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IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH

IRAN (PART II)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 14, 2015

Serial No. 114–80

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, co-chair, Iran Task Force, Leadership 

Council, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (Former United States 

Senator) ................................................................................................................. 5

General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, retired, principal, Chertoff Group (former 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency) ............................................................... 8

The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations, Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 

University (former Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State) ................................................................................................................. 16

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations ........................ 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, retired: Prepared statement ...................... 12

The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns: Prepared statement ...................................... 21

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 28

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 88

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 89

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 91

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: Prepared statement .................................. 92

(1)

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 

WITH IRAN (PART II) 

TUESDAY, JULY 14, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

Today, the committee continues to examine the Obama administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran. We thank our witnesses for 

joining us this morning. 

The administration, of course, has just announced a hugely consequential agreement. In testimony before this committee, Secretary Kerry told us these negotiations would be used to dismantle 

Iran’s nuclear program. That was the goal. Instead, this agreement 

allows Iran to retain a vast enrichment capacity, to continue its research and development and, gain an industrialized nuclear program once key provisions of this agreement begin to expire in as 

little as 10 years. The President told us that Iran does not ‘‘need 

to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordow in order to 

have a peaceful nuclear program.’’ Yet, this military complex will 

now stay open. 

While Obama administration officials first told us that Iran’s 

missile program would have ‘‘to be addressed’’ as part of a final 

agreement, they failed to mention that ‘‘addressing’’ the program 

means taking restrictions off—we are talking here about the 

I.C.B.M. program that Iran has—taking those off in just 8 years. 

As Secretary of Defense Carter testified just last week, ‘‘The reason 

that we want to stop Iran from having an I.C.B.M. program is that 

the ‘I’ in I.C.B.M. stands for ‘intercontinental,’ which means having 

the capability of flying from Iran to the United States.’’ And as we 

know, countries build I.C.B.M.s for one reason—to deliver weapons. 

And recently in this negotiation—at the very end of the negotiation 

this is what Russia and Iran pushed for—the ability for Russia to 

transfer this technology—this is what Russia would like to do—

transfer this technology to the regime. 

At that same hearing, our top military official gave his best military advice: ‘‘Under no circumstances should we relieve the pressure on Iran’’ when it comes to the arms embargo—but that comes 

off in just 5 years. 

2

On the critical issue of inspections, just a few months ago Secretary of Energy Moniz said that ‘‘We expect to have anywhere, 

anytime access.’’ But ‘‘anywhere, anytime’’ has weakened to something called ‘‘managed access.’’ ‘‘Managed access,’’ more accurately, 

should be called ‘‘manipulated access’’ as any process with Russia, 

China and Iran at the table will be treated exactly that way. It will 

be managed. It will be manipulated. The inspection regime will be 

manipulated by those with something to hide and this has been the 

past experience with Iran that has cheated on every agreement so 

far. 

We might feel better if the United States was able to permanently constrain Iran’s worrying nuclear program. But the key restriction—the ability to enrich at high levels—begins to expire in 

as little as 10 years. That is 10 years. Most Americans will take 

three times longer to pay off their mortgage. Ten years from now. 

Once these restrictions expire, Iran could enrich on an industrial 

scale—claiming the desire to sell enriched uranium on the international market, as France does. Iran could also enrich uranium to 

levels near weapons grade—claiming the desire to power a nuclear 

navy, as Brazil is doing. All these activities are permissible under 

the NPT and all would be endorsed by this agreement. Indeed, the 

President himself—President Obama said of his own agreement, 

‘‘In year ’13, ’14, ’15, Iran’s breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero.’’

As a result, the U.S. and its allies will be left with no effective 

measures to prevent Iran from initiating an accelerated nuclear 

program to produce the materials needed for a nuclear weapon. 

And Iran surely would be able to speed toward a nuclear weapon 

faster than an international sanctions regime could be placed and 

reestablished on that regime. One nonproliferation expert told the 

committee last week that this sunset clause is, in his words, ‘‘a disaster.’’

The essence of this agreement is permanent concessions in exchange for temporary benefits, and that is only if Iran doesn’t 

cheat, like it has in the past and like North Korea cheated. As one 

witness described to the committee last week, the deal ‘‘is in many 

ways a bet. . . . The bet that the administration is taking is that 

in 10 or 15 years we will have a kinder, gentler Iran.’’

Just a few days ago, Iranian President Rouhani joined a crowd—

a crowd, which if you followed the piece in the New York Times, 

chanting ‘‘Death to America.’’ This was their Quds Day rally on the 

weekend and the posters read ‘‘Death to Zionism.’’ And as Rouhani 

was walking, this reporter asked the question about the nuclear 

negotiations and President Rouhani said, ‘‘The future is bright’’ as 

people behind him were chanting, ‘‘Death to America. Death to 

America.’’ So President Obama has decided to place all his chips on 

the fact that the ‘‘Death to America’’ chants will soon disappear. 

This committee has to ask itself whether we are willing to roll the 

dice, too. 

I will now turn to our ranking member for any opening comments he may have. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Chairman Royce. I appreciate the 

chairman’s continued focus on making sure that this committee 

3

gets the opportunity to thoroughly discuss and debate the merits 

of this newly announced agreement with Iran. 

I know once the final deal is submitted to Congress the chairman 

and ranking member will move quickly to set up briefings and 

hearings as we move forward toward a vote on the deal. 

In the 18 months since the P5+1 began negotiating with Iran in 

an effort to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons we have had 

a lot of discussions about centrifuges and stockpiles and breakout 

times and we now know basically what an agreement looks like in 

terms of infrastructure. 

But we still await details as to exactly what kind of access IAEA 

investigators will get, how potential violations will be dealt with, 

how the so-called ‘‘snap back’’ mechanism will work and what a 

new U.S. Security Council resolution will look like. 

Secretary Kerry and his team have spent an enormous amount 

of time and energy on these negotiations, and I applaud their commitment to diplomacy and I appreciate their ability to negotiate 

significant limitations on enrichment and nuclear stockpiles. 

I hesitate to speculate on the deal as a whole until we receive 

all of the details. I do have some serious concerns, however, about 

various aspects of the deal which were extensively reported from 

Vienna this week. 

In particular, one, Iran needs to come clean on its past nuclear 

activities, two, its access to all suspected nuclear sites, three, the 

timing of sanctions relief and the impact on the region, and four, 

ensuring that an arms embargo remains in place to prevent the 

spread of weapons to terrorists. 

First, along with most of my colleagues I’ve been very clear from 

the outset that Iran must come clean on its past nuclear weapons 

work, a demand repeatedly made by the administration. 

Yet, as has been the case for years, Iran has been unwilling 

throughout these negotiations to cooperate with the IAEA on its 

parallel investigation into the possible military dimensions of its 

program. 

Iran’s intransigence has made it difficult for many of us to imagine how we could expect Iran to comply with the terms of a deal. 

If they stonewalled the IAEA for a decade will they continue to find 

ways to do so under the comprehensive deal or will a deal make 

that impossible? 

This is why upholding the integrity of the IAEA’s PMD investigation is so vital right now. So I will await details as to exactly what 

the new roadmap signed by Iran and the IAEA will entail. 

Further, I am concerned about access. We are told this agreement is not based on trust. It is based on transparency and 

verification. So I wait to see in greater detail how the final agreement deals with resolving IAEA access to suspected sites. 

Will we have the access we need or will Iran be able to block inspectors? If media reports are correct and one visit to Parchin is 

granted, will that be enough to gather the information needed? 

How far have we strayed from the anytime, anywhere inspections that the experts had said should be part of any deal? 

Third, I remain concerned about the timing and implications of 

sanctions relief. How extensive are the nuclear-related steps that 

Iran has to take in order to receive relief? 

4

How will stonewalling or suspected cheating on its commitments 

be dealt with and will Iran have access to its frozen assets, well 

over $100 billion, all at once and by what date? 

And where does the money go? I know that this was touched on 

last week in Part I of this hearing. Iran’s behavior is not going to 

change as part of this agreement. That is something that has been 

acknowledged. 

In fact, Iran’s support for nefarious regional actors and designated terrorist organizations has the potential to grow under any 

deal, and while it is true that some of the sanctions relief will have 

to go toward fixing domestic economic problems one can imagine 

the havoc that Iran’s terror proxies could wreak with even $1 billion more. This needs to be something that we understand better. 

And that brings me to my fourth and perhaps most troubling 

concern, which emerged as a sticking point in the final days of negotiations—the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo. 

Now, I understand that international sanctions are intertwined 

and they are complex, and I understand that there is a current disagreement among the P5+1 and Iran as to what constitutes a nuclear sanction. 

But it is extraordinarily difficult to imagine that the U.N. Security Council resolution that will result from the comprehensive 

agreement will not continue the existing restrictions on Iran’s ability to export dangerous and military hardware to it terror proxies 

for many years to come. 

Quite frankly, the apparent resolution of this issue in some ways 

is baffling to me. Why do we believe that Iran’s dangerous support 

for terror groups will change in 5 years or that its desire for ballistic missile technology will wane in 8 years? 

From the beginning, the administration has said that it is dealing with the nuclear issue separate from our other issues with this 

regime, whether meddling in neighboring countries, its holding of 

American citizens or its sponsorship of terrorism, which will be 

dramatically more dangerous when the arms embargo is lifted. 

And finally, I want to again raise the issue of the four American 

citizens held or missing in Iran. Jason Rezaian, Saeed Abedini, 

Amir Hekmati and my constituent, Robert Levinson, the longestheld American in history. 

Regardless of what transpired in Vienna this week, Iran must 

know that the United States will never stop working for the release 

of our citizens. 

I applaud and I thank the committee for its commitment to seeing these innocent Americans returned to their families. 

I appreciate the efforts of our negotiators to raise the issue, and 

members of this committee and all Members of Congress should 

have these Americans in their thoughts as they review the terms 

of this agreement. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to receiving the details this 

week so that members can begin to evaluate its merits. 

The agreement can’t just be judged on what would happen in the 

absence of a deal today or tomorrow or 60 days from now. It must 

also be analyzed by what will happen under an agreement in 5 

years, in 8 years, in 10 years and beyond. 

5

The measure of this deal will be whether the national security 

interests of our nation and that of our allies will be strengthened 

for decades to come. 

I look forward to a meaningful discussion and analysis of these 

issues in the days and weeks ahead and I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished 

panel. Senator Lieberman represented Connecticut for 24 years. He 

was chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee. 

He is currently the co-chair of the Iran Task Force at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and he is senior counsel at 

the firm Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman in New York. 

General Michael Hayden is the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, General Hayden served in multiple 

and other leadership positions including as the director of the National Security Agency and principal deputy director of national intelligence. 

Ambassador Nick Burns is the Roy and Barbara Goodman Family professor of diplomacy and international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. 

He served in the United States Foreign Service for 27 years, during which time he served as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the Ambassador to multiple posts. 

Dr. Ray Takeyh is senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was previously a senior advisor on Iran at the State Department. He has authored two books on Iran. 

So without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements will 

be made part of the record. Members here will have 5 calendar 

days to submit statements and questions and any extraneous material that you might have for the record. 

And we will begin with Senator Lieberman, if you would like to 

summarize, and we will go to questions after your opening testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, COCHAIR, IRAN TASK FORCE, LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES (FORMER 

UNITED STATES SENATOR) 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Chairman Royce, Congressman Deutch and members of the committee. I am grateful for the 

opportunity to testify before you today at a really critical time. 

The negotiation between Iran and the P5+1 has now produced an 

agreement, which will come before you shortly. Each of you will 

have to decide whether to endorse or reject it. 

I, personally, looking back at my 24 years of service in Congress, 

cannot think of a more consequential vote that each of you will cast 

in Congress for the future security of the United States and, indeed, the security of the world. And I cannot think of a better committee to lead the House of Representatives in its review of the 

proposed agreement with Iran because this committee, under the 

leadership of Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel and today, 

Congressman Deutch, has built a really strong record of nonVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:33 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071415\95512 SHIRL
6

partisanship, repeatedly putting the interest of America ahead of 

the interest of either political party. 

If there was ever a time for that kind of nonpartisan leadership 

it is now on this agreement. 

The fact is, Chairman Royce, Congressman Deutch, your opening 

statements give me confidence that is exactly the way you will go 

at this. 

Mr. Chairman, I want first, before I get to my reaction to what 

happened today, to thank President Obama, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Moniz and other staff for the extraordinary effort they put 

into these negotiations. 

You will hear in a moment that I have very serious questions 

about the agreement that these negotiations have produced. But I 

have no questions about the sincerity and good motivation of the 

administration in pursuing the negotiations. 

In the time I have had since the agreement was announced a few 

hours ago, and based on the framework agreement that came out 

in Lausanne in April, I have reached the conclusion which is that 

there is much more risk for America and reward for Iran than 

should be in this agreement. It is not the good deal with Iran that 

we all wanted. Let me explain why I reached that conclusion based 

on what I know now. 

I was a member of the United States Senate when the first sanctions legislation for Iran was passed nearly 20 years ago. I am privileged to play a role in the drafting and passage of every subsequent sanctions bill. 

Each of these measures was adopted by overwhelming bipartisan 

majorities in the House and Senate. In each case, Democrats and 

Republicans in Congress came together, despite resistance and outright opposition from the executive branch, regardless of which 

party controlled the executive branch at the time. 

There is no question in my mind that when we united across 

party lines in Congress to pass these sanctions bills, it was with 

a clear and simple purpose—to prevent Iran, the number-one state 

sponsor of terrorism in the world—from ever possessing a nuclear 

weapons capability. 

In fact, key provisions of the legislation we adopted explicitly 

stated this goal. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Deutch, members of 

the committee, this is not what the agreement announced today 

does. 

In fact, what began as an admirable diplomatic effort to prevent 

Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability dissolved into a 

bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability. 

The agreement announced today temporarily delays but ultimately allows Iran to become a nuclear weapons state and, indeed, 

legitimizes Iran’s possession of the nuclear capabilities that it has 

built up, much of it covertly, in violation of international law and 

in breach of its obligations under the Nonproliferation treaty. 

Mr. Chairman, this is precisely the outcome that for years we in 

Congress fought to prevent. This is precisely what we enacted legislative bipartisan sanctions to stop and this is the biggest reason 

why I respectfully, based on what I know today, ask you to vote 

against this proposed agreement. 

7

For under it, Iran will be granted permanent and total relief 

from nuclear sanctions in exchange for temporary and partial limitations on its nuclear projects. 

That is the essence of why I believe this is a bad deal for America, a bad deal for Iran’s neighbors in the Middle East, and a bad 

deal for the world. 

The rabidly anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Sunni Muslim Islamic Republic of Iran will have nuclear weapons. This agreement, 

if approved, takes Iran’s nuclearization, which previously had been 

unacceptable, and makes it inevitable. 

Mr. Chairman, you have talked about the bet here, Congressman 

Deutch also, that this agreement will moderate the regime in Iran. 

This is a bet not based on fact. In fact, it is a bet based on hope 

over experience we have had with Iran. 

We have to judge this country not just by what its representatives in the negotiation have said but, really, more by what its government has done and is doing. 

In the months and years since negotiations begin with Iran, 

while its Foreign Minister has been negotiating with the P5+1 and, 

I might say, charming the international media, the regime in 

Tehran has continued to build up its nuclear weapons capabilities, 

expanded support of radical proxies that threaten its Sunni Arab 

neighbors and Israel, improved its intercontinental ballistic missile 

capacity so its weapons one day reach Europe and the United 

States, and spewed out the most vile and violent rhetoric toward 

America, Israel, Britain and, lately, Saudi Arabia. 

The rhetoric would be bad enough, but the Iranian Government 

has acted on that rhetoric, sponsoring repeated terrorist attacks 

that have killed Americans and Israelis, Arabs, Muslims, Christians and Jews, from Argentina to Iraq, from Saudi Arabia to Syria 

and a lot of places in between. 

You mentioned the rally, Mr. Chairman, in Tehran last week. I 

would only add that around the same time the editor of the Tehran 

newspaper, Kayhan, who was selected by Iran’s Supreme Leader 

and is assumed to reflect his views, wrote that the United States 

‘‘which currently terrorizes humanity as the sole superpower will 

one fine day cease to be visible on the map of the world.’’ How can 

we have any confidence in an agreement made with such a government? 

The answer is it is hard, in any case, but the only way we can 

have confidence is if the inspections and verification provisions of 

the agreement are airtight. 

And this is based on the history of Iran deceiving and delaying 

the International Atomic Energy Agency, claiming that its inspectors are spies and it is a tool of the United States, even though, 

as we all know, it is actually an agency of the United Nations. 

On first look, the inspections provisions in the agreement announced today fall far short, dangerously short, of the anywhere, 

anytime access that is needed to have confidence that this deal 

with the Iranian regime will actually be behaved. 

President Obama this morning used the term to describe the inspections ‘‘where necessary, when necessary.’’ That is a long way 

from anywhere, anytime. 

8

The specific language of the agreement, which I have just gone 

over this morning, creates a process that can go on for at least 2 

weeks of negotiation with Iran when the IAEA thinks it has reason 

to inspect something going on and then has an appeal process to 

a higher board. 

The IAEA, in other words, will have to negotiate with Iran to 

gain access for its inspectors, even though Iran has a consistent 

record of refusing timely and reliable access to international monitors in the past. 

Mr. Chairman, in summing up—distinguished members of the 

committee—in the days and weeks ahead you will review this 

agreement in detail. You will hear different opinions about it and 

its implications. 

Based on what I know now, I have personally concluded that the 

agreement falls far short of what is needed, which is an agreement 

that reliably and permanently ends Iran’s nuclear weapons capability in return for an end to the economic sanctions against Iran 

based on its nuclear program. 

I know there will be some who will try to convince Members of 

Congress that if Congress rejects this deal the result will be catastrophic. 

Some may try to intimidate and demonize critics of the agreement by arguing that a vote against this deal is a vote for war. 

Those are false arguments and I urge you to reject them, and I 

cite as evidence that the most powerful measure Congress ever 

adopted against Iran, effectively barring its sale of oil to international markets, was undertaken despite explicit warnings from 

administration officials at the time that it would collapse the global 

economy. 

In fact, it opened the door to diplomacy that previously had proven impossible. In today’s context, rejecting this bad deal will not result in war or the collapse of diplomacy. It will give the administration a new opportunity to pursue a better deal. 

I will say, as a former Member of Congress, I know how difficult 

the following weeks will be for you. You will be pushed and pulled 

by supporters and opponents of this agreement. 

All I can say, and you all know it already, in the end the best 

you can do is decide in the privacy of your own conscience what you 

believe is best for the security of the American people, including, 

of course, your constituents. 

Because this is a decision you and we will live with for the rest 

of our lives. This is a vote whose consequences will reverberate in 

the lives of our children, grandchildren and beyond. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Mr. Lieberman’s prepared statement, submitted after the hearing, can be found in the appendix.] 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Senator. 

General Hayden. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF, RETIRED, PRINCIPAL, CHERTOFF GROUP (FORMER DIRECTOR, 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY) 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutch, other 

members, for the opportunity to be here today to discuss such an 

9

important topic and, really, thank you for allowing me to be in the 

company of such distinguished witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, when I was at the agency Iran was the secondmost discussed topic in the Oval Office, behind only terrorism. We 

discussed a variety of aspects of the Iranian issue, of course. 

The Iranian nuclear program was a central issue. But I mention 

that to remind us all that as important as the Iranian nuclear 

question is, it is part of a larger piece. To paraphrase Mr. Kissinger, Iran still has to decide whether or not it is a country or a 

cause. 

We have been negotiating for the past 11⁄2 years on the premise 

that it wants to be a country. But Iran’s actions suggest that it still 

considers itself a cause—a revolutionary power whose identity, in 

fact, maybe even its domestic survival has to be drawn from a narrative of unrelenting hostility between itself as the legitimate agent 

of Shi’a Islam in the rest of the world. 

Now, we put all those other issues aside 2 years ago when we 

decided to isolate and focus on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. I get that. 

I understand that decision. Diplomacy is the art of the possible, not 

the art of the ideal. 

During the Bush administration, we too focused on Iran’s nuclear 

efforts but we need to understand that nuclear focus doesn’t make 

those other realities go away and that even if we get to a successful 

conclusion of nuclear negotiations, those other issues remain and, 

indeed, there is a possibility that the nuclear result will make 

those other issues even more difficult to deal with. 

To oversimplify just a little bit, the issue is not just Iran’s nuclear program. The issue is Iran, and we need to be careful that 

our efforts to resolve this issue doesn’t worsen the other dimensions of the problem. 

Now, let me focus on the nuclear portfolio per se. If I were here 

with a butcher paper or something and drawing a PERT chart as 

to how do you get from here to there, with there being a nuclear 

weapon on the part of the Iranians, I would have three critical 

paths. 

