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50–464 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 111–39 

U.S. STRATEGY REGARDING IRAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

March 5, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew, CSIS counselor and trustee, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, Washington, DC ...................................................... 5 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts ..................................... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana ........................................... 3 

Scowcroft, Lieutenant General Brent, USAF [Ret.], president, the Scowcroft 

Group, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 7 

(III)

(1) 

U.S. STRATEGY REGARDING IRAN 

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, 

Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, and Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I apologize to 

folks for starting a little bit late. It’s my fault. I was at the Finance 

Committee, where we’re struggling with health care in preparation 

for the White House meeting this afternoon. So I apologize that we 

are delayed. 

It is a really very, very special occasion. We’re privileged and excited about the opportunity to have these two distinguished witnesses here today. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and General Brent 

Scowcroft are two of the most insightful strategic thinkers and distinguished public servants in our country. We’ve been very, very 

lucky, and Presidents of both parties have been very lucky to have 

their advice and counsel through many, many years. 

I can think of no better way to cap off this week’s series of hearings on Iran and its troubling nuclear program. If America is going 

to successfully overcome this extraordinarily difficult and pressing 

foreign policy challenge—I don’t think anybody missed the Supreme Ayatollah’s comments yesterday about Israel or about the 

Obama administration—we’re clearly going to need the kind of wisdom, the kind of insight which today’s witnesses have demonstrated throughout their careers. 

On Tuesday we heard from four top experts on Iran’s nuclear 

program about the difficulties the United States and our partners 

will face in dealing with this program. Ambassador Frank Wisner, 

Ambassador Richard Haass, Mark Fitzpatrick, and Karim 

Sadjadpour gave us some honest answers about the seriousness of 

the challenge, the realities that we have to confront when dealing 

with Iran, and the diplomatic efforts that will be required to avoid 

some day being left with the potential unacceptable choice between 

accepting a nuclear-armed Iran or attacking its facilities. 

Yesterday the committee received a classified update from the 

Intelligence Community, and most members of the committee were 

2 

there to get the latest update on the status of Iran’s nuclear missile 

programs, as well as the internal political dynamics, and the regional situation, to understand the playing field. 

Today we’ve asked Dr. Brzezinski and General Scowcroft to help 

us look broadly at the security challenge that Iran poses, so that 

we can lay out a vision for the way forward. Both of these individuals know what it’s like to walk into the Oval Office or to the Situation Room and stare at an almost overwhelming list of problems 

and have to figure out where the real priorities are and where the 

real opportunities for progress might be. They also understand as 

well as anyone in the country all of the risks tied to those choices. 

They know how to construct and implement a multifaceted approach to achieve an ultimate strategic goal. 

If there ever was an urgent challenge that will require a multidimensional solution, surely it is this apparent race by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon capacity. We know this is a challenge that 

we’re not going to deal with in isolation or hope we don’t have to 

deal with in isolation. It’s not just an American problem. It’s not 

just an American perception that suggests that it is a problem. And 

it is best not just, and probably cannot be just, an American solution. 

We know that, although Iran may have some distance to go before it can test or deploy a nuclear weapon, it is daily producing 

more reactor-grade uranium that can be further enriched to provide the guts of a nuclear weapon. 

I have long said that, following consultation with our allies and 

partners, we have to engage directly with Iran, and I’m glad that 

this idea’s day appears to be coming. But as I said on Tuesday, 

we’ve got to be honest with ourselves. We’re not going to solve this 

problem just by talking directly to Iran. While Iran was just talking to the IAEA and the Europeans, it deftly sidestepped every 

supposed redline laid down by the international community. While 

Iran was just talking to the world, it moved to the threshold of becoming a nuclear-capable state. 

Iran’s leaders need to understand that the full weight of the 

international community will bear down on them if Iran continues 

to defy the United Nations Security Council and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency. 

I would remind people, Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. Iran has obligations under that treaty. Iran also 

has rights under that treaty, and those rights have not always 

been appropriately put on the table. It is deemed by virtue of the 

secrecy of their actions and their unwillingness to answer questions 

that they are in violation of those rights, and that is essentially the 

quandary, the place of confrontation that we find ourselves in. 

So we need to understand also and Iran needs to understand 

that the talks that we envision will not be a substitute for Iran’s 

requirement to meet its international obligations. 

At the same time as we engage, we have to understand that it 

is by far better to get other countries on board with our strategy. 

For diplomacy to succeed, we need the full backing of our allies in 

Europe, as well as Russia, China, and other countries that trade 

extensively with Iran. We must quickly engage with those countries and construct a robust and sustainable energy. 

3 

The President’s recent announcement of a responsible redeployment plan for Iraq, which comes with bipartisan support and with 

the support and endorsement and input of our leading generals— 

General Petraeus, General Odierno, and others—can be an additional source of leverage in dealing with Iran because it repositions 

us. But we will only be negotiating from a position of renewed 

strength if we also reassure our allies in the region that they will 

not be cut adrift for the sake of making progress with Iran. 

So in short, we need to act boldly, wisely, and quickly with our 

allies and partners to win agreement on the way forward and to 

engage Iran backed by real consequences for its continued noncompliance. 

I want to emphasize, as I’m confident that both of our witnesses 

will and I’m sure that my colleague Senator Lugar will, we are not 

seeking a confrontation, nor do I believe that there’s some overt effort that we’re stuck on with respect to regime change or anything 

else. I think it is better for the world to see the possibilities of constructively moving on issues of mutual interest. On Tuesday we 

heard many of those issues of mutual interest, ranging from Afghanistan to Taliban to counternarcotics efforts and many other 

things. 

So I am hopeful that a solution to this problem will lie within 

our reach through diplomatic processes, and I’m looking forward to 

today’s discussion on our witnesses’ guidance and recommendations 

on how we can achieve the best way forward. 

Senator Lugar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

you in welcoming our distinguished guests. They are both very dear 

friends personally, as well as very good friends of this committee 

through their faithful testimony throughout the years. They’ve 

been generous with their time and counsel on foreign policy issues 

in the past and we look forward to their views today on Iran. 

On Tuesday, as you pointed out, the committee heard testimony 

from four distinguished foreign policy experts, and they provided 

helpful analysis of the policy options available to the United States 

in responding to threats posed by Iran. The United States agenda 

with Iran involves numerous issues, including the nuclear program, 

support for terrorist organizations, its relevance to our efforts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, its threat to the security of Israel, its impact 

on stability in the Persian Gulf region, its status as an energy exporter, its relationship with Shiite communities in the Middle East, 

and prospects for long-term improvements in the United States-Iranian relationship. 

Although all of these issues are interconnected, concerns about 

Iran’s nuclear program have understandably dominated discourse, 

given the risks and the consequences of proliferation and the uncertain status of Iran’s nuclear program. Potential leverage stemming from the economic stress on Iran caused by the drop of world 

oil prices and the fresh start provided by the Obama government 

also contribute to the sense that the time is ripe for a concerted 

multilateral effort to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. 

4 

Our hearing on Tuesday provided an opportunity to examine 

such questions as whether the Iranian Government can be induced 

to limit its nuclear program, what set of multilateral sanctions and 

incentives might achieve this goal, and whether success would likely require recognition of a limited Iranian right to enrich. There 

was broad agreement that restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions 

would require greater cooperation with allies and partners, most of 

whom have commercial interests with Iran and independent views 

about the Teheran regime. 

This leads to such questions as what compromises should we be 

willing to make in our approach to Iran to ensure a tightly unified 

coalition, and should the United States make explicit to the Chinese and to the Russians that cooperation on Iran is at the very 

top of our agenda with those nations. 

Beyond Iran’s nuclear program, the United States Government 

should also be preparing a strategy for engaging Iran on other 

issues, and such engagement should not undercut multilateral efforts on the nuclear question. Rather, it should seek to establish 

communications that can avoid miscalculation, open up the possibility of cooperation on points of agreement, and facilitate information flowing to the Iranian people. 

