J-A24003-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ABRAHAM R. CORDOVA

Appellant No. 2624 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 2, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005840-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2015

Appellant, Abraham Cordova, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after Cordova 

pled nolo contendere to charges of attempted murder, attempted rape, 

burglary, and possession of an instrument of crime. Cordova argues that 

the aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years of imprisonment imposed by the 

trial court was excessive. We disagree, and therefore affirm.

At Cordova’s nolo contendere colloquy, Cordova did not challenge the 

following factual basis for his plea, as presented by the Commonwealth.

[At around midnight on the night at issue, Cordova] had given a 

woman by the name of Mary a ride home. [Cordova] thought 

that he was owed something by that woman and attempted to 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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get into her home. Mary is not the complainant in the case. She 

shut the door on [Cordova], [Cordova] became enraged and 

angry and went around back to the apartment complex in order 

to gain access to that woman’s apartment. Unfortunately, the 

actual complainant in this case, [L.K.,] who is a 63 year old 

woman, ... was in her apartment, ... getting ready for bed. So at 

this point in time [Cordova] crawled through her kitchen window, 

which was cracked open slightly. The complaining witness at 

that point in time was only wearing her underwear because she 

was changing for bed. [Cordova] then, utilizing brass knuckles, 

beat the complaining witness in the head between five to 10 

times. He also beat her over the rest of her body, her arms, her 

abdomen, her back, he beat her so badly that she actually, as a 

result, lost all vision in her left eye. The doctor advised her it 

will have to be removed and a glass eye would replace it. She 

also had to have multiple staples in her head, as well as stitches.

In the course of [] beating the complaining witness with the 

brass knuckles [Cordova] also began to attempt to pull down 

and grab the complaining witness’s panties, and at that time that 

was all she was wearing. The beating of the complaining witness 

and her screams were so loud that the neighbor actually heard 

her and called 911. He could hear the beating and the hitting 

through the walls and could also hear the complaining witness 

scream and heard the defendant utter one phrase “mother 

fucker” during the incident. The police officers arrived, 

[Cordova] left through the back window leaving the complaining 

witness at that point. ... When the police officers arrived the 

complaining witness couldn’t move, she could barely talk. The 

blood in the apartment was so extreme that they couldn’t tell 

what happened to her. ... Also, she had significant swelling to the 

brain, it was unsure at that point if this was going to cause brain 

damage. As of this time they are still unsure of the extent of 

how the injuries will affect the complainant. She will lose her left

eye as a result.

In addition to that she spent approximately over three months in 

the hospital at Jefferson.

N.T., Plea hearing, 1/24/14, at 15-17. Cordova did not contest this factual 

summary, but pled nolo contendere to the charges, claiming that he did not, 

in fact, intend to either rape or murder L.K. The trial court requested that a 
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Pre-Sentence Investigation (“PSI”) be performed and submitted, and 

scheduled a sentencing hearing.

At sentencing, the Commonwealth conceded, for tactical purposes, 

that the possession of an instrument of crime conviction merged for 

sentencing purposes with the burglary conviction. The Commonwealth 

argued that the circumstances of the convictions called for an aggregate 

term of imprisonment of 30 to 60 years. Cordova presented evidence of his 

difficult upbringing in Guatemala, his lack of formal education, a harrowing 

experience emigrating to the United States, and his inability to find stable 

employment here. Cordova then requested an aggregate sentence of 3.5 to 

7 years of imprisonment.

The trial court found that Cordova had utilized a deadly weapon, the 

brass knuckles, in the commission of the crimes. As a result, it utilized the 

deadly weapon enhancements provided in the guidelines, and imposed the 

following consecutive sentences of imprisonment: 15 to 30 years for 

attempted murder, 5 to 10 years for attempted rape, and 5 to 10 years for 

burglary.

Cordova filed a timely motion for reconsideration of sentence, which 

the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Cordova contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

by imposing an excessive sentence. Cordova concedes that this argument 
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constitutes a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 12.

“A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a 

claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citation omitted). When challenging the discretionary aspects 

of the sentence imposed, an appellant must present a substantial question 

as to the inappropriateness of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. 

Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

“Two requirements must be met before we will review this challenge 

on its merits.” McAfee, 849 A.2d at 274 (citation omitted). “First, an 

appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied 

upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). “Second, the appellant must show that 

there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.” Id. (citation omitted). That is, “the sentence 

violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the 

Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing 

process.” Tirado, 870 A.2d at 365 (citation omitted). 

We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists. See id. “Our inquiry must focus on 

the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts
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underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the 

merits.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).

In the present case, Cordova’s appellate brief contains the requisite 

Rule 2119(f) concise statement, and, as such, is in technical compliance with 

the requirements to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence. 

Cordova argues in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the imposition of 

consecutive sentences, as opposed to concurrent sentences, by the trial 

court was excessive. Cordova also argues that the trial court failed to 

consider his rehabilitative needs. Finally, Cordova contends that the trial 

court did not consider the guidelines in imposing the sentence for burglary, 

as it imposed a sentence outside the guideline ranges. We will address these 

separate assertions in sequence.

First, Cordova argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing “virtually a life sentence[,]” which is unlikely to expire during his 

natural life span. Appellant’s Brief, at 12-14. Cordova concedes that the 

sentences for attempted murder and attempted rape were within the 

guideline ranges. While Cordova highlights the fact that the sentence for 

burglary was outside the guideline ranges entirely, for purposes of this 

argument, he focuses on the aggregate term of the sentence as excessive. 

We will address Cordova’s argument regarding the burglary sentence 

individually later in this memorandum.
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“[W]here a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, 

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(citations omitted). The imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, 

sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme 

circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, 

considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment. See 

id., at 171-172. A sentence may be excessive where the term is “unlikely to 

end during the defendant’s natural lifespan.” Commonwealth v. 

Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Cordova has 

successfully raised a substantial question with this argument. However, we 

conclude that based upon the nature of the incident, the status of the victim 

as a 63 year old stranger, the horrific injuries sustained by the victim, and 

the need to protect society from Cordova ever committing such a crime 

again, the aggregate sentence is not excessive.

Turning to his next argument, Cordova asserts that the trial court 

violated 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) by failing to consider his rehabilitative 

needs. This raises a substantial question for our review. See 

Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012). However, 

Cordova did not preserve this issue either at the sentencing hearing, or in 

his post-sentence motion. It is therefore waived. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 
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302(a); Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1273-1274 (Pa. 

Super. 2006).

Finally, Cordova argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

imposing a sentence above even the aggravated range of the guidelines for 

the burglary conviction without explanation. This also raises a substantial 

question for our review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). However, once again, 

Cordova failed to properly preserve this issue in the trial court. It is 

therefore waived. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 302(a); Shugars.

As none of Cordova’s issues on appeal merit relief, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/2015