One path would be delivery vehicles—the Iranian ballistic missile program. Another path would be weaponization—that is, making a device small enough, rugged enough and confident and reliable enough that you would have put it in a nose cone. And then 

the third path is fissile material—the things you need to actually 

have a bomb. 

We have chosen to bet the farm on blocking one path. We have 

chosen to bet our future here on blocking the path toward the creation of fissile material. The other two paths—ballistic missile delivery systems and weaponization—are effectively off the table. 

And even here in this one path—fissile material—I think we 

have really reduced our margin for error. 

Mr. Deutch, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman have already 

mentioned when this all began Secretary Kerry was claiming that 

we had not conceded the right of enrichment to the Iranians and, 

of course, we had and that was the premise—the price we paid to 

get the Iranians to the negotiating table. 

Let me just point out, too, that the Iranians claim they need this 

nuclear program for the eventual production of electricity. Now, 

10

coming from a nation so rich in fossil fuels I think we have a right 

to question that. 

But let me not question that. Let me concede that. Even conceding that point does not create a prima facie case for Iran to be 

able to or to be allowed to enrich uranium. 

Today, there are 20 countries around the world that rely on nuclear power that do not produce their own fissile material. 

To drive home this point, we have put considerable pressure on 

a responsible and trusted government in South Korea not to do 

what this nuclear agreement allows the Iranians to do. 

Similarly, Mr. Chairman, as you have already mentioned, the 

President said that Iran didn’t need the heavy water reactor at 

Arak, the buried facility at Fordow, for a peaceful nuclear program. 

And although the agreement suggests these facilities have been 

modified, we need to see the fine print that continue to exist. 

Overall, the Iranians get to keep 5,000 centrifuges of an older 

type at Natanz, which the administration says is part of a package 

that always keeps them 12 months away from having enough 

fissile material for a weapon. 

I am concerned about how much R & D—research and development—the Iranians will be able to do on centrifuge technology. We 

all have to look at the fine print of the agreement. 

But the last public announcement by our side has been the 

phrase ‘‘limited R & D,’’ which could mean an awful lot of things 

to many people. 

I am also concerned about our failure to demand an accurate accounting of the possible military dimensions of the Iranian program. 

Mr. Chairman, this really has special significance. It is not just 

what they may have done in the past to position themselves with 

regard to weaponization. The Iranians have been stiffing the IAEA 

for years on this issue and now we are going to rely on the IAEA 

for verification of this new agreement after seemingly having 

taught the Iranians that if you stiff these guys enough the requirement to concede will go away. 

Given past Iranian behavior and deception, will the agency be 

able to conduct anywhere, anytime inspections? That is always a 

concern and already has been well handled. 

I know we have to look at the fine print to see what managed 

inspections are like, Mr. Chairman. But let me give you a way that 

I have begun to think about this. 

Inspections should have been at the technical level. Inspections 

should have been driven by an IAEA decision that this international body had a technical reason for visiting Facility A, B or 

C. 

The managed inspection program puts that decision at the political level and I just don’t see a happy outcome that would evolve 

out of that kind of arrangement. 

There is an awful lot to talk about, Mr. Chairman. I don’t want 

to belabor all these issues, some of which have already been raised. 

But I do want to bring up one point. 

In discussing the new agreement, many have tried to bring in 

the pattern of inspections that we agreed with the Soviets under 

the START treaty and the SALT treaty. 

11

One of the administration’s officials said that we don’t insist on 

being able to get into every military site because the United States 

of America wouldn’t allow anybody to get into every site. That is 

just not appropriate. 

Mr. Chairman, that suggests an equivalency here—the kind of 

equivalency we did have with the Soviets because, after all, we 

were entering into a voluntary arms control agreement with them. 

This is Iran trying to get out of the penalty box for violating multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. This isn’t a neutral playing 

field. The burden of proof should be on the Iranians that they are 

adhering to an agreement, not on us to prove that they are not. 

So, again, as I said, inspections, managed looks at the political 

level, not wise, and this sense of equivalency I don’t think is an accurate reflection of what is really going on here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Hayden follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, General Hayden. 

Ambassador Burns. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. NICHOLAS BURNS, ROY 

AND BARBARA GOODMAN FAMILY PROFESSOR OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BELFER CENTER 

FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

(FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Deutch, 

members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to be here 

and I am here with friends and people I respect very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we all start from the presumption, all of 

us who have looked at this issue for a long, long time, that it is 

in the national security interests of the United States to deny Iran 

a nuclear weapon. 

Both President Bush and President Obama have taken the position they will use any means at our disposal including military 

means to accomplish that. 

Now, the route taken by both the Bush and Obama administrations doesn’t start there. The Bush administration sought negotiations with Iran. Iran turned us down. That led us to sanctions. 

The Obama administration, with the help of the Congress and, 

I would say, the leadership of the Congress pushed stronger sanctions that really made a difference on the Iranians. 

The Obama administration has now come back with a negotiated 

agreement for your consideration. I would say two things about it. 

This is among, I think, the most difficult, complex agreement 

that any of us can hope to judge. It is filled with very painful tradeoffs. There are risks in acting and following this agreement and 

there are risks in not acting, and I certainly agree with Senator 

Lieberman. 

From my perspective, this will be one of the most consequential 

and important votes that any of the members take in your time of 

office. 

I was just trying to think this morning about our diplomatic history. You might have to go back to the League of Nations vote in 

1920 for an agreement where Congress is going to play such a central and directing role as to whether we go forward or whether we 

don’t go forward. 

I worked on Iran policy for President Bush and Secretary Rice 

for 3 years as Under Secretary of State. I helped to sanction Iran. 

I believe we have got to contain their threat in the Middle East 

and we have to stop them. 

But I also believe that President Obama’s policy is worthy of 

our—of your support. I am going to support it because I think it 

is the best alternative. 

If I could have designed a perfect alternative it would be a 100 

to 0 victory for the United States and the submission of Iran. 

That alternative is not available to the United States, and 

whether we oppose it or whether we support it we have got to 

think in the real world about what the alternatives have been. 

17

Here is the alternative that President Obama and Secretary 

Kerry have followed. They think that this agreement will effectively freeze Iran’s nuclear program for the next decade. 

It will deny it a nuclear weapon because it won’t have the fissile 

material that Mike Hayden talked about—General Hayden—for 

the next decade. 

It closes out the route toward fissile material. Iraq’s—excuse me, 

Iran’s plutonium reactor at Arak will be effectively put offline. The 

core will be dismantled. 

The spent fuel will be taken out of the country. They won’t be 

able to develop a nuclear weapon through plutonium. 

The enrichment program at Fordow and at Natanz—Fordow will 

be closed completely. Natanz, of course, they will still have 5,000 

to 6,000 centrifuges but of a lower power than the advanced centrifuges for the next 10 years. 

But their store of enriched uranium will be at 3.67 percent at 

300 kilograms. Their store of uranium will not be weapons grade. 

They will not have the weapons grade uranium to make a nuclear 

device because of the restrictions at the Natanz plant. 

Right now, the Obama administration has said publically that 

Iran may be 2 to 3 months away from a nuclear weapon. 

With this deal, and there is really no dispute about this, for the 

next 10 years as their program is frozen, Iran will be a year away 

from a nuclear weapon. 

So I think the administration can make a case, whether you 

agree with them or not on the ultimate deal, that the program is 

going to be frozen—the plutonium and uranium enrichment programs and that, I think, is a very important attribute of this deal. 

Second, Iran will now be subjected to inspections that it has 

never been subjected to before 25 years under the additional protocol of IAEA inspections. 

Third, should Iran cheat—I assume they will try, given their 

past record where they have lied to us, to the United Nations in 

the past—then we have the ability to reimpose sanctions—Congress would. 

The United States would have the opportunity—any future President—to form a coalition much like the present coalition to sanction them. 

Fourth, this does give the United States a chance to resolve this 

problem diplomatically, peacefully through a tough-minded negotiation. I don’t say that lightly because I am someone who believes 

that we should keep the threat of force on the table and that any 

American President would be justified using it if we felt Iran was 

close to breakout, close to a nuclear weapon. 

But we are not at that point. No one anywhere in the world is 

contesting that the Iranians are close to a nuclear weapon and so 

the use of force is right now not pertinent to this discussion, although it is an option for us in the future. 

If we have a chance to avoid a third major conflict in the Middle 

East since 9/11 and if we can stop Iran in the process I think that 

is a good course for the United States. 

But, Mr. Chairman, let me tell you, I don’t think this is a perfect 

deal and I have had trouble as a private citizen trying to weigh the 

risks on both sides and weigh the pros and cons. 

18

If I were a member, I would want to focus on some of the questions that Senator Lieberman and General Hayden have already focused on because I agree with their skepticism. 

I would want to look at the fact that the program—Iran’s program will be suspended and frozen, in effect, in mothballs for 10 

years. But when that 10 years is over the superstructure of the 

program will be intact. 

Iran would have the theoretical right to build back up a plutonium or uranium route to a nuclear weapon. That is a weakness 

of this agreement. That is a tradeoff. 

This was a real-world negotiation where we received some benefit—the freezing of their program for 10 years—but that program 

is not being entirely dismantled and we have to understand that. 

Second, I think it is important that the IAEA has 25 years—will 

have 25 years of insight into Iran’s program. But will they have a 

clear line of sight? Will they have unfettered access? 

What, in practice, does managed access to a nuclear plant mean? 

I think it means that Iran is going to write some of the rules about 

how its plants are inspected and, certainly, questions have to be 

asked about that as well as about military dimensions. 

Third, would we actually be able to reimpose sanctions should 

Iran cheat or fundamentally violate the agreement? None of us 

know because we are talking about a hypothetical situation some 

years, perhaps, into the future. 

But it would require a tough-minded American President, whomever we elect in 2016. It would require us to assemble a coalition 

that took 10 years to build. 

I think the Europeans will be with us. I wonder if the Russians 

and Chinese will. So as I look at this honestly, these are real tradeoffs. 

This is not a perfectly designed agreement. We had to compromise and we had to give and that is where, as General Hayden 

has described and I agree with him, that is where we made the 

compromises. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I would say this. I think the only way to look 

at this is not what is the ideal solution, because the ideal solution 

is not available to us. Is this the best alternative—President 

Obama and Secretary Kerry’s route. 

I can think of two other alternatives. One, which a lot of people 

have talked about, is should we have just walked away. Should 

Secretary Kerry, as our lead negotiator, simply said this is not good 

enough? Should he have left the negotiations? Should he have 

withdrawn American support for these negotiations? 

We could have done that. But as someone who helped to put the 

P–5 together, as well as the first three U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions in the Bush administration, I think I know what 

would have happened. 

Our coalition, which is global, which contains every major country in the world would have frayed and ultimately dissolved. Countries would have gone their own way without the leadership of the 

United States. 

I know what would have happened to the sanctions regime and 

that is our leverage against Iran. That is what brought them to the 

table. 

19

It would have dissipated or dissolved over time because the Chinese would want to go for energy contracts and the Indian Government would want to import more oil from Iran. 

And even our friends in East Asia, our allies, would want to go 

back to our normal trading relationship. 

So the no-deal option that we walk away and just sanction further, the United States can sanction all it wants and I respect what 

Congress has done and it was very important. 

But what got Iran to the table was the global sanctions. It was 

Japan and South Korea and India not buying as much oil and gas. 

It was the European oil embargo. It was the European financial 

sanctions. 

If you walked away and the coalition dissolved, there goes the leverage of the sanctions. So for me, if I have to weigh that walking 

out no-deal option versus President Obama’s option, I favor President Obama’s option. 

One more option available to the United States: We could have 

gone directly to the use of military force. General Hayden would be 

a far greater authority than I would on this issue, as a military 

person. 

But I believe the United States has the capacity to effectively destroy Iran’s civil nuclear facilities. That might buy us 3 or 4 years. 

I don’t know what the numbers are. That might give us a grace 

period. But you can’t bomb the scientific knowledge that their engineers and their scientists have. 

They know how to mine uranium. They know how to convert it. 

They know how to enrich it. They know how to assemble a nuclear 

warhead, we think, we fear. And so that military option is really 

not a strategic option. 

It is a tactical option. It buys you time. Well, President Obama’s 

option buys us 10 years where we can be reasonably assured that 

their program is frozen. 

So I don’t think these other options work for the United States 

in the real world of international politics and international diplomacy, and that is why, as I look at the alternatives, I think President Obama’s is worthy of your support and I certainly am going 

to support him. 

Mr. Chairman, two quick points. At the same time that the 

Obama administration will pursue this very difficult agreement 

with Iran on the nuclear issues, I think we are going to have to 

push back against the Iranians in the Middle East because they 

are on a tear. 

They have become the king maker in Syria. They are the most—

unfortunately—the most influential country in Iraq. They are running arms to Hamas in Gaza, to Hezbollah in Lebanon and they 

are supporting and instigating the revolt of the Houthi tribes in 

Yemen that have torn that country apart. 

If you will, they are making a big play for power in the heart of 

the Sunni world. That is against the interests of all of our Arab 

friends, against Israel and against the United States. 

So I think we are in the incongruous position—I certainly am—

of supporting a nuclear deal and yet hoping and believing that 

President Obama needs to push back through a strong coalition 

with the Arab countries against Iranian power. 

20

And I would hope that President Obama and the Obama administration in general would make up with Israel, would end the war 

of words between the White House and the Israeli Prime Minister, 

would reinforce our military relationship with Israel as well as the 

Gulf States so that we can contain Iranian power in the Middle 

East. 

I think that is a very important imperative that is going—is racing right alongside the debate on the nuclear issue as we speak. 

And finally, let me say, as someone who has served in both 

Democratic and Republican administrations, I would hope that we 

could have a bipartisan debate in our country among citizens and, 

certainly, on Capitol Hill. 

There are obvious differences between the Bush and Obama administrations but both sought negotiations. Both wanted to have a 

negotiated outcome. That is what we were aiming for in 2006 and 

2007. 

When Iran denied it to us, we turned to sanctions, thanks to the 

Congress for those sanctions—very important—but we are going to 

need bipartisan unity and support for our President if we are going 

to contain and ultimately defeat this threat by Iran that is in front 

of us. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Dr. Takeyh. 

STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Deutch, for inviting me back to this particular forum. 

As the junior man on the table, I will stay within my allotted 

time, especially since I don’t—Judge Poe usually would cut me off. 

But he is not here right now—the ever-vigilant Judge Poe, I should 

say. 

Since the advent, I think, of the Iranian nuclear crisis in 2002, 

two principles have guided the United States’ negotiating position. 

From 2002 to 2013, those two positions were what kind of a civilian nuclear program Iran is entitled to and their position was given 

as practical needs and Iran has no practical needs for enrichment. 

It should be allowed only a symbolic nuclear program. Such a 

symbolic program would allow the Iranians’ leadership to save face 

while at the same time there would be assurances that such a symbolic program would not be used for military purposes. 

The second position that guided the United States’ policy from 

2002 to 2013 was that Iran can rejoin the NPT community once it 

established the trust and confidence of the international community. 

These were positions of the Obama administration—endorse, embrace and persuade the 5+1 countries including Russia and China 

to accept. It is precisely these two principles that the administration has jettisoned in 2013 in interim court, Lausanne framework 

and codified in the recent comprehensive Joint Plan of Action. 

The notion of practical needs has been replaced by something 

called a 1-year breakout period with acknowledgment that has already been made that that 1-year is now static and will alter to 

zero in the concluding stages of this agreement. 

And the notion of trust and confidence of the international community has been replaced by a sunset clause whereby an arbitrary 

time clock will determine when Iran can proceed to an industrialsized program—industrial-sized program not that dissimilar to 

Japan, should they want one. 

Japan can be trusted with such technologies. Iran should not. 

Japan doesn’t want a bomb. Iran does. All these significant issues 

aside, this deal and its implications have to be articulated in the 

context of the changing nature of Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. 

It is important to note that the Supreme Leader, Ali Khameini, 

today stands as the most successful Persian imperialist in the modern history of Iran. 

In 1970 at the height of his power, the shah never had control 

of Iraq. He never had commanding influence in Syria. The Lebanese faction of politics always eluded him and the Gulf States 

ripped off his pretensions. 

Today, as Nick and others have suggested, the Islamic Republic 

has a commanding position in Iraq and deep penetration of the 

deep state. It is the most significant external power in Syria. 

Through Hezbollah it had a lethal proxy that can employ not just 

for manipulation Lebanese politics but also in various forefronts in 

27

the Middle East and, of course, in the Gulf, another aspect of 

America’s fractured alliances give Iran ample opportunity. 

There is a debate, and it is a rather curious one, what would Islamic Republic spend its money on. Imperialism has its costs and 

some of that money undoubtedly will go to the tempting of imperial 

opportunities that are out there. 

But I do believe that the administration has one case. Some of 

the money will undoubtedly be spent on domestic concerns and domestic needs. 

Hassan Rouhani belongs to a wing of the Iranian politics that 

have always been interested with what they call the China model 

whereby you can purchase domestic consent by offering economic 

opportunity. 

So in that particular sense, you can make a case and I think a 

rather plausible one that the Rouhani administration has been one 

of the most repressive in the post-revolutionary state. 

Iran’s burdened citizens will require some sort of a relief and 

along the China model the idea is that by granting them a measure 

of economic rewards you can purchase domestic consent. 

And it’s particularly the case because the Islamic Republic, in my 

view, continues to be haunted by the Green Revolution of 2009. So 

to have any hope of succeeding in his name, Hassan Rouhani needs 

an arms control agreement as much as Ali Khameini’s Islamist imperialism. 

In the end, this deal may not rest on trust but it does rest on 

hope—the hope that a decade from now the Islamic Republic will 

be a different regime, a benign power, at ease with global norms, 

inclined to live at peace with its neighbors—a power that is no 

longer fuel-animated by anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism that 

have so long fueled this ideological engine. 

After watching the Islamic Republic for two decades in its own 

idiom, in its own language, it is a hope that I have difficulty sharing. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

I would like to just go to the question of the arms embargo and, 

you know, this was—Doctor, this was a last minute addendum to 

this agreement, a demand in the negotiation that the U.N. lift the 

arms embargo as it related not just to conventional weapons that 

Iran could better arm Assad and Hezbollah with but also goes to 

this issue of Iran’s capability to get access to the international technical assistance that it seeks to improve their I.C.B.M. program. 

And last week, Secretary of Defense Carter and Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey both sounded the alarm about what 

this would mean if they get this capability to have an I.C.B.M. 

reach the United States and, clearly, the Russians stepped in the 

last minute of the negotiations. Clearly, Russia, wants to transfer 

this technical assistance to Iran. 

This is the most recent issue that I think caught us by surprise 

and I think the other element of surprise was the discovery that 

in the middle of this negotiation about a month ago that Iran had 

committed to transfer to Hamas not just the funding to rebuild the 

35 tunnels that had been built before under Israel but also a new 

generation of rockets and weapons and then, most recently, the additional discovery or announcement that Iran was going to transfer 

precision guidance systems to the 100,000 rockets and missiles that 

Hezbollah has at its disposal aimed right now at Israel but not 

quite as effective, obviously, because of the Iron Dome as they 

could be if they had these precision guidance systems. 

The fact that Iran is willing to do this in the middle of the negotiation and to demand the up-front payment of this signing bonus 

which, evidently, they’re going to use for this purpose is something 

that really drove the attention here of a number of Members of 

Congress over the last few days as this information surfacing. 

And I would like, Ray, your comments on this or, you know, General, you might have some insights as well. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I mean, Nick can talk about the conventional prohibitions in U.N. because they were negotiated in the 2006 Security 

Council resolution. 

As I understand it that those embargoes on conventional arms 

have to do with Iran’s regional behavior and had nothing to do 

with that nuclear dispute that was ongoing at the time. 

Irrespective of what happens to the arms embargo, and I think 

it’s unfortunate that it’s not going to be sustained, Iran has developed a fairly robust indigenous defense industry that additional 

money that it uses can certainly enhance in terms of illicit procurements and so forth. 

So there is always going to be a problem of Iranian transference 

of missile technology in other forums but, obviously, under this 

particular prohibition once it expires they have access to more sophisticated knowledge. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, and now it will go both ways. So now not 

only will they be able to export from their technology that they 

have developed more easily to their allies but they are also going 

to be able to import from Russia and China the technology they 

need for I.C.B.M.s or surface-to-air weapons and so forth. 

Ambassador Burns. 

33

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, there is no question that the Iranians 

were trying to split the P–5 in the last week of these negotiations 

with this proposal—point one. 

Point two, there was no way we could have accepted this and so 

I was trying to dive through the details, coming over here. If we 

can maintain these U.N. weapons embargoes for both import and 

export for 5 to 8 years that is good for the United States. It is painful——

Chairman ROYCE. Well, hold on. Five to eight years they—in 10 

years they are going to have the capability for undetectable nuclear 

breakout—you know, 10 years plus under this agreement. 