Last year when Under Secretary of State Bill Burns joined representatives of the other P5+1 governments in a meeting with the 

Iranian nuclear negotiator, it signaled a shift in United States policy. But we still have not established a clear course of action on bilateral engagement, and some suggest the first step should be a 

low-level meeting between United States and Iranian officials that 

would set the parameters for future discussions. Others argue that 

a public, top-down approach that clarifies ambiguities and sets the 

context for subsequent discussions is preferable. 

Both Dr. Brzezinski and General Scowcroft have deep experience 

in constructing these types of strategies. I am hopeful they will 

offer thoughts about how a potential United States-Iranian dialog 

could begin and how it should be structured. 

Last, I would ask our witnesses to comment on the advisability 

and timing of opening a United States visa office or interest section 

in Iran. I support establishing a modest diplomatic presence in 

Iran. Such an outpost would facilitate more exchange and outreach 

with the Iranian people and improve our ability to interpret what 

is going on in that country. 

I thank the Chairman again for this hearing and I look forward 

to today’s testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar. I appreciate 

enormously again sort of the jointness of the statements we made. 

I might add that I join you in that call for the interest section, 

which I had hoped we would have achieved last fall actually, before 

the change in administration. But I think it would be beneficial to 

move forward on that soon. 

Gentlemen, thank you again for being here. Dr. Brzezinski, if you 

would lead off. We’d ask you both if you’d sort of give summaries 

of testimony so we can maximize the give and take with the committee. Dr. Brzezinski, if you’d lead off. Thank you. 

5 

STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, CSIS COUNSELOR 

AND TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. Thank you 

for having us here. 

I had the opportunity to read the testimony given to you on 

Tuesday by Richard Haass, and I agree with its generalized approach. Therefore, I am going to focus much more narrowly in my 

own comments on the negotiating process with Iran that the President intends to undertake. 

It seems to me that the negotiating process can be seen as guided by essentially alternative strategic objectives. At one extreme, 

the negotiating process can be designed deliberately to fail, but to 

do so in a manner that places the onus for the failure directly on 

the other party. That can be an objective of negotiations. At the 

other extreme, the negotiating process can be deliberately designed 

to seek a formula for an acceptable compromise that satisfies the 

basic interests of both parties. 

To be specific, if the goal is to encourage, for example, the Iranians to be intransigent and in effect deliberately to strengthen the 

role of extremists, thereby justifying alternative courses of action 

than negotiations because the negotiations have failed, the United 

States should publicly, first of all, insist that Iran meet certain 

basic preconditions even prior to the negotiating process, in effect 

seeking Iran to make fundamental concessions prior to the negotiations. 

Second, we should publicly threaten Iran with more sanctions if 

Iran is not compliant in the negotiating process. 

Third, we should keep asserting publicly that force and the use 

of force remains an option that may be exercised against Iran. 

We can also, fourth, keep saying publicly that it is one of our political objectives to achieve regime change in Iran. 

Last but not least, we should continue publicly to label the Iranian Government as a terrorist entity, thereby inflaming the public 

mood in Iran, and impose time limits on the duration of the negotiations. 

Such an approach would certainly achieve its obvious objective: 

to make certain that the negotiations are not productive and that 

Iran’s intransigence is the cause of the failure. 

The alternative approach, of course, should be rather different. 

It should seek to engage Iran in a process in which there emerges 

the possibility of some consensual arrangement. That of course 

means that we can and should consult privately with our allies regarding the consequences of the lack of progress, including the possibility subsequently of imposing more stringent sanctions. We can 

evaluate, to the extent that it is feasible, other options, perhaps of 

a more coercive character. But we also have to be very careful not 

to set restrictions on ourselves which dramatically limit our choice 

of action and impose on us a pattern of conduct which could lead 

us in the direction of an eventual collision. 

Obviously, the achievement of a nuclear capability by Iran would 

be a disaster, and I’m quoting President Sarkozy, who said exactly 

that. But President Sarkozy also said that the military collision 

with Iran, the bombing of Iran, would be a disaster, and hence our 

6 

strategy has to be guided by the central strategic objective of avoiding both disasters. 

That means that we have to approach the negotiating process 

with some degree of patience, prudence, and with a deliberate effort to shape the atmospherics of the engagement because atmospherics of the engagement are not only important to the negotiating process itself, but they affect Iranian public opinion, and that 

there is a latent Iranian public opinion, and we do know that a 

great many people in Iran are not in sympathy with the attitudes 

so perversely expressed by Ahmadinejad, more recently even by the 

Supreme Leader, either regarding us, the Holocaust, or Israel. 

In that context, I think we should be prepared to exploit an opening which, probably unintentionally, the Iranians are giving us. I 

have in mind a striking contrast between the North Korean approach to the negotiations and the Iranian approach to this issue. 

The North Koreans have said publicly: ‘‘We want nuclear weapons, 

we are seeking nuclear weapons.’’ Indeed, at one point or another: 

‘‘We have achieved nuclear weapons.’’ The Iranians are saying to 

us: ‘‘We do not want nuclear weapons; we do not seek nuclear 

weapons; our religion forbids us to have nuclear weapons.’’ 

I don’t say that this is necessarily a credible statement, but it is 

a statement which can be picked up in the sense that our response 

to the Iranians can indicate: ‘‘We are prepared to explore the veracity of these assertions; we have grounds for being suspicions; we 

need to be reassured. But if you’re serious about these statements, 

then by all means let us examine means that will make us and the 

international community certain that you are not seeking nuclear 

weapons, that in fact you don’t want them, and that, as you claim, 

your religion forbids them.’’ 

That seems to me to be a goal that the negotiations should be 

designed to pursue; and therefore, we should be very careful to 

avoid any approach which in advance impedes the process of negotiations, inflames the context in which they’ll be pursued, and 

makes it easier for people like Ahmadinejad to goad the United 

States and to undercut public support for the negotiating process 

in the United States and in the international community. 

What I have now said does collide with some of the advice or 

some of the considerations that are currently being discussed in the 

United States. It seems to me that we run the risk of wanting to 

have our cake and eating it too; of engaging in polemics and diatribes with the Iranians while at the same time engaging seemingly in a negotiating process. The first is not conducive to the second. 

I am not naive enough to think that the negotiating process 

would be productive quickly. I am not certain that it will be productive in the long run. But I know that if we prejudice its chances 

in the short run, we will not have the opportunity to push the process over the longer run. That means that we should avoid time limits on the negotiations because they create a sense of urgency and 

pressure which is inimical to serious exploration of the issues. We 

should consult very quietly with our allies about what alternative 

means of pressure we may choose at some point to apply. But 

we should start the negotiating process on the basis of a serious 

7 

determination to explore the degree to which there are openings for 

accommodation. 

There are ambiguities in the Iranian posture. There are some indications, according to various reports, that the Iranians are not 

moving at full speed to acquire nuclear weapons. They may be 

seeking the capability to be a proto-nuclear country, but not to 

cross the threshold of actual weaponization or a level that would 

make weaponization possible in the near future. 

We should also be very careful also not to become susceptible to 

advice from interested parties regarding how we ought to proceed. 

There is a fascinating article in yesterday’s Haaretz on the advice 

that Secretary of State Clinton was given in Jerusalem yesterday 

on how we ought to proceed with the negotiating process. I would 

suggest that members of the committee become acquainted with 

that advice. I have some reservations regarding parts of it because 

it seems to me that if we follow it closely we will be sucked into 

a process in which escalation of tensions and mutual accusations 

will poison the effort at negotiations even at the very start. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski, for a very, very interesting and helpful approach and I look forward to following up with 

questions. 

General Scowcroft. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, 

USAF [RET.], PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

General SCOWCROFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, 

members of the committee. It’s a real privilege to come before you 

today to talk about such an important issue. 

Iran is an important state in the Middle East, with a proud history stretching back for centuries. Unfortunately, both Americans 

and Iranians tend to look at each other through the prism of the 

last 30 years. Before that time, under the Shah, Iran was our bastion of regional stability. When we replaced the British as the outside power in the region, we counted on the Shah to preserve stability in the region. After he was forced into exile and with the seizure of our Embassy, we and the Iranians developed an intense, 

visceral dislike of each other. 

