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[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 711 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 711

  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives concerning the 
           United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 4, 2007

    Mr. Berman (for himself, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and Mr. Fortenberry) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
                           on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives concerning the 
           United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement.

Whereas President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued 
        a Joint Statement on July 18, 2005, declaring their intention to 
        establish a ``global partnership'' between the two countries;
Whereas in the Joint Statement the President announced his commitment to 
        achieving the establishment of ``full civil nuclear energy cooperation'' 
        between the United States and India;
Whereas Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic 
        Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-401), also known as the 
        Hyde Act, that, among other provisions, would allow the President to 
        waive restrictions in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that otherwise would 
        prohibit nuclear cooperation with India;
Whereas the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 include several 
        provisions that impose conditions on United States civil nuclear 
        cooperation with India, including--

    (1) a requirement that civil nuclear cooperation with India be 
terminated if India tests a nuclear explosive device or violates its 
safeguards agreements;

    (2) a prohibition on exports to India of sensitive nuclear technology, 
including enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production technology, 
with exceptions for certain programs to develop a proliferation-resistant 
fuel cycle or a potential multinational facility in India participating in 
a program approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 
provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities;

    (3) a requirement that India and the IAEA conclude a safeguards 
agreement that provides for safeguards on designated civil nuclear 
facilities ``in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles 
and practices''; and

    (4) a sense of the Congress that ``the United States should not seek to 
facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any 
other party if such exports are terminated under United States law'';

Whereas the Hyde Act requires that Congress affirmatively approve the United 
        States-India nuclear cooperation agreement, also known as a 123 
        Agreement, for it to take effect;
Whereas on July 27, 2007, the Governments of the United States and India 
        concluded negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement;
Whereas under the terms of the Hyde Act, Congress will not consider the nuclear 
        cooperation agreement until India and the IAEA conclude a safeguards 
        agreement for the facilities India has listed as for civil use and the 
        Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approves an exemption for India from its 
        guidelines establishing full-scope international safeguards as a 
        condition of supply;
Whereas it is in the interest of the United States to ensure that the NSG does 
        not approve an exemption for India that allows other countries to engage 
        in civil nuclear commerce with India that is prohibited under United 
        States law, thus putting United States firms at a competitive 
        disadvantage;
Whereas an unqualified exemption for India would create a strong incentive for 
        India to negotiate nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries 
        with less stringent conditions than those contained in the agreement 
        negotiated between India and the United States, thereby undermining 
        United States nonproliferation policy and United States commercial 
        interests;
Whereas to prevent United States nonproliferation policy and United States 
        commercial interests from being undermined by supplier countries 
        continuing to trade with recipient countries that have violated their 
        agreements with the United States, the Hyde Act states it shall be the 
        policy of the United States to ``[s]trengthen the NSG guidelines and 
        decisions concerning consultation by members regarding violations of 
        supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a 
        timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, 
        including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, 
        that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with 
        such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated 
        response has been achieved'';
Whereas it remains to be determined if the nuclear cooperation agreement is 
        fully consistent with the Hyde Act;
Whereas the Government of India has stated interpretations of the meaning and 
        application of the several provisions in the nuclear cooperation 
        agreement that appear to conflict with the intent of the Congress as 
        reflected in the Hyde Act; and
Whereas the Administration should clarify all conflicts of interpretation 
        regarding the nuclear cooperation agreement prior to seeking an 
        exemption for India in the NSG guidelines: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that 
the Administration--
            (1) should not propose any change to Nuclear Suppliers 
        Group (NSG) guidelines relating to India until such time as the 
        Administration has--
                    (A) answered all outstanding questions raised by 
                Congress regarding apparent inconsistencies between the 
                nuclear cooperation agreement and the Henry J. Hyde 
                United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation 
                Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-401), also known as the 
                Hyde Act; and
                    (B) resolved with the Government of India all 
                differences of interpretation of the provisions in the 
                nuclear cooperation agreement; and
            (2) should not support a proposed exemption for India in 
        the NSG guidelines that is not consistent with the Hyde Act and 
        the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and that does not incorporate the 
        following provisions:
                    (A) The immediate termination of all nuclear 
                commerce by NSG member states if India detonates a 
                nuclear explosive device or if the IAEA has determined 
                that India has violated its international safeguards 
                commitments.
                    (B) A requirement that any safeguards agreement 
                concluded between India and the IAEA provides for 
                safeguards in perpetuity for all nuclear materials, 
                equipment, and technology, and all facilities 
                designated as ``civil,'' in accordance with IAEA 
                standards, principles, and practices.
                    (C) A prohibition on the transfer of enrichment and 
                reprocessing technology and heavy water production 
                technology by any NSG member state to India and a 
                requirement that all bilateral nuclear cooperation 
                agreements between NSG member states and India 
                explicitly prohibit the replication of any dual-use 
                technology or use of such technology in any 
                unsafeguarded Indian facilities.
                    (D) A stipulation that NSG supplier states may not 
                grant India consent to reprocess nuclear fuel supplied 
                by an NSG member state except in a facility that is 
                under permanent and unconditional IAEA safeguards, and 
                that any material produced in such a facility may not 
                be transferred to any unsafeguarded facility.
                    (E) A requirement that NSG member states should 
                promptly consult regarding violations of commitments in 
                any bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between an 
                NSG member state and India in order to secure a timely 
                and coordinated response by NSG members to all such 
                violations, including termination of nuclear transfers 
                to India, that discourages individual NSG member states 
                from continuing bilateral cooperation until such time 
                as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has 
                been achieved.
                                 <all>
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