Why would we want to agree to 5 years lifting and 8 years for 

the Russian transference of that capability? Why would—why 

would the United States sign off on such an agreement, Ambassador? 

Mr. BURNS. And I am not here, of course, to represent the administration. I am just a private citizen. This is a painful tradeoff. I 

would have hoped that we could have defeated it completely. 

It’s a tradeoff that, apparently, our negotiators felt they had to 

make. So how would we then work once these embargoes are lifted 

5, 6, 7, 8 years from now? 

We will have to use the power of the United States to work on 

countries to prevent the sale to Iran because Iran’s been violating 

the other part of it. They have been selling and giving their arms 

to insurgent groups throughout the Middle East. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let me just ask General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I find it incoherent. In my prepared remarks I try to describe going from the 

broad to the specific. 

We have an awful lot of complaints about broad Iranian behavior. That is the arms embargo. There are lots of ways of stopping 

the nuclear program. We have dismissed the ballistic missile part, 

focus only on the nuclear. 

So to get Iran down to this agreement we have simply taken a 

whole bunch of things off the table that we legitimately could have 

included. 

Now we get to the agreement and the Iranians are now walking 

back up that ladder and including as concessions to them things 

that they have refused to discuss with us when we went into the 

negotiations. 

I don’t understand why the ballistic missile sanctions or the conventional weapons sanctions are even in an agreement on a nuclear 

program. 

Chairman ROYCE. General, as I mentioned in my opening statement here, the administration was once on the same page as Congress on this issue of ‘‘anywhere, anytime’’ inspections. 

But the Iranians pushed back very hard. I remember the deputy 

head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps boasting that ‘‘they 

will not even be permitted to inspect the most normal military site 

in their dreams.’’

So now we are signing up for something called ‘‘managed access’’ 

and a report overnight says that inspectors will get access to critical sites only after consultation with the Iranians, with the Russians, with China, and other world powers in this negotiation. 

34

We wanted to get this within 24 hours. That was the original 

idea—inspectors could get in within 24 hours. This agreement, if 

we are lucky, would get inspectors access in 24 days after all of the 

steps that Iran has insisted on. 

But that is only predicated on the idea that we have cooperation 

from Russia and China in backing the access. So my question here, 

as you said in your testimony, we never believed that the uranium 

at Iran’s declared facilities would ever make its way into a weapon. 

We always believed that work would be done somewhere else in secret, as you said. 

So how confident are you in a sort of ‘‘managed access’’ process 

that includes Iran on the committee that determines whether or 

not we have access? 

General HAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have several issues. I already 

mentioned one about the conventional arms. Snap back sanctions—

I am not sure how that happens. 

But this is the one I am most concerned about because, again, 

we have eliminated our margin for error. It is all about fissile material. So a couple of just very core points. 

Number one, I would never come to you and tell you that American national technical means will be sufficient for verifying this 

agreement. Without an invasive inspection regime, I would not 

while I’m in government or now tell you it’s okay, we will know 

enough to give you sufficient warning. 

So that really puts the weight of effort on the IAEA’s ability to 

go anywhere at any time. As I suggested in my remarks, Mr. 

Chairman, we have taken that from the technical level that this 

international body has an issue. It just needs to resolve. We have 

taken it from the technical level and put it at the political level and 

I just think that is a formula for chaos, obfuscation, ambiguity, 

doubt and finally, we are just going to be able to tell you for sure 

where the Iranians are. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Lieberman, final comments. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Very briefly, this question really, in my opinion, highlights the 

greatest specific weakness of the agreement announced today. I 

mean, we are dealing with a country that has proven over and over 

again that they will not play by international rules. 

They have constantly deceived and delayed international inspectors from the United Nations, not from the United States. 

So now we are taking a risk of making this trade where we end 

sanctions on them in return for them essentially temporarily freezing their nuclear program if they, for the first time in the last three 

decades, actually do honestly what they say they will do. 

And the one guarantee or hope that we could have that they 

would do it was the anytime, anywhere airtight inspections. The 

agreement that came out today is the greatest disappointment in 

this regard because it is—I mean, basically it sets a highly bureaucratic process that goes at least 21 days during which Iran can remove anything covert and in violation of the agreement that they 

want to. 

So I think this is the point—I urge members of this committee, 

Members of Congress, focus in on the section of this agreement on 

35

access. This is one that Iran won hands down and the consequences 

for this overall agreement are really devastating. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to thank the witnesses for a really thoughtful presentation and I think the establishment of a really important tone 

for what I hope will be a very meaningful and serious discussion 

over the coming weeks and months about this crucial vote. 

And I raised earlier my concern about access, Mr. Chairman, and 

I appreciate the exchange that just took place. But, Ambassador 

Burns, I would like to—I would like to ask you, you walked 

through—I think you gave an excellent presentation on what our 

negotiators were able to accomplish and the tradeoffs that they 

needed to make and the skepticism that you have about some of 

what is in this agreement. 

And I want to focus on one in particular. The goal in all of this—

the goal of diplomacy is to reach—in reaching a diplomatic solution—is to reach a peaceful solution so as to avoid the use of military force. 

And what I am trying to grapple with as we look at this—as we 

get into the details of this agreement—is what that looks like over 

time. Initially, you said that it’s really important that at the same 

time that we move forward with this nuclear deal that we push 

back against Iranians in the Middle East and you detailed the 

many ways in which they have looked to exert their influence 

throughout the region, the spread of their terrorist infrastructure. 

And I would ask, getting back to the issue of resources, when 

they satisfy the terms of their nuclear-related conditions and have 

access to their frozen assets, whether it is $1 billion or $50 billion, 

if we acknowledge, as Dr. Takeyh said, that they are going to invest in their own economy but, clearly, some portion of the money 

is going to be used to support what they are doing in the region. 

If the goal is peace short term, is it likely that the infusion of 

additional money is going to lead to less peace and more violence 

through their terror proxies? 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

I would say that the goal here for the last 10 years has been to 

deny them a nuclear weapon through diplomatic means, a negotiated solution, if possible and if not we resort to military means. 

I think that is what both the Bush and Obama administrations 

have tried to do. So yes, it is a peaceful solution but it is one that 

is in our interest, where we think we earned enough at the negotiating table so that it is worth doing. 

That is how I understand what President Obama’s logic is here 

and that is why I support it. You have asked a good question. 

The problem is that we are dealing with two different Iranian 

governments. We have the, I think, genuinely reformist in their 

context—Prime Minister Hassan Rouhani, and a genuine reformer 

in their context in Javad Zarif, the Foreign Minister. That is the 

veneer—the government we have been dealing with in Vienna. 

But there is another government and that is Qassem Soleimani, 

the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and 

36

that is a hard-bitten cynical aggressive assertive violent organization. They are the people pushing in on the Middle East. 

And so I assume, as Dr. Takeyh, Ray, does that some of the 

money from sanctions relief is going to go to economic improvements because they have got terrible political and economic problems at home. 

They are going to have to rebuild the infrastructure of that country that has withered away under sanctions. Some of it is going to 

go into arms and to supporting terrorist groups. 

And so at the same time that it is, I think, in our interest to pursue the nuclear agreement it is definitely in our interest to, I think, 

strengthen our coalition with Israel and the Arab countries and to 

push back on the Iranians. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So let me ask it this way. You talked about two different governments. Have we been—have we spent all of this time 

negotiating with one to get to an agreement only to see that government then hand off responsibility, going forward, to the other 

government that is wreaking havoc throughout the region? Dr. 

Takeyh, let me ask you then. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I will touch on this in the following way. I often 

hear that you can transact an arms control agreement and maintain your pressure on Iran. I am not sure if that is possible, and 

if you want to bring out the Soviet-American experience I am 

happy to go into that as well. 

The principal means that the United States tries to discipline 

Iran has been through economic sanctions. We never use military 

force against them and so on. 

This agreement stipulates that over a period of 10 years the 

United States will unwind its principal course of instruments, so 

a Central Bank sanction. 

In this agreement, Central Bank sanctions are to be waived. Is 

that terrorism sanctions? Is that a regression sanction? Is that a 

human rights sanction? 

It is a sanction that is going to be waived. The course of menu 

that the United States has for doing what Nick Burns wanted to 

do—contain Iran—is going to lessen. It is going to diminish. 

Soviet-American—the era of arms control in Soviet-American relations was 1973 arms control agreement, ADM, SALT I, SALT II. 

It was also one of the most aggressive decades in Soviet history, 

culminating in an unprecedented event—invasion of a country outside the perimeter of Soviet influence, Afghanistan. 

Countries that are—revolutionary countries that are a beneficiary of arms control agreements tend to be more aggressive and 

the ability of the United States to enforce, contain, reverse their 

aggression tends to diminish. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So just, finally, Dr. Takeyh, I just want to make 

sure I understand. The reference to our negotiations with the Soviet—negotiation of arms control treaties with the negotiations—

you suggest we should view more as a warning sign than——

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes. I challenge the thesis that you can maintain 

an arms control agreement and resist aggression by a revolutionary 

state. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

37

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

would just like to remind my good friend, Ambassador Burns, that 

while he says that there are two governments—Rouhani and the 

hardliners—both were very much active just this past Friday when 

they were chanting ‘‘Death to America. Death to Israel.’’

So we like to talk about these two separate entities—the 

hardliners and the moderates. They have one goal in mind and 

they say it—‘‘Death to America. Death to Israel.’’ But we ignore 

that. 

But according to reports, the White House seems to have caved 

on almost every one of Iran’s demands, blowing past its own red 

lines on enrichment, on centrifuges, on verifications, on inspections, 

on sanctions relief and on coming clean on past nuclear ambitions 

and military dimensions. 

And along the way the administration has made excuse after excuse, justifying every Iranian violation of this interim deal in order 

to continue negotiations providing billions of dollars in sanctions 

relief and is set to provide billions more. 

And now we know that Iran—what will it do with its additional 

sanctions relief and the influx of international investment that it 

is going to receive from this deal? 

It is going to continue funding its hegemonic ambitions throughout the Middle East, its support for terrorism throughout the 

world, just as it has been doing in Lebanon, in Syria, in Yemen and 

Iraq. 

And as reported, it is clear that this deal is a far cry from every 

red line that the White House itself imposed and it is a lower 

threshold than the six U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

And I look back on and read these resolutions and I think wow, 

that is like a fairy tale, once upon a time the world powers got together and said this is what we are going to demand. 

The administration kept lowering the bar time and time again, 

defending violations of the Iranians every step of the way, going 

legacy shopping—here is another item off the shelf, the Iranian nuclear deal. 

People will be worried about whatever else is going on in the 

music industry and in the film industry. Nobody is going to pay attention. Let us look at the shiny keys. 

The administration has also reportedly said that it would only 

lift nuclear-related sanctions even though officials would never describe exactly how that was defined. But now reports indicate that 

the administration has caved to the Iranian claim that all the sanctions are nuclear related. 

Do you believe that the U.S. and the U.N. should be lifting sanctions imposed on Iran for its human rights record, its ballistic missile program, its support for terrorism including the arms embargo? 

And following up on Chairman Royce’s exact point, General Hayden has pointed out that the IAEA must be allowed to inspect 

these suspect locations—military sites, et cetera. 

But you had told us and your colleagues believe that 

weaponization would never occur at declared facilities. It would be 

done in the secret facilities. It is now being reported that the deal 

would allow suspect activities at suspect sites to have access only 

after the P5+1 consultation with the Iranians. 

38

Secretary Kerry has stated that inspecting Iran’s military sites, 

coming clean on possible military dimensions isn’t even necessary 

because the U.S. has full knowledge of Iran’s activity. 

But many in the intelligence community including DIA Director, 

former DIA Director Michael Flynn, have argued that their real 

limits on U.S. intelligence in Iran makes this impossible. 

How can we trust Iran to give U.N. inspectors access to suspect 

sites after consultation with P5+1 countries? How hard is it to 

gather intelligence in Iran? How can we have full knowledge of 

Iran’s activities without access to all these sites. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, many supporters of the Iran deal 

have been floating the fantastical idea that Iran will change its behavior as a result of this agreement, become a better neighbor in 

a more stable Middle East. 

How will lifting the sanctions and influx of new money from 

sanctions relief change Iran’s involvement and influence throughout the Middle East? It will have more money to be involved in its 

hegemonic ambitions. 

There is not enough time to answer all of the questions that I 

have and not only these sanctions that the U.N. supported once 

upon a time. We are done with that. We might as well just rip that 

one up. That is not happening. 

And what about our U.S. sanctions? You know, Mr. Chairman, 

we talk about what sanctions we will lift. But there are some within our control. But there are so many executive order sanctions 

that the President can lift, so many provisions that he can waive. 

I know that I am out of time but I am greatly saddened, sickened 

and frustrated over this deal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Let me, first, set the record straight. The sanctions, especially 

the secondary sanctions, are the only reason that Iran made any 

concessions at all. 

Those sanctions were imposed by Congress over the objection of 

the executive branch. For 30 years, Congress had it right. The executive branch had it wrong except for those occasions when the 

House had it right and sent bills over to the Senate and then the 

President blocked them in the Senate. 

I am disappointed in this deal for all the reasons that have been 

brought up. The arms embargo was not a nuclear sanction yet it 

is being waived. 

The Iran Sanctions Act will be waived even though there are basically nine reasons recited in the act as to why we imposed it, and 

only one of them is nuclear. This sanctions relief is so complete 

that we are even going to import things from Iran—not oil but only 

the things that we don’t need and they can’t sell to anybody else. 

Dr. Takeyh, I think you’re right in saying they are going to 

spend a good chunk of this money that they are going to get for 

domestic purposes. 

But in addition, they will spend it on graft and corruption. They 

are good at that. They are going to kill a lot of Sunnis, some of who 

deserve it and many of whom do not, and then they will have a 

few brilliant at least left over to kill Americans, Israelis and work 

other mischief. 

39

A number of people have talked about the hope—that we are 

going to see a change in the government. Keep in mind we impose 

sanctions to change the government on the theory that if you deprive a government and its people of economic benefit you put pressure on them to change. 

Now we are going to shower them with money. Okay, it is their 

own money. But in any case, they are going to get—economic benefit is usually not the way to cause a government to lose its grip 

on power. 

General Hayden brings up missiles. I will simply point out that 

you can smuggle a nuclear weapon inside a bale of marijuana. It 

is not the classy way to do it. Obviously, Iran wants missiles—

intercontinental ballistic missiles—and they have only one reason 

for creating them and that is to deliver nuclear weapons. 

Political pundits all over the various channels are all asking is 

it a good deal—did Obama do a good job. That is their job. They 

are political pundits. They can be politicians or politician 

wannabes. 

We are here in the real world. We have got a disappointing deal 

that has the full support not only of the American President but 

also of the P5+1. 

Imagine us going on a codel to Italy and telling them that Eni 

should not invest in Iranian oil fields even though President 

Obama thinks they should. We would have good wine but I don’t 

think we would achieve our purpose. 

So we are in the real world. Senator Lieberman points out that 

we can endorse or reject this agreement. I agree with you except 

there is something else we could do. We could refuse to endorse it 

and refuse to reject it, which is probably what we are going to do. 

But I should mention this deal does have some good points. The 

good points are in the first year. Ninety percent of the stockpiles 

are being shipped out. Two-thirds of the centrifuges are being 

mothballed. 

So if we don’t take any action in the first year we get the benefits 

and the detriments of the first year of the deal. The 10th year of 

the deal is absolutely terrible. Iran has free access to 10 times as 

many centrifuges or 100 times as many centrifuges, each 10 times 

more efficient than the ones they’ve developed so far. 

And so I think our focus needs to be what do we do to prevent 

year 10. We can pass a resolution. We could—we could bring up a 

resolution of approval. 

It would be voted down overwhelmingly and then in the future 

Congresses and Presidents would be free to take action hopefully 

before year 10. 

That would be the strongest statement against the agreement. 

What is more likely to happen, unfortunately, is we will have a resolution of disapproval. It will pass. It will be vetoed. The veto is 

likely to be sustained. I think it will be sustained. 

And so we reach the same position which is Congress declares 

that it doesn’t like the agreement, doesn’t approve the agreement. 

We simply do so in the weakest and most pitiful way, the final vote 

being a victory for those who support the agreement when we don’t 

get two-thirds to override. 

40

So I think this deal is going to go into force. What I would like, 

and I realize I have left little time—hopefully, Chairman will be indulgent—but what advice do you give Presidents next decade as to 

how to prevent Iran from having an industrial-size enrichment program where, in the words of President Obama, their breakout time 

would be almost zero. 

I will start with General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have a good 

answer to that question. This deal guarantees the reality you 

just——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, this deal is not binding on the American 

people or future American Presidents. So let us say Iran kind of 

lives within the deal for the next 5 years, is economically stronger. 

Another President can say all options are on the table. What can 

a President do to make sure that this terrible year 10 does not go 

into force? Any other witness have a response? 

Senator Lieberman. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Congressman Sherman. The first thing 

I want to say is, respectfully, offer a somewhat different viewpoint 

from the outside about what will happen here in Congress. 

I am not prepared to say, based on conversations I have had with 

members of both chambers in both parties, that this agreement will 

be approved or disapproved and a Presidential veto will not be 

overridden. 

I think people’s minds are open. People are concerned. They are 

going to look at the agreement. I myself have said that whether 

Congress would override a veto by the President would depend on 

the specific terms of the agreement and now we have seen the 

agreement and the fact that it legitimizes Iran eventually as a nuclear weapons power and that even more important in the first instance the access, the inspections provisions are full of holes and 

don’t give us any hope that this country which was constantly 

cheated in its international agreements will abide by the agreement here. 

So I think it’s definitely possible that this agreement will be rejected by Congress and a President’s veto overridden. 

And to me that would be the best of all results. If it is not, the 

latitude of future Presidents, I suppose, will be expanded if there 

is an initial rejection of the agreement and not the President vetoes 

it and the veto is not overridden because a future President can 

look back and reopen negotiations, perhaps even ask for a reimposition of sanctions based on Iranian behavior and based on a 

premise that Congress will have set, which is that a majority of 

members of both houses voted to—and then the Senate will take 

60—voted to reject the agreement. 

Mr. TAKEYH. And I would just say one thing about this, Congressman Sherman. Congressman Sherman, on Page 3 of this 

agreement it says upon expiration Iran will be treated in the same 

manner as any other non-nuclear state party to NPT. That is 

Japan. You don’t like that phrase, you have to renegotiate it out 

of this agreement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, and you have to have a President who demands that and puts all options on the table. 

41

Mr. TAKEYH. I do think that one path would be, and unfortunately it’s not in this agreement—it has to be renegotiated—is to 

suggest that after 10 years all the parties to this agreement, 5+1 

and Iran, will vote whether to extend the restrictions. 

There is a precedent for that. It is called the NPT. Recently, 

when NPT expired all members voted after 25 years to actually extend its particular provisions permanently. That has to be renegotiated in this particular agreement. 

Mr. BURNS. The answer to your question, in my view, is that 

President Obama and his successor do three things—vigilance on 

inspections, number one—number two, maintain a coalition to reimpose sanctions if necessary. 

That is possible although difficult. And three, retain the right to 

use military force if necessary. There is a strategy here where this 

agreement can be implemented successfully. 

Chairman ROYCE. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this extraordinarily timely hearing and 

thank you for our distinguished witnesses. 

You know, not only has the Iranian Government just orchestrated death to America demonstrations just a few days ago but 

they continue to hold Americans—Pastor Saeed Abedini, Amir 

Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson. We have had hearings on that and they still are incarcerated, subjected to cruel 

treatment by this regime. And now a deal with them? 

Senator Lieberman, I think your comments about how this falls 

far short, more risk to America—Ambassador Burns, you mentioned that it’s not a perfect deal. 

Who expected a perfect deal? That is almost like a straw man argument, with all due respect. We hoped for a better deal where 

other issues like ballistic missiles, the whole issue of enrichment, 

which always was a foundational premise of a deal, they’re off the 

table and now there will be enrichment allowed. And again, I think 

that was a major, major mistake. 

In a statement of what I consider to be bad faith, President 

Obama vowed to veto, to block any congressional move to block this 

agreement. 

This is day one. He is already talking veto. If it is such a good 

deal, why not persuade Congress and, by extension, the American 

people about its contents? Instead veto card goes right up—red 

card. It is not going to go forward. 

Managed access—one of several Achilles’ heels—how is that defined? How does that apply to suspected military sites on a regional 

nuclear arms race? 

We all want peace and nuclear weapons are the antithesis of 

peace. Will this begin or foment a nuclear arms race in the region? 

Perhaps Senator Lieberman, you could touch on that. 

Ambassador Burns, you talked about how the deal buys us 10 

years. Well, if Iran is newly infused with cash and the sanctions 

were not aggressively or as aggressively implemented as they could 

there are always some caveats that were allowed including oil to 

China, which was a lifeline. Now we have a situation where they 

are going to get huge infusions of cash, which will hurt, obviously, 

the region. 

