U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

52–320 1998

IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY:

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

PRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY PURSUANT TO H. RES. 581:

PRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT

DECEMBER 8 AND 9, 1998

Serial No. 68

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.,

Wisconsin

BILL McCOLLUM, Florida

GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

LAMAR SMITH, Texas

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia

STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER B. CANNON, Utah

JAMES E. ROGAN, California

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina

MARY BONO, California

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina

ZOE LOFGREN, California

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

MAXINE WATERS, California

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

THOMAS BARRETT, Wisconsin
(III)

MAJORITY STAFF

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Chief of Staff-General Counsel

JON W. DUDAS, Deputy General Counsel-Staff Director

DIANA L. SCHACHT, Deputy Staff Director-Chief Counsel

DANIEL M. FREEMAN, Parliamentarian-Counsel

PAUL J. MCNULTY, Director of Communications-Chief Counsel

JOSEPH H. GIBSON, Chief Counsel

RICK FILKINS, Counsel

SHAREE M. FREEMAN, Counsel

PETER J. LEVINSON, Counsel

JOHN F. MAUTZ, IV, Counsel

WILLIAM E. MOSCHELLA, Counsel

STEPHEN PINKOS, Counsel

GEORGE M. FISHMAN, Chief Counsel

MITCH GLAZIER, Chief Counsel

JOHN H. LADD, Chief Counsel

RAYMOND V. SMIETANKA, Chief Counsel

LAURA ANN BAXTER, Counsel

DANIEL J. BRYANT, Counsel

CATHLEEN A. CLEAVER, Counsel

VINCE GARLOCK, Counsel

JAMES W. HARPER, Counsel

SUSAN JENSEN–CONKLIN, Counsel

DEBRA K. LAMAN, Counsel

BLAINE S. MERRITT, Counsel

NICOLE R. NASON, Counsel

GLENN R. SCHMITT, Counsel

JIM Y. WILON, Counsel

DAVID P. SCHIPPERS, Chief Investigative

Counsel

SUSAN BOGART, Investigative Counsel

ROBERT S. HOOVER, Counsel

JOHN C. KOCORAS, Counsel

BERLE S. LITTMANN, Investigator

STEPHEN P. LYNCH, Professional Staff

Member

CHARLES F. MARINO, Counsel

JEFFREY J. PAVLETIC, Investigative Counsel

THOMAS M. SCHIPPERS, Investigative Counsel

ALBERT F. TRACY, Investigator

PETER J. WACKS, Investigator

DIANA L. WOZNICKI, Investigator

MINORITY STAFF

JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Chief Counsel-Staff Director

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority General

Counsel

DAVID G. LACHMANN, Counsel

CYNTHIA A. R. MARTIN, Counsel

HENRY MONIZ, Counsel

STEPHANIE J. PETERS, Counsel

SAMARA T. RYDER, Counsel

BRIAN P. WOOLFOLK, Counsel

ABBE D. LOWELL, Minority Chief Investigative

Counsel

SAMPAK P. GARG, Investigative Counsel

STEVEN F. REICH, Investigative Counsel

DEBORAH L. RHODE, Investigative Counsel

KEVIN M. SIMPSON, Investigative Counsel

LIS W. WIEHL, Investigative Counsel

(V)

C O N T E N T S

HEARING

Page

December 8, 1998 ..................................................................................................... 1

December 9, 1998 ..................................................................................................... 277

OPENING STATEMENTS

Hyde, Hon. Henry J., a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois,

and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary .....................................................2, 278

WITNESSES

Ackerman, Bruce, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University ................................................................................................................... 37

Beer, Samuel H., Eaton Professor of the Science of Government Emeritus,

Harvard University .............................................................................................. 32

Ben-Veniste, Richard, Esquire, Former Assistant U.S. Attorney ........................ 197

Craig, Gregory B., Esq., Assistant to the President and Special Counsel .......... 6

Davis, Richard J., Esq., Weil, Gotschal & Manges ............................................... 294

Dennis, Edward S.G., Jr., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius ........................................... 314

Drinan, Hon. Robert J., S.J., Former Member of Congress from Massachusetts ....................................................................................................................... 125

Hamilton, James Esq., Swidler, Berlin, Shereff & Friedman, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 197

Holtzman, Elizabeth, Former Member of Congress from Massachusetts ........... 118

Katzenbach, Hon. Nicholas, Former Attorney General of the United States ..... 14

Noble, Ronald, Esq., Professor of Law, New York University Law School ......... 318

Owens, Hon. Wayne, former Member of Congress from Utah ............................. 131

Ruff, Charles F.C., Counsel to the President ........................................................ 406

Sullivan, Thomas P., Esq., Former U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois 283

Wilentz, Sean, the Dayton Stockton Professor of History .................................... 20

Weld, William Hon., Former Governor of Massachusetts .................................... 327

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Ackerman, Bruce, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University: Prepared statement ................................................................................ 41

Beer, Samuel H., Eaton Professor of the Science of Government Emeritus,

Harvard University: Prepared statement .......................................................... 35

Ben-Veniste, Richard, Esq., Former Assistant U.S. Attorney: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 202

Davis, Richard J., Esq., Weil, Gotschal & Manges: Prepared statement ............ 298

Delahunt, Hon. William D., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts: Testimony by Kenneth Starr from December 1, 1998

hearing .................................................................................................................. 374

Dennis, Edward S.G., Jr., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius: Prepared statement ....... 316

Drinan, Hon. Robert J., S.J., Former Member of Congress from Massachusetts: Prepared statement ................................................................................... 127

Canady, Charles T., a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida:

Letter dated December 7, 1998, from Douglas W. Kmiec ............................. 109

Letter dated December 7, 1998, from Harvey C. Mansfield ......................... 105

Letter dated December 7, 1998, from Griffin B. Bell .................................... 117

Letter dated December 9, 1998, from Donald C. Alexander and other

materials relating to 1974 inquiry on the tax fraud article of impeachment against President Nixon ..................................................................... 188, 459
Page

VI

Canady, Charles T., a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida—

Continued

Remarks of Mr. Owens’ .................................................................................... 134

Statement by Professor Walter Berns ............................................................ 106

Cannon, Hon. Christopher B., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Utah: Documents titled Certificate of Service, and Declaration of Charles

F.C. Ruff ................................................................................................................ 475

Craig, Gregory B., Esq., Assistant to the President and Special Counsel:

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 10

Goodlatte, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia:

An Open Letter to the Members of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate .................................................................... 510

Holtzman, Elizabeth, Former Member of Congress from Massachusetts: Prepared statement ................................................................................................... 122

Hamilton, Jim: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 215

Jackson Lee, Hon. Sheila, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Texas: the Constitution of the United States .................................................... 394

Kalzenbach, Hon. Nicholas Former Attorney General of the United States ...... 17

McCollum, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida:

Congressional Research Service report on the Compilation of Presidential

Claims of Executive Privilege from the Kennedy Through the Clinton Administrations ........................................................................................................ 467

Noble, Ronald, Esq., Professor of Law, New York University Law School:

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 323

Owens, Hon. Wayne, Former Member of Congress from Utah: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 134

Sullivan, Thomas P., Esq., Former U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois:

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 287

Waters, Hon. Maxine, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Letter dated December 9, 1998 from Alcee L. Hastings ............................ 518

Weld, William Hon., Former Governor of Massachusetts: Prepared statement . 330
(1)

IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY:

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

PRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE

PRESIDENT

Hearing on Impeachment Inquiry Pursuant to

H. Res. 581

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1998

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2141,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde [chairman of

the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Henry J. Hyde, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Bill McCollum, George W. Gekas, Howard Coble,

Lamar S. Smith, Elton Gallegly, Charles T. Canady, Bob Inglis,

Bob Goodlatte, Stephen E. Buyer, Ed Bryant, Steve Chabot, Bob

Barr, William L. Jenkins, Asa Hutchinson, Edward A. Pease,

Christopher B. Cannon, James E. Rogan, Lindsey O. Graham,

Mary Bono, John Conyers, Jr., Barney Frank, Charles E. Schumer,

Howard L. Berman, Rick Boucher, Jerrold Nadler, Robert C. Scott,

Melvin L. Watt, Zoe Lofgren, Sheila Jackson Lee, Maxine Waters,

Martin T. Meehan, William D. Delahunt, Robert Wexler, Steven R.

Rothman, and Thomas M. Barrett.

Majority Staff Present: Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., general counselchief of staff; Jon W. Dudas, deputy general counsel-staff director;

Diana L. Schacht, deputy staff director-chief counsel; Daniel M.

Freeman, parliamentarian-counsel; Joseph H. Gibson, chief counsel; Rick Filkins, counsel; Sharee M. Freeman, counsel; John F.

Mautz, IV, counsel; William Moschella, counsel; Stephen Pinkos,

counsel; Sheila F. Klein, executive assistant to general counselchief of staff; Annelie Weber, executive assistant to deputy general

counsel-staff director; Samuel F. Stratman, press secretary; Rebecca S. Ward, officer manager; James B. Farr, financial clerk;

Elizabeth Singleton, legislative correspondent; Sharon L.

Hammersla, computer systems coordinator; Michele Manon, administrative assistant; Joseph McDonald, publications clerk; Shawn

Friesen, staff assistant/clerk; Robert Jones, staff assistant; Ann

Jemison, receptionist; Michael Connolly, communications assistant;

Michelle Morgan, press secretary; and Patricia Katyoka, research

assistant.
2

Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law Staff

Present: Ray Smietanka, chief counsel; and Jim Harper, counsel.

Subcommittee on the Constitution Staff Present: John H. Ladd,

chief counsel; and Cathleen A. Cleaver, counsel.

Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property Staff Present:

Mitch Glazier, chief counsel; Blaine S. Merritt, counsel; Vince

Garlock, counsel; and Debra K. Laman.

Subcommittee on Crime Staff Present: Paul J. McNulty, director

of communications-chief counsel; Glenn R. Schmitt, counsel; Daniel

J. Bryant, counsel; and Nicole R. Nason, counsel.

Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Staff Present: George

M. Fishman, chief counsel; Laura Ann Baxter, counsel; and Jim Y.

Wilon, counsel.

Majority Investigative Staff Present: David P. Schippers, chief investigative counsel; Susan Bogart, investigative counsel; Thomas

M. Schippers, investigative counsel; Jeffrey Pavletic, investigative

counsel; Charles F. Marino, counsel; John C. Kocoras, counsel;

Diana L. Woznicki, investigator; Peter J. Wacks, investigator; Albert F. Tracy, investigator; Berle S. Littmann, investigator; Stephen P. Lynch, professional staff member; Nancy Ruggero-Tracy,

office manager/coordinator; and Patrick O’Sullivan, staff assistant.

Minority Staff Present: Julian Epstein, minority chief counselstaff director; Perry Apelbaum, minority general counsel; Samara

T. Ryder counsel; Brian P. Woolfolk, counsel; Henry Moniz, counsel; Robert Raben, minority counsel; Stephanie Peters, counsel;

David Lachmann, counsel; Anita Johnson, executive assistant to

minority chief counsel-staff director, and Dawn Burton, minority

clerk.

Minority Investigative Staff Present: Abbe D. Lowell, minority

chief investigative counsel; Lis W. Wiehl, investigative counsel;

Deborah L. Rhodes, investigative counsel; Kevin M. Simpson, investigative counsel; Stephen F. Reich, investigative counsel;

Sampak P. Garg, investigative counsel; and Maria Reddick, minority clerk.

Chairman HYDE. The committee will come to order. A quorum

being present, and pursuant to notice, the committee will come to

order for the purpose of conducting an impeachment inquiry pursuant to House Resolution 581. Ranking member John Conyers and

I will make brief opening statements. Without objection, all members’ and witnesses’ written statements will be included in the

record.

Now, members should know that while in the past I have been

liberal with the gavel, because we have many witnesses, I intend

to adhere strictly to the 5-minute rule. That means questions and

answers will end after 5 minutes. Members who make 4-minute

speeches and ask five questions in the final minute will not get

their questions answered.

I now recognize myself for purposes of an opening statement.

I have made a commitment to members of this committee, to

Members of the House, to the President and to the people that I

will do all I can to ensure that this impeachment inquiry will be

concluded by the end of the year. I plan on honoring that commitment, and today’s hearing moves us in that direction.
3

Yesterday afternoon, the White House provided us with a list of

14 witnesses that it requested this committee to hear. I am pleased

to accommodate the White House’s request. We will hear the testimony of all 14 witnesses as well as Special Counsel Greg Craig and

White House Counsel Charles Ruff.

Therefore, I would like to set the schedule for the remaining Judiciary Committee proceedings. At the request of the White House

counsel, we have begun today at 10 a.m. and we will hear from

three panels of witnesses today, one panel tomorrow morning, and

the testimony of White House Counsel Charles Ruff tomorrow

afternoon.

The first panel will be Special Counsel Greg Craig and five witnesses who wish to speak about constitutional standards for impeachment. Mr. Craig will be recognized for 15 minutes. All other

panel witnesses will each have 10 minutes to make a statement.

After the testimony of the witnesses, members will be allowed to

ask questions for 5 minutes and that will not be a liberal gavel, but

a strict gavel.

I ask that the members pay attention to their time and be aware

that their questions should be asked and answered within their 5

minutes. The White House has proposed many witnesses, and we

want to make sure that everyone has an opportunity to be heard.

In the interest of time, there will not be questioning by committee

counsel for these four panels.

After the hearing of Panel I, we will move immediately to Panel

II, and then to Panel III. We will observe the same procedures as

Panel I, 10-minute witness presentations followed by questions by

members under the 5-minute rule.

Tomorrow we will hear the fourth panel of witnesses. I hope to

start at 8 a.m. tomorrow morning to ensure ample time for the

White House presentation. Tomorrow afternoon, the committee will

receive the testimony of White House Counsel Charles Ruff. After

his presentation, members will question Mr. Ruff under the 5–

minute rule. He will also be available for questioning by committee

counsel.

Thursday morning, we will have a presentation by Minority

Chief Investigative Counsel Abbe Lowell at 9 a.m. and a presentation by Chief Investigative Counsel David Schippers at 1 p.m. Beginning at 4 p.m., we will begin consideration of a resolution containing articles of impeachment for our debate and deliberation.

We will hear opening statements from all members Thursday

evening. Friday, we will begin consideration and debate of articles

of impeachment.

I now recognize the distinguished gentleman from Michigan and

ranking member of the committee, John Conyers, for his opening

remarks. Immediately following the gentleman’s remarks, we will

hear from Special Counsel Greg Craig and the other witnesses of

Panel I.

Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing the White

House the opportunity to present their witnesses. The Independent

Counsel had 4 years to investigate the President. This committee

has had 4 months. The White House is now getting 2 days.
4

There is no question that the President’s conduct was wrong,

that he misled the country and the Nation. But I believe that the

legal case against the President is not strong. Republicans have

said that Democrats do not contest the charges. Well, we do. There

is no question that the President misled the country in his January

21 press conference. But that does not amount to perjury. The

President already admitted before the grand jury to an improper

sexual relationship. Now the Republicans insist that he must admit

to sexual relations under the contorted definition provided by the

Paula Jones attorneys. That is really at the heart of the perjury

charge. That is the strength of its foundation.

The effort to find Monica Lewinsky a job started well before

there was any Paula Jones witness list. The President never offered Lewinsky a job. That charge is frivolous.

Betty Currie was not on the witness list, and thus the President’s conversations with her could not possibly have been the

basis for obstruction. It is perfectly legal for the President, or anyone else, to tell a civil witness—in this case, Miss Lewinsky—that

an affidavit may satisfy the requirement of the court. That is not

obstruction.

It was Monica Lewinsky’s idea to return the gifts. The President

was never concerned about the gifts and kept giving them. And

Monica Lewinsky, in the most significant, clarion statement before

the grand jury, said that no one asked her to lie and no one promised her a job.

The legal case against the President is, in my judgment, a house

of cards. The Judiciary Committee has heard from no factual witnesses to validate any of the charges. Instead, it is relying on

uncross-examined, often contradictory grand jury hearsay to support an already weak case.

That would not satisfy any court of law, and it cannot possibly

serve as the evidentiary foundation for an impeachment. And even

if these shaky allegations were proven true, they would not rise to

the standard of impeachment which requires the abuse of official

power.

So we are at a critical crossroads today. We can either impeach

the President, along a largely party line vote, and send this resolution to the Senate where there will be a 6–month or more, fullblown, intensified investigation; or we can find a meaningful way

of censuring the President. The public, you may know, is overwhelmingly against impeachment and is for censure.

But our new Republican leadership, led by Speaker-Elect Livingston and Whip Tom DeLay, are thumbing their noses at the American people and telling them that the solution the American people

want most cannot even come to the floor for a vote.

Well, if the American people ever wanted strong evidence that

the extremists are still in control of this process, then that is it.

It is time to give the American people a holiday gift, to end this

sordid tale. But the gift that the extremists on the other side offer

is 6 more months of this investigation by changing the venue to the

Senate.

This, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, is not the way to bring this

important issue to a speedy conclusion.

Thank you.
5

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. Mr. Craig, Attorney

General Katzenbach, Professor Ackerman, Professor Wilentz and

Professor Beer, would you mind standing to receive the oath.

Would you raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Scott?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. I understood

that we would have a committee meeting prior to the receipt of testimony. Are motions at this point out of order?

Chairman HYDE. I think we are going to do that tomorrow morning, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I would like the record to reflect that I had a

motion that would be timely now, that might not be timely tomorrow morning.

Chairman HYDE. What is your motion?

Mr. SCOTT. To ask for a specific scope of inquiry prior to the

White House rebuttal of the undefined allegations. If we are asking

them to rebut, we ought to have them notified of what the allegations and what the scope is.

We only have 5 minutes to ask questions. We have had various

different lists of what the allegations are. We would like to use our

5 minutes effectively and not ask questions about allegations that

we are not actually pursuing.

Chairman HYDE. Well, this is a hearing, so it is not appropriate

that you be recognized for the purposes of that motion. We will proceed with the hearing.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Let the record show that the witnesses answered the question posed by the oath in the affirmative. And I

will give a very brief introduction. Mr. Craig may want to make a

more fulsome introduction, and I don’t want to foreclose you from

doing that.

Mr. Gregory Craig is Assistant to the President and Special

Counsel. The Honorable Nicholas Katzenbach is a former Attorney

General of the United States under President Johnson and Under

Secretary of State. He is also retired as Senior Vice President and

Chief Legal Officer of IBM.

Professor Bruce Ackerman is the Sterling Professor of Law and

Political Science at Yale University and author of ‘‘Volume II: We

the People,’’ which includes an historical and legal analysis of the

impeachment of Andrew Johnson. Professor Sean Wilentz is the

Dayton Stockton Professor of History and Director of Program in

American Studies at Princeton University. Professor Wilentz is an

expert and teacher of American history from the American Revolution through Reconstruction. He is the author of six books and numerous articles.

Professor Samuel H. Beer is the Eaton Professor of the Science

of Government Emeritus at Harvard University. He has written

and lectured and taught about the American system of government

for over 65 years.
6

TESTIMONY OF GREGORY B. CRAIG, ESQ., ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIDENT AND SPECIAL COUNSEL; HON. NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES; SEAN WILENTZ, THE DAYTON STOCKTON PROFESSOR OF HISTORY; SAMUEL H. BEER, EATON PROFESSOR OF

THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT EMERITUS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; AND BRUCE ACKERMAN, STERLING PROFESSOR

OF LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE UNIVERSITY

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Craig, you are recognized for a 15-minute

statement.

TESTIMONY OF GREGORY B. CRAIG, ESQ.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Conyers, members of the committee, good morning. My name is Greg Craig, and I am

Special Counsel to the President. Let me first say that it is my

honor, as well as an obligation, to appear before this committee in

defense of the President.

The purpose of my appearance is to describe briefly and in gen- eral terms how we plan to proceed with the presentation of the

President’s defense over the next 2 days. The time has finally come for the President to make his case and to give his side of the story. Over the next 2 days we will present

to this committee, to the Congress, and to the country as a whole,

a powerful case—based on the facts already in the record and on

the law—a powerful case against the impeachment of this President.

During our presentation today and tomorrow we will show from our history and our heritage, from any fair reading of the Constitution, and from any fair sounding of our countrymen and women,

that nothing in this case justifies this Congress overturning a national election and removing our President from office.

As we begin this undertaking, I make only one plea to you, and

I hope it is not a futile one coming this late in the process. Open

your mind, open your heart, and focus on the record. As you sit

there listening to me at this moment, you may already be determined to vote to approve some articles of impeachment against this

President. That is your right and your duty if you believe the facts

and the law justify such a vote.

But there is a lot of conventional wisdom about this case that is

just plain wrong, and if you are in fact disposed to vote for impeachment in the name of a justice that is fair and blind and impartial, please do so only on the basis of the real record and on the

real testimony, not on the basis of what someone else tells you is

in the record.

By the close of tomorrow, all the world will see one simple and

undeniable fact: Whatever there is in the record that shows that

what the President did was wrong and blameworthy, there is nothing in the record—in either the law or the facts—that would justify

his impeachment and removal from office.

In truth, I would not be fairly representing President Clinton if

I did not convey to you his profound and powerful regret for what

he has done. He has insisted and personally instructed his lawyers

that no technicalities or legalities should be allowed to obscure the

simple moral truth that his behavior in this matter was wrong. He
7

misled his wife and family, his friends and colleagues, and our Nation about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.

The President wants everyone to know—the committee, the Congress, and the country—that he is genuinely sorry for the pain and

the damage that he has caused and for the wrongs that he has

committed.

But as an attorney, I must caution this committee to draw a

sharp distinction between immoral conduct and illegal acts. Just as

no fancy language can obscure the simple fact that what the President did was morally wrong, no amount of rhetoric can change the

legal reality that there are no grounds for impeachment. As surely

as we all know that what he did is sinful, we also know it is not

impeachable.

Let me assure the members of this committee, the Members of

the House of Representatives, and the American public of one

thing: In the course of our presentation today and tomorrow, we

will address the factual and evidentiary issues directly. We will

draw this committee’s attention to evidence that tends to clear the

President with respect to each of the various charges—evidence

that was left out of the Independent Counsel’s referral, evidence

that has not been widely reported in the press, but evidence that

reveals the weakness of the charges being brought against the

President. We are confident that at the end of this presentation,

you will agree that impeachment is neither right nor wise nor warranted.

When it comes to constitutional standards for impeachment as

conceived by the Founding Fathers, we will show that the Constitution requires proof of official misconduct and abuse of high public

office for the drastic remedy of impeachment to be appropriate.

When it comes to standards of proof that should apply to the evidence that is brought before this committee, we will argue that this

President should be considered innocent until proven guilty, and

that he should be informed with particularity as to the facts and

specifics of the misconduct that he is accused of, especially when

it comes to the allegations of perjury.

On those allegations, we will show that neither the law of perjury nor the facts of this case could sustain a criminal prosecution,

much less impeachment.

Mr. Chairman, I am willing to concede that in the Jones deposition the President’s testimony was evasive, incomplete, misleading,

even maddening, but it was not perjury.

On the allegation of perjury before the grand jury, which we all

agree is the more serious offense, please look at the real record, not

the referral’s report of that record. Millions of Americans watched

that testimony. They concluded, as I believe you too will find, that

in fact the President admitted to an improper, inappropriate, and

intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He did not deny it; he admitted it. Fair-minded Americans heard what the President said,

and they knew what the President meant.

When it comes to allegations that the President, with Ms.

Lewinsky and Ms. Currie and Mr. Jordan, obstructed justice, we

will show that the evidence presented in the referral is misleading,

incomplete, and frequently inaccurate. We will show that the President did not obstruct justice with respect to gifts, the job search,
8

or the affidavit. And we will show that the President did not seek

wrongfully to influence Ms. Currie’s testimony.

Again, we will ask you to look at the real record, not the referral’s version of the record. And the real record shows that the

sworn testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie and Mr. Jordan, far

from incriminating the President, actually exonerates him. And yet

their testimony, although crystal clear before the grand jury, is

edited, modified, qualified, or ignored in the referral.

When it comes to allegations that the President abused his office,

we will show that the President’s assertions of executive privilege

were perfectly proper and that the claims of attorney-client privilege were justified under the circumstances.

And when it comes to allegations that the President used the

power of his office to mislead his aides, not, as one might think,

for the purpose of protecting himself and his family, but, as alleged, to mislead the grand jury, we will show that false denials

about an improper private relationship, whether those denials are

made in private or before the entire world, simply do not constitute

an abuse of office that justifies impeachment.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, before introducing the distinguished

members of this panel, let me just point out that in the course of

this impeachment inquiry the members of this committee have

learned nothing new either about the Lewinsky matter or about

any other matter warranting consideration in these proceedings except that the President has finally, if belatedly, been cleared on the

charges concerning Whitewater, the file matter, and the travel office. There has been no new evidence and there are no new

charges.

So I say to the members of the committee, if back in September

when you received this referral, if back in October when you voted

to conduct this inquiry, if back then you did not think that the referral justified impeaching President Clinton, there is no reason for

you to think so today.

There can be no more solemn or awesome moment in the history

of this Republic than when the Members of the House of Representatives contemplate returning an article of impeachment

against the President of the United States. There can be no more

soul-searching vote in the career of a Member of the House of Representatives than when he or she considers impeachment of the

President of the United States. These are weighty issues and great

moments of conscience and consequence. Please do not let the passion of partisan politics on either side blind your eyes to the truth

of the law, the evidence, and above all, the national interest.

This first panel of witnesses is composed of a distinguished public servant and a group of eminent scholars who will testify about

the history of impeachment and the constitutional standards that

should govern impeachment.

The second panel of witnesses will bring the wisdom of hard-won

experience—experience, Mr. Chairman, earned in this very room

serving on this very committee under the leadership of that distinguished Chairman, Peter Rodino, whose portrait hangs on the wall

before me. They will bring that wisdom to bear on the vital issue

of what was abuse of power by a President in 1974 compared with
9

the allegations and the evidence of abuse of power by this President in 1998.

The third panel of witnesses will discuss how we should examine

and evaluate the evidence that is before us with respect to the

abuse of power and the fact-finding process. And then tomorrow,

we will hear the testimony of a fourth group of witnesses, experienced lawyers in the criminal justice system who will shed light on

the prosecutorial standards of bringing criminal cases of alleging

perjury and obstruction of justice.

To close, tomorrow afternoon, Charles Ruff, Counsel to the President, will present the President’s final defense to the committee

and respond to questions.

On behalf of the President, I thank the committee for its time

and its attention, and I now turn the microphone over to Mr. Katzenbach, the former Attorney General of the United States.

[The statement of Mr. Craig follows:]
10
11
12
13
14

Mr. ROGAN. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry. Chairman HYDE. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. ROGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the written statements of the respective witnesses be provided to the members of the committee?

Chairman HYDE. That is a good question. I am not sure.

Mr. Craig, do you have a written statement?

Mr. CRAIG. This is my only written statement. I will be happy

to copy it and distribute it among the members.

Chairman HYDE. Would one of our staff get Mr. Craig’s statement—we can do that if you don’t mind.

Jim, would you get the copy?

Mr. CRAIG. Pay no attention to my edits.

Chairman HYDE. Will the other witnesses have written statements that we can avail ourselves of? It is helpful for the record

and for our edification.

Mr. Katzenbach.

TESTIMONY OF HONORABLE NICHOLAS KATZENBACH

Mr. KATZENBACH. I do, Mr. Chairman, but I would appreciate it

if I could have the written statement until I have completed reading it.

Chairman HYDE. Well, that gives you a considerable advantage,

but go ahead.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I think, with this committee, I need it, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Touche, touche.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Proceed?

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me first say,

Mr. Chairman, that I thought your introduction was very fulsome,

and I appreciate it.

Chairman HYDE. Good.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I also appreciate the opportunity to testify before this once-familiar-to-me committee on the important constitutional question of impeachment of the President of the United

States which is before this committee.

A great deal has been written and spoken on the subject of impeachment by the media, by Members of Congress, by the witnesses testifying before this committee, by academics and others—

so much, in fact, that it seems to me we are in danger of losing

sight of and understanding the fundamentals. So in the hope of

simplifying a complex issue, I would like to begin with some fundamentals that are not, I believe, controversial.

The process of impeachment is simply to remove from office upon

conviction, not to otherwise punish the person involved. The Constitution provides the legislative branch, the Congress, with this

means of removing from office the President, the Vice President,

and all civil officers upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other

high crimes and misdemeanors. The threshold problem for the committee is, of course, to determine what constitutes high crimes and

misdemeanors which would justify removal from office of an elected

President.

The phrase, ‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors,’’ is not a familiar

one in modern American jurisprudence. Common law constituted a
15

category of political crimes against the state and neither ‘‘high

crime’’ nor ‘‘high misdemeanor’’ have ever been terms used in the

criminal law. In the United States, one of the founders, James Wilson, made essentially that point when he wrote that, quote, ‘‘Impeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes

and misdemeanors, to political punishments.’’

Or, as Justice Story observed, ‘‘Impeachment is a proceeding

purely of a political nature. It is not so much designed to punish

an offender as to secure the state against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor his property, but simply divests him of his political capacity,’’ end quote.

The problem which the Founders faced was how to adapt this

process from a parliamentary system in which there was no separation of powers to one in which separation of powers was of great

importance. In Great Britain, the impeachment process was aimed

at officers appointed by the Crown in circumstances historically

where the king himself could not be removed from office, except

perhaps by revolution, such as Oliver Cromwell’s. As the British

system has evolved and the prime minister become essentially a

legislatively elected official where he or she could be forced to a

midterm election by a parliamentary vote of no confidence, impeachment has lost its punch. But in the United States where the

President is elected for a fixed term of office different from the legislative terms, the Founders thought it essential to have some

means of removing him or her before the expiration of his term if

he is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors.

And whatever that term may be found to mean, it is clear that

the Founders intended it to be a limited power. Because in their

debates, the Founders dealt virtually exclusively with the President. Civil officers, as you know, were added later in the process.

And because for most of the Convention the impeachment clause

was confined to treason and bribery, they equated all high crimes

and misdemeanors with, in the debates, great offenses when that

term was added.

Now, I appreciate this brief history does not resolve in any decisive fashion the threshold problem the committee is facing in determining what conduct by a President justifies impeachment. But I

do think it tends to provide some parameters which should be useful and which should not, at least when phrased generally, be very

controversial.

It is a serious matter for a Congress to remove a President who

has been elected in a democratic process for a term of 4 years, raising fundamental issues about the separation of powers. If that

power is not limited, as it clearly is, then any President could be

removed if a sufficient number of Members of the House and Senate simply disagreed with his policies, thus converting impeachment into a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Whatever its merits, that is not our constitutional system.

Because impeachment is a political process, it has always had a

strong partisan quality element and strong partisan motivation. It

still does and in a democratic political system probably always will.

But that fact simply increases the risk of subverting the constitutional system.
16

To appreciate those risks, you need only consider the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, a President who came close to being convicted in a process as unfair as it was partisan, which should be

an object lesson for all.

The job of this committee is to weigh the facts of President Clinton’s alleged conduct against the limiting provision of the Constitution, ‘‘other high crimes and misdemeanors.’’ The job may seemingly be made more difficult because of the application of that term

to judges as well as the President and Vice President. But judges

are appointed during good behavior, a term which significantly

does not apply to limit the 4-year term of the President. By removing one of several hundred Federal judges from office doesn’t have

the same constitutional significance as removing the President.

Even removal of a Supreme Court Justice would raise different

considerations from removing the President where the standard is

far higher than for judges, as Congressman—as he was then—Gerald Ford recognized when he proposed impeachment of Justice

Douglas. To come to the same conclusions on the same facts in

such different situations would make a mockery of the Constitution

and the intentions of the Founding Fathers.

Only if one takes the view articulated by Senator Fessenden in

the Johnson impeachment, that impeachment is a power, quote, ‘‘to

be exercised with extreme caution in extreme cases,’’ can the same

standards apply to Presidents and judges. One simply needs to

take into consideration the different roles and responsibilities of

the officers involved.

The proper way to resolve these problems which are made more

difficult by unfamiliar language than they are by clear purpose, is

simply to return to the reasons for the provision. If we think of it

in political, not partisan, but political terms impeachment is designed to provide the legislative branch with a method of removing

a person from office whose conduct is so egregious as to justify reversing the process by which he was appointed or elected.

It seems to me clear that in our system of separation of powers,

this cannot mean simply disagreement, however sincere, however

strongly felt, with either the decisions of judges or the policies of

the President. It must be some conduct, some acts which are so serious as to bring into question the capacity of the person involved

to carry out his role with the confidence of the public.

If I am correct—and this seems to me the fundamental question—it is simply whether the President has done something which

has destroyed public confidence in his ability to continue in that office. If the public does not believe that what he has done seriously

affects his ability to perform his public duties as President, should

the committee conclude that his acts have destroyed public confidence essential to that office? The only question, after all, is removal from office of an elected official. Is it proper? Is it the proper

role of a partisan majority in Congress to conclude that the offenses are so serious as to warrant removal, even if the public believes otherwise? I don’t find the arguments for this position persuasive.

First, there is the argument that perjury—and for the purposes

of this analysis, I take it to be correct—is always so serious, irrespective of circumstance, as to warrant removal of a President. I
17

suggest that some perjury is more serious than others—if, for example, the President were to swear falsely that he had no knowledge of a CIA plot to assassinate the Speaker.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Katzenbach, could you wind up? Because

your 10 minutes has expired.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Are you sure, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. Yes, that big red light——

Mr. KATZENBACH. Could I have 1 more minute?

Chairman HYDE. Surely, but I just wanted you to know.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Okay. The point is simply that all perjury may

be reprehensible, but it is still not of similar import when the ultimate issue is public confidence to perform the duties of office.

If the argument is made that the public’s view as to what does

or does not constitute a cause for impeachment is irrelevant because of the duty of the House to determine whether or not the

President has committed a high crime or misdemeanor, I would

agree if it were a criminal case. I would agree if the President was

extremely unpopular, because I could not then separate that popularity from the acts causing the impeachment. In those circumstances, the Congress would have a particularly difficult job.

But this Congress and this committee are faced with a totally

new impeachment problem. Due to the existence of the Independent Counsel, the facts are publicly known, the areas of factual dispute relatively minor. Members of Congress have expressed concern over the evils of perjury and other alleged offenses and their

serious nature. For whatever reason, the public remains

unpersuaded.

Finally, I cannot see any constitutional basis for impeachment.

To remove a popularly elected President requires, in my judgment,

showing a great offense against the public sufficient to bring into

question of reasonable people whether or not he should be removed.

The threshold constitutional question, Mr. Chairman, for each

Member of Congress is that he—which he must decide, or her—can

be simply stated: Is the conduct of the President such that he

should be removed from office because, as a consequence of that

conduct, the public no longer has confidence that he can perform

the duties of that high office.

Remember, impeachment is a political process, a political remedy

to preserve confidence in that political process, not to punish a perpetrator.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Katzenbach.

[The statement of Mr. Katzenbach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS KATZENBACH

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: My name is Nicholas Katzenbach.

I am a retired Senior Vice-President and Chief Legal Officer of IBM and a former

Attorney General of the United States and Under Secretary of State now semi-retired from the practice of law in New Jersey. I appreciate the opportunity to testify

before this once-familiar Committee on the important Cosntitutional question of Impeachment of the President of the United States.

A great deal has been written and spoken on the subject of impeachment by the

media, by Members of Congress, witnesses testifying before the Committee, academics and others—so much, in fact, that it seems to me we are in danger of losing sight

and understanding of the fundamentals. So, in the hope of simplifying a complex

issue, I’d like to begin with some fundamentals that are not, I believe, controversial.
18

The process of impeachment is simply to remove from office upon conviction—not

to otherwise punish the person involved. The Constitution provides the legislative

branch—the Congress—with this means of removing from office the President, VicePresident and all civil officers upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high

crimes and misdemeanors. The threshold problem for the Committee and the House

is, of course, to determine what constitutes the ‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors’’

which would justify removal from office of an elected President. The phrase ‘‘high

crimes and misdemeanors’’ is not a familiar one in modern jurisprudence.

At common law it constituted a category of political crimes against the state, and

neither ‘‘high crime’’ or ‘‘high misdemeanor’’ were ever terms used in criminal law.

In the United States one of the Founders, James Wilson, made essentially the same

point when he wrote that ‘‘impeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments’’. Or, as Justice Story

observed, impeachment is ‘‘a proceeding purely of a political nature. It is not so

much designed to punish an offender as to secure the state against gross political

misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor his property, but simply divests

him of his political capacity’’.

The problem which the Founders faced was how to adapt this process from a Parliamentary system in which there was no separation of powers to one in which Separation of Powers was of great importance. In Great Britain the impeachment process was aimed at officers appointed by the Crown in circumstances where the King

himself could not be removed from office except by a revolution such as Oliver

Cromwell’s. As the British system evolved and the Prime Minister became essentially a legislatively elected official where he or she could be forced to a mid-term

election by a parliamentary vote of no confidence, impeachment lost its punch.

But in the United States, where the President is elected for a fixed term of office

different from the legislative terms, the Founders thought it essential to have some

means of removing him or her before the expiration of his term if he was guilty of

‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors’’. And whatever that term may be found to mean,

it is clear that the Founders intended it to be a limited power. Because in their debates the Founders dealt virtually exclusively with the President (civil officers were

added late in the process), and because for most of the Convention the impeachment

clause was confined to treason and bribery, they equated ‘‘other high crimes and

misdemeanors’’ with ‘‘great offenses’’ when that term was added.

I appreciate that this brief history does not revolve in any decisive fashion the

threshold problem the Committee is facing in determining what conduct by a President justifies impeachment. But I do think it tends to provide some parameters

which should be helpful and which should not, when phrased generally, be very controversial. It is a serious matter for the Congress to remove a President who has

been elected in a democratic process for a term of four years, raising fundamental

issues about the Separation of Powers. If that power is not limited—as it clearly

is—then any President could be removed if a sufficient number of Members of the

House and Senate simply disagreed with his policies thus converting impeachment

into a Parliamentary vote of no confidence. Whatever its merits, that is not our Constitutional system.

Because impeacement is a political process it has always had a strong partisan

political element and motivation. It still does and in a democratic political system

probably always will. But that fact obviously increases the risk of subverting the

Constitutional system. To appreciate those risks one need only review the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, an unpopular President who came close to being

convicted in a process as unfair as it was partisan and an object lesson for all.

The job of this Committee is to weigh the facts of President Clinton’s alleged conduct against the limiting provision of the Constitution—‘‘other high crimes and misdemeanors’’. The job may seemingly be made more difficult because of the application of that term to judges as well as the President and Vice-President: judges are

appointed during ‘‘good behavior’’, a term which significantly does not apply to limit

the four year term of the President. But removing one of several hundred federal

judges from office does not have the same Constitutional significance as removing

the President; even removal of a Supreme Court Justice would raise different considerations than removing the President where the standard is far higher than for

judges, as Congressman (as he then was) Gerald Ford recognized when he proposed

the impeachment of Justice William Douglas.

To come to the same conclusions on the same facts in such different situations

would make a mockery of the Constitution and the intention of the Founding Fathers. Only if one takes the view articulated by Senator Fessenden in the Johnson

impeachment that impeachment is a power ‘‘to be exercised with extreme caution’’

in ‘‘extreme cases’’ can the same standard apply to both Presidents and judges. One
19

simply needs to take into consideration the different roles and responsibilities of the

offices involved.

The proper way to resolve these problems—which are made more difficult by un- familiar language than by clear purpose—is simply to return to the reasons for the

provision. If we think of it in political—not partisan—terms, impeachment is designed to provide the legislative branch with a method of removing a person from

office whose conduct is so egregious as to justify reversing the process by which he

was appointed or elected. It seems clear to me that in our system of Separation of

Powers this cannot mean simply disagreement—however sincere and however

strongly felt—with either the decisions of judges or the policies of Presidents. It

must be some conduct—some acts—which are so serious as to bring into question

the capacity of the person involved to carry out his role with the confidence of the

public.

If I am correct, then it seems clear to me that the fundamental question is simply whether the President has done something which has destroyed the public’s confidence in his ability to continue in office. If the public does not believe that what

he has done seriously affects his ability to perform his or her public duties as President, should the Committee conclude that his acts have destroyed the public confidence essential to that office? The only question, after all, is removal from office

of an elected official. Is it the proper role of a partisan majority in Congress to conclude that the offenses are so serious as to warrant removal even if the public believes otherwise?

I do not find the arguments for this position persuasive in the slightest. First, there is the argument that perjury (and for purposes of analysis I take this as correct) is always so serious (irrespective of circumstance) as to warrant removal of a

President. I suggest that some perjury is more serious than others: If, for example,

the President were to swear falsely that he had no knowledge of a CIA plot to assassinate the Speaker, that would be pretty serious—and I have no doubt the public

would regard it as such. Indeed, if he simply told the public, not under oath, that

he had no knowledge of such serious misconduct when he did have knowledge, I

think that would raise serious questions of impeachability. My point is simply that

all perjury may be reprehensible, but it is still not of similar import when the ultimate issue is public confidence to perform the duties of office. Isn’t it clear that despite the strongly held views of some, the public does not put perjury about sexual

relations in the category of ‘‘high crimes or misdemeanors’’? Second, the argument is made that the public’s view as to what does or does not constitute a cause for impeachment is irrelevant because of the duty of the House

to determine whether or not the President has committed a ‘‘high crime or misdemeanor’’. If this were a criminal trial, I would agree. If the President were extremely unpopular, as was Andrew Johnson, I would agree—simply because I would

be unable to separate dislike for the President based on unpopular policies from lack

of confidence based on ‘‘high crimes or misdemeanors’’. A public that does not like

the President is more likely to find high crimes and misdemeanors whatever the

facts. In those circumstances the Congress has a particularly difficult and demanding task of being sure that its partisan feelings and those of the public are not subverting the Constitutional standard; Congress must be sure that there has been a

loss of confidence because of the President’s personal behavior and not his policies.

From the retrospective of history one cannot but admire those Senators in the Johnson impeachment trial who, despite political affiliation or interest, had the courage

to see that Constitutional distinction and who voted to acquit because, whatever the

political feeling, the Constitutional standard had not been met.

This Committee and this Congress are also faced with a totally new impeachment

problem. Due to the existence of the Independent Counsel the facts are publicly

known and the areas of factual dispute relatively minor. Members of Congress have

expressed concern over the evils of perjury and other alleged offenses and their serious nature. For whatever reason, the public remains unpersuaded. It continues, in

the recent election and in the polls, to express confidence in the President’s ability

to carry out his official responsibilities. In those circumstances it is difficult for me

to see any basis for his removal other than the obviously partisan—however sincere—views of a putative majority.

Frankly, I cannot see any Constitutional basis for impeachment. To remove a popularly elected President requires, in my judgment, a showing of ‘‘great offenses’’

against the public weal sufficient to bring into question in the minds of reasonable

people the capacity of the incumbent to continue to govern in a democracy with public support. If those ‘‘great offenses’’ are known, I have no doubt the public will appreciate their serious nature and react accordingly. Today the public knows all the

facts and does not regard them as of sufficient importance to justify impeachment.

In these unprecedented circumstances a contrary finding by the Committee would
20

appear to be simply an act of political partisanship, not adherence to the Constitution. That would be most unfortunate and most destructive of our Constitutional

Separation of Powers.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Professor Bruce Ackerman of Yale.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think it is Mr. Wilentz.

Chairman HYDE. All right. I think we have had a substitution temporarily. Professor Sean Wilentz of Princeton. Professor WILENTZ. Turn the switch on.

TESTIMONY OF SEAN WILENTZ

Mr. WILENTZ. There it is, okay. Wilentz in for Ackerman. Mr. Chairman and members of the Judiciary Committee, it is a high honor to address you today on the grave and momentous matter of presidential impeachment. Although I appear at invitation of

the White House, I wish to make it clear from the start that I have

no intention of defending the President over his confessed and alleged misdeeds. Lawyers with a far greater familiarity with the

evidence than I are far better equipped to do that. Certainly I do

not think that the President is blameless in these matters, something that I have noted many times over the years in my writings. Instead, I wish to defend the institution of the presidency, the Constitution, and the rule of law from what I see as the attacks

upon them that have accompanied the continuing inquiry into the

President’s misconduct. In time, we will learn how much these attacks have been calculated and how much they have been unwitting. Either way, they are extremely dangerous.

It is no exaggeration to say that upon this impeachment inquiry,

as upon all presidential impeachment inquiries, hinges the fate of

our American political institutions. It is that important. As a historian, it is clear to me that the impeachment of President Clinton

would do great damage to those institutions and to the rule of law,

much greater damage than the crimes of which President Clinton

has been accused.

More important, it is clear to me that any Representative who

votes in favor of impeachment, but who is not absolutely convinced

that the President may have committed impeachable offenses—not

merely crimes or misdemeanors, but high crimes or misdemeanors—will be fairly accused of gross dereliction of duty and earn the

condemnation of history.

I would like to address three basic points of historical relevance:

the grounds for impeachment as envisaged by the framers of the

Constitution and our understanding of them, the dangers of politicizing the impeachment process, and the relation between impeachment and the rule of law.

First, regarding the framers, the scholarly testimony on November 9th before the subcommittee regarding the Constitution

showed—alas, at mind-numbing length—that there is disagreement

over what constitutes grounds for presidential impeachment as envisaged by the framers. Yet, the testimony also showed that there

is substantial common ground. Above all, the scholars agreed that

not all criminal acts are necessarily impeachable acts. Only, ‘‘treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors’’ committed,

in George Mason’s explicit, original language, ‘‘against the state,’’

would seem to qualify, at least if we are to go by what the framers
21

actually said and wrote. Or, according to James Wilson of Pennsylvania, impeachment is restricted to ‘‘political characters, to political

crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments.’’

Now, a great deal of the disagreement among historians stems

from a small but fateful decision taken by the Constitutional Convention’s Committee on Style. Before the Constitution reached that

committee, Mason’s original wording on impeachment was changed

from ‘‘against the state’’ to ‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors against

the United States.’’ The committee was charged with polishing the

document’s language, but with instructions that the meaning not

be changed at all. Yet by removing in article 1, section 4, the words

‘‘against the United States,’’ the committee created a Pandora’s box

which we have opened 211 years later.

The absence of the wording ‘‘against the state’’ or ‘‘against the

United States’’ in the final document has persuaded some historians and constitutional scholars that the Constitution embraces all

sorts of private crimes as impeachable. Yet many, if not most

American historians, including the nearly 500 who have now endorsed the widely publicized statement imploring the impeachment

drive, hold to the view that Mason’s wording and Wilson’s observation best express the letter and the spirit of what the framers had

in mind. By that standard, the current charges against President

Clinton do not, we American historians believe, rise to the level of

impeachable offenses.

As further historical evidence, I would point to the fact that the

only other occasions when presidential impeachment was pursued,

against Presidents Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon, plainly involved allegations of grievous public crimes that directly assaulted

our political system.

Another pivotal piece of evidence has to do with the Nixon impeachment. In 1974, the Judiciary Committee declined to approve

a bill of impeachment, an article of impeachment connected to serious allegations that President Nixon had defrauded a Federal

agency, the Internal Revenue Service.

Now, without question, an occasion could arise when it would be

necessary to expand on the framers’ language to cover circumstances they may never have contemplated, including truly

monstrous private crimes. I would hope, for example, that any

President accused of murder, even in the most private circumstances, would be impeached and removed from office. But not

even the President’s harshest critics, as far as I know, have

claimed that the current allegations are on a par with murder.

Various Representatives, scholars, and commentators have offered technically plausible, but I think deeply mistaken and misleading arguments, contending that the allegations against President Clinton rise to an impeachable standard under the definitions

of crimes ‘‘against the state.’’ There has been talk of a concerted

attack on one of the coordinate branches of government, of a calculated presidential abuse of power, namely, that he raised issues

of executive privilege and that he lied to his aides. But these assertions rightly sound overwrought, exaggerated, and suspicious to ordinary Americans, let alone to professional historians, when

matched against the facts of the case.
22

Similar magisterial language was used in the impeachment proceedings against President Johnson and had impact in the Congress. Johnson too, after all, had violated a Federal law much more

definitively than President Clinton has. Since then, though, historians have looked behind the language at the actual facts of the

case, as well as at the political context of the time, and in general

they have concluded that the impeachment effort against Johnson

was a drastic departure from what the framers intended, one that

badly weakened the presidency for decades. That is the reason why

very few of us can remember the names of all those presidents between Ulysses S. Grant and Theodore Roosevelt.

So, too, later generations of historians will judge these proceedings. I strongly believe that the weight of the evidence runs counter

to impeachment. What each of you on the committee and your fellow Members of the House must decide, each for him or herself, is

whether the actual facts alleged against the President, the actual

facts and not the sonorous formal charges, truly rise to the level

of impeachable offenses. If you believe they do rise to that level,

you will vote for impeachment and take your risks at going down

in history with the zealots and the fanatics. If you understand that

the charges do not rise to the level of impeachment, or if you are

at all unsure, and yet you vote in favor of impeachment anyway

for some other reason, history will track you down and condemn

you for your cravenness. Alternatively, you could muster the courage of your convictions. The choice is yours.

Second, on impeachment and politicization, many commentators—including Attorney General Katzenbach—have noted correctly that presidential impeachment is, strictly speaking, a political and not a judicial matter. Yet there is all the difference in the

world between a political procedure and a politicized one. A political proceeding is a deliberative, bipartisan, evenhanded effort to assess possible political offenses under the Constitution. A politicized

procedure, however, overlooks constitutional standards and heeds

other considerations, be they political favors, anger at the President or pressure from party leaders.

On the basis of recent press reports, I fear that these proceedings

are on the brink of becoming irretrievably politicized, more so than

even the notorious drive to remove Andrew Johnson from office 130

years ago.

I would like to be able to share with you the story of that impeachment of Johnson and its relevance to our current distempers.

The light has, however, turned orange, and I don’t have much time,

so I will skip over that and perhaps we will be able to do that in

questioning.

The point that I wanted to make is that it seems to me that, unlike then, when Members of the House of Representatives were

firmly convinced that President Johnson had committed a high

misdemeanor, today it seems that other considerations are coming

into play, that perhaps something else is going on.

Indeed, compared to 1868, a perverse logic has taken hold. Some

have said that we should impeach a President because we do not

think the Senate will remove them. This perverted logic turns the

impeachment vote into a thoroughly politicized and reckless move.

I see the red light, Mr. Chairman, and I will wrap up.
23

Some would have us forget about constitutional standards and

duties and do the short-term political thing, sailing the ship of

state into dangerous waters uncharted in this century. Such willingness to pass the buck on so grave and indelible a matter as impeachment is a feeble evasion of responsibility and a degradation

of conscience.

Finally, on the question of rule of law, what I say in my written

statement is basically that it is a greater threat to the rule of law

to actually go ahead with this impeachment than not to go ahead

with this impeachment. The argument that somehow allowing the

President to get away with suspected perjury and obstruction of

justice will countenance an irreparable tear in the seamless web of

American justice, that if we impeach the President the rule of law

will be vindicated, if only in a symbolic way, proving firstly that

no American is above the law and that the ladder of the law has

no top and no bottom—this argument, I believe, is nonsense logically and historically, with all due respect. Rather, I believe—and

we can talk about this later on—the impeachment process itself

poses a far greater risk to the rule of law.

A final comment. I began by discussing President Clinton’s accountability for the current impeachment mess. By equivocating before the American people and before a Federal grand jury, not to

mention before his family and friends, he has disgraced the presidency and badly scarred his reputation. He has apologized and

asked for forgiveness.

But now, as mandated by the Constitution, the matter rests with

you, the Members of the House of Representatives. You may decide

as a body to go through with impeachment, disregarding the letter

as well as the spirit of the Constitution, defying the deliberate

judgment of the people whom you are supposed to represent, and

in some cases deciding to do so out of anger and expedience.

But if you decide to do this, you will have done far more to subvert respect for the framers, for representative government, and for

the rule of law than any crime that has been alleged against President Clinton, and your reputations will be darkened for as long as

there are Americans who can tell the difference between the rule

of law and the rule of politics.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Professor, very much.

[The statement of Mr. Wilentz follows:]
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Chairman HYDE. Now, the question of the day is, is it Professor Ackerman or Professor Beer?

Professor Beer, you are next. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL H. BEER

Mr. BEER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is appropriate that I should be here before this committee, this formidable committee, since just last week I was in London advising some of my friends in the House of Commons and at

a conference on the American view of the constitutional reforms

being proposed there; and the one reform that I particularly

stressed was the need for them to beef up their legislative committees. I am sure my experience here won’t change my mind on that

point.

That shows really what my real concern is the political and constitutional consequences of impeachment rather than the legal and

judicial aspects. The process is judicial in form, impeachment by

the House being like indictment by a grand jury; and trial and conviction by the Senate, like trial and conviction by a court.

In fact, however, the consequences of successful impeachment do

not resemble the usual consequences of a judicial trial, for instance,

punishment by fine and/or imprisonment. As article 1, section 3,

paragraph 7, provides, punishment of that kind would be invoked

after the President had become a private citizen by resignation, removal, or expiration of his term of office.

Removal from office—and I see I am emphasizing what my colleague Nicholas Katzenbach said—removal from office, that grand

and forbidding consequence of a successful impeachment, distinguishes this process radically from the judgment of a court. It resembles, rather, a vote of no confidence in a legislature such as the

British Parliament. By such a vote, the House of Commons can

bring to an end the life of a government.

In 1841, Sir Robert Peel summed up this fundamental convention of the British Constitution when, in what became a classic formulation, he successfully moved that, ‘‘Her Majesty’s ministers do

not sufficiently possess the confidence of the House of Commons to

enable them to carry through the House measures which they

deem of essential importance to the public welfare.’’

Now, the relevance. Like a vote of no confidence, impeachment

brings to an end a President’s administration. Like a vote of no

confidence, it relates not merely to some specific failure, but is a

judgment on his record and promise as a whole with regard to

those, to adopt Peel’s phrase, ‘‘measures which he deems of essential importance to the public welfare.’’ Because of these broad and

weighty consequences, impeachment is primarily a political, not a

judicial act.

As a political act, impeachment, like a vote of no confidence,

passes judgment on and enforces responsibility on the executive

power. In the British system, that responsibility runs directly to

the legislature. In the American system, on the contrary, that responsibility runs to the legislature only secondarily and in special

circumstances. For us the responsibility of the President is essentially and directly to the voters. The legislature as a separate office,

separately elected, likewise is held accountable by the voters. This
33

separation of powers is fundamental in our constitutional design

and is a main point of distinction from the British system.

The direct responsibility of both branches to the voters expresses

the sovereignty of the people as the ultimate authority of our Constitution and of the government established under it.

Now, as the framers struggled to give expression to that principle, they ran into a problem: How were our liberties to be protected against misuse of power by the executive between quadrennial elections?

At the Philadelphia Convention during the summer of 1787, they

explored various possibilities, such as an appeal to the Supreme

Court and a concoction of other bodies discarded them. The States,

similarly thinking of their systems of Governors and legislatures,

were experimenting in theory and practice with a variety of methods of bridging the same gap.

At the last moment, the framers incorporated a structure almost

exactly in the form then being used in England in the impeachment of Warren Hastings. This device, although it had ancient

roots, had come to special prominence in the 17th and 18th centuries, when Great Britain for a time displayed a certain separation of powers, as a still powerful and independent monarch faced

off against the rising assertions of the Parliament. In those circumstances, impeachment was adopted by the Parliamentarians as

a means of enforcing responsibility on the monarch through action

against his ministers.

When finally the monarch was eased out of politics, the old fusion of executive and legislative powers was taken over by a committee of Parliament, the Cabinet. Now, the interim method of impeachment as a means of getting a hold on the executive was

dropped in favor of a vote of confidence which performed more effectively in those circumstances the function of enforcing the responsibility of the executive to Parliament.

At the same time that impeachment was dying out in Britain, it

was taken up by the Americans who found in it a way of

supplementing the principal mechanism of democratic responsibility by quadrennial elections. And this is the point: the broad scope

of impeachment was now embodied in a very different system.

Where the ultimate sovereign is the people, the interference of

one power, the legislature in its exercise of such a dire responsibility as removal of a popularly elected President, imposes severe duties on the legislators. The Congress, itself not the primary source

of authority but only a creature of the people, is acting in lieu of

the people between quadrennial elections. At their best, the legislators will do what the people at their best would do, weighing the

pluses and minuses of the record and the promise of an administration as a whole, asking as Nick Katzenbach said, this central question: Does the national interest require the removal from office of

this President? It is not a little detailed question. It is a great big

far-reaching question.

In the case of President Clinton, the American people have twice

answered that question by electing him to the American presidency. And if we seek further light on the present American mind,

surveys of opinion continue to confirm that answer, which also in

no way is disturbed by the outcome of the recent midterm elections.
34

I conclude. The failure to consider the whole record of Clinton’s

presidency in foreign and domestic affairs could have severe longrun costs. The removal of a President, thanks to such superficial

judgment, could substantially damage our democratic system. Consider the temptations which this precedent would excite in a Congress of a different party against a future President of a different

party.

As a great historian, Henry Adams, said when commenting on

the failed attempt of the Jeffersonians to remove Justice Chase,

‘‘Impeachment is not a suitable activity for party politics.’’

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Beer.

[The information follows:]
35
36
37

Chairman HYDE. By process of elimination, we get to you, Profes- sor Ackerman.

TESTIMONY OF BRUCE ACKERMAN

Mr. ACKERMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and the distinguished members of this committee. My name is Bruce Ackerman,

and I am a Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale.

I request the Chair’s permission to revise and extend these remarks.

Since you have already heard so much on the subject of constitutional standards, I thought I would concentrate on two big mistakes that are characterized in the discussion up to now.

The first big mistake centers on the power of this committee and

the present House of Representatives to send the case to trial in

the Senate. People seem to be assuming that once the present committee and the full House vote for a bill of impeachment, the stage

will be set for trial in the Senate in the coming year. Nothing could

be further from the truth.

As a constitutional matter, the House of Representatives is not

a continuing body. When the 105th House dies on January 3rd, all

its unfinished business dies with it. To begin with the most obvious

example, a bill passed by the 105th House that is still pending in

the 105th Senate on January 3rd cannot be enacted into law unless

it once again is approved by the 106th House of Representatives.

This is as it should be.

Otherwise, lame duck Congresses would have a field day in situations like the present where the old House Majority has a setback

in the polls. Recognizing that its political power is on the wane, the

dominant party will predictably use its lame duck months to pass

lots of controversial legislation on to the Senate in defiance of the

judgment made by the voters.

This abuse was very common during the first 150 years of this

Republic. Until the 20th amendment was passed in 1933, a newly

elected Congress ordinarily waited 13 months before it began its

first meeting in Washington, D.C. In the meantime, lame ducks did

the Nation’s business for a full session, often in ways that ran

against the grain of the last election.

This might have been an acceptable price to pay in the 18th century when roads were terrible and it took time for farmer representatives to arrange their business affairs, but over the passage

of centuries, the operation of lame duck Congresses proved to be

an intolerable violation of democratic principles, and they were basically abolished by the 20th amendment to the Constitution of the

United States in 1933.

This amendment aims to have the new Congress begin meeting

as soon as possible after the elections. The text itself specifies January 3rd. In enacting this amendment into our fundamental law,

Americans believed they were reducing the lame duck problem to

vestigial proportions. Perhaps some grave, national emergency

might require decisive action; but the old Congress was expected

simply to fade away as the Nation enjoyed the respite from politics

between Thanksgiving and New Year’s Day.

Generally speaking, lame duck Congresses have proved faithful

to this expectation. For example, during the 65 years since the 20th
38

amendment became part of our higher law, no lame duck House

has ever impeached an errant Federal judge, much less a sitting

President of the United States.

Such matters have been rightfully left to the Congresses that

were not full of Members who had been repudiated at the polls and

who were retiring from office.

These proceedings, then, are absolutely unprecedented in the

post-lame duck era. Despite this fact, I don’t question the raw constitutional power of the current lame duck House to vote on a bill

of impeachment. But I do respectfully submit that the Constitution

treats a lame duck bill of impeachment in precisely the same way

it treats any other House bill that remains pending in the Senate

on January 3rd. Like all other bills, a lame duck bill of impeachment loses its constitutional force with the death of the House that

passed it.

This point was rightly ignored before the election, since everybody expected the new Congress to be more Republican than its

predecessor. On this assumption, it was perfectly plausible for this

distinguished committee to proceed in earnest. If the 105th House

voted to impeach, there was every reason to suppose that the 106th

House would quickly reaffirm its judgement and send the matter

on the way to the Senate.

But now that the voters have spoken, the constitutional status

of lame duck impeachments deserves far more attention than it has

thus far been given. Worse yet, we can’t rely much on the past for

guidance.

The closest precedent comes from the 1988 impeachment of Federal District Judge Alcee Hastings. The 100th House had impeached Hastings but both sides wanted to delay the Senate trial

to the 101st session, and the Senate Rules Committee granted their

request.

The committee’s perfunctory six-page report, however, does not

resolve any of the key issues raised by the present case. Hastings

was a judge, not a President. And he was impeached during a normal session of Congress, not by a Congress of lame ducks.

As a consequence, the Senate report does not even pause to consider the implications of the fact that the people themselves have

decisively sought to limit the capacity of lame duck Congresses by

solely enacting the 20th amendment.

If we take this amendment seriously, it means that a lame duck

House should not be allowed to relieve its freshly elected successor

of the most solemn obligation it can have: to pass upon an impeachment resolution. Moreover, if the next House of Representatives seeks to duck this responsibility, the Senate will not be free

to dispense with the problem of lame duck impeachment by a simple reference to the 1988 decision in Judge Hastings’ case.

Instead, the constitutionality of a lame duck impeachment will

be the first question confronting Chief Justice Rehnquist, the designated presiding officer at the Senate trial.

Following the precedent established by Chief Judge Chase before

and during the trial of Andrew Johnson, the Chief Justice will

rightly assert his authority on all procedural issues; and the first

of these should undoubtedly be a motion by the President’s lawyers
39

to quash the lame duck impeachment as constitutionally invalid

unless reaffirmed by the 106th House.

Now, Chief Justice Rehnquist is, in fact, a scholar of the impeachment process, having written an entire book on the subject.

I am sure that he will be fully aware of the historical importance

of his conduct of this proceeding and will quickly grasp the obvious

dangers of lame duck impeachment.

Moreover, there are many strands in the Chief Justice’s jurisprudence which would lead him to give great weight to the idea that

it is only a truly democratic House and not a collection of lame

ducks that has the constitutional authority to proceed against a

man who has been fairly elected to the presidency by the people

of the United States. Without any hint of partisanship, he would

be well within his rights to quash the lame duck impeachment and

remand the matter back to the new House of Representatives.

Since the status of lame duck impeachments has never been

briefed and argued in the modern era inaugurated by the 20th

amendment, it is impossible to make a firm guess as to the way

the Chief Justice will rule on this matter.

Only one thing is clear: It would be far better for the country and

the Constitution if the Chief Justice is never put to this test. As

Alexander Bickel, my great predecessor in the Sterling chair at

Yale frequently reminded us, the health of our constitutional system is not measured by the number of hard cases that have been

resolved by clear rulings. It is measured, instead, by the number

of statesmen in our history who, seeing hard cases on the horizon,

act in sensible ways so as to avoid ever precipitating a constitutional crisis. And that is what we are going into.

If this committee and the present House choose to go forward

and vote in favor of a bill of impeachment, I respectfully urge the

new Speaker of the 106th Congress to do the right thing and remit

the matter once again for consideration by the new House.

Suppose, however, he doesn’t do so. Suppose further that, if

pressed, the Chief Justice upholds the continuing validity of the

lame duck impeachment despite the expiration of the 105th Congress. Even then, the new House of Representatives will not be

able to escape the need to consider whether a majority of the Members newly elected continue to favor the impeachment of the President.

To see why, consider that the House must select a group of Members, called impeachment managers, to present its case again the

President at the Senate trial. Without the energetic prosecution of

the case by the managers, the Senate trial—I am sorry, I’ll end up

here—the Senate trial cannot go forward. No managers, no trial.

But only the new House can appoint managers. This was done in

Judge Hastings’ case, and it certainly should be required in the

case of a sitting President facing a lame duck impeachment.

Thus, even if the new House leadership chooses to rely on a lame

duck impeachment and refuses to allow another vote on a fresh bill

before sending the matter to the Senate, there is no way it can

avoid the need to test the Majority’s sentiment of the new House.

By voting against the slate of managers, a majority of the new

House will be in a position to stop the impeachment process dead

in its tracks. It is a big mistake.
40

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [presiding]. Professor Ackerman, do you

think you could wrap up?

Mr. ACKERMAN. This is the last paragraph. It is a big mistake,

then, for the distinguished Members of this committee and this

House to suppose that they are the final judges of this bill of impeachment.

To be sure, the recommendation of this committee and the vote

of the entire House deserves serious consideration by the Members

taking office next month. But so do the judgments of the voters as

expressed at the elections in November. I respectfully urge you to

consider this point as you determine your present course.

To put my point in operational terms, if you don’t believe that

a bill of impeachment or the election of impeachment managers

will gain the Majority’s support of the next House, the wise thing

to do is to stop the process now. While it may be embarrassing to

reverse gears after so much momentum has been generated in

favor of the bill of impeachment, the leadership of the next House

will confront a much more embarrassing situation——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Professor Ackerman, I do think you are

abusing the committee’s time. You have gone much further—Professor Ackerman, could you please wrap it up? The red light has

been on for about 3 minutes now. Everybody else has been a little

bit better in terms of watching the red light. Are you done?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes.

[The information follows:]
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Would the gentleman from Arkansas

please state the unanimous consent request?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. This appears to be the appropriate time for a

unanimous consent request. I have a Congressional Research Service memorandum discussing that impeachment proceedings may be

continued from one Congress to the next. I ask unanimous consent

that this be entered into the record as a part of this proceeding and

distributed to the Members.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the first copy should be distributed to Professor Ackerman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The first copy out of the Xerox machine

will be given to Professor Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I have read it, sir.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Is there any objection to the request of the

gentleman from Arkansas?

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, reserving my right to object, I just

want to make sure that that CRS report comes to us before we get

to questioning. I realize the witness should have the first copy, but

I think it is important that we have that.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. We will see how fast the Xerox machine

can make copies.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHABOT. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Is anybody reserving the right to object to

the——

Ms. WATERS. I reserve the right to object.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California on her

reservation is recognized.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object because

I think we have hit upon an extremely important point that is

being made by Professor Ackerman. And if the gentleman would

like to—if he has different information, if he is in receipt of information that suggests otherwise, I think it deserves discussion in

this committee rather than simply the submission of the information to us.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. If the Chair may interrupt, the request is

that the CRS report referred to by the gentleman from Arkansas

in his unanimous consent become a part of the record. Once it becomes a part of the report, then anybody can discuss it as they

would like.

But it seems to me we have been very liberal in putting statements and materials in the record since the beginning of this inquiry. And the gentleman from Arkansas has something that he

thinks is relevant.

Is there objection to including the CRS report referred to by the

gentleman from Arkansas in the record?

Hearing none, so ordered.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio will state the

parliamentary inquiry.
48

Mr. CHABOT. Is it not the practice of the committee that when

witnesses testify here, we should have the statements of the witnesses in writing prior to their testifying so we can follow it as they

are going through?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is in the rules of the committee, yes.

Mr. CHABOT. Can we ask the other witnesses that come today

and tomorrow, that we could get their statements ahead of time so

we can follow that?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is in the rules, and that is certainly

a legitimate request. And I will direct that request to Counsel

Craig who is responsible for orchestrating the witnesses in defense

of the President.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. GEKAS. In response partially to the gentleman of Ohio, I believe that we had decided in advance, or someone did, to which we

acceded, that because of the late start, as it were, for the witnesses

to appear before this committee, that we in effect waive the necessity of their providing statements before the hearing. So I would let

the—I would allow the record to show, as far as my statement is

concerned, that I believe that that was waived with respect to this

panel.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Craig, do you think that it would be

possible to give committee members advance statements for future

witnesses today and tomorrow?

Mr. CRAIG. We will do our best to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. Mr. Hyde will be out of the

room for a bit. And we will begin the questioning. I will begin with

myself. And again I will reiterate Mr. Hyde’s admonition that the

questions will be limited to 5 minutes. And when the red light goes

on for each questioner, we will state that the time has expired and

go on to the next questioner. So I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Craig, in your opening statement, you asked members of the

committee to open their hearts and open their minds and to look

at the record. I think, since the 9th of September, committee members have spent a lot of time looking at the record, first in executive section and then in the public meetings, that this committee

has had pursuant to the resolution that the House of Representatives directed us to conduct an impeachment inquiry.

We have heard an awful lot of academic discourse and discussion

on what constitutes an impeachable offense, what constitutes perjury. But we have heard nothing from the President contradicting

the fact witnesses and the grand jury testimony that Judge Starr

sent over to us in 18 boxes’ worth of evidence.

I am disappointed that there are no fact witnesses rebutting any

of the evidence that was contained in the 18 boxes in your presentation today and tomorrow. Are you disputing any of the facts? And

if so, why are you not bringing forth witnesses that can provide direct fact testimony rather than opinion or argument disputing the

facts?

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, let me respond to that this way: We

have submitted in writing three different responses to the referral

that was presented to the House of Representatives by Mr. Starr

and the Office of Independent Counsel. And we in those—in those
49

responses, we take issue with many of the facts laid out by Mr.

Starr in those—in that referral.

We do dispute representations and characterizations that the

Independent Counsel has made, and we do dispute some of the testimony that has been presented in the grand jury. And we, in particular, urge the committee not necessarily to take at face value the

characterizations of that testimony or the President’s testimony

that are to be found in the referral by Mr. Starr.

We find that frequently he mischaracterizes that testimony, or

the Office of Independent Counsel in the referral has

mischaracterized the testimony of the President in order to construct a perjury of allegation.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, let me get to the heart of this case.

Did Monica Lewinsky provide false testimony to the grand jury, in

your opinion?

Mr. CRAIG. We think in some areas she provided erroneous testimony that is in disagreement with the President’s testimony and

particularly in specific areas having to do with the grand jury.

Now, you are going to have to make the determination as to how

important the divergence, the disagreement, or the disagreement

on the testimony is.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. There have been complaints by the President’s counsel and by the Minority Democrats on this committee

that grand jury testimony is not subject to cross-examination and

that Ms. Lewinsky and the other witnesses that came before the

grand jury were not cross-examined. How come you’re not bringing

any of these people before this committee to provide the cross-examination that the grand jury procedure denied you?

Mr. CRAIG. We have found, Mr. Chairman, many inconsistent

statements in the grand jury testimony itself that we believe we

can use to support our case. We believe that the President should

be given a presumption of innocence and that the burden should

be on the committee to call fact witnesses and determine whether

the credibility of the fact witnesses is such that——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, the investigation was done pursuant

to the Independent counsel statute. And I would just observe, Mr.

Craig, that if the President had told the truth in January, there

would have been no Independent Counsel investigation of this

whole matter, and we wouldn’t be sitting here today. My time has

expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Well, let me begin by reminding my acting Chairman that it wouldn’t have affected whether there would have been

an Independent Counsel appointed at all.

One of the—well, let me put all three of these together, Mr.

Craig. Mr. Starr alleged that the President lied about sexual relations before the Paula Jones deposition and in grand jury. It is also

alleged that the President obstructed justice by assisting Ms.

Lewinsky with a job search and that he further obstructed justice

in conversations with Betty Currie after his January 17 deposition.

Could you put those in context for us, please?

Mr. CRAIG. Let me talk first about the President’s testimony in

the civil deposition. In the civil deposition, in accordance with the

definition that he had been provided as to what a sexual relation50

ship was, he denied having a sexual relationship as it was defined

in the deposition by the Jones’ judge.

There may be disagreement as to whether his testimony fell

within or without that definition. But there is no disagreement

that the President himself and, in fact, Monica Lewinsky, as she

wrote her affidavit and testified in the grand jury, believed that

what he was testifying was within the definition as given to him

by the court.

The point I’m trying to make here is that there was an effort by

the President to testify accurately but not to disclose information

about his relationship. That may be blameworthy. It may be wrong.

You may judge that he crossed the line. But, in fact, there is no

testimony or no proof that President Clinton knew he was wrong

when he looked at that definition, and that he intentionally lied.

I would say when it comes to the job search, Mr. Chairman, that

there’s a good deal of additional information, and this is why I so

strongly argue that the committee should look at the actual record.

There’s a lot of information about the job search that is simply

not included in the referral: the fact that Ms. Lewinsky’s desire to

leave Washington arose in July, long before her involvement in the

Jones case; the fact that the President provided Ms. Lewinsky with

only modest assistance, if any at all; the fact that the job assistance that was provided by friends and associates of the President

for Ms. Lewinsky was in no way unusual as opposed to other people who were also receiving that kind of job assistance; the fact

that there was absolutely no pressure applied to obtain Ms.

Lewinsky a job; the fact that there was no timetable for Ms.

Lewinsky’s job search, let alone any timetable linked to her involvement in the Jones case; and the fact that all the people that

participated in that job search testified that there was nothing

linked to any testimony or affidavit.

It is the testimony of Vernon Jordan, it is the testimony of Ms.

Lewinsky, and it is the testimony of the President that there was

no obstruction of justice involved in that job search.

Now when it comes to the questions relating to Ms. Currie, Ms.

Currie at the time she had this conversation with the President

was not a witness in any proceeding. Her name had not appeared

on the Jones’ witness list. She had not been named as a witness

in the Jones case, and the discovery period was down to its very

final days. There was no reason to suspect that she would play any

role in the Jones case as a witness. And the President did not know

that the OIC at that point had embarked on an investigation of

him on the Lewinsky Matter.

To obstruct a proceeding or to tamper with a witness, Mr. Conyers, there must be both a proceeding and a witness. Here, as far

as the President knew, there was neither.

And there is a second important point that was also deleted or

left out or ignored in the presentation of the referral. Ms. Currie

testified about this conversation with the President on numerous

occasions and repeatedly testified that she felt absolutely no pressure to agree with the questions that the President asked her. Let

me just cite one excerpt from the transcript of Ms. Currie’s testimony.
51

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time is expired. You

know, somebody else can bring that up if we are to keep on time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, might he finish the sentence?

Could he finish the sentence?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Finish the sentence.

Mr. CRAIG. It’s very quick, Mr. Sensenbrenner. She was asked,

‘‘Did you feel pressured when he told you those statements?’’ She

said, ‘‘None whatever.’’ She was asked, ‘‘Did you feel any pressure

to agree with your boss?’’ She said, ‘‘None.’’

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Craig.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Craig, I am glad we’re getting into facts. I think it’s very important that we do that. And although I, too, am disappointed

there are no fact witnesses, I think the discussion is important.

With respect to the Betty Currie, the record I read indicates that

indeed the President, numerous times in his deposition said, you’ll

have to ask Betty about that, referring to a lot of times in his deposition in the Jones case. And surely he would have expected that

somebody would have called her as a witness whether she was on

a witness list at the time he had these conversations with her or

not. And that, therefore, seems to me it’s immaterial whether she

was on a witness list or she wasn’t. But that’s the type of thing

we should be discussing. And again it’s long overdue.

I also would like to point out that, as we look through these

things, there are a lot of things in the record that you are obligated

to tell us where we are wrong about because—or where the record

may be different. And I am looking forward to that.

The record I see with regard to the grand jury testimony indicates that the President swore that he did not know that his personal friend, Vernon Jordan, had met with Monica Lewinsky and

had talked about the case. And I would say that the evidence indicates that he lied about that when he made that swearing.

The President in that deposition swore that he could not recall

being alone with Monica Lewinsky. The evidence that I’ve read so

far indicates that he lied about that. The President swore he could

not recall ever being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky

except perhaps when she was delivering a pizza. The evidence indicates he lied about that.

The President swore he couldn’t recall gifts exchanged between

Monica Lewinsky and himself. The evidence indicates he lied about

that.

The President swore that he was not sure whether he had ever

talked to Monica Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be

asked to testify in the Jones case. The evidence indicates he lied

about that.

The President swore he did not know whether Monica Lewinsky

had been served a subpoena to testify in the Jones case the last

time he saw her in December of 1997. The evidence I read indicates

he lied about that.

The President swore that the last time he spoke to Monica

Lewinsky was when she stopped by before Christmas in 1997 to
52

see Betty Currie at a Christmas party. The evidence I read indicates he lied about that.

The President swore the contents of an affidavit executed by

Monica Lewinsky in the Jones case, in which she denied they had

sexual relations, were absolutely true. The evidence I read, he lied

about that. And before the grand jury as well as in the deposition,

the President swore that he did not have sexual relations with

Monica Lewinsky. The evidence indicates that he lied, even according to his own interpretation of the Jones court’s definition of the

term sexual relations; because if you believe Monica Lewinsky, you

have to conclude that indeed the President lied with respect to this,

because she explicitly said they had certain relationships described

in that definition.

And the President initiated an agreement with Monica Lewinsky

in which she would lie in a sworn affidavit to be filed in the Jones

case and each would lie under oath if called to testify in a case

brought against the President. This’s what I read the evidence as

indicating.

I am curious to know if you find anything in any of the testimony, Mr. Craig, that we have before us from Vernon Jordan

where Mr. Jordan lied? I—is there anything in the record that——

Mr. CRAIG. Not that I’m aware of. And this is a problem that we

have run into throughout this proceeding, that is to identify precisely what kind of testimony you’re talking about so that we can

have an accurate and prepared response. I am not——

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, I’m curious about many things.

Mr. CRAIG. Can I respond to your allegations about the civil deposition and about the grand jury that you strung together?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I strung those together only to give you illustrations with respect to where I see the evidence being. Let me ask

you one other question. You answered the Vernon Jordan one. Is

there any anything in the record where you see Betty Currie lied?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, regular order.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Can the witness be permitted to answer the question?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. In all due respect, it was my time. I asked him

whether there was anything in the record about Vernon Jordan

lying. He said no. And I asked him the question of whether or not

there was anything in the record about Betty Currie lying. I would

like an answer, if I could.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, regular order.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Florida has got the

time. I would ask members of the committee not to interrupt other

members of the committee during their own time. The gentleman

from Florida is recognized.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I would like to know if there is anything you

have seen in the record that would indicate that you believe Betty

Currie lied in the testimony she gave that we have in the record.

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, the answer is I am aware of nothing

in the testimony suggesting that Ms. Currie or Vernon Jordan lied.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, it’s my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. It’s not your time until I recognize. The

gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.
53

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was very important.

Mr. Craig, I wonder if you might like to answer the accusations.

I must say with Mr. McCollum I had trouble, because it seemed to

me there was a mixture of grand jury and deposition, and it wasn’t

clear which was which. And while Mr. McCollum obviously did not

want you to respond to that, understandably, I would like you to

respond.

Mr. CRAIG. I will try to be very quick, Congressman Frank.

Mr. FRANK. Why? He wasn’t.

Mr. CRAIG. And thank you. First let me say, Congressman

McCollum, that we are going to file with the committee today a

written response which I think will address every single one of

those allegations that you just went through. You can find them

consolidated on pages 18 and 19 of Mr. Starr’s presentation before

this committee.

And there are two things that I think are very important to get

straight. One is that the characterization of the President’s testimony in each one of those incidents is inaccurate.

And the second thing is that you have mixed up grand jury testimony with civil deposition testimony in very dangerous and misleading ways. And I hope—I heard you answer questions over the

weekend, and I was very pleased with your response on the issue

of separating allegations of perjury on the civil deposition from allegations of perjury in the grand jury. And I hope we can have further conversation about that.

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Craig, because I think it is important to separate them out. There was some allegations of grand

jury perjury which clearly went beyond anything Kenneth Starr

charged the President with. And the notion that Kenneth Starr

was too soft on the President is a new one to me, even this late

in the proceedings.

Before I get to that, I would like to say two procedural points.

People have criticized you for not calling witnesses. Well, the Majority had the ability to call witnesses. And I must say I take exception, I must tell my friend from Florida, to the suggestion that

Vernon Jordan might have been lying. I think Vernon Jordan is a

man of great integrity. His testimony, of course, completely supports the President’s position and refutes the accusations. And if

you think Vernon Jordan was lying, I don’t think so, but have the

courage to call him up here and defend himself.

I think that kind of imputation raising the issue about Vernon

Jordan’s integrity without calling him forward is a great error. I

understand why you don’t want to call him forward, because I

think he would make mincemeat of that accusation.

Let me just say, Mr. Craig, with regard to grand jury perjury,

as I understand it, there were three accusations of grand jury perjury from Mr. Starr. One was, am I correct, that Ms. Lewinsky said

that the sexual activity began in November of 1995 and the President said February of 1996?

Mr. CRAIG. That’s correct.

Mr. FRANK. That that was one of the accusations of the grand

jury perjury?

Mr. CRAIG. That’s correct.
54

Mr. FRANK. I wonder if anybody here as a lawyer would think

that a charge would be brought—this is more than 2 years after

that has happened. Nothing turned on that. In other words, Ms.

Lewinsky did not reach a certain age in the interim that would

have made it more or less legal; is that correct?

Mr. CRAIG. That’s correct.

Mr. FRANK. The second question—the second charge of perjury is

one that I have trouble understanding. Am I correct that it was—

and I think we ought to differentiate, because Mr. McCollum listed

a number of things that he said were perjurious; Mr. Starr only

had three.

The second one was when the President told the grand jury that

he believed in the deposition that the definition excluded certain

kinds of sexual activity, that he was lying; that he didn’t really believe it. In other words, the accusation is when he said in August

that he believed in January that the definition excluded certain

kinds of sex, that that was a lie. Is that correct that that’s the second one?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRANK. I asked that because people have said where are the

President’s witnesses. Well, what witness could he bring to show

that the sexual activity began in February rather than November?

He admitted trying to conceal it. What witness could he bring to

show that he really believed this in January? Do people think there

was a secret witness that he said, hey, I’m only kidding, I don’t

really believe this. The fact is, there is no witness you could have

believed.

Last question. With regard to the obstruction, is it the case that

everybody who was supposedly involved in the obstruction—Mr.

Jordan, Ms. Currie, Ms. Lewinsky, and the President—all denied

that obstruction of justice happened? And if you were in fact to

prosecute the case, who in fact would you bring as a witness?

Mr. CRAIG. That is the case. I wouldn’t know how to prosecute

this case. May I make one comment, Mr. Frank, since I still have

time. I would urge the committee to remember that Mr. Ruff is

coming. I am perfectly happy to deal with the committee’s questions. But the purpose of this panel, in addition to my introductory

comments, the purpose of the panel was to discuss some of the new

ideas that I think these witnesses——

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Craig, you need to finish the sentence without

any dependent clauses, under the rule.

Mr. CRAIG. I’m done.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Massachusetts’ time

has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 seconds, I hope, to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much for yielding. I wanted to

make a point. I was not imputing Vernon Jordan’s integrity. In

fact, I was trying to corroborate the fact that he has been telling

the truth, that I think is damaging to the President.

Mr. FRANK. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield to me

for 5 seconds?

Mr. GEKAS. No, I cannot.

Mr. FRANK. You could if you wanted to.
55

Mr. GEKAS. I really cannot.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. GEKAS. Professor Wilentz, your testimony has really astounded me, and I want to question you on one phase of it. You

seem to indicate that if any one of us, any Member of Congress

should vote for impeachment, there will always be the question in

your mind as to whether we did it out of cravenness or under a resolution and study and analysis and conscience.

And I hope that after this is over, that you take a roll call of

those who voted and then analyze for us. It will take you 100 years

to determine whether we did it out of cravenness or not. I think

that’s a despicable way to characterize, in advance, our possible

vote on some serious note as this. That’s number one.

General Katzenbach, you seem to have placed a great deal of emphasis on the difference between a criminal offense and a political

offense that is couched in impeachment. And I agree with you that

it is substantially, if not totally, a political process.

If the President of the United States refused to grant requests

of the Congress time and time again, and the Congress felt that it

should adjudge the President in contempt of Congress, you would

consider that a political, not a criminal offense, would you not?

Mr. KATZENBACH. If it was an offense at all, it would be political,

yes.

Mr. GEKAS. Pardon me?

Mr. KATZENBACH. If it was an offense at all, it would be political.

Mr. GEKAS. Yes. And so the Congress, if it felt on a series of contempt instances that it would proceed, you would not automatically

discount that as an impeachable offense, would you? Would this not

be a refutation or a knock in the eye to another branch of government that the President was indulging in?

Mr. KATZENBACH. It might be that, sir, but I don’t think that the

Constitution provides under high crimes and misdemeanors for refusal of the President to do what the Congress wants it to do.

There are other ways with which the Congress deals with that

problem. And, frankly, sir, this is simply not one of them. No, I

would not regard that as grounds for impeachment.

Mr. GEKAS. So that you have no idea, as you testify here, what

high crimes and misdemeanors might be?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Oh, I have a good idea; yes, sir.

Mr. GEKAS. You are saying that perjury, which would be a direct

affront to the judicial process, could not be considered fairly by any

of us as being an impeachable offense. If indeed giving false statements under oath in a judicial proceeding can be fairly characterized by many of us who are analyzing this as an affront to the

other branch of government—meaning the judiciary, the judicial

branch of government—you think that the commission of a statutory crime, common law crime of false statements under oath, or

just obstructing justice by giving false statements under oath

would not arise to an impeachable offense; is that what you’re saying to us?

Mr. KATZENBACH. No, sir; that’s not what I’m saying. I’m saying

that all of those could be impeachable offenses if the effect of that

was to destroy public confidence in the ability of the President to

play his role in the government.
56

Mr. GEKAS. And you say that the fact that he confronts the judiciary and attacks the judiciary by virtue of a perjury would not be

an attack on the constitutional system, is what I hear you saying.

Mr. KATZENBACH. That’s not what I’m saying. You hear it, but

it’s not what I’m saying.

Mr. GEKAS. I’m not hearing right.

Mr. KATZENBACH. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. GEKAS. But would you agree that we have a difference of

opinion, then? We would not be craven if we decided that perjury

committed by the President of the United States, if so concluded

in a judicial proceeding involving the rights of a fellow American

citizen, would amount to an impeachable offense?

Mr. KATZENBACH. If—the red light is on, Mr. Chairman. How can

I answer it?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Quick answer.

Mr. KATZENBACH. A quick yes? My answer is, no, sir.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. A quick answer.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Oh. It would be an impeachable offense, sir,

only if the effect of that was regarded by the Members of Congress

as so serious that it destroyed public confidence in the ability of the

President to play his role in government.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I do have a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. State

your parliamentary inquiry.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The inquiry, Mr. Chairman, is this is the only

time that the President has the opportunity to present his case to

this committee and to the American people. I noticed that Mr.

Gekas asked a question or made a comment of Professor Wilentz.

I do think it is important to allow witnesses to respond to either

comments or questions made to them.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is not a proper parliamentary inquiry. And how the 5 minutes would be allocated and enforced was

stated by Mr. Hyde at the beginning of the meeting.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Is there any

way for the professor to answer the question?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Nobody objected at that point in time. A

subsequent questioner, if they feel that it is important that a witness give an answer to a question that there was no time to answer, can decide in his or her best judgment whether to reiterate

that question. That’s what Mr. Frank did in response to some of

the statements that Mr. McCollum made. I think that that’s the

way we will be able to allow the President to spend more time presenting witnesses rather than responding to parliamentary

inquiries.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Parliamentary inquiry.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I maintain a continuing objection.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to point out,

inquire of the Chair, whether the procedures adopted by the Chairman, Mr. Hyde, when he was sitting where you are, with regards

to the panel called predominantly by the Republican Majority, will
57

prevail in this panel when the President’s counsel has called its

panel.

In particular, Chairman Hyde chose, when the Democrats were

asking questions of Republican experts and Democratic experts on

the last panel, to allow each member of the panel to respond to our

questions even when we did not specifically ask them questions.

And I wonder why today the present Chair is changing that procedure and not allowing the panelists to respond.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is not a proper parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. ROTHMAN. It is an inquiry of fairness, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Chair will state that he is merely enforcing the rules that were outlined by Mr. Hyde at the beginning

of the hearing, which no one objected to.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.

Schumer.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And you know as we

come close to finishing these proceedings and going to a vote, I

guess most people assume to regard it as an assured conclusion on

the floor of the House, I am sort of befuddled by the direction with

which we go. And I would like to direct some questions at all of

the panelists in this regard.

We are ready in this committee, and maybe in the full House, for

the second time in our history to pass articles of impeachment to

the Senate. And there are maybe 20 or 30 people who haven’t really committed, whose minds aren’t made up. They tend to be the socalled moderate Republicans. And at least to read from the newspaper statements of those moderate Republicans, what has pushed

them in more of a direction to do the unthinkable, or what was unthinkable a few weeks ago and is still probably unthinkable to

most of the American public, are two things: one, that the President didn’t apologize in a fulsome way enough. I mean, one of these

swing votes is saying please, Mr. President, apologize fully, and

then I won’t have to vote for impeachment. The other is that the

answers to the 81 questions submitted by this committee weren’t

direct enough.

And so what I worry about, I would say to this panel and to all

of my colleagues in the full House, since I think this committee is

already—sort of what we are doing is we are going through motions, but it seems minds are made up. But I say to my colleagues

that we may, the American people may wake up next week and

find out that the Congress impeached the President for not being

contrite enough to certain Members of Congress.

I just don’t get that, because it seems to me that the standard

of what the President did, and whether what he did reaches high

crimes and misdemeanors, should be totally irrelevant to a level of

contrition. You may judge the President as what kind of man he

is by the level of contrition, but not whether he should be impeached, or by whether the President answered a series of questions here directly enough. Unless someone wants to allege that in

the answers to the questions, perjury was committed as well. And

I haven’t heard anybody allege that.

So I would like to ask each of the panelists and particularly the

constitutional experts, the professors, but all of the panelists, in
58

your legal opinion, even in your political opinion, does the contrition of the President go to whether the President should be impeached? Does the level of apology, the fulsomeness of apology, the

sincerity of apology, should that be entering into one’s mind as to

whether the President should be impeached?

And, similarly, should the President’s answers to a list of questions, assuming that no perjurious statements were made in answers to those questions, and I guess, I don’t know if they are technically sworn under oath and made a standard to perjury, but just

assuming that, should that go to whether we should impeach the

President as well?

So maybe Professor Wilentz or Ackerman or Beer first.

Mr. WILENTZ. Maybe I can reply to your question, too, Mr.

Gekas.

Mr. SCHUMER. Well, do that on his time, please.

Mr. WILENTZ. The answer is, no, it should not. There is no constitutional standard for lack of contrition. The ways in which—and

my comments about cravenness, et cetera, were directed towards

that process of getting those moderates perhaps to get in line. If

any standard other than the constitutional standard of high crimes

and misdemeanors becomes the reason for a vote for impeachment,

that vote is, to my mind, a dereliction of constitutional duties.

Mr. SCHUMER. So level of contrition would not go to whether

someone committed a high crime or misdemeanor, by any stretch

of the imagination?

Mr. WILENTZ. Absolutely not. Absolutely not.

Mr. SCHUMER. Do you agree with that, Professor Ackerman?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes. The operational question is whether the

conduct alleged represents a clear and present danger to the foundations of the Republic. Contrition, it seems to me, does not enter

into that. Nor would the answer to these 81 questions——

Mr. ACKERMAN. That’s correct.

Mr. SCHUMER [continuing]. Which don’t deal with the acts of the

President for which we’re examining impeachment.

Do you agree with that, Professor Beer?

Mr. BEER. Yes, I agree. It seemed to ask him to come and confess

things which he didn’t do and does not think he did. I wouldn’t call

that contrition.

Mr. SCHUMER. Do you have any comments on this, Mr. Craig?

Mr. CRAIG. I agree with you, Mr. Schumer. You will not be surprised to know that I agree with you, Congressman.

Mr. SCHUMER. No. I mean since there’s a minute left, it seems

to me people are looking to avoid the direct, bald, naked confrontation with whether we should impeach or not when they’re coming

up with these kinds of answers. You better be convinced in your

own head that these actions either imperil the Republic or at least

meet a standard of high crimes and misdemeanors, and not look for

an excuse like the President didn’t apologize enough or he didn’t

answer someone’s question directly enough. It’s almost trivializing

what ought to be a very sacred process.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.

Mr. COBLE. I thank the Chair. Gentlemen, good to have you all

with us.
59

President Clinton, then-Candidate Clinton, assured us, I think it

was in 1992, that he would bring to us an administration that was

very ethical. In fact, he may have said the most ethical administration in history.

Well, the President has developed a pattern of being evasive and

being deceptive which has caused those words not to be prophetic.

Now having said all of that, Mr. Craig, let me put a question to

you, and I am doing this from memory, so if my memory is faulted,

don’t be reluctant to correct me.

After the deposition for the Paula Jones case, I recall having

read among my many notes here that the President contacted Dick

Morris, the political consultant, to get his spin on it. This has

turned into a spin operation. And it appears that Mr. Morris in a

response to that question said, Mr. President, the American public

will tolerate adultery, but they will not tolerate perjury. Well, at

that point, the cow was out of the barn because he had already

been deposed.

The President denied under oath having involved himself with

any intimate touching. Ms. Lewinsky consequently admits, very

forthrightly, that there was, in fact, intimate touching. Now, both

these statements were given under oath, under sworn oath. Do you

have any opinion, Mr. Craig, as to who’s lying? Because it seems

inevitable that one of those parties is lying. And you may not have

an opinion to that.

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, I represent the President of the United

States. And the President of the United States has said and testified about that activity. And I accept his word about that. The

problem for those of you who are here in a fact-finding capacity is

precisely that problem. There is no other way to determine or corroborate—or corroborate the testimony. It’s an oath-against-oath, a

‘‘he says/she says’’ situation. This is hardly, I think, the kind of

issue that the House of Representatives should send to the Senate

for a trial before the American people to determine whether or not

the President of the United States should be removed from office.

Let me just make one comment if I might, Congressman.

Mr. COBLE. Sure.

Mr. CRAIG. We intend today to file a very, very complete brief

dealing with the law and the facts in greater detail, in a greater

and more systematic way than we have ever done before. And then

we are going to have Mr. Ruff to go through these facts when he

is here all afternoon tomorrow.

Mr. COBLE. And I thank you for that, Mr. Craig. And, of course,

the Senate will be the ultimate fact-finders in this operation, assuming it advances that far.

Gentlemen, put on your alternative hats. I want to talk about

censure. And I will excuse Mr. Craig. I will let one of you other

four, if you will, come forward; not that you’re not capable, Mr.

Craig, but I have already given you time.

There’s a balloon being floated on this Hill labeled censure, and

some are suggesting that attached to that would be a financial forfeiture or penalty. Now my constitutional anxiety becomes activated at this point. I think that would be vulnerable. I think it

would probably amount to a bill of attainder. Can you all confirm

or reject my anxiety process?
60

Mr. ACKERMAN. Congressman, I think you are completely correct.

Any financial sanction against a named individual by this Congress

is a bill of attainder, and it doesn’t matter whether it’s Bruce Ackerman or Bill Clinton.

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that. And, Mr. Chairman, I want you

to know it can be done before the red light illuminates. And I yield

back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is appreciated. The gentleman from

California, Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Craig

represents the President. I would like you to put aside his points

and the points made before with respect to the factual allegations,

and I would like you to assume for a moment that the narrative

portion of the Starr report is true, and also for this purpose take

the conclusions he draws from that narrative. And then as each of

you have touched on in your testimony, I would like you very concisely to tell us why you don’t think the sum total of those conclusions he draws from his narrative are not impeachable.

I realize you’ve talked about this, but I would like to do it particularly in the context of the argument that is frequently made by

those who have come to the conclusion that the President should

be impeached; that, particularly, lying under oath has repercussions and consequences with regard to our constitutional system of

government and respect for the judicial process and these kinds of

issues. However you want to do it.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Let me be brief, Congressman. I am perfectly

willing to take everything that Mr. Starr says and still conclude

that that does not reach the level of high crimes and misdemeanors

in this situation. I reach that because the purpose is to remove the

President. The reason you have high crimes and misdemeanors as

grounds for removing the President is that there is no confidence

left of the public in his ability to conduct that office. And I do not

believe—if you came to that conclusion, you would have to explain

why it is that the public seems to still have confidence in the President.

Mr. ACKERMAN. This committee does not sit as a grand jury of

the District of Columbia. There is probably no person in the United

States today who runs a greater risk in the year 2000 of an indictment for perjury than William Jefferson Clinton. You sir as the

grand inquest of the Nation—and the question for you is whether

the conduct alleged represents an assault on the fundamental principles of government. If this conduct represents that, our history

over the last 2 centuries would be littered with bills of impeachment.

Congress has exercised its responsibilities in a very restrained

way. The most important fact is that over 2 centuries, only twice

has presidential conduct got up to the level of an impeachable offense. And so I think that this is simply, on the state of the evidence, just not nearly the kind of conduct that you, as opposed to

the grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia, should consider.

Mr. WILENTZ. Yes, I think that unless this misconduct rises to

the level of an assault on our fundamental political system that

they are not impeachable, even if every one of the charges is true.
61

I think, however, that the argument that we must impeach the

President for symbolic reasons, that somehow this misconduct represents a breach in the seamless web of justice, is, too, nonsense.

What it does is to confuse the process of impeachment with what

our legal system is for, our system of courts. We try crimes in

courts. We do not impeach people over mere crimes. That is a fundamental constitutional principle. It has been lost amidst all of this

talk of symbolism.

Mr. BEER. I couldn’t improve on what my colleagues have said,

but I will say it again. The thing to focus on is——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Professor Beer, could you please turn the

microphone on so the court reporter can catch your words?

Mr. BEER. I couldn’t improve on what my colleagues have said.

I will repeat it and say that the thing to do is to focus on the meaning of the word impeach, which means remove from office. It tends

to—it is said so much, it tends to lose its power. But when you say

these things, even as Nick Katzenbach has said, even if the Starr

charges are true, they don’t begin to outweigh the enormous damage of removing a President.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, under this process of ours, we inevitably have, I

think, two sides, and each side feels strongly about representing

their client.

In this case we have individuals who feel strongly that the President did not commit an impeachable offense. We have other individuals who feel just as strongly that his wrongful actions did

reach that level.

If the system is functional, and I believe that it is, what we all

hope is that the truth is going to shake out.

Mr. Craig, my first question is this, you have admitted in your

statement that the President did make, you call them, I think, evasive and misleading statements.

Have you ever counseled the President to go before the American

people and tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, which

is to say forget about the polls—in fact, it is likely that the White

House conducted a poll to find out generally what you ought to say

today—but forget the polls; forget the partisan politics; and no matter how much it hurts, level with the American people and tell the

whole truth?

Mr. CRAIG. Well, Congressman, let me just say that he has acknowledged the wrongdoing. He has himself acknowledged that he

was evasive, that he misled people and that he went out of his way

to conceal his conduct—if I could just finish what I am saying.

Mr. SMITH. Right. Mr. Craig, let me follow up on that by asking

you this question then: Does the President intend to specifically

correct any of those evasive and misleading statements that you

have acknowledged that he has made?

Mr. CRAIG. Well, I think he has gone a long way, Congressman,

when he gave that statement on August 17 in which he made the

painful admission and acknowledgment that he did, in fact,

have——
62

Mr. SMITH. Right. Mr. Craig, he also said he regretted it. It is

very easy to say you have regretted something after you have been

caught. But my question was, specifically, is he going to go back

and correct the record and correct any of those misleading and evasive statements?

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, I think he has, in fact, corrected the

most central element of what he testified evasively about.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, Mr. Craig.

Mr. CRAIG. That had to do with the relationship that——

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate your answer.

Mr. CRAIG [continuing]. He denied and that he has now acknowledged, and he has told everybody that he was wrong in denying it.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Craig, I understand all of that, but you have answered my question, and that is, I gather, there are no plans to go

back and correct those false and misleading statements.

Mr. Katzenbach, may I address my next question to you. I would

like to read a statement by Leon Jaworski, who was the special

prosecutor during the Nixon proceeding. And he wrote this: ‘‘The

President, a lawyer, coached Haldeman on how to testify untruthfully and yet not commit perjury. It amounted to subornation of

perjury. For the number one law enforcement officer of the country,

it was, in my opinion, as demeaning an act as could be imagined.’’

Wouldn’t you agree with that statement, at least as it pertained

to the situation in 1974?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I am not sure, Congressman, that I heard everything that you said. I am inclined to think that I would agree

with what Mr. Jaworski said because I think he was saying you

can have an impeachable offense whether or not it amounts to perjury.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Let me read a couple of more statements. This is a quotation

from the Lewinsky proffer: ‘‘At some point in the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky and the President, the President told Ms.

Lewinsky to deny a relationship if ever asked. He said something

to the effect that, if the two people who are involved said it didn’t

happen, it didn’t happen.’’

And then this as well: Ms. Lewinsky has testified that on December 17th, 1997, when she and the President discussed her possible

appearance in the Jones case, the President told her, quote, ‘‘You

know you can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you

were bringing me letters.’’

In your judgment, didn’t the President’s actions amount to coaching a witness to testify falsely?

Mr. KATZENBACH. As you have quoted them, Congressman, I

wouldn’t think so. But I am not trying to trivialize that. If that is

true, that was the wrong thing to say.

Mr. SMITH. I heard your answer as part of—let me state——

Mr. KATZENBACH. It does not amount to grounds for impeachment.

Mr. SMITH. Let me say to you that I think 99 percent of the

American people would consider this to be tampering with a witness, which is a serious felony and might well be an impeachable

offense.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.
63

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I share the view that this morning was very eloquently expressed

by General Katzenbach that the impeachment power was not intended for the punishment of an individual for his conduct. He can

be punished even if he is President in the same manner as any

other citizen in our criminal courts.

The impeachment power is designed to advance the national interest and to remove from office an official whose conduct is so severe that he threatens the Nation.

This committee in its 1974 report in the Watergate inquiry on a

broad bipartisan basis concluded that the impeachment power can

only be used for conduct that is seriously incompatible with our

constitutional form of government or the performance of the constitutional duties of the office of the President. Any other use of the

impeachment power falls short of that high standard.

I am concerned that some Members of the House may view the

application of a lesser standard as appropriate, that they may

think that the House should simply send to the Senate for trial any

charges for which there may be probable cause that an offense may

have been committed, and then leave to the Senate, as the trier of

fact, the resolution of the matter.

