U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Issues and Practices
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice

World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
Citizen Review of

Police: Approaches

and Implementation

by Peter Finn

March 2001

NCJ 184430
National Institute of Justice

Vincent Talucci

Program Monitor

Advisory Panel*

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, by Abt Associates Inc., under contract

#OJP–94–C–007. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily

represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

K. Felicia Davis, J.D.

Legal Consultant and Director

at Large

National Association for Civilian

Oversight of Law Enforcement

Administrator

Citizen Review Board

234 Delray Avenue

Syracuse, NY 13224

Mark Gissiner

Senior Human Resources Analyst

City of Cincinnati

Immediate Past President, 

1995–99

International Association for

Civilian Oversight of

Law Enforcement

2665 Wayward Winds Drive

Cincinnati, OH 45230

Douglas Perez, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor

Department of Sociology

Plattsburgh State University

45 Olcott Lane

Rensselaer, NY 12144

Jerry Sanders

President and Chief

Executive Officer

United Way of San Diego

County

P.O. Box 23543

San Diego, CA 92193

Former Chief

San Diego Police Department

Samuel Walker, Ph.D.

Kiewit Professor

Department of Criminal Justice

University of Nebraska

at Omaha

60th and Dodge Streets

Omaha, NE 68182

Lt. Steve Young

Vice President

Grand Lodge

Fraternal Order of Police

222 East Town Street

Columbus, OH 43215

*Among other criteria, advisory panel members were selected for their diverse views regarding citizen oversight of

police. As a result, readers should not infer that panel members necessarily support citizen review in general or any

particular type of citizen review.
In many communities in the United States, residents participate to some degree in overseeing their local law enforcement agencies. The degree varies. The most active citizen oversight boards investigate allegations of police misconduct

and recommend actions to the chief or sheriff. Other citizen boards review the findings of internal police investigations

and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings. In still others, an auditor investigates the process

by which the police or sheriff’s department accept or investigate complaints and reports to the department and the public on the thoroughness and fairness of the process.

Citizen oversight systems, originally designed to temper police discretion in the 1950s, have steadily grown in number

through the 1990s. But determining the proper role has a troubled history.

This publication is intended to help citizens, law enforcement officers and executives, union leaders, and public interest

groups understand the advantages and disadvantages of various oversight systems and components.

In describing the operation of nine very different approaches to citizen oversight, the authors do not extol or disparage

citizen oversight but rather try to help jurisdictions interested in creating a new or enhancing an existing oversight

system by:

• Describing the types of citizen oversight.

• Presenting programmatic information from various jurisdictions with existing citizen oversight systems.

• Examining the social and monetary benefits and costs of different systems.

The report also addresses staffing; examines ways to resolve potential conflicts between oversight bodies and police;

and explores monitoring, evaluation, and funding concerns.

No one system works best for everyone. Communities must take responsibility for fashioning a system that fits their

local situation and unique needs. Ultimately, the author notes, the talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the key

participants are more important to the procedure’s success than is the system’s structure.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

iii

Foreword
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

v

Acknowledgments

I thank the many individuals who patiently answered my questions and sent me materials about their citizen oversight

procedures. In particular, I thank the following oversight directors and coordinators: Barbara Attard, Lisa Botsko, Mary

Dunlap, Suzanne Elefante, Patricia Hughes, Liana Perez, Melvin Sears, Todd Samolis, Ruth Siedschlag, and Joseph Valu.

The following advisory panel members (whose titles are listed on the back of the title page) provided a large number 

of helpful comments during a 1-day meeting in Washington, D.C., and reviewed the draft report: K. Felicia Davis,

Mark Gissiner, Douglas Perez, Jerry Sanders, Samuel Walker, and Steve Young. Among other criteria, advisory panel

members were selected for their diverse views regarding citizen oversight of police. As a result, readers should not 

infer that the panel members necessarily support citizen review in general or any particular type of citizen review.

Benjamin Tucker, former Deputy Director of Operations of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and

Phyllis McDonald, Social Science Analyst with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), also participated in the board

meeting and made important contributions. Pierce Murphy, Community Ombudsman in Boise, Idaho, provided valuable

suggestions for improving the report.

Vincent Talucci, Program Manager for the project at NIJ, provided wise guidance and constant support. Terence

Dunworth, Managing Vice President at Abt Associates Inc., offered numerous suggestions for improving the report,

most important, a complete reconfiguration of the executive summary and discussion of program costs. Mary-Ellen

Perry and Joan Gilbert carefully produced the numerous report drafts.

Peter Finn

Associate

Abt Associates Inc.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

vii

Introduction

There has been a considerable increase in the number of

procedures involving citizen oversight of police implemented by cities and counties in the 1990s. However,

many of these procedures have had a troubled history

involving serious—even bitter—conflict among the

involved parties. Citizen Review of Police: Approaches

and Implementation is designed to help jurisdictions that

may decide to establish—or wish to improve—an oversight system to avoid or eliminate these battles. At the

same time, the publication can help oversight planners

understand and choose among the many options available

for structuring a citizen review procedure. Finally, current

oversight staff and volunteers may find it useful to review

the publication as a way of learning more about the field.

To provide this assistance, Citizen Review of Police

describes the operations of nine very different systems of

citizen oversight. However, the publication does not promote any particular type of citizen review—or citizen

review in general. Rather, the report is intended to help

local government executives and legislators, as well as

police and sheriff’s department administrators, union 

leaders, and local citizen groups and public interest organizations, learn about the advantages, drawbacks, and limitations of a variety of oversight systems and components.

Types of Citizen Oversight

There is no single model of citizen oversight. However,

most procedures have features that fall into one of four

types of oversight systems:

• Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend findings to the chief or sheriff.

• Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens review and recommend that the

chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings.

• Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established

by the police or sheriff’s department to citizens, who

review them and then recommend their own findings to

the chief or sheriff.

• Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which

the police or sheriff’s department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the thoroughness and

fairness of the process to the department and the public.

All four types of oversight are represented among the 

nine citizen review systems described in this report (see

exhibit 1).

Each type of system has advantages and drawbacks. For

example, oversight systems that involve investigating citizen complaints (type 1) can help reassure the public that

investigations of citizen complaints are thorough and fair.

However, hiring professional investigators can be expensive, and the investigations model typically has no mechanism for soliciting the public’s general concerns about

police conduct.

Whatever their specific advantages, any type of citizen

oversight needs to be part of a larger structure of internal

and external police accountability; citizen oversight alone

cannot ensure that police will act responsibly.

Oversight Costs

Exhibit 2 presents the nine oversight systems arranged in

ascending order of budget levels along with their activity

levels for 1997. As shown, there is a theoretical relationship between the four types of oversight systems and cost.

• Type 1 oversight systems, in which citizens investigate

allegations and recommend findings (Berkeley, Flint,

Minneapolis, San Francisco), are the most expensive

largely because professional investigators must be hired

to conduct the investigations—lay citizens do not have

the expertise or the time.

Executive Summary
Mediation Subpoena Officer Legal 

System Type* Openness to Public Scrutiny Option Power Representation

Berkeley Police 1 • hearings and commission decisions open to dormant yes during investigation;

Review Commission public and media during hearing

(PRC) • general PRC meetings available for public to

express concerns 

• full public report, including interview transcripts

• city manager makes response public after review of 

PRC and internal affairs (IA) findings

• appeal process

• IA’s dispositions and discipline not public

Flint Office of the 1 • findings distributed to media and city archives no yes, but not interviewed in

Ombudsman • no appeal never used person

• chief’s finding public, but not discipline

Minneapolis Civilian 1 • hearings are private yes no, but during investigaPolice Review • general public invited to monthly CRA meeting to cooperation tion, union repreAuthority express concerns required sentative may 

(CRA) • appeal process under advise officer;

• complainant told whether complaint was sustained Garrity ruling during hearing,

• chief’s discipline not public until final disposition union attorney 

defends officer

Orange County 2 • hearings open to public and media scrutiny no yes, but during hearings

Citizen Review • findings and the sheriff’s discipline are matters never used

Board of public record

• no appeal

Portland Police 3, 4 • PIIAC audits open to public and media no yes none

Internal • citizen advisory subcommittee meetings open to 

Investigations public and media

Auditing Committee • appeal to city council

(PIIAC) • PIIAC decisions are public; chief’s discipline is not

Rochester Civilian 2 • reviews are closed yes no none

Review Board • results are not public

• no appeal

St. Paul Police 2 • hearings are closed no yes, but none

Civilian Internal • no appeal never used

Affairs Review • no publicizing of disciplinary recommendations

Commission

San Francisco 1 • chief’s hearings are closed yes yes during investigation;

Office of • police commission hearings are public during hearing

Citizen Complaints • appeal process for officers

• complaint histories and findings confidential

• chief’s discipline not public

Tucson Independent 2, 4 • monitoring is private no no not applicable

Police Auditor and • appeal process

Citizen Police • board holds monthly public meeting at which 

Advisory Review public may raise concerns

Board

* Type 1: citizens investigate allegations and recommend findings; type 2: police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens review

findings; type 3: complainants appeal police findings to citizens; type 4: an auditor investigates the police or sheriff’s department’s investigation

process.

EXHIBIT 1.TYPE AND SELECTED FEATURES OF NINE OVERSIGHT SYSTEMS

E XECUTIVE S UMMARY

viii
Paid Mean Cost per Complaint

Type Location Name Budget Staff Activity Filed and Investigated

2 Orange County Citizen Review Board $20,000 2 part time 45 board hearings } 45 $444 

pop: 749,631 (1/5 time)sworn: 1,134

2 St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs $37,160a 1 part time 71 cases reviewed } 71 $523 

pop: 259,606 Review Commissionsworn: 581

3, 4 Portland Police Internal Investigations $43,000 1 full time 21 appeals processed $361 

pop: 480,824 Auditing Committee 98 audits of completed cases 119sworn: 1,004

2 Rochester Civilian Review Board $128,069 1 full time 26 cases reviewed $4,269 

pop: 221,594 3 part time 4 cases mediated 30sworn: 685

2, 4 Tucson Independent Police Auditor and $144,150 2 full time 289 citizen contacts (9/1/97–6/30/98) $755c

pop: 449,002 Citizen Police Advisory 96 complaints filed with auditorsworn: 865 Review Board 63 investigations monitored 159

1 Flint Office of the Ombudsman $173,811 2 full time 313 cases against police $555 

pop: 134,881 1 part time investigated (1996) 313sworn: 333

1 Berkeley Police Review Commission $277,255 4 full time 42 complaints filed and investigated $4,864

pop: 107,800 34 cases closed for lack of meritsworn: 190 or complainant cooperation 57

12 hearings

1 Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority $504,213 7 full time 715 citizen contacts $3,171

pop: 358,785 159 formal complaints investigated } 159sworn: 919 14 cases mediated

6 stipulations3 hearings

1 San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints $2,198,778 30 full time 1,126 complaints received $2,237 

pop: 735,315 983 cases investigated and closed } 983sworn: 2,100 50 chief’s hearings 

6 police commission trials

a. Because the board has never spent its $10,000 allocation for hiring an independent investigator, its true budget has been $27,160.b.Includes a one-time startup cost of $20,000 for remodeling office.c. Based on a 10-month prorated budget of $120,058.d.This represents the proportion of the staff who handle complaints against the police. See footnote e.e.Two of seven investigators handle complaints full time against the police; a third investigator spends one-quarter time handling police complaints.f. Because some of the 42 cases filed and investigated were among the 34 cases closed in 1997, the total activity does not represent the sum of the 42 complaints investigated and the 34 cases closed.g. The mean cost per complaint filed for 1997 was atypically high because, for example, oversight staff conducted a major pepper spray study, staffed a medical marijuana task force, and held a major 

public hearing.

h.This figure is misleadingly high as a measure of overall oversight costs because it does not take into consideration the 556 other contacts authority staff had with the public that did not result in 

formal complaints.

EXHIBIT 2. 1997 OVERSIGHT SYSTEM COSTS IN RELATION TO RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIVITY

C ITIZENR EVIEW OFP OLICE : A PPROACHES ANDI MPLEMENTATION

ix

h

g

f

d e

b
E XECUTIVE S UMMARY

x

• Type 2 systems, in which citizens review the internal

affairs unit’s findings (e.g., Orange County, Rochester,

St. Paul), tend to be inexpensive because volunteers

typically conduct the reviews.

• Type 3 systems, in which citizens review complainants’ appeals of police findings (Portland), can

also be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers.

• Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or

sheriff’s department’s own complaint investigation

process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the midlevel

price range. On one hand, like type 1 systems, only a

paid professional has the expertise and time to conduct

a proper audit. On the other hand, typically only one

person needs to be hired because the auditing process

is less time consuming than conducting investigations

of citizen complaints.

In practice, however, there is an inconsistent relationship

between oversight type and cost. This is because, when

examined closely, many oversight operations are not

“pure” examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. For example, two jurisdictions have combined two different oversight approaches: Portland has a citizen appeals board

(type 3) and an auditor who monitors the police bureau’s

complaint investigation process (type 4); Tucson has both

a citizen board that reviews internal affairs findings (type

2) and an auditor (type 4). Consequently, the actual cost

for a given type of oversight system may be more or less

expensive than the cost of a pure type. Furthermore, each

type of oversight system can incorporate features that may

increase or decrease its expenses, ranging from providing

policy recommendations to a mediation option. The choice

of staffing option also will affect expenditures, including

using volunteer staff or in-kind services and materials, hiring paid staff, or diverting part of the time of an existing

city or police employee to oversight functions. As a result,

it is difficult to predict an oversight system’s actual costs

before determining all its features and activities.

Finally, more money may not buy more oversight 

activity or increase use of the system—that is, boost the

number of complaints, hearings, mediations, policy recommendations, reviews, or audits. A variety of costinsensitive considerations—the public’s perception of the

system’s fairness, the director’s impartiality and talent,

the level of cooperation from the police or sheriff’s

department, and restrictions on the kinds of complaints

the system will be prohibited from handling or required

to accept—can prevent additional funds from resulting in

increased use of the oversight system. That said, an oversight procedure that is underfunded will not only have

difficulty achieving its objectives, it also may create

more controversy surrounding police accountability than

it resolves.

Conclusions

This report suggests at least four other significant conclusions regarding citizen oversight of the police.

Local jurisdictions that wish to establish citizen review

have to take on the responsibility to make difficult

choices about the type of oversight system they should

fashion. The tremendous variation in how the nine oversight systems described in this report conduct business—

and pay for their activities—may seem discouraging: The

lack of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions

to make an automatic selection of commonly implemented

citizen review features around which they can structure

their own oversight procedures. On the positive side, this

diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel obligated

to follow slavishly any one model or approach; they have

the freedom to tailor the various components of their system to the particular needs and characteristics of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes, collective

bargaining agreements, and pressure groups.

Many individuals and groups believe that citizen

oversight, despite its serious limitations, can have

important benefits. Complainants have reported that

they:

• Feel “validated” when the oversight body agrees with

their allegations—or when they have an opportunity to

be heard by an independent overseer regardless of the

outcome.

• Are satisfied at being able to express their concerns in

person to the officer.

• Feel they are contributing to holding the department

accountable for officers’ behavior.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

xi

Police and sheriff’s department administrators have

reported that citizen oversight:

• Improves their relationship and image with the 

community.

• Has strengthened the quality of the department’s 

internal investigations of alleged officer misconduct

and reassured the public that the process is thorough

and fair.

• Has made valuable policy and procedure 

recommendations.

Local elected and appointed officials say an oversight

procedure:

• Enables them to demonstrate their concern to eliminate

police misconduct.

• Reduces in some cases the number of civil lawsuits 

(or successful suits) against their cities or counties.

It is sometimes possible to overcome disagreements

between oversight operations and police and sheriff’s

departments. The report identifies many points of conflict between oversight systems and police and sheriff’s

departments—and with officer unions. However, as illustrated in exhibit 3, there are positions each side can take

and explanations it can offer that can sometimes make

the system acceptable to everyone involved. A critical

step to minimizing conflict is for the police or sheriff’s

department—and union leadership—to act as colleagues

in the planning process.

The talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the

key participants—in particular, the oversight system’s

director, chief elected official, police chief or sheriff,

and union president—are more important to the procedure’s success than is the system’s structure. The

report identifies jurisdictions in which these individuals

have worked together cooperatively. An effective procedure for selecting competent and objective oversight

investigators, board members, and administrators—and

for training them thoroughly—is also critical for the

oversight procedure to thrive.

Exhibit 4 is a checklist oversight system planners can

consult to help identify some of the decisions they will

have to make in designing and setting up a new or

revised review procedure. The exhibit indicates where 

in this report’s text each decision is discussed.
EXHIBIT 3. CONCERNS MANY POLICE AND SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENTS—AND

UNION LEADERS—EXPRESS ABOUT CITIZEN OVERSIGHT—AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Assertion: Citizens Should Not Interfere in Police Work

Concerns Responses

• The chief must be held accountable for discipline to • Most oversight bodies are only advisory.

prevent misconduct.

• Internal affairs already does a good job. • Even when the department already imposes appropriate 

discipline without citizen review, an oversight procedure 

can reassure skeptical citizens that the agency is doing its

job in this respect.

• The next chief or sheriff may not be as conscientious about 

ensuring that the department investigates complaints fairly 

and thoroughly.

Assertion: Citizens Do Not Understand Police Work

Concerns Responses

• Oversight staff lack experience in police work. • Board members typically have pertinent materials available 

for review, and ranking officers are usually present during 

hearings to explain department procedures.

• Oversight administrators need to describe the often 

extensive training they and their staff receive.

• Citizen review is just that—citizens reviewing police 

behavior as private citizens.

• Only physicians review doctors, and only attorneys • Doctors and lawyers have been criticized for doing a poor 

review lawyers. job of monitoring their colleagues’ behavior.

Assertion:The Process Is Unfair

Concerns Responses

• Oversight staff may have an “agenda”—they are biased • Oversight staff need to inform the department when they 

against the police. decide in officers’ favor.

• Oversight staff and police need to meet to iron out 

misconceptions and conflict.

• Not sustained findings remain in officers’ files. • Indecisive findings are unfair to both parties and should 

therefore be reduced in favor of unfounded, exonerated,

or sustained findings.

• Adding allegations unrelated to the citizen’s • Internal affairs units themselves add allegations in some 

complaint is unfair. departments.

• Some citizens use the system to prepare for civil suits. • Board findings can sometimes help officers and departments 

defend against civil suits.

E XECUTIVE S UMMARY

xii
EXHIBIT 4. DECISIONS OVERSIGHT PLANNERS NEED TO MAKE

Decision Discussion in Text

Establish a Planning or Advisory Group

Identify the key actors N/A

Establish a formal planning committee N/A

Identify sources of technical assistance chapter 8

Plan for Monitoring and Evaluation chapter 7

Design a monitoring plan 

Design an evaluation plan

identify program’s objectives 

select an evaluator

develop measures of effectiveness

develop measurement methods

collect data

analyze data

interpret and report findings

Select Program Type

Review existing program models and materials chapter 3

Visit selected programs to interview staff and observe procedures N/A

Identify tradeoffs involved in different components chapter 1

Consider Taking on Other Oversight Responsibilities chapter 3

Provide policy recommendations

Offer mediation

Assist with early warning system

Determine Outreach Methods chapter 5

Establish Extent of Openness chapter 5

Public or private hearings

Reporting procedures

type

content

frequency

distribution

Identify Staffing Needs chapter 4

Decide on type and number of staff

volunteer board members

paid investigators

director/ombudsman/auditor

use existing staff

hire new staff

other staff (support, management information system)

Determine how to recruit, screen, and train staff

Select Program Structure chapter 5

Establish eligibility criteria for complainants

Identify types of cases to review or investigate

Decide where complainants may file

at police station or sheriff’s department

at oversight program

other (city hall, etc.)

Consider whether to seek subpoena power

Develop timelines for completing each phase of the complaint process

Develop plan for minimizing delays in case processing

Estimate Budget Needs chapter 7

N/A = not applicable

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

xiii
Contents

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

xv

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Types of Citizen Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Oversight Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .x

Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

What the Publication Is Intended to Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Audiences and purposes for Citizen Review of Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

The need for the report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Features of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Sources of information for the publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Terminology used in the report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Types of Citizen Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Potential benefits to complainants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Potential benefits to police and sheriff’s departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Potential benefits to elected and appointed officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Potential benefits to the community at large . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Limitations to Citizen Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Chapter 2: Case Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

The Berkeley, California, Police Review Commission: A Citizen Board and the Police 

Department Investigate Complaints Simultaneously . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

The review process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Other activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
C ONTENTS

xvi

The Flint, Michigan, Ombudsman’s Office: An Ombudsman Investigates Selected Citizen 

Complaints Against All City Departments and Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

The review process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Other activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority: An Oversight System Investigates 

and Hears Citizen Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

The complaint process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Other CRA activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

The Orange County, Florida, Citizen Review Board: A Sheriff’s Department 

Provides Executive Support to an Independent Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

The CRB procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Other activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

The Portland, Oregon, Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee: A City Council,

Citizen Advisers, and a Professional Examiner Share Oversight Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

Citizen appeals of IA findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

PIIAC (city council and mayor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

Other activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

The Rochester, New York, Civilian Review Board: Trained Mediators Review Citizen Complaints . . . .46

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

Other responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission: A Police-Managed 

Board Recommends Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

The review process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

xvii

San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints: An Independent Body Investigates 

Most Citizen Complaints for the Police Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

The complaint filing process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

Other activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

Staffing and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

Tucson’s Dual Oversight System: A Professional Auditor and a Citizen 

Review Board Collaborate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

The independent police auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

Citizen Police Advisory Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

The relationship between the board and the auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

Distinctive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

Chapter 3: Other Oversight Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

The process of developing policy recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

Examples of policy recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

Formal mediation: The process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

Potential benefits of mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74

Drawbacks to mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

Early Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

Oversight involvement in EWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

Benefits and drawbacks of EWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

Chapter 4: Staffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

Volunteer Board Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84

Planning decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84

Selection of board members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85

Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87

Inservice training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88

Investigators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88

Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90

Executive Director or Auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
Chapter 5: Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93

Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93

Outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94

Publicity materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94

Postings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Neighborhood groups and other agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Filing locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Referrals by the police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97

Issues of Oversight Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98

Oversight’s legal basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98

Eligible complainants and cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98

Subpoena power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99

Other structural issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101

Minimizing Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101

Openness of Oversight Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103

Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104

Conflict among local government officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104

Agendas on the part of volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105

Chapter 6: Resolving Potential Conflicts Between Oversight Bodies and Police . . . . . . . . . .107

Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

Preliminary Steps for Minimizing Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108

Police Criticisms of Oversight Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109

Citizens should not interfere with police work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109

Citizens do not understand police work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111

The process is unfair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112

Oversight Criticisms of the Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116

Working With the Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117

Historical conflict between most police unions and citizen oversight bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117

Approaches to collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118

Time may help but is not the cure-all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121

Chapter 7: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123

Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123

Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124

The intake process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124

Investigators’ work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124

Board members’ performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125

C ONTENTS

xviii
Consumer Satisfaction Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125

Evaluating the Citizen Oversight Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127

Establishing objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127

The Albuquerque evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128

Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128

The relationship between oversight costs and oversight activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128

The relationship between cost and oversight type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134

The importance of adequate funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136

Chapter 8: Additional Sources of Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137

Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137

Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137

Selected Program Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137

Selected Publications and Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139

Individuals With Experience in Citizen Oversight of Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143

Appendixes

Appendix A: Rochester Internal Affairs Request for Board Member Evaluations 

of Investigators’ Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145

Appendix B: Portland Auditor’s Guidelines for Reviewing Internal Affairs Investigations . . . . . . . . .147

Appendix C: San Francisco Complaint Intake Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151

Appendix D: San Francisco Policy for Citizen Monitoring of Police During Demonstrations . . . . . . .155

Appendix E: Cost Estimates for Different Modifications to Tucson’s Existing 

Oversight Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165

List of Exhibits

Exhibit 1. Type and Selected Features of Nine Oversight Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii

Exhibit 2. 1997 Oversight System Costs in Relation to Responsibilities and Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix

Exhibit 3. Concerns Many Police and Sheriff’s Departments—and Union Leaders—Express 

About Citizen Oversight—and Possible Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xii

Exhibit 4. Decisions Oversight Planners Need to Make . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii

Exhibit 1–1. Sample Tradeoffs Jurisdictions Need to Consider in Choosing an Oversight Procedure . . .7

Exhibit 1–2. Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight for Police and Sheriff’s Departments . . . . . . . . . . .8

Exhibit 1–3. Limitations to Citizen Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

xix
C ONTENTS

xx

Exhibit 2–1. Selected Features of the Nine Oversight Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Exhibit 2–2. Additional Features of the Nine Oversight Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Exhibit 2–3. Citizen Complaint Process in Berkeley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Exhibit 2–4. Berkeley Police Review Commission Budget, Fiscal Year 1998–99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Exhibit 2–5. Flint Office of the Ombudsman’s Investigation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Exhibit 2–6. Flint Ombudsman’s Office 1998–99 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Exhibit 2–7. Disposition of 159 Signed Complaints in 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Exhibit 2–8. Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority Complaint Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Exhibit 2–9. Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority 1998 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Exhibit 2–10. The Orange County Citizen Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

Exhibit 2–11. Steps in the Portland Audit Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

Exhibit 2–12. Rochester Citizen Oversight Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

Exhibit 2–13. Center for Dispute Settlement CRB and Conciliation Budget for 

Fiscal Year 1998–99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

Exhibit 2–14. St. Paul Citizen Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

Exhibit 2–15. Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission 1995 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

Exhibit 2–16. San Francisco’s Oversight Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

Exhibit 2–17. Office of Citizen Complaints 1998–99 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

Exhibit 2–18. Citizen Oversight Process in Tucson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

Exhibit 2–19. Tucson Independent Police Auditor Budgets for Fiscal Years 1997–98 

and 1998–99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

Exhibit 3–1. Portland Police Bureau Bulletin on Handcuffing Issued in Response 

to Auditor’s Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

Exhibit 3–2. Minneapolis Mediation Program Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

Exhibit 3–3. Mediation Summary and Agreement Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

Exhibit 3–4. Potential Benefits of Mediation to Citizens and Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77

Exhibit 5–1. Oversight Outreach Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Exhibit 5–2. OCC Incident Information Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98

Exhibit 5–3. Flier Included in Letter the Portland Police Bureau Sends to Complainants 

Notifying Them of Their Cases/Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99

Exhibit 5–4. Number of Days Each of 10 Complaints Remained at 3 San Jose Police 

Department Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102

Exhibit 6–1. Concerns Many Police and Sheriff’s Departments—and Union Leaders—

Express About Citizen Oversight—and Possible Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .110

Exhibit 7–1. Minneapolis Consumer Satisfaction Post-Outcome Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .126

Exhibit 7–2. Costs of Nine Oversight Systems in 1997 in Relation to Responsibilities 

and Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131

Exhibit 8–1. Individuals With Experience in Citizen Oversight of Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141
Chapter 1: Introduction

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

1

KEY POINTS

• Citizen Review of Police:Approaches and Implementation is written primarily for local government officials and 

legislators. Union leaders, local citizen groups, and new oversight staff may also find the publication useful.

• The publication describes nine citizen oversight procedures to enable these audiences to benefit from the 

experiences of communities that have already established oversight procedures.

• While there is no single model of citizen oversight, most systems fall into one of four types:

— Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend findings to the chief or sheriff.

— Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens review and recommend that the chief

or sheriff approve or reject the findings.

— Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police department to citizens, who review them

and then recommend their own findings to the chief or sheriff.

— Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff’s department accepts and 

investigates complaints and reports on the process’ thoroughness and fairness.

• Oversight bodies can also:

— Recommend changes in department policies and procedures and suggest improvements in training.

— Arrange for mediation.

— Assist the police or sheriff’s department to develop or operate an early warning system for identifying 

problem officers.

• If they wish to implement citizen review, to make an informed decision about which type of oversight procedure to adopt jurisdictions need to examine tradeoffs inherent in choosing a model: Most features of every

model have drawbacks as well as benefits.

• Citizen oversight has the potential to benefit many groups.

• Complainants have reported feeling:

— “Validated” when their allegations are sustained—or merely appreciated having an opportunity to be heard

by an independent third party.

— Gratified they are able to address an officer directly.

— Satisfied the process appears to help hold police and sheriff’s departments accountable.

• Police administrators have said that oversight can:

— Improve their relationship and image with the community.

— Increase public understanding of the nature of police work.

— Promote the goals of community policing.
C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

2

This chapter explains the purposes of Citizen Review of

Police: Approaches and Implementation and reports the

benefits and limitations that participants attribute to citizen

oversight of the police. The report has seven other chapters:

• Chapter 2: nine case studies of citizen oversight.

• Chapter 3: three additional responsibilities oversight

systems often undertake: policy and training recommendations, mediation, and early warning systems.

• Chapter 4: recruiting, screening, and training oversight

staff.

• Chapter 5: special issues related to citizen oversight,

including outreach, structure, openness, and politics.

• Chapter 6: resolving potential conflicts between oversight bodies and police.

• Chapter 7: monitoring, evaluating, and funding oversight systems.

• Chapter 8: organizations, materials, and individuals

that can provide assistance with establishing, improving, or evaluating oversight systems.

Following a glossary, appendixes provide sample materials from the jurisdictions studied. In addition to the table

of contents, readers may locate specific topics of interest

from the key points that precede each chapter and from

the index.

What the Publication Is

Intended to Do

Audiences and purposes for Citizen Review

of Police

This report has been written primarily for:

• Local government executives, including mayors and

city managers.

• Local legislators, including city council members and

county commissioners.

This report will also be of interest to:

• Law enforcement administrators, including chiefs,

sheriffs, and their management staff.

KEY POINTS (CONTINUED)

— Improve the quality of the department’s internal investigations.

— Reassure a skeptical public that the department already investigates citizen complaints thoroughly and fairly.

— Help subject officers feel vindicated.

— Help discourage misconduct.

— Improve the department’s policies and procedures.

• Elected and appointed officials have indicated that oversight:

— Demonstrates their concern for police conduct to constituents.

— Can reduce the number, success rates, and award amounts of civil suits against the city or county.

• Members of the community at large have suggested that oversight has helped to:

— Reassure the community that appropriate discipline is being handed out for misconduct.

— Discourage police misconduct.

— Increase their understanding of police behavior.

• There are serious limitations to what citizen review can accomplish.To be most effective, citizen oversight must

complement other internal and external mechanisms for police accountability.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

3

LARGER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVE INTERNAL AFFAIRS UNITS

TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT

Most large police and sheriff’s departments have internal affairs (IA) units (sometimes called professional standards units) that investigate allegations of officer misconduct filed by citizens or other officers. In some departments, IA units not only recommend findings to the chief or sheriff, they also recommend the types of discipline

(sometimes following guidelines that provide a range of punishments for different types of misconduct).

In some departments, officers’ supervisors investigate minor alleged misconduct, leaving serious cases to the IA

unit. Some departments use supervisory panels composed of command-level staff who, after reviewing IA’s investigation results, come to a finding and, if appropriate, recommend discipline. In smaller departments, the chief or

sheriff investigates citizen complaints, or the complaints become a command responsibility.

In all departments, the chief or sheriff makes the final determination of discipline, although in some jurisdictions 

an appointed or elected official (e.g., police commission) may overrule the decision.

• Union leaders.

• Citizen groups and public interest organizations.

Oversight directors may find it helpful to ask new oversight investigators or board members to read the publication to learn more about the field.

Citizen Review of Police describes citizen oversight 

procedures in nine jurisdictions. The descriptions are

intended to:

• Enable jurisdictions that may consider setting up a citizen oversight process to benefit from the experience of

communities that have already established procedures.

• Enable jurisdictions that already have citizen review to

improve their procedures based on the experiences of

these nine cities and counties.

The publication does not promote any particular type of

citizen review—or citizen oversight in general. Rather, it

is intended to:

• Help jurisdictions decide whether they want to create

some form of citizen oversight of police or modify the

system they already have.

• Help jurisdictions select a citizen oversight system that

will best meet their particular needs.

Citizen Review of Police does not evaluate the nine citizen oversight systems; rather, it describes their operations

and the problems they have faced. The report also 

does not focus on the activities of police and sheriff’s

department internal affairs units except insofar as they

interact with civilian oversight bodies (see “Larger Law

Enforcement Agencies Have Internal Affairs Units to

Investigate Allegations of Police Misconduct”).

The need for the report

There has been a considerable increase in the number of

oversight procedures that various cities and counties have

implemented in the 1990s (see “A Short History of Citizen

Review”). However, many of these procedures have had 

a troubled history that has involved opposition from concerned citizens and community organizations and from law

enforcement agencies and police unions. In many cases,

the procedures have been revamped, in some cases litigated, and in at least one city (Washington, D.C.) abandoned.

One reason for controversy in many jurisdictions has been

the lack of advance planning for an oversight system.

The main problem with many citizen review 

procedures . . . is that they have not had a clear

vision of their role and mission . . . . This has

usually been the result of a failure of civic leadership. Both community activists and government officials have not taken the trouble to study

what other jurisdictions are doing, to borrow the

best practices and to learn from their mistakes.1
[Civilian oversight systems] are often put together

quickly and with little thought as to their workability or with much consideration as to how they fit

into the review systems already in place.2

Citizen Review of Police is intended to

make it easier to plan an oversight procedure (or decide how to improve an existing procedure) in a thoughtful manner by

presenting the options available for

structuring a citizen review mechanism.

Another reason for conflict regarding

citizen oversight is that—even with

advance planning—public officials,

police and sheriff’s department executives, union leaders, police officers, and community

activists usually have different expectations of what oversight should and can accomplish. This publication should

help these parties identify and agree on reasonable and

feasible objectives—and dispel unrealistic fears about

what the process may do—so they can try to avoid the

battles that many other jurisdictions have experienced.

Features of the Report

Sources of information for the publication

The information presented in this report

comes from five principal sources:

1. Literature on citizen oversight of the

police (see chapter 8, “Additional

Sources of Help”).

2. In-person interviews in Berkeley 

and San Francisco, California; 

Minneapolis and St. Paul,

Minnesota; and Rochester, New 

York, with oversight staff (directors,

board members, auditors, ombudsmen, investigators);

complainants; law enforcement administrators, internal affairs investigators, police union leaders, and subject officers; local elected and appointed officials

(e.g., city council members, mayors, city managers);

and representatives of citizen groups.

C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

4

A SHORT HISTORY OF CITIZEN REVIEW

The demand for citizen oversight first occurred in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the civil rights movement

and the perception in many quarters that law enforcement responded to racial unrest with excessive force.

Many of these early review procedures were short lived.1

Citizen review revived in the early 1970s as urban African-Americans gained more political power and as more

white political leaders came to see the need for improved police accountability. Most oversight procedures have

come into existence after a high-profile case of alleged police misconduct (usually a shooting or other physical

force incident), often involving white officers and minority suspects. Racial or ethnic allegations of discrimination

are often at the heart of movements to introduce citizen oversight.2

By 2000, citizen review has become more widespread than ever before in the United States.As of early 1998,

there were more than 90 citizen review procedures. Almost 80 percent of the largest cities had some form of 

citizen review.3 However, only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies in the country had citizen oversight.

1. Snow, Robert,“Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus,” Law and Order 40 (December 1992): 51–56.

2. Terrill, Richard J.,“Civilian Oversight of the Police Complaints Process in the United States: Concerns, Developments, and More Concerns,” 

in Complaints Against the Police:The Trend to External Review, ed.Andrew J. Goldsmith, Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991; see also Walker,

Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus,“The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian

Review of Police,” American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1–26.

3. Walker, Samuel, Achieving Police Accountability, Research Brief, Occasional Paper Series no. 3, New York: Center on Crime Communities &

Culture, 1998: 5.

Citizen Review of Police is

intended to make it easier

to plan an oversight procedure in a thoughtful manner

by presenting the options

available for structuring a

citizen review mechanism.
3. Telephone interviews with similar individuals in four

other communities: Flint, Michigan; Orange County

(Orlando), Florida; Portland, Oregon; and Tucson,

Arizona.

4. Less comprehensive telephone interviews with other

oversight staff across the country (Kansas City,

Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; San Diego and San Jose,

California; and Syracuse, New York).

5. Five members of an advisory board assembled to

guide and review the publication (see the back of the

title page).

The nine jurisdictions studied were selected based on the

suggestions of the advisory board. The oversight procedures studied represent a variety of approaches to citizen

oversight in different areas of the country and in jurisdictions of varying size and governance (see exhibit 2–1 in

chapter 2, “Selected Features of the Nine Oversight

Systems”).

Terminology used in the report

Different law enforcement agencies use different terminology to denote identical or similar activities. To avoid

confusion, Citizen Review of Police usually uses the following terms regardless of the local jurisdiction’s actual

terminology:

• Complainant (sometimes called “appellant”).

• Board and board member (sometimes called

panelist/panel member, commission/commissioner).

• Executive director or director (sometimes called 

“officer” or “examiner”).

• Police union (also called federation, association).

• Internal affairs (IA) (some departments have renamed

their IA units “professional standards”).

“Findings That Review Boards and Police Departments

Make” identifies and defines the principal terms used to

describe possible findings regarding allegations of officer

misconduct. A glossary following chapter 8 defines other

specialized terms used in the report.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

5

FINDINGS THAT REVIEW BOARDS

AND POLICE DEPARTMENTS MAKE

Review boards and police departments generally use

a common set of terms to identify the findings that

their investigations can lead to:

• Unfounded:The alleged act did not occur, or 

the subject officer was not involved in the act;

therefore the officer is innocent.

• Exonerated:The alleged act did occur, but the 

officer engaged in no misconduct because the act

was lawful, justified, and proper (sometimes called

“proper conduct”).

• Not sustained:The evidence fails to prove or 

disprove that the alleged act(s) occurred.

• Sustained:The alleged act occurred and was not

justified (e.g., it violated department policy).

Some oversight bodies and police departments

come to findings that conclude the subject officer

committed an act that was inappropriate but that

hold the department responsible for the officer’s

misconduct:

• Policy failure: Department policy or procedures

require or prohibit the act (e.g., an officer may 

not use a cruiser to drive someone to a bus stop

whose car was towed).

• Supervision failure: Inadequate supervision—

the officer’s sergeant or lieutenant should have

informed the officer not to engage in the act or

to discontinue it (e.g., a sergeant asks a supervisor,“Here’s what I’ve got. Is that probable cause

to arrest the guy?” and the supervisor gives the

officer bad advice).

• Training failure:The officer receives inappropriate

or no training in how to perform the act properly

(e.g., distinguishing an intoxicated person from

someone going into diabetic shock).
Types of Citizen Review

According to experts, “There is no single model [of citizen oversight], and it is difficult to find two oversight

agencies that are identical.”3 However, most oversight

systems fall into one of four types:4

• Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend findings to the chief or sheriff.

• Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and

develop findings; citizens review and recommend that

the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings.

• Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established

by the police or sheriff’s department to citizens, who

review them and then recommend their own findings to

the chief or sheriff.

• Type 4: An auditor investigates the

process by which the police or sheriff’s department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the

thoroughness and fairness of the

process to the department and the

public.

While some oversight procedures represent “pure” examples of these models, many oversight systems are hybrid

models that merge features from the

four different types into their own

unique formulation. For example, the

Office of Community Ombudsman in

Boise, Idaho, created in 1999, combines the authority to

investigate complaints—a type 1 oversight system—with

the responsibility to review internal affairs investigations

to determine if they are thorough and fair—a type 4 oversight system.5

Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, “Other Oversight

Responsibilities,” any oversight system may undertake

three other responsibilities in addition to investigating,

reviewing, or auditing citizen complaints:

1. Recommending changes to department policies and

procedures and suggesting improvements in training.

2. Arranging for informal or formal mediation.

3. Assisting the police or sheriff’s department to develop

or maintain an early warning system for identifying

potentially problematic officers.

To make an informed decision about which type of 

oversight procedure to adopt and which additional

responsibilities to undertake, jurisdictions need to 

examine tradeoffs inherent in fashioning an oversight

system—what they will gain and lose by the approach

they select. Only with these tradeoffs in mind can communities select a system that will best meet their local

needs, resources, and constraints. Exhibit 1–1 lists some

of the tradeoffs jurisdictions need to consider in selecting

an oversight procedure.

In addition to weighing tradeoffs, selecting oversight 

features may depend on several criteria:

• Which features does the public 

want?

• Which features are most effective in 

achieving the goals the community

expects the oversight procedure to

achieve?

• Which features may create conflict

with the police or sheriff’s department or the police union, and which

features may disappoint community

activists?

• How much will the features cost?

• How will the new features mesh with existing oversight procedures?

Potential Benefits of Citizen

Oversight

Oversight systems have the potential to benefit complainants, police and sheriff’s departments, elected and

appointed officials, and the public at large. The extent to

which benefits materialize depends not only on the type

of oversight procedure implemented but also, and critically, on how well these groups work together. The working relationships among the groups in turn depend to a

tremendous extent on the personality, talents, dedication,

C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

6

To make an informed 

decision about which type of

oversight procedure to adopt

and which additional responsibilities to undertake, jurisdictions need to examine

tradeoffs inherent in fashioning an oversight system—

what they will gain and lose

by the approach they select.
• Volunteers versus paid staff. Volunteer participants are lay community members who represent the concerns of the public.

Professionals conduct the day-to-day work of citizen oversight, carrying out the public’s wishes. On one hand, an oversight procedure involving only paid staff usually will not be as representative of the community as will a system that uses volunteers. On the

other hand, the amount of time required to provide adequate oversight can normally be provided only by one or more paid staff

who have been hired specifically to dedicate themselves to oversight activities. As a result, many oversight procedures use volunteers and paid staff.

• Public hearings versus private hearings. Public hearings may make the community feel it has more control over police misconduct

because officers’ alleged misconduct is made known. Private hearings are simpler logistically and protect complainants and officers

from public exposure.

• Investigative authority versus review authority. Investigating complaints can help ensure they are done thoroughly and fairly, but hiring

investigators can be expensive. Reviewing cases is less expensive but requires department cooperation in sharing records. Some 

oversight systems have both responsibilities.

• Taking on additional responsibilities—policy recommendations, mediation, or early warning systems:

— Developing policy recommendations may involve a conflict of interest because investigating and reviewing cases requires 

impartiality, but developing policy recommendations may involve political advocacy. However, providing policy recommendations may expand the oversight body’s influence.

— Mediation, usually held in private and kept confidential, may have less “teeth” than a public hearing. However, mediation may

encourage citizens to file complaints; save the time and expense of a hearing; and educate officers about the impact of their

words, behaviors, and attitudes on the public.

— Early warning systems can help identify potentially troublesome officers and may deter officer misconduct, but they may 

alienate officers if unsustained cases are included.

• Accepting complaints directly versus accepting them only by referral from the police or sheriff’s department. Citizens who may be

reluctant to file complaints with the department may file with the oversight body, but outreach must be conducted to make 

citizens aware of this option.

flexibility, and open-mindedness of the principal actors 

in each group—in particular, the oversight director, the

chief of police or sheriff, union leaders, the mayor, city

council members, and the city manager.

Potential benefits to complainants

Citizen oversight can have three benefits for complainants. Oversight can:

1. Help complainants feel “validated” in the minority of

instances in which oversight bodies agree with their

allegations.

I was afraid the investigation would be rushrush, but it was very thorough. Before the hearing, the investigator was very comforting toward

my son, who was only 16 years old, going over

the process in detail with him. When I received a

letter after the hearing that my son’s allegations

had been sustained, I was surprised. I didn’t have

faith in the powers that be to be objective. I was

elated that my son had been heard and that the

officer had to sit through the entire hearing. 

My son was happy, too; he didn’t think he’d 

win either. 

—mother of a juvenile complainant

The phenomenon of complainants [who] feel validated because the oversight body agrees with

their allegations is only part of the story. As the

procedural justice literature suggests, the process

is as important as the outcome. People feel validated when they feel they have an opportunity to

be heard. Civilian oversight is likely to enhance

that feeling by virtue of appearing to be independent of the police department. 

—Samuel Walker, Professor, University of 

Nebraska at Omaha

2. Give complainants the satisfaction of expressing their

concern in person to the officer when oversight

includes a mediation option.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

7

EXHIBIT 1–1. SAMPLE TRADEOFFS JURISDICTIONS NEED TO CONSIDER IN CHOOSING AN

OVERSIGHT PROCEDURE
Many complainants just want to be able to

express their anger or concern face to face with

the officer in an impartial setting without being

cut off, and that is all they need.

—Jackie DeBose, Berkeley Police Review 

Commission board member

3. Help hold the police or sheriff’s department accountable for officers’ behavior.

I felt I had done my civic duty. This was a young

cop [I complained about]. I coach people all the

time [at his job], so I wanted this officer to get better supervision and training so that in a similar

event he would not engage in the same misconduct.

I felt good; the officer got the direction he needed. 

—a complainant

[R]eview [by the Police Review Commission] of

this incident [in which the commission exonerated officers of a complaint that their use of

excessive force resulted in a man’s death]

prompted development of a new Berkeley Police

Department Training and Information Bulletin

regarding the risk of asphyxiation during fourpoint restraints. Development of this bulletin

was a pivotal issue in bringing closure for the

family and ensuring that their tragedy had some

positive effect. 

—Robert Bailey, former assistant city manager,

Berkeley

Potential benefits to police and sheriff’s

departments

As summarized in exhibit 1–2, police and sheriff’s

department personnel have identified several possible

benefits citizen oversight can provide them, depending on

the type of oversight procedure adopted. Oversight can:

1. Improve the department’s relationships and image

with the community by:

• Helping to establish and maintain the department’s reputation for fairness and firmness in

addressing allegations of police misconduct.

The board takes a lot of pressure or criticism off IA

and the chief because citizens are making the decisions about misconduct and the department can’t be

accused of a coverup.

—an IA commander

C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

8

EXHIBIT 1–2. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT FOR POLICE AND

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENTS

Law enforcement managers and line officers report that citizen oversight can provide a number of benefits to police

and sheriff’s departments depending on the type of oversight procedure adopted:

1. Improve the department’s relationship and image with the community by:

a. Helping to establish and maintain its reputation for investigating alleged officer misconduct with fairness and firmness.

b. Helping to reduce community concerns about possible police coverups in high-profile cases.

2. Increase the public’s understanding of police work, including the use of force.

3. Promote the goals of community policing.

4. Improve the quality of the department’s internal investigations of alleged misconduct.

5. Reassure the public that the department’s internal investigations of citizen complaints and its process for disciplining officers 

already are thorough and fair.

6. Help subject officers feel vindicated.

7. Help discourage misconduct among some officers.

8. Improve department policies and procedures.
Oversight makes the department’s job easier

because, if we couldn’t point to the board’s sustained rate of 10 percent, we would be criticized

and accused of a coverup [because our internal

rate would be just as low]. 

—a deputy chief

• Helping reduce or eliminate community concerns regarding specific high-profile incidents

of alleged misconduct.

Two Rochester police officers arrested two individuals on drug-dealing charges. The mother of

one of them claimed the two youths had been

innocently walking down the street when the

officers approached them. One

officer got into a tussle with the

mother’s son and, the mother

said, threw her son through a

store window. Some members of

the community were outraged at

what they felt was police brutality. When the Civilian Review

Board [CRB] heard the case, it

learned that the two men had

drugs in their possession. In addition, the store owner testified that the officers

had bent over backwards to be polite to the

men—and that the son had pushed the officer

into the store window. Because the CRB exonerated the officers, the community calmed down. 

—Andrew Thomas, Executive Director,

Rochester Center for Dispute Settlement

We love being able to send cases to the board

because we get less pressure from liberal groups

about not properly disciplining officers. 

—an IA commander

2. Increase public understanding about the nature of

police work, such as the occasions when officers need

to use force. Help the public develop realistic expectations regarding actions officers are allowed to take—

or departments have the personnel to take—to abate

crime and disorder.

3. Promote the goals of community policing. According

to the Berkeley Police Review Commission 1996 

annual report:

Community Involved Policing, especially

its “Problem Solving” method of organizing police work, depends heavily on the

involvement of especially those citizens

who are demographically and geographically closest to crime and criminals.

Therefore, it is undermined by hostility

generated in the normal unfolding of

police/citizen interactions at precisely the

point at which it needs the most support.

Some police administrators agree.

Community policing is related to citizen review. 

It’s another way to communicate with the public,

another source of community input.

—Fred Lau, Chief, San Francisco Police Department

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

9

ABOLISHING CITIZEN OVERSIGHT WILL NOT SAVE A POLICE OR

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT MONEY

Getting rid of the oversight body will not save the police or sheriff’s department money.When the Minneapolis

City Council was considering abolishing the Citizen Police Review Authority (CRA), Lt. Robert Skomra, the IA commander at the time, examined the number of cases CRA handled. Skomra determined that, if CRA disappeared, the

police department would have to find the funds to at least double and possibly triple the number of existing IA

investigators.The department would also have had to find desk space for the new investigators. Minneapolis police

Chief Robert Olson agreed:“If the CRA were abolished, I would have to hire additional IA investigators.”

Community policing is 

related to citizen review.

It’s another way to 

communicate with the 

public, another source of

community input.
For community policing to be effective, the integrity of the agency and the community’s trust in it are

critical. The CRB [Citizen Review Board] contributes to the trust because nonsworn citizens are

involved in reviewing the agency. 

—Kevin Beary, Orange County (Florida) Sheriff

4. Improve the quality of the department’s internal investigations of alleged misconduct.

The board has improved our professional standards’

investigative reports because investigators get

dressed down and embarrassed at hearings 

for any sloppiness, such as 

drawing conclusions on flimsy

evidence. As a result, if there is

any litigation on the complaint,

the report will enhance the

agency’s position. 

—Capt. Melvin Sears, Orange

County Sheriff’s Office administrative coordinator to the Citizen

Review Board

Informally in discussions after

hearings and in the questions

board members ask of PSD [professional standards

division] investigators during hearings, [board]

members have made observations about deficiencies in the investigators’ reports that have resulted

in improved reporting. For example, board members kept objecting to the way officers and investigators included opinions in their reports, rather than

just the facts. 

