alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
III

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 34

Authorizing expenditures by the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 29, 1997

Mr. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, reported the following original resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

RESOLUTION

Authorizing expenditures by the Committee on Energy and

Natural Resources.

1 Resolved, That, in carrying out its powers, duties, and

2 functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in ac3 cordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such

4 rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings,

5 and making investigations as authorized by paragraphs 1

6 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate,

7 the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources is au8 thorized from March 1, 1997, through February 28, 1998,

9 and March 1, 1998, through February 28, 1999, in its

10 discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent
2

SRES 34 RS

1 fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with

2 the prior consent of the Government department or agency

3 concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administra4 tion, to use on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis

5 the services of personnel of any such department or agen6 cy.

7 SEC. 2. (a) The expenses of the committee for the

8 period March 1, 1997, through February 28, 1998 under

9 this resolution shall not exceed $2,637,966.

10 (b) For the period March 1, 1998, through February

11 28, 1999, expenses of the committee under this resolution

12 shall not exceed $2,707,696.

13 SEC. 3. The committee shall report its findings, to14 gether with such recommendations for legislation as it

15 deems available, to the Senate at the earliest practicable

16 date, but not later than February 28, 1997, and February

17 28, 1998, respectively.

18 SEC. 4. Expenses of the committee under this resolu19 tion shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate

20 upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the commit21 tee, except that vouchers shall not be required (1) for the

22 disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual

23 rate, (2) for the payment of telecommunications provided

24 by the Office of the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper,

25 United States Senate, (3) for the payment of stationery
3

SRES 34 RS

1 supplies purchased through the Keeper of the Stationery,

2 United States Senate, (4) for payments to the Postmaster,

3 United States Senate, (5) for the payment of metered

4 charges on copying equipment provided by the Office of

5 the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper, United States Sen6 ate, or (6) for the payment of Senate Recording and Pho7 tographic Services.

8 SEC. 5. There are authorized such sums as may be

9 necessary for agency contributions related to the com10 pensation of employees of the committee from March 1,

11 1997, through February 28, 1998, and March 1, 1998,

12 through February 28, 1999, to be paid from the Appro13 priations account for ‘‘Expenses of Inquiries and Inves14 tigations.’’

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 11 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  1st Session
S. J. RES. 11

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
 Commemorating ``Juneteenth Independence Day'', June 19, 1865, the day 
     on which slavery finally came to an end in the United States.

Whereas news of the end of slavery came late to frontier areas of the country, 
        especially in the American Southwest;
Whereas the African-Americans who had been slaves in the Southwest thereafter 
        celebrated June 19 as the anniversary of their emancipation;
Whereas their descendants handed down that tradition from generation to 
        generation as an inspiration and encouragement for future generations;
Whereas Juneteenth celebrations have thus been held for 130 years to honor the 
        memory of all those who endured slavery and especially those who moved 
        from slavery to freedom; and
Whereas their example of faith and strength of character remains a lesson for 
        all Americans today, regardless of background or region or race: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the annual observance of 
June 19 as Juneteenth Independence Day is an important and enriching 
part of our country's history and heritage.
    Sec. 2. That the celebration of Juneteenth provides an opportunity 
for all Americans to learn more about our common past and to better 
understand the experiences that have shaped our Nation.
    Sec. 3. That a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the 
National Association of Juneteenth Lineage as an expression of 
appreciation for its role in promoting the observance of Juneteenth 
Independence Day.

            Passed the Senate April 10, 1997.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
105th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                             S. J. RES. 11

