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FIXING THE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION 

NETWORK: FINDING THE WAY FORWARD FOR 

BETTER INFORMATION SHARING 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 10, 2007 

Serial No. 110–34 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

JANE HARMAN, California, Chair 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

THOMAS M. FINAN, Director and Counsel 

BRANDON DECLET, Counsel 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

DERON MCELROY, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 

Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .......................................................... 1 

Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Pennsylvania ........................................................................................................ 30 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 26 

The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Colorado ............................................................................................................ 29 

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Connecticut ............................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

Mr. Donald F. Kennedy, Executive Director, New England State Police 

Information Network, Regional Information-Sharing System: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Wayne Parent, Deputy Director, Office of Operations Coordination, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

PANEL II 

Captain William Harris, Delaware State Police: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 34 

Mr. Barry S. Lindquist, Inspector, Office of Statewide Intelligence, Florida 

Department of Law Enforcementq: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 39 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 39 

First Sergeant Lee Miller, Virginia State Police: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37 

Captain Brian Tomblin, Military Liaison, Office of Homeland Security, 

Tennessee Army National Guard: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 41 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 42 

(1) 

FIXING THE HOMELAND SECURITY 

INFORMATION NETWORK: FINDING 

THE WAY FORWARD FOR BETTER 

INFORMATION SHARING 

Thursday, May 10, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, 

AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Harman, Langevin, Carney, Perlmutter, and Shays. 

Ms. HARMAN. [Presiding.] The hearing will come to order. 

My apologies to my colleague, Mr. Shays, and our witnesses, but 

of course the Democratic Caucus was called at precisely the same 

time. As yet, I have not mastered the ability to be in two places 

at the same time; maybe soon. 

The Homeland Security Information Network, or HSIN for short, 

was supposed to be the department’s main pipeline for sharing unclassified information with state, local and tribal partners. More 

than 3 years later, we are far from the robust system that was 

promised. What we have instead is kind of a mess. What we need 

is an effective fix. Sadly, I am not very hopeful. 

I have in my hand a one-page memo dated April 17, 2007, from 

Admiral Roger Rufe, the director of the department’s Office of Operations Coordination, to the undersecretary of management, Paul 

Schneider. I am frankly perplexed by what Admiral Rufe had to 

say about the HSIN just several weeks ago. Although he concedes 

that the system has ‘‘grown without sufficient planning and program management’’ for years, the admiral defends it, saying that 

‘‘the HSIN, for better or worse‘‘—sounds like a marriage—‘‘is tied 

to DHS missions and operations.’’ 

Is the HSIN–DHS relationship, as I just said, some kind of bad 

marriage that we are all just supposed to accept? 

Perhaps sensing that the long knives are out, the admiral goes 

on to say that he ‘‘fully embraces the concept of making decisive 

strategic changes to the program,’’ but he urges Mr. Schneider ‘‘to 

fully consider the unintended consequences of programmatic decisions, particularly as they impact DHS operations and missions.’’ 

2 

I am afraid that the admiral’s plea for patience and fear of unintended consequences could be undermined by the rest of his comments. He notes that the HSIN working group last fall found that 

‘‘DHS has not clearly defined the purpose and scope of HSIN nor 

designated roles and responsibilities for strategy development and 

implementation through a formal policy mechanism.’’ 

The admiral agrees, adding that ‘‘we continue to struggle with 

the lack of aligned DHS policy and established business rules.’’ If 

only it were that simple. From what GAO is telling us and what 

the DHS IG told us last year, HSIN’s troubles go far deeper, to day 

one of the program. 

We are joined this morning by a person who saw all this coming 

almost 5 years ago—or we will be joined; he is not here yet—our 

colleague Congressman Jim Langevin of Rhode Island. Jim started 

asking Tom Ridge back in 2002 about why the department didn’t 

first talk to state and local officials to find out what informationsharing systems were already working. 

Today, we are asking Jim’s question again. Why did the department choose not to partner with those working information-sharing 

systems and avoid the mess it finds itself in now? I have a strong 

suspicion that turf had something to do with the department’s decision to go its own way, even if it meant duplicating tried and true 

information-sharing systems in the process. 

Ignoring the experience, expertise and requirements of state and 

locals is unfortunately a common thing these days. With all due respect to the well-meaning men and women who work at DHS, 

many do not know what state and local needs are. We find time 

and again everywhere we look that there is an absence of consultation at the front end, and then we end up with a mess at the back 

end. I suppose we shouldn’t be surprised, then, that they didn’t 

talk to the state and locals who were building an information network that would have worked. 

The needs of end-users should have been the starting point, as 

they should be the starting point with intelligence products and a 

lot of other things that DHS is doing. Because DHS got it backwards, the HSIN problems were cooked in from the beginning. 

What do we have to show for it? A flawed information system 

with core problems that have continued to fester. I note that the 

HSIN has the dubious distinction of being on both the OMB watch 

list for poorly planned IT projects and the OMB high-risk list for 

poorly performing IT projects. In fact, the HSIN is one of 20 out 

of 900 IT systems across the federal government that makes both 

lists. For the mathematicians out there, that means that HSIN is 

among the top two percent worst IT systems. Almost 6 years after 

the largest terrorist attack in our country, this is totally unacceptable. 

So what do we do? First, we need an information-sharing system 

that gets buy-in from state and locals, that includes accurate, reliable and timely information, and helps them protect their communities. Second, we need an information-sharing system that complements existing systems that will work for decades, in some cases 

for more than 30 years. Third, we need an information-sharing system that not only helps safeguard the American people, but also 

operates within the bounds of the U.S. Constitution. 

3 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how to 

get there, what benchmarks we should be establishing so we can 

conduct rigorous oversight of the HSIN that is so plainly needed. 

Let me just conclude by saying this: It is no pleasure to sit up here 

and say these things. It makes me quite uncomfortable. I don’t play 

‘‘gotcha’’ and I don’t want you to feel that that is what we are trying to do up here. 

What we are trying to do up here is get it right. I think we have 

wasted a lot of time and resources and human talent in duplication 

because we don’t effectively coordinate. So this subcommittee has 

said for a long time that we are going to start at the other end. 

We are going to talk to the users of information, find out what they 

need, find out if they have tools that work, and then on a vertical 

basis coming back from the end-point to Washington, we are going 

to make sure that Washington is providing those things and adopting processes that will keep our communities safe. 

Only if we have really robust information sharing; only if we 

have a full understanding at the local level of what to look for and 

what to do, are we going to find the people in Cherry Hill, New 

Jersey, or pick a place of interest. I know you all want to do that, 

and I know you all want to get it right. So I am just telling you 

that is our intention. 

The ranking member is not here, so I would like to ask Mr. 

Shays if he has some opening remarks. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I first want to say 

that this committee is very fortunate to have you chair the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, with your background on the Intelligence Committee. It is 

just really wonderful to have you chair this committee and to have 

this hearing. 

I have a statement that I am going to read—it is Mr. 

Reichert’s—and then I am going to be leaving. I do apologize for 

that, because I think this is a very important hearing. 

Good morning. We meet today to examine the Homeland Security 

Information Network, or HSIN, the DHS information system network. 

By virtually all accounts, HSIN was poorly planned and implemented by the department. There have been several reports by the 

DHS inspector general and the General Accountability Office to 

catalogue the failings of the HSIN program. A recent example includes the June 2006 inspector general report indicating that HSIN 

is not effectively supporting state and local information sharing. 

Today, GAO is releasing a report with similar conclusions. We 

have also heard, though, that the situation with HSIN is improving. While this is good news, we must focus intently on how to 

move forward more quickly and make the federal information-sharing environment, including HSIN, a success. The story of HSIN is 

a story of the federal government trying to impose a one-size-fitsall approach on states and locals. It is no wonder that in many 

states and localities, it is not working. 

In any homeland security endeavor, but especially in the realm 

of information sharing, DHS has need to get state and local buyin and cooperation. A federal-first, top-down approach simply does 

4 

not work in an environment where state and local law enforcement 

are America’s first preventers. 

It is also important to realize that DHS will never be able to 

please every state and locality across America. While there will 

never be 100 percent satisfaction, DHS needs to get the message 

loud and clear that Congress expects substantial progress in the relations with states and localities. 

On our first panel, we especially want to hear from Mr. Parent 

on how DHS can improve its cooperation with state and local 

stakeholders. On the second panel, we expect to hear that in some 

states, the HSIN system duplicates ongoing efforts. In other states, 

it simply gathers dust. 

We will also hear that HSIN is being used by some as an essential tool for information sharing. It is critical that DHS gets information sharing right and does so in a cooperative manner. It is a 

fundamental element of our homeland security and vital to protecting our nation. 

That is the statement of our ranking member. I would also like 

to say that evidently he is not feeling very well, so that is part of 

the reason why he is not here today. So I thank you all. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank you, Mr. Shays. All compliments are welcome. Please stay here and offer more. 

[Laughter.] 

And to the ranking member, please send him our best wishes. I 

hope he will be feeling better. 

I am told that we will be joined by other members. Unfortunately, this morning was a very hectic one for everyone, and they 

are on their way over. I especially hope that Mr. Langevin will be 

able to be here soon. 

Let me welcome the first panel of witnesses. 

A ha, right on time. Here is Mr. Perlmutter. 

Let me welcome the first panel of witnesses, just in time for 

votes. 

Our first witness, David Powner, is the director of information 

technology management issues for the GAO. Mr. Powner is responsible for a large segment of GAO’s IT work, including systems development, IT investment management, health IT, and cyber-critical infrastructure protection and reviews. That is a mouthful. 

Mr. Powner has led teams reviewing major IT modernization efforts at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, the National Weather Service, the FAA, and the IRS. These reviews covered many IT 

areas, including software development and maturity, information 

security, and enterprise security. 

His team’s fine work on the HSIN is one of the reasons we are 

holding this hearing today. I would mention that we met with Mr. 

Powner just a couple of days ago and reviewed some aspects of this 

report. It is a very important report, and we thank you for it. 

Our second witness, Donald Kennedy, is the executive director of 

the New England State Police Information Network, or NESPIN. 

NESPIN is one of the six regional information-sharing system risk 

centers that are funded through DOJ’s Office of Justice programs 

in the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Mr. Kennedy is currently the 

vice chairman of the RISS National Directors Association. 

5 

Prior to being named executive director in 2006—wonderful; here 

he is just in time, a hero’s welcome—he served as NESPIN’s deputy director of field services. Mr. Kennedy is a retired captain from 

the Rhode Island State Police where he served for 24 years and has 

served in all bureaus and divisions within the state police. 

We are very pleased you are here. 

I want to welcome Mr. Langevin, because he is truly the godfather of this hearing and the issues that we are raising today. 

Our third witness—and we put you in this order, Mr. Parent; I 

just want to explain that—is Wayne Parent, the deputy director of 

DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination. Mr. Parent previously 

served as the director of current operations for the Border and 

Transportation Security Directorate within the department. 

On the BTS operations staff, Mr. Parent was responsible for current operational issues including coordinating the execution of both 

interdepartmental and interagency operations plans. He supervised 

the BTS Watch Sector in the Homeland Security Operations Center 

and managed planning and exercise participation for BTS. He was 

also responsible for coordination of intelligence-sharing between 

DHS’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and the agencies within the BTS Directorate. 

The vote lights seem to have gone off, so I would like someone 

to tell me where we are with anticipated votes. If they are not happening immediately, I would like to go directly into testimony, and 

then hopefully we can get through your testimony and some member questions before we have to adjourn briefly for votes. 

I thank you, and I will recognize our first witness. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION 

TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. POWNER. Madam Chair, members of the subcommittee, we 

appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Homeland Security Information Network. 

HSIN is a communications application that is to serve as DHS’s 

primary nationwide information-sharing tool for transmitting sensitive, but unclassified, information. HSIN’s problems to date have 

been well publicized. DHS’s IG reported last year that it does not 

effectively support state and local information sharing. 

In addition, it is on the Office of Management and Budget’s radar 

screen, having made both OMB’s management watch list and highrisk list, meaning that according to the administration, HSIN is a 

poorly planned and poorly performing project. 

This morning, as requested, I will summarize the results of a report that we recently completed at the request of Chairman 

Thompson that identified nearly a dozen homeland security networks within DHS that now cost over $300 million annually to develop, operate and maintain. 

Specifically, I will address the lack of coordination between HSIN 

and the regional information sharing program, a key nationwide 

information-sharing initiative operated and maintained by state 

and local officials. I will also address key efforts needed to improve 

coordination and to avoid this problem from reoccurring. 

6 

First, DHS did not effectively coordinate HSIN and the RISS program. RISS officials met with DHS in late 2003 and early 2004 to 

demonstrate that their application could be used by DHS to share 

homeland security information. Communications stopped shortly 

after these meetings with no explanation. When we questioned why 

this communication stopped, we were told that DHS officials involved in these initial meetings are no longer with the department. 

Instead of leveraging the existing RISS application, DHS developed its own. The reasons for this lack of coordination are several, 

and include DHS rushing into HSIN without understanding key 

state and local initiatives. Until DHS coordinates key informationsharing initiatives better, it faces the risk of ineffective information 

sharing associated with terrorist threats, vulnerabilities and warnings. 

In addition, DHS is developing and deploying HSIN capabilities 

that duplicate those associated with the RISS program. Both programs target similar users. For example, both are used and marketed for use at state fusion centers. In addition, both offer similar 

community-based portals such as those associated with emergency 

management in our nation’s critical infrastructure sectors. 

DHS acknowledges the lack of coordination and several improvements efforts are under way. These include developing an integration strategy so that HSIN can work with other applications and 

networks; improving the content that HSIN provides; and forming 

multiple committees that are to define operational priorities for 

DHS users and advise DHS on how HSIN can better meet user 

needs. 

These are positive steps that should help, but these efforts have 

either just begun or are in the early planning stages. For example, 

the membership of the committees mentioned are still being established. Further, implementation milestones for these improvements 

efforts have yet to be defined. In addition to these planned improvements, we recommended that that the department conduct an 

inventory of state and local information-sharing initiatives like 

RISS and assess opportunities for the HSIN program to improve 

information sharing and avoid duplication. 

Addressing the HSIN coordination issues with state and local initiatives should be the immediate focus, but on a broader scale, 

DHS has many networks and associated systems that need to be 

coordinated to effectively share critical information and to avoid 

duplicative efforts. We made recommendations to address this larger coordination challenge and to ensure that these efforts are consistent with the information-sharing environment called for in the 

2004 Intel Reform Act. 

In summary, HSIN has many hurdles to overcome. It has been 

poorly managed and poorly coordinated. Although some overlap in 

our nation’s initiatives is prudent to adequately protect the homeland, duplication is not and is a waste of taxpayers’ dollars. 

Moving forward, it is essential that DHS clearly define HSIN requirements with input from users; improve its content; strengthen 

its program management; and implement an integration strategy 

so that it can work with other applications. Otherwise, it will not 

be the key information-sharing network it is intended to be. 

7 

1The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directed DHS to establish communications to share 

homeland security information with federal agencies, state and local governments, and other 

specified groups. 2GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated wth Key State and Local Information Sharing Initiatives, 

GAO–07–455 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007). 3 A Web portal is generally a site that offers several resources or services, such as search engines, news articles, forums, and other tools. 

Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to 

answer questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Powner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER

Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in coordinating efforts on its Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) with state and local governments and other parties involved in the mission of keeping our nation secure. As you know, DHS is responsible for coordinating the federal government’s homeland security communications with all levels of government—including state and local. In support of this 

mission, the department developed HSIN as part of its goal to establish an infrastructure for sharing homeland security information.1 Besides HSIN, an Internetbased application, DHS also operates at least 11 other networks in support of its 

homeland security mission. The department reported that in fiscal years 2005 and 

2006, these investments cost $611.8 million to develop, operate, and maintain. 

