[Cite as State v. Bridle, 2023-Ohio-109.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

v.

DANIEL J. BRIDLE

Appellant

C.A. No. 21CA0061-M

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO

CASE No. 20CR0878

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 17, 2023

CARR, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, Daniel J. Bridle, appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of 

Common Pleas. This Court reverses and remands. 

I.

{¶2} This case arises out of an incident that occurred at a house in Hinkley, Ohio, during 

the early morning hours of December 5, 2020. Bridle travelled to the home of B.P. and approached 

the front door with a shotgun. When B.P. refused to open the front door, Bridle fired the shotgun 

through the door. Although B.P. was able to escape, Bridle entered the home and caused extensive 

damage to B.P.’s property. The Medina County Grand Jury indicted Bridle on one count of 

attempted aggravated murder, one count of attempted murder, one count of felonious assault, one 

count of aggravated burglary, and one count of vandalism. All of the counts contained firearm 

specifications and the vandalism count also contained a forfeiture specification. Bridle pleaded 

not guilty to the charges at arraignment.
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{¶3} After events that transpired while Bridle was in jail, the grand jury returned a

supplemental indictment charging Bridle with two counts of intimidating a victim in a criminal 

case and two counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor. Bridle pleaded not guilty to these 

charges as well. 

{¶4} The matter ultimately proceeded to a jury trial where Bridle was convicted of the 

charges against him. After finding that a number of the offenses merged, the trial court imposed 

a prison sentence of a minimum of 24 years and a maximum of 29 years and ordered Bridle to pay 

restitution. Bridle was also classified as a Tier II Sexual Offender. 

{¶5} On appeal, Bridle raises six assignments of error. This Court rearranges those 

assignments of error to facilitate review. 

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY DENIED BRIDLE’S 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRESENT A DEFENSE, TO A JURY’S 

DETERMINATION OF HIS CASE, TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL, AND TO DUE 

PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN, AFTER THE STATE HAD RESTED 

AND AFTER BRIDLE HAD ALREADY BEGUN TESTIFYING, THE COURT 

REVERSED ITS RULING ON THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CRITICAL 

TO BRIDLE’S ANNOUNCED DEFENSE, IN VIOLATION OF THE 5TH, 6TH 

AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, ART. I, 

[SECTIONS] 5, 10, AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, AND OHIO’S 

RULES OF EVIDENCE.

{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Bridle maintains that the trial court violated an array 

of his constitutional rights when, in the middle of the defense case-in-chief, the trial court reversed 

its position on the admissibility of several pieces of provocation and state-of-mind evidence after 

it had previously made pretrial and mid-trial rulings that the evidence would be admissible. Bridle 

argues that his constitutional right to present a defense was undermined because both parties had 

relied on the trial court’s prior rulings throughout the course of trial. This Court agrees.
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Background

{¶7} In 2015, Bridle was diagnosed with cancer and he began a series of holistic cancer 

treatments, including cryotherapy and Reiki healing. Bridle’s marital relationship began to falter 

around that time and he entered into an extramarital relationship with D.K., who was supportive 

of the holistic treatments. D.K. served as a care provider for Bridle in addition to her romantic 

involvement. D.K. and several of her children moved into Bridle’s Hudson residence in 2019. 

Bridle became close to D.K.’s children, including D.K.’s thirteen-year-old daughter, L.W. In 

November 2019, however, D.K. began a relationship with another man, B.P. The relationship 

between D.K. and B.P. grew more serious over the course of 2020. L.W. accompanied D.K. and 

B.P. on two trips to South Carolina. B.P. assisted D.K. and her children in moving out of Bridle’s 

home in September 2020, although D.K. continued to serve as a care provider for Bridle.