—Maj. Karon LaForte, Orange County Sheriff’s

Office IA commander

Investigators do a better job investigating cases

because they know that PIIAC [Police Internal

Investigations Auditing Committee] will be looking

at their work product, so they are less likely to take

shortcuts in their research and reporting than in

the past. 

—Charles Moose, former Chief, Portland Police

Bureau

5. Help reassure the public that the department already

investigates citizen complaints thoroughly and fairly.

Even when the department is capable of imposing

appropriate discipline without citizen review, an

oversight procedure can reassure skeptical citizens

that the agency is doing its job in this respect. 

—Douglas Perez, former Deputy Sheriff, Professor,

Plattsburgh (New York) State University

6. Help some subject officers feel vindicated. The St.

Paul oversight board exonerated an officer after a citizen complained about an allegedly offensive remark

the officer had made to a block party.

When the officer and Donald Luna, the

board chair, happened to meet at a

graduation ceremony, the officer said:

I want to thank you for the letter to

the chief. I’d put in a lot of time and

felt I had deescalated a tense situation. I couldn’t believe there had

been a complaint; I felt I deserved

an award. I felt the commission

understood me.

7. Help discourage misconduct (see below).

If I live a normal lifespan, I’m a citizen longer

than I’m a cop, so I want a system of checks

and balances to help prevent police misconduct. 

—Trevor Hampton, former Chief, Flint Police

Department

8. Improve the department’s policies and procedures 

(see chapter 3, “Other Oversight Responsibilities”).

Potential benefits to elected and 

appointed officials

By establishing or improving a citizen oversight mechanism, local officials can demonstrate their concern to

eliminate police misconduct—or publicize a department’s

existing exemplary police behavior. Officials may also be

able to reduce the number of civil lawsuits (or successful

suits) against the city or county or the dollar value of 

successful awards. These suits can be expensive.6 During

C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

10

Investigators do a better job

investigating cases because

they know that PIIAC 

will be looking at their 

work product.

—Charles Moose, former Chief,

Portland Police Bureau
a 6-month period alone, deaths and injuries resulting

from police shootings resulted in more than 300 civil

suits against the Washington, D.C., police department,

with nearly $8 million in court settlements and judgments awarded.7

• Joan Campbell, the chairperson of the Minneapolis City

Council Ways and Means Committee, reports that,

when citizens sue the city for alleged

police brutality, the judge asks if the

Civilian Police Review Authority

(CRA) sustained the case. In many

instances in which CRA has not, the

council has a stronger case for not

settling with the complainant and for

expecting the judge to rule in the

city’s favor. As a result, the city has

gone to court on more cases and

won most of them. Campbell also

believes that CRA has reduced the

number of complaints that have gone to litigation

because complainants feel they have already had their

day in court with the review board.

• According to Robert Bailey, former assistant city manager in Berkeley, the Police Review Commission

“saved the city at least $100,000 from one potential

lawsuit alone.” Because they did not trust the police to

investigate the matter fairly, family members filed a

complaint after a relative died from cardiac arrest in

police custody after being put into four-point restraints.

The board decided to hear the case en bloc and hired

an independent toxicologist to review the medical

records and do more testing. The toxicologist, as had

the coroner previously, reported that use of force had

not caused the person’s death—aspiration due to a drug

overdose was the cause. The family

decided not to sue the city after the

board concluded that the officers did

not use excessive force.

• Merrick Bobb, special counsel to

Los Angeles County, reported: “In

1992 . . . the County of Los Angeles

had 800 police misconduct cases

pending. And the exposure to the taxpayers of the County of Los Angeles

was calculated by the County’s

lawyers as far in excess of $600 million. Today, 5 years later, in 1997, we find the caseload

has dropped from 800 cases to a little over 200 cases.

We find that the amount of money that is being spent

has dropped for the first time to below the 10 million

mark in terms of judgments, settlements, and attorneys’ fees in such cases. . . . I think this is a 

testament to the effect of civilian oversight, civilian

review” initiated in 1993.8

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

11

According to Robert Bailey,

former assistant city 

manager in Berkeley, the

Police Review Commission

“saved the city at least

$100,000 from one 

potential lawsuit alone.”

SOME POLICE CHIEFS HAVE ESTABLISHED CITIZEN OVERSIGHT

PROCEDURES ON THEIR OWN

Police chiefs have taken the initiative to establish citizen oversight procedures on their own.

• When Robert Olson, chief of the Minneapolis Police Department since 1995, was commissioner in Yonkers,

New York, he established a civilian oversight program because of the department’s poor relations with the

African-American community.The review board he established included four civilians nominated by a citizen

panel, an officer nominated by the police union, and three other officers Olson selected. He approved all the

candidates.The board, which met monthly, reviewed completed IA cases and occasionally pending cases, and 

it had the authority to direct IA to conduct additional investigations.The board recommended findings, with

Olson retaining the ultimate decision to decide cases and impose discipline.

• William Finney, chief of the St. Paul Police Department, recommended the Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review

Commission on his own initiative because he felt the need to gain citizens’ perspective on department behavior.

(See the St. Paul case study in chapter 2.)
• Troubled in part by fatal shootings by Albuquerque

police officers (31 in 10 years) and extremely high

annual payments for tort claims involving police officers (up to $2.5 million per year), the Albuquerque

city council hired two consultants in 1996 to evaluate

the city’s existing oversight system and recommend

alternatives.9

Potential benefits to the community 

at large

Citizen oversight can benefit the entire community, not

just individual complainants. Oversight can:

1. Help to reassure the community

that appropriate discipline is

being imposed. Even when

departments are doing a top-notch

job disciplining errant officers,

the public may lack confidence in

the process. An oversight procedure that provides citizens with a

window into how the department

operates can change the opinion of these

concerned citizens.

2. Help discourage police misconduct. While there is 

no empirical evidence that oversight bodies can deter

police misconduct,10 there are three ways in which

citizen review may help encourage officers to act

appropriately.

• When oversight bodies recommend that an officer

be retrained, the officer may learn how to avoid the

type of behavior that led to the citizen complaint.

• When police and sheriff’s departments adopt policy

and procedure changes that oversight bodies recommend, officers may have a better understanding

regarding how they should perform their job.

• Oversight bodies may discourage some officers

from engaging in misconduct by reducing their

chances for promotion.

I was nervous about whether a sustained case might

hamper my promotion to lieutenant. The chief had

made it plain that an officer with sustained complaints would not be looked at as favorably for promotion as officers with no or fewer complaints. If

you look at the people he’s passed over, you can

see that the officers with complaints have been

passed over.

—a lieutenant

The [review] board influences assignments to

[desirable] details. We have supervisors in units

now who don’t want “cowboys” in their units, so

officers with complaints could get passed over.

—an officer

3. Increase public understanding of police policies,

procedures, and behavior. Complainants learn about

police procedures from oversight

investigators, board members, and

officers during mediation. Board

members themselves become better

educated about police procedures and

can share their understanding with

other members of the community.

Finally, by holding special public

hearings, oversight bodies may be

able to defuse tense community 

conflicts, channeling anger into constructive solutions.

Berkeley’s charter requires the Police Review Commission

(PRC) to hold hearings at the request of board members

or voters. PRC held a special public hearing after University

of California police officers were accused of using excessive force against students during a campus demonstration.

Although contentious, the meeting resulted in recommendations regarding officer conduct during demonstrations—

several of which the department implemented—to help

prevent future discord.

Limitations to Citizen Review

As summarized in exhibit 1–3, citizen oversight has 

several inherent and potential limitations.

Citizen oversight systems need to be part of a larger

structure of internal and external police accountability;

by itself, citizen oversight cannot ensure that police will

act responsibly. An evaluation of New York City’s oversight system concluded, “In general, civilian complaint

review procedures appear to be a necessary but insufficient

component of the [New York City Police] Department’s

approach to controlling officer misconduct.”11 “Supplements

C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

12

Citizen oversight systems

need to be part of a larger

structure of internal 

and external police 

accountability.
to Citizen Oversight” suggests other procedures that,

taken together with citizen oversight and an effective

internal affairs unit, may improve

police accountability in departments

in which officer conduct needs

improvement.

The effectiveness of citizen oversight

depends enormously on who the

principal parties are. In Minneapolis,

there was “a complete turnaround”

in the relationship between the

police department and the Civilian

Police Review Authority after a new

chief and a new executive director

took over and the new mayor made

clear she expected them to cooperate. Supporting this observation, a

subject officer in Minneapolis wrote

on his anonymous customer satisfaction survey in 1998, “It appears as though there have

been some changes in the factfinding process, which

resulted in a more satisfactory outcome. In the past I was

unable to give a favorable opinion of the Civilian Police

Review Authority, but I was pleased with this openness.”

Oversight bodies in the United States have limited

authority. In particular, they do not have the power to 

discipline officers or establish department policies. In these areas, they are

only advisory. Furthermore, oversight

bodies have no influence on some

police managers or, as a result, many

or most line officers. According to

one chief, “Boards can’t be effective

because officers fear IA, not them.”

Concerns about liability and supervisor criticisms may typically discourage misconduct much more than

either citizen oversight or internal

affairs investigations.

In a related vein, oversight procedures generally focus on individual

officers, letting supervisors off the

hook in terms of management’s

responsibility for—and tremendous influence over—line

officers’ and deputies’ behavior. As a result, unless the

oversight system includes making recommendations for

policy and procedure changes and has the ability to influence their adoption, department supervisory and training

practices that may be allowing misconduct to occur will

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

13

EXHIBIT 1–3. LIMITATIONS TO CITIZEN OVERSIGHT

We need to review 

higher-ups’ behavior to produce accountability among

line officers. Otherwise, the

beat officer gets scrutinized

and the supervisors are

never held accountable,

never called to account.

—Mary Dunlap, director of 

San Francisco’s 

Office of Citizen Complaints

1. Citizen oversight cannot by itself ensure police accountability. Jurisdictions need to implement other internal and external

mechanisms to achieve this goal.

2. The effectiveness of citizen oversight depends enormously on the talent, fairness, and personalities of the principal individuals

involved.

3. Oversight bodies have limited authority; they do not impose discipline or dictate department policies or procedures.

4. The findings some oversight bodies make, or the investigations they conduct, have no influence on some police managers.

5. Oversight bodies typically fail to hold department supervisors responsible for line officers’ behavior.

6. Some complainants who lose their cases express disappointment with the oversight process.

7. When long delays occur between filing a complaint and its resolution, complainants become frustrated and disillusioned—even 

when they win the case.

8. Some complainants and a small minority of other individuals will not be satisfied with the actions of police officers and deputy 

sheriffs no matter what the oversight body does.

9. Oversight procedures in some jurisdictions have exacerbated tensions among local officials, police and sheriff’s departments and

unions, and citizen groups and activists.
C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

14

SUPPLEMENTS TO CITIZEN OVERSIGHT*

Several other procedures for maintaining citizen oversight of law enforcement agencies can supplement a citizen

review process. One or more of the alternatives listed below can also substitute for citizen review in certain cases

of alleged police misconduct.

Legislative Control

Legislatures can monitor police behavior through investigations, appropriations pressure, oversight committees,

and other means.

Civil Litigation

Complainants may sue police officers in State court and seek common law tort remedies.They may also sue in

Federal court for violations of Federal civil rights.

Criminal Prosecution

Prosecutors at the local, State, and Federal levels can apply applicable criminal statutes to situations involving

alleged police misconduct.

Federal Government Suits

Under a 1994 law, prosecutors may seek changes in the operations of local police departments in Federal courts.

Suits by the U.S. Department of Justice can require reform through court-approved agreements in which police

departments agree to change the way they track and handle citizen complaints and disciplinary decisions or by

installing a Federal monitor to oversee the department’s activities in these areas.

Supervisor Accountability

There are several internal actions police and sheriff’s departments can take, if needed, that may make a significant

difference in helping to prevent police misconduct, including effective applicant screening, recruit and inservice

training, peer review, and, perhaps most important, leadership training. Lt. Bret Lindback with the Minneapolis

Police Department emphasizes that chiefs and sheriffs should be given funding to provide:

the best leadership training you can find to make supervisors and managers accountable for what their

guys do on the street. . . .You need to train them to tell line officers,“You don’t do that [misconduct,

discourtesy] on my watch.” A week’s training when you get your sergeant’s bar isn’t enough.You need

ongoing training, two or four times a year, to build good leadership skills.

Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC), agrees:

We need to review higher-ups’ behavior to produce accountability among line officers. Otherwise, the beat

officer gets scrutinized and the supervisors are never held accountable, never called to account.

* For a more complete discussion of the alternatives, see Perez, Douglas W., Common Sense About Police Review, Philadelphia:Temple University 

Press, 1994: 48–63.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

15

SUPPLEMENTS TO CITIZEN OVERSIGHT (CONTINUED)

OCC addresses supervisors who share responsibility for officers’ misconduct by charging them with failure to supervise the accused officer properly. In Banta v. City and County of San Francisco (1998), the presiding judge of the Superior

Court dismissed a challenge to OCC’s power to add an allegation against a sergeant for failure to supervise.

In the last analysis, supervisor accountability extends to the chief or sheriff, who must exercise active responsibility for ensuring that his or her officers and deputies comport themselves appropriately. If the chief executive will

not or cannot ensure proper conduct, it is the obligation of the mayor, city manager, or city council to find a new

chief and the duty of the voters to elect a new sheriff.

remain untouched. As one commentator observed, “The

solution to rotten apples is to fix the police barrel.”12

Some police chiefs and sheriffs agree that they should be

held accountable for preventing misconduct, and, if they

fail, they should be dismissed. One chief commented,

“If IA is not up to snuff, give the chief a chance to fix it,

and, if he doesn’t, fire him. So the solution [to police

misconduct] is to hold the chief accountable.”

Some complainants who lose their cases (and even some

who win) feel dissatisfied with the process, the results, or

both. Others are frustrated that they cannot find out what

the chief’s or sheriff’s finding was or whether and what

kind of discipline was imposed. According to Jackie

DeBose, a member of Berkeley’s board, “I have run into

several citizens who lost their cases, and they were livid—

they felt they had been done an injustice.” The Vera

Institute of Justice in New York City surveyed a sample 

of 371 citizens who had filed complaints with the city’s

Citizen Complaints Review Board.13 The Vera Institute

concluded that “the investigative process itself has a significant negative influence” on citizen satisfaction because

of how long the process took and the lack of contact with

and information about the subject officer and the final outcome. Some complainants, and a small minority of the

public, will not be satisfied with any actions oversight

bodies take. These individuals may have unreasonable

expectations of how the police should behave or unreasonable hopes for what citizen oversight procedures can

accomplish.

Finally, oversight procedures in some jurisdictions have

exacerbated tensions among local officials, police and

sheriff’s departments and unions, and citizen groups and

activists. This worsening of the status quo has occurred

for many reasons, such as unrealistic expectations on the

part of activists or unrealistic apprehensions by police

and sheriff’s departments about what the oversight procedure would accomplish; failure to involve all affected

parties in the planning process; biased oversight staff;

inadequate funding leading to long delays in case processing; and political motives for setting up the procedure on the part of local officials.

Despite these limitations, local government officials, law

enforcement managers, and citizens in many jurisdictions

believe that citizen oversight can be of value. The following chapters illustrate the potential benefits of citizen

review as well as its limitations.

Notes

1. Walker, Samuel, Achieving Police Accountability,

Research Brief, Occasional Paper Series, no. 3, New

York: Center on Crime Communities & Culture, 1998: 5.

2. Snow, Robert, “Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus,”

Law and Order 40 (December 1992): 51–56.

3. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, “A Report on the

Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police

Department,” prepared for the Albuquerque City Council,

1997: 121.

4. Walker, Samuel, Citizen Review Resource Manual,

Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum,

1995.
C HAPTER 1: I NTRODUCTION

16

5. An example of an oversight procedure that does not 

fall into any of these four types exists in Charlotte, North

Carolina. The city’s Community Relations Committee

appoints a staff member to attend the CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department’s internal hearings of

serious allegations against officers. The staff member 

contributes to the findings of each review panel and can

give a minority report to the chief, city manager, and city

council (which happened once).

6. “How Much Force Is Enough?” Law Enforcement

News 24 (500) (November 30, 1998): 1. “The cost of a

civil suit goes beyond expenses incurred by individual

police officers. Such factors as the cost of liability insurance, litigation expenses, out-of-court settlements, and

punitive damage awards all make civil liability an

extremely expensive proposition for police officers, law

enforcement agencies, governments, and, ultimately, taxpayers. . . . After several lawsuits are filed, . . . premium

prices can skyrocket, or companies may refuse to ensure

the department.” Gaines, Larry K., Victor E. Kappeler,

and Joseph B. Vaughn, Policing in America, 2d ed.,

Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company, 1997: 294.

7. “How Much Force Is Enough?”, 1.

8. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law

Enforcement conference transcript, October 15–17, 1997,

Lanham, Maryland.

9. Luna and Walker, “A Report on the Oversight

Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department.”

10. The oversight process lacks two qualities thought to

be essential to deter misconduct: certainty and severity of

punishment (Sviridoff, Michele, and Jerome E. McElroy,

Processing Complaints Against Police: The [New York

City] Civilian Complaint Review Board, New York: Vera

Institute of Justice, 1988: 35). Oversight procedures 

also often lack a third critical element for deterrence:

swiftness.

11. Sviridoff and McElroy, Processing Complaints

Against Police, 38.

12. Bayley, David, “Getting Serious about Police

Brutality,” in Accountability for Criminal Justice:

Selected Essays, ed. Philip C. Sternberg, Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1995: 96.

13. Sviridoff and McElroy, Processing Complaints

Against Police.
Chapter 2: Case Studies of Nine 

Oversight Procedures

This chapter presents brief case studies of nine oversight

procedures arranged alphabetically by jurisdiction. The

case studies concentrate primarily on the operational procedures of the oversight mechanisms. Details about other

aspects of the jurisdictions’ procedures are presented in

other chapters of the report:

• Chapter 3, “Other Oversight Responsibilities,” describes

how the jurisdictions develop policy and procedure 

recommendations, implement mediation, and assist

with early warning systems.

• Oversight staffing arrangements are discussed in detail

in chapter 4.

• Chapter 5, “Addressing Important Issues in Citizen

Oversight,” presents such problematic areas as intake,

outreach, and “politics.”

• Chapter 6 identifies the most common areas of conflict

between oversight mechanisms and police and sheriff’s

departments.

• Monitoring, evaluation, and funding issues are

addressed in chapter 7.

Exhibit 2–1 identifies the location, type of system, principal activities, and paid staff and budget for each oversight

mechanism. Exhibit 2–2 summarizes the number of complaints, hearings, mediations, and other pertinent activities each system conducted in 1997, the extent to which

its proceedings are open to the public, whether it has subpoena power, and the types of complaints it reviews.

As the exhibits illustrate—and the case studies that follow explain—there is enormous variation in the structure

and operations of the nine systems. In fact, dissimilarity,

rather than similarity, is the rule among the nine systems.

In part this is because radically different systems were

selected for inclusion in this report to illustrate the diversity in oversight mechanisms from which other jurisdictions can choose if they wish to develop a procedure of

their own or modify an existing one. However, the diversity also reflects the fact that local officials have shaped

their oversight systems very differently to accommodate

unique local pressures (e.g., from activist groups, police

unions, or office holders), legal considerations (e.g., with

regard to the types of information that can be made public or the provisions of labor-management agreements),

funding resources, and honest disagreements about what

would work best in their communities.

All four types of oversight approaches listed in footnote a

in exhibit 2–1 are represented among the nine oversight

systems. However, two jurisdictions have combined two

different approaches: Portland has a citizen appeals board

(type 3) and an auditor who monitors the department’s

complaint investigation process (type 4), while Tucson

has a citizen board that reviews internal affairs findings

(type 2) and also an auditor (type 4). Other “models” are

not pure either; for example, while San Francisco’s

Office of Citizen Complaints involves citizens in investigating complaints (type 1), OCC staff also prosecute

cases at chief’s hearings and before the police commission, a responsibility—and expense—that goes well

beyond that of investigating complaints. Similarly, the

Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) not

only hires professional staff to investigate complaints

(type 1) but its volunteer board members also hold hearings for complaints for which investigators have found

probable cause. Furthermore, the CRA executive director

prosecutes these cases before the civilian review board.

While San Francisco’s OCC and Minneapolis’ CRA both

investigate most complaints in place of internal affairs,

Berkeley’s Police Review Commission investigates

cases simultaneously with internal affairs investigations.

The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review

Commission and San Francisco’s Office of Citizen

Complaints recommend discipline to the chief.

The independence of the nine oversight systems also

varies considerably. The St. Paul police chief proposed

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

17
C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

18

EXHIBIT 2–1. SELECTED

FEATURES OF THE

NINE

OVERSIGHT

SYSTEMS

Location Name Typea Principal Activities Paid Staff Budget

Berkeley Police Review 1 • board hears complaints in public hearings and recommends findings 4 full time $277,255pop.: 107,800 Commission to the city managersworn: 190 • board and IA investigate many cases simultaneously

• board recommends policy changes

Flint Office of the 1 • office investigates complaints against all city departments 2 full time $173,811pop.: 134,881 Ombudsman • office reports subject officers’ names to the media 1 part timesworn: 333 • chief relies primarily on internal affairs’ (IA’s) investigation resultsMinneapolis Civilian Police Review 1 • paid professionals, not IA, investigate complaints 7 full time $504,213pop.: 358,785 Authority • volunteer board members hear valid complaints with probable causesworn: 919 • half of cases with probable cause are stipulated

• many cases are professionally mediated

Orange County Citizen Review Board 2 • board members review IA findings on use-of-force cases 2 part time $20,000pop.: 749,631 • board members make policy recommendationssworn: 1,134 • a sheriff’s captain coordinates the board’s activitiesPortland Police Internal 3, 4 • citizens hear appeals; the city council hears further appeals 1 full time $43,000pop.: 480,824 Investigations Auditing • citizen advisers review closed casessworn: 1,004 Committee • an examiner audits IA investigations

• all three provide policy recommendations

Rochester Civilian Review Board 2 • board members are trained mediators 1 full time $128,069pop.: 221,594 • specially trained board members conduct conciliations 3 part timesworn: 685 • board provides policy and training recommendationsSt. Paul Police Civilian Internal 2 • police chief established board as inhouse review procedure 1 part time $37,160pop.: 259,606 Affairs Review • board, not IA, recommends disciplinesworn: 581 Commission • seven-member board includes two St. Paul police officersSan Francisco Office of Citizen 1 • office, not IA, investigates most complaints 30 full time $2,198,778pop.: 735,315 Complaints • office prosecutes cases in chief’s hearings and police commission trialssworn: 2,100 • office recommends policy and training changesTucson Independent Police 2, 4 • auditor reviews completed cases 2 full time $144,150pop.: 449,002 Auditor and Citizen • auditor sits in on ongoing cases and asks questionssworn: 865 Police Advisory • board can review completed cases

Review Board • board hears community’s concerns about the police

• auditor and board make policy recommendations

a.Type 1: citizens investigate allegations and recommend findings; type 2: police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens review findings; type 3: complainants appeal 

police findings to citizens; type 4: an auditor investigates the police or sheriff’s department’s investigation process.

b.This represents the proportion of staff who handle complaints against the police.

b
Subpoena Complaints 

System Activities* Openness to Public Scrutiny Power Reviewed

Berkeley Police 42 complaints filed and investigated • hearings and commission decisions are open to public and media yes • all types of complaintsReview Commission 12 hearings • general PRC meetings available for public to express concerns(PRC) • appeal process

• IA’s dispositions and discipline not public

Office of the Flint 313 cases investigated • findings distributed to media and city archives yes, but • all types of complaintsOmbudsman • no appeal never used

• chief’s finding public, but not discipline

Minneapolis Civilian 159 formal complaints investigated • hearings are private no, but • all types of complaints except Police Review 14 cases mediated • general public invited to monthly CRA meeting to express testimony conduct for which officers canAuthority (CRA) 6 stipulations concerns required be fired or charged criminally 

3 hearings • appeal process under Garrity

• complainant told whether complaint was sustained ruling• chief’s discipline not public until final disposition

Orange County 45 board hearings • hearings are open to public and media scrutiny yes, but • allegations of use of excessive forceCitizen Review Board • findings and the sheriff’s discipline are matters of public record never used • discharges of firearms

• no appeal • abuse of power

Portland Police Internal 21 appeals processed • PIIAC audits are open to public and media yes • all types of complaintsInvestigations Auditing 98 audits of completed cases • citizen advisory subcommittee meetings are openCommittee (PIIAC) to public and media

• appeal to city council• PIIAC decisions are public; chief’s discipline is not

Rochester Civilian 26 cases reviewed • reviews are closed no • allegations of use of excessive forceReview Board 4 cases mediated • results are not public • conduct that, if proven, would 

• no appeal constitute a crime

• other matters as determined by the chief

St. Paul Police Civilian 71 cases reviewed • hearings are closed yes, but • allegations of use of excessive forceInternal Affairs Review • no appeal never used • discharge of firearmsCommission • no publicizing of disciplinary recommendations • discrimination

• poor public relations• other matters as determined by 

the chief or mayor

San Francisco Office 983 cases investigated and closed • chief’s hearings are closed yes • all types of complaintsof Citizen Complaints 50 chief’s hearings • police commission hearings are generally public

6 police commission trials • appeal process for officers

• complaint histories and findings are confidential• chief’s discipline not public

Tucson Independent 96 complaints • monitoring is private no • all types of complaintsPolice Auditor and 63 investigations monitored • appeal processCitizen Police Advisory (9/1/97 to 6/30/98) • board holds monthly meeting for public to express concernsReview Board* Data from 1997 unless indicated otherwise.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

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EXHIBIT 2–2. ADDITIONAL

FEATURES OF THE

NINE

OVERSIGHT

SYSTEMS
the idea of a review commission, nominates its two

sworn members, funds it, and houses it in the public safety building. While San Francisco’s OCC operates independently of the police department and is funded by the

city, its budget is a line item within the police department

budget. The OCC director reports to the San Francisco

Police Commission, which tries major discipline cases

and ratifies policy and training changes. By contrast, an

independent dispute resolution center operates Rochester’s

Civilian Review Board, appoints board members, and

receives funding to staff the procedure directly from the

city council.

Oversight systems differ in other respects. While most

systems may provide policy and procedure recommendations to the local police or sheriff’s department, San

Francisco’s charter requires it to make policy recommendations. In addition, some systems rarely make recommendations, while others are constantly proposing them.

Minneapolis and Rochester make considerable use of

mediation. Until 1999, Berkeley’s mediation system,

although required by statute, was dormant, while San

Francisco has had difficulty getting complainants to

agree to mediation. Other oversight systems offer no

mediation option.

The number of paid staff among the oversight systems

examined ranges from 1 part-time person (St. Paul) to 

30 full-time staff (San Francisco). Most systems have

between four and five paid staff. Largely reflecting the

number of paid staff, the systems’ budgets range from

almost no special funding in Orange County to $2,198,778

in San Francisco. While four other budgets range from

$100,000 to $275,000, St. Paul’s is slightly more than

$37,000 and Minneapolis’ is slightly more than

$500,000.

Exhibit 2–2 illustrates the significant diversity in the type

and extent of oversight activity levels. For example, San

Francisco received 1,126 complaints in 1997, and 715

citizens contacted the Minneapolis program. Berkeley

investigated 42 complaints. Orange County held 45 hearings in 1997, Berkeley 12, and Minneapolis 3. However,

Minneapolis oversight staff also provided other assistance

to 715 additional citizens.

Exhibit 2–2 shows that the systems’ openness to the public also differs widely. At one extreme, Rochester reviews

completed investigations in a private, sealed-off room in

the city hall basement—even the citizen panelists have no

access to internal affairs reports until the panelists meet,

and they must surrender the materials before they disband. The panelists’ findings are not made public. St.

Paul’s reviews also are conducted in private. By contrast,

Orange County invites 57 media outlets to every board

hearing, and the board members’ findings are announced.

Some systems mix privacy with openness. Flint’s ombudsman’s office conducts its investigations in private but then

provides its detailed findings to the press and the city

hall’s public archives. The chief’s hearings in San

Francisco are private, but police commission trials have

been attended by as many as 600 citizens and members

of the press. Boards in Berkeley, Minneapolis, and

Tucson conduct public meetings at which individual citizens can raise general concerns (not personal complaints)

about police conduct. The boards then take up the 

concerns between meetings or at a future meeting. No

oversight system publicizes the nature of the specific

discipline subject officers receive—many jurisdictions

prohibit such disclosure.

This tremendous variation in how the nine oversight systems conduct business may seem discouraging: The lack

of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions to

make an automatic selection of commonly implemented

oversight features around which they can structure their

own oversight procedures. This diversity forces jurisdictions to take the time to pick and choose among a wide

range of alternatives for designing their own oversight

systems and to assess the benefits and limitations of each

possible component. On the positive side, this diversity

means jurisdictions do not have to feel they are obligated

to follow rigorously any one model or approach; they

have the freedom to tailor the various components of

their system to the particular needs and characteristics 

of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes,

union contracts, and pressure groups. Of course, the

choices that are made may have important consequences

for how much the oversight system will cost, how much

it is utilized, and how satisfied citizens are with the complaint process—considerations that will in turn partially

determine which options to select.

Although the choices may be daunting, there is expert

help available for making them. Key participants in all

nine oversight systems have agreed to field telephone

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

20
calls from interested parties to share information about

what works best for them and why. The names and telephone numbers of these individuals follow each case

study. Chapter 8, “Additional Sources of Help,” identifies

other individuals with national experience with oversight

systems who are available for consultation.

The Berkeley, California,

Police Review Commission:

A Citizen Board and the Police

Department Investigate

Complaints Simultaneously

Background

After allegations of police use of excessive force in clearing street people from a local park, Berkeley voters in

1973 approved a ballot initiative that created by ordinance the Police Review Commission (PRC), the oldest

continuously operating citizen oversight agency in the

Nation.

Citizens filed 42 cases with PRC in 1997. The board conducted hearings in 12 cases, which sometimes included

multiple allegations (some of which came from the previous year’s filings). The board sustained at least 1 allegation in 2 of the 12 hearings, for a total of 4 sustained

allegations. The board did not sustain 30 allegations. The

board closed another 34 cases without hearings, either

because the case lacked merit or the complainant failed

to cooperate. For the first half of 1998, in 5 of the 11

hearings held, there was at least 1 sustained allegation.

The review process

Exhibit 2–3 illustrates the Police Review Commission’s

procedures.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

21

THUMBNAIL SKETCH: BERKELEY

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: Berkeley, California

Population: 107,800

Government: city council/city manager

Appointment of chief: city manager nominates, city council approves; city manager can remove

Sworn officers: 190

Oversight funding: $277,255

Oversight staff: two full-time professionals; two full-time clerical

Oversight supervisor: city manager appoints Police Review Commission officer

A nine-member, all volunteer Police Review Commission (PRC) appointed by the city council holds public hearings

of citizen complaints against the police department (with three commissioners participating in each hearing).

A PRC officer appointed by the city manager forwards each complaint she receives to the police department’s

internal affairs (IA) bureau, and she and IA conduct simultaneous but independent investigations of the complaint.

The PRC officer forwards her investigation results to the PRC board for a hearing. After the hearing, the board

submits its findings to the city manager and the chief. Any citizen may express concerns about department policies or procedures at full commission meetings. Based on these public meetings and examination of complaints

citizens have filed, PRC recommends policy and procedure changes to the city manager and chief.
EXHIBIT 2–3. CITIZEN COMPLAINT PROCESS IN BERKELEY

Intake

Citizens may file complaints directly with PRC within 90

days of the alleged misconduct. The ordinance requires

PRC to forward complaints to the police department’s

internal affairs bureau within 30 calendar days. IA and

PRC then both investigate the case independently. PRC

and the police department have 120 days to communicate

their findings to the city manager and for the city manager or chief to determine discipline.

Citizens who file a complaint initially with the police

department’s internal affairs bureau may file the complaint subsequently with PRC within the 90-day limit,

after which the parallel PRC and IA investigations occur.

The IA investigators give complainants a brochure on the

complaint process that mentions PRC, and they tell citizens who express dissatisfaction with the IA investigation

about the PRC option. From 1994 through 1998, 53 percent of complainants registered their complaints initially

with IA rather than being referred by PRC.

Investigations

Either Barbara Attard, the PRC officer, or the PRC investigator conducts an investigation of each complaint.

Subject officers must appear and answer questions, but

they may appear with a union representative or lawyer.

Hearings

To hear each complaint, PRC staff impanel a board of

inquiry consisting of three of the nine board members.

The three choose a chairperson from among themselves.

One week before the hearing, PRC staff provide the

members with a packet containing the results of their

investigation along with relevant ordinances, statutes, and

department policies and procedures. Attard sends a notice

to the chief who, according to the ordinance, must order

the involved officer(s) to attend. A lieutenant, the duty

command officer for the week, is always present to

answer questions about police policy, procedures, and

training.

As soon as the hearing begins, the chairperson makes

clear that the board can offer only recommendations to

the city manager and the chief. The hearing then proceeds as follows:

1. The complainant presents the complaint and introduces any witnesses.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

22

With PRC

Citizen files

complaint

With IA

PRC forwards

complaint

to IA

PRC officer

investigates

Citizen files

complaint

with PRC

IA

investigates

Board of inquiry 

held

PRC officer

recommends

summary

dismissal or

administrative

closure

Full PRC reviews

recommendation

Case

closed

Finding

submitted

to city

manager

and chief
2. Board members, and subject officers or their attorneys, may question the complainant and witnesses.

3. Steps 1 and 2 are followed for the subject officer.

4. Each party may make a closing statement.

5. The board deliberates in closed session.

6. The board returns to announce its finding.

According to the ordinance, the parties may present evidence “on which reasonable persons are accustomed to

rely in the conduct of serious affairs,” including hearsay.

The chairperson rules on objections, but other board

members can overrule the chair. (See “A Hearing by

Berkeley’s Police Review Commission.”)

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

23

A HEARING BY BERKELEY’S POLICE REVIEW COMMISSION

The chairperson calls the meeting to order at 6:10 p.m. A complainant has alleged that (1) an officer unlawfully

taped a telephone conversation with her and (2) failed to give proper explanation by stating that her complaint

was a civil, not a criminal, matter.The police officer’s attorney begins by asking the panel to dismiss the case on

procedural grounds because the officer was an IA investigator at the time of the incident.The chairperson refuses.

The chairperson then invites the complainant to state her complaint briefly.The woman describes her call to the

police after a business partner jumped her locked fence, banged on her door, and demanded payment for an overdue bill.The complainant asks to play the tape recording of her original 911 call, but the chair rules the tape is

irrelevant to this officer’s case. (The complainant has filed a complaint against another officer in which the tape is

pertinent.) The chair refuses two more requests by the officer’s attorney to dismiss the case. On one of the attorney’s motions, he says he will get an opinion from the city attorney.The officer’s attorney asks the complainant

several questions, after which two board members ask her questions.

The officer (who comes in uniform) is sworn in, but he says he has no statement to make.The complainant asks

the officer several questions, including,“Don’t you feel bad about not protecting me [by coming out to her home

when she reported the trespass that was the origin of the case]?” The officer’s lawyer objects to the question, and

the chair tells the complainant to save these kinds of statements for her closing argument.

A commissioner asks the officer,“Do you tell people you are taping them?” “Usually,” he responds.The chair then

asks the lieutenant,“Does the department have a policy to record conversations and tell people whether they are

taping them?” The lieutenant says there is no rule, but the practice is usually to tape and tell. Complainant:“May I

say something?” Chair:“No.”

The chair asks the officer why he did not tell the complainant to file a criminal complaint and let the district

attorney decide whether the incident was a criminal matter.The officer shrugs his shoulders.The lawyer then asks

the officer questions and gives her closing statement, repeating her three motions for dismissal.The complainant,

too, gives a concluding statement, saying,“I am at a disadvantage here because the officer has an attorney, but I

cannot afford one.” She adds that it is insulting for the officer and his attorney to be chewing gum throughout the

entire proceeding.The officer gets up and throws out his gum; his attorney does not.

The board leaves to deliberate at 7:15 p.m. and returns at 7:43 p.m.The chair reports that the board voted 3 to 0

not to sustain the first allegation (illegal tape recording) and 2 to 1 not to sustain the second allegation (improper

advice).

As the meeting breaks up, the complainant tells the chair that she is very upset; board members remain about

5 minutes longer to listen to her frustrations with the hearing process and outcome.The PRC officer explains to

the complainant her right to appeal the decision.
Findings

Board of inquiry findings are based on clear and convincing evidence. Possible findings include unfounded, exonerated, not sustained, and sustained. PRC presents its

findings to the city manager and the chief. If the IA and

PRC findings differ, a designee of the city manager

reviews the decision and recommends to the city manager which finding to support. However, because IA has

already completed its investigation and recommended a

finding to the chief, the chief has typically already ruled

on IA’s finding and, if appropriate, imposed discipline.

Nevertheless, because the city manager has ultimate

authority in disciplinary matters, he can overturn the

chief’s decision after reviewing PRC’s finding. In practice, however, the city manager does not try to reconcile

different findings; the chief alone decides whether to

reverse IA’s finding.

Appeals

Within 15 days after the complainant and subject officer

have been sent PRC’s finding, either party may petition

in writing for a rehearing. There had been no rehearings

as of October 1998 because police officers had never

requested one and complainants had not been able to

document that they had newly discovered evidence.

Commissioners and the PRC officer have no regular procedure for learning what IA’s dispositions are. California

statute (§832.7) provides that “Peace officer personnel

records and records maintained by any state or local

agency, . . . or information obtained from those records,

are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal

or civil proceeding except by discovery.” As a result, the

complainant does not learn whether or what kind of discipline, if any, the chief imposes. (See “A Citizen Has

Mixed Feelings About the PRC Process.”)

Other activities

PRC performs two additional functions.

Public forum for complaints and policy issues

At its general meetings held on the second and fourth

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

24

A CITIZEN HAS MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE PRC PROCESS

A Berkeley resident was stopped by a police officer and cited for a traffic violation.The citizen felt he had not

committed the violation but had been singled out because of his ethnicity. A few weeks later, he heard about PRC

from a friend, who had read about it in the newspaper. Several weeks later, he wrote a letter to PRC and the chief

describing the incident and alleging several acts of misconduct by the officer.

An internal affairs investigator telephoned the man to say that IA would investigate the case independently of

PRC.The IA investigator interviewed him on the phone.The PRC investigator interviewed the man face-to-face in

a 1-hour taped interview.The PRC investigator warned him that the outcome of the case was uncertain.The complainant was frightened and tired and concerned the police might retaliate against him for having filed the complaint. But he followed through. After the interview, the investigator sent him a copy of the transcript along with

the officer’s statement.

At the hearing, the complainant and the officer each gave a statement and asked each other questions.The three

board members asked them questions, too.The commissioners then left the room for 20 to 30 minutes to deliberate.Two board members found that the officer had engaged in an unprofessional backtalk, but all three exonerated the officer on the other allegations.The board member who dissented from the one negative finding

explained his position.

The PRC investigator told the complainant at the end of the hearing that he would not learn whether the officer

would receive any discipline for the sustained allegation.The complainant felt frustrated by this, but he also wanted to put the episode behind him. Overall, the complainant said,“If a similar incident happened again, I would still

file a complaint with the PRC just to see justice done.”
Wednesday of every month except August, PRC serves 

as a public forum at which citizens can express concerns

about police policies and procedures. The meetings,

announced in advance to the press, usually last about 

90 minutes and draw as many as 30 residents and media

if there is a controversial issue of community concern.

An IA investigating sergeant attends every PRC general

meeting.

At the meetings, the PRC chairperson asks for public

comment, subcommittees (e.g., on community outreach)

give reports, and new business is taken up. Barbara

Attard gives a report on the number of new cases filed

since the previous meeting and identifies cases that she

recommends be closed administratively. She may invite a

police unit (e.g., domestic violence, bicycle) to come to

describe its activities.

PRC’s charter also requires it to hold special public

hearings at the request of board members or voters to 

air controversial matters related to allegations of police

misconduct.

Policy recommendations

Either as a result of a public meeting or because of specific

citizen complaints that PRC has heard, board members

and Attard recommend changes in department policies and

procedures. In the wake of riots in a local park in 1991,

which resulted in over 30 complaints to PRC alleging

officer misconduct, the city council directed PRC to

review and make recommendations on “all aspects of

crowd control policies at large demonstrations.” After

study and deliberation, PRC recommended 12 specific

changes that the department later implemented (see

chapter 3, “Other Oversight Responsibilities”).

Staffing and budget

Each of the nine city council members appoints one PRC

board member. Board members may serve indefinitely

until the appointing city council members replace them.

Most serve 5 or 6 years; four have served for at least 10

years. Board members select one of their members to a

1-year nonrenewable term as chairperson.

The city manager appoints the PRC officer and provides

an investigator. Officially, the PRC officer and investigator are the city manager’s staff. However, the public sees

them as acting as the PRC commissioners’ staff. The city

manager in effect delegates his role in supervising PRC

to the PRC officer. Two office assistants complete the staff.

PRC’s budget for fiscal year 1998–99 was $277,255 (see

exhibit 2–4). Until 1998, the budget declined steadily for

several years, along with a reduction in staffing levels

from six full-time equivalents (PRC officer, two investigators, three clerical support) in 1992 and 1993 to four

full-time staff (two professionals and two clerical support) in 1997.

Distinctive features

Berkeley’s oversight procedure is unusual in that the oversight body and the police department investigate many

complaints simultaneously and independently, rather than

sequentially. The system has other interesting features.

• Because the police department’s IA unit and PRC

conduct parallel investigations, if a citizen files a complaint with PRC, the case has the benefit—but incurs

the expense—of two separate investigations.

• Although PRC must refer all complaints that citizens

file with the board to the police department for simultaneous investigation, internal affairs does not refer

cases routinely to PRC. While the PRC ordinance

requires IA to refer all its complaints, State law makes

citizen complaints filed with IA confidential. As a

Budget Item Funding Level

Employees $180,713

Employee education program 586

Fringe benefits 70,659

Stipend–police commission 12,390

Office equipment/furniture 2,895

Facilities maintenance 410

Building and structure 1,120

Telephone 1,761

Pagers 103

Central duplicating 680

Supplies/accessories 2,408

Postage 1,045

Workers compensation 2,485

Total $277,255

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

25

EXHIBIT 2–4. BERKELEY POLICE REVIEW

COMMISSION BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1998–99
result, the PRC officer was trying to develop a referral

process that would comply with the statute and the

PRC ordinance.

• The chief normally reviews IA findings on cases and,

as appropriate, hands out discipline before he or the

city manager receives PRC’s findings.

• PRC’s twice monthly public meetings make it possible

for any citizen to express concerns about police misconduct or policies and procedures. The hearings have

resulted in PRC making significant recommendations to

the department for changes in policies and procedures.

For further information, contact:

Barbara Attard

Police Review Commission Officer

Police Review Commission

2121 McKinley Avenue

Berkeley, CA 94704

510–644–6716

Dash Butler

Chief of Police

Berkeley Police Department

2171 McKinley Avenue

Berkeley, CA 94703 

510–644–6568

The Flint, Michigan,

Ombudsman’s Office: An

Ombudsman Investigates

Selected Citizen Complaints

Against All City Departments

and Agencies

Background

Sweden first incorporated the ombudsman concept in its

constitution in 1909 as a means of curbing governmental

abuses and protecting citizen rights. Today, an ombudsman

typically investigates unlawful or unfair acts on the part of

government agencies and complaints about their services.

In 1974, Flint voters adopted a new charter establishing

an Office of the Ombudsman along with a strong mayoral form of government. Because some citizens felt a

stronger mayor would need some checks and balances,

the electorate simultaneously voted to include the

ombudsman’s office in the new charter for a 5-year

period. In a 1980 referendum, nearly 60 percent of the

residents voted to continue the ombudsman’s office

indefinitely.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

26

THUMBNAIL SKETCH: FLINT

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: Flint, Michigan

Population: 134,881

Government: strong mayor; city council

Appointment of chief: mayor appoints

Sworn officers: 333

Oversight funding: $540,744 (includes overseeing

complaints against all city agencies)

Oversight staff: seven full-time professionals (two

exclusively handle complaints against the police),

one full-time secretary

Oversight supervisor: city council

The Flint, Michigan, City Office of the Ombudsman

investigates complaints from residents dissatisfied

with any city agency, but about half of its complaints

are filed by citizens concerned with police officer

behavior.The office settles some complaints by providing citizens with information about police department policies and procedures or through informal

mediation. In serious cases, office investigators interview complainants and witnesses and require written

answers to questions by subject officers.The office

submits a report on each investigated complaint to

the chief, who arranges for an internal investigation

before deciding on a finding.The ombudsman’s principal power lies in its ability to criticize openly the

behavior of officers by name to the press.
The Flint City Charter states that “The Ombudsman may

investigate official acts of any agency which aggrieve any

person.” City departments are required to provide information the ombudsman requests, and the office has the

power to subpoena witnesses (including police officers),

administer oaths, and take testimony. If elected officials

or appointees refuse to cooperate, the charter provides for

an obstruction hearing that could result in their forfeiting

their jobs.

The ombudsman establishes his or her own rules for

receiving and processing complaints, conducting investigations and hearings, and reporting findings. In 1996, the

ombudsman’s office investigated 662 cases, 313 of which

(47 percent) involved complaints against police officers.

In 1995, 389 of 741 cases (52 percent) involved complaints against the police. The office sustains 2 to 4 percent of citizen complaints against the police annually.

The review process

Exhibit 2–5 shows the process the ombudsman’s office

uses to review complaints.

Intake

People learn about the ombudsman’s office from highprofile cases covered by the media or by word of mouth

from coworkers. The police department’s IA unit does

not inform citizens about the ombudsman unless they

report they are unsatisfied with the department’s answers

to their questions. In addition, the ombudsman’s preferred response to complaints is to refer them to the

appropriate supervisor, accepting complaints primarily

when the citizen does not want to file with the police

department or is dissatisfied with the supervisor’s

response, or when the complaint appears to involve the

use of excessive force. Citizens who want to file complaints with the ombudsman must agree to be interviewed at the ombudsman’s office or at a location of

their choosing. The ombudsman assigns the citizens 

to one of two investigators who specialize in police 

complaints.

Informal resolutions

The assigned investigator may telephone the IA commander to resolve the complaint informally, such as

clarifying a policy or procedure and then providing the

explanation to the complainant. The IA commander

may also choose to ask the shift commander of the subject officer to investigate the problem and then explain

the officer’s behavior to the complainant. About onequarter of complaints reported to the ombudsman are

settled by means of these informal approaches.

The ombudsman office investigator’s next option is mediation. If both parties agree, the investigator arranges a

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

27

EXHIBIT 2–5. FLINT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S INVESTIGATION PROCESS

Citizen files

complaint with 

ombudsman

Ombudsman’s 

office investigates

Request for 

information

sent to chief

Chief responds through:

● IA

● officer’s supervisor

● officer

Ombudsman

informs chief

of findings

Complaint is resolved

informally by:

● an explanation of police

procedures

● referral to officer’s 

supervisor

● IA

● informal mediation
meeting through the officer’s supervisor, if necessary

walking the complainant to the police department to talk

with the supervisor. The citizen and supervisor meet

together alone. If the citizen is not satisfied, he or she

then can file a complaint with the ombudsman.

Formal investigations

When the ombudsman’s office accepts a complaint, the

investigator sends the chief a letter reporting the complaint and asking for a response to questions from the

officer. The chief sends the letter down the chain of command to the subject officer, who usually responds to the

questions in writing or, on rare occasions, in an interview.

The investigator also interviews the complainant for his

or her account of the incident and the names of witnesses. Investigators usually tape the interview. The investigator attempts to contact witnesses by telephone and, where

appropriate, sends letters to homes in the immediate area

of the incident. As needed, the investigator also takes

photos at the scene, secures medical records, and undertakes other pertinent investigatory activities. The

ombudsman’s office has never subpoenaed a witness.

The investigator turns in a report to the chief investigator

or deputy ombudsman indicating agreement or disagreement with the citizen’s allegation(s). The investigator

meets with the deputy or ombudsman to decide on a

finding.

Findings

The ombudsman’s office either sustains or does not sustain each allegation, sustaining only if there is clear and

convincing evidence. The office sends a complete report

of each investigation to the chief and the city council.

The office recommends whether there should be discipline but not the type of discipline.

When the ombudsman’s office concludes the officer did

something wrong—which happens 5 to 10 times a year—

it sends the officer and the chief a synopsis of its investigation with its conclusion. The chief then conducts his

own investigation through IA or the officer’s commander

and makes a final determination of how to proceed.

(See “The Chief’s Response to an Ombudsman

Investigation.”)

The chief sends the ombudsman his finding. He does not

inform the ombudsman’s office about IA’s finding, and

he has the discretion not to tell the office whether he

imposed any discipline. However, on occasion the city

council has asked the chief to explain his response to 

an ombudsman’s report.

The ombudsman’s investigator telephones or writes each

complainant to report the chief’s decision. The typical

case is resolved in 3 weeks.

Other activities

Because there is no shield of confidentiality in Michigan,

the ombudsman’s office has considerable latitude in

informing the press about its cases and criticizing officers by name. The office routinely sends its case reports

to the city clerk as public documents for the city

archives. However, the city charter requires that “No

report or recommendation that criticizes an official act

shall be announced until every agency or person affected

is allowed reasonable opportunity to be heard with the

aid of counsel.” As a result, the ombudsman’s office circulates the report on every sustained complaint to everyone named in the report (except the complainant), giving

them 5 days in which to challenge its factual accuracy

(but not the findings).

Staffing and budget

By a two-thirds majority of the nine members, the city

council appoints the ombudsman for a single 7-year term.

A three-quarters majority on the council can remove the

ombudsman.

At one time, the office had as many as nine investigators,

but by 1998 the number had declined to five. Two investigators handle police complaints full time, and the

deputy investigator takes on some police complaints as

well. The ombudsman appoints a deputy ombudsman and

the investigators. The office has an attorney on contract

to answer legal questions.

