No. 87-451 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsTHE DIVISION OF WORKERS' 

COMPENSATION OF THE DEPARTMENT 

OF LABOR & INDUSTRY, an agency of 

the State of Montana, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Silver Bow, 

The Honorable Frank Davis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Burgess, Joyce & Whelan; Frank Burgess and Thomas F. 

Joyce argued, Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Steven J. Shapiro argued, Helena, Montana 

Submitted: May 10, 1988 

Decided: June 7, 1988 

Filed: t.lUN 7' 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Weis, a chiropractic doctor licensed in the state of 

Montana, appeals the declaratory judgment entered by the 

Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, finding 

that the Division of Workers1 Compensation properly exercised 

its delegated authority by enacting administrative rule 

24.29.806, A.R.M. (1986) . This rule restricts medical 

evaluation of a physical impairment to those with a doctor of 

medicine (M. D . ) degree. 

We affirm. 

The issues raised and argued on appeal are: 

1. Whether the Montana state legislature intended to 

restrict the making of an "impairment rating" to licensed 

medical physicians (M.D. 's) by enacting 37-71-122, MCA 

(1985) ? 

2. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the 

Division of Workers' Compensation properly exercised its 

rulemaking authority when promulgating administrative rule 

24.29.806, A.R.M., which restricts medical evaluations of a 

physical impairment to those who hold a doctor of medicine 

(M.D.) degree and are licensed as a physician to practice 

medicine in the state of Montana? 

In 1972, the Division of Workers' Compensation enacted 

what is now rule 24.29.806, A.R.M. This rule provides that 

"[mledical evaluations to determine physical impairment shall 

only be done by qualified medical physicians," and that the 

Division must be advised of "all evaluations of impairment by 

physicians." An impairment rating is a medical determination 

of a person's physical limitations caused by an injury and 

which helps to establish a person's benefits under the 
Workers' Compensation program. As initially enacted, the 

terms "medical doctors" and "doctors" were used instead of 

physicians. 

In 1981, the Montana state legislature enacted §§ 

39-71-121 and -122, MCA, which define disability and 

impairment as they are used in determining whether a person 

has suffered a compensable, work related injury. The 

essential difference between the two definitions for the 

purpose of this action is that " [a]n impairment rating is 

purely a medical determination" whereas " [dl isability is not 

a purely medical condition." The 1987 Montana state 

legislature repealed these two definitional statutes and in 

their place enacted §§ 39-71-701, -702 and -703, MCA, which 

continues to provide that the determination of the three 

types of disability--temporary total, permanent total and 

permanent partial--must be supported by a preponderance of 

"medical evidence." 

From December, 1972, when the rule first went into 

effect, until December 14, 1982, when the Workers' 

Compensation Court decided Rookhuizen v. Pierce Packing Co., 

Docket No. 382-118, chiropractors rated impairments of 

injured workmen. In Rookhuizen, the Workers' Compensation 

Court held that " [a]n impairment rating is a medical 

determination and only a person licensed - to practice medicine 

can make a medical determination" (emphasis in original). 

Docket No. 382-118, at 6. The court thus held that since § 

37-12-102, MCA, declares that a chiropractor does not 

practice medicine and § 37-12-104 (I), MCA, forbids a 

chiropractor from practicing medicine, a chiropractor cannot 

render an impairment rating. Docket No. 382-118, at 9. As a 

result of the Rookhuizen decision, the Division of Workers' 

Compensation and the Workers' Compensation Court refuses to 

accept impairment ratings from chiropractors. Weis, a 
chiropractor licensed in the state of Montana, appealed this 

decision in District Court in June, 1986. 

The dispositive issue in this case is whether the 

Montana state legislature intended to restrict the making of 

an "impairment rating" to licensed medical physicians 

(M.D. Is) by enacting S 39-71-122, MCA? Upon review of the 

statutes and legislative history, we hold that the 

legislature did intend for only licensed medical physicians 

to render the impairment ratings necessary for an injured 

worker to recover under the Workers' Compensation program. 

In 1986, when this action was filed, the statute in 

effect was S 39-71-121, MCA, which stated "[aln impairment 

rating is purely a medical determination." The legislature 

repealed this statute in 1987. The applicable statutes in 

effect now are §§ 39-71-701, -702 and -703, MCA, which 

require that disabilities be supported by a "preponderance of 

medical evidence." Despite the changes in the statutes, the 

dispositive issue of whether the legislature intended to 

restrict the making of impairment ratings to licensed medical 

physicians by the use of the word "medical" is still before 

this Court. 

