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MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform

MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, 

and Pentagon Reform

by Christopher J. Lamb, 

Matthew J. Schmidt, 

and Berit G. Fitzsimmons

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Occasional Paper 6

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

June 2009
NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512–1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 

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Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution 

unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that 

a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of 

reprints or reviews.

First printing, June 2009
vii

Contents

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

IEDs and Armored Vehicles in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 The IED Challenge and Initial Armor Decisions. . . . . . . . . .1

 The Political Problem: IEDs and the Home Front . . . . . . . . 6

 Pentagon Organizational Adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 MRAP Requirements: The Lost 2 Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 Strategy Significance: The MRAP Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Explaining Delayed Fielding of the MRAPs . . . . 18

 Armored Vehicles and the Requirements System . . . . . . . . 20

 Armored Vehicle Requirements in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Irregular Warfare and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 The Pentagon Record on 

Irregular Warfare Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
viii

 Skilled Incompetence and Pentagon Decisionmaking. . . . 34 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

 About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
ix

Introduction

Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles1 offer an excellent case study for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon’s 

approach to developing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities. MRAPs 

first gained prominence for their ability to protect U.S. forces from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and because the Pentagon did not deploy 

them en masse to Iraq until almost 5 years of fighting had passed. More 

recently, following extraordinary efforts to field more than 10,000 MRAPs 

quickly, the program has been criticized as wasteful and unnecessary.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates often cites the slow fielding of 

MRAPs as a prime example of the Pentagon’s institutional resistance 

to investments in irregular warfare capabilities. Some irregular warfare 

requirements traditionally bedevil the United States—such as human 

intelligence—but quickly producing and fielding vehicles is something 

the country has done well often in the past. Moreover, the Pentagon 

assessed MRAPs as 400 percent more effective2

 at protecting U.S. troops 

than other vehicles, and Congress was eager to pay for them. Thus, the 

slow fielding of the MRAPs certainly seems like prima facie evidence for 

the Secretary’s claim that the Pentagon does not do a good job of providing irregular warfare capabilities.

Yet some analysts now argue that MRAPs are not really useful for 

irregular warfare and are prohibitively expensive.3

 By the time the vehicles finally flowed into the combat zone, the need for them had diminished because the insurgency and the IED problem in Iraq were on the 

decline. Now the Pentagon’s planned procurement of MRAPs is being 

slashed, Congress is demanding more accountability for controlling their 

costs, and the MRAP program is being accused of sidetracking important 

future acquisition programs such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and 

the Future Combat System.4

 As General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), 

asserted, “It is the wrong vehicle, too late, to fit a threat we were actually 

managing.”5

 Thus, MRAP proponents, who think their delayed fielding 

was unconscionable, and detractors, who consider them a misguided, 

emotional response to casualties,6

 both view the MRAP saga as an acquisition disaster. For incoming senior officials who are vowing acquisition 

reform, the MRAP experience seems to strengthen their cause.7

The controversial MRAPs raise two questions. First, does the MRAP 

experience support Secretary Gates’ contention that the Pentagon is not 

sufficiently able to field irregular warfare capabilities? To resolve this 

issue, we have to determine whether MRAPs actually are a valid irregular 
x

warfare requirement, and if so, whether the Pentagon should have been 

better prepared to provide the kind of force protection armored vehicles 

like the MRAP provides. Second, what factors best explain the MRAP 

failure, whether that failure is determined to be the delayed fielding of 

MRAPs or the fact that they were fielded at all? More specifically, is the 

acquisition system to blame, as is commonly supposed? We conclude that 

MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare requirement and that the Pentagon 

should have been better prepared to field them, albeit not on the scale 

demanded by events in Iraq. We also argue that the proximate cause of 

the failure to quickly field MRAPs is not the Pentagon’s acquisition system but rather the requirements process, reinforced by more fundamental 

organizational factors. These findings suggest that achieving Secretary 

Gates’ objective of improving irregular warfare capabilities will require 

more extensive reforms than many realize. 
1

IEDs and Armored Vehicles in Iraq

The IED Challenge and Initial Armor Decisions

By June 2003, 3 months after the initial intervention, the IED 

had emerged as the enemy’s weapon of choice. That month, then–U.S. 

Central Command commander General John Abizaid, USA, declared 

IEDs his “No. 1 threat.” IED casualties as a percentage of total casualties 

dropped during the first and second Battles of Fallujah (the spikes on the 

dark line in figure 1) when sustained offensive action of U.S. forces generated more close-quarters combat deaths from other weapons, but by 

December the percentage of fatalities caused by IEDs rose to just about 

half of all U.S. combat deaths. From the summer of 2005 until the spring 

of 2008, the IED threat was responsible for 50 to 80 percent of U.S. 

fatalities. In short, IEDs emerged early in the war and remained the most 

effective weapon used against U.S. forces through 2008. The percentage 

of casualties caused by IEDs did not decline significantly until mid-2007 

and 2008, when violence declined abruptly as MRAPs arrived in large 

numbers and the new American strategy under General David Petraeus, 

USA, took effect.

The IED threat evolved over time, but all major forms of IEDs were 

apparent early on—by 2004 or 2005 at the latest. Initially, the enemy just 

tossed charges underneath moving vehicles but soon began using roadside bombs set off remotely by electronic devices like garage door openers 

or cell phones. As up-armored Humvees that protected troops from IED 

shrapnel became prevalent, the insurgents buried large bombs in the roads 

to attack the soft underbellies of the vehicles, some packed with as much 

as 100 pounds of explosives.8

 By early 2005, insurgents were using IEDs 

to conduct both side and under-vehicle attacks against the entire range of 

U.S. armored vehicles, but the majority were side attacks. Under-vehicle 

mines were common by the summer of 2006. Insurgents also used a particularly lethal form of IED known as the explosively formed penetrator 

(EFP), which is able to better penetrate armor and in doing so, spray elements of the weapons and the vehicle armor into the vehicle’s interior. The 

EFPs arrived in Iraq as early as 2004. They reportedly were provided to 

Iraqi insurgents by Iran and Hizballah and were used almost exclusively 

by Shia insurgent groups such as the Mahdi Army. The sophisticated EFPs 

never amounted to more than 5 to 10 percent of the IEDs employed by 

insurgents, but they caused 40 percent of IED casualties. From spring into 

summer 2005, their use increased from about one per week to roughly one 
2 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

every other day. The use of EFPs also jumped again between February and 

March of 2008 as MRAPs entered service in large numbers.9

From the beginning, field commanders and Washington realized 

the IED problem10 was complex and required a multifaceted response. 

Better armored vehicles would be one part of the solution, but there were 

few options readily available. The Army scoured its bases for up-armored 

Humvees and was able to deliver over 200 to Iraq,11 but more and better armored troop transport clearly was needed. Two courses of action 

were quickly settled upon. First, the Army decided to procure more 

up-armored Humvees to replace the thin-skinned versions. The Army 

worked with manufacturers to increase production from 51 vehicles per 

month in August 2003 to 400 vehicles per month in September 2004, and Fatalities

Explosively formed projectiles arrive

% IED-caused Fatalities

MAR 03JUN 03SEP 03

DEC 03MAR 04JUN 04

SEP 04

DEC 04

MAR 05JUN 05SEP 05DEC 05MAR 06JUN 06SEP 06DEC 06MAR 07JUN 07SEP 07DEC 07MAR 08

JUN 08

SEP 08

DEC 08

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Fatalities

% IED-caused fatalities

Deep-buried IEDs more prominent

Figure 1. Percentage of IED-caused Fatalities and Total Fatalities

The box represents the roughly 2-year period before the 2007 “surge” when U.S. operational strategy 

was to reduce risks to U.S. forces and transfer security responsibilities to Iraq.

Sources: Michael O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, The Iraq Index (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution), available at <www.brookings.edu/FP/saban/iraq/index.pdf>; Defense Manpower Data 

Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division, available at <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/

personnel/CASUALTY/OIF-Total-by-month.pdf>; Andrew Feickert, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected 

(MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 

available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22707.pdf>; and various reports from Defense News, 

The New York Times, DefenseLink, and The Washington Post.

Figure1.P ercentageofIED-c ausedF atalitiesa ndTotalFatalities
MRAPS, IRREguLAR WARfARE, ANd PENtAgON REfORM 3

later to 550 vehicles per month.12 Second, the Army approved the emergency expedient of adding armor kits to the existing Humvees because 

they could be fielded more quickly than the up-armored Humvees (see 

figure 2).

The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) monitored these 

efforts closely and believed they were proceeding too slowly. In February 2004, HASC staff members, pursuing a mandate from Representative 

Duncan Hunter (R–CA), took it upon themselves to investigate Pentagon 

claims that production of the add-on kits could not be accelerated. They 

determined that with the help of industry, production could be increased. 

The HASC staffers shuttled between manufacturers and suppliers, utilizing 

their private sector experience to clear production bottlenecks and get the 

kits into the field. With Congress pushing hard, the Pentagon and several 

Army depots increased production from 35 kits per month in December 

2003 to 600 kits per month by July 2004. Consequently, 7,000 kits were 

delivered 6 months ahead of the Pentagon’s original timetable.13 Still, the 

total number of up-armored Humvees in Iraq remained below the 2004 

identified requirement. Only 5,330 of the 8,105 Humvees required to be 

up-armored by September 2004 were in place (see figures 3 and 4).14

Figure2.Hu mveemodifiedfordu tyin Ir aq

U.S. Marine Corps (Neill A. Sevelius)
4 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Neither kits nor up-armored Humvees was the best solution for 

protecting U.S. troops. The weight of the add-on armor ruined the suspension and drive trains of the original Humvees and made them difficult to maneuver. Up-armored Humvees were designed to handle the 

extra weight better but do not protect troops as well as armored cars and 

MRAPs, with their higher clearance, V-shaped blast deflection hulls, and 

better integrated armor shielding.15 However, armoring the Humvees had 

the advantage of building upon an existing Army program, which would 

minimize additional support costs and allow some vehicles to be stripped 

of the armor and returned to their original configuration after withdrawal 

from Iraq.

As the IED problem grew and better armored vehicles could not 

immediately be fielded, innovative U.S. troops began adding improvised 

armor to their light Humvees. Scrap metal, plywood, and sandbags were 

used to increase protection. The problem was dramatically highlighted in 

December 2004 when a Soldier complained to then–Secretary of Defense 

Figure 2. Add-on Armor Kits Requirements and Rate of Production

Cumulative production output

Requirements

Source: Government Accountability Oce analysis of Army data.

Number of kits

NOV 03 DEC 03 JAN 04 FEB 04 MAR 04 APR 04 MAY 04 JUN 04 JUL 04 AUG 04 SEP 04

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

Figure3.Add-on ArmorKitsRequirementsa ndR ateofProduction
MRAPS, IRREguLAR WARfARE, ANd PENtAgON REfORM 5

Donald Rumsfeld in a town hall meeting in Kuwait: “Our vehicles are not 

armored. We’re digging pieces of rusted scrap metal and compromised 

ballistic glass that’s already been shot up, dropped, busted, picking the 

best out of this scrap to put on our vehicles to take into combat.” 16 The 

Secretary’s response about “going to war with the Army you have” and 

his further explanation that the lack of armor was a “problem of physics” 

implied there was nothing that could be done about the situation, which 

elicited a firestorm of protest from Members of Congress, the public, and 

manufacturers who insisted they could increase production to meet the 

needs of U.S. troops.17

The resulting uproar put President George W. Bush on the defensive,18 and Secretary Rumsfeld moved fast to limit the political damage. 

Within one week of the exchange with the Soldier in Kuwait, Secretary 

Rumsfeld made delivery of up-armored Humvees and add-on armor kits 

a priority, and Pentagon officials “vowed to eliminate the armored-vehicle 

shortage in Iraq and Afghanistan within six months.”19 The Army was not 

enthusiastic but was compliant. The Service’s Director of Force Development noted both the expense of the program (over $4 billion) and the 

Secretary’s direction: “This is an enormously expensive program, but very 

frankly, the communication from the secretary of defense has been real 

clear.”20 The Army not only moved to provide the additional armor for 

Humvees, it also quickly changed course and approved standing requests 

Figure 3. Rate of Production for Up-armored Humvee Requirements 

and Rate of Production

Source: Government Accountability Oce analysis of Army data.

