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STRONG OVERSIGHT AT THE DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY: A PREDICATE 

TO GOOD GOVERNMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 25, 2007 

Serial No. 110–29 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JEFF GREENE, Director & Counsel 

BRIAN TURBYFILL, Clerk 

MICHAEL RUSSELL, Senior Counsel 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight ............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Alabama, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight ............................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 3 

The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Colorado ............................................................................................................ 19 

WITNESSES

Mr. Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, GAO’s Homeland Security and 

Justice Team, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary for Management, 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Key GAO Audit and Access Authorities ......................................... 31 

Appendix II: Letter from Hon. Paul A. Schneider .............................................. 35 

Appendix III: Additional Questions and Responses ...........................................

Hon. Paul A Schneider Responses ...................................................................... 33 

(1) 

STRONG OVERSIGHT AT THE DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY: A PREDICATE TO 

GOOD GOVERNMENT 

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS

AND OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Carney [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Carney, Thompson, Perlmutter, and 

Rogers. 

Mr. CARNEY. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on 

‘‘Strong Oversight at the Department of Homeland Security: A 

Predicate to Good Government.’’ 

This hearing should not have to take place. Some problems are 

to be expected when a massive new agency is created—integration 

difficulties, difficulty defining a cogent mission, even morale challenges. None of these is good, but at least they are understandable. 

A persistent and pervasive resistance to legitimate oversight, 

however, is not. Today, we are going to hear from the GAO about 

their difficulties obtaining information from DHS, but the problems 

they have been describing are much broader. DHS’s own Office of 

the Inspector General has said that they have been faced with 

delays in obtaining information that at times effectively amounted 

to a roadblock. 

Senator Lieberman said that during his committee’s Hurricane 

Katrina investigation last year, the department often took an adversarial posture and ultimately produced only a small fraction of 

the documents and witnesses that reasonably could have been expected. Senator Lieberman went so far as to request that then– 

Chairman Collins subpoena the department. 

We ourselves see continuing failure to submit required reports to 

Congress. Indeed, just a few weeks ago, Chairman Thompson and 

Ranking Member King jointly sent a letter to Secretary Chertoff 

detailing the most recent failings. And this month, the private 

Mercatus Center found that the department’s annual performance 

report ranked 22nd out of 24 agencies in terms of communicating 

information to the public. 

2 

This is completely unacceptable, and it cannot continue. DHS is 

a troubled agency. Oversight will only and can only make it better. 

When a house has a bad foundation, you don’t fix it by refusing to 

let the inspector into the basement. You fix it by letting the professionals examine it, assessing the problem, cutting out the rot, and 

rebuilding stronger. 

Since my staff began investigating this issue, Inspector General 

Skinner has reported that the department has done a 180 and has 

been cooperating with his fine investigators and his staff. I am very 

pleased to hear this, and I hope it continues and it spreads. GAO, 

the Congress and the public need to see the same improvement. 

It also needs to last. While I am glad that the IG is seeing the 

improvement, I hope it doesn’t just become a temporary thing. I am 

worried that the department might just be playing nice because we 

have been focusing on the issue, and that as soon as our interest 

is perceived to wane, the department will revert to business as 

usual. I certainly hope that is not the case. 

Undersecretary Schneider, I am glad you are here today. You impressed me as a straightshooter both when we met in my office and 

later when you testified before my subcommittee. I don’t think that 

you are afraid of oversight. I am hopeful that you can chart a better course for the department. 

So before I close, I am going to make a personal request to you, 

sir. When you get back to the department, please tell your staff or 

supervisors or counterparts, even the secretary himself, when you 

get the chance, that our concern over this issue will not wane. 

Please tell them that I have directed my staff to inquire regularly 

of the GAO and the Office of the Inspector General about whether 

they are getting appropriate cooperation from the department. 

Please tell them that I will be asking Inspector General Skinner to 

come to me directly if he has any renewed problems. I am asking 

you to ensure that every corner of the department gets the message 

that if there is a problem, I will hear about it, which of course 

means you will hear about it. 

It is my sincere hope that I never have to convene another hearing on this subject, but we will be watching. If these problems persist or recur, I will not hesitate to bring you and many more people 

from the department back here to revisit the issue. If you think we 

are going to be talking tough today, just wait until the gavel comes 

down on that hearing. 

Thank you. I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

I now turn it over to the ranking member from Alabama. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Chairman Carney, for convening this 

hearing. 

I want to thank the witnesses for taking the time to be here with 

us. We welcome back Undersecretary Schneider and Mr. Rabkin, 

who have appeared before this committee in the past. 

At the outset, I would like to note for the record that this is one 

of the first, if not the first, hearing held in this committee in the 

110th Congress which included bipartisan briefing materials. The 

bipartisan nature of this hearing underscores the importance of 

Congress and the inspector general getting the information they 

need to fulfill their oversight responsibilities. 

3 

Rigorous oversight of Federal agencies improves their operations, 

saves taxpayer dollars, and holds them accountable to the American people. Such oversight is especially important for the Department of Homeland Security, which is the third-largest department 

in the Federal Government, with an annual budget of approximately $40 billion. Oversight of this department is also critical because of its mission to prevent terrorist attacks and respond to natural disasters. 

Today, we examine the difficulties the comptroller general of the 

United States and the DHS inspector general are having obtaining 

information from the department. In February, 2007, both of these 

officials testified before our full committee and the Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security and raised this issue. As we 

explore this issue, it is important to remember that DHS is just 

over 4 years through a complex merger of 22 agencies. Experts 

have testified that mergers much less complex have taken 5 to 7 

years to complete. 

In addition, DHS handles matters at all levels of security classification, as well as information covered by the Privacy Act. Therefore, careful scrutiny of the documents and information is not only 

expected, but demanded by DHS before such material is released. 

Since February, the subcommittee has been advised that DHS has 

made progress to improve access to information. In addition, DHS 

has a new acting general counsel and a relatively new undersecretary for management. Both officials are personally committed to 

improving the process and taking steps internally to fix any problems. 

Today, we will hear from our witnesses about that progress and 

what additional steps need to be taken to ensure that GAO and the 

inspector general have timely access to the information needed. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. 

The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, the 

gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I am happy to be here for this hearing. I welcome our 

witnesses. There is no question that sunshine is real important for 

our government. I am concerned that people who talk about the 

fact that they welcome oversight sometimes put blinders on from 

the request standpoint. The GAO, as well as IG, are instruments 

of Congress. They look at organizations and institutions, and obviously when those requests are made by members of Congress, we 

expect the job to be performed. 

I would not like to see the department stonewall any of these 

agencies anymore. The public has a right to know. We are spending 

their money and therefore in return we deserve answers. So I look 

forward to the hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that under 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

4 

I welcome the witnesses. The first witness is Mr. Norm Rabkin, 

the managing director of the Homeland Security and Justice team 

at the Government Accountability Office. Mr. Rabkin manages 

GAO’s reviews of issues related to homeland security, Federal law 

enforcement agencies, including the FBI and DEA, the Federal judiciary, and Federal funds provided to state and local law enforcement agencies. Mr. Rabkin was selected into the Senior Executive 

Service in 1989 and received GAO’s distinguished service award in 

1999 and 2002. 

Our second witness is Hon. Paul Schneider, undersecretary for 

management at the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to 

joining the department earlier this year, Undersecretary Schneider 

was a defense and aerospace consultant for three-and-a-half years, 

and before that he was a civil servant for 38 years, including serving as senior acquisitions executive of the National Security Agency 

from October 2002 to September 2003, and more than four years 

as principal deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for research, 

development and acquisition. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement 

for five minutes, beginning with Mr. Rabkin. 

STATEMENT OF NORMAN RABKIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. RABKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers, Chairman Thompson. It is nice to be here this morning. I am 

pleased to be here to discuss our access to information at DHS. 

Almost every engagement we have undertaken at DHS has been 

at the specific request of the chairman or ranking member of a congressional committee or subcommittee, or has been mandated 

through the legislative process. We have been very active at DHS 

as the department deals with issues of major significance to the 

American public. It was a major merger, as you mentioned, of 22 

legacy agencies when it was created in 2003. It receives enormous 

annual appropriations, and it also has inherited a set of management and programmatic challenges from its legacy agencies. 

Since DHS began operations, we have provided major analyses of 

the department’s plans and programs for transportation security, 

immigration enforcement and benefits, Coast Guard operations, 

and emergency management. We have also reported on DHS’s 

management functions, such as human capital, financial management, and information technology. 

We have processes for obtaining information from departments 

and agencies across the Federal Government that work well. These 

processes were developed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. We have shared them with every 

department and agency in what call our ‘‘agency protocols’’—a book 

like this. 

We notify agency officials each time we begin an audit. We offer 

to meet with them to discuss our objectives, scope, our methodology, and our information needs. We are available to provide them 

with status reports on our work and our preliminary findings. 

5 

At all departments and agencies, we expect and usually receive 

excellent cooperation. Overall, our experience at DHS has not been 

as smooth. DHS’s process involves multiple layers of review by 

component and department-level liaisons and attorneys about 

whether to provide us the requested information. We have to submit each request for documents to the component liaison, rather 

than directly to program officials, even if we have already met with 

those officials. 

The liaisons often refer our requests to attorneys, either at the 

component or departmental level, sometimes both. The result is 

that we often wait for months for information that in many cases 

could be provided immediately. In some cases, DHS does not furnish information until our review is nearly finished, greatly impeding our ability to provide our clients with a full and timely perspective on the program under review. 

As we have understood these cases, DHS’s concerns have often 

involved whether they consider the information we have requested 

to be deliberative or pre-decisional, even though that is not a basis 

for denying us access. At other times, DHS does not share with us 

the rationale for not promptly providing the requested material. 

We have occasionally worked with DHS management to establish 

a cooperative process, for example, reviewing sensitive documents 

at a particular agency location. We have agreed to these types of 

accommodations for accessing information under certain circumstances because we believe that doing so allows us not only to 

maintain a productive working relationship with the department, 

but also to meet the needs of our congressional clients in a timely 

manner without compromising our auditing standards. 

We recognize that the department has legitimate interests in 

protecting certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. We share that interest as well, and follow strict security 

guidelines in handling such information. We similarly recognize 

that agency officials need to make judgments with respect to the 

manner and the processes they use in response to our information 

requests. However, to date because of the processes and the manner in which DHS officials have interpreted and implemented 

them, we have often not been able to complete our work in a timely 

manner. 

We appreciate the efforts of senior DHS managers, including our 

official liaison, to listen to our concerns and to try to make the 

process more responsive. I especially appreciate Undersecretary 

Schneider’s openness and willingness to take on this challenge. 

I look forward to working with him and will keep this committee 

and our other clients in Congress informed of the progress we 

make. 

This completes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to 

answer questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Rabkin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN RABKIN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the subject of access by the Government Accountability Office to information at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

My statement will provide information on the scope of our work, our protocols regarding how we normally get access to agency information, DHS processes for reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
6 

1See appendix I for more information on key GAO audit and access authorities. 

sponding to our requests, access issues we have encountered at DHS, and, finally, 

steps we have taken to address these issues. 

Summary 

GAO’s mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal 

government for the benefit of the American people. Since DHS began operations in 

2003, we have provided major analyses of the department’s plans and programs for 

transportation security, immigration, Coast Guard, and emergency management. 

We have also reported on DHS’s management functions such as human capital, financial management, and information technology. 

We have processes for obtaining information from departments and agencies 

across the federal government that work well. DHS’s adopted processes do not work 

as smoothly. DHS’s processes have impeded our efforts to carry out our mission by 

delaying access to documents that we require to assess the department’s operations. 

This process involves multiple layers of review by department- and component-level 

liaisons and attorneys regarding whether to provide us the requested information. 

We have occasionally worked with DHS management to establish a cooperative 

process—or example, reviewing sensitive documents at a particular agency location. 

We have agreed to these types of accommodations for accessing information under 

certain circumstances because we believe that doing so allows us not only to maintain a productive working relationship with the department but also to meet the 

needs of our congressional requesters in a timely manner. Further, such a relationship enables us to present the progress and challenges of the department in a clear 

and impartial manner, so that we can meet our shared objectives of improving our 

nation’s security preparedness. 

We recognize that the department has legitimate interests in protecting certain 

types of sensitive information from public disclosure. We share that interest as well 

and follow strict security guidelines in handling such information. We similarly recognize that agency officials will need to make judgments with respect to the manner 

and the processes they use in response to our information requests. However, to 

date, because of the processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often not 

been able to do its work in a timely manner. We have been able to eventually obtain 

information and to answer audit questions, but the delays we have experienced at 

DHS have impeded our ability to conduct audit work efficiently and to provide timely information to congressional clients. 

GAO Performs a Broad Range of Work for Congress 

GAO has broad statutory authority under title 31 of the United States Code to 

audit and evaluate agency financial transactions, programs, and activities.1 To carry 

out these audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad statutory right of access to agency records. Using the authority granted under title 31, we perform a 

range of work to support Congress that, among other things, includes the following: 

• Evaluations of federal programs, policies, operations, and performance: 

• For example, evaluations of transportation security programs related to 

passenger-screening operations at airports, our work to assess enforcement 

of immigration laws, and our work on the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater 

acquisition to replace its aging fleet. 

• Management and financial audits to determine whether public funds are 

being spent efficiently, effectively, and in accordance with applicable laws: 

• For example, DHS’s appropriations acts for fiscal years 2002 through 

2006 have mandated that we review expenditure plans for the U.S. Visitor 

and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S.VISIT) program. 

• Investigations to assess whether illegal or improper activities may have occurred: 

• For example, we investigated the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individuals and Households Program to determine the vulnerability of the program to fraud and abuse in the wake of Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. 

• Constructive engagements in which we work proactively with agencies, when 

appropriate, to help guide their efforts toward transformation and achieving 

positive results: 

• For example, we have worked to establish such an arrangement with the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on its design and implementation of the Secure Flight Program for passenger pre-screening for domestic flights whereby we could review documents on system development as 

7 

2GAO, Government Auditing Standards, 2003 Revision, GAO–03–673G (Washington, D.C.; 

June 2003). 3GAO, GAO Agency Protocols, GAO–05–35G (Washington, D.C.; Oct. 21, 2004). 

they were being formulated and provide TSA with our preliminary observations for its consideration. Congress mandated TSA certify that the design 

and implementation of the program would meet 10 specific criteria. Congress also mandated that we review and comment on TSA’s certification. 

TSA’s certification has not yet occurred. 

Auditing Standards and Our Protocols Address Accessing Information 

We carry out most of our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.2 Our analysts and financial auditors are responsible for planning, conducting, and reporting their work in a timely manner without internal or 

external impairments. These standards require that analysts and financial auditors 

promptly obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for any related findings and conclusions. Therefore, prompt access to all 

records and other information associated with these activities is needed for the effective and efficient performance of our work. 

Our work involves different collection approaches to meet the evidence requirements of generally accepted government auditing standards. Such evidence falls into 

four categories: • physical (the results of direct inspection or observation); • documentary (information created by and for an agency, such as letters, memorandums, contracts, management and accounting records, and other documents 

in various formats, including electronic databases); 

• testimonial (the results of face-to-face, telephone, or written inquiries, interviews, and questionnaires); and 

• analytical (developed by or for GAO through computations, data comparisons, 

and other analyses). 

We have promulgated protocols describing how we will interact with the agencies 

we audit.3 We expect that agencies will promptly comply with our requests for all 

categories of needed information. We also expect that we will receive full and timely 

access to agency officials who have stewardship over the requested records; to agency employees responsible for the programs, issues, events, operations, and other factors covered by such records; and to contractor personnel supporting such programs, 

issues, events, and operations. In addition, we expect that we will have timely access to an agency’s facilities and other relevant locations while trying to minimize 

interruptions to an agency’s operations when conducting work related to requests 

for information. 

We provide an appropriate level of security to information obtained during the 

course of our work. We are statutorily required to maintain the same level of confidentiality of information as is required of the agency from which it is received, and 

we take very seriously our obligation to safeguard the wide range of sensitive information we routinely receive. For example, we ensure that GAO employees have appropriate security clearances to access information. We also have well-established 

security policies and procedures. 

