### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 78 -C R

______________________________ MEL VI N THOMAS WAL TON, Appe llant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 124th J udicial District Court

Gre g gCounty , Texas Trial Court No. 27295-B

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Me mor and

um O pin ion

by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr iss2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Indicted appr ox imately

eig ht y ear s ag o for forg ery reg arding a check written in the amount of $28.15, and having ha d his bond forfe ited three differ ent times for fa ilure to appe ar in c ourt over tho se int e rv e nin g y e ars , M e lvi n T ho ma s Wa lto n f a c e s tw o ye ars ' c on fi ne me nt i n a state -j a il f

a c ili ty and a f ine of $10,000.00. He now c omplains that he was denied due proce ss beca use t he trial court refused to consider the full rang e of punishment. The Constituti onal mandate of due proce ss r equire s a neutra l and detac hed judicial off icer who will consider the full rang e of punishment and mitigatingevidenc e. Se e Ga gn on v . S c ar pe lli , 411 U.S. 778, 786–87 (1973). A trial court de nies due proc ess when it ar bitrarily ref uses to consider the entire rang e of punishment for an offe nse or ref uses to consider mitig atingevidenc e and imposes a pre deter mined punishment. Mc Cl ena n v. Sta te , 661 S.W .2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), overruled on othe r grounds by DeLeon v . Aguilar , 12 7 S.W. 3d 1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). Th is
occur s when a

trial court a ctually

assesses punishment at r evocation consistent with the punishment it has previously

announce d it would assess on revoc ation. Sa nc he z v . S tate , 989 S.W .2d 409, 411 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). I n t h e absence of a clea r showingto the contra

ry , we presume that the trial court wa s neutral a nd detac hed. Fi e ldi ng

v . S tate , 7 1 9 S. W. 2 d

3 6 1 , 3 6 6 ( T e x. Ap p . —Da l l as 1 9 8 6 , p et
. re f'd ) ( ci t i n g T h o m p s o n v . Stat e , 6 4 1 S.W .2d 920, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).3

Walton contends his due-proc ess rig hts were violated bec ause the trial court did not c onsider the fa cts and c ircumstance s surroundingthe offe nse and be cause the trial cour t demonstrated a commitment to a prede termined outcome when Walton failed to a ppear in court as or dere d. Even thoug h Walton did not object in the trial c ourt, we need not de cide whe ther a n objection below wa s require d to prese rve error beca use the re cord doe s not show that the trial court imposed a " prede termined" punishment. Se e Brum it v . S tate , 206 S.W .3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The time line of this ca se is set out below: 9/3/98 Date of

offe nse (f

org ery in the amount of $28.15) 12/1/99 Bond 2/10/00 Indictment 3/10/00 Fa iled to appea r; bond forf

eited 12/6/02 Fa iled to appea r; bond forf

eited 8/8/07 Arre sted on 12/6/02 bond forfe iture; bond forf eiture se t aside 9/6 /07 Ente re d o pe n p le a of g uil ty 9/27/07 Fa iled to show for se ntencinghear ing; bond f orfe ited; sentence d in a bs e nti a 10/29/07 Arre sted on 9/27 forfe iture; sentenc e imposed The trial court hear d Walton's guilty plea Septembe r 6, 2007. Walton testified that he had been on dr

ug s, but had bee n "c lean" for seven y ear s. He also testified that he had c ommitt ed other of fe ns e s a ro un d 2 00 0 o r 200 1 whe n he wa s still on dr ug s and that th e re wa s a

c a se pe nd ingin S mith County . Walton requested that the court place him on c ommunity supervision, stating that he had "stra ighte ned [his] life out" and that he w as em p l o y ed as a car salesman. The trial court a sked Walton, " What's differ ent today than back when y ou had those other probations? " W al t on respon d ed , "Y o u r Ho nor, I ' m older and I ' m wiser, and I ' m not on drug s at all." The c ourt thenThe trial c ourt did not conduct a he aringon Wal t o n 's m otion for new tr ial, which wa s 1 overr uled by operation of law. 4 expressed conc ern that it did not have enough information re g ardingthe cha rg e in Smith C ounty

and
rec essed the he aringuntil S eptember 27 in order to obtain c omplete information befor e pronounc ing sentenc e. When the case was called S eptember 27, Walton failed to appea r and his bond wa s forfe ited. On that date, the trial court se ntence d Walton to two y ear s' confine ment and a fine of $10,000.00. Walton was later take n into custody , and that sente nce was formally imposed in W alton' s prese nce Oc tob e r 2 9, 20 07 . It is the Oc tob e r 2 9 ju dg me nt f ro m w hic h Wa lto n a

pp e a ls. The trial c ourt hea

rd evide nce, disc ussed communi ty supervision, rec essed the tr ial and re set the fi na l po rt ion

of the se nte nc inghe ari ng un til the c ourt ha d a ll the inf

or matio n it ne e de d to
s en t en ce W al t o n . W e c o n cl u d e t h atth e r ec o rdd o es n o ts h o w t h atth e co urtp re d et erm i n edW al t o n 's
se nte nc e in t

his c a se . Th e re fo re , Walt on ' s due -p ro c e ss ri g hts we re no t vi olate d, and we ov e rr ule thi s point of err or. Walton nex t contends the sente nce w as disproportionate to the offe nse. Walton's motion for new tria l contains a contention that the sentenc e was disproportionate to the offe nse. A motion for
new trial is a

n appropr iate way to pr eser ve this ty pe of claim for revie w. See W ill iam so n v . S

tate , 1 175 S.W .3d 522, 523–24 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.); De lac ru z v . S tate , 167 S.W .3d 904 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2005, no pet.).5

