77 percent of the total from all Muslim majority states), whereas the largest 

number of students from the Muslim world come from two states, Sierra 

Leone (269) and Turkey (267), that reflected priorities other than the “war 

of ideas” (Turkey as a NATO partner and Sierra Leone due to commitments 

in the wake of United Nations and regional peacekeeping operations).46

Clearly, a far more strategic use of the limited slots can be made in terms of 

allocation, while there is certainly scope to expand the overall number of 

students brought to the United States.

Equally, it is time to consider an expansion in the structure and funding of the Near East and South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, 

located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC. While highly capable, 

its size and scope of activities are far more modest than the other DODfunded regional security centers, primarily due to a difference in funding 

structures. For example, NESA has 43 faculty and staff, while the George 

Marshall Center for Security Studies has 247 and the Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies has 127. It is time to reevaluate this structure and explore 

whether a comparable shift in size and mission might be appropriate for 

NESA, along with any additional legislative authorities that would permit it 

to carry out its mission more effectively.

Bolster high-demand/low-density units to meet current needs. Civil affairs 

teams are widely recognized as one of the most valuable capabilities the 

military has in winning local hearts and minds. These units have a multiplier effect in building up local good will and establishing U.S. credibility; 

many believe that their impact on the ground in places like Iraq will be 

remembered in individual villages for the next generation or more.47 Yet for 

the pure value-added these men and women represent to overall operations, 

there are simply too few to go around. The units that exist are overstretched, 

and the fact that they are reservist-based means they are at risk of burning 

out from repeated call-ups. This problem was already an issue during the 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 213

Balkans deployments and has only been magnified by commitments in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Simply put, thinking about force transformation must 

take into account which units are of most value to U.S. strategic goals, what 

commanders in the field need them to do, and how the relative payback 

from these units compares with capabilities offered by traditional, large 

budget acquisitions.

Formalize public diplomacy activities into the budget. The military actually engages in a range of civil military activities that could be described as 

public diplomacy at the regional and ground level, but they often occur as 

an afterthought or only during emergencies. For example, the Navy only 

sends hospital ships to key zones on an ad hoc basis, typically in response to 

a crisis and when the ship is not committed elsewhere. These types of visits, 

such as the one during the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, are powerful 

examples of American good will and demonstrable evidence of the professionalism of the U.S. military. Indeed, many credit the aid that the U.S. 

military provided on the ground in Indonesia with helping to reverse the 

downturn in esteem for the United States in the region.48

By comparison, when an earthquake slammed Pakistan (not only a 

hub of extremist groups, but also the only nuclear-armed Muslim state) in 

2005, the U.S. Government response was meek at best. Those military assets that were already near the area (mostly a small group of helicopters 

coming from deployments already to Afghanistan) deployed to the area to 

help move aid, but the subsequent followthrough was minimal. Overall, 

the United States committed just $26.4 million in aid, with the potential 

for additional aid up to a $50 million limit—roughly 3 percent of the 

amount the Government gave the tsunami-afflicted regions in Southeast 

Asia. Analysts can debate the relative importance of Pakistan and Indonesia, 

but treating the opportunity in Pakistan as only 3 percent as important as 

the one in Indonesia is clearly poor grand strategy. By contrast, a panoply of 

radical groups sensed the opportunity to prove their own merit and quickly 

started engaging in a range of aid efforts in Pakistan, seeking to fill the void 

left by the international community. Affiliate groups of Lashkar-e-Taiba 

ran a field hospital complete with x-ray machines and operating room, 

Jammat-e-Islami organized relief convoys and refugee camps, and the al 

Rasheed Trust (a group whose assets have been frozen in the United States 

due to its suspected al Qaeda links) has been in the forefront of aid and 

publicity. At best, the situation was a missed opportunity. At worst, we ceded 

more ground to radical forces, undermining U.S. national security.

The reality is that high payoff programs are not included in long-term 

planning and not supported by separate budget items. Such efforts are too 

important to be viewed as an afterthought or a drag on a unit’s regular op-
214 SINGER AND AMR

erational budget. Money spent on creating proof of the professionalism and 

good intent of U.S. troops on the ground that leave a positive long-term 

legacy should at least achieve the same amount of investment as the present 

psychological operations (PSYOP)/advertising campaigns organized by the 

military (the Joint PSYOP Support Element of the U.S. Special Operations 

Command has a projected budget of $77.5 million over the next 7 years 

to spend on creating TV, radio, and print ads to burnish the U.S. image).49

Exploration should be made of how to recognize such activities as part of 

counterinsurgency and force protection measures and whether they might 

be regularized into budgeting (perhaps through the humanitarian operations budget). 

Better support public affairs officers. Public affairs officers are often the 

single point of contact that foreign publics and media have with the U.S. 

military. During operations, many in the foreign media prefer to deal with 

them than with diplomatic handlers from other agencies, understandably 

seeing these officers as a more direct source on what the U.S. military is 

thinking and doing. We must face the reality that this area is not simply 

the domain of the State Department. As such, it is absurd that public affairs officers, who are placed in this critical, front-line role in the war for 

hearts and minds, are not afforded foreign language and cultural awareness 

in their training programs. Some of the more enterprising have resorted to 

paying for such coursework themselves. This should be a regular, funded 

component of their professional development and education. 

Our hometown (media) is the world. The link between the military and 

the press has often veered between cooperation, as in World War II, and 

contention, as in Vietnam. Recently, the military has set up the embedded 

reporter program to better manage the inherent problems of press operating in a conflict zone. However, the focus on getting U.S. reporters into 

such slots and reserving only a small portion for foreign media has been 

understandable. The merits of expanding access to professional and vetted 

foreign media should be weighed, hopefully also taking into account the 

new strategic needs of the United States. In addition, their allocation must 

be more strategic. Within these programs, a media presence from the countries that matter most in the war on terror has been ad hoc. Having a vetted, 

professional reporter from Pakistan see firsthand the professionalism of U.S. 

troops may be more important than having a tabloid journalist from Japan 

on the scene—and, arguably, even more important than having another 

reporter from the United States. The distribution across services should also 

be planned such that gaps will not occur as the focus of operations shifts. 

For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, more Muslim world reporters 

were with Navy units than either Army or Air Force units. These challenges 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 215

will have to be balanced with security concerns, but an overall strategy is 

needed. 

The Shape of the Global Antiterrorist Environment

An important element in the development of strategy is to identify the 

components that would comprise a successful completion. That is, understanding the endgame of an idealized policy success can provide a useful 

guide in what would need to be targeted and achieved to reach such a state 

of affairs. If the United States were successful in creating a global antiterrorist environment, it would have several key characteristics.

Unified Articulation of Means, Ends, and Goals

The United States has a critical need to articulate an overarching strategy toward terrorism that matches ends, means, and discernable measures. 

Part and parcel of this is not the issuance of more policy statements, but 

rather a grand strategy toward the Islamic world that will shape our often 

disparate policies. In short, a fundamental building block in the global 

antiterrorist environment would be an American articulation of a positive 

vision of its goals toward the Islamic world. This is necessary to present a 

constructive program of what the United States stands for and offers. The 

side effect of building a cohesive, positive vision is that it will also provide 

an agenda for allies and friends to support, as well as a programmatic lodestone to contend with other competing visions. 

Credibility of U.S. Voice

The American voice will only be effective if it is viewed as sincere. This 

means that it would be grounded in a dialogue that values and engages 

the Muslim world, rather than approaching it merely as an audience for 

better public relations. Underscoring the programming would be an array 

of outreach activities that create layers of networks of local partners and 

affiliates in the public and private sectors. These would serve not only as 

feedback loops, but also to build local coalitions and alliances that will add 

to our credibility. 

