IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-340

Filed 21 May 2024

Orange County, No. 21 CRS 51423

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JOSEPH JOHN RADOMSKI, III, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 7 September 2022 by Judge Craig 

Croom in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 

2024. 

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Solicitor General Ryan Y. Park, Deputy 

Solicitor General Lindsay Vance Smith, and Solicitor General Fellow Mary 

Elizabeth D. Reed, for the State. 

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Heidi 

Reiner, for defendant-appellant.

MURPHY, Judge.

When the application of a statute impedes conduct protected by the plain text 

of the Second Amendment, it is presumptively unconstitutional. To overcome this 

presumption, the State must demonstrate that its regulation is consistent with, or 

analogous to, this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The State failed 

to demonstrate that regulating Defendant’s possession of firearms, which were kept 

within a vehicle that was parked in the university hospital parking lot where 

Defendant was seeking emergency medical care, is consistent with this Nation’s 
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historical tradition of firearm regulation. As an alternative ground for reversal, the 

State failed to present substantial evidence that Defendant knowingly possessed a 

firearm on educational property. 

BACKGROUND

On 15 June 2021, Defendant drove his motorized vehicle to the University of 

North Carolina Hospital (“UNC Hospital”) for treatment related to a temporary 

kidney shunt. At this time, Defendant was otherwise homeless and living in his 

vehicle. As such, all of his personal belongings were inside of the vehicle’s back cargo 

area. Defendant parked in the open-air lot nearest the Taylor Campus Health 

building—Crescent Lot—in a spot designated as handicapped parking. 

Around or about 6:00 a.m., Officer Glenn Powell, a police officer with the UNC 

Chapel Hill Campus Police Department, received a call from UNC Hospital reporting 

a suspicious vehicle located in Crescent Lot. After making contact with hospital staff, 

Officer Powell approached Defendant’s vehicle and spoke to its occupant, Defendant. 

Officer Powell observed that Defendant’s vehicle did not have any license plate affixed 

to it and ran the vehicle’s information, upon which Officer Powell learned that 

Defendant’s vehicle had no insurance coverage. Officer Powell questioned Defendant 

about the vehicle’s contents, specifically asking if there were any items in the vehicle 

which he needed to know about, such as weapons. After a few responses to the 

contrary, Defendant stated there were firearms inside of the vehicle. At this time, 
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Officer Powell asked Defendant to exit the vehicle. Throughout this interaction, 

Defendant expressed that he had been unaware he was on educational property. 

Officer Powell placed Defendant in handcuffs while he searched the vehicle. 

Defendant assisted Officer Powell in locating the firearms, and he retrieved a series 

of firearms from the backseat. Officer Powell recovered an SKS black semi-automatic 

rifle, a magazine with several rounds of ammunition, several other semi-automatic 

rifles, and a Winchester 1400 shotgun, totaling to 6 long guns. Each of these guns 

was stored in or between a soft case without any trigger locks or other safeties. 

Officer Powell then placed Defendant under arrest for possession of a firearm on 

educational property. 

On 1 November 2021, Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a 

firearm on educational property in connection with the SKS black semi-automatic 

rifle and its magazine. On 6 September 2022, Defendant’s jury trial began, and the 

next day, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court ordered Defendant’s 

sentence of 5 to 15 months to be suspended, and Defendant was placed on 12 months 

of supervised probation. Defendant appealed.

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that his judgment should be vacated because (A) the 

statute under which Defendant was convicted is unconstitutional, both facially and 

as-applied to the facts of his case, (B) the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence, and (C) the trial court erred by failing to 
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intervene ex mero motu in the State’s improper closing argument. We hold that the 

application of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) to Defendant’s case, where Defendant’s vehicle 

was parked in a parking lot of the university hospital where he sought treatment and 

his firearms remained within the vehicle, is unconstitutional. As an alternative 

ground, we hold that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

for lack of sufficient evidence. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss, vacate Defendant’s conviction, and dismiss each of Defendant’s 

other contentions of error as moot.

A. Constitutionality

First, Defendant argues that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) is facially 

unconstitutional, as it impermissibly “burdens conduct protected by the Second 

Amendment[.]” In the alternative, Defendant argues that the statute is 

unconstitutional as-applied to the circumstances of his case. 

