50 [84 Op. Att’y

CORRECTIONS

CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ) COMPUTATION OF GOODCONDUCT CREDITS TO DETERMINE MANDATORY RELEASE

DATE FOR INMATES

February 16, 1999

The Honorable Stuart O. Simms

Secretary of Department of Public

 Safety and Correctional Services

You have requested our opinion concerning the computation

of good-conduct credits for inmates in light of a recent trilogy of

decisions on that topic by the Court of Appeals. 

In our opinion the following principles should guide the

computation of good-conduct credits by the Division of Correction

(“DOC”):

1. As a general rule, an inmate subject to multiple sentences

serves a single term of confinement that begins on the first day of the

sentence that begins earliest and ends on the last day of the sentence

that ends last. However, in certain circumstances, sentences must

be considered separately for purposes of computing good-conduct

credits. 

2. For all sentences imposed before October 1, 1992, an

inmate is entitled to good-conduct credits at the rate of 5 days per

month.

3. For all sentences imposed on or after October 1, 1992, so

long as none of those sentences is for a crime of violence or a drug

offense as described in the Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 27,

§700(d)(2), an inmate is entitled to good-conduct credits at the rate

of 10 days per month. This is true even if the inmate’s term of

confinement includes sentences imposed before October 1, 1992, for

violent crimes or drug offenses.

4. For all sentences imposed on or after October 1, 1992, if

at least one of those sentences is for a crime of violence or a drug
Gen. 50] 51

offense as described in Article 27, §700(d)(2), an inmate is entitled

to good-conduct credits at the rate of 5 days per month.

5. If a sentence is imposed on or after October 1, 1996, for

a crime committed while the defendant was on parole and parole is

revoked, good-conduct credits earned prior to the defendant’srelease

on parole may not be applied to the current term of confinement. 

In this regard, we agree with the advice previously provided to

you by Assistant Attorney General Alan D. Eason.

I

Computation of Good-Conduct Credits

A. Diminution Credits

An inmate incarcerated in the State correctional system may

earn a variety of credits that reduce the length of his incarceration.

There are four types of diminution credits: good-conduct, work,

educational, and special projects. Annotated Code of Maryland,

Article 27, §700(d)-(h). Good-conduct credits are unique in that

they are deducted in advance from the inmate’s term of confinement,

apparently on the optimistic assumption that the inmate will indeed

exhibit good conduct during the course of his confinement. Article

27, §700(d). If an inmate violates applicable rules of discipline, the

DOC may revoke all or part of the good-conduct credits that have

been advanced to the inmate. Article 27, §700(g).

 

An inmate can earn an aggregate maximum of up to 20 days

credit each month. Article 27, §700(i). An inmate who is released

prior to the expiration of the full term of his sentences, as a result of

good-conduct credits and other deductions, is on “mandatory

supervision” ) or conditional release from imprisonment. Article

41, §4-501(13). Mandatory supervision release is distinct from

“parole,” which is another form of conditional release granted at the

discretion of the Maryland Parole Commission. Article 41, §§4-

501(5), 4-504.

A person on mandatory supervision is subject to all laws,

regulations, and conditions applicable to parolees. Article 41, §4-

612(c). A person who violates the conditions of mandatory
52 [84 Op. Att’y

1

 The person may also receive “street time” credits for time spent out

of prison prior to return to prison as a result of a violation of the

conditions of mandatory supervision release. Article 41, §4-511(d).

supervision is subject to revocation of good-conduct credits and

return to prison for the remainder of his sentence.1

B. 1992 Amendment

In 1992, the Legislature made a significant change in the

manner in which good-conduct credits are calculated. Chapter 588,

Laws of Maryland 1992, codified at Article 27, §700(d)(2)-(3).

Under prior law, inmates were entitled to 5 days of good-conduct

credits for each month of a term of confinement. The 1992

amendment increased the rate to 10 days of good-conduct credits per

month; however, if the term of confinement included a sentence for

a crime of violence or certain drug offenses, good-conduct credits

would only be awarded at the rate of 5 days per month. Id. The

legislation specified that the new method of computation applied to

“a term of confinement imposed on or after October 1, 1992.”

