Brices Cross Roads National Battlefield Site and
Tupelo National Battlefield are administered by the Na-
tional Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior.
The Superintendent of Natchez Trace Parkway, whose
address is Rural Route 5, NT-143, Tupelo, MS 38801,
is in charge of both areas.

As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the De-
partment of the Interior has basic responsibilities for
water, fish, wildlife, mineral, land, park, and recreational
resources. Indian and Territorial affairs are other major
concerns of America’s “Department of Natural Re-
sources.” The Department works to assure the wisest
choice in managing all our resources so each will make
its full contribution to a better United States—now and
in the future.

National Park Service
George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director

United States Department of the Interior
Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Goverament Printing Ottice
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 70 cents
Stock Number 2405-0285

405. GCOVERNMUNT PRINTING OFFICE. 1972 O— 452-381

—



TUPELO

tuckians had closed to within 200 yards; then they
opened “a most terrific fire of artillery and small-arms.”
The Kentuckians, despite heavy losses, pressed on; some
of them were shot within 20 steps of Smith’s battleline.
The colors of the 12th Kentucky Cavalry were shredded;
Col. W. W. Faulkner was wounded and his horse killed
by an exploding shell, but he continued to advance until
struck a second time. Seeing that the Southerners were
starting to fall back, the Federals charged, sweeping the
Kentuckians from the field. As they fled, some were
heard to cry in despair, “My God! My God!”

Immediately after the defeat of Crossland’s troops,
Col. H. P. Mabry’s brigade assailed the sector defended
by Mower’s division, north of the Pontotoc Road.
Although suffering heavy losses, the Confederates lodged
themselves within 70 yards of the Federals. Col. Tyree
Bell’s Tennesseans now came out of the timber and bore
down on Mower’s left. Crashing volleys, delivered point-
blank, halted them, and they took cover in a hollow.

Meanwhile, Forrest was readying Roddey’s division
for a dash around the Union left. Seeing Crossland’s
brigade recoil in wild disorder, he recalled Roddey and
rode to his left to rally the Kentuckians. The Confed-
erate battle plan had now been ruined, and Lee called
up Chalmers’ division from the reserve. Chalmers, with
Rucker’s brigade, was rushed to the left. Storming for-
ward, the brigade was mauled by Mower’s bluecoats.
Mower’s division now counter-attacked and swept the
three Confederate brigades from its front.

By 11 a.m. the Federals had won the battle. Four of
the seven brigades committed by the Confederates had
been smashed. Lee and Forrest had withdrawn to
re-form their units while troops that had not been en-

if

“Soldiers! Amid your re-

joicing do not forget the
gallant dead upon these
fields of glory. Many 4

noble comrade has fallen,
a costly sacrifice to his i]

country's independence.
The most you can do is t
cherish their memory an

strive to make the future

as glorious as you and
they have made the past.

Gen, Nathan Bedford Forrest

A


|

BRICES CROSS ROADS

bound train for Okolona.

That evening, June 9, Forrest called a number of his
officers together. He told them that his spies had re-
ported the Federals were encamped at Stubbs’ farm, and
that while he would prefer to get them into the open
country where he could “get a good look at them,” as
Gen. S. D. Lee desired, the Confederates might be drawn
into a battle before that could be realized. Orders were
issued for the brigade and artillery commanders to have
their men ready to ride before daylight and to push for-
ward as rapidly as possible toward Brices Cross Roads.

Torrential rains, which did not cease until after mid-
night, turned the roads into ribbons of mud. When the
sun rose, many knew that it would be one of those hot
humid days which saps a man’s vigor. As Forrest trav-
eled with Rucker’s brigade, he told Rucker he intended
to attack Sturgis at Brices Cross Roads and outlined his
battle plan:

I know they greatly outnumber the troops I have at hand, but
the road along which they will march is narrow and muddy; they
will make slow progress. The country is densely wooded and the
undergrowth so heavy that when we strike them they will not
know how few men we have. Their cavalry will move out ahead
of the infantry, and should reach the crossroads three hours in
advance. We can whip their cavalry in that time. As soon as the
fight opens they will send back to have the infantry hurried up.
Tt is going to be as hot as hell, and coming on a run for five or
six miles over such roads, their infantry will be so tired out we
will ride right over them.

Forrest then pushed ahead to join his advance brigade
of Kentuckians commanded by Col. Hylan B. Lyon, an
officer described by a Federal general as “a very rude and
overbearing character.”



BRICES CROSS ROADS

Forrest call off the chase. Sturgis’ column, which had
taken 10 days to reach Brices Cross Roads, retreated to
Memphis in 64 hours. Union casualties in the fight and
retreat were 2,612. Forrest listed his losses at 493 killed
and wounded. The Confederates captured 250 wagons
and ambulances, 18 cannon, thousands of stands of arms
and rounds of ammunition, as well as the Federals’ bag-
gage and supplies.

A noted British soldier, Field Marshal, Viscount
Wolseley, in commenting on Forrest’s victory, called it

a most remarkable achievement, well worth attention by the
military student. He pursued the enemy from the battle for nigh
sixty miles, killing numbers all the way. The battle and his tong
pursuit were all accomplished in the space of thirty hours, When
another Federal General was dispatched to try what he could
do against this terrible Southerner, the defeated Sturgis was
overheard repeating to himself . . . “It can’t he done, sir: it
¢-a-n-t be done!” Asked what he meant, the reply was, “They
c’-a-n-'t whip old Forrest!”





ch 7
Sore Uni
inion Mi

No :
Confederete Movemants



BRICES CROSS ROADS

left extending well north of Baldwyn Road and their
right anchored about 200 yards west of Guntown Road.
Between the crossroads and the Tishomingo Creek
bridge was Col. Edward Bouton’s black reserve brigade
and the army’s trains, Covered by the infantry, Grierson
sought to re-form his exhausted division.