It seems to me that now we need to get past our emotions in 

order to deal effectively with the problem. Obviously, a first step 

needs to be a willingness to talk to Iranian officials. Given our mutual histories and antipathies, each side will want to make sure it’s 

found the right interlocutor. This is not a straightforward task in 

the Iranian context. 

Furthermore, I believe now is a time of opportunity and one 

where we ought to try to encourage the tendencies in Iranian to 

liberalize. Voting patterns of the Iranian people indicate they want 

a more open regime. At the end of the day the Iranian regime is 

not what is revolutionary in Iran. The revolution in Iran is the people’s desire for more openness. The conservatives, the mullahs, 

want to hold things back. 

Ahmadinejad is not the senior-most official we sometimes make 

him out to be. But when our policies and actions encourage an appeal to Iranian nationalism, at which Ahmadinejad is a master, we 

8 

play into his hands. We help him use anti-Americanism to bring 

the country together. Put differently, the conservatives in Iran 

have actually been helped by our policies. We need to stop talking 

about regime change as the objective of U.S. policy and instead to 

engage in discussions with the right Iranian interlocutors to give 

flower to the more liberal tendencies in Iran, which in turn may 

put pressure on the extremists to evolve. 

From a U.S. perspective, I think there are two issues at the 

heart of a dialog and they are interrelated. The first is Iran and 

its role in the region, and the second is Iran and nuclear weapons. 

The fact is that Iran lives in a turbulent region, where it perceives 

itself to be threatened. It’s a Shia state in a generally Sunni region. 

It’s a Persian state in a generally Arab region. We need to be willing to engage Iran in strategic discussions and make clear we understand that Iran has legitimate security interests and concerns 

that will persuade Iran that it can be secure without the need to 

acquire nuclear weapons and that its continued pursuit of its current nuclear program will make it less rather than more secure. 

America likewise needs to convince Iran that we understand it’s 

an important state in the region. For example, Iran is bound to be 

involved in what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan because Iraq 

borders it on the west and Afghanistan on the east. If Washington 

and Teheran can work together to help these countries achieve stability, it would be productive for the entire region. 

I’ve heard both Israeli and Arab officials express concern that the 

U.S. might cut a deal with Iran at the expense of the Arab community. I sincerely believe this is an unwarranted concern. America’s 

principal interest is lasting stability in the Middle East and the 

gulf region. This can only result from an understanding that deals 

satisfactorily with the concerns of all the states in the region and 

one that’s endorsed by all the states in the region. Nevertheless, we 

need to recognize that these concerns on the part of Iran’s neighbors are real and deeply felt and that any engagement with Iran 

needs to be both preceded and accompanied by close consultations 

with all of the neighbors. 

On the nuclear issue, we need to reiterate that, while the international community supports Iran having peaceful nuclear power, 

civilian nuclear power program under proper safeguards, a unilateral nuclear program that provides even a latent nuclear weapons 

capability is destabilizing for the region. 

I do not doubt that the Iranian desire to master the enrichment 

process is partly motivated by dangers Teheran sees in the region. 

But we need to convince Iran that it would in fact be worse off 

were it to succeed in developing a nuclear weapons capability. This 

is, I think, of utmost importance because we stand on the cusp of 

a great flowering of proliferation if Iran develops such a capability. 

However, I would approach the Iranian nuclear issue through a 

strategic approach, rather than as a precondition to a broader dialog, which has been the case in the past. At the end of the day, 

the dialog would convey two fundamental messages to Teheran. 

First, we’re aware that you live in a dangerous region and we are 

prepared to discuss a regional security framework that addresses 

your legitimate security concerns. As a corollary, we recognize that 

Iran is an important and influential power in the region, and we 

9 

want to work with you on issues of mutual interest. Second, in pursuing your enrichment program you’re proceeding on a course that 

destabilizes the whole region and will make you, Iran, less rather 

than more secure. 

I believe we can and indeed should work through both bilateral 

and multilateral channels in parallel. Our willingness to engage directly with Iran is a form of leverage, a way to both mobilize more 

from our partners and to disarm Iran’s arguments that we’re only 

out to change the regime in Teheran. That is, we can reach out to 

Iran on a bilateral basis and also show that the U.S. is fully engaged in the multilateral P5+1, that is the Permanent 5 of the Security Council plus Germany, process. 

It would be important to secure—to share responsibility with the 

P5+1 and to engage fully with China and Russia. Just as we need 

to have close and continuing consultations with Iran’s neighbors to 

assure them we will not make a deal at their expense, we should 

engage with the P5+1 to ensure they see our bilateral engagement 

with Teheran as reinforcing rather than undermining the multilateral mechanism. 

Thus far, that multilateral process has not worked, in part I believe because there has not been solidarity among the P5+1. I don’t 

think any of them want Iran to continue with their enrichment 

program, but they have not been willing thus far to put their bilateral interests at risk. I believe we need to create incentives for the 

other members of the P5+1 to share more equitably the burdens 

and risks of increasing the pressure on Iran if it continues on its 

present course. To this end, for example, we should take our wider 

relations with the P5+1, and particularly those of Russia, into account. For example, it seems eminently sensible to me to adjust our 

missile defense plans in Eastern Europe if Russia actively helps 

deal with the threat that Iran acquires nuclear weapons technology. But we should also persuade our P5+1 partners to increase 

pressure on Iran in a meaningful manner should talks with Iran 

fail to reach a satisfactory conclusion, and engaging and reaching 

out for those talks will help encourage that result. 

An essential goal of our strategy should be to present Iran with 

a solid international front. While the NPT does not prevent Iran 

from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel as long as it 

abides by the IAEA rules, enriching and reprocessing are not really 

acceptable things to do for Iran or anyone else in the region, or 

even broader. I think that a U.N. or other international mechanism 

that guarantees the provision of enriched uranium fuel to powerplants is a vastly preferable way to go. 

This is not just a problem we have with Iran, although Iran is 

the poster child for it. It’s a nuclear problem. If Iran continues to 

enrich uranium, I suspect that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey at 

a minimum will feel compelled to have the same capability as they 

move toward development of their civilian nuclear power programs. 

And soon we will have a flood of enrichment programs, putting 

many countries within a few steps of producing weapons-grade uranium and with it a latent weapons capability. That would not be 

a better world for anyone. 

10 

So Iran could well be a tipping point on the proliferation issue. 

Anything that allows Iran to enrich uranium is a deadly peril to 

the goal of containing proliferation capabilities in the world. 

I think we should say to the Iranians: We, the nuclear weapons 

states, encourage peaceful nuclear power. We want to support nuclear power. To do that, we’re prepared to support a mechanism 

which would provide enriched uranium for nuclear powerplants at 

a price below any cost which a particular nation can produce it nationally, and take responsibility for removing the spent fuel after 

it’s burned. We will give an international organization such as 

IAEA control of the process so that the United States cannot if we 

don’t like your policies cut off supplies. 

This would be applicable to all countries of the region, not just 

Iran. And that’s why I say we need to address the Iranian nuclear 

program, not as an isolated problem, but in the context of achieving an international regime that encourages nuclear power, but 

without the threat of enrichment or reprocessing. 

In conclusion, I think the situation, as my colleague said, requires sophisticated diplomacy, looking at all the elements of a 

very complicated problem. We need to make clear not only what we 

need from the Iranians, but also what we’re prepared to do to address their legitimate concerns. We have some substantial cards to 

play in a bilateral dialogue with Iran: recognition of Iran’s important role in the region and support for a peaceful nuclear program, 

which might include nuclear fuel at costs otherwise not possible. 

Direct talks with Iran will not be easy. They will not be easy to 

organize. It’s difficult to know who to talk to. But we need to go 

the last mile with Iran, making clear we’re not trying to freeze 

them out of their rightful role in the region. We must be realistic 

about prospects of success and we must have some patience. If the 

talks succeed, we will have fundamentally advanced the peace and 

security of the region. If it turns out that Iran is simply too intransigent, then we will at least have strengthened our hand in leading 

an international effort to restrain Iran by having shown our willingness to go the last mile. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. Thank you both again for 

very, very important testimony. 

We are going to proceed with a 7-minute round because of the 

number of Senators here, and we want to make sure everybody 

gets a chance to ask questions. 