At the core of al Qaedaism’s support and popularity has been its ability to draw from (and manipulate) the deep sense of frustration felt within 

the Muslim world over the failing status quo.50 From authoritarian regimes 

that fail to deliver effective social services to struggling economies that cannot compete with the forces of globalization, there is a sense in the Muslim 

world that the region is falling behind.51 The fundamental challenge for us 

is that the United States is viewed as an inherent part of this status quo and 

blamed for the circumstances in the region. While this often is an unfair 
216 SINGER AND AMR

characterization, it creates a regional reality that must be dealt with, as it 

undermines America’s efforts to speak on behalf of its policies. 

In an ideal global antiterrorist environment, the United States would 

be viewed as opposing the negative aspects of the status quo and supporting 

the forces that will aid human development and freedom. Our statements 

would reflect our policy, resonate, and be viewed as credible. The U.S. strategic communications agenda must articulate a vision that acknowledges 

the underlying anger in the Arab world stemming from frustration at the 

comparative lack of political, economic, and social opportunity. While this 

approach will create challenges with any allied autocratic regimes that cling 

to past practices, an environment in which terrorist groups are undermined 

and the U.S. voice is credible would be one in which our policies are clearly 

understood as being on the side of change in the region, not on the side of 

a failing status quo. We must identify the United States with the positive, 

supporting prosperity and opposing repression (and not merely through 

regime overthrow but also through the more difficult challenge of reform). 

Consistent but Nuanced U.S. Voice

In an ideal global antiterrorist environment, the U.S. voice would be 

recognized for its consistency and credibility, and for its depth of understanding, empathy, and nuance in how it engages a diverse world. For example, discussions by U.S. officials of the Muslim educational institutions 

known as madrassas have, at least as heard from outside, operated under 

the assumption that all are “schools of hate” that must be shut down or reformed. This approach misses the fact that only an extremely small percentage of the madrassas in places like Pakistan are affiliated with radical groups, 

while in other states, such as Indonesia, they are mostly government-linked 

and are in fact sources of moderation, while in Arabic-speaking countries, 

madrassa is simply the ordinary word for a school. As a result, when the 

United States discusses shutting down madrassas, Muslims view it as striking against moderates in some countries, education in general in others, 

and rarely as focusing merely on the radicals. Recognition of such regional 

nuances and differences should be part of any U.S. strategy, as it will add to 

understanding. 

At the same time, the United States must be flexible enough to open 

dialogues with the diverse set of social groups and actors on the ground. 

This may even mean seeking to gain allies with whom we differ in world 

view, just as the Marshall Plan dealt with socialist-leaning unions in 

Western Europe and Nixon went to China to divide the Communist bloc. 

The United States ultimately will have to accept that Islamist political groups 

are among the most powerful and credible groups in the Muslim world. 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 217

While we may not see eye to eye with them on many issues, it is time to 

open dialogues and work on setting a shared understanding of how we can 

cooperate to improve the lives of the citizens of their countries, as well as 

the areas in which we cannot. While the concept of U.S. engagement with 

Islamist groups may be anathema to some policymakers, the United States 

has already made such compromises with Islamist groups in Iraq—both 

old-guard Islamist leaders like Ayatollah Sistani as well as new-guard figures 

like Moqtada al-Sadr—to help steer them and their supporters away from 

violence, proving that it can be done, and quite successfully. 

Isolation and Delegitimization of al Qaedaism 

An important lesson from past insurgencies is that the key to winning 

is not merely to track down every insurgent or terrorist across the globe. 

Rather, such groups are best defeated by isolating and strangling them in 

both the physical and ideological realms. In this task, the role of the host 

community is key, and its full support is necessary, both to reject these 

groups and reveal their presence. If the host community is supportive, or 

even neutral and thus tolerant of the extremists, then counterinsurgency 

efforts will fail.52 If successful insurgents are like fish in the sea, as Mao suggested, then we win not by draining the sea, but rather by poisoning it so it 

is no longer hospitable for their radicalism. 

A turning point in the global battle of hearts and minds will occur 

when groups that advocate violence in pursuit of radical aims are not 

merely condemned for particular incidents by a segment of the more moderate opinion leaders, but when such groups as a whole (and their aims, 

agenda, and tactics) are viewed as criminals and apostates. This shift must 

come from within the community. The United States can engage groups and 

leaders that work toward the goal of isolating the extremists, but the effort 

will fail if the United States is seen as the genesis of such an agenda. Restoring America’s good name will assist such efforts, such that the baggage of 

widespread anti-Americanism will be made less burdensome for any leader 

speaking out against radicalism. 

The key to this shift will be supporting any communal self-examination that yields the twofold realization within the Muslim umma that extremist groups, especially those conducting terrorist attacks against civilians, 

are operating in contravention of the accepted practices of Islam; and that 

they are doing so in a way that undermines the well-being of the entire 

global Muslim community. As such, their activities would not merely be 

something to explain away (as poor tactics, but proper targeting of an unpopular oppressor), but would appear as a deliberate choice to harm others 

and to break with Islam. This would entail a full mobilization of opinion 
218 SINGER AND AMR

leaders against them and a recasting of local and global religious and communal structures to ensure that they do not gain support or infiltrate. The 

role of conservative clerics and Islamist leaders will be crucial in this. When 

such a transition happens (and the process appears to be under way among 

certain communities, such as the Muslim American efforts in the wake 

of the London bombings), al Qaedaism will wither on the vine.53 While 

certain individuals will likely continue terrorist activities, their overall efforts will be akin to what happened with the Red Brigades of Europe or the 

violent militia/Christian identity groups of the United States: they will be 

acknowledged as definitive threats that must be dealt with, but not ones 

that resonate to any strategic level. 

Conclusion

The 5 years since the 9/11 attacks have seen an American foreign policy 

that could in no way be described as meek or ineffective, except in its public 

diplomacy and strategic communications. From Iraq to Afghanistan, the 

United States carried out a dazzling array of actions. But it still faces a series 

of complex and demanding decisions in how it engages Muslim states and 

communities and communicates its policies toward the Islamic world. A 

striking feature of our most vexing challenges is that more often than not, 

they arise in relation to our policies toward those we usually consider our 

friends and allies—making the challenges more difficult, but also perhaps 

ultimately more manageable. 

With a greater awareness of the challenges ahead, an agenda must be 

developed in response. There is a glaring need for America to undertake 

a proactive strategy that is aimed at restoring long-term security through 

the presentation of American principles in American foreign policy. A key 

victory will occur when the United States is again seen as living up to its 

values and, in a region characterized by a failing and stagnant status quo, 

acting on the side of positive change, whether it is in affording people the 

opportunity to reach their potential or in ensuring that governance is representative rather than repressive. The tools of public diplomacy and strategic 

communications can be valuable weapons in the American arsenal. It is not 

too late to wield them.
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 219

Notes

1 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, “American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: U.S. Image Up 

Slightly, but Still Negative,” June 23, 2005; available at <pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247.pdf>.

2 Available at <globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeldd20031016sdmemo.htm>.

3 The first National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was released in February 2003. Mr. 

Rumsfeld’s memo came in October 2003, well after the writing and release, illustrating the sense 

among senior leadership that the document did not meet strategy needs. A new National Security 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism was released in September 2006, too late to be addressed in this 

chapter.

4 See Eliot A. Cohen, “World War IV,” The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2001; James 

Woolsey, “At War for Freedom,” The Guardian, July 20, 2003. 

5 Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1998).

6 “What is Public Diplomacy?” available at <publicdiplomacy.org>, July 4, 2003.

7 Ibid.

8 A useful discussion of the history and potential of strategic influence operations is Kim 

Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle against Terrorism 

(Santa Monica: RAND, 2005).

9 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power,” The International Herald 

Tribune, January 10, 2003.

10 The 4th Infantry Division was absent until after the war and thus the United States was 

unable to bring the war home to core Ba’athist supporters through an immediate, heavy presence in cities that have since become the focal points of the insurgency.

11 See, for example, the Zogby International and Pew Forum polls, available at <zogby.

com> and <pewtrust.org>.