I would like to ask for your opinions of that view of the impeachment standard, and I would also welcome your thoughts on the

gravity of the act of the House alone approving articles of impeachment. In considering whether to apply a higher or a lower standard

of what conduct is impeachable, should the Members of the House

consider the harm to the Nation that House approval of articles of

impeachment will cause? Should Members consider the divisiveness and the polarization that will occur pending a Senate trial and

during the trial in the Senate? Should they consider the fact that

for months the Congress and the President will be diverted from

the real business of this Nation?

So there are three questions that I would pose to you. First,

should the House view its standard as probable cause or something

higher?

Second, what harms will occur to the Nation based on the House

approval alone of the articles of the impeachment?

Third, should those harms be considered by the Members of the

House in deciding the proper course on approving articles of impeachment given that the protection of the Nation is the ultimate

test?

And I would like to begin with Professor Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think that the standard, so far as evidence is

concerned, should be clear and convincing evidence. This is not a

normal grand jury indictment. You are indeed correct, Congressman Boucher, that what you are doing is deciding whether the Nation’s political attention will be diverted for a year.

In the case of a normal grand jury, there is no great public interest in preventing an indictment. Here, there is a great public interest in diverting—against diverting attention away from normal

poliical problems. So you are absolutely right, that the standard

has to be high; the evidentiary standard should be clear and con64

vincing, and it is, therefore, very difficult to evaluate little snippets

of testimony without understanding the much larger context.

The second crucial point is that a vote of impeachment is itself

a terrible political precedent for the next generation or two. If this

dramatic lowering of the standard from the historical examples is

tolerated, every time we have one party, let’s call them the Democrats, in control of Congress, and a Republican President in the

year 2001, there is going to be an overwhelming political temptation to exploit a moment of political vulnerability for the President

to once again use a low standard for high crimes and misdemeanors.

Mr. BOUCHER. Professor Wilentz, let me ask you, if I might, in

the time remaining, would you care to comment on the harm to the

Nation that the mere act of the House passing articles of impeachment might cause?

Mr. WILENTZ. I have really little to add. I mean, it is true that

it will open up the possibility for future Presidents to be subject to

harassment by Congress’ caprices if it so desires.

But also I should add that as representatives of the people, you

should be well aware that the public has shown again and again

and again that it has no stomach to watch this nauseating spectacle continue. To ignore that, I think, is something that no Congressman ought to do.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Craig and other members on the witness panel today, thank

you for being here.

Mr. Craig, do you believe our legal system is dependent on telling the truth?

Mr. CRAIG. Absolutely. I think it is very important.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Craig.

Do you believe that perjury represents an attack on the integrity

of our judicial system?

Mr. CRAIG. It certainly is not consistent with the high standards

of the judicial system.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Craig.

Mr. Craig, on Meet the Press on Sunday, November the 22nd of

this year, just a couple of weeks ago, Tim Russert asked you, do

you believe the President, President Clinton, ever lied under oath?

And your statement was, no.

Do you stand by that?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes, sir.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Craig, you concede that the President’s testimony in the Jones case was evasive, incomplete, misleading and

even maddening. How could his testimony be those things without

being a lie?

Mr. CRAIG. There is one element that’s absolutely central to the

elements of a perjury offense, and that is an absolute intent and

knowledge that what you——

Mr. GALLEGLY. Pardon me, Mr. Craig.

Mr. CRAIG. Excuse me.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Are you saying that all lies are perjurious then?

Mr. CRAIG. No, I am not. I am talking about the elements——
65

Mr. GALLEGLY. We are dealing with lying, and now you are

bringing in the issue of perjury.

Mr. CRAIG [continuing]. Of specific intent.

He did not intend to help. He did not intend to volunteer. He

tried, I think, to answer accurately in a very narrow way.

You may conclude, Congressman, that he did not succeed. I can

understand what he was trying to do and how he read that definition. He may not have been successful. I think we could defend his

testimony in any court in this country.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Craig, I appreciate your assessment as a very

capable lawyer and as someone who has studied the law, I imagine,

the majority of your life. Could you please give me in as succinct

a manner as is humanly possible your definition of what it means

when you hold up your right hand and you swear to tell the truth,

the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CRAIG. It means what the words of the oath are clearly intended to mean, the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the

truth.

Mr. GALLEGLY. At this point, do you believe that the President

has told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so

help him God, to the American people?

Mr. CRAIG. I do not think he violated the oath knowingly when

he testified in the Jones deposition.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Do you think he has violated his oath to the

American people in telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing

but the truth?

Mr. CRAIG. I disagree with your sense that he did. He did not

violate his oath.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Craig.

I think probably one of the problems that we are dealing within

the President’s defense today is that any reasonable analysis shows

that the President lied on several occasions in both the deposition

and the grand jury testimony.

For example, in the deposition of January 17th, the President

was asked, ‘‘Have you ever given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?’’

He answered, ‘‘I don’t recall.’’

Yet, just 21⁄2 weeks before the deposition, President Clinton had

given Miss Lewinsky six gifts: a marble bear’s head, a Rockettes

blanket, a Black Dog stuffed animal, a small box of chocolate, a

pair of joke sunglasses and a pin of the New York skyline.

The question was important because it goes directly to the issue

of a cover-up by the President and possibly his attempt to influence

the testimony of a witness.

We have all heard that the President has an extraordinary memory. However, at the same time we are expected to believe that he

does not remember giving six gifts to Miss Lewinsky just 21⁄2

weeks earlier, and, oh, by the way, when the President gave the

gifts to Miss Lewinsky, he knew that she was on the witness list

for the Jones sexual harassment case.

Quite frankly, this is an insult to our intelligence and frankly indicates that the President is still not telling the truth.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
66

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question is for Professors Wilentz and Ackerman. Gentlemen,

I want to follow up sort of on what my colleague Mr. Boucher

asked about standards of proof. We have heard quotes that we just

have to see if there is credible evidence, send it over to the Senate,

let them be the trier of facts.

In my view, that simply transforms the role of the House into a

rubber stamp for the special prosecutor, just a transmission belt,

and it is incorrect.

We have also heard other comments. Special Prosecutor Smaltz,

after Mr. Espy was acquitted, said that indictment by itself is a deterrent to corruption, as if you seek to punish someone by indictment. And a member of this committee was quoted as saying that

impeachment itself, even if not followed by conviction, even if you

know that there is no real possibility of a conviction, is a punishment for misconduct, a scarlet letter, even if the Senate acquits,

and even if you know there is no possibility the Senate will, in fact,

convict.

Now, we know that the Canons of Legal Ethics say that it is unethical for a prosecutor to seek an indictment if the prosecutor does

not believe that he can get a jury to convict the defendant.

Could you comment on the view that it is proper to seek an impeachment as a punishment for improper conduct, even if you

know or think that the evidence will not produce a conviction by

the Senate?

Mr. WILENTZ. Let me start, Congressman Nadler, by quoting Oliver North’s attorney, Brendan Sullivan, or paraphrase him rather,

to say that Congress, or rather, the House of Representatives, is

not a potted plant. You are not just sitting here passing things

along to the Senate. To see that as your role, I think, is a violation

of your oath of office. It certainly goes towards that, your oath to

uphold the Constitution. That is what you are here for. And if you

are derelict in that, if you back off from that, out of fear, out of

desire just to get it over with——

Mr. NADLER. So it is not like a grand jury, if there is any probable cause?

Mr. WILENTZ. No. This is no more like a grand jury than an impeachment is like a normal jury trial. It is not. They are two different species.

Mr. NADLER. Could you comment on the second half of the question?

Mr. WILENTZ. Could you remind me of that?

Mr. NADLER. The second half of the question is the propriety of

voting for impeachment as a punishment in and of itself, and if you

think that the Senate probably will not convict on the evidence

there?

Mr. WILENTZ. Historically that just runs against the entire tenor

of what impeachment has been about. There has never been a case

where a House of Representatives has decided to move on an impeachment proceeding with the idea that the Senate would not convict. The entire reason—I think Elliot Richardson said this every

eloquently the other day: A vote to impeach is, in effect, a vote to

remove.
67

Mr. NADLER. And briefly, Professor Ackerman and Attorney General Katzenbach, on the second half of that question?

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is especially inappropriate when you know

that the 106th House is going to have to vote on it again. And if

there is no reason to believe that the 106th House would be willing

to vote an impeachment, this is to trivialize the impeachment process completely.

Mr. NADLER. So you think it is improper to vote for impeachment

if you don’t think the Senate would be likely to convict?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Or if the next House won’t, won’t confirm you.

Mr. NADLER. Attorney General?

Mr. KATZENBACH. It seems to me that nothing could be more improper than to use the impeachment process as a punishment, and

that is what you are suggesting. It is absolutely clear constitutionally that however bad the acts, impeachment is not a punishment. It is to remove somebody from office, the President or a

judge or somebody else.

Mr. NADLER. So do you think it would be proper or improper to

vote for impeachment, even if you thought the President should be

removed from office, if you thought the likelihood the Senate would

remove him from office was nil?

Mr. KATZENBACH. If you met the standards, if the House met the

standards of impeachment as a high crime and misdemeanor, if

those were met and sincerely met, then I would think simply to

consider what the Senate would do might be a factor in the voting,

but not necessarily from a matter of principle.

Mr. NADLER. Anybody else want to comment on that?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. BEER. Again, this points to the political and constitutional

consequences. I mean, this is not just something that is happening

now. This goes on down and into the future history of the relation

of the Congress and President. It is a further attack on the separation of powers, this entire precedent. I entirely agree with what my

colleagues said.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the

members of this panel for being here today.

I will candidly state that with the exception of Professor Ackerman’s argument concerning the procedural status of the resolution

of impeachment passed by this House, I didn’t find any new arguments advanced with respect to the grounds for impeachment or

the proper circumstances for impeachment, but I appreciate your

being here.

I want to say something about that issue, but before I do that,

I want to also thank Mr. Craig for indicating that we will soon be

receiving an exhaustive defense in writing of the President’s conduct that’s set forth in the record. And I am not going to dwell on

that, but I do want to ask one question, which just stands out to

me, of Mr. Craig.

Mr. Craig, in the President’s deposition last January, he was

asked this question: ‘‘At any time, were you and Monica Lewinsky

alone together in the Oval Office?’’
68

He answered, ‘‘I don’t recall.’’ He gave kind of an extended discussion there about working on the weekends, in which he indicated to me, ‘‘it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice

on the weekends.’’

There was then a follow-up question: ‘‘So I understand your testimony is that it was possible then that you were alone with her, but

you have no specific recollection of that ever happening?’’

Answer from the President: ‘‘Yes, that’s correct.’’

Now, Mr. Craig, is it your position here today, on behalf of the

President, that when the President gave those answers in the deposition, he was telling the truth?

Mr. CRAIG. That’s correct, Congressman. He answered the question that it was possible that he was alone with her. This is in the

civil deposition. So the description that I gave of that civil deposition is accurate. It was evasive; it was misleading; he tried to be

narrowly accurate, but, Congressman, he did not violate his oath.

Mr. CANADY. Mr. Craig, let me just say this: I read it. It is here

in writing. I believe this is an accurate transcription of what took

place. This is in the public domain. It seems to me that the President unequivocally denied that he had any specific recollection of

being alone with Miss Lewinsky. And for you to contend today that

that is truthful I think is not credible. That’s just an observation.

There are other questions about other parts of the record that I

am sure we will focus on as we move forward with this, but I must

candidly state that I don’t see how anyone in this country could believe that that was a truthful answer in light of all of the evidence

that is before us.

Let me address the issue about the standards for impeachment,

and I think it is important that all of us acknowledge that not all

criminal acts are impeachable. No one here contends that.

We also understand that impeachment should not be for trivial

matters. Impeachment, we all understand, is a grave step to take.

And, yes, I believe, and I believe most of the members of the committee understand, that we need more than probable cause to move

forward with an impeachment. We need convincing evidence. But

I believe that on the record before us, we have convincing evidence

of a pattern of lying under oath and obstruction of justice. I can’t

detail that here, but I believe that’s in the record, and we will discuss that. I think we need to look at the effect of such conduct on

the system of government.

I refer back to the report of the committee in the Nixon inquiry.

It said, the emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional

duties and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of governmental process, adverse impact on the system of government. I believe that there is a convincing case here of such an adverse impact.

Let me quote, finally, Chief Justice Jay, who delivered the following charge to a grand jury. He said, ‘‘independent of the abominable insult which perjury offers to the Divine Being, there is no

crime more extensively pernicious to society. It discolors and poisons the streams of justice, and by substituting falsehood for truth

saps the foundations of personal and public rights.’’

He goes on to say——
69

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. CANADY. Thank you.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, earlier this morning I mentioned a motion that

I would like to introduce. The motion would have been, had it been

in order, that I move that the committee establish a specific scope

of inquiry prior to the White House’s rebuttal of still undefined allegations. If it shall be necessary to expand the scope of inquiry,

then such expansion shall be permitted by majority vote of the

committee.

In addition, once specific allegations of inquiry have been designated, the committee shall hear from witnesses with direct

knowledge of these allegations before it considers any articles of

impeachment.

When that is in order, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce

that.

But in the meanwhile, I would like to ask Mr. Craig whether or

not he has been given a list of allegations, noting that Mr. Starr’s

original report had 11 allegations, he came back with 10. Mr.

Schippers, the Republican counsel, came up with 15; our Democratic counsel came up with three. Kathleen Willey has been mentioned as a possible scope. Campaign finance reform was in one day

and out the next. Insult by the virtue of the response to the 81

questions has been mentioned as an impeachable offense, or lack

of candor.

Do you have a list of the allegations that you are responding to?

Mr. CRAIG. We do not, Congressman. And may I just say one

thing about that problem, which I think has been highlighted by

what Congressman Canady just did. Particularly when allegations

are being made about perjury, it is very important to particularize

what the false statement is or what the alleged testimony is that

is perjurious. And if this committee is going to be considering those

kinds of articles, it would be of benefit to the world as well as to

this individual, trying to serve the purpose of a defense lawyer, to

know precisely what it is that the President said in the grand jury

that is supposed to be perjurious. This is the way, in fact, it is the

common pleading way, that you deal with indictments for perjury

or allegations of false testimony.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Much has been said about 17 boxes of material. It is my understanding that you have been given access to

about a third of that material. Is that right?

Mr. CRAIG. I think we have been given some access, yes.

Mr. SCOTT. But not entirely?

Mr. CRAIG. We are not allowed to take notes or to make copies.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Mr. Ackerman, you indicated—I think you acknowledged in your testimony that there is precedence for carrying

over impeachments from one Congress to the next. Is there any

question about the need to appoint managers by the House in the

new Congress? Is there any question about that aspect of it?

Mr. ACKERMAN. There is only one case of carrying over in the

last 65 years. That’s the Hastings case. The previous carry-overs

are the trial of Pickering in 1804, which is the high point of no due

process throughout the entire—this was the worst possible prece70

dent in the history of the United States. And then there was Judge

Louderback, I think it was in 1933, which was just before the 20th

amendments—this was sort of the final revenge of the lame duck

Congress. So there is only one case.

Mr. SCOTT. The question is is there any new question that the

new House would have to appoint managers?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Absolutely. And in the Hastings case, the new

House appointed managers. So there is absolutely no precedent for

holding over the managers appointed by one House to the new

House.

Mr. SCOTT. The other question I have is I would like to ask, I

guess, Professor Wilentz, the title of the offense has been mentioned as the impeachable offense. Can you comment on why the

title of the offense should not be used as the measure of whether

it is an impeachable offense but the underlying behavior?

Is perjury an impeachable offense? Usually it is perjury, because

you lied about bribes and things like that, that we ought to be looking at?

Mr. WILENTZ. Under some circumstances, perjury is plainly an

impeachable offense.

Mr. SCOTT. How do you measure—rather than the title, what do

you look to to determine whether it is an impeachable offense?

Mr. WILENTZ. When it goes to a fundamental assault on political

institutions. When it goes to, as Mason said, in the Constitutional

Convention, when it is a crime against the state. That is the spirit

of the Constitution, as well as the letter.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. SCOTT. Without that, it is not an impeachable offense?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.

Inglis.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Craig, you said in your testimony that you would address the

factual and evidentiary issues directly today and tomorrow. You

haven’t done that yet. I hope we have got more to come. I understand that what you are talking about here today, in this panel,

is the standards of impeachment, but as some of my colleagues

have pointed out, there is nothing new here, nothing new at all, except possibly Professor Ackerman’s statements. So we have heard

all the rest of this before.

Now I think you have raised a level of expectation, and now I

am counting on you to meet that over the next—today and tomorrow. You need to meet that expectation. It is very unusual for the

White House spin operation to go out there and set up expectations

they can’t fulfill. Usually they do it the opposite. So you have now

established a very high expectation that I am going to count on you

to meet.

Now, you also said in your testimony that the President, if we—

you are asking us to believe this, that the President has insisted

and personally instructed his lawyers that no legalities or technicalities should be allowed to obscure the simple moral truth that

his behavior in this matter was wrong.

Mr. Craig, did the President lie about never being alone in the

Oval Office with Monica Lewinsky?
71

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, I have made a distinction between

what was morally wrong and what was——

Mr. INGLIS. No, no, Mr. Craig. Answer that question. This is

what—let me give you a little bit further background now.

Mr. CRAIG. Yes.

Mr. INGLIS. This is a question put to the President in the deposition. And I understand you are drawing a distinction, a technicality, a nicety, as you said, between grand jury and deposition. So let

me be absolutely clear, we are talking here deposition.

Paula Jones’ lawyer asked the question: At any time were you

and Monica Lewinsky alone together in the Oval Office?

The President’s answer: I don’t recall. And then he goes on.

Now, corroborating evidence in Ms. Lewinsky’s evidence indicates

that there were eight occasions when the President and Monica

Lewinsky had sex in the Oval Office.

I ask you again now: Did the President lie when he said, I don’t

recall?

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, he goes on in that same passage to testify that it was possible, in fact, that he was alone. So the characterization of the testimony that he never was alone or he didn’t recall is not accurate. The characterization that you just gave to it,

and that Mr. Starr gave to it, and that the referral gave to it is

not an accurate characterization of the President’s testimony in

that deposition.

Mr. INGLIS. You know, I am reading the whole thing, and I don’t

see what you are talking about. It seems to me that you are relying

on these technicalities.

Now, Mr. Craig, did he lie to the American people when he said,

I never had sex with that woman? Did he lie?

Mr. CRAIG. He certainly misled and deceived.

Mr. INGLIS. Wait a minute now. Did he lie?

Mr. CRAIG. To the American people, he misled them and did not

tell the truth at that moment.

Mr. INGLIS. So you are not going to rely—the President has personally assisted you, I understand, instructed—has assisted and

personally instructed you, I suppose, that no legalities or technicalities should be allowed to obscure the simple moral truth.

Did he lie to the American people when he said, I never had sex

with that woman?

Mr. CRAIG. You know, he doesn’t believe he did, and because of

the—may I explain, Congressman?

Mr. INGLIS. He doesn’t believe that he lied?

Mr. CRAIG. No, he does not believe that he lied because his notion of what sex is is what the dictionary definition is. It is, in fact,

something you may not agree with, but in his own mind his definition was not——

Mr. INGLIS. Okay. I understand that argument.

Mr. CRAIG. Okay.

Mr. INGLIS. This is an amazing thing, that you now sit before us

and you are taking back all of his apologies.

Mr. CRAIG. No.

Mr. INGLIS. You are taking them all back, aren’t you?

Mr. CRAIG. No, I am not.
72

Mr. INGLIS. Because now you are back to the argument—there

are many arguments you can make here. One of them is he didn’t

have sex with her; it was oral sex, it wasn’t real sex. Now, is that

what you are here to say to us today, that he did not have sex with

Monica Lewinsky?

Mr. CRAIG. What he said, to the American people was that he did

not have sexual relations. And I understand you are not going to

like this, Congressman, because you will see it as a technical defense or a hairsplitting, evasive answer, but sexual relations is defined in every dictionary in a certain way, and he did not have that

kind of sexual contact with Monica Lewinsky.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me just finish. So did he deceive the American

people? Yes. Was it wrong? Yes. Was it blameworthy? Yes.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has again expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My colleagues, the last three Republican colleagues on the committee, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Canady and Mr. Inglis, have asked a series of questions about whether the President lied or misled or

didn’t lie or mislead.

What I would like to find out from Mr. Katzenbach, Professor

Ackerman, Professor Wilentz and Professor Beer is even if you assume that everything that they said was correct, that the President

did, in fact, lie on those occasions, would it be an impeachable offense?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Congressman, my answer would be that it

clearly would not because of the nature of that lie. That seems to

me to be the view that the American people take, and it is the view

that I would take.

Mr. WATT. Professor Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Impeachment is the ultimate weapon of the people’s representatives against an executive out of control. I do not

believe that this evidence is evidence of an executive out of control,

assaulting our basic liberties.

Mr. WATT. Professor Wilentz.

Mr. WILENTZ. We have answered this question on various occasions. I am happy to answer it again. Even if President Clinton did

all of the things that have been alleged, the worst of them, they

do not rise to the level of impeachment. They may rise to the level

of crimes for which our court system is set aside to prosecute.

This procedure has other meanings, other purposes, and to confuse the two is to violate, I believe, the spirit of the Constitution.

Mr. WATT. Professor Beer.

Mr. BEER. That was my point also. I think the legal case is terribly weak, but even if it were true, it would have to be taken in

consideration—in the context. I think that is what we have tried

to call attention to, that impeachment means remove; it means

eliminate this administration. It means holding the record and the

promise of this Presidency at naught, and I think that in that context, if you balance the pluses and the minuses there, overwhelmingly there is no reason to remove this President from office. That’s

the point to keep. And to do so, it would severely damage the

democratic process.
73

Mr. WATT. Professor Beer, I think you have hit on something in

your testimony that is not very exciting in the public context to

talk about, but I think is extremely important. And that is the difference between a parliamentary form of government and a democratic form of government, which we have, or a constitutional form

of government, which we have.

I wonder if you could elaborate on that distinction and the implications that that distinction has in this context.

Mr. BEER. I am so glad you asked me that, because it does need

to be said. The crucial thing in the separation of powers is that

each of the offices, the legislature and the executive, is directly responsible to the voter. That’s the point. In a parliamentary system,

there is an intermediate body, namely the Parliament, and that

makes it quite different.

I mean, therefore, when the legislature acts against the executive

in our system, it is, so to speak, taking the place of the basic relationship, which is one directly between the President and the people. And it has to, therefore, act with a special caution and look at

the whole record, and put itself in the place of the people, and try

to judge as they would judge.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance

of my time.

Chairman HYDE [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Wilentz, last week, Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz

testified under questioning before this committee that perjury before a Federal grand jury, if proven, would be an impeachable offense. Do you agree with Professor Dershowitz that perjury before

a Federal grand jury, if proven, would be an impeachable offense?

Mr. WILENTZ. I am not sure that I would, actually.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask you this: I think the prevailing opinion is——

Mr. WILENTZ. May I add, though, that I am not sure that it

wouldn’t be, either. It depends on the character of the offense, et

cetera.

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. Let’s accept that.

What about perjury that would, if the President were subject to

prosecution and imprisonment while President, result in his imprisonment?

Mr. WILENTZ. You mean, an offense—well, any offense might involve imprisonment.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Yes. And if the President of the United States,

like an ordinary citizen, could be prosecuted and, if convicted, incarcerated, would you then think it appropriate for the Congress to

remove the President from office while he is in prison, to use the

impeachment power for that purpose?

Mr. WILENTZ. I think it would be an improper use of the impeachment power.

Mr. GOODLATTE. You would leave him in prison as the President

of the United States?

Mr. WILENTZ. The President of the United States would be tried

for—by my understanding, would be tried for that crime after he

left office. That’s the point of that.
74

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, there is also a prevailing opinion that a

President of the United States can exercise the power of pardon on

himself.

Mr. WILENTZ. I would defer to a lawyer on that one.

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. Well, if the President can indeed exercise that power, and I think the language in the Constitution would

support that argument because with regard to pardons, Article II

says, have the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses

against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. Therefore, if the President has the power to pardon himself, and the prevailing opinion is that he cannot be prosecuted until after he leaves

office, your position regarding the responsibility of this committee,

with regard to use of the impeachment power, when the President

commits a serious offense that could result in his incarceration if

he could be incarcerated, is to say that the President of the United

States is above the law?

Mr. WILENTZ. No. There has to be a distinction, which I have

been trying to get across to the committee and to everyone else, between impeachment and crimes and being tried for crimes. There

are two distinct processes.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Certainly they are, but the Constitution contemplates that with the power of pardoning, that obviously the

President could be removed for crimes, because it says that he can’t

exercise that power in cases of impeachment.

Mr. WILENTZ. Well, I am going to defer to my lawyer friend over

here.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Before we go on to Mr. Ackerman, let me just

say to you, sir, that you have made this novel argument that the

Senate cannot continue with this action unless the 106th Congress

votes out additional articles of impeachment; that while I appreciate your making the argument, and while you have acknowledged

that it is a moot argument because this committee can act, and we

don’t know what action the 106th Congress will take or what the

Senate will take, that your statement is based on absolutely no historical precedent, because every single precedent available to this

committee is exactly to the contrary, both—not only in the 19th

century, but you cite as a basis for changing that precedent the

20th amendment to the Constitution.

I have the 20th amendment here before me, and there is absolutely nothing in the 20th amendment which indicates that the

precedents of the 19th century would be changed. And in fact, after

that amendment was adopted, the Congress in the late 1980s in

the Alcee Hastings case, the Senate, receiving the articles of impeachment in one Congress, conducted the trial in the next Congress, without the House of Representatives enacting or adopting

or sending to the Senate new articles of impeachment.

So there is absolutely no constitutional foundation for your argument.

Mr. ACKERMAN. May I answer that question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. GOODLATTE. Yes, please.

Mr. ACKERMAN. In the last 65 years, since the passage of the

20th amendment, there have been no lame duck impeachments. Of

course, there are no precedents because Congress has acted with

restraint for the last 65 years.
75

Mr. GOODLATTE. Reclaiming my time, that is absolutely incorrect

with regard to the Judge Hastings impeachment——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Because he is impeached by a normal Congress.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Because articles of impeachment were passed in

one Congress and tried in the second Congress.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Hastings was impeached by a normal Congress

in the month, I think, of August or something of this kind; not

after an election. This is the first time since the 20th

amendment——

Mr. GOODLATTE. It was still a new Congress,

Mr. ACKERMAN.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Overturned the results of the previous Congress.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lofgren.

Ms. LOFGREN. I appreciate the panel’s report today, and I am

mindful, once again, of the severe gravity of this matter. And although some of the questions today have been about details of sexual activity that I think we all find embarrassing, underlying that

kind of embarrassing discussion is the very real prospect, I would

say the likelihood, that this committee may vote for articles of impeachment and that the House of Representatives may also vote

articles of impeachment. And I think many in the country are not

aware of that.

I just came in from California last night, and people at home,

many of them, were asking, ‘‘well, when is this going to be wound

up?’’ They thought it was over, and people are busy getting ready

for the holidays. So I think this hearing today is very important in

terms of informing not just the committee and the House, but the

American public that something is actually happening.

Now, I think your report matches what the Founding Fathers

had in mind, what Mason and Madison meant, that impeachment

is a remedy for the Nation. For the well-being of the Nation is, in

fact, what we need to be considering.

And I am also mindful that impeachment trials take a long time.

The trial of Andrew Johnson took 3 months, and that was before

television. It would take even longer today. The Chief Justice must

preside, and I have been thinking that if we proceed with this trial,

will that mean that the Supreme Court wait to hear any cases for

a period of 6 months or more? Will all of government be gridlocked?

So as we measure the threat of this alleged conduct to the country and whether it meets the constitutional standard for impeachment, is it appropriate to also measure the impact of a trial on the

well-being of our Nation?

Now, I have a question for Mr. Katzenbach. I am from Silicon

Valley, and the venture capitalists who spoke to me last week

when they found out that this was proceeding were extremely concerned and alarmed about the potentially severe economic impact,

in their view.

You were the senior vice president for IBM, I think their senior

legal advisor, for many years. I have the IBM research division in

my district, and the disk drive division. Can you give us some insight for what the implications for an impeachment trial might be
76

for the economy? I am of course especially concerned about high

tech, but not just that.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Let me say two things, Congresswoman

Lofgren. I think your point——

Chairman HYDE. Would you move the microphone over.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I think your point about what kind of agony

and disruption that you put the country through, if there is an impeachment process, simply underlines what I think members of

this panel have been saying with respect to the importance of the

definition; not whether or not the President had sex or lied about

it, but what it does as far as the government is concerned.

On your second question, the people involved in business and the

stock markets and so forth want certainty, and I can think of nothing much worse than pushing them into an uncertainty that would

go on for some period of time while we rehearsed what has been

rehearsed a dozen times already, and I would think that that

would be a consideration, as the first points were that you made,

in terms of how serious, in terms of the public will, is the conduct

of the President? Is it so serious that he must be removed from office and we go through the long process of a potential conviction,

a trial and a conviction in those circumstances?

It was set up that way because of the importance that was attached to the idea in our system of removing the President.

Ms. LOFGREN. So if I may, would you then say it is not inappropriate to weigh that there may be implications for the stock market? Should we consider that our economy, especially high tech, is

oriented towards exports, and that might fall apart, in the balancing of whether to move forward?

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Ms. LOFGREN. Could the witness answer yes or no?

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have several questions. Let me ask each of the witnesses, how

much notice did you have that you would be here testifying today?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I had about 48 hours, something of that kind.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Saturday morning.

Mr. WILENTZ. Saturday.

Mr. BUYER. And Saturday?

Mr. BEER. Monday, I think yesterday.

Mr. BUYER. Yesterday you received notice that you would be a

defense witness for the President?

Mr. BEER. Yes.

Mr. BUYER. And who contacted each of you?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I was contacted by the gentleman to my right.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Craig.

Mr. WILENTZ. Mr. Craig.

Mr. BEER. I am sorry. It was Sunday afternoon, but I was at

such a huge cocktail party that I had to—that I had to call Mr.

Craig back Monday morning to find out what it was about.

Mr. BUYER. Were you invited to the cocktail party?

Mr. BEER. I would have loved to have had you there.

Mr. WILENTZ. He gave the party.
77

Mr. BUYER. Oh, you gave it.

All of you are here, it appears, hastily called, to defend the President. When the President spoke to the American people on August

17th, some of the President’s comments in his attacks of Judge

Starr were not taken very well by the American people. So I view

these witnesses as if the President were here speaking; this is his

position; this is his defense in this case.

And one of them has come here and said that if there are Members of the 105th Congress who, based upon the reading of the law

and the facts, believe that the President’s conduct rises to the level

of impeachment, then we are zealots, fanatics and cowards.

Now, that type of name-calling by the President’s defense is disappointing and demeaning to this proceeding.

Earlier, Mr. Craig mentioned about the witness tampering, and

said that at the time—there was some questioning by Mr. McCollum with regard to Betty Currie, and Mr. Craig said, well, she was

not on a witness list, nor was there a proceeding at the time.

I have Title 18, section 1512 here, and I am sure that you also

have read it. This criminal statute very clearly says that for the

purpose of this section, an official proceeding need not be pending

or even about to be instituted at the time of an offense; very clear.

So I would just disagree with your reading of the law here.

I would also note, and I would like for you to comment on this,

I believe that in my reading of the facts here, Mr. Craig, that the

President endeavored to influence testimony of subordinates whom

he knew to be potential witnesses in a Federal criminal investigation, systematically lying to them with the intent that they would

relay these falsehoods to the Federal grand jury.

One was John Podesta, who testified before the grand jury on

January 23rd, that the President volunteered information to him

concerning Ms. Lewinsky, even though he had not asked for that

information. Specifically, the President told him that he had not

had sex with Miss Lewinsky. Mr. Podesta also said that the President told him when Miss Lewinsky came to the White House, after

she left her employment there, she came to see Miss Currie; that

Ms. Currie had always been present or nearby. Mr. Podesta testified that he believed the President.

Mr. Podesta testified also to the grand jury that he was present

in the Oval Office on January 21st, together with Erskine Bowles

and Sylvia Matthews, when the President told the three of them,

quote, I want you to know that I did not have sexual relationships

with this woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask anybody to lie,

and when the truth comes out, you will understand, end quote.

Mr. Bowles testified to the grand jury the President made these

statements and that he believed the President.

Sidney Blumenthal testified before the grand jury that on January 21st, the President relayed a conversation that Mr. Clinton had

with Dick Morris in which Mr. Morris speculated that President

Nixon could have survived——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Welcome back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very

much.
78

Let me state on the record that I am sure my time will expire

before I have had the opportunity to fully address the panel and

to determine information that I think is vital.

However, might I just simply say and raise my continuing objection to the limited time that the President has had to present his

case, and say as well to the panel that I appreciate, I think it

might have been the esteemed Mr. Katzenbach or Mr. Ackerman,

who have noted that this is a process of completeness, this is a

process in which we have the ultimate act, the removal of a President. So there is a, in quotes, prosecutorial process of which we in

the House sit, and there is then the trial process. So it is as a

whole. And you cannot bifurcate and separate one process from the

other.

Let me just note that under the Rodino committee, there were

17 days of hearings, some in executive session. Mr. St. Clair had

2 days for an opening statement. And likewise, let me also note

that he was able to examine and cross-examine the witnesses.

As Professor Beer has indicated, I hope that we do not fall to the

idea that impeachment is a suitable activity for party politics.

With that, let me ask a series of questions that I will apologize

for their brevity, asking you to be brief because of the nature of the

time.

It is important for me, Mr. Craig, and I realize that I will have

an opportunity to query Mr. Ruff—if you would just give me a yes

or no answer, I would appreciate it simply because I realize that

I will be more pointed with Mr. Ruff. First of all, I think we can

acknowledge that the President has misled the American people.

He said it. It has been said, and it has been noted.

Do you so note today?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you also note as well that you have an understanding, when we talk about fact witnesses—and let me also

say that as we sit as a prosecutorial body, as the Rodino committee

sat, they called witnesses, in essence, to present their case. Since

the movers in that instance were Democrats who moved for the impeachment of the President, they presented fact witnesses. In this

instance, I would assume the movers of this action, the Republicans, would have likewise presented fact witnesses, and tragically

they are redundant in their accusations of who has called fact witnesses, but yet they have called none, and I don’t understand that.

But I will ask you the question: Do you have knowledge that Ms.

Lewinsky had a diary?

Mr. CRAIG. I understand that she did.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have any knowledge of whether the

President maintained a personal diary with his reflections, impressions and comments?

Mr. CRAIG. I am unaware of any such document.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is it your understanding that a diary that Ms.

Lewinsky had may have her reflections, impressions and comments?

Mr. CRAIG. I would suppose that, yes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In the grand jury proceedings, as I understand, Ms. Lewinsky had such documents, and the American people

who have not viewed the grand jury proceedings as they are now
79

viewing this really have never been inside of grand jury proceedings. It is interesting that the grand jurors today have been silent

on any indictments, but as we know the information there was

questioning and determination of credibility of the witnesses. It is

also my understanding that in that instance, Miss Lewinsky could

refer to her impressions and announcements and characterizations

in that particular proceeding.

You can just simply answer, in the grand jury I assume a witness can refer to documents that they might have?

Mr. CRAIG. I think she testified twice in front of the grand jury

and was interviewed by agents of the Office of Special—of the Independent Counsel many, many times—perhaps 19 times.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And may have had the opportunity to refer to

her documents?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I would

simply say you have here a question of the ability to determine

credibility of witnesses, where one has been able to refer to written,

line-by-line definitions and characterizations; where another witness such as the President may have had to rely upon his recollection. Again, we go to the point of the whole question of credibility

of witnesses.

Ms. Tripp, are you familiar with a Linda Tripp, Mr. Craig?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes, Congresswoman.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have any knowledge of a personal vendetta against Ms. Tripp that might have caused any actions on that

person’s part to protect herself?

Can I hear you more loudly, sir?

Mr. CRAIG. I know of no such vendetta, Congresswoman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. As I noted, and I hope that one day——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a reminder to all who might be watching this, we have had

a number of other professors from the history area, as well as law

professors, who have disagreed with you gentlemen and your opinions that these types of conduct are impeachable offenses. As a

matter of fact, Mr. Dershowitz last week said that lying before a

grand jury, in his opinion, was an impeachable offense.

I might also bring up this 400-signature letter that has been alluded to earlier, and in fact one of you gentlemen had written the

introduction to that, saying this was about historians speaking as

historians. Well, one of your colleagues, in fact two of your colleagues have the opposite view of that, and they say that this 400-

signature statement is nothing of the kind; rather, it is an impostor. It places the stamp of professional scholarship on what is, at

best, a purely partisan political tract. The only interesting question

it raises is whether those responsible should be merely censured or

impeached and removed from their professional chairs.

One of you mentioned that were we to, quote, ‘‘lower the standard for impeachment for such minor things as obstruction of justice

and perjury, that the landscape would be littered over the last two

centuries with impeached Presidents.’’ But I don’t recall any President ever being charged with perjury, lying under oath to a grand
80

jury. I don’t recall any President ever being charged with obstruction of justice, tampering with witnesses and these kinds of things,

such as this President has.

And in reference to the two professors I mentioned a moment

ago, they make, I think, a very strong statement that is contrary

to the fact that we seem to be lowering the standards for impeachment according to some of your opinions. They say that we would

set precedent. That we would establish that Presidents who commit

these crimes—let’s talk about the President now—against the system of law that they are sworn to faithfully execute, will not be

permitted to continue in office.

If we don’t impeach, in other words, do we really want to be at

the mercy of future Presidents who believe otherwise? So I think

there is definitely a two-sided coin here.

And I want to ask Mr. Craig a couple of questions, I guess, while

I have got some time.

You are an attorney?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes.

Mr. BRYANT. You represent the President?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRYANT. And as an attorney, you are bound by the applicable

codes of professional ethics, and as an officer of the court you would

be called on to preserve the court’s integrity, would you not?

Mr. CRAIG. That is correct, your Honor.

Mr. BRYANT. With that in mind, I want to ask you, what do you

believe is the difference between willful lying to a Federal judge or

grand jury and willfully misleading a judge or Federal grand jury?

Mr. CRAIG. I think the criminal justice system is special. I think

a grand jury investigation, there is a gravity——

Mr. BRYANT. Okay. Could you be specific, though?

Mr. CRAIG. You asked me about the difference between a civil

deposition where a Federal judge is presiding over a civil deposition? I may not understand the question, but I thought you asked

me the difference between——

Mr. BRYANT. What is the difference between willfully lying and

willfully misleading? You seem to make a distinction there.

Mr. CRAIG. I am making a distinction between the grand jury as

opposed to the civil case. Is that not the question you are asking?

Mr. BRYANT. No.

Let me be as simple as I can. I am asking you what is your difference between willfully lying, which I understand to be perjury,

and willfully misleading?

Mr. CRAIG. I think that perjury is a word of art. It has definitions in the statute. It has elements of an offense that must be

proven before a crime has been established, that includes a specific

intent, knowingly to present false——

Mr. BRYANT. You notice I used the adjective ‘‘willfully’’ and—the

adverb ‘‘willfully’’ in front of each of those, so the intent is there.

I understood the President intended to mislead, evade, and give

incomplete answers. He has said that. He was not going to volunteer information at that deposition because he felt their case was

wrong.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me just give you one example of a distinction.
81

A perjury defense is complete if you can show that the answer

was specifically accurate, even narrowly accurate. And absolute accuracy, even if you disagree with the interpretation, if the question

is ambiguous and there is a possible answer that can be accepted

as truthful, that is a complete defense to a perjury prosecution.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman HYDE. Yes, sir?

Mr. ROTHMAN. I seem to recall when the Chair last presided over

the previous panel, and the question was——

Chairman HYDE. You are absolutely right. I was much more liberal, and I made the announcement regarding the 5-minute rule

today because, frankly, people at your end of the table and at this

end of the table never get to ask questions. It consumes over 3

hours under the strict 5-minute rule to complete the members’

questioning.

We have a large panel considering, the entire day; and I would

like members to get a chance to ask questions.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, we ought to let the witness finish

his answer, especially, coincidentally when it is the President’s

counsel bringing his defense. It strikes me as inherently unfair

since this process started months ago, and this is a new practice

for the Chair.

May I respectfully ask that the Chair adopt its previous practice,

when the Republican majority called witnesses, to let the experts

finish their answers?

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rothman, that is unfair. I was as liberal

for witnesses, Republican or Democrat.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes, you were. But why not today, sir?

Chairman HYDE. Because we have a plethora, a swarm of witnesses. We have a lot of members who would like the opportunity

to ask questions. And that is my way of doing it. Everyone treated

alike. You, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Bryant, Mr. Barr. I am trying to

get through the day without going past midnight. So I would appreciate the gentleman’s cooperation.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman HYDE. Yes, Mr. Scott?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, will the witnesses, at the end of the

questions, be given an opportunity to give the answers——

Chairman HYDE. Yes, I am trying to use my judgment. I thought

I was——

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. Please, let me respond to your remark.

Mr. SCOTT. I haven’t made the remark.

Chairman HYDE. Okay. Who is next?

Mr. SCOTT. Could I make the remark?

Chairman HYDE. Well, if you have a remark to make, yes.

Mr. SCOTT. Very brief.

At the end of all of the questioning, could they have an opportunity to answer some of the questions they—answers that they

might not have given because of the strict way that it is being handled, so that they are given 2 or 3 minutes to go through all the
82

answers they might have given after everyone has had the opportunity?

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Waters?

Ms. WATERS. Do you want to start my time over?

Chairman HYDE. Yes, we will start your time over.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Hyde, you are not going to like this, but since

there is so much talk about lying, I am going to read what you said

about it in 1997 when President Reagan and his top national security advisors were accused of lying to Congress and the public

about their secret arms sales to a terrorist state, it was Hyde who

argued forcefully for a more nuanced view of lies and deception.

‘‘Lying is wrong,’’ he said, ‘‘but context counts.’’

So I agree with Mr. Hyde on that.

Let me just say that I think the most important thing that will

come out of this hearing today is that time that this Congress is

going to be tied up in dealing with this impeachment. I have long

since decided that the pettiness that we are dealing with does not

deserve this kind of attention. It doesn’t make really a difference

whether or not it was a little bit shaded when the President talked

about being alone or the hat pin or the tee shirt. I think this Congress needs to get on with the business of this country.

Mr. Hyde and members of the Republican Party told the Nation

they were going to speed this thing up. They were going to do it

quickly. They were going to hand the Nation, in essence, a Christmas present and get it behind us. November 3rd elections, even

today, the polls show the American people are saying they do not

want to impeach the President.

I think the most important point that has been made here today

by Professor Ackerman is, first of all, this should not spill over into

the 106th Congress, and that the President probably, if it does, can

have a motion to quash. I am thinking about all of the new members who will be coming on to this committee, and thank God, some

of the members of this committee will be gone. It seems to me they

will have a cause of action themselves, because it is not just a matter of what is on the floor. It is a matter of starting all over again.

Everything in the 105th Congress will be dead.

Members who will serve on the Judiciary Committee, who have

not been involved in these hearings, have a right to be involved

and to have their say; and new members should certainly make an

issue of that. So if we envision going back again in the 106th Congress through the committee process, back to the floor, even to try

and get to the Senate, with a different makeup of Congress, where

some members even on the other side of the aisle will not be so inclined, what are we talking about in terms of a time frame?

Even if it goes on to the Senate, and they hold a trial, and the

Supreme Court will have to stop in the middle of them on a motion

to squash, and there will be motions perhaps by the members.

What are we talking about?

And what do we do, God forbid, if in fact we have to take an action against Saddam Hussein, if in fact we have to take actions

against nations who are poised to use nuclear power?

Mr. Ackerman, let’s talk about this time frame. Can we be tied

up for another year in this mess?
83

Mr. ACKERMAN. Definitely. The constitutional process is complex—but it is for a reason. The reason is that this is a tremendously important thing. It is very rare. It is only when things are

really serious that impeachment is justified. And if a lame duck

Congress wants to impeach, it cannot expect that its judgment will

simply be accepted by the Chief Justice of the United States or the

next House of Representatives who have——

Ms. WATERS. So possibly even before they would sit in action on

the Senate, you would have a Supreme Court matter that would

have to be dealt with on a motion to quash.

Mr. Craig, do you think that is reasonable, that the President

may want to challenge that if in fact this continues? Maybe that

is an unfair question, but I am trying to get the American public

to understand this quick down-and-dirty hearing that we are supposed to be doing. These articles of impeachment are not going to

be so quick.

Mr. CRAIG. Congresswoman, I would only point out that the argument has meaning only in the context of the 105th actually voting articles of impeachment out. And I would just hope that wisdom would prevail and such articles of impeachment would not be

voted out of the House.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chabot of Ohio.

Mr. CHABOT. Professor Wilentz, I want to quote from your opening statement. You stated that any Representative who votes in

favor of impeachment, but was not absolutely convinced that the

President may have committed inpeachable offenses—not merely

crimes and misdemeanors, but high crimes and misdemeanors—

will be fairly accused of gross dereliction of duty and earn the condemnation of history. You stated that, and I agree with you.

Wouldn’t it be fair, however, to also indicate that any Representative who votes against impeachment, but who is convinced that

the President may have committed impeachable offenses—not

merely crimes and misdemeanors, but high crimes and misdemeanors—will be fairly accused of gross dereliction of duty and also earn

the condemnation of history?

Mr. WILENTZ. Absolutely.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Over the last several weeks we have heard from many witnesses

discussing what constitutes an impeachable offense. The one thing

they all seem to agree on is that reasonable people can reach different conclusions. So the testimony before us today does not represent all thought on this important issue; it represents merely the

thought of this particular panel.

For example, I strongly believe that perjury is a crime against

the state and can constitute an impeachable offense. In fact, we

know that perjury was directly described as a high misdemeanor

at its inception. This has been supported by many constitutional

scholars that have testified before this very committee.

Now, because most of the witnesses before us today did not address the facts of this case, I will turn my questions at this time

to Mr. Craig.

Mr. Craig, you have stated that you do not dispute the testimony

of Ms. Currie; is that correct?

Mr. CRAIG. That is correct.
84

Mr. CHABOT. Now, the President has admitted that following his

deposition in the Jones case, he contacted Betty Currie and asked

to meet with her the following morning. According to Ms. Currie’s

grand jury testimony, the President wanted her to agree with a series of statements that he made during the meeting. Currie said

that they were more like statements than questions.

According to Ms. Currie, the President made statements like:

You were always there when she was there—meaning Monica

Lewinsky—right? We were never really alone. And you could see

and hear everything, right?

Now, Mr. Craig, isn’t it true that the President was trying to influence the testimony of Betty Currie because he knew that she

might be called to give testimony in a Federal judicial proceeding;

isn’t that correct?

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, I have actually, I think, responded to

this question earlier before, and I disagree respectfully with your

interpretation of those events.

Let me just say that I hope you will read the document that we

are going to be submitting to you today.

Mr. CHABOT. I certainly will read that, but don’t you think that

the President, by his statement to Ms. Currie, was trying to influence her testimony; and wasn’t that illegal?

Mr. CRAIG. I do not. I do not believe that he was trying to influence her testimony. She was not going to testify.

Mr. CHABOT. Doesn’t that constitute witness tampering?

Mr. CRAIG. There was no witness tampering that was going on

there, Congressman. There was no proceeding that could contemplate that she was going to be called. There was no reason for

him to believe that either the OIC or the Jones people would be

calling her as a witness.

Mr. CHABOT. Don’t you think it would have been relevant, whether or not she and Lewinsky—or the President and Lewinsky, together or alone, wouldn’t that be relevant to the ongoing testimony

and investigation?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes, but the question is whether he was tampering

with the witness, Congressman. I would urge to you raise this

again——

Mr. CHABOT. Let me just ask you one final question——

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chabot, let him answer the question.

Mr. CHABOT. I did, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CRAIG. I am trying to be constructive, and I am trying to be

helpful and in fact deal with the facts.

I would urge you to raise this, Congressman, with Mr. Ruff again

after you have had a chance to see all the evidence that we present

to you, that we try to explain what happened, how it happened and

how it fits into the law. I think you might well be convinced that

there could not have been any tampering of a witness here with respect to Betty Currie.

Mr. CHABOT. We will look at that with great interest, and I appreciate your testimony here this morning.

I yield back.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.
85

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to

thank each member for coming before the committee and providing

your testimony. I can imagine that given your perspective on this

matter, it can be frustrating to testify before this committee because it is a foregone conclusion that the majority of the members

of this committee on Saturday will take the incredibly historic step

of voting articles of impeachment to impeach this President. And

there is not a constitutional case that any of you can provide before

this committee that would change that. There isn’t a historical

precedent that any member of this distinguished body testifying before the committee could present that could change that.

Mr. Craig, I don’t think that there is a fact that is in other parts

of the testimony before the grand jury that you could present to

this committee that would change that fact. In fact, there is nothing that any of the witnesses here today could say to this committee that would prevent the majority of this committee from voting

to impeach the President of the United States on Saturday afternoon.

But your testimony is important. It is important that the American public understand the gravity of what we face. It is important

that the 20 to 30 Republican Members of Congress who truly have

an open mind and are weighing the gravity of what is before our

country, that they hear your testimony and see your testimony. Because the will of the American people is about to be ignored in the

hope that the people won’t care enough to say anything about it.

Now, Attorney General Katzenbach, you have spoken about the

will of the American people. As of today, 65 to 70 percent of the

American people oppose impeachment, so it is hardly a surprise

that the Members of Congress who are going to vote to impeach on

Saturday have been telling us that public opinion and public consensus—indeed, the public interest—play no part whatsoever in

this critically important impeachment process. Do you agree with

this perspective on the role of public consensus in the impeachment

process?

Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I do not, Congressman. In fact, it seems

to me unusual and very important that the American people feel

the way they feel about the office of the presidency. It is a vital

fact. And it would seem to me those who wish to ignore it might

recall a quote from Berthold Brecht, which I will paraphrase, saying, Maybe we should elect a new public.

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, I would hope—and one of the reasons I think

your testimony is important is because I don’t think—as my colleague from California mentioned, I don’t think Americans have

been focused on this. They think the election ended all of this, and

they think we are just going through the motions to finish this up

by the end of the year, and then we will go on with governing the

country in January. But that is not the case at all.

Mr. KATZENBACH. And indeed it should happen.

Mr. MEEHAN. And it should happen. But the reality is, this committee will vote to impeach the President on Saturday. I am struck

not by the cases where this committee or the House has a whole

decided to impeach, that is, Watergate and the Andrew Johnson

case, but also I am struck by the cases where we failed to even

commence an impeachment inquiry.
86

I am talking about such examples as the Iran-Contra scandal, or

to put it in a bipartisan perspective, President Johnson’s deception

about the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, both of which went to

the very core of the exercise of presidential power and at least

threatened serious consequences for the country.

Now, what does a failure to impeach in those instances tell us

about whether we should impeach this President?

Professor Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. This is a central concern, because if your committee goes forward and impeaches President Clinton, the next

time the political wheel turns and we have a Democratic Congress

and a Republican President, will the Democratic Congress show the

kind of restraint that it showed in the case of Iran-Contra?

Well, I myself will be here saying, you should, but will they? Will

they?

This cycle of incivility, once it begins, will very, very quickly run

out of control. That is why this is a tremendously important precedent.

And, Congressman Meehan, what you were saying before is another way of saying, this is a lame duck Congress out of touch with

popular opinion; and if there is a reasonable disagreement, as to

the standards for impeachment, all the more reason that a lame

duck Congress should not be making this decision.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr. Mr. Barr, would you be

generous enough to yield me 30 seconds?

Mr. BARR. Certainly.

Chairman HYDE. I would just like to comment to Mr. Katzenbach, your great line from Berthold Brecht about maybe we need

to elect a new or better public, I was reminded by counsel of Lester

Maddox’s statement about what is wrong with the prisons, we need

a better class of prisoners. Anyway, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Barr, for letting me indulge myself.

Mr. BARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. Craig, one of the faults of the White House, I think, is that

they have a tendency, maybe this President personally, perhaps to

break out the champagne or light up the victory cigar a little bit

early sometimes, and I was hoping that that wouldn’t be the case.

But your remarks today in one particular area, among perhaps others, leads me to believe that you all still need to be a little bit careful.

You keep saying—and you said it in your remarks today—and

others who are defending the President keep saying that Mr. Starr

has cleared the President on Whitewater. That is not the case. And

if you will read his testimony before the Congress, I think you will

readily see that that is not the case. He says very clearly, with regard to his exposition on Whitewater and his remarks before this

committee and, in particular, regarding Mr. Hubbell, that that case

remains open, that there remain very troubling questions about it.

So I understand that in your zeal to defend the President, you

would like it to become the reality that Whitewater has gone away,

but it really hasn’t; that remains an open case.

When you have talked several times today both in your remarks,

as well as in responses to questions by members of the panel today,
87

you kept using the words ‘‘evasive and misleading.’’ Somewhere in

the recesses of my memory as a prosecutor those rang a bell, and

I went back to the Criminal Code, and indeed, I found why those

rang a bell. They are the words that are used in both section 1512

of Title 18 of the Criminal Code, and that is tampering with witnesses that my colleague from Ohio was talking about, as well as

in the definitions that relate to prosecutions under Title 18, section

1512; and they talk specifically in terms of misleading conduct.

I think if you will—in the same way that you urged Mr. Chabot

to read the material that you are going to present later, I would

urge you to go back and read the material that is already there,

and that is Title 18 of the United States Code. I believe, in fact,

the President very clearly has met both the definitional standards

for misleading conduct, as well as the other elements of tampering

with witnesses. And we don’t need go into those over and over

again. At least we don’t here today. We will in the articles of impeachment, I suspect.

But it may be satisfactory to your defense of the President, in

your mind, that evasive and misleading answers regarding possible

tampering with witnesses, tampering with evidence and so forth

exonerates the President, perhaps in the same way that you think

he has been exonerated on Whitewater. But the law is quite different. The law is very specific, and misleading conduct which includes misleading statements and so forth are very much contrary

to the law and, I believe, would provide a proper basis for an article of impeachment.

I would like to read to you on another matter, or refer you to the

grand jury testimony or grand jury statements of Mr. Blumenthal.

Sidney Blumenthal testified before the Federal grand jury the final

time on June 25th of this year. The foreperson of the grand jury

took the very unusual step of chastising Mr. Blumenthal because

after an earlier appearance before that same grand jury, he deliberately misrepresented what had gone on in that grand jury. And

then when he was subsequently called back before the grand jury,

he was chastised directly on page 69 of that grand jury transcript

by the foreperson of the grand jury.

We all know, because it was also testified to under oath, that Mr.

Blumenthal was hired by the President. Has the President fired

Sidney Blumenthal? And why hasn’t he, particularly in light of the

fact that he has deliberately misrepresented the work of the grand

jury?

Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, I came here to testify about issues

involving——

Mr. BARR. Has Mr. Blumenthal been fired or is he still on the

public payroll?

Mr. CRAIG. Of course, he has not. Of course, he has not. I understand that Mr. Blumenthal and his lawyer have disagreed with the

interpretation and the statements of the forelady as——

Mr. BARR. Apparently you and the President do not?

Mr. CRAIG. This is a matter that I think should be resolved between Mr. Blumenthal and his attorney and those——

Mr. BARR. Well, it might be nice in your mind to compartmentalize these things, but I think it also indicated that you are not
88

here today to provide complete and truthful—without any

trivialization context—answers today.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, earlier my friend and colleague from North Carolina,

Mr. Coble, raised the issue of censure. And the response—I think

he framed it in terms of a censure, rebuke, reprimand, condemnation, whatever, plus a fine; and I don’t want to leave that particular issue in terms of—I know, or I think it is well known that I

and other members of this committee, Democrats, intend to raise

that issue during the markup. And I would just simply—and I am

going to direct this question to everyone but Mr. Craig, and maybe

one of you will take it.

There is historical precedent for censure, and I suggest it would

not be meaningless. I suggest it would be constitutional; I suggest

that we did have a hearing on this matter. It was raised during

a subcommittee chaired by the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.

I want you to know that I surveyed those 19 scholars by way of

a questionnaire. The majority of those scholars indicated that it

was constitutional and would be appropriate for this committee to

consider.

I would like to hear disagreement or agreement from any member of the panel as to those statements I just made.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I agree that there is no constitutional problem

with censure.

Censure is not a meaningless thing. For example, the Senate’s

censure of Senator McCarthy in the 1950s was a very significant

act that crystallized the moral sentiment of the Nation. I do believe, however, that a fine is a bill of attainder.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Professor?

Mr. WILENTZ. I am not crazy about censuring a President as opposed to a Senator. I am not crazy about it for the reasons that Andrew Jackson stated in 1834, that it raises a possibility of a kind

of danger to the separation of powers. However, that is a principle

above and beyond the Constitution.

There is no constitutional bar to censure. Anyone who proposes

that has simply not read the Constitution clearly enough, because

there is simply no bar to it anywhere there. You may censure by

resolution anyone you care to, just as you can pass a resolution on

virtually anything under the sun.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am going to direct this to Mr. Craig.

There has been, in response to the question by the gentleman

from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, and he was suggesting that when

the American—when the President appeared on TV and spoke to

the American people that he misled and, in fact, he did lie to the

American people.

Let me just state that we have had previous American Presidents—I think my colleague to my right referred to Lyndon Johnson in terms of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. During the course of

our history, we have seen President Eisenhower lie to the American people about the U2 incident. President Franklin Roosevelt

lied regarding lend-lease. It has been suggested very strongly that
89

both Presidents Reagan and Bush lied to the American people regarding Iran-Contra.

I would suggest, and I can understand in legal proceedings such

as civil depositions or grand jury hearings, proceedings, that legalisms and legalistic language are absolutely important when one

feels that they are being unfairly treated or improperly prosecuted.

At the same time, Mr. Craig, I would suggest that the American

people do believe that the President of the United States on that

occasion lied to them, and I would suggest that he should be censured for that particular occasion, and I would urge you to go and

discuss that matter with the President.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman’s time

has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Wilentz, I have listened to the entire panel, and I have

listened carefully to your testimony. Now, not one panelist, save

perhaps the President’s counsel, has refuted any facts that are before this committee in this case. And in your case and in your testimony you did not refute one fact about the allegations of perjury

that are before us, about the allegations of obstruction of justice

that are before us, or about the allegation of abuse of power.

So we need to remember, at least here this morning, that what

we are dealing in and what you came armed with is a bunch of

opinions. And like they say back in Tennessee, everybody’s got

those.

But you will agree with all those statements, will you not?

Mr. WILENTZ. Except for the last one. There is a difference between opinion and scholarship. Anybody can have an opinion. What

I reported here has to do with scholarship, which goes beyond that.

Mr. JENKINS. Well, if there are learned opinions to the contrary,

then they would balance one another out as far as this committee

is concerned; is that correct?

Mr. WILENTZ. I should hope not. I don’t think they balance themselves out at all. I think that the opinions expressed here by a far

greater number of historians, for example, than any number that

have come up to stand for the opposite view, is absolutely clear.

There is not an equal division among historians about whether

these charges rise to an impeachable offense. It is absolutely clear

that the majority of American historians believe that they do not,

on the grounds of their understanding of the Constitution. There

are disagreements.

Mr. JENKINS. Well, at any rate, you have voiced your opinions

here this morning.

Mr. WILENTZ. I have voiced my scholarly conclusions.

Mr. JENKINS. And you also voiced the opinion that anybody who

voted for impeachment was going to be guilty of gross dereliction

of duty and condemned by history.

Mr. WILENTZ. I did not. I said nothing of the kind.

Mr. JENKINS. You did not? Well, what did you say?

Mr. WILENTZ. I said anyone who voted for impeachment, who

was not absolutely clear in his or her mind that the President may

have committed an impeachable offense, that would be gross dereliction of duty. Mr. Chabot agreed with me.
90

Mr. JENKINS. And if one holds that sincere belief, then, he would

not be guilty?

Mr. WILENTZ. Absolutely. Absolutely. If they sincerely believe—

as I said, there are many members of this committee who sincerely

believe that the President has committed impeachable offenses—

you would be derelict if you didn’t vote for impeachment.

Mr. JENKINS. And I believe that you told Mr. Chabot that anybody who voted no, who held those sincere beliefs, would be similarly guilty of gross dereliction.

Mr. WILENTZ. Anyone who believes the President has committed

an impeachable offense and votes against impeachment is similarly

derelict. Absolutely.

Mr. JENKINS. Now, you testified that at least some perjury can

be an impeachable offense; is that correct?

Mr. WILENTZ. Yes, I did.

Mr. JENKINS. And you made some effort to distinguish those

types of perjury and distinguish one type of perjury from another.

Mr. WILENTZ. Uh-huh.

Mr. JENKINS. And my question is where can you show us in the

statutes, where can you show us in the law of this land, that there

are degrees or classes of perjury? Where can you show us from the

statutes?

Mr. WILENTZ. I am not an expert or a lawyer. I cannot point to

the statutes with the clarity that you can.

Mr. JENKINS. Well, you had a opinion.

Mr. WILENTZ. Yes, absolutely, but it has nothing to do with the

character of the statutes. It has to do with an understanding of

how the framers of the Constitution understood what were impeachable offenses or not. Under that—under the Constitution, it

is clear that there are crimes that are impeachable offenses and

those that aren’t, and perjury in every instance is not. Only those

examples of perjury which actually attack the vitals of the state,

the vitals of our political system, are impeachable offenses. And I

base that on my reading of the Constitutional Convention of 1787,

the writings of the framers, and the Constitution itself. That’s the

point.

Mr. JENKINS. Can you provide this committee with those distinctions made in that Constitutional Convention?

Mr. WILENTZ. Sure. George Mason made it very clear. When he

proposed high crimes and misdemeanors following bribery and

treason, the wording he proposed was crimes against the state.

Chairman HYDE. Gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am struck by each

committee hearing that we have, how more and more this committee becomes out of touch with the American people and with what

the American people care about, and even with what the American

people see as the offense by the President in regard to this whole

national trauma.

And I think the questions today that best illustrate how out of

touch this committee is with the American people are the two

kinds of questions that are often put and have been put to Mr.

Craig today. And that is: Why, Mr. Craig, as the President’s law91

yer, haven’t you put forth evidence, put forth testimony, as to why

the President didn’t perjure himself regarding his testimony with

respect to Monica Lewinsky?

And a corollary issue, and that is: Why, Mr. Craig, or do you, Mr.

Craig, believe the President or do you believe Monica Lewinsky

when they both said the characteristics of their relationship? And

I believe Mr. Craig’s answers today basically said, respectfully, I

believe the President.

But I think what the American people are saying, which I think

is much more pertinent to this hearing is: Who cares? Who cares

where the President did or did not touch Ms. Lewinsky. Not because they don’t care about lying, but they understand that an impeachment inquiry should not be determined by whether or not Ms.

Lewinsky lied or the President lied or whether they both lied about

where the President may or may not have touched her.

So in that regard, I think Congressman Meehan’s comments

couldn’t be more pertinent. This committee’s conclusion is a foregone conclusion. This committee will vote out at least one count of

impeachment. That is a done deal. But for those Republicans—and

if there are some, and I hope and believe and pray that there are—

that still have an open mind, would Professor Wilentz or Professor

Ackerman talk to them, talk to them about what a Senate trial is

going to look like?

I have this vision of Senator Hatch asking Monica Lewinsky or

our esteemed Chairman asking Monica Lewinsky about the specifics of their relationship or her relationship with the President and

that being determinative of a perjury count.

Would you speak to the American people about what that Senate

trial is going to look like, please? Either gentleman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, one should first know that at the trial of

Andrew Johnson, no Senator asked any questions. All questions

were asked by the managers of the House. And the Senate was

mute, mum, in a very solemn situation here, which I would expect

would go on for many, many months.

One of the more interesting phenomena would be to see how the

Senators managed this burden of silence. But this is nothing like

we have ever seen. Someone asked me before when I was asked to

testify. The answer is Saturday. But I have been studying impeachments for many, many years. And I literally tell the American people, you have no idea of what the Senate trial is going to look like.

It will disrupt the Nation’s business, I would expect, for a year.

Mr. WEXLER. Disrupt the Nation’s business for a year? Would

you agree with that Professor Wilentz.

Mr. WILENTZ. I would. And also look around. In the 1868, there

were not the photographers and the film crews and the TV cameras

and media circus that surrounds—that has been surrounding this

proceeding from the beginning. It has gone beyond a question of

simply what is going to happen in the room. It is what goes on

throughout the country. And that to me is almost as dangerous as

what is going on here in this Chamber. And that is a vast difference from 1868. If 1868 was like a pebble in the pond, this is

going to be like a boulder thrown into the pond.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.
92

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, Mr.

Craig, you mentioned the concern about specificity with regard to

the perjury charges. I just want to let you know what is in my

mind with regard to the perjury allegations. Most of those are set

forth in the Starr referral—allegations of perjury in, both the grand

jury and the civil deposition. But in addition, I wanted to alert you

to an area that I do not believe is mentioned in the Starr referral

and that is in the deposition testimony of the President in the

Paula Jones case. I can’t give you the page citation, but the following statement is made by the President: ‘‘Because, Mr. Bennett, in

my lifetime I have never sexually harassed a woman.’’

I just wanted to alert you and put you on notice that that statement is of concern to me in terms of a perjury allegation, and that

is something that should be addressed.

Mr. CRAIG. Could I make one comment, a helpful comment I

would hope? I would hope, Congressman, that when you bring forward these questions tomorrow afternoon that you don’t rely on the

characterizations in the Starr referral as to the President’s testimony, and that you can talk with some specificity as to what the

President actually testified.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I’ve done my own independent review and I

have concerns and I wanted to alert you that this is a new area

that was not mentioned in the Starr referral and I wanted to give

you the courtesy of that notice.

In response to questions by Mr. Chabot, you indicated that the

President had no reason to believe that the OIC or the Jones attorney would call Betty Currie as a witness; therefore, she was not

in a position to be tampered with.

But I just wanted to alert you to the deposition testimony of the

President in which the name Betty Currie was mentioned over 20

times. And, in fact, there was a statement by the President at that

time in reference to Betty Currie that ‘‘those are questions you’d

have to ask her.’’

And so, was not the gauntlet set down by the President that

Betty Currie is a relevant witness? He even said that the Jones

lawyers need to question her. And then subsequent to that suggestion, he goes back to Betty Currie and goes through that series of

questions that every lawyer and every layperson would have some

concern that is tampering or coaching, particularly when you are

talking about a President of the United States with a subordinate

employee.

So that is a concern of mine. And I think there is a notice there,

would you agree, that the President fully was aware that she

would likely be a witness to the OIC lawyers?

Mr. CRAIG. Well, I disagree with the premise that she was likely

to be a witness. In the President’s mind, he had no idea that the

OIC at that point was conducting an investigation that might include Betty Currie as a witness. And if you are talking, Congressman, about his state of mind, which is an important element in the

category of crime that you are talking about, that element was certainly not there at that time. And I would hope you would raise

this issue with Mr. Roff after you have had a chance to take a look

at our presentation.
93

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is of great concern to me. A third area

that I wanted to ask you about is the response of the President to

the Starr referral. And in that response in conclusion number 8 at

the very beginning of the executive summary it states: ‘‘The President has admitted he had an improper sexual relationship with Ms.

Lewinsky.’’

Can you point to any testimony of the President under oath in

which he admitted to an improper sexual relationship with Ms.

Lewinsky?

Mr. CRAIG. I think it is clear in—his testimony in front of the

grand jury, Congressman, is tantamount to admitting that he had

an inappropriate, intimate, sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The language that he used in the grand jury

was that he had an inappropriate intimate relationship with Ms.

Lewinsky. Is that the correct language that the President used?

Mr. CRAIG. I think it was clear what he was testifying about.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Come on, don’t give me word games.

Mr. CRAIG. That is the language. The record speaks for itself.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Is that not the precise language that was

used? The President was very careful in his words that it was an

inappropriate intimate relationship.

Mr. CRAIG. Yes, you are right.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. He was careful to stay away from the term

‘‘sexual relationship,’’ because if he had said ‘‘sexual relationship,’’

it would be totally inconsistent with his previous testimony. And

yet the lawyers come out and say the President has admitted he

had an inappropriate sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and

there is no evidence in the record to support what the lawyers are

saying; is that correct?

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The distinguished gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make

two brief comments and then ask a question. With regards to the

rule of law which we all care about, isn’t it a fact that if the President—President Clinton has violated the law, that not even he, the

President, can get away with it? President Clinton can be sued civilly and criminally for any conduct at issue. He is not above the

rule of law. We can hold him to the law.

Therefore, no matter what decision this committee or this Congress makes about impeaching President Clinton, the world will

know and our children will know that the rule of law does exist

and does apply in America to every American, even the President,

because the President can always be sued civilly and criminally for

his conduct.

But what we are talking about here is whether additionally as

another punishment, the President should be impeached and removed from office. And on that the Constitution provides us the

standard of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

We will be faced with impeaching the President for only the second time in our history and removing a President for the first time

in our more than 200-year history.

I want to address the business about the 81 questions and about

contrition, because everyone says how evasive the answers to the
94

81 questions were. Let me read to you, because not all of my constituents had a chance to read the President’s answers, a little bit

of what he said. This is what the President said: The fact that

there is a legal defense to the various allegations cannot obscure

the hard truth, as I—the President says—as I have said repeatedly, my conduct was wrong. It was also wrong to mislead people

about what happened and I deeply regret it.

That is what President Clinton said in his answers to the 81

questions. He used the word ‘‘admitted’’ and ‘‘misleading’’ four

times. He apologized in the 81 answers three times. He said he regretted what he had done once more in the 81 answers. So if you

are looking for contrition in the 81 answers, my friends, it was

there if you only looked for it.

Now, here is my question, the question for Professor Ackerman.

If, in fact, despite your belief as to what should happen, the lame

duck Congress’ actions are accepted by the new Congress, can the

Speaker of the new House alone, without a vote of the Congress,

appoint the managers, the impeachment managers?

Mr. ACKERMAN. No.

Mr. ROTHMAN. And why do you say that?

Mr. ACKERMAN. This is a most solemn decision to allow the

House to proceed with this inquiry. It would be an extraordinary

abuse of the House for a single person to take upon himself this

responsibility. Especially when, if he did it by himself, this would

indicate that he didn’t have the support of a majority of members.

Because, obviously, anyone who did have a majority vote would put

this matter up to the House.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Do you or any other member of the panel have

any precedents or constitutional basis for that answer?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Please provide it.

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is to say that in the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, the managers were selected by the House.

Mr. ROTHMAN. By a vote of the House of Representatives?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions and a brief thought. Professor Ackerman, when presentation

was made this morning on standards for impeachment and there

was some discussion about whether perjury or related crimes of

truthfulness under oath were considered, that even if we accept—

if we accepted that standard as a standard for impeachment, that

the history of the last 60 years since the adoption of the 20th

amendment would be littered with bills of impeachment. Your

words.

Can you, either today or at some point, provide us those examples of Presidents or judges or Vice Presidents who lied under oath

and were not subject to consideration for articles of impeachment?

Mr. ACKERMAN. One should remember that lying under oath is

not the only high crime and misdemeanor. There are many other

activities of the Presidents of the United States. For example, to
95

choose a very striking example, Franklin Roosevelt’s abuse of his

authority in the lend-lease matter.

Mr. PEASE. I understand the point, but my question——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Which could also be a high crime and misdemeanor. What I said is it would be littered with impeachments.

If we have a relatively low standard of impeachment, there are

many questionable things that people in good faith would think

rise to the level of high crime and misdemeanor, and it is an act

which would be this engine of continuing bills of impeachment.

Mr. PEASE. I appreciate your clarification, because I understood

you to say that if lying under oath was the standard, that our history would be littered; and that was not your intention.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you. Mr. Katzenbach, you discussed particularly with regard to the Andrew Johnson impeachment, your understanding that high crimes and misdemeanors were at least in

part determined by the public’s understanding that the official was

no longer able to continue effectively in office. Did I understand

you correctly in that?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Let me rephrase it so that we are at least on

the same wavelength.

Mr. PEASE. Please.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I believe that when you have an unpopular

President, there is a question when the public believes that he

ought to be impeached as well as the House believes he ought to

be impeached, that it is very difficult to separate out the conduct

for which he is being impeached from the fact that he is very unpopular.

What you have in this situation today is an absolutely unprecedented thing as far as I know, and any historian can correct me,

but here you have a President acknowledged by the public of all

of the facts that you have been raising, most which I think are totally irrelevant, and the question as to whether or not those

amount to a high crime and misdemeanor. And the public is saying

no, it doesn’t. We have confidence in this man as President.

I think that is an absolutely unique situation. You can take a different view, sir, but if you do, you should have a reason for it. You

should have a reason that—evidence that says the public has lost

confidence in this man despite what they say, despite the elections,

despite the polls.

Mr. PEASE. I understand, and I appreciate your clarification as

well.

One closing thought, Mr. Chairman. Last week one of the witnesses impugned both the perceived collective motive of the House

and of individual Members. Today another witness did the same in

his accusations of a cavalier attitude among Members on this difficult subject, or a disregard for the letter and spirit of the Constitution and more.

There are Members of this committee of this House who have

been scrupulously careful, often at the expense of attack from

across the political spectrum, to reserve judgment in this matter,

to listen carefully and respectfully, to avoid partisan attacks, and

to do their duty as they see it.
96

I still believe there are Members, despite the attacks, who will

try to do the right thing in an atmosphere of civility and respect,

and words like those heard today make it more difficult for us to

do so.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to associate myself with Mr. Pease’s final comments. I think that we would all be well advised if we could stick

with the issues here. Obviously there are very explosive issues at

play here, and to the extent to which we can have civility here, I

think that is important.

The President’s actions were wrong. Everybody knows that. The

question is how he should be held accountable. And I believe that

censuring the President is an appropriate sanction, because I think

it reflects the gravity of what he did. At the same time, it does not,

I think, divide this country in a way that it need not be divided.

I long ago gave up any notion that this chapter of our history

would have a happy ending; I long ago gave up any notion that

people would be pleased by my actions or our collective actions; and

I long ago gave up any hope that people would look at the process

in this committee and view it in a favorable light.

So what do we have left? All we have left and all we can really

salvage out of this is, what is the best thing for this country? And

it is not good for this country to go through a trial where we will

call Monica Lewinsky and have her talk about her intimate relationship with the President of the United States. It is not good for

this country to call Linda Tripp forward. It simply will not do anything positive, in my mind, for this country. It will further divide

this country and make people more suspicious of government. And

if that is what people want, that is what they are going to get.

Now, today we have had a fine panel here, and I would agree

with Mr. Canady that we don’t have a lot of new news, other than,

frankly, Mr. Ackerman’s statement which I consider something of

a blockbuster in terms of where we are going to go. I see now for

the first time the possibility that the House of Representatives

could pass articles of impeachment and, 3 weeks later, refuse to reappoint managers to prosecute that case. The question is whether

there is precedent for that. In both the Judge Louderback case and

in the Judge Hastings case, Congress, not by the action of the

Speaker of the House, but by action of the full House, reappointed

those managers.

Mr. Ackerman, my question for you is, from a constitutional

standpoint, if on December 17th or 18th we pass an article or articles of impeachment; and on January 3rd, 1999, this House refuses

to reappoint those managers, what is our procedural setting?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, I am afraid it will be a terrible precedent

for the impeachment process, because one day there will be a President who deserves to be impeached, and a public demonstration,

unique in our history, of to’ing and fro’ing. Rushing to judgment in

a lame duck session and then refusing to go forward will—or may,

I hope not—discredit the weapon when it may be needed.

Mr. BARRETT. But we have a situation now—and all of us in this

room now understand it—that the claims were, prior to the elec97

tion, that the Democrats wanted to have this done by the end of

the year because we thought we were going to lose seats, and that

the Republicans wanted to drag it out beyond the beginning of the

next Congress because they would gain seats.

Obviously, reality dealt a severe blow to both of those theories,

and now they are turned on their head.

But we do have a real possibility that we could have this Congress impeach this President, and 3 weeks later the case could

completely fall apart. And I would argue to you and to my fellow

members on the committee that that would be even more of a disservice to this country and that we should move towards censure,

we should resolve this in this committee, and we should get back

to doing the people’s business, because that is what the people

want.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am not here as a witness for the President. My

teacher, Alex Bickel, once said, ‘‘A scholar is like a bus. He goes

from place to place, and people get on and get off whenever they

want to.’’

My mission here was to alert you to real and serious constitutional questions. I would hope that if——

Mr. BARRETT. Excuse me, I don’t mean to interrupt you.

Could the Senate—because obviously we would have to reauthorize payment for this—could the Senate pay for the House managers

to act, or could the Senate pay for the House to proceed if the

House refuses to pay, as was the case for the two judges where the

House authorized——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. We will have

to hold that in dire suspense.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, if I could make one unanimous consent request. I have a document that I am going to present to the

committee that writes to the CRS and asks them to clarify this

issue of what would happen if the managers were not reappointed.

And I would ask unanimous consent that that be made part of the

record.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to associate myself with the comments

by Mr. Pease, and Mr. Barrett to the degree that he was dealing

with the issue of demeanor.

And let me say, Mr. Craig, staff has informed me that they

thought you have come across very well on television, and I frankly

appreciate that. I think that the tone with which we approach this

problem, which is a very important problem, is more than just a

little bit significant.

Now, especially because some of the issues are frankly quite difficult. For instance, Mr. Craig, you said today that the President

did not violate his oath, by which I think you are saying that he

didn’t commit perjury, because he didn’t intend to lie in either the

grand jury or the Paula Jones case. Of course, no one personally

or through counsel ever admits to felonious activity outside the

context of plea bargaining. So we, as the Judiciary Committee, are

sort of left to figure out what the truth is here; and we are looking
98

for corroborating evidence or evidence that undermines this problem of what the President intended. And ultimately, that is a

criminal standard, I agree. But in informing our consciences, I

think it is important that we have corroborating evidence.

Mr. Coble referred to the intimate touching, and you characterize

this as a ‘‘he said, she said,’’ sort of back-and-forth conflict. But you

today have also characterized the President’s position as having acknowledged an intimate relationship, and used a lot of other

words—‘‘sinful,’’ ‘‘wrong.’’ You use the term ‘‘wrong’’ in a different

case—‘‘inappropriate,’’ ‘‘improper’’—and you went on to say that the

President has misled family, friends, colleagues and the Nation, et

cetera.

It seems to me that, as we have to struggle with this rather sordid question of whether or not what the President’s activities were

in the context of what he said, that that statement of intimacy, the

statement about wrongness has to lead me to believe that he is not

telling the truth about these very fine distinctions that he is making; that, in fact, he committed perjury.

Would you speak to that? And in particular, does the President

believe, or has he said to you, and I recognize the problem of being

his counsel, and you should speak from your own knowledge, either

that she touched the President intimately or that he touched her

intimately in the sense of the definition of sex in the Paula Jones

case?

Mr. CRAIG. I think the issue that was identified in Mr. Schippers’

report, which adopts only one of the three allegations in the Starr

referral and identifies that as the key question in the grand jury

testimony, is that it has to do with whether or not the President,

when he was having contact with Monica Lewinsky, whether—the

President engaged in certain intimate touching with clothing or

without clothing.

And at that point, I think I say and I think I say correctly, Congressman, that she said he did, and he says he did not with respect

to that one aspect of their activity. That is key to the perjury issue

which I think would be tried on the floor of the United States Senate if this were referred over to the Senate.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Craig, someone testified before this committee,

particularly Professor Saltzburg last week, that the proper method

of dealing with any particular untruth by the President in the

Jones lawsuit is to leave that issue for Judge Wright. Do you agree

with that?

Mr. CRAIG. I’m sorry, I didn’t understand everything you said.

Mr. CANNON. A lot of background noise here.

Do you recall that some have testified previously, particularly

Professor Saltzburg last week, that the proper method of dealing

with any particular lying by the President in the Jones lawsuit is

to leave that issue to Judge Wright? Do you concur with that?

Mr. CRAIG. That is traditionally the way allegations of lying in

civil depositions have been taken care of. In fact, the practice in the

U.S. Attorney’s Office, much to my regret, because I’ve been a civil

practitioner where the other side has offered false testimony. I

have referred such cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and routine

by matters they don’t take them up such cases and prosecute them.

It’s left up to the civil judge to handle.
99

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, sir.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rogan.

Mr. ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank all of the

witnesses for their patient and able presentations this morning.

First I want to note the comments of my dear friend from New

Jersey, Mr. Rothman, a few minutes ago where he made the very

correct point that a President is not above the law, because he can

be sued in civil court. And that’s exactly what this whole case is

about.

Let me dispel the myth that is out there among some people that

a bunch of lawyers just showed up one day and began to inquire

into the President’s personal life. That was not the case. The President of the United States was a defendant in a Federal civil rights

sexual harassment lawsuit filed by Paula Jones. And despite his

objections to answering questions about potential conduct he may

have engaged in with female subordinate employees, the judge ordered him to answer certain questions under oath because the

judge found that it might show a pattern of conduct if his answers

were in the affirmative. The judge found that Paula Jones was entitled to that information in pursuing her sexual harassment lawsuit.

Mr. Craig, you are in a somewhat unenviable position, because

I understand you have to be the President’s representative. I promise not to shoot the messenger, but I want to know. Within that

framework, does the President of the United States support Federal sexual harassment laws that are on the books today?

Mr. CRAIG. Of course he does.

Mr. ROGAN. Does the President believe those laws should be vigorously enforced?

Mr. CRAIG. Yes, he does.

Mr. ROGAN. Does he also believe that these laws properly rise to

the level of a civil rights action in Federal court?

Mr. CRAIG. Well, I have to tell you, at this point I am moving

beyond my conversations with the President, so I can’t tell you

with any authority what his views are on that. I would just be

speculating, Congressman, at this point.

Mr. ROGAN. Do you think the President believes that the law is

correct in allowing women who have been victimized in the workplace to obtain discovery about patterns of conduct from employers

who are victimizing women?

Mr. CRAIG. I think he would have no dispute with that proposition.

Mr. ROGAN. I am assuming the President also believes that

women in the workplace ought to be able fully to prosecute their

claims against harassing employers.

Mr. CRAIG. I think he would take that position as well.

Let me explain one thing that happened that I’m sure you’re familiar with. When he walked into that deposition, he was handed

a three-part definition of sexual relations which then got debated

between counsel, and then got changed by the court—by the

judge—and then got applied by the President as he was asked

questions.
100

Mr. ROGAN. I am aware of the President’s contention in that regard.

General Katzenbach, let me turn to you for a moment. You are

the distinguished former Attorney General of the United States

who has prosecuted a number of cases on behalf of our country.

What do you think the impact is to women who have been victimized in the workplace if Congress accepts the notion that lies in

court are acceptable, if the lie is about sex in a civil rights action

because somebody might be embarrassed by telling the truth. Does

that have a negative impact or a positive impact on women in the

workplace?

Mr. KATZENBACH. If you were talking in the context of impeachment, I don’t think it has any relevancy at all or any impact at all.

Mr. ROGAN. Let’s just talk about it in terms of the rule of law.

What impact do you think that has?

Mr. KATZENBACH. If all we were talking about was the rule of

law, we are talking about cases in civil or even criminal courts,

then I think it would have a very negative impact if this committee

in that context were to ignore the actions by anybody in the government, including the President.

Mr. ROGAN. And——

Mr. KATZENBACH. If you’re talking in an impeachment

proceeding——

Mr. ROGAN. I have to interrupt because my time is very limited.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, it’s my time, too.

Mr. ROGAN. Well, actually it’s my time, and I’m sharing it with

you.

Mr. KATZENBACH. It’s your time, and am I permitted to ask questions? How——

Chairman HYDE. It sounds like Rudy Vallee starting his theme

song.

Mr. ROGAN. General Katzenbach, under the law, if somebody responds under oath in court to a material or relevant question, ‘‘I

don’t remember,’’ and in fact they do remember, that would be

lying under oath or perjury, wouldn’t it?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I would think if, in fact, they did remember,

and it was a material matter in it, that would be lying, would be

perjury, yes.

Mr. ROGAN. The President was asked this question, ‘‘So I understand your testimony, it was possibly that you were alone with her,

but you have no specific recollection of that happening?’’ He gave

this answer: ‘‘Yes, that’s correct.’’ If a court found that to be material and relevant, that would be perjury?

Mr. KATZENBACH. It would be perjury. I can’t imagine anybody

ever prosecuting, but it has nothing to do with impeachment.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.

Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My understanding is that Mr. Ruff is going to handle most of the

factual disputes.

Mr. CRAIG. I’ve tried to handle those questions that have been

asked of me, Congressman, but, yes, you’re correct.
101

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, we’ve had a conversation before, and I want

to say, as a lawyer, I think you’re a fine lawyer, and the President’s lawyers have done a very good job.

And the comment about being a potted plant Congress, I don’t

think that any of us here have taken this too lightly. I don’t know

about the other folks, but I think I have aged a little bit.

I am not a potted plant. I have looked at the President’s deposition testimony. I have read his grand jury testimony. Well, I guess

I have looked at him testifying before the Paula Jones deposition

because it’s videotaped. I have read all the relevant witnesses’ testimony at least once or twice, and to be honest with you, I think

if you had an open-minded potted plant, I could convince him that

he’s committed perjury, but that’s just where I am at on this thing.

Now having said that, one thing that bothers me the most about

what we’re doing here is that there’s people listening that may get

confused about what they should do. If we can’t agree on anything

else as Republicans and Democrats, let’s agree on this: If you are

ever called in to testify, and you promise to tell the truth, the

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, don’t do what the President

did, because some people may not understand what you’re trying

to do.

Don’t ever get yourself in this position. It’s just simply not worth

it, because some people may believe that there is really no difference between willful misleading than just flat out lying, and

you’re going to get yourself and the law in trouble.

And that’s what worries me the most, that we are sending a terrible message to young people and anybody else that is going to associate themselves with the law.

Let me ask one question, Mr. Craig. When the President left his

deposition on January the 17th, I believe, he did mention, you need

to ask Betty at least once. And I believe that he knew that Betty

Currie was likely to be a witness because he suggested that she be

asked questions at least by the Paula Jones lawyers. She tells us

a series of statements made by the President. One of them was

supposedly, according to her testimony, this is the President to

Betty Currie, ‘‘She wanted to have sex with me, and I couldn’t do

that.’’ What did he mean there?

Mr. CRAIG. I don’t know how to answer that question.

Mr. GRAHAM. Would you go ask him, because that’s important to

me, and I’m going to tell everybody here at the end of this hearing

what I think was going to happen without this blue dress and the

stain on it to this young lady, and it was not going to be pretty.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Bono.

Mrs. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, first of all, want to

thank the panelists for their patience. It seems I always have to

thank everybody, being the last person here.

I have to tell you that, as you know, I’m one of the few nonlawyers on this committee. What my colleagues enjoy about me is that

I am a nonlawyer. I sit there and I’ve watched the tapes with

them. They actually watch my reactions to it.

As I watched the President’s videotaped deposition in the Paula

Jones case, which I saw after watching his testimony before the
102

grand jury, it hit me very, very hard. I know that no Americans

have seen that tape, except for a very select few.

Whether I reacted perhaps to perjury or just watching my President lie to me personally, I didn’t know at that point. And over

time, I have come to the conclusion that it was perjury, and it bothered me a great deal. I won’t be labeled a zealot because I do believe it was perjury. I do believe it is wrong. And I will not have

a problem supporting that article of impeachment.

My question really is for Mr. Craig. As the last person here, I

have to sit here and listen to 36 other Members and come up with

a question that nobody else has asked, which is very difficult. It’s

a very simple one, yet I think it’s very complex, and it’s one that

most of America is asking. That is, Mr. Craig, do you have small

children at home?

Mr. CRAIG. I do.

Mrs. BONO. What do you tell them? How do you explain to them

that your President has lied and that it’s okay?

Mr. CRAIG. Oh, I tell them it’s not okay to lie, Congresswoman.

I say that it’s the most important thing in the world to tell the

truth all the time.

Mrs. BONO. The whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Mr. CRAIG. The whole truth. And I tell them that one of the reasons that the President is in such trouble is that he did not. He

misled the American people, he misled his family, he misled his

colleagues, and that was wrong. And the President should have admitted that it was wrong much earlier than he did. He should have

made full disclosure earlier, and he did not, and that was wrong.

Mrs. BONO. But——

Mr. CRAIG. That’s a very important lesson for the children of this

country, I think.

Mrs. BONO. All right. Let me jump in here, if you will. I don’t

understand. There’s also a difference perhaps between that and

then again under oath before a court. Did he mislead the court?

Mr. CRAIG. If he did mislead a court under oath, that would be

wrong. It would be unlawful. That is for a court of law, a criminal

court of law, to resolve with all the protections that a court provides to a defendant, and most people that are working with the

President in the defense believe that such an outcome is a very

likely possibility in the future.

Mrs. BONO. Thank you. I understand that. I think this is the

hardest thing for me, for any parent, that we have looked at, we

have seen. I thank you for your honest answer. I yield back the balance of my time with that.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentlelady.

And we have reached the end of the questioning. And before I

dismiss the panel, I will indulge myself, because I have not availed

myself of the opportunity.

And if I might, in the vast literature of impeachment to which

many of you have made a significant contribution, occasionally you

run into something that strikes you as particularly salient, a gem,

so to speak. And I would like to read from a gem that I discovered

in the literature of impeachment.

‘‘What is unique in the history of the Presidency about this scandal is the long list of potential criminal charges it involves. Even
103

before the various investigations were concluded, it appeared likely

that the President and his allies had engaged in a multitude of indictable activities, among others: in perjury and subornation of perjury, and obstruction of justice, and destruction of evidence, and

tampering with witnesses, and misprision of felony, and in conspiracy to involve government agencies in a subsequent cover-up, all of

which now prove beyond doubt means that the President himself

has conspired against the basic processes of democracy.’’

Here’s the interesting part. That was interesting; this is really

interesting. ‘‘Such transgressions must not be forgiven and forgotten for the sake of the Presidency, but rather exposed and punished for the sake of the Presidency. Excessive respect for the office

should not deter us from pursuing justice this way. I would argue

that what the country needs today is a little serious disrespect for

the office. Nor should we be satisfied with watered-down, slap-onthe-wrist alternatives. Censuring the President for the crimes in

question is not enough, since the continuation of a lawbreaker as

chief magistrate would be a strange way to exemplify law and

order at home or to demonstrate American probity abroad. No, in

the end only the decisive engine of impeachment is appropriate.’’

Those words have a resonance for me, especially since they are

written by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in 1973 in his book The Imperial

Presidency, discussing the men who had the unfortunate characteristic of being a Republican. But, nonetheless, I thought that

was very interesting, and I share it with you because he’s one of

those 400 eminent historians whose view today has modulated

somewhat.

In any event, we are all in your debt. Thank you very much.

Mr. KATZENBACH. But he is not a lawyer.

Chairman HYDE. But he’s a historian. That’s better, isn’t it, Mr.

Katzenbach?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Only in some views. I don’t share that view

myself.

Chairman HYDE. I don’t either. That’s all right.

Mr. WILENTZ. Watch it.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Oh, yes, the gentlelady asked me if I would

mention to the viewing audience not in the room that occasionally,

because we are going straight through lunch and we’re going

straight through dinner, Members find it incumbent to leave the

room for one of several reasons, and that they are watching the

proceedings on closed circuit television and not missing a beat. So

please don’t think the worst if a chair is vacant for a little period

of time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have an inquiry about questions that remained unanswered for this panel.

I’m wondering if the same rules are in play that these individuals

might provide answers to questions in writing for a period of time.

Chairman HYDE. I would say it’s up to the panel. If you write

them, I am sure they would be happy enough to answer them.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would those answers be able to be submitted

in the record?
104

Chairman HYDE. If the record is still open and we get them in

time, yes. And if not, we’ll find some way to put them in the Congressional Record.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the panel for a great contribution, all

of you. Thank you.

Mr. CANADY. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request.

Chairman HYDE. Yes, sir.

Mr. CANADY. I ask unanimous consent to place in the record a

statement by Professor Walter Berns, Professor Harvey Mansfield,

and Professor Doug Kmiec concerning the subject of the testimony

today.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection. So ordered.

[The information follows:]
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. BARR. I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter for the

record to me by Judge Griffin Bell.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]
117
118

Chairman HYDE. I hope our second panel is here and ready.

The committee will come to order, please. Ladies and gentlemen,

our second panel is composed of three very distinguished former

Members of Congress, the Honorable Elizabeth Holtzman, the Honorable Wayne Owens, and Father Robert Drinan.

Would the three of you please rise and take the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman HYDE. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered

the question in the affirmative. And first we will hear from the

Honorable Elizabeth Holtzman, a former Representative of New

York and a member of the House Judiciary Committee during the

1974 impeachment proceedings and for some years thereafter. I

had the great pleasure of serving with her as well as with Father

Drinan.

The Honorable Robert J. Drinan, Society of Jesus, a professor of

Georgetown University Law Center, former Representative from

Massachusetts and member of the House Judiciary Committee

from 1971 to 1981.

The Honorable Wayne Owens, a former Representative from

Utah and a member of the House Judiciary Committee during the

1974 impeachment proceedings.

You’re each recognized—we’ll go from Ms. Holtzman, Father

Drinan, to Mr. Owens—for a 10-minute statement, and then we

will go into the 5-minute rule for questions.

So Ms. Holtzman.

TESTIMONY OF HON. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM NEW YORK; HON. ROBERT J.

DRINAN, S.J., FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM MASSACHUSETTS; AND HON. WAYNE OWENS, FORMER MEMBER

OF CONGRESS FROM UTAH

TESTIMONY OF HON. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I

thank you for the privilege of appearing before you on this historic

day and hope my experiences as a member of the House Judiciary

Committee during Watergate will be of assistance to you and the

Members of the House in your deliberations.

Let me begin by saying, Mr. Chairman, that I welcome the opportunity to appear before you. While we had our disagreements

when we served together in the House, I always had tremendous

regard for your ability to be thoughtful and open-minded. It was a

pleasure to serve with you. These very qualities are what the committee sorely needs now.

Nearly a quarter of a century ago, sitting where you are now, I

never imagined in my lifetime that we would see another impeachment proceeding. I am saddened to be here today. I love this committee, I love the Congress, and I love my country. But if this committee and the House vote along party lines for the impeachment

of President William Jefferson Clinton on the information presently

available, the credibility of the committee and the Congress will be

severely damaged for a long time.

This impeachment will be viewed by the Nation and by history

with as much disapproval of that as that of Andrew Johnson. I
119

know that many on this committee and many in the country believe the President’s conduct to be reprehensible and unacceptable.

I do not disagree, and I am not here to excuse that conduct. Let

us remember, however, that the goal of impeachment is not to punish a President, but to protect the Nation. Impeachment now will

punish the Nation, not protect it.

Consider how much the country will be harmed by an impeachment trial in the Senate if the House votes any articles of impeachment. The trial, which could last for months, will disrupt the workings of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice will have to preside

every day over the Senate trial. It will disrupt the workings of the

Senate. It will disrupt the Presidency. That is one of the reasons

that impeachment cannot be voted lightly.

The danger to the Nation of having a President remain in office

must be greater than the danger caused by the wholesale disruption of our government that an impeachment trial will bring. The

American people are not likely to look kindly on a government

shutdown number two.

During Watergate, I spent many long hours poring over books

and studies to understand the meaning of the term ‘‘high crimes

and misdemeanors.’’ The framers of the Constitution wrote the impeachment clause because they were fearful that the monarchy

they had just overthrown in the Revolution would return, that a

newly created Chief Executive, the President, would become a tyrant.

But Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s referral makes out no

case of abuse of power, a subject I have been asked to address by

the White House. In Watergate, the article of impeachment that

charged abuse of power was in a way the most serious, and it was

the one that received the largest number of Republican votes.

Think of what Presidential abuses we saw then: Getting the CIA

to stop an FBI investigation, getting the IRS to audit political enemies, illegally wiretapping members of the National Security

Council staff and of the press, a special unit in the White House

to break into the psychiatrist’s office of a political enemy, and on

and on.

By contrast, what does Mr. Starr point to as an abuse of power

in his referral? Acts that do not in the furthest stretch of the

imagination constitute any such abuse. Mr. Starr claims that the

President did not voluntarily appear before a grand jury, but had

to be subpoenaed before he appeared. That is surely not an abuse

of power.

Mr. Starr attacks the fact that the President authorized executive privilege to be claimed for a handful of staff members and require the Independent Counsel to prove his need for their testimony in court. Of course, once the court ruled that the testimony

was required, then the President withdrew the claim. That, too, is

not an abuse.

Mr. Clinton’s telling the American people that he did not have

a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky is also not an abuse

of power, although it was the wrong thing to do.

Parenthetically, I want to note that, as one of the authors of the

Independent Counsel statute, I believe that Mr. Starr overstepped

his jurisdiction by arguing for impeachment on this ground or any
120

ground. Both the referral and his appearance here go far beyond

what the statute permits. We never intended to create a Grand Inquisitor for impeachment.

I want to make a few other brief points. I have heard it said that

this committee views itself as a kind of grand jury and that it

merely needs probable cause, not overwhelming evidence to impeach. Instead, it is the Senate that must have substantial evidence to act. But if you use the analogy of a grand jury, then you

should not be impeaching at all. No indictment would be sought by

a prosecutor where there is no chance for conviction. And it is almost universally conceded that there are not enough votes in the

Senate to convict President Clinton and remove him from office. In

fact, Federal prosecutors need to have a substantial likelihood of

success before they can recommend indictment to the grand jury.

Why is this the case? Because prosecutions that go nowhere use

up precious resources. And let us not forget how much money has

already been spent on investigating President Clinton. It is almost

an abuse of power to indict someone, seriously damage that person’s representation, and force that person to the tremendous burden of putting up a defense when there is little or no likelihood of

conviction.

The same analogy holds true here. Impeachment should not be

voted by the House unless there is a strong likelihood of conviction

in the Senate. Impeachment is not a kind of super censure designed simply to besmirch a President’s reputation. Impeachment

is a tool to remove a President from office. It is a last resort to preserve our democracy. It must not be perverted or trivialized.

Also, to use a different metaphor, this is not a football game

where one player of the House simply hands off the ball to another

player, the Senate. In Watergate, when we voted for impeachment,

we did so because we believed President Richard Nixon should be

and would be removed from office. We did not operate on some watered-down standard of evidence. We didn’t think we were passing

the buck to the Senate where the real action would take place.

We voted as if we were the Senate, as if we ourselves were deciding on his removal, as if the case had been proven to us beyond

a reasonable doubt. That same standard should be followed here.

You just don’t casually overturn the majority vote of the American

people.

And let me add, too, how difficult it was to cast the vote for impeachment. It was solemn, hard, and unpleasant. As much as I disliked Richard Nixon’s policies, I did not relish for one moment voting for impeachment. He was my President, and I did not want to

see my President engage in acts of that nature. I think the other

members on the committee felt the same way.

Unless this committee and the House act on a bipartisan basis

and reach out for the common ground as we did during Watergate,

unless you have the full support of the American people for the

enormous disruption of our government that an impeachment trial

will entail, unless you have overwhelming evidence of the serious

abuse of power that impeachment requires, none of which has been

true so far, you should not, you must not vote to impeach. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Ms. Holtzman.
121

[The information follows:]
122
123
124
125

Chairman HYDE. Father Drinan.

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT J. DRINAN, S.J.

Father DRINAN. Mr. Chairman and members of this venerable

committee, the situation before the House Judiciary Committee

today is entirely different from the scene that I and my copartners

here experienced in 1974. At that time, the country knew there was

extensive lawlessness in the White House. The documentation of

appalling crimes was known by everyone. Abuse of power and criminality were apparent to the American people. There is well-documented evidence put forth in the report of that committee in 1974

about the plumbers, the break-in of Dr. Ellsberg’s office and the

cover-up of the burglary at the Watergate Hotel.

The procedure followed by the House Judiciary Committee at

that time was, however, evenhanded. Months of hearings took

place with the President’s lawyer Mr. Jim St. Clair always present

in this room and free to make any comments and ask questions.

Today, the scene is startlingly different. No investigation has

been made by the House Judiciary Committee, nor have any factfinding hearings been held. The 21 Republicans have no support

whatsoever from the 16 Democrats. And in addition, two-thirds of

the Nation or more are opposed to impeachment.

In 1974, the Members of the Democratic Majority had constant

conversation and dialogue with the Republican Members. And I remember going to the Republicans and sharing with them the destiny of this committee and the awesome task that had come to us.

The Democrats were aware of the intense problems that the Republicans had with the impeachment of a Republican President,

but eventually through the sheer force of the evidence, six or seven

of the Republicans voted for one or more articles of impeachment.

That was not a happy day when we voted for impeachment, and

I remember well that Chairman Rodino said to the press afterwards, when asked what was the first thing that he did, he said,

‘‘I went to my office and cried.’’

Another difference: the House Judiciary Committee in 1998, unlike its predecessor where we served, has allowed its agenda to be

dictated by the calendar. Strategy has been determined not by the

need for thoroughness and fairness, but by the convenience of ending this process by Christmas of this year.

The House Judiciary Committee in 1974 furthermore did not vote

for all of the proposed articles of impeachment. A serious charge

was made that Mr. Nixon had backdated his taxes in an effort to

take advantage of an exemption that had been repealed, and only

12 Members of the body voted for the proposition that this was an

impeachable offense. Twenty-four Members, including myself, voted

that this misconduct, almost certainly a felony, was not impeachable.

The dignity and the majesty of the Rodino committee was not out

to embarrass or humiliate President Nixon. What we were required

to do was painful, but we worked, heard, listened, debated, and finally voted. And the people of America then and now saw that the

process was deliberate, bipartisan and measured.

The only time in American history that has seen anything like

the process this fall before the House Judiciary Committee occurred
126

in 1868 when President Andrew Johnson was impeached by the

House. The consensus of history is that the Johnson impeachment

was partisan and was a mistake. Its failure in the Senate did not

prevent a weakening of the independence of the Presidency.

And I hope, ladies and gentlemen, that history will not decree

that the House Judiciary Committee made a profound mistake in

1998 and that this body will go down in the history books as when

it was dominated by vindictiveness and by vengeance and bipartisanship.

The American people who are so overwhelmingly opposed to impeachment may be coming aware of the dreadful consequences that

would happen to America if the House approved of impeachment

and sent articles to the Senate.

