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i 

94–225 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–23] 

NAVAL COOPERATIVE STRATEGY 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 

TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

[Serial No. 114–10] 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 18, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

CRESENT HARDY, Nevada 

RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

JANICE HAHN, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon (Ex Officio) 

JOHN CLARK RAYFIELD, Professional Staff Member 

DAVE JANSEN, Professional Staff Member 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Donegan, RADM Kevin M. ‘‘Kid,’’ USN, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) ......................................... 4 

Michel, VADM Charles D., USCG, Deputy Commandant for Operations .......... 2 

O’Donnell, MajGen Andrew W., Jr., USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant, 

Combat Development and Integration, Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command ...................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ............................ 36 

Donegan, RADM Kevin M. ‘‘Kid,’’ joint with MajGen Andrew W. O’Donnell, Jr. ........................................................................................................... 43 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 35 

Michel, VADM Charles D. ............................................................................... 38 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, 

Ready ............................................................................................................. 59 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Cook ............................................................................................................ 103 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 103 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

NAVAL COOPERATIVE STRATEGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2015. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:48 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Welcome this afternoon to the joint Seapower and 

Projection Forces and Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 

hearing on naval cooperative strategy. 

We thank our witnesses for being here. 

Normally, we would have opening statements by the chairmen 

and ranking members of both subcommittees, but today all of the 

chairmen and ranking members have agreed to waive their opening 

remarks. They will be placed in the record. Mr. Courtney, that is 

my understanding. And, Mr. Hunter, it is as well. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 35.] 

Mr. FORBES. So we are delighted today to have three very distinguished witnesses to appear before our joint hearing. 

We have Vice Admiral Charles Michel, U.S. Coast Guard, the 

Deputy Commandant for Operations; Major General Andrew 

O’Donnell, U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Deputy Commandant, 

Combat Development and Integration, Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and Rear Admiral Kevin Donegan, U.S. Navy, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy. 

General, we want to thank you for your work on this strategy. 

You have done a great job. We look forward to hearing your comments. We will put your full testimony in the record. But we would 

love to have you take 5 minutes or so to summarize it in any way 

that you would like to do so. And so I don’t know which of you 

would like to start off, but we are going to turn the floor over. 

Admiral, we are going to recognize you now and look forward to 

your comments. 
2 

† Some unnumbered photographic pages at the beginning and end of the report were not reproduced. 

STATEMENT OF VADM CHARLES D. MICHEL, USCG, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS 

Admiral MICHEL. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Forbes, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the committees, good afternoon 

and thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Coast 

Guard’s role in the ‘‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready.’’ 

With the committee’s permission, I also propose to enter the 

strategy document itself into the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] † 

Admiral MICHEL. The Coast Guard stands ready alongside the 

Navy and Marine Corps, reaffirming our unified commitment to 

confront national security threats from and on the sea. 

The Coast Guard is a member of the Nation’s five armed services 

and a global maritime force that complements the other sea services’ roles in fulfilling the Nation’s broad maritime goals. The Coast 

Guard leverages unique authorities, capabilities, and partnerships 

essential to national and homeland security. 

The Coast Guard is at all times an armed service under title 10 

and simultaneously has broad law enforcement authorities under 

title 14. The Coast Guard provides its greatest contributions to the 

collective strategy in the critical areas of maritime security operations, all-domain access, and maintaining flexible, agile, and 

ready forces. 

Maritime security operations protect sovereignty and maritime 

resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, and deter and 

counter threats that seek to exploit maritime domain, including 

weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, sanctions avoidance, and unlawful seaborne migration. 

As the Navy and Marine Corps rebalance efforts to address national imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region, Coast Guard operations projected forward in the Western Hemisphere transit zone 

increase in importance. 

The Coast Guard’s offshore patrol cutter, or OPC, acquisition is 

the key service recapitalization to maintain our forward-deployed, 

complementary, non-redundant capability in combating transnational criminal networks, the greatest threat to national security in 

this hemisphere. These assets can’t arrive too soon. 

Our medium-endurance cutters currently on scene, which annually interdict more than three times the amount of cocaine seized 

domestically and at every air, land, and sea border of the United 

States, will be 55 years old, on average, when the first OPC deploys to the Western Hemisphere transit zone. 

The Coast Guard also plays a unique role in achieving all-domain 

access. The Coast Guard’s ability to operate in polar regions ensures the Nation’s maritime security interests are met in the increasingly strategic Arctic Ocean as well as in Antarctica. Through 

its unique authorities in international partnerships, the Coast 

Guard has an active maritime security presence in 29 countries 
3 

and has 60 bilateral agreements with foreign governments that enhance maritime governance, rule of law, and global leadership. 

In the cyber domain, Coast Guard authorities and responsibilities span the dot-mil, dot-gov, and dot-com domains. To accomplish 

the collective goals of this strategy, it is imperative for our forces 

to remain flexible, agile, and ready. 

Critical to remaining forward, on call, and ready 24 [hours] by 

7 [days] to engage in a strategic and complementary manner are 

investments in the OPC acquisition, improved aviation capabilities, 

integrated command and control systems, and a proficient workforce. 

In conclusion, the Coast Guard is fully committed to the strategic 

priorities of the strategy and remains a forward, engaged, and 

ready member of our sea services across the globe and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for 

all you do for the men and women of the Nation’s Armed Forces 

and specifically the sea services. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Michel can be found in the 

Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Michel, thank you so much for your testimony, for being here with us today. 

General, we now recognize you. 

STATEMENT OF MAJGEN ANDREW W. O’DONNELL, JR., USMC, 

ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, 

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 

General O’DONNELL. Thank you. 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi and distinguished members—— 

Mr. FORBES. General, you might want to pull that mic [microphone] just a little closer. Sometimes it is difficult picking up. 

General O’DONNELL. Thanks. 

The Marine Corps’ ability to serve as the Nation’s premier crisis 

response force is due, in large part, to this subcommittee’s continued strong support. And on behalf of all marines, I thank you. 

Admiral Michel highlighted some key points from the ‘‘Cooperative Strategy of the 21st Century Seapower.’’ And I would like to 

briefly highlight the role of your Marine Corps as an element of 

U.S. power. 

When it comes to being where it matters when it matters, the 

Marine Corps is committed to keeping our force forward-deployed 

and forward-engaged. This means that today there are around 

30,000 marines deployed in over 40 countries. These forces are currently conducting strikes in Syria and Iraq, training the Iraqi 

Army, and protecting our Embassy in Baghdad. They also include 

22,500 marines in the Pacific, all of which are west of the International Date Line. 

These forces are conducting exercises and training with their Pacific partners and are staged to rapidly respond to any crisis or contingency in the region. As Admiral Donegan will mention, this 
4 

strategy recognizes that we will continue to invest in strengthening 

alliances and, also, partnerships. 

Marines deployed onboard amphibious ships and those forces forward of station routinely conduct theater security cooperation exercises to ensure interoperability and enhance our partners’ capabilities. There is no substitute for the mission. And as this committee 

has heard before, virtual presence is actual absence. 

This strategy paints a path forward in operating in an increasingly complex environment. It complements and amplifies the characteristics required of the Marine Corps and our capstone concept, 

Expeditionary Force 21. In doing so, it highlights the importance 

of naval forces in gaining and maintaining overseas access in peace 

or war. 

Your Navy and Marine Corps team provides the United States 

the ability to project sustainable combat power overseas without 

the need to ask for assistance or permission from anyone. This capability is essential to protecting our citizens, advancing our national interest, and promoting global stability. 

Today’s security environments, as well as the challenges of constrained and uncertain budgets, require creative responses to fulfill 

our global commitments. Our forward-stationed and -deployed marines remain our Nation’s 911 force and readiness, and this strategy will ensure that they remain poised to do so in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. And I look forward to answering your question. 

[The joint prepared statement of General O’Donnell and Admiral 

Donegan can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Admiral Donegan. 

STATEMENT OF RADM KEVIN M. ‘‘KID’’ DONEGAN, USN, ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND STRATEGY (N3/N5) 

Admiral DONEGAN. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today with my shipmates from the Marine Corps and Coast 

Guard to discuss this sea services ‘‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st 

Century Seapower.’’ 

With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to keep my 

remarks brief, but have submitted a separate statement for the Department of the Navy that—— 

Mr. FORBES. All of the remarks will be so ordered. It will be put 

in the record. Thank you. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Thank you. 

Now I will offer a brief overview of the strategy and then touch 

on some of the—just a few of the highlights. First, the ‘‘Cooperative 

Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,’’ 

explains how we will build and employ the naval forces in support 

of national security interests. It describes a force built and ready 

for any challenge, from high-end warfight to humanitarian operations. 

Now, the strategy was revised mainly due to changes in the geopolitical landscape since 2007, including threats from violent ex-
5 

tremist organizations, like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, evolving threats from North Korea and Iran, potential opportunities and challenges with a rising China, and recent Russian aggression in the Ukraine. 

Additionally, we face new and evolving challenges that threaten 

our access in cyberspace and the global commons. We have also 

sought to align our maritime strategy to new national strategic 

guidance and are very aware of the impact of changes in the current fiscal environment. 