There was no ombudsman’s office director between

August 1995 and the end of 1998. When the previous

director was fired in 1995, a court ruled that the city

could not hire a new director as long as a civil suit by the

fired employee was still pending. The deputy ombudsman or senior investigator ran the office in the absence of

a director. In September 1998, a Michigan appeals court

ruled that the city could hire a new director.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

28
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

29

THE CHIEF’S RESPONSE TO AN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATION

A man arrested on a domestic violence charge filed a complaint with the ombudsman’s office alleging an officer

punched him in the face after the citizen tried to headbutt the officer.The citizen also alleged that the officer

threatened to beat him up for hitting a woman.

An ombudsman’s investigator interviewed the complainant, his girlfriend, and the complainant’s brother as well as

the subject officer and two other officers at the scene. Medical records indicated a 2 by 2-centimeter hematoma

on the right cheek.The citizen’s girlfriend reported,“I heard him [the officer] say [to the citizen on the phone

that] he was gonna kick his a--.” The citizen’s brother reported that “I heard one cop say that he [the complainant] hit [the officer].”

The subject officer wrote to the ombudsman that some words were exchanged between him and the citizen, and

when the citizen said “F--- you” and headbutted him, the officer immediately struck the man with a closed fist to

the face.The other officers reported that the man was already handcuffed at the time the officer hit him.The

officer said he hit the man because “With the quickness of the situation, I had no time to use my O.C. [oleoresin

capsicum, or pepper spray] or any other methods to control [the man] from striking again.”

The ombudsman’s report sent to the chief reproduced two department policies pertinent to the complaint, one

on self-control and one on the use-of-force continuum.The latter policy includes the statement that “Above the

holds and maneuvers [in the continuum of force] are the STRIKINGS.The striking points may be soft tissue, joints,

or, in the extreme case, the suspect’s head.”

The ombudsman’s office summarized the case by saying:

Other methods available [to the officer for restraining the subject] would include verbal persuasion,

touching or pushing away, O.C. spray, a compliance hold, the assistance of the other two officers to

subdue Mr. [the complainant] . . . or simply stepping away from Mr. ____ to deescalate the altercation.

It is the Ombudsman’s determination that Officer ____ could have used any of the above mentioned

alternatives first, rather than punching Mr. ____ in the face. Officer did not indicate in any reports to

the Ombudsman that he felt his safety or life were in danger.

The report concluded by saying that “Officer ____’s actions violated the Flint Police Department’ Use of Force

Continuum . . . [and] the police department’s policy on self control.... Chief of Police Trevor Hampton should

review Officer ____’s actions and issue the appropriate discipline.”

The chief wrote the ombudsman’s office back as follows:

I am in receipt of your critical report. Please be advised that Mr. ____ did not file a complaint with the

Flint Police Department regarding this incident. As a result of your report, I am initiating an investigation.

If the findings of the internal investigation show violations by members of the Flint Police Department,

appropriate action will be taken.

Three months later, the chief wrote again to say:

“The investigation involving the complaint of Mr. ____ has been reviewed and evaluated by me.The

charge has been sustained against Officer ____ and appropriate disciplinary action will be taken.”
As shown in exhibit 2–6, the ombudsman’s 1998–99

budget was $540,744; 91 percent of the budget represented wages and benefits. With two investigators devoting

nearly full time to complaints against the police, and the

deputy devoting about one-quarter time to police cases,

the proportion of the budget devoted to complaints

against the police is about $174,000.

Distinctive features

Few jurisdictions in the country make use of an ombudsman to review police misconduct complaints.

• Because the ombudsman serves as a generalized complaint handler for all government agencies, the city

cannot be criticized for singling out the police for

oversight.

• The ombudsman’s office provides citizens with an

alternative place to file complaints against the police

department.

• The ombudsman’s office helps IA to address complainants’ concerns by offering a satisfactory explanation

for an officer’s behavior that the complainant could not

or would not get from the subject officer or patrol desk.

• The office can subpoena department heads, including

the chief, as well as employees and all case files. It has

never used this power.

• The office can—and does—criticize officers by name

in the media for their behavior. This may serve to deter

some misconduct and anger officers. The public has

the opportunity to become aware of police misconduct

when the press prints the information.

• Politics could emasculate the office. Because the

mayor appoints the chief and the city council appoints

the ombudsman, conflict between the two could stymie

the office’s leverage if the mayor were to choose to

ignore the ombudsman whenever the ombudsman

wished to take serious exception to a chief’s findings.

For further information, contact:

Jessie Binian

Ombudsman

Office of the Ombudsman

City of Flint

Flint Municipal Center North Building

120 East Fifth Street, Second Floor

Flint, MI 48502

810–766–7335

The Minneapolis Civilian Police

Review Authority: An Oversight

System Investigates and Hears

Citizen Complaints

Background

The Minneapolis city council established the Civilian

Police Review Authority (CRA) by ordinance in 1990

after African-American community leaders led protests 

at city hall because officers had killed an elderly AfricanAmerican couple in a raid and had broken up an apparently peaceful African-American college student party in 

EXHIBIT 2–6. FLINT OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE

1998–99 BUDGET

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

30

Budget Item Funding Level

Wages and salaries $273,639

Fringe benefits 220,123

Supplies 5,784

Newspapers, professional dues, and publications 240

Professional services 20,000

Micro software and leases 1,000

Data processing services 3,358

Professional services and commissions 3,400

Communications 2,500

Transportation 900

Printing and publishing 1,500

Insurance and bonds 100

Repairs and maintenance 2,000

Miscellaneous 200

Education, training, and conferences 6,000

Total $540,744
a Minneapolis hotel. In 1997, the city council and the

mayor saw the need to determine whether CRA was

providing the appropriate oversight in the most costeffective manner and if it had the structure and staff to

do so. As a result, they appointed a redesign committee

that held focus groups, took public testimony, looked at

how other jurisdictions configured their citizen oversight procedures, and then recommended changes in

how CRA operated, most of which the city council and

the mayor adopted.

In 1997, 715 individuals contacted CRA with concerns

about possible police misconduct. Of these, 114 were satisfied with an explanation of the police department’s policies and procedures. Another 87 callers were satisfied

when investigators called the subject officers’ supervisors

to resolve the complaint. In 332 cases, there was no basis

for a complaint, the caller was referred elsewhere, or citizens

failed to follow up their initial reports. Twenty-three

cases were pending.

The remaining 159 individuals signed formal complaints

(see exhibit 2–7). Of these, the CRA executive director

found no probable cause in 46 cases because of insufficient evidence. The executive director exonerated officers

in another 54 cases because the facts in the allegations

were untrue or, while true, did not constitute misconduct.

The executive director dismissed another 30 cases, for

example, because the complainant failed to cooperate.

Fourteen cases were successfully mediated, and five

cases were pending as of the end of the year. Of the

10 cases in which the executive director found probable

cause, 9 were sustained, 6 by stipulation (see next section) and 3 at hearings. One case was still pending at 

the end of the year.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

31

THUMBNAIL SKETCH: MINNEAPOLIS

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: Minneapolis, Minnesota

Population: 358,785

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor nominates, city council approves

Sworn officers: 919

Oversight funding: $504,213

Oversight staff: seven full time

Minneapolis’ Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) operates in two stages:

1. Paid, professional investigators and an executive director investigate citizen complaints to determine whether

there is probable cause to believe misconduct occurred.

2. Volunteer board members conduct hearings to determine whether to sustain the allegations in probable 

cause cases.

In 1998, subject officers stipulated to a sustained finding in about half of the cases in which the CRA executive

director found probable cause. CRA arranged for successful mediation in another 14 cases. As a result, only 10

hearings were held in 1998.
Insufficient evidence 46

Exonerated 54

Dismissed 30

Mediated 14

Pending 5

Probable cause 10

Sustained by stipulation 6

Sustained at hearings 3

Pending 1

Total 159

The complaint process

Exhibit 2–8 is a flow chart that summarizes how CRA

processes cases. The following discussion explains each

step.

Intake

When complainants contact CRA or the police department’s IA unit, they are told they have the choice of filing with either office but not both. Furthermore, if they

are unsatisfied with the finding from one office, they

may not then file with the other office. Only IA handles

allegations of misconduct that require a criminal investigation, could lead to an officer’s being fired, or are high

profile.

If the complainant files with CRA, the secretary assigns

an investigator who sees the walk-in immediately or telephones the caller to set up an appointment to meet at

CRA. The investigator fits each charge the complainant

alleges into one of eight general CRA types of complaints

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

32

EXHIBIT 2–7. DISPOSITION OF 159 SIGNED

COMPLAINTS IN 1997

EXHIBIT 2–8. MINNEAPOLIS CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY COMPLAINT PROCESS

Initial 

contact

Phone call to

subject officer’s 

supervisor

Signed complaint

Explanation of

police policy or 

procedure

Preliminary

review

Dismissal Mediation

Stipulation

No

probable

cause

Investigation Probable

cause Prehearing

Stipulation

Mediation

Evidentiary hearing

Exonerated Insufficient

evidence

Sustained Disciplinary decision 

by chief
(e.g., excessive force, inappropriate language). The investigator then identifies the department’s policy or procedure that appears to have been violated. The executive

director may dismiss the case during this preliminary

investigation stage.

The investigator sends a letter to the complainant with a

copy of the complaint form asking the person to correct

any errors and sign and return it within 15 days. The

executive director sends a notice of the complaint filing

to the officer, deputy chief, and chief. When the investigator wants to take a formal statement from the officer,

the chief sends a Garrity warning (see “Glossary”)

requiring the officer “upon pain of disciplinary action”

to make an appointment with CRA to answer questions.

CRA investigations

The investigator interviews any witnesses the complainant may have identified and does any additional

needed leg work, such as confirming visually that a witness had an unobstructed view of an incident from her

bedroom window and enough street lighting to see the

nighttime activity clearly. Investigators have gone door 

to door in neighborhoods leaving business cards for

potential witnesses.

Investigators interview the subject officer last. About

half the officers bring a union representative or attorney,

who may caucus with the officer but not speak. The

investigator sends two copies of a transcript of the taped

interview to the officer, one of which the officer signs

and returns. At the conclusion of the investigation, the

investigator forwards the file to the executive director

that includes the investigator’s conclusion regarding the

probable cause for each allegation. If the recommendation is that there is no probable cause, the investigator

recommends a finding of either insufficient evidence or

exoneration. If there is probable cause, the investigator

cites the policy or procedure that the subject officer

appears to have violated. Patricia Hughes, the executive

director, makes a final determination regarding probable

cause.

At this stage, but sometimes before the probable cause

finding or during or after the prehearing (see next section), the officer and CRA executive director may strike

the equivalent of a plea bargain, with the officer stipulating to one or more allegations (that is, admitting guilt) in

exchange for CRA dropping one or more other allegations (see “Stipulations Reduce CRA’s Caseload”). The

complainant is not consulted regarding the nature of the

stipulation.

If there is no stipulation and no offer and agreement to

mediate (see “Other CRA activities” on page 34), the

CRA chairperson appoints a three-member panel to 

hear the case, designating one of the members (including

himself, if he so chooses) as the panel chair.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

33

STIPULATIONS REDUCE CRA’S CASELOAD

Patricia Hughes, the CRA executive director, initiated stipulations after a police union representative suggested

that his client would agree to having committed one allegation if CRA would drop the other complaints. Because

the number of hearings had created an accumulation of pending cases, Hughes saw stipulations as an opportunity

to reduce the backlog.

After a stipulation, CRA informs the chief of which allegations were sustained and tells IA that the findings are the

result of a stipulation. Officers have never agreed to stipulate in cases of alleged use of excessive force.

Officers and their representatives have learned that if the executive director decides there is probable cause that

the officer committed the alleged misconduct, a CRA panel will sustain all of the allegations in about threequarters of the cases. As a result, it is usually in the officers’ best interest to agree to a stipulation to get some of

the allegations dropped.

Because officers have been increasingly willing either to stipulate or agree to mediation, there were only five 

hearings from January 1, 1998, through November 30, 1998.
The evidentiary hearing

The subject officer appears with a union attorney at the

CRA office for a half-hour “prehearing” at which the

panel chairperson and the CRA executive director agree

on the witnesses they will be bringing to the evidentiary

hearing and the information and materials that each side

will be permitted to introduce, such as the incident

report, medical records, and department training manual.

The panel chairperson rules on what information may be

introduced. The prehearing makes it possible to avoid

spending time at the hearing deciding what type of evidence will and will not be admissible.

Based on the union attorney’s and executive director’s

schedules, the panel chairperson schedules a hearing 6 to

8 weeks after the prehearing. Panel members (except the

chairperson, who has attended the prehearing) know

nothing about the case until the hearing begins.

Each panel holds a private, audiotaped evidentiary

(administrative) hearing lasting from a few hours to, on

occasion, several days. Patricia Hughes, CRA executive

director and a former assistant city attorney, prosecutes

the case, and the police union lawyer defends the officer.

CRA does not have subpoena power, but officers must

testify under the Garrity ruling. After witnesses are sworn

in, each side questions its witnesses, who are then crossexamined by the opposing side (followed by recross). 

The prosecutor explains why she believes the officer’s

behavior violates a department policy or procedure.

Panel members may question witnesses and usually do.

The chairperson rules on any objections raised by the

union attorney or executive director. The panel may

admit all evidence that furnishes proof of guilt or innocence, including reliable hearsay if it is the type of evidence that “reasonable persons are accustomed to rely on

in the conduct of their serious affairs.” While the officer

remains during the entire hearing, the complainant leaves

the hearing after giving his or her testimony because the

Minnesota Data Practices Act give employees (e.g., officers) privacy in administrative hearings. The prosecutor

may present a final rebuttal to the union attorney’s closing statement.

Findings

The panel deliberates in private, using a clear and convincing standard to sustain or not sustain the complaint(s). The

CRA executive director sends a letter to the subject officer and deputy chief presenting the panel’s finding.

Within 5 days of receiving the panel’s finding, the officer

or complainant may write to ask the panel to reconsider

its finding. About 5 percent of cases are appealed; few

appeals are granted.

The police department’s disciplinary panel reviews

CRA’s finding and recommends discipline. The officer

may appear before the disciplinary panel with a union

representative to challenge the offense severity but not to

contest the CRA finding. The panel forwards its disciplinary recommendation to the chief for final review. The

ordinance requires that the chief decide on discipline

based on the results of the hearing and then, within 30

days, provide CRA and the mayor with a written explanation of the reasons for his or her action. The chief may

not reverse a CRA finding but has the authority to decide

whether to punish the officer and what discipline to

impose. (See “A Sample Hearing.”)

Other CRA activities

CRA has three other responsibilities.

Monthly CRA meetings

The CRA board members and staff hold an open meeting

the first Wednesday of every month at 5:00 p.m. in an

office building. The executive director keeps the public

apprised of CRA’s activities, providing updates on the

number of cases opened and resolved. The board asks if

anyone in the audience wishes to express general concerns about police behavior. Patricia Hughes relates the

following story:

A few citizens expressed objections at one meeting

to the manner in which officers were conducting

apartment searches to find suspected drug dealers.

In these instances—a tiny minority of all drug

searches—the officers had raided the wrong

address or the drug dealing had apparently been

occurring while the legal tenants were not present.

However, because the raids involved no-knock

entries with shotguns and orders for everyone in

the apartment to lie down at once on the floor

(including a woman sleeping in the nude), the tenants had been embarrassed, frightened, and angry. 

I met with department inspectors to share the 

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

34
public’s concerns. The inspectors agreed with my

recommendation that the officers, when they fail to

find the drug dealer, apologize to the tenants and

explain that they had to take severe measures in

order to protect themselves from drug dealers who

are usually armed and often violent.

Mediation

After a citizen has filed a complaint against an officer,

if both parties accept an offer to mediate, Patricia

Hughes sends the case to the Minneapolis Mediation

Program, a private, nonprofit organization with which

CRA has a $1,500 annual contract to provide unlimited

mediation services, typically 40 to 50 sessions a year.

Under the terms of the contract, the program must

arrange the mediation within 14 days unless there are

extenuating circumstances. Mediation program staff

telephone the parties to reconfirm they are willing to

participate, explain the process, and set a time and neutral place (e.g., a library or neighborhood center) at the

parties’ convenience. The program informs Hughes

whether or not mediation is successful. If mediation is

successful, Hughes dismisses the complaint; if it is not,

she sends the case back to her staff for investigation.

(See chapter 3, “Other Oversight Responsibilities,” for

additional information about the mediation process in

Minneapolis.)

Early warning system

The IA unit generates a quarterly report that lists the 10

officers with the most complaints during the quarter and

for the previous 12 months. The report distinguishes

complaints filed with IA and those filed with CRA.

CRA generates the totals for the complaints it receives.

Staffing and budget

By a majority vote, the city council appoints four board

members through a public application process. The

mayor nominates three board members as well as a chairperson from among the seven members. While the city

council must approve the mayor’s nominees, it has never

rejected one. All appointments are for 4 years, subject to

reappointment.

The CRA board hires, supervises, and fires (if necessary)

the executive director. The CRA chairperson supervises

and evaluates her. He asks other board members to fill out

A SAMPLE HEARING

The chairperson called the hearing to order at 4:05 p.m. Patricia Hughes, the CRA executive director, acting as

the prosecutor, began by giving an opening statement in which she described how an off-duty white officer, stationed at an upscale hotel, was alleged to have made a racial slur against a black man, not a hotel resident, for

being messy while using the hotel restroom.The officer and the man got into a heated discussion, after which the

officer “trespassed” the man—giving him notice that he would be subject to arrest if he returned to the property.

The citizen filed a complaint for harassment and inappropriate behavior.The union attorney said there had been

numerous cases of vandalism and drug use in the hotel restroom. As a result, the officer was just doing his job to

protect the premises in questioning the man about his behavior.The complainant was sworn in and answered

questions from the prosecutor, union lawyer, and panel members. He then left.

The prosecutor introduced a friend of the complainant’s who had entered the hotel with him but had not used

the restroom. However, the friend had heard the conversation that transpired in the hotel lobby and confirmed

the complainant’s story. Although this was hearsay evidence, the panel accepted it because the witness was so

close to the event in time and place.The officer was then sworn in and given a Garrity warning.The officer denied

having made any racial slurs.

The hearing concluded with the prosecutor and union lawyer offering concluding statements, and the prosecutor

presenting a final rebuttal to the lawyer’s statement.The panel deliberated for about a half hour and found 2 to 1

for the complainant.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

35
an evaluation on her each year and invites them to sit in

on the in-person evaluation. He considers how she has

managed the office as well as her litigation skills, public

relations work, and timeliness (for example, whether she

allowed too many extensions because she failed to supervise the investigators adequately). The executive director

hires the three investigators—typically former police

officers from other departments—and clerical staff.

The CRA’s 1998 budget appropriation was $504,213 (see

exhibit 2–9). More than three-quarters of the funding is

for the salaries and benefits of seven staff: the executive

director, three case investigators, a program assistant,

and two clerk typists.

Distinctive features

The Minneapolis oversight system is unusual in that paid

staff investigate most citizen complaints, while volunteers

conduct hearings that result in findings the chief must

accept. The system has several other notable features.

• Because the board appoints the executive director, she

may be better shielded from political influence than if

the mayor or city council appointed her. However,

because the board hires the executive director, there

could be a tendency on her part to accommodate the

board’s concerns rather than to act as a check and balance on each other (for example, when the executive

director prosecutes cases before the board).

• Because most CRA investigators are former police

officers, they have a good understanding of the nature

of police work (see chapter 4, “Staffing”). At the same

Budget Item Funding Level

Salaries and wages $323,303

Benefits 68,518

Total personnel 391,821

Operating costs 33,169

Equipment 2,000

Contractual services 77,223

Total nonpersonnel 112,392

Total expenses $504,213

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

36

EXHIBIT 2–9. MINNEAPOLIS CIVILIAN POLICE

REVIEW AUTHORITY 1998 BUDGET

time, civilians with no professional experience as

sworn officers conduct the hearings. As a result, CRA

combines law enforcement and citizen perspectives.

• Using former police officers as investigators may

result in bias in favor of officers; their use may also

reduce the program’s capacity for objectivity in the

eyes of some citizens and community groups. Using

former police officers as investigators may reduce

opposition to the process among line officers and

union leaders.

• Because the complainant may not attend the hearing

except to give testimony and hear the attorneys’ concluding statements, the complainant does not know

why the case was won or lost.

• On one hand, offering stipulations reduces the number

of cases CRA has to hear, which enables it to hear

other cases more expeditiously. On the other hand, in

some cases, stipulation can prevent mediation, when

mediation might be useful as a procedure for educating

the officer and the complainant to each other’s points

of view.

• By reducing the amount of time panelists have to

spend at hearings deciding what types of evidence to

allow, prehearings speed the process. Prehearings also

offer another opportunity for subject officers to agree

to stipulate as they reconsider the strength of the case

against them.

• In its investigatory capacity, CRA is supposed to be a

neutral party between the complainant and the police

officer. However, if the case goes to a hearing, the

CRA executive director prosecutes the officer. This

dual role could confuse the public, complainants, and

police officers.

For further information, contact:

Patricia Hughes, J.D.

Executive Director

Civilian Police Review Authority

City of Minneapolis

400 South Fourth Street, Suite 1004

Minneapolis, MN 55415–1424

612–370–3800
Liz Murray

Mediator

Minneapolis Mediation Program

Hyatt Merchandise Mart

1300 Nicollet Mall, Suite 3046

Minneapolis, MN 55403

612–359–9883

Robert Olson

Chief

Minneapolis Police Department

Room 130, City Hall

350 South Fifth Street

Minneapolis, MN 55415–1389

612–373–2853

The Orange County, Florida,

Citizen Review Board: A

Sheriff’s Department Provides

Executive Support to an

Independent Review Board

Background

In 1992, in response to the nationwide concern about

police misconduct generated by the Rodney King beating, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office established a

process in which citizens could exercise oversight over

deputies’ use of excessive force and abuse of power. In

1995, the elected Orange County Commission amended

the county charter to establish an independent Citizen

Review Board (CRB) that effectively replaced the sheriff’s board.

CRB heard 45 cases involving 67 allegations of misconduct that the sheriff’s office investigated in 1997. The

board disagreed with three IA findings, exonerating

deputies of two allegations of abuse of power that IA had

sustained and sustaining one abuse of power allegation in

a case in which IA had exonerated the deputy.

The CRB procedure

Exhibit 2–10 and the following discussion explain the

citizen oversight procedure in Orange County.

Intake

Most citizens call the sheriff’s office’s internal affairs

unit to file complaints, but others call the Citizen

Review Board’s number. The CRB’s telephone number

rings at the sheriff’s Research and Development Unit,

which has a dedicated line. The switchboard operator

answers, “Citizen Review Board.” When citizens call,

the secretary mails out the CRB complaint form, which

complainants return by mail or in person at the CRB

office, located at the sheriff’s office. The CRB secretary

turns cases over to the sheriff’s office IA unit for investigation and disposition.

Melvin Sears, a captain with the Research and Development Unit and the CRB administrative coordinator,

provides board members with all completed investigations a month before the cases are to be heard. The cases

are complaints of alleged use of excessive force (including all discharges of a firearm, even if there has been no

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

37

THUMBNAIL SKETCH: ORANGE

COUNTY

Model: citizens review cases (type 2)

Jurisdiction: Orange County, Florida (Orlando)

Population: 749,631

Government: county commission

Appointment of sheriff: elected

Sworn deputies: 1,134

Oversight funding: $20,000

Oversight staff: two part time

A nine-person Citizen Review Board selected by the

Orange County Commission and sheriff hears all

cases involving the alleged use of excessive force

and abuse of power after the sheriff’s internal affairs

unit has investigated them. Hearings are open to the

public and the media. Board members also make

policy recommendations. A captain in the sheriff’s

office devotes about 20 percent of his time to 

coordinating the board’s activities.
citizen complaint) and abuse of power (using one’s official position for personal gain or privilege or for avoiding the consequences of illegal acts). These types of

cases are automatically slated for a future agenda. 

(See “A CRB Hearing Through the Eyes of a Deputy

Sheriff.”) Complaints that are questionable as to whether

they fall within CRB’s purview are given to the chairperson, and he decides if they are appropriate for board

review.

CRB hearings

CRB meets once a month in public session in a county

administration building meeting room. During the first

part of the meeting, members approve the minutes of the

previous meeting and hear any reports from the chairperson, vice chairperson, and Sears. The members then

review cases in accordance with a published agenda that

has been circulated in advance to the public and 57

media outlets. The board hears about four cases at each

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

38

EXHIBIT 2–10.THE ORANGE COUNTY CITIZEN REVIEW PROCESS

IA

investigates

and 

develops 

finding

Sheriff’s CRB administrative coordinator 

sends IA case packet 

with finding to CRB 

members for cases 

involving allegations of:

● use of excessive force

● abuse of power

Sheriff decides 

on discipline

Board holds 

hearing at 

monthly meeting

Board concurs 

with IA finding 

without holding 

hearing

Sheriff 

makes own 

finding and 

decides 

on any 

discipline

Chain of command 

recommends 

discipline, if any

Board sends 

memo to 

sheriff 

agreeing or 

disagreeing 

with IA 

finding

 

Citizen files

complaint with 

Citizen Review

Board support 

staff (sheriff’s 

office secretary 

or administrative 

coordinator)

A CRB HEARING THROUGH THE EYES OF A DEPUTY SHERIFF

The IA unit told Patrick Reilly, a deputy sheriff, that the father of a youth Reilly had arrested had filed a complaint

alleging use of excessive force in the form of a controlled knee spike (kick). Later, IA informed Reilly that it had

exonerated him. However, the deputy knew that, because it was a use-of-force complaint, CRB would hold a hearing.

Within 2 weeks, CRB sent Reilly a letter instructing him to appear for a hearing and to bring any witnesses he

chose.The deputy chose not to bring a union representative because there was not going to be a criminal charge

and he felt confident he would be exonerated. Reilly did bring two other deputies who had witnessed the kick.

Eight of the nine board members were present.

The chairperson called Reilly’s case (four other cases were heard that evening), read the allegation, and asked for

the deputy’s side of the story. Reilly reports that he was given as much time as he needed and every opportunity

to defend himself and clarify what he did and why. He did not feel he was on trial, and the board seemed neutral.

The board asked one of Reilly’s two witnesses to speak briefly.The IA investigator explained the sheriff’s office

use-of-force matrix and policy, which the board had already examined.The complainant did not come.

The board concurred with the IA finding.The case took slightly more than an hour. Reilly remained to sit in on

the case that followed.
meeting. The IA investigating deputy is present at the

hearing to answer questions about his or her investigation. Sears advises on policy issues and provides administrative support. The board has subpoena power, and

county legislation provides for a fine of up to $500 or

imprisonment for up to 60 days for anyone convicted of

ignoring a CRB subpoena. However, the board has never

subpoenaed anyone because the sheriff has issued a

standing order requiring deputies to appear when called

(but not requiring them to testify). The Central Florida

Police Benevolent Association provides interested

deputies with representation, but most deputies choose

not to be represented because either they have decided

not to answer questions or, more commonly, having

already been cleared by IA, they feel they have nothing

to fear. Finally, a criminal attorney, hired by the county

on a retainer basis, comes to every hearing to answer

questions on points of law, such as the proper interpretation of the State statute on assault.

Any board member may make a motion to place a complaint on a “consent agenda” if he or she feels that IA’s

findings are appropriate and no further review or meeting

time is needed to discuss the merits of the complaint.

Any member may also have a complaint removed from

the consent agenda and subject to a full CRB review. The

meeting minutes for the August 1998 meeting show, for

example:

Motion was made by Mr. Mills, seconded by Mr.

Rankin and unanimously agreed upon, to place this

case on the consent agenda, thereby concurring with

the findings of the Professional Standards investigation that, based on a preponderance of the evidence,

the following violations were sustained [the complaint and violation of policy followed].

Hearings follow Robert’s Rules of Order. For each hearing, the following individuals, in this order, give a statement and answer questions from board members:

• The complainant.

• Any witnesses for the complainant (although they

rarely appear).

• The sheriff’s investigating agent.

• The subject deputy.

• Any other sheriff’s employees present whom the chair

chooses to recognize.

• The complainant again (to rebut the testimony presented

by others).

At its discretion, the board may allow direct conversations among the parties.

Findings

The board spends 15 to 20 minutes deliberating each case

in open session. The chairperson calls for a vote, and

each member explains his or her decision. A majority

rules, but almost all cases are unanimous. Decisions are

based on a preponderance of the evidence. The board

chairperson signs a form letter that Melvin Sears sends to

each complainant after each hearing. There is no appeal.

CRB does not provide findings; rather, it sends a form

memo to the sheriff agreeing or disagreeing with the IA

finding in each case. The board agrees with IA findings

80–90 percent of the time. The board’s decision is only

advisory to the sheriff. On rare occasions, the sheriff

overrules the board:

A robbery detective on a stakeout fired a shotgun at

a robber’s car as it fled the scene, blowing out a tire.

Because the sheriff’s office prohibits firing at automobiles, IA determined that the deputy had violated

department policy. The CRB, however, exonerated

the deputy because members did not want to see

deputies’ hands tied so stringently—they wanted to

provide deputies with more latitude in the use of

firearms. Nevertheless, the sheriff supported the 

IA finding and disciplined the deputy.

Other activities

The board may recommend fitness-of-duty evaluations,

additional training, and other measures for officers

whose cases come before it. CRB also has the authority

to hire an investigator to conduct its own investigations.

However, when members feel more investigation is needed, they ask IA to do so and bring back the case. The

board has recommended several policy and procedure

changes that the sheriff has implemented (see the examples in chapter 3, “Other Oversight Responsibilities”).

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

39
Staffing and budget

Each of the seven members of the Orange County

Commission nominates a single board member subject to

confirmation by the rest of the commissioners. The sheriff selects two members of the board—always choosing

civilians. Board members serve for 2 years and may be

reappointed for a total of 4 years. The members elect a

chairperson for a year, who chairs every hearing.

The county commission requires the sheriff to assign a

captain and a secretary unaffiliated with internal affairs

to devote about 20 percent of their time to providing

administrative support to CRB. Melvin Sears schedules

CRB meetings and training sessions, informs complainants about the meetings, lines up the meeting hall,

sends the IA case investigation materials to members,

and prepares the annual CRB report. Sears keeps track

of the board members’ attendance on a spread sheet so

he can report excessive absences to the county commissioners. The secretary records each hearing and provides

the minutes.

Sears’ and his secretary’s CRB work amount to a $20,000

contribution by the sheriff’s office (20 percent of their

combined salaries). The sheriff also pays for all the direct

costs associated with the board’s work, such as postage

and duplication. The sheriff pays for publishing CRB’s

brochure and letterhead stationary. CRB’s attorney submits a bill to Sears—typically $200–$250 per month—

who approves it and forwards it to the county for payment.

Distinctive features

An unusual feature of the Orange County oversight system is that a sheriff’s deputy has the responsibility for

administering the Citizen Review Board’s activities.

However, the board comes to its own conclusions in

reviewing internal affairs findings. Because of this

arrangement, the oversight procedure costs the taxpayer

little.

• By keeping track of board members’ attendance and

reporting problems to the county commission, the

administrative coordinator exercises some quality 

control over the proceedings.

• Locating the CRB office in the sheriff’s office saves

money otherwise needed to rent space and spares the

administrative coordinator from having to shuttle back

and forth between the agency and an outside CRB

location. However, some complainants may be discouraged from filing because they are uncomfortable going

to the sheriff’s office.

• By reviewing all cases involving discharge of a

firearm, regardless of whether a citizen filed a complaint, CRB can help identify problems among individual officers or general failures of training and policy.

• Not handling allegations of deputy discourtesy reduces

the burden on board volunteers to hear many more

cases. At the same time, this restriction results in a lack

of citizen oversight of these types of incidents.

• Having an attorney present at all hearings provides for

instant legal advice, without which there might be

additional continuances of cases.

CRB’s Web address is www.qualitywebs.net/crb.

For further information, contact:

Paul McQuilkin, Ph.D.

Chairperson

Orange County Citizen Review Board

55 West Pineloch Avenue

Orlando, FL 32806

407–823–2821

Capt. Melvin Sears

Administrative Coordinator

Orange County Citizen Review Board

55 West Pineloch Avenue

Orlando, FL 32806

407–858–4797

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

40
The Portland, Oregon, Police

Internal Investigations Auditing

Committee: A City Council,

Citizen Advisers, and a

Professional Examiner Share

Oversight Responsibilities

Background

When the police arrested a number of gay persons in a

park in 1993 for alleged sexual activity in public, some

neighbors and the arrested individuals complained that

the police had used excessive force and had singled out

homosexuals for special enforcement. The mayoral candidate promised to look into the problem. As a result,

the city auditor prepared an audit of both the Portland

Police Bureau’s IA unit and the existing Police Internal

Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC) that had been

created in 1982. A local Copwatch organization also submitted a proposal for strengthening citizen oversight. As

a result of these efforts, in 1994 the mayor proposed, and

the city council approved, changes to the city code that

strengthened PIIAC’s authority and provided for the

appointment of an auditor.

As shown in exhibit 2–11, Portland’s oversight structure

includes three components: the four-member city council,

citizen advisers, and a professional examiner.

• Technically, the city council itself (including the

mayor) is the Police Internal Investigations Auditing

Committee, although most people loosely refer to the

entire oversight procedure as PIIAC. By ordinance, the

committee is required to:

— Assist the police bureau in maintaining community

credibility in its internal affairs investigations by

issuing public reports on the process.

— Provide a discretionary review process for 

complainants who are dissatisfied with an IA 

investigation.

• The ordinance allows the committee to “utilize Citizen

Advisors consisting of 13 persons to assist in performing its duties and responsibilities.” Advisers:

— Hear appeals as a group at monthly meetings from

citizens dissatisfied with police internal affairs

investigations of their complaints.

— Review all closed IA cases involving use of force.

— Individually conduct random audits of IA 

investigations.

• An examiner, hired by the mayor, coordinates the work

of the committee and citizen advisers and conducts

much of the auditing herself.

In 1997, citizen advisers processed 21 appeals. The

advisers or the auditor monitored 98 cases.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

41

THUMBNAIL SKETCH: PORTLAND

Model: citizens hear appeals (type 3) and audit IA

process (type 4)

Jurisdiction: Portland, Oregon

Population: 480,824

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor appoints and can fire

Sworn officers: 1,004

Oversight funding: $43,000

Paid oversight staff: one full time

Appointed by council members and neighborhood

coalitions, 13 “citizen advisers” hear appeals from citizens dissatisfied with police investigations of their

complaints, review all closed cases involving the use

of force, and conduct random audits of IA investigations.The city council, meeting as the Police Internal

Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC), hears

appeals from citizens who are dissatisfied with the

police department’s investigation of their complaints.

A professional examiner coordinates the work of

PIIAC and the citizen advisers and conducts many of

the audits herself.The examiner and citizen advisers

also provide the chief with policy recommendations.
Citizen appeals of IA findings

Citizens may appeal a complaint finding within 30 days

after IA has completed its investigation. If the complainant calls the examiner for a hearing, the examiner

sends the person an appeal application, schedules the

hearing for a future citizen advisory meeting, and

arranges for the police bureau to send her the investigation file, which she distributes to advisers to review

before their next meeting.

The examiner and an adviser of her choosing go separately to IA to review the case file and confirm each

other’s assessment of the investigation. The examiner

then prepares a report that includes a summary and

analysis of the case, a critique of the investigation

process, and recommendations for how the case should

be handled. She distributes the report to all the advisers

and IA to review. At times, she discusses the findings or

the investigation process with the IA captain before the

advisers meet.

At its next monthly meeting, the full volunteer citizens

advisory board can deny the request for review. If the

board accepts the appeal, it conducts a formal hearing.

Subject officers may attend but usually do not. However,

officers’ names are not used—they are referred to as

“officer A” and “officer B.” If he wants to know what

transpires, the police union president attends. Someone

from IA is present to explain how it investigated the case.

Although the advisers have read the full report before the

meeting, the citizen adviser who reviewed the case gives

a brief oral case summary to the other advisers. The

chairperson then asks the complainant, “Please tell us

what you would like us to know about this case.” The

complainant can not present new evidence because the

hearing is an audit, not an investigation. Advisers may

question the complainant, the subject officer (if present),

and any witnesses who have come. Advisers discuss the

case in public and vote to do one of the following:

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

42

EXHIBIT 2–11. STEPS IN THE PORTLAND AUDIT PROCEDURE

Citizen

files 

complaint

IA investigates 

and command 

staff issues 

finding

Citizen advisers 

and examiner 

audit random 

closed cases

Examiner 

reports results 

to full advisory 

board

Advisory board 

reviews and 

discusses 

report

Board submits 

report to PIIAC 

(city council)

PIIAC discusses 

and approves

Chief responds to 

recommendations 

within 60 days

IA commander

controverts finding

Board asks police bureau 

Review Level Committee 

to reconsider finding

PIIAC informs 

chief of 

recommendations

PIIAC hears 

advisers’

recommendations

Board

rejects 

finding

Board refers 

case to IA 

for further 

investigation

Board

rehears

appeal

Board affirms 

finding

Complainant 

appeals

PIIAC

hears 

appeal

Finding 

rejected

Finding 

sustained

Citizen 

advisory 

board hears 

appeal

Appeal 

rejected

Examiner and 

one adviser 

review case

Citizen 

appeals if 

dissatisfied
• Affirm the police bureau’s finding.

• Refer the case to IA for further investigation.

• Recommend that PIIAC (i.e., the city council) inform

the chief in writing that the finding does not support

IA’s determination.

• Refer the finding for reconsideration to the police

bureau’s Review Level Committee (consisting of

branch managers, the accused officer’s manager, the

PIIAC auditor, one citizen adviser, and nonvoting representatives from the police bureau and the city).

On the two or three occasions a year when the advisory

board asks the Review Level Committee to reconsider a

finding, the examiner and the adviser who reviewed the

case participate in the meeting. On occasion, the Review

Level Committee has agreed to change an exonerated

finding to one of insufficient facts. On one occasion, the

chief overruled the Review Level Committee’s recommendation and sided with the PIIAC advisers to sustain 

a complaint.

Advisory meetings last about 90 minutes, with 15–20

minutes devoted to each appeal. After each monthly meeting, the examiner drafts a report for PIIAC summarizing

the advisory board’s conclusions regarding each appeal.

Audits

Five citizen advisers volunteer to be on a PIIAC monitoring subcommittee. Subcommittee members look at cases

chosen at random by the examiner to determine trends in

quality, timeliness, and accuracy of the police bureau’s

IA procedures and investigations.

Internal affairs sends the examiner all closed cases each

month—30–40 cases. The examiner assigns the cases to

monitoring subcommittee members with a worksheet to

guide their review, but she does most of the reviews herself, including all cases that involve the alleged use of

excessive force or discrimination and all cases IA sustains.

The examiner or the assigned subcommittee member goes

individually to the police bureau to review the entire file

for each case in a private room. One of them completes

the worksheet with pertinent information about the case.

Officers’ and complainants’ names are not included in the

reports. The examiner and adviser spend 2–4 hours 

examining how thoroughly and fairly the investigation was

conducted and whether the finding is solidly supported.

At each monthly monitoring subcommittee meeting,

which is open to the public and the press, advisers and

the examiner discuss trends they may have spotted in

their investigations. (See “Troublesome Trends Revealed

by Monitoring Cases.”) Based on the audit results, the

examiner develops a draft quarterly report, with subcommittee members’ help, highlighting shortcomings in the

investigations, abuse trends, and recommended policy or

training changes (see “Other activities” on page 45). At

the next monthly subcommittee meeting, subcommittee

members review the report—and pertinent statutes and

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

43

TROUBLESOME TRENDS REVEALED

BY MONITORING CASES

In 1998, the examiner—Lisa Botsko (at that time)—

and citizen advisers noticed that several complainants reported that, when they asked police officers for their badge numbers, the officers would

reply,“I don’t have a badge number.” Technically, this

was accurate. However, officers do have identification numbers. After Botsko shared this concern

with the police bureau, the chief clarified the pertinent general order to require officers to interpret

requests for their badge number as a request for

their identification number.

Botsko and the advisers also noticed that a number

of incident reports referred to officers’ use of a “distraction blow” without explaining its purpose. After

inquiring about the behavior, Botsko learned that the

police bureau training department taught the distraction principle (e.g., pushing the driver’s head while

prying his or her hands off the steering wheel)—but

not a blow—as a means of diverting someone’s attention. Indeed, the bureau considers a blow to be a use

of force that requires explanation in the incident

report. It turned out that some officers had learned

the distraction blow technique at the State training

academy. As a result, the bureau agreed to explain

during inservice training that officers always have to

explain in their reports why they struck someone

and refrain from using incorrect terminology.
general orders that the examiner prepares for them—

before the examiner submits it to the full citizens advisory board at a public session for review and approval. The

examiner submits the approved report to PIIAC.

During her first year in 1994–95, Lisa Botsko, the examiner, used to send 60 percent of cases back to IA for

additional work; by 1998, this had declined to 20 percent

because “IA had figured out what I was looking for.”

Botsko heard investigators saying, “Be careful, or PIIAC

will send it back.” (See “Auditors Have Identified

Problems With IA’s Investigations.”) Internal affairs also

improved its reports because the bureau improved its

training and guidelines for IA investigators.

PIIAC (city council and mayor)

The city council conducts PIIAC business once or twice a

month during its regular weekly meetings. The council

may piggyback other council work onto the PIIAC agenda; at other times, council members may not meet as

PIIAC for 2 or 3 months because no appeals reach them.

The examiner schedules the meetings and the mayor

chairs them.

Typically, PIIAC hears one or two appeals a month.

Sessions are open to the public and are televised by a

local television cable channel. The complainant may

come to the meeting, and someone is present from IA 

to answer questions. The committee has the power to

compel attendance, testimony, and the production of 

documents and can administer oaths.

The adviser and auditor present each case, and the complainant comments. While the subject officer may sit in

with the other members of the audience, he or she is not

questioned because the auditor listens in advance to the

taped IA interviews and, as needed, has already requested

IA to ask any questions of the officer she felt were omitted. Commissioners ask questions throughout. Each commissioner then comments on the case and votes in public.

A majority rules. The committee informs the chief in

writing of one of the following:

• No additional investigation is warranted.

• IA should reopen the case to conduct additional 

investigation and report its findings to PIIAC.

• The finding should be changed (see “When PIIAC 

and IA Disagree on a Finding”).

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

44

AUDITORS HAVE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS WITH IA’S INVESTIGATIONS

The types of problems Lisa Botsko, the first examiner, and citizen advisers found in the past with some IA 

investigations have included:

• Interviewing only officers and no neutral witnesses.

• Neglecting to interview one or more important witnesses.

• Not taking photographs at the scene.

According to Botsko, leading questions asked by IA investigators remained a problem—for example, asking,“Was

the subject being deliberately provocative and antagonistic to you?” instead of asking,“How was the subject

behaving toward you?” On one occasion, IA investigated two officers who had arrested a juvenile for a sex crime

without contacting the boy’s parents before removing him from school. On the audiotape of the interviews, the IA

investigator examined the parents “under a microscope,” but not the officers—for example, challenging the parents’ statements but not the officers’.The investigator asked a civilian witness,“What do you mean the officer was

screaming?” but did not ask the officer to describe his own behavior.

Botsko and the auditors also have criticized IA and precinct sergeants for not following consistent procedures in

collecting evidence regarding citizen complaints, writing reports, and including documentation in the case file.

When Botsko reported to IA in 1997 that the precinct sergeants were not producing consistent reviews, the

police bureau agreed to implement annual training for sergeants on how to prepare misconduct reports.
Other activities

Based on its audits, the examiner recommends policy and

procedure changes to the police bureau in her quarterly

reports that the city council, acting as PIIAC, votes to

adopt. The chief must respond to the report in writing

within 60 days. The response must indicate what policy

or procedural changes within IA, if any, he has instituted

as a result of the report. If the chief does not respond

within 60 days, the examiner sends an e-mail reminding

him or telephones the IA commander. If the chief still

fails to respond, the city council can consider the matter.

Chapter 3 presents illustrative policy recommendations

PIIAC has made that the bureau has adopted.

Staffing and budget

Each of the four city council members appoints one

adviser; the police commissioner, who also is the mayor,

appoints two advisers; and each of seven neighborhood

coalitions chartered by the city recommends an adviser 

to the city council for appointment. Advisers serve for 

2 years, subject to reappointment.

The mayor appoints and funds the examiner, who spends

full time on oversight activities. The examiner’s salary 

is $43,000. The mayor’s office also pays for oversightrelated duplication, telephone, and secretarial costs.

Distinctive features

The most unusual features of Portland’s oversight system

are, first, the use of citizen advisers to review completed

internal affairs investigations at the police station and,

second, the city council’s role in hearing citizen appeals.

• By trying to ensure that IA investigations are done

properly, the auditor’s approach may eliminate the

need for independent professionals to investigate citizen complaints. This approach may reduce the costs

of citizen oversight.

• Because PIIAC does not accept citizen complaints,

some individuals may not report allegations of police

misconduct because they may be afraid to take their

complaints to the police bureau. Citizens do have the

option of filling out complaint forms at the neighborhood coalitions represented among the citizen advisers,

which then forward the forms to IA.

• PIIAC examines only completed cases. As a result,

PIIAC cannot shape the conduct of individual investigations while they are in progress. However, through

its audits, PIIAC may be able to motivate investigators

to do a better job overall. By not investigating cases,

the oversight procedure may receive better cooperation

from the police.

• Citizen advisers are not professional auditors. As a

result, they may not possess, or may need time to

learn, the skills needed to conduct a competent audit.

• Because a majority of citizen advisers are chosen by

neighborhood associations, citizens may be more likely

to feel they are well represented in the oversight

process than if advisers were chosen by city officials.

• The system does not require police officers to participate in the audit process.

• Because PIIAC and advisory board meetings are public, and because PIIAC must publish periodic reports,

the media have an opportunity to focus on police 

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

45

WHEN PIIAC AND IA DISAGREE

ON A FINDING

PIIAC disagreed with an IA finding three times in

1997. In two cases, the chief disagreed with PIIAC

and agreed with IA that there had been no officer

misconduct. In one of those two cases, PIIAC voted

4 to 1 to sustain an allegation of misuse of position

against an officer who wrote a police report documenting that his neighbors’ unsupervised children

were making noise on a trampoline late one night

after the officer had tried to resolve the problem by

talking with the parents.The report suggested that

the State’s Child Services Division, which investigates

child abuse cases, become involved.The chief supported IA’s exoneration of the officer. In the third

case, PIIAC decided that IA was incorrect in deciding

that an officer had not violated bureau policy by

removing a child from school without notifying the

child’s parents.The officers felt that informing the

principal was adequate notification.The chief sided

with PIIAC.
misconduct, examine how the police bureau conducts

its internal affairs investigations, and publicize what

they learn.

• PIIAC commissioners—even though they make up the

city council—do not have the power to overrule the

chief’s decision to sustain or not sustain complaints.

Police administrators are likely to feel it is important

that the ultimate decision remain with the department.

Complainants may feel frustrated that elected officials

do not have the final say in their cases.

• Because the auditor works for the mayor, the chief

executive is free to increase or decrease the hours she

devotes to PIIAC.

For further information, contact:

Examiner

Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee

1221 Southwest Fourth Avenue, Suite 340

Portland, OR 97204–1995

503–823–4126

Bret Smith

Commander, IA Unit

Portland Police Bureau

1111 Southwest Second Street

Portland, OR 97204

503–823–0236

The Rochester, New York,

Civilian Review Board: Trained

Mediators Review Citizen

Complaints

Background

In 1976, after community groups expressed serious 

concern when police officers killed a woman who was

brandishing a knife, the mayor appointed a commission

to explore how to improve police-community relations

and reduce the use of excessive force. One of the panel’s

recommendations was a citizen review process. As a

result, the city council approved legislation establishing

a Complaint Investigation Committee, consisting of

review panels with two command police officers and one

citizen that met at police headquarters to review completed IA investigations. In 1984, the council changed

the composition of the panels to include two civilians

and two command officers and established a conciliation

process. In 1992, the council renamed the committee the

Civilian Review Board (CRB), excluded any police representation, and moved the reviews to the city hall.

The city council contracts with the Center for Dispute

Settlement to train and provide the panelists and arrange

for the reviews. Founded in 1973 by the American

Arbitration Association, the center is the third oldest notfor-profit dispute resolution organization in the Nation. 

It offers alternative dispute resolution options to the court

system and trains community members to conduct conciliation. The city council chose the Center for Dispute

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

46

THUMBNAIL SKETCH: ROCHESTER

Model: citizens review cases (type 2)

Jurisdiction: Rochester, New York

Population: 221,594

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor nominates, council

approves, mayor may remove

Sworn officers: 685

Oversight funding: $128,069

Oversight staff: one full time, three part time

The Rochester City Council contracts with a local

dispute resolution center to set up three-member

panels of trained, certified mediators to review

internal affairs cases.The panels establish findings

that the chief considers along with IA’s findings in

imposing discipline.The panels also may recommend

change (related to the cases it reviews) in department policies, training, and IA investigation procedures. In a separate process, the dispute resolution

center conducts about 10 formal citizen-police

conciliations each year.
Settlement to perform the citizen oversight function

because it appeared to be the most capable organization

in the city for conducting an impartial review of police

behavior. Although most of the center’s funding comes

from the New York State Unified Court System, CRB’s

budget is a line item in the police department’s budget.

In 1997, the police department submitted 26 completed

cases out of 131 for CRB review, or 20 percent. The 26

cases involved 80 allegations. For the first 9 months of

1998, CRB reviewed 58 cases involving 141 allegations.

CRB sustained 23 percent of cases in 1997 but only

7 percent during the first 9 months of 1998.

Procedure

Exhibit 2–12 shows CRB’s review process, which is 

discussed in detail in the following section.