First of all, Dr. Brzezinski, you twice in your testimony said: 

‘‘Don’t set limits on ourselves’’; and a second time you said: ‘‘Avoid 

time limits.’’ Is there not, by virtue of Iran’s own activities and 

Israel’s perception of those activities, as well as our own intelligence community’s interpretations of those activities, isn’t there 

an automatic timetable thrust on us as a consequence, unless there 

is some indication by Iran of a willingness to change that timetable? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. When I say that there should be no timetable, 

I’m not suggesting that we should engage in indefinite, endless negotiations. What I am saying is that openly imposing time limits 

in advance creates a degree of pressure which is not conducive to 

a serious negotiating process. 

11 

Throughout the entire negotiating process, however long it lasts, 

whether it’s months or several years, we will be in a position always to ask ourselves, are we being strung out? Is the other side 

doing things outside of the negotiating table that jeopardize the 

whole negotiating process and justifies its abortion? We always retain that right. But I’m saying don’t set time limits in advance. 

That is the advice, for example, that Secretary Clinton was given 

yesterday: A time limit must be set for the talks. Well, if there is 

a time limit set for the talks, can we keep it secret? What is its 

impact if it’s announced in advance? I think it is damaging to the 

negotiating process. 

We can also do things outside of the negotiating process which 

help to create a greater degree of security and confidence, not only 

on our own part or of our immediate allies engaged in this venture, 

but also in the region. For example, I am of the view that as we 

go into the negotiating process we should at some point make it 

clear that we are prepared to extend the nuclear umbrella to all 

of our friends in the Middle East because for different reasons 

there are misgivings both in Israel and in the Arab countries, 

whether it be the Emirates or even Egypt and Saudi Arabia, about 

what the Iranians are doing. A U.S. nuclear umbrella would reemphasize the importance of deterrence. 

I think we have to some extent lost sight of the relevance of our 

very extensive experience with nuclear deterrence. It has worked. 

It worked with the Stalinist regime which was ominous, tyrannical, 

and murderous. It worked with the Chinese, whose leader at one 

time talked about a nuclear war not being so serious because it will 

kill only 300 million people. The Indians and the Pakistanis have 

managed to deter each other, knock on wood, so far. 

In brief, the experience with deterrence gives us some grounds 

for not being under tremendous time limits. And in any case, we 

know that deterrence is predictable if it works. Military action sets 

in motion unforeseeable circumstances, which in the present 

context of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and 

Pakistan would be absolutely devastating to the American national 

interest. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you both. Time sort of runs so rapidly on these things, but I want to follow up, I want to follow up 

on that because the equation of perception of deterrence for Israel, 

given the nature of the region and the challenges that are being 

thrown at them is somewhat different, I think, than the nature of 

the deterrence that we went through for those years of the cold 

war. And we could probably have a good discussion about that, but 

before we do I put it on the table. 

I want to ask both of you. The Iranians are listening to this. A 

lot of members of the Arab community are listening to this. The 

world is listening to this. You are two very experienced, thoughtful 

folks who people respect around the world with respect to this kind 

of an issue. So as we begin this hearing and lay this out, I do think 

it’s really important to put into context. 

We have a bad record with the Iranians: 1953 and the CIA involvement in the overthrow; their perceptions of what we did in 

Iraq; the Congress’s public embrace of a regime change resolution 

and concept. If you’re sitting in Iran and you see the history of 

12 

that, you’re going to make some judgments. The United States 

pulled out of the ABM Treaty. The United States has refused to 

ratify the CTB Treaty. You can run—it’s important in these processes always to think about how the other person sees you, and you 

know that better than anybody else. 

So would both of you please lay out why this—from their perception as they think about our intentions and the seriousness of our 

purpose here, why is this more, when we say they shouldn’t have 

a nuclear weapon, why is that more than just us saying something 

vis-a-vis Israel? Why is that more than the United States holding 

onto its Perm-5 status with the other four members of it plus those 

who have already sort of broken out? 

What is it that is so critical here that brings the Russians, the 

other countries in the region, the Europeans, and the United States 

to say, with justification, it might bring us to a point of confrontation, that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon? Would you both 

sort of articulate that as clearly as you can? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I will. I think it is because, as I indicated in my remarks, we’re on the cusp of an explosion of proliferation, and Iran is now the poster child. If Iran is allowed to go forward, in self-defense or for a variety of reasons we could have half 

a dozen countries in the region and 20 or 30 more around the world 

doing the same thing just in case. 

That is not a better world, and it seems to me that is what gives 

urgency to what we’re trying to do here. So I think we need to do 

what we can to reassure Iran that we recognize their problems and 

we’re prepared to help them deal with the problems, that we do our 

best to solidify the P5+1 process, so that Iran is facing a monolith 

saying ‘‘Don’t do this.’’ And then if that is not successful, then we’re 

in a better position to mobilize the P5 with the kind of sanctions 

that can really punish Iran short of a conflict. 

So I think all of these have to play together. 

The CHAIRMAN. Building into that, as you answer, Dr. 

Brzezinski, you very wisely left out sort of how people perceive 

those threats. And what you say, if those threats become too public 

and if there’s too much concentration of people, does it become a 

matter of nationalistic expression of right, if you will, if not pride, 

that they say: The hell with all of you; we’re going to do this because you are ganging up on us, in a sense. Is there a counterimpact? Dr. Brzezinski? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think there’s a lot of evidence for that. Even 

the Nobel Prize winner for literature—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you pull the mike a little closer. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. There’s a lot of evidence for what you said. Even 

a winner of the international Nobel Prize for Literature, the Iranian lady, who is a critic of the Government, has stated publicly: 

‘‘We all support the nuclear program. This is a matter of principle, 

of pride, for many Iranians of national well-being.’’ So we have to 

be careful about that, because if we are awkward in our approach, 

if we’re one-sided, if we seem to be seeking negotiations in order 

to impose, we’ll simply unify the Iranians and make it easier for 

them to do what they’re doing. So that’s point No. 1. 

Point No. 2: I do think that taking the position publicly that the 

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13 

ened country in the Middle East with its own nuclear deterrent, 

would have a lot of credibility and it would reduce this threat that 

concerns many Israelis, that they’re existentially threatened. 

Actually, I don’t think they are existentially threatened because 

I don’t see Iran the moment it gets its first nuclear weapon using 

it in a suicidal act, because the retaliation would be totally destructive. In fact, we were under a much greater existential threat when 

Brent was sitting in the White House, when I was sitting in the 

White House, and we were involved in helping the President coordinate the nuclear response in the event of an attack. We could 

have been devastated in 6 hours and still faced the option of 

whether to respond or to be finished up completely because of the 

size and the followup potential of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. We 

lived in that reality for years without claiming that we have to disarm the Soviet Union somehow in order to continue. So I think deterrence can help a lot. 

We also, it seems to me, ought to be more active internationally 

in promoting nuclear disarmament, because part of the charge 

against us in many parts of the world is that we’re seeking to preserve a monopoly for ourselves, maybe for two or three more countries. 

So I think these are the kind of things we can do to mitigate 

some of the problems that we face. 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you just finish the part of the question 

about the articulation of why it is so imperative that Iran not have 

this weapon, and the justification for our unified actions to achieve 

that? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, actually, on that point, curiously enough, 

what the Iranians say publicly is consistent with our position. They 

say they don’t want nuclear weapons. We have reason to suspect—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But they don’t answer the questions put to them 

by the IAEA—— 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. That’s right. So we have reason to suspect—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. About what they do in secret. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. We have reason to suspect that this is a mendacious assertion. But as long as they claim that this is truly their 

fundamental position, we are in a position to say to them: ‘‘In that 

case, let’s negotiate an arrangement that makes it absolutely credible to the world at large that in fact you are not seeking nuclear 

weapons and you will not have them.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN. And you do agree with General Scowcroft on the 

rationale for why they should not have it? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. The potential for nuclear dissemination I 

think is the real threat, not that they will use their first bomb to 

start a war in which they will perish. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Brzezinski, earlier in your testimony you 

mentioned a point that one of our witnesses on Tuesday also mentioned, and that is that the Supreme Ruler is the major factor, 

major leader in Iran, as opposed to Ahmadinejad. I want to pursue 

that for just a moment, to ask you and General Scowcroft. In your 

judgment, does the Supreme Ruler really want to have a relationship with us, that is the United States, or, more broadly, with the 

14 

West? Or does the Supreme Ruler believe that his security, regime, 

and authority is based upon not having such a relationship? 