Colonel Bell’s Tennessee brigade and Capt. John W.
Morton’s artillery now came up. The Confederate can-
noneers, having traveled 18 miles, rode up at a trot,
threw their eight guns into battery, and hammered away
at Sturgis’ masses with telling effect. The Union artiller-
ists replied. Placing himself at the head of Bell’s brigade,
Forrest rode to the left, dismounted, and formed the
newcomers. While Forrest was positioning Bell, the fight-
ing ebbed. The only sounds were the occasional crack of
a sharpshooter’s rifle-musket, the rustle of underbrush
as men moved about, and the hushed commands of offi-
cers. The weather was stifling—there was not a cloud in
the sky and the air was still. Several men had been felled
by sunstroke.

Forrest attacked. Because of the thick undergrowth
covering most of the area, the Confederates were able to
close to within a few paces of Sturgis’ infantry. A crash-
ing volley, however, sent part of Bell’s battleline reeling
back. The Federals called for a charge. Forrest’s sixth
sense had placed him at the key point. As he dis-
mounted, he shouted for his escort to do likewise. Ac-
companied by these daring fighters and with revolver in
hand, he rushed the Federals. Additional men came up,
and the counterattack was repulsed. In the hand-to-hand
fighting, the bayonet of the Union infantry was no match
for the heavy Colt’s revolvers. The center of Sturgis’ line
crumbled, while the Confederate brigades on the right



TUPELO

Smith, a Pennsylvanian, had graduated from the U.S.
Military Academy in 1838. An “old army” man, he had
served as Gen. Henry W. Halleck’s chief of cavalry in
1862. Prior to the Red River Campaign, in which he had
helped save the Union army from disaster, he had com-
manded a division at Chickasaw Bayou and in Grant’s
Vicksburg Campaign. Cautious and methodical, Smith
was unlikely to let himself be trapped by Forrest.

Before taking the field, Smith saw that the railroad
linking Memphis and La Grange was put back in opera-
tion. On June 22 he began shuttling his infantry into
camps in and around La Grange. Here he was joined by
General Grierson and his cavalry. The troops remained
on the railroad until July 5, while Smith and his generals
brought up supplies and perfected their plans.

Meanwhile, General Sherman had learned that the
Confederates were rebuilding the railroad bridge across
the Pearl River at Jackson, Miss. Fearing that they
would use this line to reinforce Forrest in northeast
Mississippi, he ordered Gen. Henry Slocum, command-
ing at Vicksburg, to send a column to Jackson to keep
the Confederates from repairing the railroad. Slocum
occupied Jackson on July 5 and during the next 3 days
his troops engaged two Confederate brigades near the
town. In these bloody fights, the Federals suffered the
heavier losses, but Sherman’s strategy paid off—Forrest
received no reinforcements from this area.

In the meantime, a Federal amphibious force from
Vicksburg had also been sent down the Mississippi and
had gone ashore at Rodney. The Northerners drove in-
land and on July 5 engaged another Confederate brigade
in a battle at Coleman’s Plantation. Again the North-
erners had the worst of the fighting, but more Confeder-
ate troops were pinned down,

Andrew J, Smith. Small,
hardbitten, brusque, yet
popular with his men and

respected by his superiors,

Smith was a corps com-
mander temporarily de-
tached from the Union
Army of the Tennessee.
Sherman ordered him “to
pursue Forrest on foot,
devastating the land over
which he passed or may
pass, and make him and
the people of Tennessee
and Mississippi realize

that, although a bold, dar-

ing, and successful leader,
he will bring ruin and
misery on any country
where he may pause or
tarry.”



BRICES CROSS ROADS

toward the rear and was beyond control, The road became
crowded and jammed with troops, wagons and artillery sank into
the deep mud and became inextricable. No power could check
the panic-stricken mass as it swept towards the rear,

Several regiments, among them the 55th and 59th U.S.
Colored Troops, attempted to check the onrushing Con-
federates; but assailed on the flanks, with Morton’s guns
sweeping their front with double-shotted canister, the
Northerners broke. To add to the Federals’ embarrass-
ment, a fleeing teamster’s wagon overturned on the
narrow wooden bridge over rain-swollen Tishomingo
Creek and the men were forced to climb over the wreck-
age. In their frantic effort to escape, soldiers pushed
comrades aside. Others, seeing it was hopeless to cross
the bridge, attempted to wade or swim the creek. Many
were drowned or shot as they floundered in the water.

On reaching the bridge, Forrest’s men cleared it by
pushing the wagons and the dead and wounded teams
into the creek. Meanwhile, Forrest’s escort forded the
stream about 400 yards south of the bridge and bore
down on the flank of the panic-stricken Federals. A num-
ber of prisoners were taken, along with some wagons.
Although the sun was about to set, Forrest brought up
his horse soldiers and personally took charge of the pur-
suit. A mile beyond the bridge, some of Sturgis’ infantry
rallied, but Captain Morton brought up two guns and
smashed this pocket of resistance.

