COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Willis 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WILLIAM TODD HOUSE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0654-96-3 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 MAY 27, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 

Donald R. Mullins, Judge 

 Norman Lamson for appellant. 

 Ruth A. Morken, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

Margaret Ann B. Walker, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 William Todd House appeals the revocation of his suspended 

sentence. House asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion in revoking his suspended sentence on the basis of its 

finding that House had failed to perform public service, a 

condition of his probation. Holding that the trial court's 

revocation of House's suspended sentence was based on reasonable 

cause and was within the sound discretion of the trial court, we 

affirm. 

 On March 13, 1995, House was convicted of attempting to 

purchase or possess a firearm after having been convicted of a 

felony. Subsequent to a hearing on April 24, 1995, House was 

sentenced to five years in prison, all of which were 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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conditionally suspended. At the conclusion of the sentencing 

hearing, the trial court explained the terms of the suspended 

sentence to House, stating: 

 I'm going to sentence you to five years in 

the penitentiary. And I am going to suspend 

that on the normal and usual terms and 

conditions of probation. One of the special 

conditions will be that you get a job. A 

full time job or at any time that you're not 

fully employed you'll have to perform 

community service. At least thirty-six hours 

a week. And if you fail to do that then 

you'll be in violation of your probation and 

the Court will then have you serve the five 

years. 

(Emphasis added.) In relevant part, the final sentencing order 

stated: "[t]he Court . . . does suspend the execution of the 

aforesaid penitentiary sentence . . . upon the express terms and 

conditions that the defendant be of good behavior . . . [and] 

that he perform community service if not employed full time 

. . . ." 

 In order to participate in the community service program, it 

was necessary for House to sign a liability release form. House, 

who had previously suffered a back injury and took prescription 

medication for the injuries, refused to sign the waiver. House's 

probation officer, H. M. Flynn, and the community service 

placement director had been informed of House's condition and the 

consequent limitations on his work capacity by House's physician. 

 Accordingly, Flynn ordered that House only be assigned to 

community service positions within the range of his capabilities. 

 Nevertheless, Flynn reported that House told the community 
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service placement director that "someone [would] be responsible 

for [him] getting injured." 

 Flynn notified the court that House had violated the terms 

of his probation by refusing to follow his probation officer's 

instructions and by failing to be cooperative. Specifically, 

Flynn reported House's refusal to sign the liability release form 

and his statement to the community service placement director. A 

revocation hearing was conducted at which House stated that he 

would perform community service and that he would not "present 

himself as some invalid at a work site and create problems." On 

November 6, 1995, House's probation officer informed the court 

that House was then performing community service. Consequently, 

by written order dated November 17, 1995, the court continued 

House's probation on the same terms and conditions as originally 

imposed. 

 On December 20, 1995, House's probation officer informed the 

court that: 

 On November 6, 1995, an update was presented 

to the court by letter indicat[ing] that Mr. 

House was performing community service. 

However, since that letter, subject has not 

performed community service due to work site 

supervisors not allowing him to perform his 

duties because of his attitude. Mr. House 

appears to be able to talk himself out of the 

community service work on the first day at 

each site by complaining of illnesses or 

other problems. This officer is requesting 

that the Probation Violation Hearing of July 

15, 1995, be rescheduled with a 

recommendation of revocation. 

 On January 30, 1996, the trial court ordered House to show 
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cause why his probation should not be revoked. Flynn testified 

that during the nine months that House had been on probation he 

had failed to regularly perform community service as required and 

that in fact, he had only performed 165.5 total hours of service. 

 Flynn stated that 

 at each site [House] goes to he presents 

himself as injured, on drugs, not able to do 

the community service. For example, at the 

last site, which would be the water treatment 

plant, his first statements basically were do 

I need to have shots before I work here? I'm 

on Valium. I've been injured and that kind 

of thing. And of course none of the site 

supervisors will accept him. 

Flynn also stated that he and the community service placement 

director were aware of House's work limitations and that Flynn 

had specifically instructed that House not be assigned work 

outside of his physical restrictions. House testified that he 

never complained about the work "on any job site" and that he 

never stated that he "couldn't perform the work." House also 

stated that he had worked on a variety of projects, but that 

ultimately someone would "pull him out." 

