[Cite as Strongsville v. Abouelainein, 2016-Ohio-19.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 102608

CITY OF STRONGSVILLE

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

FADI ABOUELAINEIN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Berea Municipal Court 

Case No. 14TRD04953 

 BEFORE: Blackmon, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and Stewart, J. 

 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 7, 2016 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Alan H. Kraus 

Lazzaro and Kraus 

20133 Farnsleigh Road, 2nd Floor 

Shaker Heights, Ohio 44122

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

George F. Lonjak 

Prosecuting Attorney 

City of Strongsville 

614 Superior Avenue 

Suite 1310 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: 

{¶1} In this accelerated appeal, appellant Fadi Abouelainein (“Abouelainein”) 

appeals his conviction for violating Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08 (a) and (b) 

and assigns the following two errors for our review: 

I. The trial court erred in finding appellant guilty for the traffic offense 

under Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08(a) and (b) as there was 

insufficient evidence of the essential elements of the traffic violation 

charged. 

II. Appellant’s conviction of violating Strongsville Codified Ordinances 

432.08(a) and (b) is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm Abouelainein’s 

conviction. The apposite facts follow. 

{¶3} On August 4, 2014, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, Abouelainein 

was charged with violating Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08(a) and (b). 

Abouelainein pled not guilty, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. 

{¶4} The evidence produced at trial indicated that the accident occurred at 4:40 

p.m., at the intersection of Pearl Road and South Drive in Strongsville, Ohio. Joshua 

Novak pulled up to the stop sign on South Road. He wanted to make a left turn onto 

Pearl Road to head north. In order to do so, he had to go across several lanes of traffic 

on Pearl Road. There are two regular lanes heading south on Pearl Road in this area, and 

there was also a multi-turn lane in the center of the road, which is a lane that allows turns 

in both directions. 
{¶5} Heather Skebo stopped her car at the Pearl Road and South Drive 

intersection in the lane closest to the multi-turn lane. According to Skebo, there is a sign 

instructing vehicles on Pearl Road to not block the South Drive entrance. 

{¶6} As Novak pulled out cautiously to make his left turn, Abouelainein entered 

the multi-turn lane on Pearl Road to turn onto Whitney Drive, which was 300 feet past 

South Drive. As he did so, he hit the front driver’s side of Novak’s vehicle. According 

to Skebo and Novak, Abouelainein came “out of nowhere.” Novak estimated that 

Abouelainein was traveling approximately 35 mph. 

{¶7} Officer Albert Heyne responded to the accident. He stated that other than 

the arrows on the multi-turn lane, the intersection of Pearl Road and South Drive do not 

have any traffic control devices controlling the exit and entry to South Drive. The officer 

cited Abouelainein for misuse of the multi-turn lane. He stated that according to the 

Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Drivers’ Handbook, a driver may not enter the 

multi-turning lane until the driver is preparing to make the turn. It is not to be used for 

passing other drivers. He stated that the only reason Abouelainein would have been in 

that lane was to take a left turn onto Whitney Drive, which was 300 feet past South Drive. 

 There was nowhere else to make a left turn. Therefore, he concluded that Abouelainein 

must have been using the multi-turn lane in order to pass the traffic that was backed up on 

Pearl Road to get to Whitney. Abouelainein did not testify. 
{¶8} The trial court concluded that Abouelainein violated the traffic ordinance 

and ordered Abouelainein to pay a $50 fine plus court costs. The matter was stayed 

pending appeal. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶9} Abouelainein argues that the evidence in support of his conviction for the 

traffic violation was insufficient. 

{¶10} Crim.R. 29 mandates that the trial court issue a judgment of acquittal where 

the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense. 

Cleveland v. Pate, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99321, 2013-Ohio-5571. Crim.R. 29(A) and 

sufficiency of evidence review require the same analysis. State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 95095, 2011-Ohio-1241, citing State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 

2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting a conviction requires the court to determine whether the prosecution has met 

its burden of production at trial. State v. Givan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94609, 

2011-Ohio-100, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 

541. 

{¶11} The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vickers, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 97365, 2013-Ohio-1337, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶12} Abouelainein was cited under Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08(a) 

and (b). These sections provide as follows: 

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked 

lanes for traffic or wherever traffic is lawfully moving in two or more 

substantially continuous lines in the same direction, the following rules 

apply: 

(a) A vehicle shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a 

single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line 

until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with 

safety. 

(b) Upon a roadway, which is divided into three lanes and provides for 

two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center 

lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle where the 

roadway is clearly visible and such center lane is clear of traffic within a 

safe distance, or when preparing for a left turn, or where such center lane is 

at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the direction the 

vehicle is proceedings and is posted with signs to give notice of such 

allocation. 

{¶13} In the instant case, the accident occurred when Abouelainein drove his 

vehicle in the Pearl Road multi-turn lane in an area where there was nowhere for him to 

turn for at least 300 more feet. Although at trial Abouelainein’s attorney made much of 

the fact that there was no sign to give notice of the multi-lane allocation, Officer Heyne 

testified that the pavement was clearly marked with arrows. According to the officer, the 

Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Handbook of Motor Vehicle Laws sets forth the law 

governing multi-turn lanes. The handbook states that the lane “must not be used for 

passing. It may be used only to make the turning movement. Vehicles from either 

direction may use the lane immediately prior to making a left hand turn.” Using the 

multi-turn lane for 300 feet prior to making a left hand turn is not the proper use of a 
multi-turn lane. This was not a dedicated left hand turn lane, but a lane to be used by 

traffic proceeding in both directions. The lane allows an area to wait to turn without 

impeding the traffic in the other lanes. Here, the evidence showed the lane was marked 

with multi-directional left arrows, indicating that this was not a dedicated left turn lane, 

but a lane to be shared with oncoming traffic. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that 

Abouelainein violated Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08(b). 

