In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-1103

JENNIFER SLOAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN BRAIN TUMOR ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 17 C 6509 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 15, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 27, 2018

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Jennifer Sloan sued her former employer, the American Brain Tumor Association (“the Association”), for unlawful retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA” or “the Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.

The district judge dismissed the complaint and we affirm. 

Sloan’s allegations, even generously construed, do not 

remotely support a claim that the Association retaliated 

against her for asserting rights protected by the Act.
2 No. 18-1103

I. Background

This case comes to us from a dismissal on the pleadings, 

see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), so we recount the facts as alleged 

in the complaint and the documents described in it, giving

Sloan the benefit of all reasonable inferences in her favor,

Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir. 2018).

Sloan began working for the American Brain Tumor Association in September 2014. She had early success, receiving 

multiple merit raises and strong performance reviews. In 

February 2016 she was promoted to the position of Director 

of Corporate and Community Engagement, making her an 

exempt salaried employee under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 213. 

Soon after her promotion, Sloan’s relationship with

Elizabeth Wilson, the president and CEO of the Association, 

began to deteriorate. Wilson became confrontational, unfairly criticized Sloan, and antagonized her in front of colleagues. The simmering friction boiled over on February 23, 

2017, when Wilson arranged a meeting with Sloan to “air her 

own personal grievances.” One such grievance was that 

Sloan “bring[s] [her] personal problems to work.” Sloan told 

Wilson that she was “uncomfortable being attacked this 

way.” She also complained that the Association did not have 

a human-resources department to help resolve the conflict.

Wilson sent Sloan home for the day. 

The next morning Wilson informed Sloan that she was 

suspended for six days without pay. Sloan vehemently 

objected. She again commented on the lack of a humanresources department and stated, “I don’t even know if you 

can do this.” Wilson replied: “I’m the President [and] CEO[;]

I can do whatever I want.”
No. 18-1103 3

On Saturday, February 25, Sloan emailed four members 

of the Association’s Board of Directors. The first paragraph 

of her email stated: “I’m not sure if you’re aware of the 

disciplinary action Elizabeth [Wilson] threatened against me 

yesterday[,] but it is my understanding that it is against 

federal law. I am reaching out to you in hopes that the Board 

will investigate this further.” In the second paragraph, Sloan 

said she was “taking a huge risk” by contacting the Board 

directly but that it was necessary in “the absence of any HR.”

The final two paragraphs attacked Wilson’s leadership of the 

Association. 

Sloan did not receive an immediate response from the 

Board. In the meantime, she hired Attorney John Madden, 

and on March 2, 2017, he emailed a four-page letter to the 

Board, explaining that he had “been retained by Ms. Jennifer 

Sloan for advice and representation regarding recent employment actions taken against her in the workplace and 

potential legal claims arising from her employment.”1 He 

reiterated Sloan’s “objections to the actions of Ms. Wilson, 

her belief in the illegal nature of the actions and discipline, 

and [her concern] about the lack of Human Resource personnel with whom she could address Ms. Wilson’s conduct.” 

He also warned that if Wilson repeated her false comments 

about Sloan to others, he “would consider such repetition by 

Ms. Wilson to be actionable defamation.” The letter concluded with a request to “preserve the professional reputation of 

 

1 Sloan did not attach her email or attorney’s letter to the complaint. But 

she mentions them in the complaint and copies were submitted to the 

district court in connection with the dismissal motion, so they were 

properly considered in resolving the motion. Domanus v. Locke Lord LLP, 

847 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2017). 
4 No. 18-1103

Ms. Sloan” by “facilitat[ing] an exit for her that is in keeping 

with her status as a Director of Corporate & Community 

Engagement.”

The following day a Board member forwarded the letter

to Wilson, who immediately sent an email to the entire staff 

stating: “Effective immediately, Jennifer Sloan is no longer 

employed by the [Association].”

Sloan responded with this lawsuit alleging that she was 

fired in violation of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision, 

which makes it unlawful to discharge an employee “because 

such employee has filed any complaint ... under or related 

to [the FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The Association moved 

to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The 

judge granted the motion, holding that Sloan’s complaints to 

the Board had nothing to do with rights protected by the 

FLSA, which regulates minimum wages and maximum 

hours. As such, a reasonable employer would not be on 

notice that she was asserting rights protected by the Act. 