12 As an example, see statements made by Fox News host Bill O’Reilly on June 17, 2004: 

“I don’t have any respect by and large for the Iraqi people at all. I have no respect for them. I 

think that they’re a prehistoric group”; “We cannot intervene in the Muslim world ever again. 

What we can do is bomb the living daylights out of them.” 

13 For a further analysis of al Qaeda’s health, see the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, The Military Balance 2004–2005 (London: The International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 2004). 

14 For further discussion of this dynamic, see Hady Amr, “The Need to Communicate,” 

Brookings Analysis Paper, January 2004. 

15 See Pew Global Attitudes surveys: “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim 

and Western Publics,” July 14, 2005, and “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative,” June 23, 

2005; available at <pewglobal.org/.>

16 Max Boot, “Our Extreme Makeover,” Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2005. 

17 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004).

18 “Bush: Better Human Intelligence Needed,” CNN.com, January 18, 2005.

19 “Arab Ally Snubs Bush Amid ‘Unprecedented Hatred’ for U.S.,” The Guardian UK, 

April 21, 2004; available at <commondreams.org/headlines04/0421-02.htm>.

20 For example, after the Abu Ghraib scandal, faked videos appeared that showed what 

were purported to be U.S. soldiers engaged in murders, rapes, and other atrocities. While the 

claims should have been easily disproven (for example, the “American” soldiers in one video 

that circulated among the Muslim community in Europe were clearly local, amateur actors 

wearing cast-off uniforms from the Vietnam era), they were now considered credible. 

21 Thomas Regan, “U.S. Image Abroad Will ‘Take Years’ to Repair; Experts Tell Congress 

‘Bottom Has Fallen Out’ for U.S. Support Abroad,” Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 2004.
220 SINGER AND AMR

22 Condoleezza Rice, “The President’s Fiscal Year 2006 International Affairs Budget,” testimony before Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs, May 12, 2005.

23 The Weekly Standard, February 9, 2004.

24 Christopher Ross, “Pillars of Public Diplomacy,” The Harvard Review, August 21, 2003.

25 John Sawyer, “Entrenched Distrust Undermines White House Effort to Reach Out,” St. 

Louis Post Dispatch, December 10, 2005. 

26 Institute for Global Engagement, March 2006. 

27 Zogby International/Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University 

of Maryland.

 “Arab Attitudes Toward Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy, and the Media,” May 

2004; available at <bsos.umd.edu/SADAT/pub/Arab%20Attitudes%20Towards%20Political%20

and%20Social%20Issues,%20Foreign%20Policy%20and%20the%20Media.htm>. According to 

a poll conducted by Telhami/Zogby, al Jazeera is the first choice for international news for a plurality of viewers in Lebanon (44 percent), Saudi Arabia (44 percent), the United Arab Emirates 

(46 percent), and a majority of those in Egypt (66 percent), Jordan (62 percent), and Morocco 

(54 percent). It is the most watched station in each country polled. Al Arabiya is second-ranked 

first choice in the region: it is the first choice for 19 percent in the United Arab Emirates and 

under 10 percent in Egypt (5 percent), Jordan (7 percent), Lebanon (7 percent), and Morocco 

(8 percent). 

28 Shibley Telhami, “Reflections of Hearts and Minds: Media, Opinion, and Identity in 

the Arab World,” The Brookings Institution, April 2005.

29 See “Revisiting the Arab Street: Research from Within,” February, 2005; available at 

<css-jordan.org>.

30 Information from “Reporting the Truth: Media Perceptions, Preferences, and 

Practices among Young UAE Nationals.” Public Affairs office of the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, 

July 2004; The Arab Advisors Group, September 2004—Saudi Satellite TV and Radio Survey; 

USA Today/Gallup Polls, “Iraq: Then and Now,” April 2004; available at <usatoday.com/news/

world/iraq/2004-04-28-baghdad.htm>.

31 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

“Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” 

September 2004, 41–47.

32 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Small Wars/21st Century” 

(Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 2005), 79. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Rice, testimony before Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs, May 12, 2005.

35 Author interview with Congressional Fellow, September 24, 2003.

36 “Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” 

September, 2004, 3.

37 Hady Amr, “American Public Diplomacy: Some Lessons from Germany,” The Daily 

Star, July 15, 2005. 

38 Idea put forward by Stephen Cook, “Hearts, Minds and Hearings,” The New York 

Times, July 6, 2004.

39 John N. Paden and Peter W. Singer, “America Slams the Door (on its Foot): 

Washington’s Destructive New Visa Policies,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (May/June 2003). 

40 For example, Pat Robertson, Christian Coalition founder and close associate of the 

Bush administration, in February 2002 called Islam a “violent religion.” Similar remarks were 

made by Franklin Graham, who called Islam a “very evil and wicked religion.” Likewise, 

Lieutenant General William Boykin was not reprimanded for inflammatory statements in 2004 

about Islam that set off a firestorm of attention, comparing his faith with that of a Muslim 

leader in Somalia: “I knew that my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real 

God and his was an idol.” 

41 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 69. 
IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 221

42 Author interview with U.S. Army officer, June 2005, Washington, DC.

43 Author interview with U.S. Army officer, May 2005, Washington, DC. 

44 “Rumsfeld on Looting in Iraq: ‘Stuff Happens’,” CNN.com, April 13, 2003. 

45 Author interview with U.S. Navy officer, January 2005, Washington, DC.

46 These figures are at best only a crude indicator of the way in which attention to the 

“war of ideas” is reflected in security assistance programming allocations, since there is no easy 

way of knowing whether the 1,807 Bolivians all participated in a one-hour course in La Paz 

while smaller numbers of Saudis, Egyptians, or Pakistanis underwent longer and more intensive 

educational programs in the United States. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that IMET dollar and 

student allocations have not been dramatically adjusted since 9/11 despite the immensely 

greater saliency of the Islamic world in the American strategic calculus. Department of State, 

“Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations” (Washington, DC: 

Department of State, February 2005).

47 Author interview with U.S. Army officer, May 2005. 

48 See Pew Global Attitudes surveys “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim 

and Western Publics,” July 14, 2005, and “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative,” June 23, 

2005; available at <pewglobal.org/>. 

49 “On the PR Battlefield,” Time, June 13, 2005. 

50 See, for example, Rami G. Khouri, “Lessons from a Journey Across the Arab World,” 

The Daily Star, July 20, 2005. 

51 See, for example, the United Nations Development Program Arab Human 

Development Report series; available at <rbas.undp.org/ahdr.cfm>.

52 Christopher M. Ford, “Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an 

Insurgency,” Parameters 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 51–66.

53 See, for example, “Muslim Groups Target Youths in Anti-Terror Campaign,” CNN.

com, July 26, 2005; available at <cnn.com/2005/U.S./07/25/muslims.nonviolence/index.html>.
223

Chapter Nine

Influencing Attitudes, Shaping Behaviors: 

Implications for U.S. Strategy

Joseph McMillan

It did not take long after the 9/11 attacks for thoughtful Americans to 

realize that enduring success in any struggle against violent Islamic extremism, or jihadism, would depend in large measure on altering the attitudes of 

significant portions of the world’s Muslim community. It is from that community that al Qaeda and kindred organizations draw their recruits, it is on 

members of that community that the violent extremist movement depends 

for financial, material, and rhetorical support, and it is that community’s 

acquiescence in terrorist methods, at least against some targets and for some 

purposes, that permits such organizations to operate despite concerted efforts to suppress them. 