“A party making a facial challenge must establish that a law is 

unconstitutional in all of its applications. In contrast, the determination whether a 

statute is unconstitutional as applied is strongly influenced by the facts in a 

particular case.” State v. Grady, 372 N.C. 509, 522 (2019). “When confronting a 

constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer, 

for example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving 

other applications in force or to sever its problematic portions while leaving the 

remainder intact.” Id. at 549 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
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England, 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006)) (cleaned up). As we conclude that the statute 

is unconstitutional as-applied to Defendant’s circumstances, we do not address 

Defendant’s facial challenge. 

1. Rule 2

Defendant acknowledges that he failed to raise these constitutional arguments 

at trial, and, therefore, they are unpreserved. N.C. R. App. P. 10 (2023). 

“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for 

the first time on appeal, not even for plain error[.]” State v. Gobal, 186 N.C. App. 308, 

320 (2007) (citations omitted), aff’d, 362 N.C. 342 (2008). 

Defendant, however, “respectfully requests [that] this Court exercise its 

discretionary authority under Rule 2 to waive Rule 10’s preservation requirements 

and address his constitutional arguments.” Rule 2 permits an appellate court to 

“suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any [Rules of Appellate Procedure] 

in a case pending before it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative” “[t]o 

prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest[.]” 

N.C. R. App. P. 2 (2023). In support of his request for review under Rule 2, Defendant 

asserts that, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in New 

York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), “the trial court’s 

decision to enter a judgment against [Defendant] pursuant to a statute that 

criminalizes constitutionally protected actions constitutes a ‘manifest injustice’ this 
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Court can correct and prevent by invoking Rule 2.”1 Defendant further argues that 

review of his case pursuant to Rule 2 “is warranted in the public interest” because 

the constitutional issues presented are part of a “newly percolating and widely 

occurring issue[.]” 

Defendant also seeks our review of the constitutional issues in a 

contemporaneously filed Motion for Appropriate Relief. We first address Defendant’s 

MAR. “When a motion for appropriate relief is made in the appellate division, the 

appellate court must decide whether the motion may be determined on the basis of 

the materials before it . . . . If the appellate court does not remand the case for 

proceedings on the motion, it may determine the motion in conjunction with the 

appeal and enter its own ruling on the motion with its determination of the case.” 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1418(b) (2023). We recently declined to address a defendant’s 

unpreserved constitutional argument pursuant to a MAR in State v. Stokes, 289 N.C. 

App. 631 (2023) (unpublished) (citing Gobal, 186 N.C. App. at 320) (“As an initial 

matter, we note that although [the] defendant attempts to address the 

constitutionality of [the statute] through a MAR filed separately with this Court and 

by referencing the MAR briefly in his brief, this issue was not preserved. Therefore, 

we will not address it as a part of [the] defendant’s appeal.”). Although it is a non1 We note that Bruen was decided by the United States Supreme Court on 23 June 2022, only 

76 days before the jury’s verdict was returned on 7 September 2022.
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precedential decision, we apply the same logic as in Stokes and deny Defendant’s 

MAR by separate order.

Thus, whether we review Defendant’s constitutional argument depends on 

whether the circumstances support a decision to invoke Rule 2; that is, we must 

determine whether invoking Rule 2 to permit our review of the unpreserved 

constitutional issues is necessary “[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to 

expedite decision in the public interest[.]” N.C. R. App. P. 2 (2023). Although the 

State argues that Defendant failed to show that either of these circumstances exist, 

we are satisfied by Defendant’s argument that, due to the proximity of his case to 

Bruen and to the “newly percolating and widely occurring issue” presented in this 

case, invoking Rule 2 is appropriate under both of the articulated grounds. Thus, we 

proceed to consider the merits of Defendant’s constitutional argument.

2. As-Applied Challenge

“An as-applied challenge represents a party’s protest against how a statute 

was applied in the particular context in which the party acted . . . .” Lakins v. W. 

N.C. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 283 N.C. App. 385, 393 (2022) (cleaned up). 

N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) reads as follows:

It shall be a Class I felony for any person knowingly to 

possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, 

rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational 

property or to a curricular or extracurricular activity 

sponsored by a school . . . .