What is your judgment about his preference or his security in 

this situation? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I have somewhat mixed feelings. I think the essence of the regime makes it inclined to be wary of a closer relationship with us because to them we are the Great Satan, and that 

in a sense justifies their own role in Iran. 

But one also can note at times some shades of disagreement between the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad. I think many Iranians think that Ahmadinejad is a bit of a nut and that he’s damaging Iranian standing in the world, that his verbal exercises suggest a high degree of dementia, and this does not fill a country 

with genuine historical pride in itself with much respect. 

So there are these differences. I think our task is to avoid becoming engaged directly in their political contests while creating an external international context which favors the evolution of the Iranian public in a more and more moderate direction. We do have 

plenty of evidence that, particularly in the large urban centers, 

among the younger people, among the intellectuals, there is a sense 

that the extremist agenda is counterproductive to Iran’s wellbeing 

as well as to its international standing. 

Senator LUGAR. But even if public opinion in Iran is in favor of 

negotiating with the United States, does it make any difference? In 

other words, if this is a theocratic regime of the Supreme Leader, 

leaving aside whatever Ahmadinejad’s situation is, my basic question is, should our negotiating posture be one of focusing on the Supreme Ruler? Is he inclined to want to negotiate, or is his position 

one in which he sees security by not doing so? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. We have no choice, because there is a Supreme 

Leader and he is in charge. If we negotiate with the Iranians, we 

are presumably negotiating ultimately with him. But our objective 

ought to be in the process to create the conditions in which it becomes evident to the top people in the Iranian elite that it is in 

their own domestic political interest to move in a somewhat more 

moderate direction. 

Let’s not forget, while we have, rightly so, a very negative assessment of the Iranian theocracy, it is a theocracy wedded to a political process that’s considerably more democratic than Russia’s. The 

elections in Iran are much more of a real contest and they’re much 

more open, and there is a much greater degree of competition between the key alternatives in Iran than there is in Russia. 

Senator LUGAR. General Scowcroft, do you have a comment on 

this subject? 

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I agree in general with what Zbigniew 

said. I don’t think we know about the Supreme Leader, but it 

seems to me, first, he has no reason to feel kindly toward the 

United States. Second, he probably has as his minimum achievement preserving the regime in Iran. Now, there are others in Iran 

who are more revolutionary than the Supreme Leader. The IRG, at 

least some elements, are prepared to sacrifice Iran in the larger 

jihadist movement. 

But we need to find out, and I think we need to pose those issues 

to him in a way he will make the reasonable decision. One of the 

15 

interesting things that we’re going to see, though, is, I agree with 

Zbigniew we should not appear to interfere in any way in the election process, but now we’re going to have Ahmadinejad running, 

we’re going to have Khatemi running, and apparently Larijani. 

That’s a fascinating political lineup, and one in which, if they’re all 

allowed to run, the Iranian people will really get to say whether 

they like the Ahmadinejad nationalistic, xenophobic approach, or 

whether they like Khatemi’s more open, embracing posture. 

So I think we have a lot to work with here, but we have to be 

careful that we encourage the good side and don’t push Iran back 

into their fortress mentality. 

Senator LUGAR. The reason I ask is, just being the devil’s advocate for a moment, the election may be very interesting and quite 

competitive and we are extremely interested in its outcome. But I 

want to return to the point that despite all of the debate and interest, if down deep the Supreme Ruler feels that the regime needs 

to retain, if not hostility to us and to the West, at least no particular accommodation, and that a nuclear program is a part of 

that situation what are the real prospects for an agreement. I am 

focusing on this because we’ve had a lot of testimony that public 

opinion is important, that we ought to have transparency as we formulate our policy, transparency as we formulate relations with the 

Europeans, and I think there’s logic to that, so that the Iranian 

people see all of this, or anybody who is in Iran. But when it finally 

comes down to it, even if they do see all of it, what authority do 

they have or what ability to change the mind of the Supreme Ruler 

or those who are closest to him in a theocracy that has a set pattern? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The Supreme Leader, as well as the entire Iranian leadership, has to also consider the overall condition of the 

economy, the question of social stability, the wellbeing of the people. There is, after all, some reciprocal relationship between the 

rulers and the people, even in an autocracy, in which there is a 

sense of kind of commonweal, common destiny. 

This is a country with genuine traditions of statecraft and historical and cultural pride. It is also a country in which the social indicators suggest that it is a country moving toward an increasingly 

higher level of modernity, certainly comparable in many respects to 

Turkey in the level of literacy, access to universities, particularly 

of women, amount of women in law, medicine, and so forth, there 

is even a woman who is a vice president of the country. Most 

Americans probably don’t know that. 

This is a country in which increasingly large numbers of people 

go on vacations, particularly to Turkey, less so to Europe, but towards the West. In other words, this is a country in which some 

of the social dynamics, not very visible under this super-overlay of 

theocratic fanaticism, are actually evolving. And even the Supreme 

Leader, to the extent that he wishes to remain a leader, has to take 

these considerations into account. 

If we can subtly encourage that process by avoiding a posture 

which is easy for him and his associates to translate to the public 

as being dedicated to unlimited hostility toward Iran, I think we 

help the interests that we’re anxious to promote, and we help perhaps even in the long run to revive at some point in the future the 

16 

traditional amity, even at one point alliance, between Israel and 

Iran. 

Israel and Iran were in a close relationship under Golda Meir, 

including the beginnings of the nuclear relationship. Iran received 

help from Israel during the Iran-Iraq War under Prime Minister 

Begin. Prime Minister Rabin once said that Israel and Iran are 

natural allies, I assume because of the principle that the neighbor 

of my neighbor is my friend, and it’s a perfectly sensible and welltried principle. 

So I am simply saying we should not lock ourselves into a posture in which we view the current enmity with Iran as something 

indefinitely enduring, and that we do have some subtle means to 

try to alter that, with some receptivity in Iran that we can nurture 

as well. 

Senator LUGAR. My time is up, but it would be interesting to pursue how the Supreme Leader looks at the regional balance of 

power, terrorism, economic picture, and Iran’s history. In other 

words, there might be some reasons why the Supreme Leader could 

come under some circumstances to a different view toward us. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Right. And let’s not be deceived by the word ‘‘Supreme.’’ He is the leader, but supremacy in every system has some 

limits. In their system it has more limits, let’s say, than in some 

others. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

The chairman has asked me to recognize Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the chair, and I want to thank Chairman Kerry for his leadership in making sure we have a particular 

emphasis on Iran this week. I think it has been very useful. 

I particularly want to thank these distinguished witnesses, not 

only for their superb careers, but in particular for the quality and 

the clarity of the testimony today. It’s just so helpful and interesting to listen to. Thank you very much. 

As you both know, Iran poses a threat for a number of reasons, 

including its nuclear ambitions, its missile capabilities, and its support for terrorist groups. How would you rank these in terms of 

how direct the threat is to the United States and its interests and 

its allies and in terms of the urgency and seriousness of the threat? 

And also, how should we factor in the missile threat to Europe into 

our threat analysis? 

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I’m not sure I can rank them because 

I think they’re all serious problems. The nuclear threat I think is 

probably the most serious in terms of the world impact if they get 

away with it. But I think it is also the one where we are likely to 

get the greatest amount of support in dealing with it if we go about 

it the right way. For example, a missile deployment, defensive missile deployment in Eastern Europe. The previous President said at 

least a couple of times, we cannot allow Iran to develop nuclear 

weapons, and yet we’re building a missile deployment for when 

they do. Now, if you’re the Russians what do you take from that? 

It seems to me that the way to go is go to the Russians and say, 

look, neither of us want nuclear weapons to be developed; let’s 

work together. Then we don’t need this, and we’re prepared to 

delay long enough so that we can see whether or not it’s necessary, 

17 

and if it’s necessary for us it’s necessary for you. It’s a different approach. 