42

It will be a multiplier effect—fourth multiplier for terrorism. 

That is a very serious problem. The existential threat to Israel, you 

know, we all know what Netanyahu said—an historic mistake for 

the world. Perhaps you might want to comment on that. 

Let me ask you also, one of the key questions is whether or not 

the Obama administration and the P5+1 partners can be trusted 

to punish Iran or even proactively acknowledge Iranian violations 

of the agreement as they are likely to occur. What will happen or 

are we going to submit it to a committee and nothing happens? 

Senator Lieberman. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Congressman Smith. 

So let me just respond to the question about Nonproliferation, 

and this is going to go be an ironic and, I think, painful result 

which is that an agreement presumably to reduce the presence of 

nuclear weapons in the Middle East, because it eventually allows 

a radical state like Iran to get nuclear weapons, will in fact encourage other powers within the Middle East to invest in nuclear weapons capability and that is a—that makes the Middle East, which 

is already boiling with various kinds of conflict, even more literally 

explosive. 

Look, to Saudi officials within the Saudi Government have already said to people if an agreement between the P5+1 and Iran 

enables Iran to become a nuclear weapons power they are not going 

to wait until that happens. 

They are going to begin to build up their own capacity for nuclear weapons. So the fact that—I looked at this in my opening 

statement from the point of view of America. 

I said this agreement has much more risk for America and much 

more reward for Iran than it should. It’s not the good deal that we 

all wanted. But governments in the Middle East area also making 

the same calculation throughout the Arab world and, of course, 

Israel and they are going to take actions based on that calculation. 

If we think it’s a bad deal I think they are going to think it is 

a terrible deal because it is their neighborhood and the result will 

be exactly the opposite of what was hoped for here, which is a more 

peaceful Middle East. It is going to be a much more violent and potentially explosive Middle East. 

Mr. SMITH. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Very briefly, Mr. Smith, the more the administration argues it is this deal or a vote for war the more you take 

off the table the ability of the United States to use military power 

to coerce the Iranians. 

I don’t think anyone believes that is a realistic option at the moment. In fact, I don’t think they believe that for more than a year 

or 2 going back. 

And so that does actually weaken our position in order to get the 

kind of behavior we want from the Iranians. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just very briefly ask about in the report 

itself—this is the actual agreement, although there are annexes, 

apparently, that none of us have seen yet. It says Iran intends to 

ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors. It says intends. Doesn’t say requires. Are 

there requirements in this for that? Intends—I mean, that is pretty 

weak. 

43

Mr. BURNS. I understand it’s a requirement. 

Mr. SMITH. Then why would they put ‘‘intends’’ in the text of the 

agreement? 

Mr. BURNS. I don’t know. But I understand it’s a requirement. 

It’s part of the deal. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I’d say it is a good question, Mr. Smith, and one 

that I am sure you and the committee will get answered when the 

administration comes before you to support this. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We go to Mr. Gregory Meeks of New 

York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first ask, I was listening to Ambassador Burns’ testimony 

and during his testimony one of the things that he highlighted was 

if the United States had walked away—if we would walk away and 

we just said no and the other partners were trying to strike a deal, 

so I guess my first question maybe I will ask it to General Hayden: 

Do you think that we should walk away even if that meant the dissolution of the P5+1 and the unity that we have had for both the 

last 20 months? Would you walk away from such a deal? 

General HAYDEN. Mr. Meeks, I think what’s happened is if we 

did that today it would dissolve the unity of the P5+1 and we 

would be blamed for it. But that is a corner we have painted ourselves into by accepting the agreement. 

Mr. MEEKS. So right now, though, you would agree then it would 

make it quite difficult to hold the coalition together. 

If we walked away we would get blamed and so therefore the 

sanctions that have brought Iran to agree to negotiations when I 

think it was also Ambassador Burns’ testimony that the Bush administration tried to get Iran to agree to negotiations and they 

would not at that time. 

So there has been a tremendous—there has been a change from 

what took place at the end of the Bush administration because we 

didn’t have this outside unity with the P5+1 and if we did not have 

that—now, that could relieve some of the pressure on Iran and for 

me the only thing that I am looking at in these negations is what 

is the opportunity to stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon? 

General HAYDEN. I understand perfectly. I think the Russians 

and the Chinese peel off immediately because they didn’t want to 

be there in the first place and it was actually quite a high level 

of skill to get them into the circle to pressure the Iranians. 

I think there is greater hope with the EU, the French and the 

British although, again, we have painted ourselves into a corner by 

accepting the things we are questioning now and for us to undo 

those would make it very difficult——

Mr. MEEKS. Well, the problem is, which I intend to find out, is, 

you know, while the negotiations were going and who was saying 

what to who, you know, we weren’t in the room. So how that negotiations took place and who was demanding what within the P5+1 

becomes important. 

I think it is important for Members of Congress before we make 

a decision is to try to talk to our colleagues in the P5+1 to find out 

what their feelings are, to find out where they are on this and 

what’s important. 

44

It is important to talk to scientists, not just the politics of it, but 

talk to IAEA, to go to Vienna. I would suggest that members of this 

committee travel to Vienna and talk to the IAEA and talk to scientists to see if what is in place in this agreement can do the inspections. Would that prevent, in their opinion as scientists, not politically but as scientists and as much as we can because from my 

viewpoint, you know, having had—and I agree with Senator 

Lieberman—this is a very important vote and I can’t leave it in a 

vacuum because I had another important vote and that was back 

when we decided, you know, was talking about Iraq and there was 

questions then of whether or not we should have diplomatic relations—should we debate, should we go further, should we have 

verification. And what happened at that particular point we said 

no. There was imminent danger of Iraq having weapons of mass 

destruction. 

They had them. And I can remember, you know, the case went 

to the U.N. We took the case to the U.N. that there were these 

weapons. 

And we are still—I don’t want to go back but we are still—I 

think we should learn a lesson because we are still paying for that 

when we didn’t do everything that we could first because if we did 

everything that we did first and they still had weapons we could 

have done what we did anyways. 

And so here we are again with the opportunity and I agree that 

this is not perfect. I don’t know any perfect bill that has ever been 

made in this United States Congress, ever, in the history of our 

country—not one. So I am not looking for a perfect bill. 

General HAYDEN. No, no. I agree. The correct question—I think 

you’ve just framed it—is this deal good enough that we should 

avoid sliding from that position into a position that any deal is better than no deal. 

Mr. MEEKS. I agree. But we ought to also keep in context that 

we are not dealing by ourselves or doing it unilaterally. 

Everything that I hear most saying is just us. Forget about the 

other five partners to this deal. This is what—there is other when 

you have negotiations and I think that leadership, the leadership 

keeping this group together that is leadership so that we can get 

to this point because otherwise we don’t get here and we don’t have 

any choices. 

This at least gives us a choice, a chance, and shouldn’t we at 

least look at it and talk to scientists? I mean, this bill just was 

struck this morning, for God’s sake. We haven’t talked to any scientists. We haven’t gone to the IAEA to see what they’ve done. We 

haven’t gone to Vienna. We haven’t talked to our partners in this 

negotiation. 

That is our responsibility as Congress, don’t you think, as opposed to us just making a decision like today what we are going 

to do? 

General HAYDEN. No, that is—I think the position all of us have 

here is the fine print here really matters and there is little or no 

margin for error. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let us—shall we go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher 

of California. 

45

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

again thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Engel, who 

is not with us today. But both of you provide such great leadership 

on this issue and other issues of great significance. 

Let us note that the agreement that was being discussed today 

is being held with a government entity that holds four Americans 

illegally hostage. 

Let me note that my staff is preparing legislation that would permit our President to take non-diplomatic Iranian officials into custody until their government and their clique returns these Americans who they are holding illegally. 

Now, of course, we won’t do that because we don’t want to make 

the Iranian mullah regime angry by doing something like that. In 

fact, we have refrained. 

The mullahs have already won a great deal by this elongated negotiation because for all of these years we have been refraining 

from supporting the democratic elements in Iran against the 

mullahs for fear that it would upset the negotiations over the nuclear deal. 

So we have already been a loser even before this supposed agreement. 

What I would like to ask does anyone on the panel know whether 

or not this agreement includes an Iranian agreement not to obtain 

a nuclear weapon from another source rather than building one 

their own? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think this agreement stipulates that Iran will be 

a member of the NPT and as a member of NPT it has foregone, 

presumably, a nuclear weapons option 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So the answer is yes, part of this 

agreement is that the Iranians have agreed not to obtain a nuclear 

weapon from someone else? 

Mr. TAKEYH. It says Iran will become a member of the NPT in 

good—if it becomes a member of NPT in good standing then it foregoes the option of actually having a nuclear weapon. 

It doesn’t specify the source of that. But it essentially forecloses 

the option as a matter of principle. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher, if I may just add——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN [continuing]. It seems to me that Iran has developed a lot of the nuclear capability that it has today in violation 

of its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty. So I am just 

offering that as more evidence that—Dr. Takeyh is right, of course. 

They shouldn’t do this under the NPT but they violated the NPT 

wantonly for years before. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I see. So in other words, according to—if we 

can expect the same type of behavior with—that they made with 

other agreements with this agreement they could easily—even with 

all these other inspections we are talking about they could obtain, 

let us say, a nuclear weapon from an illegal source. 

Now, another question for the panel—we have some people who 

know about U.S. intelligence, et cetera, with us today—are there 

nuclear weapons that some countries or some groups might be able 

to obtain on the market rather than develop—having to build their 

own weapon? 

46

General HAYDEN. Of course, always watching the North Koreans. 

We saw the North Koreans build a plutonium reactor in the eastern Syrian desert——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

General HAYDEN [continuing]. That we detected just at the last 

minute. Just to spin off the scenario that Senator Lieberman has 

talked about with regard to the Sunnis and how they will respond 

to this, I mean, one very possible scenario is that the Saudis will 

then go to the Pakistanis in order to get nuclear devices to balance 

what they view to be the Iranian threat. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So what we have is basically a situation 

where we have not refrained from supporting the democratic elements in Iran, which is the real solution is getting rid of the 

mullah regime and getting a democratic government in there that 

doesn’t seek to possess nuclear weapons. 

But, of course, we have actually undermined that opportunity 

by—over these last 6 years and in fact this agreement may undermine it further. 

And well I thank you all for your testimony today and I think 

that you have given us a lot to think about and I would hope that 

all of us here do our duty and I don’t think it is a tough decision. 

I think it is very clear that this is a rotten deal and but we will 

keep an open mind to see if we can be convinced that there is some 

other benefits to it. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Karen Bass of California. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I had a few questions that really kind of focused on the process 

and also the consequences of our actions. And so a couple of people 

have asked questions about our partners from the other countries. 

So I was wondering about the P5+1 and wanted to know if they 

have a similar process where they are voting in their legislative 

bodies, what happens at the U.N. and maybe you could put it in 

sequence, Ambassador Burns. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much. 

The P5+1 group was put together by the U.S. in December 2005. 

It has been the core of the international effort and one of the reasons why I am supporting the President’s initiative. 

I think that if you keep this group together that is the leverage 

point and pressure point through sanctions, inspections on the Iranians. If the group dissolves then we really lose our leverage. 

It’s a disparate group. The French, of course, the Germans and 

the British will have to go back and report to their—the Bundestag 

and the two parliaments on this deal. They are democratic countries. 

I am very strongly assured that President Putin doesn’t really 

have to worry about the Dumas very much. 

Ms. BASS. So do you have any sense of France and Britain? I 

mean, will their legislative bodies approve it? What is your sense 

of that? 

Mr. BURNS. My sense of the politics in Europe is that in the main 

the parliaments and the public are strongly supportive of this deal. 

I think that is true in Europe, almost across the board. 

47

The interesting country here is Russia. We are sanctioning Russia over Ukraine. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. BURNS. And deservedly so. And yet we are going to have to 

work with Russia to try to keep them on our side here. The country 

that I think is weakest is China because they tend to be motivated 

by commercial purposes almost to the exclusion of strategic thought 

that we have to be worried about because, you know, we have to 

worry about law and order in the Middle East. 

And so it’s a very difficult coalition. But behind it, of course, you 

have also the major purchasers of Iranian energy and I mentioned 

them before—Japan, South Korea and India—very important that 

we keep them in this coalition as well. 

Ms. BASS. How do you see this playing out at the U.N. Security 

Council? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think there is no question that part of the 

implementation of this agreement will be that there will be a new 

Security Council resolution that will put this new agreement into 

force that will take away the sanctions, at least those that have 

been voted upon by the United Nations. And if the five permanent 

members are all in agreement they will win the vote. 

They need nine votes to carry a resolution. I think it is pretty 

much assured that they will win that particular vote. 

Ms. BASS. Do you have any concerns that any of those countries 

will exercise their veto power? 

Mr. BURNS. No. I think the deal worked out is that they all agree 

they will not exercise the veto, that they are all going to go forward. This is the way to implement the agreement. So I think 

there is zero percent probability that any country would use the 

veto. 

Ms. BASS. So if we turn this down and we override a veto, what 

do you see happening then? How does it play out in the international arena? 

Here are all these reports about planes full of people who want 

to go over and make business deals for various countries. So if we 

override the President’s veto what happens then? 

Mr. BURNS. I think if the President vetoes a vote of disapproval, 

if that is then overridden, I think you will see the dissolution of 

the P–5 group, the breakdown of solidarity around the world on 

sanctions, the commercial impulse of a lot of these countries to do 

business with Iran, will take over. 

Iran will then be in the position of getting sanctions relief, right, 

effectively from most of the world. But they also won’t have any 

constraints on their nuclear program. 

Ms. BASS. Well, I was going to ask how would we hold them accountable. I mean, if we back out then it’s not us holding them accountable. But how will the rest of the world in the P–5—because 

it won’t be +1. 

Mr. BURNS. Iran won’t be accountable. Iran will be able to proceed on a plutonium and enrichment program that they haven’t 

been able to do now for 13 months and this does get to the very 

important question. 

48

We are all trying to define what is the question. My question is 

what is the best alternative for the United States as we live in the 

real world? 

We are right here in the middle of 2015. I think it is this deal. 

We can’t go back and design a better process 5 years back. I also 

would disagree very respectfully with Senator Lieberman and General Hayden on one question. 

If we are worried about proliferation that the Saudis or another 

country might want to compete with the Iranians and develop a 

nuclear weapon or buy one, the scenario for that is a breakdown 

of this deal that leaves the Iranians without constraints on their 

nuclear program. 

The way to resolve the proliferation problem and reassure the 

Gulf Arabs is to lock and freeze in the Iranian program for the next 

10 years. 

Ms. BASS. If we overrode the veto also how would we get—you 

said sanctions would break down and let’s just say we wanted to 

bring sanctions back again—how would you be able to bring them 

back? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, if that happened, hypothetically, obviously the 

President and the Secretary of State would want to reassemble a 

sanctions regime against Iran if Iran had broken the agreement 

and if Iran was proceeding with its nuclear research it could be——

Ms. BASS. What does—one last quick question. 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. It would be difficult to do. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. So whether it’s 10 years at the end of—if we get 

to year 8 and 9 and I am asking you this based on your previous 

experience because it kind of comes across like 10 years happens 

and then everything goes back to normal. 

Wouldn’t a new agreement begin to be negotiated around year 8 

or year 9 or are you just sitting and waiting until 10 years is over? 

Mr. BURNS. If you still had the Ayatollahs in control, if you still 

had a radical government in Tehran you’d have to put together, I 

think, another sanctions regime, pressure points on Iran, threaten 

them, reserve the right to use military force if they sought a nuclear weapon. You’d be back in that game. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Steve Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Lieberman, I will begin with you, if that is okay. As has 

already been mentioned, Prime Minister Netanyahu had referred to 

this agreement as a mistake of historic proportions. 

What position does this put Israel in? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Congressman. Obviously, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the leadership of Israel is better prepared 

than I am to make a statement about that. 

But this is a room full of friends and supporters of Israel and it 

is very clear that based on the violent anti-Israel rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on the support by Iran of the terrorists who know threaten Israel including, particularly, Hezbollah 

and Hamas the idea that the Iranians would have a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable period of time assuming they kept the promises that they made about the first 10 years is very threatening to 

Israel. 

49

And I think it will lead the Israeli Government to make its own 

decisions about what it can do to better protect itself. Incidentally, 

one of the interesting things, as you all know, the Israeli political 

system is quite lively, a lot of opposition. 

But from what I see the feeling about this agreement and that 

worry about it in the weeks preceding it is shared across a very 

broad spectrum of the Israeli political establishment. 

So to be more specific, the Minister of Knesset, Herzog, who was 

the leader of the opposition has basically said the same things 

about an agreement—a bad agreement—on nuclear weapons with 

Iran that Prime Minster Netanyahu had said. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. General Hayden, let me turn to you at 

this point. When you combine the lifting of the arms embargo and 

this agreement shouldn’t it be greatly concerning to us, our security, that the concern that intercontinental ballistic missile technology and information goes from Russia to Iran and that puts us 

directly in harm’s way here from a nuclear-armed Iran somewhere 

down the road? 

General HAYDEN. Well, it certainly puts us in a position of being 

more threatened by a more capable Iran with or without a nuclear 

device. 

The Senator talked about Israel and its position on nuclear 

weapons and how this really frightens the Israelis. I think there 

is another element to it. 

Yesterday, Iran was an international outlaw. Today they are not. 

And that will allow the normalization of a whole host of relationships as you’re suggesting that will allow the Iranians to grow in 

strength. 

Now, next comment about we need to work hard to make sure 

that doesn’t happen because they are engaged in egregious behavior throughout the region is certainly true and aspirational. 

But I do think for the rest of the world this is welcoming this 

Iran, the one that has not changed, back into the family of nations 

and that is very problematic. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Dr. Takeyh, I have limited time left. So 

let me put two questions to you, if I can. 

One is, isn’t it likely that with this deal you are going to see a 

pretty significant reaction by the Gulf States and the Saudis, that 

they have to counter a much stronger Iran now that ultimately is 

going to have nuclear weapons in all likelihood as a result of this, 

so that you’re going to see in essence an arms race there? 

And secondly, this—given 2 weeks’ notice before you can inspect 

you can move a lot of incriminating evidence with 2 weeks’ notice 

and then negotiations probably after that as well. Wouldn’t that be 

accurate? And I will give you whatever time I have left. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Sorry. Whether this can lead to proliferation, my 

suspicion is—my guess is that the Saudis and the Gulf States are 

going to try to match Iran’s capability. 

Now, Ambassador Burns said that this would happen in absence 

of a deal. But it hadn’t happened in absence of a deal. 

It hadn’t happened in absence of a deal because the trust and 

confidence that those countries had in the United States and its intentions to severely restrict the Iranian nuclear program. 

50

That intention is no longer in practice. This agreement says that 

Iran will be treated as NPT. I would like to hear, and I have never 

heard, a defense of the sunset clause. 

The only thing I hear about the sunset clause is if it is about to 

expire we can try to not have it expire. That is not a defense of 

the sunset clause. 

If you defend this agreement you should defend why it should expire in 10 years. That’s the intellectually consistent position. 

In terms of your verification demands, the verification procedure 

will be in place once the IAEA has credible evidence of untoward 

activity. That is not a card you can play every day, that there is 

something suspicious happening in a non-declared nuclear site. 

And then it will ask the Iranian Government for permission to 

deal with that particular. 

In the annexes that I have seen I don’t know what that means 

in terms of inspecting the military facility. Do you do environmental sampling? Do you go through the whole thing? I don’t know 

the answer to that. It is not obvious to me in the annexes that I 

have seen but maybe I should probe them more. 

And then if there is a dispute it will go to a resolution dispute 

committee. Every arms control agreement has a verification dispute committee. 

Once that committee says well, Iran is wrong and the IAEA 

should have access, Iran says not, it will go to the Security Council 

and Ambassador Burns knows all about the Security Council. 

The Security Council can do lots of different things. The Security 

Council cannot impose economic sanctions on Iran. There is no 

country called Security Council. 

It can recommend national measures but those national measures will subsequently have to be negotiated case by case by the 

United States Government as was done for the past 10 years when 

successive American diplomats went to Europe and elsewhere trying to restrict Iranian commerce. 

Mr. CHABOT. And during that long period of time that you’ve set 

out, there are no inspections? 

Mr. TAKEYH. On that particular—on the cleared side? No. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. All right. We go to Mr. William Keating of 

Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to thank the 

witnesses for the seriousness and the tone with which they conducted themselves in this hearing and the thoughtfulness as well 

of my colleagues. 

I think that—I hope this is a harbinger for the way we are discussing this issue going forward because it is, indeed, one of the 

more serious issues we’ll have and I know for one I think I speak 

for most of Congress that we are just beginning to digest this and 

in no position to take a position on this. 

