NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 12-4208

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GARY WOOD,

 Appellant 

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. No. 2-11-cr-00547-001)

District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 26, 2013

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Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: October 3, 2013)

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OPINION

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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Gary Wood appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress the 

firearm that Philadelphia police officers found on him when they were dispatched to his 
2

home in response to reports of a woman being held inside against her will. We will 

affirm.

I.

As we write primarily for the parties, we recount only the essential facts and 

procedural history. On November 14, 2009, at around 1 a.m., Officer Robert DeBellis 

was dispatched to Wood’s residence based on a 911 call reporting that a woman was 

being held inside against her will and was being injured.1 Officer DeBellis arrived 

outside of Wood’s residence and encountered a woman who told him that her friend was 

inside the residence “in distress, in fear for her life, and . . . being held against her will.” 

App. 121-22. Officers David Dawson and David Brown, who also heard the dispatch, 

joined Officer DeBellis at the residence.

The door to the enclosed porch of the residence was locked. The landlord arrived

and unlocked the porch door. The porch area led to two doors: one to the ground-floor 

apartment and the other to Wood’s second-floor apartment. The officers knocked on one 

door, and a resident appeared who directed them to Wood’s door. The officers then 

knocked on Wood’s door “for a certain period of time.”2

 

1

The 911 operator reported that someone was screaming in the background of the 

call. While no testimony was elicited concerning this fact, an exhibit setting forth this 

fact was offered by stipulation at the suppression hearing.

2 At this point, according to Officer DeBellis, a woman ran out of Wood’s 

apartment “like she was being chased by the devil.” App. 122-23. Officer Dawson, who 

arrived at the scene after Officer DeBellis, testified, however, that he did not recall the 

woman fleeing the apartment, but that he did encounter a woman upstairs in the kitchen. 

The District Court disregarded Officer DeBellis’s recollection of the woman fleeing the 

apartment in light of the conflict, but noted that it found the rest of DeBellis’s testimony 

credible and that whether the woman fled the apartment was not material to its decision.
3

Wood eventually appeared at the door and entered the porch. The District Court 

made no finding as to whether Wood remained on the porch, reentered the doorway of

the apartment, or moved between these areas during the encounter with the police. After 

the officers asked Wood a few questions, Wood “abruptly” told the officers that he had a 

child upstairs in the apartment to care for and turned to leave. App. 123-24. As he 

turned, Officer DeBellis grabbed Wood’s shoulder and, as he did so, saw that a gun was 

tucked in the back of Wood’s pants. Wood turned back to the officers and shoved 

Officer DeBellis, at which point the officers subdued Wood and placed him under arrest.

A grand jury returned an indictment charging Wood with possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Wood filed a motion to 

suppress the gun, which he contends was the fruit of an illegal seizure that occurred either 

at the time the officers brought him to the door of the apartment, or, at the latest, when 

Officer DeBellis grabbed his shoulder. The District Court denied the motion. Wood 

entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to an agreement that permitted him to appeal 

the decision denying the motion to suppress. Wood appealed.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 

and we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s 

order denying a motion to suppress for clear error as to its factual findings and exercise 

plenary review of its application of the law to those facts. United States v. Perez, 280 

F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). We have held that “[t]he presence of exigent 
4

circumstances is a finding of fact, which we review for clear error.” United States v. 

Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006).

III.

A.

Wood first argues that the factual findings supporting the District Court’s decision 

are clearly erroneous. Wood attempts to cast doubt on these findings by drawing our 

attention to inconsistencies between the officers’ descriptions of the events leading up to 

the seizure, such as the fact that only one officer stated that he saw a woman fleeing the 

apartment and only one officer stated that he heard noises emanating from the apartment. 

Clear error review is deferential, however, and in instances “[w]here there are two 

permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); see also id. at 575 

(“[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of 

two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that 

is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can 

virtually never be clear error.”); United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 

1997) (holding that review of factual findings “is more deferential with respect to 

determinations about the credibility of witnesses”) (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575).