Throughout the night Forrest pressed the pursuit re-
lentlessly. The morning of June 11 found the Federals
passing through Ripley, 22 miles from Brices Cross
Roads. Here Sturgis attempted to re-form his command.
But the Confederates came up too soon, and the retreat
was resumed. Not until he reached Salem at dark did



TUPELO

small-arms fire for distances varying from 300 to 1,000
yards, Several regiments strengthened their position by
throwing up barricades of fence rails.

The Confederate leaders recognized the strength of
the Union position, but Gen. S. D. Lee knew that Smith’s
force must be “dealt with vigorously and at once” so
that he could redeploy his troops to reinforce the other
portions of his department then under heavy pressure.
After having decided to attack the Federals, Lee offered
the command to Forrest, who declined. Lee answered,
“If it is to be a fight, let us fight to the bitter end.”

The Confederate battle plan was simple: it called for
a frontal assault on Smith’s position to cover Roddey’s
division as it swept around to envelop the Federal left.
Forrest would be in charge of the flanking force.

While the brigade commanders were deploying their
units, Confederate skirmishers drove in Grierson’s horse
soldiers, and the Confederate artillerists moved up 12
cannon and bombarded the Federals. Union gunners re-
plied. Meanwhile, Genera] Smith, sensing that the Con-
federates planned to turn his left, reinforced the troops
holding that flank.

There were no clouds, and by 8 a.m. the day was al-
ready hot. Little rain had fallen during the past month
and the ground was parched. The blades on the corn-
stalks were twisted, the leaves were withering, the roads
were deep in dust, and many of the smaller streams had
ceased to flow.

The three brigades Lee had marshaled north and
south of Pontotoc Road attacked first. As the dis-
mounted cavalrymen advanced, Col. Edward Crossland’s
Kentucky Brigade emerged from the timber and entered
the cleared ground south of Harrisburg ahead of the
other units. The Federals held their fire until the Ken-


Jines send the Northerners reeling back through
| crossroads and up the rpadttg) Ripley in retreat.

‘After dispersing Grierson’s horse soldiers, Forrest,
igade, reforms his
fantry. Smashing - 4
attacks against the center lank of the ng 4A

a8
By

fon Lines
Be eotodarats Lina

Inion
geri *: Movei

BATTLE OF BRICES CROSS ROADS PHASE 2





‘TUPELO

Crossroads, 2 miles farther east, a fresh Confederate bri-
gade charged toward the wagons and was routed by
Mower’s infantry. This defeat sapped the Southerners’
vigor, and they made no further attempts to interfere
with the march of Smith’s infantry.

The day had gone extremely well for Smith, and if he
and his officers congratulated themselves on the evening
of the 13th, as their troops camped on the high ground
west of Tupelo, they could be excused. They had stolen
a march on Forrest and now held a strong position of
their choosing. If the Confederates assaulted them here,
they were confident that they could defeat them.

The Confederates camped for the night several miles
west of Harrisburg. While the pickets took position,
Forrest and an aide rode out to reconnoiter the Union
lines. Although challenged and fired upon, they escaped
after accomplishing their mission.

Generals Lee and Forrest held an early reveille on
July 14. Covered by a strong force of skirmishers, the
Confederates moved slowly forward. They had not gone
very far when they encountered one of Grierson’s
mounted brigades that had ridden out Pontotoc Road to
look for the enemy. Smith, on learning that the Confed-
erates were advancing, called out his infantry. His bat-
tleline was on the crest of a low ridge and formed a right
angle several hundred yards north of Pontotoc Road. To
the front, the ground was open, sloping down to a small
creek, beyond which the country was an undulating
woodland with scant undergrowth but heavily timbered.
From Smith’s line, which was slightly more than 144
miles long, the distance to the edge of the timber in front
varied with the meanders of the branch. If the Confed-
erates attacked, they would be exposed to artillery and

“Forrest seemed to know
by instinct what was nec-
essary to do. He was
pleasant and companion-
able when he was not dis-
turbed, but no occasion
ever arose which he was
not master of. He fought
to kill but he treated his
prisoners with all of the
consideration in his power.
So he did his own men.
But he wanted the latter
for service, and not merely
to count.”

Capt. James Dinkins.
Forrest's Cavalry Corps


TUPELO

corps to 9,000 fighting men and 20 cannon.

Smith’s army was only one of several Union forces
threatening General Lee’s department. His commander
at Mobile warned that Admiral Farragut had strength-
ened his blockading squadron and that General Canby
was massing troops at New Orleans; the Vicksburg Fed-
erals had taken Jackson; while on the Tennessee River
in north Alabama a Union raiding column was being or-
ganized with its goal rumored to be the Selma arms fac-
tories. Forrest, himself, was suffering from boils.

On July 7, the day that Smith’s vanguard broke the
Confederate roadblock north of Ripley, S. D. Lee arrived
at Forrest’s headquarters. The two leaders decided to
fortify a position covering Okolona, 18 miles south of
Tupelo. There they would await attack, confident that
Forrest’s corps, fighting from behind earthworks, would
maul Smith’s infantry. Forrest would then counter-
attack with mounted infantry and destroy Smith’s army.

To allow the Confederates time to throw up defenses
and to bring Roddey’s division down from Corinth, Gen-
eral Forrest, who would be in tactical command, sent
several brigades up Ellistown Road to delay the advance
of Smith’s columns. On July 8, however, he discovered
that his scouts had been fooled, and that the Federals
were coming down the Pontotoc Ridge. Two more bri-
gades were ordered to the front, and Gen. James R.
Chalmers, as he rode forward, was told to delay the
Northerners until the Confederates could complete their
preparations to meet them. When Forrest gave the word,
Chalmers was to retire to Okolona, and let Smith’s army
come on.