Most importantly, this strategy describes a seapower that is critical for our Nation and our global economy. The strategy is underpinned by naval services with combat-credible forward presence 

that will be where it matters, when it matters, and our continued 

commitment to our allies and partners. 

We will also continue to meet the historic naval functions of deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. But 

our strategy has adapted, starting with an emphasis on warfighting first. In addition, we describe a new function, all-domain access, that focuses on maintaining the access we need to be where 

it matters, when it matters. 

The strategy balances the disposition of our forces and capabilities against regional threats. It also embraces innovation and efficiency in building a modern and capable force of more than 300 

ships that will overcome any challenge to our ability to fight and 

win. 

Several key takeaways from the strategy include warfighting 

first. Defending our Nation and winning its wars is a core task of 

the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. Due to varied threats we 

face as a nation, the sea services—U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Coast Guard—together with other services, must have the capabilities and capacity to defeat any adversary and defend the homeland 

while honoring our alliances worldwide. 

‘‘Where it matters when it matters’’ means that, operating forward, we will provide the President options to defend our interests, 

deter and deescalate hostilities, respond to crises, and keep conflict 

far from our shores. The naval services also protect the strength of 

our U.S. economy by globally deploying that combat-credible power 

to ensure the unimpeded flow of commerce. 

We recognize one of our advantages as a nation and a Navy has 

been our extensive network of alliances, partnerships, and coalitions. By leveraging the robust capabilities of naval forces worldwide, we are better postured to collectively face new and emerging 

challenges in the 21st century. 

Accordingly, we are going to look for new ways to enhance 

relationships and form partnerships with traditional and nontraditional maritime partners who share a stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas. 

Our new essential function, all-domain access, will ensure that 

we organize, train, and equip to overcome threats and assure access and freedom of action in any domain to enable us to fight and 

win, should a war be inescapable. 

Our strategy also continues the efforts to rebalance forces to the 

Asia-Pacific. Evolving challenges in the region, including the recent 

activities of China’s navy and the proliferation of anti-access/area- 
6 

denial technologies, require that we maintain a leading role in that 

region. 

Our force design construct ensures our capability and capacity to 

support global presence requirements. In building the future force, 

we are going to balance investments in a flexible, agile force while 

appropriately developing our people as well as the operational concepts and capabilities to remain capable and combat-ready. 

Finally, I will note that the new strategy is not the end of our 

work. It is part of a larger effort throughout the Navy to energize 

our existing culture of strategic thinking that has led to innovation 

and an increase in operational excellence. This has already been instrumental in aligning our budget requirements and operational 

concepts. The strategic continuum will also align our strategic documents. It will oversee iterative wargaming, new concept development, and further increase those strategic linkages to the budget. 

In closing, our foremost priority remains the security and prosperity of our Nation, the American people, and our way of life. The 

strategy ensures that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard 

remain forward, engaged, and ready to continue protecting American citizens and advancing U.S. interests as we have done for 

more than two centuries. 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Donegan and General 

O’Donnell can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you. 

And since we have a joint hearing today and a lot of members 

who want to ask questions, I am going to defer my questions to the 

vice chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee 

and the chairman of the T&I [Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee] Coast Guard Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, 

Mr. Hunter from California. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess my first question—or first comment is I am on the Armed 

Services Committee, too. We don’t see the Coast Guard in here 

very often. I mean, it is kind of a strange thing that you are not 

in here more often. But it is good that you are at the same time. 

I guess the first question I have is about the Arctic. Let’s talk 

about the Arctic. There is no plans to get an icebreaker. Unless the 

Navy buys in and unless there is a whole-of-government approach, 

we are probably not going to have an icebreaker. We are not going 

to buy one. We are going to have to lease one. 

But, at the very least, I would like to know what the Navy buyin is and if the Navy really—do we care about the Arctic? And, if 

we don’t, that is fine. If we do, what are we doing about it? 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, clearly you directed that at the Navy. 

This strategy clearly talks about the Arctic. It talks about it in 

a couple ways. We address it in relation to climate change and—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, let me be more specific. 

You need an icebreaker to get up there and break ice to be able 

to operate there. So I don’t care about the climate change stuff at 

all, frankly. I am curious about the actual icebreaker and acquiring 

a ship that can break ice to get the Navy and the Marine Corps 

and whoever else up there or having to save somebody if you had 

to. 
7 

Admiral DONEGAN. Yes, sir. As you know, the different missions 

and focuses are given to different services and different organizations. 

The U.S. Coast Guard was given the responsibility for the national icebreaking mission. So we are working closely with the 

Coast Guard as we identify the operating requirements and capabilities needed for future icebreakers. 

We absolutely agree in the future that we are going to need to 

be up there more than we are today. From the Navy side, we are 

increasing the exercises we do up there and our research so we understand that domain. But we do agree that in the future we are 

going to need to be up there more often. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. The Coast Guard’s budget is minuscule compared to yours. The Coast Guard’s budget also got cut by the President by 26 percent, just their acquisition budget. 

So they are not going to be able to make the ships that they need 

going back about 10 years, let alone a $400 million icebreaker— 

$400 million to a billion-dollar icebreaker. It is going to take Navy 

money. It is going to take something like that. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, as you know, the Navy has its own challenges in the shipbuilding account. And adding an icebreaker, not 

being something that was tasked to the Navy to do, would only 

pressurize our accounts further. But I fully understand your point 

of view, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. So you all recognize the mission. You write about 

the Arctic, but really don’t have any way to get up there and do 

anything there. We just say it is important. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, for us, as we talk about it in the strategy, we talk about when we need to be up there and for what missions that we have. 

And for the portion that I will mention—was going to mention 

a little bit earlier was our Arctic road map lays out for us how we 

are going to do that and when in the future we believe we have 

to be there more than we do today. 

And you are right, sir. As a country, we have to figure out and 

make sure that we have that access as those areas open up for us 

to move about and commerce starts to travel the routes that we 

know are opening now—beginning to open now. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney is recognized. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And like Chairman Hunter, it is a pleasure to see the Coast 

Guard here in the room today. 

Last time Mr. Wittman and I were over in Brunei, we were touring the 5th Fleet, ships that were tied up there, and all of a sudden 

we saw two white hulls there and actually had a great visit onboard the ship. The captain, of course, was trained at the Coast 

Guard Academy in New London. 

But, frankly, it was nothing but high praise from the Navy partners in terms of the work that the Coast Guard was doing in that 

mission. And, obviously, this report really is just a confirmation of 

what is really happening. This isn’t just sort of talk that we are 

hearing about today. 
8 

I just really have one question, which is about the sealift and logistics force piece of the puzzle that you guys are working on here. 

I think you will agree that this is a vital piece of our ability to execute the national military strategy regardless of area of responsibility. 

Given the age of the Ready Reserve Fleet and its need for recapitalization, coupled with the fragility of the Maritime Security Program, what measures are being taken to ensure that we will have 

a viable and stable sealift and logistics fleet in order to execute this 

new maritime strategy? 

And anyone who wants to take that question, the floor is yours. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Well, sir, I think I will take it first and then 

see if there’s others. 

I think you will see in the strategy that strategic sealift is a key 

element of the sea services’ ability to sustain forward operations. 

In particular, in the strategy, what we talk about is it is expected 

that the naval services can establish a sea base. 

And from that sea base, we need to be able to do what it is that 

we need to do, whether that be project power, whether it be to 

launch the marines ashore on an amphibious operation or to just 

have the presence that we need to have in the area. 

Critical to that is being able to sustain that sea base. And that 

comes through a combination, as you know, of the combat logistics 

force and, also, a Maritime Security Program [MSP] and the other 

methods we use to support that force. Aerial refueling, for example, 

is another method. So we absolutely agree that it is a requirement. 

What we are working on now is defining—we understand the 

MSP program, for instance, is under pressure, especially as we 

move forward to the future. We understand that combat logistics 

forces that we have right now, we have to look at them closely. We 

have just completed a study on the combat logistics force piece of 

the question that told us that we have enough of the combat logistics force to sustain our operations in peacetime. 

And what we are going to do in the coming months is continue 

that work through our iterative wargaming process where we look 

at the sealift—military sealift security program and the combat logistics forces and ensure that, for each of the war plans that we 

have and the other future operations, that we have a method to be 

able to continue to sustain that sea base. 

It is absolutely essential that we do that, and we need to continue to make sure we have that in the future as some of these programs come under pressure. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Garamendi, I know you were detained and got 

here just a few minutes after we started. But we also have recognized—we put all of our opening remarks in the record. And yours 

will be placed in the record. 

And Mr. Garamendi is the ranking member of the subcommittee. 

So we now recognize you for any questions that you may have. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes. 

My colleague, the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Hunter, 

raised the question of the Arctic and the lack of an icebreaker. This 

is really a question that goes to Admiral Michel, but, really, to inform my colleagues on the naval side of this committee that we are 

not going to be able to put together a new icebreaker without, as 
9 

Mr. Hunter said, an all-of-government strategy, one that we are 

going to have to take money from several different places in order 

to make this happen. 

The National Science Foundation is interested. The Navy is, as 

Mr. Hunter pointed out very carefully, and certainly the Coast 

Guard. So we are going to have to figure out some way to do that. 