N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) (2023). 
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Defendant contends that application of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) to the facts of 

his case is unconstitutional, as “[Defendant’s] possession of an unloaded rifle and 

ammunition in a UNC hospital parking lot in his car, which was both his home and 

the means by which he traveled to the hospital for treatment, unquestionably falls 

within the purview of the Second Amendment.” Defendant argues that “[t]wo factors, 

independently and collectively, demonstrate why application of N.C.G.S. § 14-

269.2(b) to [his] case was unconstitutional[]”: (1) the places protected by the statute, 

“campus or other educational property[,]” N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) (2023), “cannot be 

fairly understood to encompass a parking lot near a hospital that happens to be 

affiliated with a nearby university[,]” as this would “severely curtail[] [Defendant’s] 

right to possess and bear arms . . . in numerous places not historically understood to 

be sensitive places in violation of his Second Amendment rights and the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen” and (2) the “central component” of the Second 

Amendment, “self-defense[,]” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008), 

is not forfeited by Defendant’s “being unhoused in the traditional sense[,]” as the 

“right [to bear arms] follows individuals outside of their homes into the areas where 

they are more likely to need protection, including public parking lots,” and to prohibit 

Defendant’s conduct under these circumstances would “force[] [Defendant] to 

surrender his personal property and suffer a felony criminal conviction for exercising 

his Second Amendment rights while experiencing housing insecurity.” We note 

Defendant’s concerns regarding the equal protection of an individual’s Second 
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Amendment rights while experiencing homelessness, though we hold that the statute 

is unconstitutional as applied due to the non-sensitive nature of the parking lot and 

need not address whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied due to 

Defendant’s status as a homeless person living in his car. 

“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the 

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. “The 

government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent 

with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. Thus, the State bears 

the burden to show that prohibiting Defendant’s conduct under N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) 

“is consistent with [this] Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. We 

hold that the State fails to meet this burden.

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Bruen:

To determine whether a firearm regulation is consistent 

with the Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald point 

toward at least two relevant metrics: first, whether modern 

and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on 

the right of armed self-defense, and second, whether that 

regulatory burden is comparably justified.

. . . . 

To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead 

ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous 

enough to pass constitutional muster. For example, courts 

can use analogies to “longstanding” “laws forbidding the 

carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 

government buildings” to determine whether modern 

regulations are constitutionally permissible. That said, 

respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-
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cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit 

because there is no historical basis for New York to 

effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sensitive 

place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally 

by the New York City Police Department. 

Id. at 3 (citations omitted). 

First, the State argues that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b), as applied to the facts of 

Defendant’s case, is constitutional under Bruen’s “enthusiastic” holding that “laws 

forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools” are 

constitutional. However, Defendant argues, and we agree, that the purpose of the 

“open-air parking lot situated between the emergency room entrance, a football 

arena, and another healthcare building[]” is not educational in nature; rather, its 

function is to provide “parking access to the health care facilities in the area, 

including the hospital where [Defendant] was trying to be seen for significant kidney 

health concerns.” Therefore, we disregard the State’s argument that N.C.G.S. § 14-

269.2(b), as applied to the facts of Defendant’s case, merely forbids the carrying of 

firearms in an “obvious, undisputed, and uncontroversial[]” “gun-free [school] 

zone[][.]” See Siegel v. Platkin, 653 F.Supp.3d 136, 151 (D.N.J. 2023) (citation and 

marks omitted) (“In Bruen and Heller, the [U.S.] Supreme Court expressly identified 

restrictions at certain sensitive places (such as schools) to be well-settled, even 

though the 18th-and 19th-century evidence has revealed few categories in number. 

The inference, the Court suggested, is that some gun-free zones are simply obvious, 

undisputed, and uncontroversial.”); see also Bruen, 597 U.S. at 3 (citation and marks 
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omitted) (“To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for 

historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster. 

For example, courts can use analogies to longstanding laws forbidding the carrying 

of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings to determine 

whether modern regulations are constitutionally permissible.”). 