Intake

Citizens may file complaints by mail or in person at the

Center for Dispute Settlement office as well as at city

hall or police headquarters. The center received nine

complaints in 1997, most referred by the mayor’s office,

and five complaints during the first 9 months of 1998.

After screening to make sure the case has merit or is 

suitable for conciliation (see following), the center forwards the complaints to the police department’s internal

affairs unit for investigation. The vast majority of complainants file directly with the police department.

IA sends for CRB review all investigations of cases that

involve:

• Charges of use of excessive force.

• Conduct that, if proven, would constitute a crime.

• Other matters the chief chooses to refer to CRB.

During or after completion of each internal affairs investigation, IA calls Todd Samolis, the CRB coordinator, to

notify him to set up and schedule a panel to review the

completed case.

Hearings

Each CRB panel consists of three volunteers selected

from a pool of 15–20 individuals who are certified mediators, have attended a shortened version of a police academy (see below), and receive special training to function

as panelists. One of the three panelists is a chairperson

who facilitates the review. CRB held as few as two panels

in January 1998 and as many as 13 in June; the modal

number (occurring in each of 5 months in 1998) was 7.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

47

EXHIBIT 2–12. ROCHESTER CITIZEN OVERSIGHT PROCESS

Center for 

Dispute 

Settlement 

conducts 

mediation

Center 

sends 

results

to IA

Mediation successful

Mediation unsuccessful

If chief disagrees with panel 

finding, panel may appeal to 

the mayor and city council

If chief sustains 

finding of IA or 

CRB, he sends 

case through 

chain of 

command for 

discipline

CRB sends its 

finding to the 

chief and district 

commanders 

along with any 

case-related 

recommendations 

regarding policy, 

remedial training, 

and investigation 

procedure

Panel 

requests 

further 

investigation 

by IA 

before 

rendering 

finding

CRB panel 

reviews 

case

IA 

determines 

whether 

case is 

appropriate 

for CRB 

review

IA 

investigates 

complaint 

and 

develops 

finding

Center 

forwards 

case to IA

Citizen files 

with Center 

for Dispute 

Settlement

Citizen

files

with IA

Accepted

Refused

Mediation 

offered
Reviews are held during the day in a soundproof, locked

room in the city hall basement where the CRB files are

kept under lock and key. The investigating sergeant for a

given complaint brings the key to the room and unlocks

it for the panelists before the review.

The sergeant begins the session with a 3–5 minute summary of the case, distributes copies of the case file

(including pertinent department policies and procedures),

and leaves. However, the investigator leaves a pager

number so that panelists can call with questions during

their deliberations. The CRB legislation also requires

the department to make available an officer with the rank

of captain or higher, neither from IA nor a commander of

the officer involved in the case, to answer questions related to department policy and procedure. For example,

panelists once called the designated captain to ask

whether it was department policy that officers take all

subjects sprayed with Mace to the hospital; he informed

them that officers have the discretion to take them to the

police station basement to wash out their eyes.

Panelists do not have access to the IA investigator’s case

file in advance. Instead, they review the file after the

investigator has left. After the panelists have completed

their silent review, the chair introduces the allegations

one by one. Each member gives his or her recommended

finding and rationale. Questions and discussion follow.

Findings

On occasion, panelists ask the investigating sergeant to

conduct additional investigation, such as interviewing a

new witness or reinterviewing an existing witness. If the

panel is still unsatisfied with the quality of the investigation, it can appeal, in sequence, to the IA commander, the

chief, the mayor, and the city council. The city council,

with its full subpoena power, can itself interview witnesses and request documents. Panels have never needed to go

beyond the IA sergeant to request additional investigation.

(See “A CRB Review Reverses a Department Finding.”)

At the end of the discussion (if they have not requested

any additional investigation), the chairperson tape records

the panel’s finding and justification. As can IA investigators, panelists may choose among four findings: unfounded, exonerated, unprovable, and sustained. Panels make

their determination based on a preponderance of the evidence. Although panelists do not vote, they disagreed on

only 5 of the 141 allegations they reviewed during the

first 9 months of 1998. When not unanimous, the dissenting panelist may read his or her finding into the tape

along with the rationale for dissenting. After the taping,

the chairperson opens an envelope the investigating sergeant left that contains IA’s findings. The panels’ findings

are consistent with the IA findings about 95 percent of

the time.

When the session is over, the chairperson telephones the

investigator, who retrieves the tape and written report.

(City hall is a 5-minute walk from police headquarters.)

The IA unit sends CRB’s findings, along with its own

findings, to the subject officer’s division commander, the

deputy chief, and the chief for review. If the chief sustains the finding, the case goes through the chain of

command for penalty recommendations, starting with 

the officer’s sergeant and ending with the chief, who

makes the ultimate disciplinary determination.

In 1997, the chief disagreed with 6 of the 80 panel findings. In all but one of the six, he increased the severity of

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

48

A CRB REVIEW REVERSES A DEPARTMENT FINDING

Police officers got into a tussle with a suspect. An officer hit the man in the face and then handcuffed him.The

man filed a complaint alleging improper use of force. An IA investigation cleared the officer of any wrongdoing.

CRB concluded the complainant was right.When the case came back to the department and went through the

chain of command, the deputy chief said he agreed with the CRB panel and asked IA to do additional investigation.

Based on its additional investigation, IA ended up agreeing with CRB’s finding. According to Lt. James Sheppard,

the IA commander,“It turned out that the CRB panel had picked up on the fact that the man was lying flat on the

ground on his stomach with his arms under his chest when he was hit, and passive noncompliance does not justify

hitting a person.”
the finding—in four cases he changed it from unfounded

to unprovable. In each case, there were no independent

witnesses to verify the account of the incident. When the

chief disagrees with a CRB finding, the coordinator can

take the disagreement to the mayor or the city council,

but he has never done so.

Other responsibilities

CRB also suggests policy changes, remedial training, and

changes in IA investigation procedures to the department,

and the Center for Dispute Settlement mediates selected

citizen complaints.

Policy and other recommendations

CRB can make recommendations to the chief regarding

revisions to police policies and procedures relevant to a

given case. Although CRB does not recommend discipline,

panelists may recommend case-related remedial training.

A mother and daughter filed a complaint because

they felt they were being treated as suspects when

they called the police to disperse some gang members who would not leave their porch. The mother

and daughter objected so strongly to the officers’

attitude that the officers ended up arresting the two

women. A CRB panel exonerated the officers but

recommended they be retrained in interviewing and

conflict resolution skills. The chief ordered the

retraining.

Todd Samolis, the CRB coordinator, meets with his IA

counterpart every 3 months to go over each case to learn

whether any policy, training, and investigation procedure

changes that panels may have recommended were implemented. The chief sends CRB new or revised general

orders that result from a panel recommendation.

Conciliation

In 1984, a city council member suggested the Center for

Dispute Settlement provide a conciliation option in an

effort to help build positive relations between officers and

citizens. Cases involving allegations of excessive use of

force are not eligible for conciliation.

Depending on where the complainant files the case,

either Todd Samolis or an IA investigator may ask the

person if he or she would find conciliation an acceptable

alternative to an IA investigation and CRB review if the

officer also agreed to the procedure. Most complainants

offered the option to conciliate accept. When an officer’s

supervisor presents an officer with the option, about half

comply.

For conciliating citizen complaints against the police,

Samolis chooses one of the center’s mediators who have

participated in a 1-day extra training session on police

conciliation. Conciliations are confidential. The parties

sign no written agreement. Instead, the mediator indicates in the case file whether in the complainant’s judgment the matter was resolved or unresolved.

If the matter is resolved, Samolis sends a letter indicating

closure to IA. Internal affairs does not investigate the

complaint, and the case is closed. Samolis notifies IA if

the matter is not resolved and the complainant wishes to

have the complaint investigated. In 1997, three out of the

four conciliations were successful. Of five conciliations

conducted from January through September 1998, two

were resolved, one was unresolved, for one the complainant did not appear, and for one the officer did not

appear.

Staffing and budget

CRB’s activities are administered by Todd Samolis, the

full-time coordinator; by the half-time support of the

Center for Dispute Settlement director of special programs; and by the quarter-time support of the center’s

director of training services. Candidates for panelist positions must first attend the Center for Dispute Settlement’s

25-hour principles of mediation course that provides

State mediation certification. The course includes extensive training in how to be impartial. Candidates then

serve an apprenticeship that involves observing regular

mediators in two or three sessions, co-mediating two or

three sessions with an experienced mediator, and conducting an observed pass/fail solo mediation session.

Finally, candidates attend a 2-week, 48-hour condensed

version of a police academy run by the police department

that includes using sidearms with a “Shoot/Don’t Shoot”

simulator, handcuffing, and explanations of department

policies and procedures.

CRB administrators nominate experienced panelists 

who have demonstrated exemplary ability as permanent

chairpersons. The mayor approves their selection. CRB

arranges for one of the chairpersons to run each panel

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

49
before contacting two regular panelists to complete 

the panel.

The Center for Dispute Settlement’s fiscal year 1998–99

budget for CRB and conciliation was $128,069 (see

exhibit 2–13). The budget includes $17,000 for panel

member and mediator stipends.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

50

EXHIBIT 2–13. CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CRB AND CONCILIATION BUDGET FOR

FISCAL YEAR 1998–99

Distinctive features

Rochester’s use of trained mediators to review cases is

the oversight procedure’s most innovative feature.

• According to Todd Samolis, the CRB coordinator,

“Training as mediators goes to the essence of objectivity, including promoting listening skills, asking 

Personnel Costs Full-Time

% of Full Time Salary Position Budget 

55 $33,114 director of special programs $18,213

25 $31,353 director of training services 7,838

100 $21,011 program coordinator 21,011

60 $15,288 program assistance—clerical 9,173

Total salaries 56,235

FICA (.0765) 4,302

Fringe (.1035) 5,820

Total personnel costs 66,357

Other costs

Stipends:

Conciliation/mediation

$35/2 hours/any part thereof..............................................................................................................................................................500

CRB reviews

$35/2 hours/any part thereof ........................................................................................................................................................15,800

(70 cases x 2 people) = $9,800)

$50/2 hours/any part thereof

(60 cases x 1 person) = $6,800)

Quarterly CRB chair meetings

$35 per meeting ....................................................................................................................................................................................700

(Based on four meetings with five CRB chairpersons per quarter)

Training and outreach ....................................................................................................................................................................................5,000

Training inservice (four sessions @ $150) ..................................................................................................................................................600

Printing ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................500

Postage ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................400

Space ($685/mo.) ............................................................................................................................................................................................8,220

Telephone..............................................................................................................................................................................................................720

Supplies..................................................................................................................................................................................................................550

Miscellaneous service (database management system)..............................................................................................................................500

Equipment rental ($65/mo.) ............................................................................................................................................................................780

Parking/mileage ($12.50/mo.) ..........................................................................................................................................................................150

Insurance ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................200

Conference........................................................................................................................................................................................................4,500

Total other costs 39,120

Subtotal 105,477

Administrative overhead 22% 22,592

Total projected budget 1998–99 $128,069
probing and open-ended questions, developing a

rationale for each position taken, and looking at all

sides of a problem.” However, if CRB’s parent organization were not a dispute resolution center, arranging to

train board members as mediators might be expensive.

• Panelists hold the position for life (subject to proper

behavior). On the one hand, their longevity provides

them with considerable experience reviewing cases that

may enable them to act efficiently and objectively. On

the other hand, according to Robert Duffy, the chief of

police, “Some of them may sort of ‘settle in’ and lose

the fresh perspective citizens can bring to police work.”

In addition, rotating panelists would enable CRB and

police to educate more community members to the

nature of police work.

• By designating permanent chairpersons, usually from

among long-time panelists, only the most qualified and

experienced panelists facilitate the reviews.

• Cases are reviewed relatively quickly. (The city council

deliberately chose a system that would avoid the delays

it found existed in some other jurisdictions.) According

to the city council resolution establishing the board,

CRB has to review cases within 2 weeks of IA’s notification that its investigation is complete.

• Panels are anonymous and not open to the public. As a

result, panelists are not under pressure to skew their

decisions in response to the demands of public or

police interest groups. However, the public may lack

confidence in CRB’s objectivity since citizens are not

privy to the review process.

• Panelists do not have an opportunity to review IA case

files before the panel meets. This results in extra time

being taken during the meeting while panelists review

the files and may create pressure to review the materials less thoroughly than if panelists could review them

at home at their leisure before the meeting. Panelists

also do not have the opportunity to ponder the cases in

advance of the meetings. However, by not distributing

any IA case files outside the meeting room, the police

department is assured they will never be made public,

for example, by getting lost.

• By not handling allegations of police discourtesy and

other less serious complaints (unless they are part of a

serious complaint), CRB can focus on more important

cases. However, the board might be able to handle

many less serious cases through mediation with greater

satisfaction to complainants and more objectivity than

the police department may be able to achieve.

For further information, contact:

Todd Samolis

Coordinator of Special Projects

Civilian Review Board

300 State Street, Suite 301

Rochester, NY 14614

716–546–5110

Robert Duffy

Chief of Police

Rochester Police Department

City Public Safety Building

Civic Center Plaza

Rochester, NY 14614

716–428–7033

The St. Paul Police Civilian

Internal Affairs Review

Commission: A Police-Managed

Board Recommends Discipline

Background

Because of complaints about police misconduct, and 

in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating in Los

Angeles, William Finney, the St. Paul police chief, urged

the city council to establish a commission to look into

forming a civilian oversight procedure. The resulting

Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission

began operation in December 1993. Located in the fire

department wing of the public safety building, the commission is operated by the police department.

The commission met 12 times in 1997 to review 71

cases involving 149 allegations (73 of them involved 

the alleged use of excessive force). The commission’s

findings were as follows:

• Unfounded: 53 (36 percent).

• Exonerated: 32 (22 percent).

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

51
• Not sustained: 41 (28 percent).

• Sustained: 23 (15 percent).

The commission also reviewed 24 cases of discharge of

firearms and found them all to be justified. The commission found a policy failure in two cases.

The review process

Exhibit 2–14 displays the citizen review procedure in 

St. Paul.

Intake

The St. Paul administrative code requires the commission

to review all completed IA investigations related to:

• Alleged acts of excessive force.

• Use of firearms (regardless of whether there has been a

citizen complaint—see “The Review Commission

Hears All Discharge-of-Firearms Incidents”).

• Discrimination.

• Poor public relations.

• Other complaints the chief or mayor chooses to refer to

the commission. (The chief sometimes refers internal

complaints, particularly sexual harassment cases.)

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

52

THUMBNAIL SKETCH: ST. PAUL

Model: citizens review cases (type 2)

Jurisdiction: St. Paul, Minnesota

Population: 259,606

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor nominates, council

approves, mayor may remove only with council

approval

Sworn officers: 581

Oversight funding: $37,160

Oversight staff: one part time

A seven-person commission that is part of and funded by the St. Paul Police Department meets monthly

to review cases investigated and decided by the

department’s internal affairs unit.The commissioners, two of whom are St. Paul police officers, make

their own findings and, in sustained cases, recommend discipline to the chief.The IA unit makes no

disciplinary recommendations.The chief is free to

disregard the commission’s disciplinary recommendations but not its findings.

THE REVIEW COMMISSION HEARS ALL DISCHARGE-OF-FIREARMS

INCIDENTS

By statute, the review commission hears all cases in which an officer discharged a firearm, regardless of whether 

a citizen filed a complaint. Most of the cases involve euthanizing injured animals, especially deer. Others involve 

accidental discharge.

An officer had drawn her sidearm while searching a warehouse for a reported burglar. She had left the

building to climb a grassy hill next to the warehouse to continue the search when the man ran out of the

building.The officer yelled at the man to stop. She then slipped on the wet grass and fired her gun accidentally.The man, thinking she had fired a warning shot, stopped running and was arrested by another officer.

The officer reported the entire incident fully, but the department forbids the accidental discharge of weapons.

As a result, IA found her guilty of misconduct, and the commission did, too.The commission recommended

she receive additional firearms training.
While about three-quarters of complainants contact the

IA unit to file a complaint, some contact the commission.

The review commission coordinator takes basic information about the complaint and refers the complainant to

the IA unit. The unit investigates serious allegations of

misconduct itself but refers minor problems down the

chain of command to the subject officers’ supervisors for

settlement. The IA commander reviews these settlements

but does not send them to the commission for review.

Case review

The commission coordinator, a nonsworn police department employee, collects IA’s investigative packets 2

weeks before each commission meeting, duplicates them,

and hand delivers a copy to each commissioner (some

commissioners pick them up in person) 1 week before

they meet. The commission meets in the chief’s conference room the first Wednesday of every month from 

7:00 p.m. to about 10:00 p.m.

Because the Minnesota Data Practices Act gives employees (e.g., police officers) privacy in administrative 

hearings, only commissioners, the commission coordinator, the IA commander and investigators, and a recording

secretary attend. Members hear about seven cases each

meeting. The commission may request—and has subpoena power to require—that individuals appear before it.

The IA investigator summarizes the first case and gives

his or her recommendation that the allegations be sustained, not sustained, exonerated, or unfounded. The

commissioners discuss each case, asking the investigator

questions as needed. The chairperson asks for a vote on

the first allegation in the case. If a majority sustains an

allegation, they discuss what discipline to recommend.

Deliberations typically take 15–45 minutes per case.

Most decisions are unanimous. When there is disagreement, it is usually regarding the discipline, not the finding. The commissioners may request that IA conduct

additional investigation. If they are still dissatisfied, they

can hire an independent investigator, although they have

never done so.

The IA commander and investigator play no role in helping the commissioners to resolve their differences and

may not object to the commission’s recommendations.

Commissioners may ask the commander what kinds of

discipline have been imposed before for the misconduct

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

53

EXHIBIT 2–14. ST. PAUL CITIZEN REVIEW PROCESS

With 

commission IA 

investigates 

and reaches 

a finding

Commission 

requests 

additional IA 

investigation

Chief receives IA and 

commission findings 

and commission 

disciplinary 

recommendation 

Commission 

accepts new 

investigation

Commission issues 

own finding and 

recommends discipline

Citizen 

files 

complaint

Commission 

hires its own 

investigator

With IA

Commission 

reviews

case

Commission 

rejects new IA 

investigation

Chief metes out 

discipline
if it is a new type of wrongdoing. Commissioners have

access to the officers’ previous disciplinary records and

can therefore recommend “progressive discipline”—more

serious sanctions for repeat offenders.

After the hearing

The chair sends the chief a memorandum after each hearing with the commissioners’ and IA’s findings and, if the

complaint has been sustained, the commission’s disciplinary recommendation. The commission has disagreed

with IA’s finding in about a half dozen cases in its history.

A citizen complained that an officer’s remark to a

block party, “Don’t call me unless you call public

housing first,” meant that, if they did call, the officer would not come. The officer claimed he had

never said he would not come if called, and no

witnesses claimed he had said he would not

come. Although IA had sustained the complaint,

the commission exonerated the officer. The chief

sided with the commission.

—Donald Luna

Since the commission’s first meeting, William Finney,

the current chief, has given it the additional task of recommending disciplinary penalties for sustained cases.

Although the chief is not obligated to follow the commission’s disciplinary recommendations, Finney estimates that he disagrees with less than 2 percent of the

sanctions that the commission recommends. On one

occasion, Finney met with the entire commission to

explain why he chose to deviate from a recommended

discipline. When he has disagreed with the commission,

Finney has usually increased its recommended discipline. (See “The Chief Increases the Commission’s

Recommended Punishment.”)

There is no appeal of the commission’s and chief’s 

dispositions.

Staffing and budget

The review commission consists of five citizens and two

police officers. The mayor nominates the citizen members and the city council approves. The police union’s

executive board nominates the two sworn members for

approval by the membership at a union meeting. Once

approved, the chief recommends them to the mayor for

appointment. The two sworn police officers receive overtime pay if meetings do not occur during their regular

shifts. All commissioners serve 3-year terms, renewable

once. The commission elects a chairperson and vice

chairperson from among the citizen members to preside

over its proceedings.

A coordinator, appointed by the chief in consultation

with the commission chairperson, spends half of her time

managing the complaint process. (She spends the rest of

her time coordinating the citizens’ police academy.)

Exhibit 2–15 shows the commission’s budget for 1995

(which has remained largely unchanged in subsequent

years). As shown, the entire appropriation was $37,160,

including half of the director’s salary and $18,660 in

direct costs. However, because the commission has never

exercised its option to hire an independent investigator,

the true costs are closer to $27,000 per year.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

54

THE CHIEF INCREASES THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDED PUNISHMENT

According to Chief William Finney,“We had an officer who had a ‘smart mouth,’ but she had never had a sustained

complaint.When she finally got a sustained finding from both IA and the commission, the commission recommended supervisory counseling. However, because I knew she had had a history of ‘mouthing off,’ I suspended her

for a day.”

Donald Luna, the review commission chair, has a similar story: A number of citizens were playing games with an

officer regarding the owner of a car that the officer was trying to have moved: “It’s not my car, it’s his car; no it’s

her car.” They also began calling him derogatory names. After an hour of this, someone in the crowd said,“Why

do you have to be such an a-----e?” The exasperated officer answered,“Well, I guess I’m just an a-----e. Now

move the car.” A minister heard the remark and filed a complaint.The commission recommended supervisory

counseling; the chief gave him a 3-day suspension.
Distinctive features

The two special features of the St. Paul oversight system

are the review commission’s inclusion of two active

police officers from the city and its mandate to recommend discipline.

• On one hand, some members of the community may

not see the commission as capable of being objective

because it has two officers as commissioners, is part of

the police department, and meets at the police station.

As a result, some citizens may not trust the process.

On the other hand:

— Because of who they are and their familiarity with

how officers have been trained, the sworn members

of the commission tend to be tougher than the civilian members in their findings and recommendations for discipline.

— Having two sworn officers on the board reduced

friction between citizen review advocates and the

police union and other officers when the board was

being planned and in its subsequent operation.

• There are no disputes over gaining access to IA reports

in a timely fashion because the commission is internal

to the department.

• Although the chief is not obligated to follow the commission’s disciplinary recommendations, the commission’s ability to provide disciplinary advice allows the

chief to learn how community representatives view each

officer’s misconduct and to impose punishment, if he so

chooses, that reflects these representatives’ concerns.

• The St. Paul oversight procedure provides no public

forum for individual citizens and organizations to

express complaints and concerns about the police

department’s policies and procedures and officers’

behavior.

• Officers are spared having to appear before the commission, but some may feel frustrated that they cannot

present their side of the story in person.

For further information, contact:

William Finney

Chief

St. Paul Police Department

100 East 11th Street

St. Paul, MN 55101

612–292–3588

Ruth Siedschlag

Coordinator

Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission

100 East 11th Street

St. Paul, MN 55101

612–292–3583

San Francisco’s Office of Citizen

Complaints: An Independent

Body Investigates Most Citizen

Complaints for the Police

Department

Background

In 1982, the San Francisco City/County Board of

Supervisors put the Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC)

on the ballot as a voter initiative after a series of police

clubbings of demonstrators led to pressure for a citizen

oversight procedure from liberal organizations and historically discriminated-against communities, including the

department’s own African-American Officers for Justice.

A police commission, consisting of five members appointed by the mayor, supervises both OCC and the police

department. The commission hires the chief and OCC

director. The commission or the mayor may remove 

EXHIBIT 2–15. POLICE CIVILIAN

INTERNAL AFFAIRS REVIEW COMMISSION

1995 BUDGET

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

55

Budget Item Funding Level

Coordinator’s salary (1/2 time) $18,500

Direct costs 18,660

commissioner stipends ($50 per meeting) 6,000

consultants to train new commissioners 700

business cards 60

independent investigator 10,000

office supplies 200

conference attendance by coordinator 1,500

miscellaneous training (e.g., seminars) by coordinator 200

Total $37,160
the chief. Only the commission may remove the OCC

director.

OCC received 1,126 new complaints in 1997. Of 983

cases closed in 1997, OCC sustained one or more allegations in 100 cases, or 10 percent. In 1997, OCC held

more than 50 hearings at the chief’s level and prosecuted

6 cases before the police commission.

The complaint filing process

Exhibit 2–16 diagrams the civilian oversight process in

San Francisco. The following text describes each step in

the process.

Intake

The police department’s internal affairs division (technically called the Management Control Division) alone

investigates complaints brought by officers against each

other and incidents involving off-duty officers and

nonsworn personnel. Internal affairs and OCC both

investigate cases involving use of a firearm. OCC alone

investigates cases citizens initiate alleging misconduct—

or failure to perform a duty—by on-duty officers.

Internal affairs sergeants offer to help citizens who appear

at the police station to fill out the complaint intake form

and forward it to OCC, but more than half of these citizens

choose to go to OCC (a 15-minute walk from police headquarters) to fill out the form. Complainants also may telephone, mail, or fax their complaint to OCC. Of the 1,126

complaints OCC received in 1997, 43 percent were

made in person, 23 percent by phone, 21 percent by mail,

5 percent at the police department, and 6 percent by other

means. Organizations filed 24 of the complaints in 1997

(see “Organizations May File Complaints”).

When a complainant appears in person, the receptionist

asks the person to fill out an intake form. The receptionist calls the intake investigator for the day (each investigator generally does intake 11

/2 to 2 days a month) or, if

he or she is busy or on break, the backup intake investigator (who is the following day’s intake investigator). If

the citizen telephones to file a complaint, the receptionist

may refer the call to an investigator and generally mails

the person the intake form to complete and mail back.

After OCC has received the form, an investigator telephones the complainant and conducts a telephone interview or arranges to interview the citizen in person.

In serious cases, OCC makes an investigator available

24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The initial interview with the complainant

California State law and the police commission prohibit

revealing any information about a complaint to the public unless the case is heard by the police commission

(see “Police commission hearings” on page 59). The

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

56

THUMBNAIL SKETCH:

SAN FRANCISCO

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: San Francisco

Population: 735,315

Government: strong mayor, city/county Board of

Supervisors

Appointment of chief: police commission (appointed

by the mayor) appoints, commission or mayor may

remove

Sworn officers: 2,100

Oversight funding: $2,198,778

Oversight staff: 30 full time

An independent Office of Citizen Complaints

(OCC), with 15 full-time investigators, investigates

most citizen complaints against the San Francisco

Police Department and prepares findings. If the

department’s internal affairs division agrees with the

OCC finding, the case usually receives a chief’s

hearing at which the assistant chief presides. An

OCC attorney prosecutes the case.The assistant

chief typically approves the finding and metes out

discipline subject to the chief’s approval.The police

commission holds an administrative trial for cases

of alleged serious misconduct at which an OCC

attorney again acts as the prosecutor. OCC also

provides policy recommendations to the department, arranges for mediation, and provides early

warning system data.
investigator therefore tells the citizen the complaint will be

kept confidential unless the person makes it public. As a

result, the investigator cannot locate or interview witnesses

by telling people about the complaint unless the complainant agrees to their being told about the complaint.

Because investigators can log onto the police department’s computer, they can find the computer-aided dispatch data during the interview to identify which officers

were at the scene as well as to download the incident

report. Investigators also review the pertinent general

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

57

ORGANIZATIONS MAY FILE COMPLAINTS

The San Francisco Bay Area chapter of the National Lawyers Guild provided legal support for a demonstration in

1997 on the anniversary of the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles. After the demonstration, the guild mailed a complaint to OCC alleging that police officers arrested demonstrators who followed instructions to get onto the sidewalk

along with demonstrators who refused to move. OCC investigated the incident and notified the guild that it had not

sustained the allegation. In the meantime, the guild had received a positive judgment in small claims court for false

arrest and was awarded damages. Based on these new developments, the guild asked OCC to reopen the case, but

the oversight body denied the request because the director believed that a videotape clearly documented the demonstrators to be in the wrong and that the OCC finding was therefore not in error. In addition, OCC determined that it

had investigated the case fully and was given no new evidence that would merit granting the appeal.

EXHIBIT 2–16. SAN FRANCISCO’S OVERSIGHT PROCESS

At police 

department

Investigator 

writes report 

with 

recommended 

finding and 

factual basis

IA agrees with 

finding 

Citizen files 

complaint At OCC Case assigned

to investigator

At any city 

agency (e.g., 

mayor’s office)

Investigator conducts 

initial telephone or 

inperson interview with 

citizen

Investigator 

develops 

investigation plan 

and conducts 

investigation

Investigator 

interviews 

subject 

officer(s)

Senior 

investigators, 

chief 

investigator, 

attorney (if 

sustained), 

and 

executive 

director 

review report

OCC 

director 

makes 

decision as 

to finding 

and notifies 

parties

OCC 

forwards 

case and 

finding to 

department’s 

internal 

affairs 

division

IA disagrees with 

finding 

IA and OCC resolve 

disagreement

IA 

recommends

discipline

OCC 

concurs with

or dissents 

from 

recommendation

Chief’s 

hearing: 

OCC 

prosecutes; 

assistant 

chief 

disciplines

Police 

commission 

holds 

administrative 

trial; OCC 

prosecutes

OCC prepares verified 

complaint and asks 

chief to file case with 

police commission

IA and OCC cannot 

resolve disagreement; 

finding remains; no 

discipline

OCC director 

makes final 

decision as to 

finding

Complainant or 

officer appeal

OCC rejects appeal

OCC arranges for independent hearing

Chief informs police commission of 

his decision not to file case with 

police commission

Chief files case 

with police 

commission

Commission reviews and accepts complaint
orders and department bulletins to determine whether the

officers may have violated department policy.

Investigators tape record all interviews except when citizen informants refuse to serve as witnesses. The typical

interview lasts 15 minutes to 1 hour. OCC gives the complainant a copy of the complaint form and sends another

copy to each named officer providing notification of the

allegations as required by State law. OCC sends a copy to

the officer’s commanding officer and to internal affairs.

(See “Added Allegations.”)

The officer interview

The investigator develops an investigation plan that

includes interviewing the involved officer(s) and any witnesses and reviewing available written documents. The

plan may also include collecting evidence, such as visiting the scene of the incident, photographing vehicles, and

using the police department’s photo lab to take pictures

of injured complainants.

Investigators interview officers after they have collected

sufficient evidence to determine the best questions to ask.

Investigators may not sustain a case without interviewing

the officer in person. It is a violation of police department general orders for subject officers to refuse to

attend and answer questions at an OCC interview. If an

officer ignores the request after investigation by internal

affairs, the department generally handles a first violation

with an admonishment, the second with a reprimand, and

the third with a 1-day suspension.

Investigators generally prepare questions in advance and

follow written guidelines in their initial questioning of

subject officers. A union representative often comes to

the interview with the officer. During the interview, some

union representatives raise objections for the record, which

the investigator has no authority to rule on. Objections

may be resolved later at a chief’s hearing or police commission hearing (see “Police commission hearings” on

page 59) if an allegation has been sustained.

Findings

The investigator writes a report presenting the results of

the investigation and the factual basis for each recommended finding. After review by one of three senior OCC

investigators, Mary Dunlap, the OCC director, reviews

the file. Findings are based on a preponderance of the

evidence. Although the city charter gives OCC the power

to recommend specific discipline, it generally does not;

OCC can influence the severity of the punishment by recommending that the police commission—with its authority to provide the most severe sanctions (see “Police

commission hearings” on page 59)—hear a case.

Office administrative staff prepare and mail letters containing preliminary findings to each complainant and

named officer. Either party may request an investigative

hearing with an independent hearing officer granted at

the discretion of the OCC director. OCC received 76

requests for investigative hearings in 1997, granted 12,

and held 7 in 1997 and 5 in 1998.

Internal affairs division

If an allegation is sustained, OCC sends the case report

containing a summary of the relevant evidence and law to

internal affairs, whose staff decide whether they agree

with the finding. Internal affairs agrees with OCC’s findings about 90 percent of the time. When this occurs, an

IA commanding officer determines the level of severity

guided by the department’s Disciplinary Penalty &

Referral Guidelines, which recommends specific sanctions

for specific types of misconduct. The IA officer sends

the finding with the discipline recommendation to the

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

58

“ADDED ALLEGATIONS”

After explaining the complaint process and asking

about the incident, the investigator also asks the citizen questions designed to determine whether the

subject officer(s) engaged in misconduct that the complainant may not have identified or been aware of—

for example, the investigator may ask,“Did the officer

search your pockets or just do a pat search?” A juvenile might be asked,“When you were taken to the

station, were you cuffed to a bench? For how long?”

If the complainant is a woman, she might be asked,

“Were you transported to the station in a van with

men in it?” The information the complainant provides

may form the basis for the investigator to charge the

officer with “added allegations”—misconduct that is

related to the complaint but that the complainant did

not mention to OCC. (See chapter 6,“Resolving

Potential Conflicts.”)
Management Control Division commanding officer. If the

commander agrees with the disposition, IA staff notify

Prentice Sanders, the assistant chief, of the recommended

finding and punishment. With rare exceptions, Sanders

agrees with OCC’s sustained findings and IA’s disciplinary recommendation. Internal affairs writes the subject

officer a letter offering the option of “a chief’s hearing”

or acceptance of the stated discipline.

When IA disagrees with an OCC finding, the IA officerin-charge and the OCC investigator discuss their disagreement. About half the time, they reach a consensus.

When they fail to reach a consensus, the OCC sustained

disposition with which IA disagrees remains in the officer’s file, but no discipline is imposed unless the OCC

director asks the chief to submit the case to the police

commission for trial. When the chief and OCC disagree

on whether disciplinary action is appropriate in a case

that OCC has sustained, the following procedure is used:

1. The chief returns the file to the OCC director explaining his disagreement.

2. The OCC director reopens the investigation, if necessary. If she determines on review that discipline is not

warranted, the matter is closed. If she determines that

discipline is warranted, she prepares and forwards a

“verified” [i.e., by her] complaint to the chief.

3. If the chief files the verified complaint with the police

commission, the commission may elect to hold a hearing on the disciplinary charges against the officer.

4. If the chief decides not to file the complaint with the

police commission, he must tell the commission in

writing. After reviewing the chief’s and OCC director’s decisions, the commission may order the chief to

file the complaint. The commission decides whether

to hold a hearing to try the charges in the complaint

and, if the charges are sustained, to determine the 

discipline.

This procedure places the ultimate decision regarding

disciplinary action in the hands of citizens if the police

commission chooses to hear a disputed case.

Although there has been only one instance (still ongoing)

in which the chief has been obliged to decide whether to

file a verified complaint with the police commission,

there have been instances in which the commission has

ruled on disagreements that the chief and OCC have

asked it to resolve.

When officers in a hostage situation heard the

hostage taker, who was holding a knife to the victim’s throat, say he would kill her, they could have

legally used lethal force. However, an officer threw

his baton instead, hitting the man on the head and

ending the crisis. OCC requested the officer be suspended because department orders prohibit throwing

a baton. The internal affairs division said that using

less-than-lethal force was preferable in the situation

to using lethal force. Because IA and OCC disagreed

on the finding, the police commission heard the

case. The commission refused to sustain the allegation, ruling instead that the department’s policies on

use of batons needed to be changed.

The chief’s hearing

Fred Lau, the current chief of police, delegates the

chief’s hearing to Prentice Sanders, the assistant chief.

However, the chief reviews all of Sanders’ decisions.

Sanders upheld OCC’s sustained findings and imposed

discipline in 74 of 88 chief’s hearings held in 1998.

The Management Control Division schedules and runs the

chief’s hearings with the subject officer, union representative, and the officer’s captain present. An OCC attorney

prosecutes the case. The union representative gives the

subject officer’s version of the incident and may introduce

evidence exonerating the officer. The captain often gives

an opinion about the case as well. Because of the informal

nature of the chief’s hearing, no sworn testimony is taken,

although Sanders may ask the officer some questions.

About half the time, Sanders makes a disciplinary decision

at the hearing; the rest of the time, he decides later.

Officers may appeal Sanders’ decision to the police commission if a suspension of at least 1 day is ordered.

Police commission hearings

The police commission hears cases that:

• Subject officers have appealed and the commission

agrees to accept.

• The chief forwards to it.

• Involve more than a 10-day suspension.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

59
• The commission decides to hear because of a conflict

between OCC and the chief on a finding.

• Involve driving under the influence and domestic violence (most of which are IA, not OCC, cases).

The commission holds a formal administrative hearing 

to redetermine the finding, this time at the hearing level

(versus OCC’s investigation level), and to impose punishment if the commissioners sustain the allegations.

Commissioners first conduct a factfinding hearing and

then receive and review transcripts of that hearing before

a penalty hearing. At the final administrative hearing, all

parties are present. An OCC trial attorney prosecutes the

case, and the union attorney or privately retained counsel

defends the officer. After opening statements, there is

direct and cross examination of the parties and witnesses.

In highly publicized cases, as many as 600 people have

shown up to observe.

Commissioners, who deliberate in private, make their

determination based on a preponderance of the evidence.

The commission’s findings often are unanimous. The

commission can suspend officers for up to 90 days per

offense or terminate them. Officers may request a judicial

review to appeal the commission’s decision. Of the 12

commission hearings held in 1998, 2 involved OCC

cases. Commissioner hearings are relatively infrequent

because, when officers agree to a suspension or resign

rather than be fired, the hearing is canceled.

Other activities

OCC provides the police department with policy recommendations, arranges mediation, and assists with the

department’s early warning system.

Policy recommendations

OCC submits policy recommendations to IA and includes

them in its annual report to the police commission. OCC’s

1997 annual report provided 15 policy recommendations

arising out of citizen complaints.

If IA agrees with an OCC policy recommendation, it tries

to negotiate a solution with the OCC director—for example, restating an existing policy or requiring additional

training. In 1997, OCC recommended that officers with

complaint records be rejected as field training officers

(FTOs). Internal affairs and the department compromised

on a new policy that includes a review of the number of

complaints against a candidate for FTO but excludes

complaints from more than 5 years previous to the 

FTO’s candidacy. The union and police commission 

both approved the change. Chapter 3, “Other Oversight

Responsibilities,” identifies additional policy recommendations that OCC has made.

Mediation

OCC provides a mediation option, but few citizens agree

to the alternative, apparently because they feel uncomfortable with the approach. Of the 22 new cases eligible

for mediation in 1997, 16 complainants (and 2 officers)

refused to mediate. Twelve cases were mediated during

the year (including several cases held over from the previous year). OCC uses volunteer mediators approved by

the San Francisco Bar Association.

Early warning system

Every 3 to 6 months, OCC submits a report to the police

department and to every commanding officer identifying

the name and badge numbers of each officer who has

three or more OCC complaints (excluding unfounded

complaints) over the previous 6-month period or four or

more complaints within the year. The report for the first

half of 1998 identified 78 such officers. The first time

their name appears, officers are given a performance

review; the second time, getting a promotion and special

assignments may be in jeopardy (and they cannot be a

field training officer for 5 years).

Staffing and budget

In mid-1998, OCC had 15 full-time investigators (including two practicing trial attorneys) and a total staff of 30.

Proposition G, approved by San Francisco voters in

1995, requires the city to hire one OCC investigator for

every 150 police officers (see chapter 4, “Staffing”). As

shown in exhibit 2–17, OCC’s fiscal year 1998–99

budget was $2,198,778.

Distinctive features

The most unusual feature of San Francisco’s oversight

process is that an independent body in effect acts as the

police department’s internal affairs unit for citizen complaints about police misconduct.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

60
• With the exception of complaints by one officer against

another and incidents involving off-duty officers and

nonsworn personnel, OCC alone conducts the San

Francisco Police Department’s investigations involving

alleged officer misconduct. (The department and OCC

investigate use of firearms simultaneously and independently.) This approach may increase the community’s

confidence in the independence of the oversight process.

Some police feel that OCC investigators are not competent to evaluate their behavior.

• Organizations, not just aggrieved individuals, may—

and frequently have—filed complaints with OCC.

Allowing organizations to file expands the opportunity

for the community to contribute to the oversight of

police behavior. It may also encourage or enable

groups with political agendas to try to influence the

oversight process.

• Each OCC investigator’s finding is reviewed by as

many as three supervisors. Trained legal staff review

every sustained case. Multiple reviews increase the

opportunity for quality control. Multiple reviews also

require extra time and expense.

• San Francisco voters approved an initiative that

requires the city to hire one OCC investigator for every

150 police officers to ensure that there are adequate

staff to address all citizen complaints. The required

ratio also increases program costs.

• OCC’s findings cannot be changed by the police department; only the police commission can overturn an OCC

finding. The findings go into officers’ files even if the

department refuses to hand out any discipline.

• Citizens in San Francisco can make the ultimate decision on whether an officer is disciplined. If the chief

and OCC director disagree on whether disciplinary

action in a sustained case is appropriate, and the chief

decides not to file the case with the police commission

for a judgment, there is a process by which the police

commission may elect to review the case and decide to

hold a trial.

• In its investigatory capacity, OCC acts as a neutral

party between the complainant and the police officer.

However, if the case goes to a chief’s or police commission hearing, OCC attorneys prosecute the officer.

This dual role may blur the program’s mission in fact

or in the public’s and police department’s perception,

resulting in antagonism from some community groups

and the police.

For further information, contact:

Mary Dunlap

Director, Office of Citizen Complaints

480 Second Street, Suite 100

San Francisco, CA 94107

415–597–7711

Fred Lau

Chief of Police

San Francisco Police Department

Hall of Justice

850 Bryant Street

San Francisco, CA 94103

415–553–1551

Prentice Sanders

Assistant Chief of Police

San Francisco Police Department

Hall of Justice

850 Bryant Street, Room 525

San Francisco, CA 94103

415–553–9087

Budget Item Funding Level

Permanent salaries–miscellaneous $1,595,449

Overtime 10,323

Mandatory fringe benefits 373,339

Travel 1,500

Training 1,500

Membership fees 450

Professional and specialized services* 7,500

Rents and leases 119,500

Other current expenses 39,602

Materials and supplies 12,493

Other fixed charges 600

Services of other departments 36,522

Total $2,198,778

* Contract fees to third parties, such as expert witnesses and translators.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

61

EXHIBIT 2–17. OFFICE OF CITIZEN

COMPLAINTS 1998–99 BUDGET
Tucson’s Dual Oversight System:

A Professional Auditor and a

Citizen Review Board

Collaborate

Background

In 1996, several Tucson police officers were sent to

prison for assault, armed robbery, and child molestation.

As a result, some citizen groups and complainants’ attorneys felt the existing police oversight board, established

in 1980, was not adequately supervising police misconduct. In response, the mayor asked the city council’s public safety committee to present options to the city council

for new forms of oversight. In March 1997, after intense

debate, the mayor and city council replaced the old board

with a new and more powerful Citizen Police Advisory

Review Board. At the same time, they established a new

position of independent police auditor. The council hired

Liana Perez as the first auditor in July 1997.

From September 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998, 289

citizens contacted Perez. She or her staff answered 

questions from 155 of the individuals who called. The

auditor’s office took 96 formal complaints, which Perez 

forwarded to the police department for investigation. The

remaining contacts were requests by citizens for Perez to

monitor or review complaints they had filed directly with

the police department. During this 10-month period, she

monitored 63 ongoing investigations.

As explained in the following sections, the auditor and

board have some overlapping responsibilities as well as

different duties.

The independent police auditor

The city manager appoints the auditor to a 4-year renewable term. He can dismiss her, however, only with the

approval of six of the seven city council members. The

city manager meets with Perez every 2 weeks, and every

month she submits a performance report to him. The

auditor’s office is located in city hall.

The auditor’s principal responsibilities are to:

1. Serve as an alternative to the police department for

accepting citizen complaints.

2. Monitor ongoing investigations as needed by sitting 

in on internal affairs interviews.

3. Proactively audit—that is, review—completed IA

investigations of citizen complaints for fairness and 

thoroughness.

4. Review cases in which a citizen expresses dissatisfaction with the police department’s resolution of a 

complaint.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

62

THUMBNAIL SKETCH:TUCSON

Model: citizens review cases (type 2) and audit IA

procedures (type 4)

Jurisdiction:Tucson,Arizona

Population: 449,002

Government: strong city manager, city council, weak

mayor

Appointment of chief: city manager

Sworn officers: 865

Oversight funding: $144,150 for the auditor, none

for the board

Paid oversight staff: two full time

Tucson has both a full-time professional police auditor and a volunteer citizen review board. Both the

Independent Police Auditor, appointed by the city

manager, and a seven-member Citizen Police Advisory

Review Board, appointed by the mayor and the city

council, independently review completed IA investigations for thoroughness and fairness, and both make

policy and procedure recommendations to the police

department.The auditor also reviews cases when citizens appeal an IA finding, and she sits in on selected

IA interviews to monitor the investigation process.

The board acts as a pipeline for transmitting general

community complaints to the police department.

There has been no duplication of effort because the

board typically asks the auditor to examine the cases

it wants reviewed, and the auditor regularly attends

and gives reports of her activities at board meetings.
Intake

The auditor’s full-time customer service representative

accepts complaints in person, in writing, by facsimile, or

by telephone. Citizen review board members (see

“Citizen Police Advisory Review Board” on page 65),

city council members, and community groups refer complainants to the auditor. The auditor forwards complaints

to the police department’s internal affairs bureau.

Monitoring

Exhibit 2–18 shows the auditing process and its relationship to the citizen review board. As shown, every week

the police department forwards a list of new complaints

to Liana Perez with the subject officers’ names so she can

decide whether to sit in on any IA interviews before the

investigations have been completed. Perez monitors serious cases involving allegations of use of excessive force.

She monitors other cases based on:

1. Random selection.

2. A citizen’s request that she attend.

3. A request from the citizen review board to attend.

Sometimes Perez attends the interviews to make the complainant feel more comfortable—for example, if a female

complainant wants another woman with her—or if a

complainant feels he or she will be unable to articulate

the complaint during a police interrogation. Perez sat in

on one investigation when a woman came to her with a

complaint that involved several officers. Because Perez

knew that the officers’ statements would be critical to a

fair determination of responsibility, she wanted to ensure

that each officer would be interviewed immediately after

the other so they could not compare stories.

The city ordinance specifies that the auditor “cannot

question witnesses but may suggest questions to be

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

63

EXHIBIT 2–18. CITIZEN OVERSIGHT PROCESS IN TUCSON

City manager

Audits

completed 

cases

May sit in on 

interviews

Independent police auditor

Accepts

complaints

Forwards to police 

department

● Random

● All use-of-force cases

● Appealed cases

Investigation 

was thorough 

and fair

Additional investigation 

needed

Recommends policy

or procedure change

IA

investigates

Captains

investigate

Refers

complainants

to auditor

Complainants have 

5 minutes to explain 

complaint or to 

appeal IA finding 

or auditor’s review

Reviews IA 

cases and 

auditor’s

audits

Recommends 

policy or 

procedure 

changes

Holds meetings 

(auditor attends)

Citizen Police Advisory Review Board

City council/mayor

Asks auditor to 

review or 

monitor IA 

investigation

Denies 

complaint

Schedules case for board 

hearing at future meeting

Requests case file
asked” by IA investigators (See “An Officer’s View of the

Auditor’s Monitoring Activity”). Typically, Perez waits

for a pause in the questioning and then says she has a

question, such as, “I’d like him to clarify where he was

standing when. . . .” The investigator then repeats the

question to the subject officer or witness. Some IA investigators permit Perez to ask questions only at the end of

each interrogation; others allow questions during the

interview. Some investigators allow her to ask questions

directly of the subject officer or witness.

The auditing process

Perez audits a random sample of completed investigations and all cases involving allegations of excessive

force. The police department must comply if she requests

additional investigation in a case. The auditor may also

speak directly with civilian witnesses regarding the fairness and completeness of investigations.

The auditor does not sustain or disapprove of IA findings, and she does not make disciplinary recommendations. Instead, she reports on whether the investigation

was fair and thorough. In effect, the auditor reviews IA’s

performance, not subject officers’ behavior.

Perez has not had to talk with the chief or city manager

to resolve a disagreement with IA. She did send back 

a case that IA did not sustain because she felt the investigating supervisor had disregarded key evidence 

implicating an officer. Internal affairs conducted additional interviews and sustained the allegations.

Other activities

Perez looks for patterns of complaints in her audits and

telephones the IA commander if she finds a need for

improvement. Perez expressed concern about supervisors

repeatedly overlooking previous complaints against individual officers in deciding on discipline. As a result, the

department formed, and invited her to participate on, a

task force to examine how discipline was being meted

out and how previous complaints should fit into the disciplinary decision. If the chief refuses to implement a

policy recommendation, the auditor can appeal the

refusal to the city manager, to whom both she and 

the chief report.

In fiscal year 1997–98, Perez arranged for four cases to be

settled through informal mediation because the citizens did

not want to file formal complaints but did want to express

an objection to an officer’s behavior. Perez brought the

parties together and mediated the disagreements herself.

Staffing and budget

The auditor’s office includes two full-time staff: Perez

and an administrative assistant who takes citizens’ initial

complaints and has the authority to audit completed

investigations.

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

64

AN OFFICER’S VIEW OF THE AUDITOR’S MONITORING ACTIVITY

The uncle of a suspect an officer had arrested filed a complaint with IA claiming the officer needlessly pointed a

gun at him. The assigned IA investigator told the officer there would be an investigation and that Liana Perez, the

auditor, would be present. The investigator told him Perez would have questions but the investigator would

repeat the questions to the officer, who should then direct his answers back to the IA investigator, not to the

auditor. Just before the interview, the union representative also told the officer to wait for the investigator to

repeat each of the auditor’s questions.

Perez asked several questions through the investigator to get a clear picture of what happened. The officer had

been part of a team doing a high-risk stop of a homicide suspect who turned out to be the suspect’s lookalike

brother. Because five members of the department’s gang intelligence unit had been involved in the incident, some

of Perez’ questions were designed to determine when each one arrived, where they were positioned, and what

they did. Her goal was to determine whether any of the officers had seen the subject officer point the gun but

had not admitted to it in their reports. Perez also asked questions to determine how far the subject officer was

from the uncle, where the officer was going to secure the weapon (which belonged to the suspect), and whether

there were any physical barriers to a clear view between the officer and the uncle. IA exonerated the officer.
Exhibit 2–19 shows the auditor’s budget for fiscal year

1997–98—when the office was created—and for

1998–99. As shown, the startup budget was $144,150,

with almost 68 percent allocated to staff salaries. In addition, $37,400 were allocated for what are likely to be

one-time expenses, such as the purchase of office furniture and computer equipment and software. As a result,

the requested 1998–99 budget is only $118,710, with 

87 percent allocated to staff salaries.