Public Opinion as the Center of Gravity

What has become apparent in the 5 years since 9/11 is that public 

opinion in the Muslim world is not merely an enabling factor for terrorism 

but rather the center of gravity toward which the entire jihadist enterprise 

is directed. As Ayman al-Zawahiri explained to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi in 

July 2005, “we are in a battle . . . for the hearts and minds of our umma

[the worldwide community of Muslims].”1 The centrality of Muslim public 

opinion to this struggle becomes obvious once we understand the jihadist campaign as a transnational insurgency (albeit one deeply influenced 

by the phenomenon of globalization) in which violent Islamic extremists 

are seeking to reconstruct the existing order within (and perhaps beyond) 

the Muslim world through a combination of violence and political activity, including the propagation of their radical ideology among Muslim 

populations.2

Seen in this light, the messages transmitted to the world’s Muslims 

in jihadist rhetoric are of a piece with the messages transmitted through 

jihadist terrorist attacks on targets in the West and in countries considered 

its apostate allies. Difficult as it is to see from our perspective as the victims 

of terrorism, the acts carried out by violent Islamic extremists are less about 

us or about affecting our behavior than about generating political support 

for their cause within the umma. Extremists are consciously practicing what 
224 McMILLAN

19th-century anarchists called “propaganda by deed”3 to reinforce their propaganda by word. In the near term, the two weapons, the word and the 

sword, are aimed at “spreading the sentiment of jihad among the Muslim 

nation,”4 and, over time, to establish Islamic governments “as they [always] 

have been: by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.”5

Clearly, then, affecting the attitudes of the billion-plus Muslims who 

constitute both the political target and the potential base of support for the 

jihadist movement must be a central element in any U.S. strategy for the 

war on terrorism. In this sense, at least, the concept of a “war of ideas” is 

the right one. This realization, however, leaves a series of difficult issues to 

be addressed. In particular, having acknowledged that attitudes need to be 

changed, we must consider carefully just how sweeping a change is necessary. Those who contend that the terrorist threat emanates from the basic 

nature of Islam as a religion would hold that it is necessary to alter the basic 

teachings of Islam in some fashion, but is such radical change—with the 

high costs and long timelines it implies—really necessary to assure the security of the American people from terrorist attacks? Should we be trying to 

persuade the world’s Muslims to embrace globalization, or modernization, 

or Western-style secular liberalism? Should we be promoting a particular 

outcome in the umma’s internal debates over how Islam should deal with 

the problems of modernity? Is it essential to alter the way Muslims perceive 

the United States? Or is it possible to convince them that terrorist methods 

are illegitimate regardless of what opinions they may hold about America 

and Americans?

Deciding how fundamental a shift in Muslim attitudes we intend to 

achieve under the rubric of the war on terrorism must be governed not only 

by what various theories of the origin of the threat would hold to be optimal but also by what is feasible. Probably the most insightful discussion of 

what is involved in shifting public attitudes in the context of an insurgency 

was offered by Sir Julian Paget, a British scholar and practitioner of counterinsurgency. As Paget sets it out, “winning hearts and minds” requires the 

application of a complex and tightly integrated set of tools embracing not 

only information operations but effective and fair governance and economic development as well. Paget’s five essential elements of a hearts and minds 

campaign are: demonstrating understanding and respect for the people’s 

feelings and aspirations; fairly addressing genuine grievances and rectifying 

injustices; building up public confidence in the political system; improving 

the material conditions under which the people live; and effective public relations and propaganda.6 The elements identified by Paget as critical to the 

problem of hearts and minds are the same elements that appear repeatedly 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 225

throughout the present volume as the key factors affecting how Muslims see 

the issues of terrorism, radical Islam, and the United States.

While Paget’s essential elements would apply to any campaign aimed 

at winning hearts and minds, it is clear that the more sweeping the change of 

attitudes that is sought, the more intensive and extensive the political, economic, and informational lines of operation within that campaign must be. 

Achieving the fundamental change in public attitudes in the Muslim world 

that some argue is necessary implies an effort of such extraordinary sweep 

and duration that the Cold War itself would pale in comparison. Indeed, if 

prevailing in the war on terrorism truly requires a fundamental reorientation 

of the belief structures of the entire Islamic umma, the United States is facing 

not merely a “long war” but a practically interminable one. 

The Credibility Chasm

As will be obvious from the preceding chapters, particularly those by 

Mark Tessler and Steven Simon, the attitudes of the deepest concern to most 

Americans contemplating the war on terrorism are remarkably widespread 

from one end of the Muslim world to the other, and they present a radically 

different challenge to that which confronted the West during the Cold War. 

Most notably, our own standing among the population whose hearts and 

minds are being contested stands in stark contrast to the struggle against 

communism. Then, the Soviet Union was seen as the oppressor; the United 

States entered the competition already enjoying a strongly favorable image among the publics of the countries under Soviet control. Today, as the 

Defense Science Board (DSB) task force on strategic communication pointed out in its 2004 report, it is the United States that is viewed in a negative 

light. There are no Muslim masses yearning to be free of foreign domination,7 other than the domination they perceive as being imposed by the 

United States and Israel. 

This lack of credibility among Muslim audiences is a critical deficit 

in any U.S. effort to reshape Muslim attitudes, even more so now than it 

would have been in previous decades. The DSB report notes that “fifty years 

ago, political struggles were about the ability to control and transmit scarce 

information. Today, political struggles are about the creation and destruction 

of credibility.”8 In the middle of the 20th century, information was precious; 

by today’s standards, it was hard to obtain, and relatively few organizations 

could disseminate it widely. The key to successful strategic communication 

then was controlling the means of transmission. By contrast, in the 21st century, information is abundant—some would say excessively so—and easy 
226 McMILLAN

to obtain, even in relatively remote places. Anyone with enough money to 

rent a computer for a few hours at an Internet café has the ability to disseminate any message around the world; for a government to maintain a 

monopoly over the means of transmitting information is impossible. As a 

consequence, the premium is no longer on controlling how the message is 

sent but on establishing and maintaining the messenger’s credibility.

Unfortunately, the exponents of radical Islam have established a 

clear advantage over not only the United States but also the governments 

of many Muslim states in the battle for credibility among members of the 

worldwide Islamic community. Radicals of both violent and nonviolent 

varieties have shown an ability to mobilize and unify a disgruntled community into accepting at least their explanation of the ills afflicting the umma, 

if not their prescription for overcoming those ills. Part of the reason is that 

the diagnosis they offer, unlike the more thoughtful analysis underpinning 

the Arab Human Development Reports sponsored by the United Nations, 

shifts the blame for everything that has gone wrong onto the shoulders of 

non-Muslims and their “apostate” allies. The central role that the jihadist 

diagnosis accords to the powerful and strongly disliked United States only 

adds to its appeal. Moreover, the radical analysis is framed in the emotionally resonant terminology of a religion that is both regarded as unquestionably true and, in many cases, is the key marker by which people distinguish 

themselves from the oppressive outside world. As a result, not only is the 

United States disliked, but because its explanations of “what went wrong” 

and its prescriptions of how to put things right are so out of tune with what 

most Muslims believe, it is also distrusted.

The United States thus finds itself playing an unending game of 

public relations catch-up. Any policy errors, inflammatory statements by 

prominent citizens, or misconduct by U.S. military personnel reinforce hostile preconceived expectations. Unfavorable stories, no matter how baseless 

or ridiculous, are automatically accepted as true, while favorable stories are 

dismissed as propaganda. As explained by Steven Simon in chapter three, 

even the things the United States does that one would expect Muslims to 

perceive positively—such as intervening against Serbia to stop the killing 

of Muslim Bosnians and Muslim Kosovars—are discounted as self-serving 

political stunts—all the more so, as Scott Atran explained in chapter seven, 

when U.S. officials justify these actions to the American people on the 

grounds that they are in the U.S. national interest. 

Even if U.S. credibility were higher, achieving wholesale shifts in 

the attitudes of more than a billion people from the diverse range of cultures (almost all of which are alien to Americans) described by Caroline 

Ziemke would be a daunting task, all the more so depending on how deeply 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 227

the attitudinal changes are intended to go. As Scott Atran explained, every 

society has sacred values, criticism of which provokes an intense emotional 

reaction. Even short of that, however, it is important to keep in mind a point 

that we know intuitively concerning our own society but sometimes forget 

when evaluating others: that attitudes and opinions are the product of a 

confluence of numerous factors, only one of which is information about 

current events. Moreover, that information is not perceived with perfect 

fidelity, but is filtered through each person’s own perceptual screens. How 

the screened information affects the recipient’s attitudes—and, more to the 

point, his behavior—depends on a complex of cognitive beliefs about how 

the world works and normative values about right and wrong. Those values 

and beliefs depend in turn on the person’s upbringing and education, his 

own personal life experiences, and the norms of the group and society in 

which he lives—his culture. 

