Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1981 | March 31, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Danielle L. Flora

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: The Matter of A.K. and 

G.C. (Minor Children);

T.C. (Father)

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

March 31, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JC-1981

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, 

Judge

The Honorable Sherry Hartzler, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

02D08-1901-JC-1

02D08-1901-JC-2

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1981 | March 31, 2020 Page 2 of 8

Statement of the Case

[1] T.C. (“Father”) appeals the adjudication of his sons, A.K. (“A.K.”) and G.C. 

(“G.C.”) (collectively “the children”) to be Children in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”) based on a petition filed by the Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”). Father does not challenge the evidence supporting the CHINS 

adjudication. Rather, Father argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss the CHINS case. However, our review of the record reveals 

that Father never asked the trial court, in either a written or an oral motion, to 

dismiss the case. Father has therefore waived appellate review of this issue. 

Further, waiver notwithstanding, we find no error in this case. Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether Father has waived appellate review of his argument that 

the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the CHINS 

case when he never asked the trial court to do so.

Facts

[3] A.K. was born in August 2016, and G.C. was born in September 2017. On

January 4, 2019, DCS filed a petition alleging that the children were CHINS. 

That same day, the trial court held an initial hearing, and Father was served 

with the CHINS petition in open court. At some point during the hearing, 

Father “left without court permission.” (DCS’ App. at 8). At the end of the 
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hearing, the trial court scheduled both a factfinding hearing, which the trial 

court referred to as an initial hearing, and a dispositional hearing for February 

4, 2019.

[4] Father signed the summons that notified him about the February 4 hearing and 

advised him that his failure to appear might result in the waiver of his right to 

be heard. The summons also provided that the trial court might proceed with 

the factfinding and dispositional hearings in his absence. Father, however, did 

not attend the hearing. The trial court’s order states that Father “[could not] be 

located.” (DCS App. 28). Father’s counsel appeared and represented Father’s 

interests. After hearing evidence, the trial court adjudicated the children to be 

CHINS. Thereafter, the trial court immediately held a dispositional hearing. 

In its dispositional order, the trial court ordered the children to remain in foster 

care and Mother to comply with a parent participation plan. The trial court’s 

order did not include a parent participation plan for Father.

[5] Father failed to attend an April 2019 CHINS hearing because he was 

incarcerated. Father’s counsel appeared at the hearing. In May 2019, Father 

attended a CHINS hearing with counsel. Father admitted some of the 

allegations in the CHINS petition, and the trial court ordered Father to comply

with a provisional parental participation plan. The trial court scheduled a July

1, 2019 factfinding hearing. 

[6] DCS mailed Father notice of the factfinding hearing to the county jail. Further, 

a week before the hearing, DCS notified Father about the hearing during a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1981 | March 31, 2020 Page 4 of 8

phone call. Father told the DCS case manager that he would attend the 

hearing. However, Father failed to appear in court on the day of the hearing. 

Father’s counsel was in court to represent Father.

[7] At the beginning of the hearing, Father’s counsel acknowledged that although 

Father was not at the hearing, Father had been given notice of the hearing and 

had been properly served. Father’s counsel told the trial court that he did not 

believe that a factfinding hearing was “appropriate . . . based upon case law 

since there already was a finding of CHINS[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 5). Father’s 

counsel further explained as follows:

The Court of Appeals states that we need to look at the statute 

regarding time limitations and . . . that’s pretty strict on things 

however in this matter we’ve already had . . . an admission by 

the mom to allegations affecting . . . the adjudication of the Child 

in Need of Services for the children due to her conduct . . . there 

is a case out there . . . that states that the adjudication of CHINS 

goes towards the child and not to each of the parents so you 

don’t have to have a Factfinding regarding both of those 

parents[.] [H]owever here I believe that . . . the . . . allegations in 

the Petition Alleging the Child to be a Child in Need of Services 

that the Court already found the adjudication on pertaining to 

mom so in the long roundabout ways I don’t think it’s proper for 

the time limits to do an actual Factfinding regarding . . . my 

client because we’re past the 120 days however at the point it 

turns into a Dispositional hearing for him to find out what needs 

to be . . . given to either the children of for the parent for a Parent 

Participation Plan[.] [D]oes all that make sense kind of?