 The trial judge found that House had violated his probation 

and informed House that: 

 [Y]ou've been before me on this issue and you 

were brought the first time because when you 

were sentenced here on April 24th the first 

time you appeared . . . to sign up for 

community service, you told the lady there 

that someone will be responsible for me 

getting injured. That concerned the lady 

there. And we had a little hearing about 

that and you came in and you told the Court 

that you were willing to work and that you 

would present yourself with an attitude that 

would get you through and you could complete 
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your community service. Community service is 

required of everybody on probation here and 

you know that. You knew it when you entered 

your plea. Full-time community service calls 

for a hundred and seventy-three hours a 

month. That's forty hours a week. A hundred 

and seventy-three hours a month. You were 

sentenced in April of '95. This is February 

or the last of January of '96 and you've 

performed a hundred and sixty-five and a half 

hours. I believe you've wasted your time and 

my time and chances have been exhausted. I'm 

finding you guilty of violating the terms of 

your probation. I'm going to revoke your 

suspended sentence and have you serve it. 

 Code § 19.2-303 provides that a trial court "may suspend 

imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or in 

part and in addition may place the accused on probation under 

such conditions as the court shall determine . . . ." In 

addition, "[t]he court may, for any cause deemed by it sufficient 

which occurred at any time within the probation period . . . 

revoke the suspension of sentence and any probation . . . [and] 

pronounce whatever sentence might have been originally imposed." 

 Code § 19.2-306; see also Patterson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 1046, 1048, 407 S.E.2d 43, 44 (1991). The trial court's 

decision to revoke must be based on reasonable cause, however, 

the trial court has broad discretion in determining when 

revocation is appropriate. Patterson, 12 Va. App. at 1048, 407 

S.E.2d at 44. On appeal the trial court's revocation order will 

be reversed only where there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion. Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367, 38 S.E.2d 

479, 484 (1946). 

 Here, the record establishes that House understood that he 
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was to perform community service when he was not working and that 

during the nine months that he was on probation, he completed 

only 165.5 total hours of service. The record reflects that 

House was employed fixing small engines, but no evidence was 

introduced regarding how many hours a week House was employed nor 

how long House was employed. Ultimately, the record is only 

sufficient to prove that House performed 165.5 hours of community 

service, an amount constituting slightly less than one month of 

full-time community service. 

 Further, House's assertion that the trial court's order was 

ambiguous because it failed to specify the amount of community 

service to be performed is unsupported by the evidence. The 

trial judge's order from the bench specified thirty-six hours of 

service. The court's written order reiterated the court's intent 

that House "perform community service if not employed full time." 

 That the written order did not restate the thirty-six hour 

requirement does not make the order any less binding on House. 

As we have noted, 

 generally a court speaks through its written 

orders. . . . However, where the record 

clearly establishes what was intended, we 

must give force and effect to that intent 

rather than rely solely on precise and 

technical wording of the court's written 

order. 

Guba v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 114, 118, 383 S.E.2d 764, 767 

(1989). House stated that he understood the conditions of his 

suspended sentence and that he was "prepared to accept" the 

conditions imposed. Assuming, arguendo, that House believed that 
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he was to be employed at least thirty-six hours a week, and if 

not so employed, to perform community service, the record 

reflects that House failed to do even this. The evidence 
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suggests that there were numerous weeks in which House neither 

worked full time, nor performed any amount of community service. 

 The record also establishes that House was responsible for 

the difficulty he experienced in retaining those community 

service positions offered to him. Flynn testified that both he 

and the community service placement director were aware of 

House's physical limitations. The record establishes that House 

was repeatedly offered positions which required work within the 

parameters of his physical abilities. However, when House was 

interviewed for the various positions offered, he would present 

himself as "on drugs," injured, and generally unsuited for work. 

 Through these representations, he raised sufficient concern 

among the supervisors interviewing him to assure his rejection. 

House's testimony that he did not refuse the work offered and his 

assertions that he was "pulled out" of the positions where he was 

employed, need not have been accepted by the trial court. The 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their 

testimony are matters for the trial court to decide. Slayton, 

185 Va. at 367, 38 S.E.2d at 484. 

 Finding that the trial court's revocation of House's 

suspended sentence was reasonably based on House's failure to 

complete sufficient public service, we hold that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion, and accordingly, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.