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THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON: 

ARE WE PREPARED? 

FULL HEARING 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 15, 2007 

Serial No. 110–35 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security ........ 16 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 22 

The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Pennsylvania .................................................................................... 23 

The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York ................................................................................................ 44 

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 30 

The Honorable David Davis, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Tennessee ......................................................................................................... 25 

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 33 

The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Texas ..................................................................................................................... 42 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 35 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 26 

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, Delegate in Congress From the 

District .................................................................................................................. 20 

The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Colorado ............................................................................................................ 40 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama ............................................................................................................ 19 

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 17 

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Connecticut ............................................................................................. 31 

The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 28 

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

The Honorable R. David Paulison, Director, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

Page

IV 

PANEL II 

Mr. Joe, Becker, Senior Vice President, Preparedness and Response, 

American Cross National Headquarters: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 69 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 71 

Mr. Craig Fugate, Director, Florida Division of Emergency Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 61 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 63 

Mr. William Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Division, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 46 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery ... 89 

Appendix II: Related GAO Products ...................................................................... 97 

(1) 

THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON: 

ARE WE PREPARED? 

Tuesday, May 15, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:09 p.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson [chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Lowey, Norton, 

Jackson Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Langevin, Cuellar, Carney, 

Green, Perlmutter, King, Shays, Rogers, Brown-Waite, Bilirakis, 

and Davis of Tennessee. 

Chairman THOMPSON. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland 

Security will come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to receive testimony from FEMA 

and other key stakeholders on what has been done to prepare for 

the 2007 hurricane season. 

Good afternoon. On behalf of the members of the committee, let 

me welcome our panel. We are glad that all of you are here to discuss preparations for this year’s hurricane season. 

First of all, I am enormously concerned, Mr. Paulison, that 

FEMA is still not compliant with the committee’s requirement that 

testimony be submitted within 48 hours of the hearing. We have 

shared this to the secretary. I know you have significant jurisdictional issues, a lot of committees. We have said we would work 

through it. And I understand what other challenges you have before you, but we have some committee rules that we have adopted, 

and, to the extent practicable, we would like to see them followed. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine whether FEMA is adequately coordinating activities with its partners and the state and 

local level as well as key stakeholders in the private sector. 

The 2007 Atlantic hurricane season officially begins on June 1 

and will last until November 30. The fact that FEMA still not has 

issued the strategy that establishes practices and procedures for coordination among federal, state and local governments is very disturbing. 

I called this hearing to examine just how FEMA is doing and 

whether all key stakeholders are ready to respond and coordinate 

effectively. As a member of the Gulf Coast, I have particular interest in seeing FEMA apply the lessons learned from Katrina into 

practices for the future. In the event that a hurricane makes landfall and puts our communities at risk, we need to know that FEMA 

2 

will respond quickly and administer assistance in an evenhanded 

way. 

Another key player that has some hard lessons learned from 

Katrina was the American Red Cross. I am interested in hearing 

how the organization plans to coordinate with FEMA. As we all 

know, FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina was abysmal. Last 

year, Congress passed major FEMA reforms with an expectation 

that we would see some real progress at this beleaguered agency. 

I expect that Mr. Paulison will have an explanation for its agency’s failure to produce a national response plan by the start of hurricane season, and FEMA will have a lot of explaining to do if it 

is not all ready when a hurricane makes landfall this season. 

I want to thank the witnesses again for being here and look forward to their testimony. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening 

statement. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

The Purpose of this hearing is to examine whether FEMA is adequately coordinating activities with its partners on the State and local level as well as key stakeholders in the private sector. The 2007 Atlantic hurricane season officially begins 

on June 1st and will last until November 30th. 

The fact that FEMA still has not issued the strategy that establishes practices 

and procedures for coordination among Federal, State and local governments is very 

disturbing. 

I called this hearing to examine just how FEMA is doing, and whether all key 

stakeholders are ready to respond and coordinate effectively. As a Member from the 

Gulf Coast, I have a particular interest in seeing FEMA apply the ‘‘Lessons 

Learned’’ from Katrina into practices for the future. 

In the event that a hurricane makes landfall and puts our communities at risk, 

we need to know that FEMA will respond quickly and administer assistance in an 

evenhanded way. 

Another key player that has some hard ‘Lessons Learned’ from Katrina was the 

American Red Cross. I am interested in hearing how the organization plans to coordinate with FEMA. 

As we all know, FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina was abysmal. Last year, 

Congress passed major FEMA reforms with an expectation that we would see some 

real progress at this beleaguered agency. 

I expect that Mr. Paulison will have an explanation for his agency’s failure to 

produce the National Response Plan within the required period. Mr. Paulison, explanations don’t excuse and excuses don’t explain. And FEMA will have a lot of explaining to do if it is not ready when a hurricane makes landfall this season. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for holding this hearing and for the bipartisan effort that we are making, 

as far as ensuring that FEMA is given the jurisdiction and the 

tools to get the job done. 

Last year, our committee, working in a bipartisan way, was very 

instrumental in the enactment of the FEMA reform bill, which kept 

FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security but certainly 

set up a chain of command and gave the director, I believe, the authority and the power that he needs to get the job done in times 

of terrorist attacks and natural disasters. 

That legislation clarified the command structure and required establishment of a surge capacity force. It also consolidated emergency communications, grant-making, and other responsibilities. 

Let me just say also, speaking as someone from New York, I 

want to commend FEMA for the job they did during the heavy 

3 

snowstorms this year. They delivered generators less than 24 hours 

after the snowfall ended, and even though it was not in my district, 

in talking to people around the State, they were very appreciative 

of the job you did, the professionalism and the timeliness. 

I also, like the chairman, would appreciate testimony being provided to the committee on time. At the same time, however, 

though, I think it is important and upon us in the Congress to 

work in a bipartisan way to reduce the number of committees that 

Director Paulison, Secretary Chertoff and all the undersecretaries 

and assistant secretaries have to report to. 

So while I am not excusing the late testimony, I also realize that 

it is in everyone’s interest, including the country’s, primarily the 

country’s, that we consolidate this so you are not going from committee to committee and getting caught up in jurisdictional entanglements. 

I look forward to your testimony. I want to commend you for the 

job that you have done. You took over under very trying circumstances. Certainly, from talking to first responders across the 

country, particularly those in the fire service, they speak very highly of the efforts that you are making. Unfortunately, you are in a 

job where, I guess, you are judged by mistakes. 

But all I can say is that I certainly want to commend you for the 

enthusiasm, the professionalism and the energy that you bring to 

the job, and I look forward to your testimony today. 

I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Other members of the committee are reminded that, under the 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I now welcome our first panel. We are pleased to have the administrator of FEMA, Mr. David Paulison, here to testify. Mr. 

Paulison has an extensive background in the emergency preparedness arena, having served as the U.S. fire administrator and as the 

fire chief of Miami–Dade County in Florida. 

Without objection, the witness’s full statement will be inserted 

into the record. I now ask Mr. Paulison to summarize his statement for the committee for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. R. DAVID PAULISON, DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PAULISON. Chair Thompson, I appreciate the invitation. 

Ranking Member King. 

And, just for the record, I take very seriously your issues with 

getting our testimony in on time, and we will make a very honest, 

concerted effort to make sure we do that. 

I also take very seriously your comments about the national response plan. We are working very diligently to get that out and operating. I will talk about that a little bit in my testimony. I am 

sure it will come up during the questioning. 

We have made steady progress to approve our preparedness posture for the 2007 hurricane season. The new FEMA is leaning further forward to deliver more effective disaster assistance, not only 

to individuals but to communities impacted by the disaster. 

4 

You can see our results in our response this year in Florida, 

Georgia, the Alabama tornadoes, the nor’easter that affected the 

states in the Mid-Atlantic and up in New England and just last 

week in Greensburg, Kansas. In each of these cases, FEMA was engaged as a partner with the state immediately, we deployed operational and technical experts, we rolled logistics and communication capabilities even before the disaster declaration was declared, 

and we coordinated with the governor to facilitate a presidential 

disaster delegation. 

It was also FEMA that supported and helped facilitate the effective unified command among many federal, state and tribal and 

local partners involved in these responses. We called this an engaged partnership. Our response in these diverse and numerous 

events across the breadth of this great country are evidence of the 

new FEMA’s readiness for the 17 currently predicted storms during 

the 2007 hurricane season. 

With the first named storm of the season, Andrea, already behind us, let’s look at our advanced preparation, our plans for operations during the storm and our proved ability to help with the 

long-term recovery. 

Local governments will always, always be the first to respond, 

but FEMA has an important role to play. The old paradigm of waiting for the state and local governments to become overwhelmed before providing federal assistance simply does not work in today’s 

environment. 

Under our engaged partnership, FEMA has strengthened our relationship with key state and local partners. A one-size-fits-all approach to emergency management will not work. FEMA is helping 

each state analyze their strengths and weaknesses. Thus, our planning is more informed, and we can better anticipate specific needs 

and quickly move to support each state. 

A visible demonstration of improved federal capabilities is our 

playbook of pre-scripted mission assignments. It contains plans for 

a range of federal support that may be requested in a disaster and 

lays out interagency coordination needed to ensure that it gets 

there. The support ranges from heavy helicopters from the Department of Defense, generators from the Army Corps of Engineers, to 

disaster medical assistance teams from HHS and emergency roadclearing teams from the U.S. Forest Service. 

Prior to Katrina, we had just a handful of these pre-scripted mission assignments. Last year, we had about 40, and this year, we 

have over 180 pre-scripted mission assignments with over 21 federal agencies. 

So don’t believe the stories that say FEMA and the federal government is not ready and do not have plans in place. We do and 

they are getting better. 

With these preparations under way, FEMA will be ready to act. 

We have prearranged contracts, an improving logistics system and 

other elements that are already in place to expedite our response. 

FEMA can surge its own teams and assess them to an area in anticipation of an approaching storm. 

This forward-leaning new FEMA is evident of our response in the 

tornado that devastated Greensburg. In the first 72 hours, FEMA 

coordinated the efforts of numerous federal agencies, supplies 

5 

rolled in before they were requested, mobile support vehicles moved 

in early, and when the state asked us to supplement their urban 

search and rescue efforts, the FEMA task force was on the ground 

within hours. 

I also need to point out that the Kansas City National Guard, led 

by General Todd Bunting with the local mayor and the city administrator, simply did an outstanding job of responding to this disaster, despite the fact that their homes were destroyed also. 

I am proud of the response by our team of federal, state and local 

partners in responding to this tragedy. 

Now, once a storm has passed, FEMA is also better prepared to 

help with the recovery. FEMA’s disaster assistance directorate has 

expanded its capabilities to provide mass care, sheltering, debris 

removal, victim registration, including enhanced protections 

against waste, fraud and abuse, and coordination among government and private-sector entities, all moving to provide assistance. 

I am pleased to report that on May 3, 2007, an offer was made 

and accepted for the national disability coordinator. This individual 

is in clearance in our security office, and the official start date has 

not been declared, but we should have her on board by the end of 

this month. 

One recent example is FEMA’s response to the storms and flooding that hit the Northeast earlier this spring. FEMA had staff on 

the ground before the rain stopped, evaluated damage and registering victims. Mobile assistance centers were available in the 

immediate wake of the storm. The first individual financial aid was 

actually delivered less than 24 hours after the president signed the 

first disaster declaration. This fast, efficient, multi-state response 

shows the type of action you can expect from FEMA during this 

year’s hurricane season. 

In conclusion, we have made real progress at FEMA and are 

much better prepared for the 2007 hurricane season. By leaning 

further forward to coordinate the federal response, which is more 

informed through assessments and communication with our partners, we can better serve all Americans. 

Today, FEMA has created an engaged partnership with state and 

local governments, we have facilitated and supported effective unified command across all levels of government, we have engaged 

with hurricane-prone states to gain a better understanding of the 

vulnerabilities, and we have improved logistics and communication 

capabilities to improve our response, and we have a much improved 

disaster assistance capability for recovery efforts. 

Now, we are not done yet. We have a lot of work to do, but if 

our progress over the past year is any indication, I believe we are 

on the right track for fulfilling our vision of becoming the nation’s 

preeminent emergency management agency. 

I am especially proud of the men and women who work at 

FEMA. They really have put their heart and souls into rebuilding 

this agency. 

So I want to thank this committee and you, Chairman Thompson, particularly, for your continued support, and I look forward to 

the opportunity to discuss with you about the 2007 hurricane season. 

[The statement of Mr. Paulison follows:] 

6 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. DAVID PAULISON

Good morning, Chairman Thompson, and Members of the Committee. 

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss how the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is prepared for the 2007 Hurricane Season. 

The guiding principle of the new FEMA is that we are leaning further forward 

to deliver more effective disaster assistance to individuals and communities impacted by a disaster. We call it ‘‘engaged partnership’’. That is the FEMA you saw 

in the Florida, Georgia, and Alabama tornadoes—the Nor’easter that affected the 

New England States and most recently in Kansas where the community of Greensburg was devastated by a tornado. 

In those disasters you saw a FEMA that became an engaged partner with the 

State within minutes of the disaster, immediately deployed operational and technical experts to the disaster site, started moving logistics and communications capabilities even before a disaster declaration and coordinated with the Governor to facilitate a Presidential disaster declaration. And, FEMA has supported and helped 

to facilitate an effective Unified Command with other Federal agencies, and State 

and local officials. 

All of these actions were taken by a well led, motivated, and professional FEMA 

workforce that has embraced and enhanced the vision and reality of a new FEMA. 

Colorado State University has predicted 17 named storms, including 9 hurricanes, 

of which 5 are expected to be major hurricanes. Predictions from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) are scheduled to be released on May 22, 2007, during National 

Hurricane Preparedness Week. 

FEMA is preparing for an active 2007 hurricane season by taking the following 

actions: 

1. Establishing a heightened posture of hurricane preparedness; 

2. Engaging our State and Federal partners in more thorough and informed 

hurricane planning; and 

3. Building FEMA’s operational capabilities to provide effective response and recovery. 

Establishing a Heightened Posture of Hurricane Preparedness 

FEMA is placing primary emphasis on strengthening the Federal–State partnership to better ensure we are able to achieve shared objectives for a safe, coordinated 

and effective response and recovery effort. First, we are emphasizing the States’ primary responsibility to provide for the safety and security of their citizens. The 

States must take the lead to ensure they and their local jurisdictions are prepared 

for hurricane season. 

The Stafford Act acknowledges the Constitutional authority of a State to respond 

to incidents within that State through the State’s Emergency Management Agency 

or similar agency, which incorporates the States’ mutual aid system and principles 

of the Incident Command System, and provides the structure through which State 

and local government agencies respond. The State Emergency Management Agency 

coordinates the overall management of an emergency to include requests for support 

and resources from other State agencies, from other States under the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), and for supplemental assistance from 

the Federal government. The EMAC process offers state-to-state assistance during 

Governor-declared states of emergency: EMAC offers a responsive and straightforward system for states to send personnel and equipment to help disaster relief 

efforts in other states. When one State’s resources are overwhelmed, other states 

can help to fill the shortfalls through EMAC. 

The strength of EMAC and the quality that distinguishes it from other plans and 

compacts lies in its governance structure, its relationship with federal organizations, 

states,μcounties,μterritories, and regions, and the ability to move just about any resource one state has to assist another state. 

Second, FEMA, by advancing the concept of engaged partnership, then stands 

shoulder-to-shoulder with the State—there to support, fill gaps, and help to achieve 

a successful response and recovery. In the past, our system was cued to sequential 

failure: where the State held back until the local jurisdiction was overwhelmed, and 

the Federal system held back until the State was overwhelmed. This approach, evident in the response to Katrina, ensured caused delays in delivering support. Under 

‘‘engaged partnership,’’ FEMA has strengthened the relationship between FEMA Regional Administrators and State Emergency Managers to focus on more deliberate 

disaster planning. In preparation for this hurricane season, we have engaged each 

of the 18 hurricane impact States (Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 

Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas), 

7 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territories in a focused effort to identify 

strengths and weaknesses. We are engaging now in discussions to fill gaps and develop mitigation strategies to ensure successful response and recovery. FEMA is prepared to allocate commodities and enlist the assistance of other departments and 

agencies as needed to ensure a strong response to a State’s call for assistance. And, 

as a result of our joint planning, we can anticipate a State’s needs and be more able 

to quickly provide support. 

Third, FEMA has extended our reach across the span of Federal agencies to ensure the smooth and responsive coordination of Federal support when it is needed. 

The most visible demonstration of that coordination is the array of Federal capabilities contained in our ‘‘playbook’’ of pre-scripted mission assignments. This playbook 

represents an examination of the range of Federal support that may be requested 

in response to a disaster. It also includes advance inter-agency coordination to ensure delivery of that capability when it might be called upon in time of need. At 

present, we have gained approval for 103 separate forms of assistance and are reviewing 85 potential pre-scripted mission assignments over a span of 21 Federal 

agencies. This support ranges from heavy-lift helicopters from DOD, to generators 

from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to Disaster Medical Assistance Teams from 

HHS and Emergency Road Clearing Teams from the U.S. Forest Service. These prescripted mission assignments will result in more rapid and responsive delivery of 

Federal support to States. 

Disaster response support is coordinated through one or more of the National Response Plan’s (NRP) 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs serve as 

the primary operational-level mechanism supporting FEMA in providing State and 

local disaster assistance in functional areas such as transportation, communications, 

public works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, public health and medical services, search and rescue, agriculture, and energy. μThe 

signatories to the NRP provide substantial disaster response assistance in their 

areas of expertise and provide operational support for FEMA when assigned missions to support the disaster response. μIn addition, FEMA can surge its own teams 

and assets into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that is expected to cause a significant impact and result in a declared emergency or major 

disaster and can turn to other DHS components such as the U.S. Coast Guard for 

assistance.μ The surge capability allows FEMA to position assets prior to the event 

to enable a quick response, but actual assistance cannot be provided until the Governor requests and the President approves a disaster declaration. 