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 5-6). 
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[8] The trial court responded to Father’s explanation as follows, and the following 

colloquy ensued:

Trial Court: Well whether I agree with it is one thing –

Defense Counsel: I [] gotcha[,] I gotcha[,] and and we can you 

know –

Trial Court: - - okay

Defense Counsel: . . . ah so what I’m saying is I would object 

to any Factfinding occurring today however . . . I do believe that 

going forward under a Parent Participation Plan . . . would be 

proper . . . for Dispositional for my client and then I would have 

arguments . . . on the requirements of the Parent Participation 

Plan.

Trial Court: Okay Department?

DCS: Um Your Honor I guess I never understood the need to 

reestablish CHINS with the parent after . . . after it’s already 

been found with respect to one child but from my perspective it’s 

almost one and the same whether it’s another CHINS 

Factfinding or whether to Factfinding for the Dispositional 

Hearing . . . and I – if the Court is so inclined I’m okay moving 

forward with the Factfinding for the Dispositional Hearing . . . 

especially given statutes and case law about the admission of 

evidence in Dispositional Hearings.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 6-7).

[9] Both Father’s counsel and DCS agreed that because the children had already 

been adjudicated to be CHINS, the nature of the hearing was more factfinding 

for the purpose of disposition rather than factfinding for the purpose of 

adjudication. However, the trial court determined that it would “move forward 
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with the Factfinding [for the purpose of adjudication].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). At no 

point did Father’s counsel move to dismiss the case.

[10] After hearing evidence that Father was a frequent user of illegal drugs, 

including methamphetamine and that the children had been present during a 

domestic violence incident between Mother and Father, the trial court issued a 

July 2019 order adjudicating the children to be CHINS. The trial court held a 

dispositional hearing in late July and issued a CHINS dispositional decree in 

August 2019. Father now appeals. 

Decision

[11] Father does not challenge the evidence supporting the CHINS adjudication. 

Rather, his sole argument is that the trial court “erred in denying [his] motion 

to dismiss the CHINS petitions filed by the Indiana Department of Child

Services when the factfinding hearing was not completed within 120 days.” 

(Father’s Br. at 4). Father has waived appellate review of this issue because he 

never asked the trial court, either in a written or oral motion, to dismiss the 

case. See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Gurtner, 27 N.E.3d 306, 311 (Ind. Ct 

App. 2015) (explaining that it “has long been the general rule in Indiana that an 

argument or issue presented for the first time on appeal is waived for purposes 

of appellate review”).

[12] Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error. Father contends that his case should 

have been dismissed pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 31-34-11-1, which provides 

that a juvenile court should complete a factfinding hearing not more than sixty 
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days after the CHINS petition has been filed. The statute further allows a sixtyday extension of time to complete the factfinding hearing if all parties consent 

to the additional time. I.C. § 31-34-11-1.1

[13] However, we conclude that the parties in this case complied with this statute 

because the factfinding hearing was held well within the sixty-day statutory 

mandate. Specifically, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that a CHINS 

determination establishes the status of a child alone. In the Matter of N.E., 919 

N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010). Because the CHINS determination regards that 

status of the child, a separate analysis as to each parent is not required at the 

CHINS determination stage. Id. “Indeed, to adjudicate culpability on the part 

of each individual parent in a CHINS proceeding would be at variance with the 

purpose of the CHINS inquiry: determining whether a child’s circumstances 

necessitate services that are unlikely to be provided without the coercive 

intervention of the court.” Id. The resolution of a juvenile proceeding focuses 

on the best interest of the child, rather than guilt or innocence as in a criminal 

proceeding. Id.

[14] Here, DCS filed a CHINS petition in January 2019. The factfinding hearing, 

which Father did not attend, was held in February 2019, well within the sixtyday statutory mandate. Following the hearing, the trial court adjudicated the 

1

Father also cites Matter of T.T., 110 N.E.3d 441, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), in support of his argument. 

Although we need not discuss T.T. in our resolution of this case, we point out that the Indiana Supreme 

Court recently abrogated T.T. in Matter of M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279 (Ind. 2020).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1981 | March 31, 2020 Page 8 of 8

children to be CHINS. Where the children had already been adjudicated to be 

CHINS, another factfinding hearing for the purpose of adjudication was not 

necessary. Rather, both Father’s counsel and DCS were correct when they 

argued that the July 1, 2019 hearing was actually a dispositional hearing even 

though the trial court called it a factfinding hearing. After the July 1 hearing, 

the trial court held what it called a dispositional hearing and issued a 

dispositional order, which Father does not challenge. We find no error here. 

[15] Affirmed.

May, J., and Crone, J., concur.