Thus, even the most credible information is only one component 

in the process of attitude formation. For this reason alone, better strategic 

communication would not be the panacea that many hope it can be for 

altering the attitudes toward terrorism, radical Islam, and the related constellation of political issues confronting the Muslim world. To assume that 

better and more credible management of information can have that effect is 

to assume that the underlying cognitive beliefs and normative values held 

by most people in the Muslim umma are the same as those held by most 

Americans—in other words, to assume that cultural differences either do 

not exist or do not matter. Americans, and perhaps Westerners in general, 

habitually underestimate the significance of such cultural differences. Because of our history, many concepts and principles that matter enormously 

to people in the Islamic world—such as the power of fate, the paramount 

importance of devotion to tribe and family, and shame-based concepts of 

personal honor—no longer matter to most of us in ways that affect our 

day-to-day lives. As a result, it is fallacious to assume that people from 

other cultures have the same aspirations for their children that we have for 

ours, that they would live the same kinds of lives we live if only they could, 

or—most relevant to the question of shaping attitudes toward the United 

States and Americans—that they would like us if only they knew us better.9

In short, cultural differences, including in the way audiences receive 

and process information, matter greatly. People who have not been conditioned to perceive the universe as a logical, orderly place will not be impressed 

with cool, rational Cartesian explanations of world events. To them, conspiratorial, supernatural, or even miraculous explanations may seem more 

compelling. Messages challenging their normative values—especially their 

most deeply held sacred values—are apt to provoke not merely incredulity 
228 McMILLAN

but also anger. Appeals to individual autonomy and freedom, which most 

Americans would perceive as unquestionably good and true, may be perceived as assaults on the very foundations of society by those whose cultural 

values teach them that the welfare of the community must come before 

that of any single person. Similarly, the ideal of freedom of opinion is such 

a basic component of Western culture that we take for granted that people 

from other cultures understand and value it as we do. But our commitment 

to tolerance stems from such premises as Thomas Jefferson’s that new moral 

truths are constantly being discovered,10 or Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 

that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 

in the competition of the market.”11 The best communications strategy in 

the world is not going to persuade believing Muslims that the “marketplace 

of ideas” is a superior means for judging moral truth than the final divine 

revelation contained in the Koran. 

The Challenges of Cross-Cultural Communication

Even in the best of circumstances, communicating strategic messages 

across cultural boundaries is extraordinarily hard. This is partly just a matter of rhetorical style. Effective public rhetoric in any language is deeply, if 

subconsciously, shaped by both the cognitive habits of the underlying culture 

and by the syntax and vocabulary in which its most deeply emotive literature 

is written. In English, the ideal is a relatively spare style characterized by a 

largely monosyllabic Anglo-Saxon vocabulary, similar to that of the King 

James Bible and the Book of Common Prayer, crafted in logically linked 

sentences in parallel structure. One has only to think of the most memorable 

political speeches in the English language to perceive these commonalities: 

Churchill’s addresses on the radio and in the House of Commons rallying the 

British people during the darkest days of World War II, Lincoln’s addresses at 

Gettysburg and his inaugurations, the “ask not . . . ask rather” passage in John 

F. Kennedy’s inaugural speech.

By contrast, the most potent political rhetoric in Arabic is ornate, allusive, 

and often metaphorical. Arabic style values elegant variation, the restatement 

of the same thought several times using different words and images (something that in English translation often seems pointlessly repetitive), and the 

use of hyperbole, which in English translation seems ridiculous. Most Arabic 

education (as discussed by Kumar Ramakrishna in chapter six) emphasizes 

memorization rather than deductive logic; as a result, many Arabs are more 

impressed by a speaker’s ability to quote from the canon of classical poetry, 

especially from the Koran, than to string together a series of persuasive premises and conclusions. Finally, speech in the Arab world, including political 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 229

speech, tends to be more about making emotional connections—demonstrating empathy with the hopes and fears of the audience—than about conveying 

objective information or making purely rational arguments.

As a result, American political leaders find it difficult to communicate 

effectively with Arab audiences. The best possible translation of a speech 

originally crafted in a spare, logical, Anglo-Saxon rhetorical style will not 

resonate among people whose rhetoric is exuberant and emotive and whose 

educational experiences emphasized rote memorization over logical deduction and critical analysis.12 On the other hand, any American leader who 

delivered a speech designed to push emotional buttons in the Arabic style 

would be ridiculed by the audience that is ultimately his first concern: the 

American electorate. While many Muslims are not Arabs, and thus have different expectations when it comes to political communication, the general 

point that such messages do not translate well holds true across the board.

Moreover, we must keep in mind that most U.S. official political 

communication is neither carried out by prominent political leaders nor 

composed with the rhetorical styles of foreign audiences in mind. Instead, it 

takes the form of answers to questions from the press at the State Department 

(working from talking points carefully crafted by career diplomats to eliminate any emotive content, and often delivered in a wooden style intended 

to keep the press spokesman from showing up his bosses), the Pentagon or 

a combatant command (which usually receive heavy media coverage only 

if something has gone wrong, in which case the spokesman is principally 

concerned with damage limitation and avoiding anything that could be legally construed as an admission of culpability), or the White House (where 

the objective often seems to be scoring debating points off the reporters, 

even if that means serious subjects are dealt with in a bantering style). When 

the welter of unofficial commentary—often considered by people who 

themselves live in controlled media environments as being more authentic 

expressions of official U.S. views than what is said by government officials 

and spokesmen—and partisan jousting is included, it is little wonder that 

finely tuned efforts at shaping attitudes in foreign cultures go unnoticed or 

are dismissed as insincere.

An Alternative Approach

Yet the outlook for success in the war of ideas is not as gloomy as the 

foregoing discussion might imply. Whether success is attainable depends on 

what we set out to do. We have been discussing the feasibility—or infeasibility—of the kinds of fundamental shifts in attitudes, or even in beliefs and 

values, implicit in the ideological agenda that has been set forth in current 
230 McMILLAN

U.S. strategy for the war on terrorism. If, however, we conceive the immediate objective not as prescribing attitudes but as proscribing behaviors, there 

is reason for greater hope. In other words, the United States must begin 

by deconflating Muslim dislike of the United States and disagreement with 

U.S. policy from support for terrorism, by distinguishing between Muslim 

acceptance of the radical diagnosis of “what went wrong” and acceptance 

of the radical prescription for what to do about it. We need to return to the 

original formulation of the principal objective and strip away the accretions 

brought on by 5 years of strategic mission creep. 

That principal objective is to delegitimize terrorism, putting it “in 

the same light as slavery, piracy, and genocide,”13 unacceptable not only 

to all governments but to all people who consider themselves civilized as 

well. While clearly it is better for U.S. policy for people to have a favorable 

opinion of the United States (and obviously, those with such opinions will 

be unlikely to gravitate toward anti-U.S. terrorist movements), the bottom 

line is that it matters less that people like us than that they not try to kill us. 

Within the framework of the war on terrorism, we seek to shape attitudes as 

a way of affecting behaviors, not as an end in itself.

That is not to say that the so-called war for the soul of Islam does 

not matter. Muslim public opinion is the center of gravity of the jihadist 

strategy. Capturing the hearts and minds of the umma is the overarching 

strategic objective for the violent Islamic extremists. But the fact that the 

United States has a vital interest in ensuring the failure of the extremist ideological campaign does not mean that it is up to the United States to defeat 

it. The only way Muslims will be able to get on with the vital task of sorting 

out how Islam will deal with modern realities is for external players to stay 

out of the open debate. If non-Muslims take sides, the argument becomes 

one between the indigenous defenders of the faith and the lackeys of infidel 

powers. The more visibly the United States is involved in the question of 

what Islam means and what Muslims ought to believe, the more the debate 

is about us and not about them. The United States Government and others 

outside the Muslim community can therefore best contribute to this process 

by providing discrete support and assistance to those combating the jihadist 

message, not by overtly joining the fray.