As agreed, in my remarks today I will discuss the department’s efforts to coordinate its development and use of HSIN with key state and local information-sharing 

initiatives. These remarks are based on our recent report on homeland security networks and applications.2 That report focused on two key initiatives under the Regional Information Sharing Systems program. This nationwide program, operated 

and managed by state and local officials, provides services (including information 

sharing) to support law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. Its informationsharing efforts also include emergency responders and public safety officials. 

In performing the work for the report, we analyzed descriptive data (e.g., type of 

network, estimated costs) on major networks and Internet-based systems identified 

by DHS as supporting its homeland security mission, including information sharing. 

We also reviewed documentation on HSIN and state and local initiatives; compared 

it against the requirements of the Homeland Security Act, federal guidance, and related best practices; and interviewed DHS officials and state and local officials. This 

work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

Results in Brief 

In developing HSIN, DHS did not effectively coordinate with key state and local 

initiatives that are part of the Regional Information Sharing Systems program. Specifically, the department did not fully develop joint strategies and coordinated policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries and meet 

mutual needs, which are key practices for effective coordination and collaboration 

and are a means to enhance information sharing and avoid duplication of effort. For 

example, DHS did not engage the program in ongoing dialogue to determine how 

resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs or work through technical issues 

and differences in what each organization considers to be terrorism information. 

A major factor contributing to the limited coordination was that after September 

11, 2001, the department expedited its schedule for deploying HSIN. In its haste, 

it did not develop a comprehensive inventory of key state and local informationsharing initiatives. 

Consequently, DHS faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring. It also faces the risk that the HSIN system may be duplicating state and local 

capabilities. Specifically, both HSIN and one of the key initiatives target similar 

user groups, such as emergency management agencies, and all have similar features, such as Web portals,3 electronic bulletin boards, ‘‘chat’’ tools, and document 

libraries. 

The department has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and 

collaboration. For example, it is forming an HSIN Mission Coordinating Committee 

and an HSIN Advisory Committee to help ensure that HSIN meets the informationsharing needs of DHS and other users. However, these activities have either just 

8 

4 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

5See, for example, GAO, Information Technology: Major Federal Networks That Support 

Homeland Security Functions, GAO–04–375 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2004) and Information 

Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Deine and Implement Polices and Procedures for Effectively 

Managing Investments, GAO–07–424 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007). 6GAO–07–455. 

begun or are being planned, with implementation milestones yet to be defined. In 

addition to the planned improvements, DHS has agreed to implement our recommendations to take steps to ensure that HSIN is effectively coordinated with key 

state and local government information-sharing initiatives, which include identifying and inventorying such initiatives. We also recommended that DHS determine 

whether there are coordination and duplication issues with its other homeland security networks and associated systems and applications. Until DHS completes these 

activities, including developing an inventory of key state and local initiatives, and 

fully implementing and institutionalizing key practices and guidance for effective coordination and collaboration, it will continue to be at risk of not effectively sharing 

information with other key state and local information initiatives and duplicating 

state and local capabilities. 

Background 

DHS is the lead department involved in securing our nation’s homeland. Its mission includes, among other things, leading the unified national effort to secure the 

United States, preventing and deterring terrorist attacks, and protecting against 

and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. As part of its mission and as 

required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002,4 the department is also responsible 

for coordinating efforts across all levels of government and throughout the nation, 

including with federal, state, tribal, local, and private sector homeland security resources. 

As we have previously reported, DHS relies extensively on information technology 

(IT), such as networks and associated system applications, to carry out its mission.5

Specifically, in our recent report, we reported that the department identified 11 

major networks it uses to support its homeland security functions, including sharing 

information with state and local governments.6 Examples of such DHS networks include the Homeland Secure Data Network, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Network, and the Customs and Border Protection Network. In addition, the 

department has deployed HSIN, a homeland security information-sharing application that operates on the public Internet. As shown in table 1, of the 11 networks, 

1 is categorized as Top Secret, 1 is Secret, 8 are Sensitive but Unclassified, and 1 

is unclassified. HSIN is considered Sensitive but Unclassified. 

Table 1: DHS Information-Sharing Networks and HSIN Application 

Name Categories Users outside 

DHS 

Reported cost per fiscal 

year (dollars in millions) 

2005 2006 Total 

C Local Area Network 

(C–LAN) 

Top Secret — (a) (a) — 

Homeland Secure Data 

Network (HSDN) 

Secret Other federal, 

state, local 

$46.2 $32.6 $78.8 

Coast Guard Data Network 

Plus (CGDN+).

Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal 15.0 15.0 30.0 

Critical Infrastructure 

Warning Information 

Network (CWIN).

Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal, 

state 

12.1 12.0 24.1 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Network.Sensitive but Unclassified — 58.7 63.0 121.7 

DHS Core Network (DCN) Sensitive but Unclassified — 13.4 10.3 23.7 

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal, 

state, local 

11.9 20.5 32.4 

9 

Name Categories Users outside 

DHS 

Reported cost per fiscal 

year (dollars in millions) 

2005 2006 Total 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement Network 

(ICENet).

Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal, 

state, local 

14.4 19.2 33.6 

ONENet Sensitive but Unclassified — 34.6 40.0 74.6 

Secret Service Wide Area 

Network (WAN).

Sensitive but Unclassified — 2.8 3.1 5.9 

Transportation Security Administration Network 

(TSANet).

Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal 70.0 105.0 175.0 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

Switched Network.

Unclassified — 6.0 6.0 12.0 

Totala $285.1 $326.7 $611.8 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

a Costs for C–LAN are not included, as the information is not publicly available. 

As the table shows, some of these networks are used solely within DHS, while 

others are also used by other federal agencies, as well as state and local governments. In addition, the total cost to develop, operate, and maintain these networks 

and HSIN in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, as reported by DHS, was $611.8 million. 

Of this total, the networks accounted for the vast majority of the cost: $579.4 million. 

DHS Established HSIN to Provide Information–Sharing Capabilities 

DHS considers HSIN to be its primary communication application for transmitting sensitive but unclassified information. According to DHS, this network is an 

encrypted, unclassified, Web-based communications application that serves as DHS’s 

primary nationwide information-sharing and collaboration tool. It is intended to 

offer both real-time chat and instant messaging capability, as well as a document 

library that contains reports from multiple federal, state, and local sources. Available through the application are suspicious incident and pre-incident information 

and analysis of terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons. The application is managed 

within DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination. 

HSIN includes over 35 communities of interest, such as emergency management, 

law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, and private sector communities. Each community of interest has Web pages that are tailored for the community and contain general and community-specific news articles, links, and contact 

information. The community Web pages also provide access to other resources, such 

as the following: • Document library. Users can search the entire document library within the 

communities they have access to. 

• Discussion threads. HSIN has a discussion thread (or bulletin board) feature 

that allows users to post information that other users should know about and 

post requests for information that other users might have. Community administrators can also post and track tasks assigned to users during an incident. 

• Chat tool. HSIN’s chat tool, known as Jabber, is similar to other instant message and chat tools—with the addition of security. Users can customize lists of 

their coworkers and send messages individually or set up chat rooms for more 

users. Other features include chat logs (which allow users to review conversations), timestamps, and user profiles. 

States and Local Governments Have Also Established Similar Initiatives 

State and local governments have similar IT initiatives to carry out their homeland security missions, including sharing information. A key state and local-based 

initiative is the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) program. 

The RISS program helps state and local jurisdictions to, among other things, 

share information in support of their homeland security missions. This nationwide 

program, operated and managed by state and local officials, was established in 1974 

to address crime that operates across jurisdictional lines. The program consists of 

10 

7Formerly called the Anti–Terrorism Information Exchange. 

8GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–05–207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 9GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–07–310 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 10For example, Office of Management and Budget, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular A–130 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2000) and Preparation, Submission, and 

Execution of the Budget, Circular A–11 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006). 

six regional information analysis centers that serve as regional hubs across the 

country. These centers offer services to RISS members in their regions, including 

information sharing and research, analytical products, case investigation support, 

funding, equipment loans, and training. Funding for the RISS program is administered through a grant from the Department of Justice. 

As part of its information-sharing efforts, the RISS program operates two key initiatives (among others): the RISS Secure Intranet (RISSNET) and the Automated 

Trusted Information Exchange 7 (RISS ATIX): • Created in 1996, RISSNET is intended as a secure network serving member 

law enforcement agencies throughout the United States and other countries. 

Through this network, RISS offers services such as secure e-mail, document libraries, intelligence databases, Web pages, bulletin boards, and a chat tool. 

• RISS ATIX offers services similar to those offered by RISSNET to agencies 

beyond the law enforcement community, including executives and officials from 

governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations that have public safety responsibilities. RISS ATIX is partitioned into 39 communities of interest, such as critical infrastructure, emergency management, public health, 

and government officials. Members of each community of interest contribute information to be made available within each community. 

According to RISS officials, the RISS ATIX application was developed in response to the events of September 11, 2001; it was initiated in 2002 as an 

application to provide tools for information sharing and collaboration among 

public safety stakeholders, such as first responders and schools. As of July 

2006, RISS ATIX supported 1,922 users beyond the traditional users of 

RISSNET. 

RISS ATIX uses the technology of RISSNET to offer services through its 

Web pages. The pages are tailored for each community of interest and contain community-specific news articles, links, and contact information. The 

pages also provide access to the following features: • Document library. Participants can store and search relevant documents within their community of interest. 

• Bulletin board. The RISS ATIX bulletin board allows users to post timely 

threat information in discussion forums and to view and respond to posted information. Users can post documents, images, and information related to terrorism and homeland security, as well as receive DHS information, advisories, 

and warnings. According to RISS officials, the bulletin boards are monitored by 

a RISS moderator to relay any information that might be useful for other communities of interest. 

• Chat tool. ATIXLive is an online, real-time, collaborative communications information-sharing tool for the exchange of information by community members. 

Through this tool, users can post timely threat information and view and respond to messages posted. 

• Secure e-mail. RISS ATIX participants have access to e-mail that can be used 

to provide alerts and related information. According to RISS, this is done in a 

secure environment. 

GAO Has Designated Information Sharing as High Risk 

The need to improve information sharing as part of a national effort to improve 

homeland security and preparedness has been widely recognized, not only to improve our ability to anticipate and respond to threats and emergencies, but to avoid 

unnecessary expenditure of scarce resources. In January 2005,8 and more recently 

in January 2007,9 we identified establishing appropriate and effective informationsharing mechanisms to improve homeland security as a high-risk area. The Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) has also issued guidance that stresses the importance of information sharing and avoiding duplication of effort.10 Nonetheless, although this area has received increased attention, the federal government faces formidable challenges in sharing information among stakeholders in an appropriate 

and timely manner. 

As we concluded in October 2005, agencies can help address these challenges by 

adopting and implementing key practices, related to OMB’s guidance, to improve 

collaboration, such as establishing joint strategies and addressing needs by 

leveraging resources and developing compatible policies, procedures, and other 

11 

11GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO–06–15 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005). 12GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitve but Unclassified Information, GAO–06–385 

(Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 13GAO–07–455. 

means to operate across agency boundaries.11 Based on our research and experience, 

these practices are also relevant for collaboration between federal agencies and 

other levels of government (e.g., state, local). Until these coordination and collaboration practices are implemented, agencies face the risk that effective information 

sharing will not occur. 

Congress and the Administration have made several efforts to address the challenges associated with information sharing. In particular, as we reported in March 

2006, the President initiated an effort to establish an Information Sharing Environment that is to combine policies, procedures, and networks and other technologies 

that link people, systems, and information among all appropriate federal, state, 

local, and tribal entities and the private sector.12 In November 2006, in response 

to congressional direction, the Administration issued a plan for implementing this 

environment and described actions that the federal government intends—in coordination with state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners—to carry out 

over the next 3 years. 

Efforts to Coordinate HSIN with Key State and Local Information–Sharing Initiatives Have Been Limited 

DHS did not fully adhere to the previously mentioned key practices in coordinating its efforts on HSIN with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. 

The department’s limited use of these practices is attributable to a number of factors: in particular, after the events of September 11, 2001, the department expedited 

its schedule to deploy HSIN capabilities, and in doing so, it did not develop an inventory of key state and local information initiatives. Until the department fully implements key coordination and collaboration practices and guidance, it faces, among 

other things, the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring. DHS has 

efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and collaboration, including 

implementing the recommendations in our recent report.13

Key Practices Were Not Effectively Implemented 

In developing HSIN, DHS did not fully adhere to the practices related to OMB’s 

guidance. First, although DHS officials met with RISS program officials to discuss 

exchanging terrorism-related documents, joint strategies for meeting mutual needs 

by leveraging resources have not been fully developed. DHS did not engage the 

RISS program to determine how resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs. 

According to RISS program officials, they met with DHS twice (on September 25, 

2003, and January 7, 2004) to demonstrate that their RISS ATIX application could 

be used by DHS for sharing homeland security information. However, communication from DHS on this topic stopped after these meetings, without explanation. According to DHS officials, they did not remember the meetings, which they attributed 

to the departure from DHS of the staff who had attended. 

In addition, although DHS initially pursued a limited strategy of exchanging selected terrorism-related documents with the RISS program, the strategy was impeded by technical issues and by differences in what each organization considers to 

be terrorism information. For example, the exchange of documents between HSIN 

and the RISS program stopped on August 1, 2006, because of technical problems 

with HSIN’s upgrade to a new infrastructure. As of May 3, 2007, the exchange of 

terrorism-related documents had not yet resumed, according to HSIN’s program 

manager. This official also stated that the program is currently working to fix the 

issue with the goal of having it resolved by June 2007. 

Finally, DHS has yet to fully develop coordination policies, procedures, and other 

means to operate across agency boundaries with the RISS program. DHS has not 

fully developed such means to operate with the RISS program and leverage its 

available technological resources. Although an operating agreement was established 

to govern the exchange of terrorism-related documents, according to RISS officials, 

it did not cover the full range of information available through the RISS program. 

DHS’s Expedited Schedule Was Major Cause for Limited Coordination, Increasing 

the Risk of Ineffective Information Sharing and Duplication 

The extent of DHS’s adherence to key practices (and the resulting limited coordination) is attributable to DHS’s expedited schedule to deploy an information-sharing 

application that could be used across the federal government in the wake of the September 11 attacks; in its haste, DHS did not develop a complete inventory of key 

12 

14Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Information Technology, HSIN Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively, DHS/OIG–06–38 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006). 15 A fusion center is defined as a ‘‘collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide 

resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to 

detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.’’ 16 Beyond the collaboration tools listed, RISSNET also provides access to other law enforcement resources, such as analytical criminal data-visualization tools and criminal intelligence 

databases. 

state and local information initiatives. According to DHS officials, they still do not 

have a complete inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives. 

DHS’s Office of Inspector General also reported that DHS developed HSIN in a 

rapid and ad hoc manner, and among other things, did not adequately identify existing federal, state, and local resources, such as RISSNET, that it could have leveraged.14

Further, DHS did not fully understand the RISS program. Specifically, DHS officials did not acknowledge the RISS program as a state and local based program 

with which to partner, but instead considered it to be one of many vendors providing a tool for information sharing. In addition, DHS officials believed that the 

RISS program was solely focused on law enforcement information and did not capture the broader terrorism-related or other information of interest to the department. 

Because of this limited coordination and collaboration, DHS is at increased risk 

that effective information sharing is not occurring. The department also faces the 

risk that it is developing and deploying capabilities on HSIN that duplicate those 

being established by state and local agencies. There is evidence that this has occurred with respect to the RISS program. Specifically: • HSIN and RISS ATIX currently target similar user groups. DHS and the 

RISS program are independently striving to make their applications available 

to user communities involved in the prevention of, response to, mitigation of, 

and recovery from terrorism and disasters across the country. For example, 

HSIN and RISS ATIX are being used and marketed for use at state fusion centers 15 and other state organizations, such as emergency management agencies 

across the country. 