My question really goes a little beyond the very important point 

that Mr. Hunter raised, and it goes to the existing Polar Star. You 

have authority, Admiral Michel, to take the ship out of the water, 

check it out. 

What is the status of that process? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, there is a couple different Polar-class icebreakers. The Polar Star is actually operational right now. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The other one. 

Admiral MICHEL. Yeah. I know they get confusing. 

I just had the pleasure of presenting a master cutterman certificate to the captain of the Polar Star at McMurdo Station down in 

Antarctica here just about 6 weeks ago. 

So the Polar Star is active. It is actually on its way to regular 

maintenance, dry dock. The Polar Sea, on the other hand, has been 

inactive for a number of years. It had a major machinery casualty. 

There is money in the President’s budget that continues the preservation work on there and begins the survey process of determining how much it would take in order to reactivate that ship. 

Understand both these ships, the Polar-class, were built in the 

mid-1970s. Some of the technology—actually, most of the technology on there has been—only exists in museums anymore. So 

this is kind of a challenge. Plus, Polar Sea, in part, was cannibalized so that we could get Polar Star underway. So it is in a different condition than Polar Star is. 

So we are getting—we have got a process here to try to get our 

arms around that and start looking at what resources it would take 

in order to activate a ship like that. And that is where we stand 

with the Polar-class reactivation. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. My question had a—four letters—‘‘when’’ question. 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, the preservation work is going on right 

now. We anticipate it is 15 to 18 months for us to get a good survey 

of the ship. It is going to have to be pulled out of the water. Again, 

we are going to have to do a serious survey on some very old machinery that you can’t even really purchase anymore. 

So 15 to 18 months is our estimate so that we can get sort of 

a good cost on what that would take and a good timeline for how 

long it would take to get that reactivated. And, again, we would be 

looking for about—a 7- to 10-year reactivation timespan is what we 

would be shooting for. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How about a new icebreaker? When will you finalize the requirements for that? 

Admiral MICHEL. So a new icebreaker we hit—we are in the 

early stages of an acquisition of that icebreaker. And we have been 

doing some of the work on that. The problem, sir, is that we have 

not built a heavy Polar-class icebreaker in this country for over 40 

years. 
10 

The Polar-class was the last that were done. These are exceedingly complicated ships just because they exist in one of the most 

challenging environments on the Earth. And they are basically designed to collide with blocks of solid ice. So this requires special 

steels, construction techniques, and things like that. 

You are looking at many years in order to be able to scope out 

a project like this, determine who could actually in this country 

build a vessel of this class. The only operators of heavy Polar-class 

icebreakers are us and the Russians. That is it. So there is very 

limited expertise in this area. It is going to be expensive, particularly if we have to build one. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We know that we buy our rocket engines from 

Russia. Maybe we can buy a ship from Russia, since you seem not 

to be too anxious to get about the task. 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, it would obviously require legislative action in order to purchase a ship from Russia. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We understand that. 

But what my question really goes to is that you seem to be hemming and hawing and putting off some day into the future what 

our subcommittee thinks to be a very, very important activity. 

Mainly, we need an icebreaker. The Navy needs an icebreaker. 

This country needs an icebreaker. And the United States is now 

the chair of the Polar Committee. And all I am hearing from you 

is, ‘‘We are going to get about it someday.’’ 

Fifteen to eighteen months to figure out whether the present 

ship can even float and then who knows how long before the requirements are in place is not satisfactory. 

Admiral MICHEL. I understand the dire situation, sir. I was there 

looking at that only pathway in and out of Antarctica that our ship 

is the only one that can break. 

But here is where we are with acquisitions. As dire as we are 

on the Polar icebreaker—and I, as a sailor, understand that. It 

keeps me up at night—the OPC is even more dire. And that is a 

much larger class of ships that—even on the trajectory that we are 

talking about, 55 years old is the average age of those ships that 

will be coming offline. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We understand that. Admiral, you seem not to 

understand where I am driving you. 

Your committee knows that it needs—that this country needs one 

more heavy icebreaker. We can’t get by with just one. We need another one. The Navy and the Polar—all of those issues are before 

us. 

And what I am hearing from you is the inability for the Coast 

Guard to get us the specific information that we need to be able 

to make a decision about where to go with this issue. 

You are saying 18 months before we know whether we can rebuild the existing, and you seem not to—I don’t know—5 to 7 years 

or maybe longer before you are willing to give us the requirements 

for a new one. 

We want to make a decision. We cannot make that decision without the information that you need to develop for us sooner than 

later. I hope I am clear here. 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. And I will provide you with the information as soon as I can get it. This is a complex effort. 
11 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think I had best stop because I am about to 

climb up and down your back. That answer is not a satisfactory answer, as soon as you can get it. I am looking at a timeframe here 

where we have been prepared for more than a year and a half now 

to make a decision. We need your information in this timeframe. 

I understand we are not going to get it this year. But if you come 

to us next year with the same attitude and the same delay and obfuscation, I guarantee you that at least the ranking member of this 

committee is not going to be happy. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. FORBES. We thank the gentleman. 

And we will go to Chairman Wittman. 

We do point out—I think our witnesses would love to build some 

more ships if we can give them some money to do it with. I know 

Admiral Donegan from his Navy account is looking at the Ohio- class replacement that is going to be $60 billion and scratching his 

head as to where we are going to get that. 

I know I was just looking at our combatant commander requirements for BMD [ballistic missile defense] capability. They go up 

from this year at 44 ships to needing 77 in fiscal year 2016. And, 

yet, we were getting ready to put aside 11 carriers which had 5 of 

those BMD. 

And last year the Marine Corps had to fight to get its amphibious ship, which we wouldn’t have got if it hadn’t have been for Mr. 

Wittman’s hard work on his subcommittee. 

So we want to continue to work with you guys. And I think Mr. 

Garamendi and Mr. Hunter are saying, if you can help get the information—we realize you can’t build it without dollars. So we do 

thank you for your help in that. 

Chairman Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service to our Nation. 

I do want to drill down a little bit into the ‘‘Cooperative 21st 

Seapower Strategy.’’ Some questions come up with that. 

Admiral Michel, you talked about flexibility and agility. I think 

that is critical. The question then becomes, though is: How do you 

operationalize it—and I want to get everybody’s perspective—how 

do you operationalize it between the Joint Chiefs and the COCOMs 

[combatant commands], especially with all the challenges they 

have? 

And, as you know, the strategy now says we are going to have 

all-domain access in addition to the other four tenets of seapower. 

The question is: How do you achieve that? How do you make 

sure, too, that within your C2, your command and control—how do 

you make sure that you integrate Coast Guard into that? 

We see integration of Coast Guard in certain mission sets, but 

not in every mission set. And with there being organizational differences or separation between the Coast Guard and the Navy and 

Marine Corps, much of this sounds great. But the question is: How 

do you operationalize that? 

And then adding to the complexity of saying, ‘‘Now we are going 

to have all-domain access,’’ which means in the electromagnetic 

spectrum, in cyberspace, air, sea, land—I mean, that is a pretty 

complex environment. How are we going to achieve that? They are 
12 

great assertions in the strategy. Give us your thoughts about 

operationalization. 

Admiral MICHEL. I will take it here from the Coast Guard perspective. First of all, any equipment we buy, we try to make sure 

it is interoperable with the other sea services. 

So we carry Navy-type, Navy-owned equipment on the majority 

of the vessels that we operate because we are required to operate 

as a specialized service of the Navy during time of war when the 

President directs. So we ensure interoperability through our equipment purchases. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me stop you right there because I think that 

is an interesting question I want to build on. 

As we are talking about shipbuilding and building lots of ships, 

we talk about building Navy ships, DDGs [destroyers], CGs [cruisers]. We talk about building medium-endurance cutters—the new 

class of medium-endurance cutters, the long-range cutters. 

It seems like, to me, there is a great opportunity there to say, 

‘‘Listen, why don’t we look at some common hull forms so, when 

we do acquisition, we are not acquiring Coast Guard ships here 

and Navy ships there.’’ We can say, ‘‘Listen, the national security 

cutter is real similar to the DDG’’? 

Give me your perspective on how we can gain economies there 

to where—if we are going to have this cooperative strategy, does 

cooperation get down to the operational perspective of getting ships 

on the water? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, it absolutely does. And we had a very robust discussion with the Navy as we were determining the requirements for the national security cutter, including looking at the LCS 

[littoral combat ship] and some of the other things that the Navy 

was doing. 

Now, the LCS didn’t end up being exactly what we needed for 

the Coast Guard. It is a little bit more ship than I think the Coast 

Guard needed for its mission set. But a very robust dialogue went 

on in there. 

On the other vessels, the FRCs [fast-response cutters] are probably a little bit small for most of what the Navy is doing, and the 

OPC is going to have its own requirements. 

But, again, we try to—Coast Guard tries to borrow and leverage 

from the Navy as much as we possibly can. So when they get a 

weapon system or communication system or any type of intelligence capability, we are all over it with the Navy. And they are 

completely open with us because it is to our mutual benefit to actually share those systems. So we have got a very robust dialogue, 

sir. 