With the Chinese it’s a little different. The Chinese get a lot of 

oil and Iran is a good customer. But what happens if there’s a turmoil in the Middle East, a conflict in the Middle East? What happens to their oil supply? 

So everybody has important interests, if we can draw them together. I think Iran as a power in the region, it’s very important 

for us, but probably less apocalyptic in the sense that they can help 

us or hurt us in our dealings with Iraq and with Afghanistan. We 

had some incipient cooperation with them in the early days of our 

operations in Afghanistan, which fell apart. 

So I think we have to deal on all fronts equally, and I would not 

prioritize. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, do you want to comment on that? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Let me just add this, and perhaps this may be 

a little controversial. We’re talking about a relationship and you 

mentioned the issue of threat. There is an American-Iranian relationship and if you look at the relationship you have to ask yourself 

in what way, to what degree, they’re affecting us adversely, but you 

also have to ask yourself: How does it look to the Iranians? Who 

threatens whom more? Are we more threatened by the Iranians or 

are the Iranians more threatened by us? 

For example, who talks about the use of force a lot? And who has 

infinitely more force? So it’s a little more complicated than, ‘‘are 

they a big threat to us?’’ Yes, some of the things they do affect our 

interests adversely, but some of the things we do probably are a 

source of very major concern to them. 

There’s a further consideration involved here. We have become 

extremely casual in the use of the word ‘‘terrorism.’’ We don’t like 

somebody, well, of course he’s a terrorist. That’s a slippery slope 

and it doesn’t help to really deal with the complexities of the 

issues. It also eventually reduces the word ‘‘terrorism’’ to political 

convenience. Note, for example, our negotiations with North Korea, 

a terrorist state; but if they agree to what we say to them on plutonium, we’ll take you off the list as a terrorist state. What’s one got 

to do with the other? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I think your point is well taken on that. I 

would add that Iran is a very disturbing country, but any country 

that watches another country invade the country to its west and 

the country to its east is going to get a little nervous and edgy, 

which of course is exactly what we’ve done. So that people have to 

understand the mutual perceptions between our two countries, the 

history is a very disturbing one ever since Mossadeq was taken out, 

and that this is something that we have to look at from both points 

of view. 

At a Foreign Relations Committee hearing earlier this week, one 

of the witnesses, Karim Sadjadpour from the Carnegie Endowment 

argued that building confidence with Iran is critical to a productive 

dialog, a process that he said ‘‘will be easier if our efforts initially 

concentrate on areas of shared interest, such as Afghanistan and 

Iraq, rather than those of little or no common interest, such as the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the nuclear issue.’’ 

18 

Do you agree with this approach? If you start a dialog on points 

of common concern, how do you then direct it toward other national 

security concerns like the nuclear program or support for terrorist 

organizations, or whatever term you want to use, doctor? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. In my view, they need not be sequential. They 

could be parallel. I recently commented publicly on President 

Obama’s timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. My point was that for 

that to be effective and to minimize the potentially destabilizing 

consequences of our departure we ought to launch simultaneously 

with the withdrawal process an effort to engage all of Iraq’s neighbors in regional security negotiations, because every one of Iraq’s 

neighbors will be affected adversely if Iraq becomes destabilized. 

That includes Iran and Syria. So I favor security talks which include the Iranians regarding Iraq. Similarly, I think we had a rather constructive relationship briefly with the Iranians late in 2001 

and in 2002 regarding the Taliban issue in Afghanistan. I think 

that could be resumed as well. And at the same time I do favor the 

initiation of talks directly with the Iranians involving us particularly, not just through our European friends, regarding the nuclear 

program. I think that should be initiated before too long. I’ve already tried to articulate the context and the manner in which this 

should be done. 

But I’m also of the view—and I think this question was raised 

either by Senator Kerry or Senator Lugar and we didn’t respond— 

that we not delay these talks, unless the Iranians want to delay 

them, past the Iranian selections. I would rather start them at a 

low level, a low key fashion, before the elections, so that 

Ahmadinejad cannot claim in the course of the elections that the 

Americans are waiting to negotiate with Iran after he is defeated, 

which would then perhaps help him. So let’s start the process now, 

which woul d, of course, under the mandate of the Supreme Leader 

in any case. 

So I hope that’s responsive to what you asked. 

Senator FEINGOLD. General, did you want to make a quick comment on the strategy for negotiations that the doctor responded to? 

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I would just say that we ought to 

start them in as comprehensive a fashion as we can. We don’t 

know. We’re not used to talking to the Iranians and that will take 

some time. Even finding out who to talk to usefully will be a major 

challenge. So I would not say this is more important, let’s focus on 

this. I would start and push on all fronts, and we’ll see what’s productive and what isn’t productive as we go along. This will take exquisite diplomacy. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. I appreciate it. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service and your testimony. I want to 

ask you, is there doubt in either of your minds that Iran is seeking 

to acquire a nuclear weapons capability? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would put it this way. If I had to make a categorical judgment, I would say that they are probably at this stage 

aiming at having a capability somewhat similar to that of Japan, 

19 

which is an NPT signatory, which is not in violation of the treaty, 

but which has reached a threshold in which it is what I call a 

proto-nuclear power, that is to say one that could rapidly move towards effective nuclear weapons capability if there is a political decision to that effect, but will not cross that threshold in the near 

future. 

Senator MENENDEZ. General. 

General SCOWCROFT. I would not dissent from what Zbigniew 

just said. I think we make a mistake or have recently in claiming 

that they seek a nuclear weapon, because it seems to me the problem is there whether they want a nuclear weapon or whether they 

simply want to control their civilian power and have their own enrichment capability. I think that is almost as big a threat because, 

as I say, I am more concerned about the spread of nuclear capability in terms especially of uranium enrichment than Iran itself 

having a weapon. I think that is a much bigger threat, the general 

threat. 

When we say—when we say, well, you want a nuclear weapon, 

and they say, no, we don’t, then a lot of the world who’s suspicious 

of us anyway says, well, what’s our point? I think we have to go 

after the broader question, not the narrow question. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I raise the question—— 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Could I just add one sentence? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Surely. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. This is exactly what we should not be saying, 

and I quote: ‘‘They have declared they want to have a nuclear 

weapon to destroy people.’’ A statement by the President of the 

United States in March 21 of last year. It’s absolutely false. They 

have never declared that. 

General SCOWCROFT. That hurts us. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. That hurts us. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I asked the question because—— 

The CHAIRMAN. For people who don’t keep track of the dates, 

that’s the other President. [Laughter.] 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. March 21, 2008. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I asked the question because if Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, then one must ask 

themselves why they’ve refused to cooperate with the IAEA, why 

do they continue to act in defiance of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. It clearly raises the concern that if you have peaceful purposes at the end of the day you’d act differently in order to 

assure the world that you have peaceful purposes at the end of the 

day. 

General SCOWCROFT. Well, they have answers to those questions. 

Their argument why they need their own enrichment program is 

that they’ve tried to cooperate and the Germans were going to 

build the first plant, they backed off. We were going to supply enriched uranium to them; we backed off. Unless they have control 

of it, they are subject to the whims of the great powers. That’s their 

argument. 

They simply don’t answer the question, why don’t they let the 

IAEA have free run. They simply don’t answer it. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me ask you this. If the goal of engagement is to dissuade Iran from continuing its enrichment work 

20 

and acquiring a weapon or a breakout capability, do you believe 

that it can work in the necessarily short time frame that we have, 

based upon some of the reports that we’ve seen about where their 

capabilities are at this point? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think it can. I don’t know if it will. 

I don’t know if it’ll work at all. But it seems to me that it is worth 

a try, because in the process of trying, if the United States is really 

sincere, we’re likely to get on board people who suspect now, who 

say we’re sitting off in the corner throwing rocks at them, asking 

for sanctions, but not trying to solve the problem. If we can convince everybody else that Iran is implacable and only the use of coercive force, sanctions or whatever will work, then we’re in a much 

better position than we’re in right now, because we’re the bad cop 

and so everybody else just goes about doing their own business. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree with that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But the time is ticking on us as well. 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We have an enormous challenge here. It’s 

not that we have an open-ended opportunity. 

Let me ask you one last question. Just yesterday Iran’s president 

called Israel a ‘‘cancerous tumor,’’ and it called upon Muslims to 

join in what he calls ‘‘resistance’’ against Israel. Earlier this week, 

President Abbas said, ‘‘We are sending a message to the Iranians 

and others to stop interfering in our affairs.’’ 

I just wonder, how do you characterize Iran’s behavior within the 

region? And looking at that behavior, how would acquiring nuclear 

capability embolden Iran as a power within the region? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, obviously if Iran had a nuclear weapons 

capability it would probably be emboldened, and this is why we do 

not desire that outcome and we are prepared to work against it. 

The question is how are we going to be effective in working against 

it. In my view we should not rule out the negotiating process, especially given the repeated commitments by the Iranians to the effect 

that they don’t want nuclear weapons, but they do want a nuclear 

program. 

I think we ought to try to see whether it is possible to find a formula whereby these seemingly incompatible objectives are somehow squared. We shouldn’t overdramatize the immediate international effects of having a bomb. I agree with Brent that the most 

important effect will be the impetus towards proliferation in the region, but it’s not going to be some sort of a suicidal nuclear war. 

That is really an extreme, fundamentally irrational assumption for 

which there is no proof, and simply anxiety and uncertainty cannot 

be the basis for serious action. 

This is, whether we like it or not, a serious country of 70 million 

people, with a tradition of responsible statecraft by and large. It is 

a country that is profoundly aware of the fact it’s totally vulnerable 

to an attack by us, or even eventually by the Israelis; if push came 

to shove and they had to use their nuclear weapons against Iran 

they could greatly damage that country. There’s no evidence that 

Iran as a country, with its traditions, its self-interest, its pride, is 

bent on committing suicide. 

We never felt that about the Chinese. We never felt that about 

the Russians. The Pakistanis and the Indians have managed to 

21 

control their mutual anxieties. I don’t see any evidence that the 

Iranians, the moment they have a bomb, which I think we can 

postpone or avoid, are going to plunge head-long into suicidal adventurism. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez. 

Let me just say that, through the wonders of Blackberries, I can 

tell you that Secretary Clinton, who is now in Brussels, has announced that the Obama administration is going to be convening 

a meeting on Afghanistan on the 31st of this month. And Robert 

Wood, the spokesperson for the State Department, has publicly 

stated that that meeting will include Foreign Minister and/or 

equivalent from Iran, because obviously that’s important to Afghanistan. 

So I think a process is already under way and I think that’s a 

wise—first of all, it’s wise to meet on Afghanistan. Second, it’s wise 

to be inclusive. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the 

sustained focus this week on Iran and the challenge that it presents. 

We want to welcome—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just also announce—I apologize, Senator—there’s a vote that I think has been scheduled now for 12:10. 

So we’ll try to push through here and I think we should be able 

to wrap up by that time, because I know both of these folks have 

another engagement. 

Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. General, thank you. Doctor, thank you. As I told 

you in the anteroom, I purchased your book, with my own funds. 

General SCOWCROFT. But you also said you haven’t read it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. And I haven’t read it. I was about to admit that. 

But I’ll tell you, when you have that book in your office on a coffee 

table and you get visitors, it impresses them. I want you to know 

that. [Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. So now I get—— 

General SCOWCROFT. We’re happy to be of service. 

Senator CASEY. The next time you appear you’ll have to quiz me 

and see if I actually got to it. But I’ll do my best. 

But it’s instructive for us on this committee to have a book like 

that and have resources like that in your testimony today, and I 

know this isn’t the only testimony you’re providing today. But we’re 

grateful for your service to the country and for your continuing 

work on these difficult issues. 

I wanted to try to get to maybe three issues rather quickly, but 

the first one probably taking the majority of the time. That’s on 

sanctions. We read about as citizens and as Senators stories and 

analyses about how sanctions are working or not working in the 

context of Iran. I guess I’d ask you generally, based upon your 

knowledge of this particular challenge, but also more broadly your 

experience in foreign affairs in similar circumstances, to evaluate 

the efficacy or effectiveness of the sanctions to date, mostly of 

course in the Bush Administration; and then also what your recVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:34 Jul 28, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\50464.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
22 

ommendations would be or how would you construct sanctions 

going forward with regard to Iran, in the context of obviously the 

Security Council, but also what our government does and says in 

the context of what sanctions can work. 

We know that the financial sanctions and that isolation becomes 

part of this, but also refining capacity. That’s always put on the 

table as probably a lot more serious step to take. Please give us 

your evaluation of where we are on sanctions and where we should 

be headed? 

General SCOWCROFT. Well, Senator, I think we’re not very far on 

sanctions, but I think it’s partly due to reluctance of many of the 

major countries of the world to hurt what is a good commerce, and 

also to the attitude of the United States because, as we both said, 

we have not been participating in the dialog with Iran. First of all, 

we said before we’ll talk to Iran they have to suspend enrichment, 

so they have to give away their biggest card before they sit down 

at the table. And that’s been the general attitude. So there’s been 

a great reluctance to agree to sanctions that are anything more 

than showing symbolic solidarity. 

Sanctions generally are a very imperfect instrument. In this case, 

sanctions would require—I think they could be very effective, but 

they will require sincere acceptance by the major powers. As you 

say, oil refining; Iran has to import a lot of its refined product. 

That’s a tremendous weapon for sanctions, but it takes agreement 

and it takes—people get hurt by it, and the reaction could be that 

Iran cuts off exports of crude, which hurts everybody, including 

Iran. 

So it’s a complicated issue. But I think potentially, if the P5+1 

could get to the point there’s nothing left, then I think sanctions 

could be really effective. 

Senator CASEY. Doctor. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I basically agree. I think they work at the margins, but they don’t work on fundamental issues. Look at ILSA. It 

really hasn’t achieved its objectives in a strategic sense. In the 

present economic crisis, I think there could be also complications 

with our friends if we are arbitrary about them. 

As Brent just said, just think what it would do to the European 

quest for energy security diversification if we could get Iranian oil 

and gas to be really exported at full capacity, particularly to Europe. So in fact let’s be careful not to throw the baby out with the 

bathwater. 

Senator CASEY. I wanted to ask you about the question of how 

we talk and the strategy that’s employed to make sure that any 

kind of effort to have a new approach to talking, whether it’s bilateral or multilateral. If you were designing the next 6 months, so 

to speak, of our policy, how would you design it and what would 

the structure be for how to construct a process to make sure that 

talking and engagement leads to results that you can identify, you 

can almost quantify? We know this administration has a different 

point of view than the prior administration about engaging Iran, 

how would you, if you were designing it construct it? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I would certainly avoid the things I talked 

about early on in my testimony. I think we have to approach these 

23 

talks as a serious, potentially a very important undertaking. And 

we ought to do it in a fashion which respects the interlocutor. 

I would start with the Iranians simply by trying to first of all 

draw up some sort of a mutually agreed agenda regarding an analysis of the record in the nuclear area—in what respects the Iranians have been compliant with NPT and with IAEA; what are the 

accusations against noncompliance; what are the areas in which 

suspicions and concerns can be narrowed—pointing then to some 

perhaps mutual advantages in accommodation, beginning to spell 

out the benefits to Iran of an accommodation in which we have assurances that they’re not doing what they say they’re not doing and 

in which their compliance with standards gives them tangible benefits. 

The joint memo of the ministers of the Five of last June I think 

outlined a potential agenda, and I think this could be then examined in much more detail. That process probably would take us into 

the summer. By then there will have been elections in Iran. We’ll 

see what the political situation is and then we can again reassess 

and see how we go from there. 

We will not get much assistance from the Chinese or the Russians unless we are prepared to be patient. The Chinese are extraordinarily vulnerable to a crisis in the Persian Gulf, extraordinarily vulnerable. This is where their position is somewhat different from the Russians. The Russians, who may have reservations about Iran going nuclear, would be financially massive beneficiaries of an American-Iranian crisis. 