• HSIN and RISS applications have similar approaches for sharing information 

with their users. For example, on each application, users from a particular community—such as emergency management—have access to a portal or community area tailored to the user’s information needs. The community-based portals 

have similar features focused on user communities. Both applications provide 

each community with the following features: 16

• Web pages. Tailored for communities of interest (e.g., law enforcement, emergency management, critical infrastructure sectors), these pages contain general 

and community-specific news articles, links, and contact information. 

• Bulletin boards. Participants can post and discuss information. • Chat tool. Each community has its own online, real-time, interactive collaboration application. 

• Document library. Participants can store and search relevant documents. 

DHS Has Improvements Planned and Under Way, Including Implementing Our Recent Recommendations 

According to DHS officials, including the HSIN program manager, the department 

has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination. For example, the department is in the process of developing an integration strategy that is to include 

enhancing HSIN so that other applications and networks can interact with it. This 

would promote integration by allowing other federal agencies and state and local 

governments to use their preferred applications and networks—such as RISSNET 

and RISS ATIX—while allowing DHS to continue to use HSIN. 

Other examples of improvements either begun or planned include the following: 

• The formation of an HSIN Mission Coordinating Committee, whose roles and 

responsibilities are to be defined in a management directive. It is expected to 

ensure that all HSIN users are coordinated in information-sharing relationships 

of mutual value. 

• The recent development of engagement, communications, and feedback strategies for better coordination and communication with HSIN, including, for example, enhancing user awareness of applicable HSIN contact points and changes 

to the system. 

• The reorganization of the HSIN program management office to help the department better meet user needs. According to the program manager, this reorVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:59 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-34\48909.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
13 

17 As mentioned earlier, this plan is aimed at establishing, in 3 years, the networks and other 

technologies that link people, systems, and information among all appropriate federal state, 

local, and tribal entities and the private sector. 

ganization has included the use of integrated process teams to better support 

DHS’s operational mission priorities as well as the establishment of a strategic 

framework and implementation plan for meeting the office’s key activities and 

vision. 

• The establishment of a HSIN Advisory Committee to advise the department 

on how the HSIN program can better meet user needs, examine DHS’s processes for deploying HSIN to the states, assess state resources, and determine 

how HSIN can coordinate with these resources. In addition to these planned improvements, DHS has agreed to implement the recommendations in our recent 

report. Specifically, we recommended that the department ensure that HSIN is 

effectively coordinated with key state and local government information-sharing 

initiatives. We also recommended that this include (1) identifying and 

inventorying such initiatives to determine whether there are opportunities to 

improve information sharing and avoid duplication, (2) adopting and institutionalizing key practices related to OMB’s guidance on enhancing and sustaining agency coordination and collaboration, and (3) ensuring that the department’s coordination efforts are consistent with the Administration’s recently 

issued Information Sharing Environment plan.17 In response to these recommendations, DHS described actions it was taking to implement them. (The 

full recommendations and DHS’s written response to them are in report.) 

In closing, DHS has not effectively coordinated its primary information-sharing 

system with two key state and local initiatives. Largely because of the department’s 

hasty approach to delivering needed information-sharing capabilities, it did not follow key coordination and collaboration practices and guidance or invest the time to 

inventory and fully understand how it could leverage state and local approaches. 

Consequently, the department faces the risk that effective information sharing is 

not occurring and that its HSIN application may be duplicating existing state and 

local capabilities. This also raises the issue of whether similar coordination and duplication issues exist with the other federal homeland security networks and associated systems and applications under the department’s purview. 

DHS recognizes these risks and has improvements planned and under way to address them, including stated plans to implement our recommendations. These are 

positive steps and should help address shortfalls in the department’s coordination 

practices on HSIN. However, these actions have either just begun or are planned, 

with milestones for implementation yet to be defined. Until all the key coordination 

and collaboration practices are fully implemented and institutionalized, DHS will 

continue to be at risk that the effectiveness of its information sharing is not where 

it needs to be to adequately protect the homeland and that its efforts are unnecessarily duplicating state and local initiatives. 

Madame Chair, this concludes my testimony today. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank you, Mr. Powner, for powerful testimony 

delivered in precisely 5 minutes. 

Mr. Kennedy, no pressure. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF DONALD KENNEDY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NEW ENGLAND STATE POLICE INFORMATION NETWORK, 

(RISS) 

Mr. KENNEDY. Good morning. Chairman Harman and members 

of the subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss efforts in the exchange of homeland security information and initiatives currently under way to leverage existing systems available to criminal justice agencies 

throughout our country. 

As stated by the chairman, I am currently the executive director 

of the New England State Police Information Network, one of the 

six regional information-sharing system centers in the United 

States, otherwise known as RISS. 

14 

Having been a part of law enforcement for the past 33 years, 

first serving 24 years as a member of the Rhode Island State Police 

and now serving as a member of the RISS program for the last 9 

years, I have come to understand first-hand the importance of information sharing across all levels of government. 

Decades before terrorism moved into the forefront, RISS was established to combat crime and enhance public safety. The RISS 

program is a congressionally funded nationwide program supporting state, local, federal and tribal law enforcement, and prosecution efforts, with membership in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, and England. 

The RISS program operates on a national basis, but provides 

support regionally through its six intelligence centers, which support and serve the unique needs of their individual regions. One of 

RISS’s strengths is that each RISS center is governed by a policy 

board consisting of executives representing state, local and tribal 

law enforcement. 

RISS currently provides services to 75,000 access offices representing hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers from 

all government levels. Some of those services that RISS provides 

includes analysis, training, confidential funds, equipment loans, 

and a telecommunications systems we call RISSNET. 

RISSNET was developed in 1997 and is a national system that 

was designed by and for state and local law enforcement. RISSNET 

provides its users with a variety of online resources, which include 

websites, bulleting boards, and intelligence databases that are 

managed and populated by the law enforcement community we 

serve. 

At RISS, we have always be cognizant of the need for communication interoperability between existing law enforcement systems, so much so that in the pat 10 years, RISS has partnered and 

linked our system to numerous other state, local and federal databases, as well as recently providing node connectivity to state fusion centers and intelligence centers throughout the U.S. so that 

data can be shared securely, using the RISS backbone, fusion center to fusion center. 

RISS has worked closely with DEA to develop the national virtual pointer system, which is a national database for narcotics traffickers, along with the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to share 

their GangNet database; and the U.S. Secret Service, who share 

their dignitary protection database with our users, using our node 

connection to RISSNET. 

Continuing with this effort, soon after 9/11, RISS partnered with 

the FBI’s law enforcement online system in an attempt to share 

data between the two systems. This partnership was referenced in 

the global national criminal intelligence sharing plan as systems 

that law enforcement should utilize in their information intelligence sharing using the Internet. 

After 9/11, RISS also approached the Department of Homeland 

Security to partner with their then-JRIES—Joint Regional Intelligence Exchange System. Several meetings were held, and several 

presentations were provided in the hopes that DHS would adopt 

the RISSNET system, or at least utilize some of the law enforcement or first responder resources we provide. For whatever reason, 

15 

that did not come to fruition, and soon after JRIES became the 

Homeland Security Information Network. 

Recently, RISS again approached DHS and HSIN in an effort to 

better share law enforcement first responder documents. This dialogue ahs been quite successful as of late, and thanks to the hard 

work of folks like Theresa Phillips of Homeland Security in the 

HSIN program, we believe that we are closer to completing that 

particular RSS feed from Homeland’s information network to the 

RISS environment. 

But we need to do more. We need to continue the dialogue between systems like RISS, LEO, HSIN and other systems that have 

a public safety mission or nexus. We need to discuss not only the 

sharing of documents, but the need for bidirectional communication 

and the interoperability of these systems so that we can technically 

accomplish what I call a single log-on capability where if I, as a 

HSIN user, would like to get to a RISS or a LEO resource, that 

I can do that without having to log-off from that system and logon to one of those other two systems. 

The time is right for this technical solution to occur. RISS has 

been working very hard and has developed a way in which this will 

work and work successfully. RISS stands ready to meet and discuss 

and work with the policymakers and technical staffs of both DHS 

and DOJ to make this goal a reality. But first we need buy-in by 

the senior leadership of both DOJ and DHS. 

Madam Chairman, I thank you and your colleagues for giving me 

this opportunity to speak with you today. I hope that my comments 

have been of use to you. 

[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD F. KENNEDY

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Chairwoman Harman, and Members of the Subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss efforts in the exchange of homeland security information and 

initiatives currently under way to leverage existing systems available to criminal 

justice agencies in our country. 

I currently serve as the Executive Director of the New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN), one of the six Regional Information Sharing Systems 

(RISS) centers. Prior to being named Executive Director, I served as NESPIN’s Deputy Director of Field Services after retiring as a captain from the Rhode Island 

State Police, having served in all bureaus and divisions within the state police for 

24 years. In my career, I have been afforded the opportunity to actively participate 

in many aspects of law enforcement, from patrol to policymaker. In those roles, I 

have come to understand firsthand the importance of information sharing across all 

levels of government. 

Decades before terrorism moved to the forefront, RISS was established to combat 

crime and enhance public safety. The RISS Program is a congressionally funded, nationwide program supporting local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement and 

prosecution efforts, with membership in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, U.S. 

territories, Australia, Canada, and England. The RISS Program operates on a national basis but provides support regionally through its six regional intelligence centers, which support and serve the unique needs of their individual regions. The six 

RISS centers and the areas which they serve are: 

• Middle Atlantic–Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN): Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Maryland, 

Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, as well as Australia, 

Canada, and England. 

• Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC): Illinois, 

Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 

Wisconsin, as well as Canada. 

16 

• New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN): Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, as 

well as Canada. 

• Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC): Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 

Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, as 

well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 

• Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN): Arizona, Colorado, 

Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as Canada. 

• Western States Information Network (WSIN): Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, as well as Canada and Guam. 

Each RISS center is governed by a policy board or executive committee, composed 

of representatives from member agencies in the center’s multistate region. The RISS 

National Policy Group is composed of the six Directors of the RISS centers and the 

chair of each center’s policy board. The RISS National Policy Group is responsible 

for strategic planning, resolution of operational issues, advancement of information 

sharing, and decision making affecting the six RISS centers, the national organization, service delivery, member agencies, and related partner organizations. 

The RISS Program strives to enhance the ability of criminal justice agencies to 

identify, target, and remove criminal conspiracies and activities spanning multijurisdictional, multistate and, sometimes, international boundaries. RISS facilitates 

rapid exchange and sharing of information among the agencies pertaining to known 

suspected criminals or criminal activity and enhances coordination and communication among agencies that are in pursuit of criminal conspiracies determined to be 

interjurisdictional in nature. 

RISS is a force multiplier in fighting increased violent criminal activity by terrorists, drug traffickers, sophisticated cybercriminals, gangs, and emerging criminal 

groups that require a cooperative effort by local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement. There is an increasing communications sophistication by the criminal 

networks, including terrorists, and a rising presence of organized and mobile narcotics crime. Interagency cooperation in sharing information has proven to be the 

best method to combat this increasing criminal activity. The RISS centers are filling 

law enforcement’s need for rapid, but controlled, sharing of information and intelligence pertaining to known or suspected terrorists and other criminals. Congress 

funded the RISS Program to address this need, as evidenced by its authorization 

in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Part M. 

RISS provides diverse and valuable services and tools directly to detectives and 

investigative units within local, state, regional, federal, and tribal criminal justice 

entities, making RISS a comprehensive and universal program. These services and 

tools include investigative and intelligence analysis, secure national information 

sharing and communications capabilities, specialized investigative equipment, investigative funds support, criminal activity bulletins and publications, training, and 

other investigative support and technical services (Attachment A). 

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) administers the RISS Program and has 

established guidelines for provision of services to member agencies. The RISS centers are subject to oversight, monitoring, and auditing by the U.S. Congress; the 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, a federally funded program evaluation office; the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), BJA; and local and state governmental 

units. BJA also monitors the RISS centers for 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 

Part 23 compliance. The 28 CFR Part 23 regulation emphasizes adherence to individual constitutional and privacy rights and places stricter controls on the RISS intelligence sharing function than those placed on most local, state, or federal agencies. RISS supports and has fully operated in compliance with 28 CFR Part 23 since 

its inception. RISS firmly recognizes the need to ensure that individuals’ constitutional rights, civil liberties, civil rights, and privacy interests are protected throughout the intelligence process. In this regard, RISS officials adopted a RISS Privacy 

Policy to further strengthen their commitment and support of 28 CFR Part 23 and 

protection of individual privacy rights. 

RISS has served as a pioneer, forging the way for today’s information sharing age. 

In 1997, through funding from Congress, RISS implemented and continues to operate the secure Web-based nationwide law enforcement network known as RISSNET. 

RISSNET offers state-of-the-art technology to address and support law enforcement 

demands for rapid communication and sharing of information. RISSNET provides 

the communications backbone and infrastructure for sharing investigative and intelligence information, offers secure sensitive but unclassified electronic communications, and provides controlled access to a variety of sensitive information resources. 

Currently, RISS serves over 7,700 law enforcement and criminal justice agencies 

from all levels of government. Over 75,000 access officers, representing hundreds of 

17 

thousands of law enforcement officers from all government levels, are able to access 

the databases of six regional RISS centers and other intelligence systems from a single query—member agencies have bidirectional access to a number of state, regional, 

federal, and specialized criminal intelligence systems electronically connected to 

RISSNET. Examples of agencies connected to RISSNET include the Clandestine 

Laboratory Seizure System at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC); the National 

Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX); the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) Database; the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C); Nlets—The International 

Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network; the California Department 

of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Database; the Criminal Information 

Sharing Alliance network (CISAnet); the Oregon State Intelligence Network; the 

Utah Law Enforcement Information Network; the Wyoming Criminal Justice Information Network; and the Colorado Law Enforcement Intelligence Network. The Executive Office for United States Attorneys has also connected staff to RISSNET, as 

well as all of the 93 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices Anti-Terrorism Task Forces throughout 

the United States. In addition, staff at DOJ, Criminal Division, have connected to 

RISSNET. 

In this world of rapidly changing technology and with the increased need to provide timely, accurate, and complete information to law enforcement and public safety professionals, the ability to connect critical systems and streamline the ability to 

house, share, inquire, and disseminate information and intelligence is paramount. 

Through RISS’s trusted system, the ability for law enforcement to target, investigate, and prosecute crime continuously improves. RISS also provides valuable collaboration with others who have experienced similar crime problems or who are investigating the same or similar crime. 

RISS has also entered into a partnership with the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) to electronically connect all of the HIDTAs to RISSNET for 

communications and information sharing. Currently, 18 HIDTAs are electronically 

connected as nodes to RISSNET. RISS is working to complete the connection of the 

remaining HIDTAs. RISS has partnered with the HIDTAs and Nlets to create the 

National Virtual Pointer System (NVPS). The NVPS, which became operational in 

June 2004, is an automated system that connects existing deconfliction pointer databases into one virtual pointer system. RISS has also developed an officer safety 

deconfliction system, RISSafe, to be accessible by member agencies for the purpose 

of identifying potential conflict in operational cases. 

RISS has emerged as one of the nation’s most important law enforcement intelligence sharing networks and continues to support efforts to expand and improve 

information sharing. The partnerships RISS has formed with fellow criminal justice 

and public safety agencies has allowed for this unprecedented level of information 

and intelligence to be exchanged through RISSNET. As a result, it is critical to ensure that the information is secure and available only to those with authorized access. RISSNET protects information through use of encryption, smart cards, Internet protocol security standards, and firewalls to prevent unauthorized access. The 

criminal intelligence information accessed through RISSNET is controlled by its 

local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement member agency owners. The technical architecture adopted by RISS requires proper authorization to access information but also provides flexibility in the levels of electronic access assigned to individual users based on security and need-to-know issues. RISSNET supports secure 

e-mail and is easily accessible using the Internet. This type system and architecture 

is referenced and recommended in the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) 

and is endorsed by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). 