Citizen Police Advisory Review Board

The Citizen Police Advisory Review Board has seven

voting members. It also has seven nonvoting members—

four community advocate members and one member

each appointed by the city manager’s office, police

department, and police union. The board elected 

Suzanne Elefante as its first chairperson.

Board operations

As shown in exhibit 2–18, the city ordinance authorizes

the board to:

1. Refer citizens who wish to file complaints to the 

auditor and the police department.

2. Request the auditor to monitor a particular case and

present her findings.

3. Ask the police department to review a completed case.

4. Review completed IA investigations itself for fairness

and thoroughness.

The board spent most of 1997–98 getting organized,

including developing its procedures, establishing 

subcommittees, and training board members.

Intake

About eight citizens a month call their council representatives to complain about alleged police misconduct. Most

council members give them the name and telephone number of the member of the review board whom they have

appointed along with the auditor’s telephone number.

Board members, in turn, typically refer complainants to the

auditor because the citizens are usually already unhappy

with the IA investigation. When citizens file a complaint

with the board, not with an individual member, Suzanne

Elefante checks to see whether Liana Perez is already

auditing the case. If she is, Elefante asks her to report her

findings to the board; if not, Elefante asks her to audit it.

Appeals of completed investigations

Complainants who are dissatisfied with the IA investigation or the auditor’s review may ask the board to review

their cases. If the board agrees to review the complaint, it

requests and receives IA’s case files to examine between

meetings. (State law makes IA investigations matters of

public record.) The board may ask Liana Perez to do

additional investigation or answer questions about the

case if the auditor has already audited the case. After

hearing from Perez, the board may recommend a different finding to the chief or the city council, but it has no

power to enforce its recommendations.

Involvement of the public

The board meets from 6:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. the third

Tuesday of the month in the main downtown library. The

city clerk’s office places notices of board and subcommittee meetings in newspapers and in city hall. The meeting

begins with a “call to the audience” for any complaints

and issues, with each person allowed to talk for up to 5

minutes. The board puts issues requiring more attention

on the agenda for a future meeting, including complainants who wish to appeal an IA or auditor finding to

the board. The auditor provides an update on the cases

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

65

EXHIBIT 2–19.TUCSON INDEPENDENT POLICE

AUDITOR BUDGETS FOR FISCAL YEARS

1997–98 AND 1998–99

1997/1998 1998/1999

Expenditure (adopted) (requested)

Salaries $77,220 $84,680

Fringe benefits 20,120 18,830

Public liability insurance 820 490

Office supplies 1,280 1,200

Hazardous waste insurance 50 60

Remodeling 20,000 500

Telephone 3,760 3,800

Duplication 3,500 3,500

Office furniture 5,000 1,000

Computers 7,000 0

Software 5,400 600

Maintenance of office equipment 0 180

Information technology 0 1,000

Memberships 0 350

Miscellaneous – 1,020

Conference fees – 1,500

Total $144,150 $118,710
she has been receiving and monitoring. The board discusses other topics, such as the activities of off-duty officers. A police department IA member attends to answer

questions about department policies and procedures and

to report on IA activities during the previous month.

Other activities

The board may provide recommendations for changes in

department policies and procedures to the chief, the auditor, the city manager, or the mayor and city council.

Based on research by a board subcommittee that found

that 11 of 26 police departments conducted random drug

testing of all officers, the board sent a memo to the chief

recommending random drug testing. The chief has not yet

acted because testing is covered in the labor-management

agreement, and the union is negotiating a new agreement.

Staffing and budget

Each council member appoints one board member for 

a 4-year term (or until the end of the elected official’s

term). The board reports to the mayor and the city council. The city clerk provides staff to type, duplicate, and

disseminate the board’s minutes. There are no other

board expenses.

The relationship between the board and 

the auditor

The auditor and board do not officially report to each

other. However, by city ordinance the board:

• Monitors the auditor by examining her monthly 

reports and asking her questions during monthly 

board meetings.

• May require the auditor to monitor or audit a case 

and report on her findings.

• May offer her recommendations.

The auditor and the board both have a legal mandate to

review completed cases, either on their own initiative or

in response to a citizen complaint. There has been no

duplication of effort with reviews of IA investigations

because the board typically asks Perez to audit cases

about which it has a concern and to report back her findings; board members lack the time and expertise to conduct more than a few reviews themselves. There also has

been no duplication because Perez has chosen to go to

every board meeting, where board members can routinely

ask for updates on her previous month’s cases and the

results of her monitoring activities.

Both the board and the auditor have made similar policy

or procedure recommendations. For example, an officer

who had had a personal relationship with a citizen took

out a restraining order against the person and observed

while another officer served it. Because there was no

clear department policy prohibiting this specific action,

IA exonerated the officer of the citizen’s allegation of

inappropriate behavior. However, after reviewing the

case, both the auditor and the board independently

requested the department to remind officers that they

need to report to the department’s legal department

whenever they are involved in serving a restraining 

order in which the officer is a named party.

The auditor handles the day-to-day work of citizen oversight, while the board addresses general citizen concerns,

not just complaints about specific acts of alleged misconduct. As a result, one board member feels “the board acts

as the police department’s eyes and ears for finding out

the community’s concerns about police behavior—it is

the community’s pipeline to the police.” When citizens at

a board meeting expressed concern that there was no random drug testing for regular police officers (except for

narcotics officers), the board set up a subcommittee to

research how other police departments conduct random

testing (see “Other activities” on this page).

Distinctive features

The most unusual feature of the oversight procedure in

Tucson is the use of both a paid, professional auditor and

an independent volunteer citizen review board. (See “San

Jose, California’s, Independent Police Auditor Has Some

Similarities and Differences With Tucson’s Auditor.”)

• According to José Ibarra, a city council member, “The

dual system is good for constituents because it provides

checks and balances.” The board can act as a check on

the auditor by the community to ensure that she is not

operating as “just another government bureaucrat” rather

than as a neutral but aggressive arbiter of complaints

against the police. The auditor, in turn, provides the 

balance of ensuring that citizen complaints receive the

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

66
concentrated and skilled attention that the board does

not have the time or expertise to provide. The dual system also provides a check and balance in the sense that

citizens can seek help from one office if they are dissatisfied with the other office’s response. This may motivate each office to do an especially good job so that it 

is not second guessed by the other.

• The auditor and board complement each other in some

respects:

— The board provides for direct citizen involvement

in police oversight, while the auditor represents

city government. According to Capt. George

Stoner, commander of the IA unit, “The dual system makes sure that the department addresses all

segments of the city”—citizens and each branch of

local government.

— The board enables community representatives to

offer the lay perspective of the citizen regarding IA

investigations of alleged police misconduct, while

the auditor’s office makes it possible for a professional investigator to examine the department’s

investigations of alleged misconduct.

— The board provides a public forum in which citizens

can express general concerns about the department,

while the auditor can address dissatisfaction citizens

have about how IA handled specific complaints.

— When the auditor and board agree on a recommended policy or procedure change, the recommendation in effect has the backing of the city

manager, city council, and mayor. The auditor’s

and board’s agreement on a recommendation also

means that a professional investigator and lay 

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

67

SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA’S, INDEPENDENT POLICE AUDITOR HAS SOME

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES WITH TUCSON’S AUDITOR

Thirty-six percent of all complainants in San Jose file their cases with an independent police auditor rather than

with the police department. As in Tucson,Teresa Guerrero-Daley, the auditor, forwards the paperwork to the

police department’s internal affairs bureau, which conducts an investigation.The bureau then sends all its materials

on all cases—including those filed directly with the police department—to the auditor. Exchange of information is

simplified because the two agencies share a common computerized database.

Guerrero-Daley examines the case files for thoroughness and fairness, and she can request further investigation if

she is not satisfied with a finding. She monitors selected cases by sitting in on interviews or going to the scene of

the alleged incident. She becomes involved in all use-of-force cases. As can Liana Perez in Tucson, Guerrero-Daley

can require the IA investigators to ask questions she may have of complainants and officers during interviews.

Command staff, not IA staff, determine a disposition after the investigation. Complainants who disagree with the

finding or disposition may appeal to the auditor, who will review the case. If Guerrero-Daley disagrees with the 

disposition, she sends a memo to the chief. On the few occasions each year when she and the chief disagree, they

meet together with the city manager (who appoints the chief) to reach a consensus. Guerrero-Daley can make

specific recommendations for training as well as for changes in policy and duty manuals.The chief has adopted 90

percent of her recommendations.

With a staff of four professionals, the auditor’s office has a budget of $320,000. There is no citizen review board in

San Jose. Other cities with auditors—located primarily on the West Coast—include Seattle and Los Angeles. The

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in North Carolina, on its own initiative, hired a private accounting firm

to audit and recommend improvements to its complaints process.*

* See Walker, Sam,“New Directions in Citizen Oversight: The Auditor Approach to Handling Citizen Complaints,” in Problem-Oriented Policing:

Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making POP Work, ed.Tara O’Connor Shelley and Anne C. Grant, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive 

Research Forum, 1998: 161–178.
citizens have agreed on the need for a change. This

broad-based support may have more weight with

the chief and local government than if only the

auditor or the board propose the change.

— In time, a division of labor may evolve in which

the auditor devotes most of her efforts to reviewing

cases (as she already does) and the board focuses

on developing policy recommendations.

• The dual oversight system provides citizens with two

avenues outside the police department for registering

dissatisfaction with IA investigations.

• The dual oversight system can involve some redundancy—that is, the auditor and board are both engaged in

conducting audits and recommending policy changes,

activities that either one of them could do effectively

without the other. Redundancy could then impose an

unnecessary financial cost on taxpayers. The potential

for redundancy will be increased if one of the following occurs:

— The auditor and chairperson of the board fail to

cooperate because of personality differences, lack

of interpersonal skills, an uncontrolled desire for

publicity or power, or strongly held and antithetical

views regarding the nature of police work.

— Political dissension arises between the city manager, who appoints the auditor, and the city council,

which appoints board.

• Neither the auditor nor the board has the legal authority

to conduct investigations into alleged police misconduct

themselves, and they do not have subpoena power.

Rather, they audit, monitor, and publicize IA’s conduct 

of investigations. By ensuring that IA investigations

are done properly, the auditor approach may eliminate

the need for independent professionals to investigate

citizen complaints. This may reduce the cost of citizen

oversight.

• Citizens have three choices about where to file—or

refile—a complaint: with IA, the auditor, and the

board. This approach enables complainants “to shop

for the best deal.” It also, in the words of a police 

officer, gives them “three bites at the apple”: If they

are dissatisfied with the finding by one office, they can

take their complaint to the others.

The auditor’s Web address is www.ci.tucson.az.us/ia.html.

For further information, contact:

Liana Perez

Independent Police Auditor

Office of the Independent Police Auditor

255 West Alameda

First Floor, South

Tucson, AZ 85726–7210

520–791–5176

Suzanne Elefante

Chairperson, Citizens Police Advisory Review Board

2041 South Craycroft

Tucson, AZ 85711

520–790–4702

Capt. George Stoner

Tucson Police Department

270 South Stone Avenue

Tucson, AZ 85701

520–791–4441, ext. 1503

Teresa Guerrero-Daley

Independent Police Auditor, City of San Jose

4 North Second Street, Suite 650

San Jose, CA 95113

408–977–0652

C HAPTER 2: C ASE S TUDIES OF N INE O VERSIGHT P ROCEDURES

68
In addition to investigating allegations of police misconduct and reviewing the quality of completed investigations, citizen oversight bodies can undertake three other

responsibilities:

• Recommend policy and procedure changes and suggest

training improvements.

• Arrange to mediate selected complaints.

• Set up or assist with the operation of an early warning

system that identifies officers with potential problems.

Each of these activities has the potential to contribute to

helping police and sheriff’s departments remain or

become accountable to the local community as well as to

reduce police misconduct.

Policy Recommendations

“Many experts regard the policy review function as an

extremely important aspect of citizen oversight. Policy

review is designed to serve a preventive function by 

identifying problems and recommending corrective

action that will improve policing and reduce citizen complaints in the future” (emphasis in the original).1 Policy

recommendations, including suggestions for training

improvements, can influence an entire department, not

Chapter 3: Other Oversight Responsibilities

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

69

KEY POINTS

• Citizen oversight bodies can undertake three other important responsibilities in addition to investigating,

reviewing, or auditing complaints.

• Oversight bodies can recommend policy and procedure changes as well as training improvements.

— Many experts regard this policy review function as the most important responsibility citizen oversight 

bodies can undertake because it can improve services throughout an entire department, not just among

selected officers.

— Many police administrators report that oversight bodies have made valuable policy and training 

recommendations that they have implemented.

• Oversight bodies can make mediation available to selected complainants. Minneapolis and Rochester make

extensive use of formal mediation using trained mediators to conduct the sessions. Mediation can potentially

benefit:

— Complainants, many of whom are only interested in being able to express their concerns to the officer.

— Subject officers, who can learn how their behavior can affect the public and can avoid having the complaint

included in their files.

— The community at large, as citizens improve their understanding of police operations.

— Oversight bodies, which are spared the need to investigate and conduct hearings for these complaints.

Mediation can have disadvantages and has limitations. For example, use-of-force cases are not suitable for

mediation.

• Some oversight bodies assist police and sheriff’s departments to set up or maintain an early warning system to

keep track of complaints against officers who may need supervisory counseling or retraining.
just, as with oversight review, individual officers’

behavior. According to Mary Dunlap, director of San

Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints, “Policy recommendations may be the most important work OCC does:

They improve police services and the department’s relations with the public.”

Some police administrators believe that citizens do not

have the necessary understanding of

police practices to make useful policy

recommendations. However, according

to Capt. Gregory Winters, former officer-in-charge of the San Francisco

Police Department’s Risk Management

Office (which includes the internal

affairs unit), “The OCC’s policy recommendations can be helpful precisely

because they think of questions which,

because the staff lack expertise [in

police work], make you think.” Adds

Chief Fred Lau, “A lot of OCC’s [policy] recommendations make sense, but the police department doesn’t

always realize they are needed.”

The process of developing policy 

recommendations

Oversight bodies can identify the need for policy change

in several ways.

• Through individual citizen complaints. The bracelet

identification system described in “The Orange

County Sheriff Implements a Citizen Review Board

Suggestion” resulted from one family’s complaint.

• Through review of closed cases. If the auditor in Tucson

sees a need for a policy change, she can suggest the

modification to the chief. The oversight board also can

recommend the change to the chief. If

the chief does not agree to implement

the policy recommendation, the auditor

can appeal to the city manager, to

whom she and the chief report, and 

the city manager can require the

change. The board can appeal the

chief’s refusal to the mayor and city

council. As a result, when the auditor

and board agree on a policy change,

they have a great deal of potential

clout behind them.

• As a result of a general citizen concern. Citizens in

Berkeley may attend any regular Police Review

Commission meeting or specially assembled public

hearing to raise concerns that the board can use to

develop a recommendation for a department policy

change. One group of citizens petitioned for a public

hearing to complain about the University of California

campus police’s use of pepper spray and batons to

C HAPTER 3: O THER O VERSIGHT R ESPONSIBILITIES

70

THE ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF IMPLEMENTS A CITIZEN

REVIEW BOARD SUGGESTION

A mentally challenged man who had wandered away from his home during the night tried to enter a neighbor’s

residence thinking it was his own home. Officers who responded to the neighbor’s call reporting a burglary in

progress arrested the man, who spent 2 days in jail before his identity was discovered. The man’s parents filed a

complaint, but the board exonerated the two officers involved in arresting him, as did IA. However, the board

recommended that the sheriff work with the county commission to develop a method to identify people with

diminished mental capacity so they would not languish in jail for 48 hours.

Capt. Melvin Sears, the board’s administrative coordinator, located a local mental health association that agreed 

to adapt its existing software to administer a program to distribute bracelets to these individuals. Kevin Beary,

the sheriff, agreed to provide $1,600 from his forfeiture fund to purchase the bracelets, print an informational

brochure, and purchase two Polaroid cameras to take photos for the bracelets. Later, Beary wrote the board,

“It is always a pleasure to see positive results from an unfortunate incident. As you may recall, this is the result of

the CRB case involving Mr. ____.”

Policy recommendations 

can influence an entire

department, not just,

as with oversight 

review, individual 

officers’ behavior.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

71

force demonstrating students out of the school’s

administration building, which they had occupied and

refused to leave. As a result, the board developed recommendations on the department’s use of pepper spray

and batons that the city council endorsed and the campus police agreed to implement.

Examples of policy recommendations

Citizen oversight bodies can provide

two general types of recommendations

to change police operations:

• Changes in the way the department

conducts its internal investigations

into alleged misconduct.

• Changes in procedures that 

prescribe officer behavior.

Examples of both types of recommendations follow.

Recommendations for improving

a department’s own investigations

of alleged police misconduct

Portland’s oversight system has been

especially active in recommending

improvements to the police bureau’s

IA investigations.

• The Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee

recommended that IA handle all use-of-force complaints

rather than send them to the precincts for investigation

because of inconsistency of investigative quality at the

precinct level. The department agreed.

• The auditor became concerned that supervisors were

overlooking officers’ patterns of complaints in deciding

on discipline. As a result, the department has formed,

and invited the auditor to participate on, a task force to

address how discipline is being meted out and how patterns of complaints should fit into the disciplinary

decision.

Lt. James Shepard, commander of Rochester’s internal

affairs unit, submits a form to board members to fill out

and return assessing each investigation his sergeants

conduct (see appendix A).

Recommendations for improving policies 

governing officer behavior

Most of the oversight systems examined in this report

have developed policy recommendations designed to

improve officer conduct.

• In the wake of riots in a local park in 1991 and with

more than 30 complaints from citizens regarding allegations of officer misconduct, the Berkeley City

Council directed the Police Review

Commission (PRC) to review and

make recommendations on “all aspects

of crowd control at large demonstrations.” As a result of its study and

deliberations, PRC recommended 12

specific changes that the department

later implemented. The recommendations included:

— Obtaining and using better amplified sound devices to address

crowds and monitoring the audibility of dispersal orders.

— Providing clearer instructions as to 

what specific location or area is the 

unlawful assembly site and the route 

by which persons will be allowed

to leave and providing a reasonable opportunity for

demonstrators to comply with the dispersal order.

— Training specific officers to serve as crowd liaisons

at demonstrations.

— Barring the use of motorcycles as a means of force.

— Proscribing the use of flashlights to harass or

intimidate individuals in crowd control situations.2

• The Flint ombudsman’s office saw that the department

had no procedures for addressing victims after a

domestic violence incident. The department agreed to

develop a policy.

• The Orange County Citizen Review Board (CRB)

agreed when IA did not sustain a complaint against a

deputy who had used a “knee spike” to hit a noncompliant suspect in a specific portion of the body because

the officer had special training in using this type of

pain compliance technique. However, the board

According to Capt. Gregory

Winters, former officer-incharge of the San Francisco

Police Department’s Risk

Management Office,“The

OCC’s policy recommendations can be helpful precisely

because they think of questions which, because the

staff lack expertise 

[in police work], make 

you think.”
C HAPTER 3: O THER O VERSIGHT R ESPONSIBILITIES

72

expressed concern that the agency’s allowing a few

trained deputies to use this technique posed a potential

liability issue for the sheriff’s office. The board

observed that the department needed a clear written

statement of when it was appropriate to use the kick

and where the technique fell on the continuum of

force. As a result, the sheriff’s office developed a training bulletin that provides information on the relationship of the knee spike to the agency’s use-of-force

matrix. For example, the bulletin observes that “A knee

spike can be used as a Level 3, 5, or 6 response. If the

knee spike is used as a Level 3 response, the target

area of the strike must be a large muscle mass, such 

as the outside portion of the thigh.”

• The Orange County CRB expressed concern about

deputies who return to duty after they have been

involved in a shooting. As a result, the sheriff’s office

included new language in its use-of-force policy that

states that the agency’s staff psychologist will evaluate

employees who have discharged their firearms before

they are released back to full duty.

• St. Paul’s review commission heard a case in which an

officer failed to handcuff a suspect before putting him

in the cruiser to transport him to the station for booking. The officer had difficulty extracting the person

from the cruiser, and they got into a tussle. The officer

had not followed the department’s policy to handcuff

every arrestee before transporting the person. However,

officers and the board agreed that there are times when

cuffing a noncompliant subject on the streets can excite

the crowd. As a result, the department rewrote the

wording of the handcuffing procedure to allow some

officer discretion.

• In response to concerns raised by the auditor, the

Portland Police Bureau chief issued the bulletin shown

in exhibit 3–1 requiring officers to document in a

report every use of handcuffs with individuals who 

are subsequently not arrested.

Mediation

A second important additional function some oversight

bodies perform is to arrange for selected complainants to

mediate their complaints with subject officers. In some

cases, the mediation is informal. For example, the Tucson

auditor occasionally tells an officer’s captain or lieutenant that the complainant just wants to vent, especially

when the officer did nothing wrong but simply did not

explain his or her actions to the citizen. Typically, however, the process involves trained mediators who lead 

formal sessions at neutral locations.

Formal mediation: The process

Typically, the oversight body asks if the complainant is

willing to mediate the complaint. If the person agrees,

the oversight body directly or through internal affairs

finds out if the officer is also amenable to mediation. 

If both parties agree, the organization that the oversight

body uses to conduct mediations arranges a time for

them to meet with a mediator in a private location. If the

complainant expresses satisfaction with the result to the

mediator at the end of the session, the case is considered

closed. The content of the mediation remains confidential

and typically nothing appears in the officer’s file.

In some jurisdictions, complainants may not appeal the

results of the mediation—that is, if they leave unsatisfied,

they may no longer file a complaint with either the oversight body or the police department.

How two jurisdictions conduct mediation

Mediation is a major component of the Minneapolis and

Rochester oversight processes. Although the content of

the mediation sessions is similar in both cities, their oversight bodies arrange the process in a different manner.

Minneapolis. The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review

Authority (CRA) refers appropriate cases to the

Minneapolis Mediation Program. Pairs of trained volunteers mediate most of the sessions; program staff mediate

the rest (see “Using Mediator Teams Has Advantages”).

The Minneapolis Mediation Program requires volunteers

to already be certified mediators and to attend its own

40-hour mediation course. New volunteers sit in on 

several sessions with experienced mediators before 

mediating sessions themselves.

If mediation is successful, the director dismisses the

complaint; if it is not, she sends the case back to her staff

for investigation. In Minneapolis, the parties reach agreement in about 90 percent of the cases.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

73

EXHIBIT 3–1. PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU BULLETIN ON HANDCUFFING ISSUED IN RESPONSE

TO AUDITOR’S RECOMMENDATION
C HAPTER 3: O THER O VERSIGHT R ESPONSIBILITIES

74

Exhibit 3–2 lists the program’s mediation rules. As

shown, the mediation proceedings are confidential except

that the Minneapolis Mediation Program may inform

CRA and the police department whether the parties met

and reached agreement. Minnesota statute prohibits using

mediation discussions and documents in subsequent legal

or administrative proceedings.

Exhibit 3–3 is a copy of the form the parties sign. Two

“terms of the agreement” that participants actually signed

follow:

• “Both parties agreed that the dialogue was helpful in

allowing them to understand each other’s experiences

and viewpoints.”

• “The officer is sorry that the incident occurred and

caused ____ embarrassment. . . . ____ acknowledges

that the officer made the best decision possible with

the information available on the scene.”

Occasionally, a participant agrees to followup action:

“Resources provided by [the complainant] will be

forwarded to the Minneapolis Police training unit

Room 204 City Hall for training/treatment of 

hypoglycemic diabetes with recommendation they

be included in officer training.”

One officer agreed to attend a cultural diversity course.

Because there was no course available in the community,

he attended the cultural diversity session the Minneapolis

Mediation Program was running for its own volunteers.

One complainant agreed to go on a ride-along.

Rochester. In 1984, a Rochester City Council member

suggested that the Civilian Review Board (CRB) provide

a conciliation option in an effort to help build positive

relations between officers and citizens. Eight types of

complaints are eligible for conciliation, such as “failure

to take what complainant perceives was appropriate

action.” Cases involving allegations of use of excessive

force are not eligible for conciliation.

CRB’s parent agency, the Center for Dispute Settlement,

has a pool of certified mediators it can tap for all its

mediation components (e.g., victim-offender reconciliation). For mediating citizen complaints against the police,

the agency chooses a mediator from among a subgroup

who have participated in a 1-day extra training session on

police conciliation.

The conciliation sessions are no different than traditional

mediation sessions except that there is no written consent

agreement between the parties at the end of a conciliation.

At the end of the session, CRB sends a letter to internal

affairs indicating, if the mediation was successful, that the

case is closed and no investigation is needed. If the session was not successful, the letter informs IA whether the

complainant still wishes to have the complaint investigated. In 1997, three of the four conciliations were successful.

Of five conciliations conducted from January through

September 1998, two were resolved, one was unresolved,

and in two the complainant or officer did not appear.

Potential benefits of mediation

As summarized in exhibit 3–4, mediation can benefit

everyone involved.

Potential benefits to citizens

• Mediation may encourage some citizens to file complaints who would otherwise be reluctant to come 

forward.

USING MEDIATOR TEAMS

HAS ADVANTAGES

Because two mediators facilitate every session in

Minneapolis:

• There are always a man and woman mediator

present.

• They can share perceptions about what is taking

place and how to proceed.

• They can learn different mediation styles from

each other.

• One mediator can pick up on verbal and 

behavioral cues the other may have missed.

• They can brainstorm on possible solutions when

mediation reaches an impasse.

• They can debrief together afterward.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

75

EXHIBIT 3–2. MINNEAPOLIS MEDIATION PROGRAM RULES
C HAPTER 3: O THER O VERSIGHT R ESPONSIBILITIES

76

EXHIBIT 3–3. MEDIATION SUMMARY AND AGREEMENT FORM
• Many citizens simply want the satisfaction of expressing their concerns face to face with the officer—letting

the officer hear their side of the case or dissatisfaction

with the officer’s behavior. A survey

of 371 citizens who had filed complaints with New York City’s Citizen

Complaints Review Board found that

the desire for a direct encounter with

the subject officer was “pervasive”

and “significantly associated with

complainant satisfaction.”3

• Citizens can learn about the basis for

police officers’ actions in ways that

can promote an improved understanding of the law enforcement officer’s job.

— Many mediated cases involve incidents in which an

officer stopped and interrogated a suspect who

turned out to be innocent, and the person became

angry at having been “falsely accused” or singled

out “for no good reason.” Mediation lets officers

describe how the information they had at the time

led them to a reasonable suspicion

that the person might have been

the offender. (See “Two

Successful Mediations.”)

— Officers often have considerable

discretion in what they do, and

citizens become upset when an

officer chooses a course of action that is inconvenient (e.g., having their car towed) or embarrassing

(e.g., pat searching them in front of neighbors).

Alternatively, some citizens think officers have

discretion in areas where they do not. For example,

an officer may refuse to let a delivery truck drive

down a street the driver normally uses to get to 

a retail store because the street is temporarily

blocked off for a parade or local event. The officer

could make an exception and let the driver go

around the barricade, but, should the

driver hit a pedestrian, the officer could

be sued or disciplined.

• Like everyone, officers can be “having a

bad day” and lose their temper with citizens. In addition, citizens do not realize

how frustrating it can be when officers

encounter repeated instances of citizen

venality, venting at officers, or attempts

to break the rules (e.g., driving in the

breakdown lane). Officers are not justified in losing their temper and berating a citizen, but

mediation can help citizens understand why officers

did so.

• If the case is likely to result in an exonerated, unfounded, or not sustained finding by the review board, the

complainant can feel better about a successful mediation than receiving one of these findings.

Potential benefits to officers

• Mediation can educate officers to 

the effects their words, behaviors, and

attitudes can unwittingly have on the

public.

• If mediation is successful, nothing negative appears in the officer’s record. In

San Francisco, any mediation the Office of Citizen

Complaints schedules has this result even if the complainant fails to show up and as long as the officer

appears. In Rochester, officers who agree to mediation

do not have to go to IA to be interviewed or answer

written questions. An IA commander in another city

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

77

If mediation is successful,

nothing negative appears in

the officer’s record.

Citizens may:

1. Be encouraged to file complaints.

2. Gain the satisfaction of talking directly with the officer.

3. Gain a better understanding of police work and why the 

officer acted in a specific manner.

4. Learn why some officers are not always courteous.

5. Feel more satisfaction than if a hearing results in an 

exonerated, unfounded, or not sustained finding.

Police officers may:

1. Learn how their words, behaviors, and attitudes can 

unwittingly affect the public.

2. Avoid having a complaint included in their files if mediation 

is successful.

3. Reduce the negative image some citizens have about officers.

4. Gain an understanding of why the complainant acted the way

he or she did.

EXHIBIT 3–4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MEDIATION TO CITIZENS AND POLICE

Many citizens simply want

the satisfaction of expressing

their concerns face to face

with the officer—letting the

officer hear their side of the

case or dissatisfaction with

the officer’s behavior.
C HAPTER 3: O THER O VERSIGHT R ESPONSIBILITIES

78

tells all department personnel, “I can’t tell you how to

respond to an offer of mediation. But I can tell you

that, if you go and it’s successful, there will be no

record of the complaint in your files. So what do you

have to lose? You don’t necessarily have to apologize

or admit to wrongdoing, just explain why you did

what you did.”

• Mediation can help reduce the hostility and fear some

citizens develop toward the police. Narcotics officers

in Minneapolis raided an apartment looking for a drug

dealer who, it turned out, was selling drugs only when

the legal tenant and her three children were out of the

building. Conducted at night with a no-knock entry

with shotguns, the raid terrified the family. During

mediation, the officers (who had done nothing wrong)

TWO SUCCESSFUL MEDIATIONS

An officer was ticketing a car parked on the wrong side of the street when the owner came out of her house to

complain.The officer ran the woman’s name through the computer and found that a person matching her description had an outstanding warrant. The officer (a female) pat searched the woman and asked her to wait in the back

of the cruiser.The officer then received more information indicating the woman was not the same person, so she

released her.

The woman filed a complaint because she felt the officer had embarrassed her in front of her children. The officer,

in turn, was angry she had to mediate the issue because she felt that, having done nothing wrong, the department

should have told the woman the case was closed.

At the session, the mediator sat between them and asked them to decide who would talk first. The officer did,

asking,“Was I rude?” “No.” “Did I act professionally?” “Yes.” The officer then explained why she had asked the

woman to sit in the car, showing her the printout that indicated a person fitting her description—approximate

age, race, gender, and same last name—had a warrant out for her arrest. The officer said,“I can understand why

you were embarrassed, but if I was going to have you sit in the back of my cruiser, I needed to make sure you

weren’t carrying a gun that you could shoot me with in the back of the head.” The woman became less frustrated

and ended up satisfied with the officer’s explanation.

* * *

The complainant reported he had been stopped for driving 45 miles per hour (mph) in a 30-mph zone but that the

street was wide and deserted at the time. He said that the two officers in separate squad cars had yelled at him,

pinned him against his car (so that his buckle scratched his new BMW), spread-eagled him, and did a pat-down search.

The officers present at the session explained to him,“You have to realize what we thought we were seeing.

We had been chasing you with our lights and siren on for six blocks and you hadn’t pulled over.” The complainant

responded that, precisely because the officers had made no other move to pull him over for six blocks, he was

not sure they were signaling him to stop. The officer said he had not forced the man’s car to the curb because

there were pedestrians on the sidewalk for the first several blocks and the driver might have pulled onto the 

sidewalk and hit someone.“So I waited until we had reached some railroad tracks before forcing you to stop.”

At one point, the mediators caucused so one could talk with the officer because he was starting to get angry. The

mediator presented the citizen’s point of view of feeling “violated” because he had no criminal record yet was

being treated like a criminal. Upon their return, the officer explained,“We also thought that someone might have

stolen the car, so we had to take precautions in case the driver was truly a bad guy.” This explanation seemed to

convince the citizen of the officer’s good intentions. In turn, the officer could see that the man was only reacting

to a frightening and inexplicable police action.The parties both apologized and signed a settlement.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

79

apologized for the mistake and sat down and talked

with the children so they would not be scarred by the

experience to always be afraid of police officers.

• Just as mediation can give complainants an understanding of police behavior, some officers can benefit from

learning the reasons citizens behave they way they do.

For example, officers may learn that the only thing that

upset the citizen was not immediately being given an

explanation for why he or she was detained. As a

result, mediation can enable some officers to learn

what they can do differently that may reduce 

friction with the public.

Mediation may also benefit the community at large.

According to Andrew Thomas, executive director of the

organization that operates the Rochester Civilian Review

Board:

Since IA and the Civilian Review Board both

fail to sustain allegations in so many cases, it is

important to move beyond assessing guilt or innocence in cases of alleged police misconduct to

building a better understanding among citizens of

what officers do and why they do it. If citizens

gain an understanding about an individual officer’s behavior, they may begin to understand all

officers’ behavior better.

Furthermore, if mediation results in improvements in

officer conduct, the entire community benefits. Finally,

mediation saves taxpayers the expense of an investigation

and a hearing, or at least enables oversight and internal

affairs staff to devote more time to more serious cases or

reduce their backlog of cases.

MEDIATION IS NOT ALWAYS SUCCESSFUL

A woman filed a complaint with an oversight body because an off-duty officer checking ID cards at the door of a

night club had confiscated her driver’s license. He concluded it was fake because the woman could not identify the

color of her eyes or the address listed on the card. Without the card, the woman was unable to pick up her disability check the next day. As a result, the woman filed a complaint. She wanted an apology and her license back.

After introductions, the complainant explained why she felt the officer had treated her disrespectfully by not

believing the license was hers and, in general,“giving me a tough time” trying to enter the club. She said she 

wanted her license back. (The mediators felt she looked young enough to have possibly been underage.)

The officer talked for 3 minutes, saying that he was doing his job and was convinced that the ID was fake 

because the photo did not match the woman. He turned the ID in to the police department because it was 

standard procedure, and he no longer had the authority to retrieve it for her.

The mediators rephrased both their statements; for example, noting to the woman,“It’s very important to you to

get your license back.” The woman explained that she had been caught up in the Department of Motor Vehicles

bureaucracy trying to get it back, and began to cry. The mediators caucused, taking her in the hallway to give her 

a chance to calm down and telling her,“We understand that this was very upsetting for you.”

Back in the meeting, the mediators asked the parties what they wanted to happen to have a satisfactory settlement. The woman repeated that the officer did not need to treat her the way he did and that she wanted her

license back. The officer said again that he could do nothing about retrieving the license.

The mediators then caucused with the officer, who repeated that, because the ID was clearly fake, he would not

apologize and he was justified in seizing it. Upon returning to the meeting, the woman became teary again and

asked to end the mediation. Everyone stood up, the mediators thanked the parties for coming, and the officer and

woman left.
C HAPTER 3: O THER O VERSIGHT R ESPONSIBILITIES

80

Drawbacks to mediation

Mediation can have disadvantages (see “Mediation Is Not

Always Successful”).

• Because mediation is almost always held in private and

the results are confidential, it may be seen as having

less “teeth” than formal, public proceedings. For example, Robert Bailey, former Berkeley assistant city manager, believes that mediation circumvents the potential

benefits of a public hearing that exposes officer misconduct to citizens and the media.

• According to Charles Moose, former chief of the

Portland Police Bureau, some police administrators feel

that mediation takes away their control over discipline

because a condition of successful mediation is that

there will be no further investigation and no discipline.

• Officers may go through the motions of appearing 

to be contrite to avoid having the complaint appear in

their files. According to Todd

Samolis, coordinator of the

Rochester Civilian Review Board,

“A number of officers come for the

wrong reasons—to keep the complaint out of their file or to pacify

their supervisors—but then they see

it works: They hear the complainant

in a new light and see how they

might have handled the situation

differently.” Or they see that

explaining their actions changes the

complainant’s attitude toward them.

When Minneapolis Mediation Program staff telephone

participants a day or two after the session, officers

sometimes say, “I never really saw it from the citizen’s

perspective” or “My actions really were inappropriate;

I was having a bad day.”

• Although mediators are trained to make sure that 

each participant is on equal footing, some participants

may have more of an advantage than others in certain

situations.

— Some officers are uncomfortable sitting in the same

small room with someone whom they have cited or

arrested.

— Some mediators feel that officers appearing in uniform and armed may intimidate some citizens.

However, some citizens report they prefer to talk to

an officer who is in uniform so they feel they are

not addressing an ordinary citizen but the person in

his or her law enforcement role.

• In Tucson, complainants may opt for mediation, file a

complaint with the auditor, file with the police department, or file with all three. Some police administrators

object when mediation allows complainants to have

more than “one bite of the apple” in this fashion.

(However, in many jurisdictions, officers accused of

misconduct also have multiple recourse, such as arbitration and civil service hearings.)

Mediation also has limitations.

• Mediation is suitable only for cases involving 

allegations of officer discourtesy and other minor 

misconduct. Allegations of use of

excessive force or discrimination

should not be mediated because, if 

sustained, they merit punishment.

• Many officers refuse to participate

in mediation. One officer said, “Why

should I have to explain to a citizen

why I did my job?” Some officers

are reluctant to participate simply

because, as an unknown procedure,

mediation makes them nervous.

According to Robert Duffy, chief 

of the Rochester Police Department,

“Officers often find mediation threatening—people in

authority have difficulty hearing the other side. But we

need to hear why people disagree with us.”

• Many complainants also are reluctant to participate. 

In 1997, San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints

received 22 complaints that investigators felt were 

eligible for mediation, but complainants refused to

participate in 16 of them.

Early Warning Systems

Early warning systems (EWSs) are procedures for keeping track of complaints against officers and using the

Every 3 months,

Minneapolis’ Civilian Police

Review Authority sends 

internal affairs the names 

of officers who have 

accumulated two or more

complaints within the 

previous 12-month period.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

81

results to target officers with unusually high numbers of

complaints for supervisory counseling or retraining. The

rationale for EWS was provided by a report that found a

relatively small number of Los Angeles police officers

were responsible for a disproportionate number of useof-force reports and citizen complaints: Of about 1,800

officers against whom an allegation had been filed, 44

had 6 or more complaints against them.4 Other studies

have found that between 5 and 10 percent of a department’s officers engage repeatedly in problem behavior.5

As a result, in 1981 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

recommended that police and sheriff’s departments develop early warning systems to identify problem officers.6

Typically, EWS is designed to be

informal, nonpunitive, and separate

from the normal disciplinary process.

Usually, it involves counseling or

retraining by supervisory officers.7

Oversight involvement in

EWS

Citizen oversight programs can

become involved with an EWS in at

least four ways:

• Recommend that the police or sheriff’s department adopt an EWS.

• Collaborate with the department in implementing 

an EWS.

• Operate EWS for the department.

• Audit the department’s EWS system.

After holding a hearing for a second complaint against a

deputy for two separate shooting incidents, members of

the Orange County Citizen Review Board learned that

the deputy had a history of 18 disciplinary incidents. By

making the lack of a tracking system public during its

normal open hearing process and by stressing that the

department was in jeopardy of lawsuits and negative

media publicity by failing to discipline errant officers

effectively, the board reinforced and sped up the department’s existing plans to develop an early warning system.

As of late 1998, the EWS software had been developed

and was in place, and the sheriff’s office was working on

a policy to implement it.

Every 3 months, Minneapolis’ Civilian Police Review

Authority (CRA) sends internal affairs the names of

officers who have accumulated two or more complaints

within the previous 12-month period. A computer program generates the information. Internal affairs examines

its own list of officers with multiple complaints and

generates a report for commanders, the deputy chiefs,

and the chief that identifies officers who have had two

misconduct complaints of the same nature or three complaints of any nature combining both IA and CRA cases

during the previous 12-month period. The report indicates what the complaints allege and whether they

involve officers on duty or off duty. On average, about 

12 officers per quarter have their

names in the report. According to 

Lt. Dorothy Veldey-Jones, the IA 

commander:

Oftentimes a name will appear for

one quarter and then never again.

Occasionally, names appear for two

quarters, but by the third quarter

they drop off the list. Then, however, there are a few names that consistently appear on the list; they

may drop off for short periods of

time, but they seem to reappear 

frequently.

The department is evaluating the system to determine

what the best courses of remedial action would be given

the information the report provides.

The Portland auditor examined the Portland Police

Bureau’s EWS system and ensured it was identifying 

the individuals who met the bureau’s criteria for inclusion on the list of potential problem officers.

Benefits and drawbacks of EWS

An early warning system can help police and sheriff’s

departments identify officers who may be exhibiting a

pattern of misconduct that suggests the need for intervention before the officers commit more serious misconduct.

However, departments must determine carefully how

many complaints, what type of complaints, and the period of time that will trigger a specified supervisory action.

For example, officers on drug details may have numerous

complaints filed against them by drug dealers’ attorneys

An early warning system can

help police and sheriff’s

departments identify officers

who may be exhibiting a

pattern of misconduct 

that suggests the need 

for intervention before the

officers commit more 

serious misconduct.
in an attempt to intimidate the officers into less aggressive enforcement. Jurisdictions also must decide whether

unsustained complaints will be included in the tally.

While officers may object to this practice, one lieutenant

reported that an officer who has accumulated 10 unsustained cases may indeed be getting into trouble, and, at a

minimum, his or her supervisors need to be told to investigate whether there is a problem that requires corrective

action before it escalates.

Police Accountability: Establishing an Early Warning

System involves a national evaluation of early warning

systems that discusses their benefits and limitations in

detail.8

* * *

The success with which oversight systems are able to

improve police and sheriff’s departments’ policies and

procedures, conduct mediation, and assist with an early

warning system depends crucially on the number, skills,

impartiality, and dedication of their staff. The following

chapter addresses the issues involved in staffing an oversight system.

Notes

1. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, “A Report on the

Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police

Department,” prepared for the Albuquerque City Council,

1997: 128–129.

2. San Francisco’s Office of Community Complaints

(OCC) also drafted a policy for crowd control in

response to citizen complaints that officers were handling

demonstrations by yelling “disperse” and then scattering

the demonstrators by using their batons. The department

adopted OCC’s recommended policy that officers ensure

that demonstrators have enough time to disperse and that

there are enough avenues to leave the scene. Oversight

bodies in both San Francisco and Berkeley may have

been especially active in addressing their police departments’ behavior in crowd control situations because of

the unusual number of demonstrations the two cities

experience.

Both cities also were working with the police to improve

officers’ handling of mentally ill persons. Officials in

Albuquerque also are concerned about this problem. 

The National Institute of Justice, the research arm of

the U.S. Department of Justice, has published an Issues

and Practices report entitled Police Response to Special

Populations: Handling the Mentally Ill, Public Inebriate,

and the Homeless (Finn, P.E., and M. Sullivan,

Washington, D.C., 1987, NCJ 107273) that describes

efforts in 10 jurisdictions to enhance police and sheriff’s

departments’ efforts to handle the mentally ill misdemeanor offender.

3. Vera Institute of Justice, Processing Complaints

against Police in New York City: The Complainant’s

Perspective, New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1989.

4. Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police

Department, Report of the Independent Commission on

the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles: City of

Los Angeles, 1991.

5. “Kansas City Police Go After Their ‘Bad Boys,’” New

York Times, September 10, 1991; “Wave of Abuse Claims

Laid to a Few Officers, Boston Globe, October 4, 1992,

cited in Walker, Samuel, “Revitalizing the New York

CCRB: A Proposal for Change,” unpublished paper,

Omaha: University of Nebraska, Department of Criminal

Justice, September 1997: 5.

6. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Who Is Guarding

the Guardians? A Report on Police Practices,

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,

1981.

7. Luna and Walker, “A Report on the Oversight

Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department,” 137.

8. Walker, Samuel, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, Police

Accountability: Establishing an Early Warning System,

IQ Service Report, vol. 32, no. 8, Washington, D.C.:

International City/County Management Association,

2000.

C HAPTER 3: O THER O VERSIGHT R ESPONSIBILITIES

82
Chapter 4: Staffing

Citizen oversight procedures may require three principal

types of staff:

• Volunteer board members.

• Professional investigators.

• An executive director.1

Talented and fair staff in all of these categories are essential for citizen oversight to achieve its potential benefits.

Incompetent staff will not be able to perform their responsibilities, while biased staff will create conflict that can

grind the process to a halt. Staff must also be flexible.

Fred Lau, the San Francisco police chief, said:

The OCC [Office of Citizen Complaints] executive director is extremely critical to the relationship to the police department. If I didn’t have a

good working relationship with Mary Dunlap, it

would be horrible. She is willing not to be rigid,

sit down with department subject matter experts,

and talk. She is tough and tenacious, but we have

never come to an impasse—we’ve never had to go

to the [police] commission for a tiebreaker.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

83

KEY POINTS

• Citizen oversight bodies most commonly need three types of staff: volunteer board members, professional

investigators, and an executive director.

• Talented and fair staff are essential for any oversight procedure to be effective.

• Because they may have no formal credentials, selecting board members is especially tricky.

— Before recruiting board members, jurisdictions should establish the specific responsibilities they expect the

board to assume.Then jurisdictions need to decide how large their board will be, members’ terms of office,

and their honoraria, if any.

— A common selection criterion is to include diversity. Permitting current or former police officers or sheriff’s

deputies to serve is controversial.

— The process of selecting board members can involve public hearings, private interviews, and word of mouth.

— Training for board members can include lectures, materials review (e.g., department policies and procedures), attending a citizens’ academy, ride-alongs, and training as mediators.

• Some oversight systems involve the use of paid investigators.

— Investigators need to be able to handle the potential stress of interviewing sometimes angry complainants

and hostile officers.

— Many jurisdictions try to hire investigators with a law enforcement background.

— Senior staff train new investigators. Novices also learn on the job.

• Along with the police chief or sheriff, the executive director or auditor will have the greatest influence on

whether the oversight system achieves its objectives. Most jurisdictions make considerable use of word of

mouth to find the most qualified individual.
C HAPTER 4: S TAFFING

84

As a result, the recruitment, selection, and training of

oversight volunteers and staff are extremely important.

The following discussion examines these processes for

each of the three staff categories. The issue of staff

supervision is discussed in chapter 7, “Monitoring,

Evaluation, and Funding.”

Volunteer Board Members

If a jurisdiction chooses to have volunteer citizens

review cases, the volunteers need to be chosen with 

particular care because they usually

have no formal credentials in the law

enforcement field, may have inappropriate motives for serving, and may

be viewed as especially unqualified

by some police and citizens.

Planning decisions

There are several early decisions

jurisdictions must make before recruiting volunteer 

board members.

• What will be the board’s specific responsibilities—

that is, what will members be expected to accomplish?

The nature of their assignments and how much time

they will need to achieve them in part will influence

how jurisdictions answer the other planning questions

listed below. For example, if board members will be

expected to review—and, especially, hold hearings—

on less serious cases of misconduct (e.g., verbal

abuse) rather than focus exclusively on serious cases

(e.g., use-of-excessive-force allegations), program

planners need to provide adequate staff to avoid long

delays in case processing.

• How many members will the board have? There

appears to be no correlation between board size and

the population of the communities they serve.2 Most

boards have between seven and nine members. Factors

to consider in deciding on the number include:

— Not having so few members that, with two or three

absences, there is no quorum.

— Having enough members to represent the diversity

of the local community.

— If small groups of board members will be conducting hearings (as in Berkeley, Minneapolis, and

Rochester), having enough members so that the

burden of holding hearings is not overwhelming.

The St. Paul mayor, with the consent of the city council,

appoints three alternative commissioners to serve in the

event a regular member does not attend a meeting or

hearing due to illness or a conflict of interest.

• What will be the members’ term of office, and can

they be reappointed? Terms should not be so short that

board members leave as soon as they

gain valuable on-the-job experience3

but not so long that undesirable members can remain in office beyond their

welcome. Portland appoints members

for 2 years, with the option of reappointment. Board members in

Minneapolis and Tucson serve for 4

years. In Berkeley, new council members may replace previous members’

selections before their 2-year term is over. In Tucson,

board members may not serve beyond the term of the

mayor or council member who appointed them.

• Will board members receive an honorarium? If so, how

much? Some compensation may be necessary to attract

qualified volunteers as well as to underscore that the

community feels their work is important. Too much

compensation not only becomes expensive but may

also erode the concept that independent citizens, rather

than paid staff employed by the city or county, are

overseeing police misconduct.

— Board members in Minneapolis receive $50 for

each day they attend one or more meetings or 

hearings or provide other board-related services.

— Panelists in Rochester who chair review meetings

receive $50 for each 2-hour block of time they participate (they receive another $50 if they run at

least 15 minutes into the next 2-hour block); regular panelists receive $35. Mediators receive $35 for

each case. (See “Rochester’s Board Members All

Are Trained Mediators.”)

— Board members in Berkeley have been given $3 

an hour (not to exceed $200 per month) since the

Talented and fair staff 

are essential for citizen 

oversight to achieve its

potential benefits.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

85

Police Review Commission was established in

1974. Board members in Omaha receive no 

compensation.

Selection of board members

Jurisdictions need to recruit and screen board members

carefully.

Oversight legislation in Orange County,

as in many other jurisdictions, requires

that “The composition of the CRB

[Citizen Review Board] shall endeavor

to reflect the ethnic, racial and economic diversity of Orange County.”

• The five civilian members of the St.

Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs

Review Commission include one

woman, one African-American, one Hispanic, and one

gay person. They include the director of a communitybased organization, the vice president of a lighting fixture company, a court psychologist, the director of

enforcement for the State Commerce Department, and

an IBM project director.

• The seven Minneapolis board members consist of three

African-Americans, one Native American, and three

Caucasians. Three members are women. Members’

occupations are the former assistant State ombudsman

for corrections, a minister, a professor who teaches

police ethics, a retired social worker and probation

officer, a school teacher who is also a nonsworn Parks

Department police agent, a former city housing authority employee, and a county public defender’s office

employee.