{¶8} The State’s evidence demonstrated that in the early morning hours of December 5, 

2020, Bridle armed himself with a shotgun and drove to B.P.’s home in Hinkley, Ohio. When B.P. 

refused to open the front door, Bridle fired a gunshot through the door. Bridle then entered the 

home and fired additional shots and caused over $100,000 in damage to B.P.’s property. B.P. fled 

the house in a panic and called 911. Police arrived on the seen thereafter and arrested Bridle.

{¶9} Bridle’s intended defense to the charges against him was predicated on presenting 

evidence about a series of events that allegedly occurred in the lead-up to the incident that caused 

him to believe that L.W. was being sexually abused by B.P.

{¶10} Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine under seal wherein it asked the trial 

court to bar the admission of any evidence regarding allegations of sexual misconduct against B.P. 

The State asserted that the allegations against B.P. were unfounded and that the highly prejudicial 
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nature of evidence in support of the accusations would outweigh the probative value. The State 

further argued that the allegations were not relevant to any element of proof or point of mitigation.

{¶11} The trial court permitted the parties to make oral arguments on the motion prior to 

voir dire. The exchange largely focused on two pieces of evidence. The first was a set of letters 

that Bridle allegedly received several weeks before the incident where the anonymous author made 

sexualized comments about L.W.1 The second was an alleged excited utterance by L.W. where 

she admitted to Bridle that she had been sexually abused by B.P.2 After allowing the parties to 

present arguments on an array of issues, the trial court stated, “I’m letting it all in. I’m denying 

[the] motion in limine. I am letting everybody get everything in and letting the jury sort it out.”

{¶12} During opening statements, defense counsel referenced the contents of the letters 

and noted Bridle’s belief that it was B.P. who sent the letters. Defense counsel explained that 

Bridle had given the letters to the Stow police. When defense counsel began to discuss the 

circumstances surrounding the excited utterance, the State objected on the basis that L.W. was not 

on the witness list. The trial court overruled the objection and defense counsel informed the jury 

that Bridle intended to introduce evidence that L.W. told Bridle that she was sexually abused by 

B.P. Defense counsel continued that, on the evening of December 4, 2020, D.K. travelled to 

Bridle’s house in order to perform Reiki treatment. When Bridle raised the subject of the letters, 

D.K. and Bridle engaged in a heated argument and D.K. left prior to completing the treatment. 

Defense counsel suggested the evidence would show that, later that evening, Bridle traveled to 

1

In addition to debating whether it would be possible to lay a proper foundation for the 

letters, the parties sharply disputed whether the letters were relevant given that they referenced 

prospective conduct as opposed to conduct that had already occurred. 

2

 Defense counsel indicated that Bridle intended to testify as to the excited utterance. The 

trial court expressed concern about the ramifications if Bridle ultimately decided to exercise his 

right not to testify in his own defense. Defense counsel responded that he anticipated that Bridle 

would take the witness stand. 
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B.P.’s home in order to confront him about the letters. Defense counsel stated that while Bridle 

intended to merely confront B.P., Bridle was thrust into a state of rage by a comment that B.P. 

made when Bridle was standing at the front door. Near the end of his opening statement, defense 

counsel indicated that after the incident occurred and Bridle had been taken into custody, Bridle 

told the officers that B.P. had ruined his life by destroying his family and molesting L.W.

{¶13} Prior to calling B.P. as its first witness, the State asked the trial court to reconsider 

its prior evidentiary ruling on the basis that the events mentioned in defense counsel’s opening 

statement occurred two weeks prior to the incident and, therefore, due to the passage of time, could 

not be used to show sufficient provocation as a matter of law. The trial court noted that it had the 

same concern. The trial court then indicated that unless defense counsel agreed to refrain from 

asking B.P. about the alleged sexual abuse on cross-examination, the trial court would simply grant 

the motion in limine. Defense counsel reluctantly agreed. The State indicated that such a 

resolution was sufficient at that junction of the proceedings but the matter would need to be 

revisited given that Bridle intended to testify to those events.