The NCISP represents law enforcement’s commitment to ensure that the ‘‘dots are 

connected,’’ be it in crime or terrorism. The Plan supports collaboration and fosters 

an environment in which all levels of law enforcement can work together to improve 

the safety of the nation. The Plan is the outcome of an unprecedented effort by local, 

state, federal, and tribal law enforcement officials at all levels, with the strong support of DOJ, to strengthen the nation’s security through better intelligence analysis 

and sharing. 

The NCISP provides in Recommendation 21 that RISS and the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Online (LEO) systems, which interconnected September 1, 2002, as a virtual single system, shall provide the initial 

sensitive but unclassified secure communications backbone for implementation of a 

nationwide criminal intelligence sharing capability. In addition to providing secure 

communications, the RISS Program has embraced and integrated many of the recommendations contained in the NCISP. For example, RISS is developing a security 

architecture solution to allow users with various types of security credentials to connect and traverse RISSNET to share information and access resources without being 

required to use the RISS specific security credentials. This project, known as the 

18 

Trusted Credential Project, will promote interoperable connectivity among information sharing systems, allow bidirectional sharing, and enhance critical information 

exchange. 

RISS is also embarking on an initiative to streamline the process for RISS users 

to access RISSNET resources. Known as the RISSNET Portal, it will provide users 

with one entry point for RISSNET, allowing them to instantly view and access all 

RISSNET resources from one location. In addition, RISS is moving to an industry 

standards-based SSL authentication technology. SSL technology is a mature technology for the transmission of encrypted information and is supported by all major 

Internet browsers. These three initiatives—the Trusted Credential Project, 

RISSNET Portal, and SSL—will work in unison and represent the natural next 

steps for enhancing RISS technology and service to its members. 

In the aftermath of 9/11, RISS recognized the critical need for timely exchange 

of national security and terrorist threat information, not only among law enforcement officials but to all first responders and officials involved in homeland security. 

As a result, RISS created the Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX). 

ATIX is a communication system that allows first responders, critical infrastructure 

personnel, and other public safety personnel—including firefighters and public utility and school personnel and local, state, and federal law enforcement—to share terrorism and homeland security information in a secure, real-time environment. 

Through ATIX, users access the RISS ATIX Web pages and library, the ATIX bulletin board, ATIXLive, and secure e-mail. 

In its first year of connectivity, ATIX was selected as the official system for secure 

communication and information sharing for the G8 Summit in 2004 by the team in 

charge of security and communications, which included the FBI, the U.S. Secret 

Service, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia Office of Homeland Security, and the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Group. In 2005, the ability 

for ATIX to be successfully utilized in the aftermath of a disaster was demonstrated 

when it served as a communication tool following Hurricane Katrina. RISS provided 

logistical support to law enforcement in the damaged areas to receive water, clothing, food, medical supplies, information, and equipment. In addition, RISS prepared 

intelligence assessments on gang and criminal activity, which aided law enforcement response following the hurricane. In 2006, ATIX demonstrated its communications power during a plane crash incident in Delaware, when a C–5 cargo plane, 

laden with supplies for U.S. troops in Iraq, crashed after takeoff from Dover Air 

Force Base. The Delaware Information Analysis Center (DIAC), through its use of 

ATIX, communicated the incident to appropriate officials and personnel ten minutes 

prior to media reports of the incident. This allowed law enforcement and first responders to coordinate efforts, assess the situation, and secure the scene. And today, 

some state homeland security offices, such as DIAC, use ATIX to communicate critical information on a daily basis. In Delaware, more than 100 users across 21 discipline communities involved in their multijurisdictional, multiagency response to 

all crimes and all hazards utilize ATIX as a primary tool to communicate on a daily 

basis. 

In the months following the creation and deployment of ATIX, RISS reached out 

to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies to 

offer the infrastructure support and services available through RISSNET. It was 

also during this time that DHS was transitioning from the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) to the Homeland Security Information Network 

(HSIN) as a means of expanding to include more communities. In July 2005, at the 

culmination of numerous briefings and meetings, an executive meeting was held to 

discuss interoperability and interconnection of the JRIES/HSIN, RISS, and LEO. At 

that time, a joint decision was made by policymakers from RISS, DOJ, DHS, and 

FBI to demonstrate interoperability of the systems within a short time frame of 60 

days. The parties collaborated to produce a technical white paper describing the information sharing project and a memorandum of understanding. The ultimate goal 

of this project was to quickly demonstrate the capability to create a seamless connection between systems, permitting users of the individual systems to access 

unique tools, resources, and capabilities of all the systems through the current access method. 

Although not all the aspects of this initiative came to fruition, RISS and DHS still 

created an information sharing partnership. During the past two years, RISS has 

continued to work with DOJ and DHS on what has evolved into the Counterterrorism Collaboration Interoperability Project (CCIP). CCIP is a partnership among 

RISS, HSIN, LEO, and CISAnet that allows the participating partner systems to 

publish documents for access by authorized users of the other participating partners? systems via the use of Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds. This project has 

been recognized as a model for all agencies that will share information, as required 

19 

by Presidential Executive Order 13388, Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans. 

While significant strides have been made in the implementation of the CCIP, 

much work still remains. For example, a disruption in the RSS feeds from HSIN 

to RISSNET has resulted in a daily search effort by RISS technical staff to access 

documents posted on the HSIN Law Enforcement and HSIN Emergency Management sites. Through the limited access that RISS has been granted to HSIN, a concerted effort is made to identify and retrieve information available on HSIN, which 

could be provided automatically through RSS feeds, and post this information on 

ATIX for access by thousands of users. 

In addition to the CCIP, RISS is also involved in other critical initiatives with federal agencies to assist in their efforts to facilitate the exchange of criminal intelligence with local and state law enforcement. As the only nonfederal agency or organization involved in the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Program (LEISP), 

RISS has the unique opportunity to participate in the this critical initiative with 

DHS and DOJ to demonstrate applicability of federated identity management as a 

tool to enhance information sharing. In addition, RISS has been invited to participate in a Secure But Unclassified (SBU) Networks/Systems Collaboration Effort initiative from the Information Sharing Council, tasked to the Program Manager—Information Sharing Environment. This effort is focused on sharing SBU terrorism information and identifying capabilities necessary for a SBU Network/System to be included in the Information Sharing Environment. RISS is pleased to receive these 

invitations, have the opportunity to assist in the development of national strategies 

for information sharing, and be recognized for its significant role in advocating for 

local and state agencies who depend on RISSNET as a system of systems for information sharing. 

Local and state law enforcement, which depend on the RISS centers, must be leveraged and included in an information sharing plan. The more than 800,000 law 

enforcement officers and over 19,000 police agencies in this country are part of the 

frontline defense in domestic security. Important intelligence/information that may 

forewarn of a future attack is collected by local and state government personnel 

through their routine activities. The critical importance of intelligence for frontline 

police officers cannot be overstated. And without the benefit of intelligence, local 

and state law enforcement cannot be expected to be active partners in protecting 

our communities from terrorism. The RISS Program aims to represent these frontline officers in the quest for increased terrorism information sharing in our nation 

and strives to provide a platform for all areas of homeland security to work together 

to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist activities and to improve the safety of our nation. As demand from citizens continues to increase for the country to be ready and 

prepared and funds continue to tighten, it will be critical to leverage available resources and expertise. 

The ultimate goal of RISS is to develop and enhance bidirectional systems access 

and provide secure real-time information, enabling all participants to share information to enhance the investigative process, in furtherance of recommendations in the 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. Having a trusted sharing environment 

for communicating information and intelligence is a priority issue. There are a number of national systems and networks that local, state, and tribal law enforcement 

agencies utilize for information sharing efforts, including RISS, LEO, and HSIN. 

Each of these systems offers unique resources and provides essential information to 

its primary users. However, the power of these systems linked is exemplary of the 

whole being greater than the sum of its parts. A true success would be the creation 

of a ‘‘system of systems’’ that is accessible by hundreds of thousands of criminal justice and homeland security officials, as well as first responders and private sector 

partners who aid our country in the battle against terrorism. 

Currently, users must sign on to multiple systems in order to access information. 

Rather than develop new systems, it is recommended that the existing networks and 

systems be modified and augmented based on continuing information needs. The 

federal government should provide the funding needed to leverage existing information sharing systems and expand intelligence sharing by executing interoperability 

between operating systems at the local, state, regional, federal, and tribal levels 

using a federated identification methodology. Local, state, and tribal users should 

be able to access all pertinent information from disparate systems with a single 

sign-on, based on the user’s classification level and need to know. 

In order to succeed, we must bridge the remaining gaps between local, state, and 

federal intelligence agencies and homeland security information consumers. If we 

are to continue to successfully deter and prevent attacks, we must work as one 

united force to combat all crimes. 

20 

Over the last few years, RISS has seen increased interest by individuals, agencies, 

and organizations to use RISSNET as their primary communications system and to 

partner with RISS on a variety of critical projects and initiatives. RISS is eager to 

meet this demand and continually partners with law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to fully develop an efficient and effective information sharing environment. However, this demand is draining RISS’s resources, and additional funds are 

needed to ensure that law enforcement and the criminal justice community continue 

to improve both their information sharing and investigative capabilities in order to 

most effectively protect public safety. 

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, RISS was appropriated $39.719 million, the same level 

appropriated in fiscal year 2006. For fiscal year 2008, the President’s Budget includes $38.5 million, $1.219 million less than the fiscal year 2007 appropriation. 

Based on the needs of local and state law enforcement throughout the country, as 

well as the demand for increased safeguarding against terrorism, gangs, violent 

crimes, and other critical crime problems, RISS has requested $53.7 million. 

To combat crime, there must be continued funding support to programs like RISS, 

which have demonstrated decades of success in fighting crime, advancing technology, and enhancing officer safety. Through this strategy, we can maximize available funding, eliminate duplication, and accomplish more with less. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and your colleagues for giving me the opportunity to 

speak to you today, and I hope my comments have been of some use to you in your 

deliberations. 

ATTACHMENT A: The Regional Information Sharing Systems 

Each RISS center offers basic services to member agencies. Traditional services 

include information sharing, analysis, telecommunications, equipment loans, confidential funds, training, and technical assistance. 

• Information Sharing—The operation of RISSNET and its various applications enhances information sharing and communications among RISS members 

by providing various secure databases and investigative tools. Each RISS center 

develops and provides access to specialized information sharing systems for use 

by its member agencies. 

• Analysis—RISS center personnel create analytical products for investigative 

and prosecutorial use. RISS develops flowcharts, link-analysis charts, crime 

scene diagrams, telephone toll analysis reports, and financial analysis reports 

and provides computer forensics analysis. Staff also provide video and audio enhancement services. 

• Investigative Support—Each center maintains a staff of intelligence technicians that support member agencies with a variety of investigative assistance. 

Staff conduct database searches, utilize all RISS applications, and process batch 

uploads. Intelligence technicians respond to thousands of requests and questions. 

• Field Operations—Centers maintain field service coordinators who dedicate 

their time visiting and liaising with RISS member agencies to coordinate delivery of RISS services. This personal interaction with member agencies significantly improves information sharing and ensures that member agencies are provided quality and timely service. 

• Telecommunications—RISSNET is the communications backbone that supports electronic access and exchange of information by RISS users. The network 

provides a secure platform for communications, as well as access to various 

state and federal intelligence systems across the country. RISSNET provides 

member agencies with a secure, rapid means to access RISS resources. In addition to RISSNET, several RISS centers operate long-distance telecommunications, or WATS services, to facilitate toll-free contact between RISS member 

agencies working jointly on investigations. 

• Equipment Loans—Pools of specialized and surveillance equipment are 

available for loan to member agencies for use in support of multijurisdictional 

investigations. 

• Confidential Funds—Member agencies can use funds to purchase information, contraband, stolen property, and other items of an evidentiary nature or 

to provide for other investigative expenses related to multijurisdictional investigations. The availability and use of confidential funds are strictly controlled 

by federal guidelines, and internal policies and procedures are developed by 

each center. 

• Training and Publications—RISS centers sponsor or cosponsor meetings 

and conferences that build investigative expertise for member agency personnel. 

Subject areas include anti-terrorism, crime-specific investigative and surveillance techniques, specialized equipment, officer safety, and analytical techVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:59 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-34\48909.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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niques. In addition, each center researches, develops, and distributes numerous 

publications, such as bulletins, flyers, and criminal intelligence publications. 

Centers also offer additional services based on regional and member agency needs. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the witness. 

We will now hear from our final witness, Mr. Parent. 

Let me say that votes are expected soon. Hopefully, we will get 

through all the testimony. If there is more time before the votes 

are called, it is my intention—and I hope all the members will 

agree with this—to ask the godfather of this hearing, Mr. Langevin, to ask the first questions. 

Mr. Parent, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WAYNE PARENT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PARENT. Good morning, Madam Chairman, members of the 

subcommittee. I am Wayne Parent, the deputy director of the Office of Operations Coordination at the Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the Homeland Security Information 

Network and to provide an update on the department’s continuing 

efforts to improve information sharing with HSIN. 

Before I begin my testimony, I would like to thank Congresswoman Harman for all of her efforts on information sharing. I 

know that you have been active in this arena for years, working 

to ensure efficient and timely vertical and horizontal information 

sharing. I look forward to working with you and the members of 

the subcommittee on a path forward for HSIN. 

The DHS mission requires a robust information-sharing environment. Assorted efforts have been under way to connect the department with our stakeholders, the state, local, and tribal entities, the 

private sector and other federal partners. One of the most important tools DHS has to facilitate information sharing in the sensitive-but-unclassified environment is HSIN. 

Although various issues have at times hampered the effectiveness and the use of HSIN, it remains an important tool in the fulfillment of the department’s mission. Previously released GAO and 

DHS inspector general reports have called attention to many shortcomings, and action has been taken by the Office of Operations Coordination to address many of these recommendations. I have included specifics on those actions in my written testimony, but I 

would like to address just a few of the improvements that have 

been made to HSIN over the past year. 

In response to concerns expressed by the DHS IG, the GAO and 

this subcommittee, we have instituted a strategy for the management of HSIN, as well as a requirements evaluation process. These 

are key elements of any program, but previously missing in HSIN. 

Many of the previous criticisms of HSIN have centered on poor 

communication with stakeholders. We have established the HSIN 

Mission Coordination Council, or HMCC, to work HSIN issues 

within DHS. For stakeholders outside of DHS, just this week we 

released a solicitation for members to the HSIN Advisory Council, 

which will be a key body for collecting state, local and private-secVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:59 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-34\48909.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
22 

tor issues and recommendations. The first meeting of the HSIN Advisory Council will be held in August of this year. 

Within the last month, we have hired a person to engage fulltime on issues pertaining to the information-sharing environment. 

This will ensure that HSIN stays aligned with the efforts and recommendations of the ISE. In addition, this person will spearhead 

an effort to measure content quality within the key communities of 

HSIN. 

The National Operations Center carries the DHS common operating picture on HSIN. This common operating picture, or COP, 

which was fielded last year in response to Hurricane Katrina lessons learned, is a key element of national incident management 

and provides critical situational awareness for stakeholders and 

DHS leadership during an incident. It includes pre-incident, obviously. 

The COP has recently been upgraded to include the integrated 

common analytic viewer, or iCAV, a state-of-the-art GIS mapping 

package that has been strongly desired by our stakeholders going 

back several years in the state, local and private sectors. It is a 

good system. Within incident management, HSIN is the information-sharing tool that brings all of the DHS components and external partners together to maximize situational awareness and support decisionmaking. 

Finally, we know that a system must be user-friendly, and HSIN 

has not enjoyed that evaluation. We have worked to improve customer service by establishing a single sign-on mechanism within 

HSIN, and also increasing the loading capability to prevent slowdowns on system time, and in also developing a more focused 

stakeholder outreach program. 

This program also includes the addition of an automated feedback process, or feedback button, on the user portals which never 

existed previously. This system will be operational in August 2007. 