The application of the phrase “term of confinement” has

bedeviled those who must construe this statute in light of the 1992

amendment. The statutory definition of the phrase appears to be

straightforward:

(a) In this section, “term of confinement”

means:

 (1) The length of the sentence for a

single sentence; or

 (2) The period from the first day of

the sentence beginning first through the last

day of the sentence ending last for:

(i) Concurrent sentences;

(ii) Partially concurrent sentences;

(iii) Consecutive sentences; or

(iv) A combination of concurrent and

consecutive sentences. 
Gen. 50] 53

Article 27, §700(a). Thus, according to the literal language of the

statute, an inmate serves a single term of confinement that may

consist of several sentences running concurrently or consecutively.

The 1992 law did not change this definition.

On its face, the phrase “term of confinement” appears to

encompass all sentences being served by an inmate, even if there are

multiple sentences imposed on different dates. However, the

effective date provision of the 1992 amendment concerning the

computation of good-conduct credits is keyed to the date the “term

of confinement” was “imposed” ) suggesting the possibility that an

inmate may simultaneously serve multiple terms of confinement with

different dates of imposition. This is more than an academic

question when an inmate is serving sentences imposed before and

after the critical date of October 1, 1992. One attempting to give a

sensible construction to the statute must elect either to aggregate

sentences and assign a single date of imposition to the aggregate

term or recognize multiple dates of imposition, in apparent

contradiction of the literal definition of “term of confinement.” This

choice has understandably generated some confusion among those

who compute good-conduct credits.

As Judge Wilner has summarized the problem:

The 1992 law immediately created a

distinction between inmates serving one or

more sentences for a crime of violence or a

listed drug offense and inmates incarcerated

for other crimes. That, when coupled with the

prospectivity language of Section 2 of the Act,

created a double problem: it brought into

question whether an inmate serving a sentence

imposed prior to October 1, 1992 as well as a

sentence imposed after that date was entitled

to the additional five days a month credit on

the later sentence and, even if such an inmate

ordinarily would get the additional credit, it

raised the question whether that would be the

case if the earlier sentence was for a violent or

listed drug offense.

Henderson v. Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services,

351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1998).
54 [84 Op. Att’y

2

 In its decision, the Court also considered certain issues not directly

pertinent to this opinion ) whether the plaintiff inmates could use a habeas

corpus petition to challenge the calculation of good-conduct credits and

whether “street time credits” awarded by the Parole Commission should

be deducted from good-conduct credits.

In three recent cases, the Court of Appeals has attempted to

provide definitive guidance. In the first two cases, the Court

unanimously adopted an interpretation of the statute. When that

approach led to unanticipated consequences, the Court in its most

recent case modified that interpretation in a divided decision.

II

Recent Decisions of the Court of Appeals

A. Maryland House of Correction v. Fields

The Court of Appeals first confronted the anomalies created by

the 1992 amendment in three cases consolidated on appeal in

Maryland House of Correction v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d

167 (1997). Each of the cases before the Court in Fields involved

inmates who had been released on mandatory supervision for

sentences imposed prior to the effective date of the 1992

amendment. In each case, as a result of subsequent convictions,

good-conduct credits were rescinded and mandatory supervision

release was revoked. As a result, additional sentences were imposed

and, in some cases, suspended sentences were reimposed, after the

effective date of the 1992 amendment that accelerated the award of

good-conduct credits. On the theory that the sentences awarded after

October 1, 1992, were part of a single term of confinement imposed

prior to the effective date of the 1992 amendment, the DOC

aggregated the sentences imposed before and after that date and

calculated good-conduct credits at the “old rate” of 5 days per

month. 

The Court rejected the DOC’s method of computation and held

that, for purposes of computing good-conduct credits under the

amended law, sentences imposed before October 1, 1992, were to be

treated separately from those imposed after that date.2 It noted that,

under the DOC’s method of aggregating sentences, a person

sentenced after the effective date of the 1992 law for a non-violent,
Gen. 50] 55

non-drug crime would not obtain the benefit of the amendment’s

new rate of 10 days good-conduct credit per month. The Court

conceded that the statute suggested that a prisoner served a single

“term of confinement,” but delved into the legislative history of the

amendment to support a contrary interpretation of the statute. 