It took the Federals 2 days, July 10 and 11, to march
from New Albany to Pontotoc, a distance of 20 miles.



BRICES CROSS ROADS

destruction of the two major Confederate armies and
thus end the long, drawn-out war. He would personally
oversee the movements of the forces whose goal was the
defeat of General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia,
maintaining his headquarters with the Army of the
Potomac. In the west, Gen. William T. Sherman, who
had succeeded Grant as commander of the Military
Division of the Mississippi, was ordered to destroy Gen.
Joseph E, Johnston’s Army of Tennessee.

On May 5, 1864, coordinating his movements with
Grant’s, Sherman put his armies in motion through the
pine-clad hills of northwestern Georgia, skillfully em-
ploying his superior numbers to outflank successive Con-
federate positions and compelling Johnston to fall back
again and again. But by May 25 the Federal advance had
been checked, for the time being, in front of New Hope
Church. Although he had thrust deeply into Confederate
territory, Sherman had failed to defeat Johnston, as the
Southern leader gave up ground to gain time. Sherman’s
troops battled their way forward, their supply lines
lengthening and becoming increasingly vulnerable to
Confederate cavalry raids.

There were few cavalry leaders, North or South, whom
Sherman respected; one was Nathan Bedford Forrest. A
self-made man, Forrest had entered Confederate service
as a private, and by repeated demonstrations of personal
bravery, leadership, and audacity, he had risen to the
tank of major general.

Holding little respect for soldiers who fought by the
book, Forrest attributed his many successes to the sim-
ple fact that he “got there first with the most men.”
Powerfully built, he was ready to engage personally the

Nathan Bedford Forrest.
Bold and tenacious, a born
fighter and a born leader
of men, he was admired
by military men both
North and South. William
T. Sherman, Forrest's
principal protagonist.
called him “the most re-
markable man our civil
war produced on either
side... . He always
seemed to know what I
was doing or intended to
do, while... I could never
tell or form any satis{ac-
tory idea of what he was
trying to accomplish.”

—————



BRICES CROSS ROADS

y the spring of 1864 almost 3 years of bloodshed
B= heartbreak had passed since the firing on Fort

Sumter signaled the beginning of the Civil War,
and the terrible fratricidal struggle continued with few
signs of abatement. In the West, an army led by Gen,
Ulysses S. Grant, supported by the Navy, had won a
series of victories and had forced the surrender of Vicks-
burg in July 1863. The fall of Port Hudson a few days
later gave Union forces control of the Mississippi River
and divided the Confederacy. At Missionary Ridge, in
the fourth week of November 1863, armies under Grant
had driven the Confederates from the approaches to
Chattanooga and recovered the initiative that had be-
longed to the South in that region since the Battle of
Chickamauga in September. But in the east, Gen. Robert
E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, despite its costly
defeat at Gettysburg, remained a powerful fighting ma-
chine and guarded the approaches to Richmond.

Because of Grant’s successes in the west, President
Abraham Lincoln brought him east and in March 1864
gave him command of all United States armies. Vowing
to defeat the Southern Confederacy, Grant proposed to
employ the North’s superior resources to grind it down
in a war of attrition. The cost would be high, but the
North could replace its losses while the South could not.
In his planning, there was one factor that Grant could
not overlook: if the major Confederate armies were still
in the field in November, the electorate might send the
Lincoln administration down to defeat at the polls. It
was therefore crucial that Northern armies by November
either defeat the South or score sweeping successes, A
stalemate would be as bad a blow as a defeat.

Grant proposed to concentrate all his efforts on the



a;

BRICES CROSS ROADS

dismounted, they feigned an attack on Grierson’s left.

It was now 11 o’clock, and, although Bell’s brigade
and the artillery had not reached the front, Forrest de-
cided to assault Grierson. He rode along his line and en-
couraged his men, telling them that he expected every-
one to move forward when the signal was given. At the
sound of the bugle, the dismounted cavalry stormed
across the field toward the Federals. Grierson’s men
held their ground and blazed away. At one point, Ruck-
er’s brigade penetrated Grierson’s line, but the Federals
called up two reserve regiments to close the breach. As
the Yanks rushed forward, Rucker shouted for his men
to draw “their six-shooters and close with them hand-to-
hand.” (Each man in Forrest’s corps was armed with a
rifle-musket and two Colt’s revolvers. Forrest refused to
arm his enlisted men with sabers, because he considered
them useless in the type of fighting he favored.) After a
desperate struggle, the Federals were forced to retire
closer to Brices Cross Roads. By 12:30 Forrest had
whipped Grierson’s cavalry.

Grierson, on encountering the enemy, had sent a
courier galloping to tell Sturgis that he had found the
Confederates and needed help. As Forrest brought up
fresh units and increased the pressure, Grierson repeated
his plea for reinforcements with greater urgency. It was
noon before Sturgis reached the field and after 1 p.m.
before the advance columns of his infantry arrived
though they had marched as fast as road and weather
conditions would permit. They had tramped 9 miles
since 7 o’clock; the “last three miles had been made at
a trot, and the final mile at a double-quick.”