When interpreting the word "medical" in the above 

statutes, this Court must adhere to the legislative intent to 

determine whether "medical" includes only licensed medical 

physicians or, as Weis argues, whether it includes everyone 

trained in treating body or mental disorders, which would 

necessarily include, for example, chiropractors, osteopaths 

and optometrists. - See Section 1-2-102, MCA; Montana Tavern 

Ass'n. v. State -- ex rel. Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 1986), 729 

P.2d 1310, 1316, 43 St.Rep. 2180, 2185; Missoula County v. 

American Asphalt, Inc. (Mont. 1985), 701 P.2d 990, 992, 42 

St.Rep. 920, 922. 
The first step in determining the legislative intent is 

to examine the plain meaning of the words used in the 

statute. Montana Tavern Ass'n., 729 P.2d at 1316, 43 

St.Rep. at 2185; Missoula County, 701 P.2d at 992, 42 St.Rep. 

at 922; State -- ex rel. Sol v. Bakker (1982), 199 Mont. 385, 

390, 649 P.2d 456, 459. Webster's Dictionary defines medical 

as "of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or the 

practice of medicine." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 

Dictionary 737 (1984). Upon reviewing 5 37-12-104, MCA, 

which addresses the rights and limitations governing the 

practice of chiropractic, the definition of "medical" appears 

clearer. This statute specifically states that chiropractors 

"shall not in any way imply that they are regular physicians 

or surgeons. They shall not . . . practice medicine or 

surgery or osteopathy . . . . I' Section 37-12-104 (1) , MCA. 

The plain meaning of the word as defined by Webster in 

conjunction with S 37-12-104(1) makes it clear that 

legislators intended to allow only licensed medical 

physicians to render impairment ratings. 

The legislative history further supports this 

conclusion. In 1981, Senator Bill Norman introduced Senate 

Bill 128 and stressed that "[i] t is necessary to understand 

the concept of impairment. This is a medical 

determination.. . . " House Labor and Employment Relations 

Committee Minutes, at 1 (February 17, 1981) . In 1987, 

Senate Bill 315 was introduced primarily to help "to insure 

that the workers' benefits are provided swiftly and surely 

. . .. " Senate Business and Labor Committee, at 1 (March 9, 

1987). During the March 9 meeting of the Senate's Business 

and Labor Committee, a representative of the Montana 

Chiropractor Association supported reformation of Montana's 

Workers' Compensation laws but suggested an amendment to the 

bill to allow other health care professionals, not just 
medical doctors, to render impairment ratings. The 

Association's representative recognized that the bill as 

written allowed only medical doctors to render impairment 

ratings and therefore suggested an amendment that would, for 

example, replace "physician" with "primary health care 

provider" and define "medical evidence" as "the testimony of 

a physician or other licensed practitioner of one of the 

healing arts." Senate Business and Labor Committee, Exhibit 

5 (March 9, 1987). 

The legislators had these proposed amendments before 

them but chose not to incorporate the suggested changes of 

the Montana Chiropractor Association in the enacted version 

of Senate Bill 315. The legislative history of this bill thus 

further supports our conclusions that the word "medical" in 

this instance refers only to licensed medical physicians. 

The interpretation of 'medical1 as used in this statute does 

not, as Weis argues, prevent injured claimants from seeking 

treatment from a chiropractor, osteopath, or other licensed 

practitioner engaged in the healing arts. 

The second issue raised and argued on appeal is whether 

the District Court erred in finding that the Division of 

Vlorkers' Compensation properly exercised its rulemaking 

authority when promulgating administrative rule 24.29.806, 

A.R.M. (1986). This rule restricts medical evaluations of a 

physical impairment to those who hold a doctor of medicine 

(M.D.) degree and are licensed as a physician to practice 

medicine in the state of Montana. When interpreting a 

statute, this Court will give deference to the agency charged 

with its interpretation, unless the interpretation produces 

an absurd result. Montana Tavern Ass'n., 729 P.2d at 1316; 

State -- ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Midland Materials Co. 

(1983) , 204 Mont. 65, 70, 662 P. 2d 1322, 1325. As evident 

from the foregoing discussion, the Division of Workers' 
Compensation interpretation of rule 24.29.806, A.R.M., is not 

absurd. After consideration of the legislative intent and 

the plain meaning of the word "medical," we hold that the 

District Court did not err in finding that the Division of 

Workers' Compensation properly enacted administrative rule 

24.29.806. 

A£ f irmed. /