Yet, many of your comments have been thoughtful and I share 

many of them. That being said, I just want to go back. There is a 

few areas of interest. 

Ambassador Burns talked about how the coalition is likely to unravel and then we would lose our strength in terms of the sanctions. 

51

There is another area that might change if this is stalled or if 

we walk away from this and that is the issue that we are negotiating with Iran before they have the nuclear program in place. 

What would the negotiations be, in your mind, after they have 

that? How much more difficult would it be? How would they be limited if we wait? I think that is an important question that hasn’t 

been asked. Ambassador Burns. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Keating. 

May I just take this opportunity to say I am one of your constituents from Westport, Massachusetts. So thank you very much for 

your representing us in Congress. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, I am doubly glad that I commended all of you 

on your——

Mr. BURNS. I am too. You know, we have had a bitter experience 

with North Korea that both General Hayden and Senator 

Lieberman and I have all been involved in this. 

And once North Korea obtained nuclear weapons it has become 

almost impossible to negotiate with them because they have leverage right now. 

And, of course, they have some protection from China as well. So 

I think that both President Bush and President Obama have been 

right to try to go at this in a more direct way and try to stop—

by negotiations—the Iranians before they cross the nuclear threshold. 

What President Obama has been able to do, in my judgment, is 

buy us 10 years. And I agree with Ray and everyone else here. We 

can’t hope that the Iranians will change. I bet they don’t. 

So we are going to have to go through these 10 years with a lot 

of vigilance, a lot of toughness and maybe even replay all this 10 

years from now. But we bought ourself 10 years. 

And we do have international unity and in the end even someone 

as cynical as President Putin doesn’t want Iran to become a nuclear weapons power. Russia lies closer geographically to Iran than 

the rest of us do. 

In an interesting sort of way, the Russians have not broken consensus, despite the fact that we are sanctioning then on Ukraine. 

So I think this is the time for negotiations and I do believe, reflecting on the history of a post-9/11 era we should exhaust diplomacy and then if it fails—and this could fail—then we always have 

the military and the military option to rely on. I think that is the 

proper sequence. 

Mr. KEATING. I am trying to get in another couple questions. Let 

us see if I can. One of my concerns was raised by Ambassador 

Burns, and Doctor, you addressed your opinion on this, but the 

idea that if this agreement would result in Saudis and the Gulf 

States just moving forward. 

Now, they were at the 1-yard line, you know, to getting to their 

nuclear program and there is no doubt in my mind going the 99 

yards. They are going to go do that. 

So if they are going to get that anyways, wouldn’t any decisions 

by the Saudis or other countries, wouldn’t they have done that anyways? 

Aren’t they going to do that—my point is I hope you’re following 

this that it’s not any agreement that is going to all of a sudden 

52

make them go forward with their armed nuclear programs. But in 

the absence of an agreement they are going forward anyways, at 

least I believe that. 

So I think it’s kind of a moot point about the other countries 

moving forward. But I understand, Doctor, what you said. Then 

any of the other panelists have a view on that? 

Mr. TAKEYH. The Gulf States have not moved forward. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, but if this becomes a reality one way or the 

other they are likely to. That is your consensus? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Go ahead, General. 

General HAYDEN. I will have very, very quick view, Mr. Keating. 

Right now, they really haven’t and they haven’t because we go into 

the huddle with them. We are part of their team. 

There is going to be a perception that we have not quite switched 

sides. We have gone to the lead commissioner’s office and we are 

no longer playing on their squad. 

Mr. KEATING. All right. If I could——

General HAYDEN. We will want to pursue it. 

Mr. KEATING. I just want to get one more question in. Of course, 

I am very sensitive to going to the League for sanctions, being a 

big fan of the New England Patriots. But that is another issue. 

Quickly, at least I will raise the question—I don’t know if time 

will permit. But I think that of concern too is that if the coalition 

unravels, you know, that creates a problem. But if Iran violates 

how easy will it be to reconstitute that coalition for sanctions 

again? And that is a real concern. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I think, first, I should reassure you that I have 

a lot more confidence in Tom Brady than Ayatollah Khameini and 

that goes without saying. 

So, you know, it has been great to have the P5+1 together. It 

strengthened our position. But I think we have to talk about tradeoffs, which Ambassador Burns has spoken of. 

I think—I would have us reject a bad deal and run the risk of 

having the P5+1 coalition dissolve than to accept a bad deal which 

will compromise our security and that of our allies in the Middle 

East. 

I mean, I think we—in my opinion part of what has been lost 

here is that the Iranians needed this agreement more than we did. 

It didn’t seem like that but they are in a lot more trouble than we 

are, certainly economically, and they benefit a lot from this. 

If for some reason the P5+1 coalition falls apart we are still the 

economic superpower of the world and access to our banking system is still necessary for economic growth. 

And so we have the capacity ourselves to reimpose sanctions on 

them. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. I have gone over my time and other 

members want to talk. But thank you all. Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Joe Wilson, South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am grateful just 

as Mr. Keating for Chairman Ed Royce and Ranking Member Eliot 

Engel for the bipartisan explanation of the threats to the American 

people. 

53

Additionally, I am very grateful for the panel being here today. 

You are making a difference explaining this to the American people. 

I am disappointed the President has made dangerous concessions 

when negotiating with the Iranian regime. This regime sponsors 

terrorists who attack American families and openly calls for death 

to Americans and our allies, especially Israel. 

This bipartisan concern, I believe, has been expressed so well 

today by the courage of Senator Joe Lieberman. Your testimony 

today that this is a bad deal which should be overridden, thank you 

very much for your courage. 

Foreign Policy Initiative board member William Kristol wrote 

today, ‘‘It is obviously a very good deal for the Iranians regime, a 

very bad deal for America. Congress should pass a resolution of disapproval. Congress then should override the President’s veto and 

return America’s Iran policy to dealing from a position of strength 

rather than supplication.’’

In the coming days, I hope the American people are allowed to 

consider the agreement truthfully and hold the President accountable. 

In an effort to achieve political gain, President Obama has ignored Congress and the American people and I believe is establishing a sad legacy of a murderous regime with nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles targeting American families. 

I agree with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: This 

is a mistake of historic proportions. With that in mind, Senator 

Lieberman, it should be remembered that the Secretary of State 

designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism January 23, 1984, over 

30 years ago. 

This was in response to the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. 

Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 300 Marines. 

This was perpetrated, people need to remember, by the Iranian 

regime. Keeping that in mind, has there been any change of course 

by the Iranian regime leading up to the negotiations that have occurred today or been agreed to today? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Congressman Wilson. This is a very important point. It is easy to get focused on today and forget tomorrow but tomorrow tells us who this agreement is with. 

Let me be really explicit about it, as you have been. This Iranian 

Government, the Islamic Republic of Iran, has the blood of a lot of 

Americans on its hands. 

The Marines at the barracks in Beirut, the soldiers at Khowar 

Towers, I could go on and on. Incidentally, hundreds of American 

soldiers were killed in Iraq by Shi’a militias that were trained in 

Iran by the IRGC. 

So your question is a good one—has the government changed. 

There is no evidence of it. Somebody said before that, and I have 

heard it before—Iran has two governments. I don’t think so. 

Iran has one government and two faces. The government in 

power is Ayatollah Khamanei and the IRGC. The face that they 

put out occasionally is Prime Minister Rouhani or President 

Rouhani and now in these negotiations the Prime Minister Zarif. 

But does anybody really think Zarif and Rouhani are really representative of their government? No. Not in the final analysis. So 

54

your question, as you consider this agreement, is you got to remember that who you are making the agreement with is very important. 

Mr. WILSON. And additionally the IEDs—improvised explosive 

devices—that killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq and also in Afghanistan—I had two sons serve in Iraq, another in Afghanistan. 

They had to face Iranian weaponry and for this to be disregarded 

is incredible to me. And I want to thank you too. You brought up 

about the government-sponsored newspaper in Tehran and people 

need to know what the exact quote was and that is that they predicted the U.S. ‘‘will one fine day cease to be visible on the map 

of the world.’’ I mean, goodness gracious, what are we facing? 

And General, by lifting the economic sanctions what will this do 

to our efforts to stop the degrading of terrorism and what does this 

do to the stability of Iraq, Syria and Yemen? 

General HAYDEN. Congressman, it just increases Iranian capacity 

across the board. That is an unavoidable consequence of this. It 

may be something we are willing to pay the price for? 

I don’t think so because of the nuclear portfolio. But unavoidably 

Iran is more capable of continuing the policies it has been following 

for the last several decades and there is no evidence that this 

agreement or anything else is going to make the Iranians change 

that course. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, each of you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We will go to David Cicilline of 

Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank 

the witnesses for your thoughtful testimony and for assisting us in 

what will be a very consequential decision not only for our country 

but for the security of the world so thank you. 

I want to just start by saying that I think the objective of these 

negotiations, at least as presented to me, was always preventing a 

nuclear Iran and that it is important that, as we decide whether 

to support or disapprove this agreement, it should be measured 

against that objective. There is lots more work to do and lots of action and pushing back that needs to take place. But nobody should 

have imagined that this agreement would solve all of the challenges we face and result in a complete transformation of the ideology, behaviors or intentions of Iran because if that is the test 

there’s no question that the agreement fails. 

The question is does it achieve a non-nuclear Iran. Senator 

Lieberman, you just testified that it allows Iran to be a nuclear 

weapon state and makes it inevitable. The President this morning, 

in describing this agreement, said, and I quote, ‘‘that it is a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon.’’

So I will start with you, Ambassador Burns. Who is right? I 

mean, if the objective is to prevent a nuclear Iran, Senator 

Lieberman has said it is inevitable because of this agreement. The 

President says it will not happen because of this agreement. That 

is the question we have to decide. 

Mr. BURNS. I respect Senator Lieberman’s position here because 

he’s spent decades on this issue and I don’t want to take issue with 

him at all, in this sense. 

55

I don’t think it is possible to say that this agreement will 100 

percent prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power. 

They could achieve that through covert means. 

So I think that would be the wrong way to look at this. I think 

it gives us the greatest probability of preventing that and that is 

why I am supportive of it. 

I see the down side and I think Congress will have to struggle 

through what we have all talked about this morning—will the inspections be strong enough—can you reimpose sanctions, right? 

What is the nature of the regime? But I am convinced we have 

to try this first and we have to be vigorous in trying to implement 

it and if it works we are ahead of the game. If it doesn’t work we 

have other options. We do have other options. 

But I wouldn’t say that if you are opposed to this deal, that 

somehow leads to war. I think that is false, too. 

I actually think if the deal unravels the Iranians won’t be—the 

Iranians are smart enough they won’t go to the nuclear threshold. 

They will go—they will be some ways behind to not invite a military response. So I think the rhetoric, if you are against it, you are 

going to get a war is not correct. 

And if you are for it, you can’t assure the American people there 

will be no nuclear weapon. I think the reality is very complex between the two. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And building upon that, Ambassador Burns, 

much of the argument has been made even today that what this 

agreement attempts to do is buy a decade—buy this period of peace 

or a period of at least Iran not moving toward a nuclear weapon. 

The argument, of course, being that the end of that period, some 

would argue, Iran will be stronger. They will have greater economic 

success. They will be able to withstand the imposition of sanctions 

better than they are today. Our argument on the reverse side is 

that we will know more about the nuclear program than we’ve ever 

known before as a result of intrusive inspections. 

So it seems to me that is one of the other questions we need to 

struggle with is where do we end up. Because presumably, according the to the agreement, no options are off the table at the end 

of that period. 

Military options, all the options that are available today remain 

available. The only question is what is the difference in the 

strength of our positions. 

Mr. BURNS. Right. And I think one way to look at this analytically is that there is a lot of risk here in going forward. There is 

a lot of risk in not going forward and disapproving and you have 

to try to weigh the risks on both sides. 

I think there is a legitimate case to be made, and Ray Takeyh 

knows more about this than I do, that there is a possibility this regime is going to change—become less virulent, less aggressive. But 

we can’t bank our strategy on that. Hope cannot be the basis of 

that strategy. So we have to be prepared for either outcome. We 

would take advantage of a positive turn of events. We have to be 

very tough if 10 years from now this regime hasn’t changed and 

tries to turn back toward a nuclear futures. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Dr. Takeyh, can I follow up with you? One of the 

things you said is you challenge the supposition that you can chalVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:33 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071415\95512 SHIRL
56

lenge a revolutionary state and have an arms agreement, which is, 

of course, exactly what this proposal attempts to do. Why do you 

think we can’t do both of those things? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think in the context of U.S. relationship with the 

Islamic Republic—what I will suggest then, Congressman, is it is 

difficult to maintain an arms control agreement as well as coercive 

leverage because the principal course of leverage we have exercised 

on Iran is economic. 

We have never responded to their military attacks on the United 

States and Iraq and elsewhere. And the course of leverage of economics this agreement commits the United States and the international community to unwind economic sanctions on Iran over a 

decade. So your coercive menu shrinks. And once it shrinks from 

economic instruments you have military at your disposal and I just 

don’t think there is a military solution to this. So basically if you 

want to pressure Iran and historically we have pressure through 

economic sanctions that option is becoming less available as you 

are statutorily committed to unwinding those sanctions. 

Mr. CICILLINE. General Hayden, if I could just ask one last question of you and Senator Lieberman. What do you think happens if 

the deal is disapproved by Congress—the veto is sustained? What 

do think happens next? 

General HAYDEN. We are in absolutely uncharted waters, Congressman. It would depend on the strength of the American argument, the willingness of the administration to go to our allies and 

explain why we have chosen a new course of action. And as the 

Senator pointed out, we are a powerful nation on our own. 

We can impose very powerful sanctions on a variety of fronts 

across the Iranian, economy, particularly the Iranian banking system. But as Ambassador Burns points out, the more international 

consensus we get the more coercive pressure we can bring to bear. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. A real quick response, Congressman. If this 

agreement is rejected by Congress, nobody can predict what will 

happen. But I would say that I would hope that the administration 

would try to regather the P5+1 and basically go back to Iran and 

say we couldn’t sell it—we got to do a better deal here. And, again, 

I believe that Iran needs a deal much more than we do. 

The other thing is that at that point we probably would want to 

look at increasing sanctions to give them another motivation to 

come back and making credible the President and Congress that 

we are prepared to use our military power if our intelligence tells 

us that they have actually turned the corner and are beginning to 

nuclearize their program. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Michael McCaul, chairman of the Homeland 

Security Committee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank the witnesses. 

I, in some respects, feel like the train has already left the station. Even if we disapprove of this, it is vetoed and we override a 

veto, this still goes before the U.N. Security Council and unless the 

administration exercises leadership those sanctions will certainly 

be lifted regardless of what we do in the United States and I think 

that is maybe something we haven’t discussed here today. 

57

And then from a homeland security standpoint that means we 

have billions of dollars being restored to the Iranians that can then 

go into these terrorist operations. 

We know that they control five capitals now. Really, arguably, 

Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sinai and Yemen. That is 

what greatly concerns me and I don’t know if we can turn the clock 

back on this now, now that the P5+1 has agreed to this. When I 

was in Europe on my codel, you are absolutely correct, Ambassador. 

They are very supportive of this deal and primarily I think because they have a lot of money to be made on this. And so I don’t 

know what we can do to stop it. I can tell you what I am concerned 

about is the last minute—as the chairman mentioned—the last 

minute arms embargo being lifted, which could lead to Russian 

technology in the sanctions against the Quds Force being looked at 

as well as not to mention, you know, when you look at the track 

record of the IAEA and whether they can truly perform this mission with unfettered access, which I highly doubt the Iranians are 

going to give us access to. 

And when I look at what are they giving us access to, nuclear 

facility sites. It doesn’t include their military facilities which, arguably is where a lot of this could potentially take place. 

And then, lastly, the intercontinental ballistic missiles which 

have been talked about a great deal that they can mass produce 

and General, as you know, intelligence estimates are indicating by 

the end of possibly as early as next year could have capability to 

hit the United States of America. 

There is only one reason why you produce these things. It is to 

deliver a nuclear warhead. So all these things put together in addition to the rhetoric I think I agree with Senator Lieberman—it is 

more risk for America and more reward for Iran. I want to end 

with this because this is probably the worst. When I was in Saudi 

I think Senator, and General, as you mentioned, they asked me 

why are you negotiating with Iran—why are you doing it? 

I met with Netanyahu—why are you doing this—this will result 

in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. And as you indicated, 

the Saudis are already taking steps now, maybe working with 

Pakistan, to produce their own nuclear capability. And then Turkey 

is going to want that, Egypt is going to want it and on and on and 

on. 

I think that is one of my biggest concerns here is the result of 

all this backfiring and a not so great result. 

Senator, General, if you could both comment on that. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, Chairman McCaul, it is good to see. Of 

course, I agree with you, all your concerns, your question about 

what happens at the United Nations if we reject—if Congress rejects the agreement and the President’s veto is overwritten is a 

really interesting question. 

I mean, in the most direct sense you’d think that the deal, therefore, would be dead so that there would not be a basis for going 

to the United Nations but based on having read it one and a half 

times this morning I am not sure I could swear to that under oath. 

So it is a really interesting question and, again, I come back to 

what I said before. 

58

Let us never underestimate our power. The United States not 

only is a military power, we are an economic power, and if we continue to apply sanctions which deny Iran and countries that deal 

with Iran to our banking system it is going to affect the Iranian 

economy and let us never forget that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I am trying to 

catch up with the agreement and read the fine print this morning. 

It is not at all clear to me that this will not be resolved in New 

York before the congressional review period has expired and so we 

may have the administration going to one deliberative body about 

this before this deliberative body has a chance to vote. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Chairman, if I could just echo that point. I 

don’t—I don’t know the answer to that either. If the U.N. Security 

Council approves this before Congress even has a chance to vote on 

it and then what happens are the sanctions then lifted by the European or international partners irrespective of what the United 

States does. I don’t know the answers to this as, you know, this 

agreement just came out. But I think that is something we need 

to take a look at. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may say so—take the 

liberty, you raise a really interesting question and it may be that 

one of the points as you start your deliberation here on this agreement that you could achieve bipartisan agreement on is to ask the 

administration not to go to the United Nations before they come to 

Congress. 

I mean, that is—it seems to me that our Constitution requires 

that kind of respect first for congressional consideration. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree 100 percent. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let us go to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Well, first of all, I want to thank you gentlemen for this very 

anxiety-producing discussion. I know we all agree that Iran should 

not get a nuclear weapon. It would put the most dangerous weapon 

in the hands of the world’s foremost sponsor of terror and most 

likely lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East 

region. 

And I want to say this. I think because of the seriousness of this 

issue that we have to all take a very objective, nonpartisan scrutiny of this issue and this prospective deal. 

And I think Mr. Meeks made a point also that I wanted to echo, 

which is, you know, not knowing what went on in the room with 

our partners makes some of the deal not understandable to me because this is one of my—and I don’t mean to simplify what is a 70-

page agreement that has taken so many, literally, years to get to 

this point—but this is one of my biggest anxiety points that has 

been raised, which is we are going to give Iran billions of dollars. 

They are going to continue their terrorism all over the world. Then 

at the end of 15 years they are allowed to continue to enrich. So 

this is the part that I don’t understand. What happens in 15 years? 

I know we will—I suspect that we are going to know more, which 

is a good thing. 

But is Iran going to be nicer or are they going to be less susceptible to economic sanctions? That is, to me, a very sticky point. And 

59

then on the other side of the coin, though, to me another anxiety 

point is, you know, if we walk away and we went to let us put more 

sanctions on, do you think an us versus them approach—in other 

words, I know we need our partners to help us with these sanctions. 

Do you think they would be amenable to, you know, you have to 

be with us or there will be other economic consequences from the 

United States. So those are my two questions, if someone wants to 

take a shot at them. 

Mr. BURNS. I would be happy to. I would just say that I think 

all of us agree on our opposition to Iranian support for terrorism, 

on the American hostages—these are vital issues. 

But there is a reason why both the last two administrations have 

focused more on the nuclear issue. It is the greater immediate danger. And so in government, as you know, you have to make those 

choices and I think the choice is right to have this negotiation. 

We have to pressure them on the other issues but you have to 

go at this issue first and foremost. Second, I don’t believe that 

sanctions—U.S. sanctions alone—can work. I agree with Senator 

Lieberman that, you know, we are the biggest economy in the 

world and we can do a lot of damage to the Iranians. 

But what really tipped the balance and drove them to the negotiating table was that the rest of the world got involved, too. And if 

Congress disapproves and the sanctions regime dissolves, you have 

lost your leverage. 

Third, in that scenario, and you—a previous member asked my 

colleagues to my right about that scenario—if there is disapproval 

what will the United States do? We could go back to the P–5. 