Requirements

Cumulative up-armored Humvee redistribution

Cumulative up-armored Humvee production output

Number of vehicles

AUG 03 SEP 03 OCT 03 NOV 03 DEC 03 JAN 04 FEB 04 MAR 04 APR 04 MAY 04 JUN 04 JUL 04 AUG 04 SEP 04

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

Figure4.Up-a rmoredHu mveeR equirementsa ndRateofProduction
6 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

from field commanders for more heavily armored vehicles. For example, 

the longstanding request from the commander of the 3d Infantry Division, 

Major General William Webster, to up-armor his M113 tracked personnel 

carriers was approved, as was the request from Colonel H.R. McMaster’s 

3d

 Armored Cavalry Regiment to take their full complement of M1A2 

tanks and Bradley armored fighting vehicles to Iraq. Webster was quoted 

as saying, “My troops won’t drive out of the FOB [forward operating base] 

in an unarmored vehicle. We just won’t.”21 Also within a week of Secretary 

Rumsfeld’s exchange with the Soldier in Kuwait, the Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico posted its first notice seeking information 

on MRAPs from potential contractors.22

The Political Problem: IEDs and the Home Front

Political pressure to do more to counter IEDs did not begin with the 

concerned Soldier’s question to Secretary Rumsfeld. Representative Hunter 

and the HASC were already on the task. However, the incident propelled 

the armor issue into the public consciousness, where it remained until 

violence in Iraq declined precipitously in 2008. In Congress, numerous 

Representatives and Senators from both parties complained about the 

Pentagon’s inadequate efforts to supply the troops with armor as well as 

other irregular warfare equipment such as body armor and electronic jammers. The complaint registered by Senator John Kerry (D–MA) in a letter 

to Secretary Rumsfeld was typical: “Over the last two years, Congress has 

provided more than $200 billion in supplemental appropriations for the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . in addition to the more than $400 billion 

we spend each year on defense. . . . It is unbelievable, and quite frankly unacceptable, that American personnel face shortages of anything at this point.”23

Hunter was particularly determined to take action on perceived 

shortfalls, and especially to overcome the IEDs. His HASC hearings on 

military acquisition were excruciating for the Pentagon. In an April 21, 

2004, hearing, Hunter pointed out that although the IED threat was 

identified in May 2003 and grew steadily worse, it was not until November that production of add-on armor kits began. Recalling Abraham 

Lincoln’s admonishment to General George McClellan that he had a 

case of “the slows,” Hunter said, “We’ve got an acquisition system that 

absolutely has a case of the slows. You guys can’t tie your shoelaces.” In 

response, Lieutenant General Joseph Yakovac, Military Deputy Director 

for the Army Acquisition Corps, noted that Humvees quickly provided 

with additional armor for deployment to the Bosnia contingency in the 

mid-1990s were “miserable failures” because they could not carry the 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 7

extra weight. Hunter was not impressed. He proceeded to relate in detail 

how he and his staff also had built a perfectly useable up-armored Humvee with help from Home Depot. Hunter and his staff were particularly 

incensed that in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2005, the 

Army had categorized the up-armored Humvee and add-on armor kits 

as “unfunded” requirements:

At a time when you’re in a war fight and you’ve got these 

IEDs . . . and we’re taking fairly substantial casualties, why 

would force protection, such as up-armor, ever be an unfunded 

requirement? . . . We’ve got military construction programs for 

things like gymnasiums, and yet that money continues to flow 

into those programs, which are peripheral to the war fight, and 

it doesn’t go to the fight. That seems, to me, to be a major defect 

in this system.24

Hunter even had his own armored gun truck built and driven to the 

door of the Pentagon to dramatize what could be done quickly with few 

resources. The Pentagon representatives listened and then explained the 

vehicle was too heavy and cumbersome to be useful.25

When it became clear that even the up-armored Humvees offered 

insufficient protection against IEDs, Senators from across the political 

spectrum, including Ted Stevens (R–AK) and Joe Biden (D–DE), weighed 

in on what Missouri Republican Kit Bond decried as an unacceptable “set 

of bureaucratic delays” in fielding MRAPs. As pressure mounted, President Bush declared in March 2006 that defeating the IED threat was a top 

priority,26 and by 2007 the commandant of the Marine Corps called the 

provision of MRAPs to troops in the field a “moral imperative.”27 Media 

and whistleblower exposés, war college studies, congressional investigations, and inspector general reports castigated Pentagon performance. 

Legislators, particularly in the HASC, complained about their inability 

to “legislate a sense of urgency” and withheld funding until mandates for 

improvements in armor were met. In short, there was sustained political 

pressure not only to do something about the IED problem in general, but 

specifically to provide better vehicular armor to the troops.

Pentagon Organizational Adaptation

The Pentagon did not anticipate or prepare well for the possibility of postwar disorder. As many studies of Pentagon war planning have 

concluded, senior civilian leadership expected U.S. military forces to leave 

Iraq quickly.28 This predisposition meant that postconflict reconstruction 
8 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

and stabilization operations received little attention, as did the possibility of extended civil disturbances or sustained irregular warfare. As a 

result, U.S. forces trained for high-intensity warfare suddenly confronted 

problems with which they had no previous experience,29 including insurgent use of IEDs. While some inside and outside the Pentagon realized 

the potential for demanding stabilization operations, senior leaders 

apparently assumed any such problems could be turned over to international organizations or other U.S. agencies. Hoping to repeat the success 

achieved in Afghanistan, Secretary Rumsfeld was keen on a quick campaign that would rapidly return U.S. forces home so they could restore 

their readiness for other contingencies in the global war on terror.30

The Pentagon objective of resetting the force for other contingencies 

proved impossible to execute as the insurgency heated up. The casualties 

produced by IEDs began to have a strategic impact as they contributed to 

declining American public support for the counterinsurgency effort in 

Iraq. As General George Casey, USA, then-commander of Multi-National 

Force–Iraq, noted in 2004, the enemy intended to use IEDs and distribute 

the images of their effects to force the United States to leave Iraq.31 As 

another Pentagon leader later explained, insurgents “use the IED as a fire 

system to create a constant flow of casualties to affect American political 

will.”32 Pentagon leaders knew that countering IEDs was an operational, 

political, and even strategic imperative.

Accordingly, the Pentagon created and repeatedly expanded a 

new organization to combat IEDs and exploit rapid acquisition efforts 

designed to save lives. First, at the behest of General Abizaid, the Army 

set up a small unit dedicated to defeating IEDs in September 2003. The 

task force motto was “Stop the bleeding.” During this period, the armor 

kits and up-armored Humvee programs got under way. Otherwise, the 

Army task force concentrated on the portion of the IED problem “left of 

the boom”—that is, on improving the ability of U.S. troops to avoid IEDs 

and attack the ability of the insurgents to make, emplace, and control the 

IEDs before they went off.33 The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force also put 

its emphasis on solutions “left of the boom.”34 

The following summer, in July 2004, then–Deputy Secretary of 

Defense Paul Wolfowitz elevated the small Army-centric effort to an Armyled Joint Integrated Process Team that was intended to harness the expertise 

of all the Services. From September 2004 on, the Secretary of Defense and 

Deputy Secretary of Defense issued memoranda authorizing expedited 

procurement of equipment designed to save lives, and also created the Joint 

Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) for this purpose.35 Congress signaled the 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 9

Department of Defense (DOD) leadership that it supported such initiatives, 

but continued to find fault with DOD for not making better use of rapid 

acquisition authorities and not empowering and funding the JRAC.36

The following year, the Pentagon again strengthened its rapid 

acquisition capability, creating the Joint IED Task Force. The task force 

remained focused on attacking the network of bomb builders and users 

to find IEDs and prevent them from exploding. By the time the Joint IED 

Task Force became the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), it had 

burgeoned into a program with annual budgets of more than $3 billion37

and several hundred personnel from all Services and numerous coalition 

countries. At one point, it was estimated that some 137 different organizations were working with JIEDDO.

The Pentagon organizations dedicated to countering IEDs could 

claim some success. IED effectiveness dropped from a high of over 50 

percent (measured by their ability to produce coalition casualties) early 

in the war to less than 10 percent effectiveness by the time MRAPs began 

flowing to theater in the fall of 2007.38 Thus, JIEDDO and other counterIED efforts such as up-armored Humvees reduced the average effectiveness of an insurgent IED attack so that the insurgents were forced to stage 

an increasing number of attacks. Unfortunately, the insurgents were able 

to do so and actually to increase their ability to inflict U.S. fatalities (see 

figure 5).39 Clearly, the battle against IEDs was not being won.

In this context, it was natural to examine the full range of options 

to reduce the effectiveness of IEDs, including whether additional armor 

could better protect troops. JIEDDO did not push better armored vehicles because the organization focused more on prevention than protection and because it had no authority to field vehicles. The predilection 

for working the IED problem left of the boom was consistent with an 

offensive mentality (attacking the IED network) and offered the possibility of a more elegant solution if it could be achieved. This orientation was 

so strong that some of those working the IED problem for JIEDDO were 

dismissive of field commanders for wanting to “place a cocoon around 

the soldier driving down the street in his vehicle” rather than “taking out 

the IEDs first.”40 Thus, additional armor was considered too defensive and 

narrow a solution by many assigned to solve the problem. 

Second, and more important, JIEDDO did not have responsibility for 

acquisition of better armored vehicles. One point critics of JIEDDO make 

is that the organization lacked the authority within the Pentagon41 and 

among other departments and agencies42 to attack the whole IED problem 
10 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

“end to end.” JIEDDO’s effectiveness extended only as far as its control of 

resources encouraged other organizations to cooperate.43 The JIEDDO 

mandate allowed it to support development of better armor for MRAPs, 

which it undertook, but it did not have authority to procure and sustain better armored vehicles.44 Fielding MRAPs was instead the prerogative of the 

military Services based on their assessment of requirements. Commanders 

in the field noted as early as the fall of 2004 that they needed MRAPs, but it 

took the Pentagon almost 3 years to arrive at the same conclusion.

MRAPR equirements:TheLost2Years

The Pentagon process to evaluate military requirements is overseen 

by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which is often 

maligned45 because it typically defers to the military Services. Neither 

the Army nor the Marines wanted to invest in MRAPs, so neither did the 

JROC. Field commanders, however, wanted more armor in general and 

MRAPs in particular. First, a Military Police commander in Iraq issued 

an urgent request in June 2003 for armored security vehicles (ASVs) to 

help protect U.S. military convoys and patrols (see figure 6).46 The ASVs 

were lighter than the MRAPs ultimately fielded but similarly designed for 

better protection against mines and other ambushes. The Pentagon was in 

the process of terminating the Military Police ASV program in the fiscal Number of IED-caused Fatalities JUN 04–JUL 07

IED-caused Fatalities

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

JUL 04

AUG 04

SEP 04

OCT 04

NOV 04

DEC 04

JAN 05

FEB 05

MAR 05

APR 05

MAY 05

JUN 05

AUG 05

JUL 05

SEP 05

OCT 05

NOV 05

DEC 05

JAN 06

FEB 06

MAR 06

APR 06

MAY 06

JUN 06

AUG 06

JUL 06

SEP 06

OCT 06

NOV 06

DEC 06

JAN 07

FEB 07

MAR 07

APR 07

MAY 07

JUN 07

JUL 07

Figure5.TrendlineforIEDFatalitiesBeforetheSurgeandMRAPDeployments Figure 4: Trendline for IED Fatalities Before the Surge and MRAP Deployments
MRAPS, IRREguLAR WARfARE, ANd PENtAgON REfORM 11

2004 budget, but Congress intervened to save the program and rush more 

ASVs to Iraq.47 Also late in the summer of 2003, the Army’s 101st Airborne Division issued a report that cited “numerous” injuries from IEDs 

in its plea for more vehicle armor and training to evade the bombs.48

In September, other commanders began to request MRAPs.49 By 

November, a draft “urgent universal need statement” for MRAPs from a 

field commander was circulating in the Pentagon. The final version, sent 

by Marine Brigadier General D.J. Hejlik on February 17, 2005,50 made the 

case for MRAPs forcefully:

The [Marine Expeditionary Force] cannot continue to lose 

. . . serious and grave casualties to IED and [motor vehicle 

accidents] at current rates when a commercial off the shelf 

capability exists to mitigate the technological casual [sic] 

factors. . . . Operating forces will . . . continue to accrue 

preventable level III and IV serious and grave casualties . . . 

while operating vehicle systems that do not have basic safety, 

crashworthy protection. . . . Continued casualty accumulation 

exhibits potential to jeopardize mission success.51

Figure6.A rmoredsecurityvehicle,usedprimarilybyMilitaryPolice

U.S. Army (Micah E. Clare)
12 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

However, the Pentagon would not act upon the request for MRAPs 

until late 2007. It took more than 2 years, political pressure from Congress, and a determined intervention by the Secretary of Defense before 

the JROC validated a large purchase of MRAPs as a military requirement 

(see figure 7). Even then, the Secretary demanded weekly briefings to 

ensure his mandate was taken seriously.52

The slow approval of MRAP requirements was not due to lack 

of appreciation for their effectiveness. Their capabilities were well 

MAR 03

JUN 03SEP 03DEC 03MAR 04JUN 04SEP 04

DEC 04

MAR 05JUN 05SEP 05

DEC 05

MAR 06JUN 06SEP 06DEC 06MAR 07JUN 07SEP 07

DEC 07MAR 08JUN 08SEP 08

DEC 08

Figure 5. Timeline of Key Political and Acquisitions Events

HASC 

Chairman 

demonstrates 

his own MRAP 

on steps of 

Pentagon

Soldier 

confronts 

SECDEF on 

vehicle armor

President declares defeating IEDs 

a top-priority

USMC commandant calls 

MRAPs “moral imperative”

# MRAPs elded

SECDEF makes MRAPs top 

acquisition priority on 

May 2; JROC approves 

7,774 MRAPs on May 10

Local USMC 

and Military 

Police 

commanders 

request 

ASVs/MRAPs

4-Stars testify MRAPs 400% 

more eective but 

unfunded requirement I MEF UNS 

for MRAPs

HASC 

authorizes 

$1B for 

vehicle 

armor/rapid 

acquisition

JIEDDO

Joint IED 

Task Force

Joint 

Integrated 

Process 

Team

Army IED 

Task Force

JROC approves 

15,374 MRAPs

Political event

Requirement milestone

Organizational change

ASV: armored security vehicle

HASC: House Armed Services Committee

IED: improvised explosive device

I MEF: First Marine Expeditionary Force

JIEDDO: Joint IED Defeat Organization

JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council

MRAP: mine resistant ambush protected vehicle

SECDEF: Secretary of Defense

UNS: universal need statement

USMC: U.S. Marine Corps

Figure7.TimelineofKeyPoliticalandAcquisitionsEvents
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 13

understood. In fact, throughout the war, U.S. experts on military 

requirements recommended armored cars and MRAPs for Iraqi 

forces also under attack from IEDs.53 For example, U.S. Army Brigadier General Roger Nadeau began looking into the BAE-produced 

Badger MRAP for Iraqi forces as early as 2004. BAE received the contract in May 2006 and had vehicles in theater 90 days later.54 While 

U.S. experts understood the value of the MRAPs and their utility in 

counterinsurgency, those who dominated the Pentagon’s requirements 

process did not think they were a good fit for the U.S. military.