The 3,600 infantry and their three supporting bat-
teries filed into position covering the crossroads, their

“I need hardly add that
it is with feelings of the
most profound pain and
regret that I find myself
called upon to record a
defeat and the loss and
suffering incident (o a re-

verse at a point so far dis-

tant from the base of
supplies and re-enforce-
ments. Yet there is some
consolation in knowing
that the army fought
nobly while it did fight.
and only yielded to over-
whelming numbers.”

Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis



BRICES CROSS ROADS

foe or to thrash any.of his own men found malingering.
No other American general has killed as many enemies
with his own hand or has been wounded as often. His
words of command as he led a charge were “Forward,
men, and mix with ’em!”

Concurrently, Forrest led a cavalry corps based in
northeast Mississippi. His corps was effective because he
used it as mounted infantry. The men rode horses and
mules to the scene of action, but Forrest usually made
them fight on foot. Unlike most cavalry units, his men
worked hard and could wreck a railroad as efficiently as
Sherman’s infantry. As Sherman’s supply line length-
ened, the Federal commander feared that “that devil
Forrest” would get into Middle Tennessee and break the
railroads behind him.

When General Forrest was in West Tennessee in
March and April, Sherman telegraphed Gen. Cadwal-
lader C. Washburn, the commander in Memphis, not to
disturb the Confederate cavalryman, because he could
do less harm by “cavorting over the country” there than
elsewhere. Grant, however, could see that Forrest was
recruiting his command while harassing and destroying
isolated Union garrisons, and he directed Sherman to
send enough troops to Memphis to chase Forrest back
into Mississippi.

The first task was to find an officer equal to the chal-
lenge. Gen. Samuel! D. Sturgis, a graduate of the U.S.
Military Academy and an “old army” man, was chosen.
A veteran of Wilson’s Creek where he won promotion for
“gallant and meritorious conduct,” Sturgis had also
served in the Army of the Potomac. In the winter of
1863-64, he had been commended for his cavalry leader-
ship in East Tennessee. He had a chance to test Forrest

Samuel D. Sturgis. West
Point graduate and Mex-
ican War veteran, Sturgis
had a reputation as a gal-
lant and self-confident
soldier. After the defeat

at Brices Cross Roads, a
court of inquiry was called
to look into the “disaster”
and investigate claims that
he was intoxicated during
the battle. No charges
were ever filed against
Sturgis, but he finished
the war “awaiting orders,”



7
|



D-626

e File:
Natchez

- Trace
T Parkway

Protecting Sherman’s Lifeline

\

| The Battles of Brices Cross Roads
| and Tupelo 1864
|
{

by Edwin C. Bearss

| Office of Publications

| Nationa] Park Service
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Washington, D.C. 1971

PLEASE RETURN TO:

> Way nPien TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER
B&w Scans ON Micror: "* SeNVER SERVICE CENTER
{ . 27- 2003 “TONAL PARK SERVICE


presen enema

BRICES CROSS ROADS

Miss., with 2,000 specially chosen horsemen and a bat-
tery of artillery. Three days later, at Russellville in north
Alabama, Forrest was overtaken by a courier with a
message from S. D. Lee reporting that a powerful Union
column had left Memphis to invade Mississippi. Forrest
was told to forget the Middle Tennessee raid and return
to Tupelo.

The Federals who had left Memphis were commanded
by General Sturgis. They had been sent out by General
Washburn in response to a call from Sherman to send a
formidable expedition toward Tupelo, or in whatever di-
rection Forrest happened to be. Sturgis’ force, which
moved out on June 1, mustered 4,800 infantry, 3,300
cavalry, 400 artillerists with 22 cannon, and a large sup-
ply train. The little army was organized into two divi-
sions—one of infantry, the other cavalry. Gen. Benjamin
H. Grierson, a former music teacher from Jacksonville,
Ill, and now one of the North’s best cavalrymen, led
Sturgis’ horse soldiers, many of whom were armed with
seven-shot Spencer carbines,

Sturgis was to strike the Mobile & Ohio Railroad at or
near Corinth and destroy any force that might be posted
there. He then was to proceed down the railroad, wreck
it, at least as far as Okolona, and return to Memphis by
way of Grenada. Forrest’s corps, during this sweep,
would be dispersed and destroyed, and the countryside
devastated.

On June 3, at Lamar, Sturgis’ scouts told him that the
Confederates had evacuated Corinth and retired down
the railroad. Sturgis changed his line of march to inter-
sect the railroad farther south. On the 4th, General
Grierson, who had the lead, sent 400 of his horse soldiers
racing eastward to Rienzi. The Federals reached the rail-



BRICES CROSS ROADS

in the first week of May, as the Federals cleared the
Confederates out of West Tennessee. His column, how-
ever, moved too slowly and the Southerners outdistanced
it. Reporting to his superiors on May 7, Sturgis wrote:
“Tt was with the greatest reluctance that I resolved to
abandon the chase. Although we could not catch the
scoundrel we are at least rid of him.”

As Sherman’s armies pressed deeper into Georgia,
General Johnston knew that the only way to stop their
advance was to destroy the Federal supply line—the rail-
road from Nashville and Chattanooga. Accordingly, he
appealed to Gen. Stephen D. Lee for help in breaking
the line.

Lee, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, com-
manded the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana. Destined at 30 to be the Confederacy’s
youngest lieutenant general, his dark hair, beard, and
eyes gave him a cavalier look. He had been present when
the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter and had served
as an artillerist in the Army of Northern Virginia until
after the Battle of Antietam in September 1862. He had
then been transferred to the west and led an infantry
brigade in Gen. John C. Pemberton’s army at Vicksburg.
After Pemberton’s surrender in July 1863, Lee was ex-
changed and placed in command of all the cavalry in
Mississippi. He had assumed responsibility for the De-
partment in May 1864 after the previous commander,
Gen. Leonidas Polk, joined Johnston for the Georgia
campaign.