The entire Nation knows that there are under no consideration

67 votes for that proposition in the Senate. But what the Nation

doesn’t realize, yet, is that the country could be paralyzed for some

6 months. The workings of the Supreme Court would be harmed

because the Chief Justice, under the Constitution, must preside

each day at the trial. The Senate’s program would be held up, and

the whole country would be immobilized.

The House cannot pretend that it has only to act like a grand

jury and send the articles to the Senate for trial. There is no historical or constitutional leave or justification for the proposal that

you act as a grand jury.

The House has a unique role in impeachment. The votes cast by

each Member will be the most important vote cast by that person

as a Member of Congress. And history will discover and record and

remember whether that vote was done for partisan reasons. A vote

to impeach in this case would have dire consequences for years and

even decades to come.

Almost 70 percent of the Nation and virtually every Democrat in

the Congress are opposed to impeachment. These groups believe

firmly that, even if all the allegations in the Starr report are true,

there are no impeachable offenses.

And I would anticipate, members of the committee, an explosion

of anger like that that occurred after the Saturday Night Massacre

could happen in this country. When people realize what you people

anticipate you will do this Saturday, and when it goes to the whole

House, an explosion of anger just like happened 24 years ago when

Mr. Richardson and Mr. Cox did some brave things.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by thanking you for the opportunity and urging you and the committee to recognize that the

American people and the Democrats in Congress have a right to be

listened to. They have not agreed with any reasons for impeachment set forth by the Starr report and the Republican leadership

and the Congress. This Nation has a right to demand that impeachment efforts with no bipartisan support whatsoever should be

reconsidered and postponed. Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Father.

[The information follows:]
127
128
129
130
131

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Owens.

TESTIMONY OF HON. WAYNE OWENS

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the commit- tee, I feel like we’re appearing before you as three ghosts of impeachment past. With the exception of Ms. Holtzman, we are gray

ghosts. We are grateful to be back in this hallowed Chamber.

Thank you for giving us this opportunity.

I remember keenly this afternoon how I felt 25 years ago when

I learned while deer-hunting in the mountains of southern Utah of

the so-called Saturday Night Massacre, the forced resignation of

Attorney General Elliot Richardson and of Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus and then the firing of Special Prosecutor

Archibald Cox.

I had been following the revelations of the Senate Watergate

committee for 6 months. It was obvious that Sunday morning that

the House would be required to pursue an impeachment investigation and that my committee, the Judiciary Committee, would be

called to conduct that investigation.

I think that I was initially in awe of the assignment, almost intimidated. No President had been called to account by the Congress

for 100 years. History would be looking over our shoulder. And we

wanted from Chairman Rodino on down, Republicans and Democrats, to be sure that we were careful, judicial and bipartisan in all

that we did.

While we recognized that impeachment was a political process,

we were determined that it would not be a partisan process. And

we reported unanimously our recommendations to the House that

the investigation—that the investigation go forward, all 21 Democrats and 17 Republicans. And it was accepted by the full House

by a vote of 410 to 4. So we are aware, I think, of your feelings

as you approach the decisions you must make.

Chairman Hyde indicated early on that the precedents of the

Nixon impeachment would be followed closely, and I wanted to

argue to you that President Clinton’s misdeeds do not reach the

standard of impeachment which our committee established at that

historic time.

What was that standard? We define impeachment in our final report as quote, ‘‘A constitutional remedy addressed to serious offenses against the system of government.’’ Ten Republican members of the committee in a Minority report argued for a higher

standard of judgment saying, quote, ‘‘The President should be removable by the legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the system of government established by the Constitution.’’ The man who is now the Senate Majority Leader, then Congressman Trent Lott, a member of the committee, was one of the

10 arguing for that higher standard.

I want to recall for you briefly the circumstances surrounding the

adoption of the so-called Abuse of Power article of impeachment in

late July 1974. The committee had just passed the first article referred to as the Obstruction of Justice article by a solid vote of 21

Democrats and 6 of the 17 Republicans.

Proposed article of impeachment number two, after serious consideration and debate, was passed by an even larger majority. A
132

total of 7 Republicans joined 21 Democrats, finding that President

Nixon had violated the constitutional rights of citizens in five specific categories of abuse of his powers and voted to report the article to the floor for a full House consideration.

I urge you to consider carefully the gravity of those charges in

the Abuse of Power article, which an overwhelming and bipartisan

majority of the committee found to be sustained by not only clear

and convincing evidence. In fact, I believed the evidence to sustain

a judgment beyond a reasonable doubt, the test for conviction in

the Senate.

It was obvious to us that President Nixon would go to trial in the

Senate and to many of us that we wanted to have a standard

which would pass muster in the Senate. President Nixon, it was

clear.

One, directed or authorized his subordinates to interfere with the

impartial and nonpolitical administration of the internal revenue

law for political purposes.

Two, he directed or authorized unlawful electronic surveillance

and investigations of citizens and the use of information obtained

from the surveillance for his own political advantage.

Three, he permitted a secret investigative unit within the Office

of the President to engage in unlawful and covert activities for his

political purposes, including abuse of the CIA.

Four, once these and other unlawful and improper activities on

his behalf were suspected, and after he knew or had reason to

know that his close subordinates were interfering with lawful investigations into them, he failed to perform his duty to see that the

criminal laws were enforced against those subordinates.

And, five, he used his executive power to interfere with the lawful operations of agencies of the executive branch, including the Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency, in order

to assist in these activities as well as to conceal the truth about

his misconduct and that of his subordinates and agents.

Today you are faced with a record of misdeeds by a President

who carried on an illicit sexual affair then publicly and privately

misled others to protect his wife and daughter and the public from

finding out about his infidelity; personal, not official misconduct,

akin to President Nixon cheating on his taxes. Improper and serious, but by nature personal misconduct, and, therefore, not impeachable.

Your obligation, may I be permitted to point it out to you, is to

put those powerful differences into perspective and to render a

judgment based solely on the gravity of the offense charged here

because there is little disagreement on the facts.

I know that it is said that impeachment is a political, not a legal,

decision. But if you vote to impeach a President because he had an

improper sexual affair, then avoided full disclosure by using narrow, legal definitions, even then affirming that testimony before a

grand jury, even if he lied if you impeach on that narrow basis of

personal, not official, misconduct, you do untold damage to the

Constitution and to the stability of future Presidents.

Our forefathers wisely intended that only abuses of official Presidential powers should be the premise—should be the premise for
133

impeachment. And, ladies and gentlemen, there is no evidence of

such abuses before the committee, not at all.

In closing, may I quote again briefly from the Minority views of

those 10 House Judiciary Committee Republicans who ultimately

accepted and supported the articles of impeachment so that there

was a unanimous—unanimity in the Judiciary Committee that

President Nixon should be impeded, before the President resigned.

From their Minority views, this: ‘‘Absent the element of danger to

the State, we believe the delegates to the Federal Convention in

1787, in providing that the President should serve for a fixed elective term, rather than during good behavior or popularity, struck

the balance in favor of stability in the executive branch.’’ Thank

you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Owens.

[The information follows:]
134
135
136
137
138

Chairman HYDE. Now we will have the questions from the Members, and the first questioner is Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Holtzman, I believe that after you left Congress, you spent

some time as district attorney in Brooklyn. Am I correct in that?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Yes, Mr. Sensenbrenner. I also had the pleasure

of serving with you.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Yes, and I remember that very vividly.

Do you think that making a false statement before the grand

jury is an impeachable offense?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. It could be, but it doesn’t have to be.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. What’s the difference, in your mind?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. What Mr. Owens so eloquently spoke to, which

is that, in my judgment, whether the conduct is reprehensible or

not, whether we find it extremely distasteful or not, the standard

of impeachment is the abuse of the power of office, one that creates

a serious danger to the operations of our government and a threat

to our democracy, which is what we saw in Watergate.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The last impeachment which was voted by

the House of Representatives was 9 years ago in 1989, and there

the House of Representatives unanimously, 417 to nothing, declared that Judge Walter Nixon’s false statements to the grand jury

about a private matter, which was a sweetheart oil and gas lease

deal, were impeachable offenses. And the Senate agreed with the

House’s charge and kicked Judge Nixon out of office, I believe, by

a 91 to 8 vote.

Can you tell me what you think the difference is between Judge

Nixon’s false statements to a grand jury about a private oil and gas

lease that did not have anything to do with grievously defrauding

the government or changing the constitutional balance of powers

and Bill Clinton’s false statements, if they indeed were false statements, to the grand jury about his relations with Monica

Lewinsky?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Sensenbrenner, I think that the members of

this committee can see and the country can see that there is a huge

difference between impeaching one Federal judge and removing—

because there are hundreds of Federal judges—and removing the

one President of the United States. And, obviously, the situation of

removal of a President is so grave, because the President is voted

upon. Judges, Federal judges, are not elected. You are undoing the

majority vote of the American people that is central to our democratic system. It is central to the stability of this Nation. We have

survived as a democracy very well. The Presidency has been a central part of it.

But the second answer to your question, sir, is that judges serve

during good behavior, which is something that does not apply to

Presidents. It’s a constitutional standard. And so I think it’s quite

different.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Let me say that I am deeply concerned

with that answer, because what you are saying is that the standard of truthfulness for a President of the United States when testifying before a grand jury is less than the standard of truthfulness

for a Federal judge.
139

Now, you and I will disagree with that conclusion, but I have

looked back in the record, as I am sure all of us have, and I pulled

out your questioning of Gerald Ford when he was before this committee, having been nominated to be Vice President by President

Nixon, who was still in office at the time.

And you talked to Mr. Ford about Nixon lying allegedly about

the bombing of Cambodia. Mr. Ford responded that he didn’t think

that President Nixon had been 100 percent truthful on that matter

and then insisted that all Presidents had given some false and deceptive statements.

You then said there was a difference between keeping a secret

and falsifying information. And you said, ‘‘I think all of us understand that difference very well.’’ Could you tell us then, is there not

a major difference between historical falsehoods as opposed to lies

before a Federal court proceeding or a grand jury?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Sensenbrenner, I hate to answer a question

with a question; but don’t you think there’s an enormous difference

between keeping a dual set of books about bombing of a foreign

country without the authorization of Congress and not telling the

truth about private sexual misconduct?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I think there is—there should be no difference, because our perjury and false statement statutes, you

know, do not have various levels of perjury. When you do make a

false statement, you have to live by the consequences. And I think

we all try to teach our kids that one of the things they always

should do is always tell the truth.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan reserves his time, and we will

then go to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.

Mr. FRANK. Let me follow up. Mr. Sensenbrenner said that he

would see no difference between lying about a private sexual affair

and lying about bombing a country, and that there was no gradation at all. One of the three counts of grand jury perjury—and I

think the grand jury perjury is the most serious set of issues—one

of the three counts is, according to Mr. Starr, the President said

that the intimate activity began in February of 1996, and Ms.

Lewinsky said it began in November of 1995.

Here I would just express my difference with Mr. Sensenbrenner.

I do think, even if the President was wrong and got it wrong by

a couple of months, that making a false statement by too much—

when nothing turned on it, since Ms. Lewinsky obtained no age of

majority, nothing happened in the interim period that made any

difference, but let me ask you—so I would think as between misstating by 2 months the date the affair began when you admitted

it and bombing a country, I don’t know, maybe you could bomb the

wrong country, it would be analogous, and you cover it up by mistake, but my question would be as a former prosecutor, Ms.

Holtzman, would you have a—would you think anyone would have

brought in the prosectorial discretion a perjury case because someone 21⁄2 years after an event admitted the event but got it wrong

by 2 months when nothing turned on the 2 months?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Well, I would be surprised by such a prosecution.

Remember, perjury requires materiality, and this is a jury question.
140

Mr. FRANK. That’s directly relevant, because there was no materiality here. But this is one of Mr. Starr’s three counts of perjury.

But the way, on that subject, my colleague from Arkansas challenged Mr. Craig before. He said that the President never admitted

to sexual contact with Ms. Lewinsky. He used the phrase ‘‘inappropriate intimate contact.’’ I suppose he might have been having an

inappropriately intimate conversation about which country they

would like to bomb together.

But my sense is that almost everybody, except the gentleman

from Arkansas, accepted that, and among the people who believed

that Mr. Clinton did acknowledge that was Kenneth Starr, because

on page 149 of the referral, at point 3, he says, ‘‘The President

made a third false statement to the grand jury about his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. He contended that the intimate

contact did not begin until 1996. Ms. Lewinsky testified that it

began November 15th, ’95.’’

In other words, in the very accusation that Mr. Clinton got it

wrong by 2 months, Mr. Starr uses ‘‘intimate’’ and ‘‘sexual’’ interchangeably, and, in fact, I think disagrees from the point of the

gentleman of Arkansas and acknowledges in this report—in fact,

he charges the President with inaccurately remembering when the

sexual contact began.

It would seem to me my colleagues would have to decide here.

They cannot impeach in the alternative. You cannot accuse the

President of having not acknowledged the relationship and then

impeach him for having acknowledged it on the wrong day.

Yes, Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Congressman Frank, I think you raised a very

pivotal point, which is we are talking about impeaching a President

of the United States. It doesn’t matter if it’s William Jefferson

Clinton or somebody else. And you cannot trivialize the power of

impeachment by talking about removal because we have got a date

mistaken by 2 months or the President says——

Mr. FRANK. Thank you.

Ms. HOLTZMAN [continuing]. Intimate as opposed to sexual.

Mr. FRANK. Let me say——

Ms. HOLTZMAN. And I think that’s critical.

Mr. FRANK. Ms. Holtzman, I want to get quickly to the two other

perjuries. One of the other two counts of grand jury perjury is that

the President, when he said that—he believed he said in August—

this is even almost too complicated to state—Mr. Starr said he perjured himself because he said in August that he believed when he

did the deposition that oral sex wasn’t covered. And they say they

knew he was lying. Again, how they would prove that, I don’t know

what witness they want.

And the third one, of course, was the one Mr. Wexler talked

about before: What did the President touch, and why did he touch

it? That’s the central count of perjury.

But just in closing, I want to respond also to a comment made

by the gentleman from Georgia who said, well, the President hasn’t

yet been exonerated on Whitewater. Whitewater has seniority

around here. If Whitewater were a Member, it would be a subcommittee Chairman.
141

Whitewater has been investigated by three Republican Justice

Department appointees, Jay Stevens, Robert Fiske, Kenneth Starr,

three men who at one point had been Republican Justice Department appointees. They have been working on it for over 5 years.

They have as yet come up with nothing.

I do not doubt by this record that they will never admit an exoneration, but keeping open something which three separate Republican Justice Department former prosecutors have investigated for

5 years and have been able to bring forward no charge against the

President, it seems to me that’s an abuse of power to continue to

hold over someone’s head something that has been so long investigated for so little purpose.

And I actually yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Owens, I believe I’m reading your testimony correctly and

hearing it that you do not believe anything is impeachable or

should be impeachable that isn’t directly related to some—in some

way the President’s power of executive authority. Do you think,

then, that if the President of the United States went back home on

vacation to Arkansas and murdered two of his best friends, having

no connection whatsoever to his office in any official capacity, that

we should ignore; would be derelict? Should we impeach him for

that if we knew he committed murder while he’s sitting as President.

Mr. OWENS. Given your hypothetical, and it is a farfetched one,

Mr. McCollum, I would certainly agree that the President of the

United States would not be fit to serve if he had committed murder. My assumption is that he would be replaced probably before

it had to go to impeachment. But certainly murder is an offense in

my mind, an impeachable offense, if it’s a President or Vice President or Congressman from Florida.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Let’s hypothetically assume, then, that the

President of the United States did not commit murder, but that we

elect a President someday and find after we elected him that, indeed, prior to his election in office, he had committed several

crimes of fraud and bilking of senior citizens out of millions and

millions of dollars. Would that be an impeachable offense? That

certainly wouldn’t go to his official conduct.

Mr. OWENS. I think these issues are issues of gravity. I would

think that the Judiciary Committee would have to look at that, a

group of wise men and women like this one, and make a decision

whether it rose to the impeachability. I think that’s a subjective

judgment based on who’s before the committee and the level of evidence.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Ms. Holtzman, I am sure you are aware, because it was in today’s paper, that Henry Ruth wrote an article

about Watergate and cited specifically the income tax fraud charge

against President Nixon and cited your vote and Mr. Conyers as

having voted to impeach on that article, although I think perhaps

others on this panel voted against it.

Yet you have testified today, I can’t imagine that was related to

his official duties; that, indeed, you think that impeachment needs
142

to be related to the President’s official duties. How do you square

your vote back in 1974 with President Nixon on the income tax

fraud question to your testimony today?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I am sorry, I haven’t had the pleasure of reading

Mr. Ruth’s article. I assume it would be a pleasure to read it.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. It’s in today’s Wall Street Journal.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. In any case, my answer to you is severalfold.

One, I went back because I had remembered the article of impeachment with regard to taxes when this issue of Mr. Clinton came up.

And I looked at what I had written at that point in support of that

article. And in my writing, I said that I believe that there was a

misuse of the power of his office. My views, unfortunately, don’t

provide the back up—don’t provide the explanatory support. I

didn’t write those views. I signed those views. I haven’t had time

to—find the exact support in the record.

But I want to make one other point, sir, and that is that that

article also contained a question of emoluments, which charged the

President of the United States, as President, with enriching himself with a variety of additions that were made to his homes at taxpayers’ expense. So you did have an abuse of governmental office.

I want to say a third thing in response to your question. That

article was not the sole ground of impeachment. We had article 1

which had some 32 separate counts of obstruction of justice. We

had article 2 which had five or six separate counts. So I don’t know

that anyone would have voted or that I would have voted—if that

false tax return article were the only ground for the impeachment

of the President of the United States, I cannot say that I would

have voted for that.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I think what my point of all of my questions I

have done now with this panel is simply to point out the fact that

what may be considered to be official conduct or not is not really

the ultimate criteria we should be judging impeachment on, even

though, with great respect, that’s what some of you are advocating.

The fact is even in this case, the President, if he committed perjury or obstruction of justice, witness tampering and so forth, is

something very closely related to his job as the chief law enforcement officer. He set an example which is something that none of

us should want to have out there. And it’s very difficult to see how

the court system can function and the justice system can function

if the chief executive officer of the Nation is permitted to get away

with not being impeached, to have that kind of conduct tolerated.

So I would suggest that really the charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, while he’s sitting in office as President, are

very integral to his duties as President. So it occurs to me that—

also many other charges that are out there. But saying it’s not connected with his office is not in and of itself a reason not to vote

for impeachment.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time is expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Schumer. The gentleman

from New York. I wanted to say Shuster, and I fought against it

very hard. Mr. Schumer.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr.——

Chairman HYDE. All right.
143

Mr. SCHUMER. Anyway, I thank the witnesses, all three people

I know, and particularly my predecessor Liz Holtzman. I guess,

starting in January, this will be the first time in a very long time

our congressional district is not represented by a Member in the

House Judiciary Committee, Manny Celler before you and then me.

And I am sorry this is the way we are going out, our district is

going out of the Judiciary Committee.

My first question relating to a question—to all three of the witnesses, which relates to a question that I had asked the previous

panel, and that is this: I am still sort of—more than sort of. I am

still very perplexed by the view of some of the more moderate Republicans. I guess none of them on this committee, but a good number of the swing votes have expressed a view that, well, if only the

President would make a fulsome apology—the President believes

he has apologized already, but one, I guess, that is fuller or more

direct or whatever, or reiterate it again, that then maybe they

would vote against impeachment and for a lesser penalty.

And it seems to me that that is a specious standard. I mean,

here we are dealing with impeachment, one of the most serious

things this committee, this Congress, can do, and it should be related to the actions of the President and whether they rise to the level

of high crimes and misdemeanors, whether they rise to the high

level that we have heard so many witnesses talk about; not about

either an apology or about whether the President answered the

questions to the liking of the members of this committee or to the

Members of Congress.

So I would just wonder, each of you having gone through this,

having thought about this in a historic sense, do you think, did it

ever cross your mind, let’s say if Richard Nixon offered a full apology late in the day, that you would then—I mean, should that have

influenced your decision as to whether he deserved impeachment?

Mr. Owens?

Mr. OWENS. If impeachment is a political decision, and it is, my

sense is that if Richard Nixon, right up to the point of when the

Judiciary Committee undertook its debate at the end of July of

1974, had he gone public and said, ‘‘I apologize, I committed serious offenses, I thought I was acting in the public’s interest,’’ my

sense is the public would probably have forgiven him and the Judiciary Committee would not have voted articles of impeachment, but

certainly even if the House passed them, the Senate would not

have convicted.

When the three smoking guns turned up, the recordings, in

which Mr. Nixon was found to have directed the CIA to tell the FBI

to back off the Watergate investigation, within as I recall, 30 hours

of the break-in at Watergate, until those came out I think perhaps

he might have escaped because I think the public at that time did

not want to impeach even that unpopular President.

It is a wrenching decision on the public, very painful, to impeach

a President.

Mr. SCHUMER. You’re saying what turned the public’s mind

was——

Mr. OWENS. And I think Richard Nixon could have turned that

around.
144

Mr. SCHUMER. But you are saying what turned people’s mind

were the actions of the President, not an apology or something like

that? Aren’t I correct in assuming that?

Mr. OWENS. If the President had come clean, I think it would

have made a big difference then.

Mr. SCHUMER. Okay.

Father DRINAN. Well, Senator, I think the crimes then were so

appalling. As I reread our report here, it was just unbelievable the

things in which they were involved with Tony Lasowitz. And the

memory, it is appalling. So I don’t think that anybody mentioned

censure at that time and that it was just proceeding. Furthermore,

censure is not in the Constitution; the Congress has the one decision to make: Impeach or not impeach.

People say, well, the Constitution does not forbid censure, which

is true; and I think the people would accept censure in this country

now if we would get a Christmas present that this would all go

away. But I don’t think that the concept of censure ever really

came up. If he could have apologized again—but he never apologized, really. He made more revelations when he was required to

do them, but he never really said that he was sorry.

Mr. SCHUMER. Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Well, Senator—I like the way that sounds.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I think it is very hard to speculate about what

would have happened.

The fact of the matter is, we had those facts. None of us sought,

or I think few of us sought the responsibility of sitting in judgment

on the President. It was extremely difficult. It was very sad. It was

one of the most difficult tasks actually to cast that vote. All of us

searched our conscience and all of us felt that a very high standard

of evidence had been met.

Remember, what we were confronted with——

Mr. MCCOLLUM [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired,

unfortunately. I let you answer as much as I can, Ms. Holtzman.

Mr. Gekas, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GEKAS. I thank the Chairman.

Congressman Owens, you stated in the recitation of the provisions in the Watergate report, or the committee language, that

what was being considered there was an attack on the system of

government, and that’s what gave pause to many of you as you deliberated in that era. So you felt all of these offenses that were

lined up were attacks on the system of government.

You further stated, in answer to some of the hypotheticals posed

to you by the gentleman from Florida, like fraud and murder and

so forth, that really that’s up to the Judiciary Committee of the

time and of the circumstance on what they then have to deliberate

to determine whether or not an offense was an attack on the system of government. Am I paraphrasing you fairly correctly?

Mr. OWENS. If I had the right to revise and extend, I would have

said that I think the 25th amendment would have taken care of his

first hypothetical before it ever came to the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. GEKAS. The murder, I am not——

Mr. OWENS. But the decisions on impeachment and the evaluation of the evidence are first given to the Judiciary Committee.
145

Mr. GEKAS. And if this committee or the majority of this committee felt so strongly that the commission of perjury by the President

of the United States, if proved, in front of a grand jury, and/or in

front of a deposition in front of a Federal judge, if we felt so strongly that they were committed and constituted an attack on the system of government in that this was perpetrated in order to destroy

the rights of a fellow American citizen who had instituted a legal

case against the President in those courts, and where a Federal

judge was sitting, or Federal officers in the case of a grand jury,

is this not, I say to you, within the realm of our possibility of adjudging that as an attack on the system of government? Would you

second-guess us on that?

Mr. OWENS. If I as a member of the committee felt that strongly

and intellectually believed, as you suggest in your hypothetical,

then I would vote to impeach.

Mr. GEKAS. Thank you, Mr. Owens.

Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEKAS. In your written statement, you said that you felt that

Mr. Starr overstepped his jurisdiction by arguing for impeachment—arguing for impeachment on this ground or any ground.

Are you referring to his referral as being an argument of impeachment?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Yes. I believe, Congressman, that when we wrote

that statute, and I was one of the authors, we had in mind the experience of what happened during Watergate with Mr. Jaworski, in

which we received no brief for impeachment, we received no argument for impeachment; we simply received a factual submission

with what is called a road map on top of it, and that was it. We

had to draw our own conclusions.

Mr. GEKAS. I recite from the statute itself that says that the

Independent Counsel—in carrying out the Independent Counsel’s

responsibility under this chapter that may constitute grounds for

an impeachment; that is, that the mandate is that the Independent

Counsel shall advise the House, and all of these, that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.

So when—he has one of two choices: to do nothing or to report

that there is nothing impeachable and therefore we close the case;

or he refers something that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. Isn’t that following the mandate of the statute?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. With all due respect, sir, no.

Mr. GEKAS. No?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Because there is a third choice, which is what we

had in mind. What we had in mind was what Mr. Jaworski did.

What Mr. Starr did was, he said these are 13 grounds for impeachment. That is not what Mr. Jaworski gave us. What Mr. Jaworski

gave us were backup documents and factual statements. It was

not—it was not an argument——

Mr. GEKAS. Thank you. I have to ask Father Drinan one question. Father Drinan, in your written statement, regretfully I cannot

find the word ‘‘vengeance,’’ but I think you intoned it in your direct

testimony; that some of us, or people who are considering the impeachment of the President or considering the articles of impeachment are driven by vengeance. Did you mean that? Did you say the
146

word ‘‘vengeance’’ or am I—did I mishear you? Because it is not in

your written statement.

Father DRINAN. No, that term is not in the document.

Mr. GEKAS. Pardon me?

Father DRINAN. That term is not in the document, no.

Mr. GEKAS. You used it, though? You used it in your oral statement?

Father DRINAN. Yes.

Mr. GEKAS. Do you seriously believe that any member of this

committee or any Member of the House, in the final judgment that

he or she will render on impeachment proceedings or articles of impeachment, will be driven by vengeance?

Father DRINAN. I will leave God to judge that.

Mr. GEKAS. Thank you. And then maybe God’s messengers

should not prejudge the God that would make the judgment.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Gekas, your time has expired.

Mr. Berman, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the former

members for their excellent testimony.

I listened to what Mr. McCollum and some of the others on the

Majority side are saying as to this issue of lying under oath. And

they seem to be taking the view that in and of itself, when it involves the President of the United States, lying has ripple effects

in terms of our system of justice, in terms of the message it sends

to the American people, that raises it to a level that perhaps is different than in other situations.

I would like to hear your thoughts about that argument, the implications of lying under oath and the extent to which it should be

treated in the fashion that they are treating it.

Father DRINAN. Well, Congressman, there are a thousand

hypotheticals but we have only one case.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes.

Father DRINAN. The House Judiciary Committee has never really

heard evidence on that one case. The President has never had an

opportunity to cross-examine those who said things against him.

That’s one of my fundamental difficulties and the difficulties of the

whole country with this whole proceeding. We can speculate about

the impeachment. All I know is that when the framers put it into

the Constitution, they said and affirmed this should be very rare.

This is only for the occasion, as Benjamin Franklin says, when we

want to anticipate and prevent assassination.

Mr. BERMAN. Well, I don’t want to speak for anybody else, but

I have to say that that argument doesn’t do that much for me. Yes,

I think questions of burden of proof are important.

There is a ream of grand jury transcripts, and while the process

I would have liked would have brought that before us in an orderly

fashion, we the minority, and the President’s lawyers, had the opportunity to call those same people and subject them to cross-examination. I don’t consider this process defective in and of itself because of that. The question here that I would like answered is dealing with this issue of statements under oath and the broader context of that.

Father DRINAN. I will defer to my colleagues.
147

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Berman, if I might just give you history in

terms of an answer to your question. We had two efforts to impeach a President. One was Andrew Johnson, because people didn’t

like his policy with regard to reconstruction and they picked on one

act, the removal of a Cabinet member. One act. That impeachment

went down in history as a scandal.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Watergate, the President lied to the American

people on numerous occasions. That was not the basis on which we

removed him. We had 32 separate counts under obstruction of justice, including offering presidential pardons to burglars. We had

several counts under abuse of power, including the misuse of the

CIA to get the FBI to stop an investigation; including the use of

the IRS to audit people’s tax returns improperly; including the creation of a plumber’s unit to break into a psychiatrist’s office.

You had such a spectrum of abuse and illegality and misconduct

that there was no question that his actions constituted an impeachable offense, and that the President needed to be removed. Here

you are talking about, in essence, the theme and variation is the

President engaged in sexual misconduct. He wanted to conceal it,

and that is what we are talking about in all of its variations and

guises. It certainly doesn’t rise to what we saw in Watergate.

And in my remarks to this committee, I urged you to think about

how history will look at you. If you act on a single act of misconduct which does not involve the powers of the presidency, how

will history judge you if you try to remove a President of the

United States?

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.

Mr. Coble, will you yield to me briefly?

Mr. COBLE. I will indeed.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Father Drinan, you made the statement that one flaw with this

process is that the White House, the President, hasn’t had an opportunity to cross-examine his accusers. Is that correct? Is that

your position?

Father DRINAN. I object to the use of the grand jury testimony

in toto. I don’t think that’s what the Constitution intended. The

Constitution gives the sole power of impeachment to the House.

Chairman HYDE. Well, let’s get back to my question. Do you object to the fact that the President’s lawyers haven’t had a chance

to cross-examine witnesses, their accusers? Is that an objection of

yours? Yes or no?

Father DRINAN. We gave that to Mr. St. Clair in 1974, and I

think that should be made clear——

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, is the lighting system working down

there or are we operating without it?

Chairman HYDE. Thank you for reminding me of that. I appreciate that.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I am going to try a third time. Is it a complaint

of yours that the President has not had an opportunity to cross-examine his accusers? Is that one of your complaints?
148

Father DRINAN. I think the people have the right, the people of

this country have a right, as well as the accused.

Chairman HYDE. Okay. I will take that as a yes.

What witnesses would the President like to cross-examine and

why haven’t the Democrats invited them to be here and testify?

Father DRINAN. I can’t answer that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I didn’t think so. Mr. Coble.

Mr. COBLE. I hope I have better luck than you did, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask a question to the panel. How many Presidents have

been accused of lying to a grand jury while in office, A; and B, how

many Presidents have been accused of lying to a court of law under

oath while in office, if you know? Does anyone know the answer to

that?

Well, I take it silence indicates that you do not.

Let me move along then.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Coble.

Mr. COBLE. Yes, sir, Mr. Owens.

Mr. OWENS. I would only point out to you that the lies which

President Nixon made were not under oath, but they were material

and they were devastating because he was assuring the American

people that he was enforcing the law; that investigators were getting to the bottom of the break-in.

Mr. COBLE. Let me move along.

Mr. OWENS. They were not under oath, but they were devastating because of what they dealt with.

Mr. COBLE. My time is running. The reason I asked you is because much has been made about the historical significance and

connection to impeachment. I wanted to get that historical fact in,

if anyone knew.

Now, many people have compared this crisis to Watergate. There

are similarities and there are distinctions. I recall during the days

of Watergate, those who opposed impeachment simply said, my

gosh, it is only a second-rate burglary; what is the big deal?

Well, it was indeed a big deal because it involved cover-up, it involved obstruction of justice, it involved abuse of power, it involved

the use of government employees—paid by the taxpayers—to lie, to

evade, to deceive. So it extended far beyond a second-rate burglary.

Now, nearly a quarter of a century later, we hear people who are

opposed to impeachment in this instance: Well, my gosh, it only involves consensual sex among consenting adults; what’s the big

deal?

Well, the big deal may be a duplication of Watergate problems:

cover-up, evasion, lying, deception, using government employees—

paid for by the taxpayers, I might add again—to cover up. It may

go beyond that. And I resent the fact that some accuse us of vengeance.

I don’t mean to speak for anyone but I suspect very few in the

Watergate era, who sat on that House Judiciary Committee, were

gleeful about that exercise. Now, there may have been one or two

firebrands. There may be one or two firebrands here today who are

gleeful about it, but I dare say that the great majority of Democrats and Republicans alike on this Judiciary Committee are not
149

gleeful at all about this. But I don’t think we can afford to dismiss

the facts that have been laid at our feet.

The Constitution requires us to respond, and if we vote in favor

of impeachment, then we are accused of being partisan firebrands,

and I resent it and I think most Americans will probably resent it.

I am getting a little carried away, Mr. Chairman, but I think I

need to say this. Many people have made a big point, a salient

point about the partisanship of this committee. Well, this is an energized, spirited, polarized group, I will admit, and when the television lights are illuminated, that energy seems to intensify. But

for the benefit of our viewers, we get along pretty well with one another once those TV lights are extinguished; a pretty good group,

pretty good men and women, I might add. Most folks don’t know

that because they see the other side of it, but we are going about

our business. And if anybody thinks that vengeance is involved, I

will meet them in the parking lot later on tonight.

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much.

On that high note, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I was pleased to note in the statements made by our distinguished former colleagues who are here with us this afternoon, references to the concern that we all should have about Members of

the House who might apply a lower standard to determining

whether or not articles of impeachment should be approved in this

matter.

Several of our witnesses suggested that Members might consider

themselves to be a grand jury and apply a standard on the order

of probable cause to making that determination.

The committee on which you served, in its 1974 report in the

Watergate matter, established a standard that I think is far more

appropriate, and the standard that was adopted by your committee

on a bipartisan basis would make impeachment available only for

conduct that is, and I will quote the language, seriously incompatible with our constitutional form of government or the performance

of the constitutional duties of the presidential office. And that is a

standard which I think is much more appropriate for the House of

Representatives to employ, as well as for the Senate to employ.

It occurs to me that the reason that some Members of the House

may be considering applying this lesser standard of probable cause

is because there has not been a sufficient focus so far on the kinds

of harms that can occur to the country just by virtue of the House

itself voting for articles of impeachment. And those harms would

be first of all a polarization of the Nation well beyond what it is

today; secondly, a diversion of the Congress and the President from

their basic responsibilities of tending to our urgent needs; a possible immobilization of the Supreme Court while the Chief Justice

presides at a Senate trial; the lowering of the standard for future

impeachment inquiries, and there probably is a longer list.

Today is an opportunity for us to begin, in a serious manner, the

dialogue about what these harms really are. And so I want to welcome our former colleagues who have much to say on that subject.

You have broached that in your testimony, and I would like to provide you with the balance of this time to talk, if you are inclined
150

to do so, about what you see those harms being and why the House

of Representatives ought to apply the higher standard well beyond

probable cause, the standard announced by your committee in

1974, as we consider whether or not to vote articles of impeachment.

Mr. Owens.

Mr. OWENS. I think that the increased polarization which incidentally already exists—more than two-thirds of the people in

every poll that I have seen recently do not want this President impeached—the polarization would increase dramatically if the House

passes articles of impeachment and sends them to the Senate to be

tried.

Father Drinan mentioned slowing down, the stoppage of much of

the government, taking time of the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court, the terrible feelings and passion that depriving a President

of his elected time in office, which the people have bestowed upon

him would cause. I think it would have a terrible impact upon the

public; I don’t think there is any question about it.

Hence, some of us we tried to apply in 1974 the for test for

whether we would pass articles, not by the ‘‘clear and convincing’’

that one thinks of as typical evidence for an indictment but, rather,

‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’ so that the Senate would, in fact, have

the evidence on which to convict. And it was clear that Richard

Nixon would be convicted by the Senate and removed from office,

and only under those circumstances should you put the country to

this kind of a test.

Mr. BOUCHER. Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I think I addressed that in my arguments. I

think all of us felt—well, I can’t speak for everybody. I know I felt

that way. I think many of my colleagues felt that we had to vote

as if we were on the Senate, that we couldn’t just simply say, look,

guys and gals in the Senate, this is your job, we are just going to

hand this ball over to you, hot potato, and you handle it; because

we are talking about the United States of America and all of its

people, all of the huge tasks that have to be dealt with now, the

huge disruption that will take place if articles are voted. The Senate will be tied up. How can we pass legislation to protect Social

Security, to improve education, or to deal with agricultural problems or the environment? The Senate is going to be sitting there,

day after day after day, hearing testimony about where the President did or did not touch Monica Lewinsky and what she said

about it, and what anybody else might have said about it.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. It seems to me not exactly what we want.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. You bet.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Holtzman, I would like to point out a couple of passages in

your statement. The first passage is this—you point out that a trial

in the Senate would disrupt the workings of the Senate and it

would disrupt the presidency as well. Certainly to a large extent,

I am sure that that is true. You didn’t mention an alternative
151

which is pretty obvious and which has been recommended by over

100 major newspapers, and that’s the possibility of resignation.

The other passage I want to refer to, and it sort of follows up a

little bit on what Mr. Boucher was discussing, too—you say, in Watergate when we voted for impeachment, we did so because we believed that President Nixon should be and would be removed from

office. We didn’t operate on a watered-down standard of evidence.

We weren’t passing the buck to the Senate where the real action

was and would take place. We voted as if we were in the Senate.

Let me read to you from another expert. She, like all of you, was

a Democrat. She was a very distinguished member of this Judiciary

Committee when you all served on it. She also happens to be a

former member, Congresswoman from Texas, and you all know

who I am talking about, and that’s Barbara Jordan. But here is

what she said: It is wrong, I suggest, it is a misreading of the Constitution for any Member here to assert that for a Member to vote

for an article of impeachment means that that Member must be

convinced that the President should be removed from office. The

Constitution doesn’t say that. The powers relating to impeachment

are an essential check in the hands of this body, the legislature,

against and upon the encroachment of the executive. In establishing the division between the two branches of the legislature, the

House and the Senate, assigning to the one the right to accuse and

to the other the right to judge, the framers of this Constitution

were very astute. They did not make the accusers and the judges

the same person.

That seems to me to directly refute what you said in your statement about the members of the committee voting as if they were

in the Senate.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I am not sure that it necessarily—your conclusion necessarily follows. I do think that——

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I really wasn’t asking you a question there.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Okay.

Mr. SMITH. I want to read another passage and then give you a

chance to respond to both. I was voicing my opinion that the plain

meaning of the word seems to me to contradict what you have said.

But here is another statement by Barbara Jordan in that same

delivery. ‘‘Beginning shortly after the Watergate break-in and continuing to the present time, the President engaged in a series of

public statements and actions designed to thwart the lawful investigation by government prosecutors. Moreover, the President has

made public announcements and assertions bearing on the Watergate case, which the evidence will show he knew to be false.’’

She said, ‘‘these assertions, false assertions,’’ were ‘‘impeachable.’’

Now, a couple of follow-ups real quickly. One, the Independent

Counsel pointed out, I think accurately, that the President over a

7-month period of time had a half-dozen occasions where, if he had

chosen to do so, he could have made a crossroads decision. He had

a decision whether to continue a pattern of deception or whether

to tell the truth. The Independent Counsel found that he chose, unfortunately, to continue that pattern of deception.

And then let me also read a statement that Mr. Stephanopoulos,

who was a senior adviser of the President, said—this is a quote:
152

‘‘This was no impulsive act of passion. It was a coldly calculated

political decision. He spoke publicly from the Roosevelt Room. He

assembled his Cabinet and staff and assured them that he was telling the truth. Then he sat back silently and watched his official

spokespeople, employees of the U.S. Government, mislead the country again and again and again.’’

Now, my final question is this: Don’t you think that the President, in Barbara Jordan’s words, has engaged in a series of public

statements and actions designed to thwart the lawful investigation

of government prosecutors?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I think that the President’s statements were designed to cover up sexual infidelity, a relationship with Monica

Lewinsky, a very embarrassing and wrongful relationship.

Mr. SMITH. Wasn’t he, though, trying to thwart the lawful investigation by government prosecutors?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. It depends—well, I think I answered your question. But I also want to make the point here that if you want to

compare this to Watergate, it is a very false comparison because,

in Watergate, we had not simply false statements. We had false

statements about criminal conduct.

Mr. SMITH. I very specifically——

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Here you have false statements about—

Mr. SMITH. I would like to reclaim my time.

Ms. HOLTZMAN [continuing]. Inaccurate statements about sexual

infidelity.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Holtzman, what I read that Barbara Jordan said

was very specific, very applicable and impeachable conduct.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Father Drinan, you were asked about what witnesses ought to be

called. We have asked for the list of allegations. We have known

that Mr. Starr started off with 10—started off with 11, ended up

with 10. There have been other variations of the allegations. The

scope changes from week to week. It is Kathleen Willey one week;

it is campaign finance another week; it is not campaign finance the

next.

According to the National Law Journal’s hotline, quoting ABC’s

Douglas, quote, ‘‘ABC News has learned that the Republicans may

accuse the President of different grand jury lies than Kenneth

Starr did in his report to Congress. Sources say they will shy away

from Starr’s most sexually explicit allegations that Mr. Clinton lied

about which parts of Monica Lewinsky’s body he touched. Instead,

GOP committee lawyers cite new charges.’’

Now, the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson, alerted Mr.

Craig that there may be some other charges that he might want

to look into without a clear definition of what the allegations are.

Is it fair to ask which witnesses ought to be called?

Father DRINAN. Well, Mr. Congressman, that’s not up to me to

decide. I think that many people, maybe the majority, feel that the

House Judiciary Committee is on the wrong path, that it has been

unfair, it has been erratic, but that’s not up to us to decide.

All I know is that we were called here today to come and tell

about 1974. As I recall, there was no criticism of the committee. At
153

first, people said this is necessary, but as the evidence came out,

they applauded the committee. And we are here to compare it, and

I think that the sense of the public in the country is that the something bad has happened in the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. SCOTT. And is the—would you have taken the prosecutor’s

testimony as evidence?

Father DRINAN. No, I think that that is basically wrong, and I

agree with Sam Dash who resigned over this very point. He said

that this goes beyond the Constitution, and as Ms. Holtzman said,

the statute makes it very clear that he is to give this evidence to

this body.

Mr. SCOTT. Did you presume guilt unless the President came

forth with evidence in his defense?

Father DRINAN. No. You went to Boston College Law School; you

know that’s bad law.

The President, like all of us, is entitled to the presumption of innocence.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Owens, can you tell me what proof there was

that President Nixon had committed tax fraud? Was there any

question about whether or not that allegation was true?

Mr. OWENS. I don’t think that anybody questioned the back-dating of the deed, which saved him hundreds of thousands of dollars,

was supervised by him, and probably signed by him after the fact,

and back-dated. The evidence was overwhelming as to tax fraud

and the supplementing of his income by many gratuities by agencies of the Federal Government.

The evidence was very clear, and it is listed, of course, in our report in some detail.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, income tax is a crime and it is a very serious

crime. Why was it not adopted as an impeachable offense?

Mr. OWENS. There was a great deal of disagreement. Father

Drinan and I wrote an op-ed piece in the Times about a month ago

pointing out that we believed—and the majority of the committee

believed basically because we found it to be personal misconduct,

as opposed to abuse of presidential powers, We felt that it did not

rise to impeachability.

There were civil opportunities to redress those wrongs. A President can be sued civilly as well as criminally, prosecuted criminally, of course, while he is President or after, and I thought there

were other, better remedies. It did not rise to impeachability in my

view.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all, Panel, for being here today. As former Democrat

members of this House, I didn’t have the honor of serving with you,

Father Drinan, or Ms. Holtzman, but I did have the opportunity to

serve with Wayne Owens.

Ms. Holtzman, do you agree with Father Drinan and with Wayne

Owens that income tax evasion and perjury are pretty much on the

same level?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. They may or they may not be.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Okay.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. It depends on the circumstances.
154

Mr. GALLEGLY. One question I have for you, Ms. Holtzman, the

records from the Watergate era show that you voted in favor of an

article of impeachment dealing with the allegations that President

Nixon lied on his personal income tax return. Does that square

with your position on perjury?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I think I was just previously asked that, but if

you would like me to go into it again, I would be happy to do that.

Mr. GALLEGLY. That’s fine.

Prior to January of 1998, Mr. Owens, have you ever gone on

record publicly as stating that lying before a Federal grand jury is

not an impeachable offense?

Mr. OWENS. I feel a little like Henry Hyde must feel about his

own testimony during Iran-Contra. I could be surprised by something that I may have said in the past. At age 61, I can tell you

what the reflection of the last 24 years has brought me to.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I would love to chat with you after the meeting,

but we have a very limited amount of time. Do you remember any

specific——

Mr. OWENS. I don’t know.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Father Drinan, do you remember, prior to 1998,

ever taking a formal position that perjury does not reach the level

of an impeachable offense?

Father DRINAN. I am not certain what the—what the question is,

Congressman. Would you put it in——

Mr. GALLEGLY. Prior to January of 1998 when this story broke,

had you ever taken a position, that you remember, that perjury did

not meet a level consistent with an impeachable offense?

Father DRINAN. Well, we didn’t have to write about impeachment

during those years, and I have no recollection that I talked about

perjury as an impeachable offense.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Father.

Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Well, perjury may or may not be an impeachable

offense.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Do you remember ever having taken a position

prior to January 1998?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. On false statements, yes, in the Nixon impeachment hearings.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Okay.

Wayne, you have stated—and correct me if I am wrong—that the

President should not be impeached because the underlying lies, or

perjury by the President, are not serious enough to warrant impeachment. At the same time, we have long lists of persons in Federal jails across this country for perjury. In fact, in my own home

State of California last year we had 4,000 individuals prosecuted

for perjury, last year alone.

If the President is not impeached, do you think the President

should pardon these folks?

Mr. OWENS. Elton, using the standard you set here for our communications, my own sense is that you can’t trivialize an impeachment of the President by trying to make it comparable to any other

offense charged against any other person; and I don’t think you can

hypothesize and make it similar, as you suggest in your hypothetical.
155

I don’t think that I can give you a very good answer to that.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, I certainly don’t mean to

trivialize.

Mr. OWENS. This President’s offenses, in my view, do not rise to

impeachability.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Reclaiming my time, certainly it was not my intent to trivialize this, in fact, quite the contrary.

In your testimony that the President’s lies are not serious because—and I think you said—they involved lying about sex, and

many have said, oh, everybody lies about sex. If this is the case——

Mr. OWENS. Oh, that isn’t what I meant, Elton. I think they are

very serious and should be punished. I don’t think it should be capital punishment. I think they are lesser offenses.

I think censure is appropriate. I join with Gerald Ford on that.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I think lying under oath is serious, period.

Mr. OWENS. Of course.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I think that that is the real issue before us here.

It is not about sex.

Mr. OWENS. It is very important, and I did not mean to trivialize

that either, Elton.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The issue here is perjury, lying under oath. Telling the truth is the basic foundation of our entire judicial system,

and I think that that is the issue and we have been getting, I

think, a little bit astray here when people try to make sex the issue

here.

I firmly believe the cornerstone of our whole judicial system is

predicated on telling the truth, and I certainly would be the last

one to trivialize lying.

Mr. OWENS. And I hope the House of Representatives—if I may

say, in response to that, Mr. Gallegly, I hope the House of Representatives will not miss its opportunity to censure and condemn

this President’s actions. I think it is highly unlikely that the Senate would ever convict the President based on an article you send

over. If you send it over to see whether they will or not, I think

you create a great constitutional conundrum.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank these

witnesses for being here.

I don’t profess to be a great student of the Nixon impeachment

process, and this has been very educational to me to see some of

the interworkings.

One thing in particular that I am struck by is, we have this public perception that the Nixon impeachment vote was a very bipartisan vote, and I guess by the standards under which we are operating today, it was a very bipartisan vote in the committee. But notwithstanding the overwhelming number of charges and the magnitude of what I think everybody recognizes now was going on, apparently there were still people who were not convinced that the

Nixon offenses rose to the level of impeachable offenses.

Am I correct in that on the committee, or—

Mr. OWENS. There were 10 members of the House Judiciary

Committee, including the current majority leader of the other body,
156

who did not vote for any of the three articles of impeachment which

passed. But as I recall the chronology, something like 6 days after

we passed and completed our activities here, the President’s—the

three ‘‘smoking guns,’’ these three recordings, were released which

showed that the President, among other—proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he had instructed the CIA to instruct the FBI to

get out of Watergate and so forth, directly contradicting direct testimony that he had given.

Then even Trent Lott and his nine colleagues on the Judiciary

Committee abandoned the President and said they would vote to

impeach on the House floor. Barry Goldwater and John Rhodes and

Hugh Scott went down to the White House and said, ‘‘Mr. President, it is over. You will be removed from office. You will lose your

pension and every perk of a former President. The jig is up; it is

time to leave.’’ And the President, former President at that point,

had the dignity to accept their judgment.

But right up to release of the ‘‘smoking guns,’’ there was a significant portion of the Members of the House and of the committee

who did not accept that the offenses reached the impeachability

level.

Mr. WATT. And were all 10 of those members Republican members of the committee?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, they were, yes. Yes, sir. You had 21 Democrats

and seven Republicans who voted for impeachment before the

‘‘smoking guns.’’

Mr. WATT. I guess I raise that because my colleague, Mr. Scott,

and I had an interesting discussion one day when the proceedings

were going on. I leaned over to him and I said to Mr. Scott, what

if President Clinton were a Republican President? Do you think we

would be taking the same position?

How did you rise above the—how did your committee rise above

the partisanship? Can you talk to me a little bit about how— I

mean, because one of the things that I have been really troubled

about is that this process has become so partisan and viewed by

the public as being so partisan that I think that has colored the

public’s perception of even the credibility of the arguments on the

other side.

Mr. OWENS. It was an exceedingly painful decision, for me especially. I was running for the Senate in the most Republican state

in the Nation, a Democrat, where Richard Nixon had gotten 72 percent of the vote 2 years earlier, and I was confident that that would

be a serious political problem for me.

And the only refuge, Mr. Congressman, is in, your realistic view

of what the evidence requires. Given the serious constitutional obligations that are imposed upon members of the committee, you just

have to say, consequences be damned; I will do what my conscience

tells me I have to do under the Constitution.

It was a very heavy responsibility, and I, honest to God, had no

second thoughts about voting for impeachment.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the members of this panel for being here. Your

perspective on these issues is very important to us.
157

Father Drinan, welcome back. We appreciated your earlier testimony to the subcommittee.

I want to address the issue about the tax fraud article that has

been discussed at some length here and begin by quoting Charles

Black, who in his handbook on impeachment wrote, ‘‘A large-scale

tax cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.’’ That’s on page 42, if you

have the book there.

Now, I think I understand Ms. Holtzman has kind of a nuanced

view about that; it would depend on the circumstances. But if I understand Father Drinan and Mr. Owens correctly, it is your—your

position is to disagree with Charles Black. Is that correct?

And please give a short answer. I am limited on time.

Father DRINAN. What precisely did Professor Black say on this?

Mr. CANADY. Pardon?

Father DRINAN. What precisely did Professor Black say?

Mr. CANADY. What I just read, quote, ‘‘A large-scale tax cheat is

not a viable chief magistrate.’’ Do you disagree with that view?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir, I do, absolutely.

Mr. CANADY. Okay.

Father Drinan.

Father DRINAN. I will concur with Mr. Owens.

Mr. CANADY. So you both disagree. That’s consistent——

Mr. OWENS. We wrote an article in the New York Times, so we

have to agree with each other.

Mr. CANADY. Okay. Well, that’s consistent with what you have

been saying today.

Mr. Owens, let me ask you a question. Were you the only person

named Owens on the committee during the time of the Nixon impeachment?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. I hope I am not going to regret making that

admission.

Mr. CANADY. Well, because I am looking at the transcript of the

debate of the tax article with respect to President Nixon, and I

would like to read your closing remarks in the debate to the committee.

You said, ‘‘And so we are here having to decide this issue without

having any hard evidence that will sustain tying the President to

the fraudulent deed but which will support, in my opinion, the closing and inferential gap that has to be closed in order to charge the

President.’’

You then go on to conclude, ‘‘I urge my colleagues to’’—‘‘based on

that lack of evidence, I urge my colleagues to reject this article.’’

Now, Mr. Owens, I candidly will have to say to you, I don’t think

that what you have said here is consistent with what you have

been saying today.

Mr. OWENS. I think under the Rules of the House you can do

that, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. CANADY. Well, I think the facts speak for themselves. I have

read the whole debate, and it is my judgment that although there

were clearly some members who believed that tax fraud by the

President was not an impeachable offense, the majority, the vast

majority of the members of the committee who expressed an opinion on that subject, said that they were either for the article, as

Ms. Holtzman was, or they felt that there was insufficient evidence
158

of fraud by President Nixon to proceed, as you said in your comments.

So I find it a little disturbing that you would come before this

committee today and make an assertion that is contrary to your

own statement in the debate.

Now, let me just say that I think that Charles Black was right,

a large-scale tax cheat is not a viable chief magistrate. I agree with

that.

Mr. OWENS. So you would have voted to impeach President

Nixon?

Mr. CANADY. If there had been adequate evidence, if there was

an evidentiary question there, which I think has to be settled as

a separate matter. Just as there is an evidentiary question before

this committee, we have got to make certain that we have an adequate basis for the conclusions we reach with respect to the allegations of perjury and obstruction of justice.

But I will also say that just as a large-scale tax cheat is not a

viable chief executive, I believe that a large-scale perjurer is not a

viable chief executive.

Furthermore, I believe that the evidence before the committee

points to the conclusion that the President of the United States has

committed multiple acts of making false statements under oath,

and that’s a serious matter that we are having to grapple with

here.

I hope everyone understands we are not enjoying grappling with

this, but the facts cry out. We have to deal with this. We cannot

turn away from it simply because it may be politically not expedient to deal with it, because the system of justice in this country is

affected by what we do here today and what we will do as these

proceedings move forward.

Again, I thank all of you for being here. I yield back the balance

of my time.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lofgren.

Mrs. LOFGREN. I would like to thank the panel for being here

and sharing your experiences and recollection.

I remember also back in 1974, and at that time, I had just finished my first year of law school, and I was working for Congressman Don Edwards and looking up at all of you sitting where I am

sitting today, never dreaming that I would be here in these circumstances.

I remember watching you as you all struggled, on both sides of

the aisle, to cope with what faced you and the really grave subversions of government you faced and which you have recited today

that were presented by the situation of then-President Nixon; and

I remember in the ’73 Judiciary Committee report the discussion

of the abuse of power that would be necessary to meet the standard

for ‘‘other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.’’ I don’t have it in front

of me, but something to the effect that it would be ‘‘abusing powers

that only a President possesses’’ is one of the phrases in that report. And I thought that really kind of summarized the subversion

of the government necessary, and that was a standard accepted by

both Republicans and Democrats at that time.

As you can see, today the standard has apparently changed, and

I accept that people have legitimate good-faith beliefs that a false
159

statement alone is sufficient to impeach. I just don’t think that is

the historical standard.

And as I think about what we are doing here today, I think our

constituency is not just today’s voters. My children are 13 and 16,

the constituency for what we do today will be my children’s grandchildren, because what we need to do is to make sure that we nurture and protect our system of government. This is the greatest

country in the world, with the best system of government. We need

to make sure that we do not impair our wonderful constitutional

system, and what concerns me is that what we are doing now may

have an impact on our system of government.

I really think that we have been phenomenally successful in

many ways because we have an executive who serves for a set 4-

year term, and if you don’t like the guy, you know that in 4 years

he can be voted out. And that definitive term allows the President

to deal successfully with other countries.

And what I am wondering—and maybe, Father Drinan, you

could answer this—if we are going to have this type of situation in

which we will have the election and now with the Jones case as

precedent in which you can sue a sitting President, we may have

a litigation phase after the election, and then we will have an impeachment phase following the litigation phase. I am worried and

concerned about what kind of stature and certainty the President

will have in the future if we have got that kind of scenario instead

of the certainty of 4-year terms. And what will the implications be

for this Nation? Do you have thoughts on that?

Father DRINAN. I think the implications are horrendous, and you

are quite right, that if we weaken the independence of the presidency, who knows? The next President may want to change the

rules on Cuba, and they say, we will indict you for that or impeach

you for that, and he has been intimidated. And all history shows

that the presidency was severely weakened for 30 or 40 years after

the attempted impeachment of Andrew Johnson.

This has never happened in 220 years. I think that we should

look at that.

Furthermore—and I think the underlying thing is that the President is being charged, not with anything that relates to public policy or to the political function of the government, but for something

personal for which he has apologized for his misstatements.

Mrs. LOFGREN. I know that in all likelihood the vote that we will

take in this committee will be on partisan lines, which was different than ’74. I am not making this allegation, but I have had

constituents say that this is a Republican coup d’etat to take out

a Democratic President they could not defeat.

Whether you agree with that or not, should we be concerned

that, in the future, impeachment will be used as a partisan tool?

Father DRINAN. Well, that’s the great danger. I keep wondering

why the arguments that the Republican majority use, why haven’t

they persuaded any Democrats? Why haven’t they changed public

opinion?

There is something very fundamental in the American psyche

that we don’t want this process and that I tried to be—tried to listen to. What is that argument? And the people are very troubled.
160

And to repeat what I have said before, I think there is going to be

a big popular uprising against this process.

Mrs. LOFGREN. I will just close and say, usually the American

people get it right.

I yield back.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad that Mr. Craig is still here with us, Mr. Chairman, because it is very important to note his testimony earlier in the day

that, and I will quote, ‘‘Let me assure’’—this is again the Special

Counsel to the President. ‘‘Let me assure the members of this committee, the Members of the House of Representatives and the

American public of one thing. In the course of our presentation

today and tomorrow, we will address the factual’’—and factual is

underlined—‘‘and evidentiary issues directly.’’

Ms. Holtzman, do you have any facts or evidence relating to this

case involving the President?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. What does that question mean?

Mr. INGLIS. Do you have any facts relating to the things of which

the President is accused here today? Obviously not, right?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. No. That is not my answer, sir. That may be

your answer to your question. It is certainly not my answer to your

question.

Mr. INGLIS. What facts do you have?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. If you will let me, I will be happy to tell you.

Mr. INGLIS. Go right ahead and tell me what facts you have.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. One fact is the perspective of Watergate, the historical fact, what that means and how you place impeachment in

a historical context.

Mr. INGLIS. Good.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. The other fact is, the questions that were raised

with respect to how the public will deal——

Mr. INGLIS. Reclaiming my time, you have no evidentiary matters to present, either, do you?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Okay, reclaim your time.

Mr. INGLIS. How about Father Drinan? Do you have any evidentiary matters to present?

Father DRINAN. Do you want new facts or reflections on old

facts?

Mr. INGLIS. Generally in a legal case there are things called facts

and evidence, and then there is the law. It seems to me what you

are arguing here is the law, is it not?

Father DRINAN. We came, sir, to explain what we tried to do in

1974.

Mr. INGLIS. That is precedent, correct, Father Drinan? That is

precedent, which is generally law, is that correct?

Father DRINAN. I think so.

Mr. INGLIS. Mr. Owens, do you have any facts or evidence to

present in this case?

Mr. OWENS. That is our function today, to interpret for you what

happened in 1974. It is full of facts. The contrast between what

that President did and what this one did is, of course, where we

are supposed to——

Mr. INGLIS. You would agree that——
161

Mr. OWENS [continuing]. Spend our time.

Mr. INGLIS. That is precedent, which is in the nature of law rather than facts or evidence.

Mr. OWENS. We are here to explain what happened and to interpret it as best we can, that is correct.

Mr. INGLIS. I am just trying to point out—and I don’t know why

Ms. Holtzman became so defensive about this—I am just trying to

point out the great inconsistency in Mr. Craig’s statement earlier

today, that he—and this is not your fault, this is certainly not the

fault of these three people before us. It is just that earlier today

the Special Counsel to the President of the United States said

that—today, before this committee——

Mr. OWENS. Excuse me, Mr. Congressman. Did he say that no

witnesses would interpret old historical precedents for the committee?

Mr. INGLIS. The point I am interested in making is this is panel

two, and Mr. Craig, we have yet to hear any facts or any evidence.

There is nothing new here. In fact, we have already heard from Father Drinan once before. There is nothing new.

So the great high bar Mr. Craig earlier set for himself and for

the President, that this day and tomorrow are going to be the day

that we hear evidence and facts that contradict the evidence before

the committee, for panel two the score is zero facts, zero evidence.

There are more panels to come, but I look forward to, throughout

the rest of the day and tomorrow, keeping track every time about

whether we have got any new facts or any new evidence.

Again, I think it is very helpful, but we have heard it all before.

It is very helpful, and I appreciate your time, but it is not what

Mr. Craig said that he was going to deliver to this committee.

Father DRINAN. If I may ask, what do you mean by facts? We

have been giving facts here since we started.

Mr. INGLIS. The facts, sir, that we want——

Father DRINAN. You want new facts about the so-called scandal?

What do you want?

Mr. INGLIS. That is what I am interested in finding out. I want

to know if there are any facts and evidence in this case that would

tend to make us conclude that the President in fact did not lie to

the American people, as he said he did. Maybe there are.

Father DRINAN. The White House gave you 185 pages of their

case.

Mr. INGLIS. We are looking forward to it.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Congressman, in dealing with facts, you taught

7-year-olds in this country what telephone sex is and oral sex, and

what you can do with a cigar, and you had enough facts.

I think it is the interpretation of the facts, may I respectfully

say, which is required by this committee.

Mr. INGLIS. Okay, you disagree with the Special Counsel and

President. Mr. Craig says he wants to present facts and evidence

today and tomorrow. Apparently you are all on a different sheet of

music, because that is not what you are doing.

You are doing a very helpful thing, which is presenting the law

and precedents. It is not facts. Facts would be evidence in this case.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
162

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me

make my continuing objection to the shortness of the time of which

the President has been given to make his case.

Let me, for the record, note that Mr. St. Clair, in addition to

bringing an enormous number of witnesses, participated, as I understand, with the 17 days executive and nonexecutive sessions.

Mr. St. Clair, being the lawyer for Mr. Nixon, had the ability to examine and cross-examine witnesses. So I raise the concern that

many of the esteemed and distinguished members of this panel

have not been able to fully answer our questions.

Let me thank the panel most of all for being here and providing

us with, if not a complete understanding of the Watergate proceedings, at least a sufficient bird’s-eye-view that would warrant us to

question the process that we are engaged in at this time.

One of our past Presidents said that one man with courage

makes a majority. So I, too, want to offer this day and the next day

to those Members of this body, this House, maybe this committee,

who are thinking seriously about where we are, might I draw the

committee to a dissenting view in the Iran-Contra that was signed

on by seven Republicans, and the words are these:

‘‘The President himself has already taken the hard step of acknowledging his mistakes and reacting precisely to correct what

went wrong.’’ ‘‘There was no constitutional crisis, no systematic disrespect for the rule of law, no grand conspiracy, and no administration-wide dishonesty or cover-up,’’ by dissenting Republicans,

signed by Mr. Hyde and Representative Bill McCollum of this committee in the Iran-Contra affair.

Let me say to the Members here, and as I cite these facts for you,

would you also give us sort of an insight, if you will, as to what

went on in your committee, short of those things that you are not

able to discuss because maybe they were in executive session, in

bringing out the fullness of the case?

Because over and over again I hear my dear colleagues, my Republican colleagues, saying, ‘‘Where are the fact witnesses?’’ It is

my understanding that you were able to bring fact witnesses, and

subsequently, as Father Drinan said, there was a smoking gun of

the tape talking about Mr. Nixon asking the CIA then to stop the

FBI from investigating Watergate.

But listen to this. Would you believe that alleged conversations

by the President to a staff person, Mrs. Currie, about her recollections as to his whereabouts in the office or out of the office, at a

time when she was not a witness to anything, or not a witness

called for any proceeding, would be obstruction of justice; one question?

In the referral by Mr. Starr, these words: ‘‘Finally, the President

made a third false statement to the grand jury about his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. He contended that the intimate

contact did not begin until 1996. Monica Lewinsky testified that it

began on November 15th, 1995.’’

The conclusion of the Starr report: ‘‘For all of these reasons,

there is substantial and credible evidence that the President lied

to the grand jury about his sexual relationship with Monica

Lewinsky.’’
163

Can you tell me whether or not we have a constitutional crisis?

Can you tell me whether or not you had and others had, meaning

Mr. St. Clair, the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses

inside of the proceedings that you were able to deal with? And can

you tell me whether or not, in this instance, Mr. Clinton has as

well acknowledged that he has misled the American people?

And we could, if you will, not so much as a grand jury—but in

that structure, determine not to proceed because we have found no

reasonable basis upon which to impeach the President of the

United States of America? Because we, though not in essence a

grand jury, are the movers of this action and can decide that because of the frivolousness of it, we should not proceed.

I know that the answers will have to be brief. Ms. Holtzman, I

would appreciate it.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Our process was never started by a grand inquisitor, it was started when the American people demanded that

the House act after the Saturday Night Massacre.

We had substantial actual evidence, including tapes of the President. When John Dean and the President disagreed about what

happened, we did not start an impeachment inquiry. That was insufficient evidence.

I am concerned, and I think you have raised that, that the actual

determination of who is telling the truth, Monica Lewinsky or the

President, will be made without a basis of hearing from the actual

witnesses. I also do think that the facts of what happened in the

past—and history is fact, it is not law, it is fact—are important in

the determination of what this committee should do.

We are not in a constitutional crisis now. The question is, will

this committee and the House generate one for the country?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to

thank these former Members of Congress for their participation

today. They have been through what the members of this committee are going through now, and must understand how arduous a

task this is, how unpleasant a task this is, so I take exception to

some of the suggestions of the political motivations of the members

of this committee.

I once worked for a Republican member of this committee who

served on the Watergate Committee on the Judiciary, former Congressman Caldwell Butler. He was one of those seven Republicans

who voted for the articles of impeachment. I think it takes great

courage and great integrity to vote out articles of impeachment

against a President of your own party.

I don’t know what the vote will be in the final result in this committee or on the floor of the House, but I believe that Members on

both sides of the aisle will try to show courage and integrity and

act in that fashion.

But I am very concerned about the motivation of the White

House today in attempting to raise the bar, in attempting to try

to describe the standards that we are applying here as being somehow different than the standards applied in the Watergate hearings.
164

Congressman Canady, I think, has very correctly pointed out

that there were many, including Congresswoman Holtzman, the

only remaining member of the committee who still serves today,

Congressman Conyers, who voted out an article of impeachment

against President Nixon under circumstances in which he made a

false oath on his tax return, so I think that that is an unfair standard.

I think the effort to try to impose upon the committee the burden

of ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’’ the standard of proof in a criminal

proceeding, is also incorrect. There is no evidence that the Watergate committee used such a standard. In fact, as Congressman

Smith pointed out, Congresswoman Barbara Jordan explicitly rejected that standard. Some even set a much lower bar.

Let me read you this quote: ‘‘We are seeking what some people

have described as whether there is probable cause, and I do not

think it really reaches that. I have not found anything in the literature that says the House is looking even for probable cause. We

are trying to find out whether there are enough matters in the articles we draw up that would warrant a trial that would resolve the

questions.’’

That was said by Congressman Conyers, the Ranking Minority

Member, during the Watergate proceedings. I think that is too low

a standard, quite frankly. I think clear and convincing evidence is

an appropriate standard for this committee to look at this evidence.

But this effort to suggest that this committee is politically motivated in our efforts is contradicted, this effort on the part of the

White House and the White House’s witnesses to suggest that

there is somehow a different standard being applied here, when in

point of fact the evidence is quite to the contrary.

It has been suggested, and Congresswoman Holtzman, I think

you suggested, this is simply merely lying about an embarrassing

personal situation, attempting to cover that up. But before the Federal grand jury, Mrs. Holtzman, the President’s statements I think

clearly indicate false statements. Unless some evidence is brought

forward by the President to rebut them, they clearly were not for

the purposes of covering up an embarrassment, because minutes

after the President made those statements under oath before the

grand jury, he went before the American people and acknowledged

doing some embarrassing personally indiscreet things.

Before the depositions in the civil lawsuit seven months earlier,

the President clearly was not making those allegedly false statements for the purpose of covering up personal indiscretions, because in the same depositions the President acknowledged other

personal indiscretions with Gennifer Flowers and so on.

So I think the purpose of the President in both instances was

something other than to cover up personal indiscretion. I think the

purpose of the President was to defeat the lawsuit, the sexual harassment lawsuit; to obstruct justice in that case; to coach witnesses, and to bring forth a false affidavit from another individual.

And those, I think, are very serious charges, very similar to the

charges that the Watergate committee considered regarding President Nixon and his tax return. And I think upholding the rule of

law and standing up for honesty and truth in our judicial system
165

is a very, very serious matter that the American people are very

concerned about.

I would finally point out that you can’t look at polls to determine

the final outcome.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlewoman from California.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members

of the committee. I thank our witnesses for being here today, our

former Members. I am trying to hold onto the belief that most

members of this Committee on the Judiciary are wrestling with

their conscience on questions of perjury and obstruction of justice.

I have long since decided that I cannot, in good conscience and

with a sense of integrity and fairness, support the impeachment of

President Clinton based on the allegations in this inquiry.

We have had some discussion on the question of perjury. Some

on this committee have held onto an argument that perjury for the

purpose of prosecution is and should be considered as a simple

statement of less than pure fact or detail. This is a holier-than-thou

attitude that allows no room for misstatement; no room for inability to clearly and concisely recollect; no room for taking advantage

of legal definitions crafted by legal minds that may not comport

with lay definitions; no room for nuances or gradations.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to say this. I hate to. But your statements and your actions during these hearings place you at the

head of the class in the category of strictest and purest interpretation of perjury. You have waxed eloquent about the rule of law, a

zero tolerance of lying. You have said no exception can be made for

lying to cover up an embarrassing sexual affair.

You said, ‘‘For my friends who think perjury, lying, and deceit,

are in some circumstances acceptable and undeserving of punishment, I respectfully disagree’’. You further said, ‘‘The truth is not

trivial, playing by the rules. We are fighting for the rule of law. I

think it is our constitutional duty under the law to pursue impeachment.’’

You said, ‘‘I am frightened for the rule of law, and I don’t want

that torn down or diminished.’’

Mr. Chairman, you are our leader and the chairman of this powerful committee. Many members of your party are following your

lead, taking your advice, and looking to your experience and integrity to guide their decision.

Mr. Chairman, a few days ago I read a column written by Mr.

David G. Savage in my hometown paper, the Los Angeles Times,

and I was simply taken back by what I read. Mr. Savage did a little research on you, your statements and your actions.

Mr. Savage opened his article with the following line, quoting

you, and I quote: ‘‘He mocked the sanctity of all who sermonized

about how terrible lying is. ‘Granted, lies were told,’ he said, ‘but

it hardly makes sense to label every untruth and every deception

an outrage.’ He also condemned the disconcerting and distasteful

whiff of moralism and institutional self-righteousness that led Congress to conduct hearings on the deceptions coming from the White

House, and he denounced the result as a witch hunt.’’

Mr. Chairman, this columnist was talking about you, you who

led the defense of the Reagan administration during the Iran166

Contra hearings. This columnist’s research also shows you in direct

and absolute contrast to your belief about what was not a lie in

1987 as opposed to what is a lie in 1998.

Mr. Chairman, what are we to think about these contrasts, as we

review what you said then, and about understanding the nuances

of lies and your zero tolerance stage today? What must your colleagues in the Republican Conference who are wrestling with history, legal definitions and conscience, think about the possibility

that your statements today are in deep conflict with your 1987

statements?

To tell you the truth, I am a little disappointed. Never in my

wildest imagination did I think that you would have such conflicting views about perjury and lying. You have done a 360-degree

turn on your deep philosophical beliefs about how lying should be

placed in proper context and nuances.

Mr. Chairman, I don’t want you to default on your good name

and leadership. History will not be kind to you and the stark contradictions of your leadership. It will surely be a sad commentary

on your long years of service to be recorded as one who led the selective impeachment of the President of the United States, not

based on a consistent philosophical belief, but rather on a petty

partisan need to satisfy the need to retaliate, embarrass, or feed

the insatiable appetites of a group of hate-mongering——

The CHAIRMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady be

permitted to finish her attack on me.

Ms. WATERS [continuing]. Who will stop at nothing to destroy

President Clinton. Thank you, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, you sent 81 questions to the President. Based on

Mr. Savage’s article and his accusations about you, I am going to

send you some questions. You don’t have to answer them, and if

you are going to allow me all of this precious time——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, please don’t abuse the privilege, Ms. Waters.

You have finished your prepared statement, haven’t you?

Ms. WATERS. I really haven’t, because it includes the questions

that I am going to send you.

Mr. BUYER. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, I will have to tell you that your time

has elapsed. But we will continue this in private.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I now yield myself 5 minutes to respond to the

gentlelady.

In a way, I am glad you brought that up, because I read that article in the Los Angeles Times, and I went back to my library and

I dug out the report of the Iran-Contra hearings back in ’87. I

wrote a special dissenting report, and I reread it. If I do say so myself, it is real literature. I will get a copy and have you read the

whole thing, rather than a few excerpted sentences.

Now, it is true, at that time I was on the Intelligence Committee,

and when I had a more nuanced view about misleading people, at

no time did I sanction perjury. At no time did I sanction Ollie

North or Poindexter lying under oath. I objected and I made my

objections known.

But what I tried to explain—and I said context is everything,

and I stand by that—clandestine operations to get hostages out of
167

Iran required secrecy and occasionally withholding information

that others wanted. Trying to save Central America from a Castro

takeover required some clandestine operations, and they required

sometimes withholding information. That happened, and it takes a

little understanding that people’s lives and resources are at stake.

And while the Democrats did not agree, they preferred no money

going to the Contras, whom they portrayed as thugs; the Sandanistas, with Mr. Ortega and Mr. Castro, seemed to fit in well

with them. That was a great controversy back in 1987.

But you cannot find any place or any time where I condoned or

justified perjury, or raising your hand and asking God to witness

to the truth of what you are saying, and then lying.

Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I will not yield.

Ms. WATERS. I want to take you to something that is in contradiction to what you have said.

The CHAIRMAN. You have had your turn, Ms. Waters. This isn’t

going to be the Maxine-Henry show.

Ms. WATERS. Too bad about that. I would like that.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted the record to show that my opposition to perjury and lying under oath has been constant, and is as

strong today as it was then.

But as long as I am using my 5 minutes, I want to ask my

friend, Father Drinan, a question. This may categorize me as a

member of the religious right, and I will tell you now, I have not

been to any meetings lately in anybody’s basement, so I am not a

part of the conspiracy.

But what is the significance of asking God to witness to the truth

of what you are saying? Does that add a little heft to the undertaking of promising to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but

the truth?

Father DRINAN. No, Mr. Chairman, that was just—everybody

knows that they have a very solemn duty. If this Saturday the vote

comes out 21 to 16 to impeach, and if the Republicans put intensive

pressure upon their own people, and if impeachment is passed by

seven votes, as is now predicted, I think that we all here will say,

‘‘Awesome. What are the motives for that?’’ That is what I meant.

The CHAIRMAN. Let’s get back to my question: What about the

rule of law? What does the chief law enforcement officer, when he

raises his hand in a lawsuit, swears to tell the truth and then

doesn’t, then lies—does that erode, diminish, depreciate the rule of

law which protects you and me?

Father DRINAN. I suppose the answer is yes, but that is not the

right question. The question is——

The CHAIRMAN. I got the right answer. I will do the questions,

you do the answers. I yield back my time. Thank you, Father.

Father DRINAN. You people have to make the big answer. Is that

up to the level of impeachability, so that we will distract and disturb the country and erode the independence of the White House?

The CHAIRMAN. It is inconvenient, I will grant you that. It would

be inconvenient to have an impeachment, no question. The question is, how inconvenient is it to have the rule of law eroded, corroded, diminished, lessened, cheapened? That is the other side of

that coin.
168

Father DRINAN. That is your assumption, sir, that all of that is

going to happen. My assumption is that further gray things might

happen. We have to weigh.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s right. And everyone has to in the end answer to their conscience. Absolutely right.

Now, we can get back to normality.

Mr. Meehan is next. Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad all of you

were here today, because you, among all the witnesses who have

appeared before us, bring, I think, an important historical perspective to the table.

What I would like to do is read to you some of the portions of

the Nixon tapes, essentially to take you back to the days where you

sat in judgment of a prior President, and then ask you how the

facts before us compare with those that you grappled with. Many

of us have heard a lot of conversations about what happened in the

Nixon era and the Watergate era, so I think it is important to go

back and compare.

Let me start with a June 17, 1971 conversation between President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Henry Kissinger. Haldeman tells Nixon that there is a file at the Brookings

Institute on Lyndon Johnson’s implementation of a bombing halt in

the Vietnam War. Nixon responds, quote, ‘‘Goddamn it, get it. And

get those files. Blow the safe and get it.’’

On June 30, 1971, in a conversation with the same individuals

and Ron Ziegler and Melvin Laird, Nixon elaborates on his plans

with respect to the Brookings Institute: ‘‘They have a lot of material. I want Brookings. I just want to them to get it, to break in

and take it out. Do you understand?’’

On September 18th, President Nixon and John Ehrlichman had

a conversation in which they discussed using the IRS to harass

Senator Edmund Muskie, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and their

supporters. Nixon says the following: ‘‘John, but we have the

power, but are we using it to investigate contributors to Hubert

Humphrey, investigate contributors to Muskie?’’ He goes on, ‘‘Are

we going after their tax returns? Do you know what I mean?’’

Haldeman, ‘‘No, we haven’t.’’

Nixon, ‘‘Hubert, Hubert has been in a lot of funny deals.’’

‘‘Yes, he has.’’

‘‘Teddy, who knows about the Kennedys? Shouldn’t they be investigated?’’

September 10, 1971, President Nixon approves Ehrlichman’s proposal for a break-in of the National Archives to get secret Vietnam

papers of former President Johnson’s aides.

Ehrlichman: ‘‘There is a lot of hanky-panky with secret documents, and on the eve of the publication of the Pentagon papers,

those guys made a deposit into the National Archives under an

agreement of a whole lot of papers. Now I am going to steal those

documents out of the National Archives.’’

Nixon: ‘‘You can do that, you know.’’

Finally, on June 23rd, 1972, the infamous smoking gun conversation occurred. In that conversation, President Nixon and Haldeman

conspired to call in the CIA director, Richard Helms, and direct

him to tell the acting FBI director, Patrick Gray, that the FBI’s in169

vestigation of the Watergate break-in interfered with CIA operations.

Here is Haldeman laying out the plan for getting Helms to call

off the FBI investigation. Haldeman: ‘‘They say the only way to do

this is from White House instructions, and it’s got to be Helms and

what’s his name, Walters.’’

Nixon: ‘‘Walters.’’

Haldeman: ‘‘And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman and I

call him,’’ meaning CIA director Helms.

Nixon: ‘‘All right. Fine.’’

Ms. Holtzman, Father Drinan, Mr. Owens, we have heard attempts to compare President Clinton’s conduct in this case with

that of President Nixon. Indeed, we have seen the Independent

Counsel strive to mirror the language of the Nixon impeachment

articles in his referral, throwing out terms like ‘‘obstruction of justice’’, ‘‘abuse of power’’, despite the lack of evidentiary support for

either allegation.

To set the record straight, isn’t it fair to say that President Clinton’s conduct doesn’t even hold a candle to President Nixon and

what he did?

Mr. OWENS. There is no question that it does not. I listened as

he instructed John Dean on how to lie to the grand jury. I heard

the tape. I heard the President’s own voice. I couldn’t believe it.

‘‘Just tell them you don’t remember, John. They can’t indict you

if you don’t remember,’’ and told him to ‘‘get $120,000, by God,

today, and pay it to Mr. Hunt, because he was going to blow by

nightfall.’’ I couldn’t believe what I was hearing.

Mr. MEEHAN. Cash, wasn’t it cash?

Mr. OWENS. There is nothing like that in this evidence here.

There is nothing that touches on the immoral or—the illegality of

the evidence that we had with Richard Nixon.

We had no choice but to impeach. This committee has no choice

but to release the President, to vote down this article.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. I thank all of you for coming today.

One of the things that is a lot different is we don’t have John

Dean. You had someone on the inside that came forward. We don’t

have someone, a Sidney Blumenthal or someone else who comes

forward and says, you know, enough is enough. I can’t take it anymore down at the White House. I want to tell you all about the

conversations.

We don’t have the benefit of the taped conversations, as they put

together their defenses and their schemes and their plans. We don’t

have all of that. We have the transcripts from the grand jury testimony. So there are some differences. And I have great respect for

what you went through, because we have gone through only half

of it. Your proceeding was nine months, and this has been four.

I do have a couple of questions. Father Drinan, you piqued my

interest earlier when you brought up the word ‘‘vengeance.’’ Why

do you think in our society we think it is so important that when

we give someone an oath, we ask them to either swear or affirm

to God, and we also, in many courtrooms around America, we ask
170

someone to place their left hand on a Bible? Father, why do you

think we do that in our society? Father DRINAN. It goes way back. For centuries it was very sa- cred. But I don’t think that you can invoke the oath and say that,

immediately, that someone who may have violated it is impeachable when he is the President.

You are asking the right thing. Sir, we all agree on this. Don’t make us say that, well, we are going to minimize the oath. We are

not doing that. We took the oath today. I teach legal ethics at

Georgetown. We solemnize all of this. But that is not the question. The question is if this individual—

if this were a private matter, not related to government process, is

he impeachable because of that question?

Mr. BUYER. Let me ask another question of you, Father Drinan. Tell me what the difference is between vengeance and accountability under the legal system? What is the difference between those

two?

Father DRINAN. Vengeance is only—it is a legal term only some- times. We don’t make vengeance a crime. I used that term because

I, like the whole Nation, find it unfathomable that the whole Republican establishment says this is an impeachable offense, and

the rest of the country doesn’t get it.

Mr. BUYER. Father Drinan, I find it almost unfathomable that

there are some of my own Democrat colleagues, that somehow believe or feel that if the President lied before a grand jury, that that

was wrong but it is not impeachable. Then I have to watch, even in these proceedings, how the Presi- dent’s own counsel, and as they work with the minority counsel—

there is coordination here between minority, the minority side, and

the President’s defense.

I would ask unanimous consent that an article that was in the

Wall Street Journal on November 30th, 1998—it is a declaration

concerning religion, ethics, and crisis in the Clinton presidency,

signed by 132 religious scholars—be placed in the record.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.

[From the Wall Street Journal Nov. 30, 1998]

BILL CLINTON’S ETHICS—AND OURS

The following statement—‘‘Declaration Concerning Religion, Ethics, and the Crisis

in the Clinton Presidency’’—was signed by 95 religion scholars including Paul J.

Achtemeier (Union Theological Seminary), Karl Paul Donfried (Smith College), Jean

Bethke Elshtain (University of Chicago), Stanley M. Hauerwas (Duck University),

Robert Peter Imbelli (Boston College), Max L. Stackhouse (Princeton Theological

Seminary), and Harry Yeide (George Washington University):

As scholars interested in religion and public life, we protest the manipulation of

religion and the debasing of moral language in the discussion about presidential responsibility. We believe that serious misunderstandings of repentance and forgiveness are being exploited for political advantage. The resulting moral confusion is a

threat to the integrity of American religion and to the foundations of a civil society.

In the conviction that politics and morality cannot be separated, we consider the

current crisis to be a critical moment in the life of our country and, therefore, offer

the following points for consideration:

1. Many of us worry about the political misuse of religion and religious symbols

even as we endorse the public mission of our churches, synagogues, and mosques.

In particular we are concerned about the distortion that can come by association

with presidential power in events like the Presidential Prayer Breakfast on September 11. We fear the religious community is in danger of being called upon to provide

authentication for a politically motivated and incomplete repentance that seeks to
171

avert serious consequences for wrongful acts. While we affirm that pastoral counseling sessions are an appropriate, confidential arena to address these issues, we fear

that announcing such meetings to convince the public of the President’s sincerity

compromises the integrity of religion.

2. We challenge the widespread assumption that forgiveness relieves a person of

further responsibility and serious consequences. We are convinced that forgiveness

is a relational term that does not function easily within the sphere of constitutional

accountability. A wronged party chooses forgiveness instead of revenge and antagonism, but this does not relieve the wrong-doer of consequences. When the President

continues to deny any liability for the sins he has confessed, this suggests that the

public display of repentance was intended to avoid political disfavor.

3. We are aware that certain moral qualities are central to the survival of our

political system, among which are truthfulness, integrity, respect for the law, respect for the dignity of others, adherence to the constitutional process, and a willingness to avoid the abuse of power. We reject the premise that violations of these ethical standards should be excused so long as a leader remains loyal to a particular

political agenda and the nation is blessed by a strong economy. Elected leaders are

accountable to the Constitution and to the people who elected them. By his own admission the President has departed from ethical standards by abusing his presidential office, by his ill use of women, and by his knowing manipulation of truth

for indefensible ends. We are particularly troubled about the debasing of the language of public discourse with the aim of avoiding responsibility for one’s actions.

4. We are concerned about the impact of this crisis on our children and on our

students. Some of them feel betrayed by a President in whom they set their hopes

while others are troubled by his misuse of others, by which many in the administration, the political system, and the media were implicated in patterns of deceit and

abuse. Neither our students nor we demand perfection. Many of us believe that extreme dangers sometimes require a political leader to engage in morally problematic

actions. But we maintain that in general there is a reasonable threshold of behavior

beneath which our public leaders should not fall, because the moral character of a

people is more important than the tenure of a particular politician or the protection

of a particular political agenda. Political and religious history indicate that violations and misunderstandings of such moral issues may have grave consequences.

The widespread desire to ‘‘get this behind us’’ does not take seriously enough the

nature of transgressions and their social effects.

5. We urge society as a whole to take account of the ethical commitments necessary for a civil society and to seek the integrity of both public and private morality. While partisan conflicts have usually dominated past debates over public morality, we now confront a much deeper crisis, whether the moral basis of the constitutional system itself will be lost. In the present impeachment discussions, we call for

national courage in deliberation that avoids ideological division and engages the

process as a constitutional and ethical imperative. We ask Congress to discharge its

current duty in a manner mindful of its solemn constitutional and political responsibilities. Only in this way can the process serve the good of the nation as a whole

and avoid further sensationalism.

6. While some of us think that a presidential resignation or impeachment would

be appropriate and others envision less drastic consequences, we are all convinced

that extended discussion about constitutional, ethical, and religious issues will be

required to clarify the situation and to enable a wise decision to be made. We hope

to provide an arena in which such discussion can occur in an atmosphere of scholarly integrity and civility without partisan bias.

Mr. BUYER. It starts by saying, ‘‘As scholars interested in religion

and public life, we protest the manipulation of religion and the debasing of the moral language in the discussion about presidential

responsibility. We believe that serious misunderstandings of repentance and forgiveness are being exploited for political advantage.’’

Then they lay out six points. I think it is very good. I invite my

colleagues to read that.

I was very concerned, Father Drinan, for you to come in here and

to challenge the motives of this committee. I suppose that as you

sat on the impeachment, the three of you, there were people that

would challenge your motives and did at the time.
172

Father DRINAN. If I may say, I don’t recall anything like that in

the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1974. We had the highest

esteem for each other, and I had high esteem for Caldwell Butler,

who agonized over this and eventually voted for it.

Mr. BUYER. Father Drinan, you are the first individual that I

know that has ever challenged, and I will take it personally here

because you said it to all of us, that we are driven by vengeance.

That is why I asked you the specific question about the difference

between accountability in our legal system and vengeance. That is

very important. So I am very disappointed that the President’s defense would send witnesses to this committee that would say we

are driven by vengeance, that we are zealots and fanatics and cowards.

Father DRINAN. I didn’t say fanatics or cowards.

Mr. BUYER. You did not, but a witness from the previous panel.

Mr. DRINAN. Don’t make me accountable for what other people

said.

Mr. BUYER. I am not making you accountable. I will make you

accountable for the vengeance statement.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.

Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. Father Drinan, welcome, my former

teacher at Boston College Law School.

You are all Democrats. I think it is important to point out to you

and to the American people that a former colleague of yours,

Charles Wiggins, who is presently serving on the Court of Appeals

in the Ninth Circuit, agrees with you, and he is a Republican.

I am going to quote from testimony that Charles Wiggins gave

to this committee a short time ago, back on December 1st. I am

quoting: ‘‘I am presently of the opinion that the misconduct immediately occurring by the President is not of the gravity to remove

him from office.’’ I think that goes to much of what you have all

said today in terms of the gravity of the conduct, even if it is presumed to be accurate.

He goes on to state, on page 141, ‘‘I find it very troubling that

the Committee on the Judiciary seems to be willing to impeach the

President. I find that there is not any necessity that the President

knew his acts were impeachable, that he was obstructing justice or

abusing power at the time he did them.’’

So I think it is very important that you understand you are here

in a bipartisan sense with Judge Wiggins. He also stated, and you

just stated rather elegantly, Mr. Owens, that—and again, I am

quoting him—‘‘We heard testimony from Haldeman, we heard testimony from Ehrlichman, and we heard testimony from John Dean.’’

You just referred to that, listening to that particular tape. It was

the smoking gun.

It is my position that we have a process here, and I think process

is important, because it is the process, not the names of the principle players, whether they be William Clinton, Ken Starr, Monica

Lewinsky, or Linda Tripp, that will serve as a precedent for the

rest of our history.

I am really concerned that we have not heard direct evidence,

and I am particularly disturbed when I hear from others that suggest that somehow the burden of proof to rebut what is—can only
173

be described as triple and quadruple hearsay is on the President

of the United States.

We heard earlier from Mr. Craig when he said, ‘‘Much of what

Monica Lewinsky said was erroneous.’’ He did not accuse her of

lying or testifying falsely, he said ‘‘erroneous.’’

I dare say it is the responsibility of this committee, of this committee, to hear from the principal witnesses, to make those critical

determinations in terms of memory, in terms of credibility, and in

terms of evidence. I would welcome your comments. Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I think you are absolutely correct. You know, the

question was what standard of evidence should be applied. We actually had evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. We had the tapes

of the President of the United States himself. There was no question of the level of evidence. We heard witnesses, direct witnesses.

We heard tapes. I don’t think it is——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time, I think it is very important

that you know and the American people know that we have heard

direct testimony in deposition from only two witnesses. I think it

is absolutely wrong for this body and for this institution to abdicate

its responsibility under the Constitution to an independent prosecutor that merely served as a conduit for so-called evidence, while

it goes to the United States Senate for a trial which I think we can

all agree will be traumatizing this Nation and creating great instability within the body politic.

I yield back.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank

the panel, a couple of you, for your second—I guess for the rerun

here.

I am reminded by my colleagues’ from Massachusetts statement

of my years in trial, when the other side often argued that there

is no proof here today on this point, when they too had the subpoena power and the ability as such to call in that proof if they

really, really wanted that proof there.

One would have to assume that by providing some 30 hours, if

you look at eight-hour work days, almost four complete days of

work hours before this panel, that if one really wanted that type

of proof, if they wanted confrontation with these witnesses and if

they wanted to cross-examine these witnesses, and they were so, so

dissatisfied with the process, that one would think they might issue

a subpoena and call some of these witnesses in.

On another subject, there are many issues here and I want to

touch on just a couple of them. I have heard today argued that private conduct is not grounds for impeachment. I see the hypocrisy

in the White House of spending so much money and time and legal

effort in asserting the White House presidential privilege, which we

all know covers official conduct. So if we are talking private conduct only, why aren’t we litigating in court the official conduct and

the executive privilege issue?

This panel seems to be arguing that, unless you have the Richard Nixon case, you can’t impeach anybody. We have 32 counts and

one article of impeachment in that case. That sounds to me like if

you have got a bank robber out there that robbed 32 banks, and
174

then you have got a second bank robber who only robbed four, that

you can’t charge that person with bank robbery; that everybody

from here on has to rob 32 banks before they can be charged.

I suspect when it all settles in, this case will fall in between the

Andrew Johnson impeachment and the President Nixon impeachment. It is for this panel to vote their conscience and decide whether, within that spectrum, if indeed there are sufficient articles of

impeachment.

One final argument I might say, woe be it to this country if we

go through this process, another government shutdown. I have

heard that term used today. But let me tell you, this is important

work that we are doing today. We are doing it not because we

started it, but because it is the President’s own conduct that began

this.

Back in 1974 when you folks were sitting in these seats, your

Democrat chairman of this committee faced similar circumstances

in terms of the troubles that this country had been through at that

point, and probably a sentiment in America that just didn’t want

to do this.

In his opening statement in the Congressional Record, Mr. Rodino eloquently states that, ‘‘We know that the real security of this

Nation lies in the integrity of its institutions and the informed confidence of its people. We will conduct our deliberations in that spirit. It has been stated that our country, troubled by too many crises

in recent years, is too tired to consider this one. In the first year

of the Republic, Thomas Paine wrote, ‘Those who expect to reap the

blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it.’ For almost 200 years Americans have undergone the

stress of preserving their freedom, and the Constitution that protects it. It is now our turn.’’

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Father Drinan, I think, as you described earlier, you were asked

to come today to tell us what happened during Watergate. For

those of us that don’t really remember Watergate, it was chilling

for me to hear Congressman Meehan repeat verbatim President

Nixon’s language, and I think at least for some of us that don’t recall the actual testimony, because we were too young or otherwise,

and then have it compared to the President’s alleged behavior is

very dramatic.

Mr. Owens had an opportunity, I think, to answer a question

earlier. I would like to give you an opportunity. Describe in your

words what was the abuse of power, the abuse of office by President Nixon, and compare that, if you would, in an objective fashion,

which I know you can, to the alleged abuse of power or abuse of

office by President Clinton.

Father DRINAN. Thank you for the question. I think the documentation exists here. This, along with other books, indicates the

extent of the upgrading or downgrading of government. It is just

unbelievable. That is the whole point, that we sat here and listened

to it. It was almost unbelievable.
175

I remember sitting right over there with the microphones, listening to President Nixon telling his Attorney General, ‘‘You are not

going to appeal that ITT case. Understand that? You are not going

to appeal that.’’ And then they lied about that afterwards: ‘‘Well,

we never got any instruction.’’ And there is nothing, compared to—

now, I mean all these things, whatever you call them. This was an

eruption of corruption in the White House for which the Framers

intended impeachment. The Nation recognized that.

Mr. Rodino presided majestically, and the whole Nation was impressed. The other day Mr. Rodino said there are no impeachable

offenses in anything that he has seen about these events.

So we are glad to be here to have an opportunity. But it becomes

more unbelievable every day, the possibility that the Congress, the

House, could go forward and impeach this person. What are they

looking at? Where are the documents? It is just unbelievable.

I want Ms. Holtzman to respond.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Wexler, I mentioned in my testimony, but it

bears repeating, one claim of abuse of power was that the President had to be subpoenaed, did not voluntarily appear before a

grand jury despite being invited several times. He ultimately appeared. What is the abuse of power?

Secondly, the other claim was that he invoked executive privilege

so that the special prosecutor would have to be put to his proof in

court. Once the court ruled, the President turned over the information. Where is the abuse of power here?

When we talk about the Nixon impeachment here and the abuse

of power, when the President uses his office to get the FBI to—the

CIA to stop an FBI investigation, or gets the IRS to audit his political enemies, that is an abuse of power that threatens the people

of the country and the operation of government. We don’t see that

here.

I think that the members of this committee have to—obviously

have to search their conscience, but this process will be judged by

how bipartisan it is and how much the public is willing to put up

with a huge disruption because of the level of presidential misconduct. I don’t think we see that. The public is not prepared to

see that, that level of disruption take place.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Owens.

Mr. OWENS. If you will permit, I am about to say something that

is about to put me on a hotter seat than Father Drinan had. But

when you talk about abuse of powers, I wonder about the powers

of this committee and the leadership of the House which will not

permit Members of the House, as I understand, to vote on censure,

which insists on impeachment or nothing.

This President should be condemned for his actions. He did lie

to a grand jury, in my view, and to say to the Members of the

House, you cannot censure him, you either have to impeach him

up-or-down or let him go. Many Members on the hot place do not

believe he should be impeached, apparently—at least two Republicans have expressed it to me—and yet they have no choice, either

they impeach or they turn him free, I think that is bordering on

an abuse of power.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.
176

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Ms. Holtzman, let me go back to your

testimony here this morning. You stated, ‘‘Nearly a quarter of a

century ago I never imagined in my lifetime we would see another

impeachment. I am saddened to be here today.’’

And I can assure you that we are all very saddened to be here

today, but we are here because of the conduct and the seeming inability to tell the truth of only one person, and that is William Jefferson Clinton.

Let me go back to a statement that you made in the Nixon impeachment era, back in 1974. You stated at that time that ‘‘The

President of this country ought to set a standard of strict, scrupulous obedience to the law.’’ Do you still feel that way? Do you

still feel that the President of the United States should set a standard of strict obedience to the law, that the President should be honest?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Of course I believe the same thing. The question

is, what happens when the President is not? What is the punishment? That is really the question you have to grapple with. Even

if in your conscience you feel impeachment is warranted, if you

don’t have bipartisan support and if the public won’t accept it, are

you going to put this country through a terrible disruption? For

what? Try to find the common ground.

That was what distinguished us in Watergate. We drew up the

articles of impeachment with the Republicans. It wasn’t an effort

of a single party.

Mr. CHABOT. Let me move to Father Drinan now, because our

time is relatively brief, as you know.

Censure, Father, has come up several times here in this committee today. Let me address censure for just a moment here. You had

testified previously in this committee, and you stated back on November 9th when you appeared before us at that time, and I will

quote, ‘‘A vote to censure a President by one or both bodies of Congress would establish a dangerous precedent.’’

I agree with you. I am concerned that censure could lead to using

a censure against a President for political purposes. For example,

I strongly disagree with President Clinton’s veto of the partial birth

abortion ban. Despite my strong opposition to that, however, I don’t

think we should punish him for what was essentially a political act

on his part.

Do you continue to believe that censure by either this committee

or the House is not the appropriate course for us to take?

Father DRINAN. That is up to the Congress itself. But I think

many people would say ‘‘I am not certain about impeachment, and

I will vote for a censure.’’ People do feel strongly about presidential

misconduct, and the President realizes that.

The consequences, however, still worry me, that this will intimidate future Presidents; that they will censure him, shortly before

election, for political reasons and not for reasons that might be impeachable.

Mr. CHABOT. So your feeling is that censure is probably not the

course that we ought to take?
177

Father DRINAN. Well, it is up to people who are wiser than I to

say what is the appropriate.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Father.

Congressman Owens, let me go to you at this point. I am going

to quote from a statement attributed to you back in 1974, again,

in the Nixon impeachment proceedings.

You stated at that time that ‘‘Impeachable conduct need not be

conduct prohibited by criminal statute, although it must be clearly

offensive; that is, known to be wrong by the person who commits

it at the time it was committed. It could be a substantial abuse of

power, blatantly unethical conduct, or a flagrant violation of constitutional duties.’’

Doesn’t the President of the United States have the constitutional duty, when he raises his hand and swears to tell the truth,

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God, to tell

the truth?

Mr. OWENS. Obviously he does, and I regret that he didn’t. My

concern here—I disagree, obviously, with Father Drinan on censure. I disagree with Barbara Jordan as she is quoted to us. I disagree with Congressman Owens as he is quoted to us. I am now

24 years older and at least 10 years more mature.

But I think it is very important that the punishment fit the

crime here. I’m just trying to say to the committee, the offense does

not rise to impeachability. The President was like a deer caught in

the headlights of a car. His marriage all of a sudden was in danger,

his presidency was in danger by his own sexual infidelity.

Mr. CHABOT. He also, as a private citizen—

Mr. OWENS. I understand.

Mr. CHABOT. Excuse me.

Mr. OWENS. I understand how he got caught in that mess, and

I think he ought to be censured for having done the wrong thing.

Mr. CHABOT. He also had a private citizen, Paula Jones——

Mr. OWENS. It does not rise anywhere to the level of

impeachability as compared to Richard Nixon’s offenses, whom we

are here to contrast today for you, the actions of that President.

That is the point I am trying to make.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just about to

make the statement, but Congressman Owens made it for me. But

I will repeat it, because it is the appropriate issue for us: What is

the appropriate punishment for the President’s wrongful conduct?

Now, we all want to uphold the rule of law for ourselves, our

children, and our judicial system. But we have civil courts and

criminal courts, and we have President Clinton already liable to be

sued civilly and criminally for any action that he has taken. So the

rule of law will apply to this President.

As my friend from California said, this is about a civil procedure.

Of course it is. If the President was deemed to have done something wrong in a civil deposition, the civil judge, upon discovering

that, had the right to sanction him, punish him, and thus uphold

the rule of law. So the rule of law already applies to the President.

We were talking about whether the punishment, the nuclear

bomb punishment, the death penalty punishment of impeachment
178

is necessary or appropriate for the President’s wrongful conduct.

This does not get to the question of whether those seeking the

President’s impeachment have presented a scintilla of factual evidence to justify or to meet a burden of clear and convincing evidence. They have not presented a single fact witness. But that is

for another day. Hopefully they will come to their senses and meet

that clear and convincing standard of proof requirement.

But my friend from Indiana, Mr. Buyer, was saying, that when

you raise your hand to tell the truth, that is so important. Of

course it is important. Anyone who violates that can be sued civilly

and criminally. But is the violation of that oath per se treason,

bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, so we need to add

the punishment of impeachment and removal to the punishment

the President can already sustain, civil punishment and criminal

punishment; knowing, of course, that the punishment of impeachment and removal is not just a punishment and will not just have

an effect on President Clinton, but it will have an effect on the entire country and perhaps the world?

So that is the standard. No one has the right to draw to themselves the mantle of the protector of the rule of law, even if you

believe he lied under oath, know that most scholars say, lying

under oath is different than perjury, which is lying with specific intent, and it has a material effect. But even if you believe lying

under oath is wrong and rises to the level of impeachment, ask

yourself if that was what the Founders had in mind by treason,

bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors? And say, is that an

appropriate punishment that fits the offense, the wrongful conduct

of President Clinton? That is what we have to decide. I hope my

colleagues will bear that in mind.

Again, on the issue of whether or not any factual evidence has

been brought before us by those seeking the President’s impeachment, I dare say, not yet. That disturbs me greatly, because I believe that the American notion of fairness and due process puts the

burden of proof on the accuser to prove by clear and convincing evidence someone’s guilt.