Delegitimizing terrorism should be a considerably easier task than 

shifting more deeply rooted attitudes, beliefs, and values. Public opinion 

theory generally recognizes that one of the most effective ways of altering 

an opinion is by persuading the person that the opinion is inconsistent 

with a more deeply rooted value or belief that he holds. Already a number 

of Muslim scholars and preachers have begun challenging the extremist 

analysis of the individual obligation to jihad under present conditions and 

emphasizing that the Prophet set limits on the means that may be employed 

even in a just war and the persons who may be targeted. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 231

Moreover, these scholars may find a more receptive audience than 

is widely assumed. Notwithstanding the view of most jihadists and some 

Western commentators that true Islam demands violence, the fact is that 

most Muslims most of the time prefer to live in peace with their neighbors, 

Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Were it otherwise, it would be impossible 

for non-Muslims to travel safely anywhere in the Islamic world. While we 

need to know much more about what ordinary Muslims think, believe, and 

feel, it is clear from their behavior that not even everyone who cheers when 

al Qaeda succeeds in striking the United States accepts the case for a universal obligation to “join the caravan” of jihad. And such polling data as we do 

have indicates that, while the proportion of those who cheer terrorist attacks 

is troublesome, it is not a majority anywhere.

There is also reason to hope that the classical understanding of the 

issues involved will reassert itself as responsible Muslim thinkers increasingly express themselves against the extremist interpretations. While it is 

true that classical mainstream thinking does include important elements 

that lend themselves to violent interpretation (such as the global dichotomy 

between believers and unbelievers, the apocalyptic rhetoric of the Koran, and 

the history of Muhammad himself as a political-military leader, not just a 

religious teacher), countervailing impulses historically have moderated this 

violence in practice. One such impulse is that mainstream Sunni Islam gives 

rulers a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Another is the traditional 

respect accorded to ulama, those who have devoted themselves to the study 

of the intricacies of the religious law. Extremists call into question the idea 

that such extensive study is necessary; they contend that only the Koran and 

hadith—the records of the sayings and practices of Muhammad—are valid 

sources of the law. The extremists also contend, in an argument reminiscent 

of that espoused by the early Protestant reformers, that all believers are 

qualified to interpret the plain language of the scriptures for themselves. 

But perhaps the most important of these countervailing tendencies is 

the premium that Islam traditionally places on harmony within the community of believers. This is an impulse that seems to be deeply felt by most 

Muslims, and one to which such leaders as King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia 

have appealed with great success, notably in his recent speech calling for 

Saudis to stop calling into question each other’s credentials as Muslims. 

This was clearly aimed at takfir, the extremist practice of condemning as 

non-Muslim anyone who disagrees with any of a variety of legal, theological, or liturgical views extolled by radicals. 

Furthermore, religion does not exist in isolation. As Caroline Ziemke 

observes in chapter five, cultural, historic, ethnic, tribal, and class factors 

also shape behavior. In some cases, these factors may make people more 

susceptible to the jihadist message. For example, the common concerns felt 

by many Arabs (fueled by the information revolution) and the fact that so 
232 McMILLAN

many of the most prominent jihadist leaders are Arabs may well make Arab 

audiences more receptive to certain elements of the jihadist message. Other 

Muslim ethnic groups, however, would be less instinctively supportive, while 

in some cases the Arab-ness of the extremist ideologues may be held against 

them. In any event, each culture, or “ring of identity,” within the Muslim 

umma is shaped by nonreligious factors that tend to make it more or less 

open to the use of violence. A sound strategy to build a consensus against 

terrorism obviously needs to ascertain which antiterrorist elements of each 

culture are most potent and play upon them to undercut the credibility of 

the jihadist cause.

If our first priority is to stop violent—specifically terrorist—behavior, rather than to change opinions about the United States or to achieve 

a specific outcome in the reform of Islam or of Muslim governments, 

anything that influential Muslims say or do that discourages terrorism is a 

positive contribution. The United States should resist the urge to quibble 

over the fine points; useful messages do not have to be 100 percent what 

we would like to hear. Indeed, one could argue that any Muslim opinion 

leader who echoed the U.S. line completely—on Israeli-Palestinian issues, 

for example—would soon lose his standing as an opinion leader. 

Ideally, Muslim politicians, scholars, and commentators need to explain why terrorism is contrary to properly understood Islam and why the 

extremist agenda is an inadequate solution to the problems confronting the 

Muslim people. Even better, they could articulate diagnoses and prescriptions for those problems that might generate mass support for nonviolent 

alternatives. The visions articulated by these voices need not be congruent 

with U.S. desiderata to serve the broader purpose of undermining the jihadist 

vision. A traditional mainstream religious perspective or even a salafi (fundamentalist) perspective that eschews violence probably would be more effective than a highly Westernized secular perspective in drawing the susceptible away from the apocalyptic world view of the jihadists. In fact, growing 

numbers of salafi intellectuals have begun articulating the view that Osama 

bin Ladin and his followers constitute a deviant sect, a development whose 

significance should not be underestimated.14

Even those who are only willing to denounce violence as a strategic error can serve a useful purpose. Two years ago, a group of prominent Egyptian 

radical Islamists bitterly denounced al Qaeda’s use of terrorist tactics on the 

basis not of morality but of expediency. The attacks of 9/11 and others, they 

argued, had provoked the West into the war with Islam that the Zionists 

had long been seeking, increased rather than reduced the infidel military 

presence in the Muslim lands, and brought Islam into disrepute among 

potential converts. To turn President Bush’s oft-quoted axiom around, we 

should understand that in this particular campaign, at least anyone who is 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 233

not with the terrorists is with us. It needs to be clear that Muslim governments can be against terrorism without necessarily being pro-United States 

at the same time.

How the United States Can Help

The main advantages that violent extremists have over Muslim 

opinion leaders who oppose the use of terror, apart from the benefit of being unambiguously anti-American, lie in the strength of their networks—often built to withstand the opposition of hostile state authorities and their 

command of the modern means of information dissemination. Perhaps the 

most important contribution the United States can make to the immediate 

problem of discrediting terrorism is to enable those who oppose the jihadists to link up effectively with one another and to disseminate their message 

to the Muslim masses. Those who have the ability to prevail in this war of 

ideas do not need us to tell them what to say, but they can definitely use 

help in getting it heard. 

To be effective, of course, this assistance cannot have American fingerprints all over it. The United States must learn to be discreet in facilitating 

the distribution of anti-jihadist ideas, just as it was in the early years of 

the Cold War when the Central Intelligence Agency helped anticommunist intellectuals in both Eastern and Western Europe combat the tide of 

Soviet-funded and -guided propaganda. Unlike the Cold War years, we must 

concurrently be careful not to embrace Muslims who voice opposition to 

violent extremism. Bringing Lech Walesa to Washington when he was the 

leader of Solidarity, allowing him to address a joint session of Congress, 

and having the President award him the Nation’s highest civil decoration 

all burnished Walesa’s image among the Polish people for whose hearts and 

minds he was contending. Doing the same thing with a prominent Muslim 

opponent of the jihadists would only destroy any credibility he had, and 

might well be equivalent to signing his death warrant. 

While much of this effort should naturally be done through the 

usual mass media—television, radio, newspapers, and magazines—tailored 

to the sources of information that are available in each country (as described 

in chapter three by Christine Fair), we should also be prepared to look beyond those classic outlets. Most obviously, assistance can be given in using 

the Internet, an increasingly important source of information for young 

middle-class Muslims in particular. But the impact that the arts and entertainment have on how people perceive the world should also be considered. 

