UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

TRAMAINE MONDALE BEADLES, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-3106 

(D.C. No. 5:10-CR-40118-JAR-1) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Tramaine Beadles, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion for a new trial. Because this motion was actually an unauthorized second or 

successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we vacate the district court’s order and 

remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

I 

 After receiving an anonymous tip that Beadles had robbed a bank in Topeka, 

Kansas, FBI agents conducted an interview of Beadles in which he confessed after 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 21, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

signing a waiver of his Miranda rights. Beadles repeated his confession when 

testifying at trial. He claimed that he was coerced into participating in the robbery 

through threats of violence to himself and his wife. A jury convicted Beadles of bank 

robbery and he was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. 

Prior to sentencing, Beadles filed a motion for a new trial based on newly 

discovered evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, which the district court denied. 

We affirmed Beadles’ sentence on direct appeal. United States v. Beadles, 508 F. 

App’x 807, 814 (10th Cir. 2013). He then filed a § 2255 motion in the district court, 

which was also denied. 

The instant appeal concerns a second Rule 33 motion filed by Beadles 

following the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Beadles claims the government 

violated his due process rights because it could not produce phone records of the 

anonymous tip. He requested that the court vacate his conviction. The district court 

denied the motion, concluding Beadles offered only speculative and conclusory 

claims of new evidence, which he claimed to have learned about from counsel prior 

to his initial Rule 33 motion. After Beadles appealed, the government filed a motion 

for remand, asserting that Beadles’ Rule 33 motion was actually a second or 

successive § 2255 motion over which the district court lacked jurisdiction as Beadles 

failed to receive authorization under § 2255(h). 

II 

 A district court has jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive 

§ 2255 motion only if the defendant first obtains authorization from a circuit court. 
3 

In re Lindsey, 582 F.3d 1173, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). A motion 

“claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States” should be treated as a 

§ 2255 motion. United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(quotation omitted). “It is the relief sought, not [the] pleading’s title, that determines 

whether the pleading is a § 2255 motion.” Id. at 1149. 

In his second motion for a new trial, Beadles seeks release from prison on the 

ground that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution. He does not 

allege any newly discovered evidence that would justify a new trial, and admitted 

that the information forming the basis of his motion was disclosed to him prior to 

sentencing. We thus conclude his motion was actually an unauthorized second or 

successive § 2255 motion. See United States v. Evans, 224 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 

2000) (“A defendant whose argument is not that newly discovered evidence supports 

a claim of innocence, but instead that he has new evidence of a constitutional 

violation or other ground of collateral attack, is making a motion under § 2255 . . . no 

matter what caption he puts on the document.”). 

To the extent Beadles attempts to pursue a fraud upon the court theory, our 

conclusion remains the same. “[A] motion alleging fraud on the court in the 

defendant’s criminal proceeding must be considered a second-or-successive collateral 

attack because it asserts or reasserts a challenge to the defendant’s underlying 

conviction.” United States v. Baker, 718 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013). Because 

Beadles’ attempt to collaterally attack his conviction renders his Rule 33 motion an 
4 

unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion, the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider it. In re Lindsey, 582 F.3d at 1174. 

III 

We GRANT the government’s motion to remand.1

 The district court’s order is 

VACATED. We REMAND with instructions to dismiss the motion for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

 1

 In his response to the government’s motion, Beadles requests a stay of these 

proceedings. We deny that request.