It gives the accused the right to demand the accuser meet that

burden before the accused says anything, if at all. It is not up to

the accused to prove his or her innocence. That is the American

way. That is our rule of law in America. I hope we will get to that

sometime before this inquiry is completed.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. I would like to yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from

Ohio, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. In the previous

testimony here, it was assumed that the President lied to protect

his wife and his daughter, et cetera. But I think it is just as likely

that he lied in order to defeat a fellow citizen’s lawsuit against

him, a sexual harassment lawsuit which was a very significant

lawsuit.

I yield back. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. You all are here today in support of the

President, in defense of the President. I understand that. That is
179

certainly very appropriate. You all are not here to present new evidence in terms of rebutting evidence, evidence that might rebut the

specific charges against the President, but rather to present your

opinions or evidence, as you may call them, of your view of impeachment; as Father Drinan said, to contrast the procedures in

Watergate, your view of the standard that was used then, as opposed to the standard that either is or should be used here.

That is fine. That is part of the process here. What I find somewhat disturbing, though, is the effort by many of the defenders of

the President to really mischaracterize, in their zeal to defend the

President and rewrite history, to mischaracterize prior proceedings

and put them in a light that really, on careful examination of the

actual, historical record, really is not quite fair.

For example, we have heard from the President’s defenders how

it is that there is not sufficient time for the President’s lawyers to

engage in whatever it is that they want to engage in, a thorough

and sifting cross-examination, perhaps, or what not.

We constantly hear, particularly from the oh, so eloquent ranking member of this committee, how fair the proceedings were in

Watergate as contrasted to the all unfair proceedings currently.

Yet, in fact, according to many of those involved in your very proceedings back in 1973 and 1974, for example, with Jerry Zeifman,

a lifelong Democrat, the chief counsel from ’73 to ’74 of the committee, there was a tremendous battle in your committee, particularly

among the staff and among the chairmen.

In fact, one Hillary Rodham—of whom we have heard mention

in other proceedings in which we have been engaged as one of the

authors of the impeachment research document that many of us referred to as part of the paper that was put together by the Watergate impeachment staff, that stands for the proposition that the

impeachment is indeed a political process, that it is not necessary

to show violation of criminal laws, and so forth, for impeachment

to lie—according to Mr. Zeifman, Hillary Rodham wrote a memorandum arguing that President Nixon should be denied any representation of counsel. In fact, in many of the proceedings Mr.

James St. Clair, who basically was Mr. Craig’s predecessor, Special

Counsel of the President, was not allowed to participate.

Also we have heard a great deal about the lack of evidence as

opposed to or in addition to the material that Judge Starr sent us,

as if this is somehow also at diametric odds with the great open,

thorough, and sifting search for the truth in the Watergate proceedings.

As a matter of fact, again drawing on not my research but the

research of those involved, such as Mr. Zeifman, it is very clear, as

he documents, that in fact on the morning of May 9, 1974, the beginning of the so-called Watergate hearings by the committee on

which you all served, they consisted of nothing more in open session than the chairman gavelling them to order and then going into

executive session for many days, at which time new evidence was

not received. There was none received. It was simply a rehashing

and a reading of the evidence that had been developed by other

sources, such as the Irving committee. That really formed the basis

for your all’s deliberations.
180

I am not arguing with that. But what I am arguing against and

want to set the record straight is that all these sanctimonious references to how open the proceedings were back in 1973 and 1974,

as contrasted with the proceedings that we are moving through

nowadays, based in large part on the very voluminous work of

Judge Starr, and on which case we have given certainly a great

deal of time to the President’s lawyers, not what they would like

but a great deal of time, is somehow much less worthy of the work

of this committee and the Congress. In reality, the procedures were

very, very much the same.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. OWENS. I just wondered if an old has-been can rise to a point

of personal privilege. Mr. Canady quoted me out of context, and I

have now got the correction, and I think it would be a one-minute

reading if I might be permitted to correct the testimony he gave.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I will be happy to indulge the witness.

Mr. OWENS. I am now in agreement with myself.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, then you ought to set the record

straight.

Mr. OWENS. Does the gentleman permit it, the Chair?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Yes.

Mr. OWENS. Thank you very much. Page 549 of the hearings, I

don’t know the date, the gentleman’s former boss, my good friend

Caldwell Butler yielded me 2 minutes.

‘‘I believe Mr. Nixon did knowingly underpay his taxes,’’ I said,

in the four years in question, ‘‘by taking unauthorized deductions,

and he knowingly ordered or caused to be ordered improvements

on his properties in Florida and California at government expense.

These are offenses against the people, and I think the government

should pursue its remedies. But you don’t impeach for every offense, nor, on the other hand, do you excuse any offense by saying

others did it. But whether to impeach or not is a question of judgment, permitted to each of the members; is it sufficient, is it that

serious, and, on the evidence available, these offenses do not rise

in my opinion to the level of impeachability. It is not sufficient to

the standards. I promised the people of Utah when I sat down to

impeachment that I would impeach only if there were hard evidence and which was sufficient to support conviction in the Senate,

and I found it in four instances, and I do not find it this 6th, to

which I feel I must apply the same remedy.’’

I thank the Chair.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you.

Mr. CANADY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to respond

to the gentleman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Chair will state that you can ask

somebody else who is recognized for time, but if we start this kind

of a debate, we are going to be here until 4 in the morning rather

than midnight.

My colleague from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett, is recognized.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Owens, I was the person who handed that to

you.

Mr. OWENS. Thank you very much.

Mr. BARRETT. The reason I did was earlier today I joined in with

Mr. Pease because I felt it was wrong for committee members to
181

castigate members and to question their motives. I think that the

standard applies to us as well, and I think it is wrong for us to

take words out of context and apply them to the witnesses, and

that is exactly what was done to you. And I felt that once you did

read your entire statement from 24 years ago, that you would agree

with yourself, and I am glad that you——

Mr. OWENS. I thank the gentleman. That is a very nice courtesy

to an old has-been. Thank you very much.

Mr. BARRETT. When this proceeding started three months ago or

four months ago, the Chairman indicated that he felt by the end

that it would be bipartisan. I think he couldn’t conceive that we

would vote out articles of impeachment, I don’t know if he was referring to the House or to the committee, on a strictly partisan

basis. All indications, of course, are that five days from now, or two

days from now, we will do exactly that, and I have had many constituents who have come to me and said there is something wrong

here. Aren’t there any Republicans that agree with the Democrats,

aren’t there any Democrats that agree with the Republicans? And

they are right, there is something wrong here, because we have

been hearing that this would be a vote of conscience, and it defies

logic, even for the most partisans, to think that there is not one

person on either side of the aisle that is buying the arguments.

I think that part of the problem is that we haven’t tried in any

way to work on a bipartisan basis in open committee. Some of us

have tried behind the scenes to see if we could move this along. I

am of the firm belief, as I have said many, many times, that the

President was wrong in his actions, that he should be held accountable. But I also think it has to be done in a bipartisan way, and

we are not anywhere close to doing that.

So I am looking to you three for guidance. Since the committee

did work in a bipartisan way, give us some tips as to how we can

bring this to closure, because, again, as I have stated, for the sake

of the American people, we have to get this resolved and we have

to get it resolved in a manner that at least a majority of the American people feel is fair. I will ask you, Ms. Holtzman, if there is any

advice you have. I realize you are all Democrats and I should be

asking the same of some Republicans, but I think this committee

needs some counseling and I am asking you to provide that.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I don’t have a therapist’s hat to put on, and I

don’t want to presume to give you that counsel, but I must say I

am troubled by what I hear, for example, with regard to the issue

of evidence. On this side I have heard some Republican members

say, well, if they want to hear it, let them call the witnesses. It

didn’t work that way during Watergate. We had a Republican—we

had two Republican counsels, actually, and they worked together,

the committee worked together in calling the witnesses, in trying

to reach that common ground. And if people don’t search for the

common ground, they are not going to find it. But the American

people will never accept the verdict of impeachment unless it reflects the common ground.

I think you just have to keep trying, and I would hope the Chair

would lead that effort. Mr. Rodino was the one who made sure that

the articles were not drafted before we had bipartisan input. Not

what happened here, where you had the Republican counsel listing
182

15 charges, which reflected perhaps the view of the majority, but

not the views of the minority, maybe there is some way that people

can say, let’s stop and see where there is a common ground for the

good of the country and the reputation of this committee and the

Congress.

Mr. BARRETT. Father Drinan?

Father DRINAN. I agree with you something is wrong. What is

the wrong? We were called here today to say that this group has

not followed what we did in 1974, and I don’t know whether we are

going to change any minds. A friend asked me this morning do you

think that anybody will change their mind? And I said I always

think that people can be rational and reasonable, and we can hope

for that. But something is wrong in your terms, when and if this

vote comes out 21 to 16.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Barrett, it seems to me that bipartisanship

would return if the House leadership and committee leadership

would permit members an alternative vote on censure. I say to the

committee, why can’t you have a range of punishments here? I

think bipartisanship would return if the House leaders would

allow, if this committee would allow, a vote on censure as well as

a vote on impeachment. Members deserve a full range of bipartisan

responses to deal with the President’s transgressions.

Mr. BARRETT. I would agree with you, and I know on this committee it is not going to happen. But I think on the full floor it

would be a great injustice to this Nation if we don’t have a vote

on censure, because we have been told time and time again this is

a vote of conscience. To deny that vote on the full House floor

would be denying members the opportunity to vote their conscience.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say thank you

to those of you on this panel. It may become difficult to recruit

members for this committee in the future when they find that you

may have to come back and testify on such matters at some distant

time down the road.

Let me say thanks to all of you, and especially, Mr. Owens, to

you. You have demonstrated a great deal of understanding for this

committee. I think you understand, and I am sure the others do,

too, but you have expressed it more clearly, that none of us relish

this responsibility that we have had thrust upon us. It is a little

bit like when I was in the Army, I went and reported to basic

training through the ROTC program. I had dreams of becoming an

officer and a gentleman, and I remember one morning at 4 o’clock,

we were still pulling KP in the Army then, and they got me up and

the first job they assigned to me was cleaning out the grease trap.

And it left an indelible impression on my mind as it was not the

most pleasant task that I had ever been assigned to.

But I wanted to ask you, and I think you covered part of this in

your statement, but would you agree that giving false testimony

under oath to a material matter in either a civil lawsuit or a criminal matter or before a grand jury constitutes perjury? Would you

agree that constitutes perjury?
183

Mr. OWENS. As I understand the definition, it seems to fit the

classic mode.

Mr. JENKINS. All right. And I believe you agreed that perjury at

least can be an impeachable offense.

Mr. OWENS. That is correct, but could I ask you a question in return? Why the House leadership won’t let a full range of punishments come before the House? Because if there is perjury, it ought

to be punished.

Mr. JENKINS. You are talking about punishments. All right, let’s

talk about punishments a minute. The Constitution says, as I read

it, that in the event that anybody is accused and in the event they

are convicted, then the remedy is removal from office plus one additional remedy, perhaps being foreclosed from holding public office

in the future.

Is that not in your mind an impediment to a remedy of censure

either in the House of Representatives or even in the Senate?

Mr. OWENS. Not in the least, Mr. Congressman. There is precedent. Andrew Jackson was censured. You can introduce any resolution you want. You can do anything that you can get by the Parliamentarian here. There is no question in my mind that it is totally

constitutional, and here it is very practical. It would solve a very

real problem.

Mr. JENKINS. So that doesn’t give you any problem that that

remedy is not provided for in the Constitution?

Mr. OWENS. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. All right. Well, let me ask Father Drinan a question. Father Drinan, it appears to bother you, and I don’t know how

this vote is going to turn out. You may be absolutely right, it may

be strictly along party lines. But you seem to be disturbed that the

prospect exists that there could be 21 Republicans who would ultimately vote for an article of impeachment.

Are you not just as concerned that there might be 16 members

of the other political party who would vote no on an article of impeachment? Does that not concern you too? Does it not work both

ways?

Father DRINAN. Sir, I inherit the great tradition of 1974 when

first this thing was in the country. We wouldn’t do that. There was

something wrong with our judgment if some Republicans can’t

agree with us. That was the beginning, from day one, that we can’t

trust our own judgment unless we have some Republican support.

And we got seven people in the end.

Mr. JENKINS. Are you working on getting anybody on the other

side of the aisle to change their mind, Father Drinan?

Father DRINAN. I think it would bother me all the time if there

it is strictly partisan. There is something wrong with the logic if

it doesn’t appear to the other side.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. May I respond just briefly? We wrote the articles

of impeachment with Republicans. They weren’t crafted by one side

that said here, take it or leave it. It was a joint effort, a joint writing.

Mr. JENKINS. I am about to run out of time, but if I have time,

Ms. Holtzman, you said that a trial would disrupt the workings of

the Supreme Court, is that correct?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I believe so.
184

Mr. JENKINS. Was that true in 1974?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. We didn’t get to that point.

Mr. JENKINS. Would it have been true if you had gotten to that

point?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I listened to the

testimony today, it is like we yearn for the days of Camelot. I know

those were tough times, but it sounds like we describe them in

terms of great bipartisanship and everything was just smooth in

the committee. Last night I had an opportunity to read back

through many of the statements that were made during the Watergate proceedings, and I enjoyed the statement of James R. Mann,

a representative at the time, who said something like you know

some of the things that cause me to wonder are the phrases that

keep coming back to me, oh, it is just politics, or, let him who is

without sin cast the first stone.

So, I look back and I think you all heard some of the same things

that we hear today, and I am impressed, no question about it, with

your ability to achieve in the end not total bipartisanship, but some

consensus where some Republicans, the minority, looked at the

facts and concluded that there were impeachable offenses committed.

Now, I don’t know who is right or wrong, but I do respect the

other side that they are looking at this as a matter of conscience.

I think we are all looking at this as a matter of conscience. It happens to divide us though. And I look at this panel right here, you

know, there is disagreement right here, and you three reflect it.

Father Drinan has tried to soften his comments based upon Mr.

Owens’ comments, but Mr. Drinan, you were very clear the last

time you testified that censure was totally unacceptable, and I

think you have tried to soften that today out of respect for your colleague. In fact you said at that time, there is no procedure for congressional censure and that the introduction of such a procedure

could weaken the independence of the presidency and be a danger

to the integrity of the separation of powers.

Is that an accurate quote, Father Drinan?

Father DRINAN. And I say it again.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. So the point is, there is disagreement even on

this panel. I look at the testimony of Mr. Owens, and I wrote this

down when you said it, but you said the President did lie to the

grand jury, and then you conclude there should be a different outcome. And you said that his presidency was in danger, and that is

one of the reasons that motivated him to lie, as well as protecting

his family.

If you conclude that the President did lie to the grand jury, and

that his motivation, whatever his motivation, was to protect his

presidency, well, that rings like 1974. President Nixon was concerned about his presidency.

Mr. OWENS. Now, wait, Mr. Congressman, that is not what I

said, with all respect.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Tell me where I am wrong.

Mr. OWENS. I said that I think he did lie, and I think his

response——
185

Mr. HUTCHINSON. You said lied to the grand jury, is that correct?

Mr. OWENS. Pardon me?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I wrote it down that you said the President

lied to the grand jury.

Mr. OWENS. Initially he lied, I think, in his testimony in the civil

deposition, and then reiterated by implication that testimony in

that grand jury. I think I meant to say the civil testimony, but I

think by implication that it is also true with regard to his grand

jury testimony.

But the point here is that the President was not defending—was

not covering up a gross abuse of the presidential office, he was covering up a stupid infidelity, a sexual transgression. And I think

very clearly he was concerned, I think, mostly about his wife and

about his family, and then also by the great embarrassment, ultimately the presidency.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I don’t think I misquoted you then. What you

just said is not any different than what I said you said.

Mr. OWENS. If I said what you said I said, then I didn’t mean

to say what you said I said, and I apologize.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The point is, I think there is a difference

among the panel, and I think there are some respectful differences

in this body. I respect my colleagues, even though they might have

a different view of this. I think it is an extraordinarily serious matter.

I come as a former prosecutor. Perjury is just an extraordinarily

serious thing to me, and I am weighing that. And so I just hope

that America can see that we are trying to do this carefully and

thoughtfully.

One other point, finally. Some of you have referenced the ‘‘beyond

a reasonable doubt’’ standard that arguably was applied, and I

have heard that mentioned twice. In reading your statements in

1974 as well as the committee report, I believe that each of you applied the standard of clear and convincing evidence ‘‘and not beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ Am I correct in that?

Father DRINAN. That is my recollection, yes.

Mr. OWENS. The testimony that I just read into the record in response to Mr. Canady’s earlier quote says that I promise that I

would impeach only if there were hard evidence and which was sufficient to support conviction in the Senate. That is my 1974 testimony. I wouldn’t say that at another time I didn’t talk about clear

and convincing, but the test I had set for myself was ultimately

what would sustain conviction in the Senate. But I am sure——

Mr. HUTCHINSON. It is in the record and in the additional views.

It was clear and convincing.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease. The gentleman from Indiana,

can you yield to me for one quick question?

Mr. PEASE. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I would like to ask the panel, having heard

about the necessity for bipartisanship, if during the 1974 Watergate hearings all of the Republicans who were then serving on the

Judiciary Committee got taken in by the Nixon White House stonewall and refused to vote for any of the articles of impeachment,

would the Democrats on the committee have gone ahead and re186

ported them out of committee and referred them to the House for

debate and vote?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. But that is not what happened, Mr. Chairman.

What happened is——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The question, Ms. Holtzman, was you said

that it was necessary to report out articles on a bipartisan basis.

My question is if bipartisanship could not have been achieved in

1974, would you have proceeded to report the articles out of committee and sought a floor vote on those articles? It is a simple question that can be answered yes or no.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Well, I don’t know that anybody can rewrite history. The fact is that the committee worked together to achieve a

bipartisan result. We crafted articles of impeachment because—together—because we understood that the country would never accept a partisan impeachment and we wanted to make sure, because

in answer to Mr. Hutchinson——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I guess I am not going to get an answer

to that question. I will give the time back to Mr. Pease. Mr. Pease

is recognized. He can proceed as he wants.

Mr. PEASE. I did want to follow up on my colleague Mr.

Hutchinson’s line of inquiry regarding the proper standard, and

whatever folks may have said 25 years ago or today is not as important to me as the current discussion of what you think ought

to be the standard. Whatever the differences may be on what constitutes an impeachable offense, what do you think ought to be the

standard, number one, and we have heard beyond a reasonable

doubt and clear and convincing; and secondly, what do you think

ought to be the process by which we make the decision about

whether to go forward? Whether that ought to be simply that we

believe there is probable cause, or whether it ought to be that we

believe that there will be a conviction in the Senate, or whether it

is something in between, such as whether there is sufficient evidence for a conviction, not necessarily a certainty that there will

be?

I know that is two major questions for a short period of time, but

if you could address both of those, I would appreciate it. We will

just start with Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I tried to address it in my testimony, that very

point. Personally when I voted for impeachment, I believed that we

did have evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and that that was the

standard that in our hearts we used. If we had to articulate it,

maybe we wouldn’t, and maybe that standard doesn’t have to

apply. But it has to be a very, very high standard, because of the

disruption of the country that you should be able to do.

With regard to how you assure yourselves, I would say definitely

not as a grand jury. We are not dealing with probable cause. We

believed when we voted for the impeachment of Richard Nixon, we

believed not only that he should be removed, but that he would be

removed and that he had to be removed.

Mr. PEASE. Do you believe that that ought to be the standard?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Yes, because I don’t think you start this process

lightly. I think you have to have in your head that the conduct

warrants removal and that the likelihood of removing him be there.
187

Father DRINAN. Sir, the evidence was so overwhelming that we

didn’t have to get to the refined question of clear or present or beyond every reasonable doubt. It was just so absolutely baffling.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Pease, I don’t think the grand jury analogy is

perfect here, and thus clear and convincing is not necessarily definitive and not the best answer.

I thought that and feel today where the country is so polarized

on this issue, and it was not in 1974, I think today that unless you

have, not only clear and convincing evidence, but evidence beyond

a reasonable doubt to justify your indictment of the President, that

you ought not to indict, that you ought to have another alternative

punishment in mind.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you all. I know there is not much time left,

but I yield what I have to Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. I do want to respond to the point that was made,

which is totally erroneous. I did not misrepresent the gentleman’s

testimony, and I think if you look at the testimony, you will understand that the gentleman from start to finish focused on the inadequacy of the evidence that was before the committee, what you referred to as hard evidence. And that is inconsistent with what you

have represented to the committee here today, that the committee

at that point was deciding to drop the matter because they decided

that it was not an impeachable offense.

You end up saying to the committee I urge my colleagues based

on that lack of evidence to reject this article.

Your whole focus was on a lack of evidence, and not on the claim

that you have made today that tax fraud, even if proven, would not

be an impeachable offense.

Mr. OWENS. Well, the gentleman has not given me the courtesy

of giving me a copy of my remarks, and I don’t have them in mind.

Mr. CANADY. You have them before you. You read from it.

Mr. OWENS. I have this page, and I just quoted it to the gentleman.

Mr. CANADY. You know the paragraph that comes right after it.

It is right there. I ask unanimous consent to place these full remarks in the record of the hearing.

[The information follows:]
188
189

Chairman HYDE [presiding]. Without objection, so ordered. The

gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by associating

myself with the remarks of Mr. Goodlatte, when he said President

Clinton’s purpose appears not to have been to avoid personal embarrassment, but to obstruct justice in the Jones case and to suggest it to the American people that we are all looking for evidence

from the President to the contrary on that point. I would also like

to associate myself with your comments, Mr. Chairman, about

where you asked the question how inconvenient is the erosion of

the rule of law comparing that to the inconvenience of an impeachment of the President.

Now, we have some parallels today between myself and one of

my witnesses, that is Mr. Owens from Utah. He was a freshman

in the Nixon impeachment 24 years ago, as am I. We are both lawyers, we both have deep interests in Utah, and national public

lands issues. I might say that we also have some very deep differences that divide us, but I don’t think that that goes beyond our

friendship.

Frankly, Mr. Owens, I was intrigued by the comments that you

have made without much opportunity to really flesh them out

about censure. I take it you believe that censure is an option we

ought to have. Frankly, I think that is something that many of us

on the committee would like to see at least debated. Personally I

am not yet of a view that censure is appropriate, for which I would

like to hear your comments.

You have talked about the seriousness of what the President did.

Would you mind, first of all, commenting about the seriousness of

what the President has done and why censure is appropriate in

that context? And then if you would deal with issues like whether

a penalty like a monetary penalty or an appearance in the well of

the House would be appropriate?

Mr. OWENS. Well, I appreciate my friend from Utah’s giving me

this opportunity. I have argued for a long time, before Gerald Ford

made it in a more persuasive way, that censure is the alternative

here which should be considered.

To lie, to mislead, under oath, and in my mind to look into the

eyes of the American people and say in a straight, very straightforward way what is not just misleading, was a lie, that he ‘‘did

not have sex with this woman, Ms. Lewinsky,’’ I think deserves

some punishment. But it does not rise to the level of

impeachability, as I said several times, and that there ought to be

an alternative way of expressing the displeasure and the disapproval of the Congress, and state such before the American people. The American people, according to polls, would support censure.

Mr. CANNON. How do you make censure substantial? Personally

I don’t think it means much. Would you add a penalty?

Mr. OWENS. I am not involved in any of the negotiations, but, of

course, the press is saying the President would pay up to $300,000.

I don’t know, it sounds a little like another deal in this body

recently——

Mr. CANNON. I think that deal would result in $4.5——

Mr. OWENS. I am sorry?
190

Mr. CANNON. I think that deal, if you modeled it on that deal,

it would be about a $4.5 million penalty.

Mr. OWENS. Well, whatever. The President would have to agree

to it, because you couldn’t assess it. You have no authority, constitutional authority, to do anything in any material way to the

President’s powers short of impeachment.

Mr. CANNON. If the President agreed to it, what does that do to

separation of powers?

Mr. OWENS. The pain would be that he would be the second

President in the history of the country to have been censured and

condemned by this body. I think President Clinton would do whatever you require. He would pay, if he does pay a fine, he would

come to the well of the Senate, or the House, and express his apologies and accept responsibility. That would be a very degrading experience, but it would get us beyond this crisis. It would be a powerful punishment, and in my view, as an old 25-year observer of

these issues, I think would be an adequate punishment, a proper

punishment.

Mr. CANNON. I wish I had more time, because I would like to

pursue it, and maybe we can privately, but it seems to me the issue

here is not punishment of the President; it is political hygiene, it

is solving a problem, it is solving an example of the destruction of

the rule of law, of the sanctity of perjury.

I don’t care whether the penalty is large or small. It doesn’t seem

to me that is the issues as much as the constitutionality of a penalty. I think that the submission of a President to either a penalty

or to standing in the well of the House and demeaning the office

of the presidency is a far graver constitutional problem than the inconvenience of an impeachment hearing, and thus I find myself

compelled to think that there is only two alternatives, impeachment or vindication.

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rogan.

Mr. ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I not only welcome our former colleagues to the Judiciary Committee, but if I may be so bold, I welcome you home. I was a 15-

year-old rabid liberal Democrat during the Nixon impeachment debate. Having been transfixed to the television in those days, you

were all heroes of mine. Although I am now more selective in my

party affiliation, I still deeply respect your service to our country

and to the Congress.

Mr. OWENS. I hope it wasn’t our impeachment of the President

which made a Republican of you, sir.

Mr. ROGAN. No, I just gave up drinking hard liquor! [Laughter.]

A couple of things: First, with respect to the concept of censure,

it is a fact that Andrew Jackson was censured by the Senate of one

Congress, and then the censure was expunged by a later Senate

when its majority makeup were of Jackson’s own party. Further,

my recollection in the law is that an ‘‘expungement’’ means that

the act never occurred for legal purposes. In fact, when criminal

records are expunged, defendants can apply for a job and put down

that they have never been convicted, and that legally is a truthful

statement. So one of the problems with censure is that it can be

removed and be expunged from the record.
191

But I don’t want to spend my time belaboring that point.

There are a couple——

Mr. OWENS. Might I just comment on that, Congressman?

Mr. ROGAN. If I have time remaining, Congressman Owens, I

would be more than happy to invite comment. But, as you know,

the red light does come on rather quickly, and I do want to make

a couple of observations.

I am very proud of the fact that during the Watergate era a number of Republicans who served on this committee were prepared to

put their party affiliation aside, to look at the merits of the case,

and cast what had to be one of the toughest votes of their entire

career.

I remember as a freshman member of the California State Assembly voting against the budget of my Governor and how tough

that was. I can’t imagine what it had to be like for members of the

Republican Party on this committee to vote to impeach the President of their party—probably a President who had appeared in

their districts, had raised money for them, had supported them and

had campaigned for them.

Today there is the suggestion that if committee Democrats do not

vote for any articles of impeachment, and all the Republicans on

this committee do vote for articles of impeachment, that somehow

delegitimizes the vote of this committee. I certainly hope that is not

the expression that any of you are trying to make.

I will cast my vote ultimately as a matter of conscience. I would

never suggest that any of my colleagues on the other side would

do anything other than the same.

I know all of my colleagues on this committee, and I deeply respect them. On matters of grave national urgency not relating to

impeachment, such as economic principles, foreign affairs, national

security and the like, there are times when there are party line

votes. It doesn’t necessarily mean that partisanship is ruling the

day. It means that people with honest differences of opinion have

done their very best to make a decision as they see fit. And I am

sure that has been the repeated legislative experiences of our three

former colleagues who join us today.

I am also concerned about what I perceive to be a double standard, not necessarily promulgated by this panel, but certainly suggested throughout the day by some. We are constantly being reminded that there are polls that have been taken suggesting that

the American people do not want the President to be impeached

and, therefore, Congress should abrogate their constitutional obligations and simply follow the polls.

I reject that notion. The polls are interesting. They are something we politicians take into account. But if polls alone are to govern our judgment, we then should just simply shut down the legislative, executive and judicial branches and turn governing over to

Dr. Gallop’s organization.

If somebody wishes to press the issue, then I respectfully suggest

they consider the other side of it. The latest poll I have seen says

that if the President lied to a grand jury, he should leave office—

by a 57 percent margin. Further, the polls showed that if the President encouraged others to lie, he should resign. The agreement on

that principle was 60 percent.
192

Now, we don’t see supporters of the President who argue we

should follow the polls in committee down to the White House and

saying, ‘‘Mr. President, the polls explicitly say over and over that

you should resign from office if you have lied.’’ One can’t have it

both ways. In fact, according to my notes, even Congressman

Owens said today he believed the President lied before the Federal

grand jury.

Those are a couple of observations I wanted to make with respect

to the testimony that has been elicited today.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My apologies to Congressman Owens. I was trying to squeeze a

few seconds out for you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.

Graham.

Would Mr. Graham yield to me for just a second?

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely.

Chairman HYDE. Put your mike on.

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rogan was talking about the efficacy of

polls in our political careers, and I would like to ask Father Drinan

a question, if you would, on polls. Someone said that if Jesus had

taken a poll, he would never have preached the gospel. Do you

agree?

Father DRINAN. That is beyond my realm.

Chairman HYDE. Okay. I hope not. Mr. Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you.

Being a Baptist, that gets me going here.

Let me make a couple of observations, and I really do appreciate

your coming. I have talked to at least one of you privately. And this

is very difficult. It is not like Watergate. It is not exactly what you

were dealing with. In many ways what you were dealing with was

probably more serious or at least you could put your hands around

it and say it is more serious.

You have really got to dig in this case I think to feel uncomfortable, and the more I dig, the more uncomfortable I feel, because it

is easy to write it off as somebody, like the deer in the headlights.

That is a good analogy. That is what I thought at first. I thought

the President got stunned, he is trying to protect himself and, you

know, he just started telling a lie and couldn’t get his way out of

that.

I am not so sure I believe that anymore, but I do believe this:

If we impeach a President based on a consensual sexual affair, no

matter how inappropriate, we are going to screw this country up,

pardon the terms. I don’t mean to be crude about it, but we are

going to really mess this country up. And that has always been off

the table for me, because I don’t want to go down that road. Because we have elections, and impeachment should be reserved for

very serious offenses like you were dealing with.

Now, I would say this to you, that if every Republican had voted

no during your time, history would acquit you well. You were right

to have voted to remove President Nixon.
193

Let me tell you what I am becoming more and more concerned

about. This is more like Peyton Place than it is Watergate, but

there is a component to this case that is very unnerving.

Richard Nixon cheated the electoral process. I think Richard

Nixon didn’t trust the American people to get it right in an election, and he had operatives going and breaking into the other side’s

office, and when he knew about it he cheated to cover it up. Richard Nixon cheated the American electorial process.

I am beginning to believe more and more that this is not about

being caught in the headlights, of a person caught in a lie about

a consensual matter, but that the President was very much, in an

organized fashion, trying to cheat the legal system and cheat the

party in opposition to him.

I believe, whether you believe it or not, that when he went to his

secretary and planted a story in her mind along the lines, Monica

came on to me and I never touched her, right? She wanted to have

sex with me, and I couldn’t do that—he said that the day after his

deposition, that he had a sinister motive, not an innocent motive.

I believe that he went to Ms. Currie in an unlawful manner to

change her testimony, and I will tell you later what I think was

going to happen to Monica Lewinsky.

I believe that when his lawyer had to write a letter to the court

saying I apologize for putting a false affidavit in evidence, that his

lawyer was duped by the President. I believe that, like Richard

Nixon, Bill Clinton was very involved in unlawful activity, to cheat

the legal system.

I am willing, with some admissions on his part and reconciliation

on his part to the law, to consider another disposition, because this

is not totally like Watergate. However, if he does not reconcile himself with the law, if he continues to dance on the head of a pin,

if he continues to bring people in here who won’t say anything

about the facts but tell me how to vote, I don’t think he has the

character to be our President, and I will vote to impeach him based

on what he did, not based on any other sinister motive.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Bono.

Mrs. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Way a long time ago, Mr. Owens, you made a comment that hit

me pretty hard. You mentioned that it is our fault that 7-year-olds

in this country have heard about sex, and I disagree with that

statement wholeheartedly.

I think that we have to remember that the President is a role

model. It is solely his actions that have caused this, not ours. I

think if we start with that, at least putting some responsibility

where it belongs, it is a pretty good start, at least as a parent. I

would like to just point that out. I don’t know if you truly meant

that it is our fault.

Mr. OWENS. I don’t think I said it in that fashion. I said it is this

committee’s responsibility or fault that they passed the raw grand

jury evidence directly, unexpurgated, gave to America, to the 7 and

8 year olds, the knowledge, or raised the question of, what oral sex

is, what telephone sex is and what you can do with a cigar sexually.
194

I was interviewed yesterday in Salt Lake City as I left by a reporter who said, I don’t appreciate my little children asking me

those questions.

Mrs. BONO. Mr. Owens, I get that question more than anybody.

I really have to say I get that quite often, and I have to tell you

that is not quite what you said, and it is nobody’s fault. It is not

our fault. The responsibility must lie with the President with this

one. You know, the buck has to stop there on that one.

I want to make a point generally in response to what the witnesses have said today. You have said that in 1974 you voted according to your consciences and have no regrets. Please know that

now, in 1998, we are proceeding according to our consciences based

on the facts and the law. None of our guests have done what my

colleagues and I have done. That is gone to the Ford Building and

reviewed the thousands of pages of documents and watched the

videotape deposition. Those are the facts that are relevant to this

inquiry. I am sure if you had taken the time to review this compelling evidence that you would also support the impeachment with

no regrets.

But my question is to you, Ms. Holtzman, somebody I respect

and I admire for having been in this seat years ago. If in 1974 you

would have had no Republican support whatsoever, would you still

have reported out those articles of impeachment?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Well, I know you go back to that because you

find yourself in a very awkward position, where you don’t have the

support and there is no bipartisan support. So I want to urge what

my colleague Wayne Owens said, which is to find an alternative

that can bring Republicans and Democrats together.

Because even if you are voting in your conscience, in the end,

how does the public judge the legitimacy of these proceedings? If

it is bipartisan, if there is a common ground found, that is something the people can take away and say the Congress acted properly. If it doesn’t find the common ground, then the people are befuddled and confused and bewildered. That is what I am saying.

This is such a serious effort, and I don’t mean to minimize the

search of your conscience or the difficulty of this job. I was there.

It is not easy. What I am saying to you is how important it is to

come away with public respect for and public confidence in what

you are doing. Maybe the common ground that is not your first

choice, but maybe, if we are going to live with this verdict for history, it is the best choice.

Mrs. BONO. I am curious, what evidence do you base this on?

And have you seen the videotape deposition or read the transcript

in its entirety? What are you comfortably basing your opinion on

today?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Well, you don’t have bipartisan support right

now. I am trying to say to you, in terms of ultimately how this go

down in history and how the public will accept it and how they will

deal with——

Mrs. BONO. My question is a simple one.

Ms. HOLTZMAN [continuing]. They won’t. It will be difficult.

Mrs. BONO. Can you answer my question?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I am sorry. I must have misunderstood your

question.
195

Mrs. BONO. You must be a lawyer, because you are good at this.

My question is very simple. It is a very simple one, but, actually,

Lindsey Graham has asked for me to give him my time, and I will

be happy to do that.

Mr. GRAHAM. I don’t mean to interrupt. Just do you believe the

President committed grand jury perjury, Ms. Holtzman?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Well, he came very close to a line. I don’t know

whether he danced over it——

Mr. GRAHAM. But—very close, but no cigar. Let me tell you—and,

every time, that shows you the problem, where this case—there is

a thousand million jokes out there. This is serious. There is a thousand million jokes, and you can’t go to Rotary Club—and it is not

because of our fault. It is because of Bill Clinton’s fault. And if he

doesn’t reconcile himself with the law—he committed grand perjury. And when you come to believe that like we do, if it is 21–16,

so be it.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. But if you do it, you need to do it with evidence.

You need to do it with the facts. You need to do it with witnesses.

You have to assure the public that this process has been one that

is honorable.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman and the gentlewoman’s time has

expired. And Mr. Conyers, who reserved his time earlier today, is

now recognized.

Mr. CONYERS. I want to congratulate my former colleagues for a

long afternoon and evening’s work here. You have helped me keep

hope alive that we might somehow be able to persuade a few Members of Congress, maybe even on this committee, some of whom

have spoken today, about evidence against the President.

But, you know, generalities are not enough to impeach. Instead,

there must be concrete evidence that is clear and convincing and

arises to the level of an impeachable offense. And when we look at

the evidence, examine it carefully, what do we see? An allegation

of perjury in the Paula Jones deposition.

Well, what we see beyond the fact that the President’s testimony

was not material is that he was confronted at the deposition with

a tortured definition of sexual relations that he hadn’t seen before

and which was inconsistent with the Webster definition. To make

matters worse, the presiding judge changed the definition as the

President sat there.

The simple fact supported in the record is that the definition was

ambiguous, and it is the Jones lawyers, not the President, who

bear the responsibility for that ambiguity. They could have just

asked the President who touched who where, but they chose not to.

The President can’t be blamed for that. That cannot, therefore, be

the foundation for an article of impeachment.

Now, my friends across the aisle say that the President lied in

the grand jury, but they neglect to mention that he admitted to an

improper sexual relationship there. So then we have these three alleged, attenuated theories of perjury: that the President somehow

understood the term ‘‘sexual relations’’ to be something more than

the limited and contorted definition provided by the Paula Jones

lawyers; two, that he lied about a difference of a mere 3 months

regarding the inception of the relationship; or, three, that he actually touched Ms. Lewinsky in certain places.
196

Ladies and gentlemen, are we serious? Do we really intend for

the second time in our history to impeach a President over a case

that holds out these weak, puny perjury charges as its foundation?

Do we wonder why this committee’s ratings are not going up? We

are in trouble here inside of this room.

Some of my Republican friends have realized the flimsy nature

of these allegations and are trying—well, they are grasping at an

even perhaps less persuasive case on obstruction.

Think about where that goes. They say that Lewinsky’s return

of the gifts somehow amounts to obstruction, but then again neglect to mention that the testimony clearly establishes that Ms.

Lewinsky and not the President sought the return of the gifts.

Remember also that Monica Lewinsky said no one told her to lie,

no one promised her a job. The job search started long before the

Jones case, and Betty Currie wasn’t even on a witness list when

the President refreshed his recollection with her. So that conversation could not possibly lead into witness tampering.

Now we hear novel charges that the President lied about his conversations with Vernon Jordan. But when you examine the record

closely, the record is clear that the President answered poorly

worded questions regarding his conversation with Jordan to the

best of his current knowledge. There is no evidence that he gave

false answers.

So I close, the charges against the President, when stripped

away of partisan rhetoric and factual gaps, are, in reality, a paper

tiger. Do we on the Democratic side contest the charges? We sure

do, and we assert that this committee has done no independent factual inquiry, no evidentiary witnesses as it is incumbent upon

them to do to justify any case of impeachment.

I am delighted to, if the Chairman will allow any of you that

would like to make a comment about my assertions as the final

questioner, perhaps you might want to try that. Father Drinan?

Father DRINAN. You want additional comments?

Mr. CONYERS. Well, no, if you had something that you added to

my comments. But I didn’t want to prolong my time. It has expired.

Father DRINAN. I think we all have to pray for each other so we

can come to the right decision.

Chairman HYDE. That is a very——

Mr. CONYERS. That is appropriate.

Chairman HYDE. That is a very appropriate note to end this session on.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Who is seeking——

Mr. OWENS. In front of you, sir. I just want to commend you for

your conduct of these hearings. I think you bring great integrity to

them.

Your old friend from Utah strongly believes that if you are to

heal the country and bring us together you have to give an alternative for a censure resolution, and I urge in the strongest way

that you afford that opportunity to your colleagues in the House.

I thank the gentleman for his courtesy.

Chairman HYDE. I certainly hear what you are saying and take

note of it.
197

Ms. HOLTZMAN. I would like to echo his comments, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Fine. I just want to thank you all, three wonderful troopers, former members of this great committee, and we

were instructed and illuminated by your being here today.

Mr. OWENS. Any time you want us to come here and tell you how

to do your job, Mr. Chairman, you just give us a call.

Chairman HYDE. You may have to wait in line, but that is fine.

Thank you so much.

Now we are ready for the next panel.

Our third panel is composed of James Hamilton and Richard

Ben-Veniste. Would the witnesses please rise to take the oath?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Let the record reflect the witnesses answered the question in the

affirmative.

James Hamilton is a member of the Washington, D.C., law firm

of Swidler, Berlin, Shereff & Friedman. He served as Assistant

Chief Counsel in the Senate Watergate Committee and is the author of The Power to Probe, a Study of Congressional Investigations. He is former Chairman of the Legal Ethics Committee of the

District of Columbia Bar.

Richard Ben-Veniste served as an Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of the Special Prosecution Section in the Office of the

United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. He

was also Assistant Special Prosecutor and Chief of the Watergate

Task Force from 1968 to 1973. More recently, he served as Minority Chief Counsel to the Senate Whitewater Committee during

1995–1996. He has also served as Special Counsel to the Senate

Subcommittee on Government Operations and as Special Counsel

to the Senate Subcommittee on District of Columbia Appropriations.

Each of you will be recognized to make a 10-minute statement

and then be subject to the 5-minute rule questioning by the members.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES HAMILTON, ESQUIRE, SWIDLER, BERLIN, SHEREFF & FRIEDMAN, WASHINGTON, DC; AND RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQUIRE, FORMER ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Chairman HYDE. So, Mr. Hamilton, when you are ready, we will

put the switch on. Either one want to go first?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think I will go first.

Chairman HYDE. Very well. Mr. Ben-Veniste.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQUIRE

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member and members of the committee.

I have served under Democratic and Republican United States

attorneys as a Federal prosecutor. I have served as an Assistant

Special Prosecutor in the Watergate Special Prosecutor’s Office. I

have prosecuted corrupt officials of both political parties, including

the administrative assistant to a Democratic Speaker of the House.

At the request of both Democratic and Republican Members of

the Senate, I have served in a pro bono or part-time capacity in
198

various capacities, as the chairman has indicated. I have been engaged in the private practice of law since 1975 and have represented clients in a wide variety of civil and criminal matters.

I am presently a partner in the D.C. office of Weil, Gotshal and

Manges, and, obviously, the views which I express today are my

own. I am providing my observations and analysis not as a witness

to the events in question, but as one whose professional experience

over the last 30 years may provide some perspective on the issues

before you.

I confess that I have spent more than one sleepless night considering whether anything that I can say will help extricate us all

from the terrible mess that we are in.

In my view, this process has suffered from too much partisanship, too much hypocrisy, too much sensationalism, and too little

time for reflection.

I ask whether impeachment will become still another arrow in

the quiver of the warrior class of ever more truculent partisan politicians in Washington. If this is so, will we ever see an end to the

gamesmanship of ‘‘gotcha’’ and pay-back that has already taken

such a toll on civility and comity within these hallowed halls?

I have been talking about proportionality and moderation for

some time. Back in August, well before Mr. Starr sent his referral

to this committee, in an opinion piece published in the Washington

Post I suggested that the appropriate resolution of the Lewinsky

matter was for a group of respected leaders to come forward and

propose a congressional resolution of reprimand to deal with Mr.

Clinton’s reckless and improper personal conduct.

I continue to believe that respect for the momentousness of the

constitutional remedy of impeachment and appreciation of the common sense application of proportionality to the offensive conduct in

question make a resolution of censure the appropriate result. Such

a resolution, not impeachment, will give voice to the public will in

retaining their twice-elected President’s services, while expressing

firm disapproval for his private conduct.

In my view, such a resolution would be consistent with the obligations of the House of Representatives and would be in the best

interests of our Nation.

The first Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, was fired

on the orders of Richard Nixon when he refused to back down after

subpoenaing Mr. Nixon’s famously incriminating White House tape

recordings. In response to the firestorm of public opinion following

the Saturday Night Massacre, President Nixon replaced Professor

Cox with Leon Jaworski, a conservative Texan who vowed to continue the investigation with the independence and professionalism

that had marked Mr. Cox’s truncated turn at the helm. By all accounts, Leon Jaworski made good on his promise, and today his

record provides the model against which all high-profile investigations and prosecutions are measured.

In Watergate, the serious abuses of power committed by the

Nixon administration resulted in the prosecution and conviction of

numerous individuals who held public office during Mr. Nixon’s

tenure, including two Attorneys General, the White House Chief of

Staff, the chief and deputy domestic advisors to the President, a

senior advisor to the President, the counsel to the President, and
199

many others. Their offenses went directly to the abuse of power of

the President’s office and misuse of the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, the

FCC, in violation of important rights of others.

The obstruction of justice and perjury that was committed in furtherance of the Watergate coverup was designed to shield higherups from detection while blaming everything on the lower level individuals who had been caught red-handed.

Upon his appointment, Mr. Jaworski immediately withdrew from

his lucrative law practice and devoted himself entirely to his duties

as special prosecutor. Even with President Nixon’s unlawful firing

of Archibald Cox, the Watergate coverup case was investigated and

prosecuted within 21 months of the creation of the Special Prosecutor’s Office.

The credibility of the Watergate Special Prosecutor’s Office was

dependent on the public’s perception that our investigation would

be professional, impartial and fair. If we had leaked such explosively damaging evidence as President Nixon’s taped instruction to

continue the coverup or his admission regarding the promises of

presidential clemency to the Watergate burglars, it would not only

have been unfair, it would have violated the law. No leaks occurred.

Mr. Starr has the unhappy distinction of being the first Independent Counsel to come under investigation himself for unethical

and possibly illegal conduct. In addition to the 24 prima facia instances of improper leaks of grand jury material identified by Chief

Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, there was the spin leak of the

Starr referral itself in the days leading up to its actual transmittal

to this body.

Mr. Starr’s response to Representative Lofgren’s question as to

whether he would release any journalists from promises of confidentiality, ‘‘that it would be unwise’’ for him to do so, he said,

may well be true, but it only serves to reinforce the basis for Judge

Johnson’s suspicions.

In addition, the aggressive and disproportionate tactics employed

by Mr. Starr’s office, sometimes in violation of Department of Justice guidelines, have left the public with a justifiable perception

that Mr. Starr has conducted more of a crusade than an investigation, with the political objective of driving President Clinton from

office rather than uncovering criminal activity.

Leon Jaworski took extraordinary care not to intrude beyond the

proper boundaries of his office. Mr. Jaworski would be the last person to suggest that an attempt to pierce the attorney-client privilege of the President or to interfere with the time-honored protective function of the Secret Service could be justified as an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion, no matter what a court

might ultimately rule.

Even 25 years ago, it was the practice of Federal prosecutors not

to subpoena the target of a grand jury investigation. On the other

hand, it was considered unfair to deprive the target of an investigation the opportunity to testify if he so desired.

Accordingly, Mr. Jaworski extended an invitation to President

Nixon to testify before the grand jury. When Mr. Nixon declined,

Mr. Jaworski did not publicize the exchange, because to do so
200

would have been unfair to comment on Mr. Nixon’s decision not to

testify. And, again, there was no leak.

By comparison, Mr. Starr has aggressively pursued every opportunity to push the limits of legal boundaries.

Mr. Jaworski recognized that he had a responsibility to transmit

to Congress important evidence bearing on the House Judiciary

Committee’s impeachment inquiry. At the same time, he was careful not to encroach on Congress’s constitutional function of evaluating evidence and determining whether impeachment was warranted. Because the evidence was obtained through grand jury subpoenas, Mr. Jaworski first sought the grand jury’s approval and

then sought permission from Chief Judge Sirica to transmit the

material as an exception to rule 6(c), which would otherwise prohibit its dissemination.

Chairman HYDE. Can you wind up?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I would like to, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately,

yesterday I was told I would have 20 minutes and I have tried to

boil it down as best I can.

Chairman HYDE. Well, I don’t want to foreclose you because we

are down to just two witnesses, so——

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. May I have an additional five minutes, sir?

Chairman HYDE. It is Christmas week, but you are setting a terrible precedent with my Republicans, but go ahead. Take five.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Judge Sirica reviewed the transmittal which we had sent up to

him through the grand jury. He found that the transmittal rendered no moral or social judgments. He found that the grand jury

had taken care to assure that the report had no objectionable features, and that the grand jury had respected its own limitations

and the rights of others, and then he passed it along to the Judiciary Committee.

At the same time, Mr. Jaworski did not inform the House that

the grand jury had voted to authorize him to name Richard Nixon

as an unindicted coconspirator in the upcoming Watergate cover-up

trial. While the grand jury’s action provided insight into its views

of the evidence, the grand jury’s decision was not itself evidence,

and again, it would have been prejudicial at that point to make

that information public, and again, this explosive information was

never leaked.

Mr. Starr, as we know, did not submit his report to the grand

jury for its approval or consideration, and thus no one, the chief

judge, and not even the three-member court which gave him carte

blanche authority, ever reviewed the aggressively accusatory and

gratuitously salacious referral before it was transmitted to this

committee. Mr. Starr’s ethics advisor resigned when Mr. Starr

agreed to act as chief advocate for impeachment, as a witness before this committee.

I believe, Chairman Hyde, that you stated at the outset that in

substance—and I am not quoting, but this is my own recollection—

that unless the public perceived this exercise before your committee

as a bipartisan effort, that it would not have the kind of credibility

necessary to bring an article of impeachment to the Floor of the

House. In my view——
201

Chairman HYDE. If I could just interpret, what I really said was

that the impeachment would not succeed without bipartisan support, but I was adverting to the two-thirds requirement in the Senate.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. You mean conviction?

Chairman HYDE. Yes, I was talking about that. My hope was

that as this process moved along, the public would get more and

more educated as to its details, but I never really expected a lot

of bipartisanship here, although I hoped for it. Thank you.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. In my view, Mr. Chairman, the inability to

find a bipartisan consensus in this committee is not a function of

the individual characteristics of the Members, but it is more rooted

in the wide gulf between the President’s conduct, even assuming

that the factual allegations against him are true, and were proved,

and the grave consequences of a vote of impeachment.

I do not condone the President’s conduct in his relationship with

Ms. Lewinsky, or his conduct in the Paula Jones deposition. Indeed, I was personally let down and disappointed by his conduct.

But it is clear to me that attempting to criminalize that conduct,

much less make it the basis of an article of impeachment, would

do a disservice to the Constitution and any notion of proportionality, moderation, and common sense.

I thank you for extending the time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Ben-Veniste.

[The information follows:]
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank

you for the opportunity to address you in this——

Mr. CONYERS. Move your mike closer, sir. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you for the opportunity to address you on

the momentous issue of impeachment that you now face. I wish to

focus mainly on the abuse of power allegations made by Mr. Starr

in items 10 and 11 of his submission to this committee and by Mr.

Schippers in item 14 of his reformulation of the charges. Read together, the assertions are that President Clinton, in addition to

committing perjury, abused his power by various other actions:

First, by lying to the American people and the Congress about

his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Second, by lying to his wife,

the Cabinet, and his present and former staff about that relationship, which caused some of them to repeat his falsehoods to the

grand jury, the public and the Congress. Third, by repeatedly and

unlawfully invoking executive privilege to conceal his personal misconduct from the grand jury. And fourth, by refusing six invitations

to testify before the grand jury, and by declining to answer relevant questions when he did testify in August 1998.

A central question before this committee and the Congress is

whether these alleged abuses of power, assuming they are proven

true, rise to the level of impeachable offenses. In my view, they do

not.

A proper starting point is the abuse of power allegations in Article 2 of the impeachment resolution against President Nixon that

caused this committee to vote 28–to–10 to impeach him. The contrast between President Nixon’s conduct and President Clinton’s

conduct is striking.

The committee voted to impeach Nixon for the following five

abuses of power: first, for causing the Internal Revenue Service to

initiate audits and investigations of Nixon enemies, and to provide

his associates with information about these enemies for the President’s political benefit. Second, for causing the FBI and the Secret

Service to engage in unlawful wiretaps for the President’s political

advantage, and for causing the FBI to conceal evidence of these

wiretaps. Third, for maintaining a secret investigation unit, the

plumbers, that using CIA resources and campaign contributions,

engaged in various unlawful covert activities, including the breakin of the office of Daniel Elsberg, psychiatrist. Fourth, for allowing

conduct that impeded the investigations of the break-in of the DNC

headquarters, the ensuing cover-up, and other misdeeds. And, fifth,

for interfering with the FBI, the Criminal Division, the Watergate

special prosecutor’s office, and the CIA for personal political advantage. This interference included Nixon’s firing of Special Prosecutor

Cox and his attempts to abolish the special prosecutor’s office in

order to stymie its investigation.

Mr. Chairman, this conduct rightly was considered to constitute

high crimes and misdemeanors that justified impeachment. To use

the words of Founder George Mason, who proposed the phrase

‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors,’’ Nixon’s conduct constituted great

and dangerous offenses against the State that amounted to acts to

subvert the Constitution. The notion of great and dangerous of213

fenses against the State captures the essence of what an impeachable offense should be. It must be as Alexander Hamilton said. It

must relate chiefly to injuries done to the society itself. A President

should not be impeached to subject him to punishment, but rather,

to protect the State and society against great and dangerous offenses that might reoccur if he is allowed to remain in office.

I respectfully submit that the alleged abuses by President Clinton do not indicate that he is a danger to the Nation. Lying to the

public and to his Cabinet and aides is disgraceful, but if we would

impeach all officials who lie about personal or official matters, I

fear that the halls of government would be seriously depleted.

Other Presidents, for example, Lyndon Johnson as to Vietnam,

have not been candid in their public and private statements. There

must be a higher bar for impeachment.

It is true that Article 1 of the impeachment resolution against

Nixon charged that he misled the public about the scope of his administration’s investigation of Watergate misconduct, and the lack

of involvement by administration and reelection committee personnel in this misconduct. But these statements involve lies about official actions and were part of a massive cover-up of government

misdeeds. This is far different than lies about private consensual

sexual conduct.

The claim that unsuccessfully asserting executive privilege to the

grand jury is impeachable is, in my view, extraordinarily thin. The

President did so upon the advice of counsel, and the district court

recognized that the President’s conversations were presumptively

privileged, although it found that the needs of the criminal justice

system outweighed that privilege. At no time did the court suggest

that the privilege was claimed in bad faith. Losing a privilege argument, Mr. Chairman, should not present grounds for removal from

office.

As this committee may know, I had my own battle with Mr.

Starr about whether Vince Foster’s attorney-client privilege survived his death, which I won in the Supreme Court. Even in my

angry moments about that case, and there have been some, I would

not contend that Mr. Starr should be removed from office under the

good cause provision of the Independent Counsel Act simply because he failed to convince the Supreme Court that he was right.

Neither the President’s reticence to appear before the grand jury,

nor his failure to answer certain questions put by the prosecutors,

should constitute impeachable offenses. The President was well

aware that he was facing a hostile prosecutor, of whom he had

much to fear. He was not under subpoena, and thus had no obligation to appear at a time certain. Moreover, Mr. Starr agreed to the

rules that allowed the President to decline to answer certain questions in his grand jury deposition. In these circumstances, to brand

his conduct as impeachable is untenable.

The claim that the President lied under oath, of course, is more

troubling than these other allegations against President Clinton.

But lying about private consensual sexual conduct seems more appropriately designated as a low crime, rather than a high crime.

While reprehensible, it is not a great and dangerous offense against

the State that demonstrates the necessity of removing the President from office to protect the Nation from further abuses.
214

Now, I readily concede that lies under oath about treason, bribery, the break-in at the DNC, or matters of national security could

be high crimes and thus impeachable, but the conduct at issue

seems of a different character. The committee should recall that

the claim that President Nixon fraudulently evaded his tax obligations, which essentially involved private, not official wrongdoing,

was not made part of the impeachment charges against him.

Mr. Chairman, because this Nation requires a strong and secure

presidency, this committee and Congress should be chary of making impeachment too easy. Long ago, in 1691, the Solicitor General,

later Lord Chancellor Somers, told the British Parliament that the

power of impeachment ought to be like Goliath’s sword, kept in the

temple and not used but on great occasions. In a similar vein, Justice Story wrote that impeachment is intended for occasional and

extraordinary cases where a superior power, acting for the whole

people, is put into operation to protect their rights and to rescue

their liberties from violation.

Mr. Chairman, we must guard against turning our system into

a parliamentary one, where a national election can be negated by

a legislative no-confidence vote.

Chairman HYDE. Would you like another five minutes?

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like another three minutes.

Chairman HYDE. Oh, that is so much the better. Please continue.

Mr. HAMILTON. This is particularly true because the Congress

has another tool with which to express its strong disapproval of the

President’s action: A concurrent resolution of censure. With the

Chair’s permission I will submit for the record several articles I

have recently written showing that a concurrent resolution of censure would be fully constitutional and in accordance with congressional practices. These articles also contend that a sharp censure

coupled with a significant agreed-on fine would be an appropriate

remedy. I will be pleased to expound on my views if the committee

desires.

Some argue that a censure resolution would injure the presidency by setting a precedent that would make censure commonplace. I have no doubt that censure resolutions, if judgment is not

exercised and partisanship abounds, could be used unwisely to

weaken the presidency. But how much more harm would be caused

by impeaching a President for actions that, while deplorable, do not

amount to great and dangerous offenses against the State or require his removal to protect the Nation?

With all deference, Mr. Chairman, this is a time for statesmanship, wisdom and conscience, not partisan politics. In my judgment,

a vote for impeachment along party lines would be a horrendous

result from which the presidency and the Nation would suffer for

years to come. The goal should be to end this matter now in a nonpartisan fashion that appropriately sanctions the President and allows the government and the Nation to return to the other pressing

problems we face.

Thank you for your attention.

[The information follows:]
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me express my concern that the White House

really does not want to work with this committee to resolve this

matter in the manner in which you have just described. I was in

the back room having a couple of slices of pizza before coming out

here for the questions and answers, and on CNN as we speak, Wolf

Blitzer and Greta Van Susteren are talking about the 184-page response that Mr. Craig said was coming up to the committee. They

have read it, they have been able to dissect it, they have been able

to analyze it, and we have never gotten it. And it seems to me,

when I was practicing law way back when, that you always gave

counsel on the opposing side a copy of your pleadings before releasing it to the press. Isn’t that standard law practice?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I think it depends on who your opponent

is. But I understand, Congressman—I think—I understand, Congressman, that you will receive that brief in the near future.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, both of you have criticized Mr. Starr

for leaking things prematurely, so that the White House and members of the committee and the American public have learned things

before they really were supposed to. Now, aren’t you, Mr. Hamilton, saying that there are different strokes for different folks here?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I believe it was Mr. Ben-Veniste who criticized Mr. Starr in his opening statement for leaking, Congressman.

Maybe I will let him speak to that.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Let me say this, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Will you please turn the mike on, Mr. BenVeniste?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Yes, sir. Let me say this. It is not my practice,

and nor would I have provided copies of that material to anyone

else prior to its designated recipient. I don’t think that is the appropriate way to do it.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. So you are saying that the practice of the

White House in releasing it, at least to CNN, before sending it up

here so that members of the committee could have it, is inappropriate?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. If that is what happened, it is not the way

that I would have handled the matter. But to follow on to your

question, the idea of leaking grand jury matters, I am sure you will

agree, is by several steps much more dangerous and indeed illegal,

and so we are really not talking about comparable events.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Ben-Veniste, last month when Judge

Starr was here explaining the content of his referral, Mr. Kendall,

who is one of the President’s personal attorneys, was given an hour

to cross-examine him. And one of the issues of cross-examination

that Mr. Kendall raised was whether or not the Independent Counsel staff treated Monica Lewinsky unfairly at the time of the interview in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel about a week before all of us found

out who Monica Lewinsky was.

Apparently, that issue was litigated, and there was a sealed decision rendered months before Judge Starr’s testimony that Judge

Johnson reviewed the matter and determined that there had not
229

been prosecutorial misconduct. I assume that Mr. Kendall, as the

President’s lawyer, was familiar with that sealed decision.

Judge Starr did not refer to it. He didn’t leak it. He didn’t testify

before the committee. What do you think the ethics are of bringing

up a sealed decision that you know has occurred in an attempt to

get the lawyer on the other side to try to admit the misconduct or

unethically refer to a sealed decision?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, there are two things about that, and I

have not read the decision. I don’t know whether it has been released publicly or not.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. It was in the newspaper. It was released.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I have not read it. But I understand that there

were two aspects to it.

One is whether the actual circumstances of her interrogation

were unlawful, that is, whether she was free to go or not; and, secondly, whether it was appropriate for the prosecutors to attempt to

plea bargain with her in the absence of her attorney whom they

knew was representing her. And I think as to the latter question,

that was, at least unethical and probably improper. So I think

there is a distinction——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That was not my question. My question

was whether it was ethical for Kendall to ask those questions.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Does the Chairman wish me to answer the

question?

Mr. CONYERS. I think I will just let Mr. Ben-Veniste quickly conclude his response to Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, I think the area of inquiry was quite appropriate. The confidence of the American public in whether an

Independent Counsel has performed consistently with the public’s

expectations of fairness and independence is an appropriate area of

inquiry. Unfortunately, in watching Mr. Kendall’s examination,

that exchange, it seemed to be a combination of cross-examination

and beat the clock. I have practiced trial law for 30 years, and I

have never had that kind of restriction placed on a cross-examination. It is a very difficult, difficult obligation to undertake, Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Ben-Veniste and Mr. Hamilton, you are two

of the most seasoned lawyers that we have in the area across the

years and down through time. Let me just solicit your opinions on

these two considerations.

How has the Starr investigation harmed the present impeachment inquiry? Would an investigation that had not been tainted by

possibly unfair and unethical tactics have brought us to a different

result today? And how has this committee’s process negatively impacted on the inquiry that we are charged to dispose of?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, let me take the latter question first.

To the extent that there is the impression in the public’s mind

that this process has not been bipartisan or fair, where people

haven’t had an adequate opportunity to either express their views

or explore the subject matter or inform the public, then I think we

all suffer as a result of that. I don’t know what happens in executive session, or whether there have been accommodations made,
230

but simply in reading the newspapers there seems to be the impression that we are in some kind of a hurry-up mode, and yet

there is this disconnect in proportionality between the gravity of

the offenses and the speed with which you are conducting these

hearings, and I think the process does suffer in the public mind in

that sense.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Conyers, let me just say that I think that one

reason that the Watergate Committee, the Senate Watergate Committee was so successful is that Senator Erwin and Senator Baker

worked together to—in a bipartisan fashion. That is not to say that

there were not strong disagreements, but most of these were

worked out behind the scene, and the committee worked together

to get the information and, of course, produced a unanimous report.

And I think, for that reason, its conclusions have stood the test of

time.

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I certainly hope that somewhere in our congressional body among those two dozen Republicans that are, you

know—I don’t know what they are doing besides reading and praying and trying to find the fortitude to help forge this middle path

so that we can all get to this exit door with some shred of dignity,

rather than to just push this thing over the cliff where we know

nothing will happen. I am hoping that somehow there will be some

epiphany, if necessary, to help us get across this hump. I am hoping that your discussions with our colleagues tonight and the work

we do in the next 48 hours will help something like that happen.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I join in that hope and——

Mr. CONYERS. Is that too optimistic?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, Father Drinan’s prayer I think set an

admirable tone, and I cast my ecumenical vote in that direction.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see both of you here today.

I have a couple of observations about today. It seems to me that

in the President’s defense through this day we have been proceeding through some fairly carefully crafted patterns. This panel principally seems to be designed to attack Mr. Starr. With all due respect, that is what I think you are doing, or have done, or attempted to do, which has been a tactic of the White House defense

team for some time but diverts attention from the probative questions of whether the President did commit the felonies he has been

charged with or whether or not indeed there is an impeachable offense.

The previous panel spent a great deal of time in the question and

answer period and some of their testimony trying to scare folks

with the belief that if we impeach that we are going to have a long,

protracted trial and the consequences of impeachment are going to

be very dire for the Nation, when, in fact, based on what Mr. Craig

said earlier this morning, with the admission of the White House

counsel, the truthfulness is not questioned of what Betty Currie

said or what Vernon Jordan said.
231

With a record fairly complete, with no need to call up any witnesses, since we have a formal record collected for us which all of

us can examine and have been, I would suggest the trial in the

Senate could be very short, probably simply rendered, first of all,

from the President’s defense standpoint to a summary judgment request on the basis that these aren’t impeachable offenses and then,

if not, pretty much the facts are going to speak for themselves.

Certainly the President could have chosen to call some of these

folks as witnesses if he wanted them cross-examined. We didn’t

think it was necessary. I don’t today think it is; and I guess. By

not calling them, the President doesn’t either, because the record

is so complete on the facts. There just may be some hair-splitting

differences.

We will hear Mr. Ruff talk about more tomorrow on those facts

and then, of course, the claim that this isn’t impeachable in some

way.

I would submit that the consequences of this, if indeed the facts

do bear us out, and I think they do, that the President lied under

oath a number of times, committed perjury in the case involving

Paula Jones multiple times, committed perjury before the grand

jury, which Professor Dershowitz said, if indeed he believed it were

true, though he doesn’t, and I think the facts show it is true, would

be an impeachable offense for which the President he said should

be impeached. If that is the case, committed the crimes of obstruction of justice regarding the matters of the affidavit and the gifts

and maybe what he said to Betty Currie, all of these things or even

a substantial number of them or even if it is only the grand jury

perjury, as Professor Dershowitz points out, are true, and we believe that, then our failure to impeach the President would be a

terribly dire consequence for the Nation.

In fact, to suggest that these don’t rise to the level of impeachable offenses begs a great question. The Constitution says, treason,

bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors. Bribing a witness and perjury are one and the same thing, essentially. They are

treated the same way by the Sentencing Commission.

Interestingly enough, the Sentencing Commission has exactly the

same level of punishment recommended for both of them. Perjury

and bribery of a witness go to the basic premise that if a party to

a lawsuit cannot get the truth on the record, if somebody lies or

encourages somebody else to lie or somebody, as a witness, hides

the evidence or encourages somebody else to hide the evidence, a

party in a lawsuit cannot get justice, they cannot get a judgment

rendered by a court that is fair and just to them, which is the traditional American way. So it is considered very grave.

And if bribery and bribing a witness is part of the bribery laws

of this Nation, if bribery is specifically named in the Constitution

as an impeachable offense, it seems to me, so is perjury. And the

consequence of not going forward with perjury in these cases would

be grave. Because, in that case, we are undermining the integrity

of the court system. We are going to encourage more people, it

seems to me, to commit perjury in the future or to witness tamper

or whatever.

We are likely to find fewer cases where Federal judges will be

impeached for perjury. People will be treated differently than the
232

President. One hundred and fifteen people are already in prison

today for perjury in the Federal system. If this President committed it, we have a double standard.

I think the consequences of not doing it are extraordinarily dire,

and I am disappointed that the President’s defense has not come

forward with a more substantive process with regard to the facts.

Now that may happen tomorrow. It has not happened today. I am

looking forward to tomorrow, because I want to engage that, since

I happen to believe, based on what I have seen, it is going to be

a heavy burden to prove that the facts are not right, that are in

every bit of the evidence that we have before us that indeed the

President committed the perjury numerous times, that he committed obstruction of justice and so forth.

So I will look forward to tomorrow. I don’t think today was very

constructive.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I take it there was no question in that?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. There was no question, just an observation.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Because I do disagree most respectfully with

many of the things you have said.

Mr. GEKAS. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I am sorry. I was talking to Mr. Conyers. That

does happen now and then.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. My time expired. I yielded back.

Chairman HYDE. It has expired.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I have no question.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Frank.

Mr. FRANK. I want to begin with just an observation. Because

one of the things we have been talking about has to do with censure, and I am convinced that we should have censure as an option. I believe that it represents a majority.

But I am struck by two arguments against it. And just as it

seems to me two of the articles of grand jury perjury are articles

in the alternative, that is, they contradict each other, the second

and third accusations. The major arguments against censure are

being made in the alternative, and I thought I would just ask my

colleagues to pick one or the other. Because I do think when we

get to the floor we can’t act like lawyers anymore and argue two

inconsistent things in the hope that one of them will stick.

One argument against censure is that it is meaningless, that it

is trivial, that it is a slap on the wrist, that it does not sufficiently

injure the President and, therefore, is not suitable punishment.

The other is that censure, once we begin it, will be so frequently

resorted to that it will cripple the presidency. Now, it is a pretty

fragile president who could be crippled by a slap on his wrist or

it would be a pretty hefty slapper.

The arguments, one, that censure is wrong because it is too little

a punishment, directly contradicts the notion that censure is wrong

because it would be too heavy a punishment. I would be perfectly—

I don’t hold my colleagues to too high a standard; one consistent

argument will do. But two inconsistent ones it seems to me ought

to be dropped, and you ought not to be arguing that censure is both

too much of a punishment and would, once resorted to, become interference with the presidency and also too little of one.
233

Now, let me turn to our witnesses here, because I do believe that

the assertion that there was grand jury perjury is simply not true;

and, with regard to the deposition, it does seem to be clear that the

President lied in one case. I do not believe that the President did

not remember whether or not he and Monica Lewinsky had been

alone. The question there, though, does go to materiality, and I will

be interested tomorrow in particular to talk about materiality.

But let me ask on the obstruction of justice from your standpoint

as criminal attorneys, people who have tried and prosecuted and

defended. One of the arguments is, my colleague from Florida just

said, a witness being asked to lie, that that is high bribery, and I

assume one of the accusations is that the President bribed, in effect, Monica Lewinsky, that by offer of a job and by other inducements the President got Monica Lewinsky to lie.

Let me ask both of you, if you were prosecuting attorneys and

you contemplated bringing such a case and you found that, in a

volunteered bit of testimony to the grand jury, the person who was

presumably bribed not to tell the truth said, by the way, no one

asked me to lie, and no one promised me a job for my silence,

would that affect your decision to prosecute that case? And do you

think a case in which the alleged subject, recipient of the bribe, volunteered that she had not been made any promise or asked, would

that be a problem? And, secondarily, as a matter of lawyer’s tactics,

if you were the prosecutor, why would you never have asked her

this?

Because Monica Lewinsky volunteered. At no point did the prosecutor ask her. So one reason you couldn’t cross-examine her on the

question about whether she was bribed is that she was never examined on that subject. The prosecutors quite scrupulously avoided

asking her. So how would that affect your decision to bring the

case? And if you were the prosecutor trying to bring such a case,

would you have asked her, Mr. Ben-Veniste?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, certainly in my experience bringing that

kind of a case would have some kind of scatological barnyard expletive attached to it. It is just not a case any Federal prosecutor

would bring, in my experience.

On the other hand, because now we are talking about impeachment, the notion that the Founders gave consideration to the proposition that the President of the United States of this new republic

might be on the ‘‘give’’ rather than on the ‘‘take’’ is certainly beyond comprehension. The specification of bribery and treason

meant that the President should be loyal to the United States, that

he should not commit treason, he should not accept bribes, he

should not accept emoluments that were not appropriate to his office, he should conduct himself in an honest way in the affairs of

state. That is what that was all about. In my opinion, the idea that

the facts concerning efforts to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job have

absolutely no connection to reality in terms of impeachment.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.——

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. Oh, I am sorry. I recognize the gentleman from

Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. I ask unanimous consent to have printed overnight

the submission by the counsel of the President to the Committee
234

on the Judiciary of the United States, this document that just has

been delivered to yourself and myself.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. CONYERS. I further ask unanimous consent to have printed

with Professor Dershowitz’ testimony a letter that he has sent to

me.

Chairman HYDE. That would be in the previous record.

Mr. CONYERS. Exactly.

Chairman HYDE. Yes. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas.

Mr. GEKAS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Hastings, I think—no, Mr. Hamilton it is, yes. Deja vu. You

and I have the makings of a deal, I think. I have felt from the very

first moment that we received the referral from Judge Starr that

there were serious problems with his assertion that the assertion

of executive privilege by the President, by itself, would constitute

an abuse of power, and I am still delving into that mess in the formulation of my position, my final position. But while I am tending

to give you that, it seems to me you have given me, and we have

the makings of a deal, great concern about the President’s alleged

lying under oath. You exhibit a troubled mind as to that category

of what we are considering in this case.

Do you believe that given the fact that if perjury or lying under

oath was committed by the President in the Jones case, that it had

the intended result of destroying the case of a fellow American citizen who lawfully, as decreed by the Supreme Court, had the chance

to sue the President of the United States, with which decision, by

the way, I disagreed, I still rue that decision by the Supreme

Court. Don’t you believe that this rises beyond the level of something as oh, it is just perjury and it is just about sex, and it doesn’t

matter? Aren’t you willing to yield to me that that is serious

enough for this panel to apply its conscience and its collective judgment in determining whether or not it is an impeachable offense?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I certainly think the panel should apply its

judgment and its conscience in determining whether it is an impeachable offense. My position is that assuming that he lied in the

Jones deposition or the grand jury, I think that you can look at

that conduct and still say, it is not impeachable, because it is not

a great and dangerous offense against the State. Sure——

Mr. GEKAS. We don’t have a deal.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am sorry to hear that.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Ben-Veniste, I want to congratulate you on the

most artful bill of particulars ever drawn up against a nonparty to

the investigation. Your bill of particulars against Ken Starr is wonderful. It is masterful. You have an article here about the perfect

President in which you criticize Starr; you have another one, the

case against Ken Starr. Marvelous language and articulation of the

case against Ken Starr.

This prompts me to invite you to be the first witness that I am

going to have in next spring on the question of the reauthorization

of Independent Counsel, which you seem to feel is of no value, at

least the Independent Counsel statute. Just a moment, I will let

you get to it.
235

The thing that bothers me is I didn’t see any articles during the

Lawrence Walsh reign of his incumbency as Independent Counsel.

Did you have any such articles that you wish to submit to the committee about the Walsh conduct of Independent Counsel?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I did not. The Walsh——

Mr. GEKAS. Any other Independent Counsel? Of any other Independent Counsel appointed in the past?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Oh, yes, sir. I actually defended an individual

in a case brought by Independent Counsel McKay. I am glad you

gave me the opportunity to talk about it.

Mr. GEKAS. Did you write an article about him?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, but I got a jury acquittal in that case,

which is better than an article. It would not have been appropriate

for me to write an article while I was representing the client. But

let me say this, in all seriousness, and I will accept your invitation

to come and talk about the Independent Counsel statute, because

I feel strongly about the importance of the individuals who hold

that office, and I think there is a bifurcation here between the statute and the expectations on an individual who holds the office that

that statute creates.

Mr. Walsh’s investigation, in my view, went on too long; there

were a lot of defects with it. However, the subject matter, the res,

if you will, of that investigation was momentous, it was important.

Mr. GEKAS. But you did not file any documents or——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ben-Veniste, I would like you, for the

purposes of your answers, to make two assumptions. First, the

President lied under oath. Second, as to his grand jury testimony,

those lies were not to cover up a consensual sexual relationship,

but to avoid conceding that he had testified untruthfully in the civil

deposition.

The question is, to deal with the contention that this conduct justifies impeachment because coming from the President, it is so corrosive of the judicial system and it so erodes the rule of law.

Mr. HAMILTON. Congressman Berman, clearly, lying under oath

before a grand jury or in a deposition is reprehensible. I think the

question is, does that rise in this circumstance where the lying is

about private consensual sexual conduct, whether it rises to the

level of an impeachable offense. Is it a great and dangerous offense

against the State that indicates it would be a danger to leave the

President in office.

My conclusion is that it is not.

Now, I will go on and say, as I have said both orally and in writing on several occasions, that I think this conduct demands a sharp

censure, and indeed something more than censure. I think that the

President should agree to some type of monetary penalty to emphasize the seriousness of his conduct. I also think that there obviously

will be a possibility after the President leaves office that if some

prosecutor really deems that this is a case that he could win, that

he could be prosecuted for it.
236

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Clearly, Mr. Berman, the President’s conduct

was not, we can all agree, lying about disloyalty, treason, matters

of national security, bribery, or other things which are characterized as high crimes and misdemeanors.

Now, clearly, Mr. Clinton attempted to obfuscate in his civil deposition something which his adversaries already knew; that is, that

he had had an inappropriate physical relationship with a young intern.

The question is, whether even in that context, the vice of perjury

was accomplished. Did the President’s conduct somehow skew the

result in that case? Not even there, I think, did it have that effect.

Mr. BERMAN. I think in a way both of you are missing the point

I was hoping to hear you speak to, which is, the contention by some

that lying under oath by the President—assuming that’s what he

did—rises to the level of impeachment because they are so corrosive of the judicial process.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. It is clearly under any circumstances something which is deplorable. However, what we are dealing with is

the impeachment of the President of the United States, this most

monumental, momentous task, that this committee can consider.

And under that standard, the idea that no man is above the law

has to do with whether a prosecutor could prosecute the President,

as the Constitution provides, after he leaves office, but it has nothing to do with the application of the standard of high crimes and

misdemeanors, in my view, and therefore does not warrant impeachment of the President.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.

Coble.

Mr. COBLE. I thank the Chairman.

Today, ladies and gentlemen, I have seen evidence of wringing of

hands and intense anxiety expressed because of the lack of bipartisanship on the Judiciary Committee, and the implications seem to

place most of that blame on the Republican corner of this room. I

think no blame at all needs to be afforded to that corner or this

corner. If we search our consciences and vote our sound judgments

for or against impeachment, I don’t know that any blame needs to

be a allotted or attributed. Sure, it would be fine if we could do it

in a bipartisan fashion, but the nature of this beast oftentimes

avoids that.

Let me talk to you gentlemen about perjury. Some say that lying

about sex to a grand jury is not sufficient to warrant impeachment.

I guess for the sake of argument, let’s assume that perjury is a

crime that raises itself to the threshold of impeachment. If that is

in fact true, which I believe it is, I think the subject about which

one is lying is immaterial, because I don’t think there are exceptions to the perjury statute.

Now, having said that, let me ask you all this: how about one

who lies to a grand jury about his obstruction of justice, or his concealing evidence, or encouraging the filing of a false affidavit, or

perhaps coaching a witness? If it has in fact been done, do you all

believe that that would constitute crimes that raise themselves to

the threshold of impeachment?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. If, in fact, the obstruction of justice and the

perjury had to do with the kind of weighty subject matter about
237

which the impeachment clause was created, that is treason or bribery, or some like offense, then I would agree, as I did in the case

of Richard Nixon, that this would, in fact, constitute——

Mr. COBLE. My time is about to run out. Let me hear from Mr.

Hamilton on this as well.

Mr. HAMILTON. Again, I think the question is whether the lying

amounts to a great and dangerous offense, so that it is dangerous

to allow the President to remain in office. That is a judgment you

have to make with every specific factual situation that you are confronted with.

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I am going to yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. I thank the gentleman. I just want to make a couple of points.

I want to thank both of you for being here today. You are both

very distinguished lawyers and we appreciate you taking your time

to be here. I have to candidly say, I don’t think your testimony has

added much to our deliberations, however. I am disappointed that

we see the continued attacks on the Independent Counsel, and it

is interesting that I still have not heard any claim of misconduct

by the Independent Counsel which undermines the credibility or

the reliability of the evidence, the sworn testimony that is before

us. It is not there. And so I find—if we had something like that,

then that would be relevant for us to consider, but——

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I could give you something to think about.

Mr. CANADY. But to generalize charges of misconduct by the

Independent Counsel I think are just an attempt to divert attention once more from the facts of this case. And it has been very disappointing today that we have had so little discussion of the actual

facts of the case against the President. There has been some discussion of that, and I think that is good. But there has been very

little of that, and I am hopeful that tomorrow we are going to see

a change of focus and deal with these facts. And as I am going to

discuss a little more in a minute, I think the facts are very troubling. And they are facts that we have to come to terms with.

Is this case equivalent to Watergate? My answer to that is no.

But that doesn’t resolve the matter for us. There are similarities

I would also say, but I don’t think anyone would responsibly contend that President Nixon somehow established the threshold there

for what is impeachable. That is not right. We have got to judge

this President’s conduct on the evidence that is before us and make

a judgment under the standards of the Constitution.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.

Mr. NADLER. Since the gentleman from Florida followed some of

his colleagues’ comments about making aspersions about your testimony and not permitting you to answer them, could you take about

a minute to tell us about how Mr. Starr’s misconduct may have affected conclusions about the President, and then let me ask my

question.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, I think there are things that have not

been fully investigated. I don’t make the claim of misconduct, and

in fact, The New York Times has its own way of putting a title on
238

an editorial piece. That was not my title, that was The New York

Times’ title.

Mr. NADLER. Do you think that Mr. Starr’s misconduct, if misconduct it be, has any relevance to the factfindings?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think to the extent that all inferences have

been drawn in the referral received by this committee by Mr. Starr

against the President, that there has been selectivity involved, that

there has not been investigation of the activities of certain people

who are responsible for starting——

Mr. NADLER. It has been a one-sided investigation, in other

words.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, there is more to look at than has been

looked at.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I have 2 quick questions and I will read

them both so that you can answer them in the time remaining. I

find somewhat startling the assertions made by some of our colleagues on the other side that the President’s failure to call witnesses somehow proves his guilt.

The gentleman from Florida, the other gentleman from Florida

said a few moments ago that a Senate trial can be whisked along

in a matter of days, that they don’t need to call witnesses there,

that everything is clear. I had assumed that the alleged lack of a

need for calling fact witnesses to prove by the prosecution, if you

will, here was because of the analogy to the grand jury where we

could use the hearsay testimony of Mr. Starr that certainly would

have to call witnesses in the Senate. Is there really no obligation

on the part of the accusers of the President to bring forward witnesses or direct evidence? Is it proper to rely on the Starr report

to establish the facts? Is the President really required to prove his

innocence rather than have his accusers prove his guilt? That is my

first question.

My second question is for Mr. Ben-Veniste. My second question

is, in your testimony you say that it is clear that Mr. Starr’s purpose in forcing Mr. Clinton to testify was simply to provide additional fodder for an impeachment referral. What interest would a

Federal grand jury have in investigating whether one consenting

adult touched another consenting adult, whether the conduct first

occurred in November or January, or how many gifts they exchanged. And further you say, that the 2 supposed grounds for obstruction of justice, Vernon Jordan’s attempt to find a job for

Monica Lewinsky in the talking points which formed a basis for the

request of the Attorney General to extend the jurisdiction were

both dead letters, and Mr. Starr knew that before he called President Clinton as a grand jury witness.

Are you asserting here or do you think it proper to state that

therefore Mr. Starr’s calling of the President before the grand jury

was simply a perjury trap, and that in fact there was no basis, and

that this was improper, and that that in some way affects how we

should regard this whole thing?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, let me say that it escapes me as to what

the grand jury was properly investigating at that point.

Mr. NADLER. And that makes any perjury, any alleged lying

there, immaterial?
239

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, it puts into some kind of context, Mr.

Nadler, that the allegations of obstruction of justice and of perjury

really do not have the kind of substance that one would find if

something were actually obstructed, or somebody was actually

harmed by a perjury, and I think it is in that context that you look

at whether you get to the momentousness of conduct that would

warrant impeachment.

Mr. NADLER. So in other words, it is hard to have obstruction if

there is nothing being obstructed.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think so.

Mr. NADLER. And it is hard to have perjury if it wasn’t material

to anything having to be proven.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think so.

Mr. NADLER. My other question is, please answer my first question about the lack of witnesses establishing guilt, both here and

presumably, according to Mr. McCollum in the Senate, is it the

President’s job to prove his innocence rather than the other way

around?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I would think, Congressman, that it is the

job of this committee to convince itself that the President has engaged in impeachable conduct.

Now, how the committee does that depends on the circumstances.

It is true that neither the committee or so far the President has

called any witnesses before this committee, and both sides are

going on grand jury testimony. The majority seems to be relying

basically upon Mr. Starr’s analysis, and I think tomorrow the

White House is going to give you their analysis of the grand jury

record. But the bottom line is this committee has an obligation to

do what is necessary to ascertain the facts that would support impeachment, or not support impeachment.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hamilton, let me read for you a longer quote by George

Stephanopoulos, who is a former, as you know, senior advisor to

President Clinton, and ask for you to respond.

‘‘When President Clinton turned his personal flaws into a public

matter, he made the whole country complicit in his cover story.

This was no impulsive act of passion, it was a coldly calculated political decision. He spoke publicly from the Roosevelt Room’’—that

is in the White House—‘‘he assembled his cabinet and staff and assured them that he was telling the truth and he sat back silently

and watched his official spokespeople, employees of the U.S. Government, mislead the country again and again and again.’’

Mr. Hamilton, don’t you think that the President’s actions and

statements were an effort to try to thwart the investigation that

was then going on?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me answer it this way. I am not sure

I can put myself in the President’s mind. I do think his conduct in

this regard was disgraceful.

Mr. SMITH. Let’s use the reasonable person standard. Don’t you

think a reasonable person, a reasonable American would listen to

the President’s statements, watch what he did, and conclude that

he was making an effort to try to thwart the investigation that was

then going on? Don’t you agree with that?
240

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Congressman, I am sure that he wanted

the investigation to go away. I think there is no doubt about that.

The question again, and if I sound like a——

Mr. SMITH. My question is pretty clear, and could you answer it

for me?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think I did answer it. I think he clearly wanted

the investigation to go away.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. That wasn’t answering my question. Do you

think that he was attempting to thwart the investigation that was

then going on?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I am not sure there is a distinction there.

I am sure he wanted the investigation to end.

Mr. SMITH. Was he actively trying to impede the investigation?

Mr. HAMILTON. He may have been trying to impede the investigation. I guess the question is——

Mr. SMITH. No, no, you——

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me finish, Congressman.

Mr. SMITH. I think you just answered my question. If you said

he may have been trying to impede the question, you have answered it.

Mr. HAMILTON. The question is, was what he was doing improper

or impeachable.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hamilton, don’t rephrase my question. I think

you have answered my question that he may have been trying to

impede the investigation that was going on. That is all I was looking for. I would have to confess to you in part I was looking for that

because that was Barbara Jordan’s definition of an impeachable offense, and I think that that is the important point. Let me read,

this is a little bit lighter subject, some letters to you from the 6th

graders at Chisholm Middle School in Round Rock, Texas. They

have a way of putting it very straightforwardly, even if it is not always grammatically correct. Here are three letters:

‘‘If the President doesn’t get impeached, it could be very dangerous because more people will start doing more crimes and say,

quote, if the President can get away with it, I can.’’

Another one: ‘‘Last year I studied the Constitution in social studies. One thing I learned was that the Constitution stated, ‘all men

were created equally.’ If we want an equal Nation we must make

sure justice is served no matter how high on the branches of government.’’

And then lastly: ‘‘If everybody lied under oath, our justice system

would fall apart.’’

That is a very succinct version, I guess, of a categorical imperative along the lines of never engage in any action which if engaged

in by everybody else would, in effect, lead to chaos. Would you not

agree that if everybody engaged in deceptive or misleading or evasive statements or perhaps was not telling the whole truth, that

could in fact undermine the entire judicial system. In effect, what

is the point of having courthouses if people aren’t going to tell the

whole truth?

Mr. HAMILTON. Of course I agree with that.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
241

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the

witnesses, if you assume that the President has committed impeachable offenses and in fact should be removed from office my

question is, what is a rational way to present the case? Mr. BenVeniste, did Mr. Jaworski testify to help make the case before Congress?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, Mr. Jaworski was very careful to avoid

any sort of advocacy in connection with transmitting evidence

which we had obtained through the grand jury. We had obtained

very damaging White House tape recordings and other grand jury

testimony of witnesses which were transmitted without any sort of

advocacy or pointing to what might be an impeachable offense. It

was just the material. And Judge Sirica, who reviewed it, said that

the grand jury had done its job in a fair way without making any

comment or without arguing for any result in having done so.

Mr. SCOTT. Are witnesses appropriate in this case to be called to

make the case if you are not going to rely on the prosecutor?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. One would think that if an impeachment article were voted out of this committee that the committee should

hear from an individual who has firsthand knowledge of the conduct on which an impeachment is based.

Mr. SCOTT. Should you rely on a presumption of guilt if the

President doesn’t prove his innocence?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Not in this country, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Should the specific allegations be made available to

the President before he has to respond? We have heard just today

that the gentleman from Arkansas notified the President that there

are other allegations that he might want to bring forward. The gentleman from Florida mentioned bribery as a possibility. The expansion and contraction of the scope of the inquiry changes daily and

hourly. What about the specific allegations being available before

the President has to respond?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. That is the normal way in which any sort of

judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is begun. The advocate for one

side who is bringing the matter, in some kind of a document, either

a complaint or other document, sets forth the basis and the substance of what it is he has claimed the other side has done wrong

so that the other side can then answer. It is I think a very difficult

process if one does not know with some specificity what the allegation is.

Mr. SCOTT. Is the title of the offense—we hear a lot about perjury, obstruction of justice and other titles of offenses. Do you need

more than the title of the offense in order to appropriately respond?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. There is no question that you cannot respond

to a claim of perjury unless you know what the false statement is

and then you can address whether or not a case has been made

out, or at least a prima facie case.

Mr. SCOTT. Now, in terms of whether or not it is an impeachable

offense, we have heard the title of the offense, perjury, being sometimes impeachable and sometimes not impeachable. How would you

measure—would you measure the title or would you measure the

effect it has had on the Nation? Mr. Hamilton, if you want to respond to that.
242

Mr. HAMILTON. I think you measure the effect it has on the Nation. You look at whether the offense is so great that it is dangerous to allow the President to remain in office.

Mr. SCOTT. And the title of the offense is not the measurement

but you would measure the effect. So whether it is obstruction of

justice, or whatever the title is, is not the measurement but the effect it has as far as it is a grave danger to the Nation?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Even in the narrow confines of what we are

discussing here, I have trouble understanding who was obstructed

and how that person was obstructed by the conduct we are talking

about.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. Before

recognizing the gentleman from California, just to make sure that

the documentation that has been submitted to the White House is

all printed at once, the Chair would ask unanimous consent that

the documentary appendix to the submission by counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United

States House of Representatives dated December 8, 1988 also be

printed overnight. Is there objection to that?

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I assume you meant December 8,

1998?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I stand corrected. It is this document.

Without objection so ordered. The gentleman from California Mr.

Gallegly is recognized.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. It has been a long day. We started

off a little over 8 hours ago. And for the past 8 hours we have been

listening very attentively to the President’s premier defense team.

Mr. Craig started off the morning by advising us today we would

be hearing to quote him ‘‘very powerful, to quote him, evidence supporting the President.’’ So far I have not heard any new evidence,

much less powerful evidence, that refutes the fact that the President lied under oath. Mr. Hamilton, do you believe that our legal

system is dependent on people telling the truth?

Mr. HAMILTON. Of course.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Do you believe that perjury represents an attack

on the integrity of our judicial system?

Mr. HAMILTON. Of course.

Mr. GALLEGLY. This morning and this afternoon, we heard testimony from two witnesses for the President, one Mr. Craig and one

Mr. Owens. Mr. Craig testified earlier that he believes the President did not lie under oath. This afternoon Mr. Owens stated that

the President did lie under oath. He didn’t say ‘‘I believe.’’ He says

the President did lie under oath. Mr. Hamilton, do you believe the

President lied under oath?

Mr. HAMILTON. I find the President’s testimony very troublesome. It was clearly evasive and misleading. I understand that tomorrow Mr. Craig is going—Mr. Ruff is going to make an attempt

to convince us all that it was not perjury.

Mr. GALLEGLY. But at this particular point, in your heart, do you

believe the President lied under oath?

Mr. HAMILTON. I find his testimony extremely troubling. I am

going to withhold judgment until I hear what Mr. Ruff has to say

tomorrow.
243

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Ben-Veniste, with a simple yes or no, do you

believe the President lied under oath?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Are you talking about—what proceeding?

Mr. GALLEGLY. Before the Federal grand jury.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Before the grand jury? I have trouble with

that. I have trouble with the grand jury proceeding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ben-Veniste. You both

are very capable lawyers and have a distinguished record. Mr.

Hamilton, can you give me very clearly your definition of what it

means to hold up your right hand and swear to tell the truth, the

whole truth and nothing but the truth so help me God?

Mr. HAMILTON. It means what you say.

Mr. GALLEGLY. It does not mean to deceive and does not mean

to minimize the truth?

Mr. HAMILTON. Of course not.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much. Based on what you have

seen and heard, do you think that the President has been truly

candid and totally honest with the American public, to date? To

date. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do I think—you mean in the past, do I think

today——

Mr. GALLEGLY. I mean today in view of the months of presentations he has had, civil deposition, grand jury, the August 17 and

the 81——

Mr. HAMILTON. He clearly has not been fully candid.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much. My colleagues, the President has had the choice of telling the truth, the whole truth and

nothing but the truth not on one occasion but at least on four occasions to the American public. First his deposition, second his grand

jury testimony, third during the address to the American people

and fourth just a few days ago in answering 81 questions submitted by this committee. It is clear in each of these four instances

that the President has been less than honest. I am disappointed

that the President has not presented any exculpatory evidence relating to these facts. I anxiously await tomorrow’s presentation. I

hope the President’s lawyers take seriously the need to rebut the

allegations that the President has lied under oath and that he has

lied to the American people, which I think compromises his oath

of office.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hamilton, Mr. BenVeniste, if you assume everything that Mr. Gallegly just said, that

the President was in fact less than honest, that he lied, has the

President engaged in impeachable conduct in your opinion? Is it

abuse of power?

Mr. HAMILTON. In my opinion, he has not engaged in impeachable conduct. He has engaged in reprehensible conduct. He has engaged in conduct for which I believe he should receive a sharp censure. Indeed I think he should agree to pay a substantial fine. But

I don’t think that he has engaged in conduct that demonstrates he

is a danger to America.

Mr. WATT. Mr. Ben-Veniste.
244

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I agree that the subject matter here which we

all know is about the President’s unwillingness to ‘‘fess up’’ to an

inappropriate relationship that he had with a young intern is the

core of everything that we are talking about. It is the core of what

he walked into when his deposition was taken. The Jones lawyers

were armed with the information that Linda Tripp had surreptitiously tape recorded from Monica Lewinsky. So they knew they

had something. The President didn’t know they had it. And the

President gave testimony as artfully as he could, I think, to try to

evade answering questions about Ms. Lewinsky. He should not

have done that. That is an understatement. The question is whether everything that springs from that, Mr. Starr criminalizing that

conduct by opening an investigation which in my view no other

Federal prosecutor in this country would go after, at least no one

of any reputable stature in this country. And then to try to draw

from that the concept of an obstruction of justice, putting him before the grand jury, asking questions about where he touched Ms.

Lewinsky, where Ms. Lewinsky touched him, on what day of the

week, in what place in the White House, in what month of the

year. How in the world can we be discussing removing a twice

elected President of the United States on the basis of this kind of

conduct? That is the question that I raise and that is, I think, the

issue of proportionality and common sense that the American public has grappled with and has come to some conclusion, I think, expressing their great common sense. As a trial lawyer, I see people

from all walks of life in the courtroom, and I have great respect for

their collective common sense.

Mr. WATT. So I take it from that that notwithstanding what Mr.

Gallegly said, you don’t think this is impeachable?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. That is correct, sir.

Mr. WATT. When Mr. Starr came before this committee, he made

some references to Mr. Jaworski and suggested that he thought

Mr. Jaworski would approve of the way that Mr. Starr had conducted this investigation. Would you give us your assessment of

that, Mr. Ben-Veniste?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, I had the opportunity to talk with Mr.

Jaworski’s grandson just the other day. Joe Jaworski, who practices law in Houston, Texas, told me he was rather appalled by the

comparison. I worked with Mr. Jaworski and quite frankly I was

quite skeptical when he came on board and took over for Archie

Cox, because, after all, Richard Nixon was the one who picked Mr.

Jaworski. He was a conservative Texan. He said he was going to

follow Mr. Cox’s mode of investigating, he would be beholden to no

one, he would conduct an independent investigation, and we were

all prepared to watch what he did more than what he was saying.

And by all accounts, his activity in not leaking and conducting a

fair and vigorous investigation but not taking any cheap shots at

the President, giving the President the benefit of the doubt, provides the model, I think, for all high profile investigations that

have come thereafter.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
245

I wanted to go back to a point that I was making earlier. That

is, that President Nixon’s misdeeds do not somehow establish a

threshold level of misconduct that must be met in order for there

to be an impeachable offense. Do either of you disagree with that

point?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I do not. God help us if we see that kind of

conduct again.

Mr. CANADY. Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. HAMILTON. No, I don’t disagree with that.

Mr. CANADY. Thank you.

Let me go on to make some comments about what I think is at

stake in the case that is before us.

When we look at the facts concerning the President’s conduct,

what do we find? I believe, based on my reading of the evidence,

that we find a pattern of calculated wrongdoing, a sustained course

of criminal acts designed to thwart the due administration of justice. I know some people believe this is all trivial. But I believe

that is what is going on.

We see evidence that the President last December—it starts in

December—lied under oath in answers to interrogatories. We see

evidence that in January he lied under oath repeatedly in his deposition in the Jones case.

And let me add that today we have heard the President’s lawyer

here before this committee affirm the obvious lie that the President

told then when he said that he had no specific recollection of being

alone with Ms. Lewinsky. Even Mr. Frank has recognized that that

was a lie. But yet the President’s counsel reaffirmed that lie before

us today. And we find in the evidence that the President in August

lied under oath before the grand jury to cover up and to avoid responsibility for his earlier lies.

Mr. Ben-Veniste, I believe you stated that you have got a problem with what happened before the grand jury and the President’s

conduct.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I have a problem with characterizing it as an

obstruction of justice. The President admitted to the grand jury.

Mr. CANADY. Mr. Ben-Veniste, I am sorry, you have made that

point. I have got some questions.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I thought you were asking me about it.

Mr. CANADY. If I have some time left, I will be happy to recognize you.

Then we find evidence along the way of various other acts in

which the President attempted to corruptly influence the testimony

of witnesses.

And, finally, I believe that we have evidence that the President

just last month lied under oath to this committee in answers that

he gave to questions propounded to him by the chairman of the

committee.

Now, how do we respond to this? How do we respond to this substantial course of wrongdoing that was sustained over a period of

a year?

Now, it has been argued essentially that we should forget about

it because the underlying cause of it was sordid. I don’t believe that

the sordidness of the underlying conduct is a mitigating circumstance. Indeed, it is not a defense against these allegations. I
246

think that just doesn’t make sense, that that is the claim that is

being made, that is the primary claim, that we should see all of

this go away, because the underlying conduct was sordid.

This was not some trivial lapse of judgment. The President

wasn’t blindsided. He was calculating every step along the way.

I believe that this is conduct that shows an utter contempt for

the judicial process in this country, it is conduct that shows utter

contempt for the dignity of the office of President, and it is conduct

that, by its very nature, undermines the integrity of the office. It

is conduct by the chief executive that harms our country and our

Constitution by undermining respect for the law.

Now, that is what we have before us, I believe; and let me end

by quoting again the first Chief Justice of the United States, Justice Jay, who said, ‘‘independent of the abominable insult which

perjury offers to the divine being, there is no crime more extensively pernicious to society. It discolors and poisons the streams of

justice and by substituting falsehood for truth saps the foundations

of personal and public rights. Controversies of various kinds exist

at all times and in all communities. To decide them courts of justice are instituted. Their decisions must be regulated by evidence

and the greater part of evidence will always consist of the testimony of witnesses. This testimony is given under the solemn obligations which——’’

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. CANADY. If I could just read one sentence here, in the middle

of a sentence, ‘‘is given under the solemn obligations which an appeal to the God of truth imposes. And if oaths should cease to be

held sacred, our dearest and most valuable rights would become insecure.’’

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California, Ms.

Lofgren.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, panelists, for being here today and for

your enlightening testimony.

Also, I just wanted to take a personal moment—I worked in a

lowly position during the 1974 inquiry, and I would like to express

my thanks to Mr. Ben-Veniste. You are someone who I looked up

to and admired at that time for the service that you gave to our

country then at a very difficult time.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Thank you.

Ms. LOFGREN. You did it skillfully and honorably.

Since you are here and because you do have experience in the

Justice Department, I want to ask you just a quick question before

I get to my real question. When Mr. Starr was before the committee, I asked him three questions, two of which had to do with when

he found out certain information and the third about whether he

would release reporters from their confidentiality bond. I recently

received a letter from Mr. Bitman saying that Mr. Starr wouldn’t

answer any of the questions that were posed and sent to him because of Justice Department policies. Can you think of any Justice

Department policy that would prevent Mr. Starr from answering

the three questions I posed to him, that he said he would answer?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No. Indeed, I would think that Justice Department policies would compel an answer, particularly to an oversight

committee——
247

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you for that.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE [continuing]. Investigating whether the Starr

investigation was somehow skewed, and whether there was an attempt to create an unwarranted appearance of obstruction of justice. I don’t say that that occurred, but I think there is an obligation to look at that.

Ms. LOFGREN. Nor do I. I just wanted an answer.

Let me follow up on something that you mentioned in answer to

Mr. Nadler’s questions earlier. You mentioned that there were

other things that perhaps should maybe have been looked at by the

Independent Counsel, other witnesses that might have been called.

You are familiar with the Independent Counsel’s investigation, and

you have a lot of experience as a prosecutor and an investigator.

Do you think there were areas that merited further investigation

by his office? Were there witnesses who were not called to testify

before the grand jury who should have been called, who might have

given a greater picture of the truth? Do you have any advice for

us on that?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. There was one anomaly that I found in looking

through the volumes of material that Mr. Starr produced to this

committee, and that was the fact that the individual who, by Ms.

Tripp’s admission and by that person’s own admission, put Ms.

Tripp up to tape recording was never put before the grand jury.

That person is Luciane Goldberg.

If you look in the appendix that Mr. Starr submitted, at page

1225 on there is an FBI 302 report that shows that on January 22,

1998 Ms. Goldberg was served with a grand jury subpoena duces

tecum to appear, testify and bring evidence to the grand jury. And

yet there is no indication anywhere that I have seen that Ms. Goldberg was, in fact, compelled to go before the grand jury. And, as

we know, this grand jury was fully capable of asking its own questions.

And so there is no answer in the Starr referral to questions

about what Ms. Goldberg did with information, the tapes that she

had in her possession, the information she was getting on a daily

basis from Ms. Tripp and, perhaps more importantly, whether Ms.

Goldberg or others were guiding Ms. Tripp in some way. None of

those questions or answers are before us in any record because, as

far as we know, Ms. Goldberg was never put before the grand jury.

At page 1227 of the Starr supplemental appendix there is an FBI

302 report that shows that 7 months after she received the grand

jury subpoena, Ms. Goldberg was interviewed by an FBI agent

working with Mr. Starr. That report raises some very interesting

questions. I have not heard those questions discussed in this committee. Maybe it has been done in executive session or maybe you

have received information that I have not heard about, but it

seems to me——

Ms. LOFGREN. We can’t say what we do in executive session, but

we can say what we don’t do in executive session. That is something we have not done in executive session.