The Court quoted a bill analysis of the 1992 amendment

prepared for the General Assembly that indicated that the purpose of

the amendment was to move non-violent offenders through the

prison system at a faster pace in order to reduce overcrowding.

Sponsors of the amendment apparently understood that the new rate

for good-conduct credits would apply to anyone sentenced on or

after the effective date of the amendment. 348 Md. at 263. In

addition, the Court also noted that the effective date provision had

been added to the bill to meet the DOC’s concern that the

amendment otherwise would have required the retroactive

computation of credits for inmates in prison at the time of its

passage. Id. at 264. 

The Court then turned to the definition of “term of

confinement,” which predated the 1992 amendment. The Court

pointed out that the definition had been designed to ensure that

persons serving more than one sentence at a time would not receive

good-conduct credits for more than one sentence at a time. Id. at

264-65. A “commonsensical” construction of that phrase did not

require aggregation of all sentences served by an inmate for purposes

of computing good-conduct credits under the 1992 amendment. Id.

at 265-66.

Finally, the Court applied the “rule of lenity,” which requires

that any ambiguity in penal statutes be construed against the State

and in favor of the defendant. 348 Md. at 267-68. Accordingly, it

held that an inmate should earn good-conduct credits at the rate of

five days per month for the sentences that were imposed prior to

October 1, 1992 and at the rate of 10 days per month for sentences

imposed on or after that date for non-violent, non-drug offenses. Id.

at 268-69. 

B. Beshears v. Wickes

A slightly different permutation presented itself in the Court’s

next encounter with the statute in Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1,

706 A.2d 608 (1998). That case involved an inmate who had been
56 [84 Op. Att’y

sentenced for a violent crime prior to the effective date of the 1992

amendment and who, after release on mandatory supervision, was

convicted and sentenced for a non-violent offense after October 1,

1992. The question before the Court was whether the inmate

should receive good-conduct credits with respect to the latter nonviolent offense at the rate of 10 days per month for non-violent

offenses under the 1992 amendment or whether he would be limited

to 5 days per month for that sentence because it was part of a single

term of confinement including a violent offense. 

The Court reiterated its reasoning in Fields and held that the

two sentences constituted “separate terms of confinement.” 349 Md.

at 8. Accordingly, Wickes could receive the benefit of the 1992

amendment for his subsequent non-violent offense and earn goodconduct credits at the post-1992 rate of 10 days per month with

respect to that sentence. 

The Court explained the basis of its holding:

In Fields, we specifically rejected “the

notion that all sentences that overlap or run

consecutively must aggregate for all purposes

to a single term of confinement.” Today, we

expand on this in concluding that “term of

confinement” does not aggregate sentences

imposed before and after the defendant is

released on mandatory supervision. Where a

defendant is released on mandatory

supervision and later commits and is

sentenced for a new crime, we hold that the

new sentence and the old sentence reimposed

upon revocation of mandatory supervision

release do not aggregate to form one term of

confinement for the purpose of §700. The rate

at which an inmate is awarded good-conduct

credits should not depend on the Maryland

Parole Commission’s decision to revoke

mandatory supervision release for a prior

conviction based on a subsequent offense.

349 Md. at 9 (emphasis added; citations omitted). This elaboration

of the rationale for the decision in Wickes resulted in consequences

apparently unintended by a majority of the Court.
Gen. 50] 57

C. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services v.

Henderson

Following the decisions in Wickes and Fields, the DOC

recalculated the sentences of more than 2000 inmates serving

multiple sentences to desegregate sentences in accordance with the

apparent direction of the Wickes opinion. For some inmates this

recalculation resulted in a longer period of confinement. In

Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Henderson,

351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998), one such inmate challenged

this method of computation and the Court considered the

ramifications of the language in its opinion in Wickes.