{¶14} Thereafter, the State asked for a recess in the middle of its direct examination of 

B.P. At that time, the trial court indicated that it wanted to resolve the motion in limine. The trial 

court inquired of defense counsel as to whether there were temporal concerns with introducing 

evidence about the reception of the letters and L.W.’s statements to Bridle given that those events 

allegedly occurred almost two weeks prior to the December 5, 2020 incident. Defense counsel 

explained those events ultimately led to an argument between Bridle and D.K. on the evening of 

December 4, 2020, meaning there was a triggering event just hours before the alleged incident. At 

that point, the trial court indicated that it would allow the evidence to be admitted. In response, 
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the State argued that the trial court was effectively reversing itself. The trial court then made the 

following statement:

[T]echnically this is why I don’t like to rule on motions in limine until I hear how 

the information is coming in because under the Rules [of Evidence], a motion in 

limine is no longer interlocutory. It is a final decision that people can proceed on. 

So technically if anybody was going to argue that I should not have changed my 

mind, it would have been the Defense but the Defense has given me sufficient 

information that I’m going back to the decision I made yesterday on the original 

motion in limine and letting everything in. 

{¶15} In light of this ruling, the State continued its direct examination of B.P. and asked 

several questions about his relationship with L.W. B.P. testified that he took two trips to Myrtle 

Beach with D.K. and L.W. L.W. had her own room on those trips and B.P. was never alone with 

her. B.P. firmly denied that he sexually abused L.W. When asked if he had ever been accused of 

inappropriate conduct, B.P. testified that, upon returning from Myrtle Beach in July 2020, he 

learned from D.K. that there was a mysterious letter that suggested that he had designs on carrying 

on an inappropriate relationship with L.W. Several months later, when B.P. and D.K. returned 

from a trip to Mexico just prior to Thanksgiving in 2020, B.P. was contacted by Stow police and 

asked about additional letters. B.P. testified that the conversation was short and direct and that he 

denied any knowledge about the subject matter of the letters or who might have authored them. 

B.P. explained that he never saw hard copies of the letters but he was shown photos of the letters 

at the police station the day after the December 5, 2020 incident.

{¶16} On cross-examination, Bridle introduced a written statement that B.P. gave to 

police following the December 5, 2020 incident. Therein, B.P. indicated that, on November 16, 

2020, D.K. told him about a letter accusing him of being a pedophile. B.P. testified that he had a 

vague understanding of the letter’s existence prior to that point but it was not until mid-November 
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that he learned about the severity of its contents.3 A detective showed B.P. photographs of the 

letters at the police station after the home invasion. When defense counsel marked the letters as 

exhibits for identification purposes, the State requested a sidebar and raised an authentication 

objection. The trial court allowed the letters to be introduced for the limited purpose of allowing 

B.P. to confirm what the detective had shown him. When defense counsel indicated that he hoped 

to admit the letters at a later point, the trial court stated that defense counsel could attempt to do 

so but not during the cross-examination of B.P.

{¶17} Thereafter, defense counsel continued the cross-examination of B.P. and engaged 

in a line of questioning about the details of the home invasion. In regard to the moment when B.P. 

saw Bridle at his front door, defense counsel asked whether B.P said, “I’m going to F your daughter 

[L.W.]” B.P. responded in the negative. The trial court sustained multiple objections to questions 

posed by defense counsel as to whether B.P. had done anything to provoke Bridle.