As Minneapolis’ board composition suggests, many jurisdictions look for volunteers with some type of background in the criminal justice system. Portland’s citizen

advisers include a retired State patrol

officer, a retired police chief, a judge,

and a defense attorney. Allowing current

or former law enforcement officers to

serve is controversial (see “Should

Police Officers and Sheriff’s Deputies

Serve on Boards?”). Few jurisdictions

choose active police officers to serve;

some local ordinances prohibit their

selection. The Berkeley ordinance prohibits all city employees from serving.

Boards typically do not include local activists, such as

members of local chapters of the American Civil

Liberties Union or the Lawyers Guild.

Lisa Botsko’s written description of Portland’s citizen

advisers’ responsibilities and duties includes the 

ability to:

• Work with persons of opposing viewpoints.

• Provide constructive criticism.

• Communicate effectively, verbally and in writing.

Allowing current or 

former law enforcement

officers to serve on 

volunteer oversight boards

is controversial.

ROCHESTER’S BOARD MEMBERS ALL ARE TRAINED MEDIATORS

Rochester trains all Civilian Review Board members in mediation. According to Todd Samolis, the CRB coordinator:

Mediation training exercises focus on helping participants to become aware of their biases—since everyone has

them and they cannot be eliminated—so that as board members they can keep these prejudices in check when

they review IA cases. Mediation training increases their ability to think impartially.

According to one board member,“The [mediation training] program was probably the most educationally enlightening experience I’ve ever had.”

Samolis also believes that “mediation training increases listening skills dramatically. In addition, it helps panelists to

absorb the information in the case files in terms of who said what, when, and where—to keep things straight—

and to spot inconsistencies.”
• Maintain confidentiality of information in IA files.

• Realize possible conflicts of interest such as relatives

working with law enforcement.

Recruitment

Most jurisdictions recruit board members through public

announcements and by word of mouth.

• Minneapolis has an open appointment process in which

the city council’s Public Safety and Regulatory Services

Subcommittee hosts public hearings at which applicants

present themselves. The subcommittee makes recommendations to the full council for approval by majority

vote.

• In Orange County, citizens can tell county commissioners they would like to serve on the oversight board.

C HAPTER 4: S TAFFING

86

SHOULD POLICE OFFICERS AND SHERIFF’S DEPUTIES SERVE ON BOARDS?

The inclusion of law enforcement officers (whether current or former) on volunteer oversight boards is a controversial issue. On the one hand, the St. Paul oversight ordinance requires the city’s board to include two active

police officers. (The St. Paul police union lobbied to have one officer for each citizen board member but settled

for two officers on a seven-person commission.) Omaha’s Citizens Complaint Review Board has one police union

member. On the other hand,Tucson’s ordinance prohibits board members from being current peace officers, while

Berkeley’s forbids current or former officers from serving.

Many people argue that having one or two officers on the board provides additional insight into police behavior.

According to a former board member in St. Paul,“It is good to have officers on the board because they have a

perspective citizen commissioners don’t have; you want their frame of reference. But [they cannot exercise undue

influence because], with only two members, they do not have a majority vote.”

The Rochester board had two, then one, and now no officers as board members. One long-time citizen member

reported:“I liked having an officer on the panel because, regardless of how much training civilians get, the officer is

better versed in department policies. And they took their jobs very seriously.” On a few occasions, police members drew other board members’ attention to improper procedures that subject officers had engaged in which

were not among the reasons for the citizens’ complaints.

Opponents of allowing active or even former officers to serve as board members argue that their participation

violates the concept of independent review: Officers, even if from other departments or retired, may not be able

to be objective about the culpability of another officer’s conduct.The Orange County charter establishing the

Citizen Review Board is silent on the matter of whether the sheriff’s two appointees to the board may be

deputies. However, the sheriff has deliberately selected civilians to avoid any impression that the board is biased 

in favor of the department. Indeed, to make sure the board remained neutral in the public’s perception, when a

county commissioner nominated a correctional deputy to the board, the sheriff successfully asked the commissioner to withdraw the nomination.

A board member in Minneapolis added:

All you need [to be a competent board member] is to be a citizen of sound judgment. . . . You don’t need to

understand police work to know if someone is mistreating someone else, such as calling them names. Abuse

is obvious. And the hearing brings out whether the officer violated department policies or procedures.

A police officer observed,“I have heard comments from street cops that board members are clueless, but then 

I hear the same thing said about IA investigators who haven’t been on the streets for years.”
In addition, because there are so many advisory boards

in Orange County, there is a board whose only task is

to look for people to serve on other county boards.

Some jurisdictions experience difficulty recruiting board

members because of the time commitment involved to be

trained and to serve. Todd Samolis, coordinator of the

Rochester board, had to court candidates because of the

requirement to attend 48 hours of police academy training

in the middle of August. A board member in Berkeley

reported she spends about 50 hours a month reading

materials and attending hearings. Board members in

Orange County devote an average of 10–16 hours a

month, and in Minneapolis the average is 10 hours a

month. Most board members elsewhere

spend a minimum of 4 hours a month.

Training

Training requirements for board members differ. City ordinances in Tucson

and St. Paul specify that board members

must attend mandatory comprehensive

training before they may review any

cases. The Tucson ordinance identifies

nine areas of required training, from police department

operations to confidentiality. The police department and

independent auditor provide the 40-hour training. Some

of the more common training methods follow.

Lectures 

Barbara Attard, Berkeley’s Police Review Commission

(PRC) officer, runs a 4-hour session on PRC procedures

that includes presentations by the chief on the discipline

process and by the city attorney on open meeting regulations. Melvin Sears, the Orange County Sheriff’s administrative coordinator, trains new members by reviewing

the department manual and board manual, paying special

attention to use-of-force issues.

Materials review

Board members typically are provided with written materials that include department general orders and other

policies and procedures. Melvin Sears gives all new

board members in Orange County a large notebook that

details their responsibilities and includes many of the

department’s general orders.

Citizens’ academy

Candidates for Rochester’s board must attend a 2-week

condensed version of a police academy. Run by the

police department, the 48-hour course involves 3 hours

per evening for 2 weeks and two all-day Saturday sessions. The training includes using sidearms with a

“Shoot/Don’t Shoot” simulator, practicing handcuffing,

and learning about department policies and procedures,

such as the use-of-force continuum. According to one

board member, “I had never fired a gun before. At first it

was a strange sensation. But it helped me understand

how inaccurate handguns are and the officers’ need for

split-second decisionmaking.”

By ordinance, new board members in 

St. Paul may not be sworn in until they

have completed the 11-week, 33-hour

citizens’ academy that includes getting

sprayed with a minor dose of pepper

spray, using a baton, handcuffing each

other, and firing handguns using a

“Shoot/Don’t Shoot” simulator. The

Albuquerque city ordinance requires

commission members to attend the 

citizens’ police academy. Most Orange County board

members have attended a 36-hour citizens’ academy 

on their own.

Using a citizens’ academy as a training tool is not without controversy. The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review

Authority was originally reluctant to have its board members attend the citizens’ academy because of concerns

that they might be “coopted” as a result of the process.

By contrast, the police union wanted attendance to be a

requirement for board membership. As of 1998, six of

the seven board members had voluntarily attended the

12-week course. When Paul McQuilken, chairperson of

the Orange County board, recommended that the county

commission select board members only from among

individuals who had already attended the academy, some

community groups objected because they felt members

would become too sympathetic to the police. A board

member in another jurisdiction downplayed this risk:

“We don’t get brainwashed to believe blue.”

The real issue, according to Mark Gissiner, president of

the International Association for Civilian Oversight of

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

87

Candidates for

Rochester’s board must

attend a 2-week 

condensed version of 

a police academy.
C HAPTER 4: S TAFFING

88

Law Enforcement (IACOLE) from 1995–99, is whether

the empathy for police work that board members may

develop by attending citizens’ academies (not a bad thing

in itself) makes it difficult for them to focus in the future

on whether officers violated department policies and

procedures.

Ride-alongs 

In Minneapolis, board members must do one ride-along

after they have been appointed.

However, a police lieutenant in another city observed, “One or two ridealongs are useless [as a learning tool]

because officers are on their best

behavior,” and any one shift could be

atypical. “Volunteer board members

need to go on several to begin to gain

an understanding of police work,” he

said. Reflecting this judgment, the 

St. Paul ordinance requires new board members to go 

on at least 10 ride-alongs, 2 in each district and 1 with

each of 4 specialty units (e.g., traffic, search warrants,

canine).

Evelyn Scott, a board member in Rochester, went on 

a ride-along and reported:

I ended up running through back alleys and backyards following an officer chasing a suspect. The

officer arrested the person, handcuffed him, put

him in the cruiser, and drove him to the booking

area. When the suspect kept cursing the officer the

whole way, I realized how much patience officers

have to have. Later [when she was a board member], we had a case in which an officer stopped a

suspicious person. When the officer tried to frisk

him, the man took off. The officer chased him,

and the man fired back. The officer then shot and

wounded the man. The citizen filed a complaint

against the officer for use of excessive force.

Reviewing the case, I remembered my ride-along

and recalled how fast things happen, how quickly

officers have to react, how situations that look routine may be dangerous, and how officers may have

to make an instantaneous decision about whether

to shoot.

On-the-job training 

In some jurisdictions, the bulk of the training occurs on

the job; in all jurisdictions, some of the required experience can be learned only by doing it.

Inservice training

The Albuquerque city ordinance requires board members to attend a yearly 4-hour training session conducted by a civil rights attorney. Tucson

legislation requires board members to

pursue 48 hours of educational opportunities annually, such as ride-alongs

and the police department’s citizens’

academy. The Orange County

Sheriff’s Department periodically

provides members with an hour of

inservice training before (or instead

of) regular board meetings that has included explanations of:

• Deputies’ procedures for dealing with armed and

unarmed subjects in relationship to body shape and size.

• The procedures the department’s psychologist follows

in conducting fitness-for-duty evaluations.

• IA operations and chain-of-command procedures for

reviewing investigations.

• Office policy and procedures related to its use-of-force

matrix and defensive tactics that included simulated

demonstrations by deputies followed by board member

participation in exercises designed to help them determine the level of force used.

Investigators

For oversight systems that investigate alleged officer misconduct, selecting and training investigators also requires

careful attention. According to Mark Gissiner, former

IACOLE president and a senior human resources analyst

for Cincinnati who has investigated allegations of police

misconduct since 1985: “The investigation, analysis, and

determination of whether excessive force occurred is an

extremely difficult task.”4

The St. Paul ordinance

requires new board 

members to go on at 

least 10 ride-alongs,

2 in each district.
Recruitment

Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco’s Office of

Citizen Complaints, requires candidates for investigator

positions to have 2 years of investigative experience,

which may be in academic research. Dunlap also looks 

for individuals who can handle the stress of angry complainants and hostile, armed officers. She tests applicants

for tendencies to jump to conclusions, and she interviews

them to detect biases for or against law enforcement.

(See “San Francisco Mandates the Number of Oversight

Investigators.”)

Investigators in many jurisdictions have

a law enforcement background. In

Minneapolis, two of three current investigators are former police officers with

other departments. According to Robin

Lolar, one of the investigators:

My police background enables me

to detect when officers aren’t being

truthful in their reports by way of

their creative writing. I can also

sense when complainants are leaving something out of their stories. I

know what officers can and can’t do by way of

stops and seizures. Knowing proper police procedure saves me a lot of research time.

Lolar added, “Complainants feel comfortable knowing I

am a former police officer from outside of Minneapolis.”

(Minneapolis legislation forbids any present or former city

officer from becoming a Civilian Police Review Authority

[CRA] investigator.) The investigators’ previous experience as police officers helps address police union and

subject officers’ concerns that CRA does not understand

police work or is biased against officers. In fact, an IA sergeant who was exonerated of misconduct by CRA reported, “The investigator questioned me for 45 minutes and

was very thorough and fair—in fact, I ended up hiring him

as a criminal investigator for the city attorney’s office.”

An auditor’s report on the Kansas City,

Missouri, Police Department questioned

how independent the city’s Office of

Citizen Complaints was from the department because three of the five staff members had ties to the department; two were

former police officers, including one who

was a former department IA investigator.

The police commission resolved not to

hire former officers again.

Oversight bodies must also consider

carefully whether to hire investigators who are members

of activist groups. Even if activists are able to be objective on the job, their volunteer activities off the job may

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

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SAN FRANCISCO MANDATES THE NUMBER OF OVERSIGHT INVESTIGATORS

Inadequate funds to provide for sufficient staff can doom an oversight system because either investigations cannot

be conducted thoroughly or cases will be delayed—or both. As discussed in chapter 5, delays result in disillusioned complainants and angry police officers as well as loss of memory and witnesses.

To avoid these shortcomings, in 1996 San Francisco voters approved Proposition G, which amended the city and

county charters to require that the Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) have at least 1 investigator for every 

150 sworn officers. As a result, in 1998 OCC had 15 investigators and 4 supervisory personnel to handle a

department with 2,100 sworn officers. By contrast, Minneapolis’ Civilian Police Review Authority has only 4 investigators for a police department with 919 sworn officers.

However, even with the charter amendment, it took San Francisco many months to provide the money for OCC

to hire the required investigators. And even with the increased staffing level, OCC staff continue to be overworked—each has 40–60 cases at any one time. Because officers generally may be interviewed only while they are

on duty, investigators frequently conduct interviews at 6:00 a.m. if officers are working night shifts. Investigators

are granted compensatory time for working before or after hours, but not overtime pay.

In 1996, San Francisco voters approved Proposition G,

which amended the city and

county charters to require

that the Office of Citizen

Complaints have at least 

1 investigator for every 

150 sworn officers.
create the perception—as might the use of current or former police officers—that investigations may be biased.

Training

In Minneapolis, the director trains new investigators,

who then sit in on cases handled by the senior case investigator. Investigators have attended inservice training 

conducted by police officers and others in use of force,

verbal judo, search warrants, cultural diversity, and domestic abuse; they also have participated in seminars with a

professional training firm on investigation, interviewing,

and interrogation techniques. In San Francisco, the Office

of Citizen Complaints’ (OCC’s) director, chief, and senior

investigators, using a standardized training manual OCC

managers developed, lead 8 to 10 full-day training sessions, followed by several weeks of working side by side

with supervisors who monitor and correct their intake

interviews, complaint analyses, witness searches, and officer interviews. The office follows up with two to four

trainings each month for all staff on a variety of subjects.

Lisa Botsko, Portland’s first police auditor, developed a

set of “Standards of Review” that advisory board members are instructed to follow in conducting reviews of IA

cases and determining whether the oversight body needs

to review a case. The standards include guidelines related

to the filing and intake process for complaints, investigations, and findings. (See appendix B.)

Although she is not an investigator, San Francisco’s OCC

policy and outreach specialist regularly attended recruit

classes for 28 weeks at the police academy to improve

OCC’s knowledge of police department basic training

and to establish rapport between OCC and recruits. “The

bank of knowledge built by attending the academy,” she

said, “is vital to understanding police procedures.”

Executive Director or Auditor

The executive director (or auditor), along with the police

chief or sheriff, is the single most important person for

ensuring that the oversight process is effective. Hiring or

appointing experienced individuals is critical to establishing or maintaining the system’s credibility. For example,

Lisa Botsko, the Police Internal Investigations Auditing

Committee’s auditor in Portland from 1993 to 1999, had

been a private investigator for insurance fraud companies

and had conducted high security clearance investigations

for the Federal Government’s Office of Personnel

Management in its Denver regional office.

Most jurisdictions send out public notices when they are

hiring an executive director, but they also rely heavily

on word of mouth to help identify the most qualified

individuals.

• The Berkeley city manager hired Barbara Attard

because of her reputation as an effective senior investigator for many years with San Francisco’s Office of

Citizen Complaints.

• In Minneapolis, the Civilian Police Review Authority

(CRA) president hired Patricia Hughes, the current

CRA executive director. The CRA chairperson, Daryl

Lynn, had previously hired Hughes as a counselor in

1975 to work in a pretrial diversion program. Later,

Hughes became an attorney and Lynn moved to another position. Serendipitously, Lynn became a paralegal

with the Minnesota State public defender’s office at a

time when Hughes was an attorney in the office, so he

was able to see her litigation skills firsthand.

Word of mouth can be the best method of hiring staff

because jurisdictions more easily can identify individuals

who are likely to be appropriate for the position than 

if they have to rely exclusively on resumes and interviews. Echoing what Police Chief Fred Lau said in San

Francisco, Capt. Melvin Sears, the Orange County sheriff’s board administrative coordinator, confirmed, “Who

the people are is critical to the system’s working.”

Notes

1. In larger jurisdictions and in systems with a large volume of cases, programs also will need administrative and

clerical support staff as well as data entry personnel. If

the system prosecutes cases, it will need attorneys. San

Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints employs a policy and outreach specialist.

2. Walker, Samuel, Citizen Review Resource Manual,

Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum,

1995: 11.

C HAPTER 4: S TAFFING

90
3. A police officer said, “Board members don’t understand police work—how volatile and ugly bad guys are

and the need to act quickly to avoid escalation. But once

on the board a while, they develop a sense of what takes

place on the street.”

4. “Use of Force,” paper presented at the 1995 International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law

Enforcement World Conference, Vancouver, British

Columbia, Canada, 1995.

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C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

93

Chapter 5: Addressing Important Issues in

Citizen Oversight

KEY POINTS

• Jurisdictions establishing citizen oversight procedures or seeking to improve existing procedures need to 

consider four issues not discussed in detail elsewhere in this report:

— Outreach.

— Oversight structural considerations.

— The openness of the procedures to the public.

— The role of “politics.”

• Effective outreach is essential to a successful oversight system; otherwise, allegations of misconduct will go

unreported and the system will not be used.

• Despite its importance, most oversight bodies have lacked the resources to market their services effectively.

• Jurisdictions that engage in outreach:

— Publish and distribute program brochures.

— Place information about the system in the telephone book, police stations, and the mayor’s office and on the

Internet.

— Promote coverage in the local press beyond attention to high-profile cases.

— Give talks to neighborhood groups and other agencies.

— Arrange for citizens to pick up complaint forms at multiple locations.

• Some citizens are reluctant to file complaints because they fear retaliation from the police.

• Jurisdictions need to address several organizational issues related to the structure of their oversight process,

such as:

— Developing the oversight system’s legal basis (typically by municipal ordinance).

— Determining which complaints will be investigated, reviewed, or audited.

— Providing the system with subpoena power.

— Minimizing delays in case processing.
C HAPTER 5: A DDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT

94

Jurisdictions setting up new citizen oversight procedures

or improving an existing system need to consider four

important issues that are not discussed in detail elsewhere

in this report:

1. How to conduct effective outreach so that citizens

know the oversight process is available to them.

2. How to structure the oversight process.

3. How public the system’s procedures will be.

4. How “politics” can interfere with the system’s 

effective operation.

Outreach

Citizen oversight bodies use a variety of methods to

advertise their availability and services, but most have

not done an effective job of publicizing themselves

because:

• They lack the resources to market their services 

effectively.

• Local media tend to focus only on scandals related to

police misconduct, not on mundane issues of how and

why to file complaints.

• Police and sheriff’s departments that take initial 

complaints may not make complainants aware of 

the citizen oversight option.

Nevertheless, outreach is important because, if citizens

are not aware of the oversight body and its services, allegations of misconduct will go unreported. Reflecting this

perception, in 1998 San Francisco’s Office of Citizen

Complaints (OCC) hired an additional staff person whose

responsibilities specifically include community outreach,

while Berkeley’s Police Review Commission has established an outreach subcommittee.

To become widely known, oversight staff need to use

multiple marketing approaches. As the following discussion and exhibit 5–1 suggest, many jurisdictions have

implemented valuable outreach methods, but no jurisdiction has incorporated all of them.

Publicity materials

The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority has

published a brochure about its services in several languages. A map in San Jose’s brochure identifies where

the office and validated parking are located. San

Francisco’s citizen complaint form is formatted as a

postage-paid, self-mailing letter (see appendix C). The

Berkeley Police Review Commission (PRC) distributes 

KEY POINTS (CONTINUED)

• Making oversight procedures public has potential benefits and drawbacks.

— Openness can increase the public’s trust in the system but discourage citizens who want to remain 

anonymous from filing complaints.

— There are often legal barriers to opening citizen oversight to the public.

• Most oversight bodies prepare annual reports for public dissemination. Some reports include:

— The nature and status of each policy recommendation the body made that year.

— Demographic information about complainants and subject officers.

— Cases in which the chief or sheriff disagreed with the board’s findings.

• “Politics” can seriously hamper the oversight system’s effectiveness. Politics can involve:

— Conflict among local government officials.

— Volunteer board members with a pro-police or anti-police “agenda.”
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

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SOME CITIZENS FEAR OFFICERS MAY RETALIATE

Some citizens are afraid to report allegations of police

misconduct because they fear officers will retaliate

against them for complaining. One complainant reported,“I was concerned about retaliation—I felt if the

officer could find out about this [complaint], I might

want to rethink about whether to pursue the case. But

the investigator said don’t be concerned—he had had

only one case of retaliation.” Another complainant

reported that he was waiting for someone in his car

when the officer against whom he had filed his complaint rode by in a cruiser. After they made eye contact, the officer stopped and watched him.When the

complainant’s friend arrived, the officer drove off.

A complainant in one city expressed concern that,

because the oversight office was located next to the

police station, he was nervous that officers could see

him enter and leave the building. As a result, oversight

bodies try to locate their offices away from the police

department. The Berkeley ordinance specifies that the

board meetings “shall not be held in the building in

which the Police Department is located.”

However, oversight staff in most jurisdictions believe

that actual retaliation is rare. Tucson’s auditor has

received only one complaint alleging retaliation, while

San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC)

received fewer than 10 complaints during the 3-year

period between 1996 and 1999, none involving violence. OCC confirmed only one allegation.

Examination of data collected from citizen surveys and

debriefings as part of the 1977 Police Services Study in

Rochester, New York, St. Louis, Missouri, and Tampa-St.

Petersburg, Florida, identified 455 individuals who felt

they had a reason to complain about police conduct

but took no action. A relatively small proportion of

these citizens said they did not complain because they

were afraid of the police (3.2 percent) or felt that filing

a complaint would make matters worse (4.6 percent).

The most common reason for not complaining (42

percent) was the belief that filing would do no good.*

Oversight bodies can try to reduce retaliation—or the

fear of retaliation—by telling complainants to report

immediately any attempts at reprisal to the police

department and the oversight board, where the allegation will receive prompt attention. San Francisco’s OCC

and Berkeley’s Police Review Commission brochures

inform potential complainants that retaliation is illegal.

OCC staff also advise apprehensive would-be complainants to weigh whether they will be safer by complaining (and thus becoming known and identified) or

by not complaining (and thus remaining vulnerable

without any notice to those who could act to protect

them). Police and sheriff’s departments can reduce the

chances of retaliation by developing and disseminating a

clear policy prohibiting reprisals. A bulletin, the “Policy

of the Police Commission of the San Francisco Police

Department on OCC Cooperation,” advises all members of the department of the following:

1. Attempts to threaten, intimidate, mislead, or harass

potential or actual OCC complainants, witnesses,

or staff members will be considered to be serious

violations of General Order L–1 deserving of

severe forms of discipline including, but not limited

to, termination.

2. When the Chief of Police receives a sustained case

involving a violation of General Order L–1, such

case will be referred to the Police Commission for

trial.

3. Members who are the subject of a complaint filed

with the OCC shall not contact the complainant or

witness regarding the issues of the complaint.

* Walker, Samuel, and Nanette Graham,“Citizen Complaints in 

Response to Police Misconduct: The Results of a Victimization 

Survey,” Police Quarterly 1 (1) (1998): 65–89.
C HAPTER 5: A DDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT

96

a foldover business card describing PRC and the complaint

filing process.

Postings

Most oversight bodies are listed in the telephone directory. However, because the agency’s function may not be

clear from its name, the public may not realize the

agency is the place to contact to file a complaint against

the police. Furthermore, even independent oversight

bodies are sometimes listed in the phone book under

“Police,” which may discourage some citizens from filing

complaints because they believe the organization is a

part of the police department. San Francisco’s Office of

Citizen Complaints is listed in the business section of the

phone book twice, once as Office of Citizen Complaints,

San Francisco Police Department (boldface), with the

police department address, and a second time with

OCC’s physical location.

The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority’s

(CRA’s) brochures are available, along with CRA business cards, in a wall display outside the mayor’s office.

The city’s free events calendar lists the name and telephone number of the Civilian Police Review Authority

under the “Police” heading.

Media

Tucson’s auditor, as do other oversight directors, sends

notices of each board agenda to newspapers, radio, and

television. The Sunday newspaper lists the next council

agenda. Some citizens learn of their jurisdiction’s oversight body when the media cover a high-profile case of

alleged police misconduct that involves the oversight 

system. A local cable station televises Portland’s board

meetings when appeals are heard.

Neighborhood groups and other agencies

Liana Perez, Tucson’s auditor, sends pamphlets to community and neighborhood centers. She also alerts interested citizen groups to police issues, such as when she

told the Southern Arizona People’s Law Center that she

was bringing up the issue of off-duty, uniformed officers

working for merchants. Orange County Citizen Review

Board members distribute their brochure when they give

talks to civic groups.

Tucson’s auditor uses the city’s Citizen Neighborhood

Services Department, a resource office for the city’s 200

neighborhood associations, to send fliers to neighborhood associations offering to make presentations. OCC

staff in San Francisco usually earn compensatory time to

attend street fairs, community meetings, school assemblies, and other events while off duty to publicize the

office. (See “San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints

Monitors Selected Public Demonstrations.”)

Filing locations

The more locations oversight bodies have in the community where citizens can pick up complaint forms, the easier it will be for individuals to file who may not have

the time or assertiveness to travel to a central location.

Citizens in San Francisco may file a complaint at any

city agency, including the mayor’s office and the sheriff’s

Although most oversight bodies have had difficulty making the

public aware of their existence and procedures, many have

implemented parts of a comprehensive marketing strategy.

Publicity materials:

• Brochures (some in foreign languages).

• Business cards.

Postings:

• Listings in the telephone directory.

• Brochure and business card racks in the mayor’s office.

• An Internet site.

Media:

• Sending notices of hearings to the media.

• Placing announcements in newspapers.

• Televising hearings.

Neighborhood groups and other agencies:

• Mailing brochures and business cards.

• Making presentations.

Filing locations:

• Providing filing forms at multiple locations.

• Facilitating Internet filing.

Referrals by police:

• Posting signs in police stations.

• Handing out oversight brochures and business cards.

EXHIBIT 5–1. OVERSIGHT OUTREACH

METHODS
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

97

department. Citizens in Omaha may pick up forms in any

library branch. Melvin Sears, the Orange County Citizen

Review Board administrative coordinator, set up a Web

site citizens can access to get information about the board

or to file a complaint online. The Web site on the city

page set up by Liana Perez in Tucson also allows citizens

to file complaints electronically.

Most oversight bodies lack the resources to set up 

satellite offices. According to Mary

Dunlap, director of the Office of Citizen

Complaints in San Francisco, “We

should set up office hours in communities that are poor, young, and otherwise

likely to underreport alleged police misconduct, like satellite mayor’s offices,

where we wouldn’t take complaints but

could explain the complaint process.”

Referrals by the police

According to Mary Dunlap, “Every district station should

also have a display at the window and a sign on the wall,

along with brochures and complaint forms.” A sign to the

right of the Berkeley Police Department receptionist desk

in fact says the following:

If you have a complaint regarding a Berkeley

Police Officer’s conduct or need an explanation

regarding a department practice, policy or procedure, you can either

1. Contact the Watch commander or Senior 

Officer in charge.

2. Contact the Internal Affairs Bureau 

of the Berkeley Police Department. 

The phone number . . . is 664–6653.

3. Contact the City of Berkeley Police 

Review Commission. The PRC is a 

civilian review board independent of 

the Berkeley Police Department. It is 

located at 2121 McKinley Avenue,

phone 644–6716.

A brochure that Berkeley’s internal affairs investigators

give to complainants includes a four-paragraph description of PRC with its address and telephone number. The

SAN FRANCISCO’S OFFICE OF CITIZEN COMPLAINTS MONITORS

SELECTED PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS

At the director’s instruction, Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) staff attend situations where there has been a

public perception or actual history of police misconduct.Wearing OCC hats or jackets, they regularly monitor

bicycle rallies, community fairs, and public demonstrations. A group sponsoring an Immigration Pride event wrote

OCC asking staff to monitor the event because it claimed there had been problems with the police in the past;

OCC agreed to go. No complaints resulted, and OCC staff did not observe any situations that required investigation of alleged misconduct.

OCC staff believe that the observations can serve to document, interpret, and evaluate the potential merits of

OCC complaints, including establishing that there is no basis for a complaint.

The agency has developed a written policy for monitoring demonstrations (see appendix D) that specifies that “it

is the policy of the OCC to monitor demonstrations when it is determined to be consistent with OCC’s mission,

and feasible and advisable to do so, in the joint determination of the Director and Chief Investigator.”

At least one monitor and a supervisor observe each demonstration. Staff do not hand out intake forms and,

except in emergencies, do not take complaints at the scene. If a civilian wishes to make a complaint, a monitor

offers to provide the person with an OCC Incident Information Card (see exhibit 5–2) and, when appropriate,

a business card. After gathering as much information as possible about the complaint, the monitor suggests the

person contact OCC during business hours for followup.

The Web site on the city

page set up by Liana

Perez in Tucson also

allows citizens to file

complaints electronically.
C HAPTER 5: A DDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT

98

Portland Police Bureau includes a notice about the

review board with the letter it sends to complainants

reporting their case findings (see exhibit 5–3).

Some Tucson beat officers hand out the

independent police auditor’s business

cards. Officers who work the beat

where the auditor is located periodically

come in to ask for new supplies of

cards, as do the secretaries at department substations.

Issues of Oversight

Mechanics

Jurisdictions need to address—or reexamine—several

organizational issues related to the structure of their

oversight process.

Oversight’s legal basis

Citizen review bodies have been established by municipal ordinance, State statute, voter referendum, mayoral

executive order, police chief administrative order, and

memorandum of understanding. The vast majority have

been established by municipal ordinance.1 Typically, the

authorizing body or legislation grants the oversight body

the power to adopt rules and regulations and develop

procedures for its own activities and investigations.

Examples of these rules include Berkeley’s 16-page

“Regulations for Handling Complaints Against Members

of the Police Department” and Minneapolis’ 28-page

“Civilian Police Review Authority Administrative Rules.”

(See chapter 8, “Additional Sources of Help.”)

Eligible complainants and cases

San Francisco accepts anonymous complaints but sustains them only with corroboration. Most jurisdictions

permit aggrieved citizens and the parents of juveniles to

file complaints. San Francisco also allows organizations

to file complaints. The Berkeley Police Review Commission designated itself as the complainant in one case.

Many oversight systems do not accept complaints by one

officer against another officer.

Deciding what types of cases to review or investigate

has important implications for staffing needs, system

costs, and, above all, case processing delays (see

“Minimizing Delays” on page 101). Mark Gissiner,

past president of the International Association for

Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, recommends,

on the one hand, that systems not try

to handle every type of complaint

because the result can be a large 

backlog of cases whose resolution is

delayed significantly, especially if

hearings are held on each case. On the

other hand, Gissiner says, oversight

systems should investigate or review

all cases involving use of firearms.

Because most oversight systems have

been established in response to an

incident in which the police shot someone, the public expects an oversight body to review

these cases. Indeed, the St. Paul and Orange County

boards automatically review all cases in which an 

EXHIBIT 5–2. OCC INCIDENT

INFORMATION CARD

Tucson officers who work

the beat where the auditor

is located periodically come

in to ask for new supplies 

of business cards, as do 

the secretaries at 

department substations.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

99

officer has discharged a firearm, even if there has been

no complaint.

Jurisdictions must decide how long

after the alleged misconduct occurred

complainants may file a complaint.

Berkeley’s Police Review Commission

requires complainants to file within 90

calendar days of the alleged misconduct, with another 90 days allowed if

six board members vote that the complainant has demonstrated by clear and

convincing evidence that his or her

failure to file in time was the result of

“inadvertence, mistake, surprise, or

excusable neglect.” Not knowing about PRC’s existence

or procedures does not fall into any of these categories.

Furthermore, police testimony is not mandatory in cases

that are accepted during the “late filing” period.

Subpoena power

As of 1995,2 almost 40 percent of review bodies had

subpoena power—the right to command an individual

to appear to testify or produce documents—including oversight procedures

in Berkeley, Flint, Orange County,

Portland, and San Francisco. Legislation

in Orange County provides for a fine of

up to $500 and imprisonment for up to

60 days for officers who refuse to

honor a board request to appear.

Most citizen oversight procedures 

that have subpoena power, including

Berkeley’s and San Francisco’s, are

prohibited from undertaking an investigation until any

pending criminal charges against police officers have

been adjudicated or unless they receive permission from

the district attorney to proceed.

EXHIBIT 5–3. FLIER INCLUDED IN LETTER THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU SENDS TO

COMPLAINANTS NOTIFYING THEM OF THEIR CASES/FINDINGS

The St. Paul and Orange

County boards automatically

review all cases in which an

officer has discharged a

firearm, even if there has 

been no complaint.
C HAPTER 5: A DDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT

100

Many oversight advocates and directors believe that having subpoena power serves no useful purpose. If the

oversight body already has authority under Garrity v.

New Jersey (see “The Legality of Forcing Officers to

Testify”), subpoena power adds nothing. If the oversight

body lacks authority under Garrity to compel testimony,

there is still little reason to seek subpoena power. Patricia

Hughes, executive director of Minneapolis’ Civilian

Police Review Authority, and Daryl Lynn, CRA’s chairperson, can remember only one case in which they could

have benefited from having subpoena power. Indeed, the

Orange County review board, Portland’s city council

acting as the Police Internal Investigations Auditing

Committee, and the Flint ombudsman’s office have 

never used their subpoena power. Furthermore, a 1992

city council report in Rochester suggested:

The advantage of using the investigative authority

of the IA lies in the fact that police officers are

required to cooperate fully with the investigation

since it falls within the employer-employee

relationships. If the investigative authority were

transferred to an outside agency, accused officers

would be able to have recourse to their constitutional rights as citizens to avoid making any statement which might tend to incriminate them. 

THE LEGALITY OF FORCING OFFICERS TO TESTIFY

Under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), whoever is the employer of a police officer, including not only the

chief but, by extension, the city manager or mayor, can order the officer to answer questions “specifically, directly,

and narrowly relating to performance of his [or her] official duties” as part of an internal, noncriminal investigation. Failure to answer questions related to the scope of their employment may form the basis for disciplining and

dismissing officers. However, statements officers make under this requirement cannot be used against them in any

subsequent criminal proceeding unless the officers are alleged to have committed perjury. Because officers can be

terminated if they do not answer administrative questions, internal affairs and citizen oversight investigators typically read them their “Garrity rights”—a guarantee that the information sought will not be used against them in a

criminal proceeding but that failure to respond to questioning could lead to disciplinary action.

In 1998 the Colorado Court of Appeals in City and County of Denver and the Public Safety Review Commission v. Scott

Blatnik and Jerome Powell (97 CA 1662) held that law enforcement officers are entitled to assert their fifth amendment privilege before a citizen review board.The court ruled that the Denver Public Safety Review Commission

could not compel subject officers to testify during an inquiry into allegations of improper use of force once the

officers had invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.The city and commission had sued to compel them

to testify after the officers had invoked the amendment.The court ruled that, because the commission was not

the officers’ employer, it could not compel them to testify.

The court of appeals distinguished this case from a 1997 Federal court case, Pirrozzi v. New York (950 F. Supp.

90 [S.D.N.Y. 1996], aff’d 117 F. 3d 7223 [2d Cir. 1997]), which compelled an officer to testify under threat of

discharge. In Pirrozzi, the court found that officers can be compelled to testify as a condition of employment by

employers or those representing their employers. Because New York City’s review board is an integral part of the 

disciplinary process, and because departmental regulations require officers to give statements to the board under

threat of termination, subject officers cannot invoke the protection of the fifth amendment.

The Berkeley city attorney issued a similar ruling in 1998. Because of the Colorado case, a police officer took the

fifth amendment during an interview with the Police Review Commission investigator. As a result, Barbara Attard,

the PRC officer, asked the city attorney for a legal opinion.The attorney ruled that, under a California statute

similar to the Federal Garrity ruling, officers must testify because PRC acts pursuant to the authority of the city

manager, who is the police department officers’ employer.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

101

Trying to secure subpoena power could involve oversight

planners in lengthy court battles with officers’ unions that

they may not win. In addition, in the process of the litigation, planners may incur significant legal costs (see the

second page of appendix E) and lasting poor relations

with the police or sheriff’s department. Although subpoena power could in some limited circumstances be useful

for forcing citizens (e.g., complainants or, more likely,

witnesses) to testify or provide documents, oversight

staff are unlikely to want to exert such coercion.

Other structural issues

Jurisdictions that decide to have a citizen review board

must settle other organizational and operational issues,

some of which include the following:

• Should the entire board hear or

review every case, as in Orange

County and St. Paul, or should

rotating groups of three or four

members hear cases, as in Berkeley,

Minneapolis, and Rochester?

• Should board members know what

IA’s findings are in advance of their

own hearing? In Rochester, they 

do not.

• Legislation in Orange County and

St. Paul permit boards to hire their own investigators

if they are dissatisfied with internal affairs’ investigations, but neither has ever done so. Although there are

cost implications in hiring an investigator, the option

may help motivate IA to do a better job with its own

investigations.

• Where and when will hearings be held? As noted earlier, most jurisdictions try to house their oversight bodies some distance from the police station. (Because the

St. Paul Police Department administers the oversight

body, housing it in the public safety building is not an

issue.) Most board hearings in Rochester take place

during the day so the police department does not have

to pay IA investigating sergeants overtime to attend

evening meetings. Sometimes this creates a problem

for employed board members who work a regular 

9-to-5 day.

• Will the standard of evidence for sustaining a complaint be a preponderance of the evidence or the more

stringent clear and convincing evidence? Some boards

use one, some the other. Subject officers favor the

more stringent standard, while complainants favor the

more lenient standard.

• Finally, how can unacceptably long delays in reviewing and hearing cases be avoided? Delays are a problem for some oversight bodies.

Minimizing Delays

Many oversight bodies struggle to keep the review, hearing, or auditing process from taking months and even

years to end. The annual report of the

Tucson independent police auditor

observes: “A concern that is frequently

raised by complainants is the length of

time taken to complete an investigation.” Nearly two-thirds of complainants

interviewed in a study of New York

City’s citizen oversight process reported

the process took too long.3 According to

Jerry Sanders, former San Diego police

chief, “Delays harmed the credibility of

the review process here more than anything else.” Sanders adds, “They also

put officers under enormous stress” waiting for their cases

to be decided.

Delays were such a problem in San Francisco that

the police commission directed the Office of Citizen

Complaints to explain its backlog of cases. OCC’s report,

issued in February 1998, observed that most cases were

completed within 1 year of receipt; when they were not,

circumstances beyond OCC’s control were often responsible, including the unavailability of participants or documents; delays requested by union representatives, criminal

litigants, and attorneys; and staff attrition. The San Jose

independent auditor’s annual report includes a chart

illustrating a sample of 10 cases and the number of days

the complaint remained at different stages of the review

process (see exhibit 5–4).

To reduce delays, many jurisdictions have established

deadlines by which police departments and oversight

bodies must complete their reviews.

The Orange County review

board, Portland’s city council

acting as the Police Internal

Investigations Auditing

Committee, and the 

Flint ombudsman’s office

have never used their subpoena power.
Berkeley helped reduce its backlog of cases by amending

its regulations so that it would not be required to hold a

hearing on every filed complaint, instead allowing the

director to recommend that the Police Review Commission summarily dismiss cases without merit. Patricia

Hughes, executive director of Minneapolis’ Citizen Police

Review Authority, came up with the idea of plea bargaining cases through a stipulation procedure that decreased the need for hearings dramatically, thereby reducing

delays for other cases. (See the

Minneapolis case study in chapter 2.) 

A citizen advisers’ monitoring report to

the Portland City Council highlighted

delays in processing complaints at the

police bureau’s internal affairs department and provided four strategies for

reducing the delay, including improved

recruitment and staffing and the establishment of timeliness goals for each

stage in the review process.

When a delay is inevitable, Felicia

Davis, administrator of the Syracuse,

New York, Citizen Review Board, sends the complainant

a letter explaining where the case is in the complaint

process and the reasons for the delay. Davis says, “In

effect, I tell them, ‘We haven’t forgotten you.’ This helps

keep them interested in and willing to pursue the case.”

Davis sends the letter after 60 days when she knows the

case will take more than 90 days to be decided.

C HAPTER 5: A DDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT

102

• The city council requires the Rochester Civilian

Review Board to review cases within 2 weeks of IA’s

notification that its investigation is complete, but the

board sometimes misses the deadline when a highprofile case takes precedence or it proves impossible

to find three board members who can assemble within

that 2-week period.

• The Minneapolis ordinance requires

the Citizen Police Review Authority

to complete a preliminary review

within 30 days after a citizen has

signed a complaint and complete an

investigation within 120 days of the

signing, with a 60-day extension

allowed in rare circumstances. CRA

has never missed a deadline because

the police union then might argue to

have the case dismissed.

• As of January 1, 1998, a new provision in the California Government

Code requires the Office of Citizen

Complaints to conclude investigations of complaints and make findings within a year of

filing, absent exceptional circumstances.

Some oversight bodies establish internal rules for 

completing cases. However, according to one activist,

“Establishing hard deadlines without adequate money 

for staff is a setup for failure.”

EXHIBIT 5–4. NUMBER OF DAYS EACH OF 10 COMPLAINTS REMAINED AT 3 SAN JOSE

POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICES

Patricia Hughes, executive

director of Minneapolis’

Citizen Police Review

Authority, came up with the

idea of plea bargaining

cases through a stipulation

procedure that decreased

the need for hearings dramatically, thereby reducing

delays for other cases.

Total Length of Investigation and 

Case IA Other Bureau Chief Administrative Review (days)

1 582 259 37 878

2 591 57 68 716

3 310 118 105 533

4 230 154 64 448

5 56 41 342 439

6 94 177 163 434

7 176 259 173 608

8 228 136 181 545

9 43 301 139 483

10 125 74 152 351
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

103

Openness of Oversight

Proceedings

Most citizen oversight advocates feel strongly that oversight proceedings benefit from openness.

Many experts believe that one of the most important functions of citizen oversight is to provide

information to the public about the police department and the complaint process. By itself, this

information serves as a form of oversight and

accountability, providing voters, elected officials,

and the news media with relevant information

about police activities. Information serves to

“open” police departments to the public.4

However, oversight procedures have to be sensitive to the

legal and ethical privacy rights of complainants and

police officers. For example, State public

records, statutes, and labor-management

agreements may limit the information

citizen oversight bodies can disseminate

to complainants and the public.

• A California statute provides that

“Peace officer personnel records and

records maintained by any state or

local agency, . . . or information

obtained from those records, are confidential and shall

not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding

except by discovery.” Disclosure, with narrow exceptions, is a criminal offense.

• The corporation counsel to the city of Rochester

advised that “the public airing by the Police Advisory

Board [sic] of its agreement or disagreement with the

findings of the Chief of Police would not appear to 

be fully in keeping with the intent of the New York

State’s Civil Rights Law, which makes all personnel

records used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion of a police officer 

confidential.”

Even when not prohibited, openness and access may discourage citizens who want complaints kept secret from

coming forward, and it may inhibit officers from reporting misconduct by other police personnel.

When legal, activities that oversight procedures can consider making public include:

• Hearings.

• Findings.

• Policy recommendations.

• Internal quality control findings.

Hearings in Berkeley and Orange County are open to the

public. The Berkeley ordinance requires that all commission meetings and agendas be publicized at least 3 days

in advance by written notice to newspapers, radio, and

television stations serving the city. The Orange County

board invites 57 media outlets to board meetings. Flint’s

ombudsman’s office faxes its findings to the local newspaper, two radio stations, and three television stations.

Many oversight bodies write complainants about the outcomes of their

cases but, because of legal limitations or

the chief’s decision, rarely report what

discipline was imposed—and sometimes

whether discipline was imposed.

Finally, all oversight bodies prepare

annual reports (and sometimes monthly

or quarterly reports). (See “The San Jose

Office of the Independent Police Auditor Annual Report

Is Particularly Informative.”) At a minimum, these reports

should include:

• The disposition of complaints.

• Patterns of complaints, such as:

— Type.

— Geographic area.

— Race, ethnicity, and gender of complainants.

— Characteristics of the officers (e.g., race, gender,

assignment seniority).

• Any policy recommendations.

The Orange County

board invites 

57 media outlets 

to board meetings.
C HAPTER 5: A DDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT

104

Politics

“Politics” may interfere in two respects with the effective

operation of citizen oversight.

Conflict among local government officials

Conflict among elected and appointed officials in a jurisdiction over the operation of citizen oversight can disrupt

the review process. In Flint, the mayor appoints the

police chief, but the city council appoints the ombudsman. If the mayor and council do not see eye to eye,

there is the potential for conflict with the ombudsman

becoming the chief’s adversary. Even when there is a

good working relationship among the involved officials

in a jurisdiction, turnover through new elections or

appointments can result in new personnel who wish to

have things done “their way.”

Sometimes, ambiguity in the lines of authority and communication creates the potential for controversy:

• The Portland mayor appoints and hires the auditor,

but the auditor feels she is legally responsible to the

board—which is the city council sitting en bloc—

because she acts as the board’s executive director. Who

her true legal supervisor is has never been tested. The

auditor is also in an awkward position whenever her

reports are critical of the city because what she says

could make the city liable for damages. As a result,

THE SAN JOSE OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE AUDITOR ANNUAL

REPORT IS PARTICULARLY INFORMATIVE

The 1997 Year End Report of the San Jose Office of the Independent Police Auditor is a particularly comprehensive and

well-presented document.The 58-page, spiral-bound report, with a glossy burgundy cover, includes:

• Biographical sketches of office staff.

• An 11-page executive summary printed on burgundy-colored pages.

• A flowchart illustrating the complaint process.

• A discussion of complaint timeliness that includes a chart illustrating a sample of 10 cases and the number of

days a complaint remained at different stages of the review process (see exhibit 5–4).

• The types of complaints and sustained cases by city council district for the previous 3 years.

• A chart showing the type of alleged unnecessary force used by body area affected and degree of injury.

• Demographic information about complainants, including gender, ethnicity, age, educational level, and occupation.

• Statistical information about subject officers, including bureau, gender, years of experience, type of allegation by

years of experience, and police unit in which they work(ed).

• A chart showing discipline imposed.

• A discussion of the criteria for evaluating internal affairs investigations and the auditor’s findings related to 

each criterion.

• Summaries of seven selected audited cases.

• A chart showing the status of every policy recommendation the auditor has presented and its disposition since

the office was established in 1993.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

105

there were times when the mayor expressed concern

about the auditor’s statements.

• The Berkeley Police Review Commission officer is

staff to the city manager, who appoints her, but the

perception among the public and police department is

that she is staff to PRC. The city manager in effect 

delegates his oversight role to the PRC officer. As 

a result, the officer needs to maintain good relations

with both PRC and the city manager.

In one jurisdiction, board members do

not consult with the council members

who appointed them when reviewing

specific cases. However, because

some council members tend to side

with the police, and others are hostile

to the department, they appoint board

members sympathetic to their respective positions. As a result, the board 

is split between pro- and anti-police

factions.

Politics also can work for the good. 

In some jurisdictions, the police chief

cooperates with the oversight process

at least in part because the mayor

demands support for it. Because the

Minneapolis city council president led

the effort to revamp the city’s oversight system before

she became president, all the involved parties understand that she expects them to cooperate.

Agendas on the part of volunteers

When they are appointed by the mayor or council members, volunteer board members may feel, as Lt. Robert

Skomra, former head of IA in Minneapolis, pointed out,

that “they represent a special interest and see themselves

as champions for that group.” As one city council member said, “Some board members play to the tune of the

city council member who appoints them.” In one jurisdiction, some board members have supported the electoral campaigns of the council members who appointed

them; these volunteers may feel especially obligated to

reflect “their” council member’s political views.

A partial solution to this problem of volunteer bias may

be mediation training. Volunteer board members in

Rochester all must become certified mediators, which

may increase their ability to provide impartial reviews

(see chapter 4, “Staffing”). Another approach to ensuring

board members’ objectivity is to avoid having government officials select them. Each of seven neighborhood

coalitions recommends one individual adviser to serve

as a citizen adviser in Portland. Board members in

Rochester are selected by the review

board’s screening committee, consisting of board chairpersons and staff.

As a result, according to Anne Pokras,

former director of special projects for

the board’s parent agency, “Panelists

have a heightened awareness that they

represent no one—that is, no politician—but everyone—that is, the

community.”

Some Portland residents have called

for the election of board members.

However, according to a local activist,

this might result in the police union’s

providing more campaign funds to

candidates sympathetic to their positions than other candidates could raise

(see “Working With the Union” in

chapter 6).

Of course, not all disagreement among elected and

appointed officials and not all bias among oversight volunteers is politically motivated in the sense of serving

narrow self-interests. Many clashes over citizen oversight

are the result of genuine differences of opinion on what

is, after all, a controversial topic. Chapter 6 identifies

some of these conflicts as they relate to oversight bodies

and police and sheriff’s departments.

Notes

1. Walker, Samuel, Citizen Review Resource Manual,

Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum,

1995: 6–7.

2. Ibid., 13.

Of course, not all disagreement among elected and

appointed officials and not

all bias among oversight 

volunteers is politically 

motivated in the sense of

serving narrow self-interests.

Many clashes over citizen

oversight are the result of

genuine differences of 

opinion on what is, after all,

a controversial topic.
C HAPTER 5: A DDRESSING I MPORTANT I SSUES IN C ITIZEN O VERSIGHT

106

3. Sviridoff, Michele, and Jerome E. McElroy, Processing Complaints Against Police in New York City: The

Complainant’s Perspective, Washington, DC: Vera

Institute of Justice, 1989: 109.

4. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, A Report on the

Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police

Department, prepared for the Albuquerque City Council,

1997: 131.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

107

Chapter 6: Resolving Potential Conflicts

Between Oversight Bodies and Police

KEY POINTS

• Three preliminary steps can help significantly to reduce conflict among all the parties involved in citizen 

oversight:

— Either initiate the oversight system without the impetus of a controversial police shooting or avoid 

consideration of the incident in the planning process.

— Involve representatives of all concerned parties in the planning of the oversight procedure.

— Establish clear, measurable objectives for the oversight system.

• Many police administrators and officers have criticisms of local oversight bodies, most of which fall into 

three categories:

— Citizens should not interfere with police work.

— Citizens do not understand police work.

— The process is unfair.

• Several considerations and actions can help address police concerns about the oversight process, including:

— Recognizing the typically advisory role oversight bodies play but also documenting the judicious role 

most oversight systems have adopted.

— Training board members thoroughly and publicizing how carefully they have been prepared.

— Accepting that the mission of oversight is to provide for citizen, not professional, review.

— Highlighting that oversight bodies agree with the police or sheriff’s department’s findings in the vast 

majority of cases.

— Publicizing particularly high-profile cases in which the oversight body has sided with the subject officer(s).

— Working to reduce delays in holding hearings and reviews.

— Explaining how oversight findings can benefit officers.

— Sitting down and resolving misconceptions and conflicts face to face.
C HAPTER 6: R E S O LV I N G P OTENTIAL C ONFLICTS

108

There are conflicts in many jurisdictions between oversight bodies and police agencies. To be sure, if there is

no tension between them, the oversight

body may not be acting assertively to

maintain or improve police accountability. However, excessive conflict will

destroy any oversight system.

Preliminary Steps for

Minimizing Conflict

There are three preliminary steps jurisdictions can take

that can substantially reduce the potential for future conflict not only between the oversight

body and the police but among all parties involved in, or at least concerned

about, citizen oversight—local public

and elected officials, union leaders,

and community activists.

1. Do not wait for a serious incident, typically a police

shooting that creates a public uproar, before setting up

an oversight system. Because of the

tensions such an incident creates, it is

difficult for the parties involved to

approach the planning task in a rational manner. As a result, the planning

process may perpetuate, rather than

defuse, existing tensions. If the planning process has begun only after a

conflict, avoid discussion of the incident in the planning process.

2. Involve representatives from all concerned parties as colleagues in the planning process. Although it may require

months to iron out differences, even if

they are not resolved to everyone’s satisfaction, the implementation and operation of the oversight procedure is likely

to proceed more smoothly if all the parties have participated in its planning.

(See “Working With Activists.”)

KEY POINTS (CONTINUED)

• Oversight staff often have criticisms of the police.Their most common concerns are:

— Officers may refuse to answer questions, and departments may refuse to share records.

— Officers do not understand the oversight body’s mission and legitimacy.

— Departments ignore the oversight body’s findings or policy and procedure recommendations.

• Some police departments have attempted to work constructively with their local oversight bodies, including 

disciplining officers who fail to appear for questioning and arranging for oversight staff to explain their 

procedures to officers at the academy or at roll call.

• Oversight planners and review bodies need to take the initiative to involve union leaders in their activities.

Some unions no longer oppose citizen oversight as strongly as in the past. Oversight planners successfully have:

— Involved union leaders in designing and setting up the review procedure.

— Accommodated some union concerns.

— Addressed union concerns about biased review procedures by ensuring the review process is 

scrupulously fair.

— Highlighted shared objectives, such as a joint interest in fair treatment of officers by internal affairs.

Do not wait for a serious

incident, typically a police

shooting that creates a 

public uproar, before setting

up an oversight system.

Involve representatives from

all concerned parties 

as colleagues in the 

planning process.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

109

3. Specify precisely the review system’s objectives.

Without specific objectives such as the ones listed in

chapter 7, “Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding,” the

involved parties may lock horns because they have

different expectations of what the system should be

doing and accomplishing. Even if all the involved parties do not agree on what the oversight system should

be trying to accomplish, at least they will have the

same understanding of its goals.

That said, it remains true that the most severe antagonism

surrounding citizen oversight is usually between the

oversight body and the police or sheriff’s department and

between the review process and union leaders. This chapter reviews some of the principal sources of conflict

between oversight bodies and law enforcement agencies—including police unions—and suggests possible

solutions.

Police Criticisms of 

Oversight Procedures

Exhibit 6–1 summarizes the concerns many police and

sheriff’s departments express about citizen oversight

along with possible responses to their concerns. As

shown in the exhibit and discussed below, these concerns

generally fall into three categories:

1. Oversight procedures represent outside interference.

2. Oversight staff lack experience with and understanding of police work.

3. The oversight process is unfair.

Citizens should not interfere with 

police work

Most police administrators believe their agencies should

have the final—and often only—say in matters of discipline, policies and procedures, and training. Police

administrators feel they have to be held accountable for

their officers’ behavior because they are in charge.

Without final say over discipline, policy, and training,

their accountability is undermined. (See “Should Citizens

Control the Discipline Process?”)

Police executives’ objections to citizen oversight sometimes reflect their belief that they already do a good job

responding to citizen complaints. As a result, when a

finding from an oversight body disagrees with the

department’s internal finding, some chiefs and sheriffs

WORKING WITH ACTIVISTS

Local activists have often been as critical of oversight systems as have police departments and unions. Sometimes

they criticize the system’s lack of power; other times, they report that oversight staff are not using the authority

they have to pursue cases of alleged police misconduct. One activist observed,“San Francisco’s citizen oversight

organization has the most money and best structure in the Nation, yet it sustains only 10 percent of cases.”

A newsletter published by Dan Handelman, a member of Portland Copwatch, an organization that tracks alleged

police misconduct, objects to the fact that the Portland police chief can ignore, and in the newsletter’s opinion has

ignored, reversals of IA findings by the city council acting in its capacity as the city’s oversight board. However, in

one of the two recent examples when the chief did this, the council’s vote to reverse was 3 to 2, suggesting that

there was room for honest disagreement. As a result, the chief’s decision in this case, although it rejected the

council’s decision, was not necessarily arbitrary. However, the council’s vote in the second matter was 4 to 1.

In any case, Handelman’s larger concern is that the city council—that is, elected citizens—not the chief, should

have the final say in determining whether officers engaged in misconduct.

According to a board member in another city,“Some groups are very vocal and bring police problems to the

media and raise holy hell. But if they didn’t, we would not have achieved this level of oversight. So they play a 

beneficial role, but they can make life painful because they say some ridiculous things.”
C HAPTER 6: R E S O LV I N G P OTENTIAL C ONFLICTS

110

EXHIBIT 6–1. CONCERNS MANY POLICE AND SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENTS—AND UNION

LEADERS—EXPRESS ABOUT CITIZEN OVERSIGHT—AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Assertion: Citizens Should Not Interfere in Police Work

Concerns Responses

• The chief must be held accountable for discipline to • Most oversight bodies are only advisory.

prevent misconduct.

• Internal affairs already does a good job. • Even when the department already imposes appropriate 

discipline without citizen review, an oversight procedure 

can reassure skeptical citizens that the agency is doing its

job in this respect.

• The next chief or sheriff may not be as conscientious about 

ensuring that the department investigates complaints fairly 

and thoroughly.

Assertion: Citizens Do Not Understand Police Work

Concerns Responses

• Oversight staff lack experience in police work. • Board members typically have pertinent materials available 

for review, and ranking officers are usually present during 

hearings to explain department procedures.

• Oversight administrators need to describe the often 

extensive training they and their staff receive.

• Citizen review is just that—citizens reviewing police 

behavior as private citizens.

• Only physicians review doctors, and only attorneys • Doctors and lawyers have been criticized for doing a poor 

review lawyers. job of monitoring their colleagues’ behavior.

Assertion:The Process Is Unfair

Concerns Responses

• Oversight staff may have an “agenda”—they are biased • Oversight staff need to inform the department when they 

against the police. decide in officers’ favor.

• Oversight staff and police need to meet to iron out 

misconceptions and conflict.

• Not sustained findings remain in officers’ files. • Indecisive findings are unfair to both parties and should 

therefore be reduced in favor of unfounded, exonerated,

or sustained findings.

• Adding allegations unrelated to the citizen’s • Internal affairs units themselves add allegations in some 

complaint is unfair. departments.

• Some citizens use the system to prepare for civil suits. • Board findings can sometimes help officers and departments 

defend against civil suits.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

111

give little or no weight to the oversight body’s finding in

determining discipline. In some jurisdictions, chiefs and 

sheriffs accept internal affairs findings and decide on discipline long before they even receive the oversight body’s

findings. Some have never changed an IA finding as a

result of an oversight finding that was different.

Jurisdictions have used a variety of

strategies to address concerns about

outside involvement in police matters.

In most jurisdictions, local government

has established oversight bodies that

are only advisory; their recommendations are nonbinding on departments.

Some review bodies can appeal the

chief’s or sheriff’s rejection of their

recommendations to elected or

appointed officials who can require the

department to act. However, because

these officials have this authority

regardless of whether there is an oversight body, the oversight procedure

itself does not further diminish the

police or sheriff’s department’s authority. Even when citizen oversight bodies do have some authority over the

police, they have generally exercised it cautiously. For

example, Flint and St. Paul have never used their subpoena power to compel officers to testify; Orange County and

St. Paul have never exercised their right to hire an independent investigator to second-guess an IA investigation.

Many internal affairs and other procedures for investigating citizen complaints are already rigorous. However, the

process typically is only as effective as the current chief

or sheriff requires it to be. Advocates of citizen oversight

believe it is important to have an independent review

mechanism in place that can help IA maintain its standards in case the next chief or sheriff fails to demand—

and ensure—fairness and thoroughness in the internal

complaint investigations process.

In addition, even with a conscientious

chief or sheriff, because of turnover

there are usually some IA investigators who are not yet fully skilled in

their jobs—and who may switch

assignments after they have become

fully qualified. Finally, even when a

police or sheriff’s department is being

conscientious in imposing appropriate

discipline without citizen review, an

oversight procedure can reassure

skeptical citizens that the agency is

indeed following through responsibly

on citizen complaints.

Citizens do not understand police work

Some police oppose citizen oversight procedures

because they believe that oversight staff, lacking experience as police officers or sheriff’s deputies, cannot

determine fairly whether officers have engaged in misconduct. Officers frequently observe that State medical

boards composed only of physicians investigate doctors

for malpractice, and only attorneys investigate lawyers

for misconduct. Similarly, some police argue, only law

enforcement officers have the knowledge to investigate

and judge other sworn personnel.

SHOULD CITIZENS CONTROL THE DISCIPLINE PROCESS?

Most oversight directors and researchers agree that citizens should not have power to discipline officers.They

believe that giving citizen oversight systems that authority would be illegal or unwise because:

• It would violate State law, city charter, or collective bargaining agreements with police unions.

• It would detract from holding the chief or sheriff accountable for ensuring proper standards of professional

conduct, making it possible for the top law enforcement executive to argue,“Yes, my department has a problem

with police misconduct, but I can’t do anything about it.”*

* Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department, prepared for the 

Albuquerque City Council, 1997: 148.

Advocates of citizen oversight believe it is important

to have an independent

review mechanism in place

that can help IA maintain its

standards in case the next

chief or sheriff fails to

demand—and ensure—

fairness and thoroughness 

in the internal complaint

investigations process.
C HAPTER 6: R E S O LV I N G P OTENTIAL C ONFLICTS

112

There are at least four specific areas in which police

officers feel citizens do not understand police work:

1. Case law (and the agency’s own rules) governing

police behavior, such as when officers may conduct

searches (and what types of searches) and when they

may use deadly force against a fleeing felon.

2. The nature of police discretion, both in terms of what

officers have the flexibility to do and what they may

not do.

3. How officers are trained, in light of the fact that, in

the absence of a policy or procedure, training is policy.

4. The manner in which the totality of the circumstances

influences an officer’s behavior—for example, when

courtesy is not always a viable option.1

Several considerations may reduce these concerns:

• By reviewing materials they receive before or at each

hearing, which typically include the work product of

the IA investigation as well as relevant department

policies and procedures, board members report they

generally can determine whether officers engaged in

misconduct. In addition, a department supervisor

attends hearings in many jurisdictions (e.g., Berkeley,

Orange County, and Tucson) or is available on call

(e.g., Rochester) to answer questions about department

operations.

• Regarding board members’ lack of expertise, Jackie

DeBose, a 10-year member of Berkeley’s Police

Review Commission, observes, “This is a citizens’

review, not a court of law, so they [board members]

should look at the problem as private citizens.” In addition, Sgt. George Cardenas, the only sworn member of

Omaha’s Citizens Complaint Review Board (CCRB),

notes, “In looking at whether officers violated a policy

or procedure, board members are pretty good at determining the answer. But most cases [in his jurisdiction]

are of the ‘he said/she said’ variety, so they don’t need

special expertise.”

• Although selecting only individuals with police experience for board membership would negate the purpose

of citizen oversight, citizen review systems that investigate allegations of misconduct can hire investigators

with pertinent law enforcement expertise. Most of the

Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority’s investigators are former police officers who worked in other

jurisdictions. Of course, these investigators need to be

screened, trained, and supervised closely to make sure

they do not show bias in favor of subject officers during their investigations.

• Although it is generally true that only physicians and

attorneys investigate their respective colleagues for

misconduct, many organizations and individuals have

in fact criticized these licensing boards for ineffectively

monitoring and disciplining members of their professions.2 It is also notoriously difficult to find physicians

who will testify in court against other physicians and

lawyers who will testify against other lawyers. As a

result, the analogy with only police overseeing other

police is a poor one. If anything, the analogy reinforces

the case for not leaving oversight to members of the

profession being monitored.3 Furthermore, as Mary

Dunlap, director of San Francisco’s Office of Citizen

Complaints, points out, “Lay jurors already factually

resolve allegations of police misconduct [and physician

and lawyer malpractice] in civil and criminal justice

trials that are a key element of the American justice

system.”

• Oversight directors need to educate officers about what

their staffs do as well as to describe their backgrounds

and training. According to Todd Samolis, coordinator

of the Rochester Civilian Review Board, “At a panel

for middle school students that I ran jointly with 10

officers, the officers were stunned to learn about the

extensiveness of the mediation and academy training

board members receive, especially impartiality training.” Oversight staff in Rochester and Minneapolis

attend roll calls so they can describe their operations

and training to officers.

The process is unfair

Although many officers believe that the oversight process

is unfair because, as previously discussed, citizen reviewers are unfamiliar with police work, officers also find the

process unfair for other reasons. Many officers feel oversight staff have “an agenda”—that is, the staff believe it

is their personal mission or assignment from the elected

officials who appointed them to reduce police officers’
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

113

power. As one chief said, “The problem is not the concept [of citizen oversight] but using biased staff. . . . [For

example,] staff ask complainants exculpatory questions,

but they don’t ask exculpatory questions of officers that

would justify their behavior.” According to a report evaluating Tucson’s oversight system, “The appointment of

[board] members with strong political agendas can result

in their use of the review body as a tool for promoting

those causes.”4

When they are biased, investigators and board members

can sometimes come across as hostile. An officer who

was a witness at a board meeting felt the process was so

demeaning and insulting, she wrote a

memo to the chief saying she would

walk out of any future hearings: “The

board chairperson was argumentative

and condescending, and he in effect

accused me of lying.” Bias, some officers feel, also leads staff to tolerate

complainants who are only out to get

the police, such as drug dealers who

regularly file complaints only to build

a specious defense on grounds of harassment and to slow

down assertive officers by getting complaints into their

personnel folders.

Officers in several jurisdictions reported that some complainants take advantage of the complaint process to benefit a planned or ongoing civil suit against the city or

officer. Because everything said at hearings in some jurisdictions is discoverable, plaintiffs in civil cases in effect

get free “prediscovery.” Daryl Lynn, chairperson of the

Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority, reports

that “some [citizens] do file complaints just to get discovery of the police department’s case to use in a civil

suit.” After Mark Gissiner, a Cincinnati human resources

analyst, conducted an investigation and prepared a report

that concluded that an officer had used excessive force, a

lawyer used the report to sue the city for damages. The

city settled for $300,000. A plaintiff’s attorney in another

jurisdiction described how he makes use of the oversight

process (see “An Attorney Uses Citizen Oversight as a

Screening Tool for Civil Suits”).

Officers in several jurisdictions felt that the practice of

“added allegations,” also called “collateral misconduct,”

was particularly unfair. Some oversight procedures,

including those in Berkeley, Flint,

Rochester, and San Francisco, investigate and sustain allegations that are not

part of the citizens’ original complaint

but that oversight staff discover in the

course of their investigation or review.

For example, the complaint may be

about the alleged use of foul language,

but the oversight body learns the officer

was not wearing a badge at the time of

the incident or failed to file a report. One oversight body

sustained an added allegation against an officer for not

“timing out”—recording the end mileage on a wagon

transport. These added allegations are not “citizen” complaints but accusations of misconduct by the review body.

Officers complain that they are held accountable for tiny

rule violations, such as placing the wrong offense code

on a citation. One chief said, “It gets tiresome to get 

nitpicked.” Officers also object to having “not sustained”

findings included in their file. Finally, many officers

complain about the long delays the complaint process

AN ATTORNEY USES CITIZEN OVERSIGHT AS A SCREENING TOOL

FOR CIVIL SUITS

A private attorney reported that he has used sustained citizen oversight cases as evidence in civil suits, and he

may let the oversight agency do its investigation first so he can benefit from its work product when only a small

settlement will be involved. When the board does not sustain a case, he reexamines the strength of his case. As a

result, he uses the oversight system as a screening device. However, he has still won cases the oversight body has

rejected, but he also lost a case the board sustained—even though there was a lower burden of proof in the civil

case (preponderance of evidence) than in the board hearing (clear and convincing).

Officers in several 

jurisdictions felt that the

practice of “added 

allegations” was 

particularly unfair.
C HAPTER 6: R E S O LV I N G P OTENTIAL C ONFLICTS

114

sometimes entails. According to one, “Delays make it

impossible for officers to collect witnesses or even

remember what happened.”

Several actions and observations may help to temper

police concerns that oversight procedures are unfair.

• Every citizen oversight process should protect officers

from petty and vengeful complaints. “An important

component of the intake process surrounds development of procedures (and related training) to assess and

dismiss complaints that are unfounded . . . to permit

frivolous complaints to be set aside and not utilize

[oversight] resources unnecessarily” or inappropriately

implicate and take up the time of officers.5

• Oversight boards need to let officers know when they

decide in favor of officers in specific cases so police do

not develop or maintain the misperception that the program is biased. (See “The Types of Board Findings

Oversight Staff Should Publicize to Officers.”) Boards

can also make clear that they sustain citizen complaints

at low rates that are not significantly higher—and

sometimes lower—than those of internal affairs units.6

Lisa Botsko, Portland’s first auditor, went to training

sessions for IA investigators to tell them how well they

were doing.

• Investigators and board members should ask neutral

questions in a nonaccusatory manner. One accused

officer was pleased to report that the Tucson auditor’s

questions during an IA interrogation of his alleged

misconduct were not judgmental but rather were

designed “to get a clear picture of what happened.”

He felt her questions “all made sense.”

• Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco’s Office of

Citizen Complaints, observes that indecisive findings

can be unsatisfying and unfair to both parties. As a

result, she wants to reduce the number of undecided

cases—that is, have more determinations that the case

is unfounded, exonerated, or sustained. In any case, it

may be the police or sheriff’s department decision, not

the oversight body’s determination, to record unfounded cases in an officer’s files.

• Reasonable doubt in a criminal case results in a “not

guilty,” not an “innocent,” finding. It is perhaps not

unreasonable, therefore, that in oversight cases, when a

preponderance of the evidence is lacking that the officer

did not engage in misconduct, an unsustained—not an

unfounded or exonerated—finding is made. Similarly,

just as a criminal defendant found not guilty still has

an arrest record, it may not be unreasonable to include

a record of unsustained cases in an officer’s personnel

THE TYPES OF BOARD FINDINGS OVERSIGHT STAFF SHOULD

PUBLICIZE TO OFFICERS

A mayor pointed out,“Even though review boards side with subject officers in the overwhelming number of cases,

many officers still believe the board is out to get them.” As a result, it becomes especially important to let officers

know how specific reviews have favored them.

An Orange County sheriff’s deputy wiped pepper spray on his hand and then wiped it on an unconscious suspect

to wake him up. The IA unit sustained the violation of the department’s pepper spray policy—excessive use of

force—but the board said he was a new deputy from another department where deputies had carried ammonia

capsules, and he was only using the spray as a substitute. The board said the sheriff’s department pepper spray

policy needed revision because it required automatic termination for misuse regardless of mitigating circumstances.As a result, the department rewrote its policy so that misuse would not require automatic termination.

The deputy was suspended but not terminated.

When three Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) staff monitored New Year’s evening partying, they observed that

San Francisco police officers used the utmost restraint in preventing a riot by drunken revelers. OCC issued an

oral report to the police commission describing the officers’ exemplary behavior.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

115

file. A reasonable compromise may be for the oversight body not to report unsustained findings to the

police or sheriff’s department or for the department not

to include them in the officer’s file until the number of

unsustained findings has reached an agreed-upon minimum number during a specified period of time (e.g.,

three findings during a 2-year period).

• Police IA units themselves add allegations to citizens’—or their own—complaints against officers. The

Rochester Police Department’s IA unit added what it

calls 12 “satellite issues” as a result of investigations

initiated for other reasons in 1997. A letter the Tucson

Police Department sent to one complainant noted,

“This complaint has been closed as OTHER, meaning

that the Officer committed a violation of TPD [Tucson

Police Department] Rules and Procedures other 

than the alleged violation.” In other

words, in adding allegations, citizen

oversight bodies are merely following in police footsteps. In some

jurisdictions, such as San Francisco,

oversight bodies are required to

investigate any added allegations

they discover because their charter

mandates that they investigate any

wrongdoing they uncover. Nevertheless, San Francisco’s internal

affairs unit is trying to work with

the Office of Citizen Complaints on not generating

added allegations that do not represent deliberate misconduct—for example, claiming an officer recorded

the wrong code on a report. Finally, on the one hand,

added allegations are not citizen complaints and therefore, absent a legal mandate to investigate them, might

be considered beyond the oversight body’s purview.

On the other hand, few citizens are familiar with their

police or sheriff’s department general orders and therefore are unaware when an officer’s behavior violates

these orders. A possible reconciliation of this dilemma

may be for oversight bodies to ask the complainant if

he or she would like to add any instances of misconduct discovered by the oversight body to the original

complaint. If the complainant does not wish to add

them, the oversight body could inform the department

of the additional violations without including them as

part of the complaint.

• Board decisions can benefit, not just harm, officers

who are sued civilly. In one case, a citizen whose complaint a board did not sustain filed a civil suit, and the

city attorney had the oversight investigator testify. The

investigator’s testimony helped the officer have the suit

dismissed. (See chapter 1, “Introduction,” for further

evidence that citizen oversight can prevent or reduce

award amounts in civil suits.) Whenever the department is sued, the Portland Police Bureau internal

affairs unit shares with loss-control personnel reports

that the Portland auditor routinely sends it in case the

information can help the department’s case.

• Delay is a product of many people. Also, slowness is

often an unavoidable feature of many oversight bodies

because they are overworked and understaffed, just as

it can take years for Federal and State equal opportunity employment commissions to hear

cases. Providing citizen oversight bodies with adequate personnel and funding often can reduce delays dramatically, as happened when San Francisco

funded additional investigators for 

the Office of Citizen Complaints.

Oversight bodies, such as Berkeley’s,

also can develop a process for summarily dismissing inappropriate complaints to reduce delays involved in

scheduling hearings on legitimate

complaints. Orange County allows board members to

place noncontroversial complaints on a “consent agenda,” bypassing the need for further discussion.

• Oversight staff and police need to meet and talk,

whether to iron out specific misconceptions or conflicts or to share information about what they are

doing. According to Prentice Sanders, assistant chief 

of the San Francisco Police Department, in 1997 the

police commission chairperson invited OCC and the

police department as well as interested citizen groups

to four roundtable discussions run by two independent

professional facilitators to address concerns about the

oversight process. Everyone looked for common

ground. All agreed there was a problem with cases taking too long that needed to be addressed. They also

agreed to talk to each other in the future if a problem

arose before going to the press.

Oversight staff and police

need to meet and talk,

whether to iron out 

specific misconceptions 

or conflicts or to share 

information about what 

they are doing.
C HAPTER 6: R E S O LV I N G P OTENTIAL C ONFLICTS

116

Oversight Criticisms of the

Police

Oversight staff raise several concerns about their relationships with the police and sheriff’s departments whose

investigations they review. Their most common concerns

are that in some cases:

• Officers refuse to answer questions.

• Departments resist providing needed records—or fail

to provide them in a timely manner.

• Officers do not understand the oversight system’s 

mission and legitimacy.

• Departments ignore the oversight

body’s findings or policy and 

procedure and training recommendations.

For example, the Berkeley Police

Review Commission was trying to

have the police department provide it

with the relevant police report and

computer-aided dispatch printout

regarding radio and telephone communications before, not after, the

commission gives a copy of the citizen’s complaint to the

police department. The Omaha Police Department was

providing the Citizens Complaint Review Board with the

results of investigations 59 days after receipt of complaints, leaving the board 1 day in which to review the

findings according to the ordinance. The mayor issued an

executive order requiring submission within 30 days or

granting an automatic extension for the board’s review.

The minutes of the January 1998 Police Internal

Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC) meeting in

Portland record a citizen adviser as reporting:

An ad hoc subcommittee had met the previous

week to discuss policy issues regarding the Chief

not accepting recommended findings on contested

appeals. The consensus [among subcommittee

members] was to not pursue changes to city code

or union contracts; that’s not something that could

be accomplished overnight. Rather, the recommended finding from City Council [acting as

PIIAC] is that he personally appear in a Council

session to explain his rationale . . . for now, this

appears to be the only practical solution. There

are philosophical issues involved; if a disturbing

pattern develops, this could be a catalyst for

change.

Some police and sheriff’s departments have attempted to

accommodate board members’ concerns.

• When the Tucson board complained that the police

department’s data were difficult to follow, the chief

had the board chairperson meet with the department’s

statistical department, which developed a clearer 

way of presenting the information for the board. The

department also offered to provide a photographer for

a board project to develop a video

for schools designed to improve

police relations with the Hispanic

community.

• The San Francisco Police Commission required the department 

to issue a general order mandating

that officers submit to an Office 

of Citizen Complaints interview

because officers had been rendering 

OCC impotent by not showing up.

The department now responds to an officer’s first violation of an order to appear with an admonishment, the

second with a reprimand, and the third with a 1-day

suspension. When some officers who did not care

about losing a day’s pay continued to ignore the summons, the chief told them violations would influence

their promotion opportunities.

• Some departments also make special efforts to ensure

their officers are familiar with the oversight body’s

responsibilities and the officers’ obligations to it.

— At the San Francisco Police Department’s invitation, Mary Dunlap teaches a 50-minute session at

the police academy on “How to Avoid OCC.”

— The Minneapolis Police Department’s training

commander arranged for Patricia Hughes, the

Civilian Police Review Authority’s (CRA’s) executive director, to give a 90-minute presentation at

When some officers who did

not care about losing a day’s

pay continued to ignore the

summons, the chief told them

violations would influence their

promotion opportunities.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

117

each police academy to explain to recruits how to

stay out of trouble and what the citizen review

process is. Hughes presents eight sustained cases

that have come before CRA, asking the recruits

what they would do in each situation. She compares their responses with what the police officers

actually did in the situations. An example of a case

Hughes presents is described below.

After several squad cars responded to a gang

shooting, the last officer to arrive saw a male in

the back of a cruiser; the officer pointed his

flashlight at the man, and the man made an

obscene gesture to the officer. “What would you

do?” Hughes asks. After getting the recruits’

responses, Hughes continues. “The officer

walked around the car, opened the door, and

punched him. Later, he learned that the other

officers had stowed the man in the cruiser

because the person had witnessed the shooting

and was terrified he would be retaliated against

if the gang members knew he was going to testify. So, the man overreacted when the officer

made him visible with his flashlight.” Hughes

then explains how citizens feel when officers

engage in misconduct.

— According to Orange County Deputy Patrick

Reilly, “All deputies know the [Citizen Review]

Board [CRB] exists—it is discussed in the academy and during supervisor tests.” In addition, CRB

is the subject of an entire general order dated

August 7, 1997, that begins, “The purpose of this

policy is to ensure all agency employees are aware

of the Orange County Citizen Review Board

(CRB).” After describing the board’s composition,

the bulletin goes on to observe, “All agency

employees shall appear before the CRB when formally notified in writing. Failure to appear may

result in disciplinary action.”

Other departments have gone out of their way to

show good faith in working with their oversight

systems.

• Lt. Robert Skomra, former commander of the

Minneapolis Police Department’s IA unit, on his own

initiative, went to every Civilian Police Review

Authority meeting, bringing a different IA investigator

with him each time. “You can’t tell people [i.e., CRA]

you’re a valuable asset unless you go in person.”

• Robert Duffy, when he became chief of the Rochester

Police Department, came to a meeting in which his

IA investigators were training Civilian Review Board

members to introduce himself and to explain how

valuable the board’s work was to the department.

Working With the Union

The local officers’ union can be more important than the

chief or sheriff—and have different concerns than the

chief or sheriff—in making sure citizen oversight functions properly. The union can challenge the process in

the courts, influence line officers to cooperate with or

hamper the procedure, and expedite or delay proceedings

when it represents subject officers during interviews and

hearings. It is therefore crucial for oversight planners,

staff, and volunteers to address union concerns about

the review process.

Historical conflict between most police

unions and citizen oversight bodies

Most police unions have traditionally opposed citizen

oversight—often successfully—through litigation or lobbying. In one jurisdiction, the union asked city council

members to vote against renewing the appointment of a

board member who had had the highest rate of recommendations for sustaining complaints.

However, police unions have increasingly been unable

to defeat citizen review proposals. In some jurisdictions,

unions have either chosen not to oppose oversight proposals or even supported them. Opposition has declined

in part because leaders have decided that a review system

was inevitable and because, as one union president said,

“We’re not getting gored by it.” According to a union

treasurer in another city, “If there had been no sworn

[officers] on the board, the union would have opposed 

it. But we knew we could not litigate it—oversight was

inevitable—so we wanted to make the best of what could

have been a bad situation.” (See “Not All Police Unions

Have Opposed Citizen Oversight.”)
C HAPTER 6: R E S O LV I N G P OTENTIAL C ONFLICTS

118

Approaches to collaboration

There are several ways in which oversight planners can

try to work with the local officers’ union.

Involve the union in planning the review 

procedure

In some jurisdictions, oversight planners have invited

union leaders to help design the new oversight system.

As a result, although union leaders may not agree with

the procedure that is ultimately adopted, they have an

opportunity to shape its design, express their concerns,

and get to know some of the individuals who may be

administering it.

• When planning the Boise oversight procedure, Pierce

Murphy, the new ombudsman, invited the union 

president to accompany him to examine the Civilian

Police Review Authority in Minneapolis. The Boise

Police Department agreed to pay for the president’s

time and to reimburse his travel expenses.

• In 1997, the Albuquerque City Council established an

ad hoc committee on public safety consisting of three

city counselors and staff to develop a citizen oversight

procedure. The committee in turn assembled a task

force of seven individuals representing community

organizations (e.g., the American Civil Liberties

Union), the police department, and the officers’ union.

The group met every 2 or 3 weeks for 6 months and

ended up presenting five different models to the city

council for consideration. A legislative analyst merged

the models into a single ordinance, which the council

approved.

When possible, accommodate union concerns

Union leaders have legitimate interests in how citizen

oversight operates, including:

• The use of subpoena power.

• The system’s authority to impose discipline.

NOT ALL POLICE UNIONS HAVE OPPOSED CITIZEN OVERSIGHT

Union opposition to citizen review has never been monolithic. In particular, some police unions representing

minority officers have supported citizen review as a means of reducing alleged police misconduct toward racial

and ethnic minorities.

• According to the National Black Police Association, an advocacy organization composed of 150 chapters representing more than 30,000 African-Americans in law enforcement, there is “substantial evidence that the police

department and its leadership cannot properly discipline their colleagues.” The organization executive director

goes on to report,“Most traditional police associations and police unions are strongly opposed to citizen’s

review of police . . . [but] the National Black Police Association . . . strongly support[s] the implementation and

use of civilian review of police misconduct.”

• A July 11, 1999, New York Times article reported,“Lieutenant Eric Adams, president of a civic group representing

New York’s black police officers, said . . . [a United States Attorney’s] investigation [into the New York Police

Department’s handling of brutality complaints] gives credence to complaints long voiced in minority communities. He said the city needed an independent agency with power to gather evidence, because as long as investigators depend on the Police Department for information, their work will be compromised.”

• The African-American Officers for Justice, composed of San Francisco Police Department black officers, joined

with liberal organizations in the city in 1982 to urge the Board of Supervisors to place citizen oversight on the

ballot as a voter initiative.

Not all rank-and-file members support their union’s opposition to citizen review. A sergeant in one jurisdiction

reported he did not take a union representative with him to a board hearing on a citizen’s complaint because he

disagreed with the union’s “rightwing positions.”
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

119

• Delays in case processing.

• The fairness of the procedures.

For example, according to Liana Perez, Tucson’s auditor,

“It’s better not to try to get subpoena power because then

the union ties you up in court.” Furthermore, many oversight staff and researchers believe that subpoena power is

not a particularly useful tool. (See the discussion of subpoena power in chapter 5, “Addressing Important Issues

in Citizen Oversight.”) Other examples of meeting the

union half way follow.

• The Rochester corporate counsel worked closely with

the city council and the mayor to fashion an oversight

procedure that would not be subject to a successful

union suit. For example, the city council attorney

reported that giving the Civilian Review Board authority to establish mandatory findings and discipline would

make it vulnerable to litigation by the union, and the

union already had said it would sue if the council

granted the board these powers. As a result, this authority was omitted from the legislation.

• Rochester’s first review board included police officers 

to accommodate union concerns. Later, the city council

enacted legislation excluding them. The Rochester police

union consented to a mediation option after the city

council agreed to exclude any final signed agreement

and to call the process “conciliation,” not “mediation.”

• Board members in another jurisdiction agreed to base

their findings on clear and convincing evidence rather

than on a preponderance of the evidence after the 

union agreed that officers could be required to testify.

• To address the concerns that the oversight system could

cost the union money, the Minneapolis statute requires

that the Civilian Police Review Board pay the union’s

legal fees when a complaint is not sustained after the

executive director has found probable cause.

• When first appointed, Lisa Botsko, Portland’s first

auditor, met with the union president and treasurer

initially “just to get to know them, learn their perspectives, and tell them what I do.” One of the grievances

they expressed to Botsko was how long it took to

process complaints. As a result, Botsko developed

timelines for everyone involved in the review process.

Make sure the review process is scrupulously fair

Some union leaders report they have no objection to 

citizen review as long as it treats officers fairly.

• I wasn’t opposed to citizen review; I had researched it

and hadn’t found that citizen review burns cops. I just

didn’t want it to be one sided.

—Butch Swinteck, treasurer, St. Paul Police Officers’

Union

• The concept of oversight is excellent; it builds citizen

trust in the department: We can’t be accused of covering anything up. The problem lies in the practice—the

procedure attracts staff with an axe to grind against us.

For civilian review of law enforcement to function

properly, all parties to it, including officers, must 

perceive the process to be impartial and professional.

—John Evans, officer representative, San Francisco

Police Officers’ Association

According to Mark Gissiner, president of the International

Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement

from 1995–99, “Police officers feel that oversight has a

third standard for judging officers in addition to criminal

behavior and violation of general orders. But there should

not be any other standard; either the behavior is a crime

or a violation of general orders—or it is not. A lot of people feel oversight should be an advocate for complainants

because no one else seems to represent them. But oversight should not; it should be a factfinder only with the

authority to make recommendations based on its findings.” Of course, once an oversight body finds for the

complainant, depending on its legislative mandate, it

may have to end up acting on the complainant’s behalf.

According to Lt. Steve Young, vice president of the

Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, in addition to

basic fairness, “Union leaders are concerned that any

oversight system follow due process in how they treat

officers.” Oversight bodies should, in consultation with

the union, investigate thoroughly the due process rights

of officers reflected in State statute, case law, and labor’s

contract with the department. For example, some union

contracts require that matters of discipline must be dealt

with during working hours. Other contracts limit the

information oversight bodies can disseminate to complainants or the general public. The oversight director 

can distribute a summary of these rights to all staff and

volunteers, ask the union to report when it believes a
C HAPTER 6: R E S O LV I N G P OTENTIAL C ONFLICTS

120

right has been violated, and monitor how well staff are

respecting these rights.

Oversight planners can address union concerns about

fairness and due process in part by working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement for officer representation at

investigatory interviews and hearings that, at a minimum,

respects the union contract’s requirements regarding officer representation in disciplinary investigations and hearings. The extent to which union leaders may accompany

and represent officers at oversight investigatory interviews and hearings varies considerably. In Berkeley, subject officers may have representation by a union agent or

the union’s legal counsel during all investigations and

hearings. Union representatives may attend interviews in

Minneapolis, but they may not speak during the investigation (they may caucus to offer the officer advice).

Fairness may always be compromised if political leaders

and local officials see oversight simply as a means of

placating citizen groups that are asking for a review

system. Steve Young observes, “Most union people feel

officers are the victim of politics—that city and county

officials implement oversight to pander to the complaints

of a few vocal citizens and citizen groups. As a result,

officials need to articulate nonpolitical, legitimate reasons for implementing it.”

Highlight shared objectives

Unions and oversight bodies share the same concern that

internal affairs treat officers fairly. As a result, some union

leaders have used the citizen oversight system to seek redress for their members whom they felt IA treated unfairly.

• In Portland, the union treasurer—over the objections of

some rank-and-file union members—filed a complaint

against a lieutenant with the oversight body after internal affairs rejected the complaint without investigation

on the grounds that it had no merit. The oversight body

voted to send the complaint to IA for investigation.

• When the union president told the Portland auditor

about a case he felt IA had handled poorly, Lisa

Botsko asked for the case, saying, “That’s my job, and

I’ll audit it.” She did, and reported, “The union was

right about how the case was mishandled.”

• Although he opposed—and still objects to—having an

auditor in Tucson, Mike Gurr, the officers’ association

vice president, has since asked the auditor, Liana

Perez, to review sustained cases that he felt IA had not

handled well, even though the city manager and police

department objected to his referring the cases.

When police and sheriff’s departments already are doing

a good job investigating citizen complaints, another

objective that oversight bodies and union leaders share 

is to reassure a frequently skeptical or hostile public, or

certain community groups, that the department is in fact

doing a good job. According to Thomas Mack, treasurer

of the police federation that represents Portland Police

Bureau officers, “The auditor’s review of investigations is

good because it opens up the files so people can see the

department isn’t covering up. And with community policing, it makes sense to look at what IA did. Many [union]

members believe IA’s review is enough, but I feel, ‘Let

them take a look.’”

Time may help but is not the cure-all

Some unions may modify their views about the oversight

procedure after they have had a chance to see it in operation and find that its staff are unbiased and competent. At

the union’s insistence, the St. Paul City Council agreed to

include a 1-year sunset clause in its oversight legislation.

At the end of the year, union leaders realized that the

review process tended to be more lenient with officers

than internal affairs and decided not to oppose its being

made permanent.

Despite everyone’s best efforts, some areas of disagreement are likely to remain between oversight planners and

staff on the one hand and union leaders and members on

the other hand. Even when union leaders themselves may

not regard oversight as a cause for serious concern, members may still be leery. According to Capt. David Friend,

president of the local police union in Omaha:

Oversight has a necessary function and its role is

important, but my membership is not thrilled

because the board is mostly civilians. The CCRB

[the Omaha oversight body] finds for the officer

in 99 percent of cases, but it’s hard to convince

cops the board isn’t out to get them. Their feeling

is, “Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean

they’re not after you.” So they still have a fear

that they could be the first to get skewered.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

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Notes

1. “A major problem with civilian review from the police

perspective is the lack of a working understanding of

the environment in which [police] decisions are made.”

“External Police Review: A Discussion of Existing City

of Tucson Procedures and Alternative Models, Report to

the Mayor and Council,” 1996: 12.

2. For example, “The [Massachusetts] Board of

Registration in Medicine, . . . according to a growing

number of critics, was lax to the point of negligence in

policing doctors,” Boston Sunday Globe, March 28,

1999: B1.

3. The argument that there should be citizen review of

police departments because officers alone have the legal

authority to exercise lethal force is also specious: doctors, airline pilots—even taxicab drivers—are also in

positions that place the lives of their clients in jeopardy.

4. “External Police Review,” 12.

5. “External Police Review,” 15.

6. Some officers report that, because they are afraid that

oversight findings will accumulate in their personnel files

and hamper promotion or transfer to desired details, they

enforce the law less vigorously. However, “There is no

evidence gleaned from civilian review studies that would

suggest that this piece of subcultural wisdom is anything

but folly . . . the only police review systems that have

generated any significant amount of counterproductivity

have been internal systems.” (Perez, Douglas, Common

Sense about Police Review, Philadelphia: Temple

University Press, 1994: 161–162.) According to Prentice

Sanders, San Francisco assistant chief, “Regarding officers who say OCC ties their hands and they cannot do

their jobs, I ask: ‘How come there are many officers with

lots of arrests and no complaints?’”
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

123

Chapter 7: Monitoring, Evaluation, 

and Funding 

Some programs can flourish without any evidence of

effectiveness simply because they are seen as politically

useful. Certainly, oversight systems can fall into this category. However, most of the time securing adequate

funding for a program depends at least in part on being

able to document that it is achieving its objectives.

Documenting success in turn can be done only if 

program activities are closely monitored. This chapter

suggests methods of monitoring and evaluating citizen

oversight as a prelude to discussing funding issues.

KEY POINTS

• To justify their funding, oversight bodies need to be able to document their effectiveness.To do so they need 

to collect monitoring data.

• Efforts to monitor oversight bodies should address:

— The simplicity, speed, and courteousness of the intake process.

— The quality of investigators’ work product.

— The performance of board members.

• To evaluate the effectiveness of an oversight system, it first is necessary to establish the objectives the 

procedure is designed to achieve—something few oversight planners have done.

• Comprehensive evaluations of citizen review have been rare. However, an evaluation of Albuquerque’s oversight

mechanisms is a good example of a thorough assessment.

• Jurisdictions can implement inexpensive “customer satisfaction” surveys that can suggest how the oversight

process may be improved.

• Jurisdictions need to fund their oversight procedures adequately to make sure the mechanisms are effective 

and respected.

• Funding for oversight ranges from $20,000 (e.g., because the effort is run almost entirely by volunteers) to

more than $2 million. Determining funding levels depends on the activities the oversight system will undertake

and several other considerations.

• There is an inconsistent relationship between the type of oversight system and cost, although costs are 

generally higher when oversight involves investigating citizen complaints.

• It is difficult to predict oversight costs before determining what the system’s features and activities will be.

• Although more money may not buy more oversight activity, an underfunded procedure may be doomed to 

failure—and may create more controversy around police accountability than it resolves.
Investigators’ work

Most programs have a procedure for reviewing the quality of their investigators’ work. Many tape record all

interviews, not only to have a permanent record of what

complainants, officers, and witnesses said but also to

review the investigators’ techniques.

In Flint, the senior investigator reviews the findings of

every investigator, and the ombudsman provides a final

review. In San Francisco, one of three Office of Citizen

Complaints (OCC) senior investigators reviews every file,

followed by a review by the chief investigator. If investigators recommend the complaint be

sustained, one of two OCC attorneys

reviews the case to assess whether the

evidence is sufficient and the findings

comply with applicable laws, rules,

and orders. Mary Dunlap, the OCC

director, reviews the file for a final

determination. Dunlap reviews about

1,500 packets a year, averaging 6 per

working day. It takes her 3–5 minutes to

review simple cases, but complex and

important cases can take many hours.

Because she feels that supervision of

investigators is critically important for

quality control, Dunlap makes sure she

hires enough supervisors and provides them with extensive training and close oversight. Each senior investigator

is responsible for the same five investigators’ work product so they can monitor the investigators’ progress over

several months or longer.

Any of the OCC reviewers may send inadequate packets

back to investigators for additional work. The most 

typical—although still uncommon—problem supervisors

C HAPTER 7: M ONITORING , E VALUATION , AND F UNDING

124

Monitoring

Examining several aspects of a citizen oversight system

can suggest how well the process is operating.

The intake process

Intake staff can discourage would-be complainants by an

indifferent attitude, lack of helpfulness, or dilatoriness.

Program supervisors can assess intake staff performance

by casually or formally observing the process. They also

can require investigators and board members to ask complainants whether they found the

intake process complicated or discouraging. Customer satisfaction surveys

(see next section) can include questions about the intake process.

Oversight directors can also use

“testers”—fake complainants—to

monitor the intake process (see 

“Using ‘Testers’ to Monitor the 

Intake Process”).

Oversight bodies to which internal

affairs units refer complainants can

monitor how conscientiously IA

investigators are making referrals.

The program coordinator of

Rochester’s Civilian Review Board (CRB) asks each

chairperson to visit the police department’s IA section

four times a year to review whether a random sample of

six cases that were never sent to CRB (e.g., because a

citizen dropped the complaint) should have been forwarded. CRB administrators talked with IA on the one

occasion in which a chairperson felt a case should have

been referred because of its sensitive nature.

USING “TESTERS” TO MONITOR THE INTAKE PROCESS

To monitor the intake process, program directors can arrange for unknown citizens to file fictitious complaints.

Although using testers may anger program staff, the technique is common in the private sector when retail businesses need to make sure their personnel are providing good customer service.Testers can provide valuable information regarding the thoroughness with which staff screen citizens’ complaints, how well they help complainants

fill out necessary forms, how accurately and politely they answer questions, and how expeditiously they meet

complainants’ needs.

In San Francisco, one of

three Office of Citizen

Complaints (OCC) senior

investigators reviews every

file, followed by a review 

by the chief investigator.

Mary Dunlap, the OCC

director, reviews the file for 

a final determination.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

125

find is that an investigator failed to ask the complainant

or subject officer an important question.

Board members’ performance

Oversight directors typically attend all board hearings,

giving them an opportunity to observe board members’

behavior. Directors need to be especially sensitive to

whether members appear biased for or against the police

(see “Can Repeated Contact With Police Officers Impair

Oversight Staff Objectivity?”).

In Rochester, board members meet privately without the

director’s presence. As a result, chairpersons are required to report another

board person who appears to be biased

to the program coordinator, who then

will meet with the person to discuss

the matter. A few board members have

been dismissed when it was discovered they discussed a case with a third

party. In another jurisdiction, the

director removed a board member

who had told a police officer that she

did not like his behavior, warning him, “And I’m a 

member of the citizen oversight board.”

Consumer Satisfaction Surveys

Jurisdictions can inexpensively implement a customer

satisfaction survey. The Vera Institute of Justice in New 

York City surveyed a sample of 371 citizens who had

filed complaints with the Citizen Complaints Review

Board. The study found:

• Most complainants (61 percent) had “moderate” objectives: an apology for themselves or a reprimand of the

officer(s).

• The desire for a direct encounter with the subject officer(s) was “pervasive” and “significantly associated

with complainant satisfaction.”1

Minneapolis’ Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA)

hired Samuel Walker, a consultant, to develop two customer satisfaction surveys. The board

and union attorney reviewed drafts of

the surveys. Patricia Hughes, the executive director, sends one survey twice a

month to the previous week’s complainants and the second survey (see

exhibit 7–1) to complainants and officers after their cases have been settled.

The anonymous survey includes an

addressed, stamped envelope to be

mailed back to the city coordinator’s office, which tabulates the responses and sends a copy to Hughes.

Walker’s analysis of 29 surveys completed by citizens

and 21 completed by officers found:

• Although most citizens were satisfied with how CRA

staff treated them, 8 of the 29 respondents reported

they were not treated with respect.

CAN REPEATED CONTACT WITH POLICE OFFICERS IMPAIR OVERSIGHT

STAFF OBJECTIVITY?

A close observer of citizen oversight has reported that investigators’ and board members’ “daily interactions with

the police force allow them plenty of opportunities to develop empathy and subliminal ties with those involved in

‘real law enforcement.’”* For the same reason, some citizens have objected to oversight staff attending police citizen academies (see chapter 4,“Staffing”). A report proposing the redesign of Minneapolis’ Civilian Police Review

Authority (CRA) recommended that “Periodic monitoring should be done to ensure that co-option does not

become an issue (regarding staff).” However, CRA responded,“There exists no known, objective, scientific measure for ‘co-optation.’ Therefore,‘monitoring’ of this possibility must be subjectively assessed by the Executive

Director of the CRA and its Board members.”

* Perez, Douglas W., Common Sense About Police Review, Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 1994: 182–183.

Minneapolis’ Civilian 

Police Review Authority 

hired a consultant to 

develop two customer 

satisfaction surveys.
C HAPTER 7: M ONITORING , E VALUATION , AND F UNDING

126

EXHIBIT 7–1. MINNEAPOLIS CONSUMER SATISFACTION POST-OUTCOME SURVEY
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

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• Almost half of the citizen respondents felt the 

outcomes of their cases were not fair.

• Eighteen of the 21 responding officers felt the 

outcomes of their cases were fair.

Because only 29 of 174 citizens and

21 of 81 police officers to whom the

survey was sent returned them, it 

is difficult to know whether the

responses are representative of more

general satisfaction or dissatisfaction

among all complainants and officers.

Nevertheless, the responses are useful for documenting considerable satisfaction with CRA while pointing to

areas for possible improvement.

