Critical Technology Events in

the Development of Selected

Army Weapons Systems

A Summary of Project Hindsight

Revisited

John Lyons, Richard Chait, and Duncan Long 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

September 2006 
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified 

materials. 

John W. Lyons is a Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University. He was previously director 

of the Army Research Laboratory and director of the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. Dr. Lyons received his PhD from Washington University. He holds a BA from

Harvard. 

Richard Chait is a Distinguished Research Professor at CTNSP. He was previously Chief 

Scientist, Army Material Command, and Director, Army Research and Laboratory

Management. Dr. Chait received his PhD in Solid State Science from Syracuse University

and a BS degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 

Duncan Long is a Research Associate at CTNSP. He holds a Master of International 

Affairs degree from the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, 

and a BA from Stanford University.

Acknowledgments. The Project Hindsight Revisited series of studies would not have 

been possible without the contributions of a great many people. We have done our 

humble best to acknowledge in our foregoing reports those who assisted us in our 

research. Here, we would like to re-emphasize our gratitude for the efforts of two of these 

people: Dr. Thomas Killion, the Army S&T Executive, who saw the benefit of looking 

back at key Army weapons systems for insights that would be helpful in managing S&T 

in today’s environment; and Al Sciarretta, who ably supported the entire Hindsight 

Revisited project and gave us valuable insight based on his experience as an active duty 

Army officer. We would also like to express our appreciation to our colleagues at the 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, and to its director, Dr. Hans 

Binnendijk, for their ongoing support. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online 

at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

 ii
Table of Contents 

I. Introduction: Project Hindsight Revisited and the Critical Technology 

Event Concept..............................................................................1 

II. Research Results and Analysis................................................5 

Assessing the Origins of the CTEs................................................................. 7 

Technology Readiness Levels ........................................................................ 8 

III. Comparison of Project Hindsight Revisited and the Original Project 

Hindsight ........................................................................................................ 9 

IV. Findings and Recommendations......................................................... 12 

V. Concluding Remarks............................................................................. 18 

Maintaining a Strong Cadre of Army Technical Personnel ......................... 18 

Observations on Recent Changes in the Acquisition Process...................... 20 

Conclusion .................................................................................................... 22 

Appendix A: CTE Sources......................................................................... 23 

Abrams.......................................................................................................... 23 

Apache .......................................................................................................... 25 

Stinger and Javelin........................................................................................ 27 

 iii
 iv
I. Introduction: Project Hindsight Revisited and 

the Critical Technology Event Concept 

In 2004, Dr. Thomas Killion, the Army Science and Technology (S&T) Executive, 

requested a series of reports detailing technology development for selected Army 

weapons systems. Dr. Killion was interested in studying the genesis of successful, fielded 

systems to gain insight into common factors that promoted technology development and 

integration. He was inspired in part by a similar study conducted by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) in the 1960s, called Project Hindsight.

1

 Dr. Killion hoped that the 

findings of the studies could help guide decisions in managing the Army S&T portfolio. 

Our Hindsight Revisited reports covered four Army weapons systems. We first studied 

the development of the Army’s premier ground combat vehicle, the Abrams main battle 

tank.2

 We followed that study with a paper on the development of the Apache attack 

helicopter.3

 We then covered two man-portable missile systems in a third report: the 

Stinger antiaircraft missile and the Javelin antitank missile.4

 

This report collects and summarizes the findings from these three studies. Included here 

are findings related to the contributions of the Army’s in-house laboratories, the Program 

Managers’ (PM) offices, and industry. We compare these findings to the findings from 

the original Project Hindsight. The report then offers recommendations, based on our 

findings for the four systems, for managing today’s Army science and technology work. 

The paper concludes with commentary on two issues of current interest in today’s 

environment: the problem of attracting and retaining talented technical staff for the 

government’s in-house laboratories, and the implications of recent changes in the 

acquisition process, as seen in the way the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is 

being developed. Before embarking on our analysis, findings, and recommendations, 

however, it is useful to define critical technology events, the key unit of analysis in the 

Hindsight Revisited reports, and place them in the context of the overall innovation 

process. 

Our three Hindsight papers had a common unit of analysis: the critical technology event, 

or CTE. CTEs are ideas, concepts, models, and analyses, including key technical and 

managerial decisions, that had a major impact on the development of a specific weapons 

 

1

 Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Project Hindsight: Final Report

(Washington, DC: Office of the DDRE, 1969). 

2

 Chait, Lyons, and Long, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the Abrams Tank: Project 

Hindsight Revisited,” Defense and Technology Paper 22 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, December 2005). 

3

 Chait, Lyons, and Long, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the Apache Helicopter: 

Project Hindsight Revisited,” Defense and Technology Paper 26 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy, February 2006). 

4

 Lyons, Long, and Chait, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the Stinger and the Javelin 

Missiles: Project Hindsight Revisited,” Defense and Technology Paper 33 (Washington, DC: Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy, July 2006). 
system. CTEs can occur at any point in a system’s life cycle, from basic research, to 

advanced development, to testing and evaluation, to product improvements. CTEs can 

even relate to concepts that were developed but that ultimately were not incorporated into 

the weapons system. Also, they can originate in many places: the Army’s in-house 

laboratories, the private sector, academia, and the research and development programs of 

our allies. Using CTEs as hallmarks of technical advances gave us a way to focus our 

attention on the important factors for success. We did not attempt to capture every single 

technical development in a given system or to discuss its development in exhaustive 

technical detail. 

Given the central importance of the CTE to our reports, it is worthwhile to explain the 

concept in greater detail and place it in the broader context of technical innovation. A

useful framework for understanding the innovation process and the genesis of 

operationally useful advances is provided by a recent report from the National Defense 

University, “The S&T Innovation Conundrum,” by Coffey, Dahlburg, and Zimet.5

 The 

authors hold that there are two distinct phases in science and technology innovation, 

“prospecting” and “mining” (see figure 1). Prospecting is early work that provides a 

fundamental scientific basis for later research. Mining is later work to develop specific 

systems. The prospecting phase is often not focused on a particular outcome, so the 

contribution to a particular military (or other) capability is low. The mining phase draws 

on knowledge gained in the prospecting phase to yield useful capabilities. 

 

Figure 1. Prospecting and mining phases of development of two new technologies.6

 

The majority of our CTEs occurred in the mining phase, in the later stages of the basic 

research-to-engineering development continuum. If taken at face value, this would seem 

to discount basic research and suggest that the most important S&T work takes place in 

 

5

 Timothy Coffey, Jill Dahlburg, and Elihu Zimet, “The S&T Innovation Conundrum,” Defense and 

Technology Paper 17 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, August

2005). 6

 Drawn from Coffey et al. 

 2
applied research, advanced development, and engineering development. This conclusion 

would be incorrect, for two reasons. The first relates to how we defined our CTEs and the 

second has to do with the foundational nature of basic research. We now discuss both. 

First, we elected to count as CTEs only those things that bore on significant 

improvements over the predecessor systems. The Abrams was compared to the M–60 

Patton tank, the Apache to the AH–1 Cobra, the Stinger to the Redeye, and the Javelin to 

the Dragon. We could have broadened the time horizon of our examination considerably. 