As the details of an internal Marine Corps report make clear, 

despite interest from Marines in the field and some Marine supporters in the Pentagon, it was not possible to get the MRAPs approved in 

the Service requirements process. In the report, Franz Gayl, a retired 

Marine and science advisor, blames “a ‘Byzantine’ acquisition system 

that pushes bureaucrats to protect their own programs and priorities.” 55

He argued—as Secretary Gates would—that MRAPs and other irregular 

warfare capabilities are largely ignored in the acquisition system, which 

is overwhelmingly focused on future operational capabilities and not on 

the irregular wars we are currently fighting. The study became the subject of an inspector general’s report and received congressional interest 

when Senators moved to protect Gayl from retribution.56

According to Gayl and the subsequent inspector general’s report, 

Marine Corps senior leaders convened on March 29–30, 2005, to consider the need for MRAPs. The flag officers heard a strong case for 

MRAPs from a Marine who had long studied their value in irregular 

warfare. After conferring with other flag officers, the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps “directed the Deputy Commandant 

for Combat Development and Integration to review the feasibility of developing or buying a new, mine-resistant tactical vehicle to 

replace the HMMWV and to present the results at the next Executive 

Safety Board meeting.”57 But that did not happen. Instead, the Marine 

Corps decided to hold out for a future vehicle that would meet all the 

requirements for mobility and protection better than either the uparmored Humvee or MRAPs.58 The Army requirements process was 

even less favorably inclined toward the MRAP, always moving more 

slowly than the Marines to approve MRAP requirements and always in 

smaller numbers.59

In 2006, field commanders finally succeeded in getting the Pentagon requirements process to approve MRAPs. On May 21, 2006, the 

Commanding General, Multi-National Force–West, submitted a Joint 
14 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing Request for 185 MRAPs to the 

JROC, and in July he submitted a second request for 1,000 more. It is 

unclear if the JROC or a Marine requirements oversight board eventually 

approved the requirement for 1,185 MRAPs,60 but the approval cleared 

the way for a joint MRAP acquisition program, which began in November 2006. Approving the initial requirement for MRAPs removed a 

major roadblock, and the desired number of MRAPs grew rapidly. However, the approval of a large MRAP requirement did not guarantee the 

Pentagon would accord the program a high priority, as was soon made 

clear by testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on March 

13, 2007, by Generals Robert Magnus, USMC, and Richard Cody, USA.

General Magnus acknowledged MRAPs are “up to 400 percent more 

effective than the up-armored Humvees in reducing injuries and deaths” 

and can “cut casualties by perhaps as much as two-thirds.”61 Yet just as 

armor kits and up-armored Humvees were classified as “unfunded requirements” in 2004, General Magnus and General Cody explained to the dismayed HASC in the spring of 2007 that MRAPs likewise were unfunded 

requirements. In other words, despite their demonstrated value, neither 

Service budget covered MRAPs’ costs. General Magnus told the committee 

an extra $3.8 billion would be necessary for the more than 6,200 MRAPs 

needed. General Cody’s explanation for why the Army was not attaching 

a higher funding priority to MRAPs focused on the lack of an approved 

requirement and insufficient funding. When General Cody noted the 

Army put MRAPs in the 2007 budget supplemental but “it did not stick,” 

Representative Gene Taylor (D–MS) interrupted: “When you said ‘did not 

stick,’ who did that not stick with? Office of Management and Budget? The 

White House? The Secretary of Defense? Because I don’t think I have heard 

this committee say that is a nonstarter, and we are the ones who fund those 

things under the constitutional provisions of the law.”62

General Cody answered by noting the Army “did not have a valid 

requirement except for 335 MRAP vehicles when the 2008 Title IV supplemental was being built,” and again was interrupted by Taylor:

But we are getting back to that word requirement. And I have 

pointed out three instances where somebody tried to fight this 

war on the cheap. . . . I guarantee you kids died needlessly and 

kids are lying up in Walter Reed needlessly because of body 

armor, because of Humvees and because of jammers. So the 

question is: Why do we go through this again? . . . We are 

finally admitting things that we should have been asking for 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 15

last year and the year before that and the year before that. If this 

vehicle is going to save lives, if Humvees, as we now know, are 

vulnerable to mines and a hugely disproportionate number of 

casualties are occurring in Humvees because of mines and we 

have a way to address that, why don’t we address it now?

Taylor complained that the Army “seems to be dragging their feet” 

and suggested transforming auto plants to produce MRAPs if necessary. 

He concluded, “I think the Army is making a tragic—and I can’t emphasize the word tragic enough—mistake in not asking for more of these 

vehicles.” General Magnus then intervened to support General Cody and 

argued that MRAPs were a “rapidly evolving requirement over the past 

three months.”63

Almost 3 years after units in the field submitted their requests for 

MRAPs, the Pentagon requirements system had moved to the point 

where senior Service leadership could invite Congress to pay for a large 

number of the vehicles if it was willing to do so over and above the Pentagon’s normal budget and its warfighting supplemental. Two months 

later, Secretary Gates cut the Gordian requirement knot and announced 

MRAPs were the Pentagon’s number-one acquisition priority. Shortly 

thereafter, the JROC validated huge MRAP requirements, first for 7,774 

and then for 15,374 vehicles.

Strategy Significance: The MRAP Impact

Fielding MRAPs would have supported both the U.S. operational strategy under General Casey and the substantially revised U.S. 

approach to the insurgency under General Petraeus. When General 

Casey took command of forces in Iraq on July 1, 2004, he undertook 

a study to reassess his options in the war. Casey believed U.S. troops 

were seen as foreign occupiers, an innate irritant to Iraqi patriotism that 

helped feed the insurgency. Casey also knew he did not have enough 

troops to secure the population and was not likely to get more. With 

encouragement from civilian leadership looking forward to a withdrawal of some U.S. forces, Casey’s operational strategy was to pull U.S. 

forces back and reduce casualties while pushing Iraqi forces forward 

into the fight.64 Fielding MRAPs would have complemented Casey’s 

strategy well by better protecting U.S. forces as they moved to and from 

their protected enclaves, reducing political pressure for rapid withdrawal, and buying time for the transition to reliance on the Iraqi army 

and police.
16 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Instead, MRAPs were not validated by the Pentagon as a requirement for U.S. forces until mid-2007, just when the American shift in 

strategy under General Petraeus was being implemented. The acquisition 

system was already primed to move quickly on MRAPs before the Iraq 

War began because the Army’s engineers had managed to negotiate the 

Army requirements process well enough to get approval for testing and 

fielding a handful of MRAP prototypes for the purpose of clearing mines 

from transportation routes.65 With the support of Congress and Secretary 

Gates, more than 10,000 MRAPs were fielded in record time—about a 

year and a half. Congress pushed through funding; Secretary Gates made 

MRAPs a “DX” industrial priority for the country, allowing producers to 

lay first claim to whatever materials were needed; and acquisition officials 

worked with industry to increase production capacity.

The MRAPs made a significant impact once they arrived in theater, 

but this fact is obscured by the decline in violence that accompanied 

the American shift in strategy under General Petraeus. He agreed with 

counterinsurgency experts who argued that retreating to big forward 

operating bases produced “a fortress mentality [that] simply isolated the 

counterinsurgent from the fight.”66 Instead, he supported the dispersion 

of an increasing number of U.S. forces (the so-called surge of five additional Army brigades) among the Iraq population, principally in Baghdad. These efforts, in addition to other factors such as cooperation with 

Sunni tribal leaders, produced a sharp drop in violence—including IED 

attacks—from the summer of 2007 onward.67 That drop in violence meant 

a reduction in the number of U.S. casualties.

Yet it was still desirable to reduce U.S. casualties as far as possible, and 

American casualties (fatalities and wounded) from IED attacks dropped 

even further after MRAPs arrived, as would be expected. Comprehensive 

statistics on IED attacks by type of military vehicle attacked are not available, but the signature characteristic of the MRAPs—survivability—was 

evident in particular and overarching trends. Specifically, the casualty rate 

for MRAPs is 6 percent, making it “the most survivable vehicle we have in 

our arsenal by a multitude.” By comparison, the M–1 Abrams main battle 

tank was said to have a casualty rate of 15 percent, and the up-armored 

Humvee, a 22 percent casualty rate. In more than 150 attacks on MRAPs, 

seven MRAP occupants had been killed, and an undisclosed number 

had been wounded.68 As one defense official noted: “Compared to an uparmored Humvee against the same type of explosive, nine times out of 10 

there are no injuries in an MRAP other than bumps, bruises and scrapes. 

And we’re talking about sizable amounts of explosives.”69
MRAPS, IRREguLAR WARfARE, ANd PENtAgON REfORM 17

Overall trends were favorable as well. From June 2007 through 

August 2008, attacks declined 79 percent but fatalities from IED attacks 

fell further, by 85 percent. Even the most fearsome IEDs, the EFPs, were 

less effective as MRAPs flowed into country. Between February and 

April of 2008, when use of EFPs jumped about 40 percent, the deaths 

from such attacks dropped by 17 percent.70 By the time 10,000 MRAPs 

were deployed in December 2008, the percentage of U.S. casualties in 

Iraq attributable to the IED attacks that MRAPs were designed to defend 

against dropped precipitously. As figure 8 illustrates, when MRAPs began 

to flow to Iraq in November 2007, almost 60 percent of U.S. casualties 

were attributed to IEDs. Just a little over a year later with 10,000 MRAPs 

in country, only about 5 percent of casualties were attributable to IEDs, 

despite the fact that insurgents were making a point of targeting MRAPs 

with IEDs for symbolic reasons.71 In short, General Magnus’ testimony in 

March 2007 to the effect that MRAPs could “cut casualties by perhaps as 

much as two-thirds” seems well founded.72

It is natural to speculate about the impact of the MRAPs if they had 

been fielded earlier when the counter-IED effort was going poorly, as many 

believe they should have been. Congressmen, Senators, and fellows at the 

Brookings Institution are among those who argued that earlier deployment 

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

NOV 07 DEC 07 JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08 MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08 SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08

Figure 6. MRAPs Deployed and Percentage of IED-caused Casualties

Cumulative number of MRAPs deployed

Percentage of IED-caused fatalities

Overall downward trend in percentage of IED-caused fatalities

MRAPs

% IED-caused casualties

Figure8.MRAPsDeployedandPercentageofIED-causedCasualties
18 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

of MRAPs would have saved many lives.73 Some sources suggest that fielding MRAPs earlier would have lowered roadside bomb casualties as much as 

50 percent.74 General Magnus’ testimony suggested a two-thirds reduction 

in casualties, while some forces in theater suggested MRAPs could reduce 

casualties by as much as 80 percent in their sectors.75 Assuming that all other 

factors are held constant, and using the same fielding timelines from later 

in the war, we can postulate the impact MRAPs might have had if fielded 

after the receipt of the first urgent needs statement in February 2005. Arguably, MRAPs would have achieved an even more dramatic reduction in IED 

effectiveness earlier in the war since other counter-IED efforts were not yet 

bearing fruit. But even a two-thirds reduction in just IED-related (not total) 

fatalities, which would be consistent with the level of impact postulated by 

General Magnus in 2007, would have been dramatic (see figure 9). Such a 

reduction in casualties would have reduced political pressure for withdrawal 

and bought time for Casey’s strategy of pushing Iraqi forces forward. However, the substantial reduction in casualties from fielding MRAPs earlier also 

would have facilitated the strategy of securing the population that General 

Petraeus supported.

ExplainingDe layedF ieldingoft heMR APs

The overview of the Pentagon’s record on fielding MRAPs corrects 

some mistaken impressions and substantiates some popular concerns. 

The following points bear emphasis: Killed in action 160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Fatalities assuming 65% MRAP “save rate” (2,612)

Actual total fatalities (4,221)

MAR 03

JUN 03

SEP 03DEC 03MAR 04

JUN 04

SEP 04DEC 04MAR 05

JUN 05

SEP 05DEC 05MAR 06

JUN 06

SEP 06DEC 06

MAR 07

JUN 07

SEP 07DEC 07MAR 08

JUN 08

SEP 08DEC 08

Figure9.HypotheticalReductioninFatalitiesfromEarlierFieldingofMRAPs Figure 7. Hypothetical Reduction in Fatalities from Earlier Fielding of MRAPs
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 19

■ As has been widely argued, the Pentagon was poorly prepared 

for irregular warfare in Iraq in general and the IED ambush 

tactics it encountered in particular.

■ The IED threat evolved, particularly in intensity, but all types of 

IED attacks—side, underbody, EFP—were evident by 2004 or 

2005 at the latest, so the need for the range of better armored 

vehicles requested by commanders in the field was evident.

■ While the response of the acquisition system in providing 

armor kits and up-armored Humvees was not as fast as it 

could have been, the Pentagon did launch new programs 

and special organizational efforts to address the IED 

problem comprehensively and to accelerate acquisition of 

needed equipment.76

■ Despite huge resources (for example, $12.4 billion for JIEDDO 

from 2006 to 2008), the new organizations did not have the 

authority to tackle the problem in a comprehensive manner—

particularly where armoring vehicles was concerned.

■ The counter-IED organizations focused on attacking the 

precursors in the chain of factors leading to an IED explosion, 

primarily with new technology that their funding permitted 

them to readily influence.

■ Senior military leaders who control the requirements process 

only validated better armored vehicle requirements under 

pressure from two Secretaries of Defense and Congress, 

despite the demonstrated effectiveness of better armored 

vehicles and early appeals from field commanders.

■ The acquisition system fielded effective MRAPs quickly once 

they were approved and funded not only because Congress and 

Secretary Gates made them a top priority but also because the 

system had already developed and tested MRAP prototypes.

In retrospect, it is clear that the acquisition system was not responsible 

for the Pentagon’s lack of preparedness for irregular warfare or its inability to 

respond quickly to the need for better armored vehicles. The glaring deficiency 

was in the Pentagon’s requirements system, which requires further explanation. 
20 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Armored Vehicles and the Requirements System

As this account highlights, before any equipment can be bought, 

the need for it must be established along with its relative priority. The 

Pentagon process for determining military requirements, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), is overseen by the 

JROC, and together they help the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

advise the Secretary of Defense on the military capabilities needed to support the national military strategy. Not all requirements are joint or are 

important enough to be considered by the JROC; many are handled at 

lower levels and by the military Services.

The process is rigorous, as numerous tradeoffs and consequences 

must be considered. Precisely how important the requirement is for mission success must be evaluated along with the best means of meeting the 

need. Both material and non-material solutions such as training, tactics, 

and techniques are considered. Possible solutions must be considered 

for their impact on doctrine, organizations, leader development, personnel, and facilities. For example, MRAPs required the Pentagon to open a 

new training center in Texas where contractors and government workers 

could be instructed on operating and supporting the MRAPs being sent 

to Iraq.77 The requirements process is designed to reduce waste and maximize benefits for the Department of Defense. It is a lengthy process.

If and when a requirement is approved, and if the solution includes 

procurement of equipment, the acquisition system provides it. At each stage 

in the process, the individual with overall responsibility for the acquisition program reviews progress to determine whether the program should 

advance to the next stage. The relevant point here is that the process begins 

with a “Materiel Development Decision review” where JROC recommendations are heard and other factors are considered, “including the preliminary 

concept of operations, a description of the needed capability, the operational 

risk, and the basis for determining that non-materiel approaches will not 

sufficiently mitigate the capability gap.”78 In short, it is not possible to acquire 

military equipment without a validated requirement or without considering 

whether other less costly alternatives might solve the problem.

While the system pays the most attention to future requirements, 

it also allows for the identification of urgent needs from field commanders. After a commander sends a joint urgent operational needs statement 

to the Pentagon, it is processed by the Joint Staff (J–8 Capabilities and 

Acquisition Division). During the Iraq War, the requirements system was 

modified to accelerate identification of requirements, including relief 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 21

from the requirement for JROC approval in some cases.79 The acquisition system was also modified—for example, by the creation of the Joint 

Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). Its purpose was to better meet “immediate warfighter needs,” which were defined as a higher priority subset of 

urgent operational needs that must be resolved within 120 days or less. 

The JRAC is notable in three respects. First, it was innovative in 

that it used money from supplemental budget requests to fund immediate 

needs rather than going through the more laborious process of requesting permission from Congress to reprogram funds. Second, it brought 

more civilian influence from the Office of the Secretary of Defense into 

the requirements process. The JRAC core group membership includes 

representatives from the under secretaries for acquisition and comptroller and the DOD General Council. The JRAC advisory group includes 

representatives from the under secretaries for intelligence, personnel 

and readiness, policy, and networks and information integration, and 

the directors for Program Analysis and Evaluation and Operational Test 

and Evaluation. The expanded participation makes it more likely that 

the resourcing strategy for supplemental funds will be acted upon with 

alacrity. Third, JRAC must provide regular status reports to the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, thereby providing greater senior leader scrutiny of 

progress on immediate warfighting needs.80 The JRAC did not help speed 

large numbers of MRAPs to the field for two reasons. First, the amount 

of money required for thousands of MRAPs was too large to be handled 

through supplemental funding. Second, and more important, the requirements system was mired in debate over the need for the vehicles and did 

not validate the requirement.

Many factors besides the value of additional armor protection 

influenced the debate over better armored vehicles for forces in Iraq. 

Reliability and maintainability are key factors, since the vehicle will not 

protect anyone if it is constantly in depot being repaired. Mobility must 

also be considered, as well as agility (high speed, good acceleration, good 

handling for evasive maneuvers), since both contribute to mission success 

and the survival of soldiers. Deployability—how easily the vehicle can be 

transported to the fight—is also important for mission success, as is the 

vehicle’s versatility (that is, will its alternator provide sufficient electricity 

to power communication gear, jammers, and other electronic gear that 

contribute to survivability?).

The major tradeoffs between MRAPs and lighter tactical vehicles for 

forces in Iraq under sustained attack by IEDs were well understood from 

the beginning, however. As Representative Hunter noted, the advantages 
22 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

the MRAP has over a Humvee are clear: “It’s a simple formula. A vehicle 

that’s 1 foot off the ground gets 16 times that [blast] impact that you get 

in a vehicle that’s 4 feet off the ground,” such as the MRAP.81 However, 

the higher clearance, along with additional armor, also makes the vehicle 

less stable and diminishes mobility, making it impossible to navigate narrow urban streets or rough off-road terrain. The new MRAP All Terrain 

Vehicle being developed for use in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan, 

where IED use and effectiveness is on the rise,82 is smaller and designed 

to minimize the tradeoff between mobility and survivability. The objective is to provide the “same level of protection as the previous MRAPs 

(used in Iraq), but with the mobility of a Humvee,”83 which is a difficult 

engineering challenge (see figures 10 and 11). 

The tradeoff between a low ground clearance and minimum weight 

for enhanced mobility and agility, and a high center of gravity, extra 

armor, and a V-shaped hull for deflecting blasts, is straightforward, 

but there are other requirements for armored vehicles optimized for 

irregular warfare. MRAPs are supposed to be both mine resistant and 

ambush protected, meaning they are effective at countering ambushes 

from any direction. “Off-the-shelf ” MRAPs, however, are not designed 

Figure10.Ca tegoryIMRAP,in tendedforurbanoperations

U.S. Air Force (Craig Lifton)
MRAPS, IRREguLAR WARfARE, ANd PENtAgON REfORM 23

for 360-degree warfare so much as mine clearance. They do not necessarily have all the advantages of a good armored car (outward-facing 

seats, 360-degree visibility and firing ports, means of easy egress, and so 

forth). The same is true of other heavily armored vehicles such as tanks 

and armored personnel carriers. Tank armor is stronger in front, where 

the vehicle is most likely to be hit by enemy fire, and more vulnerable 

from behind (for this reason, insurgents prefer to attack from behind). By 

mid-2005, the United States had lost more than 80 tanks in Iraq to insurgents.84 Thus, “ambush protected” vehicles have more than high clearance 

and thick armor. Israel, for example, has modified tanks for urban combat 

against insurgents. The tank turrets are replaced by armored boxes with 

bulletproof glass that “allow the vehicle commanders to see 360 degrees 

without exposing themselves to fire.”85 The massive size of MRAPs is 

another feature that some consider inconsistent with counterinsurgency 

requirements. Detractors argue that MRAPs are menacing, which interferes with building good relations with the population. However, during 

some stages of a counterinsurgency effort—for example, when restoring 

basic security in contested areas—a “menacing” posture can be helpful. 

Figure11.Ca tegoryIIMRAP,u sedforconvoyescort,trooptransport,and

explosiveor dnancedisposal

U.S. Marine Corps (Thomas Griffith)
24 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Moreover, when a less threatening posture is called for, troops can dismount their vehicles. 

The point is that MRAPs are not necessarily optimized for counterinsurgency, and they satisfy a very specific requirement at the expense of 

other valuable attributes. All things considered, it is not surprising that 

when IED-related deaths were climbing, the perceived value of MRAPs 

by troops, commanders, and Congressmen was high, and when the rate 

of IED fatalities dropped dramatically, it was more common to hear complaints about MRAP mobility limitations from all of those sources. One 

Soldier summed up the situational value of MRAPs when he observed, 

“On main supply routes, MRAPs would be great, but out here [in urban 

areas] they are not tactical [because of their size and weight]. But I’d 

rather get hit by an IED in an MRAP than a Humvee any day.”86

Armored Vehicle Requirements in Iraq

Those who argue the Pentagon did the best it could in providing better armored vehicles for U.S. forces in Iraq stress the fact that the 

threat kept evolving. Senior Pentagon leaders reiterated this point in testimony to Congress. When the majority of IED attacks were from roadside 

bombs that delivered shrapnel to the sides of the vehicles, it seems that 

the up-armored Humvee and kits would suffice. When the underbody 

threat emerged, it was clear some form of MRAP would be required, and 

this happened first and most frequently in areas where the Marines operated.87 When EFPs became more prominent (primarily in areas where the 

Army operated), even heavier MRAPs with improved armor were needed; 

hence the requirement for the advanced armor. This so-called Frag kit 

six triggered the requirement for a DX industrial priority rating because 

this kind of armor was in high demand for multiple armored vehicle 

programs. When the threat declined in 2008, the Department of Defense 

decided not to purchase the 30-ton MRAP IIs that were optimized to 

defend against larger bombs and EFPs because their limited mobility 

seemed like a handicap that outweighed their advantages in survivability. In short, the threat evolved and requirements had to as well. As one 

participant later argued, “If anybody could have guessed in 2003 that we 

would be looking at these kind of [high-powered, buried] IEDs that we’re 

seeing now in 2007, then we would have been looking at something much 

longer term as a solution. . . . But who had the crystal ball back then?”88

While acknowledging insurgents adapted and used IEDs differently 

as U.S. capabilities evolved, we believe entrenched attitudes explain the 

slow response to fielding MRAPs better than evolving threats. All types 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 25

of IEDs (roadside attacks, underbody attacks, EFP attacks) were used by 

insurgents early in the conflict, which explains the early requests from 

commanders in the field for better protection than the up-armored Humvee offered. Since it was clear to Department of Defense experts advising 

the Iraq military on their requirements that MRAPs were needed for 

counterinsurgency, the lack of enthusiasm for purchasing MRAPs for U.S. 

forces seems better explained by the view that they were an expensive 

“niche” capability for irregular wars that hopefully would soon be over. 

In fact, when it came to equipping U.S. forces, the decisionmakers 

in the Pentagon’s requirements system were not enthusiastic about any 

additional armor, much less expensive MRAPs. Decisions to provide 

additional armor had to be made first by Secretary Rumsfeld and then 

by Secretary Gates. The lack of enthusiasm for additional armor also was 

manifest in the argument frequently made by force development leaders 

that the insurgents would simply build bigger IEDs, and thus “you can’t 

armor your way out of this problem.”89 As one senior Army leader argued 

as late as fall 2007, “The lesson of this war says that no matter what kind 

of a vehicle you put soldiers in, what you are going to find is somebody 

who can assemble more explosives and can overwhelm anything you try 

to put together.” 90

The contention that any additional armor is futile because it can be 

defeated one way or another is not really a valid requirements argument. 

By that logic, the military would never use armor for any purpose. Armor 

has value not because it is invulnerable but because it makes it more difficult for the enemy to defeat you and easier for you to defeat the enemy. 

The extra armor boosts the confidence of U.S. troops and permits a quick 

response to ambushes. Also, as one commander of a division in Baghdad 

noted, MRAPs forced insurgents to build bigger and more sophisticated 

bombs. Those bombs take more time and resources to build and set up, 

which gives U.S. forces a better chance of catching the insurgents in the 

act and attacking them.91

Some have pointed out that the military did not want to invest in 

MRAPs because the heavy vehicles ran counter to the Pentagon’s vision 

that future forces must be light, lethal, and expeditionary. This is true, 

but it was not just the weight of the vehicles that made them unappealing 

to those who establish military requirements. Tanks weigh more than 70 

tons but their value was recognized when they proved useful in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

92 Instead, the MRAPs were unappealing because 

they are useful for a limited defensive purpose in select irregular warfare 

campaigns like Iraq and Afghanistan that military Service leaders hoped 
26 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

would be short-lived. In this regard, the Pentagon requirements system 

was true to its historical mindset, which discounts the importance and 

persistence of irregular warfare.

Irregular Warfare and Force Protection

Pentagon officials explained the lack of readiness for IEDs by arguing that the threat could not have been anticipated.93 Actually, the general 

requirement for better vehicular protection should have been well understood.94 It is commonplace to note that irregular warriors typically hide 

among noncombatants so they are not easily identified and defeated, and 

use ambushes and other hit-and-run tactics to bleed and frustrate regular 

forces. Whereas the United States lost about 5 percent of its casualties 

to both mines and ambushes in World War II and Korea, mine-related 

casualties alone were 33 percent in Vietnam and 26 percent in Somalia.95 In fact, since World War II, slightly more than half of all infantry 

deaths have occurred while troops were trying to find the elusive enemy.96

Because insurgents are hard to locate and identify and use mines and 

ambushes as a common tactic, a patient strategy of securing the population is required to defeat them.97 When the population feels secure, it is 

more likely to provide information to help locate the insurgents and avoid 

their ambushes.

In turn, such a patient, persistent strategy requires sustained support from the U.S. public. The American populace is more likely to 

support such a strategy that produces initially ambiguous results when 

costs, including U.S. casualties, remain low in comparison with perceived 

national interests and discernible progress. The need to limit casualties in 

irregular warfare is not absolute, but rather relative to the public’s perception of progress and national interests at stake. When casualties seem disproportionate to the progress being made and the purpose for which we 

are fighting, public support will decline.

In the case of Iraq, since the war was controversial from the beginning and progress was not evident, it was particularly important to limit 

casualties. Before the war started, a majority of Americans opposed the 

war if it was going to mean “thousands of American casualties.” As the 

war transitioned into a prolonged counterinsurgency, the number of 

Americans who supported sticking it out “until civil order is restored . . . 

even if it means continued U.S. military casualties” went from 72 percent 

in July 2003 to 39 percent in July 2007. Overall, those who thought the 

number of U.S. military casualties in Iraq was “acceptable” given the goals 

of the war dropped from a slight majority in June 2003 to 21 percent by 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 27

the end of 2006.98 Similarly, support in Congress began to decline as well. 

Understanding the connection between combat losses and public support, members of both parties were emphatic about the need to give the 

military every possible means of reducing casualties.

Thus, statistical comparisons with World War II casualty rates, 

often raised by those questioning the will of the American people to fight 

extended wars, are beside the point. The public and Congress did not 

view the objectives or progress in Iraq the way they viewed the objectives 

and progress in World War II. Leaders in a democracy, including military 

leaders, must recognize that counterinsurgency typically will take more 

time, progress will be ambiguous, and the objectives will be considered 

more suspect by the public.99 The shaky and declining congressional and 

public support for continuing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq was 

typical for irregular warfare that is proceeding poorly and with increasing 

casualties. Both opinion polls and the signals from Congress on this point 

were unmistakable.

Thus, military forces must place a higher priority on force protection in irregular warfare for strategic and tactical reasons. Force protection is a strategic imperative because costs must be kept low in comparison with perceived interests and progress. It is a tactical imperative 

because hit-and-run attacks at close quarters and from any direction are 

the norm in irregular warfare. This is why counterinsurgents historically 

invest more in key infrastructure protection, static fortifications to protect lines of communication (blockhouses or fortified operating bases), 

and modification of their approaches to force protection on the march.100

These requirements for irregular warfare have not changed over time, but 

the technology has evolved so that counterinsurgents benefit more from 

both body and vehicular armor protection.101 Convoys that transport and 

supply the forces that constantly pursue the insurgents and protect the 

population must include well-armored vehicles that serve as firing platforms to counter ambushes.102

Lessons from past U.S. participation in irregular warfare emphasize 

the importance of force protection and armored mobility.103 In fact, the uparmored Humvee program originated with the U.S. intervention in Somalia. The warlord trying to frustrate U.S. forces in Somalia and encourage 

their withdrawal was using ambush tactics—including IEDs—to increase 

U.S. casualties and sap the Nation’s will to remain engaged. In response, an 

urgent effort to get up-armored Humvees to Somalia was mounted. However, soon after U.S. forces left Somalia the program was phased out, only 

to be rushed forward again when troops were sent to Bosnia.104 Both of 
28 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

these emergency acquisition efforts delivered problematic results, and each 

time support for the program waned quickly after the intervention. The 

same thing happened to urgent operational needs for armoring trucks.105

Only the U.S. Army Military Police, which specialize in population security, 

showed sustained interest in the up-armored Humvee program and ASVs. 

By the time U.S. forces went to Iraq, only 2 percent of the Army’s 110,000 

Humvees were armored,106 and only the Military Police were equipped with 

ASVs. The Pentagon even had difficulty finding the up-armored Humvees 

in its inventory, which reflects the low importance attached to the vehicles 

and to irregular warfare more generally. Oddly, 70 of them turned out to be 

located at missile bases in North Dakota and elsewhere.107

Thus, the DOD inspector general’s report on MRAPs correctly concluded that the Department of Defense should have been better prepared 

to provide better armored vehicles for irregular warfare:

DOD was aware of the threat posed by mines and improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) in low-intensity conflicts and of the 

availability of mine-resistant vehicles years before insurgent 

actions began in Iraq in 2003. Yet DOD did not develop 

requirements for, fund, or acquire MRAP-type vehicles for lowintensity conflicts that involved mines and IEDs. As a result, 

the Department entered into operations in Iraq without having 

taken available steps to acquire technology to mitigate the 

known mine and IED risk to soldiers and Marines.108

Two objections to—or qualifications of—the general proposition 

that the Pentagon should have been better prepared to meet irregular 

warfare requirements with enhanced vehicular armor may be raised. 

First, as is frequently argued, force protection is not an end in itself. Fielding a heavily protected vehicle like the MRAP requires a greater appreciation for the importance of enhanced force protection in irregular warfare,109 but this understanding must complement rather than supplant an 

aggressive, offensive tactical approach. Irregular warfare theorists deplore 

tactics that limit military forces to the protection of their compounds 

where they “lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and 

cede the initiative to the insurgents.” Instead, they argue that “aggressive 

saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be 

conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained.”110

Withdrawing inside of large, well-fortified vehicles may seem like the tactical equivalent of retreating to large bases. 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 29

On the contrary, however, as the new U.S. counterinsurgency manual notes, counterinsurgents must attach more significance to protection 

of logistic activities, treat “every logistic package or resupply operation 

[as] a mounted combat operation,” and appreciate the need for special 

equipment, including up-armored vehicles and specialized mine-clearing 

equipment (that is, MRAPs).111 In short, the requirement for a higher 

level of protected mobility for troops conducting counterinsurgency supports rather than undermines an aggressive tactical spirit, and the use of 

the vehicles can be reduced as the threat decreases and troops set aside 

heavy equipment in favor of dismounted operations with less visible firepower and protection.

The second objection is that even though a general requirement for 

better armored vehicles in irregular warfare may exist, prior to Iraq it was 

not self-evident that DOD needed to invest in a large fleet of MRAPs. 

Force protection requirements vary from one irregular conflict to another 

and even within the different regions and phases of an individual irregular conflict. As pacification succeeds, force protection requirements can 

be relaxed. Thus, force protection, like all military requirements, must be 

balanced against other demands and cannot be considered independently 

from questions of affordability and “how much is enough.” The precise 

number and mix of armored vehicles, and the way they balance mobility, 

survivability, and other attributes, depend on terrain, level of irregular 

resistance, and proficiency in other tasks such as human intelligence, psychological operations, and discriminate use of force. 

To determine the extent to which the United States should have 

anticipated the force protection requirements in Iraq, it is useful to compare the U.S. experience in Iraq with those of other countries that have 

fought irregular wars. Historically, forces well prepared for irregular 

warfare have fielded MRAP variants, but more typically they have had to 

compromise between better protected armored personnel carriers (APCs) 

with heavier armor but less visibility for the occupants and more mobile 

vehicles with better visibility but less protection. Some form of armored 

car variant is typically the result.112 They are less costly and more mobile 

than an APC, but provide 360-degree visibility and better ballistic and 

blast protection than an unprotected vehicle like a jeep or Humvee. Most 

nations with modern counterinsurgency experience that can afford it—

for example, Britain, Israel, and South Africa—use armored car variants 

with improved blast and ballistic protection, just as the United States did 

in Vietnam.113 Other countries with military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan deployed with better armored vehicles (armored car variants for the 
30 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

most part) than the United States, but they too were left scrambling for 

MRAPs.114 In other words, the absence of up-armored Humvees, ASVs, 

or other armored car variants prior to Iraq is much more difficult to justify than the absence of a large fleet of much more expensive and heavy 

MRAPs. Once the nature of the IED challenge in Iraq became apparent, however, MRAPs should have been fielded expeditiously. Instead, 

the Services hoped to get by with up-armored Humvees and avoid the 

cost of the MRAPs. Adding armor to a Humvee cost only $14,000; uparmored Humvees cost twice as much as the unarmored version (about 

$200,000),115 and MRAPs can cost three to seven times as much as an 

up-armored Humvee, from $600,000 to over $1 million per vehicle.116

The $25 billion cost projected for MRAPs is high and should have been 

kept down,117 but it is not indefensible. Congress provided annual supplemental war funding in the hundreds of billions of dollars,118 and the 

overall cost of the Iraq War is estimated at over $1.6 trillion.119 Moreover, 

as Senators120 and other sources point out, protecting people in an allvolunteer military is cheaper than replacing them. It is a cold-blooded 

observation that the cost of enlisted casualties averages $500,000, while 

officers, depending upon their military occupation, range from $1 million to $2 million each. In other words, the average light tactical vehicle 

with one officer and four enlisted personnel is protecting $2.5 million 

of DOD’s operations and maintenance account funding, leading some to 

conclude that it is specious to argue we cannot afford armored vehicles. 

Even discounting political, operational, and vehicle replacement costs, 

the opposite is clearly the case when compared to the costs of replacing 

personnel.121 Considered in this context, and given their value for countering IEDs and reducing casualties, MRAPs were a bargain, and the 

same is true of up-armored Humvees. Yet DOD refused to invest in better 

armored vehicles such as the up-armored Humvee before Iraq and was 

slow to field the MRAPs during the conflict. The Pentagon’s persistent 

tendency to ignore irregular warfare requirements is not an aberration 

but part of a larger trend.

The Pentagon Record on Irregular Warfare Requirements

Incredibly, several months after the Secretary of Defense declared 

MRAPs the top defense acquisition priority, his subordinates were 

explaining declining interest in the vehicles.122 The Secretary’s top civilian acquisition official told Congress that MRAPs will be put in storage because “Service chiefs have indicated that these are heavy, large 

vehicles that might not fit well with mobile expeditionary missions.”123
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 31

Similarly, the Marine Corps commandant explained the Service’s decision to cut the MRAP purchase in half with the observation that they 

would not be very useful after Iraq.124 The Pentagon’s explanation that 

MRAPs will not be a good fit for future conflicts seemed odd to Congress,125 and understandably so. After all, as the 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review concluded, Pentagon policy, strategy, and planning 

guidance insisted irregular warfare would be a major element of the 

future combat environment.

The Services’ attitude toward MRAPs reflects one school of thought 

in the Pentagon’s longstanding debate over the nature and precise definition of irregular warfare capabilities.126 This debate heated up in response 

to the war on terror, figured prominently in the 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review, and was further elevated by Secretary Gates who publicly reiterated that the Pentagon is unable to generate a proper balance of 

conventional and irregular warfare capabilities. Secretary Gates took the 

first step to correct this shortcoming with a policy directive that declares 

irregular warfare just as important as traditional warfare and prescribes 

improved irregular warfare capabilities to ensure the military is equally 

proficient at both.127 The Secretary then rolled out a new defense strategy that emphasizes irregular warfare capabilities,128 and followed up 

the strategy by announcing the termination or reduction of some major 

weapons programs such as the F–22 and Future Combat System to pay 

for more irregular warfare capabilities.129

This is at least the third time since World War II that national leaders have been willing to spend significant political capital on promoting 

better irregular warfare capabilities. In 1986, after years of inadequate 

responses to terrorism and other political-military problems, Congress 

mandated new special operations and low-intensity conflict organizations130 over the objections of the Pentagon. Prior to that, the Soviet 

Union’s support for “wars of national liberation” led President John F. 

Kennedy to embrace Special Forces and unconventional warfare, even firing an Army chief of staff whom he found unsympathetic to his plans.131

The enthusiasm generated by Kennedy for Special Forces was reversed 

after Vietnam, and the new organizations created by Congress in 1986 

never have been able to direct substantial investments in irregular warfare. Thus, past experience suggests it will be difficult to thrust irregular 

warfare capabilities on the Services.

Historically, the Services have focused on what they perceive to be 

their core mission: fighting regular wars and, more recently, deterring 

nuclear war. They argue irregular warfare is not sufficiently different from 
32 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

conventional war to justify separate capabilities.132 When circumstances, 

such as the war on terror, demonstrate otherwise, the military Services 

avoid sustained investments in irregular warfare capabilities by supporting 

less onerous alternatives. They argue that special operations forces have the 

irregular warfare mission covered and, if necessary, can be augmented. They 

also insist that allies and other U.S. departments and agencies should provide additional irregular warfare capabilities. If forced to invest in irregular 

warfare, the Services tend to respond with less costly nonmaterial initiatives 

such as education and training programs that can be more easily reversed. 

The adjustments made to improve irregular warfare capabilities noted in the 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review primarily follow this pattern. 

When pressed to invest in equipment tailored for irregular warfare, 

the Services argue that future capabilities should be equally effective in all 

types of conflicts. In the case of armored vehicles, the argument is made 

that those currently under development will meet all future requirements, 

including irregular warfare. Thus, the emerging preference is for “scalable 

armor” added to an all-purpose chassis that bears up well regardless of 

the levels of armored protection it carries.133 Such versatility is desirable, 

but of course is difficult to achieve. 

When niche science and technology efforts are tailored for irregular warfare, they often are isolated from the broader force development 

process.134 This appears to have happened in the case of nonlethal weapons, for example. In the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense created 

a policy for nonlethal weapons, a joint concept for their use, and a joint 

nonlethal weapons program to develop prototypes. Yet a recent Government Accountability Office report found that the Department of Defense 

did not prioritize nonlethal capability gaps until 2007 and that most of 

the capability gaps identified in 2007 were already broadly identified 11 

years ago.135 Along with other shortcomings identified in the report, the 

lethargic requirements identification helps explain why today, more than 

a decade after policy and doctrine were developed, the gaps in nonlethal 

capabilities are still not remedied. 

When operational needs force the urgent procurement of some 

specialized irregular warfare equipment, such capabilities are abandoned shortly after the conflict fades from memory. The Air Force 

quickly lost its slower fixed wing aircraft for reconnaissance and close 

fire support after Vietnam and never recovered it.136 The Navy did the 

same for its brown and green water vessels that patrol coastlines and 

inland waterways. More recently, after accepting transfer of the U.S. 

Special Operations Command coastal patrol ships, the Navy planned 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 33

to decommission them and give them to countries such as the Philippines. The attacks on September 11 saved the vessels, which have gone 

to the Coast Guard to patrol U.S. waters or are now used overseas for 

coastal patrol in the war on terror.137 The prognosis for MRAPs is the 

same. When U.S. forces leave the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

some number of MRAPs may be converted to command and control 

vehicles and some may be stored in equipment stockpiles.138 However, 

many will be left behind,139 and others likely will be declared excess 

defense articles and given away to other friendly forces.140 The substantial investment in these vehicles will be sacrificed in order to save some 

operations and maintenance costs.

A prudent base for irregular warfare capabilities that could be 

modified and expanded as circumstances warrant is necessary and would 

not be that expensive for several reasons. Many material requirements 

for irregular warfare are not technology-intensive. When sophisticated 

technology is required, it often just requires modifying capabilities developed for regular warfare, which means lower overall program costs.141 In 

addition, some irregular warfare requirements are so variable that it only 

makes sense to invest in research and a limited number of prototypes for 

experimentation, another factor that holds down the costs of irregular 

warfare capabilities. For example, specifications for electronic countermeasures can evolve so quickly that it is best to approach them as rapid 

acquisition challenges. Better preparedness for irregular warfare would 

save the costs later incurred by inefficient emergency acquisition programs. For example, up-armored Humvees had to overcome design and 

production flaws,142 including a tendency to roll over and injure the occupants,143 and rushing MRAPs to theater with emergency airlift was quite 

expensive (about $750,000 per vehicle).144

In short, better preparedness for irregular warfare requires a solid 

research and development base and some programs of record that can be 

rapidly expanded depending on precise needs. This is Secretary Gates’ 

goal; he wants to “institutionalize procurement of [irregular] warfare 

capabilities” so they can be quickly fielded when needed. He argues 

that the Pentagon should be able to deliver the “75 percent solution in 

months” to forces engaged in irregular warfare, in contrast to delivering 

“the 99 percent solution in years” that is typical of our conventional force 

modernization programs.145 It would be nice to field equipment rapidly 

without sacrificing rigorous analysis of effectiveness,146 but in most cases 

there is an inescapable tradeoff between quality and speed. A 99 percent 

solution requires investments well in advance (for example, the Military 
34 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Police investment in armored security vehicles), and a 75 percent solution 

fielded quickly—such as the up-armored Humvees and MRAPs—means 

we cannot lament the lost 25 percent (better prices and better sustainability for a more homogenous fleet of MRAPs) later on.

The source of resistance to the Secretary’s goal of institutionalized 

irregular warfare capabilities is not the Pentagon’s acquisition system, 

however. As acquisition professionals are quick to emphasize, and as the 

experience with MRAPs illustrates, it is impossible to legally procure 

anything without a validated requirement and congressional funding. 

Instead, it is the requirements system and, more generally, the way the 

Pentagon is organized to make decisions that frustrate fielding of irregular warfare capabilities.

Skilled Incompetence and Pentagon Decisionmaking

Secretary Gates has argued that the Pentagon’s poor performance 

on irregular warfare stems from multiple, dysfunctional organizational 

factors present in “any large, hierarchical organization.”147 This is true. In 

the case of MRAPs, the Pentagon displayed a characteristic common to 

nearly all such large organizations known as “skilled incompetence.”148 Put 

simply, the kind of counterproductive behavior seen in the management of 

the force protection issue in Operation Iraqi Freedom was a “natural and 

routine” result of otherwise highly skilled and earnest practitioners resolving problems within their own frames of reference but without a broader 

appreciation of the entire problem. The MRAP experience reveals how 

reasonable but ultimately incorrect decisions can be made at different levels of the national security system to produce adverse outcomes.

To begin with, the DOD requirements process is focused on providing future operational capabilities at the expense of meeting current needs, 

an organizational penchant the Secretary calls “next-war-itis.”149 Commanders always want more than can be provided, and their many requests 

for additional capabilities must be vetted and balanced against competing 

requirements and limited resources, including the weapons being developed for future forces. There is a system for reconciling future and current 

requirements, but it is dominated by Service force development leaders 

who are rewarded for protecting future programs and who operate in Service cultures that are dismissive of irregular warfare requirements. It is not 

surprising that the Army and Marine combat development leaders decided 

to hold out in favor of a better future vehicle rather than purchase MRAPs 

in quantity for a war they hoped would quickly end. The Service leaders 

who made these decisions knew that from the force development point of 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 35

view, there were good reasons to avoid expensive new armor programs or 

minimize their costs by sticking with the up-armored Humvees. Doing so 

made little sense in the larger context of U.S. stakes in Iraq and the impact 

of the growing IED problem, however.

Leaders in the field looked at the IED problem from a different perspective, but they did not control the decisionmaking for procurement. 

General Casey recognized early on that IEDs threatened the ability of the 

United States to sustain operations in Iraq. He understood the need to 

“stop the bleeding.” He developed a strategy that relied on Iraqi forces and 

reduced the exposure of U.S. forces. At the same time, with the help of 

General Abizaid, he worked to further reduce casualties through extraordinary efforts to combat the IED problem, which the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense supported with new organizations and procedures, including the 

creation of JIEDDO. JIEDDO’s focus on “left of the boom” technologies 

reflected not only the larger DOD cultural predilection for “offensive” 

initiatives but also its limited scope of authority. JIEDDO helped with 

new armor technologies, but it did not have authority to oversee the ready 

solution MRAPs provided. All these individual decisions, defensible 

within a narrow frame of reference, were insufficiently comprehensive; 

they could not prevent the broader failure to field MRAPs.

At the national level, failure to work the invasion of Iraq as an interagency enterprise set the stage for the scope and level of the IED problem. 

With DOD in the lead, the decision was made to minimize the number 

of forces deployed, which in part explains the poor readiness for postconflict stabilization tasks. Iraqi munitions were not secured, and there 

were insufficient forces to quickly control rising civil disorder. From the 

DOD point of view at the time, it was more important to reset U.S. forces 

and provide the President with options for further operations in the war 

on terror. Thus, DOD was slow to recognize and respond to a problem 

that its own commanders in the field reported and other departments and 

agencies predicted. Again, the inability to consider and work a problem 

comprehensively contributed to failure.

With the benefit of this summary, it is possible to highlight some 

of the organizational factors that Secretary Gates mentioned as an 

explanation for the Pentagon’s poor performance in irregular warfare. 

Beneath the Secretary of Defense, there was no entity empowered to 

work the IED problem holistically. Instead, the Pentagon is structured 

to delegate decisionmaking to enclaves of specialists and ignore the 

difficult job of making tradeoffs among many competing objectives 

and areas of expertise. Culturally, the Pentagon disparages irregular 
36 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

warfare in general and particularly the defensive requirements derived 

from irregular warfare principles.150 Other factors inhibit organizational 

learning so that pockets of expertise are not accessible to higher level 

general decisionmakers. Even when they are, as happened to be the case 

in the Marine review of MRAPs, leaders are very reluctant to override 

decisions made by those who have more time and detailed knowledge, 

even if the incentives and perspective of those subordinates are limited 

to their organizational mandates.

Thus, the planning for the Iraq War and its aftermath, the strategy development for the counterinsurgency that emerged, and the 

effort to defeat IEDs that were the insurgents’ key weapons were all 

managed in a manner typical of large, hierarchical organizations. At 

each level, the problem was given to a lead element of the larger organization or system, one that had a constricted point of view or lacked 

the authority to address the problem comprehensively. To correct the 

tendency toward “skilled incompetence” typical of large, rigidly hierarchical organizations, the Secretary of Defense has two general choices. 

Either the Secretary must repeatedly intervene personally to manage 

complex issues—as both Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Gates had 

to do in order to address the need for better armored vehicles—or else 

he must change the way the Pentagon is organized to manage complex 

issues and contingencies. The first option will produce inconsistent 

results because one person inescapably has a limited span of control. 

The second option requires onerous reforms that go beyond adjustments to the acquisition process. 

Conclusion

MRAPs are not a silver bullet for defeating IEDs or the only element of force protection important in irregular warfare, but they were 

and remain a valid irregular warfare requirement. They made a difference 

even as insurgent violence was winding down, and would have made a 

bigger contribution if deployed earlier. They will be used again in the 

future. In short, Secretary Gates is right to cite the MRAP experience as 

prima facie evidence of the Pentagon’s inability to properly balance conventional and irregular warfare capabilities, and he could make similar 

points about the inadequate investments in up-armored Humvees and 

ASVs prior to the conflict in Iraq. At issue is what to do about it.

Most immediately, the Secretary is determined to rebalance the 

current defense program to better support irregular warfare. Secretary 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 37

Gates’ experience with MRAPs reportedly disillusioned him to the 

point that he resolved to make more fundamental changes in DOD 

procurement programs.151 In announcing his decisions to terminate 

or curtail major acquisition programs, the Secretary explained that 

more resources were needed for irregular warfare capabilities and also 

observed that the current program inadequately integrates the investment in MRAPs.152

Second, the Secretary’s recent speeches justifying the historic rebalancing of the Pentagon’s defense programs promote the need for lasting 

acquisition reform. Gates notes that we must have “a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.”153

The call for acquisition reform is consistent with his observation that 

the key to solving the irregular warfare problem “is to make sure that 

the strategy and risk assessment drive the procurement, rather than the 

other way around.”154 In making this comment, Gates implied that Pentagon procurement—backed by powerful external interests supporting 

conventional force programs—is on autopilot and negates strategy. Thus, 

in addition to rebalancing the current defense program, the Secretary 

intends to realize his goal of institutionalizing procurement of “specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment for stability and counterinsurgency missions” through acquisition reform.

If there is one clear lesson from the MRAP experience, however, 

it is that the Pentagon’s problems with irregular warfare go well beyond 

the acquisition system, a point that easily could get lost as the battle is 

joined over the current defense program and new Obama administration 

political appointees rush to implement acquisition reform. The long delay 

in fielding MRAPs is attributable first to the Pentagon’s force development or requirements system, secondly to Service cultures that generally 

undervalue irregular warfare capabilities, and finally to the Pentagon’s 

decisionmaking structure and processes that typically favor specialization 

over integration of diverse areas of expertise to solve complex problems. 

Once senior leadership corrected these problems, validated the requirement, and made resources available, the acquisition system was able to 

field large numbers of MRAPs within 18 months—an accomplishment 

often described as an industrial feat not seen since World War II. No 

doubt improvements in rapid fielding of high-quality systems could and 

should be made—for example, by testing systems as they are fielded in 

a spiral development process as is frequently advocated.155 However, the 

inadequate effort to provide armored vehicles to troops in Iraq is better 

explained by broader organizational factors than acquisition processes. 
38 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Reducing the problem with irregular warfare to acquisition reform 

underestimates the institutional resistance the Secretary will encounter. 

Past efforts to get the Pentagon to take irregular warfare seriously have 

failed to produce lasting change despite major interventions by civilian 

leadership. If the MRAP example is representative of general Pentagon 

decisionmaking tendencies, as we believe it is, eliminating the imbalance between conventional and irregular warfare capabilities requires a 

broader and more robust reform effort than commonly understood. To 

get irregular warfare capabilities right,156 the Secretary needs the cooperation of the Services, which would be more likely if the Pentagon was reorganized for more collaborative decisionmaking. The Secretary should be 

able to delegate decisionmaking to horizontal teams that could make the 

difficult tradeoffs across multiple areas of expertise required for successfully managing complex missions comprehensively.157

Admittedly, the fundamental decisionmaking reform that the Pentagon requires to overcome its “skilled incompetence” in irregular warfare would be difficult. But as Secretary Gates has argued, “In the end, 

the military capabilities we need cannot be separated from the cultural 

traits and reward structure of the institutions we have.”158 Hopefully, the 

Secretary’s broader understanding of the problem—and hence the proper 

scope of required reform—will not get lost in the rush to restructure the 

current program or reform the acquisition system.
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 39

Notes

1

 Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAPs) are vehicles designed from the ground up to 

reduce casualties and increase survivability for personnel subjected to mine explosions, improvised 

explosive device (IED) detonations, and small arms fire. Blast forces are deflected away from the 

crew with the vehicles’ V-shaped hulls. The Pentagon designates two categories of MRAPs: “The 

Category 1 MRAPs are four-wheeled vehicles that carry a crew of two and four passengers. The sixwheeled Category 2 vehicles have a crew of two and can carry eight.” Within these categories, there 

are 16 different variants, including separate Marine Corps and Army versions of the vehicles. See Jim 

Garamone, “Defense Department Contracts for 2,400 More MRAP Vehicles,” American Forces Press 

Service, October 22, 2007, available at <www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47849>. 2

 Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 

110th Congress, 1st Sess., Readiness Subcommittee Hearing on Budget Request on Adequacy to Meet 

Readiness Needs, March 13, 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008). 3

 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Dakota L. Wood, Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [CSBA], 

2007); Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, “Military Thinks Twice on Fortified Trucks,” The Los 

Angeles Times, December 27, 2007, available at <www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-namrap27dec27,0,843075.story?coll=la-home-center>. 4

 Kris Osborn, “Early MRAP Contracts Draw Fire,” Defense News, July 16, 2007; “Will MRAPs 

Drain U.S. Army’s JLTV, FCS Efforts,” Defense News, July 23, 2007; and “MRAP Pushes JLTV Arrival 

Two Years to 2012,” Defense News, September 3, 2007. 5

 Barnes and Spiegel.

6

 One of the authors of the CSBA report Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex 

Irregular Operations called the MRAP a “million-dollar Kleenex.” See Christian Lowe, “Marines Urge 

Caution on MRAP Fielding,” Military.com, October 19, 2007, available at <www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,153219,00.html>. 7

 John Bennett, “DoD Nominees Vow Acquisition Reform,” Federal Times, January 19, 2009, 

12. 8

 Inspector General, Department of Defense, Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent 

Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (Arlington, VA: Department of 

Defense, 2008), available at <http://pogoarchives.org/m/ns/dod-ig-report-20081208c.pdf>, 7. 9

 On explosively formed penetrator (EFP) use, see Gareth Porter, “U.S. Military Ignored Evidence of Iraqi-Made EFPs,” Inter Press Service, October 25, 2007, available at <http://ipsnews.net/

news.asp?idnews=39810>; “Military Vehicles to get Updated Armor,” Washington Times, May 10, 

2008; William McMichael, “IED Casualties in Iraq Drop Sharply,” Defense News, October 6, 2008; 

William McMichael, “JIEDDO: Decisions Made within 3 Weeks,” Defense News, November 12, 2007, 

44; and Rick Atkinson, “You Can’t Armor Your Way Out of this Problem,” The Washington Post, 

October 2, 2007, A1. 10 A good overview of the complex problem is provided by Ezio Bonsignore and David Eshel, 

“Countering the IED Threat,” Military Technology, June 2006. 11 Rick Atkinson, “The Single Most Effective Weapon Deployed Against Our Forces,” The 

Washington Post, September 30, 2007, A1. 12 Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, 2005), 120, available at <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS60246>. 13 Interview with House Armed Service Committee (HASC) staff, Washington, DC, February 

17, 2009. 14 Government Accountability Office, 22.

15 Marine Corps vehicle hardening study conducted in early 2005. See <http://blog.wired.com/

defense/files/franz_gayl__complete_mrap_study_archive.pdf>. 16 Pamela Hess, “Troops Ask Rumsfeld Tough Questions,” United Press International, December 8, 2004. 17 George Edmonson, “Armored Vehicle Shortage Disputed, Manufacturers Insist Production 

Not an Issue,” Austin American-Statesman, December 10, 2004, A1; Bryan Bender, “U.S. Stance On 

Armor Disputed: Company Says Vehicle Orders Waiting for OK,” Boston Globe, December 10, 2004, 1.
40 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

18 Mark Mazzetti, “Bush Acts to Defuse Furor on Armor,” The Los Angeles Times, December 

10, 2004, available at <www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-armor10dec10,1,907476.

story>. 19 Matthew Cox and Megan Scully, “Pentagon Vows to Add Armor to Vehicles by June,” 

Defense News, January 3, 2005, 11. 20 Matthew Cox and Megan Scully, “$4 Billion Pledged to Make Trucks, Humvees Safer,” 

Defense News, January 3, 2005, 11. 21 Elaine M. Grossman, “Army Approval for Heavier Armor in Iraq Delayed until Last Month,” 

Inside the Pentagon, January 20, 2005, 1. 22 Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison, and Tom Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at Pleas From 

Officers in Field for Safer Vehicles: Iraqi Troops Got MRAPs; Americans Waited,” USA Today, July 16, 

2007, 1.23 Bryan Bender, “Lawmakers Criticize Marine Corps for Humvee Armor Delay,” The Boston 

Globe, June 22, 2005, A7.

24 HASC, hearing on DOD acquisition, April 21, 2004. 

25 Atkinson, “The Single Most Effective Weapon Deployed Against Our Forces,” A1. CSBA 

analysts seem particularly concerned about MRAP weight and whether they are a good fit for the 

“transformed force” of the future. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Dakota L. Wood, “Unbalancing the 

Force?” Defense News, October 22, 2007. 26 Bonsignore and Eshel, 108.

27 Congressional Record, March 29, 2007, S4085, available at <http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.

gov/record/2007/2007_S04085.pdf>. 28 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward an American Way of War (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004), 16. 29 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 

2006), 151. 30 Joseph J. Collins, Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 5 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

April 2008), 6–8. Collins notes the unique role of Secretary Rumsfield in planning the war. See also 

Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004); Thom Shanker 

with Eric Schmitt, “Latest Mission for Armed Forces: Analyze New Ways to Prepare for Conflicts,” 

The New York Times, April 30, 2003. 31 Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008 (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 2008), 40. 32 Noah Shachtman, “Pentagon Bomb Squad Chief Looks Back,” Wired.com, November 16, 

2007, available at <http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/11/the-other-day-i.html>. 33 Interview with Bob Simons and John Wason, HASC, February 17, 2009, Washington, 

DC; Doug Sample, “DoD Joint Task Force Making Progress Against IED Threat,” American 

Forces Press Service, April 18, 2005, available at <www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=31400>. 34 Roxana Tiron, “Future of Army’s ‘Rapid Equipping Force’ Still Uncertain,” NDIA Business and Technology Magazine, August 2004, available at <www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/

ARCHIVE/2004/AUGUST/Pages/Future_of_Armys3454.aspx>. See also Megan Scully, “Rapid 

Equipping Force Shifting U.S. Acquisition Culture,” Defense News, January 3, 2005, 11; and Michael 

Moss, “Many Actions Tied to Delay in Armor for Troops in Iraq,” The New York Times, March 7, 

2005, 1. The first leader of the Rapid Equipping Force, Colonel Bruce D. Jette, USA, quit in frustration as traditional Army acquisition processes were reasserted over time. 35 DOD Inspector General Report No. D–2009–030 (Project No. D2008–D000AE–0174.000), 

December 8, 2008, “Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles,” available at <http://pogoarchives.org/m/ns/dod-ig-report20081208c.pdf>. 36 Simons and Wason. Even though the Pentagon already had the authority for rapid 

acquisition, Congress reasserted this prerogative in section 811 of the Ronald W. Reagan National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375). The HASC would later 

chastise DOD for not making sufficient use of the authority. See House Report 109–089, National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, available at <www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&

dbname=cp109&sid=cp109bysBv&refer=&r_n=hr089.109&item=&sel=TOC_741620&>.
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 41

37 CAPT Douglas Borrebach, USN, division chief of J–8, Joint Improvised Explosive Device 

Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), telephone interview, March 31, 2009. 38 IED effectiveness figures were generated from raw data supplied by JIEDDO. 

39 Rey Guzman, “Joint IED Task Force Helping Defuse Insurgency’s Threat,” Army News 

Service, July 18, 2005. See also Anne Roosevelt, “Joint IED Defeat Task Force Awaits White Papers,” 

Defense Daily, June 9, 2005. 40 John Bennet, “What Next for U.S. Joint Anti-IED Efforts,” Defense News, September 17, 

2007, 1.41 Richard F. Ellis, Richard D. Rogers, and Bryan M. Cochran, “Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO): Tactical Successes Mired in Organizational Chaos; Roadblock in the Counter-IED Fight,” student paper, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, March 13, 2007. 42 William G. Adamson, “An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,” student paper, Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces, Washington, DC, 2007. 43 Ellis, Rogers, and Cochran.

44 LtCol Tracy O’Grady-Walsh, USAF, director of JIEDDO strategic communications, telephone interview, March 31, 2009. 45 Defense experts, think tanks, and the Defense Business Board frequently call for its reform. 

John Bennett, “DoD Nominee Vows Scrutiny of Technologies,” Defense News, March 30, 2009. 46 Telephone interview with Mark Savorese, Textron, February 16, 2009; Eliot Blair Smith, 

“Textron Fought Storm to Deliver for Army,” USA Today, May 5, 2006. 47 Blake Morrison, Tom Vanden Brook, and Peter Eisler, “When the Pentagon Failed to Buy 

Enough Body Armor, Electronic Jammers and Hardened Vehicles to Protect U.S. troops from Roadside Bombs in Iraq, Congress Stepped In,” USA Today, September 4, 2007. In July 2005, the Army 

contracted for 724 Armored Security Vehicles. “Textron Systems Awarded Contract for Production 

of 724 Additional Armored Security Vehicles for Operation Iraqi Freedom,” July 5, 2005, available at 

<www.textronmarineandland.com/news/2005/09_12_05.htm>. 48 Moss, 1.

49 Simons and Wason.

50 Inspector General, “Marine Corps Implementation.”

51 Brigadier General D.J. Hejlik, USMC, “Universal Need Statement, Urgent, Mine Resistant 

Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle” (2005), available at <http://blog.wired.com/defense/files/MRAP.pdf>. 52 Barnes and Spiegel.

53 Christopher J. Lamb and Michael Casey, “Armored Arguments: Tougher U.S. Vehicular 

Armor Critical to Success,” Defense News, February 13, 2006; Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), “Iraqi Armed Forces: The Way Ahead,” unclassified briefing, CMATT Strategic 

Planning Workshop, January 20, 2004; Riad Kahwaji, “No Artillery, Tanks in Iraqi Buying Plan,” 

Defense News, May 7, 2007. Also in 2004, the United States helped the Iraqi minister of interior 

purchase armored security vehicles. See “Textron Systems to Provide Armored Security Vehicles to 

Newly Formed Iraqi Civil Intervention Force,” Textron Newsroom, July 29, 2004. 54 Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison, and Tom Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at Pleas for Safer 

Vehicles,” USA Today, August 22, 2007. 55 Sharon Weinberger, “Report: IED Crisis ‘Avoidable’ with Armored Trucks,” Wired.com, February 19, 2008, available at <http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/02/report-ied-cris.html>. 56 “Bond: Red Tape Delaying Troops Humvee Protection; Secretary of Defense Launches 

Investigation,” Kansas City Star, February 29, 2008; Associated Press, “Study Faults Delay of 

Armored Trucks for Iraq,” The New York Times, February 17, 2008, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2008/02/17/washington/17armor.html? r=2&ei=5087&em=&en=d0a6d1a8cfb34fa7&ex=1203

397200&adxnnl=1&oref=login&adxnnlx=1203438139-0IrE4QUGVSJwJcHzkseS/Q.; Weinberger. >. 57 Inspector General, “Marine Corps Implementation.” 

58 Gayl’s report is available at <http://blog.wired.com/defense/files/franz_gayl__complete_

mrap_study_archive.pdf>. 59 In 2007, the Pentagon had to divert 1,200 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles 

ordered by the Marine Corps to the Army because of widespread concern about Army casualties 

in Baghdad. “DOD Shifts 1,200 MRAPs from Marine Corps to Army,” InsideDefense.com, June 

20, 2007. 
42 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

60 The two best sources on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC’s) involvement 

are the DOD Inspector General (IG) report, “Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal 

Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles,” and the Government Accountability 

Office, “Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles,” Report GAO–08–884R, 

July 15, 2008. Neither source specifies whether the JROC approved the initial 1,185 MRAPs. The 

IG report specifies the JROC approval of larger MRAP requirements after the Secretary of Defense 

weighed in on the issue, but simply notes the requirement for 1,185 was approved without reference 

to the JROC. Neither does testimony by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics) clarify the issue, as Young notes only the later, larger JROC-approved MRAP requirements. See John Young, Jr., Bill Greenwalt, and Clovise Hoover, testimony before the Seapower and 

Expeditionary Forces and Air and Land Forces subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee, November 2007, available at <www.defense-house.com/December2007.pdf>. One news article, relying on inside sources, indicates that the “Joint Chiefs validated requests from Iraq for 4,060 

MRAPs” in December 2006. Eisler, Morrison, and Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at Pleas from 

Officers in Field for Safer Vehicles,” 1. 61 Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. 

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 John D. Banusiewicz, “‘As Iraqis Stand Up, We Will Stand Down,’ Bush Tells Nation,” 

DefenseLink News, June 28, 2005. In May 2005, Vice President Dick Cheney declared that the insurgency was “in its last throes,” and in March 2005, General Casey had predicted “very substantial 

reductions” in U.S. troops by early 2006. Eisler, Morrison, and Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at 

Pleas from Officers in Field for Safer Vehicles,” 1. 65 COL Timothy Goddette, USA, Maneuver Support and Sustainment Systems Command, interview, February 27, 2009, Arlington, VA. Four Nyala multipurpose mine clearing 

vehicles were purchased from a South African company for use in Bosnia in 1996. In addition, 

while the larger purchase of MRAPs was held up by the requirements system, the Army bought 

about 500 MRAPs specifically for IED disposal teams. Osborn, “Will MRAPs Drain U.S. Army’s 

JLTV, FCS Efforts.” 66 Ricks, 446.

67 John T. Bennett and William H. McMichael, “JIEDDO Chief: IED Attacks Down, But so 

Are Research Funds,” Defense News, November 26, 2007, 20. 68 Andrew Feickert, “Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background 

and Issues,” Report RS22707, Congressional Research Service, updated August 1, 2008, available at 

<http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22707_20080801.pdf>. Feickert obtained the information from 

DOD Press Transcripts, “DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell,” May 15, 2008. 69 Kris Osborn, “MRAP Breakthrough,” Defense News, October 6, 2008, 11. 70 “Military Vehicles to get Updated Armor,” Washington Times; McMichael, “IED Casualties 

in Iraq Drop Sharply.” 71 Andrew Gray, “New U.S. Armored Trucks are Symbolic Targets: General,” Reuters, August 

24, 2007, available at <www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN24356492>. 72 Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. 

73 Then–Senator Biden argued that 67 to 80 percent of IED casualties could have been 

avoided. U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, July 19, 2007, available at <www.govtrack.us/congress/

record.xpd?id=110-s20070719-15>. 74 Jeff Schogol, “Marines Ask DOD’s Inspector General to Review MRAP Allegations,” Stars 

and Stripes, February 27, 2008. 75 Gayl.

76 The Pentagon mounted a spirited but largely ignored public relations effort on this score. 

Lawrence Di Rita, “Armor for the Troops: The Pentagon View,” letter to the editor, The New York 

Times, March 11, 2005.

77 “MRAP University Opens in December,” Inside the Pentagon, November 29, 2007. 78 Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Department of 

Defense Instruction No. 5000.02, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” December 8, 2008, 

available at <https://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&doc=2>. 79 Kris Osborn, “Work to Codify U.S. Army’s Rapid-Fielding Rules Continues,” Defense News, 

September 22, 2008. 
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 43

80 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, “Rapid Validation and Resourcing 

of Joint Urgent Operation Needs in the Year of Execution,” July 15, 2005 (current as of July 9, 2007). 81 Eisler, Morrison, and Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at Pleas from Officers in Field for 

Safer Vehicles,” 1. 82 Tom Vanden Brook, “Push for MRAPs in Afghanistan: IEDs Now Causing 75% of Casualties,” USA Today, April 3, 2009, 6A, available at <www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20090403/

ieds03_st.art.htm>. 83 Matt Sanchez, “Defense Department Designs ‘Baby MRAP’ for War in Afghanistan,” Fox 

News, April 1, 2009. 84 Richard Lowry, “What Went Right,” National Review, May 9, 2005, 29. 85 David Wood, “Lack of Heavy Armor Constrains Urban Options in Iraq,” Newhouse News 

Service, available at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20041005326461.html>. 86 Bryan Mitchell and Andrew Scutro, “Three Die Amid MRAP Rollover Concerns,” Defense 

News, July 7, 2008, 26. 87 Godette interview.

88 Eisler, Morrison, and Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at Pleas from Officers in Field for 

Safer Vehicles,” 1. 89 Atkinson, “You Can’t Armor Your Way Out of this Problem,” A1. 

90 Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, USA, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, 

interview, Defense News, September 3, 2007, 38. 91 Tom Vanden Brook, “Roadside Bombs Decline in Iraq,” USA Today, June 22, 2008, available 

at <www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2008-06-22-ieds_N.htm>. 92 John Gordon IV and Bruce R. Pirnie, “Everybody Wanted Tanks’: Heavy Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Joint Force Quarterly 39 (4th Quarter 2005). 93 See testimony by Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, USMC, U.S. Marine Corps’ Deputy 

Commandant for Combat Development, to House Armed Services Committee, Tactical Air Land 

Forces Subcommittee, “Future Combat System and Force Protection Initiatives,” April 1, 2004; also 

Eisler, Morrison, and Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at Pleas for Safer Vehicles.” 94 Christopher J. Lamb and Joel Wiegert, “Give the Troops the Right Armor in Iraq,” Defense 

News, May 3, 2004. 95 See “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Program,” GlobalSecurity.org, available at 

<www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mrap.htm>. 96 Kris Osborn, “Bolton: U.S. Army Should Keep Pursuing Rapid Acquisitions,” Defense News, 

January 14, 2008. Osborn cites Major General Robert Scales, a former commandant of the U.S. Army 

War College, on this point. 97 U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5, The U.S. 

Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of 

the Army, 2006), 1–10, 7–4. 98 Karlyn Bowman, “Public Opinion on the War with Iraq,” American Enterprise Institute, 

March 19, 2009, available at <www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.22142/pub_detail.asp>. 99 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in 

Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 

Press, 2003); Charles K. Hyde, “Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policymakers and Senior Military 

Officers,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition Essays 2000 (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), available at <www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books_2000/

Essays2000/HYDE.HTML>. 100 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice, 3d

 ed. (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 1996), 77ff., 284–285; U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Navy, 1940), sections 5–21, 5–24. 101 The Small Wars Manual mentions the value of armored cars. See section 2–44, 50. 102 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual; U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, “Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgent Operations,” February 10, 1962, F–8, para. 

12, “Convoy Escort Vehicles.” 103 See the vignette in the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: “Vietnam: 

Meeting the Enemy and Convoy Security,” 8–6; also see Christopher J. Lamb, “The Impact of Information Age Technology on Operations other than War,” in War in the Information Age: New Challenges for 

U.S. Security Policy, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Richard H. Shultz (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997).
44 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

104 Greg Jaffe, “Cold-War Thinking Prevented Vital Vehicle from Reaching Iraq,” The Wall 

Street Journal, March 19, 2004, A1. 105 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, “Planning Armor Requirements for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles,” Report No. D–2008–089 (Project No. D2006–

D000AE–0225.001), May 9, 2008, available at <www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy08/08-089.pdf>. 106 Ibid. 107 Rick Atkinson, “The IED Problem Is Getting Out of Control. We’ve Got to Stop the Bleeding,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2007, A13. 108 Inspector General, “Marine Corps Implementation.” 109 Dr. Vernon Joynt, chief scientist for Force Protection who also served as a scientific consultant for the South African army, notes that “a vehicle designed with mine-and-blast protection as 

its priority focus is not part of conventional thinking. Conventionally armored vehicles are aggressive vehicles: Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Strykers. Those vehicles are designed to 

be fighting vehicles.” W. Thomas Smith, Jr., “The ‘Ultimate Betrayal’? Humvee Realities,” National 

Review, December 21, 2005. 

110 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1–149, 5–36, 8–18, 8–23, 8–24. 111 Ibid. Not coincidentally, General Petraeus has praised the MRAPs and their performance. 

Kris Osborn, “Petraeus Praises MRAPs,” Defense News, April 14, 2008, 4. “If given a choice, soldiers 

always choose to travel in an MRAP.” See David Axe, “Petraeus’ Weapons Picks,” Wired.com, September 10, 2007, available at <http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/09/petraeus-weapon.html>. 112 By way of illustration, the USMC Small Wars Manual notes that “Normally, the addition of 

mounted detachments, armored cars, and aircraft is desirable in such [flying] columns” (5–9, 7). 113 Andrew Birtle notes that:

Army doctrine had always stated that tanks and armored personnel carriers 

would be of limited utility in counterguerrilla warfare. Westmoreland initially 

shared this philosophy . . . . [But] the heavy vehicles demonstrated their worth 

as convoy escorts, raiders, rapid reaction forces, and as integral parts of many 

sweep, search-and-destroy, and assault operations. They were especially useful 

in minimizing casualties from mines, booby traps, and bunkers.

See Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine, 1942–1976 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 384. 114 For example, see Andrew Chuter, “U.K. to Rush Armored Vehicles to Duty,” Defense News, 

October 9, 2006. The same is true for Canada, Italy, and France. Israel also concluded that it needed 

better armored vehicles after its most recent war in Lebanon. See Barbara Opall-Rome, “New Life for 

Merkava Line? Tough Tanks Have Israel Rethinking Plans to End Production,” Defense News, August 

28, 2006, 6. 115 “Force Protection Money Flows Following Supplemental Bill’s Passage,” InsideDefense.com, 

August 30, 2004. 116 Bryan Mitchell and Andrew Scutro, “Three Die Amid MRAP Rollover Concerns,” Defense 

News, July 7, 2008, 26; Eisler, Morrison, and Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Balked at Pleas from Officers 

in Field for Safer Vehicles.” 117 MRAP costs at one point mushroomed to more than $3 million each. John T. Bennett, 

“White House Wants $5.3B for 1,520 New MRAPs in ’08,” Defense News, August 6, 2007, 6. 118 Some analysts complain about the hidden costs of MRAPs, including their fuel consumption. However, as Franz Gayl argues, such costs should be balanced against the hidden savings from 

lower survivor benefits and physical rehabilitation when using vehicles that are so much more effective than the up-armored Humvees in reducing injuries and deaths. 119 “War costs could total $1.6 trillion by 2009, panel estimates,” CNNPolitics.com, available at 

<www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/13/hidden.war.costs/index.html>. 120 Senator Joseph Biden, speech on MRAPs, Congressional Record 153, no. 54, March 28, 

2007, available at <www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2007-03-28_Biden_MRAP_Amendment_

Speech.doc>. 121 “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Program.” 122 Kris Osborn, “DoD: We May Not Need All Planned MRAPs,” Defense News, November 12, 

2007, 3.
MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform 45

123 Ibid. 124 “Making Sense of Vehicles,” Defense News, March 24, 2008. 125 Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D–HI) asked why the Pentagon expected future combat environments to be so much different from the current one. Osborn, “DoD: We May Not Need All Planned 

MRAPs.” 126 Greg Jaffe, “Short ‘06 Lebanon War Stokes Pentagon Debate: Leaders Divided on Whether 

to Focus on Conventional or Irregular Combat,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2009, A1. 127 Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare,” December 1, 2008, available 

at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf>. 128 John T. Bennett, “New U.S. Defense Strategy Focuses on Irregular Wars,” Defense News, 

August 4, 2008, 58. 129 Anne Geran, “Defense Chief Proposes Weapons Cuts,” Associated Press, April 6, 2009, 

available at <www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5idcsRSLw6_ppJCceAZXPgvBEfojgD97D4TG00>. 130 The Low-Intensity Conflict Board, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict. 131 President Kennedy fired General George Decker in 1962 for asserting that “any good soldier can handle guerrillas.” 132 Alternatively, it sometimes is argued that irregular warfare is not a valid mission—that is, 

that it does not play to American strengths or strategic interests. This is an implicit acknowledgment 

that irregular warfare requires different skills and capabilities. 133 Kris Osborn, “U.S. May Armor Most Vehicles,” Defense News, February 18, 2008, and 

“MRAP Tactics, Training Adjusted; Vehicle Shrinks Lessons from Vehicle Making Mark on JLTV 

program,” Defense News, October 6, 2008. 134 David C. Gompert, Underkill: Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations Amid Populations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009). 135 Government Accountability Office, “DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, 

Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful Non-lethal Weapons,” GAO–09–

344, April 21, 2009, available at <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-344>. 136 For the post-Vietnam decline of U.S. Air Force irregular warfare capabilities, see David J. 

Dean, The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 

1986), 107ff. 137 Author’s experience in the Pentagon. See also <www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/

ship/pc-1.htm>. 138 Kris Osborn, “U.S. Prepares Vehicle Road Maps,” Defense News, June 30, 2008, 1. 139 Kris Osborn, “Iraq to Get Used MRAPs,” Defense News, February 2, 2009, 12. 140 Andrew Chuter and Pierre Tran, “Britain, France Seek Immediate Solutions to Capability 

Gaps,” Defense News, December 15, 2008, 12. The article notes that the United States is “poised to 

lend 100 BAE RG–31 MRAPS to the French Army.” 141 Lamb, “The Impact of Information Age Technology on Operations other than War,” 

256–257. 142 Michael Moss, “Safer Vehicles for Soldiers: A Tale of Delays and Glitches,” The New York 

Times, June 26, 2005; Jennifer H. Svan, “Improvised Simulator Helps GIs Train for Humvee Rollovers,” Stars and Stripes, September 26, 2006; “Humvee Doors Trap Troops,” United Press International, May 8, 2007, available at <www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,135017,00.html>. 143 An analysis of the Army’s ground-accident database, which includes records from March 2003 

through November 2005, found that 60 of the 85 Soldiers (about 70 percent) who died in Humvee accidents in Iraq were killed when the vehicle rolled. Of the 337 injuries, 149 occurred in rollovers. “Armor 

on Iraq Humvees Is Linked to Deadly Rollovers,” Associated Press, June 12, 2006, A5, available at <www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/11/AR2006061100814.html>. 144 Earlier Armored Security Vehicles ordered by the Army also were delivered by expensive 

airlift. See Elliot Blair Smith, “Textron Fought Storm to Deliver for Army,” USA Today, May 5, 2006, 

available at <www.usatoday.com/money/industries/2006-05-01-textron-usat_x.htm>. 145 Robert M. Gates, “The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance,” Joint Force 

Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 6. 146 Kris Osborn, “Army Acquisition’s Challenge: Combining Rigor with Rapid Fielding,” 

Defense News, September 15, 2008.
46 INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

147 Gates, 7. 148 Chris Argyris, Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning

(Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1990), 12–24. 149 Robert M. Gates, remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Colorado Springs, CO, May 13, 

2008, available at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240>. 150 Representative of this attitude is the frequent observation that more armor is futile since 

insurgents can always build a bigger IED. See “Interview with Lt. Gen. Stephen Speakes, U.S. Army 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs,” Defense News, September 3, 2007, 38. 151 Jeffrey Smith, “Gates Proposal Reveals His Alienation from Procurement System,” The 

Washington Post, April 7, 2009, A4. 152 Robert M. Gates, press briefing, Arlington, VA, April 6, 2009, available at <www.

defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341>. 153 Robert M. Gates, speech at Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, 

April 15, 2009, available at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1344 154 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” 

Foreign Affairs (January-February 2009), available at <www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103/

robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy.html?mode=print>. 155 Kris Osborn, “New Mind-Set for U.S. Army: Start Tests Sooner,” Defense News, March 10, 

2008, 4.156 Arguments can be made that on rare occasions, we overshoot the mark. For example, the 

National Training Center now stresses counterinsurgency warfare, risking an atrophy of critical skills 

required for large unit maneuver warfare. An initiative by civilian leadership to force every officer 

to have foreign language proficiency may be another example of excessive attempts to overcome 

resistance to irregular warfare preparedness. A robust foreign area officer program, long neglected 

by Army leadership, might have been sufficient to meet irregular warfare requirements. Instead, the 

Defense Language Transformation Roadmap promulgated in March 2005 requires all junior officers 

to complete language training and mandates foreign language ability as a criterion for general officer/

flag officer advancement. 157 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review hinted at this possibility, but there was no follow 

up. See DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2006), vii, 4, 63, 65, 

70. The Project on National Security Reform emphasizes the importance of such teams. See the project’s final report at <www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf>. 158 Gates, “The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance,” 7.
47

About the Authors

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb has been a Senior Research Fellow in the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense 

University since January 2004. He conducts research on national security 

strategy and policy, and U.S. defense strategy, requirements, plans and 

programs, and strategic military concepts. 

Prior to joining INSS, Dr. Lamb served as the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans. He also has served as the 

Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Deputy 

Director for Military Development on the State Department’s Interagency 

Task Force for Military Stabilization in the Balkans, and the Director for 

Requirements and Plans in the Office of Secretary of Defense.

Dr. Lamb has received the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious 

Senior Executive Service, the Superior Honor award from the Department of State, and Meritorious Civilian Service awards from the Department of Defense.

Matthew J. Schmidt is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army School 

of Advanced Military Studies. He received his Master of Arts from the 

University of Kansas and is currently completing his doctoral dissertation 

at Georgetown University on the development of American counterinsurgency doctrine. Mr. Schmidt has been a Research Fellow at the National 

Defense University, as well as a National Security Education Program 

(Boren) and Smith Richardson Foundation Fellow. He has published articles in Demokratizatsiya, The Review of Politics, and Democracy and Society.

Berit G. Fitzsimmons is a senior at the College of William and Mary, 

where she is majoring in government and economics. She interned for the 

Research and Analysis Team of the Project on National Security Reform 

from January to August 2008.

The National Defense University (NDU) educates military and civilian 

leaders through teaching, research, and outreach in national security

strategy, national military strategy, and national resource strategy; joint and multinational operations; information strategies, 

operations, and resource management; acquisition; and regional 

defense and security studies.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy research 

and strategic gaming organization within NDU serving the Department of Defense, its components, and interagency partners. Established in 1984, the institute provides senior decisionmakers with 

timely, objective analysis and gaming events and supports NDU 

educational programs in the areas of international security affairs 

and defense strategy and policy. Through an active outreach program, including conferences and publications, INSS seeks to promote 

understanding of emerging strategic challenges and policy options.

NDU Press publishes books, monographs, reports, and occasional papers on national and international security affairs, defense

policy, and military strategy, primarily the output of university 

research and academic programs. In addition, it produces Joint Force 

Quarterly, a professional military and security journal published for 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.