II. Discussion

We review the dismissal order de novo. Tagami v. City of 

Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2017). A complaint must 

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

The FLSA requires employers to pay minimum wages

and overtime compensation to nonexempt—i.e., hourly—

employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207. The Act also makes it 
No. 18-1103 5

unlawful for an employer to “discharge or in any other 

manner discriminate against any employee because such 

employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to 

be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the 

FLSA].” § 215(a)(3). To state a retaliation claim under this 

provision, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he engaged 

in activity protected under the Act, his employer took an 

adverse employment action against him, and a causal link 

exists between the two. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 

Plastics Corp., 703 F.3d 966, 972 (7th Cir. 2012).

Sloan’s claim founders on the first element. Her complaints to the Board—that is, her email and the letter from 

her attorney—can qualify as “protected activity” under the 

Act only if “a reasonable employer in [the Association’s] 

circumstances and armed with its knowledge of the relevant 

context would have had fair notice of [her] assertion of rights 

protected by the FLSA.” Id. at 976.

Neither the email nor the letter refers to the FLSA. That’s 

not necessarily fatal; still, a complaint must “be sufficiently

clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand 

it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of 

rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 

563 U.S. 1, 14 (2011). The rights protected by the FLSA are 

those found in the statute’s wage-and-hours provisions. See 

Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999). To 

repeat, these provisions require employers to pay a minimum wage and overtime compensation to all nonexempt 

employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207.

Sloan was an exempt employee. Indeed, her complaint 

expressly alleges as much. She insists nonetheless that her 
6 No. 18-1103

email and her attorney’s letter were enough to put a reasonable employer on notice that she was complaining about a 

violation of her rights under the Act. We cannot see how—

and not only because she was an exempt employee. Her 

email contained only a highly generalized protest that 

Wilson’s “disciplinary action” was “against federal law” and 

asked the Board to investigate. The attorney’s letter merely 

mentioned Sloan’s belief in the “illegal nature of the actions 

and discipline,” which is far too vague to notify a reasonable 

employer of a suspected violation of FLSA rights.

The email and letter attacked the substantive basis for 

Sloan’s suspension, criticized Wilson’s leadership, and 

protested the absence of a human-resources department. The

attorney’s letter added an overture to negotiate a favorable 

exit from the company. Read in context, these complaints to 

the Board expressed Sloan’s frustrations with Wilson and the 

Association, but no reasonable employer would recognize 

them as assertions of FLSA-protected rights. See Kasten, 

563 U.S. at 14 (distinguishing between an employee who “is 

in fact making a complaint about an Act violation or [is] just 

letting off steam”); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 

44 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[N]ot all abstract grumblings will suffice 

to constitute the filing of a complaint with one’s employer.”).

Sloan argues that the email and letter, when considered 

in the context of her unpaid suspension, would be recognizable as a complaint that the suspension violated 29 C.F.R. 

§ 541.602(b)(5). That rule addresses how to determine if an 

employee is an exempt salaried employee and generally 

permits disciplinary suspensions without pay. Sloan’s complaints neither referred to her wages or hours, nor challenged her classification as an exempt employee.
No. 18-1103 7

Sloan also makes a weak attempt to analogize her case to 

others in which a generalized complaint about the legality of 

an employment practice qualified as protected conduct

under the Act. But in every case she cites, the employee’s 

complaint, though general, was readily recognizable as an 

objection that a particular employment practice regarding

wages or hours was illegal. See Kasten, 703 F.3d at 969 (involving an employee’s complaint that the time clock location 

was illegal); Starnes v. Wallace, 849 F.3d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 

2017) (involving an employee’s assertion that the employer 

was “violating the law” by not paying another employee for 

overtime or travel time); EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 

985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (involving an employee’s complaint 

that paying higher wages to male employees was “breaking 

some sort of law”). That is not the case here.

Finally, Sloan’s complaint fails for a second and entirely

independent reason. For her conduct to be protected, she 

must have held a good-faith belief that her suspension 

violated the FLSA. Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 857. And that 

belief must be objectively reasonable. See Lord v. High Voltage 

Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying the 

objectively reasonable standard in a Title VII retaliation 

case); Spiteri v. AT&T Holdings, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 869, 876–

77 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (collecting cases that apply the objectively reasonable standard to an FLSA retaliation claim).

Sloan’s allegations do not plausibly support an inference that 

she held a good-faith belief that her disciplinary suspension 

violated her rights under the FLSA. Nor has she identified 

any colorable legal basis for such a belief.

AFFIRMED.