Henderson was convicted of a violent offense in 1975 for

which he received a sentence of 20 years imprisonment. He was

released on parole twice and returned to custody on both occasions

for parole violations. His second parole revocation was the result of

a 1994 conviction on a drug violation for which he received a 10-

year sentence. In accordance with its previous practice of

aggregating sentences and diminution credits, the DOC originally

computed Henderson’s mandatory release date by aggregating his

1975 and 1994 sentences and then subtracting the total diminution

credits to arrive at a mandatory release date of July 7, 1997.

Some months after Henderson’s release, the Court of Appeals

issued its opinion in the Wickes case, in which it stated that “[w]hen

a defendant is released on mandatory supervision and later commits

... a new crime, the new sentence and the old sentence...do not

aggregate to form one term of confinement for the purpose of §700.”

Wickes, 349 Md. at 9. Following the apparent dictate of that

holding, DOC computed separate release dates for each of

Henderson’s sentences and arrived at a mandatory release date in

February 2002 for the more recent sentence. As a result, Henderson

was arrested and returned to custody.

It is notable that, unlike the cases in Fields and Wickes, there

was no question whether Henderson was eligible for good-conduct

credits at the “new rate” of 10 days per month under the 1992

amendment. Both of Henderson’s convictions were for drug or

violent crimes. Accordingly, under any reading of the statute, he

was limited to 5 days per month good-conduct credits. Nevertheless,

those decisions resulted in the termination of his mandatory

supervision release and his return to custody.
58 [84 Op. Att’y

Henderson filed a habeas corpus petition. The circuit court

granted the petition on constitutional grounds, holding that the State

had denied him due process of law and had violated the proscription

against ex post facto punishments. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the

constitutional questions, but instead refined its construction of §700

to affirm the circuit court. In a 4-3 decision, the Court disavowed

the broad language in Wickes that sentences imposed for new

convictions should not be aggregated with those for prior

convictions. Writing for the majority, Judge Wilner reasoned that

the results in both Fields and Wickes were justified on a narrower

ground than a general rule against aggregation of sentences. He

summarized that narrower justification: 

The predominant reasoning in both cases

was that, through the enactment of Ch. 588 in

1992, the General Assembly directed that

inmates be allowed ten days a month good

conduct credit against sentences imposed on

or after October 1, 1992 for non-violent, nondrug offenses, and that, to the extent that the

device of a single term of confinement would

frustrate that direction, an ambiguity was

created ) an ambiguity that the rule of lenity

required be resolved in favor of the inmate.

718 A.2d at 1157. Judge Wilner noted that aggregation of sentences

in Henderson’s case did not lead to any ambiguity and that there was

therefore no need to calculate the diminution credits and mandatory

release dates separately for his two sentences. He acknowledged

that, in recomputing good-conduct credits separately for

Henderson’s sentences, the DOC had been misled by the “secondary

justification” for the Court’s decision in Wickes. Id.
Gen. 50] 59

3

 Judge Chasanow dissented from the majority opinion’s restriction

of the rationale of the Fields and Wickes decisions, but concurred in the

decision to grant habeas corpus relief to Henderson. He would have

affirmed the circuit court on the alternative ground that Henderson’s arrest

following recomputation of his mandatory release date had been

accomplished through unconstitutional and improper procedures. 718

A.2d at 1161. Judge Chasanow’s opinion was joined by Chief Judge Bell

and Judge Rodowsky.

In a concurring and dissenting opinion,3 Judge Chasanow, the

author of both the Fields and the Wickes opinions, disagreed sharply

with the majority’s reasoning. The concurring and dissenting

opinion asserted that “the method of calculation described in Wickes

that lets non-violent offenders out sooner, but also keeps paroleviolating offenders in longer, is a desirable result.” 718 A.2d at

1158. Judge Chasanow suggested that an interpretation of the 1992

amendment which benefitted non-violent parole violators but under

which violent parole violators fared worse was more consistent with

legislative intent in amending §700. He argued that the majority

opinion attempted to accommodate two conflicting constructions of

“term of confinement” with the result that an inmate like Henderson

had “a kind of savings account where they can bank sentencing

diminution credits” against sentences for future crimes. 718 A.2d at

1160. He noted that the Parole Commission’s revocation of

Henderson’s parole for his subsequent conviction had the

paradoxical effect of decreasing, rather than increasing, his time in

custody when the two sentences were aggregated as required by the

majority decision. 