In the alternative, the State argues that, “even applying Bruen’s analogical 

test, [N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b)] easily passes constitutional review.” The State contends 

that prohibiting Defendant’s possession of a firearm in the parking lot adjacent to the 

UNC hospital is constitutional as a “modern regulation[] that [was] unimaginable at 

the founding [of the U.S.]” but analogous enough to “[h]istorical sensitive-place 

restrictions, [which] barred firearms where people gathered to engage in important 

activities where firearms could be particularly disruptive” such as “legislative 

assemblies, polling places, and courthouses[]” to pass constitutional muster. Bruen, 

597 U.S. at 28, 30. We disagree.

Defendant argues that, although hospitals are often “owned by or otherwise 

affiliated with colleges and universities[]” due to “[t]he financial and practical 

realities of modern-day medical administration[,]” “[c]olleges and universities are 

frequently large landowners[]” and “[t]his affiliation alone[] . . . cannot bring those 

facilities or the parking lots outside them into the purview of [N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b)] 

without running afoul of the Second Amendment.” Defendant emphasizes that, 

although Officer Powell testified that the hospital is “immediately in the vicinity[,] . 
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. . engulfed by [] campus, [and] . . . considered part of campus[,]” he also testified that 

it is policed separately by the UNC Hospital Police Department. Defendant further 

contends, and we agree, that the mere nature of being “in an[] area where there are” 

“various signs . . . either in Carolina Blue or otherwise saying UNC” does not in and 

of itself render the parking lot to be fairly and constitutionally included within the 

statutory language of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b), and “[a]ny conception of N.C.G.S. § 14-

269.2[(b)] that folds in any area where there are such signs reads ‘campus’ far too 

broadly[]” for the purposes of a sensitive-place restriction. To restrict Defendant’s 

Second Amendment right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) under these facts, where 

the firearms remained within his vehicle in the parking lot of the hospital where he 

had gone to seek medical treatment, would be unconstitutional. 

B. Motion to Dismiss

Next, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

dismiss because the State failed to present substantial evidence of each element of 

the charged offense. Defendant argues that the State failed to present substantial 

evidence both that Defendant was on educational property, as defined by the statute, 

and that Defendant knew he was on educational property. 

“In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need 

determine only whether there is substantial evidence of 

each essential element of the crime and that the defendant 

is the perpetrator.” State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 574 

(2015) (quoting State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301 (2002)). 

“Substantial evidence is [the] amount necessary to 

persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.” Id. 
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(quoting Mann, 355 N.C. at 301). In evaluating the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, 

the evidence must be considered “in the light most 

favorable to the State; the State is entitled to every 

reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to 

be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 

95, 99 (1980)). In other words, if the record developed at 

trial contains “substantial evidence, whether direct or 

circumstantial, or a combination, ‘to support a finding that 

the offense charged has been committed and that the 

defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the 

motion to dismiss should be denied.’” Id. at 575 

(quoting State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358 (1988)). 

“Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each 

essential element of the offense is a question of law; 

therefore, we review the denial of a motion to dismiss de 

novo.” State v. Chekanow, 370 N.C. 488, 492 (2018) 

(quoting [State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717, 720 (2016)]).

State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 249-50 (2020) (cleaned up).

1. Educational Property

The term “educational property[,]” as used in N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b), refers to 

“[a]ny school building or bus, school campus, grounds, recreational area, athletic field, 

or other property owned, used, or operated by any board of education or school board 

of trustees, or directors for the administration of any school.” N.C.G.S. § 14-

269.2(a)(1) (2023). Defendant argues that this definition of “educational property” 

does not apply to Crescent Lot because it is not used “for the administration of any 

school.” Id. According to Defendant,

[t]he lot was situated between a football field, a health 

center, and the emergency room entrance of a hospital . . . 

. The plain and strict understanding of this statute should 

not include a public parking lot unrelated to the 
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educational administration at the university. Rather, it 

would include the spaces the general public would think of 

when hearing about this statute—college and school 

classrooms and hallways—and the scenarios they would 

call to mind—someone carrying firearms on their person 

through a school building with nefarious intent. The 

State’s only evidence, instead, showed [Defendant] was in 

a parking lot adjacent to the hospital at which he was 

seeking care.

Despite Defendant’s contentions to the contrary, a plain reading of the statute 

does not require that all “educational property” be “owned, used, or operated . . . for 

the administration of any school.” Id. Rather, only those “other propert[ies]” which 

do not fall within the earlier categories, “[a]ny school building or bus, school campus, 

grounds, recreational area, [or] athletic field,” must be “owned, used, or operated . . . 

for the administration of any school.” N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(a)(1) (2023). Even if we 

accepted Defendant’s proposed reading of the statute requiring each of the 

enumerated items to be “owned, used, or operated . . . for the administration of any 

school[,]” such a reading would lend itself to absurd results. Id.; see C Invs. 2, LLC v. 