Timely access to information, facilities, and other relevant locations is in the best 

interests of both GAO and the agencies. We need to efficiently use the time available to complete our work to minimize the impact on the agency being reviewed and 

to meet the time frames of our congressional clients. Therefore, we expect that an 

agency’s leadership and internal procedures will recognize the importance of and 

support prompt responses to our requests for information. When we believe that 

delays in obtaining requested access significantly impede our work, we contact the 

agency’s leadership for resolution and notify our congressional clients, as appropriate. 

DHS Has Implemented Burdensome Processes for Working with GAO 

Unlike those of many other executive agencies, DHS’s processes for working with 

us includes extensive coordination among program officials, liaisons, and attorneys 

at the departmental and component levels and centralized control for all incoming 

GAO requests for information and outgoing documents. In an April 2004 directive 

on GAO relations, DHS established a department liaison to manage its relationship 

with us. In addition, DHS has a GAO coordinator within all of its components and, 

within the DHS General Counsel Office, an Assistant General Counsel for General 

Law who provides advice on GAO relations. According to the directive, the department liaison (1) receives and coordinates all GAO notifications of new work, (2) participates in all entrance conferences, and (3) notifies the Assistant General Counsel 

of new work to obtain participation of counsel. The directive requires the Assistant 

8 

4GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO–07–398T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2007); and GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security, GAO–07–452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

General Counsel to participate in all entrance meetings to ensure that the scope of 

any request is clear and finite, and that mutual obligations between DHS and GAO 

are met. The component coordinator handles all matters involving GAO for the component, generally participates in GAO entrance meetings, and seeks advice of component’s counsel, as appropriate. 

The following figure illustrates the coordination of information among DHS officials described above when we make a request for information. Typically when we 

begin an engagement, we send a letter to the department liaison to notify DHS that 

we are starting a new engagement and we request an entrance meeting to discuss 

the work. During the course of our review, we provide written requests for meetings 

and documents to component coordinators using a DHS-prescribed form. The component coordinators then forward our requests to program officials and consult with 

component counsel, who may consult with the Assistant General Counsel. 

Figure 1. DHS Process for Working with GAO. 

GAO requests for interviews 

and documents 

↓ ↑ 

DHS departmental liaison← 

↓ ↑ ‰DHS Assistant General Counsel ↕ 

Component coordinator← 

↓ ↑ 

‰Component counsel 

Program Officials 

In a memo that transmitted the above directive to senior managers in DHS components, the then-Under Secretary for Management emphasized the importance of 

a positive working relationship between the two agencies. The memo stated that 

failure to meet or brief GAO staffs in a timely manner, as well as being viewed as 

nonresponsive to GAO document requests, could result in tense and acrimonious 

interactions. The Under Secretary also reminded senior officials that prompt and 

professional discharge of their responsibilities to GAO requests could affect both 

DHS’s funding and restrictions attached to that funding. 

GAO Has Experienced Difficulties Accessing DHS Information 

In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on Appropriations, 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February 2007, we stated that DHS has not 

made its management or operational decisions transparent enough to allow Congress to be sure that the department is effectively, efficiently, and economically 

using its billions of dollars of annual funding.4 We also noted that our work for Congress to assess DHS’s operations has been significantly hampered by long delays in 

obtaining access to program documents and officials. We emphasized that for Congress, GAO, and others to independently assess the department’s efforts, DHS 

would need to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing 

access to information on its programs and operations. 

At most federal agencies and in some cases within DHS, we obtain the information we need directly from program officials, often on the spot or very soon after 

making the request. For example, our work on the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) 

has so far met with a very welcome degree of access to both DHS officials and documents. SBI is a comprehensive multiyear program established in November 2005 to 

secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal immigration. One element of SBI is SBInet, 

the program within CBP responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system of tactical infrastructure, rapid response capability, and technology. The 

fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act required 

that, before DHS could obligate $950 million of the $1.2 billion appropriated for 

SBInet, it had to prepare a plan for expending these funds, have it reviewed by 

9 

5Pub. L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). 

GAO, and then submit it to Congress for approval.5 The plan was to be submitted 

within 60 days of the act’s passage. 

CBP officials provided us office space at CBP headquarters, gave us access to all 

levels of SBInet management, and promptly provided us with all the documentation 

we requested, much of which was still in draft form and predecisional. DHS met 

the 60-day requirement when it submitted its plan to the Appropriations Committees on December 4, 2006. We met our responsibilities by being able to review the 

plan as it developed over the 60-day period, and to provide the results of our review 

to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on December 7 and 13, 2006, 

respectively. 

In contrast to the access we were afforded in the above example, the process used 

in most of our interactions with DHS is layered and time-consuming. As discussed 

earlier, we are asked to submit each request for documents to the component coordinator rather than directly to program officials even if we have already met with 

these officials. Also as mentioned earlier, the component coordinator often refers our 

request to component counsel. And the Assistant General Counsel for General Law 

in DHS’s General Counsel’s office may become involved. The result is that we often 

wait for months for information that in many cases could be provided immediately. 

In some cases, DHS does not furnish information until our review is nearly finished, 

greatly impeding our ability to provide a full and timely perspective on the program 

under review. 

Each access issue with DHS requires that we make numerous and repetitive follow-up inquiries. Sometimes, despite GAO’s right of access to information, DHS 

delays providing information as it vets concerns internally, such as whether the information is considered deliberative or predecisional. At other times, we experience 

delays without DHS expressing either a concern or a cause for the delays. On other 

occasions, DHS is unable to tell us when we might obtain requested information or 

even if we will obtain it. 

We have encountered access issues in numerous engagements, and the lengths of 

delay are both varied and significant and have affected our ability to do our work 

in a timely manner. We have experienced delays with DHS components that include 

CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), FEMA, and TSA on different types of work such as information sharing, immigration, emergency preparedness in primary and secondary schools, and accounting systems. I have examples 

of two engagements to share with you today that illustrate the types of delays we 

experience and how they have affected the timing of our work. 

My first example is of an engagement related to detention standards for aliens 

in custody, where the team working on this engagement experienced delays of up 

to 5 months in obtaining various documents. The objective of this work, which is 

still under way and is being done for the House Committee on Homeland Security, 

is to assess ICE efforts to review facilities that house alien detainees, determine 

whether the facilities have complied with DHS standards, and determine the extent 

that complaints have been filed about conditions in the facilities. Some of the facilities are owned and operated by DHS; others are operated under contract with DHS. 

In order to determine the extent to which facilities are complying with DHS standards, we requested that ICE provide copies of the reports of inspections it conducted 

in 2006 at 23 detention facilities. We requested those reports in December 2006 and 

did not receive the final four of the inspection reports until just last week, after 

DHS departmental intervention. We had several meetings and discussions with 

DHS officials including program officials, liaisons, and attorneys, and we were never 

provided a satisfactory answer about the reason for this 5-month delay. We also experienced delays on this engagement obtaining a copy of the contract for detainee 

phone services between ICE and the phone service contractor. DHS took 1 month 

to provide the contract and redacted almost the entire document because a DHS attorney contended the information was ‘‘privileged.’’ We followed up with DHS officials to communicate that our authority provided for access to this type of information and then waited another 2 weeks before we were able to get an unredacted copy 

of the contract. 

In another engagement being done at the request of the then-Chairman of the 

House Committee on Government Reform, we are reviewing an emergency preparedness exercise that DHS conducted in June 2006 called Forward Challenge 06. 

The purpose of the exercise was to allow agencies to activate their continuity of operations plans, deploy essential personnel to an alternate site, and perform essential 

functions as a means of assessing their mission readiness. Our objective is to determine the extent to which participating agencies were testing the procedures, personnel, and resources necessary to perform essential functions in their continuityVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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of-operations plans during the exercise. We began our work a few months before the 

exercise and had arranged with DHS to observe the actual exercise. However, 2 

days before its start, DHS officials told us we would not be permitted to observe 

the exercise and stated that after completion, they would instead brief us on the 

exercise and the lessons they had learned from it. They provided that briefing in 

August 2006, at which time we requested relevant documentation to support the 

claims the DHS officials made to us. 

Subsequently, in November 2006, DHS provided us with one-third of the agency 

after-action reports we requested but redacted key information, including the identity of the participating agencies. DHS, however, was reluctant to provide us with 

the balance of the documents requested, stating that it considered these to be ‘‘deliberative materials’’; and expressing concern that sharing these with us would have 

a significant and negative impact on participants’ level of openness in future exercises. Despite GAO’s right of access to the information, the involvement of GAO and 

DHS officials at the highest level, and a letter of support from the former and current chairman of the committee, we did not receive access to the requested documentation until March 2007. Our report for this engagement was to be issued in 

November 2006; because we did not receive the needed information until March 

2007, we will not be able to issue our analysis until later this year. 

GAO Has Taken and Suggested Steps to Resolve Access Issues with DHS 

We have made good faith efforts to resolve access issues. Specifically, we have undertaken many steps to work with DHS to resolve delays as expeditiously as possible and gain access to information needed for our work. At our audit team level 

we have asked staff to set reasonable time frames for requesting DHS to provide 

information and arrange for meeting and when we encounter resistance, to ensure 

that the information we request is critical to satisfying the audit objectives. When 

delays occur, our approach is to involve various management levels at both GAO 

and DHS, beginning with lower-level managers and working up to the Comptroller 

General and the Secretary. At each level, our managers and legal staff contact their 

counterpart liaisons and counsel, component heads, or DHS senior managers, as appropriate, either by telephone, e-mail, or letter, to communicate our access authority 

and need for the information to satisfy audit objectives. Our communication efforts 

have generally resulted in obtaining the requested or alternative information, or 

making other accommodations. 

We have proposed to DHS that the department take several steps that would enhance the efficiency of its process. First, our staff should be able to deal directly 

with program officials after we have held our initial entrance conference. If these 

officials have concerns about providing us requested information, they can involve 

DHS liaison or coordinators. Second, to the extent that DHS counsel finds it necessary to screen certain sensitive documents, it should do so on an exception basis. 

Other documents should be provided directly to us without prior review or approval 

by counsel. We provide DHS several opportunities to learn how we are using the 

information its officials provide us—we provide routine updates on our work to program officials; we provide program officials, liaisons, and counsel a ‘‘statement of 

facts’’; that basically describes what we learned during the engagement; and we formally provide DHS a copy of our draft report that contains our evidence, conclusions, and recommendations for its comment. There is no reason to hold information 

back from us when it has been made available to contractors, other federal agencies, 

state and local governments, or the public, or when its only sensitivity is that DHS 

considers it confidential or classified. The Secretary of DHS and the Under Secretary for Management have stated their desire to work with us to resolve access 

issues. We are willing to work with DHS to resolve any access-related concerns. 

Nevertheless, we remain troubled that the design and implementation of the current 

DHS process is routinely causing unnecessary delays. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions your or other members of the subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Undersecretary Schneider for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SCHNEIDER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers and members of the subcommittee. I 

appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the department’s relaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
11 

tionships with its Office of the Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office. 

In nearly four decades of government service, I have developed 

a deep appreciation of the investigative and audit work that the 

IGs and GAO conduct. It is through appropriate oversight that government agencies can improve internal processes and programs. As 

Secretary Chertoff stated during his February 8 congressional testimony, cooperation with these entities is imperative. 

The department maintains management directives regarding its 

interactions and cooperation with the GAO and the IG. The management directive relating to the IG requires DHS employees to cooperate fully by disclosing complete and accurate information to 

the IG and provide prompt access to any files, records, reports or 

other information that may be requested by the IG. The management directive on the GAO similarly requires all DHS employees 

to work cooperatively with the GAO. 

Therefore, we believe that the proper framework is already in 

place as these directives reflect solid concepts and principles of the 

department’s cooperation. 

Nevertheless, we must improve our execution. The secretary has 

already acknowledged that the department’s responsiveness is not 

what it should be, and we are not as timely in our response as we 

would like to be. We are looking into numerous ways to improve 

the management processes of the department, including the responsiveness to the GAO and the OIG. 

During his February 8 testimony, the secretary acknowledged 

the need for greater information flow and he has committed to improving this process. For example, he has already put in place a 

mechanism to create incentives for DHS officials to make information flow to Congress a top priority and has required that employee 

performance reviews be linked to individual responsiveness to such 

requests. 

With respect to the IG, we are only aware of one situation where 

the IG has complained about major access issues. This instance related to the IG’s investigation of efforts to update the Coast Guard 

fleet, known as the Deepwater Program. It is my understanding 

that this issue has been addressed and resolved. 

Last Wednesday, I learned that I would be the department’s witness for this hearing. In preparation, I read previous testimony, IG 

and GAO reports. I met with the representatives of all the DHS 

components and obtained an appreciation for the large number of 

audits that are currently underway. I also had the opportunity to 

talk to Mr. Rabkin. He was kind enough to come over and spend 

a couple of hours with me. I had a pretty detailed discussion earlier 

this week with Mr. Skinner, the inspector general. 

In my opinion, we do not have consistent guidance across the department. Some of the operational components are using procedures and practices that were from their parent organizations before they became part of DHS. The use of these liaison offices in 

each organization is somewhat inconsistent. 

Looking ahead to the future, we are examining ways to improve 

the speed by which documents and information flow. This includes 

improving communications, training and outreach to the employees 

of the department, possibly revamping the organizational structure 

12 

or the placement of these liaison offices, both at headquarters and 

in the operational components, providing additional guidance to department employees on how to interact with the IG and the GAO 

through further revising or updating instructions to the personnel. 

We need to make our expectations more clear to our people on 

the frontline as to what they can and should provide in response 

to the IG and GAO requests, with the intent that there would rarely be exceptions to the requests, and that responses must be timely. 

If there are any exceptions, they need to be identified quickly and 

resolved quickly. 

We must also improve our awareness at the headquarters level 

of problems that arise so we can take expeditious action to resolve 

these matters quickly and satisfactorily. The department takes this 

issue very seriously in examining the best ways to improve the 

processes. 

I have worked with the GAO and IGs for nearly 40 years. Frankly, I have never experienced problems such as the ones that are 

being discussed today. We need to do a better job of implementing 

the department’s stated principles of full cooperation. I am hopeful 

that I can bring my experience to bear here and effect the required 

changes we all think are necessary. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I would be 

happy to answer any questions you have. 

[The statement of Mr. Schneider follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL A. SCHNEIDER

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers and Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the Department’s relationships with its Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO). As well, I look forward to clarifying some factual misunderstandings 

and describing how we intend to improve the process for cooperating with these investigative bodies. 

As you know, I am the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary 

for Management and have served as such for the past four months. Prior to this 

experience, I was a defense and aerospace consultant for 3–1/2 years and before 

that, I spent 38 years as a civil servant -working in various positions, including as 

the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and 

Acquisition and as the acting Assistant Secretary for a period of time. 

In four decades of government service, I have developed a deep appreciation of 

the investigative and audit work that Inspectors General and GAO conduct. It is 

through appropriate oversight that Government agencies can improve internal processes and programs. 

The nature of the relationship with the DHS OIG and the relationship with the 

GAO are, of course, different. The OIG is a part of the Department, within the larger executive branch, and the IG is under the supervision of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The GAO is a part of the legislative branch. In the case of both the 

Department’s OIG and the GAO, the Department seeks to handle information access 

issues in a harmonious manner in accordance with the law. 

In this vein, it should be noted that DHS routinely makes its employees and supporting documentation widely available for open, free-flowing exchanges with the 

GAO and OIG. As the Secretary stated during his February 8 congressional testimony, cooperation with these entities is imperative. 

As the Under Secretary for Management, I oversee the Audit Liaison Office at the 

Department, housed within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. This Liaison 

Office helps to oversee the Department’s efforts to coordinate and cooperate with the 

GAO and OIG. Moreover, the Liaison Officer regularly meets with his counterparts 

at DHS component agencies. In this way, the Department Liaison can communicate 

DHS goals and objectives with the components’ liaison officers. 