General O’DONNELL. Sir, just a couple comments. Exactly what 

you are talking about. And you are well aware because you were 

the leader of all that when we got the LPD–17 hull form for what 

we are working on next. 

Probably the same thing that the admiral mentioned, too, with 

the Marine Corps. Our Naval Board [Navy and Marine Corps 

Naval Board] works very, very hard to make sure that we are 

aligned with other services and, as you know, with the Commandant’s Planning Guidance not only with the Coast Guard, but 
13 

with SOF [Special Operations Forces], and making sure that we 

are integrating with everybody. 

So that is the big thing about the C2 and then making sure that 

we all are using the same type of equipment and we are all on the 

same frequencies. 

The other comment that I would just make very quickly is that 

the things that the Marine Corps is doing, we had kind of a little 

bit of a heads-up. As you know, we rolled out EF–21 [Expeditionary 

Force 21] last year, about a year ago this time. Of course, the Commandant came out with his Planning Guidance about 2 months 

ago. So we have already kind of hit the ground running. And we 

are pretty well aligned already with the tenets that are in this 

strategy. 

So we feel pretty good. We have already had a couple exercises. 

The EW–15 [Expeditionary Warfare 2015] just went up and we 

came up with 232 gaps that we have to work on. But most of them 

are not—luckily, are not going to be equipment pieces, just a little 

bit how we are doing business. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, just the fact that we are here together 

gives you the indication—and this is the second time the three 

services have come together to build this strategy—should give you 

an indication that we get it in terms of what you said, that our objective is to make sure that the individual pieces add up to more 

when we put them together. I think that is really what you are trying to say. 

There’s a bunch of examples. The Naval Board was one. The AirSea Battle Office is another. It is now, as you know, chaired—we 

changed the name, Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. But it is now chaired by a marine. Marine three-star General Glueck is chairing that right now to drive us to that interoperability that you are talking about and take it beyond the strategy 

and put the strategy into action. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Gabbard from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

My question was with regards to the portion of your strategy 

where you talk about the sea services deploying tactics, techniques, 

and procedures that target adversary vulnerabilities and you talk 

about striking the right balance between kinetic and non-kinetic 

actions. 

I would like to see if you can detail more what those non-kinetic 

actions would look like. 

Admiral MICHEL. I will take it from the Coast Guard perspective. 

Just here in the Western Hemisphere, the Coast Guard and the 

Navy have worked together actually for decades against transnational organized crime, most of which isn’t taken care of as a 

kinetic matter. It is actually taken care of as a law enforcement 

function. 

So Navy ships carry around Coast Guard law enforcement detachments so that we can use the sensor packages and the floating 

hull of the Navy to transport our law enforcement folks out there 
14 

who have actually got the authority to take down the narcotraffickers [narcotic traffickers]. 

And there is a whole range of other different activities that we 

work with them in sort of non-kinetic or asymmetric arenas. Piracy 

is another example of that type of work. And some of the other 

things I listed under maritime security operations, which have as 

their endgame, not a kinetic endgame, a smoking hull in the water, 

but a law enforcement action or a sanctions enforcement or other 

types of things. And that ability to cooperate between Navy equipment and Coast Guard authority has been gold here in a lot of missions. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Admiral DONEGAN. I think that a good way for us to explain the 

non-kinetic and kinetic—if we just talk about this new function 

that we talked about, which is all-domain access, it is a perfect example that we can describe the difference between kinetic and nonkinetic. 

If striking the balance means we can’t have systems—things that 

just shoot down other things, for example, that is cost-prohibitive. 

We will run out of money long before we run out of the enemy having an ability to get at us. 

So in our work in achieving all-domain access, it means working 

across the full spectrum, using all domains, to degrade, disrupt, 

deny, use the cyber and electromagnetic domain to make it harder 

for them to see us—the enemy to see us, for example and, therefore, they can’t employ their weapons or, if they did, they wouldn’t 

go to the right place so that we then can focus our kinetic resources 

on what got through after we did all that other work to make it 

much harder for them to be able to find us, see us, target us. 

Ms. GABBARD. You mentioned in your focus on the Indo- and 

Asia-Pacific region how, by 2020, approximately 60 percent of Navy 

ships and aircraft will be based in the region. 

What do you foresee could arise that would cause you to deter 

away from that plan between now and then? 

Admiral DONEGAN. Well, in other words, to not focus on the—or 

continue the rebalance—— 

Ms. GABBARD. For you to not reach that size of presence in the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Since that is our focus area and most of the 

forces that we have there are already targeted to go there—in other 

words, we have the forces there. Our FDNF [Forward Deployed 

Naval Forces] forces are there. We have already begun establishing 

our LCSs in Singapore. We have already—the Marines have already moved some forces, as you know, into Australia. We have 

plans to move a sub—an additional submarine into Guam and additional ships into Japan, and they are on track and going to happen in the near term—it is going to be hard for us to come off of 

that because of the forces that are already there and, in the short 

term, what we expect to be there just in the next year or so, 

ma’am. 

Ms. GABBARD. Great. Thank you. 

I ask the question because I obviously believe it is important that 

we recognize and continue to uphold kind of the commitment—the 
15 

strategic commitment that we have made to the region, recognizing 

the opportunity and the strategic necessity to do that. 

Given the environment that we sit in both fiscally and politically 

and otherwise, it is good to hear the affirmation that this is something that is well on its way. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Cook, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to talk a little bit about maritime prepositioning and 

where we stand on that. I was led to believe we still haven’t replenished the supplies that were in there from our previous engagements in the Middle East. 

Can you give me an update on where we stand on that and Diego 

Garcia, if you could? 

General O’DONNELL. Yes, sir. I will get you all the information 

here. But let me just very quickly go over it. 

We still only have two squadrons. We shut down the other 

squadron. So we still have two squadrons with 12 ships. 

Each of those would have the mobile landing platform, which you 

are familiar with, the one—the exercises we have been doing off of 

Camp Pendleton, to be able to selectively offload equipment, load 

it onto transports, most likely, LCACs [Landing Craft Air Cushion], 

and put it towards the beach. 

So we still have the 12, with the mixture of the old and new, the 

T–AKEs being the new ones, that are built in San Diego. But most 

of the other ships that we are building right now that will be on 

that thing will be that 12, along with that mobile landing platforms 

that will help us move those things around. 

And the ships—it is my understanding—I will confirm this—all 

the ships have been replenished and all the gear is on the normal 

cycle to be turned into Blount Island and turned around on time. 

Mr. COOK. Do we have anything at Diego Garcia right now? 

General O’DONNELL. I will have to get back to you on that. That 

is where the ships are. But I don’t know if we have anything 

ashore. 

Mr. COOK. Yeah. And I am just a little nervous about—you know, 

the Pacific is—the world is very big, and it is a long ways from 

North Korea to Australia and to Guam. And, you know, I understand the concentration. And we were in Japan together, of course. 

The other thing maybe I wanted to follow up on is: What is the 

situation with Okinawa right now in terms of relocation? I know 

we had that issue in the past. And there has been a change in policy with the Japanese in terms of they certainly, I think, welcome 

military forces there. If you could just—— 

General O’DONNELL. Yes, sir. As I mentioned when I saw you in 

Yokota, I was 2 years at U.S. Forces Japan. And I saw the Congresswoman there, too. 

I don’t think there is a change in policy. And this is not my lane. 

We can get you the information. I don’t think there is a change in 

policy by the Abe government. They are going forward. 

There is that same issues down in Okinawa. But it is my understanding that the work is still going forward. And that is the agreement that we have between our two governments, that they will 
16 

build the FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] and we will move 

there. 

Mr. COOK. When is that supposed to be finished? Do you know 

offhand? 

General O’DONNELL. I will have to get you that number. It is 

way down the road. As we said in Japan, we would tell them, 

‘‘When you build it, we will move.’’ So it is really kind of in their 

court right now. So we are working towards that. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Okay. 

General O’DONNELL. I will get you the exact date though, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Thank you very much. 

And, by the way, I did want to throw in a plug for the Coast 

Guard. I had the pleasure of visiting the Coast Guard Academy, a 

great, great institution. I encourage all my colleagues to go there. 

I wouldn’t recommend going there in the winter. Go to Hawaii. 

Visit the Congresswoman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Graham from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You can go to Hawaii or you can come to Florida. 

I recently had a chance to tour the Coast Guard facility in my 

district. And thank you for all you do. And I specifically want to 

thank the Coast Guard for all that you did during the tragedy that 

occurred last week where we lost a helicopter training group of marines and soldiers. Thank you very much for all that you are doing. 

And thank you, gentlemen, as well, the other two representatives 

here. 

My question is for Admiral Michel. 

I understand the Coast Guard has been undergoing an acquisition program for a total of 8 national security cutters, 25 offshore 

patrol cutters, and 58 fast-response cutters. 

In February of last year, the Coast Guard awarded three firmfixed-price contracts for preliminary and contract design of the 

OPC. One of those contracts is in my district, Eastern Shipbuilding 

Group, which is located in Panama City, Florida. 

Now, I know that you can’t comment further on any of these finalists, but I just want to be on the record of supporting Eastern 

Shipbuilding. It is a phenomenal small shipbuilding operation. I 

have toured it. And it is a great shipbuilding yard. 

With that said, Admiral Michel, can you comment on the role of 

the OPC in the naval cooperative strategy and, also, on the carefully crafted ratio of 8 national security cutters, 25 offshore patrol 

cutters, and 58 fast-response cutters. I would much appreciate your 

response. 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, ma’am. Well, the OPC is really going to 

be the workhorse of the Coast Guard fleet, and it replaces our medium-endurance cutters, two classes of those, our 210-foot cutters, 

which will be 55 years old, if everything stays on track, and then 

our 270-foot cutters, which will be about 35 years old when they 

come off the line with the OPC. 
17 

We are very much looking forward to the design work that comes 

through, and we are very encouraged that we are going to be able 

to get an affordable and capable platform for the OPC as we move 

forward. 

But this really does go to the cooperative strategy because the 

OPC is going to be the bulk of the work that is going to be done 

here in the Western Hemisphere, which is Coast Guard work, by 

and large, that we have got to do, maritime security work, work 

against transnational criminal organizations, fisheries enforcement, 

search and rescue, marine environmental protection, responding to 

natural disaster, this whole basket of things. 

This is going to be the workhorse for the Nation. And it will 

allow the Navy and our other forces who are pivoting to other 

areas where we have national security concerns—they can rest assured that the Coast Guard is there because we are forward, engaged with our offshore fleet, of which the OPC is going to be the 

centerpiece of that fleet. 

It is going to be complemented by the higher-end NSC [national 

security cutter], but the OPC is going to be the workhorse for the 

Nation in that maritime security role. And we owe it to our sailors 

to give them decent equipment. And 55-year-old ships, which can 

almost take Social Security—we shouldn’t be putting our sailors 

out there. 

So, again, we very much appreciative of the support, very much 

look forward to the designs, and it is critical to the Nation. 

Thank you. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you. And I look forward to it as well. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Graves from Louisiana is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you for being here today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you a number of issues important to 

south Louisiana. 

Thank you for your update on the ‘‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st 

Century Seapower’’ [CS–21]. It is certainly helpful to see the integration of forces. 

In that update, you are only as strong as your weakest link, 

right? And the Coast Guard does play an important role in CS–21, 

particularly the role of the OPC and the role of the C–27Js. 

When you look at the budget request, you are not seeing additional funds in there. So I am having trouble understanding how 

the Coast Guard is actually going to fulfill its role without the resources there to, I guess, actually conduct the mission that is laid 

out in CS–21. And then what type of repercussions does that have 

with your sister agencies? 

Secondly, I think this is perhaps part of a larger problem, when 

you look across—as I recall, the AC&I [Acquisition, Construction, 

and Improvements] account this year does, as Chairman Hunter 

noted, experience a significant reduction this year. Yet, your mission is expanding, as has been discussed here today. 

And so can you help me understand or kind of connect the dots 

there? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, it has been pretty clear and our Commandant has testified that we have had acquisition challenges, 
18 

budget-driven in large part, and it has forced us to continue to extend the length of our ships, whether they are the medium-endurance cutters or the Polar-class icebreakers, where we have just got 

kind of a patchwork of things to be able to do. 

We have got the budget. We are going to deal with it. It is going 

to allow us to finish out the eight NSCs, which we need. It is going 

to allow us to move forward with the FRCs. But we have got some 

serious challenges, and I don’t mean to downplay those. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Admiral. 

General and Admiral, could you just quickly comment. You know, 

again, focusing on the weakest link comment that I made earlier, 

do you see the Coast Guard with its aging fleet being able to fulfill 

the mission? Are they dragging you down—and I certainly understand acquisition challenges in other agencies as well. But are they 

dragging you down and challenging your ability to complete your 

mission? 

Admiral DONEGAN. I will start first. Well, the Coast Guard is not 

dragging us down by any means. They are all in in not only the 

strategy, but in working with us. 

Where they are challenged resource-wise, for instance, if we talk 

about the Pacific and the Asia-Pacific region, for example, if they 

can’t get out there and participate in a particular exercise that we 

need to with a ship, they are there with the rest of their forces, 

whether they send a LEDET [law enforcement detachment] there 

or they have already built relationships with the countries we are 

going to work on. 

We are leveraging the relationships that they have already. Of 

course, we would like them to have more resources and ships to be 

with us in those regards. But given the challenges that they have, 

we are working as closely as we can to get the most out of it. 

So I look at it more as not particularly that you are as strong 

as your weakest link, but we are stronger because we are doing 

this together. 

General O’DONNELL. Yes, sir. And I would just echo what Kid 

just said. I mean, by no stretch of the imagination are they dragging us down. 

But I think us working together and being here together kind of 

shows you that we are all in on this strategy and that we—where 

some of the things that perhaps we can do, the Marine Corps can 

do that the other two gentlemen either side of me can’t do, we are 

going to fill those lanes. 

And, of course, there are plenty of gaps in the Marine Corps that 

both these services can help us with, too. So, no, by their being all 

in, I think we all are. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you. 

And I want to echo the comments of some of the more senior 

members in regard to the icebreakers. It seems like that is, once 

again, a capability that is potentially going to challenge all the 

services if it is not aggressively addressed. 

One other comment, Admiral Michel. I keep looking at your 

name. In south Louisiana, that would be ‘‘Michel.’’ 

Admiral MICHEL. It actually is. 

Mr. GRAVES. Oh, is it? There we go. I was listening to other 

folks. I will stop following the elders here. 
19 

Very quickly, in the Coast Guard’s Western Hemisphere strategy, 

you list transnational criminal organizations as a mission of the 

Coast Guard and something you plan to address. 

Could you talk about, just briefly, how that dovetails or intersects with CS–21 and how CS–21 perhaps addresses that challenge. 

Admiral MICHEL. Sure. The Western Hemisphere strategy was 

designed by the Commandant specifically to work with CS–21 so 

that we could focus our core competencies here in the Western 

Hemisphere and allow our Navy/Marine Corps folks to focus in 

other areas. 

So the strategy itself, which talks about combating networks, primarily transnational criminal organization networks, which for a 

lot of these countries are national security threats—I mean, ask a 

country like Honduras, you know, the extreme murder rates and 

homicide rates and things that they have in there. 

And the Coast Guard’s presence there really is critical to these 

nations because it polices off cocaine before it actually gets into 

Central America and creates death and devastation. Just the effectiveness of the Coast Guard last year seized 91 metric tons of cocaine. 

That is about one and a half times all the cocaine seized within 

the United States last year by every law enforcement agency and 

all that seized at every air, land, and sea border of the United 

States combined. So that is how effective that is. 

And Coast Guard interdiction efforts are much closer to the head 

of the snake that starts this than a buy-bust on the streets of one 

of our hometowns. So it is a critical national security function. It 

is complementary to the Navy and the rest of our sea services and 

was designed exactly to work like that, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Admiral. 

General, Admiral, thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Cummings is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Michel, let me ask you just picking up on what you were 

just talking about. Before he retired, Admiral Papp indicated that 

there had been an approximately 30-percent drop in drug interdictions as a result of the cuts required by sequestration several years 

ago. 

What trends have there been in drug interdictions over the past 

year? And if we return to sequestration, what impact would that 

have on drug interdictions? I mean, you gave some very high numbers you just mentioned. And I am just wondering. 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. Well, I can tell you, based on long 

years of experience—I used to be the Director of Joint Interagency 

Task Force South [JIATF-South], which was right in the middle of 

this fight, sir. 

And here’s the bottom line for major cutters of the Coast Guard. 

And this has been over many years. One cutter year’s worth of effort seized about 20 metric tons of cocaine. That is about a billion 

dollars in traffickers’ profits. 

Over many years, that was about the national average for all the 

cocaine seized within our borders every year by one ship of the 
20 

Coast Guard. That is how effective maritime interdiction is. But 

you got to get the ships to do it. 

Right now the figures are here and there, but about three-quarters of those high-confidence intelligence cases that we know are 

moving out there on the water we can’t interdict because there is 

no ships in order to be able to do it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you know they are out there? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You just can’t get to them? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. I, as JIATF Director, used to watch 

the vessels go by, but there were not enough ships out there to be 

able to action it. And then, once it gets into Central America, it is 

broken into such small parcels it becomes hard to police up. Plus, 

it creates corruption, death, destruction all its way, wherever it 

moves on its way up to our citizens. 

So it is tragic when it gets past us. But, again, that is forward, 

engaged, ready, complementary, non-redundant seapower capability of the Nation that works directly with our partners. So it is 

tragic that we have to see that go by. But if we don’t build ships, 

that is what ends up happening. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What impact have asset failures had on the 

Coast Guard’s ability to perform its mission? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, lots of different things, sir. We are lucky 

that—we had a major casualty on Polar Star. But, thank god, it 

was kind of out of the ice by the time that it actually happened. 

But that is a daily occurrence for the Coast Guard. 

And our medium-endurance cutter fleet, our 210-foot fleet, over 

20 percent of the operational hours were consumed by breakdowns. 

The ships are just that old that—I don’t say we are in a death spiral yet, but we spend increasing amounts of lost operational time 

and continuous investment in these old class of ships that could be 

spent on recapitalization efforts. 

Again, I wouldn’t want to say we are in a death spiral, but we 

are definitely playing with fire with these old ships. As a sailor 

who has been around a long time, these ships are really old and 

they need to be replaced. 

And it has an impact on a daily basis. And that is what keeps 

me awake. And I manage all this old infrastructure with all these 

pressing missions that are on top of us. That is why they pay me 

the money. But it is a very uncomfortable position, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what do you have to give up, then? So you 

are spending this time repairing old ships. You got them falling 

apart. And what gives? I mean, do you have a priority of what 

gives or is it just sort of haphazard? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, the risks to the Nation in the key areas of 

the Coast Guard that are fulfilled by these platforms increases 

every day. Whether it is risk of access to Antarctica, whether it is 

risk of access to the Arctic, whether it is fisheries enforcement, 

whether it is maritime law enforcement, whether it is our ability 

to respond to a hurricane or a national disaster or an oil spill or 

a mass migration incident, the risk in that fleet goes up every single day. 

Now, we have brought some of it down through the national security cutter and the fast-response cutter, which are way better as-
21 

sets than the ones that they replaced, but they are fewer in number. Our major cutter fleet is going to go even under the current 

plan from 44 ships down to 33 ships. Now, they are a little bit 

more capable ships, but, still, the numbers don’t lie. 

So this is all about risk management. And that is what I spend 

the majority of my day, sir, is managing risk, where to place assets, 

which ones to bring in the yard, how long can we run the ships before they break or catch on fire. That is what I do on a daily basis, 

sir. And that is what we are incurring as additional risk. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Last question. 

Can you discuss the state of the Marine Safety Program. That is 

something I have always been very interested in. What is happening with it? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, that is a whole other side of the Coast 

Guard that is critical to the national security and the economy of 

the United States. That is all ensuring that our waterways operate 

correctly and that we have got licensed mariners and safety equipment and all that. 

And that is definitely one of the priorities of the Commandant of 

the Coast Guard. Under our Energy Action Plan, he has asked us— 

well, he has tasked me with putting together an entire plan to revitalize our Marine Safety Program, which is another investment we 

are going to have to make to ensure that we can respond to new 

developments in offshore oil infrastructure or Bakken crude oil 

moving down the Nation’s waterways or a whole range of different 

activities. 

The marine industry is incredibly vibrant in this country and 

uses technology more and more as time goes on. But to keep up 

with that, instead of being a regulatory hurdle to that industry, 

really requires significant investment and increased expertise and 

capacity in our people. 

For a while there, they were building out one tank barge a week 

down on the gulf coast. And each of those requires Coast Guard inspection. Each one of those requires a waterway to be operated 

safely on. And that is a whole other mission set of the Coast 

Guard. And the Coast Guard is stretched pretty thin. 

But you have got my commitment to work on that area, sir. It 

is on my task list that is getting pretty long these days. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, and I know that each 

one of you are dealing with lots of difficulties because of budget 

cutbacks, and I appreciate what you do. You are managing a very 

difficult situation with a very difficult budget situation. So it is our 

job to try to make that a little better for you. 

And by the way, Admiral Michel, I have got two Coast Guard 

bases in my district in Mobile, and I have been out in the air assets 

and in the marine assets, and I have seen for myself some of the 

challenges you’ve got in the Coast Guard, and my hat is off to you 

for what you have been able to do so far. 

Admiral Donegan, I have a question for you. The 2015 strategy 

identifies the importance of U.S. naval cooperation with international partners, and I firmly believe the interoperability with our 
22 

allies is critical to creating an agile force. Can you elaborate on the 

impact of having forward-deployed assets, like the littoral combat 

ship in regions like the South China Sea, and what the presence 

of ships like the LCS means to our partners in that region. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Yes, sir. I certainly can. The—as you rightly 

said, this strategy really talks as one of the underlying—underpinning things, along with being forward, being engaged, and the 

engaged piece is with our partners, to build that alliance, to build 

those trusts—to build that trust. 

To have ships like LCS, as you know, we are putting four into 

Singapore, and we are going to get some more bang for the buck 

in terms of presence by rotating crews on those ships. That is part 

of the innovation piece that we are talking about, but it allows us 

to be responsive to things that happen that build up our credibility 

in the region, that when the allies turn and look, they see and 

know and are assured that we are going to be there. 

The LCS, for instance, was one of the first ships to—Fort Worth 

that we had over there that responded when we had the recent airliner go down. That is an example. When you have humanitarian 

assistance or disaster response exactly that kind of ship can provide, but also when we move into the higher-end piece, as you 

know, that ship fills gaps in mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, 

and surface warfare. So it was also meant to contribute and will 

contribute in the event that we have to, together with our partners, 

get involved in any kind of conflict. So absolutely, that ship will 

bring us back a return on investment. 

It is also in other places, though. As you know, we are going to 

base them in San Diego and Jacksonville, Florida. So the one certainly based in Florida will have better access to support the Coast 

Guard and what we were just talking about in the SOUTHCOM 

[U.S. Southern Command] commander and the missions he has on 

counter-drugs. 

It is also going into—into Bahrain to replace the mine ships we 

have there, but as you know, building the partnerships amongst 

the navies in the Gulf requires that you have a ship that is compatible with them where they can see you operating side by side with 

their ships, and we can definitely do that. 

An example is, we just did a mine countermeasure exercise in 

the Gulf. We had on the order of 44 nations and 38 different ships 

participating in that event. Nowhere else can you bring together 

that many nations to build partnerships and build that trust that 

we are talking about. 

Mr. BYRNE. Are you already working on plans for how you will 

utilize the LCS when it is redesigned to be a frigate? 

Admiral DONEGAN. Yes, sir. We are in the forefront of that, as 

you know, but it is going to bring additional capability, which 

means in those mission sets that I just talked about, you are talking about enhanced—enhanced reliability and survivability because 

of the weapons systems that we are putting out. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, thank you. I think the LCS has proven to be 

a very wise investment by the Navy and by the country, and I appreciate your plans and your usage of it, and I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I would like to finish up where we started by saying 

what a good job that the three of you did with all of the individuals 
23 

working with you. We appreciate your hard work on this, but it is 

a piece of paper. So, Admiral Donegan, how do we go from strategic 

theory to operational effectiveness? 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, that is a great question, and the good 

news is while we were building the strategy, we took on the piece 

of how do we operationalize it? How do we implement it? 

First of all, we have to implement it together, and so because it 

is a strategy written by us together, all of the services are going 

to participate in—already participate in the process of implementation. Some of those processes are well underway with the Naval 

Board, with our Coast Guard and Navy warfighting talks, with the 

Navy and Marine Corps warfighting talks, but we also are planning on a series of—as you know, we have a classified annex is 

coming with this—after this strategy. That is part of the 

operationalizing when we bring together the staffs here in the Pentagon with our Naval War College which runs wargaming for us, 

with forward-deployed fleet commanders and combatant commanders and begin—and execute war games and modeling and 

simulation where we can iteratively look at the problems that we 

are facing in each region. 

Each region has a certain threat, and each region has a certain 

plan to deal with that threat, and what we are working forward to 

operationalize this strategy is, is now looking at the current way 

we would get at that threat, running it through a series of war 

games, and determining if we have any gaps we need to fill, and 

if we fill those gaps—how would we fill those gaps? I am sorry. 

It is not all about buying something new. It may be an adjustment to the concept. So we have concept development work going 

on. It may be something innovative like—like we are doing with 

high-energy lasers or railguns. Or it may be something in cyber. It 

may be another way to get at the problem, but it isn’t just buying 

something, as I talked about before, where you get into this thingon-thing problem. So we are doing that. 

As you know, the Navy has also developed a strategy subspecialty code. That is where we have identified the really smart 

folks, placed them in all the right places so we can link the strategy to what it is we go buy. Because in the end, this force will be 

what we bought and also how we employ it. So the first part gets 

at how we employ the second piece. We have to link this strategy 

to what we buy. 

So those are some of the things. There is more—more into the 

continuum that we call the strategic continuum that does that linkage. 

Mr. FORBES. We heard Mr. Garamendi, Mr. Hunter correctly be 

concerned about building icebreakers and more ships. If Mr. 

Wittman was here, he would be concerned about his aircraft carriers. Mr. Courtney would certainly be concerned about his Virginia-class submarine. 

As I look at the strategy, it is going to call for an additional 23 

forward-deployed ships, and projects about a 60-percent increase of 

Navy ships and aircraft in the Indo-Pacific region by 2020. 

Where do they come from? Do we build them? Do we bring them 

from other parts of the globe? And if we build them, do we have 

the industrial capacity to accommodate the strategy for either? 
24 

Admiral DONEGAN. Well, sir, it is a combination of a little bit of 

each of what you said. We are building more. As you know, the 

Secretary was in here and talked to you about his plan for building 

some more, but it is also about the innovative employment of the 

assets that we do have. 

An example is if the ships that we can put forward bring us more 

return on investment. So in terms of the commodity that we give, 

and that commodity is forward presence, so the ships we put into 

Rota, Spain, we are putting four ships into Rota, Spain. They are 

high-end DDGs with the ballistic missile defense capability. If we 

were to resource that same commitment of presence from the 

United States, we would need 10 of those ships. So part of the increase in the presence that we are getting is the fact that—how we 

are employing those ships. The LCSs that we are putting into 

Singapore, we are putting four of those there. They are not going 

to be based with their families, but we are going to rotate crews. 

Our modeling and simulation tells us that we will basically get 

a twofold increase in presence because of that concept. So we will 

get—two ships, it would take back here, to keep that one forward, 

if that would make sense. If we were doing rotational, we would 

need twice as many LCSs to do that same kind of presence. 

So it is a combination of the innovative way we are employing 

it. It is a combination of growing the force to some extent with 

those that are already in the shipbuilding plan. 

Mr. FORBES. Please, General. 

General O’DONNELL. Sir, thanks. 

I would just make one comment that we are already looking— 

the Commandant has made it very clear that we are looking at all 

avenues to get marines out on ships. 

Now, most of the alternate platforms we talked about earlier 

coming from the MPS [maritime prepositioning ships], those are for 

the low end of the ROMO [range of military operations], but they 

could be out there doing theater security cooperation or humanitarian assistance and those types of things, and that helps take 

some of the pressure off the amphibs [amphibious assault ships]. 

So we still have to—they are not a replacement for the amphibs, 

but they are complementary in that they could probably reduce 

some of the workload on those amphibs. And so we are looking very 

closely at that, and we are working, obviously, very closely with the 

Navy on that, and we see some—we see some real opportunity 

there to help reduce some of that thing. 

The last thing I would leave you with, and I didn’t get a chance 

to mention before, but coming from 2 years in Japan and watching—watching—I can’t speak to the South China Sea, but I certainly can speak to the East China Sea, and the Japanese Coast 

Guard taking the brunt of that. They have learned a lot watching 

how our United States Coast Guard and United States Navy work 

together very closely hand in glove, and the 2 years I was there I 

saw them—a lot more interoperability among their own ships by 

just watching and learning from the gentlemen on either side of me 

and their service. That is all. 

Mr. FORBES. Let’s suppose my last question, and then Mr. 

Garamendi has a final question, but I know the President’s—the 

Navy’s President’s budget request for fiscal year 2016 is 300 ships. 
25 

We are currently at 287, and let’s just say we have one member 

that may slide in here, be just a little skeptical that we don’t get 

there. 

If we do not get there, and we have a reduction in the number 

of ships, is this strategy still possible with your ships? 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, we wrote—the three services wrote this 

strategy based on what our assessment of that environment that 

I described earlier says that the Nation needs from the sea services. 

So the first thing that I will say is the targets that we want to 

get to and how we are going to employ the force and the way we 

are going to do it and the capabilities we need, and to some extent, 

the numbers are what we believe the Nation needs. Now, that said, 

if we get less than that, we are still going to move out on that trajectory with those priorities, and then we are going to be coming 

back and talking to you about the risks that then we are going to 

be taking and where that would be. 

We will still work as, you know, on innovation and efficiency to 

reduce that risk as much as we can, but we will be very open and 

transparent with where we see the risk coming if we are—if we are 

not given the resources to the level that we describe in some parts 

of this strategy. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Garamendi has a final question, and after his 

question, as I told each of you before, we are going to give you 

whatever time you need as a summation or if there is anything you 

need to clarify or add that we haven’t put on the record. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

putting together this hearing. And, gentlemen, thank you for your 

participation and your service. 

Admiral Donegan, the revised Cooperative Strategy for Seapower 

implies the ready deployment of sea service assets, and it does, in 

fact, mention the involvement of the Military Sealift Command 

[MSC], and that its central contribution is that the MSC vessels 

and capabilities are available. And it does raise the question of 

whether our domestic sealift capacity is sufficient to meet the 

needs of this new strategy. 

Is it sufficient? 

Admiral DONEGAN. We believe right now it is sufficient. The 

question, though, I think that we have to address is looking forward as we continue our iterative wargaming and simulations and 

modeling that we are doing. As we move to the future and that 

force is potentially less available or comes under greater stress, we 

have to define—see if the—if the combination of all things that give 

us sealift, which is the combat logistics force combined with Military Sealift Command and the other—and the other sealift that we 

bring to support our sea base are enough to do it. 

I think that it is going to be a function of the scenario and the 

location of where it occurs, and we also have, as you know, because 

each of those vessels require escorts, we have to work that piece, 

too, to make sure that we have the right size and shape. 

Right now, for what we have in the current force, yes, and I 

think as it comes under stress because less of those become available, we are going to have to reevaluate that as we go along. 
26 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. We have some significant concerns about 

the future of the Military Sealift Command, the aging of the ships, 

and the like. I would like to get into more detail with you on that. 

Just another set of questions quickly. The Navy is using UAVs 

[unmanned aerial vehicles] off its ships, and, Admiral Donegan, my 

understanding is that you are advancing this program very rapidly 

and that you are—have some satisfaction with the potential that 

it brings to expanding the ability of the ship to see what is going 

on and to do its task. Is that the case? 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, specifically, the strategy talks about continuing to develop unmanned systems that improve our abilities to 

do what we need to do, and the unmanned brings endurance, for 

sure, and it brings capabilities that man does not—does not bring, 

and I am not just talking about in airplanes. So this is airplanes, 

this is subsurface, and this is on the surface. So this strategy has 

us looking hard at that. 

In terms of unmanned airplanes, as you know, we have a validated demand for our UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike] system based—which is CVN [aircraft carrier] ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], 

but it also has with it survivable and possesses a strike capability. 

That demand has been validated, and we are moving forward with 

that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yeah. And I noticed, Admiral Michel, that the 

U.S.—that the President’s budget does not have any money for 

UAVs. Are you working with the Navy vaulting off their work and 

their systems and the application of their systems to the Coast 

Guard? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, we have been all in with the Navy on unmanned aerial systems for things that might be useful to the Coast 

Guard. Some of the Navy systems are a little bit too high-end for 

us, but certainly in the areas—shipborne systems like Fire Scout 

or ScanEagle or the smaller ones, and we have operated a number 

of those systems off Coast Guard cutters. 

From the Coast Guard perspective on the unmanned aerial system, be extremely interested for the same reasons that the Navy 

is. You know, optimal sensor capability, extending the range of the 

ship. Very attractive. You know, whether those would be landbased or sea-based or whether they should be small and cheap or 

higher end and more capable, really the Coast Guard is evaluating 

all that because we have got to make sure that whatever investment we make there is a wise one, but the Navy has been—and 

the Marine Corps, for that matter, have been completely open with 

us and let us be full participants, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And I would hope you would do this at a little 

faster strategy, a little faster than the icebreakers. 

Finally, very quickly, the Navy is deploying a Poseidon UAV off 

the coast of California, probably for training purposes out of San 

Diego. The Coast Guard might consider being in some sort of a coordinated arrangement with the Navy since they will be looking at 

the same water you are presently unable to see. So I just—if you 

look into that and come back to me with the potential that it might 

have between the two forces? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. We will do that. 
27 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Hunter is recognized for any final questions he 

may have. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just one quick question. General, what do you do when it comes 

to logistics right now? Do they change at all with this new plan? 

Meaning the amphibious logistics having stuff everywhere for when 

we are everywhere? 

General O’DONNELL. No, sir, no. It is the same strategy. You 

were out, but we talked a little bit about that, and certainly with 

both the two squadrons that we have that are out there with the 

MPS, and then, as you know, the MLP [mobile landing platform] 

will bring that new capability of the selective offload and be able 

to bring those things ashore. 

But I think it kind of gets back to the—as you well know, it is— 

everything gets a vote. So it depends on really kind of what the situation is going to be. If it is on the low end of the ROMO or whether it is going in the high end, but we are definitely going to have 

to have the—and the Commandant has been working very hard for 

the last couple of months on wargaming some of the high-end stuff, 

the A2/AD [anti-access/area denial], and I am sure you were briefed 

on it, but as we work through that, it will not change the fundamentals of the—of the organization on how we do the logistics, 

but just a little bit on the distances and how we would protect it 

and how the sea base—and, of course, we are dependent on the 

other services to help us with that. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman 

Langevin was here a short time ago, had to leave, but he asked me 

if I could just to forward one concern he had and—or question he 

had. Again, I think as we all know, Jim does a lot of work in terms 

of cyber security with his subcommittee. 

And what he was curious about was that the strategy of all-domain access in terms of whether or not that extends to cybersecurity, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence command control, 

other non-kinetic regimes. And I was just wondering if any of you 

could talk about that a little bit for the record. 

Admiral MICHEL. I will talk about—excuse me, sir. From a Coast 

Guard perspective, I—that is a new term, and I think it is exactly 

the right term, and it encaptures those things beyond the physical 

domain, so the ability to conduct cyber operations, electromagnetic 

spectrum, and that is very important to the Coast Guard to be able 

to do that. We are incredibly interconnected. We have our own networks. We want to be able to exploit or do whatever we need to 

do regarding adversaries’ networks, and we have a whole regulated 

industry that we deal with which has cyber challenges as well from 

a Coast Guard perspective. So we really have a prominent place in 

dot-mil, dot-gov, and dot-com, and I am not aware of anybody else 

in the government that has that array of expertise and access, but 

the ability to conduct cyber operations, the ability to do the things 

that are necessary in cyberspace as well as the nonphysical do-
28 

mains, absolutely critical to the Coast Guard missions. And we 

have got to build out a workforce and a capability in order to get 

at that. So thanks, sir. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, quickly from our standpoint is the reason 

that we—this group together as we were building the strategy 

came up with the concept of all-domain access was partly because 

of this cyberspace issue that we see in front of us. So it is absolutely central to the piece about access because we are talking 

about in all domains. It doesn’t have to be the physical space by 

any means. So we have taken this onboard pretty hard. As you 

know, we have an information dominance score that is tacked on 

this. 

We have—the Naval Academy has stood up their cyber center so 

we can start at the very beginning in the training for this, but 

where it is really going to come to an end is—point in the 

warfighting end of the business is the ability to have the access 

and use that domain to our advantage. First, we have to defend our 

systems, but we also have to be able to reach out and touch others 

to be able to potentially degrade, to potentially disable so that we 

are not constantly, as I said earlier, putting one of our things 

against another thing and losing that cost battle. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. And so, again, Jim’s sort of observation in 

the notes that he left here is that, you know, at some point this 

is about standing up the, you know, the human capital to be able 

to do that, and, I mean, it sounds like you are trying to sort of form 

these centers of excellence at the different training facilities and— 

yes, sir. 

General O’DONNELL. Well, I would just comment that a Marine 

force in cyber is—they are all connected with each other, and of 

course to CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], but I think that 

kind of gets what you are talking, sir, is making sure you have the 

human capital and the capabilities and the—training the right people to do those things that it will be this part of the all-domain we 

talked about. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. And now I would like to give each of you an opportunity anything—last comments that you have, and in doing that, 

could you also include a little follow-up to Mr. Courtney’s question. 

It is one thing to stand these things up. How do we measure success in the non-kinetic domains? That is a little trick here for us, 

and if you would include that in your summation. And, Admiral 

Michel, we are going to start with you since everybody slaughtered 

your name today, and thank you so much once again for being 

here. 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, thanks for giving the opportunity for me 

to be here. I think having the three sea services in front of you is 

really the message that I want to convey here, is that your sea 

services are working together on a daily basis. We have folks who 

work in each other’s commands. We do operations together on a 

daily basis, whether in the physical domain or whether in the cyber 

domain. So the taxpayer gets a huge benefit from its investment 

in all three sea services because we’re interoperable. We face similar or same challenges, and we work together on a daily basis in 

a very cooperative manner. So that is the one key takeaway. 
29 

I know we focused a lot on Coast Guard acquisitions. I don’t 

want to—we had our discussions regarding that, but your Coast 

Guard is ready. The Commandant reports that your Coast Guard 

is ready today. We are concerned about the risks that we are taking, particularly with aging equipment, but your Coast Guard is 

‘‘Semper Paratus’’ [‘‘Always Ready’’], and I can report that to you 

today. 

Issue on cyber, I appreciate your comments, sir. This is a workforce issue. I don’t think it is going to be—you know, regardless of 

whatever whiz-bang equipment, we are either going to win or lose 

on this based on our people and being able to train and retain 

those high-quality people that are going to be necessary to conduct 

the cyber operations that we need in order to make the Nation successful. 

Boy, measuring success in the non-kinetic realm is a lot harder 

in many ways, but as a Coast Guardsman, most of our endgames 

are not smoking holes in the ground. They are law enforcement actions, they are regulatory actions, or dealing with resilience and 

being able to rebuild infrastructure and different things like that. 

So the Coast Guard is comfortable with trying to measure success 

in non-kinetic solutions, but it is going to be very difficult. 

What I would say is our strategies, typically, if we can defend 

ourselves, make sure that we conduct our operations in whatever 

areas we are, and then be able to protect the American people and 

our other stakeholders at an adequate level, that is probably the 

ultimate measure of success in most of the non-kinetic areas we operate, and that would include cyber. 

Mr. FORBES. General. 

General O’DONNELL. Yes, sir. Let me answer your last question 

first about how do you measure success. You know, it is more than 

just being able to keep in your C2 systems up and running to be 

able to command and control and do the things that you want to 

do, but you have to be able to have those as—as Admiral Michel 

had just mentioned how we are going to make sure we have people 

in there that are monitoring those types of things. But it is going 

to be very, very difficult to find out. You are only going to find out 

if you failed within those—within those cybers. But all of us—I 

know all the services are working very hard on that. 

And the other part, the only thing I would comment about your 

other question was that everybody in this room manages risk, and 

we started about a year ago with Expeditionary Force 21, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance a couple of months. And as I mentioned to you before, we have already kind of moved out on making 

sure that we are doing all the experimentation and we are working 

those things to operationalize this strategy. 

Unfortunately, you know, we don’t have a forecast on what the 

budgets are going to be and how they—but we only plan for those. 

But the basic, as I mentioned, the basic tenets of the strategy, 

whether it is the EF–21, CS–21, or the Commandant’s Planning 

Guidance, sir, I will assure you that we are working to make sure 

those tenets stay the same, and that is being ready when this Nation is least ready, being forward deployed, forward engaged, building trust, working all those issues, and being the 911 force that you 
30 

expect us to be, and there is no doubt about that; and whatever 

funding we end up with, we will execute our mission. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. And, Admiral Donegan, we will 

let you have the last word. 

Admiral DONEGAN. Thank you, sir. 

I will start with getting at the hardest question you give us, 

which is how do we measure success in that domain. It is very difficult. We are working, and it is not one service that is working on 

this. As you know, Admiral Rogers and Cyber Command are working with all of us as we move forward to sort that out. 

In the near term, it is cyber hygiene and making sure that we 

have that piece right, that we have the basic things that we need 

to be doing as a service. In the longer term, though, it gets beyond—it gets beyond that. When we—when we are working in acquiring our systems, we have to acquire them with this in mind as 

we go forward, and one of the metrics needs to be that that has 

to be one of the things we are looking at as we go along, and it 

is, but it will need to continue to be. It wasn’t necessarily one of 

the things in mind for some of the older systems that we bought. 

So we have to bear that in mind, but it is going to be difficult, and 

I don’t think that it is going to be easy. 

And in closing, I think I can speak for all of us when I say we 

are very proud of the strategy that the three services put together. 

A lot of work went into it, but we are equally proud of the game 

plan we have for moving forward to put it—to continue to put it 

and implement it and make sure that we can execute the strategy, 

and we look forward to working with this committee and the rest 

of Congress as we do that. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you all for being here today. Thanks for the 

work you have done, and please communicate to your staffs and 

the people that work with you how much we appreciate the jobs 

that they have done, and with that we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 18, 2015 

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MARCH 18, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Admiral MICHEL. In recent discussions with the Navy, the TRITON UAV is still 

in early testing phases. Any operational use of this capability is approximately 4 to 

5 years away. The Coast Guard will remain in contact with the Navy and discuss 

options for collaboration, once it is operational. [See page 27.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK 

General O’DONNELL. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) has been fully reconstituted after substantial quantities of prepositioned equipment were downloaded 

for Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and II. 

The status of the equipment aboard the Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons 

(MPSRON) is ready for issue. 

Each ship of the MPF rotates through maintenance at Blount Island Command, 

Florida every three years. Equipment is downloaded and undergoes maintenance, 

upgrades, or replacement. Additionally, any equipment which may be damaged as 

a result of exercise use is repaired as rapidly as possible. In FY15 there are 12 

scheduled exercises in which MPF equipment will be utilized. 

The MPF is made up two MPSRONs. MPSRON–2 is located in Diego Garcia and 

MPSRON–3 is located in Guam/Saipan. A third, MPSRON–1, was located in the 

Mediterranean until the end of FY12, when it was deactivated. 

Each MPSRON contains six ships. The six ships in each MPSRON are two large, 

medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (T–AKR); three roll-on, roll-off ships (T–AK); 

and one dry cargo/ammunition ship (T–AKE). 

The T–AKEs are the newest additions to the MPF. While the T–AKRs and T–AK 

carry vehicles, equipment, and containerized supplies, the T–AKEs carry palletized 

supplies which allows the distribution of tailored support packages to forces ashore. 

During FY15 and FY16, the MPF will receive two additional ships called Mobile 

Landing Platforms (MLP). These ships permit the transfer of vehicles and equipment from T–AKRs to smaller craft for movement ashore. They are, in effect, a ‘‘pier 

in the ocean’’ which will enable a Marine force to operate from the sea without the 

need for a logistics presence ashore. 

While our goal is to preposition 80% of a MEB’s equipment set on each squadron, 

we currently have 67%. The ships currently assigned to the program are fully loaded, utilizing all available square-footage. It will take additional ships to reach that 

80% goal. 

The Marine Corps does not preposition anything ashore in Diego Garcia. 

The only Marine Corps ashore prepositioning site is the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP–N). Substantial quantities of prepositioned equipment were removed to support OIF and we have worked steadily to replace them. 

While this effort was going on, MCPP–N was reorganized to support a battalionsized response/contingency force, as well as three reinforced company-sized units.

[See page 16.] 

Æ