Within the first 72 hours after the tornado devastated Greensburg, Kansas, 

FEMA coordinated the efforts of numerous Federal agencies in their ESF roles 

under the NRP. For example, the DHS/National Communication System (ESF 2) 

worked with the State and local officials to reestablish communications infrastructure, advising local government as necessary, and providing needed technical assistance. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ESF 3) management team for critical facility restoration planning was on-site providing technical assistance to state and local 

government. Additionally, Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) in the form 

of 13 small Mobile Emergency Operations Vehicles (MEOVs) and one large MEOV 

were deployed to Greensburg for communications and command and control support. 

The larger MEOV was provided to serve as the Unified Command Post. 

To further strengthen our partnerships, FEMA is actively engaging with State 

governments and other Federal partners in joint exercises as we prepare for the 

2007 Hurricane Season. During the first week in May, FEMA tested the national 

incident management system and its response operations during an exercise called 

Ardent Sentry—Northern Edge, which depicted a Category 3 hurricane that struck 

Newport, Rhode Island. 

Engaging with State and Federal Partners in More Thorough and Informed 

Preparedness Planning 

As we approach the 2007 Hurricane Season, FEMA is a taking a three-tier approach to planning. First, we are engaging each of the 18 hurricane impact States, 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territories in focused hurricane planning. This includes employing a Gap Analysis Tool that will inform the planning 

process. Second, we are providing specific attention to the Gulf Coast States pursuing for the first time regional development of a Gulf Coast Evacuation Plan. 

Third, we are pursuing specific planning efforts with our partners in the State of 

Louisiana, in recognition of their fragile condition following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. Last, we are also focusing Catastrophic Disaster Response Planning 

on Southeast Louisiana and the State of Florida. 

8 

Hurricane Gap Analysis Tool 

FEMA is employing a Gap Analysis Tool that is serving as the basis for better 

understanding vulnerabilities in a more consistent manner. The Gap Analysis Tool 

was developed in coordination with the State of New York Emergency Management 

Office/New York City Office of Emergency Management and has been implemented 

to provide FEMA and its partners at both the State and local levels in the hurricane 

prone regions of the country with a snapshot of asset gaps at the National, State 

and local levels 

The initiative is a joint effort between State Emergency Management representatives and FEMA Regional representatives to conduct a series of structured discussions with local jurisdictions to better understand potential disaster response asset 

gaps in the critical areas of debris removal, evacuation, sheltering, interim housing, 

healthcare facilities, commodity distribution, communications, and fuel. The discussions are providing an opportunity for local jurisdictions to ask specific questions of 

Federal and State officials and identify issues of critical concern to help long-term 

preparedness programs. We are confident that through these structured discussions, 

we will all be better prepared. 

Specific gaps are determined by identifying a series of requirements in each critical area within each location and then subtracting the corresponding capabilities 

for meeting those requirements for each location. By June 1, 2007, the data will be 

compiled for the jurisdictions within the hurricane prone States, reviewed, and then 

incorporated into FEMA’s planning efforts. Although our initial use of this method 

is being applied for the upcoming hurricane season, this process is applicable to all 

hazards and the goal is to build upon lessons learned and apply the tool to all locations for all hazards on an ongoing basis. 

The new FEMA has made a conscious effort to focus broadly on all 18 hurricaneprone States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Territories to prepare for the 

2007 Hurricane Season. Today, FEMA is working closely with each of the 18 state 

emergency management communities in hurricane prone states using a consistent 

set of measures and tools to evaluate strengths and vulnerabilities. 

We are actively conducting these analyses with state emergency managers. So, 

not only have we improved our ability to respond, we also will have a better understanding of what type of response and supplies may be needed for a particular area 

following a disaster. 

Modeling is also an essential element of FEMA’s planning efforts for different circumstances. FEMA is coordinating with the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to adapt modeling tools to large metropolitan areas. For example, many 

tools utilize a standard figure for population per square mile, often resulting in 

skewed data for areas with high-rise apartment buildings. The work with S&T is 

focusing on adapting these modeling tools to urban environments. 

As the use of the Hurricane Gap Analysis Tool becomes more mature, FEMA 

plans to incorporate additional modeling capabilities to validate the data received 

and to forecast needs based on different variables. FEMA’s current hurricane planning efforts rely heavily on existing modeling tools such as: 

• HurrEvac (Hurricane Evacuation) to enable tracking hurricanes and assist in 

evacuation decision making; 

• SLOSH (Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) to enable estimates of storm surge heights and winds resulting from historical, hypothetical, 

or predicted hurricanes by taking into account pressure, size, forward speed, 

track, and winds; 

• HAZUS (Hazards U.S.) established by FEMA to assess risk and forecast 

losses based on population characteristics and buildings; 

• The US Army Corps of Engineers modeling tools which rely on geospatial capabilities to provide estimates of debris volumes; water, ice, and commodity 

needs; and the number of people within the households likely within hurricane 

force winds; and 

• NISAC (National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center) advanced 

modeling and simulation capabilities to analyze critical infrastructure interdependencies and vulnerabilities. 

Gulf Coast State Evacuation Plan 

FEMA is helping Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama develop a Gulf Coast Evacuation Plan that extends to adjacent States who may host Gulf Coast evacuees. The 

purpose of this effort is to synchronize separate State evacuation plans to create a 

more jointly organized effort. Teams are engaging with each State, identifying requirements and capabilities, and then will work to develop a plan that integrates 

shelter planning with transportation planning. The result will be a timelier, better 

9 

organized and coordinated evacuation by those with their own transportation and 

those who need assistance to evacuate by bus or air. 

Coordinating with Louisiana 

Recognizing Louisiana’s continuing fragile situation, we are collaboratively assessing requirements, State capabilities and the potential need for Federal assistance. 

Louisiana is better prepared than last year—by applying lessons learned and investing some of their resources, but still needs assistance in finding shelter space in adjacent States, ensuring sufficient transportation resources to conduct a timely and 

effective evacuation, pre-positioning commodities, and caring for those with critical 

medical needs. 

Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiatives 

We are also working with 13 southeastern Louisiana parishes (including the City 

of New Orleans), which were selected as the initial geographic focus area for 

FEMA’s ‘‘Catastrophic Planning’’ initiative, because of their vulnerability to hurricane disasters. Substantial planning activity continues with the State of Louisiana 

and its parishes in planning and preparing for the 2007 Hurricane Season. 

In addition, FEMA is using scenario-driven workshops to enhance the State of 

Florida’s capability to respond to a Category 5 Hurricane making landfall in Southern Florida. This is a two-phased project. Phase 1 focuses on developing regional response and recovery annexes, including evacuation planning, for the counties and 

communities surrounding Lake Okeechobee (in the event of failure of the Herbert 

Hoover Dike) and will be completed by the beginning of the 2007 Hurricane Season. 

Phase two will address the effects of a Category 5 hurricane striking south Florida. 

The end product for phase two will be standardized and comprehensive catastrophic 

Category 5 hurricane disaster functional response and recovery plans for the State 

of Florida and responding Federal agencies. Phase two will be completed by September 30, 2008. These plans will be used as planning templates for other large 

urban areas also. 

Next, it is important to understand what FEMA is doing to build its operational 

capabilities to improve its response and recovery capabilities in support of State and 

local efforts. 

Building FEMA’s Operational Capabilities to Provide Effective Response 

and Recovery 

In addition to the many action items already described to better prepare for the 

2007 Hurricane Season, FEMA’s comprehensive strategy for improving its disaster 

response efforts includes a 2007 Hurricane Contingency Plan, a new operational 

planning unit, an Interagency Agreement with Defense Logistics Agency, Total 

Asset Visibility, a new generation of response assistance teams, principal federal officials role, and mass evacuation planning. 

2007 Hurricane Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 

The 2007 Hurricane CONPLAN provides the operational incident management 

framework to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of hurricanes impacting the United States. The CONPLAN provides guidance on actions 

that will be executed by Federal Departments and Agencies. 

This document was developed in collaboration with all of FEMA’s National Response Plan partners for the Emergency Support Functions—or ‘‘ESFs’’—and addresses the coordinated national-level Federal preparedness, response and initial recovery operations that will be used to support State, local, Territorial and Tribal 

government entities impacted by a hurricane or tropical storm. 

New Operational Planning Unit Capabilities 

FEMA is hiring staff for its new Operational Planning Unit (Planning Unit). Located in FEMA’s Headquarters, the Planning Unit will provide sophisticated operational analyses. With the new staff, FEMA is building its core planning competency 

that will possess greater depth of experience and more capability to perform critical 

disaster response operational analyses, prepare operational plans, and conduct crisis 

action planning to ensure that the Agency can lead, coordinate and support a national all-hazard emergency management response. 

Specifically, the Operational Planning Unit— 

• Provides National and Regional operational planning guidance and coordination; 

• Coordinates at the operational level the execution of all hazard contingency 

plans; 

• Provides forecasting and analysis of potential events; 

• Assists FEMA Regions in operational planning at the regional level; and 

• Leads the development of DHS and FEMA hazard-specific contingency plans. 

10 

Eventually, planners will also be hired for the Regions to provide this capability 

to those specific areas. 

FEMA/DLA Interagency Agreement 

FEMA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have entered into a collaborative 

partnership, via an Interagency Agreement, to optimize the planning, ordering, storing and replenishing of certain commodities such as emergency meals and fuel, and 

develop a road map for larger scaled supply chain initiatives. 

The FEMA/DLA partnership has improved FEMA’s immediate response and logistics capabilities by reducing the acquisition and distribution time, as well as the replenishment lead-time. The partnership has also improved FEMA’s day-to-day supply chain operations by creating repeatable, sustainable processes for planning and 

execution at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Through this agreement 

DLA will procure, maintain, transport, and stage commodities. DLA currently provides visibility of all commodities shipped to disaster locations, logistic centers or 

other locations as directed, from the initial receipt of the order until ownership 

passes to FEMA. 

TAV Program 

FEMA Logistics has identified areas for improving its end-to-end supply chain to 

deliver critical supplies at the right time, in the right quantity and to the right location. FEMA is implementing industry best practices for supply chain management 

and an automated system that is improving information flow by providing real-time 

visibility into orders and shipment of critical supplies during emergency response 

efforts. The Total Asset Visibility (TAV) Program oversees, directs and manages the 

design and implementation of an initial capability pilot system to monitor and view 

the orders and movement of select commodities which was launched during the 2006 

hurricane season. 

Currently, the TAV Program provides FEMA with the ability to (1) manage and 

view orders and inventory of select commodities and (2) track the location of trailers 

carrying the commodities distributed from the FEMA Logistics Centers (LCs) and 

select vendors to field sites. The long-term vision for the TAV Program is to engage 

external emergency management stakeholders—from state, local and tribal governments and other federal agencies to non-government agencies and vendors—in the 

entire FEMA supply chain. These activities cover requests for critical supplies to 

tracking shipments and delivery to people in need during times of emergency. 

Stakeholders would have real-time visibility into the status of requests and locations of shipments in transit. 

FEMA recognizes that certain types of resources may be required immediately 

after a disaster by State and local governments in order for them to adequately respond. 

If State or local governments, and State partners, are unable to supply these resources, then FEMA will coordinate the provision of Federal commodities to ensure 

that resources are in place in order to supplement State and local response efforts 

during the immediate phase of response activities. FEMA has initiated the Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply (PPDS) program to position life-saving and life sustaining 

disaster equipment and supplies in modular containers as close to a potential disaster sites as prudent, in order to substantially reduce the initial response time to 

incidents. 

Enhanced Response Teams 

FEMA is developing the next generation of rapidly deployable interagency emergency response teams, tentatively identified as Incident Management Assistance 

Teams (‘‘IMATs’’). These teams will support the emergent needs of State and local 

jurisdictions; possess the capability to provide initial situational awareness for Federal decision-makers; and support the initial establishment of a unified command. 

These teams will ultimately provide the three national-level response teams and regional-level emergency response ‘‘strike’’ teams required by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. 

The teams are still being designed and decisions on team assets, equipment, and 

expected capabilities have not yet been finalized. FEMA’s goal is to establish interim Regional and National teams using existing personnel within FEMA. The 

teams will subsume the existing mission and capabilities of the Federal Incident Response Support Teams (or ‘‘FIRSTs’’) and Emergency Response Teams (or ‘‘ERTs’’). 

The mission and capabilities will incorporate similar leadership, emergency management doctrine, and operational communications concepts. The national-level and regional-level teams will eventually be staffed with a core of full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a collateral duty basis; will be fully compliant 

with NIMS and ICS; and will train and exercise as a unit. 

11 

Principal Federal Officials 

Also, the Secretary of Homeland Security is represented by the Principal Federal 

Official (PFO). The PFO ensures that incident management efforts are well coordinated and effective. The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure, nor does the PFO have directive authority over other Federal and State officials. For example, during a terrorist incident, the local FBI Special Agent-in– 

Charge coordinates with other members of the law enforcement community and 

works in conjunction with the PFO. 

The PFO is one member of the JFO Coordination Group. This group also includes 

either an FCO, who manages and coordinates Federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies, or a Federal Resource Coordinator, 

who performs similar functions for incidents that do not involve Stafford Act declarations. Depending on the incident, other agency officials are added to the Coordination Group, such as the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official. 

Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the National Response Plan 

As part of incorporating lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, a Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRP is under development. The Mass Evacuation Incident Annex will provide an overview of evacuation functions and agency roles and 

responsibilities. It also will provide overall guidelines to enable evacuation of large 

numbers of people in incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response through the 

NRP ESFs. This annex will describe how Federal support resources are integrated 

into State, local, and tribal efforts. Communication linkage to sheltering facilities, 

special needs of evacuees, and addressing the need for evacuation of both companion 

and service animals are just a few of the issues reflected in this annex. 

Improved Delivery of Disaster Assistance 

FEMA is making significant progress in improving its disaster assistance as well. 

FEMA’s Disaster Assistance Directorate’s planning and capability building initiatives include enhancing mass care capability by improving the National Shelter System and developing better tools for coordinating and tracking donations and volunteers; greatly increasing disaster victim registration capabilities while enhancing 

protections against waste, fraud and abuse; developing a national disaster housing 

strategy and improving operational planning for providing temporary housing in a 

catastrophic disaster; establishing a case management program; updating ESF 6 

Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services standard operating procedures; developing debris estimation technology and monitoring methodology and enhancing 

state and local debris operations capabilities; and, improving our capability to conduct operations planning for long term disaster operations. 

Emergency Evacuation, Shelter, and Housing 

FEMA’s most pressing priority for planning for Recovery from a catastrophic disaster event has been emergency evacuation, shelter and housing. In 2004, FEMA 

completed an initial Catastrophic Disaster Housing Strategy, which proposed several initiatives to increase FEMA’s capability to provide assistance to individuals 

and households following an extraordinary or catastrophic disaster. The strategy 

provided the principles and recommended strategies that establish the framework 

for the catastrophic disaster housing recovery planning being done today. Key needs 

identified at that time included: an expandable disaster registration intake and applicant assistance process; the ability to provide immediate benefits payments; a 

plan for assisting applicants to temporarily relocate to outside the disaster area; and 

a strategy and prepared public messages to provide victims with information about 

assistance. 

• Mass Evacuee Support Planning: The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes caused 

several hundred thousand residents to evacuate to over forty States, many for 

prolonged time periods. Cities such as Houston, Oklahoma City, Atlanta, and 

Baton Rouge received hundreds of thousands of evacuees requiring immediate 

shelter, food, other basic assistance, as well as longer term services. In June 

2006, FEMA published Recovery Strategy RS–001, Mass Sheltering and Housing Assistance. This strategy addresses many contingencies for providing sheltering and housing assistance for declared emergencies and major disasters. In 

addition, FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning. 

This will assist State and local governments to plan and prepare for hosting 

large displaced populations. The project includes FEMA developing an evacuee 

registration and tracking capability, implementation plans for federal evacuation support to states, emergency sheltering guidance and providing direct 

planning assistance to potential host States and communities. 

• The National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System and 

National Emergency Child Locator Center: As defined in the Post Katrina 

12 

Act, these capabilities will address the reunification of displaced persons and activity to locate missing children during disasters. For disasters declared by the 

President, this tracking capability will assist FEMA, Department of Justice and 

the American Red Cross in further developing and implementing methods for 

quickly identifying and reunifying missing and separated children and family 

members during a disaster. 

• Improving Shelter Management and Accountability: FEMA and the 

American Red Cross, the nation’s largest operator of major congregate shelters 

during disasters. The first phase of the National Shelter System (NSS) was developed through a FEMA/American Red Cross partnership to provide a webbased data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification activities. The system is intended for use by all agencies that provide 

shelter services during disasters to ensure a comprehensive understanding of 

the shelter populations and available shelter capacity. In addition, this system 

will provide visibility on large shelter populations and position FEMA to provide 

targeted registration assistance to disaster victims. Outreach and training for 

Federal, State, and local authorities in use of the system is being conducted. 

• Housing Options: The FEMA Housing Portal was developed to consolidate 

available rental resources for evacuees from Federal agencies, private organizations, and individuals. The Joint Housing Solutions Group is a dedicated unit 

to research and document alternatives to traditional temporary housing. They 

are currently conducting initial baseline field tests of a housing option assessment tool. 