{¶18} Bridle testified in his own defense. After explaining the history of his relationship 

with D.K. and her children, Bridle indicated that he received two letters in his mailbox on 

November 20, 2020, the day before D.K. and B.P. were scheduled to travel to Mexico. The letters 

had not been mailed but were marked, “Dan, read these[.]” Defense counsel marked the letters as 

exhibits and Bridle confirmed that they were the letters he had received. When defense 

3 B.P. testified that it was during that mid-November conversation that D.K. expressed her 

view that L.W.’s father, M.W., was responsible for the letters. 
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counsel asked if the letters were signed, the State objected and the trial court ruled that it would

not permit questioning about the contents of the letters. After D.K. left for Mexico, Bridle traveled 

to her house in order to install a fence. When asked if he had a conversation with L.W. that day, 

the State again objected and requested a sidebar. The State asked for an in-camera review of 

Bridle’s testimony to determine whether L.W.’s statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and 

whether it was necessary to explore the contents of the letters. Over the objection of defense 

counsel, the trial court agreed to remove the jury from the courtroom so that it could review 

Bridle’s testimony.

{¶19} During the ensuing in camera inspection, Bridle testified that he was extremely 

distraught about the letters because the author expressed an intention to carry on a sexual 

relationship with L.W., who was a minor.4 Bridle believed that B.P. was the author of the letters 

based on the personal information contained therein as well as his belief that he saw B.P.’s vehicle 

in his neighborhood at the time he retrieved the letters from his mailbox. Bridle explained that he 

spoke with L.W. about the letters in order to determine if she had been sexually abused. According 

to Bridle, L.W. became very upset, started crying, and repeatedly expressed fear that her mother 

would learn about what had happened. Bridle testified that L.W. provided details about being 

sexually abused by B.P. on multiple occasions.

{¶20} After hearing the testimony, the trial court indicated that it would not allow the 

evidence because L.W.’s statements did not fit within a hearsay exception and the general line of 

questioning was more prejudicial than probative. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the 

4 Bridle testified that the author of the letters referred to wanting “a little taste of 

chocolate[,]” which Bridle interpreted as a reference to L.W., given the fact that she was biracial. 
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parties had relied on the trial court’s prior ruling and that defense counsel had specifically 

referenced the evidence in his opening statement.

{¶21} During the testimony that followed, Bridle made several general references to the 

letters and his conversation with L.W. but he was not permitted to discuss the contents of the letters 

or the subject matter of the conversation. For example, Bridle testified that D.K. came to his house 

for a treatment session the night before the incident but she became angry and left when he 

mentioned the letters.5 Bridle testified that he decided to drive to Hinkley to confront B.P. about 

the letters. With respect to the exchange that occurred at the front door of B.P.’s house, Bridle 

suggested that he became enraged by a comment made by B.P. but he did not testify as to the 

nature of the comment. Near the end of Bridle’s direct examination, defense counsel asked a 

question about whether Bridle’s comments to police after being taken into custody were indicative 

of his state of mind. The trial court sustained an objection when, in answering the question, Bridle 

started to suggest that he was distraught because he had failed to protect L.W. 

Discussion

{¶22} Bridle’s foremost contention on appeal is that the trial court violated his right to 

present a defense when it repeatedly reversed its position as to whether he could introduce the 

provocation and state-of-mind evidence. Bridle emphasizes that the entirety of his defense theory 

was predicated on the trial court’s ruling that it would allow him to present evidence 

5 The State presented evidence during its case-in-chief that Bridle had a text message 

exchange with another Reiki healer after D.K. left his house. Bridle expressed a high level of 

anger and made several profane comments about D.K. In pleading for the Reiki healer to call him, 

Bridle stated that he was about to go to Hinkley to kill someone with a shotgun. When Bridle took 

the stand, he testified that these text messages amounted to a cry for help and that he did not intend 

to shoot B.P. 
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about the events that occurred leading up to the December 5, 2020 incident. Notably, Bridle does 

not merely challenge the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine but instead argues that the 

manner in which the trial court handled the provocation and state-of-mind evidence over the course 

of the trial violated his constitutional rights. 

{¶23} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “the Constitution guarantees 

criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Holmes v. South 

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006), quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). “The 

right to offer the testimony of witnesses[] * * * is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the 

right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it 

may decide where the truth lies.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); State v. Pieronek, 

9th Dist. Wayne No. 18AP0031, 2019-Ohio-4305, ¶ 18.