For example, to discuss infrared vision systems for the Abrams tank we could have 

looked back to the development of the quantum theory in the early 20th century and the 

subsequent development of solid state physics in mid-century and found CTEs all along 

the way. Doing so would not have shed much light on what was a critical technology in 

the DOD’s development of the particular weapons systems, and would have shifted focus 

from the specific factors that have produced great improvements in the performance of 

the weapons systems studied in comparison to those they replaced. 

Secondly, basic research need not be as non-specific and general as the above reference 

to quantum theory would suggest. It can be problem-driven as well as curiosity-driven. 

Though the DOD defines basic research as the scientific study of phenomena not related 

to any one specific weapons system (i.e., curiosity-driven),7

 and while there are many 

examples of curiosity-driven research in DOD (most clearly in the work sponsored at 

universities), a majority of DOD research is problem-driven. It thus bears directly on the 

needs of specific programs and systems. Also, even non-specific and general research is 

needed to lay the foundations for future advances. Someone must do the prospecting if 

there is to be any mining. 

The importance of basic research is illustrated by figure 2, which charts the evolution of 

the technology associated with the M829 series of long-rod penetrators. The figure 

shows the progression from problem-driven basic research through applied and 

developmental research leading to one version of the M829 series—the M829A1. It is 

important to note that research and development rarely proceeds as linearly and simply as 

the figure suggests. More often than not there are many dead ends, recursive loops, and 

new starts. Nevertheless, the work done in the research phase was the basis for many 

long-rod penetrator-related developments, such as the use of composite materials for the 

sabot of the M829A3 round (CTE No. 16 in the Abrams tank report). These efforts, 

which demonstrate the importance of basic research to providing a stream of new ideas 

on which to base future CTEs, involved contributions from various entities, including the 

Army laboratories, Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and academia. 

 

7

 This definition, however, is not followed in practice. Nor should it be, according to a recent National 

Academies study, Assessment of Department of Defense Basic Research (Washington, DC: National 

Research Council, 2005). This NRC report recommends a concept of basic research that includes both

curiosity-driven work (not addressing a particular system) and problem-driven work (applied to a particular 

problem or problems in developing a system). 

 3
Energetic Materials:

- Propellant Chemistry

- Mechanical properties

- Ignition & combustion

- 2-phase flow models

Mechanics of Composites

- Finite element codes

- Strength of materials

- Analysis of thick composites

- Micro scale model

Penetration Mechanics:

- Constitutive models

- Hi-strain rate propagation

- Metallurgy

- Hydrocodes

Propulsion Technology:

- Travelling charge

- Monolithic charge

- 19 perf stick and granular

charge

- Enhanced energy

Aluminum and Composite

Materials

Sabot Technology:

- Carbon fiber

- Metal matrix

Target Defeat Tech:

- Material (DU vs. W)

- Penetrator Geometry

- Target interactions

- Expl RA defeat

Charge Design:

- 19 perf, JA2 granular

Sabot Design:

- Aluminum

Penetrator Design:

- 680mm, DU rod

Cartridge integration,

producibility, and

performance testing

Basic Research

Applied Research

Adv Development

Eng Development

M829A1

FY 84 85 86 87 88 89

IOC

Figure 2. The evolution of a weapon from basic research to finished product.8

 

 

8

 From the Office of the Chief Scientist of the Army. 

 4
II. Research Results and Analysis 

This chapter reviews the CTEs that emerged from the interviews and correspondence that 

formed the core of our research for the three Hindsight Revisited reports. Our study of the 

development of the Abrams, the Apache, the Stinger, and the Javelin yielded 134 CTEs 

for the four weapons systems. For each system, we offer a quick breakdown of the CTEs 

and a summary of our findings. We then review our analysis of an important point—the 

sources of the CTEs—and discuss our efforts to identify Technology Readiness Levels 

for the advances. Our findings and analysis for the Hindsight Revisited reports set up 

subsequent chapters, where we compare our findings with those of the original Project 

Hindsight and where we offer broad findings for all four systems and recommendations 

based on them. 

Summary of CTEs for Four Army Weapons Systems 

The Abrams tank... We identified 55 CTEs in the development of the Abrams tank. The 

majority of these (31) were related to armor and armaments, including such advances as 

the 120mm gun and the composite sabot. There were 9 CTEs related to the power train 

and 15 related to vehicle electronics, fire control, and communications systems. As 

indicated earlier, not all of these CTEs were technical developments per se. Some, like 

the choice to use a gas turbine engine rather than a diesel engine in the tank, were 

managerial decisions based only in part on technology. 

Our principal findings for the Abrams were as follows: 

• The CTEs came from many sources inside and outside the government. 

• The Army laboratories’ technical expertise in armor and armaments was crucial to 

success. The in-house laboratories also contributed to the infrared sights, fire 

control systems and inter-vehicle communications system, among other things. 

• The ability of Army in-house laboratories to make these contributions is 

attributable to the existence of a skilled technical staff with a depth of experience 

in the relevant technologies. It also depended on a lengthy series of Army

investments in laboratory and field experimental equipment and facilities. 

• Industry made essential contributions to the power train and suspension and to the 

development of manufacturing processes. 

• Close collaboration and teamwork among the several participants, to include the 

Army laboratories and industry, helped move the work along. This closeness was 

facilitated by a supportive management at the Army laboratories. 

• Integration of technologies was overseen by the PM office and implemented by 

the prime contractor. 

The Apache helicopter... We have identified 46 CTEs in the development of the Apache 

helicopter. Ten of these had to do with the power system. Fourteen CTEs were related to 

 5
crew protection, an area on which the Apache’s designers put special emphasis, and other 

structural considerations. We found 19 CTEs on the helicopter’s avionics, fire control 

system, and weapons suite, and 3 CTEs related to the modeling and simulation work and 

other enabling factors. 

Our principal findings for the Apache were as follows: 

• Integration of the many systems and components was critical for success. This 

was done with oversight from the PM office and the Advanced Aviation 

Technology Directorate of the Aviation Systems Command, and implemented by 

the prime contractor. 

• Teamwork was very effective. The many groups involved included the Army inhouse scientists and engineers, the industrial partners, and the experts, facilities 

and equipment at NASA. 

• Army engineers defined the needs and specifications for the Apache program and 

managed the program throughout. Army scientists and engineers conducted basic 

and applied research in support of the program. Industry engineers designed and 

developed key systems and components. 

• Important basic and early applied research was done at co-located Army-NASA 

research sites. The co-location arrangement greatly facilitated work on structures, 

propulsion, and modeling and simulation. Use of NASA’s specialized 

experimental capabilities facilitated the validation of models and the testing of 

new concepts. 

The Stinger and the Javelin missiles... We have identified 35 CTEs for the Stinger and 

the Javelin missiles. For both systems, the emphasis is on the seeker and the guidance 

system. We found 6 CTEs for the Stinger’s seeker and 3 for guidance and control 

systems. For the Javelin’s seeker we found 4 CTEs, for guidance and control, 2 CTEs, 

and for the command launch unit, 6 CTEs. For the propulsion and warhead components 

we found for the Stinger 2 CTEs and for the Javelin 7 CTEs. In modeling and simulation 

we list 2 CTEs for Stinger and 1 for Javelin. The Javelin also had 2 CTEs that were based 

on early management decisions rather than technical achievements. 

