R-896 

EA 

‘L Aucvrnv 11. Texas 

PRICE DANIEL’ 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

December 30, 1947 

Han, Sherwood Brown, Jr, Opinion No. 'V-469 

County Attorney 

Galveston County Re: Authority' of a comGalveston, Texas missionersO court to 

purchase an automobile for the county 

juvenile officer with 

money seised in a 

gambling house raid, 

Dear Sir: 

Reference is made to your letter and enclosures of recent date wherefn you request the opinion of 

this Department on the following question: 

"Does the County Auditor have authority 

to advertise for and purchase an automobile 

for the Juvenile Officer of Galveston County, 

Texas, with money sefsed,in a gambling house 

raid, said money being declared confiscated 

by an order of the District Judge under the 

provisions of Artiele 637, Penal Code of 

Texas, and delivered ,to the County by said 

order upon the condition that it be used for 

that purpose, where said money was deposited 

by the 6ounty,Audftor in the General Fund, 

and where there is no pr.ovisfon under %he 

law permittfng the purchase by the County of 

Galveston of an automobile for the Juvenile 

Officer?" 

This Department, following the decisions af 

the Texas courts, has repeatedly held that the CommiesionersQ Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction and 

has only,such powers as are conferred upon it by the 

statutes and Constitution of this State, either by express terms or by necessary implication. See, 18 of 

Art,, V, Constitutfonof Texas; Art, 2351, V,C,S.; Von 

Rosenberg vsO Lovett, I.73 S,W, 508; Galveston, H, & S, 

A, Ry. Coo VS~ Uvalde County, 167 SOW, (2d) 1084; 11 

Texi Jur, 5640 
. . . 

Hon. Sherwood Brown, Jr. - Page 2 (V-469 ) 

In former Opinion No, O-5812 dated February 

9. 1944. this Department had under consideration the 

authority of the-Commissioners( Court to purchase automobiles for the county judge, county tax assessorcollector and county probation officer, all to be used 

in the performance of officialbusiness. In advising 

that the Legislature of Texas, in the absence of a 

special County Road and Bridge Law, and under provisions of the general law, had granted authority to Commissioners' Courts to purchase automobiles for only the 

sheriff and the district attorney or criminal district 

attorney in certain counties, and for no other county 

officials. The opinion used the following language: 

"No other statutory or constitutional 

authority exists, so far as we have been 

able to ascertain, whereby a Commissioners 

Court may furnish or allow an automobile 

for the'use of any'county or district officials, other than those hereinabove listed. 

"It is a familiar rule of construction 

th&the specification of one partioular 

excludes all other cl.asseso 

v. &el, (Civ. App,) 61 S,W; (2d) 14"?t" 

Also see 39 Tex. Jur,, pe 188, par. 100, in 

which the Pexpressio unius' rule (the expression of one thing is exclusive of another) is discussed. Said rule of construction clearly has application to the~ouestions 

now under consideration, The Legislature has, 

by general law, only designated two classes 

of officers that might be allowed automobiles 

for official use by the Commissioners', Court, 

They are sheriffs and certain District Attorne 

ea f de 

s or Criminal District Attorneys as aforeNot having so designated any other officer or officers to whom the Commissionersq 

Court might furnish or allow automobiles for 

official use) the Legislature has granted no 

authority by general law to said Court to 

furnish or allow automobiles for such use to 

any officials other than those already named." 

We are aware of the special road law, with the 

amendment thereto, under which Galveston County operates. 

However, we find no authority contained in it forthe 

purchase of an automobile for the county juvenile officer of Galveston County. 

) 
Hon, Sherwood Brown, Jr0 - Page 3 (V-469) 

Tubing directly to the question now under con& 

sideration, we quote Sec. 3 of Art, 637, V,P,C,, in part, 

as follows: 

"If upon a hearing of the matter referred 

to in Art, 636, Penal 6ode of Texas the JUStice of the Peace, 6ounty Judge or &Lstrict 

Judge before whom the cause is pending, shall 

determine that the property seized is a gaming 

table, bank,or gambling paraphernalia and equipmen% per 5e, or if Che Justice of the Peace, 

County Judge or District Judge shall determine 

that the same8 or any part thereof, was in 

fact used as equipment OP paraphernalia for 

gambling.house or was being used for gaming 

purposes, then any money or coins seized in or 

with said equipment or paraphernalia shall;by 

order of the 60urt, be declared confiscated, 

and the GOUP% shaalll cause the same to be delivered to %he S&ate of Texas or any political 

subdivision thereof, OP to any State institution to be used by it for its own use and benefi%, or the Cour% may fn its dfscre%ion order 

such money or coins to be delivered to the 

Grand Jury of the county in which such equipment or paraphernalia was seized; to be used 

by said Grand Jury for the purpose of %nveatigatfn 

this 5 

the violations of the gaming laws of 

tate or for the purpose of investigating 

violations of any of the provisions of the 

Penal 6ode of this State, O Qn 

fiscated in a gambling house raid to GaYves%on 6ounty 

burdened, however, with an express condition as to its 

future use0 

We quote Art, XVI See, 24 Gonstitution of 

Texas, and Arts, 1626 and I&28, V,6,S, as foliows: 

"Sec. 24, The Legislature shall make 

provision for laying out and work%ng public 

roads, for %he building of bridges, and for 

utilizing fines, forfeitures, and convict 

labor to a91 these purposesOn 
Hon, Sherwood Brown, Jr. - Page 4 (V-469) 

Art, 1626 reads as follows: 

"Claims against a county shall be registered in three classes, as follows: 

"1. All'jury scrip and scrip issued for 

feeding jurors., 

"2. All scrip issued under the provisions of the road law or for work done on 

roads and bridges. 

“3. All the general indebtedness of the 

county, including feeding and guarding prisoners, and paupers9 claims," 

Art. 1628 reads as follows: 

"The funds received by the county treasurer shall be classed as follows, and shall be 

appropriated, respectively, to the.payment of 

all claims regist~ered in the first, second and 

tkiird classes: 

"1, All jury fees;all money received 

from the sale of estrays, and all occupation 

taxes. 

"2. All mon'ey received under any of the 

provisions of the road and bridge law, including the penalties recovered,from railroads 

for failing to repair crossings, and all fines 

and forfeitures, 

“30 All money received, not otherwise apP 

ropriated herein or by the commissioners court." 

Underlining supplied) 

-Forfeiture is the loss of lands and goods to 

the State, as the consequence of crime, and is distinguishable from confiscation in that the latter is the 

consequence of the forme,r, Forfeiture is the result 

which the law attaches as an immediate and necessary 

consequence to the illegal acts of the individual; con-. 

fiscation implies the action of the state, and property, 

although it may be forfeited, cannot be said to be confiscated until the government has formally claimed or 

taken possession of itO BlackPs Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed, 
. . 

Hon. Sherwood Brown, Jr. - Page 5 (V-469) 

Clearly a forfeiture has occurred in this case, 

and the forfeited property has been confiscated by the 

State0 Following the plain import of.the above quoted 

constitutional and statutory mandates, if the District 

.Judge gives the #1710060 to Galveston County it is to 

be deposited in the road and bridge fund of Galveston 

County. Once in the road and bridge fund, it becomes 

county funds for all intents and purposes and is to be 

expended by the commissioners' court as the Constitution 

and statutes direct that road and bridge funds should be 

spent. 

The CommissionereD Court of Galveston County 

is powerless to fulfill the condition placed upon the 

use'of the Qbl7lOb60 delivered to it under the terms of 

Art. 637, V.P.C,, in the absence of statutory or constitutional authority. The Commissioners' Court can 

function only where authority ha6 been conferred upon it 

and in this instance no authority to ex end 

for an automobile for the county juveni f 

county funds 

e officer exists, 

In view of the fore$olyi we are of the opinion that the county auditor o Ga veeton County has no 

authority to advertise for and purchase an automobile 

for the county juvenile officer with money confiscated 

and delivered to Galveston County under the circumstances 

you have outlined. 

A commissionersP court has no authority 

to purchase an automobile for the county juvenile'officer with money seised ina gambling 

raid and declared confiscated by a district 

court and delivered to the county upon condition that it make such purchase. Sec. 3$ Art. 

637, V,P,C,; Seca 24 Art. XVI Texas Con&., 

Art. 1628 V.CoSos Opinion No, b-5812. 

Yours very truly 

APPROVED: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

BY 

JTB/djm/lh/erc