Although some critics have claimed that the liaison officers get in the way of the 

process, they are actually useful facilitators of the oversight and auditing functions. 

For example, the liaison officers help keep track of incoming requests and outgoing 

13 

responses, thus avoiding unnecessary duplication, gaps, and inefficiency. The liaison 

officers understand the landscape of their respective component agency and thus ensure that the GAO and OIG obtain accurate information from knowledgeable personnel. The liaison officers in Washington, DC can also assist in providing physical 

access to field offices and facilities. Through the liaison offices, we aim to ensure 

proper accountability through a centralized, coordinated process, and we strive to 

provide complete, accurate and thorough responses to GAO and OIG requests. 

The Department maintains Management Directives regarding its interactions and 

cooperation with the GAO and OIG. For instance, the Management Directive relating to the Office of Inspector General requires DHS employees to cooperate fully by 

disclosing complete and accurate information to the OIG and provide prompt access 

to ‘‘any files, records, reports, or other information that may be requested’’ by the 

OIG. The Management Directive on GAO similarly requires all DHS employees to 

work cooperatively with GAO. Therefore, we believe that the proper fiamework is 

already in place, as these Management Directives reflect solid concepts and principles of the Department’s cooperation. 

Nevertheless, it is these concepts and principles upon which we need to improve our execution. The Secretary has already acknowledged that the Department’s responsiveness is not what it should be, and we are not as timely in our responses 

as we would like to be. We also recognize that there are serious concerns about the 

execution of the Department’s Directives and objectives. Admittedly, the requirements of the Management Directives have not always been followed, and we need 

to improve these processes, as indicated by the remarks of the Comptroller General 

and the Inspector General during their testimony on February 6. While we understand certain of their frustrations, we do not agree with some of their factual assertions, including that lawyers attend every interview and review every document. 

That is simply not the case. Even so, we understand that we need to do a better 

job. 

We are looking into numerous ways to improve the management processes of the 

Department, including the responsiveness to GAO and OIG. During his February 

8 testimony, the Secretary acknowledged the need for greater information flow, and 

he has committed to improving this process. For example, the Secretary has already 

put in place a mechanism to create incentives for DHS officials to make information 

flow to Congress a top priority, and has required that employee performance reviews 

be linked to individual responsiveness to such requests. In a similar vein, we are 

considering better ways to communicate our expectations regarding GAO and OIG 

inquiries to our employees. 

With respect to the OIG, we are only aware of one situation where the IG has 

complained about access issues. This instance related to the OIGY’s investigation 

of efforts to update the Coast Guard fleet (Deepwater). It is my understanding that 

this issue has been addressed and resolved. I will note that, while both the Comptroller General and the IG complained about the ‘‘tone at the top’’ at DHS, I have 

seen just the opposite. The Secretary promotes an atmosphere in which the Inspector General is called—and called early—in situations where his insight and advice 

can prevent problems for the Department down the road. This is evidence of a 

healthy relationship with our IG. 

With respect to the GAO, quite frankly, we were a bit perplexed by the level of 

their complaint, especially given the substantial level of cooperation previously provided to GAO investigators. In general, we feel that the Department’s cooperation 

with the GAO has been very good. 

Nevertheless, it is important to keep these activities in the proper perspective of 

the Department’s overwhelming efforts to cooperate with a wide variety of investigative and oversight bodies. The Department has assisted in providing information for 

over 250 OIG Management Reports, 1,350 OIG Investigative Reports, and 600 GAO 

reports and testimony. Each report requires extensive work to collect, prepare, coordinate, produce, review, and provide input. These efforts require substantial workhours from the dedicated, hard-working employees of the Department who must also 

balance these efforts with their operational responsibilities to secure the homeland. 

In total, we have facilitated thousands of interviews and provided, quite literally, 

millions of pages of documents and other materials. Also, it is important to view 

this cooperation in light of the other extensive oversight by more than 88 congressional committees and subcommittees, and approximately 2,000 hearings and briefings provided by Department officials per year. The sheer volume of work product 

belies any notion that DHS has somehow slowed the process or shunned proper 

oversight. 

Last Wednesday, I learned I would be the Department’s witness for this hearing. 

In preparation, I read previous testimony, IG and GAO reports, met with representatives of all the DHS components and obtained an appreciation for the large numVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
14 

bers of audits that are currently underway; I also talked to the GAO and the IG. 

In my opinion, we do not provide consistent guidance across the Department, some 

of the operational components are using procedures and practices that were from 

their parent organizations before they became part of DHS; the use of liaison offices 

in each organization is somewhat inconsistent; and there is a general feeling that 

information provided will be used for ‘‘Gotchas.’’ In light of my 40 years of dealing 

with GAO and IG organizations, I know that we can turn this around. 

Looking ahead to the future, we will further improve the Department’s management processes. Indeed, we are examining ways to improve the speed with which 

documents and information are produced in response to appropriate requests. This 

includes improving communications, training, and outreach to the fine employees of 

the Department; possibly revamping the organizational structure or placement of 

the Liaison Office; and providing additional or updated guidance to Department employees on how to interact with the OIG and GAO. We should make our expectations more clear to the people on the front lines. We must also improve our headquarters-level awareness of problems that arise as a result of GAO and IG engagements, and of any access issues that arise in the operational components, so that 

we can take expeditious action to resolve these matters quickly and satisfactorily. 

As the Under Secretary for Management, I want to assure the Committee that 

we take this issue very seriously and are examining the best ways to improve our 

processes. I have worked with the GAO and IGs for nearly 40 years, and I am hopeful that I can bring my experience to bear here and affect the changes we all think 

are necessary. We need to do a better job of implementing the Department’s stated 

principle of cooperation, and we will work with all DHS components to improve our 

implementation and execution. DHS welcomes input on how to better pursue its 

mission, and we look forward to working with the Subcommittee and other congressional bodies, as well as the Inspector General and Comptroller General, to better 

protect the Nation’s homeland. Thank you. I would be happy to address whatever 

questions the Members may have. 

Mr. CARNEY. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

I will remind each member that he will have five minutes to 

question the panel. I now recognize myself for questions for five 

minutes. 

Undersecretary Schneider, your testimony struck me oddly, both 

as hopeful, but somewhat ambivalent, I think, might be the right 

word. On the one hand we are saying that we are making good 

progress, that we are doing well, that we have a substantial level 

of cooperation, it has been very good. On the other hand, we have 

some serious problems. Which is it? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, let me give you some examples. 

In my discussion with the inspector general on Monday, I said, 

‘‘Can you give me some concrete examples of where we in the department do things well?’’ And he said, ‘‘Sure.’’ And so he cited, for 

example, what I would phrase, just giving back what he told me, 

of three turnaround efforts, say, in the past six months. 

One was the Coast Guard. His example was after the issue with 

the national security cutter, which was the big issue that surfaced, 

he met with the commandant of the Coast Guard, the deputy secretary, and I forgot who else, and basically established an agreement in principle that basically got full and open cooperation. Since 

that period of time, once the leadership of the Coast Guard, the 

commandant, got involved, he has not had any problems. 

The other two examples he cited were my own chief financial officer organization. They are, for obvious reasons, an area that frequently get looked at as good management oversight, by the IG. 

What he told me was once the new Senate-confirmed CFO came on 

board, Mr. Norquist, after a brief discussion with him about the 

problems that the IG had had in the past, he has not had any problems. Those problems have disappeared. 

15 

He also talked to me about what he considered to be one of the 

most serious organizations that he had problems dealing with, 

which was the headquarters Science and Technology Directorate, 

and that upon the arrival of, and I think it was back in the summer, the new undersecretary, Secretary Cohen, based on the discussions that the IG had with him about the difficulties, that has 

been a complete turnaround. 

So he and I had a discussion, and I guess it just reaffirmed in 

my own mind what I felt all along is that it is the responsibility 

of leadership to reflect the change. When the leadership of those 

organizations realized they had a problem, they took action. I can 

tell you in my own personal experience since I have been here, I 

mentioned in my testimony that the secretary takes very seriously 

responsiveness to Congress. 

I can tell you that since I am one of the senior members of his 

staff, the controls that he has put in place and the management 

oversight that he personally and the deputy secretary personally 

exercise in terms of timeliness of reports, or questions for the 

record, it is managed at a very high level because the secretary and 

the department’s credibility is key to it. In just my personal assessment since I sign out the large percentage of the reports that are 

due to Congress, I can tell you we track every one. We have a 

weekly sit-down with the deputy secretary and all the senior managers and go through it. 

So my view is, the leadership gets involved at the right level, and 

if necessary at the highest level, it gets resolved. The other issue 

that he gave me an example was he cited one of the other operational components. I think it was Customs and Border Protection. 

He said, ‘‘I will tell you, I was having a problem, it got to my level, 

I picked up the phone, I called the head of Customs and Border 

Protection, Commissioner Basham, and he said ‘no problem’, and it 

was solved in five minutes.’’ 

So that is why I am optimistic that leadership has to get involved. If I could give you one other example, because I think it is 

a very telling example, of why I am optimistic and why I also recognize we have difficulties. When I had the opportunity to review 

Mr. Rabkin’s testimony yesterday morning, obviously the first 

thing I did was scan it. I noticed that he cited two examples in 

there, one pertaining to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

ICE, and the other to an exercise, I think it was called Forward 

Challenge. 

So after reading the ICE example, I had no knowledge of it. I 

picked up the phone and I called the head of ICE, Assistant Secretary Myers, and I said, ‘‘I am going to send you this report. I 

would like you to have somebody call me back with some information in the morning so I at least have some awareness of it.’’ 

Well, 60 minutes later I got a series of e-mails from her, and 

then a personal phone call. It went like this, and I will just kind 

of summarize it. She sent an e-mail to all of her subordinates, her 

key subordinates nationwide and basically said, ‘‘I want you to read 

this document. It is very disappointing to me, and I want you to 

know that I will not tolerate this type of performance by my organization.’’ And then she gave some additional guidance, et cetera. 

16 

She called me shortly after that and told me that she had picked 

up the phone and called Mr. Rabkin, and said that she was totally 

unaware of this thing, and that is not the type of performance that 

she expects from her organization. 

So this example—and I am happy, quite frankly, in one way that 

it was in the report—pointed out a couple of things. Number one, 

why did it get to that level that she had to find out about it in a 

GAO report? And since that management directive that has been 

in place says that I am responsible within the department for the 

management of this system, why did I find out about it by having 

to read the testimony? 

So we within the department, and that includes me, my liaison 

office, the operating components liaison office, we do not have the 

right procedures in place by which information gets surfaced so we 

can react quickly and get these issues nailed down. 

I hope I tried to explain and answer your question. 

Mr. CARNEY. I appreciate that. 

I will now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, 

the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Schneider, I want to direct this question to you. As you may 

or may not be aware, I have been pursuing border patrol training 

information for a couple of years now, specifically trying to make 

sure that we are on track to meet the president’s goals of having 

18,500 border patrol agents trained and on the ground in 2009. But 

also trying to determine why it costs $187,000 per border patrol 

agent to train them and put them on the ground. 

Having said that, in order to meet the goal of getting from where 

we started, and that is 12,500 agents to date, 18,500 agents in 

three years, we are going to have to train approximately 8,800 per 

year when you factor in attrition from retirements. So what I have 

been trying to get CBP to do is to give me some basic information 

about how they are going to accomplish this goal. 

In January, I requested from Customs and Border Protection an 

update of the statistics CBP previously provided on the number of 

border patrol trainees and where they were in the pipeline, what 

I refer to as the pipeline between the time we advertise for the applicants until we vet them, and then put them through the educational program, when there is an actual agent on the ground. 

In March, I asked again for these statistics in a meeting with the 

CBP commissioner. And again this month I asked the DHS acting 

general counsel to help secure these basic statistics. What I would 

ask you, Mr. Schneider, is will you provide these statistics for the 

record? Specifically, please provide the number of border patrol 

trainees who, one, have entered the pipeline; two, discontinued 

training; three, started training; four, dropped out due to attrition; 

or five, graduated. [See Appendix II.] 

My concern is this: I have believed from the beginning that we 

don’t have the current infrastructure in place at Artesia, New Mexico, if that is going to be the sole location for training, to move this 

massive number of agents through in three years. I have been out 

there and visited and I have talked with the folks in charge. It is 

a great school. I am not disparaging the school. But based on their 

17 

historical performance, I don’t see how they can recruit and process 

enough to do that. 

I have asked for information that will tell me I am wrong. I can’t 

get any information. This is just one of many examples that the 

members of this committee have had with different components 

within DHS. One of my concerns is the reason they are not providing the information is because they are not meeting the goals. 

They don’t want us to see the information they have because it will 

demonstrate that in fact the administration is not going to be able 

to hit those targets. 

That is information we need to know because if we are not going 

to be able to hit that 2009 target, we have to do something different. That is why I think they are afraid that we are going to propose that we do something different. So that is just my pet problem. If you could help with it, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Congressman, I will certainly go look at that. 

Most of these types of formal reports or responses to Congress, I 

am the guy that is the final signature on most of these. I can tell 

you, I sign out reports where the numbers are not very good. OK? 

I don’t remember that one, but I do sign a tremendous amount 

of reports. I really read them all, and I pick out the areas that I 

think where in fact we have not met expectations. On this specific 

case, I will go back and find out why we haven’t been able to answer your question. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Does the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson, for five minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Rabkin, Undersecretary Schneider talked about the need for 

senior leadership to become involved in this access to information 

and cooperation issue. Do you have an opinion as to whether the 

problems you encountered were just at the component level? Or did 

they start at the top? 

Mr. RABKIN. It is my sense, Mr. Chairman, that the problems 

start at the top. There is a tone that is set in the department, and 

it reflects its way through how the components are expected to implement the directives—what the words really mean; what kind of 

action is recognized and rewarded; what kind of action is sanctioned, et cetera. 

I am concerned that the flow of information to the top also is not 

what it should be. I am pleased to hear that there are steps being 

proposed and hopefully taken to improve that. There are at least 

two ways that top management can be aware of these kinds of 

problems. Number one is that the liaisons and the component 

heads will surface them themselves. The second is that GAO will 

bring them to a head. 

From our perspective, that is part of our protocol. We will do 

that, but it is more towards the end of our process than at the beginning. We don’t want to come running to the component head 

with every question that we have and every time we think documents are not flowing or information is not flowing as quickly as 

possible. We try to work with the program officials. We try to work 

18 

through the liaisons. We work actively with DHS and component 

counsel to try to resolve this. We work it up the management structure slowly to try to resolve this at as low a level as possible. 

When the circumstances get to the point where we are not making progress and we feel we have to get to our clients and let them 

know that things are being delayed, we will bring that to higher 

levels within the component’s management, eventually to Mr. 

Schneider’s office and if need be to the deputy secretary and the 

secretary, as we have done in the past. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Undersecretary Schneider, are you aware of a letter that the inspector general provided the deputy secretary with detailing the 

role of the inspector general and a series of frequently asked questions? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, I am. It is a single-page letter that was a 

proposal by Inspector General Skinner, a proposed letter that he at 

the time, I think it was July, 2006, recommended that the secretary sign out to all employees. It laid out the very simple statement about what he expected them to provide, and then it was an 

attachment that had a series of what he considered to be frequently asked questions and answers. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Your testimony to the committee is that you 

were aware that in this letter the inspector general asked that they 

be distributed. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. From what I understand, and when I became aware of this letter a couple of days ago, my question was: 

Who actually saw it? I don’t know for a fact that the deputy secretary actually saw it. I know for a fact that the general counsel 

saw it. Whether it ever got to the deputy secretary or secretary 

with or without the general counsel’s comments, I don’t know. I 

didn’t ask him, frankly. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you tell us that as of this hearing date 

whether or not that letter has ever been distributed as requested 

by the inspector general? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It has not been distributed. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know why it was not distributed? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. I have a pretty good reason understanding 

why. I think there were issues with blanket implementation across 

the department on several of the items that were listed in the covering memo. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Fine. Do you know whether or not the inspector 

general’s office was every told that there were some issues with the 

memo? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. When I talked to him, the inspector general, on 

Monday, I talked about this memo within the context of, ‘‘Hey, 

Rick, is this really needed?’’ Because I had seen previous documentation in some of his reports—and I forget which report it is— 

where he indicated that additional protocols were not necessary. 