Auger, 277 N.C. App. 420, 430 (2021) (citing Mazda Motors of Am., Inc. v. Sw. Motors, 

Inc., 296 N.C. 237, 361 (1979)), aff’d, 383 N.C. 1 (2022) (“Now, to be sure, if the plain 

reading of a statute leads to a result so absurd that no reasonable legislator could 

have intended it, we can ignore that absurd interpretation and find a reasonable 

one.”). For example, to fall within this statute’s protections, any school buses or 

athletic fields would need to be “owned, used, or operated” for administrative 

purposes. Giving the State the benefit of “every reasonable inference” from the 
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evidence, Defendant’s car was located on the UNC Chapel Hill Campus. See Golder, 

374 N.C. at 249-50 (“In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

criminal conviction, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to 

the State; the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable 

inference to be drawn therefrom.”). The UNC Chapel Hill Campus squarely falls 

within the enumerated categories in N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(a)(1). Defendant’s attempt 

to suggest that the parking lot itself, located on the UNC Chapel Hill Campus, must 

be used “for the administration of [the] school” fails. The State presented sufficient, 

substantial evidence that Defendant was on educational property as defined by the 

statute. However, as we discuss below, the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss because the State failed to present substantial evidence that 

Defendant knew he was on educational property. 

2. Knowledge

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b), a person commits a felony when he 

“knowingly [] possess[es] or carr[ies] . . . any . . . firearm of any kind on educational 

property . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) (2023). Defendant’s knowledge that he 

possessed the firearm on educational property is an essential element of the crime, 

and, therefore, the State was required to present substantial evidence of such 

knowledge. 

To support this element of the offense, the State offered Officer Powell’s 

testimony regarding the events during Defendant’s arrest and the seven possible 
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paths by which Defendant could have reached the parking lot. Officer Powell testified 

that he and Defendant “spoke about” whether he was aware he was on educational 

property “on and off[,]” that “[a]t one point . . . [Defendant] said that he always forgot 

that the hospital was on UNC’s campus[,]” and that Defendant mentioned he was 

unaware that he was on educational property “several times throughout [their] 

encounter.” Officer Powell also testified that “there was not a sign where 

[Defendant’s] vehicle was actually located that indicated [Defendant] was on campus 

property[,]” nor was there “a sign that indicated you could not possess weapons where 

his vehicle was actually located[.]” 

Officer Powell further testified as to why he arrested Defendant:

At that point, viewing the totality of the circumstances, I 

looked at where we were located, our vicinity to Taylor 

Campus Health with its sign, the Taylor Campus Health 

hanging sign that’s nearby the vehicle; Gate 6 being within 

eyeshot, which is part of Kenan Stadium, the large football 

stadium that UNC football plays at. I determined that 

based on the totality of the circumstances that there was 

no way that any reasonable person would not recognize the 

area as part of campus, that he was -- that there were 

firearms in the possession of [Defendant], ammunition, 

and they were not secured. So I determined at this point 

that I was going to place [Defendant] under arrest for 

felony possession of a firearm on educational property. 

Officer Powell’s testimony explicitly indicates that Defendant expressed numerous 

times that he was unaware he was on educational property, but that Officer Powell 

arrested him based on his belief “that there was no way that any reasonable person 

would not recognize the area as part of campus . . . .” Officer Powell also testified 
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that “everything on campus is very clearly labeled so that any layperson with limited 

familiarity can navigate campus effectively[]” and that “[t]here is a hanging sign for 

Taylor Campus Health . . . [which] would have been immediately to the left of the 

vehicle’s front headlight at an angle where it would be within your line of sight.” 

Notably, at no point did Officer Powell testify that he had any further reasons, specific 

to Defendant, to believe that Defendant knew he was on educational property. 

The State also questioned Officer Powell about the number of means by which 

Defendant could have reached the parking lot in his vehicle. The exchange between 

the State and Officer Powell was as follows:

[OFFICER POWELL:] If you are coming from Highway 54 

area and you are turning onto the eastern part of Manning 

Drive, heading from Manning Drive up toward Ridge Road, 

Skipper Bowles vicinity.