• Expanding Home Inspections Capacity: FEMA has increased the daily 

home inspection capacity of FEMA contracted firms from 7,000 per day to 

40,000 per day through a new contractual agreement. This added capacity— 

combined with a newly established third party evaluation of inspections performed on victims’ damaged homes—will increase the speed and accuracy of 

home inspections that determine the FEMA repair and replacement grants for 

which a victim may be eligible. 

Applicant Registration and Management 

In 2006 and 2007 FEMA has focused its Recovery planning and capability building efforts on improving applicant management systems, expanding registration intake and processing capacity, increasing fraud controls, supporting displaced populations, identifying alternative forms of temporary housing, and debris management 

planning. FEMA has made significant progress in increasing its capability to provide assistance to individuals particularly in the areas of registration, applicant 

processing, and providing assistance. 

• Doubling Registration Capacity to 200,000 Per Day: During the days 

and weeks following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA surpassed 100,000 

registrations a day, shattering all previous records of intake.μ While call center 

capacity was increased to its highest levels ever, FEMA is pursuing even more 

robust contract and contingency surge capabilities that will quickly allow for 

rapid expansion to a registration intake capacity of up to 200,000 per day. 

FEMA’s Internet-based registration capability has been increased by improving 

accessibility, allowing FEMA to handle more registrations than ever before. 

This will help reduce registration wait times and FEMA Helpline information 

delays following a major disaster. 

• Deployable Mobile Registration Intake Centers (MRICs) Pilot: Recognizing many disaster victims may be stranded or in congregate shelters with 

no communications, and unable to register for assistance, FEMA has established a new registration pilot program that pushes registration capabilities directly into the field. In the 2007 hurricane season FEMA will have the ability 

to deploy Mobile Registrations Intake Centers immediately to congregate shelters and provide an on-site capability to quickly register for FEMA assistance. 

Debris Management Planning 

Management of contaminated debris is of particular concern for terrorist events, 

but is also an issue in most large natural disasters. An Interagency Work Group 

to coordinate Federal agency management of contaminated debris began work in 

2005 just prior to Hurricane Katrina. The Work Group is further developing Federal 

contaminated debris operational procedure guidance. This project is analyzing the 

implications of a catastrophic incident on contaminated debris management programs and policies and will assist FEMA, USACE, EPA, USCG, and other federal 

stakeholders to better define their operational role and inter-relationships. FEMA’s 

Public Assistance Program is also undertaking two catastrophic planning initiatives 

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13 

ning and enhancing Federal capabilities to estimate debris volumes following a disaster to assist in operational planning and cost estimation. 

Increasing Fraud Controls 

FEMA has also taken steps to implement new and stronger controls pertaining 

to identity and occupancy verification of applicants for disaster assistance. Examples 

of controls implemented include: deployment of a new Internet registration application that disallows any duplicate registrations; added identity proofing to the call 

center registration application so that all Individual and Households Program (IHP) 

registrations are subjected to the same stringent criteria, including verification of 

social security numbers and occupancy requirements; data-marking any applications 

in FEMA’s database that fail identity proofing so they are flagged for manual review 

and denied automated payment; real-time interaction between the FEMA Service 

Representative and the applicant during registration to ensure the data entered 

that resulted in a failed identity check is correct before accepting the application; 

working with FEMA’s data contractor to flag any addresses that are not residential 

addresses in order to prevent automated payments without an on-site inspection 

verification of address and residency; and flagging at-risk social security numbers 

to identify potential fraud. 

Conclusion 

I believe we have made real progress at FEMA and are prepared for the 2007 

Hurricane Season. Our efforts will bear fruit across our disaster operations and assistance programs. Today, I have focused on 

• 1. Establishing a heightened posture of hurricane preparedness; 

• 2. Engaging our State and Federal partners in more thorough and informed hurricane planning; and, 

• 3. Building FEMA’s operational capabilities to provide effective response and recovery. 

But, there is a lot more going on inside FEMA that will contribute to enhanced 

performance and organizational success. For example, I hope to announce soon the 

selection of our Disabilities Coordinator. 

Although all disasters are local, FEMA must play a more proactive role in understanding vulnerabilities so we can assist the localities in being better prepared to 

respond. And, as I hope you can see by today?s testimony—we are. By leaning further forward to coordinate the federal response, we can better serve all Americans. 

Today, FEMA: 

• Has created engaged partnerships in support of State and local governments, 

• Has supported and helped to facilitate an effective unified command 

with other Federal agencies, and State and local officials, 

• Has engaged with hurricane-prone states to gain a better understanding of their vulnerabilities, 

• Has improved logistics and communications capabilities to improve 

response, and 

• Enhanced Disaster Assistance capabilities for recovery efforts. 

Of course, we are not done yet.μ There is still much work to do. 

But if our progress over the past year is any indication, I believe we are on the 

right track to fulfilling our vision to become the nation’s preeminent emergency 

management and preparedness agency. 

I am especially proud of the men and women who work at FEMA.μ They have 

put their hearts and souls into rebuilding this agency. The men and women of 

FEMA are dedicated to the mission of disaster and victim recovery, and staunchly 

committed to improving the speed, efficiency, and accountability with which we perform that mission. That commitment is not only to the victims and communities of 

those disasters that we expect to face in the future, but to those victims and communities still struggling with the personal, professional, and social consequences and 

challenges of past disasters. 

Thank you for your continued support and the opportunity to discuss how FEMA 

is preparing for the 2007 Hurricane Season. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Paulison. I 

thank you for your testimony. 

I will remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes 

to question the witness. 

I will now recognize myself for questions. 

14 

Before I do, I would like to make reference that, under the House 

rules and this committee, visitors and guests are not permitted to 

make undue noise or to applaud or in any way show their pleasure 

or displeasure as to the actions of the members of the House. 

Mr. Paulison, as you know, with the hurricane season coming on 

June 1, when do you think we will have the plan ready? 

Mr. PAULISON. Well, the national response plan is actually in 

place now, the one we have been using. The concept of how we are 

going to operate under that plan is still in place. What we are 

doing is trying to rewrite that plan, to build it from the bottom up, 

to make it much easier for the local communities to understand 

and use and also incorporate some of those things that came out 

of the Post-Katrina Reform Act. 

We are going to try to get this thing ready before our first hurricane comes. I will not be ready by June 1, I want to tell you that 

right now, but it should be done shortly after that. I have had my 

staff working on it with the Department of Homeland Security and 

also a lot of our users out there are involved in rewriting this plan. 

So we do have a plan in place. We have a CONOPS for hurricane 

season, we are doing right now multi-state evacuation planning 

and working with all the states and their planning efforts to make 

sure that we can fill those gaps that they have. 

So we have a plan in place. The national response plan you are 

speaking of, as far as rewriting it, is not done yet, but we are working very hard to make sure we get done in a timely manner. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Can you give us an approximation of when 

you think it will be ready? 

Mr. PAULISON. I would hate to give you that and have something 

happen. Invariably, if I give a date on something, something happens with that. I can tell you that we are working hard to get it 

done in the June timeframe and not into July. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I think you do understand the need 

to present that document. 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Is your testimony to this committee of 

such that even though we don’t have the plan before us, that it 

does not impede FEMA’s ability to respond to any particular disaster, especially hurricanes? 

Mr. PAULISON. That is correct, sir. That is my testimony. We are 

ready to respond. We are working with the states, making sure we 

are doing those gap analyses, particularly with the hurricane 

states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and working with them 

very closely. And we are ready to respond should a hurricane come 

prior to getting that revised national response plan out; yes, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Another issue that came before us in previous testimony is that we authorize FEMA a certain number of 

slots from a personnel standpoint. Can you provide the committee 

where we are in completing the slots, as authorized by Congress? 

Mr. PAULISON. At this point in time, we are just a little bit over 

90 percent of our authorized strength, and I think that is remarkable. We will be at 95 percent before hurricane season, that is our 

goal. And don’t forget we only had 1,700 people when I took over 

FEMA, and we lost 500 after Katrina. So we made a remarkable 

15 

recovery of hiring people, getting them aboard, and we are at 90 

percent. 

If you are talking about the 254 positions converting to full-time, 

we are in the process of doing that. Of course, that will drop the 

percentage down once we get those in there, but we are doing a remarkable job of hiring, being able to cut through some of the red 

tape and being able to get people on board. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Can you provide the committee with what 

you identify as some of the red tape that perhaps prevented you 

from bringing people on as fast as you would like to have? 

Mr. PAULISON. I think a lot of it was getting stuck in the mud, 

so to speak, with the old way of doing things. I will give you an 

example: We have a job fair right there at the Holiday Inn where 

FEMA is located, and we had almost 600 people show up for 42 

jobs. 

So we are going to be doing more things like that, going out and 

looking at hiring veterans that have been disabled from the war in 

Iraq, going out to colleges and community colleges. I spoke at a 

commencement exercise last week and challenged people to come to 

work for FEMA. It is a good place to work. Targeting minority 

groups and women groups to get them to apply to come to work for 

FEMA. 

We are looking outside the box, trying to cut through some of the 

red tape. One of the things I learned coming from local government, the hiring of the federal government is much more difficult 

than at the local level. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, as you know, one of the workplace 

issues for DHS in general is the morale of its employees. Can you 

provide us those things that you think that might help Congress 

help the department improve morale of its employees? 

Mr. PAULISON. I will speak to FEMA directly. The morale of 

FEMA when I took over was obviously, by anyone’s perception, not 

good. They had been beat up, they were overworked, shorthanded, 

not enough people to do the job. So we are building the morale by 

doing a couple of things. 

One, the employees see that I am very serious about rebuilding 

this organization and they bought into that. Two, we have been 

hiring people. Like I said, we are at 90 percent of our authorized 

strength now. Three, and maybe as important as the other two, is 

bringing people on board who have experience to do the job, bringing in good leadership. We only had two of our 10 regional director 

slots filled. Now, they are all 10 filled, and they are people with 

25 and 30 years experience dealing with emergency management. 

So the employees see that we are serious about it. 

I think that what I would ask Congress to do is to continue what 

you have been doing, Mr. Chair. You have been supporting me, you 

have been supporting this agency, and the employees recognize 

that. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Last question, Mr. Paulison: Are you aware of an issue with 

formaldehyde in certain trailers that FEMA bought and placed in 

the Gulf Coast region? And if you are, to what extent have you had 

it investigated, and what have you come up with your investigation? 

16 

Mr. PAULISON. The formaldehyde issue was brought to our attention, and we actually went out and investigated. We used EPA and 

some other agencies to do testing. We have been told that the formaldehyde does not present a health hazard; however, we do encourage our occupants of those trailers to air those out, keep them open 

as much as possible to let the fumes die out. And pretty much any 

mobile home you buy has that same issue. Actually, a lot of single 

family homes have that. 

But we have been very cognizant and are on top of that and are 

making sure that we are not doing anything that is going to harm 

those people that are living in those travel trailers and mobile 

homes. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So there is not anything out of the normal? 

Mr. PAULISON. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the 

gentleman from New York, for questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Paulison, I understand that probably in the next several 

weeks the U.S. International Trade Commission may issue a decision in a patent dispute case that would prohibit the importation 

of broadband-capable cell phones that allow users to share video 

and exchange other data via the Internet. I assume you are aware 

of it. I know several first responder groups have come to me, and 

they are concerned about the impact that would have. 

What impact do you think it would have, and how would FEMA 

adapt itself to that decision, if it comes down that way? 

Mr. PAULISON. We had a discussion with this yesterday, so your 

question is timely. 

I won’t have a major impact on FEMA itself, because we have 

the capability of doing those things already. What it does have an 

impact on is the first responders. They need that technology out 

there to be able to do the video, the data over one instrument instead of having several. 

So without getting into a dispute on who is right, the fact is that 

the first responder community can use that technology and can use 

it to actually protect themselves and better protect the American 

public. 

Mr. KING. On to another point, and I realize that no two disasters are alike and no incidents are alike, but based on the leadership you are bringing to FEMA and based on the legislation that 

was passed last year, what would be done differently if a Katrinalike event occurred this summer? How do you see FEMA reacting 

differently than it did 2 years ago? 

Mr. PAULISON. Well, FEMA itself, the difference is some of the 

things we have already talked about, about having a better communication system, having the right type of leadership on the ground 

who know how to handle disasters, know how to manage these big 

disasters, but also having visibility of what is actually happening 

in real time as opposed to guessing what is happening and getting 

it off some of the television stations. 

Also, we have been working with each state, looking at evacuation plans. Are they in place, how are they going to transport peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
17 

ple, where are they going to go, who is going to staff the shelters? 

We have been working very closely with the Red Cross on the shelter issue, putting a shelter registry in place. We have identified 

44,000 shelters across this country that we didn’t know that were 

there before. 

So we are doing a lot of things that you are not going to see the 

same type of response. You are going to see a federal government 

that is extremely proactive, moving very quickly and making sure 

that when the state asks for something it is there on the ground 

waiting for them. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now yield to the gentlelady from California for 5 minutes, 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Paulison, for being before us today. 

In the next couple of weeks, I am planning to introduce legislation to authorize the national urban search and rescue system. And 

my question for you is, do you think that the national urban search 

and rescue system and its task forces are a successful part in helping FEMA respond to these disasters? 

Mr. PAULISON. There is no question about it. They are an outstanding asset for FEMA to use. We have 28 teams out there right 

now. In 2007, they received $25 million from FEMA, and the president’s proposed budget for 2008 is another $25 million. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In particular, the legislation I have drafted right 

now would allow the urban search and rescue system and task 

forces to activate for pre-staging and training activities, and do you 

think that this will improve the system’s preparedness and ability 

to respond when they are needed? 

Mr. PAULISON. Well, without seeing the legislation, I will just 

speak generally, that any time that the teams exercise and deploy 

in practice, it makes them sharper and more able to respond in a 

better manner, if that is answering your question. And that is why 

we have increased the amount of money they get to $25 million and 

again next year to give them the dollars to do some of those things. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In the testimony that we received from the second 

panel, Mr. Fugate, the director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management, urges us to increase the funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program. The National 

Emergency Management Association estimates that the current national need for that funding is at about $487 million, and yet the 

president only put in $200 million for this 2008 budget. 

Given that this the only grant that we have of federal funding 

for the states and locals to use for planning and preparedness activities for all hazard disasters, do you think that that is enough 

money, the fact that the president only put in $200 million in his 

budget? 

Mr. PAULISON. Well, since Mr. Fugate is sitting behind me, I will 

be careful how I answer that. 

Actually, the president and the administration does feel that that 

is sufficient. There is no amount of money that is ever enough for 

anybody to operate under. We know that our state emergency management systems are stretched. Florida has a very robust one, and 

18 

Mr. Fugate is one of our better emergency managers around the 

country. 

But the president is putting into the budget what he thinks is 

sufficient to keep those systems going. It is a state activity, and the 

federal government is simply assisting in that area. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you think that the Department of Homeland 

Security has a sufficient all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness and response? 

Mr. PAULISON. I do. I am a firm believe in all-hazards response 

and all-hazards preparedness. Any type of disaster that we prepare 

for we have to prepare for all of them. We have to prepare for natural disasters, manmade disasters, terrorist disasters, any type of 

thing. You can see it in your home state what you have to deal 

with, from forest fire to floods, mudslides, earthquakes, all those 

types of things. 

So we have to have a general perspective of this, and I do feel 

like that I get a lot of support as the secretary for an all-hazards 

approach to how we respond and how we prepare. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, lastly, let me ask, my biggest concern right 

now, being a Californian and just going out in the community, is 

that the first line of response or successfulness with respect to either a terrorist attack or a hazard situation is how the people respond. And what I have seen is really a deterioration in people 

even being prepared on an individual, family or unit basis. 

What do you think that we can do to increase that knowledge 

and really get people to understand that it may be 9 days, like in 

Katrina, before the federal government or anybody else gets to 

them? 

Mr. PAULISON. And I have seen the same thing, and I will talk 

about my home state of Florida after Hurricane Andrew came 

through. We saw several years where people were prepared and 

would get ready for every hurricane season. And as we got further 

and further away from that hurricane, it got worse and worse 

where people simply did not prepare. 

With Hurricane Wilma coming through last year, we ended up 

working with the state and simply could not keep up with the 

amount of supplies we had to deliver to people because they were 

not ready. They didn’t have their 3 days supply of food and water 

and medicine, flashlights and batteries and all those things that we 

know you have to have. 

This country has to get back to a culture of preparedness. We 

can preach it from here, but it takes people like Mr. Fugate, who 

will testify in the next committee, and the local emergency managers and our congressional members and our local elected officials 

continuing to preach that we have to be ready for any type of disaster. Because regardless of what state you live in, in this free 

country of ours, there is some type of natural disaster that can be 

there. Plus we have the threat of terrorism. 

So I think we are on the same page. We have got to get that out 

there and convince our public out there, our residents, that they 

have to prepare and take care of themselves and their families. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I apologize to the 

gentlelady. I looked at one red light and it was second. 

19 

We now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Those of us who were on this committee last Congress are all 

aware of the real difficulty DHS has had in trying to recruit and 

retain top management personnel, and we all are also aware how 

difficult it was for us when your position came open to recruit topflight personnel to be interested in this job. And as I recall, you 

were the only top-flight candidate who didn’t run for the hills, and 

our nation owes you a debt of gratitude for taking on this job when 

nobody else wanted it of your caliber. So I appreciate that. 

Also, I appreciate the fact that when we had a tornado in Alabama earlier, a few months ago, FEMA performed exceptionally 

well, which was a stark turnaround from what we saw on the Gulf 

Coast after Katrina. So I know that didn’t happen by accident either, so I appreciate your service in Alabama. 