You have provided us with some newspaper articles, and in the

New York Times article you mentioned with the headline that you

didn’t write about Mr. Starr, you mentioned the ‘‘unseen hand’’ possibility. Understanding that we have a high standard for offenses
248

against the State, what would the ‘‘unseen hand’’ mentioned in the

article have to do with any of what has been brought to us?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Mr. Sensenbrenner, if I may answer.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. A sentence or two. The gentlewoman’s time

has expired.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Surely. I think when you are considering

something like removing the President of the United States you

ought to know whether somebody has created something and put

it in motion to take him down. Public confidence in the process demands an answer to that question, and I think it is the obligation

of this committee to investigate that possibility. I am surprised to

hear, frankly, that Mr. Starr had not responded to the follow-up

questions in that area. I don’t know what the committee’s procedure is for enforcing that.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Craig is out of the room as far as I can see, but this third

panel, I want to keep score here. Again, no criticism of these two

witnesses. They were invited here by Mr. Craig to testify. But this

is now zero for three in terms of anybody who can present any facts

related to this case. No facts being presented here, no evidence.

And I would remind committee members of what Mr. Craig told

us this morning: ‘‘Let me assure the members of this committee

and the Members of the House of Representatives and the American public of one thing. In the course of our presentation today

and tomorrow, we will address the factual and evidentiary issues

directly.’’ Not yet. Zero for three. Three panels, no facts, no evidence.

Mr. NADLER. Point of parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from South Carolina has

the floor, and interruptions are only allowed when the holder of the

floor yields. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. INGLIS. I don’t have time to yield. I am terribly sorry.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman will proceed.

Mr. INGLIS. Mr. Hamilton, on an issue, though, that I think you

can testify here about, you are an officer of the court, a lawyer, is

that correct?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. INGLIS. If you have a client on the stand who commits perjury to your knowledge, what do the cannons of ethics require you

to do in that case?

Mr. HAMILTON. The District of Columbia cannons are a little bit

different than the ABA model rules. Basically, a lawyer is supposed

to tell his client that he should correct his testimony. If the client

doesn’t do that, the lawyer withdraws from the case.

Mr. INGLIS. In that case, isn’t it clear that what is happening

there is that perjury is such, as Mr. Canady was just exploring,

such a pernicious thing that it trumps the client’s right to rely on

counsel because in that case the lawyer must disclose this to the

client and in many jurisdictions disclose to the court as well, correct?

Mr. HAMILTON. In some jurisdictions, yes.
249

To answer your question, the lawyer’s obligation as an officer of

the court in that circumstance supersedes his obligation to his client.

Mr. INGLIS. The only point I would make to everyone listening

here in the committee is that, for those of us who are officers of

the court, it shows how crucial this matter of telling the truth in

court is, that it trumps the attorney-client privilege.

Mr. Ben-Veniste, I understand——

Mr. HAMILTON. It doesn’t trump the privilege. The lawyer still

has no obligation to reveal his client’s perjury. But he does have

an obligation to take some steps to disengage.

Mr. INGLIS. I understand.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. And obviously this only occurs when the lawyer has actual knowledge that his client has lied.

Mr. INGLIS. Let me ask you a different question that has to do

with something else.

I understand that there is a regular conference call from the

White House that deals with communications efforts of the White

House. Is that true, to your knowledge, that there is some regular

conference call, if I understand it, at 11 o’clock possibly on every

day of the week? Is that about right, to your knowledge?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I have participated on an irregular basis in

what may be a more regular conference call.

Mr. INGLIS. So you participated in this call?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. From time to time.

Mr. INGLIS. So then——

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. In recent weeks.

Mr. INGLIS. The evidence you can give here—actually, we have

found something that you can testify about in terms of facts and

evidence——

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. There is a lot I can testify about.

Mr. INGLIS [continuing]. Would be the effectiveness of the spin

machine at the White House, which is interesting. Have you participated in calls that sort of coordinated the attack on Ken Starr,

I wonder?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, there are no such calls——

Mr. INGLIS. No calls——

Mr. BEN-VENISTE [continuing]. To my knowledge.

Mr. INGLIS [continuing]. Involving Ken Starr?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Coordinating some attack on Ken Starr?

Mr. INGLIS. Excuse me?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, sir, I am unfamiliar with a call coordinating an attack on Ken Starr.

Mr. INGLIS. So you haven’t participated in any such calls?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, sir.

Mr. INGLIS. Well, it is an interesting fact that you could testify

about. If we had more time maybe we could develop what is discussed on those calls, because it is a masterful operation. Those are

facts that you could testify about, and I wish that Mr. Craig had

let us know that ahead of time so that we could ask you about the

facts that you could actually testify about.

Because neither of you—not any criticism of you, but neither of

you can testify about the facts in this case; and, unfortunately, Mr.

Chairman, once again zero for three. The third panel, no facts.
250

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. For what purpose does the gentleman from

New York——

Mr. NADLER. A point of parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. State your inquiry.

Mr. NADLER. My inquiry is that the gentleman from South Carolina just again stated that there has been no factual submission,

implied that Mr. Craig, who said that there would be a factual submission today——

Mr. BUYER. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. That is not a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. NADLER. My inquiry is——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. State your inquiry.

Mr. NADLER. My inquiry is, was that side of the aisle not served

with this material or was the gentleman being dishonest and misleading the television viewers by implying that there was no such

submission made?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is not a proper parliamentary inquiry; and the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank both of the members of the

panel for their presence and acknowledge as well their astuteness

as lawyers and having a special insight into the proceedings we

know as Watergate.

Mr. Ben-Veniste, let me thank you as well for your kind words

about Leon Jaworski, who I had the honor and pleasure of working

for and know full well the somberness and the high position he

held his role and responsibility in Watergate.

A simple question to you before I begin. Did Mr. Jaworski ever

leave his position as a prosecutorial implementator and move to

the witness chair and become a fact witness?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, he did not.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. To your knowledge?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, of course not.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me then proceed with words from Daniel

Webster known as the March 7 speech in 1850 right before the long

and elongated discussions about slavery and the potential Civil

War in this Nation. He said simply, ‘‘I wish to speak today not as

a Massachusetts man, not as a northern man but as an American

and a Member of the Senate of the United States. I speak today

for the preservation of the union. Hear my cause.’’

We come now almost to the end of this process, and I would like

to thank Chairman Hyde, who is not in the room right now, for his

kindness in the running of today’s proceedings. I have a running

objection on the time and the inability of many witnesses to answer

questions, but I thank him for the way he has offered to those of

us who disagree to answer or to ask our questions.

It is at this time that I call upon him as well for a matter of good

faith and to heal this country. We should have any opportunity to

present, as I have supported over the past couple of weeks, a censure resolution to heal this country and to address these circumstances. What troubles me is the precedent that is being set

today or over these past few hearings that we have had, one in un251

dermining the institution of the presidency and how this is played

to the American people. And the exaggeration of the gravity of

these allegations such that children in American schoolhouses are

believing that those who may tell untruths will go unpunished.

And so I have some questions both for Mr. Hamilton in his recounting of the allegations against President Nixon as it relates to

abuse of power—you started out in your presentation that the allegations included unlawful wiretaps, concealing evidence of the

wiretaps, secret investigative units such as the plumbers who, to

my chagrin, to my appalling understanding, broke into a psychiatrist’s office of an American. Could you ever imagine? And then the

use of the CIA and the FBI.

My question to you, as I read from allegations of our Office of

Independent Counsel, as he charged abuse of office: ‘‘The President

repeatedly and unlawfully invoked the executive privilege to conceal evidence of his personal misconduct from the grand jury. The

President refused six invitations to testify to the grand jury, thereby delaying expeditious resolution of this matter, then refused to

answer relevant questions. The President misled the American people and the Congress in his public statement on August 17, 1998.’’

And might I just simply say, they refused to acknowledge that

the Paula Jones case was dismissed, that she appealed it and then

she settled it. They refused to acknowledge that. Mr. Bennett questioned the lack of clarity of the question to the President.

But my question, Mr. Hamilton, does this equate so that the

American people will not believe that we are here covering up the

Nixon case—the Clinton case? Do we have the same abuse of

power?

Mr. HAMILTON. There is no comparison between the Nixon case

and the Clinton situation in my judgment. The Nixon case involved

serious repeated abuses against the State, violations of the constitutional rights of individuals.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will you heal this Nation and provide for us

a censure resolution and stop the farce and the theatrics of what

is going on in this matter?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The clock runs at the same rate for one of

the members of the committee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I would hope that the members would be

respective of the time. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Along those lines, I

would like to thank both of these gentlemen for their participation

in the process today and for your answers to Mr. Canady’s question, which you indicated earlier that the standards in the Nixon

impeachment, the Watergate proceedings, are not a standard to be

followed for impeachment. Is that correct, Mr. Ben-Veniste?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. They are not a threshold.

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. That is what I am looking for. And I

take it you agree with that, Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. HAMILTON. I don’t think they set the bottom position of the

bar. But I do think they are indicative of the type of conduct we

should look at when we are considering impeachment.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I agree with that.
252

Mr. GOODLATTE. Certainly. Certainly. But you see, I think that

the whole purpose of the White House’s presentation today has

been to try to raise the bar to that standard. And I think that that,

plus this effort to suggest that somehow the motives of the majority

of this committee are somehow wrong, are the efforts of the White

House today.

And, Mr. Ben-Veniste, you actually set this story straight a long

time ago, long before you ever heard of Paula Jones or Monica

Lewinsky, long before Bill Clinton was ever on the national scene.

You wrote a book back in 1977 called ‘‘Stonewall, The Real Story

of the Watergate Prosecution’’ by Richard Ben-Veniste and George

Frampton, Jr. In that, in the closing, you wrote about the Watergate proceeding:

’’Did the system work? True, the nationally televised debate and

vote on articles of impeachment was a shining hour for the House

Judiciary Committee. But all in all, the total course of the committee’s investigation exposed the extreme political nature of impeachment.’’ This is about the Watergate proceeding.

‘‘The cumbersomeness of the process, its politicization, and the

unwillingness of so many in Congress to recognize objectively the

stark facts of criminal wrongdoing that were put in front of them

make the Nixon impeachment case an unpromising precedent.’’

Here is where I think you are so farsighted, more farsighted than

anybody who has been before the committee today: ‘‘Next time

might it not be a potent defense for a President charged with

wrongdoing to argue that his conduct, however improper, fell short

of the spectacularly widespread abuse of the Nixon administration.

If Watergate or more is what it takes to galvanize the impeachment mechanism, can we really rely on it to protect us in the future against gross executive wrongdoing?’’

Let me ask you about the title of the book, Mr. Ben-Veniste,

‘‘Stonewalling’’. That is an effort to obstruct justice, to keep the

process from moving forward, from discovering the truth. Is that

not an accurate definition of that?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. The title of the book came from Mr. Nixon’s

injunction to his subordinates, to stonewall, to deny everything, to

blame everything on the lower level individuals so that the higherups would not be detected.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask you this. Do you believe that President Clinton has engaged in stonewalling in this matter?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I believe that President Clinton tried to obfuscate from the very beginning a very inappropriate relationship of

a private nature about which he was, I am sure, and should be,

ashamed.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask you this. Is exercising executive

privilege over personal matters and not public matters, is inventing

new forms of executive privilege, is coaching witnesses about what

may have previously transpired, is engaging in efforts to suborn

perjury and to get your Cabinet officials and other members to go

out and repeat falsehoods, are all of those stonewalling devices?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No, I do not believe those are stonewalling devices.

Mr. GOODLATTE. You don’t think those are comparable——
253

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Stonewalling devices that were involved in

Watergate involved individuals denying such things as the misuse

of the FBI, the misuse of the CIA, the misuse of the Internal Revenue Service to inflict pain and embarrassment upon enemies of the

President of the United States.

Mr. GOODLATTE. I think you have just changed the definition of

stonewalling.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and members. The last time I spoke I talked about Mr. Hyde’s discussion of

lying back in 1987, and I want to continue on that because I find

these discussions about lying and perjury intriguing and troublesome. Intriguing because we discuss it in very interesting ways. We

discuss lying as if it is fallen to us and if there are no gradations

of lying that we understand and deal with on a daily basis.

Judge Higginbotham, when he was here, talked about gradations

of lying and we pretended not to know what he was talking about.

It appears we are reticent to discuss our knowledge and experiences with lying because we want to send a message about our own

honesty and credibility. I humbly submit to this committee that it

does not make us less than honest human beings to recognize that

there are lies and there are lies. The court recognizes, and that is

why there is a legal definition for perjury. I believe that we make

these distinctions every day, with our children, our families, our

friends, our colleagues. Most of us would like to be as strong and

truthful as we can be, and many of us work at trying to correct our

faults and our weaknesses.

In these hearings, we are attempting to hold the President to a

standard that needs to be seen in context. Clearly the President’s

indiscretions are not impeachable. As Members of Congress, we

take an oath and we swear to uphold the Constitution. The public

does not believe politicians are as honest as we should be. They believe we are far too often guilty of extramarital affairs, violation of

FEC laws, misuse of government resources, misrepresentations,

promises not kept. The people do not necessarily demand expulsion

of us for our poor judgments and less than candid actions. The public will know the difference between these actions and actions that

defy our oath of office.

We are often criticized because of the ways we deal with situations. Why are we trying to send a message about our honesty, our

lack of honesty, by attempting to communicate our belief in zero

tolerance? Nobody believes us. And we further damage our credibility by attempting to make this President’s indiscretions impeachable. The public does understand inconsistency and lack of candor.

Let me just put on the record the questions that I wanted to ask,

and I will continue to ask of our chairman:

Mr. Chairman, did you lead the defense of the Reagan administration during the Iran-Contra hearings in 1987 when President

Reagan and his top national security advisers were accused of lying

to Congress and the public about their secret arms sales to a terrorist state? Did you argue forcibly for a more nuance view of lies

and deception? Did you in fact say lying is wrong but context

counts?
254

Mr. Chairman, did you say while Reagan aides may have lied,

they did so for the larger purpose of fighting communism in Central America? In 1987, Mr. Chairman, did you say, ‘‘It just seems

to me too simplistic to condemn all lying,’’ and I further quote, ‘‘In

the murkier grayness of the real world choices must often be

made.’’

Mr. Chairman, do you agree with Charles Tifer, a deputy counsel

to the Democratic members of the special Iran-Contra investigating

committee, who said, ‘‘Henry Hyde of 1987 listened to Oliver North

confess to an incredible career of lying to Congress, and he excused

it.’’ Mr. Chairman, do you agree with Mr. Tifer, who said, ‘‘We are

dealing with hard core obstruction of justice, where documents

were destroyed and phony chronologies were concocted at meetings

on which all conspirators agreed the goal was to lie, and Mr. Henry

Hyde condoned that.’’

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

Ms. WATERS. I have got more the next time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I would ask unanimous consent that the

other questions of Mr. Hyde be placed in the record, if that is what

the gentlewoman from California wishes.

Ms. WATERS. No, I have got to keep telling them to you.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I hope those questions were not directed to

the present occupant of the chair.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. You would note that the gentlelady from California

wants to propound detailed questions of the chairman but she has

no questions to ask of the President nor of his conduct.

As I have heard some of the witnesses testify today on how unfortunate it has been for the committee to be so partisan, as if partisan is only defined by Republicans doing something and not perhaps even what the Democrats are doing. I mentioned it earlier.

There is tremendous coordination in this town not only between

you and Mr. Ben-Veniste, you go out on MS–NBC, you are one of

the talking heads out there.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No Gong Shows.

Mr. BUYER. I have a specific question for Mr. Hamilton. I noted

in your testimony you are endorsing a concurrent resolution of censure. My question is, what would be the actual purpose of a censure? What would be the objective purpose of the censure? And

what would be the effect of the censure?

Mr. HAMILTON. The purpose of the censure would be to condemn

the President’s conduct. The effect I think would be significant. We

all have read how the President values his place in history. I think

if a concurrent resolution was enacted by the Congress with heavy

participation by the Democrats, as I believe would happen, that it

would have a pronounced effect on the President.

Mr. BUYER. The question was actual purpose and what would be

the objective purpose. If you have to draft a censure resolution that

condemns his conduct, are you then suggesting that within a censure, in order to do that there is some pronouncement perhaps of

guilt on the President, on what he had done?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the Congress has discretion to put in that

censure resolution what it wants to put in there, and I would assume that there would be some pronouncement of guilt. I do not
255

have a draft in my pocket to show you, but I would assume there

would be.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Ben-Veniste, let me ask you the very same question about actual purpose, objective purpose and the effect of a censure.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Censure has been so infrequently used in our

country to bring forward a strong and clear disapproval of conduct,

that it is my view that this is not a slap on the wrist, but rather

a device which is proportionate and appropriate to the misconduct

committed by the President. Insofar as I have been asked about my

statement 25 years ago about Watergate, there is a gulf between

the crimes of Richard Nixon, what is an impeachable offense and

what we have here before us.

Mr. BUYER. Let me reclaim my time because I don’t want to get

back to Richard Nixon. The reason I asked this question, gentlemen, is because of case law. In order for a legislative measure to

survive a bill of attainder prohibition, it must pass the threepronged test.

The test requires that the actual purpose, the objective purpose

and the effect are not punitive. Courts are directed to examine the

legislative intent of the measure to see if the intent was to punish.

If the objective purpose was solely remedial, the measure may not

qualify as punitive. Similarly, if the intent of the measure is to

defer future acts of the same nature, it is likely not punitive.

So the problem we have here is a bill of attainder, it pronounces

the guilt of a party without any forms or the safeguards of a trial.

So if you do a censure and the President may face indictment when

he leaves office, we have now prejudiced his case.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to that?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. A sentence or two.

Mr. HAMILTON. A concurrent resolution of censure would not be

a bill of attainder because it would not be legislation signed by the

President. It would be a measure adopted by the two houses. It

would not be an unconstitutional bill of attainder.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ben-Veniste, as a former U.S. Attorney, you surely have extensive experience in bringing cases before grand juries and securing indictments. Indeed, you were deeply involved in the bringing

of indictments in the Watergate cases before a grand jury in a

nearby Federal district court, so I think you know what a grand

jury does. You know the level of scrutiny it employs and what purposes it serves.

For that reason I would like to hear your views on an analogy

that it seems we are hearing more and more about as we approach

this vote on impeaching the President of the United States which

will likely take place Saturday, probably about 4 o’clock, just before

the network news and in time to make the Sunday morning papers,

I would guess. Not that I would think that that would be a political

question, but this analogy draws a parallel between the work that

this committee and the House must do with respect to the

Lewinsky matter and the work of an ordinary criminal grand jury.
256

And under this perspective, we on the House side of the Hill apparently exist for little other reason than to serve as a ready conduit for scandal between the Office of Independent Counsel and the

United States Senate, and we simply flow this referral through us

and give sort of a stamp of approval and send it over to the Senate

for trial.

Now, personally I think that this analogy is a mistake. It is a

grave mistake for our country. But I think that it is put forth by

those who wish to send the following message to Republican House

Members who are still struggling in good conscience with the impeachment issue. That is, vote for impeachment, it doesn’t mean

that you want the President to be removed from office, it doesn’t

make you responsible for whatever happens over in the Senate

when they have a long trial and it breaks down. It is politically

safe. All you are saying is, ‘‘Hey, look, there’s enough here, why

don’t you guys over in the Senate handle it.’’

What do you think of this attempt to draw the analogy between

us, this committee and the House, and an ordinary criminal grand

jury?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think that your responsibility, because it is

constitutional in nature, is far beyond the responsibility of a grand

jury when you consider articles of impeachment. That man whose

portrait is here in this room, I can tell you, was so burdened by

the question of impeachment of a President of the United States

which had been placed on his shoulders that it showed through to

every American who saw those proceedings. Peter Rodino cared

deeply about what his committee would do and how it would affect

America, and the responsibility to be fair and complete and to be

as unbiased and impartial and bipartisan as possible, because he

was speaking directly to the American public, which then had to

determine whether this cataclysm of impeachment was warranted.

Mr. MEEHAN. I want to get to the grand jury testimony on August 17 of this year by the President, and I would like to ask you

a couple of short questions.

It is interesting why and how the President was called before the

grand jury. But I am interested, at the time the President was

called before the grand jury, do you believe that Ken Starr had any

thought of seeking an imminent indictment of the President for

civil deposition perjury?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I have no idea what Mr. Starr thinks about.

Mr. MEEHAN. Let’s assume he wasn’t intending to seek an imminent indictment of the President in a civil deposition for perjury.

Would he summon the President before a grand jury at that time

for indictment purposes, or could it be perhaps he would wait until

closer to the date in which he would be seeking an indictment, or

willing to seek an indictment?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. The latter would be true, but the practice in

the United States in Federal prosecutors’ offices is not to summon

the target of an investigation before a grand jury.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me be clear and remind everyone once again as to what is going on today. We have

the final two members of today’s panels, witnesses number 8 and
257

9 today, who are in here on behalf of the President, testifying favorably for the President as a part of the 30 hours of testimony or

time the President had to make his case.

Both of you gentlemen are very experienced in trial law and

know that oftentimes people who testify are independent and don’t

have any dog in that hunt, so to speak. Sometimes they have biases and prejudices. You both have made something of a disclosure

before you testified, but in the interest of broader and fuller disclosure, quite frankly, Mr. Ben-Veniste, you had the opportunity to,

I think—Mr. Craig has been here as the President’s lawyer today.

You had the opportunity to serve in that capacity at one time, but

declined that opportunity, or declined that job, did you not? It was

offered to you, was it not?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Let me say that my feeling about this

matter——

Mr. BRYANT. I understand. In the interests of full disclosure, I

am not making any allegations. I just wanted to know, were you

offered his job and you turned it down?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I don’t think that would be an allegation. I

think any individual who is a lawyer in the United States——

Mr. BRYANT. In your preliminary testimony you mentioned some

things I thought were fair disclosure. I am trying to make sure that

everybody understands you also had the opportunity to be the

President’s lawyer.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. It has been reported in the newspaper, sir, if

I may, that discussions were held as to whether I would come on

board in some way. My view about that was that the issues of impeachment of the President go so far beyond the question of the defense of this particular President, that although it would be a great

honor for any lawyer to be selected to counsel the President of the

United States.

Mr. BRYANT. Okay. You have answered that fully.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. To talk in a broader way.

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Hamilton—he answered it fully, I think. I have

5 minutes. I don’t have time for a filibuster.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I hope I wasn’t trying to filibuster.

Mr. BRYANT. As counsel for the President, for the Clinton-Gore

transition team for nominations and confirmations, you were the

lawyer in 1992 and 1993?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Yes.

Mr. BRYANT. And you also mentioned voluntarily that you defended the case or you were involved against Mr. Starr somehow

in the case against Vince Foster. You argued that case, I believe?

Mr. HAMILTON. Nine days before Vince Foster died he came to

see me about legal representation. I took some notes. Mr. Starr

wanted those notes. I thought those notes were protected, both by

the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege.

Mr. BRYANT. I understand. People are familiar with that case. I

wanted to know, did you in fact represent Mr. Foster’s estate?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. BRYANT. You did. I am listening to my colleagues, and as

time goes by we talk about how we want the facts, and how we

have been disappointed that these nine witnesses have made essen258

tially no presentation as to the facts, and that we should wait on

this 184-page document.

As part of that, I have quickly looked at about one-third of it,

and in that it says that—somewhere along here, it says we are not

going to be attacking Kenneth Starr anymore, and our submission

to the committee is going to talk about the facts.

But just quickly, in the first 50 pages or so, I counted—we talked

about sex earlier in his report, but I counted Mr. Starr’s name, or

the OIC or the Independent

Counsel, 42 times, just in a quick glance at the first 50–something pages.

I hope—and this I guess is a message to Mr. Craig as the President’s lawyer—I hope the balance of the 130 pages are more fruitful in terms of giving us, once and for all, some defense of the

President based on facts and not on attacks of Kenneth Starr. I

yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is important to note that in fact we have received 184 pages of the submission from counsel for the President related to facts and related to

evidence.

I think it is also time to put out here as a matter of public information that members of the minority have heard that there are

draft articles of impeachment that have been written by staff counsel to the majority.

I would respectfully suggest that tonight that those draft articles

be produced for the President and for minority. If that is not the

case, I stand corrected, but at least that is what has appeared in

the paper, Mr. Chairman. I am making that request a formal request.

I also want to pick up on something that Mr. Inglis has alluded

to during the course of his questioning. He talked about facts and

he talked about evidence, and he suggests that after three panels,

we haven’t heard from any fact witnesses.

He is correct. During the entire course of this committee’s work,

we have not heard from a single fact witness. Those panels that

have been produced here by the committee chair have been very informative, but none of them have contained a single fact witness.

So we are now on the verge of making a decision of extreme gravity

without having heard from one fact witness, either produced by

counsel for the President or produced by the committee.

Again, I want to read something in the record drafted by—it is

part of the committee report, and it is drafted by Mr. Schippers,

the chief majority investigative counsel. This is his language:

‘‘Monica Lewinsky’s credibility may be subject to some skepticism

at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. That credibility will of

necessity be assessed, together with the credibility of all witnesses

in the light of all the other evidence.’’

Well, I wonder what stage Mr. Schippers was referring to, because, as it has been stated here today, we are ready to take a vote

at the end of this week. Maybe he was referring to a trial in the

Senate. But since this is a House document, I presume that Mr.

Schippers was referring to House proceedings.
259

Now, having said all that, I think what I am hearing, and it is

a point, it is a legitimate point from members of the majority side,

that in there—in some of the individual members’ opinions, they

perceive grave damage to be done to the judicial system by what

they suggest is perjury and obstruction of justice, despite the fact

that we have not heard from any fact witnesses.

At the same time, I think it is important for the American people

to understand that those schoolchildren down in Texas that Mr.

Smith referred to when he read their letters should be reassured

that the President of the United States, if he has violated the

criminal code, is still in legal jeopardy. He can be prosecuted if a

prosecutor makes that decision, and, depending on the verdict, if

it should get to a jury, can be incarcerated. The President of the

United States is like every other American citizen.

You know, when we talked about Mr. Starr as a witness, he is

certainly not a fact witness, and in fact, I thought it was interesting when Mr. Starr acknowledged to this committee that not only

had he not participated during—in FBI interviews, nor had he attended grand jury hearings, but he had never met Monica

Lewinsky.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the chairman. We just received a little

while ago this 184 pages, I think, that is the submission by the

President’s attorneys. This is supposed to be their answer to the

facts, even though none of the witnesses here have really addressed

the facts, as has been brought up a number of times. But this is

supposed to talk about the facts and clear up everything.

On page 77—and I haven’t had a chance, and I doubt whether

any other member has had a chance to read the whole thing. But

on page 77, in the President’s attempt to clear up whether he was

alone with Ms. Lewinsky, and that he of course had indicated that

he couldn’t remember, or that he wasn’t alone with her—the President’s submission indicates, and this is their statement: ‘‘The term

‘alone’ is vague unless a particular geographic space is identified.’’

That is supposed to clear up the definition of ‘‘alone.’’ Let me

read that again. ‘‘The term ‘alone’ is vague unless a particular geographic space is identified.’’

Mr. Ben-Veniste, let me ask you, can our system of justice work

at all if witnesses parse words like this, when the commonsense

meaning of a word, like ‘‘alone’’, ought to be pretty clear?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I agree that there has been too much hairsplitting and too much parsing of language in all of this. But can

I say that surely the question of whether the President said he was

alone or not alone on a particular day with a particular individual

with whom he was having a consensual relationship cannot, in the

wildest expansion of the concept of high crimes and misdemeanors,

justify the impeachment of the President.

I agree with you in connection with your frustration over this

parsing of language.

Mr. CHABOT. I would agree with you, if it was only that one lie

about whether or not he was alone with her. But there is a whole

series of lies. I only have 5 minutes, so let me get on.
260

Mr. Hamilton, in your opening you claim that the President’s

conduct should not be impeachable, and I quote, ‘‘because other

Presidents have not been candid.’’ Isn’t this an argument for impeachment? Don’t we want our Presidents to be honest, rather than

giving them the opportunity, for example, to lie before a grand

jury, or lie to Federal judges?

Mr. HAMILTON. Congressman, I think I said that I don’t find the

President’s conduct impeachable for a variety of reasons, principally because it is not a great and dangerous offense against the

State.

But surely we don’t want our Presidents to lie or our Congressmen to lie or our Senators to lie. But sometimes they do, and I

think the question is, when we find that they have, do we want to

initiate impeachment proceedings? I think there is some judgment

that comes in here, some proportionality.

Mr. CHABOT. Certainly there does have to be judgment. Let me

give the full quote. You said that ‘‘Lying to the public and his cabinet and aides is disgraceful, but if we would impeach all officials

who lie about personal or official matters, I fear that the halls of

government would be seriously depleted. Other Presidents, for example, Lyndon Johnson as to Vietnam, have not been candid in

their public and private statements.’’

Now, the President said, for example, that he would pull the

troops out of Bosnia in a year. That was 3 years ago. They are still

there. I don’t think that is impeachable. But he was not testifying

before a grand jury. He hadn’t raised his hand and sworn to tell

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

That is the whole point here, is that this President apparently

lied under oath, committed perjury. That is why many of us are seriously considering whether or not this President should be impeached and removed from office. I yield back the balance of my

time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If we have accomplished

one thing today, I think we have accomplished something important. That is that many instances today the majority members

have talked about the fact that the President has not presented

any exculpatory facts.

It has been referred to earlier, but here it is, 184 pages. If I’m

getting the sense of it, from page 54 on, the great bulk of the testimony of the President’s counsel relates to specific rebuttal, specific

factual rebuttal of the claims against the President; that the President did not commit perjury, that the President did not obstruct

justice, that the President did not tamper with witnesses.

In analyzing some of the President’s counsel’s response, I would

like to address the issue of perjury, because that is the issue that

seems to have captured the imagination of most of the Republicans

in the House. Let’s talk about what that perjury, alleged perjury,

is, at the grand jury.

The President admitted to an inappropriate intimate relationship

with Monica Lewinsky at the grand jury that was physical in nature. He acknowledged that his conduct was wrong. What the

President denied at the grand jury was having sexual relations
261

with Ms. Lewinsky, only as that term was defined by the Jones’

lawyers and substantially restricted by Judge Wright.

The President failed to go into the details of his encounters with

Ms. Lewinsky, and he did testify that he did not have sexual intercourse or sexual relations, as defined by the Jones deposition.

Mr. Schippers, the Republican counsel for the committee, in his

presentation to this committee, analyzed that the discrepancy between the testimony of President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky over

the precise nature of the physical contact involved in their relationship—that was the basis for an allegation that President Clinton

perjured himself before the grand jury.

I would respectfully submit that the American people understand

full well what an affair entails. They understand that it is not

going out for coffee. And what the American people need to understand and what I would like Mr. Ben-Veniste, for you to address

to the American people and to those so-called moderate Republicans that have yet to make up their minds, what is this perjury

before the grand jury about? Do I have it right?

Is it about the discrepancy of the great detail by Ms. Lewinsky

as opposed to the admission by President Clinton that it was

wrong, that it was a physical relationship, that it was intimate, but

he didn’t tell us all of the precise details? Is that what the perjury

is all about?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. It seems to be. It seems to be what the perjury

is all about, or the claim of perjury is all about. I have to say that

if that is what it is, then simply using the word ‘‘perjury’’ does not

convey the discrepancy between the remedy we are talking about;

that is, to disenfranchise all of the United States in its election of

the President, taking away their vote, nullifying it, and saying, he

cannot be President anymore because he did not testify to these details in the grand jury. To me, that is mind-boggling.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. Indeed, that might be mind-boggling, but

that is not the situation we are faced with, Mr. Ben-Veniste. You

know very well that essentially what we are faced with is not simply a statement about an improper sexual conduct and an argument over the plain meaning of language regarding a court definition, but whether or not it is appropriate for a President to make

statements in court for the purpose of either establishing or not establishing a pattern of activity that is deemed relevant to a lawsuit

involving the civil rights, the constitutional rights, of a citizen.

So you may, along with your colleagues on the other side of the

aisle, keep simply saying that this is about a particular statement,

but it really isn’t.

Mr. Hamilton, I find, similar to other statements that we have

heard here, rather disturbing, where you say in your statement

that the President lied, that he unlawfully invoked executive privilege repeatedly, abused power, and so forth; yet these don’t rise to

the level of an impeachable offense. I’m sure that we could engage

in a discussion for the entire remainder of my 5 minutes and I’m

not going to convince you otherwise.

It just strikes me as odd that learned attorneys who have extensive experience in representing parties, including the United
262

States, in court believe that it is appropriate for a President who,

not just an average citizen but the President of the United States

of America, in your opinion, lies under oath, unlawfully invokes executive privilege, commits abuse of power, yet should remain in office.

Mr. HAMILTON. Congressman, I did not say it was appropriate for

the President to lie in office. You are mischaracterizing my statement.

Mr. BARR. The only way we have under the Constitution, Mr.

Hamilton, unless you can pull out your copy of the Constitution

and show me otherwise, to remove a President is impeachment.

You are arguing that we should not impeach the President.

Therefore, you are denying to us—you are saying that the one

method we have of removing a President for these things, which

you agree he committed, should not be available; then yes, by implications you are saying that that President should remain in office. We don’t have any other way of removing a President from office for these sorts of abuses of office. Censure, even if we censured

the President in the most horrendous language possible, called him

all sorts of names, would not remove him from office. Even if we

reprimanded the President in the most horrendous terms, it would

not remove him from office.

I would certainly presume that you would agree that the only

method in our Constitution, the only method available to us, because we can’t control whether a President resigns or not, to remove a President for whatever the behavior is that we believe is

impeachable, is impeachment. Is there some other way of removing

a President in our constitutional form of government?

Mr. HAMILTON. You have a way if he is disabled.

Mr. BARR. Pardon?

Mr. HAMILTON. If the President is disabled, there is a way.

Mr. BARR. We are certainly not contemplating disabling the

President. Maybe you have some——

Mr. HAMILTON. You asked me a question, whether it was the

only way. My answer is if the President is disabled there is another

way.

Mr. BARR. That is sort of silly. There are provisions in our Constitution that address a President who is disabled. That is not a

method of removing a President from office that is available to us.

I certainly would never contemplate that, anyway.

What I am saying is it really does strike me as very, very odd

for you all—and you are not alone, I know there have been many

defenders of the President that have sat in those chairs today and

in the prior hearings that we have had, and I’m sure we will have

more tomorrow that will sit in those same chairs and admit that

the President lied under oath, that he abused office.

I commend you for at least recognizing that he has unlawfully

abused the privileges available to him, such as executive privilege.

Many of your colleagues won’t even admit that. But yet then you

say that this President should remain in office. And particularly

with somebody with a distinguished career, that has represented

the United States of America, both of you, that really does strike

me as odd. I think that sends a very, very bad message to the country.
263

That, I think, Mr. Ben-Veniste, is what does damage to our country’s reputation and the ability of our President to conduct foreign

affairs, not the fact that we might remove him for those sorts of

behaviors.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. If you have some actual empirical evidence of

that, that would be contrary to what I hear when I talk to foreign

nationals about what is going on in this country.

Mr. BARR. My empirical evidence is the same as yours, what they

tell me.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to get

back, if I may, to what I believe these hearings are all about. We

have heard a great deal of conversation from my friends on the

other side of the aisle that what these offenses are all about and

what we should do about them has to do with whether we are

going to enforce the rule of law in America or not, and whether we

are going to send the right messages to our children and to others

involved in the judicial—in the justice system as litigants or defendants.

I agree that the rule of law is important, critically important to

our system of justice and our way of life in a civil society. That is

why there are penalties, civil and criminal penalties. I dare say to

my friends on the other side of the aisle who trivialize what President Clinton is going through, and think that he might be a model

to those who would avoid telling the truth, the following: The

President of the United States has just agreed to pay Paula Jones

and her lawyers $850,000 for his misconduct during the Paula

Jones matter.

Is that an incentive for people to lie in civil litigation? The President did not get away with anything there, did he? The fact that

President Clinton is still subject, when he leaves office, to being

criminally charged for any of the charges raised by Mr. Starr, and

could go to prison for his misconduct, his alleged misconduct, is

that an incentive for people not to tell the truth, the whole truth,

and nothing but the truth under oath? Of course not. So all of the

incentives to uphold the rule of law are there already.

We are not talking about whether we want our kids to respect

the truth. It is there already, and will be applied against the President. What we are talking about is what we are responsible for, upholding the Constitution. The Constitution says how the President

gets hired, elected, and gets fired: Treason, bribery, and other high

crimes and misdemeanors.

We have to decide whether the President’s conduct not should be

punished, but—it has already been punished and may very well be

punished criminally in the future. We are deciding whether, as a

Nation, we must remove the President. So I daresay that the arguments about upholding the rule of law, we have already taken care

of that discussion.

One could argue that the penalty of impeachment and removal

far exceeds the crime, and that censure is a better approach. I have

not yet made my mind up on the charges raised by Mr. Starr. The

hearing has not been concluded. But I will say to you this, that in

my judgment a clear and convincing standard of proof must be met
264

by those who would seek the President’s impeachment and removal, and that it, of necessity, requires fact witnesses when the

testimony relied on by Mr. Starr, is equivocal, is ambiguous, is contradictory, and is qualified, as the President’s counsel has addressed.

So we have one prosecutor, Judge Starr, saying the witnesses say

this and it means this, we have the President’s counsel say the witnesses said this and mean this. We are left to decide in the middle.

Let me say that we are founded by a Nation of those who were

loathe to take the word of government officials only, and put the

burden of proving guilt on the accuser, and did not require the accused to prove his or her innocence. To put the burden of proof on

the accused, in this case President Clinton, is not only to subvert

the Congress’ impeachment power, but 200 years of American justice. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I thank

both of you for being here. It has been a long day. You are the

third panel which has been here, consisting of two very good lawyers testifying—not representing, testifying for the President of the

United States today.

As I understand your testimony, both of you think that the President has engaged in wrongful conduct. Is that correct?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. JENKINS. Both of you think that the President has violated

the law?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Perhaps.

Mr. JENKINS. Perhaps?

Mr. HAMILTON. Certainly his testimony is most troubling.

Mr. JENKINS. Perhaps, and the testimony is most troubling. Both

of you, in any event, believe that some remedy for this situation

is appropriate?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Yes.

Mr. JENKINS. Both of you believe that. And you have talked

about censure, fines, and reprimands, and perhaps one or two other

possible remedies.

Now, to follow up on what Mr. Barr was asking, and I will try

to leave time for you to respond to this, but I am concerned, in

reading the Constitution, it says that in the event there is a violation, the remedy for that is removal from office. Some people don’t

like to call it a remedy, some don’t like to call it punishment, but

whatever you call it, the Constitution provides that removal from

office is the appropriate action to take.

Now, I am not directing this at you, but this entire day has reminded me of that lawyer strategy that is used across this land

whereby, if the law is against you, you argue the facts; if the facts

are against you, you argue the law; if the law and the facts are

both against you, then you attack the prosecutor, and certainly the

special counsel has been attacked time and again in this room.

Now, the very resourceful Washington lawyers have added a new

dimension to that, and in addition to attacking the prosecutor, they

have said, well, tell them how bad Watergate was to this country.
265

So if I ever get back to practicing law, I may use this down in Tennessee.

But my question to you is, do you not have any concern, either

of you, for what the Constitution says insofar—and we don’t know

what is going to happen, it may never get to the point where there

is a remedy employed, and that will resolve that question. But in

the event that this proceeding gets to the point where there must

be some remedial action taken, then do neither of you have any

concern for the words of the Constitution that say that removal

from office and that additional remedy of not holding public office

again, do you not have any concern for that?

Mr. HAMILTON. Congressman, clearly that is a remedy that is set

forth in the Constitution. That does not mean that there are not

other remedies.

The House is governed by a rules manual. If you look in the first

pages of that manual, there is something that is called Jefferson’s

Manual that was written by Thomas Jefferson when he was the

Vice President and was, therefore, the President of the Senate.

In Jefferson’s Manual, he says that a resolution is a way that a

House can express its opinions, its purposes, and its principles. If

you look in the footnote that is written by the Parliamentarian of

the House, the Parliamentarian says in modern practice a concurrent resolution is the means by which the Senate and the House

express their opinions and their purposes and their principles.

So there is a legitimate way to do it that has been recognized

since the time that Thomas Jefferson was Vice President, which

was before 1800.

Mr. JENKINS. But that—thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The Chair is aware that there are two members who wish to

make requests to include material in the record.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I wish to include a letter I had given

to the chairman at the same point as the letter from Mr. Conyers.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. I would like to enter this newspaper article from Sunday’s Washington Times.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Is there any further request to include material in the record?

Mr. GOODLATTE. I would ask that the Wall Street Journal article

of today’s date be included in the record.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. A further request?

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have two articles, one dated November 1993:

House Panel Reportedly Draws up Clinton Impeachment Charges,

and one dated November 28, 1998, Impeachment Articles Being

Drafted.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to include those.
266

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, they are included.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson

Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit

in its entirety the Constitution of the United States of America,

which does not denote any prohibition on censure.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I believe the committee has already printed that.

Mr. BUYER. I object.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman from California

have a request?

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to take you up on your offer

to place my questions to the Chairman in the record about his past

comments.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. You are talking about the real Chairman,

not the acting Chairman?

Ms. WATERS. The real Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Chair will put the question, without

objection.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. For what purpose does the gentlewoman

from California——

Ms. LOFGREN. I ask unanimous consent to submit for the record

my two letters to Mr. Starr and my letter to the Attorney General

relative to the three questions I asked Mr. Starr, and my seeking

of answers to those.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Anybody else? Going once, going twice.

The gentlewoman from California.

Ms. WATERS. I would like to submit the L.A. Times article that

I referenced by Mr. Savage relative to 1987, and the comments by

our chairman, the real chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Wisconsin has been

very patient, and is recognized.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I seek a clarification. It was

noted that the Constitution is already cited in the record of these

proceedings. Is that accurate, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I said the committee has already published

the Constitution elsewhere.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will get a review on this and raise the question again tomorrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. That request is withdrawn, without

objection.

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Several of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have been

keeping score tonight and have said that this is the third panel

where we haven’t had a material fact witness on behalf of the

President. They are absolutely correct. Now, at the end of 3

months, if you are keeping score, as they have, there have been
267

zero material fact witnesses to push this investigation and zero material fact witnesses in defense of the President. Again, the score

remains zero to zero, which sort of highlights the bizarre nature of

these proceedings. We have heard hours and hours of testimony on,

talked to ourselves for hours and hours, and still not heard from

a single individual who was supposedly involved in this. That

points to some of the problems with the impeachment.

I just want to take a minute or two to talk about my perception

as to why we are having problems here. I think there are three reasons why the American people are opposed—at least the majority

of the American people—are opposed to impeachment.

I am going to advance, first, the one that I hear most often from

my Republican colleagues, and that is that the economy is doing

well. The stock market is doing well. People are working.

That might be true. I must say I never thought that I would hear

my Republican colleagues in Congress being frustrated by a good

economy, but certainly I think that that is part of the reason, that

the economy is doing well, inflation is low, unemployment is low.

Darn it, it was that Democratic president who was in office when

that happened.

The second reason, and the one that I hear least often from my

colleagues here, is that the American people think there is something wrong here, there is something going on. It can be characterized as attacks on Ken Starr. I frankly prefer to center my attention on Linda Tripp, because I think that she is the one that, in

many aspects, is the focal point here.

I don’t think it is necessary to hold Ken Starr’s office culpable

for the mistakes, but when you have a situation where the cooperating witness for the Independent Counsel is also working very,

very closely with the attorneys for Paula Jones, there is something

wrong here. When we are doing something as grave as talking

about setting aside the only national election in this country and

there are questions about her role and the role that is being played

by the political enemies of the President, in some respects I think

that is a greater danger to democracy than anything we are talking

about here tonight.

The third reason I think is that many Americans think that

these are not impeachable offenses.

I was at home over the weekend. I wanted to buy some hock ham

on Sunday. The grocer said to me, ‘‘I will tell you, the President

screwed up.’’ And his language was much more colorful than that.

He said, ‘‘The President screwed up. But the question is, was it Bill

Clinton the President, or Bill Clinton the man?’’ He said, ‘‘I think

it was Bill Clinton the man who screwed up, and we should deal

with it. It wasn’t Bill Clinton the President.’’

As you analyze what should be an impeachable offense, if we can

take a piece of paper and draw a line right down the middle and

on one side you put offenses against the body politic, offenses

against our democracy, those that we talked about in terms of Watergate, I think most of us would agree that those are offenses that

are impeachable.

On the other side of the ledger, you have offenses that are committed by a person. And I have heard individuals talk about murder. I would think that murder would be an impeachable offense,
268

even though it is not an offense against the State. That is sort of

at the high end, even though it is committed by the person. At the

low end would be jaywalking. I don’t think anybody would talk

about that.

But in the middle you have perjury. You have perjury for things

like murder, but then you have people who say that their odometer

was wrong when they got a speeding ticket. If that were the case,

we would have a lot more malpractice, a lot more product liability

suits against odometer makers than we have.

But people are lying there. I think there is a gray area.

So what it comes down to is, what is the best thing to do for this

country? There is not a single person that I have yet to talk to who

thinks the President is going to be removed from office. So we are

going to slap him in the face. We are going to either slap him in

the face with censure or impeachment. Impeachment drags this

matter out for several months and divides the country. Censure,

also a slap in the face. Both have only been done once in this Nation’s history.

So, in both instances, we are either going to censure the President for the second time in this country’s history or we are going

to impeach the President for the second time in this country’s history. I opt for censure, which I think is the least divisive or the less

divisive of the two.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to first make reference to my friend from Virginia,

Bobby Scott. He has mentioned twice today a question and a statement that I made to Mr. Craig, the White House counsel, the President’s counsel.

I was providing with specificity, at his request, the concerns I

have about perjury. So the whole idea was not to bring up a new

idea, but it was to be very specific and respond to his requests.

There have been some questions asked about the evidentiary

record in this case. I want to make it clear, in my own judgment—

and I believe it is clear—that this committee has the burden of

proof. There is not any question about that. If the House goes forward, the President has no burden of proof. It is this body that has

the burden of proof. And it is not, in my judgment, by preponderance. It should be a high standard, because we are talking about

impeachment of the President of the United States.

So as I look at these facts, the burden of proof is on those who

wish to go forward with articles of impeachment. We should make

that perfectly clear. It should be a high standard.

Now, to the evidentiary record on perjury, I don’t know that

there is a whole lot in dispute here. It appears to me that there

is a growing consensus that the President lied under oath.

Now, there is a debate as to whether this is legally perjury or

whether it is simple lying under oath. But I think there is a growing consensus. We don’t need to have a lot of witnesses, if any witnesses. The record is clear.
269

Obstruction is a little bit more difficult. You have to use a lot of

common sense. You have to apply other evidence to support the

particular witnesses in the case. You have to analyze that more.

Let me go to the questions about perjury. I think this is an extraordinarily serious area. Questions have been raised about Mr.

Starr, about Linda Tripp, about other figures in this inquiry.

To me, it comes down to the fact that when the President testified in front of a judge in a civil deposition, a Federal proceeding,

he had a choice to make, either to tell the truth or not to tell the

truth. Regardless of what has happened in the investigation, when

it went to the grand jury, Alan Dershowitz and everyone else was

riding him, whatever you do, tell the truth in the grand jury. It

could very well cost you your presidency.

He had a choice to make. To blame it now on Starr or Linda

Tripp, really, it is not helpful. I think you all would agree as lawyers that you cannot excuse a decision he made, if he made a decision not to tell the truth, on anything else but his own decision.

Is that fair?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. The question, all the way up to the grand jury,

there are two things. One, he had another choice, and that was not

to respond in the civil deposition and to take an appeal and to take

that up.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is true.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. In connection with the grand jury, I again

question the materiality and, indeed, the entire basis for claiming

that perjury was committed. Because maybe I am missing something, but . . .

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I agree. That is a legal question there that we

can debate. That is not conceded. Materiality, all those issues on

perjury, you can debate. But the truthfulness, the decision to lie or

not, is the President’s decision—either answer, don’t answer, tell

the truth or don’t tell the truth.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. That is true.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Would you agree, Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am going to run out of time here in just a

few minutes.

I want to thank you gentlemen for testifying. Quite frankly, I

wanted to hear you because I have a high regard for both of you,

but you are put in an awkward situation to help us make a decision, and you have no information that will help us make that decision. But I respectfully receive it.

We are getting down to the ‘‘lick log’’ in this case, as they say

on the farm in Arkansas, and we have to make a decision. It is not

an easy one. Thank you for testifying.

I wanted to end with a quote from 1974, since we have spent so

much time reflecting on that proceeding. This is a quotation from

a Member of Congress in his remarks to this committee. ‘‘But I am

happy to say tonight that most of the people in my own State of

Arkansas are law-abiding citizens who believe strongly in the rule

of law in this country and that all of the people in this country

have an obligation to live by that standard of law and that the

leaders of the country have an obligation not merely to obey the

law but to set an example of justice and adherence to justice upon
270

which our free government must be based. There can be no national interest greater than the requirement that the public servants must be bound by the laws that they make and administer.’’

That statement was made by representative Ray Thornton of Arkansas, who is now on the Supreme Court of Arkansas. I reflected

on that last night. I think that is still the attitude of the people

of Arkansas. I just wanted to bring that to everyone’s attention

today.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ben-Veniste, you discussed earlier in your prepared remarks

your suggestion that it would be appropriate and constitutional for

the Congress to reprimand the President for his personal conduct.

Without getting to the parsing of words again, what do you mean

when you say it would be appropriate for us to reprimand the

President for his personal conduct?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. By which I mean to make the distinction between the meaning of high crimes and misdemeanors in the category of treason and bribery, versus the conduct with which you

are now struggling. And it seems to me entirely proportionate, reasonable and in the greatest interest of this country to apply a commonsense and moderate approach to the conduct in question and

the kind of remedy with which you will deal with that conduct.

And in my view, a reprimand, be it a censure, be it a rebuke, but

a formal declaration of disapproval of the conduct is the appropriate remedy.

Mr. PEASE. I understand that. My question still is when you

say—let me back up. I’m not interested in us addressing in a reprimand, in a censure, in an impeachment, the President’s personal

contact, whatever it may have been, with Ms. Lewinsky. I do think

it is appropriate for us to address the question of his behavior before judicial proceedings in their various forms. That is the distinction I was getting to.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. All of that conduct, if I may, flows from his

personal conduct. He appeared in his personal capacity before the

lawyers and the judge in a deposition in a civil matter. He appeared in his personal capacity before a grand jury. I think that

is the distinction.

Were he to have lied about the misuse of power, say he had

someone on this committee, Mr. Barr, for example, audited by the

IRS, or had his phone bugged by a plumber’s unit, or broke into

a psychiatrist’s office for the purpose of obtaining records, all of

those things would indeed rise to a level of scrutiny.

Mr. PEASE. I understand. Thank you.

Mr. Hamilton, in your prepared materials you discussed the

issue of abuse of power, and I don’t recall that you got into the

question of executive privilege, but can you explain for us briefly

your understanding of that concept?

Mr. HAMILTON. I did get into it in my prepared statement. There

are several types of executive privilege, but one type is what is

called the deliberative privilege. When the President speaks with

his aides to obtain their advice, that conversation is presumptively
271

privileged. That, by the way, is what the district court found, that

those conversations were presumptively privileged.

The court went on and found that the needs of the criminal justice system outweighed the President’s presumptive privilege, so

the court ordered the conversations and the information to be

turned over. This is essentially what happened, by the way, in the

Watergate situation. The Supreme Court found that President Nixon’s tapes were presumptively privileged, but the needs of the

criminal justice system, in this case the need in a trial, outweighed

that.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you. Can you help me understand how on the

one hand it can be argued that the President’s behavior, his conduct, was purely personal, but yet he asserts executive privilege

about behavior that he also contends is purely personal?

Mr. HAMILTON. I was not obviously in the conversations, and

some of this information was in a sealed transcript. But I understand that certain of these matters, the Lewinsky matter and all,

was discussed in the White House in determining what official actions the President was going to take. It had some ramification. I

can’t give you any details on that. Maybe that is a good question

to ask Mr. Craig tomorrow.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to begin by

agreeing with my friend, Mr. Barrett, that we actually have a good

economy with a Democratic President, and I would like to point out

that that fact, the fact that the economy is going well in spite of

a Democratic President, is maybe the best case, maybe the best

case for not exaggerating the threat of impeachment proceedings to

the country.

Now, Mr. Ben-Veniste, did you know that Sam Dash was going

to resign before that—from the Office of Independent Counsel before that became public?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. No.

Mr. CANNON. One of the nice things about being at the end of

the panel, besides going through a long process, is that you get to

sort of put things together as we go.

I would like to speak to a couple of points made by my good

friend, Mr. Rothman, who pointed out first of all that the President

is going to be punished to some degree, $850,000, and humiliation;

an $850,000 penalty in the Jones case, and that should teach children that perjury is not appropriate. May I just point out that I

don’t think this is about punishment.

Secondly, in the case of the $850,000, the President may have decided to do that because of the box he is in publicly, but I think

that went to settling the base case with Ms. Jones.

Mr. Rothman talked at some length, and I agree with much of

this, about the rule of law. Let me suggest that the question here

is not the rule of law or not having the rule of law, but rather the

kind of weight that we give here to perjury.

There has been a great deal of comment today that we have

heard about what happened in the Watergate circumstance, situation. That has established what I would call a very high bar for impeachment. I might say that this bar seems to be a lot more clear
272

today after 24 years and after having come to a national consensus

that what went on was wrong. I recall distinctly during the time

how vicious and partisan that all was.

On the other hand, we have a great deal of talk also about an

alternative, and that alternative would be some kind of censure.

The bar with censure is actually quite low. You may raise that bar

a little bit by talking about a penalty, but of course you can’t penalize the President unless he agrees. And you may also have him

come and stand in the well of the House and abase himself before

the House, something that I think would do great damage to the

office of the President and not be appropriate.

I find myself at this time really searching for where we ought to

go. I think most Americans who care about these proceedings are

also looking at some of these same questions. Interestingly, the

facts are not really in question. We talked about the zero for zero

with the fact witnesses.

But we do have a prima facie case. We have a case that has been

made, and many people have acknowledged that, essentially even

trying to say that even if true, these actions wouldn’t have been

impeachable. Both of our current panelists have talked about or acknowledged wrongdoing on the part of the President.

Mr. Owens earlier said that he thought the President had lied

to the grand jury and had lied in the civil action about Paula

Jones. He also said earlier than that that the facts are pretty clear,

by which I think he meant that the President had actually committed perjury.

Those people who support the President have variously called his

behavior deplorable, I think is a term Ms. Jackson Lee used, reprehensible is a term Wayne Owens used, sinful is a term that Mr.

Craig used, obscene has been used, morally wrong, indefensible, inappropriate, and improper. All these pejoratives from the supporters of the President imply sex rather than perjury.

And I think there is an attempt when we use those kinds of

terms to avoid the real issue here, which I believe is perjury.

Frankly in trying to tie these issues up, Mr. Owens looked at the

Republicans and sort of blamed us for people becoming aware of

some of the President’s most lurid actions, when it was in fact the

vast majority of all of Congress who voted for the release of the

documents that made those actions by the President public.

Professor Drinan pointed out that one of the major differences

between this hearing and that of 1974 is that Republicans are in

the majority. I would suggest that the fact that Republicans joined

Democrats in 1974 says more about Republicans then and Democrats now than it does about the difference between the crimes of

President Nixon.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Lindsey Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. Where did Mr. Rogan go?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Rogan is ill and went home.

Mr. GRAHAM. I am sorry, I apologize.

Very important, you made some statements that really, Mr. BenVeniste—is that right?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Yes, it is.
273

Mr. GRAHAM. I think I understand what you are saying about the

type of things that you would want to impeach a President for, and

the types of abuse of office that becomes threatening to the public.

If a President focused on a political enemy or someone that could

affect the President adversely, and started using the power of the

presidency or the power of the government against that small individual, that would trouble you, right; Watergate stuff, is that correct?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. If he——

Mr. GRAHAM. If he wiretapped an individual, somebody that was

a potential threat to their political interests, personal interests,

monetary interests—let’s just say political interests—or they got

the IRS to kind of audit that person, then that really bothers you,

doesn’t it?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think that is an abuse of power, yes, sir.

Mr. GRAHAM. If I can show a reasonable fact pattern that suggests such an event occurred with Bill Clinton, would you have a

different opinion about this as being a little more than about sex?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I am certainly willing to listen to your argument, sir.

Mr. GRAHAM. You just need to tune in tomorrow.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Oh.

Mr. GRAHAM. Let me ask you this. About his perjury, about the

body parts being contacted, I think most of us really believe if that

is all there is to this, let’s just let it go. Count me in that category.

Count me in that category. We will do something to him other than

impeach him.

When the President, according to Mrs. Currie, came to her after

his deposition testimony and made these statements, do either one

of you know what he was trying to do? Here is what she claims

he said: ‘‘You were always there when she was there, right? We

were never really alone? You could see and hear everything?’’ This

is really important. ‘‘Monica came on to me, and I never touched

her, right? She wanted to have sex with me, and I couldn’t do

that.’’

What do you believe the President was trying to do when he

made those statements?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I don’t know.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. We

will talk about this tomorrow.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Finally, last and certainly not least, the

gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Bono.

Mrs. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always get the same introduction every time.

Mr. Ben-Veniste, I want to address this to you. We were on a

panel together, you were in New York, I was here in Washington.

We didn’t get to complete our dialogue. I would like to do that now,

if I may, without Larry King present.

I am curious which tape you saw first, between the Paula Jones

deposition or the videotape of the grand jury testimony.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I don’t think I have seen any tape of the Paula

Jones deposition. I am pretty sure I have not.

Mrs. BONO. All right. So you just read the transcript?
274

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I am not sure that I read the entire transcript.

I probably did not.

Mrs. BONO. You have read parts of the transcript in the Paula

Jones case?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I have read parts that were reproduced in the

Starr report.

Mrs. BONO. My question is not going to be legal, obviously. These

brilliant minds, I leave that up to them to do that argument. By

the time it gets to me, Mr. Graham and I have questions that are

great and written, and we lose them. And by the end of 37 people,

I am stuck with what is left in my gut.

My question for you is if you have read parts of the transcript.

I don’t know that many Americans have read even that much of

the transcript of the Paula Jones testimony. I am wondering if you

believe that if the American people saw the testimony of the deposition before the Paula Jones case, if they might feel differently

about the perjury case; if they would, when they saw the President

lie, if they juxtaposed the two, Paula Jones and grand jury, how

would they feel then? Would they be more inclined—would the poll

numbers be different than they are?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Well, when I saw the President’s testimony before the grand jury on videotape and I listened to what people were

saying, I think they understood that the President was reacting as

a human being who had done something about which he was

ashamed, and which was a very human reaction.

I think the idea of not disclosing a personal relationship with an

individual with whom he should not have been having that relationship was troubling to him, and I think it is quite clear that he

did not want to tell anybody about it in connection with that very

highly politicized Paula Jones case. Whatever that case was about,

dismissed by the court now, the tangential matter of Ms. Lewinsky,

which the court ruled was not central to Ms. Jones’ allegations

against the President, was something that the President clearly

wanted to evade talking about. And I don’t think he did it the right

way, and I don’t think it is appropriate to lie in depositions, but

it happens every day.

Every time there is a civil case in which one party says X and

the other party says Y, one says black, one says white, usually

after all of that happens, the matter goes to a trial, if it is not settled before that, and then a jury decides, was it black, was it white,

was it X, was it Y, and then the loser loses, the winner wins, and

no one gets prosecuted for perjury.

Mrs. BONO. All right, can I just jump back into my original question, I think it is a good one. If the American people saw the testimony of the President in both situations, would they feel differently, would the polling numbers which are so important to the

Democrat side of this aisle, would those numbers be different if

they actually saw the President lying to them?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I don’t think I can answer your question. As

much as you have worked on it, it has a lot of parts to it, and I

think we will just have to see. And I am thankful that you are the

last person to question us this evening.

Mrs. BONO. Thank you very much. We all appreciate your time,

and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
275

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman yields back the balance

of her time. The Chair is about ready to make the most controversial statement of the day. The committee stands recessed until 8

a.m. tomorrow.

[Whereupon, at 8:58 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene

at 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, December 9.]

(277)

IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY:

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

PRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE

PRESIDENT

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1998

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 8:12 a.m., in room 2141,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde [chairman of

the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Henry J. Hyde, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Bill McCollum, George W. Gekas, Howard Coble,

Lamar S. Smith, Elton Gallegly, Charles T. Canady, Bob Inglis,

Bob Goodlatte, Stephen E. Buyer, Ed Bryant, Steve Chabot, Bob

Barr, William L. Jenkins, Asa Hutchinson, Edward A. Pease,

Christopher B. Cannon, James E. Rogan, Lindsey O. Graham,

Mary Bono, John Conyers, Jr., Barney Frank, Charles E. Schumer,

Howard L. Berman, Rick Boucher, Jerrold Nadler, Robert C. Scott,

Melvin L. Watt, Zoe Lofgren, Sheila Jackson Lee, Maxine Waters,

Martin T. Meehan, William D. Delahunt, Robert Wexler, Steven R.

Rothman, and Thomas M. Barrett.

Majority Staff Present: Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., general counselchief of staff; Jon W. Dudas, deputy general counsel-staff director;

Diana L. Schacht, deputy staff director-chief counsel; Daniel M.

Freeman, parliamentarian-counsel; Joseph H. Gibson, chief counsel; Rick Filkins, counsel; Sharee M. Freeman, counsel; John F.

Mautz, IV, counsel; William Moschella, counsel; Stephen Pinkos,

counsel; Sheila F. Klein, executive assistant to general counselchief of staff; Annelie Weber, executive assistant to deputy general

counsel-staff director; Samuel F. Stratman, press secretary; Rebecca S. Ward, officer manager; James B. Farr, financial clerk;

Elizabeth Singleton, legislative correspondent; Sharon L.

Hammersla, computer systems coordinator; Michele Manon, administrative assistant; Joseph McDonald, publications clerk; Shawn

Friesen, staff assistant/clerk; Robert Jones, staff assistant; Ann

Jemison, receptionist; Michael Connolly, communications assistant;

Michelle Morgan, press secretary; and Patricia Katyoka, research

assistant.

Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law Staff

Present: Ray Smietanka, chief counsel; and Jim Harper, counsel.
278

Subcommittee on the Constitution Staff Present: John H. Ladd,

chief counsel; and Cathleen A. Cleaver, counsel.

Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property Staff Present:

Mitch Glazier, chief counsel; Blaine S. Merritt, counsel; Vince

Garlock, counsel; and Debra K. Laman.

Subcommittee on Crime Staff Present: Paul J. McNulty, director

of communications-chief counsel; Glenn R. Schmitt, counsel; Daniel

J. Bryant, counsel; and Nicole R. Nason, counsel.

Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Staff Present: George

M. Fishman, chief counsel; Laura Ann Baxter, counsel; and Jim Y.

Wilon, counsel.

Majority Investigative Staff Present: David P. Schippers, chief investigative counsel; Susan Bogart, investigative counsel; Thomas

M. Schippers, investigative counsel; Jeffrey Pavletic, investigative

counsel; Charles F. Marino, counsel; John C. Kocoras, counsel;

Diana L. Woznicki, investigator; Peter J. Wacks, investigator; Albert F. Tracy, investigator; Berle S. Littmann, investigator; Stephen P. Lynch, professional staff member; Nancy Ruggero-Tracy,

office manager/coordinator; and Patrick O’Sullivan, staff assistant.

Minority Staff Present: Julian Epstein, minority chief counselstaff director; Perry Apelbaum, minority general counsel; Samara

T. Ryder counsel; Brian P. Woolfolk, counsel; Henry Moniz, counsel; Robert Raben, minority counsel; Stephanie Peters, counsel;

David Lachmann, counsel; Anita Johnson, executive assistant to

minority chief counsel-staff director, and Dawn Burton, minority

clerk.

Minority Investigative Staff Present: Abbe D. Lowell, minority

chief investigative counsel; Lis W. Wiehl, investigative counsel;

Deborah L. Rhode, investigative counsel; Kevin M. Simpson, investigative counsel; Stephen F. Reich, investigative counsel; Sampak

P. Garg, investigative counsel; and Maria Reddick, minority clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HYDE

Chairman HYDE. The committee will come to order. If the panel

would be kind enough to turn their nameplates around. You know

who you are, we would like to know who you are. Thank you very

much. Good morning.

The committee will come to order. Today we will hear from the

fourth panel of witnesses. Panel witnesses will each have 10 minutes to make a statement. After the testimony of the witnesses,

members will be allowed to ask questions for 5 minutes. I ask that

the members please pay attention to their time and be aware that

their questions should be asked and answered within their 5 minutes. The reason for that is it takes over 3 hours to cover the members under the 5-minute rule. To make this meaningful, we have

to watch our time.

Immediately following this panel, the committee will receive the

testimony of White House Counsel Charles Ruff. After his presentation, members will question Mr. Ruff under the 5-minute rule.

After the members have questioned Mr. Ruff, the committee counsel may question him.

Thursday morning, tomorrow morning, we will have a presentation by minority chief investigative counsel Abbe Lowell at 9 a.m.

and a presentation by chief investigative counsel David Schippers
279

at 1:00 p.m. Immediately following Mr. Schippers, we will begin

consideration of a resolution containing articles of impeachment for

our deliberation. We will hear opening statements from all members Thursday evening.

Friday we will begin consideration and debate of articles of impeachment. At this point my thinking is to provide a 10-minute allocation for every member to make an opening—my present thinking is to allow 10 minutes for each member to make an opening

statement. I think 10 minutes is adequate and in balance.

I also know that you would like copies of any articles of impeachment that we may have. Let me just suggest to you, they are still

works in progress. We think it improper, improvident, to issue any

documents until we have heard the testimony. Changes are occurring as we speak. But as soon as we have a document that we feel

fairly is a working draft that we can stand behind, we will get it

to you.

Mr. SCOTT. Will the gentleman yield?

Chairman HYDE. I certainly will yield.

Mr. SCOTT. As you know, Mr. Conyers and I wrote a letter asking

for the specific articles to be available at least 48 hours before we

had to take action on them. It would seem to me that if we are

going to consider the factual basis and go through the record to determine what the facts are and to propose amendments and to determine whether or not, with specificity, they actually constitute

impeachable offenses that we would need some period of time, and

48 hours before we start having to deal with them, I think, is a

minimum amount of time. Will we have 48 hours before we

have——

Chairman HYDE. The actual amendment process would not begin

until Friday morning. We will try to get you something by early

afternoon today. But they are still being drafted and I am unwilling to provide working papers and nothing more. We will give you

a workable draft, fairly solid in terms of the final product, by early

afternoon today. And you won’t need the amending process until

Friday morning.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will the gentleman yield?

Chairman HYDE. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think you answered the question. If there

were a desire to amend or to add to or to distract from, detract

from this process of working together on these, it is an open process?

Chairman HYDE. You mean, you want to help us draft articles

of impeachment?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In the spirit of bipartisanship, I want to know

if the opportunity is open.

Chairman HYDE. Indeed, the amendatory process will permit you

to draft them any way you would like and we will give them full

consideration.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Or undraft them?

Chairman HYDE. Oh, yes, undraft.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The final question, Mr. Chairman, is as you

well know, the votes will probably come very late in the day or possibly Saturday. Would we have an opportunity for an explanation

of our votes before we vote?
280

Chairman HYDE. I originally thought 5-minute opening statements and then 5 minutes at the end of the final vote, but I am

persuaded by one of your members that a 10-minute opening statement is probably the procedure of choice. So we will all have plenty

of opportunity to talk, and a 10–minute opening statement I hope

will suffice. And then at the end we can vote and, as the phrase

goes, get this behind us.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I think you have done an adequate

amount of time. My guess is that by the end, the opportunity we

will have to explain ourselves will substantially outpace the interest anyone has in hearing our explanation.

Chairman HYDE. I want to associate myself with the sentiments

of the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Chairman HYDE. Yes.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Also in the spirit of bipartisanship, can we

get a commitment on the Democratic side that the majority will

have copies of amendments in advance so that we can prepare arguments and also any resolution of censure that the Democrats

may offer?

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Just a second. First of all, they have to have

the documents so they can know how to amend it.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I am aware of that.

Chairman HYDE. So that would come first. Then I am sure they

would give us their proposed amendments in adequate time for us

to study them.

The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. FRANK. Two things. First, I think obviously there is a major

resolution that could be done, but I would say, while it may be possible to do some of the amendments, as the gentleman from Wisconsin knows, because he is an able legislator, sometimes you do

decide during the process because of the ebb and flow of the argument that you might want to offer an amendment. So I think that

is an undertaking I think you can try, but I would never be able

to commit——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. Yes.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. How about a censure resolution? Can we

get a copy of that just like you are asking for a copy of our——

Mr. FRANK. I will trade you a copy of it for a vote on it on the

floor.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I think, if the gentleman will yield further,

I think, you know, we have been dealing in good faith in saying

that we would give you copies of the proposed articles in advance.

I would hope that the gentleman from Massachusetts would seriously consider reciprocating with any proposed censure resolution

that the Democrats——

Mr. FRANK. Let me say, first of all, I am speaking in the absence

of the Ranking Minority Member, but, yes, if there is a censure resolution ready, I am sure people will——

Chairman HYDE. I have no doubt that we will have mutual exchanges of documents. Mr. Rothman?
281

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am concerned about

the response from Judge Starr to the questions raised——

Chairman HYDE. We have written him a letter.

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may just finish, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I am sorry. I was trying to anticipate your

question.

Mr. ROTHMAN. I saw yesterday, it was distributed, a copy of a

letter under your signature and Mr. Conyers’ signature, asking

Judge Starr to answer the questions that had been previously forwarded by the Democratic minority and others. You had indicated

that you had hoped that he would have them by the end of the

week. I would certainly hope and I am—first of all, I very, very sincerely appreciate the Chair’s efforts in getting these answers to

these questions. I believe Judge Starr indicated during his testimony that he would be happy to provide them, then he wrote back

and said, he was not sure if he would, unless both parties agreed.

And now that the Chair and the ranking member have put it in

writing, I am hopeful that the Chair will be able to get from Judge

Starr these answers before we debate and before we vote.

Chairman HYDE. I understand they are not much help if we have

already had the debate and vote. We will attempt to move that

process along. I don’t like to give deadlines to anybody, but we will

do our best.

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may just finish my—I just want to again repeat my thanks to the Chair for taking that action.

Chairman HYDE. Well, I appreciate that very much. Thank you.

Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. The Independent Counsel can probably save time.

He doesn’t have to prepare the answers. He can just leak them to

the press and we will read them.

Chairman HYDE. Very good. Very good.

Are you going to comment on what Mr. Meehan said? Otherwise

you are not recognized for that purpose.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, speaking of what Mr. Meehan said, I would

hope that the Chair would entertain to address the concern of some

members in terms of explanation for votes and expand the time period for the filing of concurring or dissenting opinions.

Chairman HYDE. Well, if what you are saying means you want

beyond the 10 minutes for the opening statements——

Mr. DELAHUNT. No, I am not talking about that. I am talking

after the committee concludes its business.

Chairman HYDE. You have 2 days to file minority views.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. I would hope, however, that the Chair

would entertain waiving that particular rule.

Chairman HYDE. We don’t want to go into the Christmas week,

Bill, I don’t think. We don’t want to put you against the wall, but

we have to move ahead, really. Two days, I know you can collect

your thoughts in 2 days and express them well.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I need more time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Consult with Mr. Meehan.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I will consult with Mr. Meehan.

Chairman HYDE. All right.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. Yes, Mr. Scott.
282

Mr. SCOTT. Are we going to have a business meeting sometime

before the, before—I have a motion pending. I guess based on that

explanation, it may not be relevant, but I would like the opportunity to offer it whenever we can get around to it.

Chairman HYDE. All right. We do have some business to attend

to. We are waiting for the propitious time to do that. At that point

we will consider your motion, too.

Very well.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Would the witnesses please stand and take the

oath?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Let the record show the witnesses

answered the question in the affirmative. We have a distinguished

panel today, as we have had all week. Thomas P. Sullivan is a senior partner at Jenner & Block and has practiced with that firm for

the past 44 years. He is a former United States Attorney for the

Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Sullivan specializes in civil and

criminal trial and appellate litigation and he has served as an instructor at Loyola University School of Law and for the National

Institute for Trial Advocacy.

Richard Davis is a partner with the New York law firm of Weil,

Gotschal & Manges. He clerked for United States District Court

Judge Jack B. Weinstein from 1969 to 1970. He also served as an

Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York from

1970 through 1973 and was task force leader for the Watergate

Special Prosecution Force, 1973–1975. From 1977 to 1981, he

served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and

Operations.

Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr. is a partner in the litigation section of

the Philadelphia law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius. He joined

the firm after 15 years with the Department of Justice, during

which he held the following positions: Acting Deputy Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, and

U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He is cochairman of the Corporate Investigations and Criminal Defense

Practice Group.

William F. Weld is a former 2-term Governor of Massachusetts.

A graduate of the Harvard Law School, Governor Weld began his

legal career as a counsel with the House Committee on the Judiciary during the Watergate impeachment inquiry. He then served as

U.S. Attorney and as head of the Criminal Division at Main Justice

under President Reagan before being elected Governor of Massachusetts in 1990.

Governor Weld is currently a partner in the Chicago law firm of

McDermott, Will & Emory and he is also the author of the recently

published comic political crime novel, Mackerel By Moonlight.

I hope it is not a violation of any rule or regulation to give a plug

for the Governor’s book.

Ronald Noble is Associate Professor of Law at NYU Law School.

He served as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement,

1994–1996; as Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Chief of

Staff in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, 1988–
283

1990; and as Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1984–1988.

Before recognizing each of you in whatever order you choose to

go—although it is probably just as simple to start on my left to the

right—I would like to recognize the Ranking Minority Member,

John Conyers, for a statement, if he wishes to make one.

Mr. CONYERS. Could I delay my statement, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. You surely could.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, ESQ., FORMER U.S. ATTORNEY, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS; RICHARD J.

DAVIS, ESQ., WEIL, GOTSCHAL & MANGES; EDWARD S.G. DENNIS, JR., ESQ., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS; HON. WILLIAM

WELD, FORMER GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS; AND RONALD NOBLE, ESQ., PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

Chairman HYDE. Very well, Mr. Sullivan.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS P. SULLIVAN

Mr. SULLIVAN. Members of the Judiciary Committee, I appreciate

the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the professional standards for obstruction of justice and perjury. My qualifications to discuss this subject include over 40 years of practice in

Federal criminal cases, chiefly in Chicago, but also in other cities.

During most of that time I have acted as defense counsel for persons accused of or under investigation for criminal conduct. For 4

years, from 1977 to 1981, I served as the United States Attorney

for the Northern District of Illinois. Chairman Hyde and Mr.

Schippers are known to me from the practice in Chicago, and I believe they can vouch for my qualifications.

Chairman HYDE. Extraordinarily high.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, sir.

During the past 35 years, I have taken an interest in but no part

in politics. While I am a registered Democrat, I consider myself

independent at the ballot box and I have often voted for Republican

candidates. I have acted for the Republican Governor of Illinois, a

Democratic Senator, and Mayor Harold Washington. I have prosecuted as well as defended Democrat and Republican officeholders.

I appear today not as an advocate or partisan for President Clinton

or the Democrat Party, but rather as a lawyer of rather long experience who may be able to assist you in your deliberations on the

serious and weighty matters you now have before you.

The topic of my testimony is prosecutorial standards under which

cases involving alleged perjury and obstruction of justice are evaluated by responsible Federal prosecutors.

In the Federal criminal justice system, indictments for obstruction of justice and perjury are relatively rare. There are several

reasons. One is that charges of obstruction and perjury are not substantive crimes, but rather have to do with circumstances peripheral to underlying criminal conduct. The facts giving rise to the obstruction or perjury arise during the course of an investigation involving other matters, and when prosecuted are usually tagged on

as charges additional to the underlying criminal conduct.
284

Second, charges of obstruction and perjury are difficult to prove

because the legislature and the courts have erected certain safeguards for those accused of these ‘‘ripple effect’’ crimes, and these

safeguards act as hurdles for prosecutors.

The law of perjury can be particularly arcane, including the requirements that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant knew his testimony to be false at the time he

or she testified, that the alleged false testimony was material, and

that any ambiguity or uncertainty about what the question or answer meant must be construed in favor of the defendant. Both perjury and obstruction of justice are what are known as specific intent crimes, putting a heavy burden on the prosecutor to establish

the defendant’s state of mind. Furthermore, because perjury and

obstruction charges often arise from private dealings with few observers, the courts have required either two witnesses who testify

directly to the facts establishing the crime or, if only one witness

testifies to the facts constituting the alleged perjury, that there be

substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt.

Responsible prosecutors do not bring these charges lightly.

There is another cautionary note, and this I think is very significant here. Federal prosecutors do not use the criminal process in

connection with civil litigation involving private parties. The reasons are obvious. If the Federal prosecutors got involved in charges

and countercharges of perjury and obstruction of justice in discovery or trial of civil cases, there would be little time left for the

kinds of important matters that are the major targets of the Department of Justice criminal guidelines. Further, there are well established remedies available to civil litigants who believe perjury

or obstruction has occurred. Therefore, it is rare that the Federal

criminal process is used with respect to allegations of perjury or obstruction in civil matters.

The ultimate issue for a prosecutor deciding whether or not to

seek an indictment is whether he or she is convinced that the evidence is sufficient to obtain a conviction. That is, whether there is

proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the

crime. This is far more than a probable cause standard, which is

the test by which grand jury indictments are judged. Responsible

prosecutors do not submit cases to a grand jury for indictment

based upon probable cause. They do not ‘‘run cases up the flagpole’’

to see how the jury will react. They do not use indictments for deterrence or as a punishment.

Responsible prosecutors attempt to determine whether the proof

is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the answer is yes and there are no reasons to exercise discretion in favor

of lenity, the case is submitted to the grand jury for indictment

which, where I come from and everywhere else I know about, is

routine and automatic. If the answer is no, that is, even if the evidence establishes probable cause but in the prosecutor’s judgment

will not result in a conviction, the responsible prosecutor will decline the case.

Some years ago, during the Bush Administration, I was asked by

an independent counsel to act as a Special Assistant to bring an

indictment against and try a former member of President Reagan’s

Cabinet. Having looked at the evidence, I declined to do so because
285

I concluded that, when all the evidence was considered, the case for

conviction was doubtful, and that there were innocent and reasonable explanations for the allegedly wrongful conduct.

Having reviewed the evidence here, I have reached the same conclusion. It is my opinion that the case set out in the Starr report

would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a responsible Federal prosecutor.

Before addressing the specific facts of several of the charges, let

me say that in conversations with many current and former Federal prosecutors in whose judgment I have great faith, virtually all

concur that if the President were not involved—if an ordinary citizen were the subject of the inquiry—no serious consideration would

be given to a criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct

in discovery in the Jones civil case, having to do with an alleged

coverup of a private sexual affair with another woman, or the follow-on testimony before the grand jury. This case would simply not

be given serious consideration for prosecution. It wouldn’t get in

the door; it would be declined out of hand.

A threshold question is whether, if the President is not above the

law, as he should not be, is he to be treated as below the law? Is

he to be singled out for prosecution because of his office in a case

in which, were he a private citizen, no prosecution would result?

I believe the President should be treated in the criminal justice

system in the same way as any other United States citizen. If that

were the case here, it is my view that the alleged obstruction of

justice and perjury would not be prosecuted by a responsible

United States Attorney.

Having said that, I would like to address several of the specific

charges in the Starr report. The first has to do with perjury in the

President’s deposition and before the grand jury about whether or

not he had a sexual affair, relationship or relations with Ms.

Lewinsky. The President denied that he did, based on his understanding of the definition of the term ‘‘sexual relations,’’ adopted by

the court in the Jones case. That definition, which you have before

you in the papers, is difficult to parse, and one can argue either

side, but it is clear to me that the President’s interpretation is a

reasonable one.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sullivan, I hate to interrupt, but your time

has expired. Do you think in another 3 minutes you could wind up?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

Chairman HYDE. Very well.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think I can.

Chairman HYDE. We will continue it for 3 minutes.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hyde.

It is clear to me that the President’s interpretation is a reasonable one, especially because the words which would seem to describe directly oral sex were stricken from the definition by the

judge. In a perjury prosecution, the government must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew when he gave the testimony that he was telling a falsehood. The lie must be knowing

and deliberate. It is not perjury for a witness to evade, obfuscate

or answer nonresponsively. The evidence simply does not support

the conclusion that the President knowingly committed perjury,
286

and the case is so doubtful and weak that a responsible prosecutor

would not present it to the grand jury.

Let me turn to the issue of obstruction through delivery of gifts

to Ms. Lewinsky by Ms. Currie. Some of the evidence on this subject is not recounted in the Starr report, but a responsible prosecutor will not ignore the proof consistent with innocence or which

shows that an essential element of the case is absent. The evidence

is that, when talking to the President, Ms. Lewinsky brought up

the subject of having Mrs. Currie hold the gifts, and the President

either failed to respond, or said, ‘‘I don’t know’’ or ‘‘I’ll think about

it.’’ According to Mrs. Currie, Ms. Lewinsky called Mrs. Currie and

asked Mrs. Currie to come to Ms. Lewinsky’s home to take the

gifts, and Ms. Currie did so. Ms. Lewinsky testified that Mrs.

Currie placed the call to Ms. Lewinsky, but the central point in

this is that neither Mrs. Currie nor Ms. Lewinsky testified that the

President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she hide the gifts or that

the President told Mrs. Currie to get the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky.

Under these circumstances, it is my view that a responsible prosecutor would not charge the President with obstruction, because

there is no evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable

doubt that the President was involved. Indeed, it seems likely that

Ms. Lewinsky was the sole moving force; having broached the idea

to the President, but having received no response or encouragement, she called Mrs. Currie to take the gifts, without the President’s knowledge or encouragement. That is not the stuff of which

an obstruction case is made.

Because of time, I am going to skip over my third example and

go to my conclusion.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Which was about influencing Mrs. Currie’s testimony.

Time does not permit me to go through all of the allegations of

misconduct in the Starr report. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, none of them is of the nature which a responsible Federal prosecutor would present to a Federal grand jury for indictment. I will

be pleased to respond to your questions.

Thank you very much, particularly for the extra time.

[The statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

This is a formal proceeding, and in this Chamber of Congress,

unlike in certain State legislatures, we never introduce people in

the family, but this is a special day and we have someone in the

audience that I think ought to be introduced. With the permission

of the gentleman from Massachusetts, I would like to introduce

Elsie Frank, Barney Frank’s mother.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Davis.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. DAVIS

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, members of

the committee.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I am reluctant to do this, but in the

sense of fairness, do you think that—Mr. Sullivan was afforded an

additional 3 minutes—that we should make that offer to the other

members of the panel, if it comes to that?

Chairman HYDE. I would rather face that critical decision——

Mr. COBLE. Very well.

Chairman HYDE [continuing]. On a piecemeal basis.

Mr. COBLE. For the remaining four, at least, I tried.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. I will try and summarize my longer written statement, which the committee has.

There can be no doubt that the decision as to whether to prosecute a particular individual is an extraordinarily serious matter.

Good prosecutors thus approach this decision with a genuine seriousness, carefully analyzing the facts and the law and setting aside

personal feelings about the person under investigation. In making

a prosecution decision as recognized by Justice Department policy,

the initial question for any prosecutor is, can the case be won at

trial? Simply stated, no prosecutor should bring a case if he or she

does not believe that based upon the facts and the law, it is more

likely than not that they will prevail at trial. Cases that are likely

to be lost cannot be brought simply to make a point, to express a

sense of moral outrage, however justified such a sense of outrage

might be. You have to truly believe you will win the case.

I would respectfully suggest that this same principle should

guide the House of Representatives as it determines to, in effect,

make the decision as to whether to commence the prosecution by

impeaching the President. Indeed if anything, the strength of the

evidence should be greater to justify impeachment than to file a

criminal case.

In the context of perjury prosecutions, there are some specific

considerations which are present when deciding whether such a

case can be won. First, it is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury

prosecution based solely on the conflicting testimony of two people.

The inherent problems in bringing such a case are compounded to

the extent that any credibility issues exist as to the government’s

sole witness.

Second, questions and answers are often imprecise. Questions

sometimes are vague or use too narrowly-defined terms and interrogators frequently ask compound or inarticulate questions and fail

to follow up imprecise answers.
295

Witnesses often meander through an answer, wandering around

a question but never really answering it. In a perjury case, where

the precise language of a question and answer are so relevant, this

makes perjury prosecutions difficult because the prosecutor must

establish that the witness understood the question, intended to

give a false, not simply an evasive answer, and in fact did so.

The problem of establishing such intentional falsity is compounded in civil cases by the reality that lawyers routinely counsel

their clients to answer only the question asked, not to volunteer

and not to help out an inarticulate questioner.

Third, prosecutors often need to assess the veracity of an ‘‘I don’t

recall’’ answer. Like other answers, such a response can be true or

false, but it is a heavy burden to prove that a witness truly remembered the fact at issue. The ability to do so will often depend on

the nature of that fact. Precise times of meetings, names of people

one has met, and details of conversations and sequences of events,

indeed, even if those events are of fairly recent origin, are often difficult to remember. Forgetting a dramatic event is, however, more

difficult to justify.

The ability to win at trial is not, however, the only consideration

guiding the decision whether to prosecute. Other factors reflected

in the Justice Department guidelines include Federal law enforcement priorities, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the impact of the offense on any victim, whether there has been restitution, deterrence and the criminal history of the accused.

Before turning to the application of these principles to the facts

at hand, I should say that in my work at the Watergate special

prosecutor’s office, I was involved in applying these principles in

extraordinarily high-profile cases. While we successfully prosecuted

a number of matters, we also declined to proceed in a number of

close cases. We did so even in circumstances where we believed in

our hearts that a witness had deliberately lied under oath or committed some other wrongful act, but simply concluded that we were

not sufficiently certain that we would prevail at trial.

I will now turn to the issue of whether, from the perspective of

a prosecutor, there exists a prosecutable case for perjury in front

of the grand jury. The answer to me is clearly no. The President

acknowledged to the grand jury the existence of an improper intimate relationship with Monica Lewinsky, but argued with the prosecutors questioning him that his acknowledged conduct was not a

sexual relationship as he understood the definition of that term

being used in the Jones deposition. Engaging in such a debate,

whether wise or unwise politically, simply does not form the basis

for a perjury prosecution. Indeed in the end, the entire basis for a

grand jury perjury prosecution comes down to Monica Lewinsky’s

assertion that there was a reciprocal nature to their relationship

and that the President touched her private parts with the intent

to arouse or gratify her and the President’s denial that he did so.

Putting aside whether this is the type of difference of testimony

which should justify an impeachment of a President, I do not believe that a case involving this kind of conflict between two witnesses would be brought by a prosecutor since it would not be won

at trial. A prosecutor would understand the problem created by the

fact that both individuals had an incentive to lie: the President, to
296

avoid acknowledging a false statement at his civil deposition; and

Ms. Lewinsky, to avoid the demeaning nature of providing wholly

unreciprocated sex. Indeed, this incentive existed when Ms.

Lewinsky described the relationship to the confidants described in

the Independent Counsel’s referral.

Equally as important, however, Mr. Starr has himself questioned

the veracity of his one witness, Ms. Lewinsky, by questioning her

testimony that his office suggested she tape-record Ms. Currie, Mr.

Jordan, and potentially the President. And in any trial, the Independent Counsel would also be arguing that other key points of Ms.

Lewinsky’s testimony are false, including where she explicitly rejects the notion that she was asked to lie and that assistance in

her job search was an inducement for her to do so.

It also is extraordinarily unlikely in ordinary circumstances a

prosecutor would bring a prosecution for perjury in the President’s

civil deposition in the Jones case. First, while one can always find

isolated contrary examples, under the prosecution principles discussed above, perjury prosecutions involving civil cases are rare;

and it would be even more unusual to see such a prosecution where

the case had been dismissed on unrelated grounds and then settled, particularly where the settlement occurred after the disclosure

of the purported false testimony.

Second, perjury charges on peripheral issues are also uncommon.

Perjury prosecutions are generally filed where a false statement

goes to the core of the matter under inquiry. Indeed, in order to

prevail in a perjury prosecution, the prosecutor must establish not

only that the testimony was false, but that the purported false testimony was material. Here, the Jones case was about whether

then-Governor Clinton sought unwanted sexual favors from a State

employee in Arkansas. Monica Lewinsky herself had nothing to do

with the actual facts at issue in that suit. This deposition was

about the Jones case. It was not part of a general investigation into

the Monica Lewinsky affair, and that is important on the materiality issue. Given the lack of connection between these two events

under the applicable rules of evidence, a purely consensual relationship with the President half a decade later would, I believe, not

have even been admissible at any ultimate trial of the Jones case.

While the court allowed questioning in the civil deposition about

this matter, the judge did so under the very broad standard used

in civil discovery. Indeed, while not dealing with the admissibility

issue had there been no Independent Counsel inquiry, after the

controversy about the President’s relationship with Ms. Lewinsky

arose, the court considered this testimony sufficiently immaterial

so as to preclude testimony about it at the trial.

Finally, the ability to prove the intentional making of false statements in the civil deposition is compounded by inexact questions,

evasive and inconsistent answers, insufficient follow-up by the

questioner, and reliance by the examiner on a definition of sexual

relations rather than asking about specific acts.

But whatever the ability to meet the standard of proof on this

issue as to any particular question, it simply is not a perjury case

that would be brought. It involves difficult proof issues as to, at

best, peripheral issues where complete and truthful testimony

would be of doubtful admissibility in a settled civil case which had
297

already been dismissed. It simply is not the stuff of criminal prosecution.

Turning to the issue of obstruction of justice involving the Paula

Jones case, a prosecutor analyzing the case would be affected by

many of the same weaknesses that are discussed above. These

weaknesses as well as additional problems with such a case are

discussed in my written statement, and I will not comment on

them orally in the interest of time.

Before concluding, I would like to make two closing observations.

I will be, with your permission, just a minute or so.

In August of 1974, prior to the pardon, the Watergate Special

Prosecution Force commenced the extraordinarily difficult process

of determining whether to indict then former President Nixon. In

my 1974 memorandum analyzing the relevant factors which would

ultimately affect such a decision, and proceeding in that memorandum on the belief not present here that adequate evidence clearly

existed to support the bringing of such criminal charges, I articulated two primary and competing considerations which I believed

it appropriate for us then as prosecutors to consider. The first factor was to avoid a sense of a double standard by declining to prosecute a plainly guilty person because he had been President. The

second was that a prosecutor should not proceed with even provable charges if they conclude that important and valid societal benefits would be sacrificed by doing so.

In the Nixon case, as articulated in my memorandum, such a

benefit was the desirability of putting the turmoil of the past 2

years behind us so as to better be able to proceed with the country’s business. I believe today, 25 years later, that it is still appropriate for those deciding whether to bring charges to consider these

factors.

Finally, prosecutors often feel a sense of frustration if they cannot express their sense that a wrong has been committed by bringing charges. But every wrong is not a crime, and wrongful noncriminal conduct sometimes can be addressed without the commencing of any proceeding. Apart from issues of censure, we live

in a democracy, and one sanction that can be imposed is by the voters acting through the exercise of their right to vote. President

Clinton lied to the American people. If they believed it appropriate,

they were free to voice their disapproval by voting against his

party in 1998 and remain free to do so in 2000, as occurred in 1974

when the Democrats secured major gains.

The answer to every wrongful act is not the invocation of punitive legal processes.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

[The statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Dennis.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD S.G. DENNIS, JR.

Mr. DENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, members of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, I am opposed to the impeachment of President Clinton. My opposition is grounded in part on

my belief that a criminal conviction would be extremely difficult to

obtain in a court of law. There is very weak proof of the criminal

intent of the President. The Lewinsky affair is of questionable materiality to the proceedings in which it was raised. I believe that

a jury would be sympathetic to any person charged with perjury for

dancing around questions put to them that demanded an admission

of marital infidelity; that is, unless the answers were essential to

the resolution of a very substantial claim.

On another level, I sense an impeachment under these circumstances would prove extremely divisive for the country, inflaming the passions of those who would see impeachment as an attempt to thwart the election process for insubstantial reasons.

Perjury and obstruction of justice are serious offenses. They are

felonies. However, in my experience, perjury or obstruction of justice prosecutions of parties in private civil litigation are rare. Rarer

still are criminal investigations in the course of civil litigation in

anticipation of incipient perjury or obstruction of justice. In such

circumstances, prosecutors are justifiably concerned about the appearance that government is taking the side of one private party

against another.

The oath taken by witnesses demands full and truthful testimony

at depositions and in grand jury proceedings—excuse me, demands

truthful testimony at depositions and in grand jury proceedings.

Nonetheless, imprecise, ambiguous, evasive and even misleading

responses to questions don’t support perjury prosecutions, even

though such responses may raise serious questions about the credibility of a witness on a particular subject.

Proof that a witness’ testimony is untrue is not sufficient alone

to prove perjury, and proof that a witness is intentionally evasive

or nonresponsive is not sufficient to prove perjury either.

Courts are rigorously literal in passing on questions of ambiguity

in the questions and the responses of witnesses under oath, and

generally give the accused the benefit of any doubt of possible interpretations of the questions and the meaning of the allegedly perjurious response. Perjury cases are very difficult to win under the

most favorable circumstances.

I believe the question of whether there were sexual relations between the President and Ms. Lewinsky is collateral to the harassment claim in the Jones case. The President has confessed to an

inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The Jones case was

dismissed and is now settled. These circumstances simply would

not warrant the bringing of a criminal prosecution, and a criminal

prosecution would most likely fail. Certainly the exercise of sound

prosecutorial discretion would not dictate prosecuting such a case.

The consequences of the impeachment of the President of the

United States are far-reaching. These consequences are grave and

they impact the entire Nation. Impeachment in my view should not
315

serve as a punishment for a President who has admittedly gone

astray in his family life, as grave as that might be in personal

terms. Where there is serious doubt, as there must be in this case,

prudence demands that Congress defer to the electoral mandate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you Mr. Dennis.

[The statement of Mr. Dennis follows:]
316
317
318

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Noble.

TESTIMONY OF RONALD NOBLE

Mr. NOBLE. I, too, will attempt to keep my remarks within 10

minutes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, and members of

the committee, before I begin my formal remarks, let me extend my

thanks to the following people who helped prepare me under these

rushed circumstances. My brother, James Noble, is here with me

today, a research assistant; Russell Moore, a friend of mine in law

school is here with me today; my students in my evidence class,

with whom I spent the last two weeks talking about impeachment

but not the impeachment of a President, the impeachment of a witness. I have been trying to give them hypotheticals with which or

from which they could learn. I told them I will be the best prop

they will have today.

I am honored to appear before you today. I will discuss the factors ordinarily considered by Federal prosecutors and Federal

agents in deciding whether to investigate, indict and prosecute allegations of violations of Federal criminal law.

I submit that a Federal prosecutor ordinarily would not prosecute a case against a private citizen based on the facts set forth

in the Starr referral. My experience which forms the basis of my

testimony is as follows: I have served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, a chief of staff and Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the

Justice Department’s Criminal Division during the Reagan and

Bush administrations, and Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement in the Clinton administration, and I am currently a professor at the New York University School of Law where I teach, as

I said, a course in evidence.

When investigating a possible violation of the law, every Federal

prosecutor must heed the guidelines of the Department of Justice.

DOJ guidelines recognize that a criminal prosecution entails profound consequences for the accused and the family of the accused,

whether or not a conviction ultimately results.

Career Federal prosecutors recognize that Federal law enforcement resources and Federal judicial resources are not sufficient to

permit prosecution of every alleged offense over which Federal jurisdiction exists.

Federal prosecutors are told to consider the nature and seriousness of the offense as well as available taxpayer resources. Often

these resources are scarce and influence the decision to proceed or

not to proceed and the decision how to proceed. Federal prosecutors

may properly weigh such questions as whether the violation is

technical or relatively inconsequential in nature and what the public attitude is towards prosecution under the circumstances of the

case. What will happen to public confidence in the rule of law if

no prosecution is brought or if a prosecution results in an acquittal? Even before the Clinton Lewinsky matter arose, DOJ guidelines intimated that prosecutors should pause before bringing a

prosecution where the public may be indifferent or even opposed to

enforcement of a controlling statute, whether on substantive

grounds or because of a history of nonenforcement or because the
319

offense involves essentially a minor matter of private concern and

the victim is not interested in having it pursued.

Yet, public sentiment against an otherwise worthy prosecution

should not dispel prosecutors from bringing charges simply because

a biased and prejudiced public is against prosecution. For example,

in a civil rights case, or a case involving an extremely popular political figure, it might be clear that the evidence of guilt, viewed objectively and by an unbiased fact-finder, would be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, yet the prosecutor might reasonably

doubt whether the jury would convict. In such a case, despite his

or her negative assessment of the likelihood of a guilty verdict

based on factors extraneous to an objective view of the law and

facts, the prosecutor may properly conclude that it is necessary and

desirable to commence or recommend prosecution and allow the

criminal process to operate in accordance with its principles.

During the civil rights era, many prosecutions were brought

against people for locally popular but no less heinous crimes

against blacks. However, prosecutors should not bring charges on

public sentiment in favor of prosecution when a decision to prosecute cannot be supported on grounds deemed legitimate by the

prosecutor.

DOJ prosecutors are discouraged from pursuing criminal prosecutions simply because probable cause exists, and a number of the

witnesses have already addressed this point. Why? Because probable cause can be met in a given case, it does not automatically

warrant prosecution. Further investigation may be warranted, and

the prosecutor should still take into account all relevant considerations in deciding upon his or her course of action.

Prosecutors are admonished not to recommend in an indictment

charges that they cannot reasonably expect to prove beyond a reasonable doubt by the legally sufficient evidence at trial. It is one

of the most important criteria that prosecutors must consider.

Prosecution should never be brought where probable cause does

not exist, and both as a matter of fundamental fairness and in the

interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution

should be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of

fact.

Federal prosecutors and Federal agents, as a rule, ought to stay

out of the private sexual lives of consenting adults. Neither Federal

prosecutors nor Federal investigators consider it a priority to investigate allegations of perjury in connection with the lawful, extramarital, consensual, private sexual conduct of citizens. In my view,

this is a good thing. From a proactive perspective, who among us

would want the Federal government to initiate sting operations

against private citizens to see if we lie about our extramarital affairs or the nature of our sexual conduct? Imagine a rule that required all Federal job applicants to answer the following question

under oath: Because we are concerned about our employees being

blackmailed about unusual or inappropriate sexual conduct, and

because we want to know whether you would be at risk, please

name every person with whom you have had a sexual relationship

or with whom you have had sexual intercourse during your life. It

certainly would be relevant and certainly might lead to blackmail.
320

Such a question would naturally lead to allegations of perjured

responses. Irrespective of constitutional challenges from a public

policy standpoint, most Americans would object to Federal prosecutors and Federal agents investigating and prosecuting those cases

that came to our attention.

Could we trust our government to make fair, equitable and restrained decisions about how much to investigate any one of these

allegations? The potential for abuse and violation of our right to

privacy would be great. Indeed, assigning Federal agents to interview witnesses, install wiretaps and insert bugs to learn about the

private, legal sexual conduct of U.S. citizens would concern us all.

But aggressive prosecutors and agents would do exactly that to

make cases against those citizens where prosecutions would garner

publicity and thereby act as a deterrent, and in my view the biggest target would be politicians.

As a general matter, Federal prosecutors are not asked to bring

Federal criminal charges against individuals who have allegedly

perjured themselves in connection with civil lawsuits. As a rule,

Federal prosecutors on their own do not seek to bring criminal

charges against people who perjure themselves in connection with

civil depositions for the reasons that have already been articulated.

In addition, this would open a floodgate of referrals. Parties by

definition are biased, and it would be difficult to discount the potential bias. By their nature, lawsuits have remedies built into the

system. Lying litigants can be exposed to such and lose their lawsuits. The judge overseeing the lawsuit is in the best position to receive evidence about false statements, deceitful conduct and even

perjured testimony. She can sanction violating litigants by initiating civil or criminal contempt proceedings.

Notwithstanding the reasons generally, there are 10 good reasons, taken in combination, which support the view that a career

Federal prosecutor asked to investigate allegations like those in the

Clinton-Lewinsky matter would not pursue Federal criminal prosecution to the indictment or trial stage.

One, the alleged perjury occurred in a civil deposition and concerned private, lawful sexual conduct between consenting adults.

Two, the alleged perjured testimony was deemed inadmissible by

the trial judge.

Three, that evidence arguably was dismissed as immaterial by

the trial judge.

Four, in any event, the alleged perjured testimony was at most

marginally relevant.

Five, the alleged perjured testimony did not affect the outcome

of the case.

Six, the parties settled, and the Court dismissed the underlying

civil lawsuit.

Seven, the settlement of the suit prevented the appellate court

from ruling on the dismissal and on the materiality of the alleged

perjured testimony.

Eight, the theoretically harmed party knew of the alleged perjury

prior to settlement.

Nine, alleged, I say alleged, political enemies of the defendant

funded the plaintiff’s suit.
321

Ten, a Federal government informant conspired with one of the

civil litigants to trap the alleged perjurer into perjuring himself.

Given the above considerations, most Federal prosecutors would

not want to use taxpayer dollars, Federal agents and sensitive Federal investigative resources to uncover the most intimate and embarrassing details of the private sexual lives of consenting adults

when there is a risk of bias and when there is a judge in a position

to address the alleged criminal conduct.

The judgment that a career prosecutor might make about an ordinary person might be very well affected by the knowledge that

the alleged perjury was committed by the President. That is to be

conceded. Even the most experienced, fair-minded prosecutor will

find it difficult not to pursue allegations of criminal misconduct

against the President, a Senator, a Governor, any Member of Congress.

The interests in targeting, threatening or in harming the President especially can be explained in part by the power and visibility

of his office. Even a prosecutor with exceptional judgment might be

tempted by the challenge of bringing down a President. A prosecutor with unchecked power, unlimited resources and only one target

might find the temptation even stronger.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I can conclude in 2 minutes with the

permission of the Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Two minutes?