Responding to Johnston’s plea, Lee ordered Forrest
and his cavalry to advance into Middle Tennessee and
wreck the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad. Forrest
moved promptly. On June 1, he rode out of Tupelo,

Es



TUPELO

back and let Smith come on. But when reports filtering
into headquarters seemed to indicate (erroneously) that
the Federals were about to withdraw, Lee counter-
manded the order and, on the afternoon of the 12th, he
and Forrest started for Pontotoc with the units they had
assembled on the approaches to Okolona. They reached
the front late that night.

As expected, much confusion resulted from the change
in plans, and, on the morning of the 13th, when Smith
started for Tupelo, the only Confederate force guarding
the road was an understrength battalion which was
brushed aside by an Iowa cavalry regiment. Early in the
afternoon, Grierson’s cavalry occupied Tupelo. Smith’s
infantry followed the horse soldiers. The wagon trains, as
they rolled eastward, were well guarded. Colonel Bou-
ton’s black brigade watched the rear.

When the Confederates advanced they found the
Union camps abandoned. Lee and Forrest realized what
had happened. After a hurried discussion, Lee sent For-
rest with a reinforced brigade to assail the rear of
Smith’s column; Lee himself would take the rest of the
troops eastward, sending columns northward across Chi-
wapa Creek to strike the Federals in the flank. By at-
tacking from two directions, he hoped to panic the
Union infantry.

Forrest and his column pounded through Pontotoc.
During the afternoon, he launched a number of attacks
on the Union rearguard. The blacks more than held their
own, as they parried Forrest’s savage lunges. Sweeping
across Chiwapa Creek, Col. Edward Rucker’s brigade
assailed one of Gen. Joseph Mower’s infantry units as
it was passing Burrow’s shop. After destroying several
wagons, Rucker’s men were driven off. At Coonewah



TUPELO

Smith, to guard against disaster, moved his army when-
ever possible along parallel roads, so each column would
be in easy supporting distance of the other. Large num-
bers of skirmishers covered the front, flanks, and rear.
Smith’s vanguard on both days clashed with Confederate
detachments, while one of Forrest’s patrols on the 11th
threatened to sweep down on the rearguard.

Union soldiers on the evening of July 11 camped on
the hills southeast of Pontotoc. Three of the roads lead-
ing south and east from Pontotoc were guarded by four
of Forrest's brigades; Tupelo Road was patroled by a rein-
forced regiment. On the 12th, Smith rested his infantry,
while General Grierson’s cavalry scouted the roads.

An Illinois cavalry regiment, advancing down Okolona
Stage Road, was mauled by Confederates. Information
brought in by the cavalry satisfied General Smith that
the Southerners had concentrated to the southeast of
Pontotoc, leaving Tupelo unprotected. He accordingly
ordered his division and brigade commanders to have
their men ready to march for Tupelo at daybreak on
July 13. If he could get there ahead of Forrest, he would
not only secure a lodgment on the Mobile & Ohio Rail-
road, but he also would be able to choose his own ground
and wait for the Confederates to attack him.

Unknown to Smith, other events were helping to in-
sure the success of his plans. Slocum, after returning to
Vicksburg from Jackson, had been reinforced and was
now sweeping through the countryside between the Big
Black and Bayou Pierre, while Farragut continued to
add to his strength off Mobile Bay. Lee knew that he
would have to bring Smith to battle soon or withdraw
units from Forrest’s corps for the defense of Mobile and
southwest Mississippi. Chalmers was now ordered to fall





BRICES CROSS ROADS

doubled back the Union left upon Ripley Road.

Off to the northwest in the direction of Tishomingo
Creek, the 2d Tennessee Regiment, sent out by Colonel
Bell to attack Sturgis’ left and rear, had reached its
objective “just as the fighting seemed heaviest in front.”
To deceive the Federals about their strength, the Con-
federates made a great commotion and a bugler galloped
up and down the line sounding the charge. Not only did
this show of force throw Sturgis’ reserve brigade and the
train guard into confusion, but Grierson sent off most of
his cavalry to check the advance of the 2d Tennessee.

Forrest knew that the crisis had come, and that now
the battle must be won or lost. Riding along behind his
line, he told his troops that the enemy was starting to
give way and that another charge would win the day.
He told his young chief of artillery, Captain Morton, to
be ready to advance four of his guns, double-shotted
with canister, to within pistol range of the Federals at
the crossroads. When the bugle sounded, the Confed-
erate battleline pressed forward. At the same time, Mor-
ton’s cannoneers drove their teams up the narrow coun-
try road. At point-blank range, they unlimbered their
pieces and fired double-shotted canister into Sturgis’ in-
fantry with frightful effect. After a brief but savage fight,
the Federals were routed from the crossroads, with the
loss of three cannon.

General Sturgis grimly described this phase of the
fight:

I now endeavered to get hold of the colored brigade which
formed the guard of the wagon train. While traversing the short
distance to where the head of that brigade should be found, the
mainline began to give way at various points. Order soon gave
way to confusion, and confusion to panic. The army drifted



TUPELO

gaged were busy throwing up fortifications. Smith, how-
ever, did not press on to complete his victory and destroy
his opponents. Instead, he recalled Mower’s troops, after
they had policed the field and brought in the wounded,
and had the soldiers strengthen their position.