Wood has not demonstrated that the District Court’s factual findings are 

implausible, incoherent, or inconsistent with the objective evidence, and therefore has not 

shown that they are clearly erroneous. The difference in the officers’ testimony

concerning whether they heard any noise coming from inside the apartment is a minor 
5

inconsistency and does not render the remainder of the District Court’s findings 

implausible or incoherent.

Even setting aside the subjects about which the testimony varied, as the District 

Court did, the facts on which the officers agreed were sufficient to support a finding of 

exigent circumstances. Those facts include the radio dispatch to the officers informing 

them that a woman was being detained at Wood’s address, and a separate report from a 

woman outside Wood’s home who told the officers that she had received text messages 

from a friend who was inside the home and who indicated she was “in distress, in fear of 

her life, and [was] being held against her will.” App. 122. The reports of someone being 

held against her will and fearing for her life inside the residence were sufficient to 

establish the likelihood of immediate and ongoing violence and justified the officers’

decision to detain Wood. See United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(officer’s entry into home to investigate was justified in light of 911 call indicating a 

domestic disturbance and officer’s conversation with a girl outside the residence who 

reported that defendant was acting violently and had a gun). Because these facts 

demonstrate a coherent, plausible description of what the officers observed and heard 

regarding a report of a woman being held in Wood’s apartment, the District Court’s 

conclusion that exigent circumstances existed is amply supported and not clear error.

3

B.

 

3 Wood also argues that the record does not sufficiently demonstrate exigency, and 

that there must be a showing of immediate and ongoing violence or harm to enter. 

Certainly, if there were more evidence that someone was being held inside and feared for 

her life, that would bolster the finding of exigency, but that does not mean that the 

District Court’s conclusion of exigent circumstances was clearly erroneous on these facts.
6

We next turn to the de novo application of law to those facts. At issue is whether 

the police officers violated Wood’s rights by seizing him. This requires us to determine 

first whether Wood was seized and second whether the seizure was lawful.

As to whether there was a seizure, Wood would be deemed “‘seized’ within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances 

surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 

leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (circumstances indicating 

seizure include “the threatening presence of several officers, . . . some physical touching 

of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 

compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled”). A reasonable person would 

have understood that Wood was not permitted to leave—and therefore was seized—when 

Officer DeBellis grabbed him by the shoulder. 

A reasonable person would also conclude, however, that it was appropriate for 

Officer DeBellis to seize Wood either on the porch or in the doorway of his premises, 

particularly since the porch is a common area, and the officers could have entered

Wood’s home given the exigent circumstances. While a search of a home generally 

requires a warrant, see, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), there are 

exceptions to the warrant requirement, see Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) 

(collecting cases and listing exceptions to the warrant requirement, including exigent 

circumstances). Among those exceptions is the need to protect an individual from

imminent harm. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“One exigency 

obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously 
7

injured or threatened with such injury.”) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 

(1978)); Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that exigent 

circumstances exist where “officers reasonably . . . believe that someone is in imminent 

danger.”) (emphasis omitted); cf. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006) (stating 

that no question could reasonably be raised “about the authority of the police to enter a 

dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence”). If the officers have probable 

cause to believe an individual in the home is in imminent danger, they may enter it 

without a warrant. Parkhurst, 77 F.3d at 711.

Here, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an individual 

inside the home was in danger. They were notified of a 911 call that reported a woman 

being held against her will. Upon their arrival at the home, a witness told them that she 

had received text messages from the woman inside the home, who was in fear for her life 

and was being held against her will. Those facts, when taken together, provided a 

reasonable basis to believe exigent circumstances required the search of the home without 

a warrant. The officers were therefore authorized to enter the home to search for a victim 

or to determine whether there was an ongoing threat of imminent harm.4 Brigham City, 

547 U.S. at 403; see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118; Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 

(3d Cir. 2006).

 

4 Wood also contends that the officers needed to investigate further before making 

a warrantless entry into the apartment. This is precisely what the officers were 

attempting to accomplish by asking Wood questions at the door before entering into his 

home.
8

On these facts, the officers had both the authority to enter the entire home, as well 

as engage in the less intrusive act of detaining Wood at or near the doorway to further 

investigate.