Mr. NOBLE. In 2 minutes.

Chairman HYDE. Very well.

Mr. NOBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is difficult to think of a fail-safe structure that could protect

anyone from allegations of bias in the decision to prosecute or not

prosecute the President. Not the Attorney General, the Independent Counsel, the Justice Department, the FBI, the Secret Service,

the Federal judiciary, the Congress, the Bar, and the Academy can

escape some person or act in their background that could create a

conflict or an appearance of a conflict. No one for or against prosecution would be safe from attack on the merits or from false personal attacks.

For this reason, a prosecutor or a committee assigned such a case

must strive to be objective, knowing that criticism of bias will be

unavoidable. In a prosecutorial context, a 13-to-10 vote by the

grand jury constitutes enough votes to proceed, but reflects that

there must be or might be a serious problem with some aspect of

the case. Similarly, a vote for impeachment based on a party line

vote or a near party line vote is a signal that something is wrong

or may be wrong with the case and that the case may not be worth

pursuing. This is particularly true where the overwhelming majority of Americans appear to be well-informed about the allegations

and unbiased as a group. Yet they do not want this President impeached.

While indictments and impeachment proceedings are different,

they carry at least two similarities. One, most of us know it when

we see the clear cases for criminal conviction and for impeachment.

Two, public confidence in the rule of law and our system of government would suffer if we regularly indicted cases or impeached

Presidents only to have juries or the Senate vote to acquit.
322

In closing, I believe that the Justice Department got it right and

Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz got it wrong. Indictments and

impeachments that result in acquittal ought to be avoided where

possible. No prosecutor would be permitted to bring a prosecution

where she believed that there was no chance that an unbiased jury

would convict. Almost no one in this country believes that the U.S.

Senate will convict the President on any potential article of impeachment. Members of Congress should consider the impact that

a long and no doubt sensationalized trial will have on the country,

especially a trial that will not result in a conviction.

In the end, I am confident that you will give the weighty responsibility that you must discharge serious consideration. A vote

against impeachment need not be viewed as a vote against punishment. As Professor Steve Saltzburg noted before you earlier this

week, Judge Susan Webber Wright retains jurisdiction over the

case wherein the allegedly perjured testimony occurred. She can

hold civil or criminal contempt hearings. Of all the arbiters of justice in this matter, she is perceived as being the least biased. She

can punish the President for false and misleading conduct even if

it does not rise to the level of perjury or obstruction of justice.

Trust her to mete out the appropriate punishment.

I thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Noble.

[The statement of Mr. Noble follows:]
323
324
325
326
327

Chairman HYDE. Governor Weld.

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM F. WELD, FORMER GOVERNOR

OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. WELD. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the

committee, my name is William Weld, and I am sincerely honored

to appear before you this morning.

I am no Tom Sullivan, but I have knocked around the criminal

justice world a little bit. From 1986 to 1988, under President

Reagan, I was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the

Criminal Division in Washington, which is relevant because that’s

the policy or political appointment charged with ensuring the uniformity of charging decisions, decisions whether to seek an indictment around the country in various districts.

Prior to that, for 5 years, I was the United States Attorney in

Massachusetts, and I became familiar in the course of that 7 years

with the handbook, the Principles of Federal Prosecution, and with

the United States Attorney’s Manual and, when I was in Washington, with the practices and procedures that also have been developed over the years to try to ensure uniformity in charging decisions.

It so happens that in 1974, for 9 months, I also worked for this

committee under Chairman Rodino on the impeachment inquiry

into President Nixon, and I worked on the constitutional and legal

unit there, which was charged with reading every precedent in

Britain, in Hinds, in Cannon, in reported cases in the records of

the 1787 debate on the Constitution having any relevance at all to

what high crimes and misdemeanors means in the United States

Constitution.

Like Mr. Sullivan, like many others, I do not consider myself an

advocate here before you. I do have a couple of points of view that

I would like to share with the members of the committee, and you

can take them for what they are worth. Ordinarily, in a civil context, you don’t qualify as an expert on the basis of 9 months’ experience, but for whatever they are worth.

I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that under the Reagan Administration, it was not the policy of the U.S. Justice Department to seek

indictments solely on the basis that a prospective defendant had

committed adultery or fornication, which are not lawful, but it simply wasn’t the policy to go there. It was also not the policy to seek

an indictment based solely on evidence that a prospective defendant had falsely denied committing unlawful adultery or fornication.

Let me say a little bit about perjury cases. I don’t think they are

all that rare, and I have prosecuted a lot of them, but I do think

that what one or two of the witnesses said is true. There is usually

something else involved in a Federal perjury prosecution. There is

a pass-through aspect here. You are really going to something else.

I once prosecuted a guy who stated that he was in Florida on November 28th and 29th, 1981. You may say, that’s kind of stooping

to pick up pins. Why would you prosecute him for that? Well, that

was the day the city of Lynn, Massachusetts, burned down, and

this guy was an arsonist, and three people made him in the Porthole Pub in Lynn, Massachusetts that day, and we found his fingerprints on a ticket to Florida the next day, after the fire, so we
328

thought it would be a good idea to bring a perjury prosecution

there to rattle the cage a little bit, and we did.

And often we brought them where we were trying to penetrate

a wall of silence as in cases of public corruption or narcotics, when

you are trying to break through this omerta, everyone has got to

dummy up, phenomenon. But there is something else that you are

trying to get at there.

Until this year, the policy of the Department of Justice was that

in cases of false statements, they would not seek an indictment

solely on the basis of somebody denying that they themselves had

committed misconduct. This is called the ‘‘exculpatory no’’ doctrine,

and it was adopted in a lot of circuits. It was kicked out by the Supreme Court in a decision by Justice Scalia early this year based

on bad facts. You had a ranking union official who had taken

money from employers in violation of an independent Federal statute, so that’s the something else that the prosecution was trying

to get at. So a very unsympathetic case for the Court applying the

‘‘exculpatory no’’ doctrine.

In my view, it would have been a handy idea to carve out an exception to the abrogation of that doctrine for cases involving personal misconduct as opposed to a violation of an independent Federal statute such as was involved there. Certainly, a responsible

prosecutor could apply that filter in the exercise of his or her discretion.

The last thing, let me just say, on the law of impeachment, I am

pretty well convinced that adultery, fornication, or even a false denial, false, I am assuming perjury here, false denial of adultery or

fornication, they do not constitute high crimes and misdemeanors

within the meaning of the impeachment clause of the U.S. Constitution. They are not offenses against the system of government.

They don’t imperil the structure of our government.

The remedy of impeachment is to remove the officeholder, get the

worm out of the apple. It is a prophylactic remedy. It is not punitive. If any of you are thinking we have got to vote yes on impeachment to tarnish the President, he is already tarnished, and that’s

really not the purpose of the impeachment mechanism. Nobody is

going to forget this stuff. And this is a man who has been elected

President of the United States twice, and thus entitled to this office, after allegations very similar to those now before you.

I hate to open old wounds, but you remember back to 1992, and

the Gennifer Flowers matter, if there are two people in a room and

they both deny that something happened, then you can’t prove that

it happened. Well, that’s very similar to what we are talking about

here, and this officeholder was elected President of the United

States twice after all of those facts were before the people.

So I come out thinking that the most appropriate result is something other than removing this person from his office, taking his

office away from him.

There is a lot of talk about censure. I think personally the dignity of Congress and the dignity of the country demands something

more than merely censure here. And I would suggest in conclusion,

Mr. Chairman, four things that you might want to think about in

addition to censure.
329

Number one, it is not unknown for grand juries investigating corruption in a city or a county, for example, to issue a written detailed report of their findings. That could easily be done here. It

would be entirely proper.

Number two, there could be a written acknowledgment of wrongdoing on the part of the President, and for reasons which will become evident in a moment I would not propose that there be insistence on the use of the word ‘‘lie’’ or ‘‘perjury’’ there, but it is something that could be negotiated to reflect the gravity of what he has

done.

Number three, there could be an agreement to pay a fine. This

is something tangible, more tangible than censure, and it involves

the respondent as well as the moving party, the moving party here

being the House, and that would mark the moment. That would

mark the solemnity of the occasion. And the agreement would remove any doubt about somebody going to court and saying, there

is no basis for this. It would be thrown out on the basis of political

question doctrine anyway, I think.

I am not here to say what the fine should be, but if memory

serves, Speaker Gingrich had to pay quite a large fine not so long

ago because people didn’t like either the content or the marketing

of a college course that he taught.

The members might wish to consider providing that the fine

could not be paid out of the proceeds of a legal defense fund, given

all the background circumstances.

Finally, what I am proposing, the final element, would be that

the President would have to take his chances with respect to the

criminal justice process post his Presidency. I do not agree with

those in the media who say that any deal on censure has to protect

the President against criminal proceedings after he leaves office.

First of all, there doesn’t have to be any deal on censure. That’s

entirely within your power. The White House has no leverage

there. Second, the Constitution explicitly says that even if a President or anybody is impeached, convicted and removed from office,

they remain liable to trial and indictment. It is very explicit. It is

right in the Constitution.

If the objection is that the spectacle of a former President being

prosecuted would be tawdry and degrading, it really could not be

much more tawdry and degrading than what we have already been

subjected to through the constant daily reports of the Lewinsky affair.

Lastly, I agree with everyone who has spoken before about

whether a perjury prosecution here really lies. I think there is

quite a low risk of that from the point of view of the President.

So that’s the suggestion. It is a political suggestion, but this is,

in part, a political process; about a five-part deal, if you will, and

I think the dignity of the House would be upheld if something like

that were to be approached, and everybody could perhaps get on

more easily with attending to the public’s business.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Governor.

[The statement of Mr. Weld follows:]
330
331
332
333
334

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As I am sure all members of the panel know, the last impeachment took place 9 years ago in 1989 against Walter Nixon of Mississippi, and in that impeachment the House of Representatives, by

a vote of 417 to nothing, declared that making false statements to

a grand jury were impeachable offenses. The Senate apparently

agreed with the House’s judgment because Judge Nixon was removed from office on a 91-to-8 vote on both of those articles of impeachment.

I am wondering if members of the panel think that the House

made a mistake 9 years ago in unanimously declaring that making

false statements to a grand jury were impeachable offenses?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, one, I think you have to look at the proof. First

of all, I assume there was proof as to the perjury that took place.

I assume also that the perjury, as I recall, went to a core issue in

the matter in which the perjury took place. So you had certain important factual differences.

I also think that there is an important difference when one is

considering the issue of a judge versus the President, since a judge,

as others have testified, sits for life subject to good behavior, and

so the standard is not precisely the same as would be in removing

a President who is elected by the public and sits for only 4 years.

And finally, I think that in terms of perjury, I do think that one

has to look a little bit about what the underlying events are, and

I do think that since what we are talking about is a private consensual relationship being at the core of it, that that affects the

impeachability. But the bottom line is, as I said in my statement,

I don’t think there is really the proof, particularly as to grand jury

perjury.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, just by way of background, the

events that led up to the Judge Nixon impeachment, which is contrasted to the President Nixon impeachment—we have to be very

particular here—involved a private affair, a financial affair, where

Judge Nixon allegedly accepted an illegal gratuity of a sweetheart

deal in an oil and gas lease. He was acquitted of that charge by

the jury at a criminal trial.

So here we are seeing that the jury made a determination that

Judge Nixon did nothing wrong in terms of entering into the oil

and gas lease, but he was convicted by the jury of the two counts

of making false statements.

While there are some differences, there are also some similarities

in that a private—private misconduct was alleged as a part of the

grand jury investigation.

I am concerned with the answer to your question in that you

seem to be implying that the standard of truthfulness for the President of the United States is less than for a Federal judge someplace in the country, because the President is elected and the judge

is appointed and holds office for good behavior. Am I wrong on

that?

Mr. DAVIS. I am not really saying that. I am saying that the

standard for truthfulness is really the same. I am saying that here

I don’t think there is the proof, particularly as to the grand jury,

that you can make the case of perjury; and, second, what I am say335

ing is the standard for impeachment, not the standard for truthfulness, but there are differences in the standard of impeachment for

a judge as opposed to the President, and I think there is a lot of

scholarship on that.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, yesterday many of the President’s defenders were troubled about the alleged false statements to the

grand jury, and at least one of the witnesses that the White House

brought up here, former Congressman Owens, flat out said that the

President lied before the grand jury.

That’s what the House found in terms of Judge Nixon, and, you

know, I am concerned that if a judge lies to the grand jury, we all

agree that it is impeachable, and if the President lies before the

grand jury, then there is a huge debate about whether or not that’s

impeachable.

Now, who is going to stand up for the truth here?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, respectfully, I don’t think that the evidence supports the perjury in the grand jury, as I articulate in my statement.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. I yield back my time.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Gentlemen, I want to pay my highest commendations to all of you here, because you have now put on the record,

once and for all, all of these pestering questions that have been attempted to be dealt with for so many weeks and months now. You

should, Ron, feel proud to go back to your evidence class. You can

hold your head high. And I thank you all.

Now, the important thing about this was that, unless I missed

something, none of you contradicted each other, nobody. And it

seems to me that this testimony of you five gentlemen ought to be

bound up and delivered, which I would elect to do. I need Pat Buchanan to get a copy of this, Tim Russert, Cokie Roberts, George

Will, Sam Donaldson and Miss Buchanan, Pat’s sister, not because

they object to all of this, but because they are the ones that in the

media continue, with many others, of course, this nonsensical debate about obvious legal questions that a first-year law student

could dispose of.

So what you have done here is of signal importance, from my

point of view. This should be studied carefully by everybody that

makes public utterances about the questions of perjury and obstruction and how and when materiality figures into the prosecutorial role.

Now, this question has come up, I think I called it the Scott

question: Is there any case on record for a prosecution, based on

a case in which it was dismissed, it was an immaterial statement,

there was a settlement to boot? I mean, are we going through everything? Has anybody ever heard of a case like this? We need the

citation right away if there is, because I will stop making this assertion.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I can’t guarantee you that there is no such case,

but I doubt it. The thrust of what I am saying is that the Federal

criminal process is simply not used to determine truth or falsity in

statements in civil litigation, and it is also even more true when
336

you take a situation, as you have here, that the testimony is even

peripheral to the civil case involved.

The Federal criminal justice system is not designed or intended

to enforce a code of moral conduct. That’s not what we do, or what

I used to do, and what the good Federal prosecutors do. I’m not

saying you can’t find an errant one somewhere that will bring

charges, but so far as I know, it would be totally unprecedented if

such a case were brought.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

Mr. Davis, Mr. Noble, Governor, any other comments on this,

this matter?

Mr. DENNIS. Well, I agree. I mean, I do not disagree with any

of the statements that have been made by my colleagues here on

the panel. I have not considered the suggestions that Governor

Weld had made with regard to possible political disposition of the

matter, but I think that it is fairly clear, and that if a poll were

taken of former U.S. attorneys from any administration, you would

probably find the overwhelming number of them would agree with

the assessment that this case is a loser and just would not be sustained in court.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time——

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that this is one

of the most important panels that we have had before us in the

course of these proceedings.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sullivan, have you had an opportunity to review the District

of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding the question of materiality in the issue before us, you know, in the question

of the Independent Counsel and Lewinsky?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have read about it in the Starr Report. I don’t

think I read the opinion.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, the decision just was unsealed and available to us in the last week, and you may not be aware that the

District Court of Appeals opinion squarely addressed that issue of

materiality, and it found that her false sworn statement would be

material for the purposes of perjury law. In other words, a false

statement by the President in that case would have been material.

So I think we can put that materiality question to rest that Mr.

Conyers just raised.

I also want to make a comment to you, Governor Weld. You said

that I do not believe that adultery, fornication or false denial of

adultery or fornication constitutes high crimes and misdemeanors

within the meaning of the impeachment clause of the Constitution

of the United States.

I agree with you. But in this case we are not dealing simply with

false statements or fornication or adultery. We are dealing with potentially perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, things

of that nature, and this is where you and I may differ, and I think

it is significant.

Albeit a civil case, Mr. Sullivan, you and Mr. Davis and several

others on the panel pointed out how rare you think it is for perjury

cases to be brought in Federal court in civil cases, and yet we just
337

had Mary—Barbara Battalino, I should say, last week as a witness,

a very recent case in which a perjury case was brought in a civil

suit involving the Veterans Administration psychiatrist, and on August 4, 1998, a former employee of the United States Postal Service, Diane Parker, was sentenced to 13 months in prison and 3

years of supervised release for lying in a civil case regarding a sexual relationship with a subordinate. And that, of course, was a Federal case.

I have got citations for 29 of these cases, at least, sitting right

here. There are 115 people minimally, maybe more than that by

now, serving in Federal prison today for perjury; as I say, most of

those, or a great many of those, for civil perjury. So maybe the policy a few years ago was different, but certainly prosecutors are

prosecuting in these sexual harassment-type cases and the type of

Battalino and Parker cases that we are seeing more of today than

maybe we did back 10 or 15 years ago.

I also want to address the question that, Mr. Sullivan, you

raised, and I think, Mr. Davis, you raised, in particular, about perjury with regard to a single witness. Section 1623, as you have

pointed out rightfully, does allow prosecution with a single witness,

and I dare say that about 90 percent of the cases brought today

that have resulted in people going to prison in the Federal system

have been brought under that. I have looked at it, and that’s who

those 115 people constitute.

Now, I will agree with you. I think that your analysis is good,

you need corroborative witnesses even though it may not be required. But let me go through here what is in the grand jury case

with respect to the perjury charged, and it is the same underlying

main issue in the deposition.

You had a situation in which the President of the United States

says that he did not commit or have sexual relations with Monica

Lewinsky under the definition as given by the court in the Jones

case. That court included in its definition explicitly the touching of

breasts or genitalia. Now, the President said, I didn’t do that. He

repeated it very carefully in the grand jury testimony.

Monica Lewinsky said on nine occasions, in her sworn testimony

before the grand jury, the President touched her breast, and on

four occasions they had genital contact, and that all of this was to

arouse.

Now, the issue of corroboration, there are 10 corroborative witnesses. Interestingly enough, strangely enough, Monica Lewinsky

talked contemporaneously with family members, friends and relatives about these matters in great detail, and we have 10 of those

whose testimony is before us, in sworn testimony. Seven of the ten

corroborate the explicit detail with regard to this touching under

the definition of sexual relations that Monica Lewinsky describes.

Now, it seems to me that that kind of corroboration is precisely

the kind of corroboration that would, in fact, engender a prosecution, would give confidence to a prosecutor to take perjury cases

forward, and would, indeed, give a high probability of conviction if

this were taken before a court in any case—any court in this land.

The jury would be hard-pressed not to convict under those circumstances. So it strikes me as very strange that we are dismissing this.
338

Nobody, nobody on this panel and nobody yesterday, has mentioned the fact that these corroborating witnesses exist. It seems to

be something that the President’s advocates simply want to ignore.

It is a bottom-line question in here, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. I think I did address that.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, before the gentleman from Massachusetts, I request recognition for a

moment.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Regular order.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. For what purpose does the gentleman from

New York seek recognition?

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, the question that Mr. McCollum

just asked the witness is perhaps the central question of this case.

Mr. FRANK. I will give him time to answer. I was just about to

do that.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. With yielding to continue on the debate,

that’s going to mean that we are going to be here until midnight.

The Chair will enforce the clock and the rules that were laid down

by Mr. Hyde at the beginning of this hearing. If further members

down the list want to have questions answered when the time has

run out, they can decide to use their time to do that.

The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. FRANK. Anybody want to answer that question?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I would like to answer that.

I think that there are reasons why that prosecution would not

win. One is, as I said in my statement, that both witnesses, including Ms. Lewinsky, had an incentive to lie, and she had an incentive

to lie not only to the grand jury on this issue, but to her confidants,

because otherwise she would be acknowledging an unreciprocated

sexual relationship.

But just as important, if you are talking about one witness that

Mr. Starr or any prosecutor is going to put forward, Mr. Starr and

his prosecutors themselves are going to have to argue in this case

that Ms. Lewinsky’s testimony on other issues is not accurate.

They are going to have to argue that. They are going to be in a

position where they are going to have to say she is telling the truth

as to this, not telling the truth as to other things.

Also, Ms. Lewinsky in her testimony at various times said she

had a similar definition of sexual relations. So I think that if you

look at this from the perspective of a trial lawyer in terms of how

this would play out, I think this would be really an impossible case

to sell.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Davis, you have convinced me. We will go on to

the next issue. I think that’s absolutely right. All of those corroborating witnesses corroborate only what Ms. Lewinsky had told

them. No one has yet alleged that there was a kind of a Peeping

Tom slot outside the Oval Office where they would have made any

observation that would have made them in any way relevant to the

trial.

We also ought to note, telling the truth was not the most noticeable characteristic of this set of interrelationships. But, I mean, I
339

think the guy with the lamp in there, he would still be outside

looking for someone to talk to as he got involved with all of them.

Ms. Lewinsky was herself threatened with prison, as was her

mother, and I know Mr. Starr’s penchant for threatening people

with prison if they did not say bad things about the President has

some credibility relevance.

But I wanted to—just also want to talk about Judge Nixon. I am

reading from the majority, and the gentleman from Wisconsin said

he perjured himself only about—or he didn’t say only. He perjured

himself about an oil and gas deal. But I am reading from the majority’s report, which the majority issued earlier this year and staff

kindly gave to me. On pages 9 and 10, Judge Nixon lied about

whether he had discussed the case with the State prosecutor and

had influenced the State prosecutor to essentially drop the case.

In other words, the underlying issue here was not simply a private oil and gas deal, but a Federal judge intervening with a State

prosecutor to get him to drop the case, and that is why I was particularly interested in Mr. Weld’s presentation and others.

One of the arguments we have had here is that looking at the

underlying issue in a perjury allegation is somehow to traduce the

law and to undercut it. And I would like to ask all of you—because

I think this becomes now a central issue in this case—when you

are deciding how to deal with allegations of perjury—and I don’t

believe that anybody would be able to prove grand jury perjury. I

do think that with regard to the deposition, it would be easier, and

the President did, unfortunately, in my judgment, when he said he

couldn’t remember being alone, transgressed. But on the question

about whether or not you take into account the underlying issue,

in the case of Judge Nixon, the underlying issue was talking to a

State prosecutor and intervening to get his partner’s son’s conviction lessened, I think very different.

This is the central case: As prosecutors, all of you, is it wrong

to take into account the underlying cause where there is a perjury

allegation? Mr. Weld has said that in his experience, perjury is

usually a way to get at a broader issue. So let me start with Mr.

Weld.

Mr. WELD. Well, I agree, Mr. Congressman. I think the underlying conduct is important. I mean, I would agree in a way on the

law with Representative Sensenbrenner, Representative McCollum.

I do think that false statements to a grand jury can easily be

grounds for impeachment.

I think I had the Judge Nixon case for a while when I was at

Justice, and my recollection is that there was clouds of corruption

in the background of that.

Mr. FRANK. And in the foreground.

Mr. WELD. And perhaps in the foreground of that case. So I think

looking at the underlying conduct, that’s another way of saying

what Mr. Dennis, Mr. Noble, others have said, that there is a test

of substantiality, Mr. Davis said it as well, in assessing the totality

of circumstances and making a charging decision whether to go forward in a perjury case. And it is really more a substantiality than

a materiality that I think might be the rock you run up against.

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Weld.
340

Let me just say in closing, that is a point I wanted to make, and

I was particularly grateful to the former Governor of my State for

making it, as a man who understands the broader democratic, with

a small ‘‘D,’’ implications here. He made a very important point

when he acknowledged the President has been tarnished. Bill Clinton is a man who clearly thinks a lot about how he is going to be

regarded, and the argument that somehow he will be walking away

unpunished if he is censured and has had this and other proceedings, I think, is very inaccurate. I appreciate Mr. Weld bringing

that up.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas.

Mr. GEKAS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Sullivan, you have repeated today what we have heard in

different ways over the months of this controversy, that the President is neither above the law nor below the law, implying, I believe, on your part that if it were an ordinary citizen, not the President of the United States, that this case would have been dismissed out of hand, and therefore the same premise should have

been accorded to the President because he is not below the standard or above the standard that you would apply to an ordinary citizen.

I see such a big difference that it is hard for me to articulate it.

But suppose the ordinary citizen, in your set of circumstances, had

pleaded the Fifth Amendment, you would have undoubtedly honored that, and then we may never have heard of it all, that case,

in the body politic. And I would submit that the Fifth Amendment

is pleaded regularly across the land, and we never get results from

that kind of case. But if the President of the United States had

pleaded the Fifth Amendment, you would agree that there would

have been headlines across the world, and that there would have

been a shaken seat of government in Washington, D.C., or don’t

you think that would have been as dramatic as I think it would

have been?

Mr. SULLIVAN. If the President, instead of testifying in the grand

jury, had taken the Fifth Amendment, I am certain it would result

in a great deal of publicity, probably adverse. I don’t think that it

changes the issue of whether he is above or below the law.

Mr. GEKAS. But my point is that you are asserting with me that

this high-profile case that would have been a result of the President pleading the fifth amendment makes it a different situation.

It is possible, I believe, that the Congress, that the House, could

begin impeachment proceedings if that alone had happened, the

pleading of the fifth amendment by the President, as being a political problem, a political affront to the system of government.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Do you think taking the Fifth Amendment is a

high crime or misdemeanor?

Mr. GEKAS. No, no, no, no. I am saying that——

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Constitution gives everyone——

Mr. GEKAS. No, no, no, no.

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. The right to assert the Fifth Amendment, and the jury is instructed that they are not to take any inference from that.
341

Mr. GEKAS. What I am saying to you, sir, is that in pleading the

fifth amendment, it becomes a high-profile case.

Mr. SULLIVAN. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. GEKAS. And——

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry if I interrupted you.

Mr. GEKAS. If the President did so, you can’t argue that case.

You already admitted it is a high-profile case.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Of course, but I don’t think it is relevant here.

Mr. GEKAS. Well, I am asking questions concerning it.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Go ahead.

Mr. GEKAS. The fact that it becomes a high-profile case means

that when the President of the United States takes some kind of

legal action like committing false—or stating falsehoods under

oath, that we cannot treat it as just another case, but whether or

not the President attacks the system of government that is so important to us.

Governor Weld makes a great deal out of the fact that what the

President did, no matter how we couch it, is not an attack on the

system of government. Yet, we submit, many of us, that when he

undertakes to make false statements under oath, that he is directly

attacking two segments of our system of government: One, the

rights, the constitutional rights, of a fellow American citizen who

has instituted a case in which he, if he did those falsehoods, was

trying to destroy that individual’s right to pursue a case. That is

an attack, some of us might conclude, against our system of government. And, secondly, in affronting the judicial system, the other

third branch of government, by directly giving false statements

under oath, could be considered, could it not, as an attack on the

delicate balance of separation of powers, his disdain for the judicial

system?

We have to take that into consideration, do we not, Governor?

Mr. WELD. It could be so considered, Mr. Congressman. Those arguments, while fair on their face, strike me as on the technical

side, but I understand what you are saying.

Mr. GEKAS. I thank you. I have no further questions.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. The gentleman from New York, Mr.

Schumer.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to compliment this panel. I think it was an extremely strong and erudite presentation from all five of you. It was

an excellent panel, and I appreciate your putting the time and effort into it.

When I look at where we are headed here, I think there is sort

of three levels of argument. The level we addressed yesterday was

dispositive for me and for some of us, and that is that even if you

assume all of Mr. Starr’s facts to be true, and that the President

did wrong, however one would define that wrong, it does not rise

to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors and doesn’t merit impeachment. I think that case was made very well yesterday by the

first panel.

The second level of the case would be both—the next two levels

relate to you folks, and that is if you assume the opposite, that if

Starr’s facts are correct, if Mr. Starr’s facts are correct, then impeachment is warranted, there are two parts to that. One are the
342

abuse of power and obstruction of justice charges, which seem to

most, myself included, to be at a higher level, and the next go to

the perjury charges. So let me ask you about each of those.

First, on the abuse of power charge, which even many on this

committee feel went too far, do any of you think there is any merit

to that charge being filed, whether it be—well, you can’t even make

the case to a citizen because it relates to the President being President. Do any of you feel that charge has any merit whatsoever?

Okay. Let the record show that nobody did, and I don’t want to

spend much time on that.

On the obstruction of justice, there seem to be three specific

areas that at least Mr. Starr talked about. One was the finding

of—the attempt to find Ms. Lewinsky a job; the second, the discussions between Ms. Lewinsky and the President about what they

would say if confronted with their relationship; and the third about

Ms. Currie’s testimony and so-called being coached about that testimony.

When we examined that, and when I questioned actually Mr.

Starr himself about those, and I asked him what greater evidence

did he have to the President making a determination that he

wished to influence the judicial process as opposed to not having

his wife, his friends, his staff, the Nation find out about his relationship, Starr didn’t point to any evidence. It was simply surmise.

Would any of you care to comment on that group of charges?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Schumer, can I answer the one about Mrs.

Currie?

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Sullivan, yes.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Because that’s the one that I didn’t allude to in

my statement.

Mrs. Currie testified that the President came and asked her

some questions in a leading fashion, is this right, is this right, is

this right, after his deposition was taken in the Jones case. And

she testified that she did not feel pressured to agree with him and

that she believed his statements were correct and agreed with him.

The quote is, ‘‘He would say right, and I could have said wrong.’’

Now, that is not a case for obstruction of justice. It is very common

for lawyers, before the witness gets on the stand, to say now, you

are going to say this, you are going to say this, you are going to

say this. It doesn’t make a difference if you have got two participants to an event and you try to nail it down.

Mr. SCHUMER. Do all of you agree with that, with the Currie

matter?

And on the other two, the Lewinsky parts of this——

Mr. DAVIS. I think to some degree——

Mr. SCHUMER. I mean, I don’t even understand how they could—

how Starr could think that he would have a case, not with the

President of the United States, but with anybody here, when it

seems so natural and so obvious that there would be an overriding

desire not to have this public and to have everybody—to have the

two of them coordinate their stories, that is, the President and Ms.

Lewinsky, if there were not the faintest scintilla of any legal proceedings coming about. It just strikes me as an overwhelming

stretch.
343

Am I wrong to characterize it that way? You gentlemen all have

greater experience than I do.

Mr. DAVIS. I think you are right, and also the problem a prosecutor would face would be that in these cases there is a relationship

between these people unrelated to the existence of the Paula Jones

case.

Mr. SCHUMER. Correct.

Mr. DAVIS. Not just the——

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Weld, do you agree with that?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. I am

sorry, Mr. Schumer, your time has expired.

Mr. SCHUMER. Can I just ask for a yes or no answer on that?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Can you answer that yes or no, Governor?

Mr. WELD. I think it is a little thin, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.

Coble.

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to have you all with us.

Governor Weld, I have a handful of friends who reside in your

State, and Democrats and Republicans alike, without exception,

speak very favorably of you.

Mr. WELD. Well, I have friends in your State, too, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. COBLE. Do they speak favorably of me, Governor?

Governor, last fall you appeared on the Today Show and alluded

to the possibility of resignation of the President. I am quoting in

part here. You said, my sort of rule of thumb here, I think it comes

down to this, if when the President goes to a high school and colleges and universities, really his strongest point, if he looks out at

those kids, those students, and their teachers and sees a sea of

signs that says, liar, liar, pants on fire, it is time to go.

Governor, at this late stage of the game, what is your view on

the possibility of resignation?

Mr. WELD. Well, in a way I say this with a heavy heart, because

I was troubled by the conduct at issue here, but I think that events

have overtaken that possibility. I remember saying and thinking

that the President would be well advised when he looked in the

mirror shaving every morning to say, are people taking me seriously? Are they taking me seriously at home? Are they taking me

seriously abroad?

I was concerned that some international events that were happening around then were happening because of a perception of

weakness at the core of the executive of the U.S. Government. But,

you know, what happens the week after I deliver myself of these

wise sentiments, the President goes to the United Nations and gets

a standing ovation. Then he goes into the budget negotiation with

members of the opposite party and by most accounts gets, you

know, better than half a loaf. Then he has the Wye agreements on

the Middle East. So it appears to me people are taking him seriously.

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir.
344

Mr. Davis, in a Washington Post interview, you, comparing the

impeachment process with Watergate, indicated that we are at an

uglier political time now.

Now much has been said about the late President Kennedy’s sexual indiscretions that were not publicized, but, however, were commonly known, and many of those same people insist that those indiscretions would be publicized today. And I am not convinced, sir,

that we are in an uglier political climate or a political time. I think,

rather, the members of the media are probing more thoroughly and

probing more consistently, and I think probably that may be why

more attention is focused today.

Let me ask you this, Mr. Davis: Would you—I started to say

wouldn’t you, but I would be speaking for you. Would you acknowledge that this committee’s consideration of whether grand jury perjury and civil deposition perjury and potential witness tampering

by the President—I am not saying that it happened, but assuming

that it did—that it merits impeachment as a legitimate exercise for

this committee? Would you acknowledge that?

Mr. DAVIS. I think that it is appropriate for the committee to be

conducting a review. I think that there are issues in terms of

whether the committee can meet what I believe is the committee’s

burden, if it is going to decide that there should be impeachment,

without really itself satisfying itself as to the credibility of some of

the core witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky. But I think that once you received the referral, I think obviously it was appropriate for you to

consider that referral and consider it seriously.

Mr. COBLE. Governor Weld, neither am I Tom Sullivan, but, Mr.

Sullivan, this has been broached previously, but I want to broach

it as well, you indicated that it was your belief that the average

citizen probably would not be prosecuted under similar circumstances that are now before us. And it was referred to the—

the two average citizens last week, one is a physician, one a basketball coach, appeared to sit where you are sitting now, and they,

in fact, were prosecuted. I am inclined to think, Mr. Sullivan, and

I am not—by no means am I taking you to task for this, but I think

what you said may well be subject to interpretation.

I think perhaps—and maybe it is because of the uglier time or

the fact that the media is more focused now. I think probably that

you would see more and more average citizens prosecuted for perjury, but I will be glad to hear from you in response to that.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Mr. Coble, I am aware of the fact that there

are some few prosecutions for perjury arising out of civil matters.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Sullivan, I hate to do it to you, but the time is

up.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The time is up.

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, the question I am most curious about is whether, Mr.

Davis, if there had been a cooling off period, and if President Ford

hadn’t issued the pardon, what do you think Mr. Jaworski would

have done?
345

Mr. DAVIS. The answer is, I don’t know. Indeed, the reason that

in my memorandum I recommended a cooling off period and felt

that we should defer that decision was because I thought the emotions at the time were too high, and one would have to balance the

factors very carefully, including, as I said in my statement, whether the public interest in saying, we have had 2 years of this, we

need to get on to something else, and shouldn’t we do that, and

that a prosecution would drag things out.

Mr. BERMAN. Well, I agree with the other comments. I think this

panel has presented some very compelling testimony on all of the

pitfalls in pursuing a perjury prosecution in this situation and

raised doubts about whether all the elements of perjury are present

in this case. We are not a courtroom. Some people keep trying to

make that analogy. I thought the professors yesterday were a political body. This is a political process in many, many ways. The

Founding Fathers would have given this process to the Supreme

Court if they had wanted a strict legal analysis.

So perhaps your testimony on the question of whether there

would be a prosecution for perjury is less relevant to whether there

are high crimes and misdemeanors here than it is to the question

of whether one of the articles of impeachment should actually assert the conclusion, the legal conclusion, that perjury has been

committed. And I would hope the framers of these articles would

look at this testimony carefully in making that decision.

The point that does interest me, for those who want to make an

analogy to a legal proceeding, is this notion that even if I think,

as a prosecutor, that I have probable cause to indict, and I believe

that the accused is guilty and that if I know I can’t get a conviction

from an unbiased jury, I don’t bring the case, develop that a little

bit more. Is this a formalized process that prosecutors use? Where

did you get this from?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I can only speak from my experience as a prosecutor, but I have had situations where, not my assistants, but agents

have said to me after discussion about the evidence, and we concluded that we cannot get a conviction or it is likely that we will

lose, let’s indict him anyway to show him. My response to that is,

get out of my office and never come back.

Mr. FRANK. But you might tell that person to become an independent counsel.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes, Mr. Weld.

Mr. WELD. This is written into the Principles of Federal Prosecution, which is the handbook which guides Federal prosecutors, and

what it says about the charging stage of the criminal justice process is that the prosecutor has to believe that there is sufficient admissible evidence, admissible evidence, to obtain from a reasonable

and unbiased jury a conviction and to sustain it on appeal.

Mr. BERMAN. As I understand, though, there is another provision

in the Justice Department guidelines. If you were bringing a case

in the South involving civil rights, where certain practices were

prevalent, you wouldn’t refuse to bring that case alleging crimes

against a black victim simply because you had fears in the 1950s

or ’60s that an all-white jury might never convict? That wouldn’t

stop you from bringing the case?

Mr. WELD. That is why it says ‘‘reasonable and unbiased.’’
346

Mr. BERMAN. So you would have to conclude that the United

States Senate was somehow not a reasoned and unbiased jury to

apply that logic in this situation?

Mr. NOBLE. May I respond? And let me quote you from the Justice Department guidelines because they use precisely that example and they say: ‘‘For example, in a civil rights case or a case involving an extremely popular political figure, it might be clear that

the evidence of guilt viewed objectively by an unbiased fact-finder

would be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction if the prosecutor might reasonably doubt whether the jury would convict. In

such a case, despite his or her negative assessment of the likelihood of a guilty verdict based on the factors extraneous to an objective view of the law and the facts, the prosecutor may properly conclude that it is necessary and desirable to commence or recommend

prosecution and allow the criminal process to operate in accordance

with its principles.’’

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I have an observation and then a question for Governor Weld.

I have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the premise of

this panel, which is that the President should be considered ‘‘an ordinary citizen.’’ And therefore I disagree with their conclusions. To

me, the President has a special responsibility that goes beyond that

of an ordinary citizen. He holds the most powerful position in the

world. He is the number one law enforcement official of our country. He sets an example for us all. Other people in other positions

of authority, such as a business executive or a professional educator or a military officer, if they had acted as the President is alleged to have acted, their careers would be over, and yet they don’t

hold near the position of authority that the President does.

Let me read a statement from the rules under which President

Nixon was tried for impeachment. It says, ‘‘The office of President

is such that it calls for a higher level of conduct than the average

citizen in the United States.’’

Because of the President’s special authority, I think it makes the

charges against him more serious; and therefore, in my judgment

at least, demands that any punishment be more severe.

Let me go, Governor Weld, to my question to you, and on the

way there let me compliment you for offering a well-thought-out alternative to impeachment; and that is not to say I agree with it,

it is just a well-thought-out alternative.

I want to read a couple of statements from students at Roxbury

Latin School, which I am sure you know is a school in Boston. This

is a column that appeared in the Boston Globe that was written by

their headmaster, and apparently he conducted a couple of school

forums, and this was for students aged 12 to 18, and suggested

that they accept the President’s statement of regret. He said they

would have none of it, and then he generalized their reactions,

which I want to read, and these are quotes:

‘‘You’ve got to be kidding. This wasn’t some one-time lapse in the

face of sudden and unexpected temptation. The President did this

over and over, plotting meetings with Monica Lewinsky in the

White House, including one on Easter, just after he was pictured
347

coming out of church, Bible in hand. Clinton lied passionately, looking us in the eye; then he played word games, but he never told

the truth until he was caught.’’

‘‘Cheating by students usually results in suspensions. Repeat

cheating brings expulsion. Clinton cheated repeatedly. The only difference is that Clinton is a lot older than we are, supposedly a lot

wiser, and he holds the highest public office there is.’’

‘‘Maybe we are naive, but people our age want to look up to the

President. What we see when we look at Clinton is someone who

can’t control himself and lies to his fellow citizens.’’

Governor Weld, aren’t those students generally right in their assessments?

Mr. WELD. I don’t think that anybody is saying that this is a day

at the beach or a walk in the park. This is not a strong outing by

the President, and I find those statements as depressing as you do.

And as I was discussing with Mr. Coble a moment ago, if that kind

of attitude and reaction had persisted in the citizenry at large—

Mr. SMITH. I understand your answer, and I appreciate it. I yield

back the balance of my time.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Boucher.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join with you and the other members who have

congratulated this panel on what I think is a very excellent presentation this morning, and I would like to join in the welcome of

these distinguished witnesses.

Mr. Weld, I was very interested in your statement, with which

I wholly concur, that the intent of the impeachment power was to

protect the public interest and that the standard that Congress

should apply in determining whether acts of the President constitute impeachable conduct is the public interest, and your further

statement that impeachment should not be deemed to be a punishment for individual misconduct or the punishment can occur in the

court in the regular course. You cited the constitutional provision

that says that for any crimes that are committed during the tenure

of the presidency, the President can be indicted and tried just as

any other American.

I gather, however, from the thrust of the testimony of this panel

of witnesses that perjury prosecutions in civil actions are rarely undertaken. I gather also that perjury prosecutions generally, while

undertaken on occasion, are not the first resort of prosecutors in

most cases. But in this particular instance, there is yet another avenue in which the President potentially could be sanctioned for any

misconduct that may have occurred in his testimony under oath.

And that is in the U.S. district court in Arkansas which had jurisdiction of the Jones case, it is—it has been suggested by a number

of witnesses before this committee that that judge retains jurisdiction even though the case itself has now been formally dismissed

by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, and that if she decides it is

appropriate to do so, that she could impose sanctions based on any

misconduct that may have occurred in the deposition that was

taken in her court.

I would like the opinion of these witnesses with regard to whether or not that is an accurate statement of the jurisdictional posture
348

of that case, does she have the jurisdiction to do that? And based

on your very extensive experience with regard to criminal prosecutions, do you think there is a probability or likelihood, or how

would you rate the chances that if she deems that misconduct occurred there, that she might be led to impose sanctions? That

might be the more probable way in which some sanction occurs as

opposed to a criminal prosecution.

Mr. SULLIVAN. There is under the United States Supreme Court

decisions, inherent power in the District Court in civil cases to impose sanctions for misconduct occurring before the court. There is

no question about that. That case was decided several years ago.

Your second part was what would happen if she were to do that.

Not having brought my crystal ball with me, I can’t tell you. But

she does have that power to pursue that, so far as I know. I do not

know whether the dismissal of the case terminates that power.

That is an issue I really haven’t looked at.

Mr. BOUCHER. Does anyone else have a comment on that issue?

Let me ask this additional question.

Mr. Noble, I was very interested in your saying that this Congress should consider, in deciding whether or not to vote articles

of impeachment, the effect that the House voting articles of impeachment and the Senate being put to trial would have on the

country, the further polarization that would occur, the diversion of

the President and the Congress from their real responsibility which

is attending to our national agenda, the potential immobilization of

the Supreme Court while the Chief Justice presides, the lowering

of the standard of impeachment in future years. I am concerned

that in fact some Members of this Congress, not fully having considered those effects, may have decided to apply a lower standard

to determining whether or not articles of impeachment should be

approved and believe perhaps the House should act as a grand jury

and simply vote on probable cause.

Do you agree that there ought to be a higher standard than probable cause for us to consider this weighty matter?

Mr. NOBLE. Yes. This follows on Mr. Smith’s comment. It is clear

that before the public, the President is not an ordinary citizen. It

is clear that before Congress, the President is not an ordinary citizen. It is clear that any rational criminal investigator or Federal

agent investigating an allegation of perjury by a President of the

United States is not going to treat it like an ordinary case. It is

clear based on everything that we have heard, that most of us believe, without looking at specific evidence, that the President either

did perjure himself or didn’t perjure

himself.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. NOBLE. I will wait.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr.

Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being

here this morning, gentlemen.

Mr. Sullivan, do you believe that the knowing and willful misleading of a judge or Federal grand jury represents an effort to

thwart the judicial system from discovering the truth?
349

Mr. SULLIVAN. It sounds like what you said is correct, if I understand it.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The evidence indicates that the President and

Ms. Lewinsky had three conversations about her testifying in the

Jones case within 1 month before his deposition. When the President was asked, ‘‘Have you ever talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the

possibility that she might be asked to testify in this lawsuit,’’ he

answered, ‘‘I’m not sure.’’

Governor Weld, you know the President pretty well, do you think

it’s reasonable to believe that the President completely forgot about

these three conversations?

Mr. WELD. I really don’t know, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Governor.

When the President was asked, ‘‘At any time were you and

Monica Lewinsky together alone in the Oval Office,’’ he answered,

‘‘I don’t recall.’’ The evidence indicates that he was, in fact, alone

with Ms. Lewinsky on many occasions, including the time that he

exchanged gifts less than 20 days before the deposition.

Mr. Sullivan, for this not to be perjury, the President must have

genuinely forgot his numerous encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, for

it not to be perjury, is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Evidence in a perjury case requires proof beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant not only made a false statement, but knew it was false at the time it was made; that is correct.

Mr. GALLEGLY. And the test would be that he genuinely forgot

in order for that not to be perjury?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is my understanding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Sullivan. The President’s action of being less than truthful has caused and continues

to cause serious problems. I am concerned that his lying affects the

ability of the American people to trust the highest elected official

in the land. One of my constituents called me yesterday, a constituent by the name of Les Savage. I have never met this gentleman

before, but his question was very sincere: How do we know when

the President is telling the truth, and how do leaders of other countries around the world know when President Clinton is telling the

truth?

President Clinton has had many occasions to come clean, and to

date I don’t believe he has. The President’s failure to present any

substantive evidence is consistent with his obvious lack of concern

about how serious the offense of lying under oath truly is.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before my 5 minutes

begin, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman HYDE. State your inquiry.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. A few weeks ago when Mr. Starr was

here in answer to a question I asked, he referred to a court case

which was then under seal, and I was not able to characterize

his—I felt myself unable to characterize the accuracy of his statement about that case lest I be accused of violating the seal.

A few moments ago Mr. McCollum referred to the same court

case, which is no longer under seal but which is within the posses350

sion of this committee in executive session. Would I be violating

the confidentiality rule if I were to state that Mr. McCollum misquoted and misstated what the court found and that the court did

not conclude that the President’s testimony about Lewinsky was

material to the Jones litigation, but rather found that the truthfulness of Monica Lewinsky’s affidavit was material enough to her

motion to quash her subpoena in that case to justify the OIC’s

issuance of a grand jury subpoena to her lawyer, and that this is

a distinct issue from whether the Jones deposition was material to

that case? And if I were not permitted to state that, why is Mr.

McCollum permitted to quote this case?

Chairman HYDE. You will be provided with a copy of the opinion.

Mr. NADLER. Am I permitted to state this?

Chairman HYDE. I am told that you have mischaracterized Mr.

McCollum.

Mr. NADLER. Since that——

Chairman HYDE. You can say anything that you want, but I am

suggesting that you will get a copy of the opinion very shortly, and

I am suggesting that you read it before you make statements about

it. But that is up to you.

All right, now your 5 minutes start.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I should note that I have written to the Attorney

General, asking that Mr. Starr be disciplined for breaking the confidentiality of that case when he mischaracterized it 2 or 3 weeks

ago.

Let me ask Mr. Davis, I think, starting off, you have stated very

carefully and clearly in your testimony that really no prosecutor

would prosecute a perjury case on the basis of the evidence that we

have before us from the Starr referral; that there are holes and

there is no likelihood that a jury would convict. You have said, for

example, that you wouldn’t bring a prosecution of perjury based on

two conflicting statements of two witnesses, one of whom disagrees

with the other, that the alleged corroboration that Mr. Starr cites

from Monica Lewinsky’s testimony is not corroboration at all because that corroboration that she told 10 or 11 friends and relatives of hers the same thing; that she had a motive to falsify or

embellish the statement; and in fact I think law school tells us that

such a statement would be inadmissible in a court as hearsay and

prior inconsistent statements in any event.

First of all, do I characterize your testimony correctly?

Mr. DAVIS. Generally, yes.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Secondly, some people on the other side

here have talked about the President being impeachable not only

for perjury but for a lesser crime; if perjury isn’t a high crime and

misdemeanor and a great offense threatening the safety of the Republic, maybe false statements under oath are. Would the same or

similar constraints prevent a successful prosecution under these

circumstances with this evidence of false statements under oath as

would prevent the successful prosecution for perjury?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. The false statement under oath section of the

U.S. Code, while it formally eliminates the so-called two witness

rule, the same prosecutorial judgment would come into play in

which you would have to assess can you win the case. And for the
351

reasons that I articulated before, it seems to me that with the oneon-one testimony and with the fact that Mr. Starr would have to

disassociate himself and criticize Ms. Lewinsky’s testimony and say

that it is not true in various regards would make such a prosecution, in my view, doomed to failure.

Mr. NADLER. For false statements under oath as well as for perjury?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct.

Mr. NADLER. And again to summarize, Ms. Lewinsky is a weak

witness because the special prosecutor would have to point out that

she lied under oath in some other place?

Mr. DAVIS. In the grand jury context, she is the witness as to the

core perjury.

Mr. NADLER. And it is further weakened by the fact that the alleged corroboration witnesses would be inadmissible in any court

as hearsay?

Mr. DAVIS. They would probably be inadmissible. There may be

some arguments that they could come in at some point, depending

on cross-examination, but the point is whatever motive she had to

falsify in the grand jury, the same motive would exist.

Mr. NADLER. So in other words if I want to falsify or embellish

my statement or have a fantasy or lie, the fact that I lied to 12

people doesn’t make it any less of a lie than if I lied to only one

person?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct.

Mr. NOBLE. Can I talk about that for just a minute, because it

is very important? A good prosecutor is going to try this case with

the defense theory in mind, which is going to be can I prove that

the President did what she said that the President did. She is

going to be impeached for every prior inconsistent statement she

has, but the person is not going to cross-examine her, and make

it seem as though her testimony was recently fabricated because

that way she can bring in every prior statement. All of us ought

to worry about someone lying about us to a thousand people and

having that come in as admissible evidence, making what we lied

about the first time was true if the motive to lie began in the very

beginning. So for that reason—

Mr. NADLER. And her motive did begin at the beginning?

Mr. NOBLE. And her motive did begin at the beginning.

Mr. NADLER. And that applies to false statements under oath as

well as to perjury?

Mr. NOBLE. That applies to false statements under oath as well

as perjury. I tried a false statement case. I convicted it at the jury

level. It was reversed on appeal because of a literal truth defense,

the same defense that would apply here.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Smaltz, the special prosecutor in the Espy case,

said an indictment is as much a deterrent sometimes as a conviction, so you might as—

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. I want to thank all of the members of this panel

for being here today. You have done a good job in presenting what

I believe are some of the best arguments in defense of the Presi352

dent. I understand that is why you are here, and we appreciate

your perspective on this.

I have agreed with some of the points that have been made, obviously I disagree with some of the others, but when we talk about

prosecutorial discretion and the question that a prosecutor has to

ask about whether he can have some expectation of winning before

a jury, I think that is right. I think that is an appropriate way for

a prosecutor to view the case.

My judgment about the facts of this case differ from yours based

on what I have seen to date, because I think there is compelling

evidence here that points to the conclusion that the President engaged in a pattern of lying under oath and other misconduct. But

on the standard for prosecution, I think you have raised some good

and valid points, but I want to quarrel a little bit with the application of that in this context. The argument has been made that in

essence we in the House should, in carrying out our responsibility,

look to the Senate and make a guess about how the proceedings

would turn out in the Senate to determine how we exercise our responsibility under the Constitution. I would suggest to you I don’t

think that is a proper way for us to proceed. I believe that we have

an independent responsibility under the Constitution to make a

judgment concerning the conduct of the President and whether he

should be impeached or not, and it would be in derogation of our

constitutional responsibility to attempt to count noses in the Senate. But I will have to say that it is a very difficult thing to count

noses in the Senate anyway, and in a proceeding like this it is hard

to predict the outcome. I don’t think that this is a proper undertaking for us to be involved in.

I would also point out that the very structure of the Constitution

indicates that in the Constitution the framers provided that the

House could impeach with a simple majority. They provided that

conviction in the Senate would have to be by a two-thirds majority.

I would suggest to you that that structural feature of the Constitution suggests that the framers would have contemplated circumstances in which the House might very well impeach but the

Senate would not convict, and I think that is obvious on the face

of the documents.

Some of these arguments have to be brought to the text of the

Constitution and evaluated in that light.

On the issue of prosecutor discretion, let me pose a scenario here

which I think is very analogous to what we have before us. Suppose the chief executive of a Fortune 500 corporation, a major national corporation in the United States, was accused of sexual harassment and the corporation had been sued, and in the course of

the discovery in that case, the chief executive of that major national corporation lied under oath to impede that civil rights action.

Now, I believe that the fact that the chief executive of a major national corporation was engaged in that conduct would be a relevant

consideration for the prosecutors who were evaluating the case and

whether to bring it, because of the impact of that conduct.

I do believe that bringing prosecutions have a deterrent impact,

and that is one of the considerations that has to be factored into

prosecutorial discretion. So I think if we step back from this situation, and again we can argue about the weight of the facts and I
353

understand that you disagree with the evaluation that some of us

may have made about the weight of the facts here, but if the President of the United States did engage in obstruction of justice and

committed multiple acts of lying under oath, I think that we have

to look at that conduct in light of the consequences that it has and

the message that it sends, just as we would look at the conduct of

the chief executive of a major national corporation who was the defendant in a civil rights case brought against that corporation. I

think that is something to look at.

There is really not time for you to respond, but do you disagree

that this sort of high-profile case has to be evaluated in light of

those circumstances?

Mr. DENNIS. The analogy isn’t quite there. If you were looking

at the President of a Fortune 500 corporation, you would be talking

about a suit that was brought by someone prior to them taking

that position and——

Mr. CANADY. No, absolutely not. He could have been guilty of

that in the course of his conduct as chief executive.

Mr. DENNIS. The issue of materiality has been discussed here,

and that is where the nub of it is. The Jones matter was prior to

the President becoming President of the United States. We are not

talking about issues of how the President deals with subordinates

in that respect. That makes a huge difference in terms of how that

person should be perceived insofar as these kinds of charges.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Sullivan, in your prepared testimony you said no

serious consideration would be given to a criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in discovery in the Jones civil case

having to do with alleged coverup of a sexual affair with a woman

or the follow-up testimony before the grand jury; it simply would

not have been given serious consideration for prosecution, it

wouldn’t get in the door; it would be declined out of hand.

Are you aware that we are not straight as of now as to all of the

allegations, specific allegations of perjury; that even yesterday the

gentleman from Arkansas specified a different statement that he

believed to be perjurious? ABC News said that the Republicans—

on December 7 said that the Republicans might shy away and come

up with new charges than the grand jury.

Is it fair to have an accused respond to a perjury charge without

stating with specificity what the statement is that was false?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. Noble, in fact-finding, is there a problem using conflicting

grand jury testimony, copies of FBI interview sheets, and prior consistent statements in order to make a case against an accused?

Mr. NOBLE. I believe there is a problem using only those bases

for making prosecutorial decisions, yes.

Mr. SCOTT. Why is conflicting grand jury testimony and copies of

FBI interview sheets inherently unreliable as testimony?

Mr. NOBLE. Because our system of justice is based on testing the

testimony of someone under oath in front of the finder of fact, subject to cross-examination, in a grand jury that doesn’t exist. For

that reason, prosecutors at the very least interview the principal

witnesses themselves, try to test that witness as much as they can
354

in terms of deciding whether or not he or she can withstand crossexamination; otherwise you just have hearsay.

Mr. SCOTT. And because of that unreliability, you can’t make a

case just using grand jury testimony to make a case against someone?

Mr. NOBLE. I say this with all due respect. Only a foolish or inexperienced prosecutor would attempt to indict and convict someone

based on hearsay grand jury testimony.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. Davis, in your testimony, on page 13 of your prepared testimony, right at the top, you didn’t have time to go through the specifics of why the obstruction of justice case could not be made.

Could you start at the top of page 13 where it says ‘‘but there

are’’——

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

‘‘Another complicating factor in the obstruction of justice case

which makes this such a difficult case to bring is the reality that

the principal players in this drama, the President, Ms. Lewinsky

and Ms. Currie, had relationships and motivations to act wholly

unrelated to the Jones case. This kind of thing would seriously

complicate the ability of a prosecutor to establish the intent to obstruct some official proceeding, which is required to prevail in an

obstruction of justice case. Examples: The job search began before

Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list, and frankly there is nothing

surprising that someone who had an illicit relationship with a

woman would, when it is over, be willing and want to help her get

a job in another city.’’

‘‘Ms. Currie had her own relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.’’

‘‘People who have an illicit relationship often understand that

they will lie about it without regard to the existence of litigation,

and here it appears that such an understanding was discussed

prior to Ms. Lewinsky being identified as a potential witness.’’

‘‘The evidence, you know, about retrieval of the gifts is contradictory, with Ms. Currie and the President offering versions of the

events which exculpate the President and which differs from Ms.

Lewinsky’s testimony. Ms. Lewinsky herself provided varying and

sometimes exculpatory interpretations of these very events in

terms of her testimony.’’

These are the kinds of things that make winning a case——

Mr. SCOTT. Can you read the next paragraph?

Mr. DAVIS. The reality at the time of the President’s conversation

with Ms. Currie in the immediate aftermath of a civil deposition:

Ms. Currie was not a witness in any proceeding, and given the status of the Jones case, there was no reason to believe that she ever

would be, and that the President was likely focusing on the likely

potential public relations repercussions of his relationship.

Also in response to an earlier comment, it is not a question of

counting votes in the Senate. The issue is in thinking through the

standard of whether to proceed at the House level, whether you

think you have adequate evidence to prevail. You are making that

judgment.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The Chair will declare a 10-minute recess and I mean it, that is

10 minutes. Please come back. Thank you.
355

[Recess.]

Chairman HYDE. The committee will reconvene. I must say that

the panel looks refreshed. That’s good.

Mr. NOBLE. On behalf of the panel, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. All right, Mr. Inglis is next.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the

panel for being here. Mr. Sullivan, if this case, the facts of this case

ever resulted in a prosecution of Bill Clinton after leaving the

White House, would any of what we have heard this morning be

admissible as a fact in a case involving a prosecution of Bill Clinton, a private citizen? Any of your testimony, would any of that be

admitted as a fact in that case?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, absolutely not.

Mr. INGLIS. Would anything that anyone else has said here this

morning be admitted as a fact in that case?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Absolutely not.

Mr. INGLIS. I am keeping score, Mr. Chairman, as you know. So,

Mr. Chairman, this makes panel 4, the fourth panel, Mr. Craig, no

facts. And Mr. Craig said yesterday to us, in the course of our presentation today—that was yesterday—and tomorrow—that’s today—

we will address the factual, underlined, factual and evidentiary

issues directly.

The score now is zero to 4. Zero panels, zero witnesses dealing

with facts. Everybody that we have heard from in these four panels

has given conclusions, has given legal opinions. Not a single person

has presented a fact.

Mr. Sullivan, would a memorandum of law be considered a fact

in a trial?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Not unless—normally no, unless the issue arose

out of that; but no.

Mr. INGLIS. If the memorandum of law was an issue, then it

would be a fact?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Correct.

Mr. INGLIS. So this 184-page document which really I think can

only be described as a memorandum of law, possibly a brief, contains no facts, no facts in the case before us today.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is similar to the Starr report in that regard.

They are about equal. They do deal with the facts, but there are

no witnesses that you’ve heard to testify directly about the facts;

whereas in a trial, the people would have to appear and give their

testimony personally.

Mr. INGLIS. Of course the difference, which you have to concur

with me, is that the Starr report is based on sworn testimony gathered by an independent counsel, which is the same facts that are

discussed here; it is just that there you have a direct quotation of

those facts and a summary of those facts; is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. I think that the White House submission, although I have not read all of it, I have read part of it, the part I

read did deal in great detail with a lot of the facts, including a lot

of the facts not highlighted in the Starr report.

Mr. INGLIS. But none of those are facts in the case. And the point

that I am making is that again Mr. Craig yesterday made a very

high bar for him to get over, and the thing that I find wonderful

about these proceedings is really it is a rare opportunity to bring
356

accountability to the White House spin machine. What happens, I

think, with the spin machine is that the reporters get worn down,

they get tired of trying to pursue it and they just accept it. But

here we have accountability. Yesterday Mr. Craig said, in the

course of the presentation we will address the factual evidentiary

issues directly.

The score is zero to 4. Zero of these panels, Mr. Craig, have addressed facts. All of them are doing what the other panels have

done in times past. In other words—here again, very helpful discussion and I appreciate the time of all of these witnesses, but

there is nothing new here. No new facts, no new evidentiary issues

which have been addressed directly. And once again, though, we do

have that the President had personally instructed you not to obscure the simple moral truth, but all this 184-page document is is

more of the hair-splitting, more of the legal technicalities that are

so maddening in what the President has to say to us. That is what

the 184 pages is.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We got a 445-page referral

from Independent Counsel Starr. Is there anything in those 445

pages in those form that would be admitted in a criminal case?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. WATT. So I suppose what Mr. Inglis has been talking about

is what we have been talking about, we keep waiting on some facts

to be developed here; and without that development, the score remains zero to zero, I take it, with the presumption of innocence

being in favor of the President.

Mr. Noble, you had a response?

Mr. NOBLE. Yes, I would like to respond to the previous Congressman’s comments.

Mr. WATT. Before you go there——

Mr. NOBLE. And in direct response to your comment, and that is,

if it was a trial and the prosecution presented no admissible evidence, zero, not guilty, there would be no defense case.

Mr. WATT. That’s right. Now that brings me to the point that I

wanted to make, because I got a call—everybody seems to be getting calls from constituents—and I got mine last week from a constituent who started out by saying that the President was engaging

in a legal attempt to distinguish what he had said in some way,

and I reminded the caller that this in fact is a legal proceeding that

we are involved in. Is there anybody on this panel that disagrees

with that?

Okay.

So the standards that are applicable in a legal proceeding, Mr.

Sullivan, you refer to that as—on the first page of your testimony,

you said, ‘‘The topic of my testimony is prosecutorial standards

under which cases involving alleged perjury and obstruction of justice are evaluated by responsible Federal prosecutors.’’

I take it that you are equating this panel to responsible Federal

prosecutors. And what you are saying, I guess, I take it from your

testimony this morning is, if a responsible Federal prosecutor

wouldn’t prosecute this case, then we ought not be moving it along
357

to the Senate or to the House floor; is that—is that the essence of

where you come down?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am not sure that I would presume on the issue

of what your responsibility is.

I am only saying that since your judgment here is high crimes

and misdemeanors, that is the test, in my opinion a responsible

Federal prosecutor would not bring a case based on these charges

in the Starr report. Now, you can draw whatever conclusions you

wish politically from that conclusion.

Mr. WATT. Mr. Noble, what would be your response to that, and

in the context of what some of my Republican colleagues on the

committee have suggested ought be the standard under which we

are evaluating this evidence?

Mr. NOBLE. I believe, and I am not—I was not elected by anyone,

not by prosecutors or citizens, to comment; but my best advice is

that there is a lesson to be learned from the Justice Department.

The parallels are quite striking. In the Justice Department before

bringing a criminal prosecution, the hurdle is very low: probable

cause. However, before getting a conviction, you need proof beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Here, in order for it to get voted out of this House, you’ll need

a majority. However, for a conviction to occur, you need two-thirds

of the Senate. I believe you ought to look and think about what a

rational fair-minded Senator would do, how he or she would vote.

If you conclude that they would not convict, think about the precedent you would have set if after 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 impeachments and

no convictions. You would not restore public confidence. If anything, you would undermine public confidence in the impeachment

proceeding.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

Mr. Goodlatte, would you yield to me for just a question?

Mr. GOODLATTE. Sure.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Maybe Mr. Sullivan——

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, on whose time are we operating?

Chairman HYDE. Pardon? I’m sorry. I ask staff to do that, and

sometimes they forget; they are so enchanted by my question.

Mr. WATT. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The question I was going to ask: When someone

is granted immunity, as Ms. Lewinsky was, is it customary—and

of course we can get the answer by looking at the immunity agreement—but is it customary that they are obliged to tell the truth

thereafter; and if they lie or tell a falsehood about some substantial

issue, that they forfeit their immunity? Is that the custom?

Mr. SULLIVAN. There are two kinds of immunity, but the normal

immunity, and I have not seen her agreement, is what is called

‘‘use immunity,’’ which means that any testimony that she gives

which is not truthful could be used against her in a subsequent

perjury prosecution.

If she gets transactional immunity, she is entirely free, but that

is not normally the case. It is usually use immunity. However, in

my experience when the Federal prosecutors give use immunity to

a witness, I don’t like to say never happens, because that is usually
358

wrong, but I just don’t know of a case in which they have brought

a prosecution——

Chairman HYDE. I think the thing to do is see what the agreement held.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. Generally the agreement requires truthful

testimony, and you are subject to perjury prosecution if you do not

give truthful testimony.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

I thank you, Mr. Goodlatte.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Governor Weld, when you were Governor of

Massachusetts, if you were convicted of a felony that was serious,

that included jail time, what would happen to you as Governor of

the State of Massachusetts?

Mr. WELD. I think you are out automatically, but I never got

close enough to the border to focus on that question.

Mr. GOODLATTE. We hope not.

But the point is I think that is true not only in Massachusetts

but in virtually every State in the country if the chief executive is

convicted of a felony, that he or she is automatically removed from

office; and I do have the annotated laws of Massachusetts here in

front of me, and that is exactly what they provide.

In addition, it is my understanding that you would not be exempt

from prosecution during the time that you served as Governor. In

other words, the prosecution could go forward, you could be tried

and convicted during that time, unlike the prevailing opinion with

regard to the President of the United States?

Mr. WELD. Sure, I think that is true.

Mr. GOODLATTE. If that were to occur, that would be a serious

disruption of your duties as Governor of Massachusetts, to go

through what conceivably could be a lengthy trial; but nonetheless

the laws of that State and virtually every other State provide for

that to be done to protect the public trust and the interest of the

public in not having someone with a serious charge and subsequently a felony conviction serving in the office of highest trust of

that State; is that correct?

Mr. WELD. That’s right. Actually one of the reasons that I resigned in 1997 was because the Mexican ambassadorship was taking up so much of my time, I didn’t think that it was fair to the

people to continue drawing a full salary. So a lengthy criminal proceeding would be problematic also.

Mr. GOODLATTE. If the judgment against the Governor is reversed at a later time, the Governor can be restored to that position unless it is so expressly ordered by the terms of a pardon. The

President of the United States has the power to pardon, and the

prevailing opinion is that the President can pardon himself. Are we

all in agreement that the likelihood of any kind of subsequent prosecution of this case, regardless of your opinions of the merits, is not

going to take place because of the reality of the circumstances that

either for practical reasons after the President leaves office or because he could bestow a pardon upon himself, that that would take

place?

Mr. WELD. I cannot imagine the President pardoning himself.

When I said that I thought that the post-term risk was low, that

is because of my assessment of the merits of the prosecution case.
359

Mr. GOODLATTE. Nonetheless, he has that power and the Constitution is very explicit about the one exception to the use of that

power, and that is in circumstances where the President is impeached. He cannot then pardon himself and restore himself to office as a result of an impeachment.

Mr. Noble, in my last question, would you be able to keep your

job as professor of law at New York University if these charges

were brought forward before you and made known to your employer?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [presiding]. Mr. Noble, you don’t have to

answer that because time is up.

Mr. CONYERS. Could he answer it if he wanted to?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I think so.

Mr. NOBLE. I can’t even imagine being accused of anything——

Mr. GOODLATTE. Professor Noble, I can’t imagine you being accused of anything as heinous as this either, but nonetheless I think

you would agree that you would not be able to hold that position.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlelady from California, Ms.

Lofgren.

Ms. LOFGREN. I believe the issue before the Congress is whether

the behavior of the Chief Executive is so severely threatening to

our constitutional system of government that it requires us to undo

the popular will of the people and remove the executive and go

through that trauma. That is the issue that faces us. However, not

every person is analyzing this in the same way, the appropriate

way. There are some who say that lying about sex, although deplorable, is not enough to impeach, but it is the crime of perjury

that causes them to think that there ought to be an impeachment.

Unfortunately for the President, there is no forum to address the

issue, to defend against allegations of crime. People say those are

technicalities, but that is what the criminal law is all about.

I have been thinking about my late professor, Graham

Douthwaite, my criminal law professor, who thought that in order

to convict of a crime you had to prove every element of a crime,

and that necessarily becomes technical. And in the case of perjury

you have to have the person under oath, it has to be a statement

about a material fact in the case, it has to be an unambiguous

question, it has to be a knowingly false answer, it has to be actually false, and there must be competent evidence for all of those

elements to get a conviction.

For example, I recently—and I am not arguing this case—read

an article in the Legal Times and also in the American Lawyer

Today that points out that the President was probably not actually

under oath when he testified before the grand jury because the

oath was administered by an officer who did not have the capacity

to administer the oath; to wit, a prosecutor.

There is a case on that, U.S. v. Doshian, which requires that in

such a case, the case must be dismissed. If it was John Smith in

court, any court in America, that case of perjury would have to be

dismissed. It is a technicality, but that is what the criminal law is

about.

I went home this weekend and asked a friend who is a deputy

district attorney whether a conviction could be had in this case,

and the answer I got was ‘‘no way.’’ This could never yield a convic360

tion if it were John Smith. And so I am wondering, Mr. Sullivan,

could you help the American people, most of whom have the benefit

of not going to law school, to understand and to appreciate why we

have these technicalities and why it could be possible, if it was

John Smith in court, to say something that was obviously misleading but that would not actually yield a criminal conviction? How

could that be, and what is the point of that, Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. The law has raised very, very high barriers

against any citizen being convicted of a crime. The presumption of

innocence, we have it in the United States, it is not common

throughout the world, but we are really very privileged in many

ways, and this is one of them. In perjury cases, you must prove

that the person who made the statement made a knowingly false

statement.

Where I think the defect in this prosecution is, among others—

and I don’t think it would be brought because it is ancillary to a

civil deposition—is to establish that the President knew what he

said was false. When he testified in his grand jury testimony, he

explained what his mental process was in the Jones deposition.

And he said that the two definitions that would describe oral sex

had been deleted by the trial judge from the definition of sexual relations, and I understood the definition to mean sleeping with

someone. I don’t want to get too particular here.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you.

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is where this case, in my opinion, wouldn’t

go forward, even if you found an errant prosecutor who would want

to prosecute somebody for being a peripheral witness in a civil case

that had been settled. So that is my answer to that.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Noble, you are an evidence professor. My time

is up. Perhaps someone else can ask you about hearsay. I yield

back.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I thank the gentlewoman from California

for watching the red light.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. I would like to respond to this frivolous argument

about the oath that we just now heard.

The President’s deposition oath was administered in a civil deposition by Judge Susan Webber Wright, according to the court reporter who recorded the deposition.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28 specifies three types of persons before whom depositions may be taken within the United

States: before an officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws

of the United States, or of the place where the examination is

held——

Ms. LOFGREN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUYER. No, I will not. Or before a person appointed by the

court to administer oaths and take testimony. There is no dispute

that Judge Wright has the authority to give the oath in a civil deposition. Note, also in addition, 5 USC 2903 provides, ‘‘An oath authorized or required under the laws of the United States may be

administered by the Vice President or an individual authorized by

local law to administer oaths in that State, district or territory, or

possession of the United States where an oath is administered.’’
361

Now before the grand jury, rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules provides that the foreperson of the grand jury, ‘‘shall have the power

to administer oaths and affirmations and shall sign all indictments.’’ This does not mean that the foreperson is the only person

who can administer oaths in the grand jury. In the District of Columbia, a notary public can administer a oath, an affirmation. In

the President’s grand jury testimony, the oath was administered by

the court reporter/notary public, who is authorized to administer

oaths by the Federal law in the District of Columbia. The District

of Columbia Code provides that a notary public shall have the

power to administer oaths and affirmations. That is Chapter 8,

D.C. Code 1–810.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, was he reading off a document?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentleman from

Indiana, Mr. Buyer.

Mr. SCOTT. If he was reading off a document, we would like to

see what he was reading.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentleman from

Indiana.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Noble, with regard to prosecutorial discretion, I

was pleased to hear some of your testimony. I am referring here

to the Principles of Federal Prosecution. I have a couple of questions that I would like to ask. Prosecutors end up having to exercise discretion a lot of times, because sometimes there is more

crime that occurs and you have less resources, and so you have to

exercise good judgment; is that correct?

Mr. NOBLE. That is correct.

Mr. BUYER. And there are many different factors that you need

to take into consideration, and that is also why you have these

guidelines in the Federal sector?

Mr. NOBLE. That is correct.

Mr. BUYER. One of the factors that you talked about today is the

strength of evidence?

Mr. NOBLE. That’s right.

Mr. BUYER. Another factor is the gravity of the offense?

Mr. NOBLE. That’s correct.

Mr. BUYER. Another is deterrence, the deterrent effect?

Mr. NOBLE. Correct.

Mr. BUYER. By prosecuting or not prosecuting?

Mr. NOBLE. That is correct.

Mr. BUYER. In this case when I refer to the guidelines, under the

section of the Nature and the Seriousness of the Offense, I think

it is somewhat informative. It says here, ‘‘The public may be indifferent or even opposed to the enforcement of a controlling statute,

whether on substantive grounds or because of the history of nonenforcement or because the offense involves a minor matter of private concern.’’ And that is what some of you have tried to articulate here today.

Mr. NOBLE. I believe I quoted that in my prepared remarks.

Mr. BUYER. If you go down further it reads, ‘‘While public interest or lack thereof deserves the prosecutor’s careful attention, it

should not be used to justify a decision to prosecute or to take

other action that cannot be supported on other grounds. Public and
362

professional responsibilities sometimes require the choosing of a

particularly unpopular course.’’

Do you agree with that?

Mr. NOBLE. Again, I have quoted most of what you have said,

yes.

Mr. BUYER. We have had other panels come in and testify, and

they like to cite public opinion polls, and they say, you need to listen to public will here and exercise sound public discretion here

and go with the polls. But as in the prosecution of cases, you don’t

have that luxury, do you?

Mr. NOBLE. I believe that what one is supposed to do is try to

make one’s best judgment in terms of what an unbiased decider of

fact would decide, and if the public polls are deemed to be based

on unbiased opinions, then that should be considered. But if they

are deemed to be based on bias, then I think they should be ignored.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman very much. I think it

is important, as these days come to a close, to make all of ourselves

clear. Let me again clearly state that I find the President’s behavior unacceptable and morally wrong. But I take issue with my colleague from South Carolina who continues to restate the premise

that there are no new facts.

Unfortunately, what I would offer to say is there has been no

new thinking in this room, because as I read the provision, treason

and bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors, I do not

hear the claim treason and bribery and unfit morally. So we are

discussing in actuality apples and oranges for the American people.

That confusion causes the divide and the inability for us to come

together in a collaborative and bipartisan manner.

I would offer to say that maybe the panel that is missing here

are spiritual leaders who might address the question of the schoolhouse in Texas, to be able to talk about redemption or the fact

that, no, liars are not excused, and it is wrong; to teach parents

how to teach their children, church houses and synagogues and

parishes how to lead America morally. For the impeachment process is not a spiritual process, it is a process in fact that we must

deal with, one, the framers’ intent, and as these gentlemen, who

I applaud for your presence, your intellect and your experience,

have come to answer concerns as put forward by the President’s defense.

So I would like to get to what you are here for, to present information that is relevant to the impeachment question. That is not

a spiritual question. It is not a moral question, though we condemn

morally the behavior of the President.

Now, my friends say there is no new evidence. If they would turn

to page 93 in the President’s presentation, there is a statement

that says, there is no evidence that the President obstructed justice

in connection with gifts. But the point is, the Independent Counsel

Mr. Starr said, the President and Ms. Lewinsky met and discussed

what should be done with the gifts subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky.

Here, the answer; here is Ms. Lewinsky’s testimony not ever put

forward: He really didn’t, he really didn’t discuss it. And so you
363

have it where there is an absolute new fact of which my friends

seem to reject.

Another point is in the Paula Jones deposition Mr. Bennett objected to the definition. This is the sexual relations or sexual affairs. He was on the record saying, I think this could really lead

to confusion. I think it is important that the record is clear. I do

not want my client answering questions, not understanding exactly

what these folks are talking about.

Another codefendant, Danny Ferguson’s lawyer said, frankly, I

think it is a political trick definition, the definition, and I have told

you before how I feel about the political character of this lawsuit.

Let me ask, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Davis and Mr. Noble, as my time

eases on, one, Mr. Davis, give the American people, most of whom

have not been charged with a crime, never been inside of a grand

jury, as to what it is like, whether it ends there with the probative

value of that.

Mr. Sullivan, if you would, if you could remember the question,

so I could quickly get it answered, you mentioned the fact that it

is unlikely to prosecute for these issues of perjury. Say that again

for us quickly.

Mr. Noble, do we have the authority in this proceeding not to go

forward if we don’t think we have a case?

Mr. Davis, inside the grand jury room.

Mr. DAVIS. The grand jury is really the instrument of the prosecutor. While they may ask some of their own questions, their

agenda really is the agenda of the prosecutor. And what it is not

is a vehicle for getting an assessment of the credibility of witnesses

that appear there. There is no cross examination. It is the prosecutor’s presentation and really it is not sufficient to determine what

ultimately will happen in a trial.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. The reason I think a perjury prosecution on the

sexual relations issue would fail is that the President has clearly

explained in detail and repeatedly in his grand jury testimony

what his understanding of the term meant when he gave his testimony in the Jones case. And I do not think in light of that obscure

definition, and in light of what happened, that it can be said that

there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not honestly

have that interpretation.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished panel.

I always want to remind those that might be watching that this is

the President’s defense, and the witnesses who have been testifying

the last 2 days are all called by his lawyers to testify in his favor.

I want to commend Mr. Craig for the outstanding strategy he has

presented today. He is truly a very fine lawyer. He has brought a

defense to us today that this President should not be impeached because he almost committed perjury, obstructed justice, tampered

with witnesses, caused someone to file a false affidavit. But because he didn’t actually cross that line exactly, then he should not

be impeached. This extraordinarily talented wordsmith, or the extraordinarily talented wordsmiths and people who can make those

extremely sharp distinctions for the President, allow him to rede364

fine such words as ‘‘sexual relationships,’’ the word ‘‘is,’’ the word

‘‘alone’’ and defend this cover-up story with such statements that—

actually, in this 184-page report, that the cover story for Monica

could be that she was delivering papers, and that is because she

did maybe two times of the numerous times that she went there.

And she said there was a lot of truth in there.

Well, there were also a lot of lies in there in addition to that

truth. But again, this is good wordsmanship. Again, I have to commend again the counsel for the President for the defense that has

been crafted so carefully and say it is consistent with the President’s statements so far.

Summarizing, though, I would say that the defense of today that

he almost did these things is like saying, close only counts in

horseshoes. I don’t think, though—let me say, I think, like Mr.

Canady and so many others in this committee, the proof is there

that he didn’t almost commit those offenses, that in fact he crossed

that line. There is compelling evidence of that.

But for those who don’t agree, who might accept your view, I

want to remind the people of the other witnesses who have said

that you don’t have to have a crime to impeach. I think that is

unanimous among all the experts who have testified. And as the

Congress, if we accept your view, I think we have to be careful that

you don’t box us in to the Nixon standards or that you don’t box

us in that there has to be a crime and that a technical defense

would escape impeachment.

I think what we have to look at—what is so important to me is

Mr. Craig’s statement yesterday, the admission on the part of the

President that the President, under oath, the chief law enforcement

officer, the President who appointed all of us as U.S. attorneys,

who appoints the Attorney General, the Commander-in-Chief

evades the truth, gives incomplete answers to the truth, gives misleading testimony, and, he says, it is maddening, it is maddening.

I think it is sickening. I think it is sickening that the President

does this. And for us to allow this President to do that and do damage in a civil rights lawsuit I think is improper. And for Congress

to turn the other way and look away. I don’t think we can do that.

Now, we all in the end have to vote our conscience, but we

should not continue to hear about Nixon is the standard, is the

threshold. That is not the case.

But in the end, I do want to thank you for your able presentation, you have done again what you were supposed to do as part

of this presentation. I think you have done a good job at it. But

again, I think I would address my colleagues, let’s don’t get boxed

in to this idea that he almost did it, in your view, and we can’t impeach. I also again would give the disclaimer that I do believe he

committed these crimes, and I think the evidence is there to show

that. I thank you again.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. I would like to thank our

panelists for being here today. I am extremely impressed with the

way that they have used the very limited time, and I am extremely

frustrated. I would like to see each of you take one aspect of these

allegations and present a summation about why they are not im365

peachable. But this process doesn’t allow for it, and you are not

able to do what you have shown you could do so well because you

don’t have the time.

You are sitting here with so-called legal minds and lawyers talking about they want to impeach the President because they are

sickened by his actions. They feel his actions are reprehensible.

They don’t—they feel they are unacceptable. We keep trying to

make the case they have a right to feel anything they would like

to feel, but just because they are sickened by his actions does not

mean they are impeachable. I don’t know how we are going to get

that message through.

I think you did a fine job, Mr. Sullivan, of talking about the state

of mind of the President and why he could rationally say that he

did not have sexual relations based on the definitions and his belief. He did not consummate the sexual act that he thought was

central to sexual relations. And simply because he got on television

and said, I did not have sexual relations, somehow these would-be

lawyers on this committee think that he has done something that

is impeachable.

Let’s move on to the gifts, Mr. Davis.

Betty Currie did not say that she was instructed to go get gifts

and burn them up or dump them in the river. If she wanted to obstruct justice, do you think she could not have found a better hiding place than putting them under her bed? Would you illuminate

on that as obstruction of justice for us?

Mr. DAVIS. I think there would be both a better hiding place, and

in terms of obstruction of justice, I think there is also the significant issue as to the lack of evidence as to the President’s real role

in that whole process even when you look at a lot of Ms.

Lewinsky’s testimony, Betty Currie’s testimony and the President’s

testimony.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Dennis, this business about bribery, somehow

there is an attempt to make the case that because there were discussions about jobs, that Ms. Lewinsky was trying very much to

get a lot of help from anybody she could get it from to get a job,

that somehow there is some bribery involved here and obstruction

of justice because they would like to make the leap that there was

an exchange of some kind of information or communication that

said, if you give me this job, I will not; or an offer, if I get you a

job, will you not.

Will you help us with that?

Mr. DENNIS. Two things I recall, one from President Clinton’s

grand jury testimony which was not challenged, I don’t believe,

that issues related to her employment were taken up long before

she became a witness in the case. It is also my understanding, excuse me, that Ms. Lewinsky herself denied that there was any attempt to use help with her employment in order to get her to testify one way or the other. I would think that that would basically

close the whole issue.

Ms. WATERS. Exculpatory information that was never presented

to us——

Mr. DENNIS. It is right in the record. That is correct.

Ms. WATERS [continuing]. In this so-called case.
366

In addition to that, there was some discussion about conversations with the President and Ms. Currie about trying to remember

what was said or what took place. Is there anything in that exchange that would cause us to move toward impeachment because

the President said, were we ever alone, do you remember? Give

us—would you illuminate on that somewhat, Mr. Noble?

Mr. NOBLE. Again, it is a specific intent crime. The question is

what was President thinking when he said this. We can look at his

words and try and analyze his words. But Ms. Currie says that she

didn’t believe he was trying to influence her, and that if that she

had said something different from him, if she believed something

different from him, she would have felt free to say it. For that reason, I believe you just don’t have the specific intent necessary to

prove obstruction of justice with regard to the comment that you

just asked me.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Weld, someone offered that there were other people serving

time for perjury, and they gave these piddling little numbers, despite we have the kind of population that we have in the country.

They did not give you the facts in the case of the woman who came

before us, Dr. Battalino I think is her name. And I think it was

not fair to use that and say, you see, she was prosecuted; how can

you not say the President should be prosecuted. Do you know the

facts of that case? If so, can you illuminate on them?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

Governor, you got a quick answer to that one?

Mr. WELD. Saved by the bell, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Dennis, in your statement you said, and I

quote, I sense an impeachment would prove extremely divisive for

the country, inflaming the passions of those who would see impeachment as an attempt to thwart the election process for insubstantial reasons.

I can assure you that there are many citizens who feel just as

passionately that this President deserves to be impeached. Would

you acknowledge that that is true?

Mr. DENNIS. I am sure that passions do run in both directions,

high in both directions.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Mr. Davis, let me quote from your opening statement as well.

You said, and I quote, prosecutors often need to assess the veracity

of an ‘‘I don’t recall’’ answer. The ability to do so will often depend

on the nature of the facts at issue. Precise times of meetings,

names of people one has met and details of conversations and sequences of events, even if fairly recent, are often difficult to remember.

Let me ask you this: In your experience, is it common for people

to forget things such as whether or not they had sex with somebody

or whether or not they were alone with someone? Just yesterday

we were presented with the President’s 184–page defense report

and were told that the word ‘‘alone’’ is a vague term unless a particular geographic space is identified.
367

Do you find that sort of legal hair-splitting defense helpful? Don’t

you think that we ought to at least be able to agree that alone

means you are by yourself, not with anybody?

Mr. DAVIS. I think alone in essence means that you are by yourself. But I think that while you don’t forget that you had sex with

somebody, I think you have to go back and look at the confusing

nature of the answers. Basically what was going on, there is no

question the President was trying his best to avoid and was playing word games in his deposition. He shouldn’t have been doing it,

and he was doing it. The issue is what is the legal consequences

now, and that is what we are all struggling with.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

I think the President should set a standard for all the citizens

in this country. I think we all ought to be able to agree on what

the word ‘‘alone’’ means.

Mr. Sullivan, in your opening statement in discussing how much

evidence a prosecutor should have before he brings a case to a

grand jury, you stated that they should not run cases up the flagpole to see how a jury will react. Do you think it is responsible for

a President to take a poll to in a sense run something up a flagpole

to see whether he ought to tell the truth or lie?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Mr. Noble, in your statement you said, Members of Congress

should consider the impact of a long and no doubt sensationalized

trial, what effect that will have on the country. Should we also consider what the impact a President committing perjury, obstructing

justice, tampering with witnesses and getting away with it might

have on the country, particularly when that President is the chief

law enforcement officer, and is sworn to uphold the laws in this

country, and, in fact, is sworn and took an oath himself that he

would uphold the laws?

Mr. NOBLE. I believe you ought to consider whether or not you

could prove those allegations that you have just made. From my review of the evidence, I don’t believe you could prove any of the allegations that you just articulated in front of a jury, and I think you

ought to take that into account in deciding whether or not you

want to base your impeachment, as I have read, on perjury. You

can base your impeachment on whatever you want, but it if is on

perjury, I believe you would not be able to sustain a conviction for

perjury before a jury in this country.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

In the final time that I have here, I think, as Mr. Bryant just

said, it is very important for all of those folks that may be watching the testimony today not to forget that these witnesses were

sent here, and I think they have done a very good job, but they are

witnesses on behalf of the President, not impartial witnesses. They

are advocates.

I think that the President should set a standard that our kids

in this country ought to be able to look up to, and we ought to

know that the chief law enforcement officer, the President of this

country, is somebody that we can respect and who actually tells the

truth.

I yield back the balance of my time.
368

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCollum earlier referred to a case from the

United States Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia Circuit

and seemed to indicate that that case, the ruling in the case, which

had been sealed, put to rest the issue of whether or not the President’s testimony was material in the Paula Jones case. Well, it just

so happens that I got a copy of that ruling that was under seal,

and this is not a ruling on that at all. This is a ruling on a motion

to quash by Ms. Lewinsky’s attorney because Ms. Lewinsky didn’t

want to testify. This ruling in no way, shape or manner says that

the President’s testimony was material to the underlying civil case

in the Paula Jones filed lawsuit. So just to set the record straight,

I would ask that this be submitted for the record, that Members

might want to read it.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

In any event, I am delighted to see the former Massachusetts

Governor here, back in the public arena on the right side. I heard

my friend from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, talk about the high bar

over the last few days, the high bar, that Mr. Craig has to make

sure that he gets over that high bar because it is a very high bar.

They are prepared to vote for impeachment of the President of

the United States on Saturday. It is the second time we will have

a trial in the United States Senate if the full House goes along

with it. And he is talking about the high bar that Mr. Craig has

to pass to get witnesses before this committee to prove the President’s innocence.

Now, Governor Weld, you are a former prosecutor. I am sure that

you have heard many on the other side say that this is sort of like

a grand jury proceeding. Now, have you ever had a case where you

as the prosecutor appeared before a grand jury and gave your presentation as to why you thought a defendant had committed a

crime, yet called no material witnesses, no witnesses, yet nonetheless you got an indictment? I don’t subscribe to this theory, but

let’s assume we are in the grand jury system.

Mr. WELD. I have had cases where the case went in through an

agent at the grand jury, and a lot of the agent’s testimony would

be hearsay. He would be a cumulative witness.

Mr. MEEHAN. But you have never had a case where you didn’t

present basically a prescient case; you never went in and said, we

should indict this person?

Mr. WELD. I don’t think you get too far that way, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Apparently though, Governor Weld, you do—here

is the point. Because we haven’t heard from a material witness yet,

and I hear the other side saying, wait a minute, the Democrats, the

President, they haven’t brought a material witness here. They

should prove the President’s innocence. Isn’t the fact of the matter

in the judicial proceeding, any judicial proceeding, that the prosecution or the person seeking to pass that high bar has the obliga369

tion to provide the material witnesses? Mr. Sullivan, isn’t that the

way our system works?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. It clearly works and must, and, indeed, I think that

the burden to proceed with impeachment should have a higher evidentiary threshold than the burden for a prosecutor to bring a

criminal case because the consequences of impeachment are much

more important nationally.

Mr. MEEHAN. Let me go on to another instance. There is all of

this talk of obstruction of justice that is being thrown around here

as if we had a case of obstruction of justice. And there is a talk

about who initiated the events relative to the gifts, who transferred

the gifts. Betty Currie testified before the grand jury that Ms.

Lewinsky called her and asked her to come over and pick up the

gifts. Monica Lewinsky claimed that Ms. Currie made the initial

phone call.

Now, I know this is probably hard to believe, but one of the articles of impeachment is going to be an obstruction of justice. But

this committee has never called either one of them to try to determine what the truth is.

Mr. Sullivan, have you ever heard of drafting an article of impeachment where there is a conflict in the facts like on this particular instance and we didn’t call either one of the witnesses to try

to correct what the grand jury testimony says?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, no. But let me——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Can you answer briefly?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I can, Mr. Hyde.

Even if you take what Ms. Lewinsky said, when she talked to the

President about what to do with the gifts, you wouldn’t have a case

because she says that he said, ‘‘I don’t know, or let me think about

it.’’ That is all. That is the total sum of what Ms. Lewinsky said

Mr. Clinton said.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. Barr, would you yield to me just briefly?

Mr. BARR. Certainly.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Davis, in law if you have a prima facie

case, the burden then shifts to the other side to come forward with

some evidence; does it not?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, not really. The burden in a criminal case always

remains on the prosecutor to show proof beyond a reasonable

doubt, and that burden stays with the prosecutor from beginning

to end.

Chairman HYDE. Well, I understand that. But can you be critical

of not producing witnesses when you have 60,000 pages of underoath testimony, deposition testimony, grand jury testimony; are

you not entitled to take that into consideration, and then, if you reject that, if you think that’s wrong, don’t you have some obligation

to come forward yourself with a scintilla—by the way, what is a

scintilla?

Mr. DAVIS. A scintilla is very little. But I think——
370

Chairman HYDE. Don’t you think you have an obligation to come

forth with a scintilla of evidence invalidating the 60,000 pages that

the Independent Counsel has developed?

Mr. DAVIS. It is not a question of the number of pages. The real

issue is whether those pages continue uncontradicted facts as to

which there is no factual issue. The problem here is——

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I have to reclaim my time. I have

some—with all due respect.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, let the witness finish his answer,

please.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that

the witness be allowed to finish his answer.

Mr. BARR. Could we restart the clock then? If they want to give

this gentleman time to answer the questions, let him answer, and

then restart the time.

Chairman HYDE. Please, please. On nobody’s time but the

Chair’s time, the gentleman may finish his answer, and then we

will start again with Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I want to be fair, and I really intruded on his

questioning.

Go ahead, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. I think it does depend upon what is in those 60,000

pages. If there are conflicts that are revealed so that there are factual issues, the issue then becomes credibility, and credibility is

important. And even as Mr. Starr recognized, he didn’t want to

give immunity to Ms. Lewinsky unless he saw her. Of course, actually, he didn’t see her. He wanted his office to see her. So if you

are going to make credibility judgments, and as to a number of

these issues there are credibility issues, that is when it becomes

important for the person with the responsibility for making the decision, and that is, in this case, this committee, in my view, to actually test the credibility of the witnesses.

Chairman HYDE. Of course, where there is no conflict, that isn’t

an issue; isn’t that so?

Mr. DAVIS. If there is no conflict, then it is a question of the significance of what is said and understanding that.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Now, forgive me, Mr. Barr, I won’t do that again. You will start

all over.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, if you can ask questions and then start

the time for me, you can do that any time you want.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know Mr. Craig is here, and I don’t know whether he is delighted or dismayed by the panel today, because after promising us

yesterday that we would not be hearing technicalities and legalities, that is all we hear today. That is fine. We have a panel of

very distinguished criminal attorneys here, and that is the essence

of criminal law, finding a clever way to parse words and definitions

and so forth and determine why certain principles don’t apply, and

I understand that.

But we really have gone, Mr. Chairman, today from the technical

to the absurd. From the technical we have lawyers here that would

apparently agonize greatly over a definition of sexual relations that
371

is very, very broad; uses terms that are deliberately broad to encompass a whole range of activities, using the term ‘‘any person.’’

Now, to Mr. Sullivan, any person may not mean any person, but

I think to the average person of common sense it would.

So we still have this legal technical parsing over definitions and

words that really leaves us precisely where we were before Mr.

Craig made a promise yesterday that we would have no more technicalities and legalities to hang our hats on. We have gone then to

the absurd, Mr. Chairman, and that is the preposterous presumption or scenario that the President, in talking with Ms. Currie the

day after he gave his grand jury testimony or his testimony in his

deposition before the court, was really acting as her attorney because, according to Mr. Sullivan, it is entirely proper for an attorney to go over somebody’s testimony in advance of that testimony

to make sure that it fits.

I don’t think the President was contemplating serving as her attorney, nor do I think that Ms. Currie was contemplating hiring

the President for that purpose. Therefore, we would have to look

elsewhere, and the elsewhere is that he was trying to coach her,

and that fits within the definition and the statute of tampering.

For those on this panel, all of whom have tremendous and very

noted experience in dealing with criminal law, many including

dealing with very serious drug cases, I would ask them rhetorically, since they seem so enamored of the propriety of evasive and

crafty answers being the tools in trade of an attorney, why they

would find it interesting, or maybe they wouldn’t, that the Acting

Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, for

whom I would presume you would all agree it is important to have

agents testifying in court, testify truthfully, why that Deputy Administrator believed it necessary on September 15 of this year in

a memo to all DEA personnel admonishing them—and I have never

seen a memo like this before—admonishing them, quote, that evasive or craftily worded phrases, testimony or documents designed

to omit or distort key facts are similarly unacceptable and will not

be tolerated. Making false statements in any matter or context is

completely unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

That, I think, Mr. Noble, and I noticed you did not answer this

specific question put to you by I think it was my colleague and another former U.S. Attorney Mr. Bryant, that is why this case is so

important, not necessarily that we know for a fact that there are

DEA agents out there developing crafty or evasive answers to be

used in court, but apparently the head of one of our preeminent

law enforcement agencies, because of the President, the chief law

enforcement officer, using crafty and evasive answers in court before judges, because that sets a certain standard, that is why it is

important that we are here today.

That is why it is important why we are here today, not to argue

over the technicalities, niceties and legalities of whether or not a

specific case of perjury can be made, but because of the damage

that is already being done to our law enforcement by having a

President who excels at evasive and crafty answers that in the case

of the average DEA agent would be unacceptable, would get them

thrown out of court and probably cashiered from the government.

That is why this is important.
372

And, Mr. Craig, shame on you for putting together a panel here

of technicalities and legalities when you promised us yesterday

there would be no more of that.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The Chair would appreciate no demonstrations, although we

have had them, but we can get along better without them.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I want to speak to the issues of technicalities and legalities and what have you, because I think it is important, when

we speak about the rule of law, oftentimes we are talking about

technicalities and questionable legalities because it is embedded in

our Constitution that there are certain standards and requirements. Is that a fair statement, Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. This is not about technicalities.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is, in response to what Mr. Barr said, in

somewhat——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Sullivan, I am just going to speak to you, because I have wanted to help——

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is interesting to me because in my experience,

persons who make such statements, when they become the subject

or the object of investigation, are the first ones to get the mantle

of the constitutional protection and wrap it around them, and insist

on their rights. You don’t hear that kind of a speech from them

anymore, when they hire me on to defend them, I can guarantee

you that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Let us talk about perjury. To evade is not to perjure, is it, Mr.

Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. DELAHUNT. To obfuscate is not to perjure.

Mr. SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. DELAHUNT. To be nonresponsive is not to perjure either.

Mr. SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is not a crime, is it?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, it is not. The definition of perjury and the

proof required to prove perjury is very specific, very technical, and

properly so.

Mr. DELAHUNT. However, it might be maddening, it might be

frustrating, it might not be right, it might very well be immoral,

but it is not a crime.

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Criminal Code is not enacted to enforce a

code of morality.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, I was listening to my friend from Tennessee Mr. Bryant, and I thought his comments were interesting,

you know, the almost did it theory. You know, I don’t think he and

I disagree all that much. I do think, however, that there are ways

to deal with a President who has evaded, who has been nonresponsive, and who has obfuscated the truth. I suggest that there are alternatives that are open to this Congress to deal with that particular issue.

You know, I think it was Mr. Chabot who raised the issue about

recollection and forgetfulness. You are all experienced trial law373

yers. We know as human beings that memories—people can answer

in good faith and memories can fail. Is that a fair statement, Mr.

Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Of course, it is.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I just want to submit this for the record,

because hearing the issue being raised yesterday, several days ago,

I went back to the testimony that was provided by Kenneth Starr,

and, according to my review, the Independent Counsel expressed

difficulties in recalling information at least 30 times during the

course of his testimony. And it is fully detailed here, and I want

to submit it, Mr. Chairman, for the record.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, it may be received.

[The information follows:]
374
375
376
377
378

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, I think it is important to also note

that credibility is an issue here, Mr. Davis. It is a real issue. And

I think it is important to note, too, that the Majority, represented

by Mr. Schippers, has acknowledged that in their report to this

committee.

I am going to read to you his statement: Monica Lewinsky’s

credibility may be subject to some skepticism. At an appropriate

stage of the proceedings, her credibility will, of necessity, be assessed together with the credibility of all witnesses in the light of

all the other evidence.

Would you suggest that it is an obligation of this committee to

make that assessment before we proceed?

Mr. DAVIS. I believe it is, because you are the people who have

to be comfortable that there is sufficient evidence to establish what

is put in a piece of paper.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ms. Lewinsky has on numerous occasions lied, if

you have read—if you accept the—if you accept the transmittal by

Mr. Starr.

Mr. DAVIS. I think Mr. Starr’s transmittal references that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And early Mr. McCollum talked about nine corroborative witnesses. My memory of the Starr communication is

that she told different stories to different people.

Mr. DAVIS. I think there is set out there, and, as I said before,

it is also the same if she had a pre-existing motivation to tell false

statements to the grand jury, it was the same with those people in

any event.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say to this panel, thanks. Mr. Chairman, I regard this

as a very able panel. And I suppose you saved, Mr. Craig, the best

for last. I feel like I would be unarmed to get engaged in any mental gymnastics with any member of the panel.

But you have all announced that you are here as witnesses, not

advocates. You are advocates, in a sense, as witnesses, and I suppose the tendency for all of us who have practiced law or been

judges is to get back in the arena. The last two or three panel

members, I think, have gone in a direction that we need to continue to go in. They have talked about getting away from

legalistics, talked about getting away from lawyer talk, and talked

about discussing things that the American public would understand. I have got a question along those lines I would like to ask

Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. Sullivan, you testified that you had read from the President’s

deposition that he had denied that he had sex with somebody based

on the interpretation of sex.

Mr. SULLIVAN. In the grand jury testimony, the grand jury testimony about his deposition testimony.

Mr. JENKINS. And you commented that you thought the President’s interpretation was reasonable.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I think it is a reasonable interpretation. He

insists that that is his interpretation. And it seemed to me, given

the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he thought
379

he was telling a lie, that you could not make a criminal case

against him.

Mr. JENKINS. Well, now, this is a solemn matter, and I want to

keep it that way, but for those people across this land who are

viewing this now, I want to ask you, you have come down here and

testified, and, actually, I see what it comes down to this, when you

pull the shuck back and look at the corn, what you are asking the

American people to believe is that we have got a guy down at 1600

Pennsylvania Avenue who is smart enough to get himself elected,

who is smart enough to serve as President of the United States,

and he doesn’t know what sex is.

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, I am not suggesting that at all. That is absolutely not what I am saying. I have said it three or four times. The

judge in the Jones case gave a specific definition of the term ‘‘sexual relations.’’ She deleted two sentences that specifically read on,

as the patent lawyers say, oral sex. The President says in his mind

that took oral sex out of it, and that what was left was what we

would call normal sexual intercourse. And he said that is the definition I was responding to.

Now, you can say that is silly, that is ridiculous, I don’t believe

it, but that is what he says. And it seems to me that if you were

to bring this as a criminal case with that background in mind, and

what was left in that definition, you can’t make a case. That is all

I am saying.

Mr. JENKINS. Well, you and Mr. Noble have both indicated that

you don’t believe, and perhaps, I guess, other panel members have

indicated——

Mr. NOBLE. I would like to respond to two points you made. One

is——

Mr. JENKINS. I haven’t asked you to, Mr. Noble. Wait just a

minute, and I will try to give you an opportunity. I am about to

burn up all the time I have.

But do you know anything, Mr. Sullivan, about the Battalino

case, the lady who came here and testified?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Just what I have read in the newspapers about

it. I did not witness it.

Mr. JENKINS. You are not able to compare——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I could compare it this way. In the cases

that have been referred to, I have not heard of any in which it is

analogous to this case, where the witness’ testimony was peripheral

to the issues in the case, where the alleged perjury was not dealing

with the specific facts like of the Jones case, but of some other peripheral case that might not even be admissible in evidence.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sullivan, I was very struck by your testimony in terms of

your examination of the allegations against the President because

it seems to me one of the most critical elements against the President and the President’s lawyers’ performance in this process is

that they have engaged in legal hair-splitting, and they have been

condemned for it, and in some cases maybe appropriately so. But

as you analyzed the nature of the case against the President with

respect to perjury, what struck me was it seems that in order to
380

make that same very case against the President, you have to engage in legal hair-splitting to do so, because when it all comes

down to that very essence of the case against the President on perjury, it comes down to a discrepancy, a discrepancy between the

testimony of the President and Ms. Lewinsky over the precise nature of the physical contact involved in their relationship.

The President on the one hand to the grand jury says, I had an

intimate relationship, an inappropriate intimate relationship with

Ms. Lewinsky that was physical in nature. And he goes on to say,

it was wrong. And then, of course, as you have pointed out here

today on several occasions, he denied in essence having sexual relations as it was defined by the judge.

Ms. Lewinsky on the other hand, in response to the Independent

Counsel’s several questions, goes into graphic detail in recollection

of her encounters with the President. That is what it seems the

perjury is all about.

Let’s take the advice of the members on the other side. Throw

away the legal technicalities. Throw away the requirements that

the law provides we prove for perjury. Forget all about that. Tell

the American people what is the false statement that the President

allegedly made to the grand jury? Forget the consequences, forget

the law. What is the false statement?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, could be one of two. It could be when he denied having sexual relations, and I have already addressed that,

because he said, I was defining the term as the judge told me to

define it and as I understood it, which I think is a reasonable explanation. The other is whether or not he touched her or touched

her breast or some other part of her body, not through her clothing,

but directly. And he says, I didn’t. And she said, I did. So it is who

shot John. It is a one on one.

The corroborative evidence that the prosecutor would have to

have there, which is required in a perjury case—you can’t do it one

on one, and no good prosecutor would bring a case with, you know,

I say black, you say white—would be the fact that they were together alone and she performed oral sex on him. I think that is not

sufficient under the circumstances of this case to demonstrate that

there was any other touching by the President, and therefore he

committed perjury.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Sullivan, I only hope that a vast majority of

Americans have heard your answer right now. What this is about

at its worst is the President making false statements about sexual

relations and about where he touched Monica Lewinsky. That is

what the perjury, the alleged perjury, is about. I hope I am not

misstating what your answer was.

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, you are not. What the other side is saying is

that perjury in any regard is so important that the President

oughtn’t to engage in it. We can all probably agree with that. The

issue for you is whether or not it justifies impeachment.

Mr. WEXLER. I agree. I agree. So it is about sexual relations, and

it is about touching, and now we are about to impeach a President

because we think he gave false answers about sexual relations and

about touching. How many times does it have to be said, how many

times do we, the Congress of the United States, have to now set

up a standard that says the President may have falsely told us an
381

answer about sexual relations and about touching, and now we are

going to impeach him?

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. This investigation was opened because of concerns about attempts to obstruct and suborn perjury in a civil proceeding in which a plaintiff who had a right to bring a suit, who

the courts determined had a right to bring a suit, was pursuing.

And our review is looking into these allegations of obstruction of

justice and perjury.

There are questions about whether Monica Lewinsky is truthful

or not. I think that is a legitimate question that can be raised, but

I think she does have an incentive for telling the truth. I have here

before me the immunity agreement, which I have seen before and

these witnesses have seen before as well. It says that if Ms.

Lewinsky has intentionally given false, incomplete or misleading

information or testimony, she would be subject to prosecution for

any Federal criminal violation. And so certainly she has immunity,

would you agree, Mr. Sullivan, but if she does not tell the truth,

then she will be subject to prosecution?

Mr. SULLIVAN. If that is the standard use immunity agreement,

that is correct.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Now, I believe, Mr. Sullivan, going to your testimony, you suggested that prosecutions for perjury are relatively

rare, difficult to prove, and the United States does not do it generally in pursuit of civil litigation. We have the statistics for Federal prosecutions.

I think Governor Weld mentioned this, that he didn’t believe that

they were that rare, and, in fact, in 1993, there were more Federal

perjury prosecutions by a United States attorney than there were

kidnapping prosecutions. I don’t think that means that kidnapping

is not significant. In ’94, the same fact was true. There were more

perjury prosecutions, in fact 93, than there were kidnapping prosecutions. And the same is true in ’95. It is really a pattern that

goes back to the 1960s.

And I wish I could give credit to all of my staff who did such

great work, but talking about the United States attorneys prosecuting perjury in civil litigation, here is a stack of cases. I could go

through them, but I only have 5 minutes. I found an impressive

arena of cases in which U.S. attorneys prosecute perjury in civil

cases across the country.

Now, I agree with your point that sometimes there is a history

behind the case. But I think there is a history here in this case as

well. There is an investigation of obstruction of justice.

Now, Mr. Sullivan, you mentioned that it was in a peripheral

matter, am I correctly——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Has anyone on this panel ever represented a

woman as a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case? If you have,

raise your hand. No one?

All right. Well, I have. And the most difficult thing in a sexual

harassment case is proving who is telling the truth. Many times

you have to go to a pattern of conduct because there is a denial.

So if you try to prove a pattern of conduct, you have to ask ques382

tions in a deposition as to what has happened in the past. And I

don’t think that is a peripheral matter. I don’t think you can build

sexual harassment cases if you do not ask those questions.

When the President in that deposition denied ever having in his

lifetime sexually harassed a woman, is that a material statement

in the civil deposition? I invite your answers.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think the issue is—I don’t believe it is,

because——

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The question is, is it material?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I don’t think it is material because you are entitled to ask the question under the broad discovery rules. But the

question is, if a truthful answer here would have revealed the true

facts, would it have been admissible in that Jones case. Actually,

the truth is, it would not have been because it would not have been

admissible in the Jones case.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Does anyone disagree that it would be a material statement? Do you disagree, Mr. Noble?

Mr. NOBLE. I am sorry. Maybe I misunderstood the question, and

I don’t know the record to reflect this question, but if your hypothetical question is in a sexual harassment suit, if a person is

asked, have you ever sexually harassed someone, would that be

material, I believe it would be material.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Would anyone else agree with Mr. Noble, who

gave a very straightforward answer? I know you all haven’t handled sexual harassment cases. Perhaps this is a little bit of a disadvantage.

I thank you for your testimony.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start off by

saying that with respect to my colleagues on the other side of the

aisle, I do not think it aids the search for truth to demonize the

White House counsel. Mr. Craig said that he was going to be presenting us with some factual rebuttal to the factual arguments

made by Mr. Starr. As I have read the 184 pages of the White

House submission, there are pages 70 through 89 and pages 93

through 182 which address each and every one of the factual

charges made by Mr. Starr.

So what we now have is Mr. Starr, who was a witness to no

facts, making his statements, 450 pages in writing and in 21⁄2

hours in his initial testimony, and we have Mr. Kendall, who made

several written rebuttals, and then now this 184-page rebuttal to

all the facts, neither of which are admissible in a court of law, as

we all know and have accepted, the testimony of these experts. And

we are left without one single fact witness to help us clarify when

Monica Lewinsky was telling the truth and when she wasn’t, because Mr. Starr said that sometimes she was telling the truth, and

sometimes she wasn’t. But no fact witnesses have yet been called

to aid us in the finding the truth.

But we all agree that there is a basic fundamental American notion of due process and fairness, that those bringing charges must

bear the burden of proof. And in this instance, it is a clear and convincing standard of proof, yet not one single fact witness has yet
383

been presented. That will be telling unless it is remedied, my

friends.

But I understand that my colleagues on the other side of the

aisle, despite the fact that these distinguished prosecutors have

said they would never bring a criminal indictment on these matters, my colleagues say that even if it was not a crime, it is a pattern of lying. It is not right.

Well, I am not sure that the standard is treason, bribery, high

crimes, misdemeanors, evasiveness and lack of respectability. Although some might argue that the constitution should say that, it

does not say that.

With regard to the rule of law, we have said many times President Clinton will pay an $850,000 fine, or settlement this case for

$850,000, in the Jones civil case. That is not an incentive to lie in

a civil case. He can be prosecuted criminally once he leaves office

and go to prison if the charges against him are proven true. That

is certainly not an incentive to anyone to lie under oath in any proceeding. And the rule of law is upheld because the President is not

above the law. He can be sued civilly and criminally, and our kids

know that, and this whole process has demonstrated that.

The question for our committee and for all of America is to decide if no reasonable prosecutor would bring these matters up for

a crime, how could it be a high crime or misdemeanor. Say the

founders got it wrong, that they should have added evasiveness as

a high crime and misdemeanor, or lack of respectability as a high

crime and misdemeanor. Some might argue yes; some might argue

no. What we have to be aware of is the consequences to our Nation

if we expand on that definition when we already know the President can be punished civilly, as he has been in the settlement, and

criminally by going to go to prison if the charges are proven

against him.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few questions

and then an observation.

I wanted to—first of all, let me say, I have found this panel very

helpful on the questions dealing with criminal prosecutions. I understand that there is a difference between criminal prosecutions

and impeachment, but on the questions of criminal prosecutions

and the parallels that may be argued, I am grateful. I wanted to

be certain—let me back up.

I especially, without diminishing the work done by any of you,

I especially want to thank Mr. Noble, whose presentation was most

helpful to me, and I had some follow-up questions I wanted to ask

you, based on questions that you were asked by other panelists but

didn’t get the chance to conclude.

The first deals with questions from Mr. Boucher on the standards that are used in assessing when to prosecute cases where

there is a high-profile potential defendant. Can you share with us

the standards in the Department of Justice in those cases?

Mr. NOBLE. I must say, I am humbled to answer this, because

on my left was the Assistant Attorney General from the Criminal

Division when I was Assistant U.S. Attorney, and on my right is
384

a U.S. Attorney and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, so I will see if I learned anything from these two wise

fellows.

As soon as you get an allegation that there is a political figure

who has engaged in criminal activity, as a U.S. attorney or as a

prosecutor, one of the first things you will think about is, will people have confidence that my office’s investigation of this will be

deemed independent and unbiased? You ask yourself that, before

you do anything. Can my office handle this? Or should I send it to

the criminal justice—or to the Justice Department’s Criminal Division in Washington and have Mr. Weld or people from Public Integrity handle it?

Then you want to know, who is the person bringing it? Does he

or she have a bias, a stake in the outcome of this matter? And if

it is a matter involving parties that are already involved in a dispute, you have got to worry about that.

And how did this person become aware of this information? If in

the case of someone cooperating with you, one of your informants

giving information to someone and having that information lead to

possible criminal activity like a perjury trap, all of the considerations, so that after all is said and done, a rational citizen who is

looking at you—I can’t help the fact that I was asked by the Democrats to be here; if the Republicans had asked me to come, I would

have come willingly—but that a rational, independent person

would say, yes, I can look at the evidence and see why this prosecution is brought; no rational seasoned prosecutor would bring

any criminal prosecution against any person for perjury or obstruction of justice based on the evidence I have seen, and I am thankful

of that, and we should all be thankful of that because if you want

to prosecute me, prosecute me for something I did but not for something you thought I did.

If I have got a weird thought process, don’t process me criminally

for it. Say that I am a weird person and disassociate yourself from

me.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Noble. I appreciate your efforts to be

concise.

I don’t know if this question was directed to you or to the panel,

but Mr. Boucher was getting into the question of whether dismissal

of a case terminates the authority of a court to sanction parties or

witnesses. And I don’t know that that was addressed, and I would

appreciate it if someone could.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I addressed that. I said that there is inherent

power under the Supreme Court decision, and that I do not know

whether or not the dismissal of the case terminates that.

Mr. PEASE. That’s my question. So you do not know?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not know.

Mr. PEASE. Does anybody else have a response or a thought on

that?

Mr. WELD. I believe that she does not lose jurisdiction to investigate and recommend a prosecution, hold criminal contempt hearings for anyone that might have engaged in criminal conduct during the time period that she had this matter.

Mr. PEASE. I also, as I began, want to thank all of you. Your

presentation has been very helpful in understanding the issues sur385

rounding charging and conviction in criminal matters. I am concerned, though, that we not assume that either the standards in a

criminal prosecution or the burden of proof or the procedures employed are the same as those which face this committee.

A criminal prosecution is not the same as an impeachment, and

we should not succumb to an argument that because a criminal

prosecution might not succeed, Congress is unable to act under its

constitutional obligation regarding impeachment. No matter my

eventual conclusion on the matters before us, I am not prepared to

say that the expected standard of conduct for an American President is simply that he or she may not be indictable.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sullivan, you indicated in your testimony that you did not

think that this would be a case that would be brought by a United

States attorney for perjury. We have heard many witnesses and

many members saying that the President, when he leaves office, is

open to criminal prosecution. The sense of the American people, I

think, remains that the President did something wrong, that he

should be held accountable for his actions, and that he should not

be impeached. So in your discussion, where is the justice?

In this case, in the civil suit, since every one of us would deplore

not telling the truth, or lying, where is the justice in your analysis

here?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we live in an imperfect world, and justice

is not always achieved in this world. We sometimes have to wait

and hope. But all I am saying is that you have to follow the law.

If the law provides that the President can be indicted after he

leaves office, and if some prosecutor wants to take this up, who has

jurisdiction over it, they may reach a different conclusion than I do.

I doubt that a responsible prosecutor would bring a perjury case

against the President on these facts.

Mr. BARRETT. Okay. Now let’s——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Now, I think that the justice—I mean, look at

what the man has already gone through, though. We are sitting

here, the third time in the history of the country that they are considering removing a President from office, it seems to me that there

has been terrible retribution on this man for what he did.

Mr. BARRETT. Let’s take the President out of it and let’s leave it

as a civil case where a person has lied. Where does the justice system work in this case? If a person in a civil case has lied under

oath or misrepresented themselves or obfuscated the facts, tell me

where the justice comes into this system if there is not going to be

a perjury prosecution? There has to be justice. We can’t just say,

well, that’s the way it goes.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we are talking about the Jones civil case?

Mr. BARRETT. Yes.

Mr. SULLIVAN. And in that case, after the President made his

disclosures, and Monica Lewinsky made her disclosures, and the

case had been dismissed, but before it was decided by the court of

appeals, Ms. Jones settled the case. So it seems to me it is washed

away, because she then knew, at the time she settled, that if that
386

evidence was going to be admissible, you know, she would take

that into consideration in determining the amount of her settlement.

The case was thrown out, as I understand it, for reasons entirely

different; that she couldn’t demonstrate that there was any connection between what may have happened and the detriment to her

in employment.

Mr. BARRETT. Do you think that the amount of the settlement reflects some of that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I think that Ms. Jones voluntarily took that

settlement in light of all the facts, including the facts that we are

now talking about today.

Mr. BARRETT. Okay.

Mr. Weld, you offered some interesting observations, I think, one

of which was the notion of a fine. I have had commentators talk

about a plea bargain or a deal. I bristle when I hear those words,

because I do think that this is a vote of conscience and that every

member on both sides of the aisle should be listening to their conscience and be guided by that.

I also am mindful of the fact that we cannot impose a fine on

the President of the United States, that there are bill of attainder

problems. How conceivable do you think it is that the President, if

we were to censure him, would come forward and say, I recognize

that as part of the healing process I should reimburse the Treasury

for part of this investigation?

Mr. WELD. Well, politically, I guess I had anticipated that all of

that might be the subject of negotiation before the votes were

taken. I was trying to think of things that would mark the solemnity of the occasion, do justice to the dignity of the House and its

role, having the sole power of impeachment, and would say to the

American people, there has been justice here; this person, this

President, has paid a penalty here, short of being removed from office, which I think we have kind of slid by that one.

But the fine, the written acknowledgment of wrongdoing and the

exposure to future criminal prosecution, as well as a censure and

as thorough a report as the committee or the House wished to put

on the record in perpetuity, those are the five things that I could

think of to mark the event.

Mr. BARRETT. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by thanking this panel today. This is an important issue, and I think your presence has added weight to the

issue. And I appreciate your comments and testimony.

I would also like to just point out at the very beginning that

without any parsing of words or equivocation, I agree with my

friend, Mr. Delahunt, and with the comments by Mr. Sullivan, that

the essence of the rule of law lies in the technicalities, and the

technicalities are very, very important for us here.

Now I would like to refer to some of the things that my good

friend, Ms. Lofgren, commented on earlier. Ms. Lofgren and I are

on two subcommittees of this committee together and I have the
387

greatest respect for the way she thinks. She said or pointed out

that perjury about sex is relevant essentially—and I am paraphrasing here—is relevant to this side because it is a crime, and then

went on to point out some of the technical elements of the crime

that may in fact be missing here. And the first was the suggestion

that the person who administered the oath to the President may

not have been authorized to do so. I think that was rebutted fairly

effectively by Mr. Buyer, and I agree with his responses.

Second, she said that the question must be unambiguous. Now,

I don’t read the statute as requiring an unambiguous question, but

I think the perjury ultimately has to be quite clear.

Later, Mr. Sullivan, I think, in response to some of this questioning, suggested that the President can defend on the basis that the

definition was changed, that is, the definition of sex, and that the

new definition may somehow have excluded a certain act or type

of sex.

Let me just suggest in response to that that I have read that definition very carefully, as I think many of the members of this committee have. The President pointed out that he answered the question very carefully because he answered the question in the context

of the definition that he read very carefully, and obviously minds

can disagree on this sort of thing, but I just don’t see how you

could exclude that particular act from the definition that remained

after the striking of the two sentences.

Now, a lot has been said about whether or not the President can

be prosecuted for this crime, whether these technical defenses may

be relevant. But I think the real potential for understanding the

likelihood of a criminal prosecution actually lies in the President’s

own actions. He refuses to acknowledge or deny the underlying

facts of the case, and it is like there is an allergy to the ‘‘L’’ word.

Mr. Craig yesterday said in answer to a question, no, he deceived, he misled, but he did not lie; later, no, he was technically

accurate, but he did not disclose information.

I think all the commentators in the editorial pages have pointed

out that the President is caught between the Fifth Amendment and

coming clean with the American public, and I think it is his actions, the fact that he won’t deal with the facts of the case, that

make it clear to me that there may actually be in another context,

rather than this one, a criminal problem that he is concerned

about.

But unlike Mr. Wexler, who says that this is about lying about

sexual relations and touching, let me suggest that I believe that

this proceeding is really not about crime; I believe that it is about

the government’s ability to secure—I have to protect my mike from

my compatriot on this side. This is about the government’s ability

to secure the rights of the governed.

John Jay was quoted yesterday. Let me just repeat part of that

quote: ‘‘If oaths cease to be sacred, our dearest and most valuable

rights become insecure.’’

Now, Mr. Weld, you have actually governed and you are a person

for whom I have the greatest respect. Would you mind responding?

What do you think those rights are? And if you can be very particular, because my time is almost up, what are those rights that Mr.

Jay is concerned about keeping secure?
388

Mr. WELD. I think it is the rights to life, liberty, property, and

the pursuit of happiness.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you. I view property and the pursuit of happiness as the same right—life, liberty and property.

Since my time is gone, I would love to hear a little bit about that.

I believe that John Jay was right. What this panel is doing is

maintaining for Americans, for generations and centuries to come,

the security of those basic rights of life, liberty and property, or the

pursuit of happiness. That’s what we are about here.

And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rogan.

Mr. ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join my colleague from Utah in welcoming the panel, and particularly in welcoming the distinguished former Governor of Massachusetts, whose service to our country I have long admired, and

thank him for it to this day.

Gentlemen, let me start off by saying that I have noticed a recurring theme among most of the panelists over the last few hours.

The first one, with the exception of Governor Weld, is that perjury

generally is a crime not prosecuted. The second one is the claim

made over and over that somehow the statements made by the

President were not material, even if they were lying under oath.

I must tell you, I take exception to both of those claims.

The federal government since Bill Clinton became President, and

according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines table, has convicted

and sentenced almost 700 people for perjury in Federal court. In

my own State of California, since Bill Clinton became President,

some 16,000 perjury prosecutions have occurred. And so I just don’t

know where this novel claim comes from that perjury is a crime

that is ignored by the courts. The record simply does not reflect

that.

A couple of members raised the case of Dr. Battalino. There were

some blank stares by witnesses unfamiliar with her case. Let me

share with you briefly the story of Dr. Battalino. She was here a

week or so ago and testified before this committee. She was a doctor who worked for the Veterans Administration. She is also an attorney. In her capacity as a VA physician, she had a one-time consensual sexual relationship with a male patient of the hospital, but

not her patient.

He later sued the hospital for a sexual harassment claim and

named her in the claim. She was asked in a civil deposition whether she ever had a sexual encounter with this patient. Out of embarrassment and out of concern for her job and her career, she denied

it.

The civil case was later dismissed. The gentleman’s case against

the hospital and the doctor was later dismissed. Despite that dismissal, the Clinton Justice Department filed perjury charges

against her. She is now precluded from practicing law as a result

of her conviction; she lost her medical license, and she is under incarceration. She appeared before us with an ankle bracelet, because she is under house arrest.

You might imagine that Dr. Battalino has some grave concerns

over the incredible double standard. Her loss of livelihood and the

shame that she has had to face as a result of the Clinton Justice
389

Department prosecuting her perjury does not square with the claim

now being proffered by some of the President’s supporters that

tlying under oath about consensual sex is much ado about nothing.

I must say that I take exception to some of my beloved colleagues

on the other side who keep insisting to the American people that

this is simply about sex. That just is not true. Governor Weld is

absolutely right. Fornication and adultery not only are not impeachable offenses; they clearly and patently are not the business

of the House Judiciary Committee. But that is not what is at stake

here.

The President was a defendant in a Federal sexual harassment

civil rights case, and as a result of that case, a Federal judge ordered him to tell under oath whether in his capacity as Governor

or President he had ever had sexual relations with subordinate female employees. And the judge specifically found that was relevant

to show a pattern of conduct. That’s how sexual harassment cases

are proven.

So this idea among some folks is that if they just state the false

premise over and over; if their histrionics, drama, and theatrics are

enough; if their volume is raised sufficiently, then somehow we can

reduce this to being just a case just about sex. This conduct may

play well for the talk show circuit, but it doesn’t play well for the

truth.

I thank the Chair and I yield back my time.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.

Lindsey Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a couple of observations and some questions for the panelists here. I, too, have appreciated you being here.

Please understand that when I vote, I will look at it in a very

legal sense. I don’t believe, due to the nature of what is going on,

that we should send a case forward that doesn’t meet certain legal

standards. And I just happen to disagree with you about whether

or not this is a provable case of perjury. I think this is a very clear

case of perjury, and it is not just about intimate touching. It goes

much further, and I can’t explain all that in 5 minutes.

I have seen the President’s deposition in Paula Jones where he

testified. I saw Mr. Bennett wave the affidavit of Monica Lewinsky

in front of the President. I saw the President’s eyes follow the affidavit, his head nod, and I believe his grand jury testimony, where

he said he wasn’t paying any attention, is a lie, and I believe I

could convict him with fair-minded people.

But this is really more than just about the law. It is about the

national interest. I am a politician and there is a unique political

aspect to this case that is probably good. I have said before, impeachment without outrage should be difficult, and it should be in

a democratic society. But let me tell you the mood of my district

to let you know a little bit about what I am up against here.

The Washington Post sent apparently four reporters to the four

corners of the country and they happened to pick my district to figure out how people feel about the President and his misconduct.

There is a portion of my district, very good friends of mine, who

want to get this over with; and I understand, in their minds, it
390

doesn’t rise to the level of overturning an election. That’s a real dynamic: very nice, rational people, but that’s the minority people.

You can take the polls and reverse them. The reporter said, I

think I need to come home now, because he never got out of the

clothing department of Wal-Mart to figure out what people thought

about the President. It wasn’t good. Being evasive, deceptive, immoral and nonresponsive are not resume builders in my district.

Forget about perjury.

So I am a Congressman that comes from an area of the country

who has got no use for this kind of stuff, but I have publicly said

that we are going to play it straight with the President; we are not

going to take our emotions and our political disagreements and try

to use that in an impeachment process, and I am going to stand

by that. I have said to Mr. Craig and others, I believe the President

committed serious crimes, but if he would reconcile himself with

the law, so that we could end this thing on a note of honor, I may

consider a different disposition than impeachment.

But if he continues to flout the law, I don’t think he should be

the President for the next century. I stand by that statement.

But there is another aspect of this that I think we need to talk

about. Ms. Waters, who I really do—have gotten to know my colleagues on this side and we do get along pretty well. She says, well,

it is really silly to believe the President would have his secretary

hide gifts under her bed. Well, that sounds silly, but the day that

people stop doing silly stuff is the day all of us as lawyers go out

of business. I think it is silly to fool around with an intern while

you are being sued. But those things happen, and they happen to

smart people like Bill Clinton. And if we impeach people for being

silly and doing inappropriate things, we will wipe the Congress out.

So I am not saying that those type of things ought to be the reason we get rid of the President. But don’t underestimate what people can do that really is inappropriate and defies understanding,

and I believe that’s a lot of what Bill Clinton’s problems really are

at the end of the day.

If I have got to cast my vote based on knowing what the Senate

is going to do, I would never vote in the House because I can’t tell

you what they are going to do half the time. And I think what they

ought to do is wait until they get a case before they decide it; and

everybody in Congress ought to let this committee do its work,

whether you like us or not, before you decide what you are going

to do. Because the day you start deciding the case before the case

is over is the day we lose a lot in this country.

Governor Weld, hypothetically, you are the governor. There is a

person out there that possesses damaging information about you.

You are in a consensual relationship that’s wrong. That person, you

know, if asked to testify, could hurt you legally and politically. If

you used the resources of the governorship, if you got people in

your office to plant lies, falsehoods, malicious rumors and tried to

use your office as governor to trash that potential witness against

you, what should be your fate?

Mr. WELD. Well, in a clear enough case, my fate should be, out

of here.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Bono.
391

Mrs. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to the panel, thank

you first and foremost for your patience.

I woke up this morning and I thought what do I get to do today?

Question five of the top attorneys in the entire country. What a

great way to start off my day.

I want to ask a question to Governor Weld to begin. It is a follow-up to something that Congressman Coble had asked earlier on.

You discussed how you had changed your position. Your initial reaction in February was that you said the President should resign,

and you indicated that you changed your thinking because of

events during the past year and the general reaction to the President.

As a Congresswoman, I also sit on the National Security Committee. Issues concerning our military readiness and standing

around the world greatly concern me. Earlier this year, the United

States engaged in some military activities. Many people accused

the White House of following a ‘‘Wag the Dog’’ strategy.

It troubles me that the President may be, in some ways, hamstrung to lead and act decisively and swiftly on the international

military stage without the complete trust of the American people.

In other words, if the office of the President does not enjoy the complete public trust, this might affect our national security.

So, Governor, if there is new evidence that the President does

not have the trust of the international community or of our armed

forces—and I am not talking about polls, but more specific evidence

from leaders around the world—would you revisit your February

advice that the President should resign for the good of the country?

Mr. WELD. Yes. I think actually it was September, Madam Congresswoman. And as I indicated, there are—or alluded to earlier,

one of the things I was troubled by in September was we had had,

frankly, some acts—some bombings and similar actions abroad

which coincided with the Lewinsky matter really coming to a head,

and that’s precisely what I was worried about. So I think, you

know, anybody on an ongoing basis has got to ask themselves the

question, can I do the job? And if you can’t do the job, you shouldn’t

do the job.

Mrs. BONO. Will your opinion vacillate, though, depending on

what is happening with attacks on us or the economy is strong?

Mr. WELD. Well, we don’t have a parliamentary system here. We

have Presidents who are mighty unpopular. Harry Truman was

mighty unpopular even when he was—by and large, you know, in

retrospect, people think—doing the right thing on a lot of stuff. So

I don’t think it should be following the public opinion polls. It is

a question of ability to discharge the duties of the office. And I will

confess that I was somewhat surprised at the alacrity with which

all seemed to be forgiven and forgotten in terms of people saddling

up and doing business with the President and taking him seriously.

Mrs. BONO. Well, my point, here is that you know the public

trust, though, is something we also have to anticipate. It is easy

to have it now today while the economy is strong, the stock market

is great—although some of us still can’t get Furbies, it is not strong

enough—but how about tomorrow? Will we have it tomorrow? Will

the public trust be there tomorrow?
392

It cannot change. It is something that we can’t—we have to

guess, will it be there? I am hearing, as you are saying, too, here

today and gone tomorrow.

We on this committee cannot have that. We have to decide will

the public trust be there a month from now when Osama Bin

Laden rears his ugly head again?

Mr. WELD. I don’t think you want to go the removal route because of a concern that the trust might not be there. It would have

to be a little bit more solid than that.

Mrs. BONO. There is a concern. Right. Thank you.

I guess—I still have a green light. This is a miracle.

I have a question based on Mr. Sullivan’s testimony, but I will

leave it open to the whole panel. But first I want to just comment

briefly.

Mr. Sullivan, We are here because of the President’s dancing on

the head of a pin, as Lindsey would say, over the definition of sex.

‘‘Oral sex’’ was omitted from the description before the Paula Jones

testimony. But then here in this room you have changed it to sleeping with somebody. And I know you were trying to elude references

to salacious materials again, but isn’t that what got us in this

whole mess?

Now you are changing the wording—and I am not a lawyer, so

I am getting used to listening to every word we are saying—and

you did the very thing that got us in this whole mess to begin with.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much.

We are going to take a break. I will yield to Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I wanted to take a few minutes on the reservation that I had earlier.

Chairman HYDE. All right. Well, you are recognized for——

Mr. CONYERS. I will move as quickly as I can, Mr. Chairman, and

thank you.

I first wanted to let Sheila Jackson Lee utilize 30 seconds of the

time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Conyers.

Just very briefly, there was a comment on the presentation of the

witnesses. Let me assume that you can come forward here because

you in fact are expert witnesses, but I did want to very quickly

comment on Dr. Battalino’s case and Ms. Parsons’ case.

Dr. Battalino’s case, the issue of perjury went to the fact that she

was attempting to reclaim monies for litigation costs. It was insurance fraud, if you will. That went to the question—that’s why the

Department of Justice prosecuted her, and you were unfairly asked

about it.

Pam Parsons, she was accused of being a lesbian. She was a

plaintiff and sued the newspaper that accused her of such, and lied

that she was not and there was definite—or definitive proof otherwise. So it went to the heart of the case, and I think it is important

that we clarify the record on those grounds.

I thank the gentleman. I yield back my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and

to this very much appreciated panel, this is a critical phase of the

hearings, and it is helping us to recognize how the experts on this

panel, seasoned and experienced prosecutors all, which Mr. Starr
393

acknowledged that he was not, would have rejected bringing a

criminal case against the President based on Mr. Starr’s allegations if he were an ordinary citizen.

It’s critical at this part of our hearing to understand the vast difference between the allegations being considered by the committee

and the system of criminal justice that applies to the rest of us. If

no ordinary citizen would face even a criminal prosecution based on

the allegations in the referral, how can we justify considering the

rarely used remedy of impeachment for the same conduct? If no ordinary citizen would face a criminal prosecution based on these allegations, how can it be argued that to decline to vote for impeachment places the President above the law? If no ordinary citizen

would face a criminal prosecution based on these allegations, why

should we bother to take the Senate and the Chief Justice of our

highest court to spend months resolving undignified and trivial

questions of fact rather than attending to the important business

of the country?

I hope these questions raise serious issues and reservations for

all of my colleagues in the committee about the wisdom of proceeding on the paths that we apparently are on. And may I acknowledge the chairman of this committee’s accommodations that he has

offered me concerning prompt notice to all of us on the committee

of any draft articles of impeachment and his further willingness to

consider the motion that will be offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, to require that the specific allegations against the

President be provided to him before his counsel responds when we

conduct our business session today or tomorrow.

May I reiterate my strong view to the Republican leadership that

fairness dictates that the American people not be muzzled on the

all-important issue of censure. Overwhelmingly, the American people that we have referred to, tested in the districts and the Nation,

do not want the President impeached. Our citizens either support

doing nothing or—under the theory that the President has already

been censured or they support an additional resolution of censure.

But the important point is that for the vast majority of those who

do not want an impeachment, a 6-month Senate investigation with

all of the attendant political and economic turmoil for all of those

who want a proportional and sensible alternative shouldn’t be muzzled. And so your testimony here, and this panel, may well be the

most important that we will have because you have dealt so significantly with these fact questions that have been troubling us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I thank you, Mr. Conyers. And I want to say

that I too deeply appreciate the contribution, which was and is substantial, that you have made to the sum of our knowledge on this

very difficult question. You have all been enormously helpful, highly qualified, very forthcoming, and you have made a great contribution.

Now, we should take a 30-minute recess. But before I reach that

happy point, I yield to Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to

submit into evidence of this proceeding the Constitution of the

United States, particularly noting that there is no prohibition on
394

censure noted in the Constitution of the United States. I would like

to submit this into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Certainly, without objection, even though ours is a government of delegated powers, but nonetheless, your motion

is granted.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

[The information follows:]

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote

the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Article. I.

Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen

every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each

State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous

Branch of the State Legislature. No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who

shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,

which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including

those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three

fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three

Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every

subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The

Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each

State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be

made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts

eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six,

New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten,

North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three. When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Au- thority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and

shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators

from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator

shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the

second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and

if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until

the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies. No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when

elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate but shall

have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in

the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President

of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the

United States is tried the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
395

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit

under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and

subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but

the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as

to the Places of chusing Senators. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different

Day.

Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Quali- fications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to

do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under

such Penalties as each House may provide. Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the

Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire

of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which

the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for

their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United

States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be

privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective

Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate

in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which

shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be

a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Rep- resentatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other

Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States:

If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to

that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large

on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two

thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the

Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if

approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases

the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names

of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of

each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within

ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same

shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their

Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and

House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)

shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall

take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the

Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and

with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject

of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
396

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin

of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times

to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and

Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall

be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress

Insurrections and repeal Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing

such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving

to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of

training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not

exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to

exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature

of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution

the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States

now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress

prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may

be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when

in Cases or Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census of Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the

Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one

State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding

any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress,

accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any

King, Prince or foreign State.

Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;

grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any

Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant

any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties

on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s

inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State

on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States;

and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep

Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with

another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded,

or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
397

Article. II.

Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United

States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,

a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives

to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall

be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number

of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the

Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of

Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The

Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number

be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than

one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House

of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and

if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House

shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes

shall be taken by States, the Representatives from each State having one Vote; a

quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of

the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every

Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of

Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two

or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice

President.

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on

which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the

United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the

time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President;

neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to

the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United

States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,

or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall

devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case

of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act

accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation,

which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he

shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath

or Affirmation:—‘‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the

Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,

protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’’

Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the

actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the

principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating

to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves

and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make

Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,

and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,

other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided

for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the

Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,

in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
398

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during

the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End

of their next Session.

Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the

State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he

shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene

both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with

Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall

think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take

Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of

the United States.

Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United

States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Article. III.

Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time

ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall

hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for

their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or

which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,

other public ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another

State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State

claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those

in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.

In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and

such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or

Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War

against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No

Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to

the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the

Life of the Person attainted.

Article. IV.

Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,

Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by

general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings

shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall

flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive

Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the

State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the

Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but

no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State;

nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
399

without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the

Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States;

and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims

of the United States, or of any particular State.

Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and

on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot

be convened) against domestic Violence.

Article. V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall

propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures

of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of

this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several

States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of

Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which

may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any

Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article;

and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in

the Senate.

Article. VI.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this

Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution,

as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority

of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in

every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any

state to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United

States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support

this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to

any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Article. VII.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and

Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth.

In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our Names,

G°. Washington—Presidt.

and deputy from Virginia

New Hampshire

John Langdon

Nicholas Gilman

Massachusetts

Nathaniel Gorham

Rufus King

Connecticut

Wm. Saml. Johnson

Roger Sherman

New York

Alexander Hamilton

New Jersey

Wil: Livingston

David Brearley

Wm. Paterson

Jona: Dayton

Pennsylvania
400

B Franklin

Thomas Mifflin

Robt Morris

Geo. Clymer

Thos. FitzSimons

Jared Ingersoll

James Wilson

Gouv Morris

Delaware

Geo: Read

Gunning Bedford jun

John Dickinson

Richard Bassett

Jaco: Broom

Maryland

James McHenry

Dan of St. Thos. Jenifer

Danl Carroll

Virginia

John Blair—

James Madison Jr.

North Carolina

Wm. Blount

Richd. Dobbs Spaight

Hu Williamson

South Carolina

J. Rutledge

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney

Charles Pinckney

Pierce Butler

Georgia

William Few

Abr Baldwin

Attest William Jackson Secretary

In Convention Monday, September 17th 1787.

Present

The States of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton from New York, New

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

Resolved,

That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards

be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People

thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give

Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the

Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall

have ratified this Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should fix

a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified

the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution.

That after such Publication the Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and

Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the

Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified, signed, sealed

and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in

Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the

Time and Place assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President;

and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President,

should, without Delay, proceed to execute this Constitution.

By the Unanimous Order of the Convention
401

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

Amendment I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the

right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II.

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right

of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment III.

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent

of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Amendment IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the

land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and

public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,

and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with

the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in

his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Amendment VII.

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall

be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the

rules of the common law.

Amendment VIII.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to

deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited

by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
402

Amendment XI.

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any

suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one on the United States

by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

Amendment XII.

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President

and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same

state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall

make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted

for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall

sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United

States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall,

in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates

and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest Number of

votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the

whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from

the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those

voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by

ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by

states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon

them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall

act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the

President—The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall

be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors

appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers

on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose

shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the

whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the

United States.

Amendment XIII.

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for

crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the

United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XIV.

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to

the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each

State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for

the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such

State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any

way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such

male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of

age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector

of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the

United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
403

legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion

against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may

by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,

including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United

States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of

insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or

emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held

illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,

the provisions of this article.

Amendment XV.

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied

or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate

legislation.

Amendment XVI.

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever

source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Amendment XVII.

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each

State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one

vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors

of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies:

Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to

make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the

legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any

Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

Amendment XVIII.

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture,

sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into,

or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the

jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to

enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as

an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof

to the States by the Congress.

[NOTE.—The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified January 16, 1919. It was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment, December 5, 1933.]

Amendment XIX.

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged

by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XX.

Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on

the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon

on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if

this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
404

Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such

meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President,

the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President.

If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning

of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice

President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or

the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act

accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of

the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death

of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever

the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following

the ratification of this article.

Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as

an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several

States within seven years from the date of its submission.

Amendment XXI.

Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United

States is hereby repealed.

Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as

an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided

in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to

the States by the Congress.

Amendment XXII.

Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than

twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President,

for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President

shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall

not apply to any person holding the office of President, when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the

office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article

becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during

the remainder of such term.

Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as

an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several

States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

Amendment XXIII.

Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States

shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number

of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled

if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall

be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for

the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed

by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided

by the twelfth article of amendment.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate

legislation.

Amendment XXIV.

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or

other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
405

President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or

abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax

or other tax.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XXV.

Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or

resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation

by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives has written declaration

that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall

be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal

officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law

provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of

the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable

to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives has written declaration that

no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the

Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four

days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge

the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress,

within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress

is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge

the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge

the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and

duties of his office.

Amendment XXVI

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of

age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any

State on account of age.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate

legislation.

AMENDMENT XXVII

No law varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

And now I will try again. We will have a half-hour recess. Please

come back at the end of a half-hour.

Chairman HYDE. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to welcome Mr. Charles F. C. Ruff, Counsel

to the President, a very distinguished member of the bar, as our

final witness. Mr. Ruff became White House Counsel last year and

is a longtime and widely respected member of Washington’s legal

community as well as the rest of the community. He was the U.S.

Attorney in the District of Columbia from 1979 until 1982 and the

fourth and final Watergate special prosecutor.

Welcome, Mr. Ruff. Would you please raise your right hand?

[Witness sworn.]
406

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Let the record reflect the witness

answered the question in the affirmative.

Mr. Ruff, you are recognized for 2 hours to make a statement.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES F.C. RUFF, COUNSEL TO THE

PRESIDENT

Mr. RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I probably will not use all

of that time because, very candidly, having watched these proceedings with interest for the last 2 days, it seems to me that perhaps

the most productive thing I can do and my colleagues can do is to

respond to the questions of this committee. But I will, with the

Chair’s permission, speak for awhile about some of the issues that

I think are important for all of us to understand.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Conyers, members of the committee, as Counsel to the President, I appear before you today on behalf of the person who under our Constitution has twice been chosen by the people to head one of the three coordinate branches of

government. Necessarily, I appear also on behalf of the man whose

conduct has brought us to what for all of us is this unwelcome moment. Neither the President nor anyone speaking on his behalf will

defend the morality of his personal conduct. The President had a

wrongful relationship with Monica Lewinsky. He violated his sacred obligations to his wife and daughter. He misled his family, his

friends, his colleagues and the public, and in doing so he betrayed

the trust placed in him not only by his loved ones but by the American people.

The President knows that what he did was wrong. He has admitted it. He has suffered privately and publicly. He is prepared to accept the obloquy that flows from his misconduct and he recognizes

that, like any citizen, he is and will be subject to the rule of law.

But, Mr. Chairman, the President has not committed a high crime

or misdemeanor. His conduct, although morally reprehensible, does

not warrant impeachment. It does not warrant overturning the

mandate of the American electorate.

If statements in this body and to the press accurately reflect

what is in your minds and hearts, many in the Majority have already reached a verdict. I hope that for some that is not true. Indeed, if there is only one whose mind remains open, I will do my

best to respond to your questions, to address your concerns, and to

try to convince you that your constitutional duty, your historical

duty, and your duty to the people you represent, is to vote against

any article of impeachment.

In the nature of this extraordinary proceeding, no one can claim

the ability to reach the absolute right answer. No one can claim to

be free from doubt. But when all the questions have been asked

and answered, when all the debate has ended, and when you look

within yourselves and ask should I vote to exercise the most awesome power I am granted in our system of government, I have no

doubt that you will reach your decisions on the merits and, I hope,

unswayed by mere partisanship.

This committee has heard much in the last 2 days and in prior

hearings on the subject of what the Founding Fathers meant to include within the term ‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors,’’ and I will

not even attempt to engage in the kind of scholarly discourse that
407

has filled this room over the last days and weeks. But I suggest

to you that although there are differences of opinion which have

been voiced, the weight of scholarly and historical teaching is on

one side: nothing the President did falls within the constitutional

definition of an impeachable offense.

Yes, there were witnesses who disagreed; enough to give anyone

who wishes it some intellectual cover. But I suggest to you that

any fair-minded observer must conclude that the great weight of

the historical and scholarly evidence leads to the conclusion that in

order to have committed an impeachable offense, the President

must have acted to subvert our system of government. And members of the committee, that did not happen.

There has been a tendency, I think, in the debate over standards,

to conflate some of the issues in what may not be a very helpful

fashion. Let me say that there is one thing that I think all would

agree on, and that is that the framers made it clear in their debate

and in the drafting of article II, section 4, that they intended to

place substantial constraints on the use of the impeachment power.

They used language flowing directly from the history of impeachments in England that was clearly designed to reach conduct that

involved abuse of official power.

Within those constraints, however, and quite rightly, the framers

did not and could not anticipate the specific circumstances that

might give rise even to the consideration of impeachment. Instead,

they made it clear that in the nature of our republican form of government, impeachment of the President was not to be the equivalent of an expression of disagreement, but was to be reserved for

only the most serious matters that threaten the very fabric of our

political structure.

It is not enough to say, however, that the issue must be decided

on a case-by-case basis, for that suggests that what is impeachable

is to be left to the unfettered judgment of each Congress. Even if,

as the events of 1974 and the events of 1998 reveal, it is not possible to set down rules that will govern every case, it is possible

to set down principles, and we must. And those principles must be

faithful to the intent of the framers and, most importantly, must

be consistent with the form of government we live under and the

delicate relationship between the legislative branch and the executive branch that is the hallmark of that government.

The debate over whether misconduct or even criminal conduct

arises out of personal rather than official matters is in some sense

misguided, I think. One can certainly conceive of acts arising out

of a purely personal matter that would be presumptively impeachable, bribery of a judge to rule in the President’s favor in some private matter, but that is not to say that you should ignore the roots

from which a President’s misconduct stems. If he were to perjure

himself about some serious official act he had taken, one might find

that he had abused his office. On the other hand, if perjury arose

in a purely personal setting, one could sensibly ask, indeed should

sensibly ask, whether—no matter how serious such a violation may

be when viewed in the abstract, he has demonstrated an inability

to continue to lead the Nation, which must be the test for each of

you.
408

One need only look to something that has been discussed at great

length before this committee, and that is the decision in 1974, even

in the face of very strong evidence, not to return an article of impeachment based on President Nixon’s alleged tax evasion, to test

for yourself whether there indeed is a dividing line of constitutional

importance between misconduct arising out of official matters and

misconduct arising out of personal matters. But the core principle

governing your deliberation should be that the only conduct that

merits the drastic remedy of impeachment is that which subverts

our system of government or renders the President unfit or unable

to govern.

Such a standard impresses on all of us the recognition that impeachment is indeed a grave act of extraordinary proportions, to be

taken only when no other response is adequate to preserve the integrity of government

Now you must, of course, as you all recognize far better than I,

not set so high a bar as to make it impossible to act when our system of government is threatened, but you must not set so low a bar

that you encourage future Congresses to set foot on this perilous

path when the matter is uncertain and there is a danger that partisan forces alone will tip the balance. We should always look to

the political process to deal with officials who breach their public

trust. Impeachment must be the last resort.

Now, I want to talk very briefly about the record before you, because there has been much discussion on that subject. Yesterday

we were chastised by some members of the Majority for not bringing forward so-called fact witnesses, as though somehow the burden was on us to bring that kind of evidence before the committee.

Now, I admit that I come to this exercise with the instincts of

a former prosecutor and a former defense lawyer, but I really found

that criticism to turn the world I know on its head.

This committee has determined in its wisdom simply to accept at

face value all of the conclusions reached in the Independent Counsel’s referral and to look to whatever backup information was provided in support of those conclusions. But with that decision, I suggest to you, comes the obligation to look into that record and to ask

what the witnesses really said.

It seemed odd to me, as I listened to that criticism, that the committee should accept a predigested conclusion and then turn to the

accused and say, bring us witnesses to convince us we were wrong.

What we tried to do in the submission that we gave to the committee yesterday, and what I will do much more briefly today, is

to show you that your premise is wrong; that the very record on

which you rely does not support the conclusion it purports to reach.

Some time ago, when Independent Counsel Starr testified, my

colleague, Mr. Kendall, asked him whether he had ever met any of

the witnesses on whom his referral relies. We asked that not out

of some desire to launch an ad hominem attack on Mr. Starr, but

because it seemed to us that some personal sense of the witnesses

on whom the referral was relying, in recommending so grave a

matter as the impeachment of the President, was important. It was

important for him in making his judgments and important for you

in making your judgments about the reliability of the evidence be409

fore you and the reliability of the Independent Counsel’s recommendation.

You must, I think, also ask as you look to that record and test

whether it is adequate for your purposes, did the Independent

Counsel come to its task with the same sense of constitutional

gravity that must guide these proceedings? Was there anyone in

the Office of Independent Counsel who questioned the credibility of

particular testimony or asked whether all the relevant facts were

being considered?

Even if occasionally heated in its rhetoric, this committee’s debates do lend to this process some of the value of the adversarial

give-and-take that trial lawyers believe is important in seeking the

truth. But none of that healthy tension between adversaries was

brought to bear on the witnesses who appeared before the grand

jury.

The members here are left with essentially the cold text of the

referral and its supporting materials, followed by—and I truly do

not mean to speak unkindly of the Independent Counsel—a recitation of that text by a witness who was, in all candor, equally impervious to any efforts to reach behind the surface and touch the reality of the events that are at issue here.

In our memorandum submitted to you yesterday, we attempted

to set out a point-by-point rebuttal of the 11 grounds advanced by

the Independent Counsel. We even, and I am sorry, Congressman

Inglis—he doesn’t appear to be here—set out some facts, and I will

talk about those.

Today I want to touch only on some of the issues raised in the

referral for the purposes of pointing out for the committee its principal deficiencies and to highlight those areas in which myth appears to have replaced fact in the committee’s debates and in public discourse.

I want to begin by coming to grips directly with the issue that

I think has been the principal focus of the committee’s attention

and concern: the President’s grand jury testimony. We take this as

our starting point to address the concerns oft-stated by Congressman Graham and others, whether if the President were proved to

have committed perjury before the grand jury, such conduct would,

without more, merit impeachment.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we firmly believe,

first, that the President testified truthfully before the grand jury;

but, second, that no matter what judgment you reach about that

testimony, there could be no basis for impeachment on any reasonable reading of the constitutional standards.

But that said, we do want to use our time today to address the

issues that appear to be most troubling to the committee, for we

recognize that only by doing so can we assist you in performing

your constitutional duties.

I need to stop here because I want to address an issue that probably has been heard, bruited about more frequently than any other

over the course of this committee’s work, and it falls under the

heading, I suppose, of legalisms.

What are they? Well, whatever they are, they have caused a

great deal of pain to those of us engaged in trying to represent the

President over the last many months. I and my fellow lawyers have
410

been accused by the media and by some of you, heaven forfend, of

actually employing legalisms in defending our client. And, Mr.

Chairman, I have to plead guilty on my behalf and on behalf of

every lawyer who ever argued some point of law or nuanced fact

to establish his client’s innocence. But I am worried here not about

whether lawyers will ultimately recover from these attacks, I am

worried that our sometimes irresistible urge to practice our profession will stand in the way of securing a just result in this very

grave proceeding for this very special client.

However, I do suggest that it is not legalistic to point out that

the President did not say what some accuse him of saying. It is not

legalistic to point out that a witness did not say what some rely

on her testimony to establish. It is not legalistic to point out that

a witness was asked poorly framed or ambiguous questions, and it

is not legalistic to argue that a witness’ answer was technically

true, even if not complete. Yet, however proper it may be to make

those arguments in a proceeding such as this one and for a witness

such as the President, there is a risk that they will get in the way

of answering the ultimate question: Did the President do something so wrong and so destructive of his constitutional capacity to

govern that he should be impeached?

Even if we were successful, as I am confident we would be, in

defending the President in a courtroom, that would not suffice to

answer that question. For it is within your power, even if hesitantly exercised, to decide that even though there is insufficient

proof to establish that the President committed perjury, he nonetheless should be impeached. But I suggest to you that even then,

our oft-criticized legalisms are relevant to you. They are relevant

because they were not just dreamed up by scheming lawyers looking for a good closing argument. Instead, they reflect the judgments of lawyers, judges and, yes, legislators through the centuries, that we must take special care when we seek to accuse a

witness of having violated his oath.

Among the protections that the law has created, including laws

enacted by this body, are the requirement that the witness intentionally testified falsely; that his testimony be material; that the

question not be ambiguous; that the burden is on the questioner to

ask the right question; and that the witness may be truthful but

nonetheless misleading, without having violated the law. The Supreme Court has so told us.

It cannot be the rule, to add to an old phrase, that close only

counts in horseshoes, hand grenades and perjury. The Supreme

Court in Bronston made it clear that our adversarial system requires that we take great care when we ask whether a witness has

perjured himself. It made clear that we rely largely on the adversarial process, particularly in civil cases, to test the truthfulness of

witness testimony; and we do not, as the panel preceding me I

think made eminently clear, look to prosecutors to police the civil

litigation system.

What does it really mean to say that these are legalisms? Well,

granting the system’s belief in the sanctity of the oath, which no

one would deny, they reflect the judgment of society, of the legislature, of the judiciary, that those who would charge perjury must

bear a heavy burden.
411

The Office of Independent Counsel would have the committee believe that in three respects the President committed perjury in his

testimony before the grand jury: first, by stating that his relationship with Miss Lewinsky began in February 1996 rather than November 1995; second, by stating that he believed that a particular

form of intimate activity was not covered by the definition of sexual

relations approved by Judge Wright in the Jones case; and third,

by stating that he had not engaged in specific types of sexual conduct, theoretically in order to conform his testimony to his civil

deposition.

Now as to the first of these, you must begin your consideration

with the proposition that the President acknowledged to the grand

jury that he did have a wrongful intimate relationship with Ms.

Lewinsky. What then might have led him to change by 3 months

the date on which that relationship began? Well, the referral surmises, it must have been because although the President was prepared to make the most devastating admission of misconduct any

husband and father could imagine, he still wanted to have the

grand jury believe that when their relationship began, Ms.

Lewinsky was a 22-year-old employee rather than a 22-year-old intern.

Well, putting aside for the moment the fact that under no circumstances would any reasonable prosecutor or any judge or jury

find such a discrepancy material, there is absolutely no proof of

any such purpose on the President’s part. Not one witness, including Ms. Lewinsky, even suggested such a thing.

The only proof the referral offers is a mischaracterization of the

record; the contention that the President’s concern about Ms.

Lewinsky—about Ms. Lewinsky’s badge reflected concern about her

status, that is as an intern, rather than as was clearly the case,

her ability to move freely in the West Wing of the White House.

Other than this misleading representation, we are left only with

the referral’s bare speculation, clearly contrived simply in order to

find some fine point in the President’s testimony that it could

trumpet as false.

As to the second of the three perjury allegations, the Independent Counsel would have the committee find that the President testified falsely, because the Independent Counsel has concluded that

the President’s statement of his own belief in the meaning of the

definition of sexual relations in the Jones case is not credible.

At least here the Independent Counsel is candid enough to acknowledge that he has no evidentiary basis for that conclusion; the

referral simply states it to be the case and moves on.

I suggest that those of you who have been prosecutors know as

a matter of practical experience, and those of you who have not

been prosecutors or even lawyers know as a matter of common

sense, that no one could or would ever be charged with perjury because the prosecutor did not find credible a witness’ statement of

his personal belief, much less his personal belief about the meaning

of a definition used in a civil deposition.

And so we come to the third. The referral alleges that the President lied when he admitted having one form of sexual contact with

Ms. Lewinsky but denied having certain other forms of contact, as

the Independent Counsel would have it, in order to make his grand
412

jury testimony consistent with the definition under which he testified in the Jones deposition.

We will not drag the committee into the salacious muck that fills

the referral. Instead, let each member assume that Ms. Lewinsky’s

version of the events is correct; and then ask, am I prepared to impeach the President because, after having admitted having engaged

in egregiously wrongful conduct, he falsely described the particulars of that conduct?

Let each member even assume that the President testified as he

did because he did not want to admit that in a civil deposition, confronted with a narrowly, even oddly, framed definition, he had succeeded in misleading opposing counsel; and then ask yourself, am

I prepared to impeach the President for that?

The answer must be no.

Does it not speak volumes that after 4 hours of hostile interrogation by prosecutors armed with information from countless documents and witnesses, the referral is able to identify only these

three instances that even it is prepared to argue constitute false

testimony?

The Independent Counsel had the opportunity to press the President on every point of his Jones testimony that they might have

thought was false or misleading. They were experienced cross-examiners, unfettered by judicial supervision, and this is what they

accomplished.

When one scrapes away all the rhetoric, what one finds is this:

The referral alleges that the President lied to a grand jury about

the details of sexual conduct, not to conceal his wrongful relationship with a 22–year-old employee, but to avoid admitting that in

a civil deposition, he had misled plaintiff’s counsel about an embarrassing matter that the Court ultimately found immaterial.

Now, I do not in any sense, and nor would any of my colleagues,

suggest that we take false testimony lightly. We are, as most of you

are, members of a profession that values truthful testimony. What

we do suggest is that if you were to conclude as to this aspect of

their relationship that Ms. Lewinsky was telling you the truth and

the President was not, you might know—no, you should conclude

that his conduct was wrong, deserving of severe condemnation; but

you could not in good conscience and consistent with your constitutional responsibility conclude that the President should be impeached.

Surely the same result must follow to the extent that the referral

alleges that the President committed perjury in the Jones deposition.

As any fair reading of the deposition must conclude, the questions were oddly and vaguely framed. The Jones counsel didn’t follow up when they had the opportunity. Counsel were indeed invited, by the President’s lawyer, to ask specific detailed questions

and declined to do so. They decided to proceed on the basis of a

truncated, artificial definition of sexual relations.

The President has said that he made no effort to be helpful, that

he did not want to reveal his relationship, understandably. His answers were frequently evasive and incomplete, as my colleague, Mr.

Craig said yesterday, even maddening. They were misleading but
413

they were not perjurious and, a fortiori, they cannot be the basis

for an impeachment.

Now this conclusion is, in my view, only fortified by an assessment of the remaining allegations in the OIC referral. The President did not obstruct justice. He did not tamper with witnesses. He

did not abuse the powers of his office. The referral’s overreaching

claims of impropriety are themselves but an attempt to lend artificial weight to allegations of perjury that, standing alone, Independent Counsel knew could not support the result for which he has

been such a zealous advocate.

Let me examine at least part of the record that is before you. If

the committee is going to rely on the testimony before it, contained

in the submissions from the Independent Counsel, it must take all

of that testimony. It cannot accept the Independent Counsel’s picking and choosing. It cannot accept the Independent Counsel’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses.

Let me just touch on two examples that demonstrate, I believe,

how the committee can be misled by the referral into assuming a

reality that does not exist.

First is the Independent Counsel’s charge that the President conspired with Ms. Lewinsky to conceal gifts he had given her. The

central events, as the Independent Counsel has described them, are

these: that on Sunday, December 28th, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky visited

the President at the White House. The Independent Counsel alleges they discussed the fact—in quotes, they discussed the fact

that she had received a subpoena to testify in the Jones case and

to produce any gifts that she had.

The President then gave Ms. Lewinsky a number of gifts because

he believed she was moving to New York and it was Christmas

time.

She went back to her apartment and sometime thereafter, on

that day, according to the Independent Counsel, Betty Currie, the

President’s secretary, called and told Ms. Lewinsky that she understood that Ms. Lewinsky had something for her. Ms. Currie then

drove to Ms. Lewinsky’s apartment, took the gifts from her and put

them under her bed. That is the essence of the Independent Counsel’s description as it tries to deal with whether this constituted an

obstruction of justice.

Now, the introduction to this issue as offered by Independent

Counsel when he testified before you was that the President and

Monica Lewinsky on December 28th, quote, met and discussed

what should be done with the gifts subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky.

If you look at the record before you, I suggest to you you will find

little or nothing to support that conclusion. For one thing, to the

extent one is trying to determine whether indeed the President of

the United States engaged in some obstruction of justice by urging

or causing the concealment of evidence in the Jones case, begin by

noting that there is not one single suggestion anywhere in any testimony that the President suggested, brought up, hinted at the notion of Ms. Lewinsky’s concealing these gifts, in any manner.

Note as well that there is not one iota of proof that the President

ever even mentioned Betty Currie in the context of this gift discussion. Note as well that Monica Lewinsky gave at least 10, and

there may be more, versions of this event. The Independent Coun414

sel chose one, the one the Independent Counsel thought was most

injurious, most reflective of what that office believed to have been

improper conduct. They don’t tell you about the other nine. They

don’t tell you about all of the ones in which Ms. Lewinsky doesn’t

mention the President saying anything to her or, at worst, says,

uhm, I will think about it. Doesn’t mention the ones in which the

story they want to tell is not reflected in their critical witness’ testimony.

And if you move to the issue of who triggered the picking up of

the gifts, you face a comparable problem. According to what I have

to say is a simplistic summation by the Office of Independent

Counsel, it is easy. Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky; said, the

President tells me you have got something for me to pick up, or I

understand that you have something for me to pick up; all of which

fits neatly into a theory that it all must have happened at the

President’s instigation.

The problem is, Betty Currie says she never had such a conversation with the President. Betty Currie says, Monica Lewinsky

called me. The President says he never had such a conversation

with Betty Currie; didn’t know anything about Betty Currie going

to pick up gifts.

Where is that? Where is that in the Independent Counsel’s assessment of its case?

Indeed, presumably it is the Independent Counsel’s theory that

the reason for this transfer of the gifts from Monica Lewinsky to

Betty Currie had directly to do with the Jones subpoena. The problem with that is that what Betty Currie says about her conversations with Monica Lewinsky is nothing about Jones; references to

people asking about the gifts and, in particular, a reporter, Michael

Isikoff. Indeed, it is interesting that, in possession of Betty Currie’s

description of that telephone call, that conversation, the Independent Counsel never even asked Monica Lewinsky, is that right? Did

you really say to Betty Currie that the reason you wanted to get

rid of these gifts was because people were asking you, including

Michael Isikoff? Never even asked her the question, much less put

it before this committee.

But let me point not to conflicting testimony, one version by Ms.

Lewinsky, another version by Ms. Currie. Let me point to the actual events about which there is no conflict on December 28th. On

that day, the President gave gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. The Independent Counsel would have this committee believe that on the very

day in which the President and Ms. Lewinsky, and maybe Betty

Currie, are conspiring to get rid of the gifts that she already had,

the President added to the pile. That’s very strange conduct for a

bunch of conspirators. Very strange conduct.

Why would the President, so concerned about the possibility that

she might have to turn over gifts, give her a bunch and encourage

her to send them all to Betty Currie on the same day? I don’t think

there is a sensible answer to that question; certainly not one offered by the Independent Counsel.

Let me just briefly suggest to you that a similar analysis on the

issue of the job search leads to the same result. The referral would

have you believe that there was an inextricable link between the

assistance given to Monica Lewinsky in searching for a job and her
415

role in the Jones case, either as a witness or in connection with her

affidavit. It does so, although I must say it does admit that there

is only circumstantial evidence to support the theory, by offering a

chronology that essentially focuses only on the events of late December and January. And indeed if you look at pages 183 to 184

of the referral, you will see that they talk about what happens on

January 5th, Monica Lewinsky declines the U.N. job; January 7th,

Monica Lewinsky signs the affidavit and Vernon Jordan informs

the President that the affidavit has been signed. January 8th, the

very next day, Ms. Lewinsky is interviewed by MacAndrews &

Forbes, on Vernon Jordan’s recommendation. Shortly thereafter,

after it is reported that that interview did not go very well, Vernon

Jordan calls Ron Perlman, and ultimately Ms. Lewinsky is reinterviewed and offered a job.

What could possibly be more incriminating?

Well, you might want to know, as I am sure you do if you have

done your homework and you have looked at this record, that

Monica Lewinsky was looking for a job months before any of this

happened. Mainly, candidly, she wanted a job in the White House;

spent a lot of the spring of 1997 looking for a job in the White

House.

Now, there was one person who I guarantee you from personal

experience in the last 2 years could have gotten her a job in the

White House. That’s the President of the United States. It didn’t

happen; never pushed the button, never called anybody and said

put her back in legislative affairs, give her a job with them. It

didn’t happen. Strange.

Indeed, if you look at the record you will see that the President

gave only limited assistance to Ms. Lewinsky in her job search,

never put any pressure on anybody. Vernon Jordan has helped a

lot of people in this town and he helped Monica Lewinsky, and he

didn’t do it because she was a witness in the Jones case or because

she was going to file an affidavit.

Monica Lewinsky told the President as early as July that she

wanted to move to New York. The reason for that is she had been

told by her friend, Linda Tripp, that she wasn’t going to get a job

in the White House. Failing that, New York looked good to her.

When the issue of the U.N. job arose, she pursued it during the

summer, and Vernon Jordan begins to help her later in the fall,

and met with her in November. And at the same time, by the way,

just so that the conspiracy gets broader and broader, Ken Bacon at

the Pentagon, her boss, was helping to get her a job, too.

You will search the referral in vain for an honest description of

these events. And those are facts, not new, because they have been

resting in your hands for months, but new if you ask the question:

Were they in the referral; have they been the focus of discussion?

In that sense, I suggest to you, members of the committee, that

they are new and they are important.

And one last piece on this subject. To the extent that it has been

suggested that there was some linkage between the job search and

the filing of her affidavit in the Jones case, I direct your attention

to Ms. Lewinsky’s interview with the FBI on July 27th in which

she said, as clearly as anyone possibly could, there was no agree416

ment to sign the affidavit in return for a job. You can search for

awhile, too, before you find that in the referral.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that Ms. Lewinsky’s friend, Linda Tripp,

was the one who recommended, at a time when we now know she

had other roles in life, not signing the affidavit until she had a job.

Now this is not a new fact, because we have been very vocal about

it from the very beginning, but it is a fact that isn’t in the referral

in any meaningful sense. And there is, of course, Ms. Lewinsky’s

statement in the grand jury, not in response to any question from

a prosecutor but in response to a question from a conscientious

grand juror. And she said, Ms. Lewinsky said: ‘‘I think because of

the public nature of how this investigation has been and what the

charges have been that are aired, I would just like to say that no

one ever asked me to lie. I was never promised a job for my silence.’’

Lastly and very briefly, given what we surmise to be the articles

that may be under consideration here, although of course we have

not been given any specific information about what they may contain and thus our defense is modestly handicapped, let me touch

very briefly on the issue of abuse of power in the assertion of executive privilege.

From the very first day that this story broke in January of this

year, impeachment has loomed on the horizon for all of us in the

White House.

We were faced with the truly unique experience of coping with

a grand jury inquiry by a prosecutor who had a statutory mandate

to inquire into whether there were grounds for impeachment of the

President. I considered personally the question of whether we

should raise any issue of executive privilege on behalf of the President in response to any documents that were subpoenaed or questions asked of particular witnesses. We fully understood from earlier litigation what our obligations were when the issue of executive

privilege arises. It is to assess whether indeed the President had

conversations which go to the essence of his official responsibilities

and which need to be preserved as confidential so that he can, in

fact, receive the candid and sensible advice to which he is entitled.

But step 1, whenever we contemplate assertion of executive privilege, is accommodation. There are some on this committee with

whom we have engaged in accommodation in other settings in similar situations, and we do so as well when prosecutors seek information from us.

We accommodate by trying to get into the hands of, in this case,

the prosecutors and, in some cases, congressional committees the

facts, information which they need in order to perform their duty,

and to screen off only those limited areas of inquiry that go to the

heart of the confidential advice and discussion between the President and his senior advisers, and that is what we did here.

We tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to accommodate the interests of

the Independent Counsel, and only when he rejected all efforts towards accommodation were we required upon his filing of a motion

to compel to assert executive privilege, and we did so in two areas

with respect to two nonlawyer staff members of the White House,

and ultimately—although initially only one lawyer, ultimately
417

three lawyers, the latter really being linked to a wholly separate

area of disagreement having to do with attorney/client privilege.

Now, one cannot read the Independent Counsel’s description of

what happened in the executive privilege area and come away, I

think, with any true understanding of what happened. There is no

indication of our efforts to accommodate, no indication that we understood the need to provide facts about the underlying conduct at

issue, indeed no indication that we produced thousands and thousands of pages of documents without once ever raising the issue of

executive privilege.

Instead what happened is that the Office of Independent Counsel

took the position that executive privilege simply didn’t apply at all

to his inquiry because it all arose out of the personal conduct of the

President, and we litigated that issue, and we litigated it on the

ground that we weren’t seeking to protect information about the

President’s personal conduct, what we were seeking to protect was

the advice that he was getting and the discussions that he was

having among senior advisers with respect to the conduct of his official business in the most extraordinary high-tension, hectic era

that has ever been my—I won’t say pleasure experience in this city.

We had state visits. We had the State of the Union address. We

had the core business of the President to worry about, and we told

that to the judge, and guess what? Although you will never read

it in the referral, the judge agreed with us. She said these conversations are presumptively privileged. And she instructed the

Independent Counsel to make a factual showing, which is what

happens in executive privilege claims, it is a qualified privilege, to

demonstrate that their need for this information was greater than

our interest in confidentiality, and only then did the Independent

Counsel finally and reluctantly acknowledge that indeed executive

privilege properly was asserted here. They made a showing to the

judge, ex parte. We don’t know what it was. The judge found that

it overcame our interest in confidentiality, and that was the end of

the assertion of executive privilege for Ms. Hernreich and Mr.

Blumenthal, the two nonlawyers involved. That all happened by

March. There was no delay, no great hurdles to be overcome.

Most importantly, I think you need to understand what really

happened. This was not the President throwing out willy-nilly

whatever privilege claims he thought might stand in the way of an

investigation. This was his lawyers’ advice that the interests of the

Presidency dictated protecting not the facts, but the day-to-day advice he was getting about running the Presidency and the discussions among his senior advisers.

Now, if you ever had any question about the extent to which the

Independent Counsel’s referral sought to color, sought to paint the

blackest picture of this insidious effort to assert a privilege recognized by the Constitution and by the Supreme Court in as limited

a way as was necessary to protect the core interests of the President, look to pages 207 and 208 of the referral.

At the bottom of page 207 we find the following: ‘‘The tactics employed by the White House have not been confined to the judicial

process. On March 24, while the President was traveling in Africa,

he was asked about the assertion of executive privilege. He responded, you should ask someone who knows. He also responded,
418

I haven’t discussed that with the lawyers, I don’t know. And the

referral said this was untrue. Unbeknownst to the public, in a declaration filed in District Court on March 17, 7 days before the

President’s public expression of ignorance, White House counsel

Charles F.C. Ruff,’’ that’s me, ‘‘informed Chief Judge Johnson that

he ‘‘had discussed’’ the matter with the President, who had directed

the assertion of executive privilege.’’

And not satisfied with noting that in the referral, the Independent Counsel, when he appeared before this committee, engaged in

a colloquy with Congressman Cannon. I hope the Congressman will

excuse me for making use of his dialogue.

‘‘Mr. Cannon, According to the sworn declaration of White House

counsel Charles Ruff, the President personally directed him to assert executive privilege to prevent you from questioning some of his

assistants. When he was in Africa, however, President Clinton denied knowing about the assertion of executive privilege. Which is

it? Did Mr. Ruff ever amend his declaration, or is the President

lying to the public on his Africa trip?’’

‘‘Mr. Starr: To my knowledge, Congressman, there was never an

amendment to the declaration, and the declaration was filed on

March 17, and then the President’s statement in Africa was on

March 24. So they can’t both be right. Either the President had discussed with Mr. Ruff the indications of the executive privilege, or

he had not. Both cannot be true.’’

Well, unhappily, at least I think, for the Independent Counsel,

both are true, because what really happened was that I did, as my

declaration says, consult with the President of the United States.

He did authorize me to assert executive privilege. And if you look

at—and I will have to take a minute to find it—pages 174 and 175

in our submission of yesterday, what really happened in March in

Africa was not what the Independent Counsel said happened. The

Independent Counsel completely misstated the questions posed to

the President, and by carefully selecting only a portion of his answer, took his response entirely out of context.

The actual exchange was this. Question by the press: ‘‘Mr. President, we haven’t yet had the opportunity to ask you about your decision to invoke executive privilege. Why shouldn’t the American

people see that as an effort to hide something from them?’’

The President: ‘‘Look, that is a question that is being asked and

answered back home by the people responsible to do that. I don’t

believe I should be discussing that here.’’

Question: ‘‘Could you at least tell us why you think the First

Lady may be covered by that privilege, why her conversation might

fall under that?’’

Answer, and this is where the quote comes from: ‘‘I haven’t discussed it with the lawyers. I don’t know. You should ask someone

who does.’’

By the way, the First Lady was found by Judge Johnson to be

covered by the executive privilege, but it would have been nice,

whatever argument the referral wanted to make, to at least put the

full statement in the record so you could assess and not simply rely

on the Independent Counsel’s assessment of what happened.

Some commentators, and indeed some Members of Congress,

have suggested that the work of this committee, and indeed the
419

work of the House, should be treated as nothing more than some

preliminary proceeding designed to package a bundle of evidence

and send it over to the Senate. Some have likened the committee’s

work to that of a grand jury whose only task is to determine

whether there is probable cause to believe that the President has

committed an impeachable offense.

Members of the committee, nothing could be further from the

constitutional truth. With all respect, nothing could be a greater

abdication of your responsibility. This is not routine business. This

is not a charging device pushing hundreds of thousands of cases

out into the criminal justice system. Only twice before has this

committee ever voted out articles of impeachment against a president. Such a vote is not intended to say, well, we think there may

be some reason to believe that William Clinton has done something

wrong, but we will let the Senate sort out things at trial. This vote

is intended to speak the constitutional will of the people—to say we

believe that on the evidence before us the President of the United

States should be removed from office. No member of this committee

and no Member of the House can take shelter behind the notion

that an article of impeachment is the equivalent of nothing more

than a criminal complaint or an indictment or some formalistic

slap on the wrist. Each Member, and I need not tell you this, must

weigh the weightiest burden that our Constitution contemplates,

the burden of making an individual determination that the President has committed such grave offenses against our polity that he

is no longer fit to serve, that the will of the people should be overturned.

If there is any analogy to the grand jury, it is this, and you heard

it from some of my former colleagues in the prosecution business,

and you heard it from others: For any professional prosecutor, the

true test, and it is certainly true for serious cases, and one can conceive of no case more serious than this, is whether there is sufficient evidence on the basis of which a prosecutor could convince a

jury beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense had been committed. This is not, as Congressman Canady suggested earlier today,

a matter of counting noses in the Senate. It is not a question of

whether a majority vote in the House somehow gives permission to

put this responsibility in the hands of the Senate. They only require a majority vote in the grand jury, and we require a unanimous vote in a criminal case at trial.

This is a matter of testing the charges that you are going to consider and asking yourself not would I win if I really litigated this

in the Senate, but rather do I have enough evidence to justify putting the country through the horror that we all know will follow

if, in fact, there is an impeachment.

In closing, I urge you to ask, as Senator Fessenden asked 130

years ago, is the evidence before you of such character to commend

itself at once to the minds of all right-thinking—forgive me—men

as beyond all question an adequate cause for impeachment. And finally ask, what is best for our Nation?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ruff.

[Information not available at time of printing].

Chairman HYDE. Would you like a break?
420

Mr. RUFF. I am ready when you are, Mr. Chairman. Let me say

as we venture into the questioning period, there may come a moment when I actually turn to one of my colleagues behind me for

a little assistance as we get into the specifics.

Chairman HYDE. If you want to take a break——

Mr. RUFF. No, I meant as we go on, it may be necessary for me

to turn for a little guidance on the facts. I will do it in such a way

that it doesn’t disrupt the process.

Chairman HYDE. It would be a terrible waste not to avail yourself of their talents, so I understand.

Mr. RUFF. Indeed.

Chairman HYDE. We are going to operate under a strict 5–

minute rule.

Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Ruff, and thank

you for a very eloquent statement. I will not get into the business

that there were no fact witnesses provided here, because you are

obviously the President’s clean-up hitter, but I do think that we

have got to cut through the academic discourse and the legal hairsplitting that has gone on in order to make an essential determination on whether the President has committed an impeachable offense, and let me say for my own part that I believe that at least

perjury before a grand jury is an impeachable offense, whether the

perjury has been committed by the President or whether it has

been committed by a Federal judge. I think that issue was decided

9 years ago in the Walter Nixon impeachment.

So getting to whether or not the President did make a false

statement before the grand jury, let me ask you a few questions.

First, Mr. Ruff, did the President mislead the American people

when he denied having sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky?

Mr. RUFF. He has admitted doing so, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Did he lie then?

Mr. RUFF. Mr. Congressman, there is no secret here. When he

stood in the Roosevelt Room and said, I never had sexual relations

with Ms. Lewinsky, he knew that the vast majority of the people

who were listening to him out there would probably understand

that to mean that he had no improper relationship with her of any

kind, and he knew when he said that, holding within him, as he

did, his understanding that sexual relations means sexual intercourse, that he was misleading the people who were listening to

him.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Ruff, was the President evasive and

misleading in his answers in the civil deposition and before the

grand jury?

Mr. RUFF. I have so stated, and so has he.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Did he lie?

Mr. RUFF. The President engaged in an exercise the hallmark of

which was a desire to be as little help to these people on the other

side of the Jones case as he possibly could.

I think my colleagues’ description of his testimony as evasive,

misleading and maddening is probably as good as you can get.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. But did he lie?

Mr. RUFF. And I am going to respond to your question.
421

I have no doubt that he walked up to a line that he thought he

understood. Reasonable people, and you maybe have reached that

conclusion, could determine that he crossed over that line, and

what for him was truthful but misleading or nonresponsive and

misleading or evasive was, in fact, false. But in his mind, and

that’s the heart and soul of perjury, he thought and he believed

that what he was doing was being evasive but truthful.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The oath that witnesses take require them

to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. I seem

to recall that there were a lot of people, myself included, when

asked by the press what advice we would give to the President

when he went into the grand jury in August, was to tell the truth,

the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Mr. RUFF. Indeed.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Did he tell the truth, the whole truth and

nothing but the truth when he was before the grand jury?

Mr. RUFF. He surely did.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Then how come following the grand

jury’s—the grand jury appearances, we heard all kinds of allegations of legal hair-splitting, and debating the meaning of various

types of words, and claims that some of the questions were ambiguous? My list includes words such as is, alone, sex, and sexual relations.

Do you have any more?

Mr. RUFF. Well, I will take your list for starters, but I am not

sure how that addresses the question that you put to me, which is

did he tell the truth. He made it very clear to the grand jury that

he engaged in inappropriate intimate relationships. There is no one

who listened——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Ruff, you are saying that some of the

questions were ambiguous, and the President really did not understand what those questions were. Now, who do we blame for the

fact that the President didn’t understand and we have had all of

these redefinitions and legal hair-splitting? Is it the President, or

is it his lawyers?

Mr. RUFF. I don’t think that you will find any suggestion that the

President didn’t understand the questions put to him. What you

will find is an effort by him to explain not how he was responding

to the questions in the grand jury, but how he responded to the

questions in the deposition, and that’s where the issues are debated

over what the meaning——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. But whose responsibility is that? Is it the

President’s responsibility or his lawyers’ when he is talking about

all of the legal hair-splitting?

Mr. RUFF. When the President is answering questions in the

grand jury under oath, it is his responsibility to answer truthfully.

He did so.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

I appreciate your coming forward and taking this lengthy

amount of time, and I am very moved by what you have had to say.

The question that I think most people are asking themselves is
422

whether in this 445-page narrative, even assuming that for the

benefit of this question that everything in it is true, are there any

acts? Is there any conduct, are there any things in the narrative

that would rise to the level of an impeachable offense?

Mr. RUFF. As I have stated, Mr. Conyers, it is our very clear conviction the answer to that question is no.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

You’ve pointed out one glaring example of Mr. Starr’s omissions.

We have noted that a fair amount of exculpatory evidence was excluded as we’ve gone through our exercise here, but the one concerning the President’s response to a question about executive

privilege, is that the only example of an important omission that

has come to your attention by the Independent Counsel?

Mr. RUFF. As one might gather from not only my testimony

today, but submissions that we made both yesterday and earlier,

we find many—I referred to a few today in terms of leaving out exculpatory information about the gifts and the job search, and those

are, I think, but examples of areas, and I raise them, Mr. Conyers,

in the setting not because of some collateral attack on the Independent Counsel, but rather to ask the committee to look with care

at the record before them.

Mr. CONYERS. Have you, Mr. Ruff, any insight as to why the

President’s grand jury testimony was videotaped by the Independent Counsel?

Mr. RUFF. Well, I was not engaged in the discussions over that.

I am advised by my colleague, Mr. Kendall, that this was something on which the Independent Counsel insisted nominally because there might be a missing grand juror. I don’t candidly know

if that was, in fact, the case on August 17 or not. But one might

surmise that there was some collateral interest in fleshing out the

package to be sent to this Congress.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

What about the struggle that is now going on within the Congress and even outside of it to find some intermediate position to

which we may all find an exit, to which we might with whatever

integrity remains get to a conclusion to this matter? Is there any

way that this kind of a resolution might resonate favorably in the

White House?

Mr. RUFF. I think what I can say, Congressman Conyers, is what

we have said before. We are looking for an end to this process. We

think that it does not advance the public weal to drag it out further. We are open to any reasonable suggestion from any side as

a way of finding an end to this.

Mr. CONYERS. I appreciate that. If you believed, Counsel, that

the President had abused the powers of his office, would you still

be serving as the White House counsel?

Mr. RUFF. I think we all have as our core professional responsibility an unwillingness to serve where we believe our legal skills

are being abused, and I surely would not serve where I thought

that was the case.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Ruff.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.
423

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Ruff, in your opening comments you suggested that the matters before us, no matter what we might conclude are the facts, do not rise to the level of impeachable offenses

because nothing the President did amounts to subverting the system of government?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. And you also suggested that these were purely

personal matters that were involved in this case.

Mr. RUFF. I think not the latter. They arose out of personal conduct.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Very well. Whatever your characterization.

I would submit to you that the President of the United States

committing perjury, if we believe he did, obstructing justice in a

court system, and lying to the grand jury are things which subvert

the justice system of this Nation. If we believe that, you may not,

but if we come to that conclusion, that certainly subverts the American Government system because the justice system is integral to

that government system. So I would suggest that they do rise, as

was said by Professor Dershowitz, to—lying and committing perjury before the grand jury—to impeachable offenses, if we conclude

that, for which the President should be impeached.

Mr. RUFF. May I respond?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. That is a comment. I have a question or two.

You have every right to characterize, just as Mr. Starr has, and

you also highlight. There were a number of pages that you submitted, 180 or something like that. At any rate, I find that those

things that you highlighted which were your strongest points, and

I respect that, but there are things that you didn’t highlight that

you glossed over more. You only gave us about two and a half

pages on the perjury before the grand jury in your written testimony, although you mention it today. You gave us 20 pages on the

gift question, and you gave us no comments, although a few pages,

on Betty Currie in her specific questions whether the President

may have tampered with her as a witness.

Now, with regard to the perjury question before the grand jury,

the central issue is whether the President committed that perjury

or not, whether he lied or he didn’t lie. And the issue there, as I

discussed this morning, as you may or may not have observed in

my questioning, boils down to whether or not you believe Monica

Lewinsky. The President said one thing, and she said another. The

President said, I did not have sexual relations based on the definition that the court had given me in the Jones case. Monica

Lewinsky described at least two things on several occasions that

the President did with her that would meet that definition.

She is corroborated by having talked to seven different family

members and friends on seven different occasions at contemporaneous times to engaging in with these relations with the President,

having told them precisely what she later told the grand jury,

which was consistent with that. To me that is corroboration. That

is something that you don’t want to highlight. Mr. Starr highlighted it a little bit, and I do want to highlight it because I think

that is factually very important.

And the other matter goes to perjury as well as Betty Currie.

When the President testified under oath in his civil deposition that
424

he could not recall being alone with Monica Lewinsky, was he telling the truth?

Mr. RUFF. First of all, Congressman, that is not an accurate

statement of what he said. He was originally asked, were you ever

alone in the Oval Office with Ms. Lewinsky, and he responded, not

completely but accurately, that he recalled being alone with her

during the government shutdown when she brought letters to him.

Now, it is frequently bruited about that he made some broadranging and closed-in representation that he was never alone with

Monica Lewinsky.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. He was asked later very clearly, as my recollection of the evidence, was he alone, and my reading was that he

said that he wasn’t alone, and any fair reading of it would say

that—you are parsing—which is in your own reports that you gave

to us today, your own analysis, would say that alone doesn’t mean

the same thing to me as it does to the average person.

If the President thought that he was having relations with her

when nobody else was around in a room, that is alone, not simply

being in the White House when somebody else was there.

With regard to Betty Currie, there were a number of times when

he went back to her and asked her, suggested things like to her

the next day after this deposition was given. He asked her, you

know, do you agree, you were always there when she was there,

right? We were never really alone? You could see and hear everything? Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?

The fact is he knew she was going to be a witness in all probability even though she wasn’t on the witness list, and he wanted

to know that. That strikes me as very apparent because he had

raised her name a number of times in that deposition.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. Does Mr.

Ruff wish to answer?

Mr. RUFF. Just quickly.

Betty Currie was not a witness. She was not on the witness list.

The discovery process was closing down in Jones. Betty Currie had

been known to the Jones lawyers for months. They could have put

her on the list if they wanted to, and they didn’t.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for the very evenhanded and appropriate way that you have been presiding over

this particular tricky question-and-answer series.

First on hair-splitting, I think we are in a hair-splitting tie, because what some of my colleagues on the other side have said is

the actual nature of the acts which the President committed is irrelevant. That is whether or not you lied about interfering with a

State court prosecution of your partner’s son for drugs, Judge

Nixon—Judge Nixon was accused of lying about whether or not he

tried to fix a case in State court using the prestige of his Federal

judgeship, whether he was trying to fix a case for his partner’s son.

That is the same as lying about a consensual sexual affair.

Morally and factually most of us would think those are different,

but we are told but technically, if they are both perjury, they are

identical. That is, the notion that conformity to technical legal

standards trumps all other questions comes from the accusers of

the President, and it certainly is in a situation legal and reasonable
425

for the President to say, you have basically said that a consensual

sexual act which you have said in and of itself would not have

caused all of this becomes a constitutional crisis if it conforms to

these legal standards, and he is obviously therefore entitled to say

it doesn’t.

You can’t have a one-sided objection to the invocation of legal

standards because the gravamen of the charge against the President is not that he did something terrible, not as in the Watergate

case that there were substantive violations of people’s rights, but

that he told untruths or he didn’t tell the whole truth. He was supposed to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,

and he only got two out of three, that that makes it technically perjury, and therefore we go off the substance and into the technical

legal situation, and that then requires a technical legal rebuttal.

Even on those terms it seems to me with regard to the grand

jury there is no showing that perjury—that the President committed perjury.

I must say, Mr. Ruff, I do not find the rebuttal on it was alone

persuasive. I think the President simply wasn’t being truthful. I

think he waffled past the point of the lying on that. But given the

circumstances of a civil deposition where the issue of consensual

sex was, in my judgment, completely irrelevant to the underlying

case, that there is a materiality question.

And I note that my colleagues have stressed grand jury perjury.

That is the one that they are talking about. We now, as you note

in your point here, Mr. Schippers, dropped two of the three counts

in his presentation of grand jury perjury. He skipped the one about

May and November, and he skipped the one about what the President thought in August about what he said in January that is so

complicated that I can’t say it right.

The only question is one that Mr. McCollum referred to. It is an

unpleasant subject to talk about, but the fact is that the accusation, am I correct, is that while the President acknowledged before

the grand jury that there had been inappropriate intimate conduct,

and Mr. Starr himself notes that was an admission of sexual contact, Mr. Starr on page 147 of the referral notes that the President

admitted to sexual contact, so the grand jury perjury issue is that

while the President admitted that there had been inappropriate intimate, i.e., sexual, contact between him and Ms. Lewinsky, she

had performed sexual contact on him, and he did not reciprocate.

Is it, in fact, the case that is the substance of the grand jury perjury? That is the factual issue that we are talking about?

Mr. RUFF. That is correct, Congressman.

Mr. FRANK. How would you prove that? Corroboration might be

that Ms. Lewinsky told somebody. Is there any—as a lawyer, how

do you prove when two people are being alone? If he lied about

being alone—I think he didn’t lie about being alone, but if you lied

about being alone, that means that they were alone, and if they

were alone, how do we prove perjury, because it really comes out

who touched what. Now, we are thinking about the President of the

United States who admitted that he had inappropriate sexual contact, but he kind of shortchanged us on the details in a perjurious

way, and that is the question. How would you prove one side or the

other if you had to?
426

Mr. RUFF. Well, I think my colleagues on the earlier panel made

it very clear that, first of all, you would never bring a case in which

you had two people, one of whom was saying X and one of whom

was saying not X. But even if you did, the notion suggested by Congressman McCollum that someone whom you would rely on as witnesses, people that Ms. Lewinsky told the same story that she is

now telling the grand jury, whatever motivation that there might

have been to tell that story, plus noting some of the people that she

talked to she didn’t tell the same story, is I think a nightmare for

any prosecutor. And indeed, Congressman, to take it out of that

context would be a nightmare for this country if we tried to try

that lawsuit in the Senate of the United States.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas.

Mr. GEKAS. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, from the first moment that I reviewed the referral from

the Independent Counsel, I developed reservations about the executive privilege portion of his litany of abuse of power, and since then

I have further examined that, and counseled with my colleagues,

and have reached conclusions that may at some point coincide with

your affirmance as to that. But on other portions of the referral I

have some grave questions.

As Mr. McCollum brought out from you in the opening remarks

that you made in setting this scene, you stated, or implied at least,

that no offense that didn’t amount to subverting the government or

resulting in the inability to lead the Nation, anything short of that,

no matter what the offense is, would not be an impeachable offense; is that a fair description?

Mr. RUFF. That is fair, and I truly believe that, and let me——

Mr. GEKAS. No, we agree on that. I need some more time.

Mr. RUFF. I will circle back at the end, but go ahead.

Mr. GEKAS. The thing that bothers me about that is you also said

in defense of the President he didn’t commit bribery—as stated in

the Constitution, he didn’t accept a bribe or give a bribe, I think

you gave that as a little example—and therefore he didn’t come

within the meaning and the actual literal wording of the Constitution. That means to me that if bribery is committed, whether or not

it subverts the government, whether or not it deprives him of the

ability to lead the Nation, whether or not it is an attack on our system of government, because a bribe can take 20 minutes and then

he can lead the Nation for the rest of the term, that means to me

that the inclusion of bribery does not require—does not require the

subversion of government or an attack on government, but is so

heinous that it is treated by the founders as by itself enough to impeach the President. That is what it means to me.

Mr. RUFF. May I respond?

Mr. GEKAS. Hold on.

Following that logic, if I come to the conclusion, or others do,

that perjury is a high crime or a high misdemeanor, or middle or

low or some kind of misdemeanor, something to fit into that structure, and it is not accompanied by subversion of the government,

or subversion of the system, or rendering him unable to lead the

Nation, that even so I would be justified, if I feel that perjury is

such an attack on the government or such a heinous offense and
427

has the result of destroying the case of an American citizen who

lawfully brought a lawsuit in Arkansas, if I feel that strongly, you

cannot, can you, tell me that I have no basis for doing that simply

because it might not render him unable to lead the Nation or that

it subverts the Constitution?

Mr. RUFF. May I respond now, Congressman?

Mr. GEKAS. Yes, I think so. I’m exhausted.

Mr. RUFF. I have the advantage on you. I wasn’t here this morning.

Two points to make. With all due respect, Congressman, I think

your analysis is wrong.

Mr. GEKAS. I knew you would say that.

Mr. RUFF. I do think your analysis on the first point is right.

Mr. GEKAS. Yes, of course.

Mr. RUFF. What the Founding Fathers determined is that where

a President is guilty of treason or bribery, you don’t need to ask

any other questions. Those two offenses do go so much to the fabric

of our government that they are presumptively subversive of his

ability to govern. But where it is a question of what fits into high

crimes and misdemeanors, you must apply the same test.

Mr. GEKAS. I must interrupt you. I have to say that to me bribery, as in the Constitution, is less destructive of the structure of

government than is perjury committed by the President of the

United States.

Mr. RUFF. With all due respect, Congressman, and I do appreciate your candor and the strength that you hold that view, the

Founding Fathers made a different judgment.

Chairman HYDE. The time has expired.

Mr. Schumer.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you.

I want to thank you, Mr. Ruff. I think your testimony was outstanding. I think the gentleman from Wisconsin said you were the

clean-up hitter for the administration. Well, I think you have hit

it out of the park.

Mr. RUFF. Thank you.

Mr. SCHUMER. I have seen this in three levels. The first level,

even if you agree with all of Mr. Starr’s factual allegations, there

would be—you would say the President did a lot of wrong things.

It doesn’t reach the high bar of high crimes and misdemeanors, and

that we talked about yesterday.

And then this morning we talked about the two other—the nonperjury parts of the OIC’s brief, and I think again you have destroyed those quite well. The obstruction—the abuse of power

charge is just even not brought up in Mr. Schipper’s points. The

obstruction of justice really relies simply on somebody’s surmise,

the OIC’s surmise, and to impeach a President because somebody

felt, with no outside evidence, that Monica Lewinsky was getting

a job because of a desire to influence her testimony as opposed to

desire not to have the world find out about an illicit relationship

strikes me as almost Kafkaesque, and so I think we knocked that

out.

What you really dwelled on and the questions have dwelled on

is the third, the last bar to overcome, and that is perjury. And I

think my colleague from Pennsylvania, and he made the same mis428

take as the colleague of Wisconsin, they are assuming that one perjury is, ‘‘the same as another. Arguendo, just for the sake of argument, not saying that perjury was done, Mr. Nixon was interfering

in a State court to get someone out of a criminal proceeding, which

is the essence of what our system of laws is all about, perjury in

that case would be different than lying about an extramarital affair.

The reason I would say to my friends on the other side you are

not getting very far with the American people is they don’t buy

that. Very few fair-minded individuals would buy that. It is different. It is totally different, and it goes directly to a sense of fairness. Are we trying to be fair and treating someone not as a Democratic or a liberal or conservative, but just being fair because what

we are doing here is an extremely serious exercise, or do we have

other motivations?

But I would ask you, Mr. Ruff, given your, in my judgment at

least, superb testimony, that you have also made the other point

here which is what the President did is not perjurious. Misleading

and perjurious are not the same is the basic thrust. One is a standard of common usage as you and I would talk to each other, or even

as an elected official talks to his or her constituents, and the other

is a legal standard which is much harder to reach.

Could give us a few other types of examples? I thought of one,

and maybe it has holes, but that the Earth has a blue sky except

for all of the hundreds and hundreds and thousands of miles the

sky is blue, but there is one square mile in Antarctica where the

sky is pink, and you ask a witness is the sky blue, and the witness

says no. Even though it is logical that witness knows that the rest

of the sky is blue, and there is that one little part that is pink,

clearly misleading, but it seems to me if you value our system of

laws, if you are not hair-splitting, that that is not perjurious per

se unless you can get inside that person’s head and know that they

never saw the pink square of sky or didn’t believe that pink square

mile of sky existed. I don’t know if that is a good example.

Mr. RUFF. It is as good as any.

As I tried to suggest in my testimony, we didn’t just dream up

perjury protections. They serve a societal purpose, and they reflect

a judgment about what we do and what we don’t do with witnesses

under oath. We tolerate a lot of bobbing and weaving and a lot of

evasion and a lot of misleading before we say, you perjured yourself

and we are going to pursue you criminally.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Mr. Ruff,

for being with us.

I said something yesterday, Mr. Ruff, that I am going to repeat

today. I am getting tired of folks saying the Republicans are unreasonably partisan because they are favoring impeachment. I don’t

think there is any justification of that, nor do I think it is justification to say that the Democrats are unreasonably partisan because

they oppose impeachment. I think reasonable men and women can

differ, and I hope to carry that through the end of this week and

maybe into next week.
429

Mr. Ruff, I want to address a couple of myths, and one myth is

that we have no evidence because there have been no fact witnesses called.

Five volumes sit alongside me that contain sworn testimony before criminal grand jury, FBI interviews, depositions, and other

materials, and I don’t believe the critical testimony has been challenged by the other side.

The second myth is that Judge Starr omitted from his referral

important evidence favorable to the President. I am not saying that

you said this, Mr. Ruff, but others have said it.

Mr. RUFF. I have said it.

Mr. COBLE. Well, you and I may have to disagree agreeably, Mr.

Ruff, but I believe every shred of evidence upon which the White

House relies was provided herein by Judge Starr. On the one hand,

they said, we didn’t get anything, and on the other hand they use

it oftentimes to trash it, but let me put a question to you, Mr. Ruff,

if I may.

Does the President still believe that Ms. Lewinsky’s affidavit denying a sexual relationship is true?

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, the President believes that when she

submitted that affidavit, that the word ‘‘sexual relations,’’ and he

has so stated, involved sexual intercourse. And it is on that basis

of that definition that the representation in the affidavit was true.

That definition in his mind of sexual relations was one that he held

in his mind in January and in August, and he has so testified.

Mr. COBLE. All right. Sir, let me ask you this. I am wondering

why the President did not intervene when his attorney told Judge

Wright that Ms. Lewinsky’s affidavit meant ‘‘absolutely no sex of

any kind in any manner, shape or form.’’ Now, that, Mr. Ruff, it

seems to me, and I will qualify that, but it seems to me that is

right smack dab in the shadow of obstruction of justice. Now, steer

me away from the rocks and shoals if I am heading for the rocks

and shoals.

Mr. RUFF. I would like to steer you away from those particular

rocks and shoals. Let me put aside your legal characterization of

what that might have been if indeed the President understood that

his lawyer actively misrepresented the facts to the court.

The President has testified—and having represented several

hundred witnesses in depositions, I think I have a fair sense of

where this testimony comes from—that when the colloquy started

between Mr. Bennett and the other participants there, the President was not focusing on what his counsel was saying.

I understand that Mr. Starr says that is not the case, in fact the

President either was paying attention or should have been paying

attention and should have cut off that series of representations. I

was in the room, and I will tell you that I have not—I don’t have

a recollection of that particular moment in time. I have not seen

the videotape, but the President has testified, and it seems entirely

reasonable to me in my experience in civil depositions——

Mr. COBLE. Pardon me, but my time is ticking.

Did not Mr. Bennett, the President’s attorney, subsequently

admit to the court that the affidavit was not true?

Mr. RUFF. What he advised the court, quite properly under the

rule of professional conduct in the District of Columbia and Arkan430

sas, was that Ms. Lewinsky had testified that the affidavit was

false.

Mr. COBLE. My red light has illuminated. I will yield back.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Ruff, did you want to use a minute of this time

to finish?

Mr. RUFF. No, I am at your disposal, Congressman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you.

Both sides, we do it, they do it analyze this as a judicial proceeding with very formal rules and legal relations. You critiqued it, I

think, appropriately when you argued that we should not consider

ourselves a grand jury applying those standards in this very important process. That is why this issue of perjury is a legal conclusion.

It is highly technical. We heard an excellent panel this morning describe its elements, talk about the difficulty of prosecuting it and

the kinds of cases that would be prosecuted.

The thing that bothers me most in the context of the testimony

before the grand jury the one area that both Mr. McCollum and

Mr. Frank focused in on is the question of what was touched. In

looking through all of the evidence, it basically boils down to a ‘‘he

said’’ and ‘‘she said’’ kind of a situation. I am not a judge. I look

at this and apply common-sense rules, and I come to the conclusion

in this case, I hate to say it, I think the President lied. I take the

other version of what happened rather than his.

And I guess the point I want to come back to is, I don’t care

whether that is perjury—I mean, I do care whether it is perjury,

but for this purpose it isn’t my job to try to analyze that. I am

aware of the difficulties of prosecuting it. I don’t think anybody

should be making those conclusions about it in this context, but the

question still arises.

Having said all of that, what does it tell us in terms of the constitutional standard we should apply here, and I would like you to

speak about as you have already, and I think it is worth hearing

over and over again, your analysis of what one who comes to that

conclusion should do with regard to the issue of whether or not to

pass an article of impeachment?

Mr. RUFF. This really goes back in part to one of my earlier discussions in questions and answers. None of us condones perjury, if

that is what occurred. I happen to believe it did not occur. Let me

accept for the moment your position that it did.

Mr. BERMAN. I didn’t say it occurred, I said if it occurred. I said

I think he lied under oath in that particular instance.

Mr. RUFF. If you ask the question does any violation of the oath,

does any violation of a witness’ obligation to testify truthfully mean

that the President of the United States should be removed from office, that, it seems to me, ought to be the starting point for this

discussion, and it has already been suggested by Congressman

Frank and Congressman Schumer and others that you can’t simply, when you are dealing with this gravest of constitutional issues,

leap from a conclusion that we would all agree on, which is lying

is not a good thing, to a conclusion that we are going to overturn

our system of government and the mandate of the people, because

if you do that, you are failing to weigh in the balance what I think
431

the Founding Fathers, the framers of the Constitution, had in

mind, which is, as I said, as bad as this conduct may be, whatever

the conduct is, does it mean that the President of the United States

should not and cannot lead the country?

If you ask that question, people might reasonably disagree about

where in the spectrum that inability to lead falls, but if you don’t

ask the question, you don’t ever start getting into the right constitutional debate.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [presiding]. The gentlemen yields back.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Ruff, you testified today that the President did mislead the

Nation. Some of my colleagues, and I think particularly the last

one, said that they felt that the President had actually lied under

oath.

Mr. RUFF. I’m sorry, I missed that last——

Mr. SMITH. Some of my colleagues, and I think particularly my

colleague from California, said that he thought the President lied

under oath. You have testified that the President misled the American people, probably on numerous instances. Don’t you think that

those public statements and don’t you think the President’s actions

were designed to thwart or impede the investigation of the Independent Counsel?

Mr. RUFF. I really don’t, Congressman, and let me tell you why.

Mr. SMITH. That seems incredible that you don’t think that the

President’s motive was to do just that.

Mr. RUFF. The reason that I want to address your question is if

you ask would everything have been simpler for the Independent

Counsel if the President had come out on January 21 and said, yes,

everything they say about me is absolutely true, yes, that would

have indeed eased the path. I guarantee you one thing, it would

not have brought us here.

Mr. SMITH. I am not just talking about that one instance, but the

repeated instances of admitted misleading, evasive answers, perhaps lying under oath.

Let me just say to you, if there is 1 percent of the American people who don’t think that he was trying to—and intentionally trying

to mislead or impede the investigation, I would be surprised, but

that is my opinion, and apparently you disagree with it.

Mr. RUFF. I do.

Mr. SMITH. Let me go on to my next point and that is this. Yesterday, the White House brief that was delivered to us contained

this statement which I assume that you are responsible for: ‘‘The

referral omitted evidence that exonerates the President.’’ And then,

interestingly enough, in many, many instances where you say, ‘‘the

referral omitted evidence that exonerated the President’’, then you

cite the appendix itself as the source for the facts that were omitted. By my count, 17 times you referred to the appendix for the

facts that you said were omitted.

So my question to you is, don’t you consider the appendix to be

part of the Independent Counsel’s referral?

Mr. RUFF. No. Congressman, I am glad you asked that question

because I would have responded to Congressman Coble when he

asked the same question.
432

If there is one thing I think we all understand is that what the

Independent Counsel chose out of this mass of material to put in

the referral ought to have been as honest, as unbiased, as detached

an assessment of the facts as he could manage.

And let me say further that when the Independent Counsel himself came before this committee, in his own testimony he should

have, if he had failed to bring to your attention this exculpatory information in the thin little document—excuse me, Congressman,

you——

Mr. SMITH. You have answered my question to my satisfaction.

Let me just respond to you. Is that not a prime example of splitting

hairs and parsing of words and playing word games to say it

should have been in the main body rather than in the appendix?

Mr. RUFF. On the contrary——

Mr. SMITH. As long as it was there and people had access to it,

I think arguably the facts were evident and available.

Mr. RUFF. Let me ask you rhetorically, if it was just part of the

referral, if it was there for all to see and all to know, why didn’t

the Independent Counsel talk about it when he testified to you?

Why hasn’t one word been said of it in all the debate?

Mr. SMITH. My time is up, Mr. Ruff. Let the record show that

you really didn’t respond to my question about whether you considered the appendix to be part of the referral.

Let me ask—end on one other point. You have said and many

others have argued that the actions of the President don’t warrant

overturning the mandate of the American people at the last election. But the point, the response to that is that the American people didn’t know then what they know now. They didn’t know in the

1996 election. They didn’t know in the 1992 election what they

know now or their votes might well have been different.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I want to join with others today who have commended

you on the quality of your presentation. I think that you have made

significant strides in attempting to put this entire sad matter into

a clearer context. I commend you for what you have said.

I would like to take some time this afternoon to explore with you

the allegation by the Independent Counsel that in asserting executive privilege and in asserting attorney-client privilege, the President, in the words of the Independent Counsel, has abused his office, and the Independent Counsel, therefore, suggests that the assertion by the President of these two privileges would be a ground

for impeachment.

My first question to you is, do you agree that the President, as

the caretaker of the executive office, has a responsibility to tend

and look after the privileges, including executive privilege and attorney-client privilege, that attend his executive function?

Mr. RUFF. I do, and I so advised him, Congressman.

Mr. BOUCHER. Isn’t it also true that when the executive privilege

was asserted in the U.S. district court that Judge Johnson, in passing on that privilege, ruled that presumptively the executive privilege did, in fact, cover many of the communications involving the
433

President’s assistants but that in the particular context in which

they were raised those privileges had to yield to the need for information by the Independent Counsel?

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. BOUCHER. And isn’t it also true that upon that ruling the

President decided not to appeal that decision by the Judge and basically dropped that claim of executive privilege at that time?

Mr. RUFF. As to the nonlawyers, that’s correct.

Mr. BOUCHER. And then when the attorney-client privilege claim

was appealed and reached the U.S. Supreme Court, isn’t it true

that two justices of the Supreme Court said that there was no clear

legal answer to the question the President was raising to the claim

of attorney-client privilege that he was putting forth and that there

was, therefore, a clear basis for the Supreme Court to pass on that

question?

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. BOUCHER. And so would you not conclude that there was a

plausible basis for the assertion by the President of the claims of

both executive privilege and attorney-client privilege, the same

claims that now, in the view of the Independent Counsel, are being

suggested as possible bases for impeaching and removing the President from office?

Mr. RUFF. Without taking the matter too personally, Congressman, I would look not only to the opinion of the two Supreme

Court judges, but I like to believe that my own assessment and my

own advice to the President set a level of plausibility for the claim

of privilege that would defeat any suggestion of abuse of power.

Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Ruff, I also would like to explore with you

question of statements made under oath. During the process of

these hearings, many of our colleagues on the other side of the

aisle have tried to equate the standards for impeaching a president

with those applicable to the impeachment of Federal judges. I

would like to ask you if you believe that that is a fair comparison

and ask you also what differences you perceive in the standards

that should be applicable to the impeachment of a president on the

one hand and the impeachment of Federal judges on the other?

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, I think it is fair to say that there is

agreement that the pure constitutional test is the same. The difference ought to be in the assessment of the House as to what the

impact on our system of government is if you speak about a judge

with a lifetime appointment engaging, as Judge Nixon did, in the

commission of perjury, and the impact on our system of government if you think about removing the President, who has to stand

for reelection at least once and as to whose status the public can

speak in many different ways.

The President is the single head of the executive branch of government. To remove him from office, it seems to me, cannot be

compared with the seriousness, however important it is, of removing a single judge of 900 or so with a lifetime appointment.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Ruff.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
434

Mr. Ruff, thank you for being here. I know this isn’t an easy duty

for you. It certainly has not been a simple duty for us either.

Mr. RUFF. I understand.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Yesterday, Mr. Craig appeared before us and was

asked about the President’s candor before the Federal grand jury.

He said, while the President was evasive, incomplete, misleading,

even maddening, that he did not believe the President had lied

under oath.

With all due respect to Mr. Craig, and I have great respect for

his legal ability, I think he is a fine lawyer, that might sell to a

Georgetown law grad but to the average citizen across this country,

it is a pretty tough sell.

Mr. RUFF. Can I just comment on one thing, Congressman? I

won’t be long.

I think Mr. Craig, when he described the President’s testimony

as evasive, misleading, maddening was not talking about the grand

jury. He was talking about the civil deposition.

Mr. GALLEGLY. In other words, it was testimony under oath,

though.

Mr. RUFF. That is true.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Very well.

In the panel following Mr. Craig’s panel, Mr. Wayne Owens,

former Member of this House, in an unsolicited comment stated

that the President clearly did lie under oath. Who do you most associate your position with, either Mr. Craig or Mr. Owens?

Mr. RUFF. Well, I suppose I could say that Congressman—former

Congressman Owens’ statement to you reflects our efforts to put together a panel with no preconceptions about the issues before you.

But without being flippant about it, and it is too important to be

flippant about, I associate myself not surprisingly with my colleague, Mr. Craig, not just because he is my colleague but because,

indeed, as I have indicated earlier, as misleading and evasive as

the President’s testimony in his deposition was, in my view, it represented, albeit perhaps an abortive effort, to stay within some

very narrow, strange boundaries and yet not to help—to be evasive.

There is no question about that.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Ruff.

Mr. Ruff, you stated earlier that the President did not help Ms.

Lewinsky get a job. I think you further stated that Vernon Jordan

did help Monica Lewinsky to get a job and that he helps many people in Washington get a job; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. I did not say that the President did not help. I said

he provided very little assistance.

Mr. GALLEGLY. But you have said that Vernon Jordan did help

Ms. Lewinsky get a job and had helped others get a job.

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Do you know if it is common practice for Mr. Jordan to call the President’s secretary and report, ‘‘mission accomplished, ‘‘or report, ‘‘business has been taken care of’’ every time he

helps someone get a job?

Mr. RUFF. I don’t know on how many occasions he has helped

someone get a job who was a friend and acquaintance of Betty Currie’s. But there is nothing evil in any connotation about that telephone call.
435

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Ruff.

Ms. Lewinsky testified that she spoke to the President three

times about her testimony in the Jones case. All three conversations were within a one-month period prior to the President’s deposition. Vernon Jordan also told the President Ms. Lewinsky had

been subpoenaed. President Clinton was asked at his deposition if

anyone told him that Ms. Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena. He answered, ‘‘I don’t think so.’’

Mr. Sullivan, on a previous panel, stated that this is not perjury

only if the President genuinely forgot these conversations. Do you

think it is really reasonable for us to believe that the President

completely forgot about those three conversations with Ms.

Lewinsky about her testimony?

Mr. RUFF. I have to quarrel with your premise, Congressman.

Because if you read the President’s testimony I think you will see

that he acknowledges knowing that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. He questions whether it was Mr. Lindsey who first told

him. The very fact that he frames it in terms of wondering who the

first person who told him was suggests, it seems to me, that he was

acknowledging——

Mr. GALLEGLY. He just didn’t remember whether Mr. Jordan——

Mr. RUFF. I don’t think you will find a question put to him, I will

look at the record with you, if you would like, asking whether Mr.

Jordan had advised him that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.

Mr. RUFF. Mr. Chairman, can I take you up on your earlier offer?

Chairman HYDE. You surely may. A 10-minute recess. The committee stands in recess for 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Chairman HYDE. The committee will come to order. Having finished with Mr. Nadler—I thought I could get away with that.

Mr. NADLER. I don’t think so.

Mr. RUFF. I will chat with him later.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Nice try, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I want to join my colleagues in thanking you for your

presentation, and I hope this lays to rest any further declarations

that the President and his supporters have avoided addressing the

factual allegations in the Starr report.

I am, however, disturbed by the suggestion that the President’s

accusers have no obligation to prove their case with direct evidence

or that the President must prove his innocence. I think you have

done an outstanding job of showing that the Starr referral is, especially in view of the facts that he omitted and the including contradictory statements by some witnesses and omitting exculpatory

statements by those witnesses, I think you have done a good job

of demonstrating the referral is incomplete and misleading.

Now, some of the members of this committee and various newspaper editorials and other people have denounced the President’s

and the President’s defenders’ use of legalisms and hair-splitting

when you and others have pointed out that what the President said

did not meet the legal definition of perjury because his answers
436

were either—his statements were either not material because they

were literally true even if perhaps somewhat misleading.

I would point out that nearly every member of this committee is

a lawyer, so their disdain for the law is a bit disconcerting. But,

more importantly, my question to you is, why are these legalisms

important? Why not just forget about these legalisms and the hairsplitting and just admit to perjury or to lying under oath if that

is necessary to make some editorial writers less hostile or to get

a few more votes against impeachment? Why not just say, even if

it is not really perjury or lying under oath, why is enforcing a precise legal definition of perjury important for all of our liberties?

Mr. RUFF. Thank you for the question, Congressman Nadler. As

I indicated in my opening statement, we didn’t just dream up the

elements of perjury. They didn’t spring full grown from the forehead of some legislator, judge or lawyer. They come to us from a

jurisprudence that is very carefully designed to ensure that when

there is a charge that a human being committed perjury, that is,

knowingly lied, it can be distinguished from testimony that may be

actually truthful, evasive, misleading but nonetheless the product

of human frailty. We don’t put people in jail for that, and we certainly don’t impeach them.

So I think the legalisms that we are legitimately accused of

using, we use them, no question about it, because that is what we

believe best reflects the seriousness and the gravity of the offense

that the Independent Counsel has charged the President with committing. No one is defending the morality of the underlying conduct. The President himself has said he was evasive and misleading, didn’t want to help the Jones lawyers. But to get from there

to a charge of perjury, even though I believe at the end of the day

perjury itself in this setting would not warrant impeachment, requires a leap through hundreds of years of law and protection that

has grown up around that particular charge.

Mr. NADLER. So, in other words, when we hear people saying,

forget about these legalisms, forget about this hair-splitting, implying that even if the President didn’t commit perjury under oath or

meet the legal definition of lying under oath, forget about that, just

say you did and then it will make some people happy, happier

about voting against impeachment for the President, to do that

would be—that would be a betrayal of his oath, would it not?

Mr. RUFF. Indeed, indeed.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you.

Let me ask you—let me also point out that it is interesting for

members of this committee to advocate that since it is this committee that recommends to the House the legal definitions of things

like perjury and other elements of the criminal code; and if they

are too strict, it should be this committee that should change them.

I would also ask that some people have said that the President

is incapable of fulfilling his duties.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I want to thank you for your presentation here today.

The President chose well when he chose you as his White House

counsel.
437

Let me say also that I agree with some of the arguments that

you have made both in your presentation here today and in the

written submission to the committee. I agree with your conclusion

that this committee should have clear and convincing evidence before we proceed with an article or articles of impeachment. And I

agree with you that this committee should not rely on the referral’s

account of the evidence. I believe that we have an independent

duty to look at the evidence.

I would quarrel with your contention that we have decided to

rely on the referral. I don’t think that is accurate. I think we all

understand that we have to go behind the referral to look at the

independent evidence that is before us. And your presentation has

helped point us to the portions of that record before us that you

believe are relevant to your client’s defense, and that has been

helpful to us.

But let me say that I am still frustrated by what I consider to

be legal arguments that don’t really meet the test of common sense

and human experience. And we have heard about legalisms and I

understand, I am a lawyer, I understand making legal arguments

and legalisms. But there is a point beyond which things just don’t

make sense. And the contention that has been made that when the

President testified in his deposition that he had no specific recollection of ever being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, that that was truthful,

I just don’t think meets the test of common sense and experience.

I understand that is your contention. But I have to respectfully

submit, using that as an example, that it just does not stand up

to analysis. I believe that when the President gave those answers

he was lying, and I come to that conclusion reluctantly, but I think

that viewing the evidence in context, one can only reach that conclusion.

And I would say that the talk about legalisms and hair-splitting,

it isn’t just coming from this side of the aisle. I quote Mr. Daschle,

the Senate Democratic leader, who said he agreed with the people,

this is in September, who have grown impatient with hair-splitting

over legal technicalities. That is the Democratic leader in the Senate.

Mr. Gephardt himself said that he believed that this matter was

going to rise or fall not on the fine distinctions of a legal argument

but on straight talk and the truth. I am concerned that we are still

not getting straight talk and the truth.

Now, let me also, as a legal matter, refer you to the DeZarn case

which was decided just a few weeks ago by the 6th Circuit. This

is a very interesting case dealing with perjury, and it has some

comments which I think are directly pertinent to what we are considering here and which I candidly believe directly undermine some

of your contentions. In that case, the court said——

Mr. RUFF. Can you give me the name again? I am sorry.

Mr. CANADY. It is the DeZarn case, the United States versus

DeZarn, decided by the 6th Circuit, opinion filed October 14, 1998.

Mr. RUFF. Thank you.

Mr. CANADY. There the court said, a perjury inquiry which focuses only on the precision of the question, which you seem to be

doing quite a bit, and ignores what the defendant knew about the

subject matter of the question at the time it was asked misses the
438

very point of perjury. That is, the defendant’s intent to testify falsely and thereby mislead his interrogators. Such a limited inquiry

would not only undermine the perjury laws, it would undermine

the rule of law as a whole, as truth seeking is the critical component which allows us to determine if the laws are being followed.

And it is only through the requirement that a witness testify truthfully that determination may be made as to whether the laws are

being followed. Indeed, that is the entire purpose of the sworn oath,

to impress upon the testifier the need under penalty of punishment

to testify truthfully.

I have to candidly submit that when the President was asked,

‘‘so I understand your testimony, is that it was possible then that

you were alone with her, but you have no specific recollection of

that ever happening,’’ and he answered, ‘‘yes, that’s correct, it is

possible that she, while working there, brought something to me,

and at the time she brought it to me, she was the only person

there, that is possible,’’ the President was lying.

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, may I have just a moment to respond?

Chairman HYDE. Surely.

Mr. RUFF. Obviously, I am not familiar with the case, and I will

make myself familiar with it, and I don’t know what setting it

arose in. I don’t think there is any difference of opinion, though,

on the critical point that you seem to have been making. It is not

that anybody gets to choose any little loophole in a question and

slide through it and avoid prosecution. You have to look at the

question, make a reasonable assessment of it, ask in a criminal

case whether a jury would find it sufficiently precise or not, and

then ask whether, in fact, the response to the question was such

as would permit a perjury charge.

I don’t know what the questions were in DeZarn. I would be glad

to address those with you independently. But I don’t think there

is an underlying concern.

My position is that any reasonable reading of what happened in

the Jones deposition would suggest that it, not to use a legal term

of art, was a mess.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, were you given a list of the allegations that we’re actually pursuing? You are aware of the fact that Mr. Starr started off

with 11 allegations with subparts. Two days ago, ABC News said

that the Republicans were thinking of adding some new ones. Yesterday, Mr. Hutchinson added another statement of the grand jury

that he thought might be added to the list. Mr. Graham this morning added another allegation. The scope of the inquiry has gone,

has expanded and contracted to include the Willey matter and campaign finance committee matters and then not finance committee.

Have you been given a definitive list with specificity of the allegations that we are actually pursuing?

Mr. RUFF. No, I haven’t, Congressman. The last list I saw was

Mr. Schippers list of 15 points. It is an unusual experience for me

to be making a closing argument without quite knowing what I am

closing about, but——
439

Mr. SCOTT. Well, you are doing well. So I guess we have to guess

what the allegations are and, skipping through, I think you ignored

some of the allegations. 11, Count 11, ‘‘there is substantial and

credible information that President Clinton’s actions since January

17, 1998, regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky have

been inconsistent with the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.’’ And he concludes, number 17, by saying,

‘‘this represents substantial and credible information and may constitute grounds for impeachment.’’

I did not hear you comment on part B of that, which cites that

‘‘Mrs. Clinton forcefully denied the allegations on January 17th,

1998, one day after the President’s public denial’’, and cites her appearance on the Today show. Did you ignore that because you can’t

believe that we would actually pursue that particular allegation?

Mr. RUFF. Well, with limited time, Congressman, I wanted to

touch on those points that I thought had the most weight. And

whatever one might think about the allegation that the President

himself misled the country, the notion that the First Lady misled

the country and that that would lead to bringing a President down,

putting him out of office did strike me as not worth devoting the

small amount of time I had this afternoon.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you have a comment on the presumption of guilt

that has been pronounced that if you don’t—whether the evidence

is there or not, if you don’t prove your innocence, that in fact you

will be presumed guilty? If nobody produces a witness, if it is zero

to zero at the end, then you will be presumed guilty?

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, I truly do operate on the assumption in

this body, made up as it is almost of all lawyers, that the basic

principles are going to be enforced, which is, the burden is on those

who favor impeachment to show by clear and convincing evidence

that there are grounds for that. And I——

Mr. SCOTT. Can you get to a clear and convincing standard with

uncross-examined, contradictory statements?

Mr. RUFF. I can’t, as my opening statement reflects, conceive

that, without some basis for assessing the credibility of particular

testimony, you could achieve that result.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. So without knowing what the allegations are,

let us try to get to one of the allegations.

How do you conclude that Betty Currie—that the allegations involving Betty Currie, why she wasn’t going to be a witness?

Mr. RUFF. Well, I think you need to understand that as you came

to the President’s deposition in the Jones case on January 17th you

were essentially at the end of the pretrial process or almost at the

end of pretrial process in that case. Ms. Currie, whose name was

certainly not a secret to the Jones lawyers, given the amount of information they clearly had about these matters, had never put her

on the list. She was very close to the President. That was no secret.

They never subpoenaed her.

Let me just make—give you a small anecdote. The President

sometimes has a way about him. And I was the victim of one of

those. If you look at the grand jury transcript, you will find a moment in which, I forget which question he was asked, and he sort

of looks at me across the room and says, I wish Mr. Ruff could answer that question. I was taken aback. We smiled at each other
440

and went on about the President’s testimony. I trust that that

didn’t make me a participant in the Independent Counsel’s investigation any more than his reference to Betty Currie didn’t make

her a part of the Jones case.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, if there were a trial involving the President for perjury,

would anything that you have said here today be a fact in such a

trial?

Mr. RUFF. I believe that many of the facts to which I referred

and which I included in my presentation would be essential elements.

Mr. INGLIS. Would anything that you have said be a fact?

Mr. RUFF. No more than, with all due respect, Congressman,

anything said by any member of this committee.

Mr. INGLIS. Right. The point is that you have not met the standard that Mr. Craig pointed out.

And, by the way, earlier I was listening intently in the committee

room to what you were saying. But in the course—as Mr. Craig

said earlier, in the course of our presentation today and tomorrow,

we will address the factual and evidentiary issues directly. The

score is now zero to five. Five groups have come before us. No one

yet has addressed evidentiary matters.

Mr. Ruff——

Mr. RUFF. I absolutely disagree with that.

Mr. INGLIS. I understand you do, but you have just agreed that

there are no facts that you have testified to.

Mr. RUFF. No, that is not at all what I said.

Mr. INGLIS. Let me ask you this, are there any witnesses that

you would like to have called but have failed to call?

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, I think that question, with all due respect, betrays to me an inappropriate view of the process. This——

Mr. INGLIS. I understand—excuse me, with limited time, I understand what you are going to say. You are going to say that the burden of proof is not on you, and I think you are correct in that.

The point I am interested in making here is the normal White

House spin operation is coming unglued under the light of accountability here, because here Mr. Craig raised a very high bar, and

you are not meeting it. You are failing to meet what the White

House spin put out at the beginning of this proceeding. And now

that you have failed, you want to sort of split hairs again about

what it is that you are doing here.

Let me ask you this—I understand your response. Let me ask

you something very different. When the President said on January

26, 1998, the famous finger-wagging experience, ‘‘I did not have

sexual relations with that woman, Ms. Lewinsky,’’ was he lying?

Mr. RUFF. I responded to that question earlier, I forget who put

it to me, Congressman, and I will respond again. The President has

said flat out, no question about it, he intended to mislead the

American people, and he did mislead them because he spoke in

that—on that occasion on the assumption in his own mind that

sexual relations meant sexual intercourse. Just a moment, Congressman. And he knew that most of the people listening to him
441

out there didn’t understand the definition he was using and thus

would be misled into believing that——

Mr. INGLIS. You see, I think that if you were consistent with your

argument on page 72 of the 184–page submittal, I think your answer here today to the question I just put to you should be, no, he

did not lie.

Mr. RUFF. That is what I said. I said he misled intentionally.

Mr. INGLIS. So what is the difference been misleading and lying?

Mr. RUFF. Because he believed, rightly so in his own mind, that

he was telling the truth, that he used the word sexual relations to

mean sexual intercourse and that he had not had sexual intercourse with Monica Lewinsky.

Mr. INGLIS. This is the heart of it then. That is not what he was

saying. What he said subsequently is he lied when he said that

with a finger wagging. But, you see, the finger wagging is the same

as what he said earlier, that he didn’t have sexual relations.

Mr. RUFF. I fear that your recollection of the facts and the record

is incorrect.

Mr. INGLIS. Well, please straighten me. What is wrong here?

Mr. RUFF. You said the President admitted he lied. He didn’t.

Mr. INGLIS. Well, leave aside the lying. Your word misleading—

you like the word misleading better than lying. I understand that.

For some reason, you like that better. But if it is not the truth, I

don’t think—under consistent theory with your submittal here, he

was telling the truth when he said that he didn’t have sexual relations with that woman, Monica Lewinsky. But he subsequently admitted to lying when he said that. I lied to you, the American people, when I said I did not have sexual relations with that woman.

Mr. RUFF. What he said was that he misled the American people,

and that is what he did. He did it wrongfully. He has apologized

for it.

And whatever your—Congressman, and I—look, I absolutely respect your right, however misguided I believe it to be, to have your

own view of the record, but the fact is the President said that he

misled the American people and he did it with malice of forethought because he wanted to hide this improper relationship.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I followed Mr. Inglis in asking questions this morning,

and this is the question that I asked immediately after he asked

his question this morning, so I am going to open it up and ask you

the exact same question that I asked following him this morning.

Is there anything in the referral or in any of the information that

was submitted by the Independent Counsel to this committee that

could be admitted in that form in a criminal proceeding?

Mr. RUFF. I suppose I might find a document or two in there, but

the essential question is, could you simply dump that record in the

laps of the Senate and say, go ahead and try the case? No.

Mr. WATT. So I can ball that one back up now.

Mr. RUFF. Well, I would put it in your pocket.

Mr. WATT. Wait on the next round of questions then.

I am struck by how my colleagues on the Republican side keep

saying that this is not about sex, yet we have heard 2 hours worth

of testimony from Mr. Starr and all of your testimony and none of
442

the basic underlying charges that we started out with in this investigation were even mentioned or hardly mentioned, and so I would

like to go through a series of questions which you, I think, can answer very quickly just yes or no.

Mr. RUFF. I will do my best.

Mr. WATT. Is it true that the Independent Counsel back in 1994

was appointed to investigate matters related to Whitewater?

Mr. RUFF. That is correct.

Mr. WATT. And have we ever gotten a referral from the Independent Counsel on the Whitewater matter?

Mr. RUFF. No, sir.

Mr. WATT. And during his appearance before the committee on

November 19, was that the first time that we were told that we

would not be getting a referral on any Whitewater matter?

Mr. RUFF. The first I learned of any of those matters and their

status was on that date.

Mr. WATT. And Mr. Starr, after that, investigated the alleged

misuse of FBI files by the White House personnel; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. WATT. And we found out last month that Mr. Starr—that

was also a dry hole?

Mr. RUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATT. And, next, Mr. Starr investigated firings of personnel

from the White House travel office; is that right?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. WATT. And we found out last month that that was a dry

hole?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. WATT. Do you recall the talk over the summer that the key

to this whole case was the so-called talking points that were given

by Ms. Lewinsky to Ms. Tripp?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. WATT. Those are no longer an issue. We haven’t heard a

thing about those, have we?

Mr. RUFF. I think we now learned where they came from, yes.

Mr. WATT. Would you agree that only part of Mr. Starr’s fiveyear investigation that hasn’t been a bust is his investigation of the

President’s sex life?

Mr. RUFF. Well, I am not sure I would buy into your description.

It is the only one that has reached this House.

Mr. WATT. It is the only one that is still going on that we are

still talking about. And we got it over here, and then we start talking about investigating campaign finance matters. Do you remember that a week or so ago, a couple of weeks ago?

Mr. RUFF. I do.

Mr. WATT. And then we dropped that one, didn’t we?

Mr. RUFF. We did.

Mr. WATT. And then the Republicans decided to expand the investigation into Kathleen Willey, you remember that?

Mr. RUFF. I do.

Mr. WATT. We dropped that one, too; right?

Mr. RUFF. I believe so.
443

Mr. WATT. And then the Republicans subpoenaed documents

from Mr. Starr relating to John Huang, you remember that happening?

Mr. RUFF. I read about it.

Mr. WATT. And we withdrew that subpoena after a little while,

in a couple of days; right?

Mr. RUFF. So I understand.

Mr. WATT. And then there was a point at which the Secret Service was going to get information about the President’s dealings

with other Arkansas women. You remember some discussion about

that?

Mr. RUFF. Uh-huh.

Mr. WATT. They dropped that one, too.

Mr. RUFF. As far as I know.

Mr. WATT. So we are back to allegations about the President’s

sex life. That is basically what this is about, notwithstanding all

the protestations to the contrary?

Mr. RUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Ruff. I appreciate that.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Watt.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

By the way, just parenthetically, a lot of things you just dropped

ain’t dropped. Just thought I would mention that.

Mr. WATT. It would be nice to know when we are going to get

them.

Chairman HYDE. You will know in good time.

Mr. WATT. I am sure it will be next year in the next Congress.

Chairman HYDE. You got that right.

Mr. WATT. After the election.

Chairman HYDE. It is all after the election.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I would like to follow up on a line of questions that the

gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum, pursued with you earlier.

You said to us in your statement that, with regard to the grand

jury testimony of the President, that two of the instances cited by

the Independent Counsel you explained with what I would call and

I think we have been calling today legalisms or legal hair-splitting,

but on the third one, your answer was interesting to me. That was

this issue of the nature of the relationship between the President

and Ms. Lewinsky.

In that case you said to us, take the evidence in the light most

favorable to Ms. Lewinsky, take the evidence as Ms. Lewinsky said

it. Would that rise to being an impeachable offense?

I took that to mean an acknowledgment that if we do take the

evidence as provided by Ms. Lewinsky, which I think is very strong

and which is corroborated by her previous statements to other people, long before anybody knew anything about the significance of

this, that she said to friends, the computer printout on her computer of an apparently half-written letter that makes reference to

her description of the relationship, all of that corroborating her testimony, I do take it as correct.
444

And I would like you to explain to me why, if the committee does

take that testimony as being the accurate testimony, and I believe

that the vast majority of the American people on the issue of

whether or not the President had any contact with her while this

was going on would agree with her statement as well, as detailed

as it is, why that does not constitute perjury.

Mr. RUFF. If, in fact, you were to believe Ms. Lewinsky’s description of those particular events and conclude—in this setting by

clear and convincing evidence or, since we are talking about perjury in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt—that she was

right and the President was wrong, then you could legitimately

conclude that there was a basis for believing that a jury would find

the President guilty of perjury.

But I suggest two things: First, and I think you heard exactly

this from the panel this morning and I base this partly as well on

my own prosecutorial experience, I can’t conceive of a case going

forward to a petit jury on that basis. But even putting that aside,

what you have, in essence, is Ms. Lewinsky’s saying X and the

President saying not X. And the corroboration that you look to and

that, with all respect, that Congressman McCollum looked to, I

think is not a legitimate basis of support——

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me respectfully disagree, and let me go to

another point, because you have and I have very limited time here.

But you have also made the contention that this is simply about

lying to cover up a personal embarrassment. But isn’t it true, Mr.

Ruff, that moments after the President completed that testimony

before the grand jury he went before the American people and admitted an embarrassment, ‘‘which he acknowledged his side of

what took place there? Isn’t that really the reason why he committed what I think is that perjurious statement? Not to avoid embarrassment, because he had already embarrassed and disgraced himself, but for the purpose of covering up a previous lie in the testimony before the civil—the deposition in the civil case because of

the fact that if he acknowledged what Ms. Lewinsky says took

place, he would be acknowledging that what he said earlier were

falsehoods and that he knew they were falsehoods in that case.

So his intent here was not to cover up an embarrassment but to

avoid prosecution for a crime, that crime being perjury and obstruction of justice in the earlier case. And he compounded it 7 months

later by continuing his perjurious activity by lying before the grand

jury.

And I think that you have accurately stated that if we believe

what Ms. Lewinsky stated, not only in her deposition but what she

stated to other people over a long period of time, before it was ever

even known that this was an issue, if we believe that, then the

President of the United States has indeed committed perjury before

the grand jury.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has

expired.

Mr. RUFF. May I have one moment?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Of course you can.

Mr. RUFF. Thank you.

Two points. One, the kind of ‘‘corroboration’’, that you refer to,

statements to other people, for the reasons already addressed and
445

addressed by Mr. Davis at length this morning, simply would not

fit into any prosecutor’s calculations in deciding whether or not

perjury had occurred.

Second, and this was the point I made in my opening statement,

I believe, I am convinced and I think the weight of scholarly evidence would lead to the conclusion that, even if you reach that conclusion, that is your conclusion, not mine, about whether the President lied or not in that deposition, in that grand jury testimony,

it still doesn’t warrant removing him from office.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California, Ms.

Lofgren.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Ruff, thank you for being here today and for

conducting yourself with such intelligence and clarity and dignity.

I think that you have helped not just all of us but the American

people to understand what some of these issues are.

I was interested in your earlier exchange with Mr. Gekas about

the phrase ‘‘Treason, Bribery and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors?’’ Thinking back to all of the reading that I have done

in the notes of the Constitution and the Federalist papers and the

like, it seems to me clear that what the Founding Fathers had in

mind with treason and bribery was to protect the integrity of the

chief executive’s loyalty towards the United States. And all the discussion I can recall in those original documents had to do with a

fear that a chief executive could be the recipient of bribes and,

therefore, have his loyalty diverted from the new country, the new

America. They were also very concerned about titles and other

emoluments and that their newly elected executive might become

nobility, which they were trying to escape.

The other high crimes and misdemeanors had to do with the

other acts that would subvert the Constitution that were not in the

first two categories, and as we discussed throughout these proceedings, there are really two ways to look at that. One is in terms of

conduct that is so egregious that it prevents the discharge of the

constitutional duties of the President, and it occurs to me that that

is not just a matter of an opinion. I’m interested in your comment

on this.

In a sense, that is the one area that is really subject to the judgment of the American people, whether or not the President’s duties

can be discharged, thinking ahead, if we were to have a trial in the

Senate on these charges for the next six months to a year, wouldn’t

we have to go and prove up how many Mideast peace settlements

have been established, how many Northern Ireland peace settlements, how is the economy as part of that whole system? Wouldn’t

that be part of the evidence that would need to be put on?

Mr. RUFF. Thank God I’ve never had the opportunity to try an

impeachment. There is no—first let me say that your analysis of

the issue that Congressman Gekas and I were discussing was

framed much more articulately than I did and I think is exactly

correct.

The issue of the President’s capacity to govern, whether it be

Mideast, economy, Ireland, what have you, is what has to underlie

every Senator’s vote and indeed the vote of every member in this

committee and the House. I’m not sure whether we would introduce evidence or whether it would simply be taken as a matter of
446

public knowledge as to what the President is doing and how he is

doing it, and whether overturning the verdict of the election is

going to damage our country.

Ms. LOFGREN. That’s really the question we need to face, but I

think there are other issues that obviously we are dealing with,

which is what Professor Van Alstyne, Mr. Starr’s former law professor, termed minor crimes, petty crimes.

As I was listening to both Mr. Inglis and Mr. Gallegly ask how

could something be misleading and not a lie, I was thinking about

cross-examination and sort of the issue of ‘‘did you spend $10

today’’ and you answered ‘‘ham sandwiches cost four bucks.’’ It’s

the obligation of the questioner then to go back to the expenditure

question. Do you feel that was done in this case vis-a-vis the President’s testimony? Is that part of the problem why this misleading

confusion has occurred?

Mr. RUFF. That’s certainly a large part of it, Congresswoman

Lofgren. I think any amongst the many trial lawyers here who go

back and look at that deposition will realize that for whatever reason, there were—there was never a follow-up, and the example you

give is a good one. And I might just note that at the very beginning

of the deposition, Mr. Bennett, the President’s lawyer, urged Ms.

Jones’ lawyers to ask the most special detailed questions and they

declined to do so. And I think maybe that set a process in motion

that we’re living with today.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. I reserve my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, counselor. I just want to make a quick comment

and ask you two or three questions. We’re still having a problem

in my district with some of your wording, and I say ‘‘you’’ collectively meaning the White House, in terms of squaring with the

oath to tell the whole truth. Your concept that he can give incomplete testimony that seems opposite when you talk about giving incomplete testimony and telling the entire truth; also, the other part

of the oath about nothing but the truth with evasion. They just

seem opposite, how you can evade a question and say nothing but

the truth and how you can give incomplete answers and say the

whole truth. Because we understand that both misleading answers

and evasive answers are all—all tend to thwart the judicial system

in its efforts to get at the truth.

Let me ask you a couple of questions, if I could. I want you to—

you put yourself in the President’s mind today, and I want you to

put yourself—this is a hypothetical—put yourself in the President’s

mind, his thinking process, and, using the Jones definition of sexual relations, could he agree that Monica Lewinsky had a sexual

relationship with the President?

Mr. RUFF. If I understand your question, it is using the Jones

deposition definition, the conduct that he engaged in with Ms.

Lewinsky——

Mr. BRYANT. No, did she have a sexual relationship with him,

the conduct she engaged in?
447

Mr. RUFF. I guess I would have to have the definition in front

of me in the sense that she was the moving actor in whatever——

Mr. BRYANT. You haven’t thought about this?

Mr. RUFF. No, I really have not.

Mr. BRYANT. The reason I asked that is she would have had a

sexual relationship.

Mr. RUFF. Please don’t hold me or my client to this, but I think

that is probably correct.

Mr. BRYANT. Under his definition, he would not have had a sexual relationship with her?

Mr. RUFF. That is correct.

Mr. BRYANT. He has brought forth the idea that one party can

have a sexual relationship with another party, but that other party

not have a sexual relationship with the first party. That’s my understanding.

Mr. RUFF. No, it isn’t. It’s not as though you and I were having

this conversation in a vacuum. What he had in front of him is, I

have to tell you, one of the strangest definitions I have ever seen,

and in fact it was a one-sided definition and not a two-sided.

Mr. BRYANT. You’ve answered my question. She did and he

didn’t, so. Let me ask you also, you mentioned that the President—

and you’ve made something of an apology today. The President has

had two opportunities to give this committee, the House, testimony

in these proceedings, the grand jury testimony to the Independent

Counsel and his answers to the 81 questions. And you’ve indicated

that, in your wording, his answers were evasive and misleading

and even maddening. You left out incomplete, which Mr. Craig said

yesterday.

Mr. RUFF. He’ll remind me of that.

Mr. BRYANT. But now, with all due respect, that apology seems

somewhat hollow. In fact, you helped the President over the

Thanksgiving holidays construct the answers to those 81 questions,

did you not?

Mr. RUFF. I sure did, yes, indeed.

Mr. BRYANT. And surely in preparation for his deposition, Mr.

Kendall and probably others and you helped him prepare on how

to answer those questions?

Mr. RUFF. No, only Mr. Bennett. I take no responsibility for it.

Mr. BRYANT. But your apology that boy, he’s just a terrible client

to work with, he’s maddening, you folks are the ones helping him

do that, and for you to come in today, it rings sort of hollow to

apologize for that. You’re responsible for this, too.

Mr. RUFF. I will take whatever responsibility falls on me, but let

me make this point because I’m glad you raised the 81 questions.

I know there’s been a lot of discussion here and in the committee

and the press about how somehow those 81 questions were stiffarming the committee. I have to tell you I disagree with that, not

only because of the introduction to them in which the President reflects his continuing contrition but because—very honestly those

questions were framed, for example, ‘‘At 1:02 a.m. on February 18,

did you have. . . The fact is that neither you nor I expect the

President to do anything other than to say ‘‘I don’t remember specifically, but I will tell you that in fact my records reflect I did have

a conversation on that day.’’
448

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee.

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say to Mr. Ruff that your testimony has been both compelling, convincing, and understandable. And I just would like to

take judicial note of the fact that you had already indicated to this

committee if you thought that you were being asked to do something other than what an officer of the court should do, you would

not be here or be still in the White House, and that’s an understanding that you have made on the record.

But I do want to start from your premise, ‘‘Did the President do

something so wrong deserving of impeachment?’’ Frankly, I have in

my mind here a letter that I wrote to the President extending to

him my concerns about issues in my district, particularly the energy industry with the enormous number of mergers and loss of

jobs, and frankly have called upon his good services for us to begin

to look at how to solve this portending crisis. I’d much rather be

dealing with the needs of my constituents, but I’m obligated to be

here.

And frankly we have to do the very best job that we possibly can.

And so I want to just put in the record, because there seems to be

again a lack of clarity about perjury, the words of Jim Cole, a public integrity lawyer here, and I think he says it in a way a layman

can understand: ‘‘Perjury, it seems, comes down to what the person

said, what they understood themselves to be saying, and what they

understood the question to be.’’

And we’ve gone over and over this. I think we can’t be any clearer. So let me say this. Let me change the score. Let me come into

the game and change it. Five for the defense and zero for those

who don’t understand what we’ve been doing here these past two

days.

But I would like to go straight to the question of this number 11

in the referral by the OIC, that says there is substantial and credible information that President Clinton’s actions since January 17,

1998, regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky has been

inconsistent with the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully

execute the laws. Included in that, subsets B and C, and he says

the First Lady—can I say it again—‘‘The First Lady, the Cabinet,

the President’s staff and the President’s associates relied on and

publicly emphasized the President’s denial.’’ I am speechless. The

First Lady? Constituting abuse.

Can I ask you a question? Abuse of power requires use of power.

Did President Clinton in any way ask any of the members of his

Cabinet to use the powers of their office to help cover up his affair

with Monica Lewinsky?

Mr. RUFF. No, Congresswoman. I think the point that’s been

made there in our submission that I think really goes to the heart

of it is the President had already, and he’s admitted it and we all

have, misled the American people in public statements. It’s a little

difficult to contemplate a setting in which persons who listen to

him make those public statements go out and say ‘‘I believe the

President’’ and then he finds himself accused of misusing his

power.
449

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. So he did not actively engage in meetings and

conversations to devise strategy for them to go out and perform

what has now been alleged to be abuse of power by their statements?

Mr. RUFF. Obviously I can’t speak to all the discussions he had

with Cabinet members and others, but the point that the referral

makes, which is that they listened to the President say ‘‘I didn’t do

it’’ and then went out and said ‘‘I believe the President,’’ struck me

when I read it, particularly against the backdrop of the events of

1974, as an odd proposition to have constituted an abuse of power.

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Let me go immediately to this other more

chilling example, and that is the question of executive privilege and

the use of the Africa statement. I cannot believe in the referral

that—the distortion of what was actually said. Can you just comment on that? The question was about the First Lady’s being covered by executive privilege, and this is now being cited as an answer to the question of executive privilege for everyone.

How did you find this, and did you find this stunning to have

this left out, the entire transcript of the actual words of the President that would have said to us that he did not in fact lie by saying

‘‘I know nothing about it, I didn’t talk to the lawyer.’’ Could you

just give me that again? It is chilling, it is pernicious. I cannot believe it.

Mr. RUFF. I’m going to surprise everybody by being kind to the

Independent Counsel. What I believe happened is—forgive me,

Washington Post, if you’re here—they read the ‘‘Washington Post’’

story for that day, which carried only part of the dialogue and had

relied on the very limited line they used as though the President

was referring to executive privilege. So I don’t attribute evil motive

but I do attribute error, and that’s what I wanted to bring to the

attention of the committee.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, you were asked earlier whether you believed the President lied under oath, and you replied that you would like to associate yourself with Mr. Craig, another lawyer of the President who

believes the President did not lie under oath, rather than with one

of the witnesses the other day, another witness presented by your

side, Mr. Owens, who believed that the President did lie under

oath; and that’s correct, right?

Mr. RUFF. Mm-hmm.

Mr. CHABOT. Let me associate myself with Mr. Berman and with

Mr. Schumer, both Democrats on this committee, who after looking

at all the evidence in this case have concluded that the President

did indeed lie under oath. Now, we may disagree as to what the

consequences of that lie under oath might be but nonetheless,

we’ve reached a conclusion that this President did lie under oath.

Let me turn to something else. You also said in your statement,

and I quote, ‘‘It’s clear that many in the majority have already

reached their conclusion.’’ Have you heard anything from the minority which leads you to believe that they haven’t reached a conclusion or reached one quite some time ago?
450

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, I’m here with no, pretense. to represent

the President of the United States in this proceeding. Obviously I

would hope that we have convinced members of the minority and

members of the majority that we are in the right here. My goal as

an advocate, which is what I am today, is to reach the people

whose minds I want to change, and that’s what I was trying to do

today.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Also in your statement, you said that

you were not going to, and I quote, drag us through the salacious

muck that fills the referral. And I thank you for not doing that, but

let’s not forget that it was the President’s own conduct which

caused the subject matter of this hearing to be what it is.

Now, if he had lied about bribery, it would have been about that.

If he had lied about a bank robbery, it would have been about that.

In this case, he apparently lied under oath about a sexual harassment lawsuit, so that’s what it’s about, whether we like it or not.

Let me ask you this. Why do you think the President called Ms.

Lewinsky, somebody he obviously knew quite well, ‘‘that woman’’?

Mr. RUFF. You know, I don’t know, Congressman. I think at that

moment as he was standing there in the Roosevelt Room trying to

be as forceful in his denial as he could be, those words came out.

But I wouldn’t begin to try to explain to you what caused that to

happen.

Mr. CHABOT. He obviously knew her quite a bit better than referring to her as ‘‘that woman’’.

Mr. RUFF. Absolutely, and there’s no question about it.

Mr. CHABOT. You stated in the preface to your written submission that you made to this committee that nothing the President

has done justifies criminal conduct, correct?

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. CHABOT. In that case, I assume that there’s no reason for the

President to grant himself a pardon before he would leave office for

any criminal acts that he might have committed. Can you assure

us that President Clinton will not pardon himself or that he will

not accept a pardon from any presidential successor?

Mr. RUFF. Absolutely.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me conclude by asking you this. In

this written defense that you submitted to us, you again went into

this legalese thing, which I really think is a mistake that you all

do, and you talk about ‘‘alone’’ and you told this committee that the

term ‘‘alone’’ is vague unless a particular geographic space is identified. I would strongly encourage you to drop that line of defense.

I think if this President and his advocates would come forward and

tell the truth, if they’d done that a long time ago, I don’t think the

President would be in the jeopardy he is in right now, and I would

just strongly suggest that he come forward, come clean, tell the

American people the truth, and let the chips fall where they may.

Mr. RUFF. I appreciate that.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. I too must join my colleagues in complimenting you on the job that you’ve done here this

afternoon. I think you did a fantastic job of further taking apart

really the allegations that we’ve been presented with and you
451

just—you were able to build on what was said by the witnesses

who were—who this morning were discussing prosecutorial standards for obstruction of justice and perjury. They, too, did a fine job.

I don’t know what else can be done with these issues.

You’ve made it clear what the legal definitions of perjury are.

We’ve discussed in detail obstruction of justice and bribery. The

other side of the aisle, my colleagues cannot overcome the factual

information that’s been presented to us. As a matter of fact, the

more we get into these allegations, the flimsier they are. I mean,

in essence they’re rather lightweight.

They would have some believe that we on this side of the aisle

are simply some kind of liberals and that we’re not paying attention and they don’t know why this turns out to be a rather partisan

effort. Well, let me just say this. We have members on this side of

the aisle that I disagree with all the time. This turns out to be a

partisan effort simply because the allegations are lightweight,

they’re flimsy, they can’t prove the point, and the tactics that have

been used by Ken Starr are tactics that many of us and I in particular have real problems with.

It is central to the civil rights movement of which I’m a part of,

which my life’s history is all about, that we pay special attention

to the justice system, and we are absolutely focused on abusive tactics by prosecutors around this country. We are not happy about

what happened to Monica Lewinsky. We’re not happy about what

happened to Julia Still. We’re not happy about what happened to

Rob Hill’s son in the subpoena that was issued at the school. We’re

not happy about intimidation. So we cannot trust an investigation

where these kind of tactics have been used.

And I want to just add to this. That we believe that Mr. Starr

came with a bias. When Mr. Lowell, our attorney, questioned him

here in this committee and asked him about connections of his law

firm, about Mr. Richard Porter, about his contacts with Paula

Jones’ lawyer, he answered by saying things like ‘‘Well, to my best

recollection’’ and ‘‘I’m not so sure I had those conversations with

them,’’ and then he said ‘‘I’m not sure’’ so many times until he finally ended up saying ‘‘Well, you can fault my judgment if you will,

but just frankly it did not occur to me, as I think it happens to a

lot of us in life.’’ At the same time, we have colleagues from the

other side of the aisle who claim any representations about the

President that he did not recall is somehow lying.

I just want to get away from the flimsy allegations. They don’t

mean anything. I don’t want to talk about the abusive tactics anymore. But I do want to talk about this bias that Mr. Ken Starr

comes with.

Do you have information about contacts with Paula Jones’ lawyers and/or information about the connection of his law firm with

that case at all?

Mr. RUFF. I think what we know has been set out in our submission. It emerged during Mr. Kendall’s cross-examination of Mr.

Starr, and it certainly suggests that there were contacts and involvement with the Independent Counsel’s law firm and the Jones’

lawyers that in our view should have given serious pause to anyone

who was undertaking this particular prosecutorial task.
452

Ms. WATERS. Did he tell Attorney General Reno about those tactics when he sought to expand his jurisdiction?

Mr. RUFF. Not to my knowledge, Congresswoman.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Mr. Barr of Georgia.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me

state for the record a couple of important items for those who believe perjury may not be a serious offense whether it is looked at

in the context of a constitutional issue involving impeachment or

in the context of criminal prosecutions.

I know that our learned witness is very, very familiar with the

Federal sentencing guidelines which provide that perjury is even a

more serious offense than offering, giving, soliciting, receiving a

bribe. I know also he’s very familiar, as the other attorneys are on

this panel, that there are enhancements for sentencing under Federal criminal procedures for those in a position of trust, which I

would presume all of us would believe includes the President of the

United States of America. And I know that the witness is also intimately familiar with the U.S. Attorneys’ manual that provides,

quote, because false declarations affect the integrity of the judicial

fact-finding process, all offenders should be vigorously prosecuted,

closed quote.

So for any who believe that these are not serious offenses that

we are looking at here, the procedures under the Department of

Justice for United States Attorneys as well as for Federal judges

in sentencing those convicted of the offenses of obstruction, bribery,

or perjury, understand that they are indeed very serious.

With regard, Professor Ruff, to the procedures——

Mr. RUFF. You’re taking me back too many years, Congressman.

Mr. BARR. More than we’d like to think.

Professor, with regard to some of the provisions of Title 18, I understand your reticence to go into great depth about perjury. I believe that the elements of perjury are here.

But let’s put aside that for a moment and focus on some other

provisions of Title 18 that I really believe are much more problematic for the President, and that is Section 1505, obstruction; Section

1512, tampering with witnesses; and of course for both of those you

have to look at the definitions, which I’ll come back to in a moment; as well as Section 1623, false declarations before a grand

jury, which as you know does not contain the additional element

of willful, just that a person makes false declarations knowing that

they contain false material.

The problem is that when you look at these provisions of Title

18, as you know, one doesn’t look at them just in a vacuum. One

has to look at the definitions, and when one looks at the definition

for misleading conduct, it means knowingly making a false statement. So, for example, if somebody walks into a room and makes

a statement to somebody that either is or reasonably could be presumed to be a witness in an existing proceeding, and makes a false

statement to them, they have engaged in misleading conduct which

is—falls within—is the definition which applies to tampering with

a witness.
453

So I think the President has a very serious problem when one

looks at the statements that he made to Betty Currie the day after

he gave his deposition in which he referred to her many times. So

certainly he could presume—we’ve already established this morning that he was not acting as her attorney and she was not contemplating hiring him as her attorney, in which case it might make

sense for him to talk with her about certain testimony that she

might be giving, so I think one is left with the very clear inescapable conclusion that this was misleading conduct within the definition applicable to Section 1512, tampering with witnesses.

One also I think has to conclude that the President has other serious problems with regard to these provisions of Title 18 with regard to the definition of sexual relations. The definition of sexual

relations, while you have correctly pointed out it does not include

a specific reference to oral sex, it does include a very, very wide

and expansive variety of activity that clearly falls within the definition—within the activity unrebutted by the President as late as

today that Monica Lewinsky testified to under oath.

When you look at the fact that there were false statements, when

you look even at the fact that even if we presumed they were not

technically perjurious, I think clearly they fall within the ambit of

these other provisions of Title 18, and notwithstanding that we all

agree that you do not need to establish a criminal offense to impeach, I think clearly they do.

So I respect your arguments. They are indeed argument, eloquent as they are, but I think the President has a very serious

problem in violating these provisions of Title 18.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, in looking over pages 207 and 208 of the referral relative to the President’s statements while he was in Africa, while

you may view your comments as defending the Independent Counsel, I don’t know. Where I come from, if you make a submission to

any court of law and you’re a prosecutor and you say to the judge,

‘‘Sorry, we’ve got that wrong, Your Honor, but we relied on the

Washington Post’’ or any other newspaper, that generally would be

the basis of admonishment from the judge, and I’m being kind.

Prosecutorial misconduct potentially. But I think with that bit of

misinformation, the report is consistent with a lot of information

that is in this report.

Again, where I come from, a failure to provide exculpatory evidence or all of the evidence is the basis upon which in Massachusetts, that’s what prosecutorial misconduct is all about, the failure

to provide evidence which tends to show the innocence of the target

of an investigation.

But let me go to the record. Mr. Ruff, in arguing that the President lied in his civil deposition about whether he had talked to

Vernon Jordan about Ms. Lewinsky’s involvement in the Jones

case, the referral cites the following exchange:

Question. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica

Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case?

President CLINTON. I don’t think so.
454

Now, that might be a false statement by the President, except there’s one problem. The referral failed to cite the entire exchange

on this subject. The entire exchange was as follows:

Question. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case? President CLINTON. I don’t think so.

Question. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case? President CLINTON. Bruce Lindsey. I think—Bruce Lindsey told me that she was—I think maybe that’s the first person who told me she was.

Now, the President’s answer, ‘‘Bruce Lindsey,’’ clearly is an an- swer to the first question about whether anyone asked the other attorneys—any of his attorneys told him that Ms. Lewinsky had been

served with a subpoena. Indeed, it doesn’t make any sense as an

answer to the second question. The referral fails to mention the

Bruce Lindsey answer. Fails to mention it. Mr. Ruff, in light of this omission, is the referral’s presentation on this subject fair or balanced?

Mr. RUFF. Both your analysis and your imitations are exactly on the mark.

Mr. MEEHAN. I don’t mean to cut you off, but let me go to the obstruction of justice, the gifts. Mr. Ruff, the referral chose to accept Monica Lewinsky’s claim that Betty Currie suggested the idea

of picking up the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky’s apartment rather than

Ms. Currie’s conflicting claim that Ms. Lewinsky initiated the

transfer of the gifts. Now, in explaining why it believed Ms.

Lewinsky’s testimony, quote, made more sense than Ms. Currie’s

testimony, the referral noted that Ms. Currie drove to Ms.

Lewinsky’s house to pick up the gifts and then claimed, quote, the

person making the extra effort-in this case, Ms. Currie is ordinarily

the person requesting the favor, end quote. Now, that’s incredible. Let me repeat the rationale used by the referral to resolve the differences in the testimony between two key witnesses on a critical point. Quote, the person making the extra effort is ordinarily

the person requesting the favor. Mr. Ruff, do you think that that sort of speculation, and I guess you could call it pseudo-psychology, would ever be a legitimate or

rational basis to draw this kind of a conclusion?

Mr. RUFF. I surely do not.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Ruff, the referral claims the President encouraged Monica Lewinsky to file an affidavit which he allegedly knew

would be false. This claim is based on the fact that during a December 17, 1998, conversation with Ms. Lewinsky about her filing

an affidavit in the Jones case, the President allegedly repeated a

cover story that he and Ms. Lewinsky had formulated early on in

their relationship.

Now the President testified before the grand jury that he did not

recall repeating that cover story on that date. So we have a case

where the President’s account conflicts with Ms. Lewinsky, and of

course the referral believed Ms. Lewinsky.

But later on when the grand juror asked Ms. Lewinsky on August 20, 1998 whether she had any discussions about cover stories

with the President after she learned she was a witness in the

Paula Jones case, Ms. Lewinsky responded, ‘‘No, I don’t believe so.

No.’’ Not in the referral.
455

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve my time.

Mr. HYDE. The gentleman reserves his time.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I want to make sure I characterize this appropriately.

The President has apologized for his personal conduct or misconduct, but he has denied any legal wrongdoing.

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. So if there’s any violation of the law, it is fair

to say that he has not accepted responsibility for that?

Mr. RUFF. He’s accepted responsibility for his conduct. If someone determines—you described it, Congressman. Let me just try to

be responsive. I want to be as responsive as I can be. He has taken

responsibility for his conduct. We believe and I believe the better

answer to the question is it was not criminal.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, all right. I think that could have called

for a simple yes or no. I will accept what you said.

Mr. RUFF. I apologize for that.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Now, in your presentation of the defense, and

I think you had as much time today as you wanted, and you did

an excellent job, by the way, Mr. Ruff.

Mr. RUFF. Thank you.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I was listening. You covered the allegations of

perjury before the grand jury. You covered the abuse of office, and

you covered the obstruction of justice charges. I did not hear any

discussion from you on the allegations of perjury from the deposition testimony.

Mr. RUFF. I did cover it in this fashion. I said, I believe, in my

opening statement that I think if you look back at the colloquies

that occurred during that deposition, you’ll be struck by the President’s admitted, evasive, misleading answers which I do not believe

were lies. But you will also be struck by the absolute mess the deposition was in terms of the questions that were put.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I did spend some time last night looking over

the President’s response prepared by his lawyers to the charges,

and if you have that, if you would refer to page 79 and 80, particularly page 80, I just wanted to ask you some questions about the

civil deposition. The question deals with the charge that the President was not truthful when he was asked about his conversations

with Monica Lewinsky and particularly whether she told him that

she had been served with a subpoena in this case. And I would underline, ‘‘Did she tell you that?’’ And the answer was, ‘‘No.’’

The essence of the question is the conversation with Monica

Lewinsky and whether the President learned from her that she had

been served with a subpoena in the case.

Now, earlier, you said once again that the charge of false testimony—I’m at the top of the page on the right—is based on a wholly

inaccurate reading of the President’s deposition. The President acknowledged that he knew that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed.

Now, to me, that’s not the issue addressed by the question,

whenever you say the President acknowledged that he knew Ms.
456

Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. The question was, did Ms.

Lewinsky tell you that she had been subpoenaed?

Mr. RUFF. And if you actually will go back and look at the context in which—I’m now looking at page 80. If you look at the context in which the Q and the A that are cited here and that you referred to occurred, there was a long series of questions about when

was the last time that you saw Ms. Lewinsky, and it was in that

setting that this question arose. In the broader setting of all the

questions that were going back and forth with the President on

this subject, the point we’re making is—because this is the point

that the Jones people were getting at—was did you know that she

had been subpoenaed and, if so, at what time?

The critical issue I think you’ll find in that context, Congressman, was not, was it she who told you? It was, in the setting of

those meetings and conversations, did you know that she had been

subpoenaed?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Let me say, because I’m going to run out of

time, that I would like to develop this factually for a long time with

you, but it appears from reading your defense, that you set up a

false charge and then you respond to the false charge. You’re not

responding to the charge of the perjury on the question ‘‘Did she

tell you that she had been served a subpoena in this case?’’

And on the next page, on page 81, there is a lengthy question

and answer and you’re critical of Mr. Starr, but here there is not

a complete recitation of the Q and A in the deposition. There’s a

lot more that transpires in the deposition.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. RUFF. Indeed, I grant you that.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’ll be very brief. Mr. Ruff, would you care to further elaborate

on your answer to Mr. Hutchinson?

Mr. RUFF. I think the point I was trying to make, in no sense

would we ever want to do what we indeed have accused Independent Counsel of doing and that is to skew the record here. But the

point that I think needs to be made in response to Congressman

Hutchinson’s concerns is that the context in which this dialogue occurred was a dialogue over at what point did the President know

that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed.

The issue, I think it’s fair to say, and my colleagues behind me

will elbow me if I don’t have it right, was when the President last

talked to Ms. Lewinsky, did he at that time know that she was—

she’d been subpoenaed. In that setting, what is being done here, I

think, in the Independent Counsel’s analysis is to focus in on that

one Q and A without grasping the full universe of questions and

answers that were on that subject.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Ruff.

Let me just say I generally want to extend my appreciation because you definitely have provided context and texture to the referral from the Office of Independent Counsel. And I hope the American people are listening.

You know, the President and the administration have been accused of hair-splitting, semantic gymnastics, and we’re talking a lot
457

of conversation. Part of the dialogue today has been about the definition of sexual relations. And I really want to be clear, but it was

not the President that suggested a definition of sexual relations in

terms of the Paula Jones deposition. Is that a correct statement?

Mr. RUFF. That couldn’t be more true, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So it wasn’t the President that insisted on a definition. In fact, it was counsel for Paula Jones?

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you remember—I remember seeing, I think it

was on Fox-TV, Mr. Camarata who, when asked by a reporter or

journalist, acknowledged that the definition was very confusing and

convoluted. Do you have any memory of——

Mr. RUFF. I don’t remember seeing that, but I will accept the——

Mr. DELAHUNT. You will accept that, though. Thank you.

In fact, my memory of the transcript is that, in a conversation

with Linda Tripp, Monica Lewinsky herself said words to the effect

that we’re not really having sex unless you have sexual intercourse.

Is my memory correct on that?

Mr. RUFF. Your memory is correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So, again, I’m going to repeat it because I think

it’s important to repeat. It was not the President that insisted on

that particular convoluted, confusing definition of what constitutes

sexual relations?

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Am I correct when I state that it was the judge

that ruled that oral sex would not be considered within the concept

of that definition?

Mr. RUFF. What she did was to strike those portions of the definition that would encompass that form of activity.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So it was the court that struck that particular

aspect of the definition?

Mr. RUFF. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman HYDE. The distinguished gentleman from Indiana, Mr.

Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I, too, want to thank you for your time and your presence and for your demeanor before this committee. You’re a very

effective advocate.

I would like for you to address what appears to me to be an inconsistency between your strong assertion that the committee

should not consider—when we review perjury, we must look at the

underlying behavior, but when we look at executive privilege, we

cannot look at the underlying behavior, in both cases it being the

personal behavior of the President.

Mr. RUFF. No. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify that, because I don’t believe there’s any inconsistency at all. Let me describe for you what happened in the executive privilege setting so

that I think that will make it clear.

Initially, the Independent Counsel took the position that no conversation that had anything to do with Monica Lewinsky could be

covered by executive privilege because it all arose out of the President’s personal conduct. It was that issue that we litigated before

Judge Johnson.
458

The position we took was not that we were entitled to assert executive privilege over matters involving the President’s personal responsibility, his personal liability, whatever it may have been, but

that only to the extent that we were advising the President in the

conduct of his official business. For example, what to do with the

State of the Union address, which as you know came up six days

after all of this broke, or how to deal with press questions in the

setting in which he was meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu or Chairman Arafat, and his meeting thereafter with

Prime Minister Blair.

It was in those official areas of conduct that we were saying you

may not inquire, and it’s that—that’s the distinction that I think

is the difference between those two.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you.

I don’t want to misstate what I think I concluded from your presentations about the difference between misleading and lying, that

you admit in many ways that the President misled the public but

he did not lie because in his mind he technically was telling the

truth on whatever the point might be at the time. Is that a fair

assessment?

Mr. RUFF. That’s fair.

Mr. PEASE. Do I understand that to mean, then, an assertion

that that there is no objective standard for truth, that it is merely

the subjective analysis of what one believes to be true at a moment

in time?

Mr. RUFF. Absolutely not. The case law—if I were in a courtroom

now instead of in this hearing room, we would be talking about

what the case law establishes, and it is case law I think that we

can all accept which is you have to make an assessment: Is the person who tells you that’s what’s in his mind telling you the truth?

You make that assessment—of whether you believe the person who

is telling you that—by asking whether there is corroboration for it,

whether under the circumstances that is, in fact, a plausible, believable explanation of what was in his mind. And, most importantly, and this is really the crux of it, is what he is telling you

was in his mind a reasonable interpretation of the facts? That’s the

test.

Mr. PEASE. Fair enough. Thank you very much.

I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Canady.

Mr. CANADY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to place in the record

a letter from Donald Alexander, the former Commissioner of the

I.R.S., and other materials relating to some of the argument that’s

been made concerning the action of the 1974 inquiry on the tax

fraud article of impeachment against President Nixon.

Mr. HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466

Mr. CANADY. Having put that in the record I want to say, Mr.

Ruff, you quarreled with the Independent Counsel’s presentation of

facts, and I have to quarrel with your presentation of the facts relating to the committee’s dealing with the tax fraud article against

President Nixon.

In your submission to the committee, I believe you really misrepresent the facts there. You quote four members who—one of

whom you quote totally out of context for the proposition that the

committee decided that tax fraud was not an impeachable offense,

when the fact of the matter is and the record shows that 12 members of the committee, the vast majority of those who expressed an

opinion on this subject in the debate, based their decision on the

conclusion that there was simply insufficient evidence that tax

fraud had been proven. And I think that’s a significant omission in

your report.

Mr. RUFF. Can I just respond briefly, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. Yes.

Mr. RUFF. If in fact our description of those events is in any fashion misleading, I will see to it that it is corrected and resubmitted

to the committee. And I will go back and look at it, and I will respond directly to you.

But I believe, and I don’t—I haven’t flipped through it, but I believe what you’ll find, in essence, is that we acknowledge that there

were many different opinions as to why no tax count ought to be

returned.

Mr. CANADY. I suggest you read it.

Mr. RUFF. But that there were three or four, including Congressman Railsback, Congressman Hogan, and I forget who the others

were, who said specifically I don’t think tax evasion rises to the

level of an impeachment.

Mr. CANADY. That’s not what it says.

Mr. RUFF. I will see to it that it is corrected if it doesn’t.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I would like to ask unanimous consent, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for a

unanimous consent request.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I would like to ask unanimous consent to put in

the record at this point in time the Congressional Research Service

report to you on the compilation of presidential claims of executive

privilege from the Kennedy through the Clinton administrations.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]
467
468
469
470

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Ruff, I think the American people owe you a

debt of gratitude for today, I hope, finally putting to rest the argument that the President’s lawyers, that the President’s side, has

not responded to the factual allegations against the President by

presenting facts. It is undeniable that your 180-page submission—

yours, Mr. Kendall’s, Mr. Craig’s—is replete with dozens and dozens of pages of factual rebuttal to the claims against the President;

and certainly your talk here today enunciates many of those factual

rebuttals.

I would like to talk to the issue of executive privilege, because

Mr. Starr had some pretty strong condemnations of what I guess

is your legal work or your legal advice.

On page 207 of the report, Mr. Starr claims that some of the executive privilege claims were patently groundless. Later on, on

page 207, he refers to other assertions of executive privilege as frivolous.

If we turn to page 208, right after Mr. Starr either negligently

misrepresented the quote to the President or just downright took

it out of context, we don’t know, he then cites the deception of, I

guess, your legal advice and how it continued.

On page 209, he then seems to, I guess, get himself into your

head, because he asserts to this committee that the executive privilege was not, and I quote, the executive privilege was not the only

claim of privilege interposed to prevent the grand jury from gathering relevant information.

Mr. Ruff, please take the remainder of my time. Tell us why you

recommended to the President to assert executive privilege. Tell us,

was your advice to assert a frivolous claim a patently groundless

claim?

Mr. RUFF. Thank you for the opportunity, Congressman.

I would like to think that I don’t give advice to advance frivolous

claims in any setting, much less with the President of the United

States exercising a constitutional privilege.

The law in the District of Columbia circuit most recently embodied in a case called Inre Sealed Case which dealt with assertions of executive privilege in the Espy investigation, makes it absolutely clear exactly what the rules are and how broadly the presidential communication privilege extends and what the legitimate

boundaries are for that privilege. And it was within the rules set

down by that case that we advanced our claims here.

Indeed, we advanced them substantially more narrowly than we

might otherwise have done if we were in a different setting, because we certainly realized the importance and the gravity of the

investigation that was being conducted. Executive privilege was advanced, other than for the lawyers for whom it was wrapped under

the attorney/client privilege, for only two individuals who by the

middle of March had either had the claim withdrawn without a

court ruling because we believed there was no need for it or the

court had ruled against us and we did not pursue it.

So that whatever the Independent Counsel sees as the purpose,

and I certainly would deny any intention improperly to withhold

information from the grand jury, there can be no claim that it had

even a measurable impact on the conduct of his investigation.
471

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ruff, I’m going to hand you or have handed to you a couple

of documents. If I could have staff do that. And while that’s happening, I thought I would ask you a first question.

Yesterday, I asked Mr. Craig if he thought Judge Wright should

deal with any wrongdoing by the President in the Jones suit, and

he said yes. Mr. Ruff, if Judge Wright does take action against the

President for his conduct in the Jones suit and the options run

from mere admonishment to jail time, are you willing to commit on

behalf of the President and the White House that he will be subject

to Judge Wright’s discipline, if any, and pledge not to invoke the

defense that the President is not subject to jurisdiction because impeachment proceedings under the Constitution are the only method

of disciplining a sitting President?

Mr. RUFF. I will say this, Congressman, and you pose a question

to me I have not really had time to think about. I’ll say this, that

the President has stated through me, and he was very specific this

morning, that he, like any other citizen, is subject to the law, and

that would certainly include, because he has already been subjected

to this civil proceeding, being subjected to the orders of the court,

the question of whether while he is still in office a court could impose a sanction——

Mr. CANNON. Let me just shorten it and say that—you may

argue that during his tenure in office but after he leaves office.

Mr. RUFF. After he leaves the office, just as I said——

Mr. CANNON. The reason I’m asking, is that it would seem terribly inconsistent to use such a defense when the White House is

now seeking the extra constitutional measure of a censure.

You said earlier that the First Lady was found to be covered by

the executive privilege. Does that mean that Judge Johnson agreed

with the assertion that information could be withheld or only that

in the proper context the President could assert privilege as to the

First Lady’s discussion?

Mr. RUFF. The latter.

Mr. CANNON. Because, in fact, the document or the information

that was being sought was given to——

Mr. RUFF. That’s true of all claims of executive privilege in this

matter. The judge ruled that the showing finally made by the Independent Counsel overcame our interest in confidentiality.

Mr. CANNON. Certainly I had wanted to see how you were coming

across on television when you invoked my name earlier. I was in

the room watching out there. I was riveted by your description. Let

me just say that you are coming across quite well, and I think that

the way the information is coming forward I think will be helpful

to people like Mr. Berman who has made up his mind that he disagrees with you. But that’s not because of your demeanor, I will

say.

On the other hand, you were quite rough with the Independent

Counsel who you said misstated and misquoted the issues that I

had dealt with earlier. Looking at the documents, let me have you

look at the document labeled number one, and there’s a yellow tab

there that will show the part that’s relevant. That’s a declaration
472

filed by you which you referred to this morning under the seal with

the D.C. District Court on March 17, 1998, in which you were attempting to assert executive privilege for Mr. Lindsey and Mr.

Blumenthal.

On the very last page, under penalty of perjury, you assert,

quote, I have discussed with the President these areas. Of course,

you have many areas in there. But these areas of inquiry and the

privileged nature of the information sought. The President has directed me to invoke formally the privileges applicable to these communications, unquote.

Now, a week later, while the first document was still under seal,

the President was asked by the Washington Post in Africa about

rumors that executive privilege was being asserted. Let me direct

you to the document number two which is that article. Now, this

is at a time when there was a great deal of public interest in the

issue of executive privilege, and the President did not want to deal

with that.

So let me read you the characterization by the Post in that case,

which is Clinton, who has not yet acknowledged publicly even that

he is asserting executive privilege, was pressed by reporters to explain why he is trying to block testimony. His voice curt and his

expression cold—that’s the Post reporter saying that, not me—the

President responded as though he were a bystander in a controversy rather than its central character. All I know is I saw an

article about it in the paper today, said Clinton, referring to the

packet of news clippings faxed each morning to him on the road.

I haven’t discussed that with my lawyers. I don’t know. You should

ask someone who knows.

My question is, did you discuss with President Clinton asserting

executive privilege on behalf of the First Lady in that document,

in the document which you referred to?

Before you answer, let me just point out on page——

Mr. HYDE. Let me point out your time has elapsed. I don’t want

to foreclose Mr. Ruff——

Mr. RUFF. I would be happy to respond. I will be very brief.

Mr. CANNON. Would you do that in the context of paragraph 44

in which you specifically refer to the First Lady?

Mr. RUFF. The situation—and this is fully set out in pleadings

subsequent to this, Congressman, which I would be happy to point

you to so you will have a full record. This issue was litigated. Independent Counsel made the argument that somehow the claim as to

the conversations between Mr. Blumenthal and the First Lady

wasn’t covered because it hadn’t been adequately focused on by the

President.

Now, in fact what I said in that subsequent litigation was quite

consistent with my declaration and with normal process. We had

to—because the Independent Counsel refused to provide any accommodation and tell us what he wanted—what areas he wanted

to talk about, we had to go to the President and say they’re inquiring about communications between Mr. Blumenthal and others and

senior advisors to you, among whom is the First Lady. We don’t

know what they’re going to ask. We need your authorization where

an appropriate, protected communication among senior advisors is

sought to be able to seek appropriate protection for it.
473

The President authorized that. Obviously, we could not, and I

don’t think anybody would have expected us to go back to the

President when a witness was in the grand jury and say, Mr. President, they just asked Mr. Blumenthal about a conversation he had

with Rahm Emanuel, the First Lady, whoever it might be. Would

you specifically authorize us to assert the privilege? And the court

accepted that position.

Chairman HYDE. I want to say to the gentleman from Utah that

as your time is expiring, asking a complicated question prolongs,

and I want to be fair to the witness. No, it isn’t fair to you.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, my question was very simple. It

was only had he talked to the President about asserting the privilege as to the First Lady and I didn’t hear the answer to that question.

Chairman HYDE. Well, okay. Well, we will just move on. Mr.

Rothman from New Jersey.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.

Ruff. I would like to make some observations. In my opinion, those

at this point in our inquiry who are advocating the impeachment

of President Clinton based on the charges raised by Judge Starr

are going to do two very dangerous things. One is to expand the

Constitution’s definition or standard for impeachment without getting a vote of the people of the States, and, second, to turn traditional notions of fairness in American due process on their heads.

Let me explain. We were told by experts over the past several

weeks that the original standard was treason, bribery and high

crimes and misdemeanors against the State and that the words

‘‘against the State’’ meant against the three branches of government, interferring with the President’s ability to carry on his affairs of State. The words ‘‘against the State,’’ high crimes and misdemeanors against the State, that phrase ‘‘against the State’’ was

taken out by the committee on style, without the intention of

changing the meaning. Those on the other side of the aisle and

those who wish to have the President impeached at this stage of

the proceedings say, ‘‘Well, forget about the words ‘‘against the

State,’’ it is not there, so let’s talk about personal conduct. It’s got

to be ‘‘if it’s high crimes and misdemeanors, that’s enough.’’

We heard from the panel today of Republican and Democratic

prosecutors that no responsible prosecutor would raise the charges

by Mr. Starr as crimes and would not indict on them. So then the

folks on the other side of the aisle say, ‘‘Well, okay, it does not have

to be a crime, it can just be a violation of the civil rule of law, and

lying in a civil deposition is something that’s bad and we have to

tell our children that it’s bad.’’ And when we tell them that there

are penalties by a civil court judge against lying under oath in a

civil deposition and that as a matter of fact maybe that was one

of the reasons the President settled that civil case for $850,000,

they say, ‘‘Well, maybe that’s not enough.’’ What they want to do

is add a new standard to the Constitution, treason, bribery, high

crimes and misdemeanors and wrongful noncriminal behavior.

Well, I daresay that we can discuss the merits of that, but it is

not presently in the Constitution. Then they want to say that

Judge Starr presents evidence in his referral, which everyone

agrees would be not admissible. Then yourself, Mr. Ruff, and Mr.
474

Kendall present your rebuttal to his referral which is also not admissible, so we have not one single fact witness, and they say,

‘‘Okay, but it’s the President’s obligation to prove his innocence,’’

violating the long-standing notion in American justice that the accused does not have to raise a defense, because it is up to the prosecution first to bear the burden of proof here, a clear and convincing standard of proof. They say it can be accomplished without one

single fact witness. I daresay that as I read history, the framers

of the Constitution would have recoiled in horror and shock at the

notion that we as a Congress must accept the word of a government official, here the prosecutor, the Independent Counsel, without a single corroborating fact witness, not only to convict someone

of a crime but to impeach the President of the United States. They

would say it is preposterous. Maybe they will present some fact

witnesses. If you accept their notion that what has occurred requires impeachment of the President, then you must say that the

constitutional definition of impeachable offenses has been expanded

and amended without the people’s say-so and without the States

voting on it and that we are going to turn the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof on the prosecution on its head and

make it a presumption of guilt and put the burden of proving one’s

innocence on the accused.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from

Utah has a unanimous consent request.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I request that the two documents

I referred to earlier be inserted into the record.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498

Mr. RUFF. Do you need them back, Congressman?

Mr. CANNON. No, thank you. I have copies.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rogan.

Mr. ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruff, good afternoon.

I thank you for your very cogent and able presentation today. I am

also going to say something that might surprise you. I think you

are right when you express the idea that words are everything.

When it comes to looking at perjury and lying under oath, definitions may be misleading, they may even be maddening, but that is

what lawyers do. We are supposed to parse these statements and

look at the hypertechnical definitions, and determine whether reasonable inferences may be drawn.

I do want to make sure I understand your position. From the beginning, the President has taken the position that he never lied to

the American people or lied while giving testimony under oath. Essentially claims he simply misled the people with a different definition, and he was sending the same message both to the American

people and the court. Is that a fair assessment?

Mr. RUFF. I think that is fair, Congressman, yes.

Mr. ROGAN. And he did that intentionally, because in his own

mind he drew a distinction between the technical definition of ‘‘sexual relations’’ and the definition of ‘‘improper relationship’’ or something along those lines, which is how he now characterizes his relationship with Monica Lewinsky?

Mr. RUFF. Yes, I think that’s correct.

Mr. ROGAN. You suggested earlier in your testimony this distinction is one he has drawn since the Jones deposition. My notes indicate you said the definitions are one that he held in his mind in

January and in August, and he has so testified.

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. ROGAN. In determining whether the President either perjured himself or lied under oath in this matter, you are asking the

committee to look to his state of mind from the beginning of this

whole episode and make that determination?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. ROGAN. That is, I think, a very fair analysis on a technical

legal point, and I will say that I agree with you. If the record supports this technical parsing, I don’t think this would be an appropriate avenue for us to go down by way of an impeachment resolution.

Would you agree with me, however, if the record did not support

that, and demonstrated the President was lying, that would be fair

game for our committee to review?

Mr. RUFF. If any Member of this committee in good conscience

in weighing the evidence concludes that my assessment is wrong,

of course you must take it up and determine what action is appropriate.

Mr. ROGAN. Well, let me share with you what troubles me in this

area and see if it rises to that level.

In his January 17 deposition, in the Paula Jones case, the President was asked if he ever had sexual relations with Monica

Lewinsky. His answer was definitive. He said, ‘‘I had never had

sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. I have never had an affair

with her.’’
499

I take it that was the definition that he adopted that would protect him from being charged with lying.

Mr. RUFF. I think there are two pieces to that: the sexual relations definition which is encompassed in the actual document put

before him, and what he has already testified, that sexual affair or

sexual relationship encompasses for him sexual intercourse.

Mr. ROGAN. That part I understand. Now, let’s move on to four

days later. He was being interviewed by Jim Lehrer. What he

didn’t say is interesting. He did not use that carefully crafted

phrase to deny his conduct. He used a much broader phrase, and

I am quoting now from the interview of January 21. He said,

‘‘There is no improper relationship.’’

Mr. Lehrer asked, ‘‘No improper relationship. Define what you

mean by that.’’

The President responded, ‘‘Well, I think you know what it means.

It means there is not a sexual relationship, an improper sexual relationship or any other kind of improper relationship.’’

On that very same day the President sent his press secretary,

Michael McCurry, out to deny that he had no improper relationship, not a sexual relationship. When the press asked Mr. McCurry

to define what an improper relationship meant, Mr. McCurry gave

us the now-famous phrase, ‘‘I don’t want to parse the words.’’

Finally, the President gave an interview to Roll Call, when he

was asked about his relationship. The President said, ‘‘Let me say

the relationship was not an improper one but let me answer, it is

not an improper relationship and I know what the word means.’’

Question: ‘‘Was it in any way sexual?’’

The President: ‘‘The relationship was not sexual and I know

what you mean and the answer is no.’’

Then we had the famous finger-wagging speech a few days after

that, where he said, ‘‘Everybody, listen to me, I did not have sexual

relations with Monica Lewinsky.’’

Mr. Ruff, he used those phrases interchangeably. There was no

distinction in his mind when he used those phrases.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruff, I think you

have done an excellent job this afternoon.

Mr. RUFF. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. BARRETT. I think you have presented yourself very well. I

think you have presented the President’s case very well and you

can be proud. For the first time today in these proceedings, those

who are watching these proceedings and the Members here are engaged because this is the first opportunity I think that really you

have been able to take advantage of to present the President’s side

of the case. This proceeding has been marked by claims by the

Democratic side that this has not been a fair proceeding. You have

said several times that you feel somewhat hampered because you

have not—you don’t know what you are responding to. I have here

the articles of impeachment, the four articles of impeachment that

have just been released to us, so apparently out of the feeling of

fairness, you have about four minutes to respond to the four articles of impeachment which you have not seen. The first article

deals with——
500

Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman yield just briefly? We had

agreed not to give them the articles until after they had finished

so that it wouldn’t disrupt the proceedings. They just came off the

press and it was given to the Members and it wasn’t meant to disrespect counsel for the President, so I was hoping that we didn’t

try to get into that at this point.

Mr. BARRETT. Well, then I will withhold that. But I will ask you,

Mr. Ruff, because this is your last opportunity with a Democratic

questioner in these proceedings: From here we will move to the

stage where we have to make decisions. Clearly the grand jury

charge is the most serious charge. I want you to make your argument again to this committee as to why the President should not

be impeached for his statements before the grand jury.

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, let me go right to what has been the

heart of the debate on this subject today. It is very real and it

needs to be addressed in two respects. One is the pure factual

what-would-trial-lawyers-do issue, in a setting in which the President says he did not touch certain parts of Ms. Lewinsky’s body

and she says he did. I think it is fair to say, amongst all those here

who are former prosecutors, that that kind of conflict between two

witnesses simply would never be pursued in a court of law. Should

it be pursued in this committee? I think for the same reasons, because you cannot reach the level of clear and convincing evidence,

you ought not even to consider whether, or if you consider it, you

cannot arrive at the conclusion that the President committed an

act, which would take you to the determination as to whether or

not he ought to be impeached and removed from office. But I want

to pass over all of that and go to the heart of the issue. Even if

you take, as some of the Members on the majority side have suggested they do, Ms. Lewinsky’s testimony as the truthful version,

I still am convinced, and I believe that it is the position most consistent with our Constitution and our history and our form of government, that you may criticize the President (he has criticized

himself) if you believe he acted in this fashion—you ought to censure him in whatever fashion seems most appropriate, but you cannot overturn the will of the people even if you find that there is

clear and convincing evidence, which I do not think you can, that

the President was wrong and Monica Lewinsky was right on that

point.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, and I would yield back the balance of

my time.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruff, I agree with

you. If it comes down to who touched who, we are not going to overturn the will of the people. My quarrel is not with you, Mr. Ruff.

I think you are a fine lawyer and have done a good job. My quarrel

is with your client. My quarrel goes sort of like this. We are bastardizing the English language. I can only believe your defense if

I check my common sense at the door and I forget the way the

world really works. I am singularly unimpressed with this defense.

This defense is a rehashing of facts already in our presence except

the quote about ‘‘in Africa.’’ I do appreciate you reinterpreting the

facts. The term ‘‘alone’’ is a get-out-of-jail-free card according to
501

your client because when you ask him were you ever alone with a

woman, he says, ‘‘Well, no, I wasn’t,’’ and he meant there were

other people in the building. When you try to prosecute him for

perjury based on a different version of how they related to each

other, the defense is, ‘‘Well, you can’t corroborate it because there

were only two people there. There was nobody else there.’’ The

term ‘‘alone’’ seems to be used in many ways, in an inconsistent

way and in an offensive way to me. And if people in America follow

Bill-Clinton-speak, we are going to ruin the rule of law, and he is

not worth that. No one person in America is worth trashing out the

rule of law and creating a situation where you can’t rely on your

common sense.

I am not through yet. The biggest problem I have got with your

client is not about a consensual affair gone awry. Grand jury perjury, no excuse, anytime, anywhere. It is not about how they

touched. I believe your client lied when he said he wasn’t paying

attention to the discussion that Mr. Bennett had with the judge.

I have seen the videotaped deposition. He is following it very closely, nodding his head. He knew it was a false affidavit because he

colluded, in my opinion, with Ms. Lewinsky to defraud Paula Jones

from getting to a relevant, material fact. I believe that. Nothing

has changed in my opinion there. But the most disturbing thing

about your client to me goes like this. Do you know Sidney

Blumenthal?

Mr. RUFF. I do.

Mr. GRAHAM. Right after January 18, your client, for the first

time in my opinion, got wind of the fact that there may have been

something known about Ms. Lewinsky that his little collusion with

her would not protect, that they knew something he didn’t know.

This is a statement he makes to Mr. Blumenthal after Dick Morris,

who is a real character but a pretty smart guy, tells the President

that if he would just come clean it may save him because it might

have saved Richard Nixon, and here is Blumenthal’s discussion according to Blumenthal’s testimony. Are they close friends by the

way?

Mr. RUFF. Is who close friends?

Mr. GRAHAM. Blumenthal and the President.

Mr. RUFF. I truly do not know the answer to that.

Mr. GRAHAM. We will find out about that later. ‘‘I said to the

President, ‘What have you done wrong?’ and he said, ‘Nothing. I

haven’t done anything wrong.’ I said, ‘Well, then that’s one of the

stupidest ideas I’ve ever heard, the idea being confessing. Why

would you do that if you’ve done nothing wrong?’ And it was at this

point that he gave his account of what happened to me, and he said

that Monica, and it came very fast.’’ Listen, female members of this

committee. ‘‘He said, ‘Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a

sexual demand on me.’ He rebuffed her. He said, ‘I’ve gone down

that road before, I’ve caused pain for a lot of people and I’m not

going to do that again. She threatened me.’ She said that she

would tell people they had an affair and that she was known as

the stalker among her peers and that she hated it and that if she

had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn’t be the

stalker anymore. And I repeated to the President that he really

needed never to be near people who were troubled like this, that
502

it was just—he needed not to be near troubled people like this. And

I said, ‘You need to find some sure footing here, some solid ground.’

And he said, ‘I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like somebody

who’s surrounded by an oppressive force that’s creating a lie about

me and I can’t get the truth out. I feel like the character in the

novel The Darkness At Noon.’ ’’.

Do you agree with me that the President of the United States is

telling an operative, for lack of a better word, that Monica

Lewinsky was a sexual predator coming on to him?

Mr. RUFF. I take it that the implication in your use of the word

‘‘operative,’’ Congressman——

Mr. GRAHAM. What ever relationship Blumenthal had with him,

he was passing on a story about Monica Lewinsky, giving this individual an impression that he was having to fight Monica Lewinsky

off. Is that true or not?

Mr. RUFF. You read the language.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you.

Mr. RUFF. And I take it we can all understand it. But the one

thing I want to be absolutely certain of——

Mr. GRAHAM. I’m not certain.

Mr. RUFF. Because I think your implication is that this was

somehow a directive to go out and trash Ms. Lewinsky or otherwise

to denigrate her. And if that is your implication, let me tell you

from someone who was involved, I think from day one through

today in what the White House was doing and not doing, it didn’t

happen, never was thought of.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The

gentlelady from California, Mrs. Bono.

Mrs. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to yield

to Congressman Graham for the amount of time that he needs.

Mr. GRAHAM. Let’s continue that thought. Is it your testimony

that no one in the White House has ever planted a story in the

press that Monica Lewinsky is a stalker, unreliable, a troubled

young lady, shouldn’t be believed, is that your testimony?

Mr. RUFF. Congressman, obviously I wouldn’t know whether

there was ever anybody in the White House, but I will tell you

this——

Mr. GRAHAM. There was no organized effort.

Mr. RUFF. There was no authorized effort.

Mr. GRAHAM. Authorized effort.

Mr. RUFF. Because we thought long and hard about how to defend this President and how to deal with the very proceedings that

are going on today.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much. You have answered my

question.

Mr. RUFF. No, I have not, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GRAHAM. Please. Please let me continue. You are saying

there is no organized effort. I have got a mountain of press stories.

January 31, 1998. ‘‘Should they paint her as a friendly fantasist or

a malicious stalker? ‘That poor child has serious emotional problems,’ Representative Charlie Rangel said Tuesday night before the

State of the Union. ‘She’s fantasizing and I haven’t heard that she

played with a full deck in other experiences.’ ’’ One of the most respected members of this House who was passing along something
503

told to him by somebody. Charlie Rangel is a good man, but he was

of the belief that this is a disturbed young lady.

I will read to you other press accounts shortly after. ‘‘One White

House aide called reporters to offer information about Monica

Lewinsky’s past. Her weight problems and what the aide said was

her nickname, the stalker. Junior staff members speaking on the

condition they not be identified said she was known as a flirt who

wore skirts too short and was a little bit weird.’’ I can go on and

on. The troubled-girl defense. ‘‘The one White House aides have

been quietly testing out on reporters is the troubled-girl defense.

The great feeler of all pain who also bears the scars of a turbulent

upbringing was just being kind to Lewinsky because she was a

child of a difficult divorce, because Bernard Lewinsky’s parents

were German Jews who escaped to El Salvador. The White House

even speculated about family Holocaust scars.’’ I have tons of press

reports linked back to the White House saying this girl is unreliable, that she is basically crazy and weird, and I am telling you I

believe your client left that deposition, planted a story in

Blumenthal’s mind and tried to get Betty Currie to believe she

wanted to have sex with me and I couldn’t do that, he was trying

to tell Betty Currie that she was coming on to him and that the

President of the United States, his state of mind is established

based on what he told two people close to him, and shortly after

that, shortly after that, the press operation in the White House

turns on this young lady, they were calling her unbelievably vile

names, questioning her sanity, and if it had not been for that blue

dress, they would have tore her to pieces.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. Charlie Rangel’s

name has been mentioned as if he was working in connection with

the White House.

Mr. GRAHAM. No, sir.

Chairman HYDE. Let the gentleman finish speaking.

Mr. CONYERS. We should be more careful about the use of Members of integrity in the House and what their connection is with the

narrative that my distinguished colleague has put forward.

Chairman HYDE. Well, the Chair will say he heard Mr. Graham

read from a newspaper account.

Mr. GRAHAM. Could I please make this correct. I have no higher

opinion of anybody than Charlie Rangel. He is a Marine Corps veteran who served in Korea. Charlie Rangel was repeating something

somebody told him. He had no reason to believe——

Mr. CONYERS. How do you know?

Mr. GRAHAM. I believe that is what the newspaper accounts

show, that Mr. Rangel was passing on a thought planted in his

mind and he is a very innocent victim of the spin machine like

maybe all of us are around here.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Rangel is smart enough to speak his own

words. He doesn’t need to have anybody plant them.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady is not recognized. The gentleman’s time has almost expired.

Mr. GRAHAM. I yield back the balance of my time and I think I

will introduce——

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, point of order. The witness was on

the point of answering when the point of order came.
504

Chairman HYDE. Oh, all right.

Mr. FRANK. Shouldn’t the witness have a chance to answer?

Chairman HYDE. He surely should. The gentleman may answer

if he wishes.

Mr. RUFF. I would only make two points, with all due respect,

Congressman. Other than your speculation, you have no basis to

suggest that the President of the United States ever directed any

such——

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Ruff, how do you establish state of the mind

of a witness?

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Graham, please.

Mr. RUFF. I think out of all due courtesy, I am entitled to 30 seconds to respond to a 10-minute question. You have no basis for

making that allegation, and I will tell you that to the extent I have

any personal knowledge, I will represent to you that to the contrary, a very careful and well conceived decision was made to do

our damnedest to ensure that in fact no such personal attack was

ever made.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Nadler.

Mr. NADLER. I don’t know if this is a point of order or what, but

I would just ask if the Chair would suggest to the witness he speak

more closely to the microphone.

Mr. RUFF. I apologize. It has been a long afternoon, but I will try

to stay close.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have time remaining and I yield

it to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Ruff——

Mr. FRANK. Parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman may state it. Just a moment. I

am about to entertain a parliamentary inquiry. What is your inquiry?

Mr. FRANK. The question was, Mr. Jenkins hadn’t been called on

at all before?

Chairman HYDE. He reserved his time. Mr. Graham has been

yielded Mr. Jenkins’ time.

Mr. GRAHAM. I suggest this solution to this problem. That I will

get the press reports that I am referring to and I will introduce

them into the record, and every committee member will have a

chance to look and see what was going on toward Ms. Lewinsky,

what was coming out of the White House, and they can make their

own decisions about how this started.

I also would like to point both—the committee members to the

fact that we have statements from the President shortly after the

deposition where he is planting in the mind of Mr. Blumenthal a

story that is patently false, a story that if you believe he was having to defend himself from Monica Lewinsky, the stalker, a term

he used. Shortly after the President used the term stalker, we see

press accounts where White House sources are calling her a stalker. He goes to his secretary the day after the deposition and runs

a passage by her basically saying, ‘‘She wanted to have sex with

me and I couldn’t do that.’’ I have always wondered what that was
505

about. Now I believe it is not so much trying to influence her testimony as to plant into Ms. Currie’s mind or thought pattern that

Monica Lewinsky was coming on to him.

Every Member needs to look at this. This is something that is

more than consensual sex. This is something in my opinion, ladies

and gentlemen, where a high public official is using the trappings

of his office, the White House, to go after a potential witness who

if that witness is called and gives testimony down the road in a

sworn fashion, not just tapes, that what he is trying to do is set

up a defense to make her not believable; that this witness possesses information that would hurt his political and legal interest.

The President of the United States, I believe, planted stories that

were false and shortly after those stories were planted, the White

House operation went into effect, notifying the press that ‘‘if you

ever hear anything about this witness you need to know she’s unreliable, she’s a stalker, she’s basically not a responsible person’’. Bill

Clinton did in fact, like with so many woman in the past, make

sure that Monica Lewinsky was going to go through hell, and that

the only thing that stopped this was it was just maybe one too

many women to trash out or it became the blue dress. You can

think what you want to about Linda Tripp but I can tell you right

now, I believe from the bottom of my heart, ladies and gentlemen,

if she didn’t have that blue dress proving a relationship, they

would have cut her up. I have got evidence in the press reports

coming out from the White House sources after the President

planted in the minds of two people close to him that she was coming on to him—that was a false story—and I do believe for a moment in time the President of the United States used the full

power and force of the White House to go after a young lady so that

it couldn’t hurt him politically and legally, and that is far more like

Watergate than Peyton Place and I am going to believe that probably till I die and I don’t ask you to accept my rendition of the

facts. I do ask every Member, especially the female Members here,

if you have ever done a rape trial, you know what comes women’s

way sometimes, they wear their skirts too tight and they’re flirtatious and you’ve got to watch out for these tight ladies, they even

called her Elvira at one time in one of the press reports. That this

is serious, and I do wish the President would reconcile himself with

the law, Mr. Ruff. I do wish he would quit saying ‘‘alone’’ means

one thing one time and it means something else another time. I do

believe that the President of the United States was willing to use

the weight of his office, take a consensual sex partner, a 22-yearold lady, and he was going to turn on her and they were going to

unleash stuff on her that she would have never been able to handle, and that to me is far worse or as bad as anything that anybody

has brought to my attention in this case. I need to reconcile this

in my mind and I will try to keep an open heart so we can bring

this country together. But I will give the Members of the committee

the press reports and you can read for yourself what they were

about to do and what they were calling this young lady and it was

not going to be pretty. And I will yield back the balance of my time,

and I will apologize to this committee for getting upset because this

does upset me.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Buyer has time that he wants to use now.
506

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request.

Chairman HYDE. But I would be happy to entertain motions. Mr.

Frank has one.

Mr. FRANK. I would ask unanimous consent after that loaded,

filibustered question that the gentleman be given a chance to respond. To put a question such as that, to use up the full five minutes deliberately so that there could be no chance to respond is inappropriate and I would ask unanimous consent that the witness

be given a couple of minutes to respond.

Chairman HYDE. I would join in that unanimous consent to give

Mr. Ruff time.

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely.

Chairman HYDE. But before we get to that, we have Ms. Waters

to deal with. Ms. Waters.

Ms. WATERS. A point of personal privilege. I resent Mr. Lindsey’s

reference——

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Waters, state your point of order.

Ms. WATERS. Yes. My point of personal privilege is the reference

that he made to every woman on this committee.

Chairman HYDE. That certainly includes you.

Mr. GRAHAM. Ma’am, I certainly didn’t mean to do anything disparaging. All I am saying is I have been a prosecutor in rape

cases——

Ms. WATERS. I know what you did not mean to do but I have a

point of personal privilege.

Chairman HYDE. Please state your point.

Ms. WATERS. My point is that he made a reference to what every

woman on this committee should do and how we should feel about

the spin that he just put on, wild allegations about the President

of the United States. I think, as one of the women of this committee and every other woman should have an opportunity to respond,

since he is talking for us and about us.

Chairman HYDE. I think your point is you have taken offense

and you have expressed your resentment.

Ms. WATERS. No, I have not. I am asking your permission to do

such, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. It really isn’t a point of order. I want you to express yourself. I think you have. Could you do it in another minute

maybe?

Ms. WATERS. Yes. I would like to say that every member of this

committee should be offended by the spin that was just—the wild

spin that was just put on by Mr. Lindsey in attempting to somehow

send a message to Monica Lewinsky that she has been undermined

by the President of the United States and thus set her up to be

angry at the President in case she is called as a witness. We are

no fools.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. Now Mr. Buyer is recognized.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I had a unanimous consent request.

Chairman HYDE. I am sorry, Mr. Ruff is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. RUFF. I will try not to use all of that time, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your letting me respond. Congressman Graham, I have
507

the greatest respect for you. I have to make two fundamental

points: One, I absolutely reject the notion that the President of the

United States either explicitly or implicitly authorized, directed,

hinted at or caused any attack of the sort you describe. But second,

I must say, even out of the greatest respect for members of this

committee, that to be greeted at the end of a long day by the next

to the last speaker with a litany of charges never heard before, not

even I believe included in whatever document it was that I was

handed a few minutes ago, does not give us any reasonable opportunity for fair response, and I would ask the Chair’s permission

that if this is to be in any respect a factor in the consideration of

this committee’s grave duties over the next few days that we be

given an opportunity first to have clear and explicit statements by

the Congressman with whatever supporting information he believes

he has, and second a reasonable opportunity to respond.

Chairman HYDE. Well, we have a schedule to which we are trying to adhere. Mr. Graham can put together a package of his documentation and get it to you immediately for your review and response. We are not going to be through with our business, I don’t

think, until Saturday at the earliest, and anything you want to add

by way of rebuttal or amplification or commentary would be received by the committee. This is kind of a wild card situation, unanticipated, but——

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, since I was referred to, I will be

glad to do that. In terms of the timing, as I have said, this became

clear to me after trying to figure out what he was saying to Betty

Currie and we will all have a chance to evaluate it if it makes any

sense and I will gladly give you the——

Ms. WATERS. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. We are trying to wind this up and I am trying

to get Mr. Graham—and he seems to be agreeing—to present his

information to Mr. Ruff, whereupon Mr. Ruff can analyze it and respond in some appropriate way. You just let me know how you

want to do it, and if you want to come back. But we have a schedule.

Mr. RUFF. I will be glad to do that. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. We will work within your time lines.

Chairman HYDE. Very good.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I was hoping that there would be

a way to work out his return, that Mr. Ruff would need to be back

if he so desired.

Chairman HYDE. If Mr. Ruff so desires. But I would hope this

can be handled through the U.S. mail.

Mr. RUFF. If I could leave this open, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.

Conyers, thank you for the opportunity, if I could get back to you

and let you know how best we would like to be able to respond.

Mr. CONYERS. That is fair.

Chairman HYDE. Sure. We will give you an opportunity to respond but we are on a schedule. We have to file our report next

week, it has to lay over two days, Christmas is coming, and all of

this enters into our calculus. But you are entitled to respond because those were serious charges.

Mr. RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will do so.

Chairman HYDE. Now Mr. Buyer is recognized for 5 minutes.
508

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was struck by Ms. Waters’ comments that somehow Mr. Graham’s statements here was

an effort to anger Monica Lewinsky against the President. When

I read Monica Lewinsky’s deposition after the President’s statement to the American people on August 17, there wasn’t anybody

that could have angered Monica Lewinsky more than that statement. There isn’t anything anybody here can do. The President

pretty well angered Monica Lewinsky and it really came out in that

deposition that she gave to Ken Starr. One thing that is bothering

me is that part of your defense here today, and Mr. Craig’s of yesterday, is to come before the committee and to make an admission

that the President’s intent was to be evasive and incomplete, mislead, yet he was legally and technically accurate in anything and

everything he did. Not only all of yesterday but today you were also

very accurate, never ever to say the President lied. So you have

done a good job. You stuck with the game plan. I agree with you,

to prove perjury, the trier here must make an assessment: it must

be a plausible and believable explanation with regard to the state

of mind. Now, if in fact you have a witness who has perhaps a motive to lie, if in fact they are not helpful, they have an attitude to

be misleading, to be evasive, to be incomplete, that all of that is

relevant evidence to the trier of fact, is it not?

Mr. RUFF. Absolutely. It is.

Mr. BUYER. It is. Okay. Now, one thing that I am trying to reconcile, and Mr. Graham brought up the comment about, if I have

to believe some of the defense, you are saying to leave our common

sense out the door. I want to go back to the gifts for the moment,

because of this question about feigned forgetfulness. Now, you

worked with the President more than anyone else in this room perhaps, and Bruce Lindsey knows him much, much better. The President’s memory is very good, is it not?

Mr. RUFF. It is.

Mr. BUYER. Now, I guess what is troubling to me is when I read

the referral, in reference to the gifts, it says a day or two after

Christmas. And I remember that, because I was with the President

on Air Force One, we went to Bosnia, and when we came back from

Bosnia a few days later, what happens? Ms. Currie lets Monica

Lewinsky into the White House on a Sunday morning, December

28. She lets Ms. Lewinsky in there so she can give gifts to the

President. But what is interesting is what happened later. The two

of them, according to the referral which cites then the grand jury

testimony, is that she wants to know how she ended up on the witness list. The President is not sure how she ended up on the witness list and said, well, it must have been Linda Tripp or maybe

it was the Secret Service. But then she says, she mentioned with

anxiety that she received a subpoena with regard to the hat pin,

and he asked a specific question about the hat pin. Then three

weeks later, three weeks later, the President was asked a specific

question at the civil deposition with regard to what gifts he gave

he said, ‘‘I don’t remember. Do you know what gifts?’’ And then he

comes back and says——

Mr. RUFF. It’s the last part that’s important, Congressman.

Mr. BUYER. But this feigned memory about I don’t recall. There

are a series—I don’t have the time, I see that my yellow light is
509

on, but I have a series of case law and I know you have seen it

also, where individuals have been prosecuted for I don’t recall, I

don’t know, I don’t remember when in fact they know. I have difficulty reconciling, and I want you to give your explanation, isn’t

in fact the President feigning fogetfulness, asking the witness

about the hat pin, then three weeks later testifies and says, ‘‘I don’t

know. I don’t recall.’’ I would ask unanimous consent that Mr. Ruff

be permitted to answer that question to reconcile.

Mr. RUFF. Just very briefly, because you yourself pointed at the

critical issue there and I commend you not only to the transcript

of his testimony but, when we all get to see it, to the video as well.

It is clear that what he is saying is, ‘‘I don’t recall, please remind

me.’’ It is virtually one sentence. Look, I don’t know how many presents the President gets, but lots. What he said was not, ‘‘I don’t

recall any, I don’t recall ever getting gifts.’’ What he said was, ‘‘I

don’t recall, tell me which ones, remind me which ones they are.’’

And that it seems to me is the natural human response under the

circumstances.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request.

Chairman HYDE. Please state it.

Mr. GOODLATTE. I would ask unanimous consent that a letter

signed by about 80 scholars and former elected officials and Cabinet members, and so on, calling for the impeachment of the President, rebutting some of the information earlier submitted by other

scholars be made a part of the record.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517

Ms. WATERS. I have a unanimous consent request, Mr. Chairman. I have a letter here that was sent by one of our colleagues,

Mr. Alcee Hastings, talking about the way that information was received in his case, and asking that information be provided in ways

that other Members of Congress would have easy access.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, it may be made a part of the

record.

[The information follows:]
518
519
520

Chairman HYDE. We have reached the end of a stimulating day.

I want to thank Mr. Ruff for his patience and for his superb presentation. We will convene at 9 a.m. tomorrow. These hearings, pursuant to House Resolution 581, are concluded, and the committee

stands adjourned until 9 a.m. tomorrow.

Mr. RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. I appreciate it.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

Æ