I think it is important for me to state that DHS is committed to 

integrating HSIN with other interagency information-sharing systems. Our intent is for HSIN to leverage existing platforms designed to share information in order to increase information-sharing efficiency among our partner organizations and their existing 

systems. Our HSIN strategy is not to duplicate capability that already exists, but to leverage existing capability. 

With the HSIN Joint Program Management Office and our new 

program manager, we are pushing ahead to ensure the ability and 

capability of HSIN to get relevant information to and from our 

stakeholders in a more increasing manner. As we look to the future, we will continue the pattern of recent program enhancements 

and outreach efforts. We recognize that work must continue to ensure increasing connectivity and interoperability with all of our 

DHS partners. We are committed. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Parent follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WAYNE PARENT

Good morning, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I am Wayne Parent, Deputy Director of the Office of Operations Coordination at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am pleased to apVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:59 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-34\48909.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
23 

pear today before this Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me today to discuss 

the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and to provide an update on 

the Department’s continuing efforts to improve information sharing and HSIN. 

The DHS mission demands a robust information sharing environment. Key to addressing information sharing requirements is the ability to share information both 

vertically and horizontally. Assorted efforts are underway to connect the Department with our stakeholders: state, local, and tribal entities, the private sector and 

other federal partners. One of the most important tools DHS has to maximize information sharing in the sensitive but unclassified environment is HSIN. 

Background 

As you are aware, HSIN is a set of commercially secure web-based portals 

through which DHS provides real-time operation information and decision support, 

shares documents, supplies situational awareness and collaboration opportunities, 

and provides alerts, warnings and notifications. HSIN operates at the Sensitive– 

But–Unclassified (SBU) level from which threat and incident management information is collected and shared between all levels of government. 

Although complex issues have, at times, hampered the effectiveness and use of 

HSIN, it remains an important tool in the fulfillment of the Department’s mission. 

Previously released GAO and DHS Inspector General Reports have called attention 

to certain shortcomings, and action has been taken by the Office of Operations Coordination to address their various recommendations. Specifically, in response to 

these shortcomings, Operations has, among other efforts: 

• Improved Management 

In November 2006, our office hired the first Program Manager (PM) for HSIN 

and stood up a Joint Program Management Office (JPMO). Since starting, the 

PM has created integrated project teams to establish programmatic discipline 

and to systematically address the network’s development and use. The PM has 

initiated formal assessments of the system’s vulnerabilities, redundancy, survivability and training. Additionally, the PM has identified key performance measures to gain a better understanding of the network’s operation and use and 

guide future improvements. Of note, the PM initiated and completed an extensive review of HSIN, which I will discuss in more detail today. The review resulted in the creation of a HSIN Strategic Framework Implementation Plan. 

• Assessed the Policy and Strategy Framework for HSIN 

In October of 2006, the Office of Operations Coordination stood up the HSIN 

Working Group which conducted an internal review of HSIN and issued a final 

report that provided recommendations to DHS leadership on the required actions or decisions to make HSIN a more effective and efficient program. The 

working group was comprised of representatives from various DHS components. 

Key recommendations were: 

(1) Establish clearly defined requirements processes; 

(2) Develop HSIN into a capable information sharing, communication, and collaboration solution; 

(3) Identify the user and technical requirements of HSIN; and 

(4) Develop metrics to periodically assess the program 

These recommendations formed the basis of the HSIN Strategic Framework Implementation Plan that was finalized in December 2006. 

• Created the framework for the HSIN Mission Coordinating Committee 

(HMCC) 

The HMCC consists of DHS mission component representatives who plan to or 

are currently utilizing HSIN to support their operation mission requirements. 

The goal of the HMCC is to identify and validate operational enhancements to 

HSIN that are critical to the successful accomplishment of the mission of DHS 

components and the external partners they represent. Through these efforts, we 

can plan for a prioritized delivery of solutions that meet mission-operational 

needs. 

• Create the HSIN Advisory Committee (HSINAC) 

A Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) compliant advisory committee is 

being formed to provide independent advice and recommendations to DHS leadership, particularly the Office of Operations Coordination Director, on HSIN requirements of end users within State, Local, Federal and Tribal governments 

and the Private Sector. 

The advisory committee efforts will initially focus on: operational requirements 

necessary for effective information sharing and incident management; compatibility and interoperability between HSIN and other relevant information networks, databases, and resources of State, Local, Federal, Tribal, and Private 

24 

Sector entities; and the security, integrity, and safety of HSIN resources and 

contents. 

The Federal Register notice announcing the formation of the HSINAC was posted on October 20, 2006. The Federal Register notice soliciting members for the 

committee was published earlier this week. Our goal is to have our first meeting of the advisory committee this summer. 

Interagency Integration 

The Office of Operations Coordination is committed to integrating HSIN with 

other interagency information sharing systems. The intent is for HSIN to leverage existing platforms designed to share information so as to increase information sharing efficiency among partnership organizations and their existing systems. As such, we are working to establish a technical means to seamlessly utilize information resident on other platforms. This enables HSIN to both serve 

the internal needs of DHS missions, while also addressing the convergence of 

DHS missions with those of other agencies. 

Some of our current initiatives focused on interagency integration include: 

Reestablish Connection between HSIN and RISS 

The initiative to reconnect the technological bridge between the HSIN and the 

Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) is nearing completion. In June 

2006, when HSIN completed a technology refresher that moved HSIN from the 

old JRIES technology platform to its current platform, the bridge was inadvertently severed and not reconnected. Reconnecting this bridge will allow pre-defined information to automatically flow back and forth between the two systems. 

Additionally, the original agreement between HSIN and RISS only allowed for 

very narrowly defined information to be passed between the systems. This definition mandated that the content be specifically identified as terrorism information. We are working to incorporate a more liberal, flexible definition such as 

suspicious activity that may later be deemed terrorist related. The expansion 

of content will enhance information delivery over a single platform; maximizing 

the usefulness of both systems. 

Intelink-U 

HSIN will provide a link to Intelink-Unclassified, affording access to the content 

and contacts available on this online compendium of resources. Intelink-U is wellused content repository. This enhancement will provide a broad range of relevant 

information to HSIN users who may not have another way to access this valuable 

resource. 

Federated Identity Management 

The JPMO is actively involved in an Office of the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM–ISE)-sponsored, Department of Justice-led pilot 

project for Federated Identity Management. Federated identity management is 

a systematic effort to create a single sign-on for multiple secure websites. Our 

office understands the long-term possibilities and benefits of this pilot and is 

committed to the effort. 

Federated identity management will allow authorized HSIN users to seamlessly 

traverse other participating programs’ systems, gaining access to content and 

tools that are not available on HSIN. It will also permit other authorized system members to gain access to the tools and content on HSIN. This is a significant step in the direction of eliminating duplication and maximizing existing 

systems across the entire landscape of the ISE. HSIN, Law Enforcement Online 

(LEO), and RISS are all participants in this groundbreaking pilot. Once identity 

management has been federated—including federation to the state fusion centers and critical infrastructure Sector Coordinating Councils—it will provide a 

basis for such advanced capabilities as fine-grained dissemination control based 

on the recipient’s identity, role, and organizations/communities to which the recipient belongs. 

Data Exchange Hub 

The Office of Operations Coordination is working towards an initial operating 

capability between HSIN and a Data Exchange Hub (DEH) that connects the 

National Capital Region’s emergency management systems. The DEH will enable a two-way transfer of information between multiple reporting systems 

within the NCR (to include WebEOC) with HSIN. The success of this initiative 

is expected to result in a repeatable process that can be used throughout the 

nation to connect HSIN to emergency operation centers that use different communication platforms. 

25 

HSIN Utilization 

Over the past nine months, numerous improvements and enhancements to HSIN 

have been made and I believe it has the potential become the information sharing 

and situational awareness tool it was envisioned to be. For instance, DHS National 

Operations Center (NOC) notifications, which alert leadership and key stakeholders 

when incidents occur, are posted on HSIN through the COP. Additionally, HSIN 

supports the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by becoming the primary national hub for communications and information during major domestic incidents. 

An increased number of DHS components are now using HSIN extensively in the 

execution of their mission. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

has integrated the tool in all emergency management coordination and has conducted extensive training across the nation. The United States Coast Guard has 

begun to use the tool as its primary coordination tool for exercises and missions that 

require large-scale, real-time collaboration. In addition, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has constructed collaboration space for each of its 27 border patrol sectors to enhance seamless information flow and situational awareness. Data currently shows that CBP is making daily use of this tool. 

HSIN is also an important tool for information sharing between state, local, tribal, 

and private sector communities. The network is also actively embraced by state and 

local fusion centers across the country, many of which have created their own customized portals. For example, in the State of Tennessee, the Director of the Office 

of Homeland Security has cited HSIN as the backbone of its new state fusion center 

and recommended that all states adopt the network for information sharing and situational awareness. As I believe you will hear from additional testimony today, The 

State of Florida is also an active user of the system. 

One of the most valuable tools on HSIN is the Common Operating Picture. HSIN 

and COP will be increasingly relied upon as the Department continues with a number of important initiatives, in particular, interagency planning and exercises. The 

COP is a real-time, web-based situational awareness tool that ties together key 

homeland security partners primarily at the federal, state, and Joint Federal Official (JFO) levels. It is designed to: • Provide a common view of critical information during a crisis in order to enhance situational awareness; 

• Support sound, timely, risk mitigated and informed decision making by providing a shared understanding of the situation; 

• Provide the inter-agency with the capability to share critical information; • Provide information integrity for reporting requirements; and • Support a geospatial mapping feature known as iCAV—the infrastructure 

critical asset viewer—that can overlay events such as hurricanes onto critical 

infrastructure assets. 

The COP was initially deployed during Hurricane Season 2006. As such, the focus 

of the early iterations of the COP was on natural disaster information. Currently, 

as part of our incremental approach, we are advancing the COP capabilities from 

natural disasters to all hazards and all threats. These steps will advance the COP 

capabilities from unclassified, hurricanes/natural disasters to classified, terrorist 

threats and incidents. The current focus is to develop a COP template for the ‘‘worse 

case’’ scenario for nuclear/radiological incidents and will use national exercises such 

as Ardent Sentry and real world events to validate and continue this development. 

While initially focused on integrating natural disaster information, DHS activated 

the COP for several non-natural disaster incidents, including the liquid explosive 

airline plot in the UK and the private airplane crash in New York City. 

Additionally, the National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) utilizes the 

HSIN-Critical Sectors (HSIN–CS) portal to share information about the nation’s infrastructure with private sector stakeholders. DHS has designated HSIN–CS to be 

its primary information-sharing platform between the Critical Infrastructure/Key 

Resource sectors. HSIN–CS enables DHS and the critical sector stakeholders to 

communicate, coordinate, and share information. Through HSIN–CS, users are able 

to: 

• Receive, submit, and discuss timely, actionable, and accurate information; 

• Communicate information pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, security, response and recovery activities affecting sector and cross sector operations; and 

• Maintain a direct, trusted channel with DHS and other vetted sector stakeholders 

The primary objectives of HSIN–CS are to generate effective risk management decisions, and to encourage collaboration and coordination on plans, strategies, protective measures, and response/recovery efforts between government, operators, and 

owners. 

26 

HSIN’s Way Ahead 

Building on HSIN successes, lessons learned, and various recommendations from 

outside review, the Joint Program Management Office is pushing ahead to ensure 

that we get relevant information to more of our stakeholders more of the time. As 

we look to the future, we will continue the recent program enhancements and outreach efforts. Additionally, system enhancement will continue by examining and 

taking action on additional measures. The JPMO will: 

• Assess, and act upon, results from metrics designed to measure a number of 

aspects of the overall program regarding the effectiveness of information sharing across HSIN. Some areas to be assessed include: the number of users, timeliness of information posted, response times for requests for information, numbers of outstanding and closed action items, and comments posted through the 

system feedback mechanism. 

• Ensure DHS components become more involved in the development of HSIN 

capabilities, articulate their mission needs as well as the needs of the external 

partners they sponsor, create a governance structure within their mission areas 

with regard to HSIN use, and become active participants in shaping the future 

of the program; 

• Evaluate advanced information technologies for incorporation into HSIN such 

as tools for multi-party real-time collaboration/co-authoring and fine-grained 

dissemination and user access control to sensitive information products. 

• Work with the PM–ISE and the Information Sharing Council to improve business processes and contribute to an Information Sharing Environment that 

eliminates current ‘‘stove-pipes’’ between programs; 

T3Conclusion 

HSIN plays an important role in the information sharing mission of DHS. Additionally, it is critical that all agencies and components are able to monitor HSIN/COP 

for up-to-date event/threat information when notified via NOC Notification. 

HSIN is the information sharing tool that brings together all DHS components and 

external partners to maximize situational awareness. 

Without HSIN, the ability of the Department to share information would be degraded. 

Work needs to continue to ensure there is robust connectivity and interoperability 

with all DHS partners. This is an obtainable goal that will be achieved through methodical, thoughtful collaboration and planning. 

HSIN, in conjunction with the COP, is becoming the Department’s solution to address the ever-growing need to gather, assess, and share information critical to the 

Department’s overall mission. 

Finally, as we improve the HSIN technology and core functionality, we will focus 

on customer involvement and user satisfaction. Our goal is to improve overall collaboration and situational awareness among Federal, State, Local, and private industry partners. 

HSIN is playing a critical role in the Ardent Sentry and Pinnacle exercises that 

are currently underway. In these instances, HSIN and the COP are being utilized 

for situational awareness and information sharing. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify today and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the witness. He is in a tough position on 

this panel. I do appreciate the fact that you see this as a collaboration. We do want to be your partners in fixing the problem. That 

is our goal. 

I now recognize our colleague, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes of 

questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to thank the panel for being here. 

Before I begin with my questions, I just want to thank you, 

Madam Chair, for holding this hearing and for focusing on this 

issue, which is of great importance. 

It is worth noting that the chair until just recently served for a 

number of years on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and served for most of that time as ranking member of 

27 

the Intelligence Committee. There is not a person in the Congress 

who understands the importance of good intelligence more than 

Congresswoman Harman. 

On that, you and I are in lock-step. Again, I thank you. It is no 

surprise that you would be holding this hearing so early as chair 

of this subcommittee. It is a great service to the country, and I appreciate it. 

I also, again, want to thank the panel. 

Ms. HARMAN. We won’t take that out of your time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

[Laughter.] 

I want to thank the panel for being here. 

Mr. Powner, thank you for issuing and conducting this very important report. GAO is to be commended. You are focusing on 

issues that I have tried to raise now for a number of years. In particular, Don Kennedy and I have had the opportunity to speak on 

several occasions, going back over a number of years. 

Again, I thank you all for being here. 

I know that the focus of the hearing is moving past the missteps, 

but I think a certain amount of history is necessary here for context. In March of 2002, when I was first briefed by Mr. Kennedy 

and his team, about the RISS program, and actually went to RISS 

in Massachusetts and saw it first-hand for myself. I was certainly 

impressed with its information-sharing capabilities. I thought it 

could be the backbone for a national information-sharing network 

for the homeland security of the nation. 

In September of that year, I met with Tom Ridge, then secretary, 

or actually director of homeland security—later to be secretary—to 

recommend that RISS be used as a tool for the federal government 

to disseminate information for first responders and law enforcement. He seemed receptive and said he would look into it. 

Later in July of 2003 at a Homeland Security Intelligence Subcommittee hearing, I informed Bill Parrish, DHS’s acting assistant 

secretary for information analysis, about my meeting with Secretary Ridge, and asked for an update of how DHS was working 

with RISS. In the 4 years since then, I have discussed RISS numerous times with DHS officials, so its existence and capabilities 

should not be a surprise at all to DHS. 

Given that history, I was extremely frustrated to read Mr. 

Powner’s report, and learn not only that HSIN and RISSNET are 

not fully interoperable, but also that they are in many cases duplicative. It is certainly not a surprise to me. We have spent tens of 

millions of taxpayer dollars to create HSIN, yet it falls far short of 

what it should accomplish. 