{¶24} While a defendant does have a constitutional right to present a defense, he does not 

have an unfettered right to present evidence that is “incompetent, privileged, or otherwise 

inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). 

“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules 

excluding evidence from criminal trials. Such rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a 

defense so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to 

serve.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted). United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 

(1998); State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, ¶ 59. The exclusion of evidence 

will be considered unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only when it “infringe[s] upon 

a weighty interest of the accused.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308.

{¶25} In this case, we are compelled to conclude that the manner in which the trial court 

repeatedly changed its position in handling the evidence in question created a sense of confusion 
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throughout the trial and resulted in a violation of Bridle’s right to present a defense. Prior to trial, 

the trial court heard arguments regarding the letters as well as L.W.’s statement to Bridle that she 

had been sexually abused by B.P. The trial court ruled that it was “letting it all in[]” and that it 

would allow the jury to “sort it out.” Bridle relied on this ruling during opening statements when 

he painted a detailed picture of the evidence he intended to present regarding the sequence of 

events leading up to the December 5, 2020 incident. The trial court reaffirmed its position about 

the admissibility of the evidence during the State’s case-in-chief. Inexplicably, however, the trial 

court pivoted away from its ruling at several crucial junctures of the trial. While the State was 

permitted to pursue a line of questioning that allowed B.P. to discuss his knowledge of the letters 

and directly refute the allegations of sexual abuse, the trial court did not permit Bridle to crossexamine B.P. on the contents of the letter or whether B.P. may have done anything to provoke 

Bridle. Even more significantly, after permitting the State to engage B.P. in a line of questioning 

that directly challenged Bridle’s defense theory, the trial court prohibited Bridle from telling his 

side of the story regarding the letters and the conversation with L.W. Under these circumstances, 

this Court has no choice but to conclude that Bridle’s constitutional right to present a defense was 

undermined. 

{¶26} In reaching this conclusion, we remain mindful that a trial court has the authority 

to exclude evidence based upon valid evidentiary rules. See Id. In this particular case, however, 

the manner in which the trial court repeatedly reversed its position on whether the evidence was 

admissible undermined Bridle’s constitutional right to present a defense. 

{¶27} Bridle’s first assignment of error is sustained.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BRIDLE’S MOTION FOR 

ACQUITTAL ON THE PANDERING OBSCENITY CHARGES IN COUNTS 6 

AND 7 BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 

CONVICTION ON THOSE COUNTS. BRIDLE MUST BE DISCHARGED ON 

THOSE COUNTS.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BRIDLE’S MOTION FOR 

ACQUITTAL ON THE INTIMIDATION CHARGES IN COUNTS 8 AND 9 

BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 

CONVICTION ON THOSE COUNTS. BRIDLE MUST BE DISCHARGED ON 

THOSE COUNTS[,] TOO. 

{¶28} In his third assignment of error, Bridle contends the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for a judgment of acquittal on the two counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor. 

In his fourth assignment of error, Bridle argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 

a judgment of acquittal on the two counts of intimidating a victim in a criminal case.

{¶29} While this Court’s resolution of Bridle’s first assignment of error mandates 

reversal, we nonetheless address Bridle’s sufficiency challenges to his convictions for pandering 

obscenity involving a minor and intimidating a victim in a criminal case because of the 

constitutional protection against double jeopardy. State v. Lindow, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27417, 

2016-Ohio-913, ¶ 15.

{¶30} Crim.R. 29(A) provides, in relevant part:

The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on 

either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more 

offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not 

reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state’ 

case.
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{¶31} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the 

trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).

An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of 

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶32} During its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence in support of the following 

narrative. Bridle was jailed after being charged in relation to the events of December 5, 2020. 

While in jail, Bridle placed several phone calls to a former girlfriend, T.G., and asked her to work

with a motorcycle gang in order to create the appearance that B.P. had solicited child pornography. 