Texas courts have traditionally held that, as longas the punishment assesse dis within t he rang e pre scribed by

the L eg islature in a va lid statute, the punishment is n o t ex ce s s i ve, cr uel, or unusual. See , e.g. , J

or da n v . S tate , 4 9 5 S
. W
. 2 d

9 4 9 , 9 5 2 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 7 3 ). He re , W al t o n 's
se nte nc e fa lls wi thi n th e a pp lic a ble ra ng e of 18 0 d ay s t o two ye ars ' c on fi ne me nt a nd a fi ne no t to exceed $10,000.00. SeeT EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.35 (Ve rnon Supp. 2007). That does not end the inquiry . A prohibition ag ai n s t gro s s ly disproportionate punishment survives under

the Eig hth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion apar t f r o m a ny c o n s id e r a tion of wh e the r t he punis hme nt a sse sse d is wi thi n the ra ng e e sta bli sh e d by the L e g isl atur e . U .S. C O N ST . am e n d
. V I I I ; see So le m v . H e lm , 4 63 U. S. 2 77 , 2 90 (1 98 3) ; Harmelin v. M ichigan , 501 U.S. 957 (1 99 1) (S c a lia , J., plu

ra lity op .) ; J ac k so n v . S tate , 989 S.W .2d 842, 8 4 6 (T ex . App.—Texarkana 19 99 , n o p e t.) ; Lac k

e yv . S tate , 8 81 S.W. 2d 41 8, 42 0– 21 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 4, pe t. r e f' d) ; see also Ex parte Chavez , 213 S.W .3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (desc rib i n g t h i s p rinciple a s involving a " very

limit ed, ' exceeding ly

rar e,' and somewhat amorphous" revie w). Solem had sug g ested, as a three -par t te st, that a

n appellate court consider: (1) the gravity of the offe nse compa

red with the harshness of t he penalty ; (2) the se ntence s imposed for similar cr imes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the s entenc es i mposed for commissi on of the same crime in other jurisdictions. See Solem , 463 U.S. at 292. Ha rm e lin at least raised questions a bout the viability

of the Solem three -par

t test. I n fac t, it was subsequently held t hat proportionality survived Ha rm e lin , but that the Solem three -par t te s t d i d not. Se e Mc Grud e r v . P uc k

e tt , 954 F.2d 313, 316 ( 5th Cir.6

19 92 ); Lackey , 881 S.W .2d at 420–21. In light of Ha rm e lin , the test has b ee n re fo rm ulated as a n initial threshold comparison of the g ravity of the off ense w ith the severity

of the sente nce; a

nd then,
on ly if that ini tia l c omp ari so n c re ate d a n in fe re nc e that th e se nte nc e wa s g ro ssl y dis pr op or

tio nate to the offe nse should there be a c onsideration of the other two Solem fac tors—sentenc es for simil ar crimes in the same jurisdiction a nd sentenc es for

the same c rime in other jurisdictions. McG ruder , 95 4 F .2 d at 31 6; Mu lli ns v . S tate , 208 S.W .3d 469, 470 (Tex. A pp.—Texarka n a 2 0 0 6 , n o pet.); Lackey , 881 S.W .2d at 420–21. As sumin g , w ith out de c idi ng , th at Wa lto n' s se nte nc e is gro ssl y dis pr op or

tio nate to t

he c ri me he committed, there is no evidence in the rec ord from which we could compar e his se ntence to the sentenc es imposed on other persons in Texas or on persons in other jurisdi ctions who committed a simil ar of fense
. Se e Lat

ha m v . S tate , 20 S.W .3d 63, 69 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2 0 0 0 , pet. re f' d); Da v is v . S

tate , 905 S.W .2d 655, 664–65 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. re f'd)
. Wit hout such evidenc e, the rec ord befor e us does not support Walton's c laim of demonstrable err or. Cf. Jackson , 989 S.W .2d at 846 (" ther e is no evidence in the rec ord re flec ting se ntence s imposed for similar offe nses on cr iminals in Tex as or other jurisdictions by

which to make a

compar ison").7

We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ' s ju dg me nt.

J o s hR
. M o r r i s s , III Chief J ustice Date Submitted: April 29, 2008 Date D ecide d: May 14, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh