In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2204

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM P. MARR, also known as 

BILL MARR, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 CR 24 — Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 19, 2014 — DECIDED JULY 29, 2014

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. A jury found William P. Marr, also

known as Bill Marr, Jr. (“Marr”), guilty of six counts of wire

fraud. Marr appeals his conviction, arguing that he did not

receive a fair trial because the government relied upon improper propensity evidence to convict him, and that three jury

instructions incorrectly explained the law. He also contends
2 No. 13-2204

that the district court lacked the authority to order restitution.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2000, William C. Marr, the defendant’s father,

founded Equipment Source USA, LLC (“Equipment Source”),

which sold used forklifts. The defendant Marr managed

forklift sales and daily operations for the family business.

Marr advertised forklifts for sale online and sold them online

or over the phone. 

In April 2001, the defendant’s father opened a checking

account for Equipment Source at Palos Bank and Trust (“Palos 1

Bank”) and named Marr as a signatory. In January 2002, the

defendant’s father opened a second account at Palos Bank, a

merchant account,whichallowedEquipment Source to process

credit card transactions. Marr was a signatory on the merchant

account as well. Checks withdrawn from these accounts are at

the heart of Marr’s propensity argument.

From 2001 to 2003, Marr used Equipment Source to sell

forklifts that he never actually owned or possessed. Marr’s

modus operandi was to advertise forklifts for sale online,

collect credit card payments from out-of-state customers, and

then purport to deliver the product without ever doing so.

When customers did not receive the forklifts they ordered,

they would contact Marr. Typically, a customer would com-

 Palos Bank and Trust Company closed on August 13, 2010, when it was 1

acquired by First Midwest Bank. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Failed

Bank List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (Last

visited July 18, 2014).
No. 13-2204 3

plain that he received an invoice and a notice of shipment, and

that Equipment Source charged his credit card, but that he

never actually received the forklift he ordered. While Marr

gave varying explanations to his unhappy customers, he rarely

refunded their money or delivered the forklifts. Instead, his

customers were forced to contact their credit card companies

to dispute the charges. A customer’s credit card company

would then send notice of the dispute to Palos Bank, where the

customer’s payment was sent. Next, Palos Bank would notify

Equipment Source that a customer disputed a charge and

would request a response. Sandra Lecik handled all of the

credit card disputes at Palos Bank, and she dealt exclusively

with Marr when there were issues raised by Equipment Source

customers. If Marr did not respond orthe inquiry was resolved

in the customer’s favor, Palos Bank refunded the amount of the

original charge back to the customer’s credit card account by

debiting Equipment Source’s merchant account. When this

occurred, it was called a “chargeback.”

In 2002, Thomas Hullinger, Senior Vice President at Palos

Bank, noticed a high incidence of chargebacks on Equipment

Source’s merchant account. Hullinger estimated that forty

percent of Equipment Source’s credit card transactions in 2002

resulted in chargebacks. The other 300-350 merchant accounts

at Palos Bank had chargeback rates of less than two percent the

same year. 

In June 2002, Mr. Hullinger met with Marr to discuss the

excessive chargebacks on the Equipment Source merchant

account. The two men discussed Palos Bank’s requirement that

Equipment Source ship its products prior to charging its

customers’ credit cards. Marr said he would comply with Palos
4 No. 13-2204

Bank’s requirement, but the high rate of chargebacks continued. From July through October 2002, the chargebacks on

Equipment Source’s merchant account totaledalmost $200,000.

At the end of October, Mr. Hullinger called a second meeting,

this time with both Marr and his father. He informed them that

they must maintain a reserve of over $90,000 in their merchant

account to cover any overdrafts and must provide proof of

delivery before Palos Bank would release funds from the

credit card sales into their account. 

Equipment Source failed to maintain the required reserve,

so Palos Bank froze the company’s accounts a few days after

the second meeting. Nevertheless, chargebacks from customers continued to be debited from the merchant account. 

In November, twenty-eight chargebacks occurred, totaling

$153,930. Palos Bank applied the approximately $40,000

remaining in the merchant account to the balance. In December, another twenty-eight chargebacks occurred, totaling

$172,697; Palos Bank applied the approximately $13,000

remaining in Equipment Source’s checking account to the

negative balance. The final balance of Equipment Source’s

checking account was zero and the final negative balance of

Equipment Source’s merchant account was $328,881.89—a loss

that Palos Bank paid to Equipment Source customers. Palos

Bank mailed Marr a letter requesting payment for the loss, but

no payment was remitted.

Although the record does not fully describe how, the

government was informed of the suspicious activity at Equipment Source. In January 2003, the FBI executed a search

warrant at Equipment Source’s offices and seized documents
No. 13-2204 5

and office equipment. Equipment Source ceased doing business shortly thereafter.

Eight years later, the government filed an information

charging Marr with six counts of wire fraud related to his

fraudulent forklift sales. 

A. The Trial Proceedings

Attrial, the government presented testimony fromfourteen

Equipment Source customers who paid for forklifts but never

received them. One of the defrauded customers testified that

he went to Equipment Source’s office to get his money back

and met with Marr. Marr told him that he would refund the

money, but needed to talk to his lawyer first. Marr never sent

a refund. The customeridentified Marr in the courtroom as the

person he talked with during the visit. The government then

called Ms. Lecik and Mr. Hullinger, the two employees from

Palos Bank, who explained the chargebacks on the merchant

account and identified Marr as having a significant role in the

management of Equipment Source’s bank accounts. As its final

witness, the government called its financial expert witness,

Bruce Killian, who analyzed the Equipment Source merchant

account and confirmed the $328,881.89 loss to Palos Bank. The

government introduced no evidence that Marr wrote checks

from the Equipment Source accounts to “cash” or to the “Four

Seasons Currency Exchange.” 

Marr then presented his case and called Lee Williams, a

formerIRS agent, to testify as an expert witness. He stated that 

he had reviewed Equipment Source’s financial records and

calculated that Marr and his wife had loaned Equipment

Source over $1.1 million, but had been reimbursed less than
6 No. 13-2204

$900,000. Williams explained that the personal funds in the

company accounts mainly came from Marr and his wife’s

home equity line of credit account and their personal money

market account. Williams concluded that Marr deposited over

$200,000 more into the Equipment Source accounts than he

withdrew. Williams also described checks written from the

Equipment Source account to cash or a currency exchange in

October 2002. For example, Williams said one check was

written to “cash” in the amount of $266 for “office supplies,”

another was written to a “currency exchange” for “license and

permits,” and another was written to “cash” in the amount of

$2,450, this time for “cost of goods sold.”

Oncross-examination,the government questionedWilliams

about checks that had been written from the Equipment Source

checking account to cash orto the currency exchange. Williams

stated that the memo line of the checks often noted that the

withdrawal was for the “cost of goods sold,” but admitted that

he did not consider these checks in his calculations at all

because he was only hired to analyze the net amount Marr and

his wife loaned the business from their personal accounts. He

also conceded that writing checks to cash was an unusual

business practice because the IRS will deny a business expense

if it cannot be verified by an invoice or receipt of some sort.

When the prosecutor asked, “So the problem with all these

checks to cash is you don’t know where that money went, do

you?” Williams responded, “No one does.” Marr’s lawyer

objected twice during the cross-examination. First, to scope,

which the judge overruled and then to facts not in evidence,

which the judge sustained. Marr’s lawyer never objected on

Rule 404(b) grounds.
No. 13-2204 7

The government recalled its financial expert witness Killian

to rebut Williams’ testimony. Since Williams’ testimony

introduced information about checks being converted to cash,

Killian addressed this issue. The government introduced an

exhibit that summarized the checks written to cash or to

the currency exchange as compared to cash deposits. The chart

documented the Equipment Source checking account from

January 7, 2002, through October 30, 2002. Killian noted that

the cash withdrawals totaled over $1.3 million and the cash

deposits totaled only about $700,000, leaving the net cash

withdrawals around$600,000. The government also introduced

an exhibit summarizing the amount of chargebacks for

all twelve months of 2002, which totaled about $600,000;

approximately fifty percent of Equipment Source’s credit card

sales. Again, Marr’s lawyer never objected on Rule 404(b)

grounds.

Marr’s lawyer cross-examined Killian. On redirect, the

prosecutor asked only one question, it was about what was

written on the memo line of two checks dated October 29, 2002: 

Mr. Killian, in your experience as a revenue agent,

would that entry in the memo line, cost of goods sold,

would that be the kind of sufficient documentation that

would have allowed those checks to be accepted as

business deductions in an audit?

Killian responded, “No.” Marr’s lawyer then objected “about

anything to do with taxes” and asked for a sidebar. The judge

denied the sidebar because it was the government’s last

question on redirect and he overruled the objection. Afterwards, the government rested.
8 No. 13-2204

The next day, Marr’s lawyer renewed her objection about

the introduction of evidence relating to taxes and moved for a

mistrial. She argued that Killian’s “line of questioning [had]

injected into a wire fraud case the possibility that there could

have been tax fraud.” The judge denied the motion.

In closing argument, the prosecutor relied on the Equipment Source checks that had been written to cash or to the

currency exchange and stated that the checking withdrawals

did not reflect a “legitimate business” practice. And in rebuttal

argument, the prosecutor questioned Marr’s honesty and

called Equipment Source a “sneaky, dirty business.” Marr’s

lawyer made no objection.

At the jury instruction conference, Marr objected to Jury

Instructions Nos. 25, 31, and 32. The judge overruled Marr’s

objections to all three instructions and tendered the instructions to the jury.

The jury found Marr guilty on all six counts of wire fraud

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The district court sentenced

Marr to a term below the advisory guideline range of 57 to 71

months. Marr received 3 years’ imprisonment, followed by

2 years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay

$328,881.89 in restitution to Palos Bank.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Marr raises three issues. He contends that (1)

the government improperly introduced and relied on evidence

implying that he had a propensity to commit illegitimate tax

practices; (2) the jury instructions given at trial were legally
No. 13-2204 9

erroneous; and (3) the district court erroneously ordered him

to pay restitution to Palos Bank. We address each issue in turn.

A. Propensity Evidence

Marr argues that the government’s references to Equipment

Source checks that were written to “cash” or to the “currency

exchange” violated Rule 404(b). He contends that on three

occasions the government referred to these checks to suggest

that he had a propensity to commit illegitimate tax practices:

(1) when the government cross-examined Williams; (2) when

the government questioned Killian on redirect; and (3) when

the government relied on the evidence in its closing arguments.

We review the district court’s evidentiary ruling for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Collins, 715 F.3d 1032, 1037

(7th Cir. 2013). To preserve an issue for appeal, counsel must

“make a timely objection or motion to strike; and state[] the

specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context.” Fed.

R. Evid. 103(a). A terse motion in limine is not specific enough

to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Evid 103(a). United States

v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2013). We review issues not

properly raised before the district court for plain error. Id. A

plain error seriously affects the “fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings” because it deprives the

defendant of a fair trial, to the point that “the defendant would

have been acquitted otherwise,” and the error “was so obvious

and so prejudicial that a district judge should have intervened

without being prompted by an objection from defense counsel.” United States v. Haldar, 751 F.3d 450, 456 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Marr contends that we should review all three of his Rule

404(b) arguments using an abuse of discretion standard,
10 No. 13-2204

claiming that his pre-trial motion in limine objection preserved

the issue for appeal. We disagree.

Marr’s motion related to prospective testimony from a

witness who never actually testified at trial; not Williams. Marr

did object twice during Williams’ testimony, but never on

propensity grounds. Therefore, Marr’s objections did not

preserve the issue and so we review the checks evidence

introduced during the cross-examination of Williams for plain

error. 

1. The Government’s Cross-Examination of Williams

Evidence isnot admissible forpropensity purposes—a prior

crime, wrong, or bad act that is introduced to show that a

person repeated his or her bad character on this particular

occasion. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The evidence is admissible for

other purposes, however, if the prosecutor: (1) offered it for a

purpose other than propensity, (2) it was similar and close

enough in time to be relevant to the matter at issue, (3) it was

supported by sufficient preliminary evidence for a jury to find

that the defendant committed the prior act, and (4) it had a

probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, as required by Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Gulley, 722 F.3d at 906 (citing United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d

1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 2011)). 

Applying this test to Williams’ testimony relating to the

checks written to cash or to the currency exchange, we find

that Williams’ testimony was permissible under Rule 404(b).

First, the evidence was used for a purpose other than propensity; the government cross-examined Williams to call into

question the accuracy of his analysis. Williams admitted that
No. 13-2204 11

his analysis did not include the net $600,000 of withdrawals

from the Equipment Source checking account. He also admitted that writing checks to cash or a currency exchange was

an unusual business practice. The government questioned

Williams to prove Marr’s intent to commit wire fraud, not to

show that Marr committed tax fraud in the past and had done

so again on this occasion. 

Second, Williams’ testimony about the Equipment Source

checks being converted to cash was extremely relevant. The

government alleged that Marr used the Equipment Source

bank accounts at Palos Bank to evade $328,881.89 in chargebacks and that the scheme took place from November 2001 to

May 2003. Williams testified about the same Equipment Source

bank accounts and described transactions that occurred at the

same time as Marr’s wire fraud.

Marr makes a decent argument that the evidence does not

support a finding that he was the one who converted the

Equipment Source checks to cash, since he did not sign

the Equipment Source checks converted to cash (his father,

William C. Marr did) and there is no evidence that he either

cashed any of the checks or received any of the money.

However, the amount of evidence needed to link a defendant

to a prior bad act, is light; any evidence of the defendant’s

participation in the prior act beyond his mere presence

is sufficient. United States v. Coleman, 179 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th

Cir. 1999). Here, the government showed that Marr managed

daily operations for Equipment Source, he was a signatory on

the merchant account, and he deposited substantial amounts

of money from his and his wife’s home equity line of credit

account and their personal money market account into the
12 No. 13-2204

Equipment Source accounts. Therefore, the jury could reasonably conclude that Marr participated in the scheme to convert

Equipment Source checks to cash. 

Finally, though Marr asserts that the evidence of the $1.3

million in checking withdrawals converted to cash prejudiced

him because the jury could have harbored a bias against him

due to his wealth, he has pointed to no evidence in support of

this assertion. The evidence of the Equipment Source checks

converted to cash is highly probative of Marr’s intent to

commit wire fraud, and substantially outweighed any risk

that the jury would convict Marr for uncharged tax fraud

offenses instead of wire fraud charges.

Forthe reasons discussed above, Williams’ testimony about

the checks being converted to cash was permissible under Fed.

R. Evid. 404(b). The district court did not commit plain error by

allowing Williams to answer the government’s questions.

2. Killian’s Rebuttal Testimony Regarding the

Checks Converted to Cash

Marr contends that he timely objected on Rule 404(b)

grounds during Killian’s rebuttal testimony, so our standard

of review should be for an abuse of discretion. We agree.

Though Marr did not object until the close of Killian’s

rebuttal testimony, an objection does not have to be “perfectly

contemporaneous with the challenged testimony” to preserve

an issue for appeal. Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 727

(7th Cir. 1999). An objection at the “close of that witness’s

testimony or prior to the start of proceedings the very next

day” would suffice to allow the court to cure “any error by
No. 13-2204 13

issuing a limiting or curative instruction while the testimony is

still relatively fresh in the mind of the jurors.” Id. Therefore, we

review the district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of

discretion. 

Essentially, Marr makes the same argument he did about

Williams’ testimony; he contends that the government introduced improper tax fraud evidence at trial when it questioned

Killian about the checks converted to cash. Killian testified

about the same evidence Williams discussed during his direct

and cross-examination. Marr cannot now “complain on appeal

[because] the opposing party subsequently introduce[d]

evidence on the same subject.” United States v. Touloumis, 771

F.2d 235, 241 (7th Cir. 1985). It was Marr who first introduced

evidence of the checks converted to cash when his expert

witness, Williams, testified about it. The evidence of checks

being converted to cash was permissible under Rule 404(b).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled

Marr’s objection to Killian’s rebuttal testimony or when it

denied Marr’s motion for a mistrial after the close of evidence. 

3. Prosecutor’s Statements

Marr argues that the government improperly relied on the

checks-to-cash evidence for propensity purposes in its closing

and rebuttal arguments as well. Since Marr did not object to

the government’s statements at trial, our review is for plain

error. United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2010). To

prevail, Marr must establish that the government’s remarks

were improper and show that he was denied a fair trial

because of them. Id.
14 No. 13-2204

Marr contends that the prosecutor’s remarks in his case

were comparable to the improper propensity comments made

by the prosecutor in United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746 (7th

Cir. 2013). In Richards, the prosecutor repeatedly called the

defendant a “drug-dealer” in his closing argument and said,

“[c]learly the defendant's drug dealing is not limited to

California. It happens here too.” Id. at 764. The court held that

the comments were improper because the prosecutor made

“the [propensity] argument ‘once a drug dealer, always a drug

dealer.’” Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 389 F.3d 753, 757 (7th

Cir. 2004)). Here, the government made no such propensity

argument.

In closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the checks

that were converted to cash and asked, “what legitimate

business does that? What legitimate business writes $1.3

million to cash and to a currency exchange?” These remarks

were “reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at

trial.” See United States v. Nunez, 532 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir.

2008). We find no impropriety in the government’s closing

argument.

None of the prosecutor’s remarks during rebuttal closing

were improper either. The prosecutor remarked that Equipment Source was a “sneaky, dirty business.” Prosecutors are

allowed to comment on the weakness of the defense’s theory.

Id. at 654; see also United States v. Glover, 479 F.3d 511, 520 (7th

Cir. 2007). The prosecutor’s remarks were in response to

Marr’s defense that he honestly tried to rescue his failing

business. Therefore, we find no impropriety in the government’s rebuttal argument either.
No. 13-2204 15

B. Jury Instructions

Marr also challenges Jury Instructions Nos. 25, 31, and 32.

He argues that the instructions were erroneous because they

did not require the government to prove that Marr specifically

intended to defraud a financial institution, i.e., Palos Bank. 

We review challenges to jury instructions de novo. United

States v. DiSantis, 565 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 2009). “The district

court ‘is afforded substantial discretion with respect to the

precise wording of instructions so long as the final result, read

as a whole, completely and correctly states the law.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Gibson, 530 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir.

2008)). We reverse only if the instructions as a whole do not

correctly inform the jury of the applicable law and the jury is

misled. Id.

In this case, the district court tendered the following

instructions to the jury over Marr’s objections:

Instruction 25

As used in these instructions, the phrase “intent to

defraud” means that the acts charged were done

knowingly with the intent to deceive customers of

Equipment Source USA in order to cause a gain of

money or property to the defendant orthe potential loss

of money or property to another.

Instruction 31

A scheme “affected” a financial institution if it exposed

the financial institution to a new or increased risk of

loss.
16 No. 13-2204

Instruction 32

The government must show thatthedefendant engaged

in a scheme to defraud with a specific intent to defraud

and that the scheme affected a financial institution. The

government is not required to prove that the defendant

intended to defraud a financial institution.

“To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government

must prove three elements: (1) the defendant participated in a

scheme to defraud; (2) the defendant intended to defraud; and

(3) a use of an interstate wire in furtherance of the fraudulent

scheme.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657,

664 (7th Cir. 2008). Marr’s argument focuses solely on the

second element of the offense, the required mens rea.

To convict Marr of wire fraud, the government was not

required to prove that Marr specifically intended to defraud

Palos Bank. While our circuit has yet to specifically address this

issue, the Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires a

jury to find only that the defendant “had the intent to defraud”

and need not find that the defendant intended to defraud a

financial institution because “the object of the fraud is not an

element of the offense.” United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193,

216 (3d Cir. 1992). In a recent wire fraud case in the First

Circuit, the court “flatly rejected the idea that the government

is obliged to prove that the defrauders intended to defraud

a specific victim.” United States v. Tum, 707 F.3d 68, 76 (1st Cir.

2013). We join the reasoning of our sister circuits and hold that

the wire fraud statute only requires the government to prove

that a defendant intended for his or her scheme to defraud
No. 13-2204 17

someone, a financial institution does not need to be the intended

victim.

Here, the district court modeled Instruction 25 after the

Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction for the Seventh Circuit that

defines the “intent to defraud” for 18 U.S.C. § 1343. We

presume that the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the

Seventh Circuit correctly state the law, United States v. Leahy,

464 F.3d 773, 796 (7th Cir. 2006), and Marr does not argue that

the formulation of the pattern instruction was in error. At trial,

the government showed that both Equipment Source customers and Palos Bank fell victim to Marr’s scheme. Therefore,

naming the Equipment Source customers as the intended

victim of Marr’s scheme in Instruction 25 correctly informed

the jury on the applicable law. 

There is not a Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction for the

Seventh Circuit directly applicable to Instruction 31. However,

there is a Seventh Circuit case. In United States v. Serpico, 320

F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2003), we approved a jury instruction in

a wire fraud case which stated that “schemes affected the

banks if they ‘exposed the financial institution[s] to a new or

increased risk of loss.’” (citing the jury instruction). While the

precise wording of Instruction 31 is not the same as the

instruction in Serpico, it does completely and correctly state the

law. 

There is not a Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction for the

Seventh Circuit for when a wire fraud scheme affects a

financial institution either. However, we find that Instruction 32 correctly informed the jury of the applicable law. To

convict Marr of wire fraud, the government needed only to
18 No. 13-2204

prove that Marr’s scheme to defraud affected Palos Bank, not

that Marr intended to defraud Palos Bank. As we clarified

above, in a wire fraud case the “object of fraud is not an

element of offense.” Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 216. Therefore, we hold

that the district court properly instructed the jury on the mens

rea required to support Marr’s wire fraud conviction.

C. Restitution Order

Marr’s final argument is that the district court did not have

authority to order restitution to Palos Bank. He contends

that Palos Bank does not qualify as a victim under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663. We

review de novo the district court’s authority to order restitution.

United States v. Hosking, 567 F.3d 329, 331 (7th Cir. 2009). 

The MVRA requires the court to order a “defendant [to]

make restitution to the victim of the offense” and defines a

victim as “any person directly harmed by the defendant's

criminal conduct in the course of the scheme.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(a)(1)-(2). The purpose of the MVRA is to compensate

victims for harm “caused by the specific conduct that was the

basis of the offense of conviction.” See United States v. Donaby,

349 F.3d 1046, 1052 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Hughey v. United

States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990)). The court determines who is a

victim by a preponderance of the evidence during sentencing.

Id. at 1053.

Palos Bank easily qualifies as a victim under the MVRA

definition of a victim. The record contains ample evidence

showing that Palos Bank was directly harmed by Marr’s wire

fraud scheme. Marr charged Equipment Source customers for

forklifts he neither owned nor delivered. The customers
No. 13-2204 19

received refunds paid out of Equipment Source’s merchant

account. Marr depleted the funds below the reserve required

to maintain the merchant account. Chargebacks continued to

accrue after Palos Bank suspended the Equipment Source

accounts. Afterwards, Palos Bank paid the $328,881.89 deficit

to Equipment Source customers and was never reimbursed by

Marr. Therefore, the district court had the authority to order

restitution payable to Palos Bank.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court properly admitted evidence regarding

Equipment Source checks written to cash or to the currency

exchange, the three challenged jury instructions were proper,

and the district court had the statutory authority necessary to

order restitution payable to Palos Bank. The judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.