Bridle wrote a letter detailing how T.G. could send B.P. child pornography without being detected. 

Bridle indicated that T.G. could find images on the dark web or send images of her own children. 

Bridle instructed T.G. to address the envelope to B.P.’s closest neighbor without putting a name 

on the envelope. Bridle further directed T.G. to place a typed message to B.P. inside the envelope. 

After police obtained a warrant based on a jailhouse phone call from Bridle to T.G., police 

intercepted Bridle’s letter to T.G. in the jailhouse mailroom. T.G. testified that Bridle hoped that 

framing B.P. could help Bridle to either reduce the severity of the charges against him or get the 

charges dropped. T.G. initially told Bridle that she would not help him. T.G. testified that when 

Bridle persisted, she told Bridle that she would help but she never actually intended to do so and 

she never contacted the motorcycle gang.
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{¶33} After learning of Bridle’s communications with T.G., a victim advocate notified 

police of another jailhouse call that Bridle placed to a woman named J.M. The contents of the 

conversation were very similar to Bridle’s conversations with T.G. Police subsequently obtained 

a warrant and intercepted a letter in the jailhouse mailroom that Bridle had sent to J.M. In the 

letter, Bridle asked J.M. to execute a plan where child pornography would be sent to B.P.’s closest 

neighbor along with an enclosed letter indicating the package was intended for B.P. Bridle stated 

in the letter that execution of the plan would be beneficial to his court case. 

{¶34} Bridle challenges his convictions for pandering obscenity in violation of R.C. 

2907.321(A)(2), which states that “[n]o person, with knowledge of the character of the material or 

performance involved, shall * * * [p]romote or advertise for sale or dissemination; sell, deliver, 

disseminate, display, exhibit, present, rent, or provide; or offer or agree to sell, deliver, 

disseminate, display, exhibit, present, rent, or provide, any obscene material that has a minor or 

impaired person as one of its participants or portrayed observers[.]

{¶35} Bridle maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of

acquittal because the State failed to prove that he was, at any point, in possession or control of 

obscene material. Bridle points to the Twelfth District’s decision in State v. Hamrick, 12th Dist. 

Madison No. CA2011-01-002, 2011-Ohio-5357, in support of the proposition that possession of 

obscene material is a necessary element of pandering obscenity pursuant to R.C. 2907.321(A)(2). 

Bridle stresses that there was never any obscene material at issue in this case.

{¶36} In response, the State asserts that Hamrick was wrongly decided because the 

holding runs afoul of the plain language the statute. The State further points to Ohio’s complicity 

statute which provides that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the 
15

 

commission of the offense, shall * * * [s]olicit or procure another to commit the offense[.]” R.C. 

2923.03(A)(1). 

{¶37} As an initial matter, we decline to take a position as to whether Hamrick was 

wrongly decided given that this case involves a distinguishable set of facts. Hamrick involved a 

scenario where the defendant downloaded more than 300 images and videos containing child 

pornography onto his hard drive. Hamrick at ¶ 6. At trial, the court concluded that the State had 

failed to demonstrate that the defendant violated R.C. 2907.321(A)(2) but “found appellant guilty 

on the ‘lesser included offense’ of pandering obscenity in violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(5).” 

Hamrick at ¶ 26. R.C. 2907.321(A)(5) explicitly proscribes possession of obscene material that 

has a minor as one of its participants. On appeal, the Twelfth District concluded that R.C. 

2907.321(A)(5) was a lesser included offense of R.C. 2907.321(A)(2), observing that an 

individual must “possess or control obscene material in order to promote, advertise, sell, deliver, 

disseminate, display, exhibit, present, [etc.], the material under R.C. 2907.321(A)(2).” (Internal 

quotations omitted.) Hamrick at ¶ 37-38. The Hamrick court did not contemplate a scenario such 

as this where the defendant hatched a plan to have a third party locate, obtain, and transmit obscene 

materials.