Now, I know that Mr. Parent cannot speak to some of the mistakes that were made before his tenure, but I have to ask why 

DHS did not make it a priority from day one to ensure that HSIN 

would be fully compatible with RISSNET and other information 

sharing networks. 

My second question for Mr. Kennedy, RISS has been in existence 

since 1974, and reaches more than 7,500 law enforcement and 

criminal justice agencies. I would like to just have you take a few 

minutes to describe how and why RISS has been such a success. 

So with that, Mr. Parent? 

28 

Mr. PARENT. Yes, sir. What I can give you is the history of the 

relationship between RISS and HSIN, as I know it, and I am very 

certain it is correct. There was a relationship that resulted in a 

technological connection between RISS and HSIN that occurred 

sometime within the dates that you talked about and last June 

2006. Last June 2006, which is about the time that my involvement 

with RISS and HSIN, and my involvement with HSIN goes back 

a little bit further, that connection was severed when HSIN went 

through an upgrade process in 2006. So that is the first point that 

the present group of people had to look at that issue. 

We are now re-fixing that technological connection between RISS 

and HSIN that Mr. Kennedy talked about, but I would also like to 

emphasize what he said which is that is only the first step. That 

is, in essence, a gateway that will allow documents to flow back 

and forth between the two systems. But I think we both have a bigger expectation of what this is going to go than just documents 

going back and forth. 

We have identified that the previous technological connection 

was very restrictive in terms of what documents went back and 

forth between the two systems. Our goal at this time is to open 

that conduit up substantially. But I think this is the beginning of 

a new relationship, or certainly a much better relationship. That is 

what I know about the history. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Congressman Langevin. 

To answer your question, I believe that the success of RISS lies 

in the fact that we are run by state and local and tribal law enforcement. We are funded through the federal government, but our 

executive policy boards are the colonels and the chiefs of police that 

we serve throughout the United States. 

I also believe that it is that regionality that we have, that actually we work with our users and we are user-driven. So if we have 

a system, we don’t just give them a system; we sit our members 

down in a group and ask them for their input as to what they 

would like in a system, and then that is how we developed 

RISSNET. 

Whatever program that we do or whatever service we provide, 

whether it be camera equipment or to develop a database for them, 

it is for the users, and they are the ones that usually come to us, 

and we try to provide them with that service. 

But I think the most important thing is that we are not in competition with any agency, whether it be state, local or federal. I am 

sorry. We are not in competition with any agency or system. We 

are like Switzerland. We want to get along with everyone. We believe that if our members have a need for information, wherever it 

resides, that we at RISS have to find a way through interoperability with systems like HSIN and LEO to get that information to 

our members, because it is bi-directional. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. My time has expired. 

I thank the chair for her indulgence, and thank you for your testimony. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

We will now move to Mr. Perlmutter. We are sort of recognizing 

people in the order of arrival, and then Mr. Carney. 

29 

There will be a long recess for about six votes or so. It is coming 

up shortly. Hopefully, all three of you can ask your questions before we do that recess. And then what I think I might do, if it 

works out that way, is forego my own questions. I think you have 

all heard from me. And we will move to our next panel after the 

recess. 

Mr. Perlmutter, 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Just thinking about this over the last few days, there are different kinds of approaches here, if I understand it correctly. The 

HSIN system is a centralized system where there is somebody at 

the top. The RISS system is a decentralized system where you have 

a board of law enforcement for a particular region—the Rocky 

Mountain West or the Northeast. 

And so, to you, Mr. Kennedy, and to you, Mr. Parent, and then 

Mr. Powner if you want to jump in, how do we best get information? We talked about it. The ultimate goal here is the safety and 

security of the citizens of the United States of America within the 

bounds of the Constitution. The next level up is law enforcement. 

How do we best provide them information that makes me and my 

neighbors secure in Golden, Colorado? 

Mr. Parent? Am I wrong in describing one as a centralized kind 

of system and the other as a decentralized system? 

Mr. PARENT. It is very hard to put HSIN into any normal category like that. What you said is correct, sir. It is central in that 

DHS is at the center of it, but HSIN is basically a series of communities. The communities include some law enforcement members, 

but they also include a large contingent of emergency management 

people, an international community, the private-sector people in 

the critical sector connections, and a few others that kind of represent this family. 

I agree with your goal completely, and I think all of us recognize 

the fact that we inherited or we have a series of what we can call 

‘‘communities,’’ but they are enclaves out there, and the enclaves 

all need to be connected. They need to be connected in any way of 

communication that is presently being utilized to share information, whether that is chat, email, whether that is documents going 

back and forth. 

And that is our goal right now, is to, one, acknowledge that we 

at least have the communities. We have the people who have 

stepped up to the plate to participate in this grand informationsharing endeavor. It is our job to connect all of them. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Kennedy? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you. 

I wouldn’t say that RISS is decentralized. We work individually 

in the regions with our network, but it is a national network. We 

have one IT. We call it the Office of Internet Technology that oversees all of the RISS programs as it relates to RISSNET. We also 

have all, like I said, state, local, federal and tribal systems that are 

online with us. We interconnect with many of the systems that I 

have actually briefed in my nine-page brief that is before you. 

But to answer your question, I think that what we need to do 

to continue this dialogue is we need to probably set up some type 

of an executive steering committee made up of the policymakers 

30 

and the leadership of Homeland, DOJ, and RISS and others, and 

then maybe have someone that is the chairman of that particular 

steering committee—maybe the program manager from ISE or 

someone from Global—so that we can ensure that these meetings 

will continue so that the information that law enforcement and 

first responders need, you know, that comes from these systems 

that work independently of one another, can work together to try 

and make sure that that information doesn’t slip through those 

cracks, and then incidents like that that happened in New Jersey 

don’t fall by the wayside. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. And I guess I can see some instances where we 

have to take information from the top and push it down, and then 

others where there is information from the bottom and push it up 

to the top—to do it as quickly as possible to minimize whatever the 

damage might be on some kind of bad guy out there who wants to 

do harm to Golden, Colorado. 

So for $300 million per year, what is it that I am actually getting 

out of HSIN? 

Mr. PARENT. HSIN is not a $300-million-a-year program. In the entire life of HIS, we have spent $71 million, sir, and right now it 

is budgeted at about $20 million or $21 million per year. The $300 

million is a number that I think includes a number of other DHS 

systems that are not part of HSIN or connected with this directly. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

We will now hear from Mr. Carney for 5 minutes for questions. 

Following that, this panel will be adjourned. I am intending to 

come back during votes, during the motion to recommit, to convene 

the second panel. Unfortunately, this is a crazy day, so that we can 

get their testimony on the record. 

If some of you can come back, that will be great. 

Mr. Carney? 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Once again, thank 

you for your leadership. 

And my good colleague, Mr. Langevin, thank you so much. It is 

absolutely critical to get through this and get this fixed. 

Mr. Parent, DHS had an opportunity to comment on the GAO’s 

report. The GAO obviously said that there is a lot of duplication 

going on. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. PARENT. I agree with it, and Mr. Powner and I have talked, 

as well as our staffs have worked on this report together from the 

time the first draft came out in January. There is some truth in 

there. There are some functions that take place within the HSIN 

system that are very, very similar, dealing with the same kind of 

people and the same kind of information. 

But it is not and either/or-type situation. If you today said, ‘‘Stop 

HSIN; pull the plug; save the $20 million; everybody use RISS,’’ 

that couldn’t work. RISS does not have a common operating picture. It doesn’t have the information flow templates and process 

that we put into place for incident management. It also doesn’t 

have all the same people. So there is a little bit of apples and oranges there, but it is true to say that at some point there are 

groups of the same type of people getting onto two different systems that are doing similar things. 

31 

Mr. CARNEY. What percentage of HSIN do you think is unique, 

compared to what else is out there? Compared to RISS or LEO? 

Mr. PARENT. I think the incident management piece is completely 

unique. I think the private-sector piece is completely unique. The 

law enforcement piece is the one where there are obviously other 

systems that are frequently compared as the GAO did, RISS and 

LEO being the two biggest systems. But some of the states have 

systems that they have put together that are obviously just statecentric that are also very similar. 

Mr. CARNEY. But on a percentage basis, could you give me a 

rough estimate? 

Mr. PARENT. I think the law enforcement piece on HSIN, and let 

me use the number of authorized users. We have about 17,500 authorized active users today on HSIN. About 4,000 are law enforcement members of HSIN–LE. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Nothing further. We should go vote. 

Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Carney. 

That was the 10-minute bell, so I do think we need to move. 

I would just say to Mr. Powner—in fact, I will stay around for 

another minute or so, and I haven’t asked questions—I would like 

to ask you to comment on the answers to prior questions, including 

the answer to the budget question. 

How much money, in GAO’s opinion, has been spent on these different systems? And going forward, if we were able to rationalize 

this more efficiently, how much money would it cost and how much 

money would we save? 

Mr. POWNER. Collectively, when you look at roughly 10 homeland 

security information networks and applications at DHS, the annual 

amount spent is around $300 million. If you look at HSIN in particular, between 2004 and 2007, we have spent about $75 million. 

Now, in terms of going forward—and we had this discussion 

about in terms of what is duplicative and what is not duplicative— 

I wouldn’t use the word that it is completely unique, because I 

think even in some of those areas that Mr. Parent referred to, 

there still is some duplication that occurs in some of those areas. 

The important thing moving forward is because we have some 

users now tied to HSIN—they like HSIN better than RISS, and 

some folks like RISS better than HSIN—the important thing moving forward is how do we integrate these applications and leverage 

them. But a couple of things to reinforce: One, we need to start 

with requirements. What are the users’ needs? 

There are committees set up. It is very important that these committees actually identify the key users. No matter what the community is we are focused on, we need to make sure we get the right 

user needs and we proceed forward with that. We need to built out 

the content so that users are more inclined to use this. The key is 

linking these applications and perhaps others so that we leverage 

and we don’t duplicate going forward. 

The program management of HSIN clearly needs improvement, 

according to OMB. I think Mr. Parent and I have discussed that. 

There are many efforts to do that. And then we talked a lot about 

the technical integration that needs to occur. Coupled with the 

technical integration, you probably want policies and strategies, beVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:59 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-34\48909.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
32 

cause I think what you heard here is executive governance that 

would help, where we actually have some policies in place so that 

we know what the ground rules and game plans are. That can be 

done through MOAs and MOUs and those types of things. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Powner. I think you have the last 

word. 

This panel is dismissed. I should say for the record that your testimony will be included in the record in full. Without objection, so 

ordered. 

I would like to thank our colleagues and again commend Mr. 

Langevin—he wasn’t here when I said this—for asking a question 

in 2002 that we are finally getting the answers to in 2007. It took 

a while. I thank you for your patience. 

And I say to our panelists, we have a lot of work to do together. 

In real-time, we could be attacked at any moment. It is absolutely 

critical that information be shared efficiently, and that those who 

are protecting our hometowns get what they need and can communicate what they need, so that we can prevent, hopefully, or disrupt 

the plans of those who would harm us. 

I will be back shortly during this series of votes to convene the 

second panel. Hopefully, other members can return as well. 

Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. HARMAN. Hello, everybody. I would like to call up our second 

panel of witnesses. Thank you. 

Welcome to all of you, and apologies for this crazy schedule, but 

that is what we have today. 

I did talk to the ranking member, Mr. Reichert, and he will try 

to make it briefly. We are in between votes, which I think you all 

understand, so the goal here will be to convene this panel, to get 

your testimony in the most abbreviated form, to see whether we 

can proceed with questions. If that is possible, we will do it, but 

we are all trying to do all the things that are required this morning. 

So I welcome the second panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Captain William Harris, a 26-year veteran 

of the Delaware State Police. Captain Harris presently serves as 

the officer in charge of his agency’s criminal intelligence section. 

His command includes the Delaware State Police electronics surveillance unit, the high-tech crime unit, intelligence investigations, 

and the Delaware Information and Analysis Center, the DIAC, the 

Delaware Fusion Center that has been operational since December 

of 2005. 

I am going to skip over some other aspects of your bio to get us 

going. 

Our second witness is First Sergeant Lee Miller, a 13-year veteran of the Virginia State Police, who manages the day-to-day operations of the Virginia Fusion Center. First Sergeant Miller is intimately familiar with that center, having been involved in the working group that led to its creation and the policies and procedures 

that govern it. 

I want to thank you, sir, for the work that you did during the 

horrible massacre at Virginia Tech. We have heard from others 

33 

that that work was widely shared and was very critical in giving 

needed information to other fusion centers around the country. 

The third witness is Inspector Barry Lindquist. Inspector 

Lindquist has a law enforcement career that exceeds 37 years. This 

career includes 28 years with the Pompano Beach Police Department, with 22 years as a supervisor, including 12 years as a command-level officer. Inspector Lindquist has worked with the Florida 

Department of Law Enforcement since his retirement from Pompano Beach in 1998 as a police captain. 

Our fourth witness is Major Brian K. Tomblin. Major Tomblin, 

Tennessee Army National Guard, is the military liaison to the Tennessee Office of Homeland Security. Major Tomblin coordinates 

military resources and response for the Tennessee National Guard 

in support of the Tennessee Office of Homeland Security and local 

authorities. As the program manager for HSIN–Tennessee, Major 

Tomblin manages the portals and coordinates training of Tennessee users. 

I think we will start our testimony right now with Captain Harris. If you can summarize in less than 5 minutes, your nation 

would be grateful. 

Let me just add that, in all cases, your written testimony will be 

included in the record in full. 

STATEMENT OF CAPT WILLIAM HARRIS, DELAWARE STATE 

POLICE 

Captain Harris. Okay. Good morning. First of all, thank you for 

having me. I am very humbled that you would ask us as a group, 

and particularly me, for our opinion on such important matters. 

My name is Captain Bill Harris. I am with the Delaware State 

Police. I am in charge of the criminal intelligence section and the 

Delaware Information Analysis Center, Delaware’s state fusion 

center. I have been asked to give you state law enforcement’s perspective on the information sharing culture as it pertains to our 

counterterrorism efforts. 

I will specifically speak about the duplication of efforts in federal 

agencies that not only hamper our efforts at effective information 

sharing, but also hamper our efforts to secure our state and our nation from future terrorist activity and attack. 

I would first like to preface my comments that I have had positive experience with professionals from both the Department of 

Homeland Security and many with the Department of Justice, particularly with the Bureau of Justice Assistance. As the commander 

of our state’s fusion center, I am thoroughly familiar with the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security’s unclassified-but-sensitive information sharing systems. 

I would particularly like to speak about the duplication of efforts 

between the Homeland Security Information Network, RISS, the 

regional information-sharing system, and LEO, to include 

INFRAGARD. 

The RISS network was established in 1974 and has been a staple 

of federal, state and local law enforcement information sharing for 

over 30 years. In 2002, RISS launched new assets with the Automated Trusted Information Exchange. This new asset was to enhance the information-sharing environment with those non-law enVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:59 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-34\48909.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
34 

forcement, homeland security stakeholders, within their own discipline, cross discipline, and their local, state and federal law enforcement partners. 

Each of the previously mentioned systems offer similar capabilities, such as an electronic bulletin board, document library, a chat 

tool, and encrypted email. As a law enforcement agency participating in the information-sharing environment, we are forced to 

choose between information-sharing systems with separate logons 

and passwords, and the monitoring of those systems. Because of 

this bureaucracy of multiple systems, our personnel have had to 

monitor all of these systems at once in an attempt to stay current 

on the sharing of counterterrorism information and homeland security information. 

This has also forced law enforcement agencies such as mine to 

look at the bes6t information-sharing resources available. This has 

been by far the regional information sharing system, or RISS. This 

system is both robust, user-friendly, contains more relevant, reliable and timely law enforcement and homeland security information that is actionable for the line-level law enforcement personnel, 

that will most likely identify the link to disrupting pre-operational 

planning of a domestic or international terrorist. 