Our principal findings for the missile systems were as follows: 

• Both missiles’ development relied heavily on accumulated experience in industry 

with prior missiles. This was especially true in the design of the seekers, the 

guidance and control systems, and the propulsion motors. 

• DARPA played a significant role in the Javelin program. Through a program 

called Tankbreaker, DARPA promoted the development of an antitank missile 

that would use an imaging IR seeker. It also financed the design of the twodimensional staring focal plane arrays needed to build such a seeker. 

• Modeling and simulation developed and used at Redstone Arsenal and by the 

prime contractor played an important role in the development of both systems. 

Models and simulations were used to evaluate new concepts at the laboratory 

stage, to predict performance in field experimentation, and for certification work. 

• The PM office at Redstone Arsenal oversaw the development work and assisted 

the contractors in integrating the components. 

 6
• The in-house laboratories, particularly at Redstone Arsenal, the Night Vision 

Laboratory, and Picatinny Arsenal, made critical technical contributions. They 

also played an important role in evaluating contractor innovations and advising 

the PMs and the Army on technical issues. 

Assessing the Origins of the CTEs 

The CTE, it will be remembered, is a tool to identify important advances so that we can 

consider what factors led to the successful development of weapons systems. One crucial 

factor is who did the important S&T work. We therefore analyzed each CTE to assess 

who, in our judgment, was responsible for the event. We established four categories of 

work performers: government technical facilities, to include all government laboratories; 

private industry, to include prime contractors and sub-contractors; joint 

government/industry, for any CTE in which both government laboratories and industry

played a substantial role; and other, for the accomplishments of universities and foreign 

governments and for CTEs that were government management decisions rather than 

technical advances. It is likely that no CTE represented the exclusive contribution of one 

of these four groups, but except in those cases where contributions were substantial 

enough to warrant the label “joint,” we categorized the CTE based on where the clear 

majority of the work was performed. 

The chart below contains the results of this CTE source analysis (a full list is found in 

Appendix A). For the Abrams, the in-house laboratories dominate with just over half of 

the total CTEs. If we add to this the in-house role in joint work with industry we have 

over 70 percent of the work involving the in-house laboratories. Around a quarter came

from outside the government. The figures for the Abrams are not surprising, given the 

preeminent role of the Army laboratories in the areas of armor and armaments. For the 

Apache, the government laboratories played a somewhat lesser but still dominant role. 

Industry played a greater role than for the Abrams. For the missile systems, the 

contributions were primarily from industry; the in-house laboratories did less CTE work 

independent of industry. There was more collaborative or joint work in which the 

laboratories were important players. 

System Gov't/InHouse Labs Joint Industry Other CTE Total

Abrams 55% 18% 13% 14% 55 

Apache 43% 20% 30% 7% 44 

Stinger and 

Javelin 

17% 25% 50% 8% 35 

Table 1. The percentage of the CTEs for each weapons system contributed by each 

source. This breakdown reinforces for us the vital role played by the government 

laboratories in developing the necessary technology. 

 7
Technology Readiness Levels 

We also analyzed the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of our CTEs. TRLs are used 

to assess where the technology is with respect to a development timeline. The numbers

run from 1 to 9, with TRL 1 being new work and high risk, and TRL 9 being fully 

demonstrated in the relevant field application and ready for use in the force. The 

numbers can be misleading; something labeled TRL 1 may be brand new, but the path to 

full readiness may not be very difficult. The TRLs indicate where a project is on the path 

to fielding and does not tell us how hard it will be to get to the end. By assessing the TRL 

rating of the CTEs, we hoped to shed light on another important factor in the successful

development of a weapons system: how much effort the developers should take to mature 

all the critical technologies with respect to the program timeline. Unfortunately, our CTEbased analysis was not well suited to drawing conclusions on TRLs 

Nevertheless, we did make TRL assessments as of the beginning of work on a particular 

CTE. Thus, work on a technology may have just begun when work on the weapons 

system began. This would indicate a low TRL. If the system called for incremental 

improvement of an earlier technology development, then the TRL might be 5 or above. 

Given the lack of clear information, we made a simple determination: whether the CTE in 

question was TRL 5 and above, or TRL 4 and below. We choose this dividing line 

because TRL 5 is currently the first level at which the technology has passed the 

laboratory “breadboard” stage and is ready for evaluation and experimentation under 

relevant conditions. A CTE at TRL 4 or lower means the technology is still in the 

laboratory, not ready for relevant field experimentation. 

The results: across the four systems, we found more CTEs with TRL levels of 4 or less 

than of 5 and above.9

 We were not able to address TRLs any more specifically than that. 

The principal complication was that the DOD only recently established TRLs as a metric, 

and so they were not defined explicitly in the years under study. Furthermore, though 

CTEs are nominally “events,” many of them refer to technologies that matured as a 

weapons system was developed. It was thus difficult to establish a historical point in time 

at which to assess the TRL, and to keep that point consistent relative to each CTE. While 

our findings were too general to draw useful lessons for today’s S&T program, they were 

broadly consistent with our CTE definition, which led us to focus on new ideas, concepts 

and analysis. Such a concentration on innovation meant that a majority of TRLs at 4 and 

below was to be expected. 

 

9

 Please note that these estimates are the estimates of the authors, not of our interviewees or other sources. 

 8
III. Comparison of Project Hindsight Revisited and 

the Original Project Hindsight

The Project Hindsight Revisited studies were inspired in part by the original Project 

Hindsight, a Department of Defense review completed in 1969 (hereafter, DOD69). A 

comparison of the two studies reveals that while there are clear differences between them, 

their findings are largely in accord on the fundamental issue of what factors promote the 

development and successful utilization of defense science and technology. 

The most obvious disparities between DOD69 and Hindsight Revisited stem from their 

scope and the time between them. DOD69 was a massive study of the development of 20 

different weapons systems drawn from each of the military services. It involved over 100 

personnel over a period of 4 years. The Hindsight Revisited studies looked in depth at just 

four Army weapons systems, and were conducted by three individuals over a year and a 

half. During the 36 years between when DOD69 was completed and the Hindsight 

Revisited studies were begun, clear differences arose in the way that technology is 

developed and fielded. The integrated circuit, the supercomputer, and the personal 

computer were developed during or before the development of the systems we studied. 

Modeling and simulation were introduced just in time for the Hindsight Revisited systems 

but were not available for the systems covered by DOD69. Further, the acquisition 

process was different in 1969 than it is today. Among other things, the role of Program 

Executive Offices (PEOs) and Program Managers (PMs) has been formalized and 

institutionalized. 

DOD69 was driven in part by Congress, which had raised questions about the 

management of and overall payoff from Defense S&T spending. The study appears to be 

a justification of the DOD way of doing research and development. Hindsight Revisited

focused more narrowly on the changes in performance brought about by technical 

advances only as compared to the technology already in the immediate predecessor 

weapons systems. Most of the basic science enabling these advances had been performed 

before the systems under study began to be developed. 

Another difference between the two studies is in the two definitions of the critical events 

that formed the basis for their analysis. DOD69 defined a Research or Exploratory 

Development Event (RXD Event) as limited to the actual technical work, e.g., the 

conception of an idea, the design of a new component, and the initial demonstration of 

utility. As discussed in previous chapters, the CTE was the basic unit of analysis for 

Hindsight Revisited—we sought to determine what technical advances were important 

and then examine the factors that led to them. Unlike RXD Events, CTEs encompassed 

key technical management decisions as well as some significant technical 

accomplishments that were not adopted for use in the weapons system or are in versions 

of the system not yet fielded. 