The concurring and dissenting opinion also relied on a 1996

amendment to §700 to support its method of computation in

Henderson’s case. Chapter 567, Laws of Maryland 1996. That

legislation added subsection k which provides:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of

this subsection, if an inmate who is convicted

and sentenced to imprisonment for a crime

committed while on parole and the parole is

revoked, diminution credits that were allowed

prior to the inmate’s release on parole may not

be applied toward the inmate’s term of

confinement upon return to the Division of

Correction.
60 [84 Op. Att’y

(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does

not apply to any diminution credits earned

following the inmate’s return to the Division

of Correction.

Article 27, §700(k). The majority opinion responded that this

subsection was irrelevant to Henderson’s case it as it applied only to

sentences imposed after October 1, 1996 and therefore did not

pertain to Henderson’s situation. 718 A.2d at 1157 n.3. Of course,

that section will figure in the computation of mandatory release dates

in cases involving sentences imposed after its effective date.

III

Discussion

We cannot claim to provide any better guidance in an Attorney

General’s opinion to the construction of this statute than the efforts

of the Court of Appeals in its three recent opinions. What we can do

is attempt to distill the holdings of those cases into practical

guidelines for the computation of sentences by the DOC. 

First, the definition in §700(a) clearly speaks of a “term of

confinement” in the singular and indicates that a term of

confinement consists of all sentences being served by the inmate.

The majority opinion in Henderson also makes clear that normally

all sentences that are part of a term of confinement are to be

aggregated for purposes of computing the inmate’s mandatory

release date. Thus, except to the extent that rule of lenity or another

statute requires disaggregation of sentences for computation of

good-conduct credits, all sentences being served by an inmate are

part of a single term of confinement with a single date of release.

The title to Chapter 588, Laws of Maryland 1992, demonstrates

that, in enacting the 1992 amendment to §700, the General Assembly

sought to expand the availability of good-conduct credits for inmates

convicted of non-violent, non-drug offenses for which sentence is

imposed on or after October 1, 1992. However, this intention would

be thwarted if an inmate is also serving a sentence imposed prior to

October 1, 1992, and the inmate’s sentences are combined into a

single term of confinement with a combined “date of imposition”

prior to October 1, 1992. When necessary to give effect to the

Legislature’s intention to allow increased good-conduct credits,
Gen. 50] 61

under the rule of lenity, the DOC must compute good-conduct

credits separately for sentences imposed before October 1, 1992

from those imposed on or after October 1, 1992. 

Thus, as in Fields, an inmate serving sentences for non-violent,

non-drug offenses imposed both before and after the effective date

of the amendment is entitled to good-conduct credits at the rate of 5

days per month for the pre-amendment sentences and at the new rate

of 10 days per month for post-amendment sentences.

A pre-amendment sentence for a drug offense or a crime of

violence does not effect the computation of good-conduct credits for

a post-amendment sentence for a non-drug, non-violent offense. In

such a case, as in Wickes, the inmate earns good-conduct credits for

the earlier offense at the rate of 5 days per month and for the latter

offense at the new rate of 10 days per month. Of course, under the

plain terms of the 1992 amendment, a post-amendment sentence for

a crime of violence or listed drug offense will render the inmate

ineligible for the new more generous rate and the inmate will earn

good-conduct credits at the old rate of 5 days per month. 

When, as in Henderson, the post-amendment sentence is for a

listed drug offense or a crime of violence and there is no possibility

that the inmate could receive the benefit of the higher rate of goodconduct credits, then the sentences should be aggregated for

computation of good-conduct credits. 

Finally, there is an important qualification if the inmate is

serving a sentence imposed after October 1, 1996 for a crime

committed while he was on parole and his parole is revoked. In such

a case, he will not receive the benefit of diminution credits

(including good-conduct credits) earned prior to his release on

parole.