The Confederates took advantage of this situation to
recover the initiative. About dark, they drove back
Union pickets near Harrisburg, while Forrest probed
Smith’s left. To turn back these thrusts, Smith assem-
bled a formidable force.

On the morning of July 15 Smith learned that rations
and ammunition were short, and he decided to return to
his base. The wagon train, escorted by one infantry divi-
sion and a brigade of cavalry, started for La Grange via
Ellistown Road. Before Mower’s division and the rear-
guard could move out, Forrest’s horsemen dashed up
Verona Road and attacked the Union left. Once again,
they were repulsed.

Soon thereafter, Lee discovered that the Federals were
withdrawing from the area, and he placed Forrest in
charge of the pursuit. Two brigades overtook Smith’s
rearguard before all the cavalry had crossed Oldtown
Creek. A four-gun battery opened fire, panicking the
horse soldiers, and Smith called for three infantry bri-
gades to recross the stream. A desperate fight followed,
in which Forrest was wounded. With their popular gen-
eral out of action, the Confederates, although reinforced,
were driven from the ridge commanding the Oldtown
Creek crossing.

The next day, Smith’s column resumed its march. The
Confederates followed as far as the Tallahatchie, but
made no further attempts to harass the Federals. Smith’s
return march in terrible heat, along dusty roads, on half-



TUPELO

rations, and with little water, was an ordeal which tested.
his soldiers’ stamina. After an absence of 1 month, they
were back in Memphis. Federal casualties in the cam-
paign were 714 killed, wounded, or missing; the Confed-
erates lost 1,326 killed and wounded, but made no report
of their missing, which must have been numerous.

Like most Civil War operations, the Tupelo Campaign
did not result in the destruction of either army. This
campaign, along with the Battle of Brices Cross Roads
and A. J. Smith’s August expedition to Oxford, Miss.,
which triggered Forrest’s raid on Memphis, was signifi-
cant to the success of Sherman’s Georgia Campaign. As
Union armies inched closer to Atlanta, it became appar-
ent that Sherman had failed in his goal to destroy the
Confederate Army of Tennessee. Atlanta now became
his primary objective, and a series of savage battles of
attrition were fought on the approaches to that strategic
city. In this fighting, the security of the single-track rail-
road over which Sherman supplied his armies was vital.
Sherman therefore successfully employed columns oper-
ating out of Memphis to keep Forrest and his corps
occupied in North Mississippi, hundreds of miles away
from the Federal supply line. If Forrest had been allowed
to raid into Middle Tennessee prior to the fall of Atlanta
on September 2, it could have had disastrous conse-
quences for the Union. Although Smith failed to destroy
Forrest’s corps at Tupelo on July 14, he did break its
combat effectiveness. Forrest would rally his horsemen
for more daring raids, but never again would they be able
to fight and defeat infantry.





of the people of the North and South focused-on

the fighting in Virginia and Georgia. In these
States, mighty armies fought battles that were to decide
whether the United States was to be one nation or two.
Interwoven with and having important repercussions on
the fighting in Georgia were military operations in north-
east Mississippi designed to prevent a Confederate cav-
alry corps under Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest from
striking into Middle Tennessee and destroying the
single-track railroad over which Gen. William T. Sher-
man’s armies drew their supplies. The Battles of Brices

Cross Roads and Tupelo were fought to protect that
railroad.

T: spring and summer of 1864 found the attention

E 476.43 .B4 1971
Bearss, Edwin C.

Protecting Sherman’ s
lifeline; the Battles











“The line officers and sol-
diers deserve lasting
praise for the manner in
which they endured the
hardships and fatigues of
the campaign; marching
over dusty roads with only
one-half or one-third
rations, under a broiling
sun, with little water, is
certainly a severe test of
their zeal and patriotism.
All honor be to the noble
men whose breasts are the
bulwarks of our nation.”

Gen. Andrew J. Smith

TUPELO

7 Vhe disaster at Brices Cross Roads had important
repercussions on Union strategy in the West. In
early June 1864, plans had been made for a joint

Army-Navy attack on Mobile, Ala., Adm. David G.

Farragut already was strengthening his fleet blockad-

ing the entrance to Mobile Bay, and Gen. Edward R. S.

Canby, commanding the Military Division of Western

Mississippi, was concentrating a powerful army at New

Orleans to be sent ashore at Pascagoula, Miss., and from

there to strike overland at Mobile. To insure the success

of his campaign, Canby counted on Gen. Andrew J.

Smith and his two combat-tested infantry divisions.
After participating in the Red River Campaign in the

spring, Smith and his veterans had started up the Mis-

sissippi River to reinforce Sherman in Georgia. Canby,
however, convinced Sherman that Smith’s corps should
join him, and Smith was ordered to halt his troops at

Memphis, preparatory to proceeding to New Orleans.

Besides the force he was concentrating at New Orleans,

Canby was massing several thousand cavalry near Baton

Rouge. These horse soldiers were to strike eastward

through southern Mississippi and cut the Mobile & Ohio

Railroad.