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 Commemorating ``Juneteenth Independence Day'', June 19, 1865, the day 
     on which slavery finally came to an end in the United States.
```
Before the Second Division,

December 21, 1950

No. 55023.

#### Bernard Lippman et al. *v.*United States,

protests 116018-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

It was stipulated that the items of merchandise marked “A” or “B” on the invoices consist of watch movements similar in all material respects to those which were the subject of *United States*v. *Helbros Watch Co. et al.*(38 C. C. P. A. 1, C. A. D. 430). Upon the agreed statement of facts and the cited authority, the items marked “A” were held properly dutiable at the base rate of 90 cents each as watch movements more than 1 inch but less than 1.77 inches wide, and the items marked “B” were held dutiable at $1.20 each as watch movements more than *%o*of 1 inch but not more than 1 inch wide under paragraph 367 (a) (1), as modified, *supra.*
No. P67/201

#### C. M. G. Enterprises, Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 66/8605 (New York).

Oliver, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise covered by the foregoing protest consists of chord organs and parts thereof similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Excelsior Accordions, Inc.*v. *United States*(48 Cust. Ct. 148, C.D. 2328), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 18 - 00020 - CR

EX PARTE GREGARY A. TURNER, S R.

- --------- FROM THE 213TH DISTR ICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. D213 W010816

- 1343101

- A

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant Gregary A. Turner, Sr. attempts to appeal either a second time from the trial court’s 2013 judgment or from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’s February 2017 summary denial of his postconviction application for writ of habeas corpus , see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (West 2015)

. Either way, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 This court’s opini on and judgment of August 13, 2015 resolved Appellant’s direct appeal from the trial court’s October 2013 judgment

. Turner v. State , No. 02

- 13

- 00487

- CR, 2015 WL 4775758, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2015, pet. dism’d , untimely filed ) (mem. op., no t designated for publication)

. Our plenary power expired sixty days after our judgment ’s date

. See Tex. R. App. P. 19.1(a). To the extent Appellant seeks another appeal of his October 2013 conviction and sentence, we have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal , both because our plenary power has expired and because his notice of appeal, filed more than four years too late, is untimely. See Tex. R. App. 19.3, 26.2(a); Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ; cf

. Coleman v. Stat e, No. 0 3

- 11

- 00648

- CR, 2011 WL 6118604, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Austin Dec. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( “He is not entitled to a second appeal of this conviction.” ). To the extent Appellant seeks to appeal from the Texas Court of Crimina l Appeals’s February 2017 denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus , this court has no authority to review a decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. State ex rel. Wilson v. Briggs , 171 Tex. Crim. 479, 351 S.W.2d 892, 894 ( Tex. Crim. App

. 1961) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort in this state in criminal matters. This being so, no other court of this state has authority to overrule or circumvent its decisions, or disobey its mandates.”) ; cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 5 ( “After conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void and3 of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner.”) ; Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals , 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim

. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the court of appeals usurped the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’s exclusive authority to grant habeas relief from a final felony conviction)

. Appellant’s response to our letter expressing our jurisdictional co ncerns does not provide a basis for continuing the appeal . Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM PANEL: PITTMAN, J.; SUDDERTH, C.J.; and BIRDWELL, J. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2( b) DELIVERED: April 12, 2018
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CALVIN WEATHERSPOON
,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 12

- 2775

[ August 19, 2015 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Karen Miller , Judge; L.T. Case No.
2008CF017526BXXXMB

.

Ira Karmelin, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

O N M OTION R

EQUESTING C

ERTIFICATION OF Q UESTION OF
G REAT P UBLIC I

MPORTANCE

P ER C URIAM

.

We grant the appellant’s motion to certify a question of great public importance and certify the following question to the supreme court:

IN LIGHT OF THE LEGISLATURE’S CREATION OF SECTION 782.051, WHICH CREATED A CRIME CALLED “ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER,” THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY DECLARED BY

STATE V. GRAY

, 654 SO. 2D 552 (FLA. 1995)

, TO BE A NON

EXISTENT CRIME UNDER SECTION 782.04(1)(A), DOES THE

ST ATE NEED TO SPECIFICALLY ALLEGE THE ELEMENTS
OF AND CITE TO SECTION 782.051 OR DOES AN

ALLEGATION OF ATTEMPTED PREMEDITATED MURDER AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDE ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER,

JUST AS AN INDICTMENT FOR PREMEDITATED MURDER

AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDES FELONY MU RDER?2

We deem it a question of great public importance because the issue affects all attempted felony murder prosecutions and how the state charges a defendant for attempted felony murder after the enactment of section 782.051, Florida Statutes.

C IKLIN
, C.J., W ARNER and G ERBER , JJ., concur.

* * *
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DETENTION ORDER

Page - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W. D. OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

MIGUEL ANGEL PERALTA-ALONZO,

 Defendant.

Case No. 06-5091M

DETENTION ORDER

THE COURT, having conducted a detention hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3142, finds that no condition or combination

of conditions which defendant can meet will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and/or the safety of any

other person and the community.

This finding is based on 1) the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) charged, including whether the offense is a

crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug; 2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 3) the history and characteristics of

the person including those set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A)(B); and 4) the nature and seriousness of the danger release would

impose to any person or the community.

Findings of Fact/ Statement of Reasons for Detention

Presumptive Reasons/Unrebutted:

 ( ) Conviction of a Federal offense involving a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C.§3142(f)(A)

 ( ) Potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death. 18 U.S.C.§3142(f)(B)