[THE STATE:] Okay. Along that path . . . is there any 

signage that references the . . . legality of possessing 

firearms? 

[OFFICER POWELL:] There is one sign.

[THE STATE:] Okay. What does it say?

[OFFICER POWELL:] “No weapons on educational 

property.”

[THE STATE:] Okay. So that’s . . . one path. Are there any 

other paths that someone could take to get to where he 

was?

[OFFICER POWELL:] Yes, sir. There’s a few other paths.

[THE STATE:] Okay. Tell us about them.
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[OFFICER POWELL:] So in the same vicinity as you are 

cutting through Carrboro, you can take an offshoot to pick 

up 15/501 over South Columbia. That labels the area 

heading toward the hospital and the university with a 

street sign which will have you riding on South Columbia 

until you pick up the western part of Manning Drive. 

That’s in the vicinity of Pittsboro Street. You would turn 

right there and then follow the road past the hospital, past 

Cardinal Deck, past the Dogwood Deck, going past East 

and West Drive as well as the dental school, Koury.

. . . .

[THE STATE:] Once you get onto campus, all the signs 

switch from the normal green that you are used to seeing 

in regular areas to the Carolina blue color. They have an 

Old Well or . . . the Carolina NC stamp that is familiar and 

commonly used for sporting occasions. And then the large 

parking structures, all the buildings along that, past Mary 

Ellen Jones as well, the cancer research, have black signs 

with white letters and either the Old Well or some other 

University-affiliated emblem on the signage in a light blue 

color. 

. . . . 

You can use South Road as well. So without describing how 

to get completely to South Road from the various points . . 

. . [Y]ou either have to come up from Raleigh Road where 

it turns into South Road and there’s a “Welcome to UNC” 

sign where you would turn left onto County Club and then 

turn right down Ridge Road going past the School of 

Government and the law school, Van Hecke-Wettach, 

which are both clearly labeled.

. . . . 

So then you would proceed down Ridge Road, past that 

point, the football indoor practice facility; and on the left 

would be Boshamer Baseball Stadium.
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. . . .

And then from there you have two options on how to get 

where [Defendant] was located. Most people would 

continue straight down Ridge Road until it hits Manning 

Drive, going past SASP South and North. It’s the 

administrative buildings where payoffs and things like 

that are located; clear signage there as well. You would 

turn right onto Manning Drive, go past Hardin Dorm, 

which has a sign as well as for Morrison Dorm, which 

would be on your right-hand side.

On your left side you go past Craige and Craige North. 

Craige North being the closest to the road, and there’s a 

sign for that as well. Go past Paul Hardin Drive where the 

public safety building is located as well as our P2P, which 

has buses and bus stops in the vicinity. And then you 

would turn right onto Emergency Room Drive. Follow that 

past the emergency room, up toward Gate 6; and then when 

you face Gate 6, you would turn to the left, and that would 

take you to the handicapped spot by Taylor Campus

Health, which is where [Defendant’s] vehicle was located 

in. 

The other way would be right in the same vicinity of 

Boshamer Stadium. There is a Rams Head parking deck. 

If you turn right, there’s a tunnel. You go through that 

tunnel, go down past the entrance -- visiting team entrance 

gates for the football team, up a hill; and it will put you 

right at Gate 6 at Kenan Stadium. This is not an area 

where most people are familiar with or allowed to drive on; 

however, people do it fairly regularly if they are familiar 

with the area. You would pop up literally at Gate 6. It’s 

meant for deliveries and things like that, and honestly, the 

football team’s golf carts and things like that and 

emergency vehicles. And emergency vehicles use it all the 

time. 

So you would pop up at Gate 6 where it would be clearly 

labeled as Gate 6 of Kenan Stadium, and you would go to 
STATE V. RADOMSKI

Opinion of the Court

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the left and then turn right immediately. And that would 

put you in that same vicinity at Taylor Campus Health.

. . . . 

Going from the opposite direction of South Road, coming 

from South Columbia Street, you would go down past the 

Bell Tower, past Bell Tower Drive, past the Stone Center 

in the same vicinity as the student stores and Wilson 

Library, Kenan Laboratory area, all labeled in the same 

fashion with the white letters, the black sign, and the 

Carolina blue logo with either an Old Well or some other 

affiliated symbol.