Before Canby could complete his dispositions, word of
Sturgis’ defeat at Brices Cross Roads reached Union
headquarters. Sherman fumed. He feared that Forrest
would now advance into Middle Tennessee and destroy
the railroad over which his armies received supplies and
reinforcements. He would have to send another column
into northeast Mississippi to seek out and destroy For-
rest’s cavalry corps. This force would be led by an officer
in whom Sherman had confidence—A. J. Smith. Canby
would have to forgo, at least for the time being, his
attack on Mobile.



ee eee





TUPELO

Late on the afternoon of July 5, about the same time
that Slocum’s troops were occupying Jackson and while
the fight at Coleman’s Plantation was at its height,
Smith’s 14,000 men and 24 cannon took the field. Two
days later, they closed in on Ripley and encountered a
roadblock defended by two of Forrest’s regiments. The
Confederates were brushed aside, and Smith’s army felt
its way slowly and cautiously down the Pontotoc Ridge,
halting on the evening of July 9 at New Albany. The
weather was hot, the roads were dusty, and water was
scarce. Many units straggled badly. Although the infan-
try had not seen any more Confederates, the officers
urged their men to be alert and keep a close watch on
“the wagon train, the white canvas covers having always
great attraction for Forrest’s followers.”

Forrest’s command was given little opportunity to
celebrate Sturgis’ defeat. Even before the shattered Fed-
eral column reached safety, Confederate spies reported
that Smith’s troops had disembarked at Memphis. For-
rest, headquartered at Tupelo, had maintained a close
watch on Smith’s activities and had kept Gen. S. D. Lee,
informed on the Union buildup in and around La
Grange. Lee decided to reinforce Forrest. Most of Gen.
Philip D. Roddey’s division was pulled out of north Ala-
bama and rushed to Corinth and a mounted brigade
joined Forrest from the Yazoo Country. The Confeder-
ate commander in southwest Mississippi started another
brigade, but recalled it when Slocum advanced on Jack-
son. Five hundred heavy artillerists were issued rifle-
muskets and rushed northward by rail from Mobile. Cav-
alrymen with broken-down horses and mules were organ-
ized by Forrest into a dismounted division. The addi-
tion of these units increased the strength of Forrest’s



BRICES CROSS ROADS

road, but before they could do much damage some of
Forrest’s men turned and drove them off.

Heavy rains pelted Sturgis’ column as it bore south-
eastward through an area that had been tavaged by 2
years of raids and counter-raids. It was June 7 before
Sturgis’ infantry reached Ripley, 75 miles from Mem-
phis. During the day, one of Grierson’s brigades recon-
noitered the New Albany Road and encountered a road-
block manned by two regiments sent out by Forrest to
feel for the Federals, In the meantime, Sturgis advanced
down Guntown Road. By nightfall on the 9th his com-
mand was concentrated and camped on Stubbs’ farm,
9 miles northeast of Brices Cross Roads.

Forrest had returned to Tupelo from the aborted Mid-
dle Tennessee raid on June 6. Told about the general
direction of Sturgis’ march and that the Federals had
broken the railroad at Rienzi, Forrest ordered two bri-
gades to that point. Col, Tyree Bell’s Tennessee brigade
stopped at Rienzi, while Col. Edward Rucker’s continued
on, scouting for Sturgis toward New Albany, Forrest,
with his artillery and escort, took position at Booneville,
where he was joined by Rucker on the evening of June 9.
Forrest also had two brigades at Baldwyn.

Gen. S. D. Lee reached Booneville on the 9th and went
immediately to Forrest’s headquarters for a briefing.



| “If any branch of the mil-

| itary service is feverish,

r ) | adventurous and exciting,
it is the Cavalry. ... there

is no music like that of

the bugle, and no mono-

tone so full of meaning as

the clink of sabres, rising

and falling with the dash-

ing pace. Horse and rider
become one... and the

charge, the stroke, the

crack of the carbines are

80 quick, vehement and
dramatic that we seem to

i be watching the joust of
tournaments or following

fierce Saladin and Crusad-

i ers again.”

George A. Townsend, Civil War
newspaper correspondent

BRICES CROSS ROADS

Unlike the Confederates, the Federals did not make an
early start on June 10. It was 5:30 a.m. before Grierson’s
horse soldiers swung into their saddles and started down
Guntown Road; it was 7 o’clock before the infantry
marched.

Grierson’s vanguard encountered, charged, and scat-
tered enemy pickets guarding the narrow bridge across
Tishomingo Creek, By 9:45 the Union cavalry held
Brices Cross Roads, and one brigade had followed the
retreating Confederates 1 mile along Baldwyn Road. At
the edge of a field, the Federals reined up their horses
when they sighted Lyon’s vanguard on the opposite side
of the field, 400 yards away. While two of his companies
charged the surprised Yanks, Lyon dismounted and de-
ployed his 800-man brigade. Grierson did likewise, form-
ing his 3,200 horse soldiers to the left and right of the
road. Like the Confederates, most of the Federals fought
on foot.

Forrest knew that he would have to gain and hold
the initiative, or the “bulge,” as he called it. Lyon’s
Kentuckians were advanced. For almost an hour, the
Confederates drove forward, then retired, and advanced
again. A great quantity of powder was burned and a few
men killed or wounded, but General Grierson, unfortu-
nately for the Union, had allowed himself to be bluffed
by an inferior force.

Rucker’s brigade now came up on a trot and formed
on Lyon’s left. Once again, Forrest waved his men for-
ward. There was the sharp crack of small arms and the
roar of artillery as the Confederates moved forward. On
Forrest’s left one of his battalions advanced too far and
was sent reeling. Another brigade arrived, and Forrest
posted it on Lyon’s right. As soon as the troopers had