Ms. HARMAN. Captain Harris, I hate to interrupt you. It has been 

3 minutes, and it is not that we didn’t tell you 5 minutes, but I 

want to give everyone a chance. You have a made a point that I 

think is enormously important for our record. 

Is there one more sentence you would like to tell us? 

Captain Harris. Yes. The difference in the systems, ma’am, particularly with the private sector and other stakeholders. RISS or 

ATIX has no portals. They share cross-sector information across 

discipline information. Where HSIN, separate from the law enforcement side, has different portals. It doesn’t allow for that information sharing that might be important to public health, and may 

also be important to agriculture. 

[The statement of Captain Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPT WILLIAM HARRIS

I am commander of the Delaware State Police’s, Criminal Intelligence Section and 

the Delaware Information and Analysis Center (DIAC), Delawares state fusion center. I have been asked to give you state law enforcement’s perspective on the information sharing culture, as it pertains to our counter-terrorism efforts. 

I will specifically speak about the duplication of efforts by federal agencies that 

not only hamper our efforts to effective information sharing, but also hamper our 

efforts to secure our state and nation from future terrorist activity and attack. 

I would like to preface my comments that I have had positive experiences with 

professionals from both the Department of Homeland Security, and many with the 

Department of Justice, particularly the Bureau of Justice Assistance. 

As the commander of our state’s fusion center, I am thoroughly familiar with the 

Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security’s unclassified, but 

sensitive information sharing systems. I would particularly like to speak about the 

duplication of efforts between the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), 

the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), and Law Enforcement on Line 

(LEO), to include INFRAGARD. 

The RISS network was established in 1974 and has been a staple of federal, state, 

and local law enforcement information sharing for over 30 years. In 2002, RISS 

launched new assets with the Automated Trusted Information Exchange. This new 

asset was to enhance the information sharing environment with those non-law enforcement, homeland security stakeholders, within their own discipline, cross discipline, and their local, state, and federal law enforcement partners. 

35 

Each of the previously mentioned systems offer similar capabilities such as an 

electronic bulletin board, document library, a chat tool, and encrypted Email. As a 

law enforcement agency participating in the information sharing environment, we 

forced to choose between information sharing systems with separate logons and 

passwords, and the monitoring of those systems. Because of this bureaucracy of 

multiple systems, our personnel have had to monitor all of these systems in an attempt to stay current on the sharing of counter-terrorism and homeland security information. 

This has also forced law enforcement agencies, such as mine to look at the best 

information sharing resource available. This has been by far the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS). This system is both robust, user friendly, and contains 

more relevant, reliable, and timely law enforcement and homeland security information that is actionable for the line level law enforcement personnel, that will most 

likely be the identified link to disrupting pre-operational planning of a domestic or 

international terrorist. 

The RISS network gives access to an electronic bulletin board (RISS Leads) used 

by multiple law enforcement agencies, to include a national criminal intelligence 

database (RISS Intel) to include gangs (RISS Gang). In addition to this RISS has 

connectivity to assets such as the High Intensity Drug Trafficking (HIDA) Centers 

(19 databases), the National White Collar Crime Center, the U.S. Secret Service’s 

Targeted Violence Information Sharing System (TAVIS database), the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU database), the El Passo Intelligence Center, (EPIC 

database), the National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX database), to name just a few. 

These features are the force multiplier that law enforcement agencies and fusion 

centers are searching for to assist in identifying anomalies and those common 

crimes and networks that are part of pre-operational planning by both domestic and 

international terrorist. 

Duplication of systems within the information sharing environment with the public and private sectors are just as confusing and bureaucratic. HSIN has several portals for this purpose, the FBI is promoting INFRAGARD as a communication tool, 

and RISS has the Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX). The concept of 

including the public and private sector are part of the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, and makes good business sense to include these disciplines. However, when working with our critical infrastructure stakeholders in the 

private sector, they are presented with three systems that are supposed to accomplish the same goal. 

Once again, state and local law enforcement, which have responsibility for protecting our critical infrastructure, are forced to choose the best information sharing 

resource available. This has been by far the RISS ATIX system, for many of the 

same reasons law enforcement likes the features of the RISS law enforcement network. The information, contacts, and features available on the ATIX system make 

it more robust and user friendly. Additionally, like HSIN, users have the ability to 

go into their identified ‘‘communities’’ or disciplines, however unlike HSIN and 

INFRAGARD; users have the ability to gather information and contacts from users 

outside of their discipline, giving them relevant, reliable, and timely information 

sharing relationships of mutual value. This was most evident recently in February 

2006, when DHS released the ‘‘lessons learned’’ from ‘‘Cyber Storm,’’ a cyber security preparedness exercise. One of the key lessons learned, was to no one’s surprise, 

that interagency coordination and cross-sector information sharing enhanced overall 

coordination, communication, and response. 

RISS ATIX gives our law enforcement personnel and key stakeholders within our 

state and region this type of effective information sharing capability that no other 

system does. 

Ms. HARMAN. Let me thank you for that. 

We are moving right now to Sergeant Miller. 

We are going to continue to call on all of you, because we want 

this whole reform effort to start with you, not end with you. You 

should have been incorporated in the first place. If the RISSNET 

turns out to be much more user-friendly and helpful, I don’t want 

to imagine what our final conclusion will be, but you should bet on 

the fact that we want to be useful and helpful to you. 

Sergeant Miller? 

36 

STATEMENT OF 1stSgt LEE MILLER, VIRGINIA STATE POLICE 

Sergeant Miller. Good morning, Madam Chairman. 

The primary mission of the Virginia Fusion Center is to fuse together key resources from local, state and federal agencies, as well 

as private industry, to facilitate information collection, analysis 

and sharing in order to prevent and deter a terrorist attack and all 

other forms of criminal activity. 

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, law enforcement 

agencies were forced to meet the information demands created by 

the increased focus on terrorism. As a result, the resources needed 

to provide proactive intelligence operations have increased exponentially, thus compelling law enforcement agencies to consider the 

concept of a fusion center. 

In order to meet our mission, the Virginia Fusion Center utilizes 

a vast array of networks and databases to assist in the fusion process. These separate systems provide information and intelligence 

relevant to situational awareness, as well as providing the ability 

to identify trends, patterns, and targets that enhances the ability 

of law enforcement to be proactive instead of reactive. 

Some of the networks that the Virginia Fusion Center monitors 

during our day-to-day operations are HSIN, of course, LEO, FPS 

Portal, HSDN, RISSNET, JRIES, and systems developed by the 

Commonwealth of Virginia. As stated in previous reports, the number of systems that are available causes duplication and does not 

promote an effective business process. 

These systems also provide the Virginia Fusion Center an avenue for disseminating information and intelligence to our different 

partners. In order to reach all of our partners, our information 

must be submitted to multiple networks and systems, thus creating 

another area of duplication and operational ineffectiveness. 

On March 24, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis initiated the homeland security information network, HSIN–Intel. This was a 3-month pilot effort of 

multi-directional sharing assessments between state and local intelligence professionals and the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis, of timely, accurate, actionable 

information at the unclassified, for-official-use-only level. 

This pilot gave local and state officials the opportunity to provide 

input into the business process, as well as the functionality of the 

system, and a steering group comprised of local and state officials 

wrote and approved the charter. This pilot was extended for a second 3 months, and then the steering group recommended turning 

this into an operational community of interest. 

This collaborative effort between state and local created a true 

community of interest that encompassed a usable network of intelligence professionals, analyst-to-analyst collaboration, and a continuing partnership between local, state and federal intelligence 

communities. This community has created trust relationships that 

ultimately is a more powerful tool than any network or portal, and 

these relationships will remove the resistance to sharing information that has plagued government response in the past, thereby 

pooling together information form all pertinent intelligence sources 

to effect a decisive response. 

37 

This community of interest now has 14 member states, and it is 

expected to double by the end of this fiscal year, and is a perfect 

example of local, state and federal agencies working together in an 

effort to meet the needs of all those involved. 

Recommendations. In order to be a true intelligence-led policing 

model, local, state and federal analysts must be able to see all information and intelligence. If analysts are provided only a couple 

of pieces of the puzzle, we will never be able to see the overall picture. Local, state, tribal and federal agencies, as well as private industry, have individual pieces, and we must have an IT mechanism, as well as trusted relationships, to put these pieces together. 

Currently, state and local analysts are provided access to a wide 

range of unclassified systems, to include some of the ones that I 

spoke of before, but we have limited access to classified systems 

such as the homeland secure data network. Local, state and federal 

unclassified initiatives must be incorporated to meet the needs of 

everyone involved in homeland security and to improve operational 

effectiveness. Local and state intelligence professionals must also 

be given the same opportunity as their federal counterparts regarding the access to classified systems. 

[The statement of Sergeant Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF 1STSGT LEE MILLER

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. 

My name is Lee Miller and I am a 15-year member of the Virginia State Police. 

I currently coordinate the day-to-day operations of the Virginia Fusion Center. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the Homeland Security Information Network. There have been several reports written regarding the numerous federal networks that are available to promote information sharing among local, 

state, and federal agencies and private industry. These reports discussed practices 

that were not utilized in the implementation of the Homeland Security Information 

Network and recommendations to improve coordination between the Department of 

Homeland Security and local and state initiatives. In my testimony, I will discuss 

some of these issues, but I will concentrate on collaborative efforts that will enhance 

information sharing as well as Department of Homeland Security initiatives that 

have produced positive results in order to move towards a better information sharing platform. 

The Primary Mission of the Virginia Fusion Center is to fuse together key resources from local, state, and federal agencies and private industries to facilitate information collection, analysis, and sharing in order to prevent and deter terrorist 

attacks and all other forms of criminal activity. The secondary mission of the Virginia Fusion Center is to support the Virginia Emergency Operations Center by centralizing information and resources to provide a coordinated and effective response 

in the event of an attack or natural disaster. After September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, law enforcement agencies were forced to meet the informational demands created by the increased focus on terrorism. As a result, the resources needed to provide proactive intelligence operations have increased exponentially, thus compelling 

law enforcement agencies to consider the concept of a Fusion Center. 

In order to meet our mission, the Virginia Fusion Center utilizes a vast array of 

networks and databases to assist in the fusion process. These separate systems provide information and intelligence relevant to situational awareness as well as providing the ability to identify trends, patterns and targets that enhances the ability 

of law enforcement to be pro-active instead of re-active. Some of the networks that 

the Virginia Fusion Center monitors during our day-to-day operations are the 

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), Federal Protective Services Law Enforcement portal, 

Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), Regional Information Sharing System 

Network (RISSNET), Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) as well 

as systems developed by the Commonwealth of Virginia. As stated in previous reports, the number of systems that are available causes duplication and does not promote an effective business process. These systems also provide the Virginia Fusion 

Center an avenue for disseminating information and intelligence to our different 

38 

partners. In order to reach all of our partners, our information must be submitted 

to multiple networks and systems thus creating another area of duplication and 

operational ineffectiveness. 

Moving Forward 

On March 24, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis (I&A) initiated the Homeland Security Information Network State and 

Local Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) Community of Interest (COI). This was a three 

month pilot effort for the multi-directional sharing assessments between state and 

local intelligence professionals and Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A) of timely, accurate, actionable information at the 

unclassified, For Official Use Only level. This pilot gave local and state officials the 

opportunity to provide input into the business process and functionality of the system, and a Steering Group comprised of local and state officials wrote and approved 

the charter. This pilot was extended for a second three months, and then the Steering Group recommended turning this into an operational Community of Interest. 

This collaborative effort created a true Community of Interest that encompassed a 

useable network of intelligence professionals, analyst to analyst collaboration and a 

continuing partnership between local, state and federal intelligence communities. 

This community has created trusted relationships that ultimately is a more powerful tool than any network or portal and these relationships will remove the resistance to sharing information that has plagued government response in the past, 

thereby pooling together information from all pertinent intelligence sources to effect 

a decisive response. This Community of Interest now has fourteen member states, 

and it is expected to double by the end of this fiscal year, and is a perfect example 

of local, state and federal agencies working together in an effort to meet the needs 

of all those involved. 

Recommendations 

In order to be a true Intelligence led policing model, local, state and federal analysts must be able to see all information and intelligence. If analysts are provided 

only a couple pieces of the puzzle, we will never be able to see the overall picture. 

Local, state, tribal and federal agencies as well as private industry have individual 

pieces, and we must have an IT mechanism as well as trusted relationships to put 

these pieces together. Currently, state and local analysts are provided access to a 

wide range of unclassified systems, to include the Homeland Security Information 

Network, but have limited access to classified systems such as the Homeland Secure 

Data Network (HSDN). Local, state and federal unclassified initiatives must be incorporated to meet the needs of everyone involved in homeland security and to improve operational effectiveness. Local and state intelligence professionals must also 

be given the same opportunity as their federal counterparts regarding the access to 

classified systems. In the past, analysts from the federal intelligence community primarily focused on information contained in classified systems, while local and state 

analysts focused on information contained in unclassified systems. Using this system, how will we ever be able to see the overall picture? 

Conclusion 

Virginia and other state and local agencies understand the importance of protecting classified information to include sources and methods that are contained in 

these reports. The problem that still exists is the over classification of information 

and intelligence and the lack of tear lines that could be provided to local and state 

law enforcement in addition to other agencies and private Industry with a homeland 

security role. These tear lines could provide valuable tactical and strategic information that could assist in the overall mission of these entities. The ability of local and 

state law enforcement agencies to mitigate potential threats in their communities 

is hampered because of the lack of actionable information and intelligence. In all 

likelihood, a police officer in one of our communities will encounter a potential terrorist during their normal tour of duty, and without the information needed to perform their duties; they will not be able to identify the possible threat. The Federal 

Intelligence community needs to understand the importance of either providing local 

and state law enforcement agencies with a valid ‘‘right and need’’ access to some 

of these networks or the ability to provide tear lines through a standard business 

process and network. The Homeland Security Information Network would be a perfect network to disseminate these tear lines in ‘‘real time’’ so that local and state 

law enforcement agencies could have the ability to receive tactical and strategic information and intelligence to assist them in their homeland security role. 

Ms. HARMAN. Sergeant, I am going to cut you off there. Point 

well-taken, and you should know that this subcommittee is workVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:59 Jun 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-34\48909.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
39 

ing on both reforming our classification and our pseudo-classification systems, and making certain that you get the information you 

need. 

I just want to get through this testimony, and we will see where 

we are with votes, and give you more time. 

Inspector Lindquist? 

STATEMENT OF BARRY S. LINDQUIST, INSPECTOR, OFFICE OF 

STATEWIDE INTELLIGENCE, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW 

ENFORCEMENT 

Mr. LINDQUIST. Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity 

to speak. 

One poster doesn’t fit all. 

I am departing—for the sake of brevity. 

Florida has been deeply committed to HSIN as HSIN–Florida. 

We have developed with the cooperation and support of DHS. Yes, 

there has been a bumpy road, but we have a mechanism of sharing 

for multiple disciplines from our domestic security task force. It includes law enforcement and critical infrastructure, fire, public information and health. 

Recently, our state Department of Health has made a decision to 

vacate a site that they had been using to share response plans for 

health, and put it on HSIN-Florida. A HSIN-Florida is working. It 

would be very detrimental for us for any reduction in services or 

change in the program. If we all the help desk, the help desk is 

there. 

We have asked for improvements. We have received those. The 

common operating picture, that has been great. I want to mirror 

what Lee has said about intelligence and analysis, and HSIN-Intel. 

It has started. It is a collaboration, and it is working extremely 

well. I think it is the direction that the committee like to see. 

We have been guarding that deployment to those intelligence 

professionals around the state that are important. 

[The statement of Mr. Lindquist follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY S. LINDQUEST

Good morning Madam Chair and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. 

My name is Barry Lindquist and I am a member of the Florida Department of 

Law Enforcement (FDLE). I am an Inspector assigned to Domestic Security matters 

in the FDLE Office of Statewide Intelligence and the Florida Fusion Center. In this 

position, I have been the primary point of contact for the Department of Homeland 

Security for matters relating to HSIN. 