That was actually the precursor to our discussion about execution 

and leadership. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I understand. I guess what I am trying to get to 

is if someone sends you a letter in July and here it is April of the 

following year, and you have not even said to the person who sent 

the letter ‘‘we have a problem with it.’’ I think that goes to the funVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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damental issue of why we are holding this hearing is if we can’t 

answer a letter, then how in the world do we expect the agencies 

who are charged with oversight to get the information that Congress is requesting? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Very specifically, I do not know. Well, first of all, 

I am not aware of any formal response to this draft letter. I am 

also not aware of whether it was handed to the general counsel or 

if it was formally transmitted, or whether or not they had any discussions about what the potential concerns with what was in here. 

So yes, sir, should he have perhaps given him a formal, ‘‘Look, I 

have issues with A, B, and C. Let’s talk about it’’? Probably. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Will you provide the committee with the answer 

to all three of those questions you just raised? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. As to whether or not it was ever responded to. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Whether or not, from the standpoint of implementation, whether it was distributed. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will send you this formally in writing, but I 

know it was not distributed. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, then we need to know why it was not. Who 

made the decision not to distribute it? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. OK. 

Mr. THOMPSON. The inspector general’s position is a significant 

position for this department. I would think that if they ask the department to do something and the department ignores it, that is 

significant, and the process of ignoring it is a real concern. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just thank you for conducting the hearing, 

but I hope you can see that it just continues to raise other questions about information. 

And the last thing is, if our own people can’t have access to information, I wonder what John Q. Public would have if they made a 

request. I guess at some point we might need to look at it, but I 

think we are charged, just like you, with a responsibility for providing information in a reasonable period of time. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter, for five minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. 

I would like to start on the fact that we don’t have Inspector 

General Skinner here to testify today. I understand he believes 

that the department is making a lot of improvements in terms of 

communication, et cetera. 

Can either of you comment on that? What improvements do you 

think have been made in the last three months since this committee, and I know Congressman Rogers has been focusing on this 

subject for a long time. 

What improvements really have been made in the last two or 

three months that either one of you have seen? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think the three examples that Inspector General Skinner cited to me about the Coast Guard, the chief financial 

officer, and the Science and Technology Directorate of the departVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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ment, that he has seen a complete turnaround, and that they are 

examples of how the organization ought to function and respond to 

IG requests, where previously they were poor performers in providing the information. 

So we didn’t change any directives. It was a question of the head 

guy saying, ‘‘this is important and I expect you to work with these 

people.’’ So I see that, because I was looking for is there any bright 

sunlight or some examples that you can give me, and those are 

three. He said, ‘‘I will give you three right off the top of my head, 

because it is a complete turnaround.’’ 

So that is recent. It reflects, frankly, the change in individuals 

once they came on board. In the case of the Coast Guard, once the 

situation was made aware to him in detail, and he is a detail-type 

of guy, to basically change the response of the organization. So I 

think those are pretty concrete examples. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. The inspector general has seen those. What 

about you? Where have you seen improvement? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I work very closely with the Coast Guard, and the main reason is because of the roughly $1 billion a year we 

spend on Deepwater. I think the lion’s share of the Coast Guard 

IG investigations and audits have been on Deepwater. I spend a lot 

of time personally with the flag leadership of the Coast Guard, reviewing the details of that program. 

Some of the questions I ask is, ‘‘Is information flow going OK 

with the IG? With the GAO, if they are involved? Because I want 

to understand. And from what I gather, and it was corroborated by 

the inspector general, in that particular case it works very well. 

When I talk to the CFO who works for me, the chief financial officer, one of the things I do is I inquire about how well we are doing 

in answering the IG’s responsives. I basically say, ‘‘give me some 

examples, show me.’’ 

I also take a look at how many audits or how many inspections 

do we have going on? What is the rack up of the numbers? Because 

there is a tremendous volume of them. I am not satisfied, quite 

frankly, with the level of detail, the information that I get at headquarters to know whether or not we have an issue brewing. 

So one of the things that I am trying to figure out how to do is 

if the IG or the GAO is trying to interview people somewhere in 

the continental United States or somewhere overseas, and they are 

having great difficulty with access and things like that, I want to 

try and figure out how I can get my information flow from, I will 

call it that agent on the frontline back up to the right authorities 

to fix it. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Let me shift you over to the immigration side 

of this department. How is that going? 

Because I have been hearing through the grapevine, similar to 

some of the things that Mr. Rogers was talking about, that the flow 

of information about personnel issues, as well as the focus of the 

department, the missions of the department, there are all sorts of 

issues about information coming up to the top, up to all of you. We 

have had some problems with that. Am I completely off-base? Do 

you know what I am talking about? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, sir, I don’t. I am afraid I don’t know. I know 

in the case of, well, let’s talk about Customs and Border Protection. 

21 

There are two examples, OK? One example is what I would consider to be what the IG told me in terms of responses having difficulty. It was resolved in five minutes—OK?—with the head of 

Customs and Border Protection. 

I know in the case of, I think it is Mr. Rabkin’s testimony, where 

the CBP went through extraordinary effort to basically provide the 

information that was required. I also know that right within that 

same department, I think he contrasts, if you will, difficulties getting information from other elements of that particular program. 

When I talked to Ms. Myers about the ICE example in here, she 

also told me about another example (inaudible) required, and I also 

know about another example that I think she discussed with Mr. 

Rabkin I think on Atlas, where in fact I believe our interpretation 

of how well that went, was it went very well. 

So here I have two operational components—OK?—the same 

leadership. On the one hand we have efforts that work very 

smoothly, information flows very quickly; and on others, we have 

problems. OK? And so relative to immigration and protection of the 

borders, I have considered that ICE and CBP are two of the three 

main operational components. 

So we have examples in both of those where it works fairly well, 

and we have examples in both of them where we have problems. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. 

I will start the second round here. Mr. Rabkin, in his prepared 

testimony, Undersecretary Schneider said that the department was 

‘‘perplexed’’ by the level of the GAO’s complaint. Did GAO raise 

concerns with the department prior to Comptroller General Walker’s February testimony? If so, with whom? 

Mr. RABKIN. We raised these issues day-in and day-out at the 

lower levels with our liaisons. The liaisons, it is part of their responsibility in fact to try to resolve these problems. Because of the 

procedures that are in place where we have to go through the liaisons to deal with program officials, we have to rely on them. 

And so then it becomes a question of what is a reasonable 

amount of time for us to wait, while they try to resolve the issues 

as to whether the issue we are requesting, (A) exists; and (B), will 

be provided; (C), when it will be provided; and (D), in what shape 

it will be provided—that is, whether any contents will be redacted, 

et cetera. 

And because our people work constantly with them, we like to 

give them enough time to try to do their job. Days turn into weeks 

and weeks turn into months. And then we have to make judgments 

as to: Is it really going to come next week, as they have said? Or 

is it time to kick it upstairs? We make those calls on a facts-andcircumstances basis in each case. 

And there have been cases where we have kicked it upstairs, so 

to speak, and we have had meetings: we have had phone calls 

about letters that are being written to formally request this information coming from our managers to the undersecretary; there 

have been letters that have gone even higher up. So we have been 

doing this, but we much prefer doing it at the lower levels. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. I am having a tough time getting my 

mind around a lot of this. Is the slow response bureaucratic intranVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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sigence? Is it political embarrassment? Is it just stubbornness? I 

hate to have you speculate on this, but from your professional 

background, what do you attribute some of this to? 

Mr. RABKIN. I think at first there was some concern about what 

the process should be. As the department was formed, a lot of different agencies came together with different procedures, et cetera. 

I think there was a lot of GAO work going on at the time, and in 

my opinion a lot of that was because congressional committees 

were not getting direct responses—as you have already mentioned—and you (Congress) were asking us then to go in with our 

folks and try to get information out of the agency using our methods. 

So we were very busy doing that. They were getting inundated. 

They staffed up their liaison functions, which was helpful. Then 

Hurricane Katrina hit. I think that was a watershed event in that 

not only were we involved in looking at the performance of the department, but the White House was looking it. The IG was looking 

at it. The House had a special committee. The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee had a special investigation on it. 

And they were being inundated with requests for a lot of the 

times the same documents. In an attempt to control the dissemination of those documents, they created a process where everything 

had to come into a single place before it all went out. That, of 

course, was a bottleneck. At one point, our formal request got lost 

and we had to wait for them to find it, and we had to get them 

another request, et cetera. So it was not the best of times. 

Since then, I think that the tone, up until recently, has been that 

this is the process the department wanted GAO to go through. The 

department needed to be very sure before anything was turned 

over to GAO that they felt that GAO ought to have it. And it was, 

quite frankly, a little confrontational. 

In response to the question that Congressman Perlmutter asked 

recently, we have also noted some changes recently. I have asked 

my staff to keep me informed of their access issues and there are 

some anecdotes where documents are coming in a lot quicker than 

they did before. But, I am concerned for two reasons. Number one, 

it is just anecdotes. And number two is that to the extent that 

there is potential turnover of the people in DHS who are now in 

managerial and executive positions. DHS management are asking 

them to do it today, but these people may change tomorrow. The 

new attitude may come in. So I would like to see something a little 

more institutionalized. We could talk about that if you would like. 

The other issue is where there have been opportunities, or where 

there have been cases where there has been great cooperation. 

Both the cases that Undersecretary Schneider cited of SBINet and 

the Atlas Program are cases where the appropriators withheld the 

release of appropriated funds until the department prepared an expenditure plan or other documents, had it reviewed by GAO, and 

then sent it to the Congress to convince the Congress that they 

knew what they were going to do with the money. 

So our approval, our review and comments to the Congress on 

those plans was essential in the release of those monies. And so 

there was a terrific incentive for the department to cooperate, 

23 

which they did. I am not suggesting that every program and every 

appropriation be tied to this, but when it is, it seems to work. 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes, when there is money involved, things move. 

We understand that. 

I now recognize Mr. Rogers for a second round of questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Rabkin, I would like to talk about some things you would 

like to see done differently. You are probably aware that in the 

2008 DHS authorization bill, we included a provision in there that 

would require all the legislative affairs offices of the agencies to 

have direct reporting responsibility to the assistant secretary for 

legislative affairs at DHS. Do you feel like that would help this 

flow of information that we are looking for? 

Mr. RABKIN. I think most of the liaisons are not in the legislative 

affairs offices, so I think there is something separate that would 

have to take place. Whether it is mandated by the Congress or 

done administratively by the department, I think tying the liaisons 

together and elevating their status is a good first step. But I think 

there are more specific things, such as. . . 

Mr. ROGERS. Tell me about them. 

Mr. RABKIN. —in the directive that DHS has where they tell 

their people, ‘‘this is how you interact with GAO,’’ they have a 

checklist of information. They say that if any of this kind of information is going to go to GAo, we need to check on it first before 

it goes. That checklist includes such things as information that has 

been marked as security-sensitive information, for example. 

We handle that stuff all the time. We handle it as well as the 

department does. It should really be no issue on that. I think it is 

a matter of can they fine-tune of identifying those cases where 

somebody else outside of the program office needs to pre-approve 

the release of the information. I would like to see a change where 

the norm is that the information will be provided to GAO. And that 

the program officials will notify the liaison and they can notify 

their counsel at the time it is provided to GAO. And if there is any 

additional sensitivities or handling instructions that need to go 

with it, there is plenty of time for them to have that conversation 

with us. 

I would also like to see us have direct access to the program officials. These are people who are responsible for carrying out the 

very important programs of the department. They are very capable 

people. They ought to be able to make judgments as to what information that they have is so sensitive that it shouldn’t be provided 

to the GAO, or provided only under certain circumstances. Also, we 

ought to be able to have conversations with them. We can followup on information they provide us to get clarifying questions answered, without having to go through liaisons and having everything officially scheduled. It is much more efficient to do it directly. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. You stated in your prepared statement that 

they have mechanisms that the Department of Homeland Security 

employs in cooperating with investigations by the GAO that are far 

more impeding than those encountered in other agencies. Are those 

the things that you are talking about? 

Mr. RABKIN. Yes, sir. The involvement of the liaisons and the reviews. I think that what Mr. Schneider talked about regarding tryVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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ing to do these reviews in a more timely way, would really help, 

because a lot of times what happens is: All right, we can understand and wait for a couple of days while somebody in DHS checks 

out a document, to see if this is the right kind of information that 

would in fact answer the questions that GAO is asking. We ask for 

information, not necessarily for documents. If they have a document that would answer the questions, that is fine. So they may 

have to do a little research to address our specific question. 

But when days turn into weeks, and we talk to the liaisons and 

ask, ‘‘when can we expect to get this?’’ And the DHS laison responds ‘‘Well, we don’t know; the lawyers are looking it, or it has 

to go up to this person.’’ They just sort of lose track of where it is. 

That is what is very frustrating. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you find this same sort of structure or mechanism in other agencies? 

Mr. RABKIN. Most other agencies, even agencies like the Defense 

Department that deal with very sensitive information all the time 

have policies, procedures and practices in place that make it more 

efficient for the information to be shared with GAO. This is by far 

at this point in time—for the department and all the teams in GAO 

that work with the department—what we have found this to be our 

biggest concern. It doesn’t mean that the practice of providing documents is perfect elsewhere, but it is an exception elsewhere. Here, 

it tends to be the rule. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. Perlmutter for five minutes? 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. 

A couple of questions. Mr. Rabkin, you brought up the subject of 

this unclassified-but-sensitive information. We had a hearing yesterday in the Intelligence Committee about reclassifying all this 

stuff, because I think there has been a bit of a shell game going 

on, I don’t whether intentionally or not or just because folks don’t 

know exactly what their documents are and how sensitive they are, 

and whether you should be gaining access to them, and every lawyer has to look at everything before your organization gets to do 

its job. 

So I am trying to remember, the gentleman, the undersecretary, 

he is an ambassador. I don’t remember his last name. 

Mr. RABKIN. McNamara? 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. McNamara, yesterday. I think that it would be 

good if the GAO or the inspector general also worked with the ambassador in kind of redefining all of those classifications, because 

I think part of the problem, I would just say as a lawyer I want 

to represent my client. I want to make sure that the client doesn’t 

release documents that are super-secret and cause all sorts of other 

kind of havoc. 

On the other hand, we need to have the oversight and sort of this 

watchdog role, and we can’t play this kind of shell game. Because 

Mr. Undersecretary, I am concerned that the communications problems go far beyond the Coast Guard issues. I think just in the various hearings we have had, we have heard about it with respect to 

ICE, with the Border Patrol. We have heard about it with FEMA. 

25 

The trouble is, you have 22 agencies now all under one roof. Somebody says, ‘‘Well, that is sensitive information; we are not going to 

give it up.’’ Another, you know, ‘‘I have to talk to my boss on that 

one; we are not going to share it with you.’’ There has just been 

too much of that across the board. 

I am happy to hear there has been improvement. I think the fact 

that we focused on it so directly right out of the box, there have 

been some changes. But having said that, starting with you, Mr. 

Rabkin, just sort of react to my free verse here. 

Mr. RABKIN. Mr. Perlmutter, last year we issued a report on sensitive-but-unclassified information, mainly in DHS. We commented 

on the proliferation of different types of sensitive-but-unclassified 

information, and the lack of rigor in how it was marked, how it was 

handled, how people were trained in handling it, who within the 

Department were making these decisions, who were reviewing 

them, et cetera. 

We made a series of recommendations to try to tighten that up. 

Those recommendations, at first the program manager, who is now 

Mr. McNamara, were unreceptive to our report. I think they have 

changed their mind about that. I think there are attempts being 

made now to get a handle on that. I think either his office or at 

OMB or somebody at that level has got to reach across government 

and try to get a handle on this. Because when we first went 

through, we found—I forget what the number is—around 100 categories of sensitive but unclassified information. And when they 

looked, they found even more. 