 9
Hindsight Revisited included discussions of the in-house laboratory environment in terms 

of management support, funding, technical equipment and facilities and the like. We

looked at the value of past investments in the technical areas and the extent to which 

maintaining an experienced staff is important. DOD69 did not emphasize these areas. 

Hindsight Revisited also highlighted the importance of teaming among the participants to 

develop technology as well as integration of the many components of a system. This was 

not considered in DOD69. The PEO/PM, which, as noted earlier, was introduced since 

1969, had a large impact in this area. 

Despite these differences, DOD69 and Hindsight Revisited had broadly similar 

objectives. DOD69 had as one of its major goals to identify management factors that will 

assure that DOD’s “research and technology programs will be productive and that 

program results will be utilized.” Launched with comparable objectives, DOD69 and 

Hindsight Revisited yielded similar findings. It is especially valuable to consider what the 

reports had to say about factors that promote the development and successful utilization 

of defense science and technology. 

 

Both DOD69 and Hindsight Revisited found that in-house laboratories and industry made 

the greatest contributions to defense science and technology. DOD69 found that in-house 

laboratories and industry each contributed roughly 45 percent of the RXD Events, with 

academia and “other” making up the difference. Hindsight Revisited’s findings were 

similar, though we tracked joint government/industry CTEs while DOD69 did not 

consider joint RXD Events. As seen in earlier chapters, Hindsight Revisited found that 

government laboratories and industry together contributed about 90 percent of the CTEs. 

About 40 percent of the CTEs were attributed directly to in-house laboratories, about 20 

percent were joint government/industry efforts, and about 28 percent were attributed to 

industry alone. The balance fell into the category of managerial decisions or contributions 

from allied nations and academia. Further, we found that in two systems (the Abrams and 

the Apache) in-house contributions were dominant; for the two missiles, industry was 

dominant. 

 

DOD69 found that most new technology (as opposed to science) research in DOD’s S&T 

program was problem-oriented, either in generic research for a group of like systems or 

research on problems uncovered in advanced development of a specific system. There 

was evidence of results developed in one program being utilized as well in related 

programs. Hindsight Revisited found that the same is true today. For example, work on 

infrared sensors generally applied to all four weapons systems. 

DOD69 found that utilization depends on a close relationship with the user, an 

appropriate definition of requirements by the user, availability of talented research staffs, 

adequate funds, and effective communication among the participants. Hindsight Revisited

found that this is still true today. Close working relationships among the participants 

were characteristic of the development of all four systems in our studies. It is hard to 

imagine success without such teaming and close ties 

 10
DOD69 found that the dominant technology transfer mechanism was by informal personto-person contacts. Hindsight Revisited found that person-to-person contacts are very 

important and that there are many more ways to communicate than in 1969; e.g., the 

Internet for e-mail and file transfer as well as networks of scientific computers enabling 

teams of workers geographically far apart to carry out joint research. We also found 

there are many other mechanisms for transferring knowledge; namely, informal visits to 

other laboratories, exchange of staff for extended periods of time, permanent move of 

staff to another participant’s operations, participation in integrated product or process 

teams, seminars, and technical meetings. One of the roles of the PM office is to promote 

such communications and transfers of knowledge 

Hindsight Revisited’s findings did disagree with DOD69 on one important point. DOD69 

concluded that the most useful role of science (as opposed to technology) was to explain 

the basis of the phenomena being studied and used by the engineers, and that the 

engineers rely heavily on compiled scientific data in handbooks and texts. Hindsight 

Revisited found that work done in basic research does not just provide explanations for 

phenomena but directly supplies the foundations for the systems of interest. We also 

found that the basic research has usually been done well before the launch of the 

particular weapons program under study rather than during the development period (as 

shown in figure 2). Exceptions are when basic research is necessary to remove obstacles 

that occur during the development. 

In sum, the findings of our studies substantially agreed with those of the original Project 

Hindsight. Though the technology on which it depends has evolved rapidly, the Army

S&T program has consistently benefited from capable in-house laboratories and from

collaboration among those laboratories, and among the laboratories, the user, and 

industry. 

 11
IV. Findings and Recommendations 

We drew findings and conclusions on each of the specific weapons systems in our 

Hindsight reports. These were summarized in Chapter II. While each system was unique, 

there were common elements between our findings for each one. We have compiled these 

common elements, which are largely qualitative, into overarching findings. Where 

appropriate, we offer recommendations for consideration by the Army’s S&T leadership. 

In the following chapter, we discuss in slightly more detail two important current issues 

for the Army technical community: the need to acquire and retain talented personnel for 

government laboratories and the adjustment to the Lead Systems Integrator approach to 

acquisition. 

1. Funding was almost entirely from the Department of Defense. 

The work on the four systems was spread over many different laboratories and over 

different agencies. There was some important funding from DARPA, especially in the 

development of the Javelin missile, but the majority of the money came from Army R&D 

accounts. In some cases work by contractors was done on Independent Research and 

Development funds, but these too come from the DOD. There were some cases where 

the work was done on generic technologies applicable to more than one system but still 

on DOD funding. There were a few areas where investments by our overseas allies 

produced useful additions to the systems, e.g., in the case of the Abrams, work on 

composite armor done by the UK, and development of the 120mm gun done by Germany. 

2. In-house laboratories and industry were the primary sources of CTEs. 

Although CTEs came from a variety of sources—in-house laboratories, industry, 

academia, foreign allies—the in-house laboratories in particular played critical roles in 

the development of each system. Not only did the laboratories contribute many of the 

CTEs themselves, but they also were partners in important collaborations with industry. 

The in-house laboratories played another critical role as evaluators of performance and as 

technical consultants to the contractors and to the Army PM office. They were able to do 

this because they had been able to maintain continuity of staff expertise in the important

technical disciplines and had the necessary equipment and facilities. These functions 

helped ensure that the Army was a “smart buyer.” 

Industry’s technical staffs, as designers of the detailed components and the final systems, 

and the manufacturers were at the center of these developments. They made a great 

many very important technical advances. In each case, they had a trained workforce, 

established facilities, and prior experience with weapons systems. 

The same can be said of the PM office staff. Most of the staff had prior experience with 

similar systems. Many had worked in the in-house laboratories before taking 

assignments with the PM. They often had long-standing individual relationships with the 

contractors’ staffs, relationships that facilitated collaboration.

 12
Finally, the Army on occasion received important technology inputs from overseas allies. 

These resulted from long-standing agreements for cooperation between the Army and 

certain allied governments. 

Recommendation A The Army should maintain strong in-house technical 

expertise in critical technology areas, particularly for those in which it plays the 

dominant role. The in-house laboratories should be funded and managed so as to 

provide the capability to contribute to technical advances for new systems, to 

evaluate work done by contractors and to advise and consult with Army program

managers and senior leadership on acquisition programs. 

Recommendation B While it is wise to turn to the private sector in areas where 

the Army has little or no expertise, the Army laboratories should maintain enough 

competence in those areas to adapt commercial technology for use on the 

battlefield. Buying off-the-shelf technology can be cost effective, but it is rarely 

fully ready for use in the force. The Army laboratories must remain able to act as 

a smart buyer, evaluating and overseeing acquisition programs. 