Grants to writers, filmmakers, and the producers of television dramas can 

serve to discredit violent extremism more subtly and more effectively than 

direct argument. 
234 McMILLAN

Over the longer term, ensuring the ultimate failure of jihadism as the 

political alternative of choice in the Muslim world will require addressing 

that host of problems from which the violent extremists generate support. 

The United States can make important contributions in many of these areas. 

Building Muslim states’ capacity for governance, in terms of reach into ungoverned spaces and the quality of governance in core areas, will not only 

deprive terrorists of sanctuary but also alleviate many of the discontents 

with governments that Mark Tessler, in chapter two, found to be correlated 

with support for terrorism. Programs to address poverty and other material 

discontents will serve the same purpose. As Caroline Ziemke discussed in 

chapter four, poverty and poor living conditions may not directly cause 

social violence, but the perception of relative deprivation does, as does the 

feeling of solidarity with the poor held by many who may themselves be 

fairly prosperous and well educated.

Part of stripping away support for terrorism in the long run is 

also giving renewed attention to regional flashpoints such as Palestine and 

Kashmir. These issues are sometimes argued to be merely excuses, not 

causes, of terrorism. Mark Tessler’s findings suggest that they are strongly 

relevant to Muslims’ expressions of support for terrorism, even if it is true 

that the terrorist attacks that have been carried out against the United States 

did not aim to solve these conflicts. Ultimately, it does not matter whether 

one conflict or another can be logically connected in our minds with the 

terrorist jihad. If we understand that we are dealing with an insurgency being conducted in a globalized environment, it will be apparent that violence 

between Muslims and non-Muslims anywhere will have a political effect on 

Muslims everywhere. There was a time when Muslims in Indonesia or Mali 

would have been relatively indifferent to what was happening to Muslims 

in the Balkans or the Caucasus; that time is past. The growth of 24-hour 

satellite television news and the availability of the Internet guarantee heavy 

coverage of wars. Meanwhile, a growing sense of Islamic solidarity, fueled in 

part by this reporting, creates a heated political environment that is ripe for 

exploitation by jihadist ideologues. 

The relationship between actual conflict and mass perceptions highlights one of the most important things the United States must do as it 

seeks to promote the delegitimation of terrorism: to tamp down the level of 

cultural confrontation between Islam and the West. Fueling a broad intercivilizational confrontation between Islam and the West is a key goal of the 

jihadists. Creating a state of permanent hostility would validate the extremist 

interpretation of the world as permanently divided into two irreconcilable 

camps between which there can be nothing but hatred and violence. If the 

radicals can plausibly characterize this confrontation as “Islam in danger,” 

they can play on the widely accepted doctrine that every believer is under a 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 235

personal obligation to participate in what is known as “defensive jihad,” a 

struggle not to spread the faith to new areas but to protect the umma against 

assault from without.15 This means that we need not only to be careful of 

rhetoric that directly heightens the temperature of the confrontation, but 

also to be sensitive to the way that pronouncements on the universality of 

American values, the superiority of American ways, and the importance of 

American power impinge upon the sacred values elucidated by Scott Atran. 

The problem here is not what we say to Muslims but what we say to each 

other that is overheard in a world of instant global communications. 

Finally, the United States needs to acquire the jihadists’ awareness of 

the way that “propaganda by word” and “propaganda by deed” work with 

and against each other. Make no mistake: the war on terrorism cannot be 

won without a robust military component aimed at “finding, fixing, and 

finishing” terrorist elements. But as we implement that vital component 

of our strategy, we must remain conscious of the way such kinetic actions 

affect public attitudes toward us, our partners, the jihadists, and the validity 

of terrorism as a tactic for change. The poorly planned or ineptly executed 

use of force—not to mention the commission of actual atrocities—puts us 

right back on the horns of the dilemma raised by Defense Secretary Donald 

Rumsfeld: our actions generate new terrorists faster than we can kill the old 

ones. Moreover, every case of collateral damage, let alone the intentional 

killing of noncombatants as is alleged to have occurred at Al-Haditha in 

Iraq, makes it all the more difficult to persuade Muslims who are unhappy 

about the way U.S. power is asserted that they should renounce the use 

of violence against noncombatants on their side. This is not to equate intentional terrorist murders with accidental deaths and damage taking place 

despite the best precautions in the context of legal military operations. It is 

merely to point out that the people whose hearts and minds are at issue do 

not necessarily understand the distinctions between these situations.

 All Terrorism is Always Wrong

To sum up, altering values is extraordinarily difficult, even in the 

extended timeframe over which the war on terrorism must be fought. 

Moreover, a deliberate attempt to alter Muslims’ understanding of right and 

wrong will inevitably provoke a defensive reaction that can only aggravate 

their sense of being a culture under siege, playing directly into the hands 

of the insurgents. Instead of calling into question fundamental elements 

of religion and culture—trying to prescribe what Muslims ought to be—we 

should focus on proscribing certain things they must not do—namely, carry 

out, support, or tolerate attacks on noncombatants in pursuit of political 

or religious goals. We must quietly empower and facilitate the messages, 
236 McMILLAN

articulated by people inside the Islamic umma, that terrorism is evil in itself, 

regardless of the cause in which it is employed, and the violent Islamic 

extremists are incorrectly interpreting the Prophet’s teachings. Our aim, at 

least in the immediate context of the war on terrorism, should not be a 

quantum shift in the ideological center of gravity of the entire Islamic community, but rather a series of small shifts in Muslims’ attitudes toward what 

the faith means for specific practical behaviors. 

That does not mean that underlying issues can be ignored. If Islamic 

history teaches us anything, it is that violent tendencies erupt repeatedly 

when fundamental problems remain unresolved. But the immediate challenge is to eradicate social support among Muslims for the use of terrorism 

as an instrument for solving these problems. Hopefully, the essays in this 

volume will have pointed us in the right direction to achieve that goal.

Notes

1 Letter, Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005, released by the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 11, 2005, accessed at <dni.gov/press_

releases/letter_in_english.pdf>.

2 The violent Islamist movement thus meets all the criteria for an insurgency in the 

definition set forth in Bard O’Neill in Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary 

Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 13: “a struggle between 

a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses 

political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence

to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. 

Emphasis in original.

3 According to Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 

1998), 17, the concept was first articulated by the Italian anarchist Carlo Pisacane. Mikhail 

Bakunin explained it in “Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis” (1870): “We must spread 

our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and 

the most irresistible form of propaganda.” Prince Pyotr Kropotkin seems to have been the first 

to use the exact expression propaganda by deed, in his pamphlet Revolutionary Government (1880).

4 Draft bylaws for al Qaeda found in the Kandahar house of the late Abu Hafs al-Masri, 

quoted in Dennis Pluchinsky, “The Global Jihad,” presentation at workshop on “Terrorism 

and Islamic Extremism in the Middle East: Perspectives and Possibilities,” co-sponsored by the 

Center for Contemporary Conflict (Naval Postgraduate School) and Center for Naval Analyses, 

Alexandria, VA, February 22, 2005. Cited by permission of the author.

5 “Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants, Military Series,” captured by British 

police in Manchester, England and distributed by CRA, Inc., in 2002.

6 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: 

Walker, 1967), 176–179. 

7 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, September 2004), 36.

8 Ibid., 20.

9 The classic example is the Egyptian father of jihadist ideology, Sayyid Qutb, whose 

only lesson learned from an extended stay studying in Colorado in the early 1950s was that 

American society was disgustingly promiscuous and decadent.

10 “[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. 

As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths 

discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 237

must advance also to keep pace with the times.” Thomas Jefferson, letter to George Washington, 

January 4, 1786.

11 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

12 United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building 

a Knowledge Society (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2003), 54.

13 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White 

House, 2002).