So this is a significant problem. This is a balancing act that has 

to take place. There are certainly bona fide reasons to protect information. On the other hand, every time you do that, you are limiting the public access. 

We have that information. That should not be a reason for us not 

to have access to it. We can look at it. We can analyze it. We can 

report it to you. We just put a different kind of report cover on it, 

and that special report cover limits the distribution of information. 

But what we try to do at the end of each of those engagements 

where we have sensitive-but-unclassified or even classified information, we try to find a way to get a report out to the public that will 

let them know what we looked at, whether we found problems 

without getting very specific, and whether we made recommendations, so that the public, as well as the Congress and GAO, can 

hold the department’s accountable for making change. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Schneider, you seem to want to say something. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, first of all, I agree that in the attachment 

that we have in that management directive that Mr. Rabkin talked 

about, it is far too broad. That is one of the things that I really 

specifically had in mind in my testimony about can we narrow this 

thing down so that the exceptions are rare. 

I agree with him about security of sensitive information. In my 

nearly 40 years, my experience is we have given the highest level 

of classified information to the GAO and it has never been a problem. Sometimes, in fact, when we accidentally had something that 

was incorrectly marked, we said, ‘‘hey, you need to fix it,’’ and they 

have fixed it. 

26 

So I guess I agree with him that that list is too broad. We have 

to narrow it down. It ought to be a rare exception, as opposed to 

the practice. The classification issue in terms of whether it is sensitive security information, secret information or the like, proprietary, et cetera, if it is properly marked and everybody understands 

it according to the classification standard, that should not be an 

issue. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. OK. My time is up. I had one more question. 

Mr. CARNEY. The chair will yield for three minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Just one minute. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

In this draft that Chairman Thompson was talking about, and I 

know it hasn’t been circulated. I am just curious if there is any 

kind of repercussions if this doesn’t happen. 

It says, ‘‘In particular, I expect DHS employees to cooperate with 

OIG by promptly providing all requested materials and any other 

information relevant to a request; providing requested information 

materials directly to OIG, not routed through an intermediary; 

honoring OIG requests for private interviews and direct contact, 

recognizing that any employee may speak directly and confidentially with OIG; and respecting OIG independence by refraining 

from any activity that might chill an employee or contractor’s communication.’’ 

I know that wasn’t widespread, but those things seem ABC-like 

to me. Those are basic parts of the communication path in government. So those things just are basic. 

Is there any kind of repercussion in the event a department or 

an individual tries to stonewall or doesn’t permit these things to 

happen? Is there some kind of a black mark that that person gets? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am not aware today of any black mark. There 

are a couple of points here, and this is one of these situations 

where 99 percent of the time there is probably not an issue with 

what you call, Congressman, the ABCs. It is the 1 percent that we 

seem to spend the tremendous amount of time on to make sure 

that we are not crossing the line on something. 

Some of the issues come up relative to third-party classification 

of the document. It is not our document. We didn’t classify it. We 

don’t even know what the right classification is. We do a lot of 

work, as you are aware, with lots of the other departments. And 

so those are some of the issues that I would say are classified in 

the 1 percent. 

We believe that there are other issues here. For example, the 

secretary in his February 7th or 8th testimony in front of Chairman Price in the Appropriations Committee specifically talked 

about this issue relative to deciding that he as a prosecutor would 

have liked to be able to talk to witnesses without counsel present, 

but the fact of the matter is sometimes in the case here that is not 

going to be the case. 

So as a general rule, we wouldn’t expect to have somebody. If an 

employee decides that he wants to have a representative with him 

when he talked to the IG, my understanding is the IG would ultimately agree to that. 

There is one issue here on the bottom of this page that is particularly significant. I spent a little bit of time doing some research 

on this one because of my background being a program manager, 

27 

and executing major programs has to do with direct access by the 

IG to contractor employees. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. OK. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is an issue. I am an engineer. I am not a 

lawyer or contracts type, but basically I have looked at the FAR– 

DFAR clauses and HSAR clauses, and what is required in contracts 

is for information, for data. OK? Hard copy data information. We 

do not have and we would suspect that in many instances, especially where we have contractors that have strong unions, direct access to people without a management supervisor or union representatives present would probably be a problem. 

So those are just some of the issues that at first blush would 

cause some difficulty. It is one of the reasons why, notwithstanding 

the fact we should have taken prompt action, as Chairman Thomson said, but it is one of the reasons why the ABCs are on the surface, yes. Now, can we do things? Yes. We can shorten that list of 

exceptions and basically give the information and on an exception 

basis use good common sense and judgment as to whether or not 

they need to talk to somebody. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. Rabkin, prior to the formation of the department, GAO had 

dealings with many of the legacy agencies. Can you tell whether 

GAO’s relationship with those agencies has changed since DHS 

was formed? Have they gotten more cooperative? Less cooperative? 

Stayed the same? Can you characterize that for me, please? 

Mr. RABKIN. In general, Mr. Chairman, they have gotten less cooperative. While relationships prior to the formation of DHS with 

these agencies were not always perfect, we had less problems getting direct access to agency officials. We had fewer problems with 

the timely provision of requested documents. Whether it was the 

legacy INS, the Customs Service, FEMA, Coast Guard, et cetera, 

I think, as a rule, access at the working level was much better. 

Mr. CARNEY. Can you attribute that to something? 

Mr. RABKIN. As I mentioned earlier, I think it was first of all, 

the formation of the department, and everybody now was part of 

a new department and they were looking around to see what are 

the rules: ‘‘how should we behave?’’ And that took a while for those 

questions to be answered. 

When they were answered, they then became a matter of interpretation, and that took a little while until that was worked out. 

And then in 2005, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Wilma 

hit the Gulf Coast, there was a lot of worry and concern about how 

the department, specifically how a lot of the departments, but specifically about DHS and FEMA reacted. 

As I mentioned earlier, there were a lot of investigations and a 

lot of requests for access to data, which resulted in DHS centralizing control. And eventually a pattern was established from that 

that we are still with, and hopefully, maybe, we have turned the 

corner on it now. But we are still trying to deal with it. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Rabkin, in your testimony you have basically two recommendations for improving GAO’s interaction with DHS. You 

want to be able first, if I am reading this correctly, to be able to 

28 

deal directly with program officials at the initial entrance conference. Is that correct? 

Mr. RABKIN. Correct, after the initial entrance conference. 

Mr. CARNEY. After, and then where the department counsel believes it necessary to review certain documents, you want this only 

to happen on a very rare, exceptional basis. Is that correct? 

Mr. RABKIN. That is correct. 

Mr. CARNEY. OK. 

Undersecretary Schneider, can you agree to both these requests 

today? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, sir, and I have spent a lot of time looking 

at those two recommendations. I agree that for the majority of the 

instances that GAO ought to be able to deal with the program people after they have had the initial entrance conference. I believe in 

the majority of cases that should not be an issue. 

I also agree that if there are concerns, they can involve DHS liaison organizations either at the headquarters or in the operational 

components. I think that ought to be the general operating rule. 

And we ought to be able to figure out which ones they are. Certain 

types of audits or reviews require a little closer involvement or coordinators. This ends up being the issue which people refer to as 

‘‘pre-decisional’’ or ‘‘pre-deliberate,’’ where it is basically analysis as 

opposed to facts. 

Some of the cases or efforts where there have been problems 

have revolved around those types, as opposed to a straight effort 

looking at a communications system or something of the like. 

I also think that in general the second recommendation that documents ought to be provided directly kind of follows with the first. 

For the most part, that should be the normal practice. There are 

going to be some exceptions. So that is why my initial response to 

your question—would I agree to do that today?—not across the 

board. 

And that is why I think it ends up being the judgment of the people to know, based on the nature of the effort being looked at, 

whether or not it ought to be, hey, straight to the program people 

after the initial entrance meeting, or whether or not it is going to 

require special considerations and special reviews. 

And if it does, it ought to be able to be done on an expeditious 

basis. That is not an excuse, in my mind, for the lack of a timely 

response. 

Mr. CARNEY. So the judgment will be made by the same people 

that have delayed the process so far? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. That is where our system is not working. 

We have to figure out a better way so that these issues get visibility fast. I believe that at the operational component level, if they 

can’t resolve it, I can resolve it. If an issue has surfaced, OK—and 

this is where this liaison office in an operational component is a 

two-edged sword, frankly. 

I indicated earlier that last week I met with senior folks of each 

of the operational components. What they told me was this: whether it is the IG or the GAO, if they go off and they start dealing 

with program people directly, if you will, that is fine. And maybe 

that will work fine. 

29 

But then what happens if those people out there—and I am talking about geographically dispersed, as opposed to within eyeball 

sight within D.C.—for whatever reason, don’t provide the information. How does leadership find out about it? Well, leadership would 

normally rely on the liaison to get the feedback. Well, if you don’t 

have the right mechanisms in place by which program people dealing directly with the IG or the GAO are providing that information, 

where discrepancies or issues or conflicts are coming up, then how 

is leadership supposed to respond? 

So I think there is a clear middle of the road here where for most 

cases they can deal directly and should be able to deal directly with 

the program people to speed things up, and that somehow or other 

we have these feedback mechanisms in place so that whether it is 

the operational component liaison or whether it is my liaison at 

headquarters, we have visibility to these areas where we are having difficulty providing the information. 

And so we can act on it and jump on it, whether I keep a punch 

list or whether the head of ICE or CBP keeps a punch list, and we 

start working them off, and make sure they get done quickly. That 

is one of the management schemes. So that is why unfortunately 

we have a tendency to focus on the 1 percent, OK? The exceptions, 

as opposed to establishing the general operating principles that by 

and large things ought to move quickly. There doesn’t need to be 

special handling. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. I understand. To say it is 1 percent I think 

really underestimates the problem. 

Mr. Rogers, any more questions? No further questions? 

Mr. Perlmutter? 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Just a follow-up. I think it is incumbent on the 

investigative arm, whether it is the inspector general’s office or the 

GAO—and I think what I did hear you agree to is that the buck 

is stopping with you. And so if there is a problem, they are not getting a response—somebody delayed; somebody stonewalled; somebody has just forgotten about it—it can come up through your 

channels from ICE or CBP or FEMA or whatever, but it also can 

come up through the investigators, the auditor’s channel and come 

over to you and say, ‘‘What is going on here? Why haven’t we gotten a response?’’ 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir. That management directive clearly 

states that I am in charge of this thing. I think I said it earlier. 

I am not satisfied, if you will, that I have been doing a good enough 

job of getting visibility into the detailed issue so I can jump on 

them. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Rabkin? 

Mr. RABKIN. In response to Mr. Perlmutter’s comment and Mr. 

Perlmutter’s question, and the earlier discussion of GAO having access to program officials out in the field. If the field program officials are reluctant or refuse to provide us information, I think that 

fact will get up the chain quickly. Our folks will come back, call 

their managers, and let us know about it. We will call the liaisons 

and we will work it up the chain of chain command. 

I think there is another concern here, perhaps, and that is that 

DHS program officials will be too forthcoming with information. 

That is fine with us, but maybe the department needs to know just 

30 

what did you give GAO or the IG, and how much did you give 

them. And maybe there is some reasonable concern there. Was it 

the latest policies? Was it the latest information? Did you give 

them enough context so that the auditors will understand what the 

information means? 

I think that DHS and the program officials in the field can have 

their own conversations about that and ensure that we get full information. So I think they can work that separately. I really don’t 

think it is an issue. I understand that there may be isolated cases 

where we shouldn’t be talking directly to a program official and 

they may want to have somebody there. We have done this in the 

past. It has always worked out fine, whether it is here in Washington or anywhere in the field, including overseas. So we are willing to accept that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Rogers, any further questions? 

Mr. Perlmutter? 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. Members of the subcommittee may have 

additional questions for the witnesses. We ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(31) 

1The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, generally requires agencies to 

disclose documents to the public, subject to certain specified exemptions. 2More specifically, this exemption category relates to records or information compiled for law 

enforcement purpose, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records 

or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) 

would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably 

be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a state, local, or foreign 

agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential 

basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; (E) would disclose 

techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose 

guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably 

be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger 

the life or physical safety of any individual. 

Appendix I: Key GAO Audit and Access 

Authorities 

GAO’s Audit and Evaluation Authority: 

GAO has broad statutory authority under title 31 of the United States 

Code to audit and evaluate agency financial transactions, programs, and activities. Under 31 U.S.C. § 712, GAO has authority to investigate all matters related 

to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money. 

Section 717 of title 31, U.S.C., authorizes GAO to evaluate the results of programs 

and activities of federal agencies, on GAO’s own initiative or when requested by either house of Congress or a committee of jurisdiction. Section 3523(a) of title 31 authorizes GAO to audit the financial transactions of each agency, except as specifically provided by law. 

GAO’s Access-to-Records Authority: 

To carry out these audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad statutory 

right of access to agency records. Under 31 U.S.C. § 716(a), federal agencies are required to provide GAO with information about their duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial transactions. When an agency does not make a record available to GAO within a reasonable period of time, GAO may issue a written request 

to the agency head specifying the record needed and the authority for accessing the 

record. Should the agency fail to release the record to GAO, GAO has the authority 

to enforce its requests for records by filing a civil action to compel production of 

records in federal district court. 

A limitation in section 716, while not restricting GAO’s basic statutory right of 

access, acts to limit GAO’s ability to compel production of particular records through 

a court action. For example, GAO may not bring such an action to enforce its statutory right of access to a record where the President or the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget certifies to the Comptroller General and Congress (1) that 

a record could be withheld under one of two specified provisions of the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA) 1 and (2) disclosure to GAO reasonably could be expected to 

impair substantially the operations of the government. 

The first prong of this certification provision requires that such record could be 

withheld under FOIA pursuant to either 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), relating to inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to 

a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency, or 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), 

relating to certain records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes.2

The second prong of the certification provision, regarding impairment of government operations, presents a very high standard for the agency to meet. The Senate 

report on this section 716 limitation stated: 

32 

3S. Rep. No. 96–570, at 7–8 (1980). 

4 Id. at 7. 

‘‘As the presence of this additional test [the second prong] makes clear, the 

mere fact that materials sought are subject to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) or (7) and 

therefore exempt from public disclosure does not justify withholding them from 

the Comptroller General. Currently GAO is routinely granted access to highly 

sensitive information, including internal memoranda and law enforcement files, 

and has established a fine record in protecting such information from improper 

use or disclosure. Thus, in order for the certification to be valid, there must be 

some unique or highly special circumstances to justify a conclusion that possession by the Comptroller General of the information could reasonably be expected 

to substantially impair Government operations.’’ 3

The committee report also points out that the Comptroller General’s statutory 

right of access to agency records is not diminished by the certification provisions of 

the legislation. The certification simply allows the President or Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) to preclude the Comptroller General from seeking a judicial remedy in certain limited situations.4

(33) 

Appendix II: Letter from the Honorable Paul A. 

Schneider 


43565-01.eps
34 


43565-02.eps
(35) 

Appendix III: For the Record 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES


43565-03.eps
36 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT

Question 1.: What is the Department’s understanding of the Inspector 

General’s (IG) role within the Department? Please answer the following 

questions, and if your answer is in the negative please explain the basis for 

it. 

a. Do you believe that the IG can interview any Department employee in 

private without notifying his or her superior or any liaison officer? If not, 

why not? 

Response: Yes, however, if the employee wants someone present they should be 

allowed to do so. There may also be limited circumstances where it is appropriate 

to have a Departmental representative present for interviews with the OIG to ensure that sensitive information is identified and afforded proper protections. In evaluating such situations, we carefully consider the employee’s rights under the Whistleblower Protection Act and other related authorities. 

b. Do you agree that asking employees to report any contact by the IG 

to their superiors will chill their willingness to speak openly with the IG? 

Response: Employees are not required to report contact with the OIG to their 

supervisors, and DHS does not take action to interfere with, impede or hinder employees’ contact with the IG. 

c. Do you believe requiring a representative of management or an audit 

liaison to sit in on an interview with the IG would create a chilling affect 

on an employee’s willingness to talk openly and completely? 