The cases and the statute thus suggest that the DOC ask the

following questions when computing good-conduct credits for an

inmate serving sentences imposed both before and after October 1,

1992:

A. Are any of the sentences for drug offenses or crimes

of violence, as described in Article 27, §700(d)(2)?
62 [84 Op. Att’y

No. (Fields) 

C Compute good-conduct credits separately

for sentences imposed before and after

October 1, 1992.

C Award 5 days per month credit for

sentences imposed prior to October 1,

1992.

C Award 10 days per month credit for

sentences imposed on or after October 1,

1992.

Yes.

Were the sentence(s) for drug offenses or

crimes of violence imposed (1) before October

1, 1992, (2) on or after that date; or (3) both?

1. Before October 1, 1992 (Wickes):

C Compute good-conduct credits

separately for sentences imposed

before and after October 1, 1992.

C Award 5 days per month credit for

sentences imposed prior to

October 1, 1992.

C Award 10 days per month credit

for sentences imposed on or after

October 1, 1992.

2. On or after October 1, 1992:

C Compute good-conduct

credits for sentences imposed

before and after October 1,

1992 in aggregate. 

C Award 5 days per month

credit for all sentences.
Gen. 50] 63

3. Both before and after October 1, 1992

(Henderson):

C Compute good-conduct credits for

sentences imposed before and after

October 1, 1992 in aggregate. 

C Award 5 days per month credit for

all sentences.

B. Is the inmate serving a sentence imposed on or after

October 1, 1996 for a crime committed while he

was on parole?

No.

C Compute as in A above.

Yes.

C Compute as in A above, but subtract goodconduct credits earned prior to release on

parole.

While the outline above covers the common situations likely

to be encountered by the DOC in the computation of good-conduct

credits, we are no more prescient than the Court of Appeals in

foreseeing other possible permutations that may arise. However, the

guiding principle that appears in all three of the Court’s decisions is

that the 1992 amendment was intended to allow a more favorable

computation of good-conduct credits for inmates who are sentenced

for non-drug, non-violent offenses after October 1, 1992 and that it

was not meant otherwise to alter the method of computation of goodconduct credits. The outcome of any unanticipated permutation is

likely to be determined by this principle.

IV

Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that recent decisions of the Court

of Appeals construing Article 27, §700, require that good-conduct

credits be computed in accordance with the following principles:
64 [84 Op. Att’y

1. As a general rule, an inmate subject to multiple sentences

serves a single term of confinement that begins on the first day of the

sentence that begins earliest and ends on the last day of the sentence

that ends last. However, in certain circumstances, sentences must

be considered separately for purposes of computing good-conduct

credits. 

2. For all sentences imposed before October 1, 1992, an

inmate is entitled to good-conduct credits at the rate of 5 days per

month.

3. For all sentences imposed on or after October 1, 1992, so

long as none of those sentences is for a crime of violence under or

a drug offense as defined in Article 27, §700(d)(2), an inmate is

entitled to good-conduct credits at the rate of 10 days per month.

This is true even if the inmate’s term of confinement includes

sentences imposed before October 1, 1992, for violent crimes or

drug offenses.

4. For all sentences imposed on or after October 1, 1992, if

at least one of those sentences is for a crime of violence or a drug

offense as described in Article 27, §700(d)(2), an inmate is entitled

to good-conduct credits at the rate of 5 days per month.

5. If a sentence is imposed on or after October 1, 1996, for

a crime committed while the defendant was on parole and parole is

revoked, good-conduct credits earned prior to the defendant’srelease

on parole may not be applied to the term of confinement. 

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.

Attorney General

Robert N. McDonald

Chief Counsel

 Opinions and Advice

Editor’s Note:

The Court of Appeals subsequently addressed the computation

of good conduct credits in Moats v. Scott, 358 Md. 593, 751 A.2d

462 (2002) and Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services

v. Hutchinson, 359 Md. 320, 753 A.2d 1024 (2000).