bas								Docket No. 89320–Agenda 7–January 2001.

In re A.G., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, , 								v. A.G., Appellee).

Opinion filed March 22, 2001.

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

	Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Juvenile Court

Act) (705 ILCS 405/5–101 et seq. (West 1998)), the State filed an amended delinquency petition against the respondent, A.G., in the

circuit court of Rock Island County alleging five separate offenses.

The respondent entered an admission to two of the counts in

exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss the three remaining

counts. After hearing a factual basis for the admission, the trial

court adjudicated the respondent a delinquent minor and entered

a dispositional order. Thereafter, the respondent’s counsel filed a

motion to reconsider the disposition, but did not file a certificate of

compliance as contemplated by Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145

Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). No. 3–99–0515 (unpublished order). The trial court denied the respondent’s motion

to reconsider, and the respondent appealed that decision to the

appellate court. On appeal, the appellate court did not reach the

merits of the appeal, but instead remanded the cause to the trial

court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). No. 3–99–0515

(unpublished order).  The State now appeals from that ruling,

presenting the question of whether compliance with Rule 604(d) is

required in cases involving delinquency appeals.

BACKGROUND

	On February 2, 1999, the State filed a delinquency petition

against the 16-year-old respondent, charging him with two counts

of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19–3 (West 1998)), one count

of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS

570/402(c) (West 1998)), and one count of theft (720 ILCS

5/16–1(a)(1)(A) (West 1998)). On February 16, 1999, the State

amended the petition to include one count of unlawful possession

of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1998)). That same day, the

respondent entered an admission to one count of residential

burglary and one count of unlawful possession of cannabis. In exchange for his admission, the State agreed to dismiss the

remaining three counts. Prior to accepting the admission, the trial

court admonished the respondent of the potential minimum and

maximum disposition for each count to which he admitted. The

trial court also informed the respondent that by entering an

admission he would forfeit his rights to a trial, to testify, and to

confront the witnesses against him. The trial court then found that

the respondent’s admission was made knowingly and voluntarily.

After receiving a factual basis for the pleaadmission, the trial court

found the respondent to be a delinquent minor. Following a

dispositional hearing on March 12, 1999, the respondent was

ordered committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile

Division, until he reaches the age of 21.

	On April 9, 1999, the respondent’s counsel filed a motion in

the circuit court to reconsider the disposition but did not file a

certificate pursuant to Rule 604(d). The trial court denied the

respondent’s motion to reconsider, and the respondent then filed

a timely notice of appeal. On appeal to the appellate court, the

respondent filed a motion noting his counsel’s failure to file a Rule

604(d) certificate and requesting that the cause be remanded to the

circuit court for proceedings consistent with Rule 604(d). The

State argued that the respondent’s appeal should be dismissed

because he filed a motion to reconsider the disposition and not a

motion to withdraw his admission as required by Rule 604(d). In

the alternative, the State argued that the court should deny the

respondent’s motion to remand because the question of whether

the requirements of Rule 604(d) are applicable to juvenile

proceedings is unresolved. The appellate court allowed the

respondent’s motion to remand the cause for compliance with Rule

604(d).

	The State sought leave to appeal to this court, and we granted

its petition. While the State’s petition for leave to appeal was

pending, this court decided People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 186 (2000), which held that when no agreement exists between the parties as to a defendant’s

sentence, the defendant can seek reconsideration of his sentence by

filing a motion to reconsider the sentence without moving to

withdraw his guilty plea. People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at182, 186- 187 (29000). In the aftermath of the Lumzy decision, this court has amended Rule 604(d) to more precisely define the term “negotiated

plea” for purposes of the rule.  193 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). AsOfficial Reports Advance Sheet No.

23 (November 15, 2000), R. 604(d), eff. November 1, 2000. As a

result of the Lumzy decision, the State now concedes that the respondent’s appeal should not have been dismissed for failure to

file a motion to vacate the disposition. Instead, the State argues

that the appellate court’s decision remanding the cause to allow

compliance with the certificate requirements of Rule 604(d) should

be reversed. The State contends that Rule 604(d) should not be

applied to juvenile proceedings.

