alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DC Civil Construction,



# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 22, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00 362

- CV

Javan P. SMITH

, Appellant

v.

DC CIVIL CONSTRUCTION, LLC

,

Appellee

From the County Court At Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015

- CV

- 1978 Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The clerk’s record has been filed in this appeal without payment of costs by appellant.

The reporter’s record w as originally due on September 21, 2015 . On September 30, 2 015, Ms. Kay Counseller, the reporter responsible for preparing, certifying, and filing the reporter’s record in this appeal, filed a Notification of Late Record stating the reporter’s record has not been filed because appellant has failed to pay or make arrangemen ts to pay the reporter’s fee for preparing

the record and a ppellant is not entitled to appeal without paying the fee. On October 14, 2015, we ordered appellant to designate the reporter’s record and provide proof that either (1) the reporter’s fee has bee n paid or arrangements have been made to pay the reporter’s fee; or (2) appellant is entitled to appeal without paying the reporter’s fee.

Appellant filed an affidavit of indigence ; therefore, we ORDER the clerk of this court to send copies of appellant ’s affidavit and this order to Ms. Counseller and all parties. See T EX

. R.

A PP

. P. 20.1(d)(2).

We ORDER the deadline for filing a contest to appellant’s affidavit of indigence is no later than November 2, 2015

. Any contest must be filed in this court. S ee T EX

. R. A PP

. P.
20.1(e)(1).

A ppellant is reminded that if he desires a reporter’s record, and has no t already done so,

he must (1) request in writing that a reporter’s record be prepared and (2) designate in writing the exhibits and those portions of t he record to be included in the reporter’s record. A ppellant must file a copy of the request with both th e trial court clerk and this court._________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 22nd day of October, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Case No. 9,601.

#### MILLICK et al. v. PETERSON.

[2 Wash. C. C. 31.] 1

Circuit Court, D. Pennsylvania.

April Term, 1807.

Principal and Agent — Declarations op Agent —Evidence—Policy of Insurance — Payment.

1. The declarations of an agent for the defendant, by whose orders the plaintiffs had made insurance for the benefit of the defendant, were not admitted to prove the liability of the defendant for the premium. 2. The policy of insurance, without other proof of the payment of the premium, is not evidence of its payment.

NOTE. The insurer may recover the premium. notwithstanding the formal receipt in the policy, which is not inserted as conclusive evidence. but to preclude the necessity of proving it in case of loss. 1 Marsh. Ins. 240.

This was an action on the case, to recover a premium of insurance paid by plaintiffs JMillick & Burger] for defendant [Peterson] on a policy effected on the Phoenix, the property of defendant, in an insurance office at New-York. The order for insurance was given by W. Wiseman, without mentioning the defendant: and the policy stated W. Wiseman as the person insured. Evidence was given to prove that Wiseman acted as the agent of the defendant,' in ordering the insurance. Wise-man sent to the plaintiff his note for the premium, as usual, payable In twelve months; but before the note became due, Wiseman failed. The plaintiff, understanding that the insurance was made for the defendant, procured from Wiseman the defendant’s letter, ordering him to have it effected; and got him to add on the foot of it, the order he had given to the plaintiff. A witness was examined, who stated sundry conversations he had had with Wiseman respecting this business; and was about stating that Wiseman told him the defendant would pay the debt.

THE COURT

thought this improper evidence. Wiseman was the defendant’s agent only to effect the policy. His declarations that defendant would pay, are not evidence in the cause. It was proved by a witness, that it is the constant custom to retain the policy until the premium is paid, or a note with a good endorser given, and then it is delivered out.

Mr. Hallowell, for plaintiff,

argued to the jury, that the printed acknowledgment in the policy that the premium was paid, is prima facie evidence of the fact. This, together with the circumstance of the plaintiff’s being in possession of the policy which he could not be unless he had paid the premium, is sufficient to establish the fact.

1

 rOriginaliy published from the MSS. of Hon. Bushrod Washington. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, under the supervision of Richard Peters, Jr., Esq.]

