United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10234

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Darrion Murray, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:19-CR-647-1 

______________________________

Before Willett, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Darrion Murray appeals his guilty plea conviction for possession of a 

firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

As part of his written plea agreement, Murray waived his right to 

appeal his conviction or sentence, except to directly appeal a sentence 

exceeding the statutory maximum or resulting from an arithmetic error, to 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 2, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 23-10234

2

challenge the voluntariness of the plea or waiver, or to bring claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court sentenced Murray to 105 

months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Murray

timely appealed.

On appeal, he argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it 

(1) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and (2) violates 

the Second Amendment. He also argues that the district court violated 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by not informing him that § 922(g) is 

unconstitutional. But Murray didn’t raise these issues to the district court, 

so we review them for plain error only. See United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 

414, 419 (5th Cir. 2014). To show plain error, Murray must demonstrate a 

clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United 

States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes this showing, we may correct 

the error, but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

As a preliminary issue, the Government seeks to enforce Murray’s 

appeal waiver and claims that his arguments are barred by it. Murray argues 

that the waiver does not prevent him from challenging the constitutionality 

of his statute of conviction. But because Murray’s appeal is “easily resolved 

on the merits,” we need not resolve the appeal-waiver question. United States 

v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2018).

Murray first argues that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it 

exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. But he concedes

that this argument is foreclosed. See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 

145–46 (5th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Perryman, 965 F.3d 424, 426 

(5th Cir. 2020).

Second, Murray argues that § 922(g) violates the Second Amendment 

under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). This 

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argument is foreclosed, too. In a recently published opinion, we held that 

§ 922(g)(1) is not clearly or obviously unconstitutional under Bruen. United 

States v. Jones, No. 23-10198, 2023 WL 8074295, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 21, 

2023) (per curiam).

Finally, Murray argues that by not informing him that § 922(g) was 

unconstitutional, the district court did not advise him of the nature of the 

charge against him as required by Rule 11. “Rule 11’s requirement that 

defendants understand the ‘nature of the charge’ against them refers to the 

elements of the offense.” United States v. Lujano-Perez, 274 F.3d 219, 224 

(5th Cir. 2001). “To satisfy this requirement, the court must have a colloquy 

with the defendant that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the 

defendant understood the nature of the charge.” United States v. Jones, 969 

F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As we recently explained in Jones, there is no “binding precedent

holding that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, and . . . it is unclear that Bruen

dictates such a result.” 2023 WL 8074295, at *2. So the district court had no 

duty to inform Murray that § 922(g) is unconstitutional. The record reflects 

that the district court complied with its obligation to ensure that Murray 

understood the nature of the charge against him. Thus, the district court did 

not commit any error—plain or otherwise—by not advising Murray that 

§ 922(g) is unconstitutional.

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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