ANALYSIS

	Supreme Court Rule 604(d) addresses guilty pleas, which are

equivalent to admissions in juvenile court. Currently, tThe version of the rule

in effect at the time of respondent'’s admission providesd in relevant

part that a defendant cannot appeal a judgment entered upon a plea

of guilty that was not negotiated unless he files a motion to

reconsider the sentence within 30 days of the judgment, if only the

sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a

motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. 19345

Ill. 2d R. 604(d). The rule further provides that “[t]he defendant’s

attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the

attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in

person to ascertain defendant’shis contentions of error in the sentence or the

entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and

report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, and has made any

amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of

any defects in those proceedings.” 19345 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).

	Supreme Court Rule 660(a) provides that “[a]ppeals from final

judgments in delinquent minor proceedings, except as otherwise

specifically provided, shall be governed by the rules applicable to

criminal cases.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(a). The State acknowledges that

the phrase “rules applicable to criminal cases” has been construed

as referring to the supreme court rules, and in particular Rules

615(a) and Rule 604(d). In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 322 (1995). Nonetheless, the State argues that there is some confusion as to

which supreme court rules are applicable to delinquency

proceedings. Citing In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385 (1977), the State notes that the court in that case found that Rule 402 was not

intended to apply to criminaljuvenile cases. The State claims that the

confusion is augmented by language in People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103 (1988), stating that Rules 402, 604(d) and 605(b) are

“meant to mesh together.” Finally, the State asserts that the

purpose of Rule 604(d) will not be served in the delinquency

context because the rule does not provide any due process

protections.

	We initially note that the Juvenile Court Act has been

significantly amended since this court’s decision in In re Beasley. Although proceedings under the Act are still not criminal in nature

and are to be administered in a spirit of humane concern for, and

to promote the welfare of, the minor (In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d at 389), Aarticle V of the Act has been reconfigured and now contains

a purpose and policy section which represents a fundamental shift

from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding

concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders

accountable for violations of the law. 705 ILCS 405/5–101 (West

1998); In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 61 (2000) (Heiple, J., dissenting). The General Assembly has now specifically set forth the purpose

and policy of the Juvenile Court Act as it relates to delinquent

minors as follows:

			“It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a

juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem

of juvenile delinquency, a system that will protect the

community, impose accountability for violations of law

and equip juvenile offenders with compentencies to live

responsibly and productively. To effectuate this intent, the

General Assembly declares the following to be important

purposes of this Article:

				(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.

				(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly

accountable for his or her acts.

						(c) To provide an individualized assessment of each

alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order to

rehabilitate and to prevent further delinquent behavior through the development of competency in the juvenile

offender. ***

				(d) To provide due process, as required by the

Constitutions of the United States and the State of

Illinois, through which each juvenile offender and all

other interested parties are assured fair hearings at

which legal rights are recognized and enforced.” 705

ILCS 405/5–101(1) (West 1998).

	In addition to the above-mentioned purpose and policy of the

Act, we note that virtually all of the constitutional requirements of

a criminal trial have been introduced into juvenile delinquency

proceedings. These due process safeguards include the right to

adequate notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to remain

silent, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 320-21. Further, the reasonable doubt standard of proof and the rules of evidence used at criminal proceedings are

applicable at the adjudicatory hearing and in consideration of

whether the minor is delinquent. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 321. In fact, the Act specifically provides that with the exception of the

right to a jury trial, minors shall have “all the procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings” unless specifically excluded by laws enhancing the minor’s protection. (Emphasis added.) 705

ILCS 405/5–101(3) (West 1998).

	Given that many of the attributes of criminal proceedings have

already been incorporated into juvenile delinquency proceedings

and that Rule 660(a) specifically provides that the rules applicable

to criminal cases are to govern delinquency appeals, it could

reasonably be concluded that Rule 604(d) applies to delinquency

proceedings. This court nearly concluded the same in In re W.C. when it observed that “[q]uite obviously, Rule 660(a) accomplisheds

a limited incorporation into the Act of those supreme court rules

which may pertain to delinquency appeals” and that Rule 604(d)

was an example of a supreme court rule applicable to delinquency

appeals. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 322. However, the respondent in that case had not entered an admission of guilt, as the

respondent did in the present case, but instead had been

adjudicated delinquent after the State proved the charges beyond

a reasonable doubt at the adjudicatory hearing. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 317. Moreover, the issue in In re W.C. was whether Rule 660(a) incorporated into the Juvenile Court Act the requirement of

a written post-trial motion under section 116–1(b) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116–1(b) (West 1998)).