There are several things I want to ask about. First is, on the 

coast, in the coastal states, we have, and I know in Mississippi and 

in Alabama, primarily rural water systems that provide water to 

these small towns. It is my understanding that in Georgia and in 

Mississippi there are adequate numbers of mobile generators for 

pumping the water when the power goes out, but in Alabama there 

are a very small number of those generators. 

Is there anything being done by FEMA to address that inadequacy, at least on the southern part of Alabama, toward the Gulf 

Coast, in water generation? 

Mr. PAULISON. We have quite a few generators that we call 50- 

pack. We have 50 generators on a tractor trailer that we move in 

very quickly after a storm. Greensburg, Kansas, had their own 

water system and their own power system owned by the city, so we 

moved in very quickly with generators, along with the National 

Guard, to help them get those things back up and running again. 

And we would do the same thing in Alabama. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can these local rural water systems apply for grant 

assistance to get mobile units that they can move among their own 

members and their associations? 

Mr. PAULISON. They can after a storm. If there is a storm and 

their infrastructure is damaged— 

Mr. ROGERS. I am thinking ahead of time, pre-positioning these 

things, knowing that on the Gulf Coast we are going to have seasonal weather problems that will take the water distribution down. 

Because Georgia has an adequate number and because Mississippi, 

because of Katrina relief, has them, I want to know if we can do 

anything in advance of a disaster to make sure these water systems have these mobile units they can share among each other? 

Mr. PAULISON. I am not aware of any off the top of my head, 

Congressman, but I will tell you what I will do: I will research and 

see if we can find something. 

Mr. ROGERS. If you would, I would appreciate it, sir. 

The next thing you talked about in response to Congressman 

King’s question about what we would do differently. You talked 

about anticipating and working better with local governments. One 

of the things that our local officials in south Alabama talked about 

after Katrina was the debris removal, and they would like the latiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
20 

tude to go ahead and negotiate ahead of time with companies who 

are not in the immediate coastal area, to come in after a hurricane 

or tornado and remove debris, pre-negotiated prices along pre-negotiated routes so that we don’t get extorted when we have these disasters. 

Have you all done anything to allow these local governments 

themselves to pre-negotiate these debris removal contracts? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. In fact, we encourage them to do that. 

One thing that we have done is there used to be a disparity between at what percentage rate we reimburse the Corps, if the 

Corps did it, or if a local community contracted themselves, and we 

have taken that disparity away. That was not the right thing to do, 

so we have taken that disparity away. 

We encourage local communities and states to have those debris 

contracts in place. It makes it much easier. First of all, it puts the 

work back at the local community where it needs to be so you can 

put local people working. And then, secondly, it takes the burden 

off of the Corps also. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. My last question is to follow up on Congresswoman Sanchez’s issue of search and rescue. Do you all have 

within your resources canine detection teams for post-disaster 

search and rescue? 

Mr. PAULISON. The 20 urban search and rescue teams, most of 

those do have canine dogs to search for live victims and also body 

recovery. FEMA itself does not own them, but we pay for them 

through the local communities that have urban search and rescue 

teams, or the states that have them. 

Mr. ROGERS. You pay for them? 

Mr. PAULISON. We support the urban search and rescue teams, 

again, $25 million this year, and part of that the teams will support a dog canine corps at the urban search and rescue level. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize the gentlelady from the District of Columbia 

for 5 minutes, Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The gentleman from Alabama has raised an issue of the kind 

that about a dozen members came to testify before our subcommittee last week. And just for the information of members, we 

are preparing a package of legislative fixes really drawn from the 

Katrina experience. Sometimes they may apply to states like Alabama, which is also affected, but these would be one time only 

fixes, and we had the entire delegation from both states come. And 

we would appreciate your continuing input into that discussion. 

I am going to limit my question to a single one, particularly since 

my subcommittee is having a hearing that comes close to this one. 

It is going to be called, ‘‘Assuring the National Guard is as Ready 

at Home as Abroad,’’ and I appreciate that you are appearing at 

both of these hearings. 

Although I am going to suggest to both chairmen, full chairmen, 

that we perhaps have some joint hearings so as to keep FEMA 

from running between two committees, which very honestly do 

have overlapping jurisdictions. And so we have just got to figure 

21 

that out, and the committees are trying very hard. They each have 

a deep interest in your work. 

My question really goes to preparing for the coming season and 

avoiding what I will call, for lack of a better word, false positives. 

We may have scared FEMA into overpreparedness. You will remember, Mr. Paulison, our hearing on the millions of dollars above 

what was needed for food, and I know you are fixing that now, but 

several million dollars was wasted, some was given away. 

We also have asked for an audit of your new management employees. I think much of that came out of both committees. 

Mr. Chairman, you will recall that in our committee on the Federal Management Service we discussed, as we had in the other 

committee, how the person who became head of this federal police 

service that covers the entire federal work force, almost 2 million 

people, had never run a police department. I understand some of 

these people come out of the military, but that raises that some 

questions that I think only an audit will tell us about. 

But you have now new people predicting hurricanes, and there 

was an internal debate in FEMA last year about this 7-day directive, that there will be 7 days advance warning and so forth, and 

a lot of that comes out of the science, but the debate had to do with 

keeping mobilizations and deployments from occurring that may 

not be necessary. And it appears that a fair number of deployments 

were made that were not necessary based on this 7-day warning 

when in fact most of those hurricanes peter out and go out to sea, 

thank heavens. 

I want to know if you feel that you are more actively able to discern which hurricanes are likely to hit land, and you know that in 

about 3 days out. In that case, wouldn’t that be enough, given advance orders for food and so forth, if needed, to do the necessary 

deployments without trying to figure out 7 days out and then deploying people around the country, spending taxpayers’ money 

where it may not be necessary? 

Mr. PAULISON. That is a very difficult issue and a very intriguing 

question you are asking. 

We work very closely with the National Hurricane Center. In 

fact, I have a FEMA employee that is stationed down there. We 

have a hurricane liaison team actually based in the National Hurricane Center down in Miami. And we know they are working very 

hard to give us better predictions. Three-day predictions are pretty 

accurate, the 5-day predictions are not quite as accurate, and if you 

get out any further than that, it makes it much harder. 

We want to be proactive. The states have to move quickly. If we 

look at an area like Louisiana or anywhere in the Gulf Coast where 

a significant number of people are going to have to be evacuated 

and going to have to be evacuated by buses, if we wait too long before we start moving people, then they will be in harm’s way. Now, 

7 days is too early to move people, obviously, but, still, 72 hours 

out takes almost that long sometimes to move people. 

I know Craig Fugate is here, and he has a lot of experience with 

that. I am sure you can ask that same question from a state perspective just to tell you what they think. 

22 

We don’t want to move assets needlessly, we don’t want to waste 

taxpayers’ dollars, but at the same time, the downside would not 

to be there if they needed us. 

So it is a tough call. We are trying to make the best judgment 

we can. I am on the phone constantly. I was with Max Mayfield 

and the new Hurricane Director Proenza. We are developing a good 

relationship, and I am on the phone with him constantly, ‘‘Tell me 

what you really think. Where do you think it is going to go?’’ We 

are just making the best call we can at the time. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. It would be too bad if an audit then is done 

on FEMA going more places than was necessary. There ought to 

be someway to somehow do this scientifically. I do understand 

what you are up against. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I would like to remind the audience that cell phones should be 

in the ‘‘off’’ or ‘‘vibrate’’ mode during hearings. We continue to hear 

phones going off while questions and witnesses are responding. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida for 5 minutes, Mr. 

Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I am sure you are aware, Director, many experts have predicted that this hurricane season will be a very active one. Obviously, those of us who represent coastal states are very concerned 

about the potential of these dangerous forecasts. 

I believe it is incumbent upon our states and local governments 

to best prepare for major disasters. So with that, I will ask my 

questions. 

What are the most important steps that states, localities and 

even individuals can take to ensure that they are best prepared for 

the upcoming hurricane season? 

Mr. PAULISON. That is a pretty broad question. 

I am from south Florida also. My family is still down there. Individually, I can tell you what we do. We make sure that our home 

is prepared, make sure we have hurricane shutters. Every beginning of hurricane season we go out and purchase food and water, 

make sure we have batteries for our flashlights. I happen to have 

a portable generator. I make sure I have fuel for that and we are 

ready to go. 

At the local level, the local community definitely has to be prepared, because that is where the response is going to come from. 

They have to make sure they have plans in place, they exercise 

those plans, make sure they know what their shelters are going to 

be, how they are going to evacuate people, when they are going to 

call it, how are they going to get there. 

And at the state level, the same type of thing. The state needs 

to make sure that they are following up on each of those counties 

and each of those communities, that they are evaluating those 

plans to make sure those are in place and make sure the state is 

ready to respond with the assets it has. 

It is a team effort. It takes the federal government, the state, the 

local community and the individuals all to take it very seriously to 

prepare themselves for these types of storms, particularly in the 

coastal areas. 

23 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. I have a question. I introduced a piece of 

legislation which was to provide tax incentives for Americans in 

their property to better withstand hurricane and tornado-free 

winds. 

Do you believe that the administration would be interested in 

working with me on this proposal to help continue our country’s 

commitment to disaster preparedness? 

Because I think mitigation is where it is at. 

Mr. PAULISON. I can speak for FEMA, particularly. We would be 

glad to work with you on any type of legislation that would help 

people better prepare themselves and to sit down and talk with you 

and talk about what our issues are and how we think we can get 

this country all prepared for any type of disaster, quite frankly. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Can you specifically discuss again—I know 

it was touched upon—the adjustments that your agency made postKatrina? 

Mr. PAULISON. I will, and I will cover them quickly, because I 

know you have another panel behind me. We took very seriously 

those things that came out of committees like this, came out of the 

White House, came out of the IG report, the GAO reports, and they 

boiled down to just a few things that were overall themes. 

One, the biggest failure was communications, no communication 

between the local community and the state, between the state and 

the federal government and inside the federal government itself. 

That is why we put this unified command system in place. It has 

a better visibility of what is happening on the ground real time. We 

have put systems in place to be able to get live videos back where 

we can actually see that and have satellite communications. 

Having a better logistics system, better handle on how much 

stuff do we need on the ground, how do we move it, how do we 

track it, and how do we get it to the people. Having better leadership on the ground, people who know what they are doing—we 

learned that very clearly—and then also being able to take better 

care of our victims, the people who have had to evacuate. Have a 

better registration system in place, being able to track people, making sure they get what they need but yet at the same time putting 

waste, abuse and fraud systems in place so we don’t waste money 

like we did during Katrina. 

And that is a very quick, short answer, but I would be glad to 

sit down with your office and go over it in detail if you would like. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Director. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Paulison, once again, I want to commend you for your efforts 

in jumping on. It is not easy, and I realize the task you have at 

hand. 

On February 15 of 2006, February 15, 2006, Secretary Chertoff 

testified, and I want to quote this so I get it right, that, ‘‘It seems 

to me the minimum of what we need to do by June 1 is require 

that you put on the trucks the kind of communications that allow 

you to track where a truck is at any particular point in time.’’ 

24 

Now, the secretary is talking about June 1, 2006. Does FEMA, 

in fact, have this capability in place by January 1, 2006? 

Mr. PAULISON. We do. We do for the Gulf Coast, and up the Atlantic Coast, anything that flows out of our office in Denton, Texas, 

or our offices out of Atlanta, which is our biggest supply depots. We 

purchased 20,000 GPS units and we can track our trucks real time, 

but it is a bigger system than that. 

So nationwide what we can do is our ordering system, where 

does the order come from, when is it filled, where is it going, and 

when does it get on the road. We have put a system in place like 

that. 

Mr. CARNEY. And that is nationwide? 

Mr. PAULISON. The tracking of the individual trucks is not nationwide. The tracking of the individual trucks is anything that 

comes out of Texas or anything that comes out of Atlanta. 

But we are looking now at going to more of what we call a 3PL, 

third-party logistics where leveraging the private sector out there, 

like the UPSs and the FedExes and tying into their system instead 

of spending the millions and millions of dollars to purchase our 

own. So that is going to be the next phase of this. 

Mr. CARNEY. In case of a true catastrophe, are you going to then 

be pulling resources from all over the country; is that what you are 

telling us? 

Mr. PAULISON. Well, the bulk of our supplies are in Texas and 

Alabama, although we do have them scattered around the country. 

But what we are really doing is develop a partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency where they will be our main supplier and 

a backup supplier. So we will be able to rotate stocks, so we don’t 

have the wasted supplies like we had before, but at the same time 

being able to track those through that system also. We really are 

developing partnerships. 

We have learned a lot of lessons over the last 3 years on how the 

logistics systems should work and also to the point of hiring one 

of the top officials. I had a DLA to come work for us and run our 

logistics, so we are excited about that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thanks. In your prepared testimony, you said that 

the guiding principle of the new FEMA is that we are leaning further forward to deliver more effective disaster assistance to individuals and communities impacted by a disaster, and you called it, 

‘‘engaged partnership.’’ I really commend that approach. I am very 

happy to hear that. 

Yet last week, when White House Spokesman Tony Snow was 

asked about Kansas Governor Sebelius concern over response efforts, he said, ‘‘If you don’t request it, you are not going to get it.’’ 

Is this statement consistent with FEMA’s principles, or do you 

have some education to do at the White House? 

[Audience interruption.] 

Chairman THOMPSON. Excuse me a minute. We will save your 

time, Mr. Carney. 

Mr. PAULISON. What was the question again? Sorry? 

Mr. CARNEY. Your leaning forward approach, you have engaged 

partnership I think is great, but Tony Snow said, ‘‘If you don’t request it, you are not going to get it.’’ 

25 

Mr. PAULISON. I think that was in context to some of the Guard 

issues, I am not sure. But I can tell you that the philosophy of this 

agency is we are going to try to anticipate what the needs are. We 

see thousands of disasters all the time, so we kind of know what 

is going to be needed. So we are going to be moving supplies, communications but not without talking to the state and telling them 

what we are doing. We are not going to come in and take over. This 

is a local response and it is a state response. 

But what we did in Greensburg, Kansas, just seeing the magnitude of the disaster of that, we knew that they were going to 

have a difficult time asking for things, so we started moving the 

stuff that we thought they would need right away, and it worked 

extremely well. 

Mr. CARNEY. Is Mr. Snow aware of this? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, he is. He was with us when we went down 

there and saw what we were doing. I think that may have been 

taken—again, I don’t know what the context of what that statement was said, but I know he was very supportive of what we were 

doing. 

Mr. CARNEY. Good. All right. That is good to hear. 

Thank you very much. No further questions. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize Mr. Davis of Tennessee for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director Paulison, for being here. I appreciate 

your testimony today. 

It is my understanding that FEMA and the national response 

plan make it quite clear that FEMA’s role is to coordinate federal 

resources and to assist in disasters and not actually take over for 

local and state governments. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. PAULISON. Absolutely. All response is local; that is, we are 

not going to take over. We want to be there as a partner from day 

one, not wait for people to become overwhelmed before we step in. 

But I was a local first responder also. I ran the Miami-Dade Fire 

Department, and I would not want somebody to come in and take 

over my disaster, but I would want somebody by my side, and that 

is the tact we are going to take. We are not going to take over, that 

disaster belongs to that state, belongs to that local community. We 

just want to make sure they have the tools and the supplies to do 

the job. 

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. You used the word, ‘‘overwhelmed,’’ 

and it appears to me that we are really in a partnership, the federal government and state and local governments, coming together, 

working alongside, closer to the people. Local government, state 

government really take the lead and then FEMA comes in and follows up. 

With that in mind, though, there are people around the country 

that watch national TV and they just feel like the federal government should take control and be there quicker. I am not sure that 

I agree with that, but what would you say to the people around the 

country that have that sense that we should react quicker at a federal level? 

Mr. PAULISON. I think we should act quicker than we have in the 

past but not to take over. If the state or local community does need 

26 

something, like communications equipment, food, water, blue tarps, 

all those types of things that FEMA supplies, they should be there 

when they need them, not have to wait 3 or 4 days for us to ship 

them across the country. 

So we are going to move faster with things that we think they 

do need, but we are not going to step on their toes, we are not 

going to take over these disaster scenes. 

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. I know that I have been a state legislator myself, and I understand that at the local level we are closer 

to the people, typically, than we are in the Washington level. Do 

you believe you even have the constitutional authority to take control or do you still believe that is down there at the local and state 

level? 

Mr. PAULISON. In a catastrophic event, the president would have 

legal authority to take over, invoking Insurrection Act or something 

like that. However, in a normal disaster, we are not going to do 

that. That is not what we have the authority to do. That is the 

local response or a state’s rights out there. 

Again, we want to be a partner. This is not an adversarial at all. 

We want to be there with them as soon as we can, standing by 

their side, ‘‘What do you need, how can we help, what can we give 

you,’’ and that is the way we want to operate. That is the philosophy this organization is going to operate under as long as I am 

in charge. 

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you for your partnership, and 

I can tell you, being from the mountains of east Tennessee, there 

are times that we have floods coming out of the mountains with 

rivers and streams and FEMA has always been very responsive. 

This is my first term but I hear very good things that you have 

been able to do in the past, and thank you for working with us on 

the local and state level. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Lowey, for 

5 minutes. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and what a delight 

it is for me to welcome Administrator Paulison. 

I must tell you that we had a severe nor’easter and the subsequent flooding devastated many communities, particularly in Westchester County, which is my community, and Administrator 

Paulison joined Senator Clinton and me on a tour of the flooded 

areas and FEMA quickly had preliminary damage assessment 

teams on the ground, which led to the president issuing a disaster 

declaration in a timely manner. I cannot be more effusive. You 

were extraordinary, you responded immediately, and I visited every 

disaster preparedness center, recovery center, I guess we call it 

now in the district, and the response has really been fantastic. 

You set up seven disaster recovery centers, nearly 6,000 households and businesses have registered for assistance, $7.25 million 

in housing assistance grants have been approved for over 3,000 

households. The Small Business Administration has approved 41 

loans for a total of $2.24 million, and the majority of those I have 

spoken with have really been pleased. 

27 

So congratulations, and we thank you for your very efficient, effective and compassionate response. 

On another issue, I wanted to ask you about the Stafford Act, 

which limits grants for housing repair to primary residences, and 

I certainly understand the intent to not provide assistance for an 

individual to repair a second home or vacation house. 

This limitation, we have found, can have a negative impact on 

landlords who are trying to make repairs so their renters can return home, and affordable housing is very scarce in my district, 

and after the recent flooding you and I saw many cases in which 

landlords are denied assistance to repair their rental units, because 

these are not the owners’ primary residences. 

The landlords must secure a Small Business Administration or 

private loan in order to repair their property, and in some cases, 

landlords have simply said that it isn’t financially viable to take a 

loan to fix property that is rented by low or moderate income individuals. 

So this exacerbates the affordable housing problems and really 

has had a major effect on renters who must find a new place to 

live. 

So in order to solve this problem, which also remains in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, I am working on legislation to allow 

FEMA to provide direct assistance to landlords of low to moderate 

income housing. It would also give FEMA the flexibility to set appropriate conditions to ensure that funding is directed to areas 

where it will be most beneficial. 

I would appreciate it if you could share with me your thoughts 

and whether you could support a change to the Stafford Act to assist landlords who rent to low or moderate income tenants. 

Mr. PAULISON. The issue that you saw is why we really encourage people to have flood insurance and insurance on their dwellings, because no matter where you are the potential for flood is always there across this country. 

We would sit down and work with you on the issues. Obviously, 

I can’t commit the administration position on the legislation, but 

I would like to look at it and have an opportunity to comment on 

it. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I thank you very much. 

And it is also my understanding that when seeking federal assistance for personal property losses, an applicant must first file for 

a Small Business Association loan and if denied, FEMA may offer 

the applicant a grant. 

Why does an individual—oh, I see my red light, I will talk quickly—why must an individual first apply to the SBA for a loan when 

attempting to secure a FEMA grant for personal property damage? 

Mr. PAULISON. I am not sure that is totally accurate. When they 

apply for individual assistance, if they get turned down by FEMA, 

then they can apply for SBA loan, but I think it is the other way 

around. Let me have my staff sit down with you and go over that 

individual—that is one of the things we are actually going to look 

at this next year. 

Okay. There is one called, ‘‘other needs assistance,’’ and that part 

is correct, but we are going to look very carefully at the individual 

assistance piece this next year, because it doesn’t move as quickly 

28 

as want it to, it doesn’t move as smoothly as we want it to, and 

see how we can streamline that and make it much more user 

friendly. And then next year we will do public assistance. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. 

And thank you for indulging. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite, 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to also thank Mr. Shays for relinquishing his time 

to me, because I have to be in the Veterans’ Affairs Committee. 

I just wanted to thank you, Mr. Paulison, for proving that you 

are taking emergency management seriously. When we had the tornadoes touch down in central Florida, we got absolute great response from FEMA. We were able to have your people and SBA on 

the ground helping people, and that is what I think that they expect from government. So let me just commend you very much for 

rapid response. 

Probably coming from Florida, you have just had a lot of experience in the Miami-Dade area, and, certainly, in Florida, we have 

a great state system that I am proud to say I helped put together 

after Hurricane Andrew. When I was got elected it was right after 

Hurricane Andrew, and we knew that we needed some changes in 

Florida and made those necessary changes. 

One thing that has concerned local elected officials in my area 

is that FEMA will not reimburse in a gated community for—they 

will not reimburse the locality for out front of the house pickup of 

debris, and why some may think that gated community are just for 

the wealthy, I can assure you that I have low and moderate income 

mobile home gate communities also. 

I would like to ask you if the agency is considering any changes 

in that prohibition? 

Mr. PAULISON. I need to check with my staff, but I think we have 

corrected that where we do do some of those things and the reimburse the communities for that type of pickup. I live in a gated 

community too, but let me follow up and make sure. I think we 

have put stuff in place to deal with some of these issues. But let 

me find out for sure. I don’t want to give you a bad answer here. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I do believe that what you do is, they have 

to haul it out to the front of the gated community, and it will be 

taken away from there. But for many elderly homeowners, that is 

a problem. And if people are in a gated community, I just don’t see 

why we should be discriminating against them, either because they 

are at the wealthy end of the spectrum, living in a gated community, or at the very poor end of the spectrum, living in a secure senior mobile home park. And I would just ask you to take a look at 

that policy. 

Mr. PAULISON. I know we dealt with this during Katrina in New 

Orleans and some other areas, and we worked around it by getting 

a right of entry to do some of those things. But let me give you the 

right answer, and I will get back with your staff and brief them 

on what those issues are. And if it is still not where you need it 

to be, we will work on it some more. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I appreciate that. 

29 

Certainly, at a time of an emergency, such as we regularly have 

in Florida and other coastal states, tell me how you coordinate with 

the National Guard. I know that the issue of the National Guard 

has been brought up recently. I wrote to the state National Guard 

general asking where Florida is, because that is of course my concern and Mr. Bilirakis’s concern. 

Tell me how you coordinate with the National Guard. 

[Audience interruption.] 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Excuse me, ma’am, I didn’t ask you. I asked 

Mr. Paulison. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Excuse me. According to our House rules, 

you are out of order, and you are not allowed to speak. I have admonished the audience a couple of times about that. And we are 

trying to be tolerant, but understand we do have rules of the committee, and unless you follow those rules, we will have you removed. 

Continue, Ms. Brown-Waite. 

Mr. PAULISON. The National Guards are a state asset, and we 

work very closely with them when we get on the scene. In Greensburg, the adjunct general of the National Guard was the incident 

commander and we immediately made contact with him to make 

sure that we were coordinating the response. 

I know the issue is, as we heard just behind me, about the National Guard’s asset being overseas, but we do have a system in 

this country called, EMAC, the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact, where we move assets from one state to another to assist 

a particular state that is going through a disaster, and we do that 

with the National Guard asset also. 

But we work very closely with the Guard. They are a key player 

in our response system, and we have a very good partnership with 

them. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. One other question: When localities contract 

with various clean-up companies, they very often will contract with 

two or three in case one is not available, which I think is a very 

wise thing to do. But during the tornado that struck down, it really 

was a feeding frenzy of, ‘‘Well, I have got the contract, no I have 

got the contract,’’ and I am not certain I want the federal government to enter in there but perhaps to advise the localities of one 

has to be the primary, one has to be the secondary. Because in this 

instance, both of these companies thought that they were the primary. And I am sure you have found this in other locations. 

After you respond to that, I will yield back the balance of my 

time, but please do respond. 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, I actually have seen that on occasion when 

there are several contractors, but that really is a local issue, and 

I think you are right, you don’t want the federal government stepping into that. We do encourage the communities to have those debris contracts in place. We have the Army Corps of Engineers that 

can sometimes come in and referee those types of things, but that 

is up to the local community to say, ‘‘Okay, you are the prime, you 

are the backup.’’ We can advise them to do that, but it is really 

their contract, not ours. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

30 

We now recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands for 5 

minutes, Ms. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Paulison, thank you for your testimony. I am encouraged by the progress you are reporting. 

I have a question about mass care, because, as I understand it, 

the ESF–6, the housing, feeding and providing first aid now comes 

under FEMA, but I would like you to explain to me what the role 

of the Red Cross is then in mass care and how that is being coordinated. 

Mr. PAULISON. The Red Cross is one of our major players in that 

ESF–6 system. We ended up taking it over, because they don’t 

have the authority to mission assign other federal governments and 

we do. But they are partners in that, along with several other 

groups, like HHS and others, that fit into that ESF–6 position of 

mass care. And we take the lead in it, but they are right there with 

us as partners. 

And, by the way, I just met with your adjunct general and your 

state emergency manager recently, a few days ago, exactly and 

talked about some of these same issues. And they are doing a great 

job for you down there; they really are. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Yes, they are. We are very proud of them and 

looking forward to have the change of command very soon. 

I am also concerned about mitigation, because in my experience 

with FEMA, mitigation played a big role for us in the Virgin Islands in being able to prevent the damage with recurrent hurricanes. And if I remember correctly, we could request about 20 percent additional funding for mitigation. And I am hearing that that 

is no longer the case. 

Could you tell me if there is still a provision for mitigation as 

you repair and recover or is that done? 

Mr. PAULISON. No. If a disaster is declared, there is a certain 

portion of the disaster dollars that can be used by the state or the 

local community for mitigation efforts. There is also Hazard Mitigation Grant Program out there that can be used for public assistance, and I think it is 15 percent of whatever the disaster cost is. 

And that can be used to raise homes or do other things to mitigate 

future damage. But the money is still there. It is 15 percent. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. I still have a little more time. 

The PFO and FCOs— 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. —do they both report to the secretary? 

Mr. PAULISON. No. The FCO reports to me. That is our employee. 

What we are doing with the PFO, the PFO is the secretary’s representative out there to do the high-level coordination with federal 

agencies. The FCO is the primary federal person to manage disasters. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But the FCO is the person that I, as the 

health person in the Virgin Islands, would go to to ask for whatever assets I needed from the federal government. 

Mr. PAULISON. That is correct. You should. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I am surprised the question didn’t come up 

before, but it just seems to me that we have too many there, and 

when that happens, things fall between the cracks. Has that been 

31 

exercised to see how it works and whether we really need those two 

officials? 

Mr. PAULISON. It has. We just had a major exercise just this last 

week, actually, 2 weeks ago, not only to a hurricane but tied into 

a terrorist event where the PFO and the FCO worked together. The 

FCO, which you normally deal with, is the person that handles 

anything to do with the Stafford Act in that disaster. That will continue on. 

The PFO is the secretary’s representative out there. Doesn’t have 

operational control; the FCO has that. The PFO is going to help 

mitigate issues between different federal agencies, may feed the information back to the secretary. Again, it is his eyes and ears out 

there on the ground. 

But the FCO is going to be the primary person managing the federal assets on the ground, not running the disaster. That is either, 

in your case, the territorial or a state responsibility to manage that 

disaster. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. 

Shays. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Paulison, for being here. I think you 

have got a very difficult job, and I know you are working very hard 

at it. 

I don’t have the same reaction Ms. Lowey has about the gratitude from FEMA. You left Connecticut out of the businesses and 

personal assistance, and we could give you literally hundreds of examples of damage, 2,400 residential units and so on. 

What I am puzzled by is, wouldn’t you group the area together 

and—I mean, what does it matter if Greenwich in New York are 

divided if it is the same storm in the region? Isn’t the whole point 

of natural disaster to look at the impact on the region? Why would 

you do it next door to the same storm and not Connecticut? 

Mr. PAULISON. I have my staff looking at Connecticut right now, 

actually. The president did sign off on two counties for public assistance. I have not turned down individual assistance yet. I have 

asked the state for more information about individual damage. 

We are bringing on a small state and rural advocate into FEMA 

to report directly to me also. The public assistance and individual 

assistance piece for some of the smaller states like yours, it doesn’t 

work as smoothly as I want it to. I am just trying to be very candid 

here. Fifty homes in Connecticut is much different than 100 or 200 

homes in New York or Texas or California. And what it does is, the 

whole idea of the Stafford Act is to cover when the state is overwhelmed and can’t deal with a disaster. 

So it has been very difficult with Connecticut. Your county system is not like the other states. 

Mr. SHAYS. No, we don’t have a county system. 

Mr. PAULISON. And you don’t have a county system. 

Mr. SHAYS. We have counties only in name, and that is the only 

thing that they represent. 

Mr. PAULISON. That is what is making it difficult for us, so I sat 

my staff down just before I came to this area, actually not even 

knowing you would be here, but I want them to look at this very 

32 

carefully as we look at the individual assistance piece and the 

amount of damage. We have an area in there that was very low 

income that has— 

Mr. SHAYS. Right. I was going to read you some of the folks, renters, who didn’t have flood insurance—these were rivers that hadn’t 

flooded as long as anyone can remember. 

But the same storm that impacted Ms. Lowey’s district impacted 

ours, and there is this artificial boundary in New York and Connecticut. I would think we would look at the region and treat the 

region, and if that is not possible, and it seems to me it is a defect 

in the law, we should look at us as a region. And I appreciate you 

checking that out, and I look forward to having more dialogue with 

you about that. 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. I will be glad to do that. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I know you received correspondence from 

all five congressmen, two senators and the governor as well. 

I would like to ask, in regards to Katrina, we all weep for different reasons. Everything about it, it was a huge storm, 10 miles 

inland, 20 feet of water, and Mississippi. It was a biblical storm. 

But there were things that were very troubling to me. One—I 

want no comment about this, I will just say it—that the head of 

Homeland Security chose to only go there by Wednesday with the 

president. I would have thought he would have been there Monday, 

Tuesday, whatever. I think his reasoning was he wanted to let 

FEMA be FEMA and stay out of the way. 

But when I helped write the Department of Homeland Security 

legislation with others, we wanted the Department of Homeland 

Security to be added value to FEMA, not to just like say, ‘‘Here you 

go, you are the experts, do it.’’ We wanted everything to be added 

value. 

Can you tell me what added value you have by having the Department of Homeland Security and how the department may respond more effectively than it did, not FEMA, per se? 

Mr. PAULISON. There is a significant amount of added value by 

us being inside Homeland Security, from my perspective. I have assets at my fingertips that we would not have had before. I meet 

every week with the seven operational components of Homeland 

Security, from the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, ICE, all of 

those, TSA. And those are people that can give me assistance when 

we have a disaster or even in the meantime. 

I don’t have to do a mission assignment. All I have to do is pick 

up the phone and call all these people that I know on a first name 

basis and say, ‘‘I need some help or I need this or I need that.’’ Tremendous assistance. 

Secretary Chertoff has been personally, I mean personally involved in helping me rebuild this organization. Tremendous 

amount of support, making sure that I get the assets that I need, 

making sure that I get the support that I need from all the other 

agencies inside the organization. So I feel like that there is a significant amount of value added. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. 

Do I have time to make a unanimous consent request now, or do 

you want me to do that later? 

Chairman THOMPSON. We will take it right now. 

33 

* See The Financial Services Roundtable, Blue Ribbon commission on Mega-Catastophes: A 

Call to Action, Edward B. Rust, Jr. and Kerry Killenger in the Committee’s file. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I would ask unanimous consent to include, ‘‘The Mega-Catastrophe: A Call to Action,’’ in the record. And 

this is a report produced by the financial services roundtable and 

provides 25 recommendations to the public and private sectors for 

reducing the economic and human impact, as well as reducing the 

cost of rebuilding after mega-catastrophes of not only hurricanes, 

the subject of today’s hearings, but the earthquakes, floods, 

pandemics and terrorist attacks. And I could do that—* 

Chairman THOMPSON. Without objection. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. 

And thank you very much, Mr. Paulison. 

Chairman THOMPSON. We now recognize the gentleman from 

North Carolina for 5 minutes, Mr. Etheridge. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator, thank you for being here today, and I appreciate 

your comments thus far. 

Let me go back to a situation, you know, hurricane season is almost on us, and North Carolina pays a lot of attention to hurricanes, as you know. Florida does as well. 

You partially answered this when you spoke to Ms. Lowey earlier. We are going to see some major changes to the national response plan, as you well know, but as you also know, the NPR is 

meant to provide standardization for incident managers so that the 

federal, state and locals can work effectively together. And, certainly, we know that in response to Katrina that did not happen. 

And even though this plan is not ready, it also impacts NGOs as 

well, because when you have a major catastrophe, that is an important part of this whole process. 

My question to you, you partially answered but would you go into 

a little bit more detail, in the absence of that being completed, 

number one, when will it be completed, but, number two, in the absence of that, do you feel comfortable that we are going to be ready, 

having these pieces in this hurricane season, be it natural or manmade? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. I am comfortable that we have a good 

plan in place. In fact, we are doing gap analysis now in North 

Carolina and other states up and down the Atlantic Coast to find 

out what those issues are that we have to help the states fill. And 

they can recognize themselves sometimes that there is a gap that 

they can fill themselves. 

We have good solid disaster plans in place. The national response 

plan is still there. The new that we are revising is not out yet, and 

I want to get that out in June. But before we really get deep into 

hurricane season?of course, we have had a storm already this year, 

so they are unpredictable when they are going to come usually— 

but I am comfortable that we are ready to respond. We are working 

with the NGOs, the Red Cross is going to testify at the next panel, 

and I am sure they will tell you some of the significant things 

that— 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Do you think we will have it by June of this 

year? 

34 

Mr. PAULISON. It won’t be by June 1. I want it out before July 

1, though, and we are going to work very hard on that. We have 

a good draft outline now, and we are populating that to get it filled 

in. I at least have that base plan done; yes, sir. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. 

Let me ask one question on the National Guard, because we 

heard from the Guard in the last meeting this committee held, and, 

as you well know, when Floyd struck North Carolina in 1999, it 

was a massive storm. They classified it as a 500-year flood plain. 

I don’t know how you do that when no one was here to measure 

it, but be that as it may, we used 6,500 guardsmen with equipment, Fort Bragg, Lejeune, our active military were there with helicopters and others. We lost a lot of lives, but we saved a lot. 

Just recently, our governor, Mike Easley said that we only have 

enough equipment now to handle a category three. You alluded to 

this earlier. Our Guard only has 55 percent of the dual use. 

In addition to drawing from other states, here is my question, because I think that is critical: How much does FEMA have the ability to reach out and get equipment if you really need it when it becomes catastrophic like the one we had? And, secondly, given the 

state of the equipment, can you pull that resource in in advance 

and have it ready and staged to work? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. We do have the ability to pull equipment 

in, not only from other states, but private contractors and also the 

Corps of Engineers who has a tremendous amount of equipment. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Have you pre-entered into those contracts? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. We have a lot of contracts in place, hundreds of contracts in place and literally hundreds of pre-scripted 

mission assignments with different agencies around the country. 

And we can move some of those things quickly. 

Also, if there is a major storm coming in, and there are certain 

guidelines to follow, but we can do a pre-landfall declaration, the 

president can do that— 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. And get it ready. 

Mr. PAULISON. —that would allow us to move. So if we had a category four or five storm coming into North Carolina and we knew 

it was going to hit and you had to do evacuations, we can help you 

with all of that, with those dollars, asking the president to do a 

pre-landfall declaration. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Good. 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Good. Thank you, sir. 

In the time I have left—this may be above your pay grade. If it 

is, let me know. I am sure it happened prior to your arrival. And 

if not, I would like to have it in writing. 

I have it from pretty good sources that within the last several— 

well, in the last bit, previously, when hurricanes hit Florida, we 

had to contract out for pre-setting, when people were injured, were 

moved, put in mobile homes, to do the pads of water, electrical at 

a certain price. That was rewritten so that less than a handful of 

contractors in America were eligible to bid, which meant that the 

cost of those pads more than doubled. 

If that was not written by FEMA—I want to know if it was written by Homeland Security. I would like to have that in writing 

35 

when that was rewritten, who wrote it, and I would like to see the 

documentation on that, if I may. And if that is not in your jurisdiction, just let me know where it is and I will keep moving up the 

chain. 

Mr. PAULISON. That does belong in FEMA, and the fact is we 

rebid all of those contracts. I don’t know about the early ones, but 

a lot of those contracts were done in the aftermath of Katrina, and 

the contracts were not what we wanted them to be. We have rebid 

all of those contracts, and we have a lot more contractors because 

they have to use local contractors to do a lot of the work. 

But I will tell you what, I will break that whole thing down. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Please do. 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Because my understanding was it was rewritten 

to the point where you had to have so many engineers on staff, 

which meant that you only had one or two big contractors take it, 

then they sub’ed it out to everyone else, which drove the cost 

through the roof for the taxpayers of this country. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Following along that, can you provide the committee with whether or not any no-bid contracts have been awarded for this hurricane 

season in anticipation or have all of them gone through the procurement procedure? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. I will research and give you a definitive 

answer, but I can tell you that there were no no-bid contracts that 

I am aware of. There may be an occasion to do those in the middle 

of a disaster if there is something you hadn’t thought of, but what 

we don’t want to do is we don’t want to do no-bid contracts and we 

don’t want to do contracts after a disaster happens. 

That is why we are putting these contracts now. In fact, we already have them on the shelf. You negotiate much better when you 

have the upper hand as opposed to after a disaster strikes. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Absolutely. Thank you very much. 

We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island, 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Director, welcome. Thank you for your testimony today. I 

appreciated having the opportunity to meet with you personally a 

few months back, and I appreciate what you have had to say today. 

Let me just turn to my attention to a couple of issues. Last year, 

Congress passed the Katrina Emergency Reform Act, which I believe, as do others, will enhance FEMA’s ability to effectively respond to disasters in a timely manner. 

Now, as part of this comprehensive legislation, I fought to create 

a new and, I believe, much needed position at FEMA, which is a 

disability coordinator. We all know that people with disabilities 

face unique challenges in their everyday lives, and they range from 

ability impairment to communications barriers, and they can certainly become substantial obstacles in an emergency. We saw this 

as a result of the attacks on 9–11, we saw that in Katrina. 

And so I believe it is, therefore, critical that the national disability coordinator position be filled immediately, and I am extremely concerned that our 2007 hurricane season starts less than 

36 

a month from now from today, and yet this crucial position remains 

vacant still. 

So my question is here: How close are you to filling this position? 

Will the job be filled by June 1? And, finally, how will this individual be able to effectively implement a national plan for persons 

with disabilities when the position has remained vacant for so 

long? 

My next question is, earlier this month, FEMA’s region one held 

a mock hurricane preparedness exercise in my home state in Rhode 

Island—this may be the one that you were just referring to in a 

previous question and answer with other members. But in carrying 

out this event, FEMA effectively partnered with other federal, state 

and local entities, such as around emergency management agency 

and first responders to test preparedness and response to our hurricane. 

The event was highly successful from everything that I could see, 

and I think it is critical that each state, city or town have a preapproved plan that has been thoroughly examined before a catastrophic event occurs. Each plan, obviously, has to take into account a region’s unique assets and vulnerabilities and must be 

properly tested to give the government, first responders and citizens an idea of existing weaknesses. 

So my question in this area are: Are other FEMA regions embarking on similar tests, do you believe these simulations should 

become annual preparedness exercises, and, finally, what other initiatives are you undertaking to test preparedness and response for 

the upcoming hurricane season in regions throughout the country? 

You can start with the issue of the disability coordinator first. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PAULISON. We have interviewed for the disability coordinator. I have made a selection. She is ready to come on board. She 

is going through background checks. I suspect that we will have 

her on board within a couple of weeks. And I think we made an 

excellent, excellent selection. She will report directly to me, so she 

will have access to my office to make sure that we can get things 

get done. Actually, we are excited about having her on board. 

We learned a lot of lessons during Katrina of things that we 

didn’t do right that we should have done with some of our people 

who had had difficulty with access, and she will be a tremendous 

asset to us to help us do a better job. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I look forward to that announcement and 

hopefully a meeting with this individual. 

Mr. PAULISON. As soon as she gets through the process of the 

background checks, we should have her on board. She is ready to 

come, and we are ready to bring her here. We interviewed a lot of 

people and picked out who we think is an excellent person. 

The second piece, yes, it was an excellent exercise, and, yes, we 

are doing them with all of our regions, and, yes, I do think it 

should be an annual type of thing to do those exercises, test our 

system and to find out where our gaps are, because they are going 

to be different every year. I am very supportive of those types, of 

having plans in place and exercising them. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What other initiatives do you have coming up? 

37 

Mr. PAULISON. We are doing catastrophic planning also. We are 

picking four areas right now. One is the southeast Louisiana for 

catastrophic planning, two in Florida, one around Lake Okeechobee, the Herbert Hoover Dike, working with the state to do 

evacuation planning around there, south Florida, category five coming into there. And then the new Madrid fault, doing catastrophic 

planning for that and then also for California. We are picking those 

because they represent pretty much everything we are going to 

have to deal with in putting our catastrophic plans in place. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you, Director. I appreciate your answers to that and look forward to continuing to work together. 

Thank you for the job you do. 

Mr. PAULISON. And I appreciate your support too, by the way. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Director. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairman and the ranking 

member. 

Mr. Paulison, thank you for your presence here today. 

I think we can look back over the last couple of years, I think 

we can say a couple of years, and applaud the fact that a first responder, firsthand, is in the position that you happen to be in, 

which is the director of FEMA. It makes a difference. It is an important first step, I believe, as we have tried to rebuild the building 

blocks. 

And as we have hindsight, we understand that the whole challenge of FEMA was vertical. It was a combination of many issues, 

and it really didn’t fall to personalities as much as it fell a lot to 

process, particularly, obviously, the angst with the secretary of the 

Homeland Security Department, who recognized the enormous 

frustration but really loss of life. 

And I think that is something that should always be in front of 

us, the fact that the debacle of Katrina really focused around the 

enormity of the loss of life and how we could have been better 

custodians, if you will, better protectors of the American people. We 

must always be protectors of the American people. 

My questions will focus in that direction. 

I know you were not here for 9/11, but I simply want, to your 

recollection, a yes or no answer. Your recollection is that after 9/ 

11 was FEMA on the ground in New York? 

PRPEARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this extremely important hearing. As we 

near the two year anniversary of one of the most devastating hurricanes in our nation’s history, I think it is a very appropriate time to examine how we have (or have 

not) adequately prepared for further disasters. I would also like to thank the committee’s Ranking Member, and to welcome our witnesses, the Honorable R. David 

Paulison, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; William 

Jenkins, Director of the Homeland Security and Justice Issues Division of the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office; Craig Fugate, Director of the Florida Division of 

Emergency Management; and Joe Becker, Senior Vice President of Preparedness 

and Response, from the American Red Cross. 

38 

Hurricane Katrina was among the worst storms in American history. Its magnitude was rivaled only by the catastrophic failure of the federal government to adequately respond to the resulting suffering in a manner befitting our great nation. 

This year’s hurricane season officially begins on June 1st, and scientific predictions 

do not bode well. Forecasters anticipate a ‘‘very active’’ year for storms along the 

Atlantic coastline, with researchers at Colorado State University anticipating 17 

named storms, including 9 hurricanes. According to these predictions, there is a 74% 

chance that at least one major hurricane will strike the U.S. coastline. Similarly, 

Accuweather forecasts 13—17 total storms in the Atlantic Basin. Of those, 3—5 are 

likely to be major hurricanes of Category 3 of Category 3 or greater. 

Mr. Chairman, this time we have fair warning. We know how devastating a hurricane can be, and we know we are likely to see another storm of this magnitude. 

We know that our disaster prevention, preparedness, and relief mechanisms and 

agencies are woefully inadequate. Problems involved lack of staff, the inability to 

track assets en route to destinations, lack of sufficient supplies, inefficient delivery 

processes, processes, poor communication amongst agencies, ineffective computer 

systems for processing requests, lack of credentialing and more. 

We can no longer use ignorance as an excuse, and we cannot allow ourselves to 

be caught unprepared once again. 

Hurricane Katrina struck some of America’s most vulnerable and disadvantaged 

communities, communities which are just now beginning to find their feet again 

after those two devastating storms. Here in Congress, we must candidly admit that 

as a nation, we were derelict in our duty to deliver the lifesaving and life-altering 

assistance to many of the Hurricane Katrina victims who literally begged for us to 

throw them a lifeline. We have a responsibility to work to ensure that they are not, 

once again, left to face nature’s wrath alone. Hurricane Katrina was responsible for $81.2 billion in damage, as well as for the 

deaths of 1,836 people. Criticism of the federal, state, and local governments’ reaction to the storm was widespread and resulted in an investigation by the United 

States Congress and the resignation of FEMA Director Michael Brown. We now 

have an opportunity to do our utmost to ensure that when this year’s hurricane season arrives, and when the next big storm lands on America’s coastline, we have 

done our utmost to ensure adequate protection and response. 

Last month, FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security informed us that 

they required additional time to revise the National Response Plan, which is designed to integrate federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans. Due to the complexity of the issues involved, they will not meet the June 

1st deadline, and the plan will not be available for the start of hurricane season. 

We in Congress have not yet seen a revised timetable for when this plan will be 

ready, and I am concerned about FEMA’s ability to respond to any disasters that 

may occur in the meantime. 

Mr. Chairman, the Federal Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina was a 

disaster. This absolutely must not be allowed to happen again. FEMA’s logistical 

systems, charged with providing food, water, and other absolutely crucial supplies, 

were completely overwhelmed. Long term rebuilding efforts have been plagued with 

additional weaknesses, with residents still, nearly two years later, facing an acute 

shortage of affordable housing. FEMA has decided to implement a policy that transfers its housing program to the Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD). I look forward to learning more about this new program in this hearing. 

Disaster response preparedness also means ensuring that the citizens of this 

country can rely on the emergency assistance of the National Guard. As we saw just 

recently in the aftermath of the Kansas tornado, the citizens of this country were 

deprived of much needed emergency assistance because much of the Guard’s pertinent personnel and emergency equipment was not readily available, but was in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. According to Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau, deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have left state governors with roughly 

half of the equipment needed to respond to disasters within the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, as Members of Congress we have an obligation to inquire how the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may impact the nation’s ability to respond to a major 

hurricane or terrorist attack. That is why I have proposed an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that requires the Secretary of Defense to study and report 

back to Congress the impact that the deployment of more than 40% of a state’s National Guard personnel for overseas duties has on that state’s readiness and responsiveness to a natural disaster, or civil disturbance. 

We also have an obligation to provide the American people with a disaster response system that works. I have been a strong advocate of creating a contracting 

system that awards contracts to local companies when possible and always to those 

who can get the job done. By involving members of the community in the rebuilding 

39 

process, we would substantially increase the prospects for long-term sustainability 

of any reconstruction effort. 

Mr. Chairman, now is the time that we must act. With the onset of hurricane season only a few short weeks away, we must ensure that, should another storm of 

Katrina’s magnitude make landfall on America’s coastline, we will not have to witness the atrocious suffering that we saw in the summer of 2005. I look forward to 

hearing the insights offered by today’s panel of witnesses, and to engaging in constructive debate with my colleagues about how best we can secure our nation 

against the 2007 hurricane season. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the reason why I wanted that as a backdrop is because it is important to note that FEMA is an agency 

that deals with natural disasters and, tragically, manmade disasters. You have to be holistically prepared. 

And so I really want you to—Major General Blum mentioned the 

lack of equipment in states, and you had this line of questions. And 

we are looking at this threshold of 40 percent of the National 

Guard not being available or not being in-state. 

Would that not have an impact—if 40 percent or more of the National Guard were away, would that not have an impact on response coordination with FEMA? 

Mr. PAULISON. I don’t think it would have an impact on the coordination with FEMA. I guess, depending on the size of the disaster, it may or may not have an impact on the response. 

In Greensburg, Kansas, the lack of resources they said they had 

did not have an impact on that particular response. What the adjunct general said, if they had another disaster of that same size, 

they would have trouble responding. And what I committed to him 

was that if they did have another one, that I would make sure that 

we have resources from other states, bring the Corps of Engineers 

in with equipment they needed and also access our contracts out 

there to bring equipment in. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think your answer is very accommodating. 

I am not suggesting that you are being forthright, but, frankly, I 

think that we would have problems. And one of the issues that I 

think is important is coordinating with FEMA and other emergency 

entities pre-deployment of National Guard out of different states. 

I don’t know if we thought about that. 

So that means that, one, you have an inventory of who has gone 

and what states are gone, because I think my colleagues have 

asked the question, how quickly can you get them there. So if the 

next-door neighbor state or the next-door neighbor to the right or 

the left are down to zero, you have a similar problem. 

Let me move forward and comment. I think you made the point 

about lack of equipment and a lot of states have a lack of equipment. That has an impact, does it not, yes or no? 

Mr. PAULISON. Again, I think that would depend on the size of 

the disaster. Something as catastrophic as Katrina I think you 

have to say it would have an impact if they are not at the full 

speed. We are at war, there is no question about it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Clearly, but it has a negative impact if you 

don’t have equipment to meet that disaster. 

Let me move on to the question, a particular question that you 

always hear about Houston, Texas. One, this is a solution, I guess, 

that they attempted, but I do want to put on the record, out of the 

40 

$400 million that came through CDBG monies, Houston got $60 

million in Houston and Harris County. And I want to put on the 

record that obviously that is an outrage. 

I want to move to interoperability. There is $1 billion. We understand that this money is going through the states on the interoperability. 

My question to you is, how in the world can the average cities, 

major urban cities at risk—and I know this is a process—function 

with dollars going through the states, percentages taken off and 

the question as to whether or not cities who need this interoperability, the top 50 cities, can get the appropriate amount of dollars 

through this process? 

Have you all consulted about using a different formula for getting dollars to the at-risk cities, like directly to the cities? 

Mr. PAULISON. I am sorry, I didn’t understand the question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. There is $1 billion in interoperability money, 

which falls under different aspects of the homeland security but, 

clearly, it responds to FEMA’s needs. You need cities to be able to 

speak to each other or speak inside the city when there is a disaster. 

The formula that is being used is a formula that sends the monies to the states. Is it better to send the money directly to the atrisk cities? And this is from your professional opinion, not from the 

idea of jurisdiction inside the department. Cities are crying out for 

the at-risk cities to get the monies directly. 

Mr. PAULISON. And my staff is telling me that by law the funding 

has to go through the states. We want that money to flow down 

where it needs to go, but most of our interoperability issues in this 

country are not equipment per se, it is a governance issue of how 

you act interoperably with other units. It can be as simple as exchanging hand-held radios with another city alongside of you. We 

have equipment that we can bring in to help with interoperability. 

But the money going through the states, the states understand 

the entirety of the whole state to help with the interoperable issue, 

and we feel that is the right way to go right now. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I may finish, Mr. Chairman, I just want to 

finish this sentence. 

Director Paulison, the question was really from your professional 

perspective. I do know that the utilization of this equipment is how 

you use it within an area, but the point is if a state has the money 

and it doesn’t get directly, fully to the impacted area, I can assure 

you that your job as a first responder is going to be that much 

tougher, and so the local jurisdiction should be the first in line. 

And I do know it is law. I am just trying to get your professional 

position on the record. 

I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. [Presiding.] The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mr. Perlmutter from Arizona—Colorado, I am sorry, Colorado, 

from the great West. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Director, and I appreciate your answers, do 

you know how many states deployed National Guard units to the 

Gulf Coast during Katrina? 

41 

Mr. PAULISON. No, sir, I do not. We could probably track that 

down, but I don’t have any off the top of my head how many actually responded. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I was just looking at reports that was issued 

today, and there are a couple of things that concern me. Looking 

at page four, it says, ‘‘For us, it is difficult to assess the probable 

results of these initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a category four or five hurricane.’’ 

And it goes on and says, ‘‘The National Guard has traditionally 

been an important component of response to major disasters. 

States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and 

equipment for disaster response. However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the National 

Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully 

identified because the multiple federal and states agencies that 

would have roles in responding to such events have not completed 

and integrated their plans.’’ 

So along with what Representative Jackson Lee was saying and 

the woman who stood up in the audience and from comments that 

various adjutant generals have made, I mean, has your office, your 

division looked at the fact that we have a number of our National 

Guards deployed in Iraq and what effect it has on being able to respond to a category four or five hurricane in the Gulf Coast? 

Mr. PAULISON. I don’t know that we have looked at that particular issue. I would like to find out what report that is to know 

who it came from. But we depend heavily, the states depend heavily on our EMAC system, Emergency Management Assistance Compact. 

No, I believe you, I just didn’t know what the name of the report 

was. I wasn’t questioning your word at all, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. It is a GAO report. 

Mr. PAULISON. Okay. Because I wanted to get it and read it myself too. 

But we depend heavily on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact between states to share equipment back and forth. 

We have done that for years. The system has worked well. It is 

more robust now than it ever has been. And that is how we would 

respond to these disasters. And we know there is a lot of equipment gone, there is no question about it, nobody can argue that, 

but there are still resources in this country to deal with disasters. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. And I appreciate that. And, clearly, a national 

disaster is going to require a national response. And I appreciate 

the effort that all of you have gone to so that we respond to something like Katrina in a much more thoughtful, methodical manner, 

but there is only so many people and contractors and national 

guardsmen and women to go around. 

And this is a debate for probably with the president and not you, 

but if in fact we have something like we had with Katrina or Rita 

or the one that Mr. Etheridge was talking about that hit North 

Carolina, I mean, the bottom line is you don’t know what the real 

impact of our deploying National Guard troops and the numbers we 

have to Iraq will be on responding to a Katrina. 

Yes or no, or answer it however you like. 

42 

Mr. PAULISON. Well, first of all, I am going to work with General 

Blum on the issue and talk about some of those issues you just 

raised and raised in this committee and raised behind me. 

But to say what kind of impact any particular thing is going to 

have on a disaster, that would be impossible to answer. I can tell 

you that we do have the ability to move equipment around, we do 

have the ability to move National Guard around, and we are going 

to prepare for whatever storm comes our way or whatever it is with 

what we have, and we are going to make the best we can with it. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I guess, a couple just factual questions. I 

would like to know how many National Guard units from across 

the country were deployed to the Gulf Coast for Katrina and how 

long they stayed. And if in fact, as you are doing this process and 

you are preparing for a mega-storm or a mega-emergency, what 

kind of National Guard effort you see as part of your plan. Those 

would be my questions, and if you could help me with those later 

on, I would appreciate it. 

Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Mr. PAULISON. I would be happy to do that. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I return the balance of my time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Submit that for the record. That would be great. 

We have some votes on the floor, so what I would like to do is 

to try to get Mr. Green and Ms. Clarke in for their questions, and 

then we could dismiss the director. And then we will come back 

from votes and have the second panel. 

So with your concurrence, Mr. Green and Ms. Clarke, instead of 

giving each of you 4 minutes, try to keep it closer to maybe 3.5, 

because by the time we finish we still need to get running across 

to take the vote. 

So the next one in line would be Mr. Green of Texas. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Director, for appearing today. 

The title of this hearing is ‘‘2007 Hurricane Season: Are We Prepared?’’ So why don’t we visit for just a moment with reference to 

this topic, are we prepared. 

With reference to the ability to determine who is in charge, are 

we prepared, and I ask this given the circumstance that developed 

with Katrina and some consternation as to whether the federal 

government was to make the first move or whether the state government was to. Are we prepared to deal with that? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. We have a very clear system in place. 

The response is local. The local community and the state are in 

charge. We are not in charge of a natural disaster. Our role is to 

come into a system as best we can to give them the tools and supplies they need to do their job. 

We are going to move early, I made that very clear. We may 

move even before the state asks for assistance, but I move with 

what I think they are going to use— 

Mr. GREEN. Permit me to intercede quickly. Are we indicating 

that the same system that we utilized previously is the one that 

we would have in place now for making this determination as to 

which entity is going to make the call? 

Mr. PAULISON. As far as what? 

43 

Mr. GREEN. The debate last time was whether the governor of 

Louisiana or the president of the United States should have done 

something immediately, if not sooner. Is that same system still in 

place? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. If that same system is still in place, how will 

we avoid seeing what we saw on television, persons begging for 

help and nobody showing up? No disrespect to you but that is what 

the country saw, in fact that is what the world saw. How do we 

avoid that is the same system is in place? 

Mr. PAULISON. And I meant by the same system is the fact that 

the state is in charge, the local government is in charge to respond 

to disasters. The federal government there is to assist them, and 

that is what we are going to do. 

However, there are several things that we can do that we have 

in place now that we did not have before. One, we can do a prelandfall declaration if there is a major storm coming into a vulnerable community where we move assets in before the storm comes 

in. And we are going to do that anyway. 

Mr. GREEN. Is it your belief that we will not see what we saw 

previously? 

Mr. PAULISON. There is no question in my mind whatsoever that 

you are not going to see another Katrina in this country. 

Mr. GREEN. Next question, quickly, please, if I may. With reference to pre-hurricane or pre-disaster relief, do we have the vehicles, do we have the gas stations, can we move scores of thousands 

of people along the highways and byways, out of harm’s way immediately? 

Mr. PAULISON. That is why we are working with the states to 

make sure that there are good solid evacuation plans— 

Mr. GREEN. Can I assume that your answer is, yes? Because the 

reason I say this, sir, is because sometimes when people finish I 

don’t know whether they said yes or no. So I have to ask. 

Mr. PAULISON. Well, I didn’t want to say yes or no, because I 

wanted to tell you what we are doing. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, unfortunately, I have to deal in a world of yes 

or noes right now. Will we move scores of thousands of people over 

the highways and byways to get them out of harm’s way? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. Next question: Housing post-disaster, can we house 

scores of thousands of people such that we will not find ourselves 

with people in the streets of life after the hurricane has hit? Can 

we do this? 

Mr. PAULISON. Do you mean will there be homeless, will they not 

have a place to stay? 

Mr. GREEN. Will we have the same circumstances we had in 

Houston, Texas where we had people who were brought in and we 

had to have NGOs trying to find places for people to stay. People 

were sheltered in various and sundry places, but we didn’t seem to 

have a plan to accommodate people, and thank God Houston was 

accommodating to the extent that it was. So will we avoid that circumstance? 

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. 

44 

Mr. GREEN. And final question is this—this goes beyond probably 

your pay grade, but it does say, are we ready, and I consider myself 

a part of the ‘‘we‘‘—how are we going to?and this is rhetorical— 

going to deal with displaced voters? 

We still have a political question that has not been resolved with 

reference to people who were forced away from their homes who 

could not vote and participate in the political process. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. You were gracious with the time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Clarke? 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

And good afternoon to you, Director Paulison. You know me from 

Brooklyn, New York. I just wanted to ask three questions very 

quickly. 

In 2005, some of the greatest in FEMA involved reaching the 

many individuals who lived in the inner city, in particular in the 

poorer areas. How will your national response plan address this 

issue, one? 

And, two, were a catastrophic disaster to occur in New York, it 

could easily displace many hundreds of thousands, even millions, 

of people, potentially far more than New Orleans. 

Do you feel FEMA is prepared to successfully reach everyone 

necessary in such a larger, more densely populated city? And I am 

not thinking just FEMA unto itself but, of course, an incident command structure and everything else that may have been put in 

place. 

And then, finally, among my concerns is the ability of FEMA to 

effectively communicate with victims of a disaster. Not only do you 

need to urgently explain to them what they need to do during an 

emergency, but afterward FEMA must register everyone and ensure that they understand where to go and what to do in order to 

navigate a sometimes complicated bureaucracy and receive assistance. Nowhere else in the world are there more languages spoken 

than in New York City and in Brooklyn, and many residents are 

not highly proficient in English. 

Have you done anything to ensure that FEMA officials would be 

able to communicate with people from such a broad range of dialects, particularly during an emergency when family and friends 

may be separated? 

Mr. PAULISON. Okay. If I remember, the first question was about 

being able to reach some of the inner city with directions and how. 

We have contracted with some of the predominant black colleges to 

come up with how do we effectively communicate with lower income, sometimes minority populations better about personal preparedness, what to do when things happen. 

So we are working on that issue, to how do we do that and how 

do we better reach people, how do we get to them and tell them 

what they are supposed to do, where they are supposed to go and 

those types of things. 

Ms. CLARKE. Excuse me, Mr. Director. Is that part of your national response plan? Like in New York City, there isn’t a historically black college. 

Mr. PAULISON. But the philosophy is going to be the same regardless of who does it. I think Texas A&M is one of the colleges 

45 

that is working on some of those issues to come up with—and we 

had a grant actually from Congress to do that. 

The second was that you talked about what happens if we are 

going to have a catastrophic event in New York. Joe Bruno, the 

state emergency manager for New York, has just probably one of 

the most comprehensive disaster plans that I have ever seen. It is 

about 300-and-some-odd pages. In fact, we are using that, and he 

is working with us, to use that for other states around, but right 

now we are doing the hurricane coast. 

They have a great plan in place on how to deal with a disaster, 

and they have looked at a category four or five hurricane coming 

right into Brooklyn. So I am very comfortable with what they are 

going to do and how they are going to move people and how they 

are going to house them. It is, again, very comprehensive. 

And the last piece is the communication really has to come 

through the state and local government on where people are supposed to go and what they are supposed to do. That should come 

before a disaster happens and also during a disaster. The people 

need to listen very carefully to what their local emergency manager 

is saying. If they are asked to evacuate, they should do so quickly. 

And the individual should have a personal plan in place too. If I 

am in an evacuation air zone, where am I going to go if I am told 

to evacuate, and how am I going to get there and where am I going 

to go. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the director. 

I thank you, Ms. Clarke. Your time is expired. 

And if there are any other questions from the members for you, 

we will get it to you in writing. We hope you get us back an answer 

fairly quickly. 

And we stand in recess with votes on the floor to come back after 

votes for the second panel. 

Mr. PAULISON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman THOMPSON. [Presiding.] If we could, we would like to 

get our panel of witnesses before us. My colleagues will be coming 

there shortly. I appreciate your indulgence for allowing us to interrupt so we could take those five votes. 

We would like to reconvene the recessed panel. On our second 

panel, we have three witnesses. 

First witness is Mr. William Jenkins, who is director within 

GAO’s Security and Justice Issues Division. And Mr. Jenkins has 

served as a director for 4 years, and has worked on a wide variety 

of issues in his 28 years at GAO. 

Second witness is Mr. Craig Fugate, who is director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. Mr. Fugate has been serving as the director for 7 years. 

Our third panelist is Mr. Joe Becker. Mr. Becker is here to represent the American Red Cross, and serves as the senior vice president of the Preparedness and Response Division. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statement will be inserted 

in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Jenkins. 

46 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM JENKINS, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES DIVISION, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. JENKINS. Chairman Thompson and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the 

important topic of our nation’s emergency preparedness and response system as we approach the 2007 hurricane season. 

Well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective disaster preparation 

and response can save lives and mitigate damage while helping set 

the stage for recovery. Preparing for and responding effectively to 

a major disaster, and particularly a catastrophic disaster, is a difficult task. 

There is no magic bullet or easy solution for success. It takes 

hard work, attention to details, and effective pre-and post-disaster 

cooperation and coordinated actions among all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. 

Individuals can also contribute to success through knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a disaster preparedness plan and supplies. 

FEMA provides assistance in major disasters principally by coordinating and deploying a range of resources from a variety of 

government and nongovernmental sources. This requires it to develop effective partnerships with a wide range of organizations. 

The Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions designed to 

strengthen FEMA’s organizational capacity to coordinate the preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause. Effectively implementing the Act’s provisions 

should address many of the recommendations and concerns we 

have had as a result of our work on Katrina. 

Although FEMA has formally completed its reorganization under 

the Act, it enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in 

transition, one that is working simultaneously to implement the 

Reform Act’s provisions while addressing immediate preparedness 

needs and capabilities. 

FEMA faces a formidable challenge as it works to implement the 

Reform Act’s provisions, change its culture from one of mostly reactive to more proactive, and quickly build its capacity to effectively 

respond to a major disaster that could occur at any time. 

It is important that FEMA’s approach, preparedness, and response for major disasters is a national system with linked capabilities and responsibilities among all levels of government and 

nongovernmental organizations. 

Developing these capabilities must be a cooperative effort that 

integrates and defines for all major participants what needs to be 

done, how it should be done, and how well it should be done. 

On the basis of our post-Katrina work, we identified three basic 

areas of focus. One, having clear and clearly understood roles and 

responsibilities. Two, identifying, developing, and maintaining 

needed capabilites. And three, balancing the need for quick, flexible 

action with accountability for the use of resources. 

We noted that improvements were particularly needed in the 

areas of situational awareness, emergency communications, evacuation, search and rescue, logistics, and mass care and shelter. In 

each of these areas, the lack of clear and clearly understood roles 

47 

and responsibilities contributed to the problems that were experienced in the Katrina response. 

FEMA has initiated reviews and actions in these and other 

areas, but their effectiveness has not yet been tested in a major 

disaster. Some targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as 

building mobile communications and registration assistance vehicles, have been used already in recent tornado and flood events. 

As the principal federal agency now responsible for preparedness 

and response, FEMA has a unique opportunity to evaluate how it 

can most effectively target the grants it will now administer to enhance the nation’s disaster preparedness and response system. This 

can best be done by viewing the grants collectively rather than individually. 

As FEMA and the nation move forward, there are several areas 

that we believe deserve congressional oversight. Each of these 

areas is part of a considerable ongoing effort and resource investment by both federal and nonfederal agencies. 

These areas include: One, the development and implementation 

of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for 

all types of major disasters, natural or man-made. Two, needed 

state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants in building 

and sustaining those capabilities. 

Three, regional and multistate planning and preparation. Four, 

the role of preparedness exercises in building and maintaining preparedness and response capabilities. And five, the transparency of 

DHS policies and the basis for those policies. 

It is important that those affected by DHS and FEMA policies 

have sufficient information to enable them to understand the basis 

for those policies, and for Congress to assess how well DHS and 

FEMA are using the billions of dollars of resources that have been 

entrusted to it. 

We look forward to working constructively with this committee, 

the Congress, FEMA, and DHS in the weeks and months to come 

as efforts continue to build the National Emergency Preparedness 

System that we all want and our nation deserves. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to address the shortcomings of the 

preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season begins 

in just a few weeks. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the 

federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding, to and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. The goal 

of disaster preparedness and response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and 

can be stated as follows: 

To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to disasters of 

any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective actions that 

minimize the loss of life and property and set the stage for a quick recovery. 

Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in particular, 

is difficult because success requires effective pre- and post-disaster coordination and 

48 

1GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO–07–452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 2The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was enacted as Title VI of 

the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 

1355, 1394 (2006). 

cooperation among different levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, 

and the private sector. Individuals can also contribute to success through such 

things as knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having 

a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies. 

As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS’s high-risk status 

and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS must overcome continuing 

challenges, including those related to clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, 

fraud, and abuse.1 These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels of government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to major 

disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and capabilities. This is 

because effective preparedness for and response to major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as nongovernmental entities. 

Parochialism must be put aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an 

emergency event. The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to tackle these difficult issues. 

My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership, response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made by DHS and FEMA in 

their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act 2 and other recommendations 

made in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and (2) highlights several disaster 

management issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are 

based on our body of work on disaster and emergency management including more 

than 30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, our review of recent emergency management reform legislative changes, and materials and statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Summary 

Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina showed the 

need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) 

development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems 

that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to 

prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue that continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer 

(FCO), who has the authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for 

response and recovery, and the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was to 

provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. DHS has designated a FCO for each region that includes states at risks of hurricanes and a supporting FCO for each of these states. It has also designated a PFO for each of three 

regions—the Gulf Coast, the Northeast Region, and the Mid-Atlantic Region—plus 

a separate PFO for the state of Florida and Texas. 

It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these 

designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood by all. There is still 

some question among state and local first responders about the need for both positions and how they will work together in disaster response. One potential benefit 

of naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity meet 

and discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and communication in an actual disaster. 

As we have previously reported, developing the ability to prepare for, respond to, 

and recover from major and catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, 

where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities); how it should be done; and how 

well it should be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal national 

documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP, NIMS and the NPG are undergoing extensive review and revision by federal, state, and local government officials, tribal 

authorities, non-governmental and private sector officials. This effort is intended to 

49 

3Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines ‘‘catastrophic incident’’ as any natural 

disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass evacuations), 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an area. 

assess the effectiveness of the doctrine embodied in these documents, identify modifications and improvements, and reissue the documents. The results of the review 

for the NRP, for example, was initially scheduled for release in June 2007. However, 

in April 2007 DHS officials notified stakeholders that some important issues were 

more complex and require national-level policy decisions, and stated that additional 

time than was expected was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted 

that the underlying operational principles of the NRP remain intact and that the 

current document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told 

us that the final version of the NPG and its corresponding documents are currently 

receiving final reviews by the White House and will be due out shortly. We are concerned, however, that if the revisions are not completed prior to the beginning of 

the 2007 hurricane season, it is unlikely that the changes resulting from these revisions could be effectively implemented for the 2007 hurricane season. 

In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nation’s experience with hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the adequacy of the nation’s disaster response capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster—particularly in 

the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care and 

sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with training and exercises 

in which the capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders. 