3. Collaboration among the several participants was critical for success. 

A characteristic of each development was the ability of the participants to work smoothly 

across organizational lines. The attitude of senior managers concerning teamwork with 

other entities strongly influences how the staff conducts its work. Collaboration with the 

private sector has long been a hallmark of Army R&D, much of it at the level of the 

working technologists “at the bench.” There are various types of formal collaborations. 

Recently the Army has created large long-term centers of excellence in areas of interest 

to the Army for the purpose of putting more emphasis on certain technology areas and

promoting collaboration between the private sector and the in-house laboratories. Some 

of these centers are: the Institute for Creative Technology at the University of Southern 

California, the Institute for Collaborative Biotechnologies at the University of California 

at Santa Barbara, and the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies at the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology. These are funded with research grants to consortia of 

universities and private companies, and are led by universities. Another set of consortia, 

funded by the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and led by industry, are more tightly 

coupled to the in-house laboratories. These are called Collaborative Technology 

Alliances. They are managed by ARL; the programs are planned by teams of people 

from ARL and the alliance participants; and personnel may be exchanged between the 

ARL and alliance members. These exchanges facilitate information flow back and forth 

and make technology transfer into the Army much easier. 

 

Recommendation C The Army S&T Executive should encourage and reward 

cooperation and collaboration between all participants. Laboratory managers 

should take visible steps to encourage collaboration, steps such as recognition, 

awards, increased responsibility, and the like. 

 13
Recommendation D In those high priority areas where the private sector has more 

expertise than does the Army, the Army should enter into collaborative programs 

with the leaders in the private sector. The Army should create more of these 

collaborations. 

4. Systems integration was key to the technology transition process. 

For a weapons system to succeed the component parts must mesh smoothly. This means 

that each subsystem must be physically and functionally compatible with all the others. 

Integration was handled mostly by the PM offices and the prime contractors. We did not 

set out in our reports to study systems integration per se, but the topic kept coming up. It 

became clear that it is as important as the development of the component technologies. 

Integration decisions usually require tradeoffs among cost, size and weight, and 

functionality. To understand these factors in turn requires intimate knowledge of the 

needs of the ultimate user, the soldier in the field. Clearly, integration is based on 

detailed technical knowledge. It also requires skills in managing people and 

organizations. In the systems that we studied, integration was achieved by very close 

working relationships—sometimes continuing collaborations—among the participants. 

We believe these relationships account in part for the success of the programs. 

 

Recently, the DOD has begun to use Lead Systems Integrators (LSIs) from industry to 

handle very large, complex systems programs such as the FCS program. The LSIs play 

many of the roles heretofore associated with the Army PM offices. We discuss this 

development at greater length at the end of this chapter. 

 

Recommendation C also applies here—collaboration and communication between 

participants in the weapons development process is vital to smooth and successful 

systems integration.

Recommendation E When the Army chooses to use LSIs it should make certain 

that collaboration between in-house Army experts and the contractors is required. 

The Army should also make sure that it receives, from its own experts, 

independent evaluations of the technical aspects of proposals and prototypes and 

advice on critical decisions involving technology. 

5. The availability of a staff of highly skilled/experienced scientists and engineers 

was critically important. 

Development was greatly facilitated by situations in which there had been a long history 

of technical work on the subject matter in question so that very skilled personnel were 

available. This was true, for example, at Aberdeen in ballistics, at the Night Vision and 

Electron Sensors Directorate at Fort Belvoir, at the NASA Centers, at Chrysler, at 

Hughes and Boeing for rotorcraft, and at Raytheon and Lockheed Martin for missiles. 

These groups were able to move quickly into new, related programs. One of the 

distinguishing characteristics of Government laboratories is their ability to sustain efforts 

over lengthy periods without frequent staff turnover, in contrast to the turnover in 

 14
graduate students and post-docs at universities. This stability at the in-house laboratories 

develops depth of expertise. The potential downside is the possibility of laboratory staffs 

becoming parochial; this must be guarded against. Also necessary is a management 

environment that is supportive and patient and champions the programs. 

Recommendation F The Army should make sure it maintains a technical staff 

based on highly qualified experts. Priority should be given to those areas in 

which the Army has a dominant lead in the technology over domestic industry 

and in which industry does not have the commercial incentive to develop a robust 

technology base. Examples include armor and anti-armor technologies and all 

weather, day/night imaging and sensor systems. 

 

Recommendation G There should be an active recruiting effort to locate talented 

personnel beyond the usual approaches of vacancy announcements and 

advertisements. The Army should use its many formal and informal contacts with 

the ARO-sponsored universities researchers, the Small Business Innovation 

Research program’s work in the small business community, and contacts through 

collaborations at the CTA consortia and the three Institutes discussed above to 

attract skilled staff. There also are the on-going relations with industrial partners 

in systems development that could be utilized. Among other techniques, hosting 

exchanges with visiting scientists and engineers provides the opportunity to 

interest people in the challenges and opportunities of work at Army laboratories. 

Recommendation H The Army should provide stronger incentives to hire and 

retain its scientists and engineers. Salary and bonuses are important but not 

sufficient to keep the best research staff. Most effective researchers are motivated 

strongly by non-financial factors. These include: challenging work associated 

with an important mission, regular contacts with soldiers, stimulating colleagues, 

supportive management, first-class facilities and equipment, opportunities to 

publish, and approval to attend professional meetings. The Army should see to it 

that these characteristics are maintained as strong motivators for new recruits and 

should use the tools at its disposal (financial and otherwise) especially to keep the 

top echelon of its technical personnel. 

6. Having the right equipment and facilities is essential to enable the technical staff 

to carry out the work effectively and efficiently. 

Development of these weapons systems required the use of some very sophisticated 

research equipment, often lodged in special-purpose buildings, ranges, and the like. To

take the Abrams as an example, the program called for gun ranges, armor testing ranges, 

special facilities for testing armor and munitions containing depleted uranium, test tracks, 

materials laboratories, and visualization techniques for measuring the behavior of 

munitions at very high speeds and during penetration of targets. It is important to note 

that much of the work in the four systems we studied relied on advanced computers for 

modeling physical phenomena; e.g., the aeromechanics of the helicopter, finite element 

analysis of the composite sabot for the KE rounds, and firing tests. 

 15
The Army did not develop the weapons systems we studied exclusively in its own 

facilities: there were important contributions from NASA and the DOE national 

laboratories. The co-located Army groups at three NASA sites took advantage of NASA 

expertise and special facilities. Most of the basic research for helicopters was done by 

Army staff at these NASA sites. The DOE laboratories were particularly helpful in 

developing the use of depleted uranium for the Abrams tank. 

Army facilities are used not just by government staff but also by the contractors charged 

with producing a given weapons system. In particular, industry uses Army facilities for 

performance tests. It has long been the practice that new ground combat vehicles be 

tested at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, for example. Also, the test facilities and 

laboratories at Huntsville are used regularly by missile manufacturers. 

The Army had available so many special facilities and equipment because substantial, 

long-term investments had been made. In some cases the facilities and equipment had 

been established and continually upgraded for decades—some dating from before World 

War II. Many of the facilities were and are unique and are used by industry in their work 

for the Army. The skilled staff discussed in Finding 5 were an important factor in 

developing and maintaining these resources. Permanent Army installations with stable 

staffing have enabled this expertise to build up over time and thus to take maximum 

advantage of the capital investments. 