14 Salafism is the movement within Sunni Islam that calls for stripping away practices 

and beliefs that salafists consider inconsistent with those of Muhammad’s earliest followers. Not 

all rigorously conservative Sunnis are salafists, and not all salafists support the use of violence to 

achieve the movement’s aims. Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of 

Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11,” Middle East Policy 10 (2003), 76–92, provides 

an incisive look at the ideological factions within the salafi movement. Salafi antiterrorist Web 

sites in English include Wahhabi Myth (www.wahhabimyth.com), Salafi Publications (www.

salafipublications.com), Center for Victory of Islamic Da’wa (www.troid.org), and Fatwa-Online 

(www.fatwa-online.com).

15 Bernard Lewis, in The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

1988), 73, explains that an offensive jihad to spread the faith is an obligation on the Muslim 

community collectively (individual members may fulfill this obligation by paying taxes to 

support a professional army, for example), while a jihad to defend the Islamic community is a 

“personal obligation of every adult male Muslim.” Modern jihadists assert that such a defensive 

jihad does not require a call to arms by a duly constituted political authority, but that does not 

seem to be the position of the classical jurists.
239

About the Contributors

Joseph McMillan is Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, specializing in 

counterterrorism, the Middle East, and South Asia. He joined INSS following 

15 years in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where his 

positions included Principal Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia and 

Principal Director for the Near East and South Asia. Mr. McMillan’s recent 

publications include “Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring 

Rivalry” (U.S. Institute of Peace, January 2006), and “Treating Terrorist 

Groups as Armed Bands: The Strategic Implications” in Topics in Terrorism: 

Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat (Atlantic Council Publications, 2005). He is also the co-author, with Christopher Cavoli, 

of “Countering Global Terrorism” in Strategic Challenges: America’s Global 

Security Agenda (National Defense University Press, forthcoming). 

Hady Amr is managing partner of the Amr Group, which promotes 

economic and social development in the Arab world in such areas as education, technology, youth and civil society, strategic planning, and economic 

and social analysis. Mr. Amr is a development economist with over 15 years 

of experience managing projects funded by the World Bank, various United 

Nations agencies, the Ford Foundation, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, and similar institutions. In 2000, he served on the staff setting up the Near East–South Asia for Strategic Studies at National Defense 

University. Mr. Amr has conducted scores of State Department–sponsored 

discussion groups in Arab countries on the U.S. foreign policy process. He is 

the author of The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy 

with the Islamic World (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

Scott Atran is Director of Research, Anthropology, at the Centre Nationale 

de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, as well as visiting professor of psychology 

and public policy at the University of Michigan and presidential scholar in 

sociology at the John Jay School of Criminal Justice, City University of New 

York. Dr. Atran’s research centers on cognitive and linguistic anthropology, 

environmental decisionmaking, Middle Eastern ethnography and political 

economy, and cognitive and commitment theories of religion, terrorism, 

and foreign affairs. He is the author of In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary 

Landscape of Religion (Oxford University Press, 2004) and (with Douglas 

Medin) of The Native Mind: Cognition and Cultural Management of Nature

(Oxford University Press, forthcoming), as well as articles and commentaries 

in both scientific and public affairs journals. 
240 McMILLAN

C. Christine Fair is a senior research associate in the Center for Conflict 

Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace, where she 

specializes in South Asian political and military affairs. Previously, she 

was an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Dr. Fair’s current research focuses on security competition between India and Pakistan, 

Pakistan’s internal security, analysis of the causes of terrorism, and U.S. 

strategic relations with India and Pakistan. Her recent publications include 

“Think Again: Sources of Islamist Terrorism” (with Husain Haqqani), in 

Foreign Policy (January 2006), and “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from 

Fourteen Muslim Countries” (with Bryan Shepherd), in Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism (January/February 2006).

Kumar Ramakrishna is associate professor and head of studies in 

the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological 

University in Singapore. Dr. Ramakrishna’s principal research interests are 

counterterrorism and the history of strategic thought. He is a member of the 

executive committee of the Political Science Association of Singapore and 

of the Singapore Government Parliamentary Committee Resource Panel on 

Home Affairs and Law. In addition to Emergency Propaganda: The Winning 

of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948–1958 (Curzon Press, 2002), his recent 

publications include “The Making of the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist,” in 

Teaching Terror: Knowledge Transfer in the Terrorist World (Cornell University 

Press, 2005) and “Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: The Need 

to Confront the Functional and Ideological ‘Enabling Environment,’” in 

Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and 

Regional Stability (Pentagon Press, 2005).

Steven N. Simon is the Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle 

Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Mr. Simon 

served the U.S. Government in various national security positions related 

to Middle Eastern affairs, transnational threats, and terrorism for more than 

two decades, including 5 years on the National Security Council staff as 

director for global issues and senior director for transnational threats. He 

left the White House in 1999 to become deputy director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, then moved on to the RAND 

Corporation before joining the CFR. Mr. Simon is the coauthor of The Age of 

Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002) and The Next Attack (Henry Holt and 

Company, 2005), as well as a large number of articles and commentaries on 

the terrorist threat and America’s response. 

Peter W. Singer is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where 

he is director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. His 

current research interests include trends in contemporary warfare, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and terrorism. Before joining Brookings, 
. . . to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate 

so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, 

piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government 

can condone or support and all must oppose.

—2002 National Security Strategy of the United States

Soon after 9/11, the U.S. Government realized that the willingness of people 

in many parts of the world to excuse or applaud terrorist acts was a critical 

obstacle to combating terrorism. To overcome the attitudes that generate 

support for terrorism, the Bush administration concluded that it would be 

necessary to build a global antiterrorism consensus that the intentional use of 

violence against noncombatants for political ends was evil in itself. 

The question now is how the campaign of ideas can best be structured and 

prosecuted. We still have an unclear understanding of the extent to which 

support for terrorism is a function of rejection of Western values versus 

disagreement with U.S. policy, of the role that the quality and type of education 

provided in various countries affects support for terrorism, and of the causal 

links among poverty, poor governance, lack of democracy, and support for 

terrorism. This volume is an effort to begin overcoming this knowledge deficit.

Edited by Joseph McMillan, with contributions from: 

n Hady Amr, on improving strategic communications

n Scott Atran, on cultural frameworks

n C. Christine Fair, on accessing information in the Muslim world

n Kumar Ramakrishna, on education and radicalization

n Steven N. Simon, on Muslim perceptions of America

n Peter W. Singer, on improving strategic communications

n Mark Tessler, on public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world

n Caroline F. Ziemke, on social factors contributing to terrorism

9 780160 775376

9 0 0 0 0

ISBN 0-16-077537-X For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-180

Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 0-16-077537-X

ndupress.ndu.edu
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 241

Dr. Singer served with the Balkans Task Force in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and as a special assistant at the International Peace Academy. 

He is the author of a number of books and articles, including Children at 

War (University of California Press, 2005), Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the 

Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, 2003), and “The War 

on Terrorism: The Big Picture,” in Parameters (Summer 2004).

Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political 

Science, Vice Provost for International Affairs, and Director of the International Institute at the University of Michigan. Professor Tessler specializes 

in comparative politics and Middle Eastern Studies, particularly the nature, 

determinants, and political implications of popular attitudes and values in 

the Middle East, and he has presented his research in this area in numerous journal articles. He has also written extensively on the Israeli-Palestinian 

conflict and is the author of A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana 

University Press, 1994). Professor Tessler is a past president of the American 

Institute for Maghrib Studies and the Association for Israel Studies and was a 

founding member of the Palestinian-American Research Center. 

Caroline F. Ziemke is a military historian and a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). She has designed a strategic 

personality typology to provide policymakers with insight into how states’ 

histories, sources of national identity, and cultures shape their definitions 

of national interests, how they calculate risks, and how they translate all 

these into strategies and actions. She is the author of several IDA studies 

that apply the methodology to terrorism, deterrence, and nonproliferation, 

including Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence: 

Deterring Iraq and Iran (2001), and she is working on a book entitled 

Breaking the Mirror: Using Strategic Personality to Understand a World That Isn’t 

Just Like Us, applying the methodology to the broader arena of political, 

cultural, and economic interactions.