THE COURT

expressed an opinion, that better evidence could be given of the payment of the premium. That inferior evidence ought not to be left to the jury, when it appeared that there existed better in the power of the plaintiff. If he has paid the note he gave for the premium, he ought to produce it, or prove it to have been paid by other evidence. But on recommendation of the court, a juror was withdrawn.
Exhibit 32.2

Written Statement of the Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350

Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, I, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of Smart & Final Inc. (the
Company), hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 18, 2006 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      
|----------------------
|                      
|/s/ Richard N. Phegley
|Richard N. Phegley    
|July 24, 2006
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28 Page 1 ORDER - [C05-2008-RSL-MJB] 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

DEBRA A. JASPER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant

CASE NO. C05-2008-RSL-MJB

ORDER FOR REMAND

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the

above-captioned case be remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further

administrative proceedings, further development of the record, including a new hearing and a

new decision. On remand, the administrative law judge (ALJ) will: 1) further develop the

record for clarification of the opinion of Dr. Belcher; 2) obtain a physical consultative

evaluation, or in the alternative medical expert testimony to consider the severity of, and the

limitations on her ability to perform significant work activity due to Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia; 3)

further consider whether Plaintiff’s substance addiction disorder is a severe impairment and

analyze its effects pursuant to the sequential evaluation and applicable Ninth Circuit case law; 4)

further consider Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity pursuant to SSR 96-8p; and 5) if

Case 2:05-cv-02008-RSL Document 9 Filed 03/31/06 Page 1 of 2
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28 Page 2 ORDER - [C05-2008-RSL-MJB] 

warranted by the expanded record, the ALJ will obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational

expert to clarify the effects of the assessed limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to perform jobs that

exist in the local and or national economy.

Plaintiff may present new arguments and evidence. The ALJ may perform further

development and conduct further proceedings as necessary.

This case is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Upon proper presentation, this Court will consider Plaintiff’s application for costs, expenses and

attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a),(d).

DATED this 31st day of March, 2006.

A

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

Recommended for Entry

this 30th day of March, 2006:

 /s/Monica J. Benton

MONICA J. BENTON

United States Magistrate Judge

Presented by:

s/ RICHARD M. RODRIGUEZ

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Office of the General Counsel

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 MS/901

Seattle, Washington 98104-7075

Telephone: (206) 615-3748

FAX: (206) 615-2531

richard.rodriguez@ssa.gov

Case 2:05-cv-02008-RSL Document 9 Filed 03/31/06 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 31.2   I, Scott Emerson Lybbert, certify that:  1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of TGFIN Holdings, Inc.;  2.   Based upon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statements of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly represent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4.   The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:  a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report (the Evaluation Date"); and  c)   presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;  5.   The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a)   all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and  b)   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and  6.   The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.    /s/ Scott Emerson Lybbert      Chief Financial Officer -------------------------- Scott Emerson Lybbert      April 24, 2007
No. 63915.

protest 58/10122 (Seattle).

#### Border Brokerage Company *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Donlon, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of prepared or preserved pork similar in all material respects to that the subject of *C. J. Tower & Sons*v. *United States*(43 Cust. Ct. 36, C.D. 2100), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
From: davidsonpeg@gmail.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 9:03:07 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Margaret Armour

Mooresville, NC 28115
No. 54415.

#### Anglo American & Colonial Co., Ltd., et al. *v.*United States,

protests 139792-K, etc. (New York).

*215Opinion by

Mollison, J.

Following the authorities cited, in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
No. 62344.

Suit 4942.

#### United States *v.*Lyons Transport.

C. D. 1912 reversed May 23, 1958. C. A. D. 681.
----

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Sixth Chamber)

of 14 April 2005

in Case C-146/04: Commission of the European Communities against the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directives 2000/69/EC and 2001/81/EC - Atmospheric pollutants - Failure to transpose)

(2005/C 143/15)

Language of the case: Dutch

In Case C-146/04, action for failure to fulfil obligations brought on 19 March 2004 under Article 226 EC, Commission of the European Communities (Agents: M. van Beel and G. Valero Jordana) against Kingdom of the Netherlands (agents: H.G. Sevenster and J. van Bakel), the Court (Sixth Chamber), composed of A. Borg Barthet (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, S. von Bahr and J. Malenkovský, Judges, Advocate General: P. Léger, Registrar: R. Grass, has given a judgment on 14 April 2005 in which it:

----

(1)OJ C 106 of 30.4.2004.