Recommendation I To maintain in-house competence the Army must support its 

laboratories with appropriate facilities, equipment, staffing authorization, and 

funds. There must be continuity in this support: once a facility is closed it is 

extremely difficult to re-establish its capabilities elsewhere, both in terms of

physical plant and staff. 

Recommendation J The Army should maintain its test and evaluation facilities as 

key parts of its development program. These should be used not only for Army

activities but also by industry for tests of interim product advances to guide 

further development. 

7. The user communities were intimately involved in development of the weapons 

systems. 

The contributions of Fort Knox in the Abrams program and Fort Benning in the Javelin 

program are clear examples of the important role the user played. The user worked with 

the technologists to define requirements, and continuing discussions during the 

development phases were useful and productive. The user also defended the programs 

when they were in trouble; when difficulties arise that may threaten the continuance of a 

weapons program, the full support of the user makes a very large difference. 

 16
8. Cross-cutting Technologies. 

Our studies have found many technologies that are used in more than one weapons 

system. The most common is the family of technologies that the military terms C4ISR 

(command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance). Examples of ISR are night vision sights and the Global Positioning 

Satellite (GPS) system. Communications networks connect soldiers to each other and 

commanders to their soldiers. Computers are found in all communications systems and, 

as microprocessors, are in nearly all weapons. 

Of particular significance for systems development is the discipline of modeling and 

simulation or M&S. Simulation in the military falls in three categories: live, in which 

real people use simulated equipment in the real world; virtual, where real people use 

simulated equipment in a simulated world; and constructive, where everything is 

simulated. Simulation is used in the laboratory, in training, and in test and evaluation. 

As we saw in development of each of the four Hindsight Revisited systems, this 

technology enables the investigator to study many different experiments on the computer 

thereby expanding the scope, shortening the time, and reducing the cost of development 

work. 

 17
V. Concluding Remarks 

We offer here two additional sets of observations stimulated by these studies. The first, 

on personnel policy at the in-house laboratories, presents further details on the years-long 

struggle at DOD to strengthen the technical staff. The second addresses the impact of 

using LSIs to acquire new weapons systems. 

Maintaining a Strong Cadre of Army Technical Personnel 

One issue that cuts across the findings given above is the importance of having relevant 

technical expertise, especially in the government laboratories. In recent years—since the 

end of the Cold War—the size of the staff at the Army laboratories has been dramatically 

reduced, in some cases by as much as half. Recently, due to the Global War on Terror, 

this trend has stopped and in some cases been reversed. Yet the question remains: how to 

attract and retain highly skilled personnel? This is a subject that has been studied since 

the 1960s. These studies cover two main categories of concern—forms of governance 

and personnel. These studies have been done by a variety of committees inside and 

outside the Army and the DOD and have produced a large number of recommendations 

as to how to maintain and improve the laboratories. There is consistency among the 

different groups: they all agree on the critical importance of having outstanding scientists 

and engineers and a clear and well-supported mission. Additional needs are stable and 

adequate funding, close relations with the user community, and champions in senior 

management. The recommendations for personnel include competitive pay, good 

equipment and facilities, challenging work, stimulating colleagues, and opportunities for 

interactions with the world-wide science and engineering communities.10 

Consideration of various models of governance for the laboratories range from the status 

quo—government-owned, government operated (GOGO)—up to and including 

government corporations analogous to the Tennessee Valley Authority or the U.S. Postal 

 

10 Some references regarding recommended personnel practices for the laboratories are: Report of the White

House Science Council Federal Laboratory Review Panel (Washington, DC: The White House, May 

1983); Report of the Federal Advisory on Consolidation of Defense Research and Development 

Laboratories (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September, 1991); M. L. Marshall, The Key to a 

World-Class Science and Technology Enterprise: Hiring and Retaining the Best and Brightest Scientists 

and Engineers, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, Applied Research Laboratory, 

March 2001); J.M. Bachowsky et al, Science and Technology Community in Crisis, NRAC Report Number

02-03 (Arlington, VA: Naval Research Advisory Committee, May 2002); J.W. Lyons et al, 

“Strengthening the Army R&D Program: A Strategy for Improving Army Research and Development

Laboratories,” Defense and Technology Paper 12, (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National

Security Policy, March 2005); Defense Science Board, 1987 Summer Study on Technology Base

Management (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 1987); Defense Science Board, Task

Force on Defense Laboratory Management Interim Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,

April 1994); Defense Science Board Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology (Washington, DC:

Department of Defense, May 2002).

 18
Service.11 There are trade-offs in selecting the best approach. The more embedded the 

laboratories are in the DOD the more restricted will be the options for improving 

management practices. On the other hand, the further removed the laboratories are from

the DOD the harder it will be to develop and maintain close relations with the user 

communities. 

The Defense Science Board has recommended, among other things, that the DOD 

laboratories ought to make much more use of the Intergovernmental Personnel Exchange 

Act (IPA),12 to bring in experts from state and local government (including state 

universities) for definite terms. Certain agencies, e.g., the National Science Foundation 

and DARPA, have made extensive use of this authority to develop rotating staffs, thereby 

bringing in diverse experiences and points of view. The Army laboratories have not 

made much use of this authority. The advantages of the IPA are offset by some loss of 

continuity and inability to develop depth of expertise. Nonetheless, more use of the IPA 

authority would seem to be useful, especially in areas where Army expertise is in need of 

rapid strengthening. 

Adding visiting workers for shorter periods than for IPAs can also improve capabilities. 

Guests from overseas provide perspectives and ideas that may be different from U.S. 

approaches. In formal collaborations with the private sector, rotation of staff in and out 

of the laboratories can be very useful in exchanging ideas and transferring technology. 

The Army CTAs at the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) do this.13 

The DOD has tried to implement some of the recommendations from the studies 

discussed above. Demonstrations of alternate personnel systems for the laboratories have 

been set up to facilitate hiring, offer employment and retention bonuses to key personnel, 

and link pay increases to performance. The Navy at China Lake, CA, ran a 

demonstration program on a number of topics for improving laboratory operations. A 

major part of this was a series of initiatives on personnel management; namely, 

classification of employees into broad pay bands and performance-based salary 

administration. These aspects later became the core of further demonstrations at 

additional DOD laboratories. Other new features included direct hiring—local authority 

to evaluate and classify applicants and to make job offers—for some positions. However, 

many of the requests from the laboratories for increased authorities have been frustrated 

by upper level personnel functions and the Office of Personnel Management. 14 Recently, 

Congress once again passed legislation in this area, requesting a detailed study of best 

practices in leading laboratories in the private sector and mapping those over into DOD 

laboratories.15 Since the Hindsight studies clearly show the important role of the Army 

 

11 Coffey et al, “Alternative Governance: Tool for Military Laboratory Reform,” Defense Horizons Paper 

34 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 2003); Lyons et al. 12 Public Law 91-648, Part 334. 13 Lyons et al. 

14 For a discussion of the experiences at innovations in laboratory management at one laboratory see

Edward A. Brown, Reinventing Government Research and Development: A Status Report on Management 

Initiatives and Reinvention Efforts at the Army Research Laboratory, ARL-SR-57 (Adelphi, MD: Army

Research Laboratory, August 1998). 15 Section 1123 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006. 