Senator CASEY. I know I’m out of time by a minute, so we can 

move on. 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s an important and it’s an important answer. 

Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for 

holding these hearings and holding them together like this. It really makes them very, very helpful to me. I think Dave Ignatius got 

it right. He wrote a column earlier in February saying that you two 

are the A Team for Iran. I totally, absolutely, I agree with him. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I’m sure he was doing us a favor. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Well, I think he absolutely nailed it, to tell 

you the truth. 

General SCOWCROFT. He’s trying to get rid of us. [Laughter.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. I think not. 

You know, what he said in the article, and just listening to you 

here today, that there’s a real agreement between the two of you 

that this new engagement policy’s a good one. But there was a little disagreement, he said—and I couldn’t see any clarification to 

that—whether we should do this in public or in private. Could the 

two of you just talk about carrying on—the excellent question that 

Senator Casey asked: Is it best to do it in public or in private? 

General SCOWCROFT. I think that depends heavily on the Iranians. And we do differ somewhat, I believe, on that. I would be 

inclined to start off in private, for this reason: That negotiations 

with the Americans is a very controversial issue inside Iran, and 

we don’t know whether people in the end are afraid to stick their 

necks out to be seen negotiating with the Americans. 

24 

I had some experience with that in the first, the Bush Senior administration, where we got very close to negotiations and they 

backed out at the last minute. So I would let it depend, but I would 

make the first overtures with the Iranians quiet ones. First of all, 

we’ve got to figure out, get a serious interlocutor on their side, and 

that’s not easy. Who do you talk to? The government? That’s who 

foreigners should talk to. But the government doesn’t hold the 

power. 

So there are all kinds of problems here, but I would be inclined 

to start quietly. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. We may have narrowed our disagreement by 

what you just said. First overtures, of course they have to be done 

quietly. How else can we do it? We’re not going to do it on television or radio. So yes, preliminary discussions quietly. 

But once the negotiating process starts, I would favor conducting 

it openly, not necessarily with open sessions, but sessions that are 

publicly known, maybe even some press briefings afterwards if 

there is agreement about press briefings. My reason is this: If you 

do it secretly, first of all there’ll be a lot of suspicions by outsiders 

as to what’s going on. Second, you place yourself at the mercy of 

the party that is prepared to leak and to distort. And given the negotiating record of the Iranians, with whom, sadly, I have to say, 

I had to negotiate, I don’t have that much confidence that the process would be protected and that the secrecy wouldn’t be exploited 

at some moment to create something awkward for us. 

Senator KAUFMAN. General, you talked about how other nations, 

once Iran developed a nuclear capability, other nations in the region—I think you said Syria and the Saudis, Syria and Turkey, 

would be interested in going ahead. I know yesterday I’ve got a 

quote here where President Abbas said that the Palestinians—he 

criticized Iran for their interference. Clearly he wasn’t happy with 

the Palestinians. The Saudi Foreign Minister warned other Arab 

and foreign leaders in Cairo on the Iranian challenge, the need for 

a joint position among Arab States on Iran’s nuclear program. 

It seems to me there’s a—and I know this is too simplistic, but 

it seems to me there’s a lot of people in the region who are very 

much interested in Iran not getting a nuclear capability. Can the 

two of us give us kind of ideas of, is this something we can work 

on to try to help forestall Iran’s nuclear capability? 

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I think there is, there’s a lot of fear. 

As a matter of fact, there’s a lot of fear of Iran in the region. It 

seems to me one of the ways we can take advantage of that is to 

point out to Iran the consequences of their going ahead will not be 

to improve their security, but will be to make them less secure because of the reaction that will be produced in the rest of the region. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Dr. Brzezinski, you talked about keeping the 

military option on the table—— 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Off the table. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Off the table. And said that we could use it 

under some circumstances? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. These would have to be extreme circumstances, 

because we know what it takes to maintain deterrence and we can 

reinforce it, and I’ve tried to suggest today how we could reinforce 

it by giving guarantees to Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and so 

25 

forth—the full American umbrella. We cannot predict the consequences of a military action with Iran, except that we can anticipate that they’ll be very difficult for us in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in 

the Persian Gulf, more generally financially and economically, and 

perhaps in terms of renewed global isolation. 

So I think as a serious proposition the use of force ought to be 

reserved in most cases either to anticipate and prevent at the last 

moment someone else’s use of force or in response to an attack. But 

I think preventive warfare is not a good bargain in the nuclear age, 

nor is it a good bargain for the United States when we’re already 

running the risk of being bogged down for the next 10 years, maybe 

20 years, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Could you just talk about—and you talked 

about a number of things. What do you think the impact would be 

in Pakistan if we used the military, or someone used the military 

option against Iran? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. What would be the impact where? 

Senator KAUFMAN. On Pakistan, their government. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it would be very mixed, but probably in 

an overall sense it would intensify anti-Americanism, because it 

will be interpreted as another case of the United States going to 

war against an Islamic country. And there are a number of Shiites 

of some significance in Pakistan. I think more generally it will be 

part of this feeling, which is already pervasive, that we have locked 

ourselves into a kind of anti-Islamic posture which is in their view 

very one-sided, and which is I think becoming more pervasive, sad 

to say, in Pakistan in general, and is thereby transforming the Afghan problem for us into an Afghan-Pakistani problem, making it 

increasingly difficult to resolve. 

I just think that if we got into a military conflict with Iran—and 

I have no hesitation in saying this publicly—it would absolutely 

devastate the historical legacy of the Obama presidency and damage the United States, which is even more important. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I’m out of time, but General. 

General SCOWCROFT. I broadly agree with that. The use of force 

sometimes looks like an easy option: cut through all the nonsense, 

get to the core of it. But force brings its own momentum. It 

changes the nature of the game, and I think in this case it would 

change it strongly against the United States and its interests in 

the region. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. And it’s unpredictable. 

General SCOWCROFT. Hmm? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. And it’s unpredictable. 

General SCOWCROFT. It’s always—that’s what I say. It changes 

the whole nature of the game, as we found out in Iraq. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, and thank you both for your great 

service to this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Senator Kaufman, for a terrific line from both you and Senator Casey. Good questions. I think 

you covered the bases that we left open. 

We for once have serendipitous timing with the United States 

Senate here, because we’re actually starting the vote just as we’re 

concluding the questions. So that’s pretty good. 

26 

Yesterday I had the privilege of speaking at Brookings Institute 

on the Middle East and laid out some thoughts about Iran. I 

think—and not just Iran, but the entire peace process. I really am 

grateful, as Senator Lugar is, for your testimony here today, which 

dovetails into that. I am convinced we’ve got to be smart, restrained, thoughtful, skilled in our diplomacy, so that we have an 

opportunity to really pursue every avenue with the greatest potential for success. It would be silly to shut those down ourselves. 

I thought Dr. Brzezinski’s opening comments about how you can 

certainly structure a negotiation to be unsuccessful, I think it was 

a very polite way of looking backwards without necessarily saying 

he was looking backward. But the reality is that I am convinced, 

as I think our witnesses are today and Senator Lugar, that there 

are much better prospects than the current climate would seem to 

tell us. 

There’s a reason, obviously, for all the negative sides of the 

choices we face, to hold out hope that we can take advantage of 

those. So I hope the leaders of Iran are listening carefully, that nobody has come here today seeking the down side of this relationship, but rather hopefully diplomacy in the next months can 

produce a productive transition that can be effective not just for 

Iranian-American relations, but for the entire region, and indeed 

set an example hopefully for some transition that could take place 

on a global basis. 

The interconnectedness of these issues is really critical for all of 

us to see, and as we look at the increased tensions and volatility 

of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia—and you 

can run the list—we have to understand how these steps are really 

going to be related to how people perceive us and what we can 

achieve in those other places. 

So we thank you for contributing to this dialogue this morning. 

I would not disagree with the notion that somehow the two of you 

ought to be very much engaged in this effort with respect to Iran, 

and I will do my part to—and hopefully it won’t be against your 

will—to see that we can get your expertise to work. 

Senator Lugar, do you want to say anything? 

Senator LUGAR. I just join you in thanking our witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

We stand adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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