----
#### In the Matter of Charlene D., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[632 NYS2d 969]

—In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to. Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Westchester County (Cooney, J.), dated February 5, 1993, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court (Murphy, J.), dated December 3, 1992, made after an admission, finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent, placed her on probation for a period of one year, and ordered her to complete a unit of community service. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated December 3, 1992.

Ordered that the order of disposition is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the fact-finding order is vacated, the petition is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Westchester County, for the purpose of entering an order pursuant to Family Court Act § 375.1.

The depositions supporting the petition failed to satisfy the requirements of Family Court Act § 311.2 *(see, Matter of Neftalí D.,*85 NY2d 631).

Since the appellant’s probationary period has expired, the petition is dismissed *(see, Matter of John L.,*125 AD2d 472).

In light of our determination, we have not considered the appellant’s remaining contentions. Sullivan, J. P., Miller, Copertino and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 

JUL 6 - Z011. 

OFFICE t"lF 

AIR A 0 RADIATION 

Mr. Joseph S. Hensel 

Director of Field Services 

Rochester Public Utilities 

4000 East River Road, N.E. 

Rochester, Minnesota 55906-2813 

Dear Mr. Hensel: 

Thank you for your letter of June 3,2011, requesting an extension of the public comment period 

for the proposed "National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oilfired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 

Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-CommercialInstitutional Steam Generating Units" (the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule), which was 

published in the Federal Register on May 3, 2011. The proposal identified a public comment 

period of 60 days; that period would have ended on July 5, 2011. The U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency, however, recently announced an extension of the comment period by 30 days 

to August 4. 

While we are extending the comment period, we are not seeking to extend the 

November 16, 2011, deadline for signature of the final rule, and remain committed to meeting 

that deadline. 

The 30-day extension will provide the public with a 140-day period to review the proposal. As 

you know, interested parties were aware of the posting on March 16, 2011, of the signed 

proposal on the EPA's website (http://www.epa.gov/ttnJatw/utility/utilitypg.html). along with 

much ofthe pertinent supporting documentation (including the analyses used in establishing the 

proposed emission limits and the technical support documents). The proposal was published a 

little over six weeks later, on May 3, marking the beginning ofthe formal public comment 

period. This will provide the public with approximately 140 days to review and provide written 

comments on the proposed rule and supporting documents. It will also provide at least 60 days 

for other documentation that was not posted on the website until after the proposed rule was 

signed. Due to the substantive issues specific to this rulemaking, this comment period is 

significantly longer than statutorily required. 

. Internel Address (URL)' nttp'/lwww epa gov 

Recycled/Recyclable' Prlnled w.th Vegetable 0.1 Based Inks on 100% Postconsurne, Process Chlorine Free Recycled Paper 
Again, thank you for your letter. We look forward to the timely receipt of your comments. 

Gma McCarthy 

Assistant Administrator
From: rechingw@yahoo.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 4:46:39 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Ching Ching Wong

Pomona, CA 91766
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED NOVEMBER 20, 2013

NO. 03-09-00736-CV

Officer Robin Talley, Appellant

v.

The City of Killeen, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 169TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PEMBERTON, GOODWIN AND FIELD

REVERSED AND RENDERED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD;

JUSTICE GOODWIN DISSENTING WITHOUT OPINION

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being 

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was error in the trial court’s 

judgment: IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is reversed; judgment is rendered that appellant timely filed her disciplinary appeal with the 

City of Killeen’s Civil Service Commission. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellee pay all 

costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision be 

certified below for observance.
No. 65281.

#### Aut Customs Brokers, Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 60/18315 (New York).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

Since the protest was filed more than 60 days after liquidation, it was dismissed as untimely, by virtue of section 514, Tariff Act of 1930.
|   | (a) | The      report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;  and |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (b) | The      information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      registrant. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |         By | /s/      Ole Jacob Diesen                |   |
|--------|----------------------|------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |                 | Ole      Jacob Diesen                    |   |
|   |                 | Chief      Executive Officer             |   |
|   |                 | (Principal      Executive Officer)  |   |

|   |         By | /s/      Eirik      Ubøe                     |   |
|--------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |                 | Eirik      Ubøe                              |   |
|   |                 | Chief      Financial Officer                      |   |
|   |                 | (Principal      Financial and Accounting Officer) |   |

----