I don’t think Russia and China would want to form the same coalition and go back to the first step 10 years ago in trying to pressure the Iranians. I think we would be without leverage and our 

President would be weakened and all the work of the last 10 years, 

I think, would have been undercut. And that is why I am strongly 

for it—despite the misgivings and tradeoffs that I see. I am strongly for congressional approval of this agreement. 

Ms. FRANKEL. But Iran will most likely be stronger in 15 years, 

especially economically. 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I would assume they would be stronger economically. We don’t know what kind of country they will be like in 

terms of their behavior because we can’t look into a crystal ball. 

So we can’t build the policy on hoping they will change, and 

there has been too much talk, I think, from some parts of the administration that somehow it is going to be a honeymoon and the 

United States and Iran will become partners in the Middle East. 

I don’t see it, if you look down the litany of issues that all of us 

have discussed. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Senator Lieberman, do you think we could get 

sanctions back on the table? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I think if the Congress rejects this agreement I 

think the first step would be to try to go back to Iran and urge 

them to come back to the negotiations and, again, I repeat, just 

practical politics. The administration can say we tried our best to 

sell it. We couldn’t sell it. Representatives of the people in our 

country, constitutional republic, said no, we don’t go with it. If they 

60

are recalcitrant then I think we have to go back to sanctions. I 

think we can ourselves, certainly. Can we get some of our allies? 

I hope so. I don’t know. 

I think your other point here is really important. Look, I would 

have loved to have this be a good deal that closed the door, as we 

originally said we would, to Iran becoming a nuclear power and 

that would have allowed us to end our sanctions on them that 

would have had a very tough airtight inspections regime, which 

you have to have with a country that has such a record of cheating 

and deceit and delay. 

This is not it, and that is the problem, and therefore they are 

going to get money. So I think the—of course, we never know what 

Iran will look like in 10 or 15 years. But I think ratifying this 

agreement will make it more likely that the radicals who are in 

charge of Iran will still be in charge of Iran. Why? 

Because they will use some of this money that they get as a result of lifting sanctions to strengthen their position inside the country, let alone what they will do to expand what they have done 

through terrorists and others in the region. 

But they will have money to use to make people in Iran happier 

than they are now and it will be harder for the opposition, which 

is there—not supported by us or anybody else but it is there—to 

have a chance to overthrow the extremists. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. I appreciate your expertise on this very sensitive, important 

subject. 

I look at the ruling party, the Ayatollah, as a wolf in wolf’s clothing. He has made it clear that he wants death to America. He said 

that numerous times. 

And now it seems to me that the wolf has made a deal with the 

sheep not to eat the sheep for 10 years. And then what, supper? 

We don’t know. 

My concern is, were there ever any discussions that there needed 

to be free elections in Iran to let the people decide who should rule 

over them? 

Do any of you know of any discussion about that in this deal that 

has been taking place for some time? Senator Lieberman. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I don’t, and I assume it was off the table and 

wasn’t mentioned, along with a lot of the other things that bother 

us about Iran’s behavior, like their support of terrorism and their 

incarceration of Americans, their deprivation of human rights of 

their own people. Unfortunately, you could go on and on. 

Mr. POE. Public hangings of political opponents. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Exactly. 

Mr. POE. Do you agree or not that the best hope, really, for security—world security—and Iran is that they have a regime change 

with peaceful elections, Senator Lieberman? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I certainly do. That is the ultimate answer and 

we haven’t really tried or done very much to bring that about. 

Incidentally, during the Cold War, even while we were making 

arms control agreements with the Soviets we were supporting opposition movements within Eastern Europe, for instance. We were 

61

supporting the refuseniks in Russia. So there is a precedent for 

that. 

Mr. POE. Do we—is this deal, the hope in this deal, based on the 

premise that we will trust the Iranians to comply? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, so as I have said here already, Congressman, I don’t think there is any basis in Iranian behavior for the 

last three decades to trust them and you could recite the litany of 

the ways in which they have justified that unfortunate conclusion. 

The one way in which you could have confidence in this agreement is if the verification inspections—provisions of it—were really 

airtight—anywhere, anytime. But they are not. They create a 

whole negotiating process—as we have said, 14 days, 21 days, appeal to a board. It is an invitation to the Iranians to obfuscate and 

if they are caught with something wrong to have the time to get 

it out of the view of the international inspectors. 

Mr. POE. In the area of inspections, whether you are in—whatever you are inspecting, giving notice to whoever you are going to 

inspect always allows them to hide or fix the problem before you 

get there. It seems to me with 24 days you’d be able to hide the 

Grand Canyon or something. I find that is a problem. 

Big picture—is it still the policy of Iran today to destroy the 

United States? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, until we hear otherwise I think we have 

to say it is. 

Mr. POE. And Israel as well? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. And Israel, and now you will notice that at last 

Friday’s demonstration, for the first time in my memory, visibly 

and audibly brought Saudi Arabia into the pantheon of those that 

the Iranian Government wants to destroy. 

Mr. POE. And then let us talk about Saudi Arabia. Iran wants 

to be the big player in the Middle East. Does this deal that I have 

here—does that encourage Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt to develop nuclear weapon capability to deter Iran? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, well, it sure does, in my opinion, and as 

others have said—General Hayden—it does something else. It 

raises real alarm in the minds and hearts of our traditional allies 

and the Sunni Muslim world and in Israel about whether the U.S. 

has changed its traditional alliance relationship with those countries and now is either tilting toward Iran or at least pulling back 

to a kind of neutrality. 

And if this agreement is allowed to go into effect I think one of 

the great imperatives for the U.S. is to do whatever it can—it is 

going to be hard—to reassure the Muslim Arab countries, the 

Sunni Muslim countries, and Israel that we are still with them. 

Mr. POE. And may I have unanimous consent for one more question? General, this question—I.C.B.M.s—when Iran gets I.C.B.M.s 

what would be the purpose and intent and where would those 

I.C.B.M.s be able to go to from Iran? 

General HAYDEN. Well, by definition the ‘I’ is truly, as the Secretary of Defense and the chairman said, means intercontinental 

and as the chairman pointed out, those kinds of weapons have no 

real military or even coercive political utility. 

62

They just have a high explosive warhead on it. Doesn’t necessarily have to be nuclear but it has to be a weapon of mass destruction and, of course——

Mr. POE. Where could they go? 

General HAYDEN. Well, if they are an intercontinental ballistic 

missile they can reach North America. 

Mr. POE. They could even reach Texas? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. All right. I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We are going to go to Gerry 

Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Reaching Texas—now we are talking crazy. 

Thank you all for being here. What a stimulating and challenging conversation and I think we Members of Congress face a 

very challenging vote sometime probably in September. 

And Senator Lieberman, welcome back to your home. I must say, 

Senator Lieberman, I am troubled by things you have said here 

today. 

You agreed with Congressman McCaul—you said you agree with 

everything he said. One of the things he said was why engage with 

Iran at all. Do you think it was a mistake to engage with Iran at 

all? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Congressman, for welcoming me back. 

I am probably too reflexively effusive toward anybody who is a 

chairman of a homeland security committee. It is a bias I have. 

On that particular point, I don’t. I think I have said that. I didn’t 

oppose the negotiations. I mean, I did not oppose the negotiations. 

I thought it was encouraging that the negotiations were occurring. 

It is much preferable to have a peaceful resolution to this conflict. 

But what I am saying this morning is that I think the result on 

first look—it just came about a few hours ago—is that this deal is 

not a good one for the U.S. or our allies and it is a very good one 

for Iran. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, I heard you say that. In fact, I heard you 

counsel us we should vote no. Seems awfully early to do that but 

apparently you have made up your mind. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You—well, I haven’t. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. No, I understand and I just wanted to share 

that with you based on what was agreed to at Lausanne, which 

was in April, which basically says this will be a temporary freeze 

on the Iranian program if they keep their word and then they have 

the way clear to become a nuclear power. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand, and I think some of the questions 

you raised are absolutely legitimate, as are General Hayden’s. But 

I think we have to weigh the alternative. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. We can’t pretend that there is a prefect alternative if we’d only choose it and I think that is some of the—some 

of the problems—some of the discussion we have around here. 

But you also said we could just go back to the P5+1 and say we 

just couldn’t sell it—let us start over again and let us reengage the 

Iranians. 

63

Senator Lieberman, I don’t know anybody who believes that that 

has any high probability of success, that as a matter of fact the 

very opposite is likely to happen. 

If we disavow this agreement P5+1 falls apart and Iran races, 

not walks, to accelerate its nuclear development program and they 

are not about to come back to the table. Surely, you would at least 

concede that is just as likely as the scenario you laid out? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, I don’t know. I mean, I actually agree with 

what Ambassador Burns said here, that if the agreement is rejected that Iran will not rush to build a nuclear weapon. They will 

retool their program. 

But they won’t do it because they will worry that either the U.S. 

or Israel, if there is clear intelligence showing that they have broken out to a nuclear weapons capacity, that the U.S. or Israel will 

attack them militarily and they don’t want that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I take your point and that is one thing we can 

consider. But surely there is a chance that is not what is going to 

happen and when we are thinking about voting we have to weigh 

those risks. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Absolutely. Look, this——

Mr. CONNOLLY. And at least the agreement in front of me limits 

the risk. It is a completely unlimited risk—you may be right they 

won’t do that. 

But what if you are wrong? What if, in fact, they will go down? 

There is a hard-line element, as you pointed out, in Tehran that 

would be licking its chops to see this agreement fall apart. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I tell you, I think that all the elements in Iran 

want this agreement because it is so good for them economically 

and it strengthens their position in the Middle East. 

Doesn’t do anything to stop them from supporting—in fact, helps 

them support their proxies throughout the region more than they 

are now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Senator Lieberman——

Mr. LIEBERMAN. But, you know, Congressman, again, I just want 

to say I am going to agree with you that I can’t predict what will 

happen. 

I can’t predict with certainty any more than anybody can what 

will happen if Congress rejects the agreement. I can just say that 

from what I have seen this morning and based on what I saw come 

out of Lausanne in April, this agreement has more risk for the U.S. 

and more reward for Iran than I hoped it would. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One final point. By the way, I would just note 

for the record actually there were hardline elements protesting 

these negotiations in Iran. 

I do not agree with you that there is unanimity of opinion in Iran 

that this is a great deal for Iran. I think the evidence suggests otherwise. 

But you also in your statement earlier said this will strengthen 

the hard line in Iran, freeing up resources that they can use for 

bad things. 

Would you at least concede that, again, there is an alternative 

scenario in which actually that is not what happens. It actually reinforces the Rouhani element and others that engagement with the 

64

West actually produces good economic things for us and we should 

do more of it. 

Isn’t it at least worthy of conceding that also could be true? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. It is possible. It is. But I think much more likely 

is that the billions of additional dollars that the Iranian Government and economy will get will be used by the IRGC, which is, as 

I said earlier, the Ayatollah and the IRGC are the powers in Iran 

and they will be the ultimate beneficiaries of this additional money, 

not the moderates. I wish the moderates were. But I don’t believe 

they will be. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Can I just comment on one thing, Congressman 

Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, certainly. 

Mr. TAKEYH. On the issue of what happens if Congress rejects 

this deal, I went to college in the 1980s and it was possible at that 

time to major in something called arms control. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You are such a young man, Dr. Takeyh. 

Mr. TAKEYH. And I have to say that for a while I did, and I have 

gone back to all those arms control. It happened all the time. SALT 

I, SALT II were repeatedly renegotiated—various provisions of it—

because of congressional objections. 

So Senator Lieberman’s idea that upon this approval the United 

States administration has to go back and renegotiate is actually 

the way arms control typically happened with the big bad Soviet 

Union. 

Second of all, let me just play out the strain that has been put 

here. Let us say the United States disapproves this agreement, 

overrides the President’s veto and the entire international community blames the United States, becomes very censorious and Iran 

begins to develop its capacities and rush toward a bomb. 

Surely, the international community will not countenance that. 

They may think Americans were irresponsible on the whys, injudicious, intemperate for destroying the deal. 

But if they have seen Iran edge toward some sort of a weapons 

threshold surely they would rejoin the United States in imposing 

some sort of a measure to prevent that, I would imagine. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. My time is up. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. We will go to Matt Salmon of Arizona. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Senator Lieberman, during your time 

as a Senator you were afforded the opportunity to vote on a few 

treaties, I suspect. 

Why do you think that the administration pursued this as more 

of a political agreement than a treaty? What was the rationale for 

that? Something—I mean, I have heard several times today that 

this is probably the most important decision Congress has weighed 

in on, some have said, in the last 30, 40 years. Some have said in 

the last 50 years. 

With that important of a decision why would it be pursued as a 

political agreement rather than a treaty? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. So—oh, you mean literally? 

Mr. SALMON. Yes. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, I don’t think the administration, if they 

were here, would say it is a political agreement but they would say 

it is a diplomatic negotiation and not a treaty. 

65

I will tell you myself, and this is a closed issue, that what is on 

the line as a result of this agreement between the P5+1 and Iran 

is much more consequential than any treaty I was asked to vote 

for or against in my 24 years in the Senate and, of course, if it was 

considered a treaty then it would require two-thirds to pass, not 

the other way around. 

But the President, under the Constitution and established court 

decisions, has the clear right to make the decision he did. This is 

not a treaty but it is an international agreement and it has to meet 

different standards in Congress. 

Mr. SALMON. I think that many of the cynics believe that the reason is because the President could have never succeeded in crossing 

that two-thirds threshold in the Senate. And given the fact that, 

as you said, you have voted on treaties that had far less consequence than this document. 

General Hayden, you stated that the inspections have become a 

political, not a technical issue. And so one of my questions is that 

whether you believe the Obama administration and its P5+1 partners would ultimately make the political decision to call out any 

violations of the agreement, I mean, whether they are technical in 

nature or small in nature or large in nature, do you think that the 

administration, who is kind of staking its whole reputation on this 

agreement would have the political will to call out any infractions 

and make them public, knowing that the political ramifications 

could be quite stark? 

General HAYDEN. You bring up a great point, Congressman. It 

seems maybe even a little counterintuitive because we are all concerned about Iranian cheating. 

But once the agreement goes into effect, the burden of proof on—

well, let me just go back into my previous life and walk into the 

Oval Office and say, well, you know, Mr. President, that treaty that 

was so important to both you and to the country, I think these guys 

are violating it. 

The time I would need and the body of evidence that would be 

required to turn that into political action is the dynamic we used 

to call in the business the dynamic of the unpleasant fact. 

It takes always more evidence and more time to generate action. 

But beyond that, though, Congressman, that is just inside the 

American bubble. Look at it from the P5+1. 

Mr. SALMON. Right. 

General HAYDEN. And how many other folks have a real vested 

interest in not admitting the violations have taken place. And so 

I am really concerned about the managed access regime since it 

will be at the political and not the technical level. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, and the snap back, so to speak, whether it is 

a snap back of our sanctions or a snap back of international sanctions has immense financial implications to many of these countries involved. And so the likelihood that they would speak out of 

a violation—I am worried that those violations will just be swept 

under the rug and that will never even see the light of day. As described, I cannot and I will not support this deal. Iran has proven 

time and time again it can’t be trusted to meet international obligations and agreements. 

66

I believe this administration is naive to suggest that the hundreds of billions of dollars Iran will gain access through this agreement will not be used to continue the proliferation of terrorism 

across the globe. On the contrary, those terrorism efforts will only 

get better funded. 

And furthermore, that despite the President’s rather bold statement this agreement will ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran 

will not develop a nuclear weapon, in reality it puts them on a path 

toward legitimately developing and possessing a nuclear bomb in 

just 10 years. And I am wondering, this administration has had a 

penchant for doing things that only have effect during or has a 

shelf life during his administration with no thought of consequences to the hereafter to our children and our grandchildren. 

I think that this is a frightening deal and it also didn’t address 

the Americans that remain hostage in Iran. In fact, I am really disgusted that they weren’t even really front and center in any of the 

negotiations. They were sideline comments, at best. For all the reasons stated above, I cannot support this deal at all and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Salmon. We now proceed 

to Congressman Brian Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too want to thank 

the panel. You have been very professional. You have a body of 

knowledge individually and collectively that is invaluable to our deliberations on this issue. 

You know, a lot has been talked about the nuclear infrastructure—centrifuges, the proliferation of them over the past 10 years, 

which is disturbing. This deal cuts them by two-thirds, which I 

think is very, very significant. 

Also, the material that is used—the nuclear material. You have 

under this agreement, as I understand it, less than 4 percent of enrichment of that material, which is a far distance from bomb grade 

material, and then you have the inspections process, which I think 

is important. 

But I don’t think enough has been focused on the Iranian people 

and the politics of Iran, which I think are very significant here. 

The military historian David Crist wrote a book, ‘‘The Twilight 

War.’’ He says since the 1979 revolution there have been seven attempts by either side to improve relations and they all failed. And 

against that history, this nuclear deal or anticipated nuclear deal 

when he was writing at the time was uncharted territory. 

And I think when you look at what is going on in Iran today, you 

know, in the last 5 years, their currency has lost half its value. 

There has been 50 percent inflation, meaning that whatever you 

had in the bank prior to all of this was worth half and whatever 

you were buying cost you twice as much. 

Rouhani won an election as a reformist within that context. It is 

not the American projection of what we would view as a reformist 

but, you know, he was pretty vocal about how bad the Iranian 

economy was not only during the election but after he won. 

The difference in large part from 1979 to currently Iranian officials are turning on each other and I think that reflects that in this 

nation of some 80 million people you have got probably 65 million 

people who are very, very young and want normalization with the 

67

rest of the world. And then you have the hardliners made up of the 

Revolutionary Guard and Quds Forces, Qassem Soleimani. 

It has been said here and in many panels previously what a destructive force he is relative to stability in the region with, you 

know, his work in being on the ground in Iraq directing the Shi’a 

militias, saving Bashir al-Assad in the 11th hour and their support 

of Hezbollah. 

But because of the deteriorating economic situation in Iran the 

Quds Forces and the Revolutionary Guard benefit. Why? Because 

they control all the smuggling, which is made necessary by the horrific situation economically in Iran. 

I am just here to say that, you know, I think this 10-year period 

is very, very important because really nobody knows with certainty 

what will happen. But what in fact could happen is a normalization 

with the rest of the world, the promotion of a more diversified legitimate economy in Iran, could in fact undermine the current regime and produce the kind of changes that the vast majority of 

young Iranians want. And just kind of wanted your thoughts on 

that. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think some of your diagnosis is correct in terms 

of the notion of population estranged from the regime and the question is the effect of this particular agreement on the regime. 

I think whatever the life span of this Islamic Republic may be, 

and I do think there is a termination date, has actually been extended by an agreement that legitimizes its program and leads to 

infusion of economic resources. 

You can make a case, and frankly, quite a good one, that the longevity of the Kim dynasty in North Korea has had something to do 

with its possession of a nuclear weapon and attempt to leverage 

that in terms of gaining tribute from the international community. 

And so I——

Mr. HIGGINS. But North Korea wants—they love their isolation. 

They don’t want anything to do with the rest of the world. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Neither does the Iranian regime at this point at the 

level of institutional arrangements. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, but the—but, again, I think what is going on 

here is there is a dichotomy within, you know, the politics of Iran 

and there is a significant and growing population that wants normalized relations with the rest of the world and wants to see that 

economy unleash the potential of the Iranian people. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think you can say the exact same thing about 

North Koreans. I don’t think they want to live in this hermitic 

kingdom. 

Mr. BURNS. I would just say that you can’t compare North Korea 

and Iran in this situation. Iran is not a monolithic political culture. 

There is a very strong reform movement. 

Demographically, the young people are in the ascendancy. They 

are a trading culture. They are entrepreneurial. They want to be 

connected with the rest of the world and I think if you are looking 

for change and you want to build a case, that is the case that you 

would make. So I agree very much with your comments. 

General HAYDEN. Congressman, I think what you’ve led on is 

quite plausible. I don’t think it is likely but it is quite plausible. 

68

Clearly, the Ayatollah has decided that this agreement will not facilitate regime change. Otherwise, he would not have signed it. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree—plausible optimistic scenario. I wish it 

were so. I think not likely because I think this agreement strengthens the current Government of Iran, which is the Ayatollah and 

the Republican Guard. 

But the hope here but we have never really, as America supported it, is they clearly, whatever the numbers are, there is a very 

significant number of the Iranian people who would like to be freed 

of this fanatical regime. Unfortunately, this regime will not let go 

of power and in the event of an uprising is more likely to respond 

the way their proxy, Assad, did in Syria, which is to turn their 

weapons on the people. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. We now proceed to Congressman Darrell Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Lieberman, does 

that mean that you are pessimistic about peace in our time when 

it comes to Iran? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes. I must say I am—if my wife were here she 

would say that I am an optimist by nature and I am, but I am pessimistic about peace in our time with Iran because I don’t see any 

fundamental change in their radical ideology and their aggressive 

support of terrorism. 

Mr. ISSA. Ambassador Burns, I normally agree with a great deal 

of what you come up with from scratch yourself, based on your experience. But in this case, I am going to ask you questions more 

related to the deal. 

The distinguished Senator—once he left office he is by definition 

extremely distinguished—would not be considered to be a dove. So 

let us view this as doves. 

If this is the Chamberlain-esque appeasement that is going to 

work, let us review the next 10 years. Under the agreement with 

the sunset clause, during the next 10 years incrementally Iran is, 

clearly, going to have more money, more access to weapons, more 

freedom of movement than they would if we did nothing at all 

under the current sanctions. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. BURNS. Congressman, there are tradeoffs here. 

Mr. ISSA. No, no. I don’t want tradeoffs. I just want answers. 

Isn’t it true that under this agreement there will be a gradual easing that will give Iran access, almost immediately to some, over 

time to the others, but over the next 10 years they will have access 

to more money, the ability to buy weapons and the ability to continue developing at least the nonweapons portion of their nuclear 

ambition, correct? 

Mr. BURNS. And my answer is their nuclear program is going to 

be frozen for 10 years. They are going to be set back. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And I appreciate your talking points and I know 

you were brought here with talking points. I would just like you 

to answer my question. I am trying to be very, very proactive here 

and positive. 

Clearly, this agreement does let them have access to money. It 

will let them have access in 5 years or less to large amounts of conventional weapons that they already have a lot of and have been 

69

providing to Hamas and Hezbollah. These are all sort of the gives 

in this give and take. So the real question is if they are going to 

have a phase-out in 10 years from now and, by the way, they clearly do continue to get to work and to use nuclear materials for purposes nonweapons related. 

So they are going to continue to know more about nuclear during 

those 10 years even if they don’t cheat on the program. That is in 

the base of this. 

The question I have to you is very simple. Ten to 15 years from 

now under this agreement, assuming that the sunny side scenario 

that they simply break out in peace and love for their neighbors 

and democracy, assuming that happens we will be safer. 

Assuming it doesn’t happen, isn’t it true that Iran will be more 

able to build a nuclear weapon and to wage war if they choose to 

10 years from now? From where they are today, 10 years from now 

they will be able to do that with more money and no sanctions 

under the current agreement. Isn’t that true? And that is a yes or 

no, please. 

Mr. BURNS. I was asked to testify here and to give you my best 

perspective. I tried to convey a sense of how difficult this is, how 

complex it is. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well——

Mr. BURNS. And I wasn’t brought here with talking points. I 

came on my volition. My view is——

Mr. ISSA. Okay. I appreciate—Ambassador, I appreciate that. 

Mr. BURNS. My view is that we can stop them from becoming a 

nuclear weapons power 10 years from now if the President at that 

time is tough minded enough to do that. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, and then that brings up sort of the history 

of appeasement of the Soviets. Jimmy Carter forgave them their 

debt, gave them wheat that they put the hammer and sickle on and 

told their people it was Russian wheat, not U.S. wheat. 

And then Reagan took a different tact and every President has 

that ability. But General Hayden, let me just go through some factual ones. Ten years ago, you were in the administration, correct? 

General HAYDEN. Right. 

Mr. ISSA. Ten years ago, is it true, without disclosing any classified information, that Iran was behind weapon enhancements in 

Iraq that led to Americans dying on the fields in Iraq 10 years ago? 

General HAYDEN. I actually told National Security Advisor Hadley that it was the policy of the Iranian Government approved at 

the highest levels of that government to facilitate the killing of 

American and other coalition soldiers. 

Mr. ISSA. Twenty years ago, without disclosing any classified information, to your understanding is it true that Iran played a critical part to the U.S. airmen who were killed in Saudi Arabia? 

General HAYDEN. That is my understanding. 

Mr. ISSA. Thirty years ago—32 years ago—is it true that Iran, 

through its precursor to Hezbollah took an active hand in the killing of the Marines in the barracks in Beirut or had a participation 

in support of? 

General HAYDEN. I think that is true, Mr. Chairman, but I don’t 

have the personal knowledge to give that answer to you with confidence. 

70

Mr. ISSA. Well, I chose those questions—and I will summarize, 

Mr. Chairman—because 30 years ago Iran, clearly, was promoting 

bad activities on the streets of Beirut including kidnapping and so 

on. This was when they were a 5-year-old government. Twenty 

years ago Americans died for sure in no small part because of 

Iran’s hand. Ten years ago Americans were dying. 

So when we look at 10 years before they get an outright go under 

this and their ability to have the materials to suit their ambition, 

my only question to all of you—and General Hayden, if there is 

only time for one it would be you—if they were doing this 30 years 

ago including kidnapping on the streets of Lebanon, 20 years ago 

they were killing Americans in Saudi Arabia, 10 years ago Americans were dying on the battlefield of Iraq, why do we believe that 

10 years from now anything will really be different, based on your 

history in intelligence, General? 

General HAYDEN. And to bring it more up to date, Mr. Chairman, 

3 years ago they were prepared to explode an IED in a restaurant 

in Georgetown to kill the Saudi Ambassador. And so I don’t have 

faith in behavior change of the government. 

Let me put it another way. I have hope, all right. But I don’t 

know that we can base policy on that expectation. 

Mr. ISSA. Hope is not a strategy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Issa. We now proceed to 

Congresswoman Grace Meng of New York. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of 

our esteemed panelists for being here today. I will state at the outset that while I will reserve final judgment on the deal until I am 

able to read it through completely, I am deeply concerned and disappointed by what appears to be in its terms. 

For the last couple of months, I have advocated that we provide 

the 33,000-pound bunker buster bombs to Israel and the planes to 

deliver them. Now we have a deal that neglects in any way to address Iran’s providing arms and support to terrorists. 

Furthermore, we have a deal to our surprise that will allow for 

the lifting of the arms embargo against Iran. In light of all of this 

and the significant deterrence that would be created by providing 

Israel these weapons, do you support the administration’s unwillingness to provide Israel with the 33,000-pound bunker buster capability, which is totally outside the four corners of the deal? Just 

like to hear from anyone. 

Mr. BURNS. I actually support the administration’s position on 

this. Obviously, I support the security of Israel. But I think in this 

instance if force had to be used against Iran it should be by the 

United States. 

We are much more capable. We would have much greater legitimacy internationally, given the fact that we have been leading this 

coalition and that we have been at the negotiating table. 

I fear that if Israel used force ahead of the United States, and 

I don’t think it would be as effective militarily and politically. It 

would be difficult for the Israelis and for us. So I would rather see 

the United States, if we have to force, be the one that does it. 

General HAYDEN. I am kind of in the same place, Congresswoman. If we empower the Israelis to do that and if they do that 

71

I think we have given another nation the ability to put us at war. 

And so I agree with Ambassador Burns. 

Can I just draw down one additional layer? A question I genuinely have, and I will be a little oblique here and not suggest anything behind the screen, it is obviously against our policy that 

Israel conduct an overt strike against the Iranian nuclear system. 

What are our views and what are we prepared to do if Israel attempts covert action against the Iranian nuclear program and what 

will be our policy prescription in our relationship with Israel with 

regard to that question? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Congresswoman, thanks for your statement and 

your question. I have a different point of view. I think, particularly 

if this agreement announced today is not rejected by Congress and 

goes into effect, the willingness of the United States to provide 

Israel with the so-called MOP—the big bunker buster—will be part 

of a necessary strategy to regain the confidence of the Israelis. 

Frankly, I think it will have—even though I agree that if military action has to be taken against Iran because it has taken a nuclear breakout, it is much preferable for many reasons that the 

United States take that action. 

But I do think if this agreement is not rejected by Congress and 

goes into effect, the willingness of the United States to give the big 

bunker buster bombs to Israel will have a deterrent effect on Iran. 

It will encourage Iran to keep the agreement because I think, 

frankly, Iran has less confidence that the Israelis won’t take military action against them than they do that we won’t take military 

action against them. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I will just add one thing to that. It seems to me 

that if you are looking at this agreement as the best means of safety and security of Israel and stability of the region the best way 

of doing it is negotiating a stringent arms control agreement. 

To me, transference of such munitions in the aftermath of an 

agreement that is so deficient where you have to transfer such 

weaponry is attempting to mitigate the consequences of a deficient 

deal. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Meng. And we now 

proceed to comments from Randy Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. I hope to have some pretty simple questions for you all. Do you all agree that if this agreement goes into 

effect that money will ultimately find its way to Hezbollah? Yes or 

no. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Pretty much all agree that that will happen. So how 

much of that money is acceptable? One million? Five million? How 

much? Any—will anybody give us a value? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, of course, I would say none. 

Mr. WEBER. Ambassador? You would say none as well? Okay. 

Doctor? Okay, good. 

So Ambassador Burns, you said that you wished Obama’s war of 

words with Israel would stop and that they would make up, to use 

your words. In your estimation, which is worse—Obama’s war of 

words with Israel or Iran’s hateful rhetoric toward the United 

States and Israel? 

72

Mr. BURNS. Obviously, what the Iranians have done in threatening Israel is the problem here. President Obama is not the problem and the——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. And the difficulties between President 

Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu are two-sided and they are 

both responsible. 

Mr. WEBER. No, no. I just want to get you on record saying the 

Iranian’s rhetoric, spewing of hate, needs to stop. 

So there has been talk about if the veto is sustained what would 

happen. Would you all agree with me that we—the President said 

in his remarks this morning that we negotiated from a position of 

strength and power—something to that effect. 

But would you all agree with me that had we gone in there with 

these seven tenets—number one, release our hostages; number two, 

halt all enrichment—six tenets—and do away with the centrifuges; 

number three, give the IAEA unfettered 24/7 access anytime—24/

7 365; number four, stop exporting terrorism—make sure that 

Hezbollah doesn’t get any of that money; number five, stop the 

rhetoric toward Israel and the United States; and number six, 

prove their sincerity of wanting to rejoin the world community by 

exhibiting this behavior for 1 or 2 years or more—would that have 

been a position of strength from us—for us to negotiate from, Senator? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, sure. I mean, I think—and again, I wasn’t 

there and it is too easy to say this from this perspective but it felt 

to me—look, we are a great power militarily, economically, culturally, every way. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me move on to General Hayden. Pardon the 

interruption. General, would that have been a position of strength? 

General HAYDEN. It would have been a position of strength. But 

the premise of our negotiation was to narrowly focus on the nuclear 

question. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Ambassador, a position of strength if we required those six items? 

Mr. BURNS. I am confident that President Bush and President 

Obama started there. But that is not how negotiations work. 

Mr. WEBER. They did—they did—John Kerry told me himself—

I asked him about the hostage release. They were not going to 

make that part and parcel to this agreement. 

Mr. BURNS. Now, I was talking about something different. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. I am going with all six of these. 

Mr. BURNS. In our conversations with the Iranians, all those 

issues are important. But you can’t just insist on what you want 

in the negotiations. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, they—forgive me, Ambassador, but I think 

they came to use wanting relief. We didn’t go to them wanting relief. Doctor, would that have been a position of strength? 

Mr. TAKEYH. General Hayden has suggested that the premise of 

these negotiations were to resolve the nuclear issue. I do think that 

both President Bush and President Obama share those concerns regarding Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, regarding detaining of 

the American hostages, regarding other activities. 

73

I do think that that is a shared bipartisan concern and I think 

that President Obama as with President Bush actually have found 

Iranian treatment of our citizens and sponsors——

Mr. WEBER. And I would argue that they are all important. We 

have all heard the old saying talk is cheap. Apparently, it is really 

not because the Iranians are getting hundreds of billions of dollars 

because of their talk. We want action. 

We want them to demonstrate their willingness. So here is my 

question. When we—if we do—if we do override the President’s 

veto can we come back then and negotiate from a position of 

strength? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would say that I think, as General Hayden and 

I think Ambassador Burns suggested, going back is going to be 

tough. I am not suggesting it shouldn’t happen under some extraordinary circumstances. Deficient agreements should be renegotiated. 

But I don’t think we should minimize the impact. I think it can 

be done but I don’t think we should discount the difficulty of it—

of actually achieving that. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, I agree with my colleague, Grace Meng, that 

we need to provide Israel with a bunker buster bomb because that 

may be the one threat that Iran relates to and it may also put us 

pressure to help. I am out of time. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Weber. We now proceed 

to Congressman Scott DesJarlais of Tennessee. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel. 

I know it is getting to be a long morning. You have been sitting 

there a long time. 

We appreciate all your testimony. I think it has been reiterated 

a number of times today that we feel that this is a much better 

deal for Iran than it is the United States and, really, on paper we 

should have the upper hand in these negotiations. 

You know, therefore, if it is our goal to truly ensure peace and 

stability in the region and prevent Iran from developing nuclear capabilities, why have we conceded to their demands, especially in regard to domestic uranium enrichment? General. 

General HAYDEN. I asked the same questions, Congressman. I 

think a good macro view is that the Iranians needed a deal far 

more than we did and we wanted a deal far more than the Iranians 

did. 

And we have—I think it is fair to say look, I worked with Nick 

in the same administration. This is really hard and there were no 

easy answers. But it does appear to me that we have had a series 

of concessions in order to keep the Iranians still interested in the 

talks. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. This may be an easy question for you all to answer. But for people listening and watching this hearing, why have 

we not stood our ground and insisted that Iran import its enriched 

uranium just as other countries do such as South Korea, Italy, 

Spain and many others? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think that we moved away from that particular 

parameter, I suspect, quite a while back and maybe even during 

the Bush years. I don’t know. 

The parameter that I think we should not have moved from is 

the position of the United States and the Russian Federation and 

74

the People’s Republic of China in 2013 was that Iran should have 

an enrichment program but only a symbolic one that would essentially satiate their public diplomacy and public demands but not 

necessarily be misused. I don’t know why that position was 

changed in 2013. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. I mean, I think it is obvious to most anyone if 

Iran is serious about not obtaining nuclear weapons—that is the 

claim they are trying to make in exchange for all this money—then 

they should be able to join 20 or 24 nations that are doing the 

same thing—importing their enriched uranium. 

So I think we have really dropped the ball there and it, clearly, 

shows that Iran’s intentions aren’t peaceful. 

Ambassador Burns, do you agree with the President’s assessment 

from April, and to quote him, ‘‘What is a more relevant fear would 

be that in years ’13, ’14, ’15 they have advanced centrifuges that 

enrich uranium fairly rapidly and at that point the breakout times 

would be shrunk down to almost zero?’’

Can you please clarify that point for me? Do you or do you not 

support the arbitrary sunset in the agreement? 

Mr. BURNS. I think I understood the President saying when he 

spoke in April about the interim agreement that when the agreement lapsed in the 10 to 15 year period that is when the Iranian—

that is when the Iranians could reconstitute their program theoretically and that is when the breakout time would begin to diminish, as he said, almost down to zero. But I think he was—I think 

he was talking about the period beyond the freeze of the first 10 

years. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. So you think it is a good idea for—I mean, do 

you think then it is a good idea for Iran to have an industrial sized 

nuclear program? 

Mr. BURNS. No, I don’t think it is a good idea but I think that, 

you know, our President and our Secretary of State have to operate 

in the real world and what is possible and not possible. 

I think this is the best deal that they could have achieved. I supported it on that basis. But, obviously, it is going to take a lot to 

make it work and we have talked a lot about that this morning. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Ambassador, with all due respect, you are probably the only member on the panel that is openly expressing your 

support for Obama’s deal. 

Yet, in your opening statement, and I don’t want to put words 

in your mouth so you can correct me, but you basically conceded 

that you expect Iran to cheat. Is that correct? 

Mr. BURNS. I think it is likely that Iran will try to cheat at some 

point. I think that is just an objective statement. But, you know, 

I support it because I know how, having worked on this issue in 

the Bush administration, how difficult and complex it is. 

I think our national security will be met and be improved by 

locking them up in a box, freezing them for 10 years, and then, of 

course, any American President, if Iran tried to breakout toward a 

nuclear weapon, would have the right and have the capability to 

stop them through military force. So I think the President and Secretary Kerry are to be commended. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. I mean, it looks like to me a case of Obama legacy building here because from all the discussion we have had 

75

today this is not a good deal. You are basically taking a hope and 

a prayer hoping that the next President will be like Reagan and 

be able to do something to stop what this deal sets up. 

You think they are going to cheat and, you know, right now 

Chairman Royce started this hearing saying that they are going to 

take this money that is unfreezing billions of assets and immediately use them to build tunnels into Israel and also give them 

smart weapons to further endanger Israel. Do you think that is 

cheating? 

Mr. BURNS. I think that we are going to have a very tough time 

implementing this agreement. But I also think it is the best for our 

national security interests. And I also think it is going to be a 

generational struggle. We are in a long-term struggle with Iran 

and so it is going to be up to both Republicans and Democrats to 

figure out a way to contain them. 

I worry that if Congress disapproves—votes to disapprove—and 

then votes to override the President’s veto, which the President 

threatened will weaken the United States and weaken our position 

in the Middle East and I worry about that. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. And I respectfully disagree and I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman DesJarlais. We now proceed to Congressman Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I don’t know where to start. There are so many conflicting things 

here and I want to pick up with Scott. If the goal of peace—you 

know, if we start—the very beginning when this all started I remember President Obama saying Iran will not be allowed to have 

a nuclear weapon, period. Twenty-eight times he said that—they 

will not have it. But, again, we see another red line drawn in disappearing ink. And now we are at a point where we are delaying 

it for 10 years maybe and I don’t think it will be 10 years. 

Sitting on this panel over and over again I have heard the experts say that Iran has enough material to have a nuclear bomb 

within 5, 6 months to a year. That was 11⁄2 years ago. 

So I think we have crossed the point of what we tried to negotiate. And then Eisenhower said if the goal is peace—is a peaceful 

nuclear program, a civilian nuclear program flourishes only 

through cooperation and openness. Secrecy and isolation are typically signs of a nuclear weapons program. 

And a pessimist who—this is something I read the other day—

a pessimist who doesn’t think peace will occur in the Middle East 

is an optimist that has studied Middle East history. You know, I 

think it is pretty obvious what is going on there. 

Ambassador Burns, you were saying that we can’t see into the 

future but, you know, maybe the Iranian people will rise and 

change this regime. They tried that in 2009. We didn’t assist them. 

As Senator Lieberman said, we have in the past. 

We let the uprising happen. Do you think if Iran gets a nuclear 

weapon—and my prediction is it will be between now and 10 years 

from now they will have one. They have all the elements for that. 

We know they have detonated a nuclear trigger device. 

Do you think that there will be more allowing their citizens to 

rise up and have regime change or change their politics? 

76

Mr. BURNS. Well, I will just answer your—it is a good question—

I would answer it just in two points. One is I think it is not at all 

probable that Iran will achieve a nuclear weapon in the next 10 

years. After that, then I think the calculations change—first. 

Second, I think regime change is desirable. I would like to see 

a change in the regime to a democratic system. 

Mr. YOHO. It doesn’t matter what we think. It is what the Iranian people——

Mr. BURNS. But I don’t think that we have the capacity to 

produce that change on our own. 

Mr. YOHO. Not now we don’t. There is an old proverb I read a 

long time ago and it said that if you want to see one’s past look 

at their present situation. It tells you what their past efforts were, 

what they invested in, what their habits were. 

And you were saying that we can’t predict what is going to go 

on in Iran in the future. If you want to see one’s future, look at 

what they presently are doing—what they are investing in, their 

habits. 

And I see a country that is promoting terrorism, shouting ‘‘Death 

to Israel, death to America,’’ propping up the Syrian regime. I can 

see their future and it is not a healthy one and they are going to 

be more emboldened with the nuclear weapons. 

Let us see. I agree with Senator Lieberman in that you were 

stating that, you know, this is a bad deal and I said last week, you 

know, being a veterinarian if it walks like a duck, quacks like a 

duck, it is a duck. 

This is a bad deal. We need to walk away from the table and 

then—and the reason I say that, and correct me if I am wrong, because if we wait and other countries invest into Iran—you know, 

the economic development that they are seeking—other countries 

that go in there, the P, if we wait 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 years and they 

have that economic development, what is the likelihood of the snap 

back, which is a fictitious condition, of that happening if we wait 

5 years versus if we walk away from the deal now, say the sanctions are back in place and we can’t sell it to the American people? 

Senator. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, it is going to be harder in 3 or 4 or 5 years 

of course, I hope that what you described happens, that we walk 

away. 

But it is clear that the administration is not going to walk away 

voluntarily and therefore the only way that the U.S. walks away 

is if Congress exercises its authority to reject this agreement and 

then overrides a veto. 

General HAYDEN. Congressman? 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, sir. 

General HAYDEN. I just had one very quick thought. We have 

talked about what happens if and so on. I would offer you the view 

that it is a very defensible proposition that absent a nuclear detonation in Iran it will be more difficult to reimpose sanctions in 5 

years than it will be to sustain some sanctions if we turned our 

back on this agreement. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURNS. I would just like to say, Congressman, if we walk 

away now then we will have less leverage on the Iranians and they 

77

will have a nuclear program without restrictions compared to all 

the restrictions they are going to be put under for the next 10 

years. That is not a good deal for the United States. 