 ( X ) Potential maximum sentence of 10+ years as prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.§801 et seq.), the

Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.§951 et seq.) Or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46

U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.)

 ( ) Convictions of two or more offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of 18 U.S.C.§3142(f)(1) of two or more

State or local offenses that would have been offenses described in said subparagraphs if a circumstance giving rise to

Federal jurisdiction had existed, or a combination of such offenses.

Safety Reasons:

 ( ) Defendant is currently on probation/supervision resulting from a prior offense.

 ( ) Defendant was on bond on other charges at time of alleged occurrences herein.

 ( ) Defendant’s prior criminal history.

 ( ) 

Flight Risk/Appearance Reasons:

 ( ) Defendant’s lack of community ties and resources..

 ( ) Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer.

 ( ) Detainer(s)/Warrant(s) from other jurisdictions.

 ( ) Failures to appear for past court proceedings.

 ( ) Past conviction for escape.

Order of Detention

< The defendant shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility

separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal,

without prejudice to review..

< The defendant shall be afforded reasonable opportunity for private consultation with counsel.

< The defendant shall on order of a court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the Government, be delivered

to a United States marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection with a court proceeding.

 May 17, 2006.

s/ J. Kelley Arnold 

J. Kelley Arnold, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:06-cr-05350-RBL Document 12 Filed 05/17/06 Page 1 of 1
From: konopaski@yahoo.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:39:34 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Ronald Konopaski

San Francisco, CA 94118
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

December 21, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

130031 & (71)(72) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 130031 

 COA: 256767 

Oakland CC: 01-177766-FC 

LARRY A. MCGHEE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion to file a brief that exceeds the 50-page limit and 

the motion for immediate consideration of the motion to file a brief that exceeds the 50-

page limit are considered, and they are GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal 

the November 8, 2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals remains pending. 

s1220 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

December 21, 2005 

Clerk
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21 

22

ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 

COMPLAINT - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 

AT SEATTLE 

CURTIS S. THOMPSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

OFFICER BURACH, et al., 

Defendants. 

____________________________________

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CASE NO. C05-2064-JLR-MAT 

ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 

COMPLAINT 

 

 This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter comes before the 

Court at the present time on plaintiff’s motion for leave to supplement his complaint. The 

Court, having reviewed plaintiff’s motion, and the balance of the record, does hereby ORDER 

as follows: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to supplement his complaint (Dkt. No. 157) is 

STRICKEN. Plaintiff, by way of the instant motion, seeks to add a new defendant to this 

action. Thus, plaintiff’s motion is, effectively, one for leave to amend. Plaintiff has 

previously been advised that any request to amend must be accompanied by a proposed 

amended complaint and that any such motion not accompanied by a proposed amended 

complaint would be stricken. (See Dkt. Nos. 108 and 156.) Plaintiff may not circumvent the 

Case 2:05-cv-02064-JLR Document 160 Filed 01/31/11 Page 1 of 2
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ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 

COMPLAINT - 2 

requirement that he submit a proposed amended complaint simply by identifying his motion as 

something other than a motion to amend. 

 (2) Plaintiff also requests appointment of counsel in the motion now pending before 

the Court. Plaintiff has previously been advised that there is no right to have counsel 

appointed in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the Court, under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(1), can request counsel to represent a party proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court 

may do so only in exceptional circumstances. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 

(9th Cir. 1986); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 

616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation 

of both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his 

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this case involves exceptional circumstances which warrant 

the appointment of counsel and, thus, plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is 

DENIED. 

 (3) The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to plaintiff, to counsel for 

defendants, and to the Honorable James L. Robart. 

 DATED this 31st day of January, 2011. 

A

Mary Alice Theiler 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 

Case 2:05-cv-02064-JLR Document 160 Filed 01/31/11 Page 2 of 2
Case 3:06-cv-05225-RJB Document 10-2 Filed 09/12/07 Page 1 of 3
Wolotira Declaration - Attachment B

Contaminant Abbreviations for Hylebos Waterway NRDA Liability Allocation

Contaminant Abbreviation

Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons PAHs 

Polychlorinated biphenyls PCBs

Metals

 Antimony SB

 Arsenic AS

 Cadmium CD

 Chromium CR

 Copper CU

 Lead PB

 Mercury HG

 Nickel NI

 Silver AG

 Zinc ZN

 Tributyltin TBT

Chlorobenzenes

 1,3-dichlorobenzene MDCB

 1,4-dichlorobenzene PDCB

 1,2,4-trichlorobenzene TCB

 Hexachlorobenzene HCB

Phthalates

 Bis (2-ethylhexyl) phthalate BEPH

 Butylbenzyl phthalate BBPH

 Di-n-octyl phthalate DOPH

 Diethylphthalate DEPH

Case 3:06-cv-05225-RJB Document 10-2 Filed 09/12/07 Page 2 of 3
 Dimethylphthalate DMPH

Phenols

 4-methyl phenol MP4

 2,4-dimethyl phenol DMP

 Pentachlorophenol PCP

 Phenol PNL

Hexachlorobutadiene HCBD

DDTs

 Dichlorodiphenyldichloroethane DDD

 Dichlorodiphenyldichloroethylene DDE

 Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane DDT

Case 3:06-cv-05225-RJB Document 10-2 Filed 09/12/07 Page 3 of 3
Case 2:06-cv-00590-TSZ Document 22 Filed 04/04/07 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. David Russell KERNS, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 05-6441.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 18, 2005.

Decided Aug. 24, 2005.

*213David Russell Kerns, Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. McWilliams, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

David Russell Kerns, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denying relief on his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Kerns has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*