{¶38} The evidence here, even when construed in the light most favorable to the State, 

was insufficient to convict Bridle of pandering obscenity in violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(2). The 

State did not pursue an attempt theory with respect to the pandering obscenity charges. While the 

State points to the complicity statute, we note that R.C. 2923.03(C) provides that “[n]o person shall 

be convicted of complicity under this section unless an offense is actually committed[.]” While 

the evidence shows that Bridle reached out to two women regarding his plan, the evidence suggests 

that his sinister intentions were never put into action and that this case did not involve obscene 
16

 

material. The letters that Bridle wrote to the women were intercepted in the jailhouse mailroom. 

There is no evidence that T.G. and J.M. were willing to cooperate with Bridle and there is nothing 

in the record indicating that obscene material was ever procured, much less delivered to B.P. 

Accordingly, we must sustain Bridle’s third assignment of error. 

{¶39} Bridle further challenges his convictions for intimidating a victim of a crime in 

violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1), which provides that “[n]o person, knowingly and by force or by 

unlawful threat of harm to any person or property or by unlawful threat to commit any offense or 

calumny against any person, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder any * * * victim of a 

crime * * * in the filing or prosecution of criminal charges[.]”

{¶40} For the reasons set forth in our resolution of Bridle’s third assignment of error, we 

must sustain his fourth assignment of error pertaining to his convictions for intimidating a crime 

victim. The State failed to demonstrate that this case involved unlawful threats or calumny against 

B.P. Although the State presented evidence that Bridle devised a scheme aimed at damaging B.P.’s 

reputation, his plot was thwarted and no calumny ever occurred. Thus, the State’s evidence failed 

to support Bridle’s convictions for intimidating a crime victim. 

{¶41} Bridle’s third and fourth assignments of error are sustained.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

BRIDLE’S TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED CONSTITUTIONALLY 

DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE WHICH PREJUDICED BRIDLE BY FAILING 

TO SEEK A MISTRIAL AFTER THE TRIAL COURT, IN THE MIDDLE OF 

THE DEFENSE CASE, REVERSED ITS EARLIER RULING AND BARRED 

BRIDLE’S EVIDENCE WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIEWED FOR THE JURY IN 

OPENING. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION 

AS TO COUNTS 6-7 (PANDERING OBSCENITY) AND COUNTS 8-9 

(INTIMIDATION), AND IN SENTENCING ACCORDINGLY, BECAUSE THE 
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VERDICT FORMS ON THOSE COUNTS [] – PURSUANT TO R.C. 

2945.75(A)(2) – WERE SUFFICIENT ONLY FOR THE LESSER OFFENSES OF 

FOURTH-DEGREE FELONY PANDERING FOR COUNTS 6[-]7 AND 

MISDEMEANOR INTIMIDATION FOR COUNTS 8[-]9.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A CONSECUTIVE AND CLOSETO-MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE OF 24 TO 29 YEARS BECAUSE THAT 

SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED IN VIOLATION OF OHIO’S MERGER AND 

SENTENCING LAWS AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF BRIDLE’S 

SUBSTANTIAL MITIGATION, ALL IN VIOLATION OF BRIDLE’S RIGHTS 

TO DUE PROCESS, A FAIR SENTENCING PROCEEDING, AND AGAINST 

DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 

{¶42} In light of this Court’s ruling on Bridle’s first, third, and fourth assignments of 

error, we decline to address his second, fifth, and sixth assignments of error as they have been 

rendered moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

III.

{¶43} Bridle’s first, third, and fourth assignments of error are sustained. We decline to 

reach the second, fifth, and sixth assignments of error as they have been rendered moot. The 

judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cause remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed,

and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
18

 

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellee.

DONNA J. CARR

FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, P. J.

SUTTON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

TIMOTHY F. SWEENEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.