4/December 2006—MDC 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice: Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 30, 2008 

PATRICIA D. BRACKETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 135375 

FOCUS HOPE, INC., and ACCIDENT 

FUND INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

AMERICA, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

CORRIGAN, J. 

This case requires us to consider whether plaintiff’s refusal to attend an 

employer-mandated event constituted “intentional and wilful misconduct” under 

MCL 418.305, thereby barring her recovery of benefits under the Worker’s 

Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq. The magistrate found that 

plaintiff willfully refused to attend the event, despite having been informed that 

the event was essential in promoting the employer’s goal of racial reconciliation. 

In light of that finding, we conclude that plaintiff’s refusal to attend the mandatory 

event constituted intentional and willful misconduct, thereby barring workers’ 
 

compensation benefits under MCL 418.305. We thus reverse the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Defendant Focus Hope, Inc., hired plaintiff as a full-time employee in 

January 2001. Defendant’s cofounder and chief executive officer, Eleanor 

Josaitis, told plaintiff that the mission of Focus Hope is to seek racial equality and 

reconciliation. Josaitis further explained that the most important function of the 

year is the Martin Luther King, Jr., birthday celebration, and that each employee 

was expected to attend the event. If the employee had a legitimate excuse for not 

attending, the employee was to inform the human resources department. 

The King Day event was ordinarily held in Detroit, but in 2002, Josaitis 

decided to hold it in Dearborn. Plaintiff told her immediate supervisor, David 

Lepper, that she would not attend the event in Dearborn because she and her 

family had bad experiences there as African-Americans and because she believed 

the history of race relations in Dearborn was not in keeping with Dr. King’s 

aspirations. Lepper advised plaintiff that she would be docked one day’s pay for 

refusing to attend. Plaintiff did not tell Josaitis or the human resources department 

of her decision not to attend. 

After the King Day event, Josaitis met with plaintiff, Lepper, and a human 

resources manager. Josaitis asked plaintiff why she had not attended the King Day 

celebration. Plaintiff explained that she believed the site of the event in Dearborn 

was not appropriate. Josaitis responded that plaintiff had been informed when she 

2
 
was hired that attendance at the King Day event was mandatory, and that the 

purpose of Focus Hope was to promote acceptance and tolerance. Josaitis advised 

plaintiff that she would be docked for two days’ pay. Subsequently, some of 

plaintiff’s job responsibilities were taken away. 

Plaintiff and Josaitis then exchanged memos explaining their respective 

positions. Josaitis wrote in her memo that plaintiff’s failure to attend the King 

Day event had reduced her confidence in plaintiff’s commitment to Focus Hope’s 

goals. Josaitis explained: 

The purpose of the Civil Rights movement was to change the 

negative perception and prejudice of any individual towards another, 

based on race, gender, religion, color, or creed through the use of 

non-violent action. Father [William] Cunningham and I started 

Focus: HOPE based on this same philosophy that Dr. King gave his 

life for. Just as I stated to you in your orientation, I expect Every 

Focus: HOPE Colleague to abide by these same principles. 

To harbor such feelings of the past without thinking how our 

MLK mandatory staff development day helps to move Focus: HOPE 

into the future, reduces my confidence in your commitment to help 

us fulfill our mission statement. 

In her memo, plaintiff admitted that she understood that attendance at the 

King Day event was mandatory, but stated that she “felt offended by the 

celebration being in a city that I do not frequent and that I would be extremely 

uncomfortable celebrating Martin Luther King’s birthday [in].” She added, “I did 

not attend the celebration and expressed [in the meeting] that I spent it with my 

family and with no regrets accepting the day off with no pay!” Plaintiff then 

3
 
 

 

wrote, “I do not accept [Josaitis’s] judging and wrongfully degrading my character 

as a [sic] ‘untrustworthy person.’” 

Plaintiff claims that a second meeting occurred in which Josaitis allegedly 

reiterated her disappointment in plaintiff, shook her finger in plaintiff’s face, and 

said that plaintiff did not deserve to receive a paycheck from Focus Hope. When 

plaintiff asked if she was being fired, Josaitis shrugged her shoulders and let her 

out of the office. Josaitis testified that she remained calm and that she did not yell 

or threaten to fire her. 

Plaintiff claimed that Josaitis’s alleged comments traumatized her. Plaintiff 

left work and never returned. Her psychologist opined that plaintiff suffered a 

major depression precipitated by work events and that she is unable to work. A 

defense psychiatrist found no evidence of a continuing mental disability and 

opined that plaintiff could return to work without restrictions. 

The workers’ compensation magistrate credited the testimony of plaintiff 

and her psychologist. The magistrate found that plaintiff’s mental disability arose 

from actual employment events and that plaintiff’s perception of those events was 

reasonable.1

 Although the magistrate found that plaintiff had willfully refused to 

attend the King Day event, and that her disability had resulted from that willful 

1

 The magistrate reached this conclusion in spite of his “personal” view that 

“the reaction of Ms. Brackett to these events and her reasonable perceptions 

thereof (i.e., experiencing a major depressive episode causing disability for more 

than two years) is excessive bordering on outlandish.” 

4
 
 

refusal, the magistrate nonetheless rejected the defense argument that plaintiff’s 

misconduct barred her recovery of benefits under MCL 418.305. The magistrate 

stated that “[t]he kind of ‘misconduct’ plaintiff engaged in here is a far cry from 

the alleged misconduct [i.e., sexual harassment] alleged in Daniel [v Dep’t of 

Corrections, 468 Mich 34; 658 NW2d 144 (2003)], and for that reason I decline to 

follow” Daniel. 

The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed. It 

chastised defendant as “insensitive” for failing to recognize that plaintiff’s 

agreement to attend King Day celebrations would not require her to attend such 

events in Dearborn. Thus, the WCAC found “absolutely no merit to defendants’ 

claim that plaintiff’s behavior should disqualify her for benefits pursuant to the 

doctrine set forth in” Daniel. 

The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit,2

 but this 

Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave 

granted, in light of Daniel.

3 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 

WCAC decision.4

 The Court of Appeals determined that sufficient evidence 

supported the finding that plaintiff’s conduct was a “far cry” from the misconduct 

in Daniel. Citing Andrews v Gen Motors Corp, 98 Mich App 556; 298 NW2d 309 

2

 Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 28, 2006 

(Docket No. 266018). 

3

 477 Mich 922 (2006). 

4

 Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 

23, 2007 (Docket No. 274078). 

5
 
 

 

 

(1980), the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff’s conduct fell within the 

realm “in which a claimant perhaps violates a workplace rule or expectation but is 

not precluded by § 305 from recovering benefits for a resulting injury.”5 

Defendants again applied for leave to appeal to this Court. We scheduled 

the case for oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address 

“whether plaintiff’s injury resulted from her willful misconduct.”6 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In the absence of fraud, this Court must consider the WCAC’s findings of 

fact conclusive if any competent evidence in the record supports them. MCL 

418.861a(14); Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 698; 614 

NW2d 607 (2000). We review de novo questions of law, including statutory 

interpretation. Karaczewski v Farbman Stein & Co, 478 Mich 28, 32; 732 NW2d 

56 (2007); Daniel, supra at 40. 

III. ANALYSIS 

MCL 418.305 provides: “If the employee is injured by reason of his 

intentional and wilful misconduct, he shall not receive compensation under the 

provisions of this act.” “This provision has remained essentially unchanged since 

it was first adopted by the Legislature in 1912 as part of the original workers’ 

compensation legislation. See 1912 (1st Ex Sess) PA 10, part 2, § 2.” Daniel, 

5 Id. at p 2. 

6

 480 Mich 1147-1148 (2008). 

6
 
supra at 41. The question here is whether plaintiff’s refusal to attend an 

employer-mandated event, a refusal that the magistrate specifically found to be 

“willful,” constitutes “intentional and wilful misconduct” that bars recovery of 

workers’ compensation benefits. 

Our fundamental obligation when interpreting a statute is to discern the 

legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the 

statute. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 

(2002). An undefined statutory term must be accorded its plain and ordinary 

meaning. MCL 8.3a; People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 151; 730 NW2d 708 

(2007). A lay dictionary may be consulted to define a common word or phrase 

that lacks a unique legal meaning. Id. at 151-152. A legal term of art, however, 

must be construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning. 

MCL 8.3a; Mayberry v Gen Orthopedics, PC, 474 Mich 1, 7; 704 NW2d 69 

(2005). In this case, we need not determine whether the statutory phrase 

“intentional and wilful misconduct” is a common phrase or a legal term of art 

because the terms in the phrase are similarly defined in both a lay dictionary and a 

legal dictionary. 

“Intentional” is defined as “done with intention or on purpose.” Random 

House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). “Willful” is defined as “deliberate, 

voluntary, or intentional.” Id. “Willful implies opposition to those whose wishes, 

suggestions, or commands ought to be respected or obeyed: a willful son who 

ignored his parents’ advice.” Id. “‘“[W]illful” means action taken knowledgeably 

7
 
by one subject to the statutory provisions in disregard of the action’s legality. No 

showing of malicious intent is necessary. A conscious, intentional, deliberate, 

voluntary decision properly is described as willful, “regardless of venial 

motive.”’” People v Hegedus, 432 Mich 598, 605 n 7; 443 NW2d 127 (1989) 

(citations omitted). “Misconduct” is defined as “improper behavior.” Random 

House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). Therefore, conduct is “intentional 

and wilful misconduct” if it is “improper” and done “on purpose” despite the 

knowledge that it is against the rules. 

Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines “intentional” as “[d]one 

with the aim of carrying out the act,” and it defines “willful misconduct of 

employee” as “[t]he deliberate disregard by an employee of the employer’s 

interests, including its work rules and standards of conduct, justifying a denial of 

unemployment compensation if the employee is terminated for the misconduct.” 

And, indeed, in the past, our Court has approached the definition of “willful 

misconduct” with this understanding. In Detwiler v Consumers Power Co, 252 

Mich 79; 233 NW 350 (1930), this Court defined “willful misconduct” as an 

employee’s “obstinate or perverse opposition to the will of the employer.” 

In Detwiler, the plaintiff’s husband was killed in a freight elevator accident 

at work. Another employee had “cautioned” the decedent against using the 

elevator because it was dangerous, but the employer had no rule barring its use. 

This Court rejected the employer’s argument that the decedent’s use of the 

elevator constituted intentional and willful misconduct: 

8
 
Assuming, but not deciding, that wilful misconduct might 

consist in wilful violation of a rule made for the employee’s own 

safety or the safety of others, the record shows no such rule. A rule, 

to be effective as such, must be prescribed by a power having 

authority to make rules and it must be enforced with diligence. 

If it be conceded, for sake of argument, that the instruction or 

caution here was duly authorized, as contended by the employer, still 

it appears that it was not enforced, obedience was not required, and 

it is unavailing in respect of wilful misconduct. It was well said in 

Haffemayer v. United Keanograph Film Co., 1 Cal. Ind. Acc. 

Comm. Dec. (No. 24, 1915) 58, as reported in 8 N.C.C.A. 891: 

“To disregard the instructions of an employer, where such 

instructions are given merely in the form of cautions, and where 

repeated violations of such instructions are known and permitted 

without penalty and without positive insistence upon obedience, 

does not constitute such obstinate or perverse opposition to the will 

of the employer as amounts to wilful misconduct. To hold otherwise 

would be to open the door for employers to impose numbers of 

safety rules upon their employees with a tacit understanding that 

such rules need not, so far as the employers were concerned, be 

regarded if the employees chose to do otherwise, but that if an 

employee was injured while disobeying any such instructions he 

should be deprived of compensation. An employer can not be 

allowed to impose two standards of care upon his employees, one for 

the ordinary conduct of his business and the other as a test of 

liability under the workmen’s compensation * * * act in case of 

accident.” [Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).] 

The Detwiler Court’s adoption of the “obstinate and perverse opposition to 

the will of the employer” definition is useful in according meaning to the entire 

statutory phrase “intentional and wilful misconduct.” Under this standard, § 305 

bars an employee from recovering benefits for misconduct that is both (1) 

intentional, i.e., deliberate or nonaccidental, and (2) willful, i.e., obstinately or 

perversely opposed to the employer’s will. An employer’s work rule must be 

clearly established and consistently enforced in order for the employee to 

9
 
 

understand the mandatory nature of the rule and for its violation to constitute 

intentional and willful misconduct. Detwiler, supra at 81-82. 

The Detwiler analysis is consistent with our recent decision in Daniel. In 

Daniel, the Department of Corrections suspended the plaintiff, a probation officer, 

for sexually harassing female attorneys. After returning to work, the plaintiff 

suffered a mental disability because he felt harassed by his supervisor and the 

female attorneys. This Court concluded that the plaintiff was injured by reason of 

his intentional and willful misconduct. Daniel, supra at 44. Further, this Court 

rejected the Court of Appeals majority’s conclusion that the misconduct did not 

rise to a sufficient level of moral turpitude to be “‘intentional and wilful.’” Id. at 

45. 

Similarly, the facts found by the magistrate and the WCAC in this case 

establish that plaintiff’s refusal to attend the King Day event constituted 

intentional and willful misconduct. Attending this event was a mandatory 

requirement for Focus Hope employees. Josaitis personally interviews every 

prospective employee and impresses on them the necessity to attend the King Day 

event. The magistrate specifically found that plaintiff’s refusal to attend the event 

was willful. Plaintiff did not challenge this finding, and the WCAC did not disturb 

it. This finding is supported by evidence in the record. Therefore, we must treat 

as conclusive the WCAC’s finding that plaintiff’s refusal to attend was willful. 

Mudel, supra. Plaintiff’s deliberate and categorical refusal to attend this 

mandatory function constituted insubordination. 

10
 
In concluding that plaintiff’s misconduct was not excluded by MCL 

418.305, the Court of Appeals agreed with the WCAC that, unlike the sexual 

harassment in Daniel, plaintiff’s conduct perhaps violated a workplace rule but 

was insufficiently serious to preclude benefits under § 305. The Court of Appeals 

cited Andrews, in which the Court of Appeals stated that misconduct must involve 

some unspecified degree of “moral turpitude” in order to bar recovery. The 

Andrews Court relied on Crilly v Ballou, 353 Mich 303, 327; 91 NW2d 493 

(1958), in which this Court asserted in dictum that the statute excluded from 

coverage “acts of a degree of moral turpitude,” equating intentional and willful 

misconduct with acts of a “gross and reprehensible nature.” 

The dictum in Crilly essentially engrafts a “moral turpitude” requirement 

onto § 305. The dictum is thus inconsistent with the plain statutory language, 

Detwiler, and Daniel. The text of § 305 does not create a sliding scale of “moral 

turpitude” that tribunals may assess in deciding whether to apply the statutory 

exclusion. Rather, the statute simply excludes benefits where the injuries arose by 

reason of the employee’s intentional and willful misconduct. Moreover, this Court 

in Daniel rejected the Court of Appeals majority’s conclusion in that case that the 

misconduct did not rise to a level of moral turpitude that was intentional and 

willful. We held that the plaintiff’s repeated acts of sexual harassment were 

voluntary and went beyond negligence or gross negligence. 

The same analysis applies here. Plaintiff willfully refused to attend her 

employer’s most important function. She did so in the face of an express 

11
 
requirement that she attend, and did so even though the location of the event was 

an essential part of her employer’s overall mission. Plaintiff’s refusal to follow 

her employer’s clearly expressed rule constituted an “obstinate or perverse 

opposition to the will of the employer.” She was disciplined for this misconduct. 

As in Daniel, it is undisputed that her mental disability flows directly from the 

employer-imposed discipline for misconduct. 

IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT 

The dissent contends that plaintiff was “selectively singled out for harsh 

punishment” because approximately 50-60 other employees allegedly refused to 

attend the event in Dearborn. But neither the magistrate nor the WCAC found that 

plaintiff was singled out for punishment, and the record does not support such a 

finding. Plaintiff presented no evidence other than her own vague, contradictory, 

and—by her own admission—speculative testimony to suggest that other 

employees refused to attend the event but were not punished. 

Plaintiff initially testified that “50 to 60” of her colleagues “had adverse 

opinions about that particular site.” She later claimed that “there was like 80 

people. [Eighty to ninety] people or something that didn’t attend. I forgot the 

people – the numbers, but there was more than myself – then I was called by 

Human Resources.” Still later, on cross-examination, plaintiff contended that she 

“was the only person out of 80” to be questioned about her failure to attend, then 

added, “I think there was two of us.” When asked how she knew this, plaintiff 

12
 
responded, “I guess it’s speculation.” Plaintiff did not present testimony from or 

even identify any of the other employees who allegedly refused to attend. 

Even if plaintiff had shown that other employees did not attend the event, 

she offered no proof that any such employees failed to provide a legitimate excuse 

to the human resources department before the event, as defendant required, and 

that those employees then went unpunished despite their disobedience. Thus, the 

dissent’s assertion that plaintiff was “singled out for harsh punishment” is wholly 

unsupported in the record. 

Next, the dissent contends that “the ‘harm’ that Ms. Brackett suffered was 

not caused by the initial response by her supervisor, but by the director’s harsh 

personal censure of Ms. Brackett.” Post at 3. This hyperbolic criticism of Ms. 

Josaitis has no basis in the record or in the findings of the magistrate and the 

WCAC. The lower tribunals simply did not find that Josaitis engaged in a “harsh 

personal censure.” It is most regrettable that our dissenting colleagues have 

chosen to lob these unfounded accusations. 

Moreover, the dissent’s unfounded accusations do not reflect plaintiff’s 

documented, ongoing insubordination in which she continued to oppose the 

mandatory attendance at the King Day event. In her memo to Josaitis following 

the initial meeting, plaintiff expressed no remorse. On the contrary, plaintiff 

continued to insist that she should not be required to attend the event in Dearborn 

because she “felt offended by the celebration being in a city that I do not frequent” 

and in which she “would be extremely uncomfortable celebrating Martin Luther 

13
 
King’s birthday.” Plaintiff admitted that she had “no regrets accepting the day off 

with no pay!” And referring to Josaitis, plaintiff stated, “I do not accept her 

judging and wrongfully degrading my character as a [sic] ‘untrustworthy person.’” 

The dissent’s excessive criticism of Josaitis thus appears quite shortsighted where 

plaintiff (1) violated Focus Hope’s rule by refusing to join the King Day 

celebration, (2) admitted her knowledge that attendance was mandatory, and (3) 

continued to express her lack of remorse for skipping the event. 

And as the dissenting justices invent unfounded criticisms of the cofounder 

of Focus Hope, they fail to give effect to the magistrate’s findings that plaintiff 

“actually did willfully not attend the Defendant’s M L King Day Celebration” and 

that “[s]he actually did suffer disciplinary action on account thereof.” (Emphasis 

added.) The dissent’s effort to disconnect plaintiff’s misconduct from her 

resulting disability is therefore unavailing and contrary to the magistrate’s own 

findings. 

Next, the dissent endorses the Court of Appeals assertion that plaintiff’s 

“pre-arranged non-attendance” was not misconduct. Post at 5. But Focus Hope 

required employees to provide a legitimate excuse to the human resources 

department, and it is undisputed that plaintiff did not inform the department of her 

absence before the event. Although plaintiff did inform Lepper, her immediate 

supervisor, of her decision not to attend, plaintiff knew that she was violating a 

rule because Lepper told her that she would be docked a day’s pay. The dissent 

does not explain how plaintiff’s acceptance of a penalty for violating the rule 

14
 
excuses or negates her violation of the rule, nor does the dissent explain how the 

fact that plaintiff was ultimately docked for two days’ pay rather than one negates 

the existence of the rule. The rule existed and was violated regardless whether 

plaintiff was docked for one day or two days. 

It is important to recall that plaintiff was not fired for her refusal to attend 

the King Day event. Rather, plaintiff claims that she remains indefinitely unable 

to work because of a major depressive episode arising from the events surrounding 

her punishment, including having her pay docked for two days instead of one. We 

note that the magistrate himself found plaintiff’s alleged reaction to these events to 

be “excessive bordering on outlandish.” 

The dissent accuses the majority of concluding that plaintiff’s misconduct 

in this case was “equivalent” to the misconduct that occurred in Daniel. Post at 1-

2, 6. But we have expressed no such view. A claimant’s misconduct does not 

have to be “equivalent” to the misconduct that occurred in Daniel in order to bar 

the plaintiff from recovering workers’ compensation benefits. Rather, under MCL 

418.305, the plaintiff is barred from recovering benefits if the misconduct was 

“intentional and wilful.” The statute does not require equivalence to the 

misconduct in Daniel. 

The dissent states that we have “nonsensically” concluded that an 

employee’s intentional and willful misconduct bars workers’ compensation 

benefits “regardless of whether the rule is controversial and whether it is properly 

and uniformly enforced.” Post at 6. As we have explained above, however, there 

15
 
is no evidence that Focus Hope did not properly or uniformly enforce its rule. 

Other than her own admitted speculation, plaintiff presented no evidence that other 

employees failed to attend the event, failed to inform the human resources 

department, and then went unpunished for their misconduct. 

Moreover, MCL 418.305 contains no exception that would allow 

employees to intentionally and willfully violate employer rules that a workers’ 

compensation tribunal or appellate court later deems “controversial.” The dissent 

has invented this exception out of whole cloth. It is not clear on what authority the 

dissent would permit tribunals or courts to find that an employer’s rule is 

“controversial” and to then disregard the plain language of MCL 418.305 on the 

basis of that finding. Nor is it clear whether or how the dissent believes that a 

tribunal or court would possess the institutional capacity to decide on a principled 

basis what is or is not “controversial.” And even if the Legislature had adopted a 

“controversial” rule exception in MCL 418.305, the dissenting justices do not 

explain why they find it “controversial” to celebrate Dr. King’s birthday in a way 

that promotes Focus Hope’s goal of racial reconciliation. 

Finally, the dissent fundamentally distorts the nature of Focus Hope’s rule 

by questioning whether “there was a well-established work rule to hold the event 

in Dearborn, as opposed to Detroit.” Post at 3. But plaintiff concedes that when 

she was hired, she was told by Josaitis that all employees were expected to attend 

the King Day celebration, and that this celebration was the most important event 

of the year for Focus Hope. Plaintiff accepted her position with full knowledge 

16
 
that she was required to attend the event. In 2002, Josaitis held the event in 

Dearborn to further Focus Hope’s goals of racial reconciliation and healing past 

wounds. During her testimony, Josaitis quoted the Focus Hope mission statement, 

which provides: 

Recognizing the dignity and beauty of every person, we 

pledge intelligent and practical action to overcome racism, poverty 

and injustice. And to build a metropolitan community where all 

people may live in freedom, harmony, trust and affection. Black and 

white, yellow, brown and red from Detroit and its suburbs of every 

economic status, national origin and religious persuasion we join in 

this covenant. 

Josaitis testified that “every single person that comes to Focus Hope, the first 

question that they’re asked is do you have any philosophical difference with that 

mission statement. That mission statement is on the back of all of our business 

cards, it hangs on every wall.” 

Josaitis testified that the mission statement fit into the King Day celebration 

because “Martin Luther King was a man that was trying to build bridges. . . . So, 

on Dr. King day we always came together to talk about the history of civil rights 

and where we were going into the future.” She further explained that “every 

single person that comes to work for Focus Hope goes through a two-hour 

orientation with me and then they go through an orientation with the Human 

Resources Department and every single person is told that it is mandatory and why 

it is so important.” (Emphasis in original.) It is undisputed that plaintiff went 

through this orientation. 

17
 
 

Focus Hope’s mission statement articulates goals and ideals that are not 

limited to the geographical boundaries of one city. Indeed, the mission statement 

expressly refers to “Detroit and its suburbs” and to the “metropolitan community.” 

(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff had full notice of the mission statement when she 

agreed to work for Focus Hope, and the 2002 celebration was held in Dearborn to 

advance those goals. Therefore, the dissent’s effort to confine Focus Hope’s 

celebration of Dr. King’s birth to a Detroit-only venue is wholly unconvincing. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we hold that plaintiff’s injury arose out of her intentional 

and willful misconduct in refusing to attend an employer-mandated event. We 

reaffirm the holding in Daniel and reject the insertion of a “moral turpitude” 

requirement into the text of MCL 418.305. Accordingly, the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals is reversed. 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Clifford W. Taylor 

Robert P. Young 

Stephen J. Markman 

18
 
 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PATRICIA D. BRACKETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 135375 

FOCUS HOPE, INC., and ACCIDENT 

FUND INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

AMERICA, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 

I dissent from the decision of the majority of four (Chief Justice Taylor and 

Justices Corrigan, Young, and Markman) to reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals on the ground that the plaintiff’s refusal to attend a mandatory employee 

event constituted “intentional and wilful misconduct” under MCL 418.305, 

thereby barring her recovery of benefits under the Worker’s Disability 

Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq. 

The majority of four, in reversing the decisions reached by the magistrate, 

the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC), and the Court of 

Appeals, has supplanted the very well-reasoned findings reached by the 

aforementioned entities with its own nonsensical conclusion that the “intentional 

and wilful misconduct” engaged in by the plaintiff in this case was equivalent to 

the “intentional and wilful misconduct” that occurred in Daniel v Dep’t of 
 

 

Corrections, 468 Mich 34; 658 NW2d 144 (2003). Having authored Daniel, I take 

issue with the majority’s unfounded conclusion and instead agree that the 

“plaintiff’s decision to not attend the Martin Luther King celebration in 

Dearborn . . . was ‘a far cry’ from the probation officer’s sexual harassment in 

Daniels [sic].”1

 Consequently, I agree with the decision reached by the Court of 

Appeals affirming the magistrate and WCAC’s award of benefits to the plaintiff. 

A brief recitation of the facts illustrates the distinction between the 

employee misconduct that occurred in Daniel2 and the employee action that 

occurred here. The plaintiff, Patricia D. Brackett, worked for defendant Focus 

Hope in Detroit. Focus Hope’s mission statement emphasizes the importance of 

following the teachings of Martin Luther King, Jr. During her hiring interview, 

Ms. Brackett was advised that she would be required to attend a Focus Hope event 

on Martin Luther King, Jr., Day. Because the Martin Luther King Day 

celebrations had always been held in Detroit, Ms. Brackett had no reason to 

believe at the time she was hired that she would be required to attend the event in 

the city of Dearborn. However, in 2002, the year that Ms. Brackett was employed 

by Focus Hope, the director, Eleanor Josaitis, decided to hold the event not in 

1 Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court 

of Appeals, issued October 23, 2007 (Docket No. 274078) (emphasis added). 

2

 The claimant in Daniel was a male probation officer employed by the 

Michigan Department of Corrections. The basis for denying workers’ 

compensation benefits to the claimant in Daniel was the probation officer’s blatant 

and repeated sexual harassment of several female defense attorneys. 

2
 
Detroit, but in Dearborn, in an effort to promote Focus Hope’s goal of racial 

reconciliation. Ms. Brackett testified that the decision was a topic of open 

discussion among Focus Hope employees. Approximately 50 to 60 Focus Hope 

employees, including Ms. Brackett, who is African-American, believed the event 

should not be held in Dearborn. 

Speaking personally about her objections to holding the event in Dearborn, 

Ms. Brackett testified that she voiced her concerns to her immediate supervisor 

given her own family’s past experience in the community. Indeed, evidently the 

Focus Hope director’s desire to hold the event in Dearborn, instead of Detroit, was 

based in part on her decision to expand the scope of Focus Hope’s policy by 

carrying Focus Hope’s message into a new realm, an area that Ms. Brackett 

testified was “not a good fit” for her. 

While the majority equates the “misconduct” that occurred here with the 

sexual harassment misconduct that occurred in Daniel, it is not even clear that 

there was a well-established work rule to hold the event in Dearborn, as opposed 

to Detroit. Therefore, it cannot be said that Ms. Brackett violated a wellestablished work rule. 

Moreover, the “harm” that Ms. Brackett suffered in this case was not 

caused by the initial response by her supervisor, but by the director’s harsh 

personal censure of Ms. Brackett. Specifically, Ms. Brackett notified her 

immediate supervisor that she objected to attending the event in Dearborn and her 

supervisor told her she would be docked one day’s pay for her refusal to attend. 

3
 
Ms. Brackett accepted this reprimand. It was not until after the Dearborn event 

that Ms. Josaitis harshly censured Ms. Brackett for refusing to attend. Ms. 

Brackett asserts that Ms. Josaitis and she had a “one-on-one” meeting, during 

which time the director told Ms. Brackett she was disappointed by Ms. Brackett’s 

lack of loyalty and that she had lost faith in her as a Focus Hope employee. 

In addition, instead of docking Ms. Brackett’s pay for only one day, which 

was the accepted punishment dictated by Ms. Brackett’s supervisor, the director 

informed Ms. Brackett that she would be docked two days’ pay. During this 

meeting, Ms. Brackett further alleges that Ms. Josaitis shook her finger in Ms. 

Brackett’s face and told her that she did not deserve a check from Focus Hope. 

When Ms. Brackett then asked if she was being fired, Ms. Josaitis simply 

shrugged her shoulders and left the room. 

As a result of this confrontation, Ms. Brackett left the job that day and has 

not returned since. She was deeply upset by the incident and a psychiatrist 

diagnosed her as suffering from disabling depression as a result of the harsh 

reprimand by the director. 

Given the fact that Ms. Brackett testified that 50 to 60 other Focus Hope 

employees did not attend the Martin Luther King Day celebration in Dearborn, 

and there was no evidence that these employees were also singled out and 

reprimanded in the same harsh manner as Ms. Brackett, it is questionable whether 

Daniel even applies. Daniel states that “MCL 418.305 does not operate to 

preclude benefits where an employee was injured while violating a work rule that 

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had not been enforced by the employer.” Id. at 46-47. Because it appears that Ms. 

Brackett was selectively singled out for harsh punishment, it is questionable 

whether this work rule was strictly enforced across the board. 

All the lower tribunals that dealt with this case declined to deem Ms. 

Brackett’s decision not to attend the celebration in Dearborn as “misconduct.” 

Although the magistrate found that Ms. Brackett “actually did willfully not attend 

the defendant’s M L King Day celebration,” he made that determination in the 

context of discussing Ms. Brackett’s perceptions of workplace events. In deciding 

whether Ms. Brackett should be denied benefits under MCL 418.305, the 

magistrate used the word “misconduct” in quotation marks and refused to follow 

Daniel, ruling that the conduct at issue in this case was “a far cry” from that in 

Daniel. The WCAC specifically stated that to call Ms. Brackett’s actions 

“misconduct” was “clearly unreasonable” because she should not have been 

expected to attend the celebration in Dearborn. The Court of Appeals agreed that 

Ms. Brackett’s “pre-arranged non-attendance” was not misconduct. Brackett, 

supra at 2. 

Additionally, the magistrate found that Ms. Josaitis’s reaction amounted to 

a “chastisement” of Ms. Brackett, whom she accused of having “broken trust” 

with the organization and with Ms. Josaitis herself. Neither the open discussions 

among the employees of Focus Hope about the propriety of holding the 

celebration in Dearborn nor Ms. Brackett’s discussion with her supervisor about 

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the one-day-pay sanction had prepared Ms. Brackett for Ms. Josaitis’ severe 

criticism and loss of trust in her, which accompanied the decision to dock her two 

days’ pay. Notably, the magistrate did not find that Ms. Brackett was injured by 

Ms. Josaitis’s enforcement of the rule through the increased pay sanction. Rather, 

he found that she was injured by Ms. Josaitis’s expressed personal disappointment, 

lack of trust, and loss of confidence in Ms. Brackett. Thus, it is questionable 

whether Ms. Brackett’s mental injury resulted from the proper enforcement of a 

workplace rule. 

Given the evidence tending to show that Ms. Brackett was singled out for 

harsh criticism, and the fact that her “misconduct” here does not equate to the 

“intentional and wilful” sexual harassment that occurred in Daniel, I dissent from 

the majority of four’s decision to reverse and thereby deprive Ms. Brackett of 

disability benefits. The magistrate, the WCAC, and the Court of Appeals all 

concluded that the rule in Daniel should not be extended to this case. The 

majority of four instead nonsensically concludes that an employee’s decision not 

to follow a work rule amounts to so-called “intentional and wilful misconduct” 

and precludes workers’ compensation benefits regardless of whether the rule is 

controversial and whether it is properly and uniformly enforced. Consequently, I 

agree with the decision reached by the Court of Appeals affirming the magistrate 

and WCAC’s award of benefits to the plaintiff. 

As a final point, I note that given the vastly divergent factual scenarios 

presented in this case and in Daniel, the majority of four should, at the very least, 

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have granted the application for leave to appeal in order that the parties and the 

Court would have the benefit of full briefing and argument on this important 

question. 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Marilyn Kelly 

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