 19
technical staff, the ability to improve personnel management is essential for future 

success. Hopefully, as the National Security Personnel System is implemented, the 

leadership will be mindful of these important observations. 

Observations on Recent Changes in the Acquisition Process 

There is no doubt that the world, and the Army’s S&T needs, have changed significantly 

since the era when the Abrams tank was conceived. Military threats are different and the 

sophistication of the Army’s weapons systems has increased, particularly from the 

introduction of advanced electronics, the changeover to digital computation, and the 

growing emphasis on communications technologies. As the defense community’s 

acquisition needs have changed, so have the ways in which technology development 

programs are carried out. Collaboration with the private sector is the order of the day. 

Among other things, the Army has set up formal collaborations, such as the CTAs 

described in Chapter IV, wherein the Army technologists and their industrial and 

academic partners jointly plan and execute programs in basic and applied research.16 This 

shift toward a greater utilization of private sector resources is driven in part by fact that 

the private sector has overtaken the DOD technology base in some areas, including 

electronics, computers, and software. Also, new weapons systems incorporate a broader 

range of technologies and are generally more complex than in the past, so it behooves 

DOD to call on all the resources available. 

The cardinal example of the trend toward ever more complex weapons programs is the 

Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS). In brief, FCS is a family of 18 manned and 

unmanned weapons and air and ground platforms, bound together by a network, that will 

provide the backbone of the Army of the future. The cost of developing and procuring 

FCS is currently estimated at $160B.17 The DOD has turned to outside firms to manage 

this massive program (and others) and oversee integration of the many parts. For FCS, 

this function, called Lead Systems Integration (LSI), is being fulfilled by Boeing and 

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). This new acquisition strategy 

vests significantly more responsibility in private industry than was previously the case. 

Though the world and the Army’s needs have changed, one point made apparent by the 

Hindsight Revisited studies should not be lost: the Army has had significant success in 

the past decades in developing new, formidable weapons systems. In particular, our 

Hindsight Revisited reports clearly indicate that the government laboratories are a vital 

resource in weapons development. This resource must be used effectively in the new

regime. The challenge is to achieve close collaboration between in-house experts and 

contractors and to obtain the independent judgments needed to evaluate proposed 

innovations by the contractors and to advise the Army acquisition community on 

 

16 Brown. 17 Paul L. Francis, “Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key for Future 

Combat System’s Success,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate, 1 March, 2005, GAO-05-44-2T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 

Office, 2005). 

 20
technical aspects important to their decision making. In an effort to see the impact of this 

new way of doing acquisition on the in-house laboratories, we have taken a brief look 

into the FCS program by interviewing eight senior individuals from across the Army’s 

laboratories. We were particularly interested in the nature of and extent of collaboration 

among the different players as compared to what we have seen for the four weapons 

systems in the Hindsight Revisited studies. 

The Army manages the FCS program through the FCS Brigade Combat Team Program

Manager (PM FCS BCT), who is teamed with the LSI (Boeing and SAIC). The LSI has 

responsibility and accountability for managing and executing the program and making 

day-to-day decisions on technical matters. However, the PM FCS BCT is the final 

authority. Since FCS relies heavily on new or emerging technologies to meet the 

operational requirements, there has, from the outset, been a close cooperation 

between the Army S&T community and the PM FCS BCT/LSI team. The concept phase 

of FCS (2001-2003) was solely funded by a combination of Army S&T and DARPA 

funds. Once FCS became an acquisition program, after the approval of the program's

Milestone B in 2003, the System Development and Demonstration phase of the 

program had its own dedicated funding. Since that time, the job of maturing and 

demonstrating the requisite technologies has been funded either by Army S&T, by the 

FCS program itself, or through a DARPA/Army S&T collaboration. From 2003-2006, 

the majority of the Army's 6.2 and 6.3 budget was used to fund maturation and 

demonstration of high priority technologies in the in-house laboratories. Both the PM 

FCS BCT and the LSI were participants in managing the S&T programs so as to align 

them with the FCS goals and objectives. In most cases, the Army laboratories did not 

receive funding directly from the FCS program or from the LSI or its subcontractors. The 

FCS program did provide direct funding to the in-house laboratories for labor and 

technical support, such as serving on integrated process teams (IPTs) and source selection 

boards. 

 

As FCS moves forward, the task of transitioning the technologies that have been matured 

and demonstrated has become a priority issue and is being addressed through formal 

Technology Transition Agreements between and among the participants. Once mature 

technologies are successfully transitioned, the development and demonstration of 

prototype systems will be solely funded by the FCS program. In cases where this 

development activity will need to be supported by in-house technical experts, the FCS 

program will provide funding. 

 

In general, these arrangements seem to be producing effective utilization of in-house 

expertise, especially in niche areas such as armor, armaments, and ground combat vehicle 

chassis. Collaboration among the participants appears to be as strong as under the earlier 

management approach. Some in-house participants said that they are very close to the 

private sector subcontractors and to the LSI. We are told that the technical staff are 

stimulated by the challenges of the FCS program. If they are having difficulties it seems 

to come from the sheer size of the FCS program and the corresponding size and 

complexity of the management offices, including both the PM FCS BCT office and the 

LSI offices. 

 21
Further changes in the Army S&T program have also been beneficial. At about the same

time the FCS program was established, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) established 

the Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) to manage AMC 

technical work. To improve collaboration and integration, RDECOM has set up two new 

mechanisms: IPTs and technology transition agreements (TTAs). These are meant to

draw together the players in planning and execution such that the work is synchronized in 

terms of technical content and timing. RDECOM is institutionalizing matters and 

relationships that used to be left to individual players. Reaction to this at the RDECs and 

ARL seems to be positive. 

In general, recent changes in the acquisition process and in Army S&T management seem

to be working well, at least from the point of view of the laboratories. However, one 

result of the FCS program has been a narrowing of focus of the laboratories. The tech

base support they receive is for work in overcoming technical barriers in the FCS 

program. One gets the impression that there is less flexibility and less long-term

innovative work going on. We believe that the Army S&T Executive should monitor this 

aspect closely. 

Conclusion 

Our studies of the role of technology in the development of Army weapons systems have 

shown that there are, in every success story, strong, constructive interactions between the 

Army’s in-house laboratories and the technical staffs of the industrial contractors. This 

collaboration has sometimes been assisted by contributions from other Government 

laboratories, universities, and our overseas allies. However, the main players have been 

the Army laboratories and industry, operating under the oversight and participation of the 

PM offices. We conclude that for future success the Army in-house laboratories must be 

supported by sufficient, funding, strong leadership, and top flight technical staff. To 

accomplish this will require champions at all levels in the Army and in DOD. The 

Congress has shown its willingness to help in the personnel area. We have offered 

suggestions as to the measures required to maintain and strengthen these laboratories. 

We believe strongly that such steps will go a long way to ensuring the continued 

effectiveness of the Army’s warfighters.