You would turn right onto Stadium Drive, go past Gates 1, 

2, and 3 of the Kenan Stadium as well as Carmichael, 

Parker, Teague; and then Avery is where you pick up at 

Ridge Road. And then you would turn right down there 

from Stadium Drive. You can still see the same, like, 

vicinity as Boshamer Stadium. And then from there you 

would either take the back route I referenced earlier, 

cutting through to Gate 6, or the main route of Ridge Road 

to Manning Drive.

[THE STATE:] Okay. Now have we covered all the ingress 

and egress?

. . . . 

[OFFICER POWELL:] Yes, sir. 

Defendant argues that “there was no evidence whatsoever that [Defendant], 

while sick and seeking emergency medical care, visually saw and mentally took in or 

understood those signs such that he knew he was on educational property as required 

under N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b)[,]” and “[t]here was no evidence which of the seven roads 

[Defendant] took into the parking lot.” Defendant contends, and we agree, that 
STATE V. RADOMSKI

Opinion of the Court

- 21 -

“[d]riving past signs that may be blue or say UNC is not the same as knowingly being 

on campus.” 

Our Supreme Court has held that 

[t]here is no logical reason why an inference which 

naturally arises from a fact proven by circumstantial 

evidence may not be made. Therefore, it is appropriate for 

a jury to make inferences on inferences when determining 

whether the facts constitute the elements of the crime. 

Thus, circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to 

dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence 

does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.

State v. Dover, 381 N.C. 535, 547 (2022) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). However, 

“[a] motion to dismiss should be granted . . . when the facts and circumstances 

warranted by the evidence do no more than raise a suspicion of guilt or conjecture 

since there would still remain a reasonable doubt as to [the] defendant’s guilt.” State 

v. Simpson, 235 N.C. App. 398, 403-04 (2014) (quoting State v. McDowell, 217 N.C. 

App. 634, 636 (2011)). 

The State failed to present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to which 

path Defendant took, what signs he saw, or any other indication of personal 

knowledge that he was on educational property. The State did not “prove[] by 

circumstantial evidence” any fact from which the jury could infer Defendant’s 

knowledge, and the jury was left only to speculate as to Defendant’s mens rea at the 

time of the actus reus. See Dover, 381 N.C. at 547. The trial court erred in denying 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, as “the facts and circumstances warranted by the 
STATE V. RADOMSKI

Opinion of the Court

- 22 -

[State’s] evidence [did] no more than raise a suspicion of guilt or conjecture[,]” and “a 

reasonable doubt as to [Defendant’s] guilt[]” remained. See Simpson, 235 N.C. at 403-

04.

CONCLUSION

The application of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) to Defendant’s conduct under these 

facts unconstitutionally restricts Defendant’s Second Amendment protections. 

Furthermore, the State failed to demonstrate that Defendant knew he possessed a 

firearm on educational grounds. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss and vacate Defendant’s conviction.

REVERSED AND VACATED.

Judge CARPENTER concurs.

Chief Judge DILLON concurs in a separate opinion.
No. COA23-304 – State v. Radomski

DILLON, Chief Judge, concurring.

I agree in the majority opinion that the gun possession statute under which 

Defendant was convicted is unconstitutional as applied to him in this case. The 

evidence shows that Defendant is homeless; that everything in the world he owns, 

including his firearm, was in his car; and that he drove his car to UNC Hospital to 

seek emergency medical attention. There was no evidence that Defendant had the 

opportunity or means to store his firearm before proceeding to the hospital.

I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that there was insufficient 

evidence that Defendant knew that he was on educational property. Indeed, there 

was evidence that Defendant would have passed signs indicating that he was on 

UNC’s campus. He was near Kenan Stadium, where UNC plays its home football 

games. The officer testified that Defendant told him that he “always forgot” that the 

hospital was on UNC’s campus, suggesting that he has been there and/or at least was 

admitting that had known at some point in the past that the hospital was on UNC’s 

campus. One cannot forget what he did not once know. But, further, it may be that 

the jury simply did not believe Defendant’s statement that he forgot what he admitted 

he once knew, that the hospital was on UNC’s campus. In sum, I conclude the State 

presented enough evidence from which the jury could find that Defendant knew he 

was on educational property.