Mr. YOHO. But we were talking about Iran has always skirted 

the restrictions. You look at the U.N. resolutions and the sanctions—they have not lived up to those. 

They have been playing the cat and mouse game for over 30 

years and what I see is an administration that is incompetent on 

this agreement and I think Iran has done a great job and, you 

know, time will tell. 

But I think we should prepare for detection in the future and put 

the money into research and development and find out where the 

nuclear material is—there’s technology out there—and prepare for 

the day they do have nuclear arms because they are going to have 

one and we should prepare our allies with that and we shouldn’t 

delay. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Yoho. Now Congressman 

Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I ask 

unanimous consent that Representative Jackson Lee be allowed to 

ask questions after all committee members have had the opportunity to participate. 

Mr. WILSON. And we have a dilemma in that Congressman 

Zeldin just came and as such a gentleman I know he would want 

to proceed with Congressman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Deutch, I would be very 

happy to yield to the gentlelady, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, for her 

remarks and questioning. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think our witnesses are going to see the ultimate politeness and courtesy and I would only say to the chair and 

ranking member thank you for your courtesies and if it is appropriate for this member of the committee to go forward please tell 

me how I should proceed. I am more than happy to follow protocol. 

If I have been given the time I will handle it in the appropriate 

manner. 

Mr. WILSON. Congresswoman, the time is yours. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You all are extremely courteous and so are 

these very patriotic witnesses who have come today. I serve on the 

Homeland Security Committee and Judiciary Committee but I am 

an adopted daughter of this committee and they have been very 

kind when I have had the opportunity to come, having worked a 

lot in the Mideast and worked with Congressman Deutch as well 

as Congressman Wilson and as well as the chairman of the full 

committee and the ranking member. Let me thank them for their 

courtesies. 

Let me start both with, before I go to Senator Lieberman who I 

am so delighted to see a fellow alum—start with General Hayden 

and Mr. Burns—Secretary Burns, thanking them for their leadership. 

The first thing that we heard as we woke to for many was a 

breakthrough and exciting news but appropriately cautioned because of the many friends we have in the Mideast was that this 

would begin an arms race for our allies, Sunnis, in particular Saudi 

78

Arabia and I am going to end and just ask would you respond to 

that. 

The second question is that as we were negotiating I was leaning 

toward the spontaneous inspection that would come about. I now 

hear that it is regulated and you are either going to be able to go 

to bases or not go to bases, which gives me a concern. 

But if you would answer those two questions. I guess I want 

them abbreviated only because I have others and I just didn’t want 

to go on with my questions and I have other questions. Thank you 

so very much. 

General HAYDEN. Congresswoman, I agree with you. The managed access aspect of the inspections I think is very disappointing 

and very problematic. 

With regard to how the Sunnis will respond, I probably don’t 

have the confidence to say it is inevitable that they will race in the 

direction of a nuclear infrastructure and a nuclear weapon. But I 

think it is more rather than less likely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Secretary Burns? And thank you all for your 

engagement of this long process. I understand, as I have been here 

13 years plus. But go ahead, Secretary. 

Mr. BURNS. I think President Obama’s agreement diminishes the 

chance that the Saudis will try to obtain a nuclear weapon. It will 

give them some reassurance over the next 10 years that the Iranians are not going to be a nuclear weapons power themselves. So 

that is one of the, I think, advantages of this agreement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can I follow up with you, Secretary Burns? 

I understand the agreement sort of lays out either a 10-year under15-year scenario. Is that too short a period of time before we might 

see them—Iran, excuse me—moving toward that concept of a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. BURNS. I think I would have preferred an entirely different 

set of parameters for this negotiation—an entirely different framework. 

But it is the framework that we have not just negotiated and I 

want to see our country succeed. Obviously, we all do. And I think 

that there is a chance for success here. 

But it does worry me. I would have rather have seen 20 years, 

30 years rather than 10, if you ask me. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And let me follow up with you. The collective 

body politic of those who sat around the table having been engaged 

directly when Secretary Clinton was the Secretary of State and you 

were dispatched to begin these discussions over the period of years. 

Do you take comfort in the individual nations that joined the 

United States to be part of the enforcement of this agreement and 

given it more strength for peace for all of us? 

Mr. BURNS. Congressman, there are a couple people named 

Burns in Washington. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Oh, okay. 

Mr. BURNS. It is my good friend, Bill Burns, who worked for Secretary Clinton. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, take the credit. 

Mr. BURNS. I wish I—he deserves all the credit. I worked for——

79

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I saw you looking. I said uh-oh, it is not the 

same Burns. But I have worked with you so long. So go right 

ahead. 

Mr. BURNS. I worked for President Clinton——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. And President Bush. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Bill Burns. Okay. 

Mr. BURNS. We should thank Bill Burns. I do think that, you 

know, the choice that we had was and the choice we still have, depending what Congress does, is do we want to go it alone or do we 

want to lead a coalition. 

I think in this respect we are—in this case we are stronger leading a coalition, keeping the coalition together, using the leverage 

of that coalition to get what we want and to see this deal implemented. 

I fear a congressional disapproval would put us out on our own. 

We are very powerful. But the Iranians would profit from a breakup of this anti-Iran coalition that the United States over two administrations has been able to lead. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, as I asked Senator Lieberman, I do not 

want to the Iranians to profit. I have worked for a long period of 

time on Camp Ashraf and the individuals, Camp Liberty. 

I think we have seen each other and continue to want to raise 

this question protecting my friends who believe in liberty and 

peace. And so, Senator Lieberman, how would you fix this if you 

are not seeing this agreement as the way it should be? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. You mean on the specific question of the Iranians at Camp Liberty? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No. I am concerned that I don’t give Iran too 

much happiness until they ultimately fix that issue. 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But on this nonnuclear agreement how would 

you move it to a position where you would want it to be? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, I—the most disappointing—there are two 

parts to this that bother me. The first part was clear from the 

framework agreement in April in Lausanne, which was that we 

were not going to achieve what we originally wanted: The end of 

the Iranian nuclear program in return for the end of sanctions 

against them. 

They were going to promise to freeze for 10 years if they keep 

the promise and then after that we basically legalize their path to 

becoming a nuclear power. 

But as I looked at the agreement this morning with things that 

I hadn’t seen before, the most disappointing part of it is the inspection part. It is not anywhere, anytime. It is nothing remotely like 

that. 

It allows the Iranians to object, a negotiation goes on with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency. That takes 14 days. There 

can be an appeal for 7 days. It is not clear that there is a real enforcement mechanism. 

This is the real hole in this agreement and if I had my druthers 

that is the part that I would dramatically change. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am going to concluding remarks because this 

committee has been very courteous to me and simply thank them 

80

for extending me this time and say in conclusion that I want Congress to take its task seriously and to immerse itself in many different committees—with Judiciary, Homeland Security, Foreign Affairs and others—in the importance of this agreement and peace in 

the Mideast. 

I would finally say I want to thank this committee for its concern 

of my friends in Camp Liberty and Camp Ashraf. They are still not 

where they need to be, treated with dignity, allowed to get medical 

care, and as we proceed I think it would be appropriate to continuously raise these issues with Iran who seems to want legitimacy—

world legitimacy and they cannot get world legitimacy by the inhumane treatment, putting aside the nuclear efforts that this administration has worked so extensively on and I want to congratulate 

President Obama for his extensive efforts. 

But if they are going to get world notice for being a country that 

is in the world arena with dignity for all of its persons then they 

are not at that place right now, in my mind, because of the horrific 

treatment of some of their own citizens and particularly those that 

are fighting for justice and equality and freedom over in Camp 

Ashraf and, of course, Camp Liberty. 

So I thank you so very much and I yield back my time. Thank 

you for your courtesies. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman. We now proceed to 

Congressman Lee Zeldin of New York. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the distinguished panel for being here as well as your service to our country 

in many different ways including being here this morning. 

I know that you have been here for a few hours. It is now afternoon and I just want to say thank you as well for being so generous 

with your time with the committee on such a very timely and important appearance. 

I don’t need to wait 30 days or 60 days to decide that this is a 

bad deal, that it is an unacceptable deal. It is okay to be open 

minded. It doesn’t mean that a requirement to be open minded is 

that we are naive. 

It is a bad deal, and I think about—I have a really important 

question for you. You have worked for Presidents, just a tremendous amount of generations of administrations over the course of 

your time in government. 

The next President comes in, whoever the person is—Republican, 

Democrat, doesn’t matter. That person decides that something that 

wasn’t even part of these negotiations they are motivated to tackle. 

So just briefly recapping, some of the stuff that weren’t even part 

of the negotiations—Iran overthrowing foreign governments, sponsoring terror, financing terror, developing I.C.B.M.s, unjustly imprisoning United States citizens including a pastor, a reporter, a 

United States Marine, developing—well, I mean, they are pledging 

to wipe Israel off the map, they are chanting ‘‘Death to America’’ 

in the streets. 

The list goes on. We are handing them the $50 billion signing 

bonus but we are not even giving it to them with strings attached 

that they can’t use the money to continue to finance terror. 

I mean, these people have blood on their hands from U.S. service 

members who have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. All this 

81

wasn’t even a part of the negotiations. So a President comes into 

office, it is January 2017, and let us just say, God forbid, that any 

of these U.S. citizens are still being imprisoned or they decide that 

we need to stop allowing them to overthrow foreign governments. 

We need to cut off the funding supply to Hezbollah—whatever the 

scenario is the next President is motivated. 

If we give away all of these sanctions right now, tactically what 

are the options that are left? The reason why the Iranians are at 

the table right now is because the sanctions were working. What 

is the impact of this deal on that motivation to tackle all of the 

other actions we have an issue with? 

Mr. BURNS. Congressman, we did not have sustained contact 

with the Iranians from 1979 until the autumn of 2013. 

So we had an abnormal relationship. We couldn’t actually mix it 

up with them and really get in there and work with them and try 

to move them and leverage them. We have that now. 

Now, the Obama administration made a tactical decision that for 

the life of these nuclear talks they didn’t want to introduce any 

other issues. You can argue pro or con whether that was the right 

decision. 

We do have the capacity to talk to them now. Secretary Kerry 

has a relationship of sorts, a professional relationship, with the Iranian Foreign Minister and I wouldn’t wait for the next President. 

I think the Obama administration should take on the hostage 

issue and take on the terrorism issue——

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, what is the leverage? 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. And the regional issue and try to do 

what we can to motivate the Iranians to change their positions. It 

is going to be tough. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I mean, but the Iranians aren’t—when they weren’t 

negotiating with us because they are good actors, they are good 

world citizens. 

These are bad people blowing up mock U.S. warships while this 

is going on—fighting with the Syrians and the Houthis in Yemen 

against us and others. What is the leverage to actually—other than 

say, you know, for Obama to go back, you know, a few months from 

now or Secretary Kerry to go over and say, you know, pretty please 

can you stop overthrowing foreign governments, what is the actual 

leverage that is left other than asking nicely? 

Mr. BURNS. I am not sure I would ask nicely. But I think the actual leverage is to strengthen our military relationship with the 

GCC countries—the Saudis and others—to contain Iranian power 

in the Gulf, to close ranks with Israel, strengthen that relationship 

and make it difficult for the Iranians to do what they are doing in 

the Middle East. 

Mr. ZELDIN. But why would the Iranians do anything that I just 

said if what they want we are just giving them right now with this 

deal? 

In my opinion, the President of the United States should be sitting down at the table with a strong hand, inheriting all that good 

will of generations of Americans who have fought and died for this 

country to keep us free and safe, and with that good will and that 

American exceptionalism say this is everything that we want in exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:33 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071415\95512 SHIRL
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change for $50 billion plus of sanctions relief. But all this stuff was 

left out. 

So I guess what do we have to give the Iranians now that the 

sanction relief—if the sanction relief was met? What do we have to 

give the Iranians as leverage to get what we want out of them? 

Mr. BURNS. So the decision the Obama administration made was 

to focus on the nuclear issue as the greatest immediate danger. I 

think that was a correct decision. 

Now that that is underway and you have an agreement that 

hopefully will be implemented, we are going to have to build up our 

power and our coalitions against Iran. It is not about giving them 

something they want. 

It is about muscling them and out powering them through containment regimes and that is what the United States traditionally 

has done, going back to the Carter administration when we said 

the Persian Gulf was an area of vital concern to the United States. 

We should say it again to warn the Iranians about military activities, for instance, in that area. 

Mr. ZELDIN. And my time is running short here. I appreciate 

that. I think that for the life of the Obama administration or at 

least this particular moment in time no one in the entire world, 

whether it is within the United States or the Middle East or elsewhere believe if the President says that the military option is on 

the table that he would actually do it. 

We saw what happened with Syria where there would be consequences for using chemical warfare. They used chemical weapons 

and nothing ended up happening. So, you know, the President says 

the only alternative to whatever he agreed to was war and the 

irony about it is that this deal will actually result in more instability in the Middle East and cause, you know, a nuclear arms race 

to some degree in that region as well. 

I am just concerned that the President has negotiated away that 

leverage that bought the Iranians to the table in the first place. 

America got played and the President was a complacent party to 

it. 

Now, the American public and the representatives in Congress 

should have the final say, not the President with a stroke of a pen. 

An announcement this morning made at the White House was 

filled with falsehoods like 24/7, anytime anywhere inspections that 

aren’t real. 

I really do appreciate all of you being here. I am just concerned 

about the future of our relations and—I am sorry. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, just one additional thought, maybe a little 

more aggressive than what Nick just suggested. Live by executive 

order, die by executive order. You are not going to lift these sanctions. 

The President is going to use his authority within your legislation to lift sanctions based upon his executive decision. A future executive can reverse those decisions. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I am just concerned that when you get rid of sanctions that take years to put into place and then you talk about 

snap back sanctions, when you are working with foreign governments and foreign entities it is very difficult to just snap them 

back. 

83

General HAYDEN. No, it is. But with regard to our national sanctions, you are not going to repeal the law. I think that is very clear. 

And so we will ease those sanctions based upon the will of the executive, which can be changed. 

Mr. ZELDIN. And I appreciate the general’s remarks and I would 

encourage my colleagues in the spirit of that discussion of what 

power Congress has or hasn’t or what power the American public 

has or hasn’t that we do not accept defeat, that we do not accept 

a bad deal with Iran because of the consequences. 

But I absolutely appreciate the general’s remarks and the Ambassador and everyone else for being here. I yield back the balance 

of my time. Thank you, Chairman, for being generous with me. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Zeldin, and thank you for 

your military service too for our country. God bless you. 

We now proceed with Congressman Ron DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses. You know, a lot of what goes on here is just we puff, we 

do these hearings. We take meaningless votes about really frivolous 

issues. 

This is really a big vote and a big issue and Congress needs to 

step up and do the right thing for the American people. In my 

judgement, that means stopping the deal. I think this is bad for our 

country. 

I think it is bad for national security. You know, when I was in 

Iraq back in ’07-’08 the number one cause of death was not even 

al-Qaeda in Iraq at the time. It was Iran and the Quds Force and 

the Shi’ite militias that they funded and they killed hundreds of 

our service members. 

And yet I am looking through this deal and I notice that they are 

actually relieving sanctions on the Quds Force and on Qassem 

Soleimani specifically. Of course, the $140 billion that is a huge influx of cash for the Iranian regime. Is the regime going to change? 

Well, I just looked on Friday, July 10th. The regime is sponsoring 

the protest ‘‘Death to America. Death to Israel’’ on Quds Day. 

I think that the agreement really enhances Iran’s power in the 

region. I think that they are going to emerge from this unquestionably the dominant actor in the Middle East and we have seen their 

authority grow over the course of this administration. 

I think it is actually good for ISIS because in a place like alAnbar Province where I served if the choice is between an Iraqi 

Government that is backed by a Shi’ite power and Shi’ite militias 

or ISIS, which is at least a Sunni Arab group, a lot of those folks, 

who aren’t bad people, they are more apt to side with ISIS than 

to side with the central Government of Iraq. 

And so the fear is is that with U.S. policy tilting so far in the 

direction of this dominant Shi’ite power that I think you are going 

to see more recruits now flood into ISIS. So we may be killing some 

of them but there is going to be folks who are going to replenish 

it. The verification, as I read it, is a joke. I mean, it is not anytime 

we want to go in. 

There is a committee, they do this. By the time you actually 

want to see things the offending conduct could be concealed. And 

I think this really turns our back on Israel, our most trusted ally 

84

in the region. This is a country that Iran boasts is a one-bomb 

country. 

They boast that they want to wipe them off the map and I think 

the relationship that this administration has had with the Israeli 

Government has been a disaster and I don’t think this is the way 

that you treat an ally. 

Well, let me ask you this, Ambassador Burns, because I think 

you actually did as good a job—I mean, as anyone I have heard of 

justifying your position. What would be the reason to remove sanctions off of Qassem Soleimani and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps? 

Mr. BURNS. Oh, it is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do, isn’t 

it, given that the Quds Force——

Mr. DESANTIS. But I don’t understand. I mean, if——

Mr. BURNS. It is because of how the negotiations were constructed. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So it is just a concession, really having nothing 

to do with the nuke program or does it have something to do? Because on the one hand we are told that Iran never had military 

uses for any of this but yet you are removing sanctions off folks 

who are very key players in Iran’s military complex. 

So the question is is there a relationship there or is this a totally 

unrelated concession about relieving sanctions off people who are 

involved in terrorism? And we have been told from administration 

witness after administration witness sitting right where you are 

that they didn’t want to discuss terrorism. 

They only wanted to focus on the nuclear negotiations. So it is 

very, very odd to me that that would be in there and particularly 

just because of the blood that they have—the American blood that 

they have on their hands. 

Mr. BURNS. Right. And I think that the agreement announced 

this morning is framed such that all the sanctions that were passed 

against Tehran in the Security Council and in other places, executive orders, are going to be lifted, whether they are directly about 

the nuclear program or not. So is it a problem that the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guards Corps might have more money available to 

them? Yes. 

It is a problem. It is part of—when I testified earlier, Congressman, I just said I support this. I think on balance it is the right 

decision for the United States. But there are risks here and there 

are tradeoffs and some of them are very difficult to digest. That is 

one of them. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Senator Lieberman, this influx of cash to the regime—is there any doubt in your mind that some of those proceeds 

are going to be used to fund the Iranian terror network? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. None at all. It is hard to conceive of a situation 

where that doesn’t happen. How much is spent is up to, obviously, 

the Iranian authorities. The other thing I mentioned briefly before 

you were here, Congressman, is that a lot of the rest of the money 

may go for domestic purposes but it will be used to strengthen the 

position of the current radical regime in Tehran and to essentially 

undercut the popular opposition that is there. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And getting the cash—is that going to cause the 

regime to change their militant Islamic ideology, in your judgment? 

85

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Getting the——

Mr. DESANTIS. The fact that they are getting these concessions. 

I guess the hope is is that oh, maybe they will change. Is there any 

chance? Would you be willing to bet that these mullahs will change 

their militant Islamic ideology? 

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Right. I would bet that they will not, based on 

everything we have seen and the agreement strengthens their 

hand. In other words, as you have said and, again, as Ambassador 

Burns said, tough choices in our negotiation. 

But basically the negotiation did focus on the nuclear program 

that they have and it is not that we accepted all the terrible things 

that they do but implicitly it was off the table. Now, Congress does 

have a role to play here in the months ahead, which is to come 

back and the administration too, really, to strengthen sanctions 

based on human rights, support of terrorism, their treatment of the 

people in Camp Liberty, which is horrendous. 

So that right now I think this message is not only did they get 

a good deal on the nuclear agreement but they are basically free 

to do whatever they want to do in every other part of their radical 

program. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thanks. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman DeSantis, and thank you 

too for your military service. We have one final follow-up from Congressman Deutch for Ambassador Burns. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Burns, I 

just wanted to follow up on that last point since it is a very big 

agreement that we are going to be sorting through. 

But your assessment is that all of the sanctions on the IRGC are 

being lifted as part of this? I just want to make sure that I understood correctly what you said. 

Mr. BURNS. In my response to Mr. DeSantis’ question I said that 

the framework of this agreement is that many of the sanctions that 

were passed under varying authorities—Security Council and others—are being lifted as part of the overall agreement. There are 

multiple types of sanctions in here. That was my answer. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. I appreciate that. I yield back. Thanks, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. As we conclude, I want to thank each 

of you for being here today. Your insight has been very helpful. 

We are certainly concerned for the security of the American families and you have expressed that and you can see it is bipartisan, 

the level of concern and participation. I am very, very grateful for 

everyone participating today. 

I know that many of us are just so hopeful for democratic change 

actually in Iran. 

With that, we are now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:48 p.m. the committee was adjourned.] 

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