Response: Representatives of management or audit liaisons do not generally sit 

in on OIG interviews with Departmental employees, and DHS does not take action 

to interfere with, impede, or hinder employees’ contact with the IG. 

d. Do you believe that all Department employees should cooperate fully 

with the IG and provide prompt, complete, and direct access to any materials or information requested? 

Response: Yes, all employees must cooperate with the Inspector General in accordance with laws and authorities. This is consistent with the guidance provided 

in the management directives. 

e. Do you agree that the Department should promptly provide the IG with 

all requested materials—including draft, privileged, and classified—without routing them through an intermediary? If not, why not? 

Response: IG engagements are largely characterized by extensive cooperation between the Department and the IG, and DHS routinely makes thousands of documents widely available to the OIG. Few audits entail review of materials by the Department before they are given to the OIG. For instance, the OIG had direct access 

to departmental documents and information during the numerous Hurricane 


43565-04.eps
37 

Katrina investigations. There were no filters between the OIG and these Katrinarelated documents. Indeed, the Inspector General indicated that he views the 

Katrina investigations as a highlight of cooperation between the OIG and DHS. 

In limited circumstances, it makes sense—for both the Department and the IG— 

to recognize exceptions from these general practices. For example, even though the 

attorney-client privilege is not waived by providing documents to the OIG (since the 

OIG is part of the Executive Department), it is appropriate to identify documents 

as privileged before they are transmitted, so that the OIG may act accordingly in 

preparing its report. Also, there may be other instances where accountability and 

prudent management practices dictate that DHS coordinate its production of documents to the OIG through a central unit. In any case, DHS will continue to work 

with the OIG to ensure that documents are produced in a timely fashion in all circumstances. 

f. Do you agree that the Department should refrain from taking any action that could chill an employee or contractor’s communication to or cooperation with the IG? 

Response: The Department encourages full and complete cooperation by employees and contractors with the OIG and does not engage in activities which will inhibit communications to or cooperation with the OIG. The Department, through its 

Management Directive, requires all Departmental employees to cooperate fully with 

the OIG by disclosing complete and accurate information pertaining to matters 

under review—a perspective recently echoed by the Secretary and reflected in public 

remarks. Indeed, we do not take any actions which would interfere with, impede, 

or hinder communications to or cooperation with the IG; such activities would not 

be tolerated. 

g. Do you agree that the IG’s rights and responsibilities extend to Department contractors and grantees? 

Response: Access to contractor records is governed by statute and regulation. 

Section 254d of Title 41, U.S. Code and Section 2313 of Title 10, U.S. Code authorize 

‘‘the head of an agency, acting through an authorized representative. . .to inspect 

the plant and audit the records of. . .a contractor performing a cost-reimbursement, 

incentive, time-and-materials, labor-hour, or price redeterminable contract, or any 

combination of such contracts. . . .’’ Both statutes separately provide that an Inspector General ‘‘may require by subpoena the production of records of a contractor, 

access to which is provided for that executive agency by [the language above].’’ 

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) has implemented 41 U.S.C. § 254d specifically provides that ‘‘the Contracting Officer, or an authorized representative of 

the Contracting Officer, shall have the right to examine and audit all records and 

other evidence sufficient to reflect properly all costs claimed to have been incurred 

or anticipated to be incurred directly or indirectly in performance of this contract. 

This right of examination shall include inspection at all reasonable times of the 

Contractor’s plants, or parts of them, engaged in performing the contract.’’ The 

scope of examination is limited to some but not all contract types, and does not appear to extend to interviews of contract personnel. 

The FAR clause also authorizes access for the Comptroller General of the United 

States. No provision is made for audit access by an Inspector General. Neither the 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement nor the Homeland Security 

Acquisition Regulation (HSAR) further implements 10 U.S.C. § 2313 and 41 U.S.C. 

§ 254d, respectively, or the FAR. In order to develop a similar standard contract 

clause for audit access by OIG, as was recommended by OIG in the National Security Cutter audit, the Department would be required to first publish the clause in 

the HSAR after notice and public comment. 

With regard to grantees, the OIG is responsible for overseeing processes and parties related to the management and financial operations of DHS. The Office of Inspector General Fiscal Year 2007 Annual Performance Plan states that the Office 

of Audits is responsible for examining the methods employed by agencies, bureaus, 

grantees and contractors in carrying out essential programs and activities. Recipients of Disaster Assistance grants are monitored by the Office of Disaster Assistance Oversight, which ensures that disaster relief funds are being spent appropriately, while identifying fraud, waste, and abuse. Furthermore, any allegations of 

criminal, civil and administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, 

and grantees fall under the jurisdiction of the OIG Office of Investigations. By accepting funding from the Department, grantees agree to hold themselves to the 

same standard of integrity and accountability held to the Department itself. 

Question 2.: How does the GAO’s right to documents and information differ from the IG’s? 

38 

Response: GAO and the OIG operate under different statutory authorities, granting them different rights of access and recognizing their different operational missions. In addition, the OIG is part of the Department as well as the Executive 

Branch while the GAO is part of the Legislative Branch. DHS must exercise proper 

precautions before releasing information outside the Department. For example, we 

must ensure that sensitive information is properly marked and handled accordingly, 

so that it is not disclosed inappropriately in the public domain. 

Question 3.: The IG and the GAO have both expressed that their primary concern with the Department has been an undue delay in providing them with information. 

a. Since the Department is in the end providing most, if not all, of the 

requested information, what is the cause of the delays, and what does the 

Department hope to accomplish through them? 

Response: The Secretary has made clear that Departmental personnel are expected to provide requested information in a timely manner, without unnecessary 

delays, in accordance with proper authorities and procedures. Since the inception of 

DHS on March 1, 2003, the Department has provided substantial assistance and 

support to GAO in publishing over 580 reports and testimony regarding the Department. Currently, there are approximately 300 open GAO audits of DHS. Similarly, 

since October 1, 2004, the Department has provided substantial assistance and support to OIG which has conducted thousands of investigations of DHS and issued 

over 1,000 Management and Investigative Reports. This level of oversight would not 

be possible without DHS cooperation. But it also results in delays when employees 

are trying to do their jobs and respond to this level of GAO investigation. 

That being said, we must do a better job of providing information to GAO and 

OIG in a timely manner. 

b. To the extent the Department’s General Counsel or others want to review the information, what harm is there in allowing them to do so at the 

same time as the IG or the GAO? 

Response: DHS does not require that all documents be reviewed before they are 

turned over. DHS produces thousands upon thousands of documents to the OIG and 

GAO each year. However, as the Secretary previously noted, there is a professional 

responsibility to review certain documents before they are disclosed to ensure that 

personal information, legal principles, and national security information are identified. In those instances, it would not be prudent—from a management or legal perspective—to release such materials before underlying sensitivities and legal issues 

related to such information could be identified. A centralized review of documents 

can also ensure that disclosures are consistent and complete and that all documents 

are properly marked in response to multiple requests. 

c. Under what circumstances is it appropriate for the Department to review documents before providing them to the IG? 

i. For what purposes would the Department do this? 

Response: As discussed in previous answers, in certain circumstances, DHS has 

an obligation to review documents to ensure that personal information, legal principles, and national security information is protected. A centralized review of documents can also ensure that disclosures are consistent and complete and that all documents are properly marked in response to multiple requests. Moreover, it is prudent—for both the Department and OIG—to appropriately identify and mark documents as sensitive before they are transmitted to the OIG, so that the OIG may 

act accordingly in preparing its report. DHS will continue to work with the OIG to 

ensure that documents are produced in a timely fashion. 

d. Under what circumstances is it appropriate for the Department to review documents before providing them to the GAO? 

i. For what purposes would the Department do this? 

Response: In certain circumstances, DHS has an obligation to review documents 

to ensure that personal information, legal principles, and national security information is protected. A centralized review of documents can also ensure that disclosures 

are consistent and complete and that all documents are properly marked in response to multiple requests. Moreover, it is prudent to appropriately identify and 

mark documents as sensitive before they are transmitted to the GAO, so that the 

GAO may act accordingly in preparing its report. DHS will continue to work with 

the GAO to ensure that documents are produced in a timely fashion. 

Question 4.: In his prepared testimony, Mr. Rabkin said ‘‘DHS has not made its 

management or operational decisions transparent enough to allow Congress to be 

39 

sure that the department is effectively, efficiently, and economically using its billions of dollars of annual funding.’’ 

a. Do you agree with this statement, and if not why not? 

b. What are you going to do to address this? 

Response: During his February 8th Congressional testimony, the Secretary stated that cooperation with the GAO is imperative. The Secretary has already acknowledged that that Department’s responsiveness is neither what it should be nor as 

timely as it could be. He has also acknowledged the need for greater information 

flow to Congress as a top priority and has required that employee performance reviews be linked to individual responsiveness to such requests. 

Looking ahead, we are examining ways to improve the speed by which documents 

and information flow. This includes improving communication, training and outreach to the employees of the Department, revamping the organizational structure 

and placement of liaison offices at headquarters and in Components, and providing 

additional guidance to Department employees on how to interact with the GAO. 

Question 5.: In March 2004, the Department developed Directive #0820 which 

contains policies and procedures for interacting with the GAO. Please explain the 

processes for implementing this Directive. 

Response: Management Directive 0820 establishes Department of Homeland Security policy and procedures on relations with the GAO. This Directive requires all 

employees of DHS to cooperate with all employees of GAO to the fullest extent consistent with the responsibilities of DHS and its Components. 

The Department Liaison Office and component liaisons offices facilitate the GAO’s 

efforts to gain information from the Department. The Liaison Office fosters the 

GAO’s access to materials by providing direction and identifying knowledgeable employees with relevant and up-to-date information. In addition, the Liaison Office 

makes arrangements for the GAO’s physical access to DHS facilities and personnel 

at Headquarters and in the field office locations. It also ensures comprehensive and 

consistent responses to GAO requests, and identifies sensitive information (where 

necessary) for proper marking and handling. Moreover, the Liaison Office makes arrangements for the GAO’s entrance and exit conferences with Department personnel. Further, the Liaison Office provides an early-warning mechanism for senior 

DHS management to identify issues that might arise during a GAO engagement or 

audit. 

a. How has the Directive been implemented in DHS? 

Response: On behalf of the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Management has 

overall management authority for all DHS relations with GAO and responsibility for 

implementation of all aspects of this Directive through DHS. The Under Secretary 

for Management carries out this responsibility through the Chief Financial Officer 

(CFO), in coordination with senior DHS officials. 

The CFO has designated a Departmental GAO Liaison (DGL) to be the primary 

management official within DHS responsible for implementing this Directive and 

managing all matters involving relations between GAO and DHS. 

b. Do you have a sense as to whether program officials and component 

liaisons have interpreted the Directive to mean that lawyers are to review 

almost every document requested before it can be provided to GAO? 

Response: The Management Directive does not require DHS counsel to review 

every document before it is turned over to GAO. 

c. Do you interpret the Directive as written or implemented to be that attorneys are to review all documents before providing them to GAO? 

Response: No. 

d. Who in the Department is responsible for periodically reviewing this 

Directive and revising it when appropriate? 

Response: The Under Secretary for Management is the primary official within 

DHS responsible for implementing this Directive and is authorized to manage, on 

behalf of the Secretary, all matters involving relations between GAO and DHS, including all DHS Components, as well as the review and revision of the Management 

Directive. We are currently reviewing the Department’s guidance, procedures, and 

training with respect to these issues. 

Question 6.: In your testimony you said that after talking to representatives from 

all Department components, you found that ‘‘there is a general feeling that information provided will be used for ‘Gotchas.’ ’’ Does this mean that Department employees are reluctant to cooperate with the IG or the GAO? 

a. Would you agree that this is a problem? 

40 

Response: No, Department employees are not reluctant to cooperate with the IG 

or the GAO, but there has been concern in the past about how the information will 

be used. 

b. What can you do to resolve it and convey to the Department’s employees the important function both GAO and the IG play in a well-run department? 

Response: I am striving to improve communication and guidance to the Department’s employees, and engage leadership to focus on the importance of the IG and 

GAO to a well-run department. 

Question 7.: When is it appropriate for the Department to refuse to provide information to the GAO? 

Response: Management Directives identify situations where more detailed review is required prior to release of information to the GAO. For example, this might 

include documents related to ongoing criminal, civil or administrative investigations 

or proceedings, law enforcement sensitive information, deliberative information, intelligence information, and documents of a third-party or agency. In many cases, 

documents may ultimately be produced following a detailed review. 

a. Would you agree that in such situations, the Department should clearly 

and concisely tell the GAO that it is refusing to provide information, and 

why? 

Response: Yes. And the Department has done so on those few occasions where 

this has happened. 

Question 8.: GAO has some fundamental concerns about the processes the 

Department has put in place for dealing with the GAO. Are you willing to 

take a fresh look at all these processes and address the GAO’s concerns? 

Response: Yes. 

Question 9.: What are your impressions of the cooperation that your 

agency’s components have with GAO, including the role of the Department’s Office of General Counsel, compared with your prior experience in 

DOD? 

Response: It is difficult to directly relate my experiences at the Department of 

Defense (DOD) with those at DHS, because these are two agencies at very different 

stages of development. The Department of Homeland Security is still in its earlier 

stages of development. 

That said, the level of cooperation that exists between DHS and GAO is not as 

great as that between the GAO and the DoD. 

Question 10.: Secretary Chertoff sent a memorandum to all his component heads 

directing them to take corrective actions to improve on the Department’s ability to 

deliver past due reports and answer Congressional questions in a timelier manner. 

Secretary Chertoff has stated in a recent testimony that he is making this issue a 

priority. Please provide specific plans on how the Department’s leadership will ensure that all components of the Department will respond in a timelier manner. 

a. Please identify any performance goals or benchmarks that both Congress and the Department’s leadership can use to measure any improvement? 

Response: As of September 1, 2007, the Executive Secretariat’s office has this 

year managed 78 individual Questions for the Record (QFR) sets issued by House 

and Senate Authorization Committees following a formal hearing. The Office of the 

Chief Financial Officer managed 16 individual QFR sets issued by the House and 

Senate Appropriations Committees. These 94 sets represent 2,630 individual questions. 71 of these 94 sets have been answered, cleared by the Office of Management 

and Budget, and returned to the requesting Committee. Our average response time 

for QFR sets is 33 business days. 

All letters sent to DHS by a Member of Congress are answered with at least an 

interim response in 10 business days. 

In 2007 (to date), one-time and recurring reports required by authorizing legislation total 86, with one-time and recurring appropriation reports totaling 460. As an 

educated guess, easily well over 100 reports annually require an average of more 

than 300 man hours to produce at DHS. Many more still consume a bare minimum 

of 100 hours prior to transmittal. 

b. Please describe with specificity any programmatic changes you plan to 

make and what impact will these changes have. 

Response: Performance in this area is tracked and monitored by the Department’s Management. 

41 

c. Please provide the methods the Department plans to use to inform Congress of any changes or improvements in the Department’s performance. 

Response: Since January, we have been sending on average, one or two reports 

to the Hill each day. Our QFR response has improved dramatically from last year. 

The results of the Department’s leadership becoming engaged are clear. Responding 

to Congress is a priority and we are working to complete all requests in a timely 

manner. 

d. The memo addresses being more responsive to Congress but does not 

address providing timely information to GAO. As you know, GAO is an arm 

of Congress. What will the Department do to convey its commitment to be 

more responsive to GAO? 

Response: The need to improve the Department’s responsiveness to the GAO is 

being stressed by the Department’s leadership. 

Question 11.: In July 2006, the IG provided the Deputy Secretary with a letter 

detailing the role of the IG and a series of frequently asked questions. Please answer the following questions concerning this letter: 

a. What happened to it after it was given to the Deputy Secretary? 

Response: It was reviewed by several organizations within the Department. 

b. Did the General Counsel’s office review it? 

Response: Yes. 

c. Was any response—formal or informal—provided to the IG? 