Introduction 

Florida was one of the first states to pilot the Homeland Security Information 

Network (HSIN) and since implementation in early 2005, HSIN-Florida has become 

a cornerstone in our information sharing strategy. Additionally, the HSIN State and 

Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HSIN-Intel COI) is currently becoming 

our primary method of sharing information with the Department of Homeland Security, office of Intelligence and Analysis. 

Homeland Security in Florida is called Domestic Security and is structured 

around our multi-disciplinary Domestic Security Task Force (DSTF). The DSTF 

structure is further subdivided into seven Regional DSTF components (RDSTF) with 

an FDLE Special Agent in Charge and a regional Sheriff or Police Chief as Co– 

Chairs of their RDSTF. 

40 

Florida RDSTF Regions 

Each RDSTF had components that include the following workgroups; 

• Law Enforcement, 

• Fire, 

• Emergency Management, 

• Health and Medical, 

• Schools and Education, 

• Communications Critical Infrastructure, and 

• Public Information. 

HSIN–Florida 

When the Department of Homeland Security first approached Florida in early 

2005 with the opportunity to pilot HSIN, we already had a statewide anti-terrorism 

intelligence database named InSite and an Internet website named ThreatCom that 

was used to share information and alert our task force members about events and 

potential threats. Both of these systems were created in 2002 and were well integrated into our Domestic Security information sharing strategy. The challenge that 

HSIN presented was determining how it could be effectively integrated with our existing systems without confusing our partners. 

Florida worked with the Department of Homeland Security to simplify and tailor 

the system to meet our needs, HSIN-Florida has four main components; 

• Home Page 

• Announcements 

• Recently uploaded products 

• Calendar 

• Situational Awareness—a discussion thread 

• DHS Documents—Recently uploaded documents contained in the government.hsin.gov site 

• Document Library—that has a statewide document library and libraries for 

each of our seven regions. 

Using this basic structure, HSIN–Florida allows every user to view and upload 

the documents. Every user has the ability to decide what they believe is important 

and share their information with other users. In support of our RDSTF structure, 

Regional HSIN–Florida Administrators have the ability to edit and delete content, 

and also nominate and validate new users into the system. 

Every HSIN-Florida user is asked to complete an application for access to the system. Our Regional Administrators ensure a background is conducted before user access is granted. The Regional Administrators are also responsible for ensuring that 


48909-1.eps
41 

users are removed from the system when their position changes and no longer justifies access. 

Since HSIN-Florida was deployed, significant enhancements have been made in 

the Common Operating Picture (COP) that is deployed in many of the national 

HSIN sites. Florida did not include COP in HSIN-Florida because of our strong 

partnership with the Department of Emergency Management which has its own system for managing events in Florida. In its new and improved form, Florida has a 

pending request to include COP in HSIN-Florida to better inform our task force 

members about national incidents managed by DHS. 

HSIN—State and Local Intelligence 

Florida also participated in the HSIN-State and Local Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) 

pilot initiated by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). Our goal in this 

pilot was to establish a known and trusted community of intelligence professionals 

that could collaborate together and work with I&A on common Homeland Security 

matters. 

The goal of HSIN-Intel is to provide DHS and selected State and local participants with a trusted and centralized information sharing mechanism for the exchange of controlled, unclassified intelligence and threat related information. In 

Florida, HSIN-Intel is being deployed in the Florida Fusion Center and with our 

other fusion centers around the state. 

Other HSIN National Communities of Interest 

Florida has not widely deployed other HSIN national communities of interest. The 

Florida information sharing strategy focuses on collecting and analyzing information 

received from our DSTF regions and ensuring the accuracy and validity of this information as it flows from Florida to our national partners. 

National communities of interest such as Emergency Management have been deployed to the Florida Department of Emergency Management. The Law Enforcement community of interest has been made available to some of our state and local 

Fusion centers and Intelligence partners. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you for that testimony. 

Captain Tomblin? 

STATEMENT OF CAPT BRIAN TOMBLIN, MILITARY LIAISON, 

OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, TENNESSEE ARMY 

NATIONAL GUARD 

Captain Tomblin. Thank you, ma’am. 

I am going to follow along with Barry and depart from written 

comments, and just state that, like Florida, Tennessee has adopted 

HSIN, and has followed the DHS lead and invested its information 

sharing solely on HSIN. 

The HSIN-Tennessee system is very robust. We have five separate portals, an emergency management portal, a critical infrastructure portal, and then the law enforcement portal. There is a 

portal for training exercises and for running operations that you all 

want out there on the live portal. 

So what I would say to you is that HSIN-Tennessee is a standalone system that works for us. It is an information-sharing tool. 

We took it from DHS as they presented it. We modified it to meet 

our needs. I am confident in the current leadership, especially Theresa Phillips. She is very aggressive, very open. We have looked to 

her to reestablish the state working groups, and that is one of the 

big recommendations. 

Everything that we have issue-wise revolves around communications. Reestablishing those state working groups, listening to the 

states and what their needs are, will just further this system. We 

are very happy with it at the state level. My commissioner has only 

one fear, and that fear is that it would go away, and he has invested everything in it. 

42 

So I would leave you with that, and I thank you for this opportunity. 

[The statement of Captain Tomblin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ BRIAN K. TOMBLIN

I. Introduction 

Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss 

the performance of the Homeland Security Information Network in the state of Tennessee. 

The State’s ability to share information quickly and accurately over a secure network, among various communities of interests, is crucial in order to prevent, protect, 

deter and respond to potential criminal and terrorist acts. The state of Tennessee 

has followed the Department of Homeland Security’s lead and invested its information sharing holdings and strategies on the Homeland Security Information Network 

(HSIN) platform. The Homeland Security Information Network—Tennessee (HSIN– 

TN) provides connectivity for public service disciplines to receive and share information throughout Tennessee. Through a successful partnership with the Department 

of Homeland Security, HSIN—TN is the secure information sharing network for the 

state and provides users the ability to interface with the state all crimes intelligence 

and information fusion center. 

II. HSIN—TN Portal Development 

In February 2005, TN was selected to participate in the pilot phase of HSIN development at the state level. Recognizing the state did not have the ability to gather, review and disseminate information via a common system, the TN Office of 

Homeland Security (OHS) developed information sharing goals for the state and an 

aggressive timeline for the deployment of the HSIN—TN across Tennessee. Working 

directly with the IT contractor, Mantech–IST, the initial TN portals where developed. A HSIN-TN pre-pilot was conducted in August 2005 and a pilot phase was 

conducted in September to allow TN OHS users to become familiar with the system. 

Consequently, HSIN became a viable tool for communication with Louisiana during 

Hurricane Katrina. Communicating via the HSIN portals, Tennessee was able to 

provide the Louisiana State Police with logistical support and the Tennessee Office 

of Homeland Security was able to route an assistance call received from a relative 

in Knoxville to the Louisiana State Police which resulted in the successful rescue 

of a family trapped in a flooded attic. 

The initial HSIN—TN training of law enforcement occurred in November, 2005. 

A fusion center initiative conference was held in December 2005. During this conference, HSIN—TN was briefed to the state and local law enforcement leadership 

as the information sharing platform for the TN fusion center. 

III. HSIN—TN Training 

In January 2006, I was named the HSIN–TN program manager and tasked with 

developing a HSIN training program for the state. Based on Tennessee geography 

and the established 11 TN Homeland Security Districts; a regional, east to west 

fielding plan was derived. Training requirements were submitted to the primary 

HSIN training contractor, MTCI, and training began in east TN at Johnson City 

in March 2006 and concluded in Memphis in August 2006. This initial fielding plan 

resulted in the training of over 783 individual users, representing over 330 agencies. 

The initial training strategy was to train local, state and federal law enforcement 

officers in order to develop a user base that would share critical information with 

each other and provide the fusion center with all source criminal data. While reviewing the initial east TN training, a training gap was identified. We determined 

the state was missing an opportunity to get various public service disciplines together for training which would further promote interaction and information sharing between law enforcement and non-law enforcement partners. Training throughout the remaining homeland security districts was then offered to additional communities of interest (COI) such as emergency management, fire and rescue and selected critical infrastructure partners. 

IV. HSIN—TN Portals 

In June 2006, DHS recognized the HSIN—TN portals as operational and the portals where considered live and no longer a training environment. TN currently manages five HSIN state portals; Home, Law Enforcement, Critical Infrastructure, 

Training and OHS. All portals are now monitored by the TN Fusion Center, a joint 

partnership between the TN OHS and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigations 

(TBI). The portals allow all communities of interest users to share information at 

43 

the Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) level based on their occupational discipline 

and provides secure instant messaging via the JABBER collaboration tool. HSIN— 

TN users can contribute products to the appropriate portal, request information or 

operational support from the fusion center, research or contribute to the document 

library and access additional DHS portals via hotlinks. Since becoming operational, 

we have increased our user base to more than 1000 trained users representing over 

500 agencies. HSIN training continues on a weekly basis as the state strives to 

make HSIN ? TN the focal point for information sharing in Tennessee. 

V. Current Challenges 

While HSIN—TN provides the state with an excellent ability and resource, frustration is still experienced on managing and maintaining the system at the state 

level. As the HSIN—TN program manager, I have administration and community 

of interests rights but these are limited to only the ability to nominate and validate 

new users and to remove information from the portals. I cannot effectively manage 

the user data base. There is no capability to monitor use of the portal, review the 

user data base or to delete users when they no longer require access to the portals. 

Once the user is validated into the system, I loose the ability monitor and maintain 

the state user accounts. However, I have been briefed that a new account management tool is reportedly near fielding. 

The line of communication between the state and a viable DHS HSIN representative is convoluted. Tennessee has a Stakeholder Relationship Manager assigned 

through Sim–G Technologies but when request for support or changes to the portals 

are requested they often go unresolved or unanswered. When HSIN was first deployed at the State level it included a GIS mapping product. Shortly after our state 

portals where considered functional and after a third of the state had been trained, 

a decision was made to upgrade the HSIN system. The concept was to standardized 

portal configuration in order to facilitate faster deployment to new state partners. 

While this was understandable, the changes to the portal where made without input 

from the pilot states and included changes that were not discussed with the pilot 

states. One of those critical changes was the decision to drop the GIS mapping product. A reliable mapping tool is crucial to the success of the portal and provides the 

smaller departments and agencies a capability they normally could not afford. I 

have been briefed that a replacement mapping tool will be available on the state 

portals in the future. 

When the pilot states were identified, an HSIN state working group was developed to allow pilot states to meet together quarterly and discuss operational and 

technical issues with each other and the DHS HSIN staff and contract support. 

These meetings were very beneficial and allowed the states to adopt best practices 

and identify common issues and problems with the system. After only two meetings, 

the working group was dissolved without explanation and changes to the portals 

where implemented without input from the states. Information technology (IT) support is now handled through the Change Request Registration and Tracking System 

(CHaRTS). This automated system for requesting changes to the portals works but 

it is hard to explain complex technical issues through written communication. As 

the portals are operational, the State cannot afford to submit changes through and 

automated system, problems need to be rapidly worked in real time. In the past, 

by talking directly to the IT contract support, simple changes could be made over 

the phone and reviewed by the state in a matter of minutes, not days or weeks. 

VI. Recommendations 

The problems and frustrations currently experienced with HSIN are all directly 

related to a lack of communication and clear guidance between DHS and state partners. Re-establishing the state and local working groups will greatly enhance the 

states ability to communicate common issues and develop working solutions for implementation. Working together as a team to develop policy and procedures, lessons 

learned and best practices, and to review, test and implement new technical advances and solutions is critical to the continued success between DHS and its state 

partners. 

VII. Conclusion 

The Homeland Security Information Network is a critical component of the information sharing system of Tennessee. Tennessee has taken this information sharing 

tool and forged it into the secure information sharing network for the state. Continued cooperation and interaction between DHS and its state partners are crucial to 

the continued success of this system. Re-establishing the state working groups, implementing account management tools and streamlining the IT support will help to 

ensure the stability and viability of HSIN for years to come. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Captain. I appreciate your testimony. 

44 

You can see the votes have been called again, but I am try to get 

in a couple of questions. 

Obviously, two of you think this is more suitable for your needs, 

and two of you think that you have been able to use the HSIN network, at least in your states, in a way that is satisfactory. I am 

not sitting up here to referee this. Let me ask a question and just 

if any of you disagrees with this statement, please say so. 

Do you all agree that your needs are what these systems need 

to satisfy? Yes or no? That the set of criteria that need to be met 

have to originate from you, because you are the folks who have to 

take the information and make it operational in your areas. Do you 

agree with that? 

Okay. I think it was Inspector Lindquist who said one size does 

not fit all. Does everyone agree with that proposition? Or do you 

think one size should fit all? 

Nobody disagrees with that? 

Everyone was here when the GAO issued its report in our prior 

panel. Does anyone want to comment in a sentence on the findings 

of the GAO report, which was fairly harsh, at least in terms of duplication? Does anyone disagree with the thrust of those findings? 

Nobody disagrees? Mr. Lindquist? 

Mr. LINDQUIST. No, I don’t. 

Ms. HARMAN. No. Okay. So the goal here, I hope, is to start at 

your end, figure out if there is commonality of need, and I don’t 

mean one size fits all, but how best to figure this out. And then 

try to move forward, eliminating duplication, waste, inefficiencies, 

with products that suit your needs. 

Does anyone disagree with that? No. 

We had conversation in the last panel about mechanisms to do 

that. You all heard those conversations. Does anyone have a specific suggestion about how the consultation should work? 

Captain Harris. Madam Chairman, I have just a suggestion on 

that, not how the mechanism should work, but it is very important 

to have a single sign-on for those systems because those systems 

are all important, but a single sign-on feature is very relevant. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Does anyone disagree with that? No. 

Okay, the technologically challenged—that would be me—I would 

say ‘‘hurray,’’ because obviously the goal is to get everything you 

need quickly. Correct? And make sure that you are not missing 

anything. Right? 

Sergeant Miller. A perfect world for us is a one-stop-one-shop 

place. 

Ms. HARMAN. Right. That would meet your problem, would it not, 

Inspector Lindquist, because if you could log-on through the system 

you are comfortable with and get the rest of the information, you 

would be happy about that. Right? 

Mr. LINDQUIST. I think a single log-on is a good idea, but it is 

not the only solution. I think part of what we need to do is define 

how the information is going to flow within a state, because the 

states want to be able to vet and verify the information as it flows 

from the state to the national community, and to its partners, so 

that we don’t end up erroneously tracing down old information that 

occurred last week. 

45 

Ms. HARMAN. Hear, hear. I agree with that as well. Nobody disagrees with that, right? But accurate, actionable and timely information is what you need. Everyone agrees, and everyone agrees we 

have some work to do to get that for all jurisdictions in a form that 

is useful. Correct? 

All right. I am going to leave this panel there. I am very sorry 

about this, but you can hear all the bells and whistles. 

Unfortunately, other members could not get back, but if you can 

stay for a few more minutes, staff is here and if there are additional questions we have, they will be asked informally, because we 

don’t have a mechanism in this committee to do staff questioning 

of witnesses. I would hope that could occur. 

You are all enlisted in this war against those who would harm 

us in America. Let me just add this one sentence. I have been saying for some time, and it was before the most recent Fort Dix issue, 

that they are here. There are people in our country who are 

trained, somewhat loosely coordinated, and intending to attack us. 

We need our best people on the case. In most cases, they are you, 

and the people who work with you. 

These attacks could occur anywhere at any time, and if you don’t 

have the training and information you need to know what to look 

for and what to do, we will not prevent and disrupt them. So our 

goal on this subcommittee is to get you that training and information ASAP. 

Obviously, we need you as part of the group that fixes systems 

that are not working properly, because these products have to suit 

your needs. That is the absolute priority, and I give you my promise that on a bipartisan basis here, everyone is intent on getting 

this right, and with your help, we will. 

Thank you very much. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