 22
Appendix A: CTE Sources 

Abrams 

Gov't/InHouse Labs Joint Industry Other

Armament Related CTEs

1 120mm gun decision X 

2 Fracture mechanics application X 

3 Swage autofrettage process X 

4 Error budget X 

5 Statistical models X 

6 Gun tube straightening process X 

7 Long-rod penetrators/120mm gun 

decision X 

8 Long-rod penetrator development X 

9 Long-rod penetrator modeling X 

10 Depleted uranium LRP decision X 

11 High rate forming DU process X 

12 Penetrator/target interaction analysis X 

13 Slipping rotating band X 

14 Sabot tipping ring and scoop design X 

15 Aluminum sabot technology X 

16 Composite sabot technology X 

17 Propellant modeling and analysis X 

18 Propellant design and development X 

 Armament Subtotals: 

13 1 0 4 

Armor and Other Survivability 

Related CTEs 

19 Hull design and analysis X 

20 Hull joining technology X 

 23
21 U.S/U.K armor technology exchanges X 

22 Special armor design X 

23 DU arm

or application X 

24 Ammunition com

partment design X 

25 Less sensitive munitions 

X 

26 Ammunition sensitivity test r

ig X 

27 Combustible casings X 

28 Fire protection system X 

29 Nuclear, Bio

logical and Chemical 

protection system X 

30 Predictive computer m

odels for livefire tests X 

31 Robust m

odel for live-fire tests X 

 Armor Subtotals: 

8 4 0 1 

Engine and Drive System CTEs 

32 Gas turbine engine decision 

 X 

33 Gas turbine engine development X 

34 Air filtration system X 

35 Hydromechanical trans

mission X 

36 X1100 transmission requirem

ents and 

decision X 

37 X1100 transmission gears and brakes X 

38 Improved suspension system X 

39 Replaceable track p

ad X 

40 Drive sprocket fix X 

 Mobility Subtotals: 0 2 5 2 

Vetronics, C4ISR, and Fire Control 

CTEs 

41 Vetronics d

igital architecture X 

42 Ar

my Science Board concept X 

43 The Intervehicular Information System

(IVIS) X 

44 Position

/Navigation system X 

 24
45 Intercom system X 

46 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade 

and Below X 

47 Common module approach X 

48 Models to predict Minimum

Resolvable Temperature X 

49 Commander's Independent Thermal 

Imaging System X 

50 Digital fire-control system X 

51 Laser rangefinder X 

52 Eyesafe laser rangefinder X 

53 Muzzle reference system X 

54 Muzzle reference system fix X 

55 Digital ballistic computer X 

 C4ISR Subtotals: 9 3 2 1 

 

 ABRAMS GRAND TOTAL 30 10 7 8 

Apache 

Gov't/InHouse Labs Joint Industry Other

Power System CTEs

1 AATD sets engine requirements X 

2 Simplified combustor design X 

3 Particle separator design X 

4 Re-design to reduce vibration of 

compressor blades X 

5 Blisks X 

6 Ceramic coating X 

7 Rare earth magnets X 

8 Incremental T700 improvements X 

9 Run-dry transmission X 

10 Gear technology advances X 

 Power System Subtotals: 2 0 6 2 

 25
 

Crew Protection, Survivability, and 

Structural Considerations CTEs 

11 Priority placed on crashworthiness X 

12 Crash survival design guide X 

13 Crashworthy fuel system X 

14 

Wire-strike protection X 

15 Transparent arm

or to separate cockpits 

X 

16 Improved armor for seats X 

17 Active and p

assive survivability 

measures X 

18 Load-bearing arm

or X 

19 Composite m

aterials for rotor X 

20 Ballistically tolerant rotor blade X 

21 Analysis of delam

ination process in 

composite materials X 

 Survivability Subtotals: 5 5 0 1 

 

Avionics, Fire Control, and Weapons 

CTEs

 

22 TADS/PNVS X 

23 FLIR perform

ance model X 

24 High-resolution FLIR for TADS X 

25 Pilotag

e-optimized FLIR for PNVS X 

26 Head mounted site for IHADSS X 

27 Sy

mbology for IHADSS X 

28 Protocols and design standards for 

IHADSS symbology X 

29 Model for rot

orcraft ballistic fire 

control X 

30 Computerized fire control X 

31 1553 databus X 

32 Radio Frequency Interferometer X 

33 Improved data mode

m X 

34 Early rotorcraft targeting radars X 

35 Longbow MM

W radar X 

36 MIMIC X 

37 Mast-mount for Longbow X 

 26
38 Aerodynamic studies for mastmounted Longbow X 

39 SAL seeker for Hellfire X 

40 Longbow Hellfire X 

41 30mm chain gun X 

 Avionics Etc. Subtotals: 11 3 6 0 

 

Modeling and Simulation and Other 

Enabling Methodologies CTEs 

42 Modeling to prevent structural failure 

due to vibration X 

43 Engineering Design Simulator X 

44 Rotorcraft Pilot Associate program X 

 Methodology Subtotals: 1 1 1 0 

 

 APACHE GRAND TOTAL 19 9 13 3 

Stinger and Javelin 

Gov't/InHouse Labs Joint Industry Other

Stinger Seeker

1 Conical scanning X 

2 Rosette scan seeker X 

3 IR/UV detector X 

4 Seeker microprocessors X 

5 Reprogrammable microprocessor X 

6 Lithium battery X 

 Stinger Seeker Subtotals 2 0 4 

 Stinger Guidance and Control 

7 Canard servomechanism X 

8 Laser ring gyros X 

9 Terminal adaptive guidance X 

 Stinger Guidance and Control 

Subtotals: 0 1 2 

 27
 Stinger Propulsion and Warhead 

10 HTPB propellant binder X 

11 Propellant case bonding X 

 Stinger Propulsion and Warhead 

Subtotals: 1 0 1 

 Stinger Modeling and Simulation 

12 Computer-based sim

ulation X 

13 Hardware-in-the-loop simulators X 

 Stinger Modeling and Simulation 

Subtotals: 2 

 STINGER SYSTEM TOTAL: 3 3 7 

 Javelin Background 

14 Tankbreaker funding decision X 

15 Javelin Joint Venture decision X 

 Javelin Background Subtotals: 0 0 0 2 

 Javelin CL

U 

16 CLU long-wave imaging IR X 

17 CLU bi-directional scanner X 

18 CLU Thermal Reference Assembly X 

19 CLU cooling system design X 

20 CLU syste

m improvements X 

21 Composite housing X 

 Javelin CLU Subtotals: 0 1 5 0 

 Javelin Seeker 

22 Ar

my fire-and-forget requirement X 

23 Seeker focal plane array X 

24 Hughes FPA design X 

25 Seeker calibration "chopper wheel" X 

 Javelin Seeker Subtotals: 0 1 2 1 

 Javelin Guidance and Control 

26 Tracker X 

27 Captive flight testing X 

 

Javelin Guidance and Control 

Subtotals: 0 1 1 0 

 28
 

Javelin Warhead and Propulsion

 

28 Integrated propulsion design X 

29 Launch motor shear pins X 

30 Burst disc X 

31 Tandem shaped charge warhead X 

32 Precursor charge design X 

33 Blast shield X 

34 ESAF X 

 

Javelin Warhead and Propulsion 

Subtotals: 

3 1 3 0 

 Javelin Modeling and Simulation 

35 Integrated flight simulation X 

 Javelin Modeling and Simulation 

Subtotals: 0 1 0 0 

 JAVELIN SYSTEM TOTAL: 3 5 11 3 

 MISSILE GRAND TOTAL 6 8 18 3 

 29