The court found that it did not, construing the term “rule” in Rule

660(a) as referring to other supreme court rules and not the rules

of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 324. Thus, the issue of whether Rule 604(d) applies to

delinquency proceedings was not directly before the court in In re W.C.

	In support of its assertion that there is some doubt about the

applicability of Rule 604(d) to delinquency appeals, the State relies

on In re Beasley, which held that Rule 402 was not intended to apply to such proceedings. However, we do not believe that In re Beasley supports the State’s position that Rule 604(d) should not apply. First, In re Beasley found it significant that Rule 402 was contained in Aarrticle IV of the Ssupreme Ccourt Rrules, entitled “Rules

on Criminal Proceedings in the Trial Court.” In contrast, Rule

604(d) is contained in Asarticle VI, entitled “Appeals in Criminal

Cases, Post-Conviction Cases and Juvenile Court ProceedingsPPEALS IN CRIMINAL

CASES, POST-CONVICTION CASES AND JUVENILE COURT

PROCEEDINGS.”

Thus, Rule 402 concerns proceedings in the trial court, while Rule

604(d) concerns appellate procedure and is directly within the

ambit of Rule 660(a). Second, the court in In re Beasley found that, although Rule 402 did not apply to delinquency proceedings,

the due process rights the rule was designed to protect did apply

to such proceedings. The court held that to satisfy due process

requirements, it must be apparent that minors understand the

consequences of their admissions; that is, that they understand their

rights against self-incrimination, to confront witnesses, to have a

trial, and that by their admissions, they waive these rights. In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d at 3901-92. The court noted that one of the admonitions required by Rule 402, that of the defendant’s right to

a jury, was not even applicable to a juvenile proceeding because

juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial. In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d at 390. Because Rule 402 was broader than needed in the juvenile

setting and not all of its provisions were constitutionally required,

the court declined to apply Rule 402 to delinquency proceedings. In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d at 391. In contrast to Rule 402, however, all of the provisions of Rule 604(d) would be useful and applicable

to juvenile proceedings.

	The State is mistaken in its assertions that Rule 604(d) would

not be useful in the context of delinquency proceeding and would

not provide any due process protections. Rule 604(d) is designed

to protect due process rights and to eliminate unnecessary appeals. People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 362 (1998). Compliance with the motion requirement of Rule 604 permits the trial judge who

accepted the plea and imposed sentence to consider any allegations

of impropriety that took place dehors the record, and correct any error that may have led to the guilty plea. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 361, citing Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104. Requiring the defendant’s counsel to file the requisite certificate enables the trial court to

ensure that counsel has reviewed the defendant’s claim and has

considered all relevant bases for the motion to withdraw the guilty

plea or to reconsider the sentence. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 361. The attorney certificate thereby encourages the preservation of a clear

record, both in the trial court and on appeal, of the reasons why a

defendant is moving to withdraw his plea or to reduce sentence.

Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 361.

	In Wilk, the court noted that “Rules 402, 604(d) and 605(b), which concern guilty pleas are meant to mesh together not only to

ensure that defendants’ constitutional rights are protected, but also

to avoid abuses by defendants.” Relying on this language, the State

argues that because Rule 402 does not apply to delinquency

proceedings, Rule 604(d) should not apply either. The State,

however, does not offer any persuasive explanation for its claim,

nor does it articulate any harm that would result from application

of Rule 604(d) in the present context. The State’s position must be

rejected. As previously explained, the due process protections

served by Rule 402 are in place in delinquency proceedings even if

the rule itself has been held inapplicable. Moreover, Rule 604(d)

protects due process rights and allows the trial court to correct any

error that might have led to the admission. Additionally, application

of the rule to juvenile proceedings is particularly important given

that this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellate court

concluding that relief from such proceedings is unavailable under

the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See, e.g., In re A.W.H., 95 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1107 (1981); In re R.R., 75 Ill. App. 3d 494, 496 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that compliance with the Rule 604(d)

certificate requirement is required in juvenile proceedings.

	Lastly, the defendant urges us to hold that a juveniles’s failure

to file a post-admission motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) should not

serve as a jurisdictional bar to a notice of appeal. Here, however,

it is undisputed that the respondent did in fact file a post-admission

motion to reconsider his sentencedisposition. Accordingly, we will not

decide on these facts whether such a motion is a jurisdictional

prerequisite to taking a delinquency appeal.

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court

is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Rock Island County for compliance with Rule 604(d).

.

Affirmed and remanded.