5

 McArthur, 531 U.S. at 335; see also Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403 (officers may 

enter premises without a warrant to protect occupant from injury); Myers, 308 F.3d at 

266 (911 call and similar report outside the home from adolescent that her mother and 

boyfriend were fighting and that the boyfriend had a gun “created sufficient exigency to 

allow [a police officer] to enter her home to investigate”). Under these circumstances, 

detaining Wood at or near his doorway and asking him questions was an appropriate 

method to determine whether a full search was necessary. The brief seizure allowed the 

officers to avoid the more intrusive—and, in light of the exigent circumstances, entirely 

permissible—search of the house. In short, Wood’s detention was reasonable. See

 

5

The Supreme Court’s decision in McArthur supports this conclusion. There, 

officers were called to the defendant’s home to keep the peace as his wife removed her 

belongings. Id. at 328-29. When she finished, the wife informed the officers that the 

defendant had drugs in the home. Id. at 329. The officers knocked on the defendant’s 

door, told him what his wife had said, and asked for permission to search the home, 

which the defendant denied. Id. The officers then required the defendant to remain 

outside the home while they applied for a search warrant so that he could not destroy the 

evidence. Id. Two hours later, the officers received the search warrant, searched the 

home, and found marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. The defendant moved to 

suppress the results of the search, contending that the warrantless seizure was per se 

unreasonable. Id. The Supreme Court observed that, in light of the exigent 

circumstances, the defendant’s warrantless detention was a Fourth Amendment seizure 

but was not per se unreasonable. Id. at 331. The Supreme Court balanced “the privacyrelated and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was 

reasonable.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that it was reasonable because the 

officers had probable cause to believe contraband was in the home, they had good reason 

to fear the drugs would be destroyed if they did not detain the defendant, they reconciled 

their law enforcement needs with the defendant’s privacy by “impos[ing] a significantly 

less restrictive restraint” than searching the home or arresting the defendant, and the 

restraint was imposed for only two hours. Id. at 331-32.
9

McArthur, 531 U.S. at 336 (“Temporarily keeping a person from entering his home, a 

consequence whenever police stop a person on the street, is considerably less intrusive 

than police entry into the home itself in order to make a warrantless arrest or conduct a 

search.”) (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 585).

Wood also contends that the seizure was inappropriate because he was effectively 

seized inside his home when the officers knocked on his door.6 The District Court did 

not decide whether Wood was in a common area, United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 

190-91 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 

locked common areas of apartment buildings), or inside his apartment when Officer 

DeBellis seized him. App. 123 (“He at some point may have entered the area of the 

porch . . . .”). The location of the seizure is not dispositive here because, as we 

explained, the officers would have been justified in entering and searching the home. Cf.

McArthur, 531 U.S. at 335 (rejecting the conclusion that it was improper to restrain the 

defendant outside of his residence after encountering him on the porch, which the lower 

court described as “a constructive eviction”) (quotation marks omitted); Michigan v. 

 

6 Wood relies on two cases in which other circuit courts have held, on very 

different facts, that individuals were seized inside their homes when police officers 

knocked on the individuals’ doors. See United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d 1161, 1170 

(10th Cir. 2008) (observing that the government had “pointed to no evidence that could 

support exigency at the time [the defendant] was seized”); United States v. Saari, 272 

F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that, when the police officers knocked on the door, 

“there was no proof that anyone was being threatened inside”). We need not decide 

under what circumstances, if any, an individual who answers the door would be deemed 

seized.
10

Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-05 (1981) (officers may detain an individual inside a 

residence during a search of the residence).

7

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

 

7 Because the government has shown that there were exigent circumstances and 

probable cause would have justified the officers’ entry into the home, see, e.g., Alabama 

v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1990) (describing the difference between the type and 

quantity of evidence required to establish reasonable suspicion and probable cause), we 

need not decide whether the encounter with Wood at the doorway of his home was also 

permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (reasonable suspicion standard 

governs an investigatory stop and search).