Response: The draft memorandum has served as one of the bases for discussion 

between senior Department officials and the IG about the proper way to communicate the Department’s expectations regarding IG access to DHS’s employees. That 

discussion is ongoing. 

d. Were there were any discussions between Department officials and the 

IG regarding potential concerns with the letter? 

Response: Yes. 

e. If there were no such discussions, why not? 

Response: There were discussions. 

i Was it appropriate not to hold such discussions if the Department had 

concerns about its contents? 

Response: There has been ongoing discussion regarding the details of the draft 

memoranda. 

f. Will you recommend that the letter be sent out, and if not why not? 

Response: I would not recommend the memorandum written be sent out. I do 

not agree with every proposition in the draft memorandum, including the strict prohibition on any review of documents produced to the IG, and on any assistance during witness interviews. 

Question 12.: What steps have you taken since this hearing to communicate the importance of cooperation with the IG and the OIG to your colleagues and subordinates? 

Response: I have discussed this matter with the leadership at DHS headquarters 

and I have raised the issue with the representatives of the DHS operating components at the Department’s Management Council, which I chair. 

Question 13.: What steps have you taken since this hearing to communicate Congress’s ongoing concern over the GAO and the IG’s difficulties 

to your colleagues and subordinates? 

Response: I have discussed this matter with the leadership at DHS headquarters, and I have raised the issues with the representatives of the DHS operating components at the Department’s Management Council, which I chair. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. ROGERS, RANKING MEMBER, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT

Question 14.: As the Under Secretary responsible for management and 

budgets across the Department of Homeland Security, please provide for 

the following information regarding the Department’s canine teams: 

a. Any DHS component which currently uses canine teams (in addition 

to CBP, USSS, and TSA); 

b. A summary of each canine training program operated by a DHS agency; 

Response: USSS 

42 

The United States Secret Service (USSS) has 57 Explosive Detection Canines (w/ 

57 handlers). The USSS has 14 Emergency Response Canines (w/14 handlers). 

USSS has a total of 71 Canine Teams. 

ICE 

The ICE Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently maintains 60 canine explosives detection dog teams strategically located across the country. 

CBP 

As of March 6, 2007 CBP employs 1,234 canines and canine teams. 

USCG 

The Coast Guard has 18 teams (one handler and one canine per team). 

TSA 

TSA’s canine program deploys only explosives detection teams under the National 

Explosives Detection Canine Training Program (NEDCTP). It is operated cooperatively in partnership with local law enforcement agencies and transportation industry stakeholders. The canine handlers come from local law enforcement (airport/ 

mass transit) agencies. Currently, TSA has 441 teams deployed in aviation and 

mass transit systems, with a target of 478 deployed teams by the end of fiscal year 

07. 

Shown below are the funding levels in fiscal year 07 and those requested for fiscal 

year 08, for each DHS agency’s canine program. c. The Fiscal Year 2007 funding level and Fiscal Year 2008 budget request 

for each DHS agency’s canine program; 

USSS 

Overall Approved Budget for Canine Program fiscal year 07: $241,364. 

Overall Proposed Budget for Canine Program fiscal year 08: $371,029. 

ICE 

The FPS Canine Program is approximately $7.74 million in fiscal year 2007, or 

$129,000 per team. This includes the full cost of the FPS inspector and the cost of 

care, feeding and annual recertification training for the dog. The fiscal year 2008 

cost will be approximately $8.05 million. 

CBP 

While there is no discrete budget for canine enforcement, CBP estimates a projected spending level for fiscal year 2007 of $130.7 million and a requested funding 

level for fiscal year 2008 of $176.3 million. 

USCG 

The Coast Guard’s recurring annual budget for one Canine Detection Team (CDT) 

is $9,600 per canine and $73,000 per handler (handlers also perform other MLE/ 

FP duties as needed). The total funding level for 18 teams is $1.5 million. 

TSA 

Fiscal year 07 funding is $32 million; fiscal year 08 funding is $35.5 million. 

d. The number of canines currently utilized by each DHS agency, and an 

assessment of the existing unmet need in each DHS agency for additional 

canines; and 

USSS: At this time the USSS is short three (3) Explosives Detection Canines. 

ICE: The FPS will not require any additional canine teams for fiscal year 08. 

CBP: CBP has no unmet needs for canines in fiscal year 2008. 

USCG: Coast Guard currently has a sufficient number of CDTs. 

e. An assessment of the percentage of detection canines utilized by DHS 

which is bred domestically compared to the percentage which is acquired 

from vendors overseas. 

The USSS utilizes Belgian Malinois canines. All of the USSS canines are purchased from an American company, the Vohne Liche Kennels, in Indiana. The 

Vohne Liche Kennels acquires its dogs from Germany. None of the canines are bred 

domestically. 

The FPS explosives detection dog teams are trained at Auburn University. Auburn University provides the dog at the time team training begins. A check of the 

University records indicates that 19 of the FPS dogs were bred domestically and 41 

were bred overseas. 

None of CBP’s dogs are purchased from overseas vendors; however most of the 

domestic vendors that supply dogs to CBP utilize and procure a portion of their dogs 

from overseas kennels. 

The U.S. Coast Guard acquires all canines from CBP. 

You have had a long career in the Federal Government, including serving as a 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 

43 

Question 15.: Based on your past experience, what are some of the differences between the process at the Defense Department compared to the 

process at DHS for addressing inquiries from the GAO and DoD Inspector 

General? 

Response: It appears in general that the major difference is that there are fewer 

reviews of material by DOD before it is released to GAO and DOD Inspector General. The other difference is the role of the liaison office (at the equivalent to the 

operational component level) after the start of a review. In DOD, it appears they 

have a very small role after the start of a specific review. 

Question 16.: Are there any aspects to the way DoD responds that you 

have instituted, or plan to institute, at DHS? 

Response: We are looking at ways to expedite the flow of information to the OIG 

and GAO by streamlining the process prior to releasing the requested information. 

You point out in your statement (page 1) that the relationship between DHS and 

the Inspector General differs from its relationship with GAO. 

Question 17.:Could you please elaborate on this difference and explain 

the differences in procedure for the response by DHS to each? 

Response: GAO and the OIG operate under different statutory authorities, granting them different rights of access and recognizing their different operational missions. In addition, the OIG is part of the Department and thus the Executive 

Branch while the GAO is part of the Legislative Branch. DHS must therefore exercise proper precautions before releasing information outside the Department. For example, we must ensure that sensitive information is properly marked and handled 

accordingly, so that it is not released inappropriately in the public domain. 

The Subcommittee has been advised that when DHS employees meet with auditors, 

the supervisors of those employees may sit in on the meetings. 

Question 18: Is this the usual practice? 

Response: There is no requirement for the presence of a management representative or audit liaison at interviews. We encourage DHS employees to speak openly 

and frankly with auditors and to provide information. Indeed, Department representatives attend very few such meetings. 

There may be limited circumstances where it might make sense to have a Departmental representative present for interviews to ensure that sensitive information is 

identified and given proper protection. Just because a DHS liaison attends a meeting does not inhibit an individual’s opportunity to convey important information. 

The presence of a Departmental representative is in no way designed to inhibit the 

free flow of information to auditors. 

When an employee requests a Department representative to accompany him/her 

to a meeting, we will consider such a request and honor it when appropriate. In 

evaluating such situations, we carefully consider the employees’ rights under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act and other related statutes. 

Wouldn’t the presence of a supervisor have a chilling effect on what an 

employee may say? 

Response: DHS does not require a supervisor to be present at an interview with 

auditors, and DHS does not take action to interfere with, impede, or hinder employees’ communications. 

In your capacity, you oversee the Audit Liaison Office, which is housed within the 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer. The Audit Liaison Officer works with his or her 

counterparts in the Department’s components to respond to requests from the GAO 

and Inspector General. 

Questions 19: Could you please elaborate on the roles and responsibilities 

of the Audit Liaison Officer at the Headquarters level? In the component 

agencies? 

Response: The role and responsibilities of the Headquarters Audit Liaison are 

spelled out in Management Directive 0820. 

Question 20: Do you believe the Audit Liaison Officer has sufficient authority over the liaison officers in the Department’s components? 

Response: Yes. Pursuant to MD 0820, the Departmental GAO Liaison is the primary management official within DHS responsible for implementation of this Directive and authorized to manage, on behalf of the Secretary, all matters involving relations between GAO and DHS. The DGL is authorized to provide oversight and direction to all DHS Components relating to relations with and responding to GAO. 

Question 21.: Does the Audit Liaison Officer at DHS Headquarters have 

direct line authority over the audit liaison officers in the Department’s 

44 

component agencies? If not, why not? Would operations be improved if the 

Audit Liaison Officer had direct line authority? 

Response: The DGL does not have direct line authority over the component audit 

liaison officers, but has authority under the Management Directive to provide oversight and direction to all DHS components regarding relations with and responding 

to GAO. 

Question 22.: How many employees serve in the Office of the Audit Liaison Officer? Is this number sufficient? 

Response: The Office of the Audit Liaison Officer is sufficiently staffed. The Office consists of a Director and a staff of four management analysts, and will be adding an additional staff member. The DHS Audit Liaison Office relies upon the dayto-day work of the more than thirty component liaisons and other DHS employees 

handling the GAO and OIG interview and document requests, as well as the audit 

follow-up for implementation of GAO and OIG recommendations. 

Would additional staff improve the response time to GAO and the Inspector General? 

Response: No. 

You indicate in your statement (page 3) that the Department maintains Management Directives regarding its interaction with GAO and the Inspector General. You 

also state that the Directives are adequate, but the problem is in ‘‘execution’’ of the 

Directives. 

Question 23: When were these Directives issued? 

Response: The Management Directive on GAO is dated June 25, 2003 and the 

Management Directive on the IG is dated June 10, 2004. 

Do you believe they should be updated? 

Response: In April, DHS started a review of all our Management Directives with 

the intent to update the directives as necessary to reflect current policy. 

Question 24: Do you know how these Directives compare to similar directives in other Federal Cabinet departments? 

Response: We have compared our Management Directive 0810.1, governing relations with the IG, with the equivalent directives issued by Treasury, Justice, Defense and Commerce. The DHS Management Directive is consistent with those of 

the other Executive Branch agencies. 

Common factors include: • Requiring that all employees cooperate fully with their OIG and report any 

complaints of possible activities violating law, rules, or regulations to the OIG; 

• OIG is to have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, and 

other material available regardless of the program and operation; 

• OIG is an independent and objective Component within DHS responsible for 

investigating fraud, waste, and abuse uncovered as a result of audits, evaluations, and inspections; and is responsible for informing the Secretary and Congress of serious problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to programs and operations within the Department. 

We have also compared DHS Management Directive 0820, governing relations 

with GAO, to the equivalent directives issued by the Treasury, Defense, Energy, and 

Commerce Departments. The DHS Management Directive is essentially consistent 

with the directives at these other agencies. 

Question 25.: Have you reviewed these Directives to assess whether they 

could be improved? 

Response: We are reviewing Management Directives 0810.1 and 0820. 

Question 26.: How are DHS employees made aware of these Directives, 

and how is their compliance with these Directives monitored? 

Response: Directives are posted on the DHS intranet Web site and made available to all DHS employees. 

Component heads are directly responsible for ensuring compliance with Management Directives 0810.1 and 0820. They are also responsible for assuring the widest 

possible dissemination of the Management Directives within their Component, and 

they may issue further instructions for implementing departmental policy related to 

the OIG within their Component. 

Question 27.: You indicate in your statement that there are ‘‘serious concerns’’ with execution of the Directives. Could you please give examples of 

some of these concerns and what steps you are taking to address them? 

Response: As stated in my testimony, I am concerned that while the Management Directives provide a consistent process, the Department’s components are not 

45 

implementing or executing this guidance in a consistent manner across the entire 

Department. The use of liaison offices in each organization is inconsistent. 

Looking to the future, we are examining ways to improve speed by which documents and information flow. This includes improving communications, training, and 

outreach to employees across the Department, revamping the organizational structure and placement of these liaison offices, both at Headquarters and in the operational components, and providing additional guidance to Department employees on 

how to interact with the IG and GAO through further revising or updating instructions to personnel. 

Leadership needs to get involved at the right level, and if necessary, at the highest level. 

You indicate in your statement (page 3) that Departmental lawyers do not review 

every document and are not present in every interview. 

Question 28. When are departmental lawyers involved in the process of 

responding to requests from the GAO and Inspector General? 

Response: The vast majority of requests from GAO and the OIG are characterized by cooperation from Department, and very few entail legal review of responses 

to GAO and OIG requests. DHS produces thousands of documents to the OIG and 

GAO each year. As discussed in previous answers, a legal review of documents is 

appropriate in limited circumstances, including where there is a particular need to 

ensure that proper procedures are adhered to, specific information warrants appropriate safeguards, or disclosures must be consistent among various reviewing bodies. In certain circumstances, DHS counsel have a legal and ethical obligation to review documents to ensure that personal information, legal principles, and national 

security information are protected. 

Review of documents by counsel also ensures that disclosures are consistent and 

complete. A centralized review of documents can also ensure that disclosures are 

consistent and complete and that all documents are consistently marked in response 

to multiple requests. 

Question 29.: Are there standard criteria by which a determination is 

made when lawyers review documents and attend interviews? If so, what 

are those criteria? If not, why not? 

Response: Management Directive 0820 provides that DHS employees have the 

responsibility to review GAO document requests using the sensitive information 

checklist appended to the Directive, and when sensitive information is potentially 

implicated, request and follow the advice of counsel to ensure the legal obligations 

of DHS are met. If a response involves potential access to sensitive information on 

the checklist, e.g., classified, law enforcement or homeland security, and grand jury, 

the GAO coordinator for the Component possessing the information shall ensure the 

assistance of counsel is sought within that Component to ensure any legal issues 

are considered. 

You indicate in your statement (page 4) that the ‘‘Secretary has already put in 

place a mechanism to create incentives for DHS officials to make information flow 

to Congress a priority, and has required that employee performance reviews be linked 

to individual responsiveness to such requests.’’ 

Question 30.: Could you please describe the mechanism the Secretary put 

in place and some of the incentives for DHS officials? 

Response: The attached memorandum contains the guidance the Secretary has 

issued. 

Question 31.: An employee’s performance review generally contains many elements. How is responsiveness to Congressional requests weighted and considered? 

Response: It depends on how large of a role an individual has in responding to 

the congressional requesters. For a large number of people in the Department, they 

have no role in responding to the Congress, so it would not be a factor. For those 

in an area where there is extensive Congressional reporting, it would be a factor 

that would be considered by the person’s supervisory chain of command. 

You indicate in your statement (page 4) that you are ‘‘perplexed’’ by GAO’s complaints. 

Question 32.: Which of GAO’s complaints do you believe have merit and 

which do not? 

Question 33.: Why do you think GAO feels so strongly about the difficulties GAO auditors claim they have in obtaining information from DHS? 

Response: We feel that the Department’s cooperation with the GAO has been 

good. In light of that substantial cooperation, I testified that I was a bit perplexed 

46 

by the level of GAO’s complaint. We understand that GAO has had some complaints, but many of these complaints have been addressed and resolved. Nevertheless, we have taken notice that GAO still raises such concerns, and we understand 

we need to continue to strive towards improvements in order to ensure the timeliness of the Department’s responsiveness. GAO’s only complaint is that the Department is not timely in its response to its requests. 

Question 34.: What steps are you taking to improve the working relationship with GAO? 

Response: The Department is taking many steps to improve its responsiveness 

to GAO, including instituting better coordination among the Component’s liaison officer and the Headquarters DGL. There should also be more frequent meetings with 

GAO and OIG at the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) level to identify specific and systematic issues, which the CFO and the Under Secretary for Management (USM) will 

address with DHS Management to improve the responsiveness of the Department. 

We are examining ways to improve the speed by which documents and information flow. This includes improving communication, training and outreach to the employees of the Department, revamping the organizational structure and the placement of liaison offices at headquarters and in Components, and providing additional 

guidance to Department employees on how to interact with the GAO. 

You indicate in your statement (page 5) that DHS has provided ‘‘information for 

over 250 OIG Management Reports, 1,350 OIG Investigative Reports, and 600 GAO 

reports and testimony.’’ 

Question 35.: Do you know how these numbers compare to other Federal 

agencies? 

Response: No. 

Question 36.: Can you estimate how many employee hours were required 

to provide this information? 

Response: The Department does not yet have a formal tracking process to calculate the hours spent or the costs of responding to particular requests. We receive 

requests for information from the GAO and OIG on a daily basis. Depending upon 

the nature of each request, time and resources are expended to perform research, 

solicitation of information from one or more DHS components, and drafting a response, which—depending upon the subject matter—can take anywhere from a few 

hours to several weeks or months. Following drafting of each response, senior leadership must review and, where appropriate, executive branch clearance must be obtained, adding more time. 

Question 37.: Do you know how many GAO and Inspector General audits 

and investigations are currently open within DHS? 

Response: Approximately 500 GAO and OIG audits are open throughout the Department with either ongoing audit work or open recommendations. 

You indicate in your statement (page 5) that DHS must respond to 88 congressional committees and subcommittees. You also indicate that DHS provides approximately 2,000 briefings and hearing statements per year. 

Question 38.: Do you agree with the 9/11 Commission recommendation 

that Congress should centralize its oversight of DHS in one committee in 

the Senate and House of Representatives? 

Response: DHS takes very seriously its responsibility to protect the homeland— 

a responsibility that is of course shared with the Congress, among others. To further 

both of these responsibilities, the Administration has expressed it strong support for 

Congress adopting one of the 9/11 Commission’s most important recommendations: 

to streamline congressional oversight of DHS. This would be one of the easiest and 

most direct ways that Congress could carry out our shared responsibility, by allowing DHS to focus more time and resources on its crucial mission of securing the 

homeland, while retaining an appropriate level of oversight. 

Question 39.: What impact does responding to 88 congressional committees and subcommittees have on departmental operations? 

Response: In my testimony I provided the major statistics. Supporting these efforts drives an extensive workload in the Department. 

You indicate in your statement (page 5) that DHS does ‘‘not provide consistent 

guidance across the Department’’ in how to respond to GAO and Inspector General 

inquiries. 

Question 40.: Could you please provide some examples of how this guidance is not consistent and what steps you plan to take to address this 

issue? 

47 

Response: DHS is the result of the integration of 22 agencies. Many of the legacy 

organizations, such as the former U.S. Customs Service, the former Immigration 

and Naturalization Service, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Coast Guard had legacy 

processes regarding interactions with OIG and GAO; these processes are specific to 

their organization. We are working to integrate these processes and ensure that 

they support the execution of DHS Management Directives in order to provide proper and timely access to GAO and the OIG. Indeed, we are examining ways to improve the speed with which documents and information are produced in response 

to appropriate requests. This includes improving communications, training, and outreach to the fine employees of the Department; possibly revamping the organizational structure or placement of the Liaison Office; and providing additional or updated guidance to Department employees on how to interact with the OIG and GAO. 

We should make our expectations more clear to the people on the front lines. 

We are examining ways to improve the speed by which documents and information flow. This includes improving communication, training and outreach to the employees of the Department, revamping the organizational structure and the placement of liaison offices at headquarters and in Components, and providing additional 

guidance to Department employees on how to interact with the GAO. 

You indicate in your statement (page 5) that some of the component agencies in 

DHS ‘‘are using procedures and practices that were from their parent organizations 

before they became part of DHS.’’ 

Question 41.: Which components are you referring to? 

Response: The former U.S. Customs Service, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Coast Guard. 

Question 42.: In light of the Management Directives the Department 

issued, why do you think these components are still following procedures 

that date back before 2003 when the Department was created? 

Response: These legacy organizations had processes and regulations at the detail 

operational level, which are specific to their organization. In a similar vein, we are 

considering better ways to communicate our expectations regarding GAO and OIG 

inquiries to our employees. 

Question 43.: What steps are being taken to correct this issue? 

Response: We are examining ways to improve the speed by which documents and 

information flow. This includes improving communication, training and outreach to 

the employees of the Department, revamping the organizational structure and the 

placement of liaison offices at headquarters and in Components, and providing additional guidance to Department employees on how to interact with the GAO. 

You indicate in your statement (page 5) that ‘‘the use of liaison offices in each organization is somewhat inconsistent.’’ 

Question 44.: Are the liaison offices in each component agency located 

within the same office organizationally, such as the Office of the Chief Financial Officer? If not, why not? 

Response: Depending upon the operational needs of each DHS component and 

the legacy structures of the components, the audit liaison offices are located in various parts of the component organizations, such as the Office of the Chief Financial 

Officer, the Office of Policy, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary. 

Question 45.: What steps are you taking to improve the consistency with 

which liaison offices are used across component agencies in DHS? 

Response: We are considering various ideas and options for the proper use of liaison offices throughout the Department. We want to make sure that there is an 

appropriate structure in place to provide proper and timely responsiveness to oversight requests. In addition, the liaison offices are critical to providing training and 

outreach to Department personnel in order to ensure that expectations are clear and 

guidance is implemented in a consistent manner. Also, liaison offices may be used 

as a mechanism to improve awareness of issues that might arise during GAO engagements. 

Question 46.: What training is provided to Audit Liaison Officers? 

Response: Through quarterly liaison meetings and daily interaction with the 

component liaisons, the DHS audit liaison office provides continuous training for the 

component liaisons. Using a ‘‘best practices’’ concept, component processes are 

shared across organizational lines to enhance the liaison process throughout the entire Department. In this way, the DGL can coordinate engagements throughout the 

Department, provide outreach by communicating the Department’s guidance and expectations, and provide continuous training for component liaisons. Once again, we 

48 

are considering options to issue guidance to liaison officers in an effort to ensure 

consistent application and execution of the Department’s directives. 

On April 13, 2007, Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King wrote to Secretary Chertoff regarding the Department’s overdue reports for Congress. 

Question 47.: What is your role in the Department’s preparation and review of reports requested by Congress? 

Response: My office reviews all reports prepared by DHS at the request of Congress. My role, as Under Secretary for Management is to approve and sign out appropriations reports to Congress. In some cases I also approve and sign some of the 

authorization reports depending on subject matter. 

Question 48.: Why does it take so long to prepare and submit a report? 

Response: Depending on the nature of the topic is for the report, it could take 

a while to collect and compile the necessary data. 

Question 49.: Why are there so many overdue reports? 

Response: Because there are many reports which require extensive data to be 

compiled and then reviewed before approval, many reports do not make the deadline. However, the significant volume of reports requested from the Department also 

adds to the timeline. 

Question 50.: What steps are you taking to reduce the backlog and improve the Department’s responses to Congressional requests for reports 

and information? 

Response: The Secretary sent a memorandum to all component heads on February 7, 2007 which expressed his view about the Department’s delivery of reports 

and responses to Congress in a timely and accurate manner. In the memorandum, 

direction was given to establish performance measures for employees as well as hold 

the leadership of that component responsible for overdue responses. The Department’s management is aware of the issue and is working to track our performance. 

The Integrated Deepwater System Program (Deepwater) is a $24 billion, 25-year 

acquisition program designed to replace and modernize the Coast Guard’s aging and 

deteriorating fleet of ships and aircraft. 

The DHS Inspector General has released audits reflecting that the Coast Guard’s 

Deepwater acquisition program has suffered from apparent mismanagement. It is imperative that the Coast Guard is provided with the highest quality and most capable 

equipment to continue to protect our Nation’s ports, coasts and waterways. At the 

same time, though, it is important that the assets the Coast Guard acquires are procured in an efficient and cost-effective manner to ensure that taxpayer dollars are not 

spent in an irresponsible manner. 

Question 51.: How are you working with the Coast Guard to improve the 

contract oversight in the Deepwater program? 

Response: The Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) has been actively engaged in the 

oversight of the Deepwater program since the inception of the Department. Separate 

from the general oversight of the USCG Acquisition Operations, Deepwater has 

been the specific subject of numerous reviews by the CPO and CPO Staff. CPO and 

the Acquisition Oversight Staff have been part of every major review of the program 

beginning with the review of the updated ORD to account for changes in requirements brought on by the attacks of September 11, 2001. We have reviewed each 

change to the Program and each quarterly report to Congress as well. The CPO Acquisition Oversight staff participated with the Deepwater staff in several GAO and 

DHS OIG reviews conducted over the past 3 years. The DHS CPO was instrumental 

in advising USCG to seek outside assessment on the critical portions of the Deepwater acquisition. The DHS CPO Acquisition Oversight Team was one of the first 

offices outside USCG to review and comment on the application of Earned Value 

Management data on the program and sought refinement of several cost estimates 

as a result of that review. Reviews of the Deepwater program have been conducted 

by several levels of DHS Management and the CPO and CPO Acquisition Oversight 

staff have been intimately involved in each. The DHS CPO Acquisition Oversight 

Team closely reviewed, for example, the entire process for assessing and awarding 

the first Award Term for the Deepwater contract. 

Question 52.: What steps should DHS take in the short-run—and longrun—to ensure the Deepwater program is managed most efficiently and 

cost-effectively? 

Response: First and foremost, the DHS CPO is supporting the USCG in its implementation of the USCG Blue Print for Acquisition Reform. This initiative, begun 

by the Commandant shortly after assuming command, will fundamentally change 

the way that the USCG does business and will focus assets in the areas of requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Jun 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-29\43565.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
49 

ments generation, program management, contracting and logistics where needed 

and when needed. DHS CPO supports the request to Congress by USCG to have 

personnel costs shifted from Deepwater specific appropriations to the general Operations Expense appropriation so as to give the USCG the flexibility to place human 

resources in the most efficient manner possible and no longer be constrained by 

rigid personnel limitations in program specific appropriations. The DHS CPO and 

the CPO’s Acquisition Oversight Team will continue to engage the USCG at every 

level in the routine oversight activities involved in the review of Acquisition documents such as Acquisition Program Baselines, Acquisition Plans, and other selected 

contract documents. The Acquisition Oversight Team is part of the departmental executive review of each major action and attends every meeting involving Deepwater 

with DHS external organizations. As circumstances arise, the DHS CPO has the 

ability and commitment to assign special reviews to the Acquisition Oversight Team 

and has done so recently with respect to the coordination of the updated set of Acquisition Documentation including an updated Program Baseline and Acquisition 

Plan. The Team has recently reviewed the Acquisition Plan for the Fast Response 

Cutter (FRC) B-Class and has submitted numerous comments on the draft plan. 

This plan provides evidence of the changes that have taken place in the Deepwater 

program in the past several months as it marks the departure from using Systems 

Integrator to acquire a major Deepwater Asset. DHS recently issued an Acquisition 

Decision Memorandum laying out a variety of new tasks requiring the Coast Guard 

to submit for review and approval numerous plans and estimates relating to the acquisition of the National Security Cutters (NSC) and the Fast Response Cutters 

(FRC) in the near term. The Department has placed limits on the Coast Guard’s 

contracting authority pending the receipt and approval of these documents. Additionally, a longer term plan has been agreed upon between the CPO Acquisition 

Oversight Team and the Deepwater program concerning the consolidation and alignment of all critical program documentation, including a comprehensive update to the 

Program Acquisition Plan, Implementation Plans and Acquisition Program Baseline. 

Question 53.: How will you achieve the balance between procuring the 

highest quality equipment, while ensuring procurements are cost-effective 

to protect taxpayer dollars? 

Response: High quality will, in the long run, yield the lowest overall cost and 

our goal in acquisition and contracting for complex systems is to seek the ‘‘best 

value’’ solution, considering price, quality, and other factors. When the mission becomes the placement of a contract in the shortest possible timeframe and at the lowest apparent cost, both quality and cost will suffer. The balance is achieved by carefully considering not just the instant contract cost, but the life-cycle costs as well. 

This requires that the requirements be fully vetted and considered before soliciting 

industry and that industry response in the competitive marketplace be thoroughly 

and carefully considered before making an acquisition decision. At the bottom line, 

this process, for major systems, requires a very experienced set of professionals from 

engineering, logistics, and business disciplines working as a team with operators to 

plan, evaluate and negotiate a complex contract with acknowledged risks and a fair 

and equitable approach to managing those risks, including the schedule, the price 

to be paid, and the way the contract will be administered. Those are the keys to 

providing the best quality product to the operators at the best overall price to the 

nation. 

In one of its Deepwater reports on the National Security Cutter, the Inspector General indicated his office ‘‘encountered resistance’’ from the Coast Guard and the contractor during the OIG’s review of the structural design and performance issues related to this vessel. In a rare public rebuke, the Inspector General wrote that ‘‘such 

behavior by an auditee is contrary to the Inspector General Act. . .and is inconsistent with the intent of DHS Management Directive[s].’’ 

Question 54.: Are you aware of the problems the Inspector General indicated he had in obtaining information from the Coast Guard on the National Security Cutter? 

Question 55: What steps are being taken to improve the Coast Guard’s responses to the Inspector General on reviews of Deepwater and other programs? 

Response: The Coast Guard enjoys an ongoing positive relationship with the 

OIG. This is evidenced by the OIG’s comments in the February 9, 2007 123-foot Patrol Boat Audit, which stated that ‘‘The Coast Guard was responsive to all of our 

requests for interviews, briefings, information and documentation requests associated with our review.’’ 

With respect to the audit of the Deepwater program and the National Security 

Cutter audit, it is my understanding that once senior Coast Guard officials were 

50 

made aware of the underlying issues, the matter was quickly resolved with the OIG. 

The Coast Guard and IG established a principled framework by which there was 

mutual cooperation. In fact, the IG has stated that he has had no other concerns 

regarding this issue and now considers this example to be an area of successful accommodation and cooperation. Senior Department officials are continuing their ongoing dialogue with the OIG to improve information and ensure that the IG obtains 

information in a timely manner. 

The Inspector General provided to the Office of General Counsel in July 2006 a 

draft memo that the Secretary could send to DHS employees highlighting the importance of cooperating with Inspector General reviews. Apparently, the memo was never 

sent. 

Question 56.: Have you seen the draft memo? If so, what are your 

thoughts regarding its contents? 

Response: Yes. I do not agree with every proposition in the draft memorandum, 

including the strict prohibition on any review of documents produced to the IG, and 

on any assistance during witness interviews. 

Question 57.: Do you believe it would be helpful if the Secretary sent this 

or a similar memo to all employees underscoring the importance of cooperating with Inspector General and GAO reviews? 

Response: The draft memorandum has served as one of the bases for discussion 

on the proper way to communicate the Department’s expectations regarding IG access to DHS’s employees. That discussion is ongoing. We are currently looking at 

various means of communicating improved guidance to DHS employees to enhance 

cooperation with the Inspector General and the GAO. 

The Department of Homeland Security handles a wide range of sensitive and classified information. 

Question 58.: What specific safeguards does the Department have in place 

when classified material is requested by GAO or the Inspector General? 

Response: The Department is very diligent about taking proper steps to ensure 

the proper marking and handling procedures are implemented with respect to classified national security information. For example, Management Directive 0810.1 instructs Department personnel to advise the OIG when providing classified information, and Management Directive 0820 requires DHS employees to consult with appropriate officials when the Department intends to provide classified information to 

the GAO, so that they can be clearly notified as well. 

Question 59.: What specific safeguards are in place when personal information that may be protected by the Privacy Act is requested by GAO or 

the Inspector General? 

Response: The Department is similarly vigilant about the protection of personal 

privacy information. In such instances, the Department identifies the sensitive information and notifies the GAO and OIG that appropriate protections and safeguards should be followed. We aim to be extremely careful about the disclosure of 

such sensitive personal information. 

If a GAO request for information involves potential access to sensitive information 

on the checklist, e.g., personal Privacy Act protected information, the GAO coordinator for the Component possessing the information shall ensure the assistance of 

counsel is sought within that Component to ensure any legal issues are considered. 

In addition, the GAO Agency Protocols, GAO–05–35G, provides that GAO will protect information, including personal information, to the same degree it would be protected at the Federal department. 

Æ