{¶14} Moreover, both Novak and Skebo testified that Abouelainein was traveling 

at a high rate of speed and “came out of nowhere.” This was an area congested with 

rush-hour traffic. Thus, Abouelainein was driving through the area without first 

ascertaining if it was safe to proceed. Thus, there was also sufficient evidence that 

Abouelainein violated Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08(a). 

{¶15} Abouelainein also contends that his citation failed to explicitly state the 

exact section he violated. His ticket stated “illegal lane usage” and cited to Strongsville 

Codified Ordinances 432.08, without telling him which section of that ordinance he 

violated. “Traffic offenses need not be issued with the specificity of indictments.” 

Cleveland v. Austin, 55 Ohio App.2d 215, 220, 380 N.E.2d 1357 (8th Dist.1978). While 

a traffic citation must provide notice of the nature of the charge, that notice can be 

satisfied where the ticket indicates the basic facts and sets forth the ordinance at issue. 

Bellville v. Kieffaber, 114 Ohio St.3d 124, 2007-Ohio-3763, 870 N.E.2d 697, ¶ 19, citing 

Austin. In the instant case, the ticket adequately advised Abouelainein of the charge he 

was facing. Abouelainein’s first assigned error is overruled. 
Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶16} Abouelainein also contends that his convictions were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

{¶17} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, 

the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for a criminal manifest weight 

challenge, as follows: 

The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained in 

State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541. In 

Thompkins, the court distinguished between sufficiency of the evidence and 

manifest weight of the evidence, finding that these concepts differ both 

qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. The court 

held that sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether the 

evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, but 

weight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief. 

Id. at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541. In other words, a reviewing court asks 

whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s? We 

went on to hold that although there may be sufficient evidence to support a 

judgment, it could nevertheless be against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. “When a court of appeals reverses 

a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees 

with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Id. at 387, 

678 N.E.2d 541, citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 

2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652. 

Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶18} An appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but 

must find that “in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a 

new trial ordered.” Thompkins at 387. Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight 
grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily 

against the conviction.” Id. 

{¶19} Abouelainein has failed to cite to any conflicting evidence. Therefore, we 

conclude there is no evidence that the trial court “in resolving conflicts in the evidence” 

lost its way so that Abouelainein’s conviction constituted a “manifest miscarriage of 

justice.” In the event he is contending that Novak’s behavior after the accident, where he 

apologized to Abouelainein, conflicted with his testimony at trial that Abouelainein was 

at fault, the trial court did not err by resolving the conflict. Novak testified at trial that he 

apologized because it was his first accident and he was scared. Accordingly, 

Abouelainein’s second assigned error is overruled. 

{¶20} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Berea Municipal Court to carry 

this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of 

sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS; 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., DISSENTS 
(SEE ATTACHED DISSENTING OPINION) 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., DISSENTING: 

{¶21} By its own terms, Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08(b) states that a 

vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane except “when preparing for a left turn.” 

When Abouelainein entered the center turn lane on Pearl Road, that lane was painted with 

an arrow indicating a left turn. As the police officer indicated at trial, that left-turn arrow 

indicated that from that point forward, the lane was dedicated to a left turn onto Whitney 

Drive because there was no other place to make a left turn prior to Whitney Drive. That 

being the case, Abouelainein entered the center lane with the intent to make a left turn. 

If he passed cars while doing so, that act was incidental to making the turn. To accept 

the majority’s interpretation of the ordinance would mean that under no circumstances 

could a driver enter a turn lane if doing so resulted in the center lane driver passing 

another vehicle in a through lane. That would make center turn lanes useless because 

turn lanes are designed to alleviate congestion at intersections, a goal that necessarily 

requires that some drivers who enter turn lanes would pass through drivers waiting. If 

the city of Strongsville does not want drivers entering the center turn lane where 

Abouelainein entered, in this case more than 300 feet from the only left turn that can be 

made, the city should not have a left turn arrow prominently painted in the center lane and 

more than 300 feet from Whitney Drive, indicating exactly the opposite. The location of 

the left turn arrow baits — no encourages — drivers who want to turn left at Whitney 
Drive to proceed in a way that the trial court and the majority opinion have determined to 

be illegal. Drivers beware. 

{¶22} Finally, there was likewise no evidence to show that Abouelainein violated 

Strongsville Codified Ordinances 432.08(a), which states that a vehicle shall not be 

moved from a lane of traffic until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can 

be made with safety. Abouelainein had the right of way because there was no traffic 

signal on Pearl Road at its intersection with South Drive. The driver on South Drive had 

a stop sign and thus had the duty to yield to oncoming traffic when making a left turn into 

traffic. See R.C. 4511.43(A). Although the driver said that he proceeded cautiously, he 

was not cautious enough and failed to yield to Abouelainein. 

{¶23} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would vacate the judgment.