Walker plans to reexamine the data

after a year when 140–150 surveys

should be available for analysis, at

which time he will examine levels of satisfaction in

relation to the citizens’ and officers’ gender, race,

and age.2

A Tucson city councilman telephones each constituent

in his district who appeals an IA investigation to see if

the person was satisfied with the auditor’s review. For

example, he called a mother who complained about an

officer pulling over her son. The woman reported she

had learned from the auditor that her son had been in

possession of an illegal substance and had no valid driver’s license, facts of which she had not been aware. As

a result, she now was satisfied with the officer’s behavior—and pleased with the auditor’s review. Every constituent but one whom the councilman has telephoned

has reported being satisfied with the oversight process.

Evaluating the Citizen 

Oversight Process

Two long-time observers of citizen review have reported,

“There are no thorough, independent evaluations of 

the effectiveness of any [citizen oversight] procedures,

much less any comparative studies.”3 Although one 

comprehensive evaluation has been conducted since this

statement was made, the lack of evaluations is perhaps

not surprising.

Establishing objectives

To evaluate the effectiveness of an oversight system, it

first is necessary to establish the objectives the procedure

is designed to achieve—something few oversight planners

have done. The objectives need to be specific and measurable. However, this crucial step is frequently omitted, making it necessary

to develop objectives for measuring

program success after the fact. In

addition to hampering any evaluation,

not establishing objectives from the

outset leaves program staff uncertain—or mistaken—about what they

are supposed to be doing.

Among the possible objectives planners can establish for citizen review of

the police are the following:

1. Increase the public’s confidence that the police or

sheriff’s department is addressing citizen complaints

fairly and thoroughly.

2. Reassure the public that the police or sheriff’s department appropriately disciplines officers who engage in

misconduct.

3. Defuse hostility toward public officials or the police

or sheriff’s department expressed by residents or specific groups of residents. This typically is the reason

most oversight systems are established.

4. Improve the fairness and thoroughness of the police

or sheriff’s department’s investigations of citizen

complaints (for example, by auditing the department’s

own procedures or conducting investigations in tandem with or instead of internal affairs department

investigations).

5. Reduce misconduct by police officers, such as verbal

abuse, use of excessive force, and discriminatory

enforcement of the law.

6. Reduce the number of police shootings.

7. Help ensure that officers who engage in misconduct

are appropriately disciplined.

8. Provide the public with an understanding of the

behavior of police officers and sheriff’s deputies.

To evaluate the 

effectiveness of an 

oversight system, it first is

necessary to establish the

objectives the procedure is

designed to achieve—

something few oversight

planners have done.
C HAPTER 7: M ONITORING , E VALUATION , AND F UNDING

128

9. Provide the public with a “window” on how the

police or sheriff’s department investigates allegations

of officer misconduct.

10. Increase legitimate citizen complaints by, for example:

• Providing an avenue for filing complaints that is

less intimidating than going to the police or sheriff’s department.

• Increasing confidence that complaints will be taken seriously.

• Providing more accessible locations for filing.

11. Provide an open and independent

forum for the public to express

general concerns about the police

or sheriff’s department’s operations or about officer conduct.

12. Provide a mechanism through

which citizens can suggest recommendations for improving police policies and procedures and police training.

13. Establish a mediation option for resolving selected

complaints to achieve one or more of the potential

benefits of mediation identified in chapter 3.

After establishing objectives, program planners and

administrators need to determine how they will know

whether each one has been achieved in terms of:

• What level of activity will be considered a success

(e.g., 10 fewer police shootings in each of the next 2

years compared with the average number of shootings

during each of the previous 10 years; a 15-percent

increase within 2 years of citizens who feel confident

the department is disciplining officers appropriately).

• How the necessary data will be gathered (e.g., police

records of use of firearms over a 12-year period; public

survey of community attitudes toward the police before

the oversight procedure was initiated and 2 years later).

There are other barriers to evaluation in addition to 

the failure to develop measurable objectives. Many

administrators consider monitoring and evaluating 

program activities a low priority. They may lack the time,

money, or expertise to assess their programs, or they may

be concerned that negative results may jeopardize their

funding and even their positions. Finally, even with solid

objectives and the time, skills, and will to conduct a useful

evaluation, there may be problems with the data that make

it difficult to draw valid conclusions about the oversight

system’s effectiveness (see “Data Barriers to Evaluating

Oversight Procedures”).

The Albuquerque evaluation

Despite these concerns and barriers,

assessing program effectiveness is

essential for learning how to improve

oversight operations and for demonstrating that the oversight process

should be maintained or expanded.

Reflecting this need, the Albuquerque

City Council commissioned a $27,602

evaluation of its oversight system and

used many of the findings in restructuring its procedures (see “The Albuquerque City Council

Commissioned a Thorough Evaluation”). Although this

approach may cost more money than jurisdictions are

able to spend, other cities and counties easily can afford

to implement parts of the evaluation.

Funding

Oversight bodies have dramatically different budgets:

Some, such as the review board in Orange County, cost

relatively little because they rely almost entirely on 

volunteers and in-kind services, while others, such as

those in Flint and Minneapolis, run into the hundreds of

thousands of dollars (see exhibit 7–2). San Francisco’s

oversight budget is more than $2 million.

The relationship between oversight costs

and oversight activity

In most organizations, there is a relationship between

expenditures and results—that is, the more money

spent, the more or better the results. Are increased

expenditures for oversight associated with increased 

utilization—that is, do oversight systems get what they

pay for? Exhibit 7–2 presents the nine oversight systems

The Albuquerque City

Council commissioned a

$27,602 evaluation of 

its oversight system and

used many of the 

findings in restructuring 

its procedures.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

129

arranged in ascending order of budget levels along with

their activity levels for 1997. As shown, it is impossible

to compare activity levels among oversight systems

because different systems engage in different types of

activities—for example, investigations, hearings, mediations, and audits. Nevertheless, it is possible to examine

five different relationships between oversight budgets and

activity levels.

1. There is no association between budget levels and

overall activity levels among the nine systems. For

example, Rochester’s level of activity (26 cases

reviewed, 4 cases mediated) appears to be less than

Orange County’s, Portland’s, and St. Paul’s, even

though its budget is much higher. Tucson, with a

budget of more than $144,000, monitored 63 investigations, while Portland, relying on a single staff person’s salary of $43,000, audited 98 cases and

processed 112 appeals.

2. There is a clear association between higher budgets

and whether a system conducts investigations: All

four systems with the highest budgets are type 1 systems (which investigate citizen complaints). These

systems are the most expensive because they have to

hire professional investigators rather than rely on volunteers. It also appears that, the higher the 1997 budget among these four type 1 oversight systems that

conduct investigations, the more overall activity (not

just investigations) they engaged in. For example,

while Flint conducted more investigations (313) than

either Berkeley (42) or Minneapolis (159), Berkeley

conducted 12 hearings and 34 preliminary investigations, and Minneapolis provided assistance to 715 citizens as well as arranged for 14 cases to be mediated.

(If the Minneapolis and San Francisco oversight bodies did not conduct investigations, their respective

police departments would have to hire additional

internal affairs investigators [unless they could transfer existing personnel] to perform the work the oversight bodies had been conducting. As a result, the

additional money that oversight bodies need to conduct investigations does not cost the city, town, or

DATA BARRIERS TO EVALUATING OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES

It would seem logical to evaluate the success of citizen oversight by determining whether complaints increase or

decrease after the system becomes operational.The natural assumption is that, over time, complaints will decline

as the oversight system begins to play a part in reducing officer misconduct. However, complaints may increase

because the intake process has been simplified or made more accessible or because public confidence in the

review process has increased. Furthermore, there are rarely complete—or any—baseline data on the actual 

number of incidents of police misconduct.*

Case review data also are suspect.The number of cases reviewed by the Rochester Civilian Review Board

declined significantly one year and rose the next.The decline occurred because there had been several shootings,

and IA investigators had to drop less serious investigations and delay examining new ones while they investigated

the complex and high-profile shootings. Staff turnover among investigators further delayed investigations. More

cases were investigated the following year after staffing problems ended and investigators caught up on their 

backlog of less serious cases.

Examining changes in community attitudes toward the police would provide more valid information on oversight

effectiveness. However, these data, too, may be misleading because many other events may be taking place simultaneously in the community that could change the public’s attitudes toward the police, including community policing

or a new police chief who is more strict or more lax about discipline than his or her predecessor. Finally, it is

difficult to compare the effectiveness of different citizen review models because they have different goals,

resources, and constraints.

* Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus,“The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the 

Civilian Review of Police,” American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1–26.
C HAPTER 7: M ONITORING , E VALUATION , AND F UNDING

130

THE ALBUQUERQUE CITY COUNCIL COMMISSIONED A

THOROUGH EVALUATION

Troubled by fatal shootings by Albuquerque police officers (31 in 10 years), extremely high annual payments for

tort claims involving police officers (up to $2.5 million per year), and other concerns, the Albuquerque City

Council in 1996 hired Eileen Luna and Samuel Walker, two well-known experts in citizen review of police, to 

evaluate the city’s oversight mechanisms. Luna and Walker’s 159-page report concluded:“The existing mechanisms

for oversight . . . are not functioning effectively” (emphasis in original).1

The researchers used five sources of data:

1. A survey administered in person to more than 357 rank-and-file officers (44 percent of the total sworn 

officer force) consisting of 70 close-ended and several open-ended questions.

2. Personal interviews with:

• Community members, including leaders and members of human rights, civil rights, and neighborhood 

organizations; attorneys in private and public practice; and spokespersons for ethnic communities.

• Police officers, including the chief, command officers, union officers, and the staff psychologist.

• Public officials, including the mayor, city council members, and advisory board members.

3. A review of official documents, ranging from advisory board minutes to internal affairs quarterly reports.

4. An audit of the internal affairs unit’s general patterns and practices, including:

• Complaint files for 1994–96.

• A consumer satisfaction survey administrated to everyone who had filed a complaint during the previous 

3 years.

5. A national survey of citizen oversight mechanisms.

The report concluded with 10 recommendations for improving the oversight process in Albuquerque, including

advocating that oversight procedure administrators exercise fully the authority they already had and that the

mayor and city council take a more active role in overseeing the police department.

In October 1998, the city council enacted the Police Oversight Ordinance to restructure the city’s oversight system along the lines of the report’s recommendations. According to coauthor Samuel Walker,“The City Council is

to be commended.They paid an outsider to come in and then acted on those [recommended] changes.Very often

these reports just sit on a shelf.”2 The council provided for an 18-month evaluation of the new oversight system.

1. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department, prepared for the 

Albuquerque City Council, 1997.

2. Law Enforcement News, “Who’s Watching the Watchers?” 29 (499) (November 15, 1998).
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

131

Mean Cost per

Complaint

Cost Filed or

Location Name in 1997 Principal Responsibilities and Features Activity in 1997 ReviewedOrange County Citizen Review $20,000 • board members review IA findings on use-of-force cases 45 board hearings } 45 $444

pop: 749,631 Board • board members make policy recommendationssworn: 1,134 • a sheriff’s captain coordinates the board’s activitiesSt. Paul Police Civilian $37,160 • police chief established board as in-house review procedure 71 cases reviewed } 71 $523

pop: 259,606 Internal Affairs • board, not IA, recommends disciplinesworn: 581 Review Commission • seven-member board includes two St. Paul police officersPortland Police Internal $43,000 • the city council hears appeals 21 appeals processed $361pop: 480,824 Investigations • citizen advisers review closed cases 98 audits of completed cases 119sworn: 1,004 Auditing Committee • an examiner audits IA investigations

• all three provide policy recommendations

Rochester Civilian Review $128,069 • board members review IA findings on use-of-force cases 26 cases reviewed 30 $4,269pop: 221,594 Board • board members are trained mediators 4 cases mediatedsworn: 685 • specially trained board members conduct conciliations

• board recommends policy and procedure changes

Tucson Independent Police $144,150 • auditor reviews completed cases 289 citizen contacts $755pop: 449,002 Auditor and Citizen • auditor sits in on ongoing cases and asks questions (9/1/97 to 6/30/98)sworn: 865 Police Advisory • board hears community’s concerns about the police 96 complaints filed 

Review Board • board can review completed cases 63 investigations monitored 159

• auditor and board make policy recommendations

Flint Office of the $173,811 • office investigates complaints against all city departments 313 cases against police $555pop: 134,881 Ombudsman • office reports subject officers’ names to the media investigated (1996) 313sworn: 333 • chief relies primarily on internal affairs’ (IA’s) investigation results

EXHIBIT 7–2. COSTS OF

NINE

OVERSIGHT

SYSTEMS IN 1997 IN

RELATION TO

RESPONSIBILITIES AND

ACTIVITY

a

b

c
C HAPTER 7: M ONITORING , E VALUATION , AND F UNDING

132

Mean Cost per

Complaint

Cost Filed or

Location Name in 1997 Principal Responsibilities and Features Activity in 1997 ReviewedBerkeley Police Review $277,255 • board hears complaints in public hearings 42 complaints filed and 57 $4,864pop: 107,800 Commission • board and IA investigate many cases simultaneously investigated sworn: 190 • board recommends policy changes 34 cases closed for lack 

of merit or complainant cooperation

12 hearings

Minneapolis Civilian Police $504,213 • paid professionals, not IA, investigate complaints 715 citizen contacts $3,171pop: 358,785 Review Authority • volunteer board members hear complaints with probable cause 159 formal complaints 159sworn: 919 • half of cases with probable cause are stipulated investigated 

• many cases are professionally mediated 14 cases mediated

6 stipulations3 hearings

San Francisco Office of Citizen $2,198,778 • office, not IA, investigates most complaints 1,126 complaints received $2,237pop: 735,315 Complaints • office prosecutes cases in chief’s hearings and police 983 cases investigated and 983sworn: 2,100 commission trials closed 

• office recommends policy changes 50 chief’s hearings

6 police commission trials

a. Because the board has never spent its $10,000 allocation for hiring an independent investigator, its true budget has been $27,160.b. Based on a 10-month prorated budget of $120,058.c. This represents the proportion of staff who handle complaints against the police.d.Because some of the 42 cases filed and investigated were among the 34 cases closed, the total activity does not represent the sum of the 42 complaints investigated and 

the 34 cases closed.

e.The mean cost per complaint filed in 1997 was unusually high because oversight staff devoted considerable time to labor-intensive activities beyond investigating complaints,

such as conducting a major pepper spray study, staffing a medical marijuana task force, and holding a public hearing on a use-of-force case.

f. This figure is misleadingly high as a measure of overall oversight costs because it does not include the 556 other contacts authority staff had with the public that did not result in 

formal complaints.

EXHIBIT 7–2. COSTS OF

NINE

OVERSIGHT

SYSTEMS IN 1997 IN

RELATION TO

RESPONSIBILITIES AND

ACTIVITY

(CONTINUED)

d e

f
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

133

county more money. It merely saves the law enforcement agency money.)

3. It is theoretically possible to compare the nine oversight budget levels with the number of units of a specific type of service provided. The most comparable

unit of service to examine is the number of complaints filed or reviewed.4 Exhibit 7–2 shows the units

of this type of service for each of the nine oversight

systems. As shown, there is no association between

budget levels and number of cases filed or reviewed.

Portland, whose oversight systems costs $43,000,

reviewed 119 cases, while St. Paul, with a budget of

$37,160, reviewed 71 and Rochester, with a budget of

$128,069, reviewed 26 and mediated 4. Flint handled

313 cases with a prorated budget of $173,811 (the

system investigates complaints against other city

agencies), while Minneapolis, with a budget of more

than $500,000, handled 159.

4. The final column in exhibit 7–2 shows how much it

costs to process each complaint that a citizen filed or

oversight system staff reviewed in 1997 by dividing

the system’s budget by the number of filed complaints

or complaints reviewed.5 As shown, there is no correlation between cost per complaint filed or reviewed

and overall activity level. For example, Rochester’s

Civilian Review Board, which reviewed cases in

1997, had a unit cost is $4,269, while the oversight

systems in Orange County, Portland, and St. Paul

reviewed or heard between 45 and 119 complaints

with a cost per complaint filed of less than $525. A

similar discrepancy appears for Flint ($555 for each

of 313 complaints) and Berkeley ($4,864 for each of

57 complaints).

5. Finally, as shown in exhibit 7–2, there is no relationship between a system’s budget and its cost per complaint filed. San Francisco, with the largest budget,

has a lower cost per complaint than Berkeley and

Minneapolis, which have smaller budgets. Rochester

has a much higher cost per complaint reviewed than

Tucson and Flint, even though its budget is lower than

theirs.

Why is there a weak correlation at best between budget

levels and these measures of oversight system activity?

• Oversight systems often cannot alter the number of

complaints they investigate or review even with

increased funding because they are limited by statute 

to accepting only certain types of cases (e.g., use of

force—Rochester) or are mandated to accept all cases

within certain categories (e.g., use of firearms—

St. Paul).

• An oversight system’s activity level for a given year

may reflect considerations that have nothing to do with

budget levels. For example, there often are anomalies

in the number of complaints filed in a given year. A

large and unruly public demonstration may result in

numerous complaints, or there may be a decline in the

number of cases forwarded by the internal affairs unit

because the unit loses staff or gets backed up investigating high-profile shootings. Changes in oversight

staffing levels—for example, through resignations—

may affect system activity in a given year irrespective

of budget levels.

• More money for citizen oversight may fail to result in

increased utilization if staff do not make citizens aware

of the opportunity to file complaints, if citizens do not

trust the system, if the police or sheriff’s department

refuses to cooperate, or if other barriers to filing 

complaints are not addressed.

• Cost-per-complaint figures do not take into consideration each system’s total responsibilities or the in-kind

services it uses. For example, Berkeley’s cost per filed

complaint includes not only its cost of investigating the

complaint but also of holding hearings and making policy recommendations. Minneapolis spends many hours

every year helping hundreds of citizens who decide not

to file a complaint.

Does more money buy better quality service? Unfortunately, most systems do not monitor the quality of their

services. Furthermore, it was outside the purview of this

publication to examine quality of services. Finally, it was

not possible to examine oversight activity in some jurisdictions—for example, hearings in Rochester are not

open to the public.
C HAPTER 7: M ONITORING , E VALUATION , AND F UNDING

134

The relationship between cost and 

oversight type

There is a theoretical relationship between the four types

of oversight systems (see chapter 1) and cost.

• Type 1 oversight systems, in which citizens investigate

allegations and recommend findings (Berkeley, Flint,

Minneapolis, San Francisco), are the most expensive

because, as previously noted, professional investigators

must be hired to conduct the investigations—lay citizens do not have the expertise or the time.

• Type 2 systems, in which citizens

review internal affairs findings (e.g.,

Orange County, Rochester, St.

Paul), tend to be inexpensive

because volunteers typically conduct the reviews.

• Type 3 systems, in which citizens

review complainants’ appeals of

police findings (Portland), also can

be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers.

• Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or

sheriff department’s own complaint investigation

process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the midlevel

price range. On the one hand, like type 1 systems, only

a professional has the expertise and time to conduct a

proper audit. On the other hand, typically only one

person needs to be hired because the auditing process

is much less time consuming than conducting investigations of citizen complaints.

In practice, however, there is an inconsistent relationship

between oversight type and cost. This is because, when

examined closely, many oversight operations are not

“pure” examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. As a

result, the actual cost for a given type of oversight 

system may be more or less expensive than what a pure

type would cost. For example, San Francisco’s type 1

system requires extra staff to prosecute cases at chief’s

hearings and police commission trials. While type 2 systems (e.g., Orange County, St. Paul) generally cost relatively little, Rochester’s budget is more than $128,000 in

part because paid staff are involved in training and 

certifying citizen reviewers as mediators and in subcontracting for mediation of selected cases.

There are other reasons why there is frequently no direct

relationship between type of oversight system and cost:

• Flint’s ombudsman system probably achieves some

economies of scale because it investigates complaints

from all city agencies, not just the police.

• The actual cost of any oversight system depends 

on the number of complaints it hears, which in turn

hinges on many considerations that

are independent of its budget, such 

as the kinds of complaints its charter

permits it to accept or review and how

frequently officers in the local department engage in misconduct. For

example, some type 1 oversight systems investigate almost all citizen

complaints (e.g., Minneapolis, San

Francisco), while others investigate

only some (e.g., Berkeley, Flint).

• Type 1 and 2 oversight systems (e.g., Minneapolis) can

reduce the expense of holding hearings or conducting

reviews by diverting some cases to mediation.

• Labor market rates for investigators and executive

directors can influence an oversight system’s costs, as

can the use of inhouse staff versus contracted staff who

receive no fringe benefits.

• Different systems provide different stipends to volunteer board members. For example, Berkeley provides

$3, while Rochester provides $35 (totaling $15,800 in

its 1997 budget).

In sum, it is difficult to predict what an oversight system’s actual costs will be before agreeing on what all its

components and activities will be and before selecting

from among many mechanisms—and combinations of

mechanisms—for paying for oversight activities. That

said, it is still important to provide a level of funding that

will make it possible to investigate, hear, or audit all the

cases a program can expect to handle.6

It is difficult to predict what

an oversight system’s actual 

costs will be before agreeing

on what all its components

and activities will be.
Department, and included in the SFPD’s proposed budget. . . . It is asking a lot of Police

Chief Fred Lau and his planners to cut their own

money requests for the benefit of civilians often

derided by cops on the beat as second-guessers.9

Furthermore, if the oversight process

fails, citizens and public officials can

blame the department for not providing it with enough money.

Elected and appointed officials, not

just police and sheriff’s departments,

also may keep funding levels unrealistically low.

• Every year some members of the

Minneapolis City Council want to

abolish the Civilian Police Review

Authority because it is expensive.

In the 1996 budget process, some council members

argued that CRA was a waste of $400,000 because the

police department’s IA unit should be investigating

misconduct.10

• Although San Francisco residents voted in 1995 to

require one Office of Citizen Complaints investigator

for every 150 officers, the Board of Supervisors did

not immediately allocate the money to hire additional

investigators and supervisors to monitor them.11 During several months in

1997, staff attrition reduced the number of investigators well below the

charter requirement; at many points,

there were only 8 investigators (compared with 19 in 1998). According to

Mary Dunlap, OCC’s director, “It was

a battle [to get the money].” Dunlap

met and corresponded with supervisors

and mayor’s aides, and she testified

extensively to the Finance Committee of the Board 

of Supervisors during budget hearings. The OCC 

staff attorney organized a letter writing campaign to the

mayor and supervisors from about a dozen individuals

and community groups, including the American Civil

Liberties Union and National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People. 

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

135

The importance of adequate funding

Without adequate funding, the oversight process may 

be just a political statement without any substance—

“See what we’re doing to hold the police accountable.”

According to Samuel Walker, an oversight researcher,

when boards lack effective investigative powers, necessary funds, and

expertise, “We should really think of

that as consumer fraud—it is promising an independent review of complaints and not delivering. And that’s

really fraud.”7 As a result, the Flint city

charter stipulates that the ombudsman

“shall be granted a budget adequate to

allow such a staff as is reasonable and

proper for the performance of the

duties of said office.” Similarly, San

Francisco’s voters passed an initiative

that requires the city to fund one

Office of Citizen Complaints investigator for every 150

police officers.

Funding an oversight system with money from the police

or sheriff’s department’s budget, as is done in St. Paul

and San Francisco,8 may hamper efforts to provide adequate funding for two reasons:

1. The more money chiefs allocate to citizen oversight,

the less they have for other important functions. In competing with

these other functions, oversight

may come out the loser.

2. Departments that have an adversarial relationship with the oversight

body naturally will be reluctant to

provide any more money for it than

they have to.

A 1997 editorial, “The Starving Watchdog,” in the 

San Francisco Examiner suggested:

[T]he [county/city] supervisors should ask why

appropriations for the watchdog agency [i.e.,

Office of Citizen Complaints] must be approved

by the object of its investigations, the Police

When boards lack effective

investigative powers, necessary funds, and expertise,

“We should really think of

that as consumer fraud—it

is promising an independent

review of complaints and 

not delivering.”

To avoid funding cuts, some

oversight staff may be

tempted to accept cases for

investigation or review cases

that do not merit intake.
C HAPTER 7: M ONITORING , E VALUATION , AND F UNDING

136

The tasks of monitoring, evaluating, and securing funds

for an oversight procedure may seem intimidating.

However, as the following chapter indicates, there are

many resources available that can assist oversight planners to address these and other oversight planning tasks.

Notes

1. Vera Institute of Justice, Processing Complaints

Against Police in New York City: The Complainant’s

Perspective, New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1989.

2. For additional guidelines for program evaluation, see

Walker, Samuel, Police Accountability: The Role of

Citizen Oversight, Belmont, California: Wadsworth,

forthcoming.

3. Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus, “The

Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on

Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian

Review of Police,” American Journal of Police 11 (4)

(1992): 1–26.

4. It is possible to calculate mean costs by using another

standard besides complaints filed. However, complaints

filed appear to be the most universal activity among oversight systems, if audits and reviews of cases are considered within the definition of “filings.”

5. The mean cost per complaint filed may not be correct

for all systems. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, hearings and mediations for some complaints that are filed

are not conducted until the following calendar year, while

some complaints that are heard were filed the previous

year. As a result, the mean cost was calculated by dividing the budgets for these programs by the number of

cases investigated in 1997, exclusive of the number of

hearings and mediations held that year.

6. In its 1996 report to the city council examining

reconfigured options for its oversight mechanism,

Tucson city staff provided startup, first-year, and recurring cost projections for five different types of oversight

responsibilities, ranging from an expanded intake function to subpoena power to an independent auditor model

(see appendix E).

7. National Public Radio, Morning Edition, July 31,

1997, “Policing the Police.”

8. However, the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco,

not the police department, establishes the Office of

Citizen Complaints’ budget.

9. San Francisco Examiner, “The Starving Watchdog,”

June 17, 1997.

10. To avoid funding cuts, some oversight staff may be

tempted to accept cases for investigation or review cases

that do not merit intake. One city council calculates its

oversight body’s cost per complaint. Because the number

of complaints declined one year, the cost per complaint

rose. As a result, some council members felt the board’s

funding should be reduced. Funding for Berkeley’s

Police Review Commission has changed significantly 

and frequently over the years, for example, going from

$346,233 in 1994 to $196,732 in 1996 to $277,000 in

1998.

11. Investigators earn from $46,000 to $56,000, senior

investigators earn from $50,000 to $62,000, and the 

chief investigator earns from $54,000 to $71,000. In

Minneapolis, Civilian Police Review Authority investigators earn from $38,000 to $51,000.
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

137

This chapter identifies resources with information about

setting up and improving citizen oversight systems. The

resources are based on a limited search and therefore are

not comprehensive.

Organizations

The International Association for Civilian Oversight of

Law Enforcement (IACOLE) is devoted to advancing the

cause of citizen oversight of law enforcement. The organization sponsors an annual world conference for oversight practitioners and researchers, publishes a quarterly

newsletter (International Connection) with position

papers and recent developments in the field, provides

information to jurisdictions interested in creating citizen oversight agencies, and provides a compendium

of oversight agencies and publications. Address:

P.O. Box 99431, Cleveland, OH 44199–0431; phone:

513–352–6240; fax: 513–624–8042; e-mail:

IACOLE1@fuse.pnet.

The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law

Enforcement (NACOLE) provides educational opportunities and technical assistance to existing and emerging

organizations that perform civilian oversight of law

enforcement. The organization provides a national forum

for information gathering and sharing for these organizations. Established in 1993, NACOLE supports civilian

review boards that are under attack by writing letters of

support to the local political establishment and community. In addition, the organization will send someone when

possible to testify on the behalf of civilian review boards.

The association is considering developing a mentor program within NACOLE to make the informal networking

that is occurring formal. Address: 9420 Annapolis Road,

Suite 302, Lanham, MD 20706; phone: 317–327–3429.

Selected Program Materials

The appendixes to this report contain a number of materials from oversight bodies studied for the publication. In

addition, many oversight bodies have developed detailed

reports of their procedures for handling citizen complaints, including the following:

• The Berkeley Police Review Commission’s “Regulations for Handling Complaints Against Members of the

Police Department” provides 16 pages of detailed procedures for intake, investigations, and board reviews.

• Minneapolis’ “Civilian Police Review Authority

Administrative Rules” provides 28 pages of guidelines

for citizen review. The bound booklet addresses the

collection and dissemination of data, definitions, standing to file a complaint, intake, grounds for dismissal,

mediation, investigations, personal bias or prejudice,

rules of evidence, burden of proof, and disposition.

Chapter 8: Additional Sources of Help

KEY POINTS

• Information for establishing and improving citizen oversight systems is available from:

— Organizations.

— Oversight programs.

— Publications and reports.

— Individuals with experience in oversight systems.

• Some jurisdictions have engaged in comprehensive research on their own to determine what type of oversight

system would be best for their communities.Their research strategies are instructive.
C HAPTER 8: A DDITIONAL S OURCES OF H ELP

138

Oversight bodies also produce annual reports.

Minneapolis’ Civilian Police Review Authority,

Rochester’s Civilian Review Board, San Francisco’s

Office of Citizen Complaints, and San Jose’s Office of

the Independent Police Auditor prepare especially

informative annual reports (see the discussion on reports

in chapter 5, “Addressing Important Issues in Citizen

Oversight”).

For guidance in developing a program brochure, examine the brochures prepared by the oversight bodies in

Minneapolis, Rochester, San Francisco (in English and

Spanish), San Jose, and Tucson. Several jurisdictions

have prepared reports recommending modifications to

their existing oversight procedures. These reports provide valuable discussions of alternative approaches to

citizen oversight. See, for example, the following (available from the oversight bodies):

ALBUQUERQUE, PORTLAND, AND TUCSON DID THEIR OWN RESEARCH

Albuquerque, Portland, and Tucson conducted reviews of oversight procedures in other jurisdictions to learn 

how best to improve their own oversight systems.

Albuquerque

According to Linda Stewart, an aide to the Albuquerque mayor, because of a rash of police shootings in 1997,

the city council established an ad hoc committee on public safety consisting of three city counselors and staff.

Members visited San Jose and Long Beach and conducted conference calls with other cities.The city council’s legislative policy analyst convened a town hall meeting for 300 people to hear their concerns. Finally, the committee

appointed and the analyst assembled a task force of seven individuals representing community organizations 

(e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union and the police department and union).

The group met every 2 or 3 weeks for 6 months to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in terms of

what kind of citizen oversight system to establish.The members reviewed “stacks” of ordinances from other cities

and also had an evaluation report assessing the current oversight system. The task force presented five different

models to the city council for consideration. The legislative analyst merged the best of the models into a single

ordinance, which the council approved.

According to Stewart,“The most important part of the process was inviting the activists who were so dissatisfied

with the police to sit down and forcing them to explain what they wanted done.” The mayor and chief supported

the ordinance, and the mayor was getting ready to sign it.

Portland

In 1992, the Portland City Council appointed the mayor to chair the Police Internal Investigations Auditing

Committee (PIIAC) with the expectation that she would evaluate its operations and recommend improvements.

(Members of PIIAC had resigned in protest, alleging the group was ineffective.) The mayor reviewed recent

assessments of the PIIAC process, including a self-assessment by the citizen advisers, the auditor’s reports, and

proposals from community organizations. She also reviewed citizen oversight systems in other jurisdictions and

consulted with citizens who had filed complaints with PIIAC. She attended adviser meetings and the city council’s

public hearing on PIIAC.

As a result of this research, the mayor prepared a report to the city council that included five pages of recommended changes to the PIIAC process to address primarily three identified PIIAC weaknesses: complainants’ 

feelings of intimidation using PIIAC; the perceived failure of the citizen advisers to address policy issues inherent

in cases; and advisers’ lack of information by which to assess the quality of IA investigations.
• “Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority

Redesign Report,” November 1997, 29 pages, and the

board’s response to the report, “Response to MCPRA

Redesign Report,” April 1998.

• “External Police Review: A Discussion of Existing City

of Tucson Procedures and Alternative Models, Report

to the Mayor and Council,” October 7, 1996,

36 pages plus appendixes.

The Portland Copwatch organization developed a 10-page

“Proposal for an Effective Civilian Review Board” that is

available from Portland Copwatch/People Overseeing

Police Study Group, P.O. Box 244296, Portland, OR

97242; 503–288–3462. (See also “Albuquerque, Portland,

and Tucson Did Their Own Research.”)

The Minneapolis and Rochester oversight bodies can provide additional materials on conducting mediation.

Selected Publications 

and Reports

Bailey, Robert G. “The Re-Emergence of Civilian Review

of Police: Seizing the Opportunity and Understanding the

Trade-Offs.” Unpublished paper submitted to the eighth

annual IACOLE conference, September 1992, 8 pages.

Discusses tradeoffs in different ways citizen oversight can

be structured. Order from IACOLE (see address above).

Human Rights Watch. Shielded from Justice: Police

Brutality and Accountability in the United States, New

York: Human Rights Watch, 1998, 440 pages. Discusses

factors that contribute to human rights violations; recommends changes in police administration to reduce police

misconduct; discusses civil remedies, prosecution, and

other approaches to accountability; and provides case

studies of misconduct and efforts at accountability in 14

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

139

ALBUQUERQUE, PORTLAND, AND TUCSON DID THEIR OWN RESEARCH

(CONTINUED)

Tucson

In 1996, the mayor and city council of Tucson asked staff to provide information on alternative models for external

police review procedures, including potential changes to the city’s existing Citizen Police Advisory Review Board.

Staff consulted with involved parties throughout the city and obtained additional information from a number of

well-known practitioners and experts from across the Nation.The resulting 33-page report identified the limitations of the current commission, reviewed alternative models, and provided recommendations for improving the

city’s current procedure and cost estimates for each proposed improvement.

A mayor’s and city council subcommittee, headed by an assistant city manager, conducted a nationwide review of

options and discussed them before adopting its own ordinance. The assistant city manager telephoned cities and

visited the independent police auditor in San Jose. The assistant had a budget and survey people assigned to her 

to conduct the survey. The subcommittee considered to whom the board and auditor should report, whether the

board would have investigation powers, and who would supervise the auditor. There was a historical precedent

for having a board because one had existed for several years. So it was natural to continue the existing board.The

auditor was assigned to the city manager because the city charter puts the city manager in charge of all administration. An auditor was selected because the subcommittee felt a board was not the best avenue for citizens to

bring complaints, monitor investigations, and do alternative intake because of turnover among volunteers and lack

of time.

The city council debated the proposed options, including doing nothing. Three members of the council made up

the public safety subcommittee, which conducted the investigation. The council debated whether an auditor was

needed or only a strengthening of the existing board. There was a great deal of intense debate before the auditor

model was agreed on.
C HAPTER 8: A DDITIONAL S OURCES OF H ELP

140

cities. Address: 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor, New York,

NY 10118–3299; phone: 212–290–4700; fax:

212–736–1300; e-mail: hrwnyc@hrw.org.

Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker. A Report on the

Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police

Department. Prepared for the Albuquerque City Council,

February 28, 1997, 159 pages plus appendixes. See the

description of the report in chapter 7, “Monitoring,

Evaluation, and Funding.” Available from the Albuquerque

City Council, P.O. Box 1293, Albuquerque, NM 87103;

phone: 505–768–3100.

New York Civil Liberties Foundation. Civilian Review of

Policing: A Case Study Report, New York: New York

Civil Liberties Union, 1993, 155 pages. Describes the

operations of seven oversight systems and presents policy

and practice recommendations. Address: New York Civil

Liberties Union, 132 West 43rd Street, New York, NY

10036; phone: 212–382–0557.

Perez, Douglas W. Common Sense About Police Review,

Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994, 322 pages.

Discusses the nature of police misconduct, the limits of

reform, and methods of evaluating different approaches

to accountability; describes three types of police review

systems: internal, civilian, and monitoring; suggests

methods of improving police accountability; and proposes an ideal review system. Address: Temple University

Press, 1601 North Broad Street, Philadelphia PA 19122.

Sviridoff, Michele, and Jerome E. McElroy. The

Processing of Complaints Against Police in New York

City: The Perceptions and Attitudes of Line Officers. New

York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1989, 56 pages. Examines

police officer attitudes toward New York City’s Civilian

Complaint Review Board based on focus groups with

22 officers. Address: Vera Institute of Justice, 377 Broadway, New York, NY 10013; phone: 212–334–1300.

Walker, Samuel. Citizen Review Resource Manual,

Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum,

1995, 424 pages including appendixes. Defines citizen

review; discusses selected characteristics of existing procedures in the country, including sources of legal authority, organizational structure, roles and missions, board

composition, disciplinary authority, and information 

dissemination; and includes as appendixes a variety of

ordinances and statutes, rules and procedures, annual

reports, and other documents. Order from the Police

Executive Research Forum, 1120 Connecticut Avenue,

Suite 930, Washington, D.C. 20036; phone:

888–202–4563.

Walker, Samuel. Police Accountability: The Role of

Citizen Oversight, Belmont, California: Wadsworth,

2001. Addresses many of the same issues covered in the

present report. See address and phone number for Walker

in exhibit 8–1.

Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus. “The Effectiveness

of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent Trends and

New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review of Police.”

American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1–26. Based on

a survey of 50 oversight procedures. Describes their general features, explains the pattern of growth in citizen

oversight, and discusses barriers to evaluating the effectiveness of citizen review operations. 

Walker, Samuel, and Betsy Wright. Citizen Review of 

the Police, 1994: A National Survey, Washington, D.C.:

Police Executive Research Forum, January 1995, 19

pages. Based on an ongoing survey of oversight bodies.

Discusses the types of procedures in existence, dividing

them into four models; tracks the growth of oversight

procedures since 1970; identifies which types of models

are most prevalent in cities of various sizes; and provides

a matrix listing jurisdictions by oversight model, name of

the oversight body, year established, and jurisdiction size.

See ordering information above.

Individuals With Experience in

Citizen Oversight of Police

The individuals identified in exhibit 8–1 are available to

provide technical assistance related to citizen oversight of

the police by telephone. In addition, chapter 2, “Case

Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures,” provides the

names of program coordinators and law enforcement

administrators who are available to provide telephone

consultation.
Name Title or Position Contact Information Areas of Experience

K. Felicia Davis, J.D. Legal consultant and director Citizen Review Board • Legal consultant, NACOLE

at large, NACOLE 234 Delray Avenue • Administrator, Syracuse Citizen 

Syracuse, NY 13224 Review Board

Administrator, Syracuse phone: 315–448–8750/8058 • Startup problems

Citizen Review Board fax: 315–448–8768 • Working with police union

Mark Gissiner President, IACOLE (1995–99) 2665 Wayward • Former president, IACOLE

Winds Drive • Staffs commission that hears appeals of 

Senior human resources Cincinnati, OH 45230 disciplinary actions in Cincinnati

analyst, Cincinnati phone: 513–624–9037 • Designs and provides technical assistance

e-mail: IACOLE1@fuse.net in creating oversight systems 

fax: 513–352–5223 nationally and internationally

Douglas W. Perez, Ph.D. Assistant professor, Department of Sociology • Former deputy sheriff

Plattsburgh State University Plattsburgh State University • Wrote book on oversight procedures

45 Olcott Lane • Internal affairs procedures

Rensselaer, NY 12144

phone: Fri.–Mon.: 518–426–1280

Tues.–Thurs. 518–564–3306

fax: 518–564–3333

Jerry Sanders Former chief, San Diego United Way of San Diego County • Police administration

Police Department P.O. Box 23543 • Former SWAT commander

San Diego, CA 92193 • Former training academy director

phone: 858–492–2000 • Implemented community policing 

fax: 858–492–2014 departmentwide

Lt. Steve Young Vice president, Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police • Union negotiator

Fraternal Order of Police 222 East Town Street • Police officer

Columbus, OH 43215 • Certified police instructor

phone: 614–224–5700

fax: 614–224–5775

Samuel Walker, Ph.D. Kiewit Professor, University of Department. of Criminal Justice • Studies oversight procedures

Nebraska at Omaha University of Nebraska at Omaha • Conducted survey of early warning

60th and Dodge Streets systems

Omaha, NE 68182–0149 • Author of books on citizen oversight

phone: 402–554–3590

fax: 402–554–2326

Note:The individuals in this exhibit have agreed to respond to telephone calls for technical assistance for citizen oversight of police.The

individuals are members of the project advisory board who served as advisers in the preparation of this report.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

141

EXHIBIT 8–1. INDIVIDUALS WITH EXPERIENCE IN CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE
Glossary

Burden of proof. The standard used to conclude that 

an officer committed the alleged misconduct. (See

“Preponderance of the evidence” and “Clear and convincing evidence.”)

Clear and convincing evidence. The degree of proof

that will produce in the mind of the trier(s) of fact a firm

belief or conviction as to the allegations; an intermediate

burden of proof, being more than mere preponderance

but not to the extent of such certainty as is required by

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Discipline. Punishment meted out for misconduct by

officers. In increasing order of severity, punishment may

include:

• Verbal or written counseling by the officer’s supervisor.

• Remedial training.

• Professional counseling (e.g., for substance abuse).

• Verbal reprimand (supervisor orders inappropriate

behavior to be corrected).

• Written reprimand. 

• Suspension without pay (may include ineligibility for

promotion, department-paid health insurance premium

payments, and off-duty enforcement work).

• Probation.

• Demotion (reduction in rank, job classification, or pay

grade or step).

• Termination.

Exonerated. See “Findings.”

Findings. The internal affairs or citizen review oversight

body’s determination of the legitimacy of a citizen’s

complaint. Options include:

• Unfounded: The alleged incident did not occur, or the

subject officer was not at the scene.

• Exonerated: The incident did occur, but the officer’s

actions were lawful and proper.

• Not sustained: There is insufficient evidence to prove

or disprove the allegations.

• Sustained: There is sufficient evidence to conclude that

the officer engaged in misconduct.

• Policy failure: The officer acted incorrectly but,

because the department had no policy, an ambiguous

policy, or contradictory policies prescribing the correct

behavior for the situation at issue, no blame is attached

to what the officer did.

Garrity warning. Under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.

493 (1967), as part of an internal, noncriminal investigation, police officers can be ordered to give a statement to

their employer regarding actions they took while working

for the police department. A Garrity warning informs the

officers of two conditions: (1) failure to answer questions

related to the scope of their duties may form the basis for

disciplining officers, including dismissal, and (2) any

statements given under this warning cannot be used in

any subsequent criminal proceeding against the officers

unless the officers are alleged to have committed perjury

in their statements.

Internal affairs. Section, unit, or bureau within a law

enforcement agency responsible for investigating officer

misconduct.

Not sustained. See “Findings.”

Policy failure. See “Findings.”

Professional standards. In some law enforcement agencies, a new name for the internal affairs unit; in other

agencies, a unit that houses several activities (e.g., inservice training) for which investigating officer misconduct

is only one responsibility.

Subject officer. The officer against whom a complaint

has been filed.

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

143
Subpoena power. The authority to compel witnesses 

to appear and give testimony or produce relevant 

documents.

Preponderance of the evidence. Enough evidence to

decide that one party in the case has the stronger evidence on his or her (or its) side, however slight the

advantage may be, even when the trier has a reasonable

doubt that the party is in the right or the party’s rightness

is not even clear and convincing.

Suspension. Time off without pay. Suspended officers

may not be allowed to work off-duty details and may

have to pay their own health insurance premiums for the

time they are suspended.

Sustained. See “Findings.”

Unfounded. See “Findings.”

G LOSSARY

144
Appendix A

Rochester Internal Affairs Request for Board Member Evaluations of

Investigators’ Investigations

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

145
A PPENDIX A

146
Appendix B

Portland Auditor’s Guidelines for Reviewing Internal Affairs

Investigations

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

147
A PPENDIX B

148
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

149
Appendix C

San Francisco Complaint Intake Form

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

151
A PPENDIX C

152
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

153
A PPENDIX C

154
Appendix D

San Francisco Policy for Citizen Monitoring of Police During

Demonstrations

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

155
A PPENDIX D

156
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

157
A PPENDIX D

158
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

159
A PPENDIX D

160
C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

161
Appendix E

Cost Estimates for Different Modifications to Tucson’s Existing

Oversight Procedure

C ITIZEN R EVIEW OF P OLICE : A PPROACHES AND I MPLEMENTATION

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A PPENDIX E

164
A DDRESSING C ORRECTIONAL O FFICER S TRESS

165

A

added allegations 58, 113, 115

Albuquerque 12, 88, 118, 128, 130, 138

annual reports 103–104, 138

appeals 24, 34, 39, 54, 65

associations (see unions)

audiences, for the publication 2–3

auditors 6, 41–46, 62–65, 66–68, 104–105, 147–149

B

benefits (potential) of citizen oversight 6–12

to communities 12

to complainants 7–8

to elected and appointed officials 10–12

to subject officers and deputies 10, 115, 120

to police and sheriff’s departments 8–10

Berkeley 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21–26, 70–71, 80, 82,

84, 84–85, 85, 87, 90, 94–96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103,

105, 112, 116, 136

board members 21–25, 46–51, 51–55, 65–68, 84–88, 101,

104–105, 112–114, 125

Boise 6, 118

budgets (see funding)

C

case studies (see also cases, vignettes of) 17–68

cases, vignettes of 23, 24, 29, 35, 38, 78, 79

Citizen Review of Police 

features 4–5, 18, 19

organization of publication 2, 17

purposes 3–4

sources of information used in preparation of

report 4–5

terminology used in report 5, 143–144

commissioners (see board members)

community policing 9–10

complainants—eligibility 98–99

consumer satisfaction surveys 125–127

costs (see funding)

crowd control 71, 82 

conflicts 107–121

among local government officials 104–105

between oversight and police and sheriff’s

departments 3–4, 101, 105, 109–117

between oversight and activists 3–4, 109

D

delays in case processing 98, 101–102, 113–114

directors 90

discipline of officers 13, 24, 28, 34, 48, 54, 55, 59, 60, 64,

80, 111, 143

E

early warning systems 35, 60, 80–82

effectiveness of citizen oversight (see also evaluation)

12–16, 123

evaluation 127–128, 130

F

federations (see unions)

filing locations 96–97

Flint 10, 26–30, 71, 100, 104, 111, 124, 134

funding

average cost per complaint 131–132, 136

budgets 18, 25, 30, 36, 40, 45, 50, 54–55, 60–61, 65,

128–129, 131–135

determining funding needs 84–85, 134, 136,

163–164

Citizen review programs are listed by jurisdiction, not by official title (e.g.,“Rochester,” not “Civilian Review Board.”

Index

Citizen review programs are listed by jurisdiction, not by official title (e.g.,“Rochester,” not “Civilian Review Board.”)
G

Garrity decision 100, 143

goals of citizen oversight 109, 127–128

H

hearings, vignettes of 23, 24, 35, 38

help with setting up citizen oversight 137–141

experts 26, 30, 36–37, 40, 46, 51, 55, 61, 68,

140–141

organizations 137

program materials 137–139

publications and reports 139–140

I

internal affairs 3, 10, 13, 43, 44, 58–59, 71, 97, 109–111,

120, 129, 143, 145–146, 147–149

International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law

Enforcement 87–88, 88, 98, 119, 137, 141

investigators, citizen 88–90, 112–114, 124–125

intake 124

K

Kansas City 89

L

legal basis for citizen oversight 98

limitations to citizen oversight 12–15

Los Angeles County 11

M

media involvement 28, 30, 45–46, 96

mediation 20, 35, 49, 60, 64, 72, 74–80, 105

Minneapolis 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 30–37, 72, 74–76, 78–79,

80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102,

105, 112, 113, 116–117, 117, 119, 125–127, 135

models of citizen oversight 6, 17–18, 134

monitoring 124–127

N

National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law

Enforcement 137, 141

New York City 12–13, 77, 125

O

objectives of citizen oversight (see goals of citizen 

oversight)

Omaha 86, 120

ombudsman (see Boise, Flint)

openness of procedures 19, 20, 103–104

Orange County 10, 20, 37–40, 70, 71–72, 81, 85, 86,

86–87, 87, 88, 90, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 111, 114,

115, 117

outreach 94–97, 151–154

P

panelists (see board members)

planning checklist xiii

policy and procedure recommendations 10, 18, 20, 25, 39,

43, 45, 49, 60, 66, 69–72

politics 30, 36, 104–105

Portland 10, 17, 41–46, 71, 72, 73, 80, 81, 90, 98, 100,

102, 104–105, 105, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 138,

147–149

public forums 12, 24–25, 26, 34–35, 65–66

R

resources (see help with setting up citizen oversight)

retaliation for filing a complaint 95

ride-alongs 88

Rochester 9, 20, 46–51, 71, 74, 77–78, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86,

87, 88, 101, 102, 103, 105, 112, 117, 119, 124, 125, 129,

145–146

166

I NDEX

Citizen review programs are listed by jurisdiction, not by official title (e.g.,“Rochester,” not “Civilian Review Board.” Citizen review programs are listed by jurisdiction, not by official title (e.g.,“Rochester,” not “Civilian Review Board.”)
167

A DDRESSING C ORRECTIONAL O FFICER S TRESS

S

St. Paul 10, 11, 17, 20, 51–55, 72, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 99,

101, 111, 119

San Diego 101

San Francisco 9, 14–15, 17, 20, 55–62, 70, 77, 80, 82, 83,

89, 90, 94, 96–97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 112, 114, 115, 116,

119, 120, 121, 124, 135, 151–154, 155, 161

San Jose 67, 104

staffing (see also board members; directors; investigators,

citizen) 18, 20, 83–91

subpoena power 19, 39, 99–101, 111, 118–119

T

terminology, used in the report 5, 143–144

tradeoffs in choosing models 6–7, 20

Tucson 17, 20, 62–68, 70, 80, 84, 87, 96, 97, 98, 113,

114, 115, 116, 120, 127, 136, 138, 163–164

U

unions 33, 34, 54, 58, 59, 60, 64, 86, 101, 117–120, 141

use of force 9, 16, 70, 71–72, 82, 112

Citizen review programs are listed by jurisdiction, not by official title (e.g.,“Rochester,” not “Civilian Review Board.” Citizen review programs are listed by jurisdiction, not by official title (e.g.,“Rochester,” not “Civilian Review Board.”)