In various meetings with GAO, in congressional testimonies, and in some documents 

FEMA has described a number of initiatives to address identified deficiencies in 

each of these areas and progress is being made on these multiyear efforts. However, 

a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale 

that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a 

major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of 

these initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as 

a category 4 or 5 hurricane.3 Additional information on FEMA’s efforts can be found 

in Appendix I. 

The National Guard has traditionally been an important component of response 

to major disasters. States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and 

equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas, including those outside their home states. However, as we 

reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the National 

Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would have roles in responding 

to such events have not completed and integrated their plans. 

With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability, FEMA has 

stated it can register up to 200,000 applicants per day for individual assistance 

while including safeguards for preventing fraudulent and duplicate applications. 

The inability to reliably and efficiently identify fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major problem following Katrina that resulted in millions of dollars in 

improper payments. FEMA has also taken actions to revise its debris removal and 

contracting policies and to increase the use of advanced contracting for goods and 

services. Again, we have no basis to determine the effectiveness of these systems 

as they have yet to be tested on a large scale basis. 

As FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season, it is an organization in transition 

that is working to implement the reorganization mandated by the Post-Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to implement a comprehensive, riskbased national emergency management system as required by the act. In November 

2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting that 

one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding 

to, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that Congress 

might consider for oversight are: 

• the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, 

including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; 

• the assessment of state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants 

in building and sustaining those capabilities; 

50 

4The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. 

5 California is currently not a member of EMAC as the state’s legislation approving its membership in the compact had expired. 6 House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane Katrina 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 7 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: 

A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 8White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 9Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General. A Performance Review of 

FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG–06–32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 10Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane 

Katrina in Louisiana, DR–1603–LA (Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006). 11GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, 

GAO–06–618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

• regional and multistate planning and preparedness; • the status and use of preparedness exercises; and • DHS policies that affect the transparency of its efforts to improve the nation’s 

preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic disasters. 

Background 

Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation for and 

response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) 4 primarily establishes the programs and 

processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and qualified private 

nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering 

the provisions of the Stafford Act. 

Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic disaster 

can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge capacity—the ability 

to draw on additional resources, such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative 

framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49 states, 

the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.5 We have ongoing work examining how the Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been 

used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report 

by this summer. 

As the committee is aware, a number of specific recommendations have been 

made to improve the nation’s ability to effectively prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,6 the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee,7 the White House Homeland Security Council,8 the DHS Inspector General,9 and DHS and FEMA 10 all identified a variety of 

failures and some strengths in the preparations for, response to, and initial recovery 

from Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these reviews, a report from the American 

National Standards Institute Homeland Security Standards Panel (ANSI–HSSP) 

contains recommendations aimed at bolstering national preparedness, response, and 

recovery efforts in the event of a natural disaster. A key resource identified in the 

document is the American National Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management 

and Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed by the 

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The standard defines a common set 

of criteria for preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and 

business continuity programs. 

Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and 

local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to 

more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, 

particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and 

local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed.11 Our analysis showed the 

need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) 

the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
51 

tems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need 

to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the nation’s most destructive hurricane until Katrina, we 

recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions 

to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS 

1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing 

changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems; 

2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident 

Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation 

plans; 

3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, 

and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, 

and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; 

4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their 

responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; 

and 

5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. 

The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and recommendations in 

the various reports examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane 

Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act enhances FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a 

risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator 

reports directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within DHS; 

and the Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to perform them 

unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA has absorbed many of the functions of DHS’s Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The statute also establishes 

a National Integration Center responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. 

The Post-Katrina Reform Act also included provisions for other areas, such as 

evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals with disabilities, In addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the management 

and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the statute called for a strategic 

human capital plan to shape and improve FEMA’s workforce, authorized recruitment and retention bonuses, and established a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the 

organizational changes became effective as of March 31, 2007. Others, such as the 

increase in organizational autonomy for FEMA and establishment of the National 

Integration Center, became effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act 

on October 4, 2006. 

FEMA Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act 

After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were over 

time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, 

state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing 

for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS, 

the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA’s internal structure to 

incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically 

new and existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA. 

As I stated in March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of recent recommendations and the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities should address many of our emergency management 

observations and recommendations. In addition, we previously reported that DHS 

needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery 

efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of 

state and local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our analysis 

showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response 

against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

52 

12On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as 

which situations require secretarial leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national 

significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident Annex. The revised NRP 

clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who reports directly to the President, 

is responsible for declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to the catastrophic incident 

annex, which provides more detail on implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent 

to Hurricane Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex, 

dated August 2006. 13 Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 14 Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 15 Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, District of Columbia, Maryland, 

Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. 

Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic 

Disasters 

In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the 

legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of 

government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood 

to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need 

to improve leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic 

disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed 

to integrate and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), how it should be done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal national documents designed to address 

each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG. 

All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by federal, 

state, and local government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental and private sector officials.12 For example, the review of the NRP is intended to assess the 

effectiveness of the NRP, identify modifications and improvements and reissue the 

document. This review includes all major components of the NRP including the base 

plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement; as well as the role of the PFO, FCO, and the Joint 

Field Office structure. Also during the current NRP review period, FEMA has revised the organizational structure of Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF–6), Mass 

Care, Housing, and Human Services, and places FEMA as the lead agency for this 

emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in 

the responsibilities and activities of ESF–6. According to a February 2007 letter by 

the Red Cross, this change will not take place until the NRP review process is complete and all changes are approved. 

The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June 2007. 

In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that some important 

issues were more complex and require national-level policy decisions, and additional 

time was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying 

operational principles of the NRP remain intact and the current document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us that the final version 

of the National Preparedness Goal and its corresponding documents like the Target 

Capabilities List, are currently receiving final reviews by the White House and are 

expected to be out shortly. 

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One that continues to be a subject of discussion is 

the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, who has the authority to make mission 

assignments to federal agencies for response and recovery under the Stafford Act, 

and the PFO, whose role was to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. The May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to 

address this issue. However, as we noted in March 2007, the changes may not have 

fully resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of the PFO and the FCO. 

While the Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid conflicts by appointing a single 

individual to serve in both positions in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist 

if the Secretary of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so. Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents, and the revised NRP 

does not specifically provide a rationale for this limitation. 

FEMA has pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf Coast and 

eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This includes FCOs and PFOs for the 

Gulf Coast Region,13 Northeast Region,14 and the Mid-Atlantic Region,15 and separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas. It is critically important 

that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these pre-designated FCOs and 

PFOs be clear and clearly understood by all. There is still some question among 

53 

16GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage 

Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO–07–139 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 17The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4) payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, 

(6) capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human resources, (9) logistics, (10) 

acquisition, (11) disaster emergency communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15) federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget process, and (18) disaster relief fund. 18GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO–07–60 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 

state and local first responders about the need for both positions and how they will 

work together in disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs and 

PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity meet and discuss expectations, 

roles and responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials before an 

actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and communication in an actual disaster. 

Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond to Major 

Disasters 

Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White House, 

and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and capabilities marshaled 

by state, local, and federal governments and nongovernmental organizations were 

insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of 

damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic 

disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how 

well it should be done?that is, according to what standards. As previously discussed, 

the principal national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, 

the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision. 

Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, skills, 

processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with training and exercises in which 

the capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent 

work on FEMA management of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting resources caused by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the 

agency’s management of existing resources compounded these problems.16 FEMA 

lacks some of the basic management tools that help an agency respond to changing 

circumstances. Most notably, our January 2007 report found that FEMA lacks a 

strategic workforce plan and related human capital strategies—such as succession 

planning or a coordinated training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills 

needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and 

future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational management issues. To this end, FEMA 

has commissioned studies of 18 areas, whose final reports and recommendations are 

due later this spring.17

An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to identify 

and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety of sources—federal, 

state, local or tribal governments; military assets of the National Guard or active 

military; nongovernmental entities; and the private sector. One key method of tapping resources in areas not affected by the disaster is the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC). Through EMAC about 46,000 National Guard and 

19,000 civilian responders were deployed to areas directly affected by the 2005 Gulf 

Coast hurricanes. We have ongoing work examining how EMAC has been used in 

disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report by this 

summer. 

One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard. States and 

governors rely on their National Guard personnel and equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states. However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and 

quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies 

that would have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated their plans.18 As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, 

the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. However, until the bureau’s charter and its civil support regulaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
54 

19GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO–06–643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

tion are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for multistate events, 

such planning may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and efficiently as possible. In addition, questions 

have arisen about the level of resources the National Guard has available for domestic emergency response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness 

of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or report 

this information to Congress. Thus, although the deployment of National Guard 

units overseas has decreased the supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units in the U.S., there has been no established, formal method of assessing the impact on the Guard’s ability to perform its domestic missions. Although 

DOD has begun to collect data on units’ preparedness, these efforts are not yet fully 

mature. 

The nation’s experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the 

questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic 

disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) 

emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and 

(6) mass care and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies in each 

of these areas. Examples include designating national and regional situational 

awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite communications trucks; 

developing an electronic system for receiving and tracking the status of requests for 

assistance and supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify 

roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. However, a 

number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale 

that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a 

major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of 

these initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as 

a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The section below briefly discusses actions taken or underway to make improvements in each of these areas. Additional details can be 

found in appendix I. 

Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing the national response for catastrophic incidents. These 

teams will support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the 

capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers and support 

the initial establishment of a unified command. 

Emergency Communications. Agencies’ communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies 

(e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public 

works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across agencies 

and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have identified a number of 

programs and activities they have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken action to design, staff, and maintain a 

rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability, which we discuss further in appendix I. 

Logistics. FEMA’s inability to effectively manage and track requests for and the 

distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came under harsh criticism in the 

wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days, FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics mission.19 In the Post– 

Katrina Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more 

flexible and responsive. FEMA’s ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy and 

efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a 

disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are needed 

for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. In addition, we recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system, which are discussed in 

appendix I. In short, FEMA is taking action to transition its logistics program to 

be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other initiatives hold 

55 

20GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to Minimizing 

Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO–07–418T. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 

2007. 

promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will be several years before 

they are fully implemented and operational. 

Mass Care and Shelter. In GAO’s work examining the nation’s ability to evacuate, 

care for, and shelter disaster victims, we found that FEMA needs to identify and 

assess the capabilities that exist across the federal government and outside the federal government. In an April testimony, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Operations said that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA’s most pressing priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He said that 

FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing methods for more quickly identifying 

and uniting missing family members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed 

a web-based data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility 

identification activities. 

Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse 

Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are used 

appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and accountability mechanisms 

and the demand for rapid response and recovery assistance. On one hand, our work 

uncovered many examples where quick action could not occur due to procedures that 

required extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital supplies 

and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples where FEMA’s 

processes assisting disaster victims left the federal government vulnerable to fraud 

and the abuse of expedited assistance payments. 

We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million to 

$1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used 

invalid information to apply for expedited cash assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season 

so that federal recovery programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident but also provide accountability. Examples include significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water; placing 

global positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other planned improvements will be 

critical to achieving their intended outcomes.20

Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require more flexible policies 

and operating procedures. In a catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly replace ‘‘business as usual’’ and unquestioned 

adherence to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes intended. 

We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that effectively 

balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, 

fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to provide assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all 

cases. We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement 

practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal agencies with roles and 

responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could then better manage 

disaster-related procurement and establish an assessment process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and 

the maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency 

response practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how 

the federal government can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These 

practices include developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and esVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
56 

21GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO–07–452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 22GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO–07–235R (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

tablishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the response with the need.21

In my March 2007 testimony I noted that recent statutory changes have established more controls and accountability mechanisms. For example, The Secretary of 

DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive use of 

subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is also required to 

promulgate regulations that limit certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may 

dedicate up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as oversight 

funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain internal management 

controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and develop and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds in response to or 

recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients of disaster relief assistance. 

Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention 

In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional leadership 

suggesting areas for congressional oversight.22 He suggested that one area needing 

fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, recovering 

from, and rebuilding after catastrophic events. Recent events—notably Hurricane 

Katrina and the threat of an influenza pandemic—have illustrated the importance 

of ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated can 

save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning insurance market 

can substantially reduce the government’s exposure to post-catastrophe payouts. 

Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of potential catastrophic 

events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation 

of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, 

according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. As stated in our 

March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform 

Act’s organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities—in addition to 

those changes already undertaken by DHS—should address many of our emergency 

management observations and recommendations. 

The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress could 

also consider how the federal government can work with other nations, other levels 

of government, and nonprofit and private sector organizations, such as the Red 

Cross and private insurers, to help ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers 

effectively. Given the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to, 

recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters, congressional oversight 

is critical. 

A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term efforts. 

Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing 

state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining 

those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and preparation, 

(4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and 

(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance. 

DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Reform Act 

On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation of the 

Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional organizational 

changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA’s internal structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new 

and existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA: 

• United States Fire Administration, 

• Office of Grants and Training, 

• Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division, 

57 

• Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, • Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and, • Office of State and Local Government Coordination. 

DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational elements, 

such as a logistics management division, a disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, FEMA expanded its regional office structure 

with each region in part by establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least 

one Regional Strike Team. With the recent appointment of the director for region 

III, FEMA officials noted that for the first time in recent memory there will be no 

acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by experienced professionals. 

Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate intended to 

consolidate FEMA’s strategic preparedness assets from existing FEMA programs 

and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate programs. The National Preparedness 

Directorate will contain functions related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also will include the National Integration Center that will 

maintain the NRP and NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities reflect 

these documents. 

Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s Provisions Should Respond to Many Concerns 

As I have previously stated in my March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational changes and related roles and 

responsibilities—in addition to those changes already undertaken by DHS—should 

address many of our emergency management observations and recommendations. 

As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the 

need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) 

the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need 

to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership 

roles and responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management adviser to the President, 

the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress after informing the Secretary of DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of the National Integration Center are 

now clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a clear 

chain of command to lead and coordinate the federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must 

have a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of executive leadership and management experience. 

Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For example, the statute requires the President to establish a national preparedness goal and 

national preparedness system. The national preparedness system includes a broad 

range of preparedness activities, including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a national training program to implement, and a national exercise program to test and 

evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and strategies. 

In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a national emergency management system. States must develop plans that include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in order to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must be developed in consultation 

with local officials, including regional commissions. FEMA regional administrators 

are to foster the development of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must 

enter into a memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, including 

credentialing of personnel and typing of resources. In addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities, such as (1) developing a logistics system providing 

real-time visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support 

and response teams. 

The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster Capabilities 

More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, which is mandated 

under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal ‘‘to establish measurable readiness 

58 

priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude 

of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources 

required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.’’ The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness assessments and strategies 

and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness to respond to major 

events. 

To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness Goal using 

15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. 

According to DHS’s National Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency 

events for which the nation needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale emergency 

events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first responders would have 

to address. Some state and local officials and experts have questioned whether the 

scenarios were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in terms 

of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios. 

Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local emergency 

response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600 discrete tasks, of which 

300 were identified as critical. DHS then identified 36 target capabilities to provide 

guidance to federal, state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need 

to develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single jurisdiction 

or agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target capability 

could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional 

and federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is still in the 

process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the 

National Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience. 

Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in the PostKatrina Reform Act—the NPG, target capabilities and preparedness priorities, and 

comprehensive assessment systems—should be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane 

Katrina, DHS had established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness, including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; 

strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those seven priorities 

were incorporated into DHS’s fiscal year 2006 homeland security grant program 

(HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning. 

In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others. 

These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the NPG, (2) integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3) developing and sustaining a 

statewide critical infrastructure/key resource protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications interoperability, 

(6) strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan review results. Under the 

guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an investment justification that provides background information, strategic objectives and 

priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each 

proposed investment (project) is anticipated to have. 

The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic 

The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat to the 

nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but when such 

a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the preparation for and response 

to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership 

roles and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic 

planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective information sharing and communication; and 

accountability for the effective use of resources. 

However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can have long-term effects, as we have seen 

in the Gulf region following Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate 

59 

damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue 

in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide areas 

of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza 

in the United States results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of detection and 

response. 

The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a severe 

pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an affected community 

because individuals are ill, caring for family members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation’s economy, as businesses and governments face the 

challenge of continuing to provide essential services with reduced numbers of 

healthy workers. In addition, our nation’s ability to respond effectively to hurricanes 

or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to perform 

their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as well as international cooperation. 

We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to implementing the Department of Health and Human Services? National Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of Agriculture’s preparedness efforts and plans, 

public health and hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease 

surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late summer 2007. 

Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities 

Is Limited 

Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on state and 

local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying risk management principles 

to guide federal investments, over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants. 

Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and localities finance their 

efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds. 

Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on the 

answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency preparedness and 

response: What is important (that is, what are our priorities)? How do we know 

what is important (e.g., risk assessments, performance standards)? How do we 

measure, attain, and sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary tradeoffs, given finite resources? 

There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of major emergency events than 

for others. For some natural disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there 

is more experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation and 

response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has 

experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major 

city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, 

there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people 

across the nation. 

A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant guidance for 

the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that eligible recipients must 

provide an ?investment justification? with their grant application. States were to 

use this justification to outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program 

and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program 

management plans for the entire state homeland security program that look beyond 

federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland security grant program. In 

the guidance DHS noted that it would use a peer review process to evaluate grant 

applications on the basis of the effectiveness of a state’s plan to address the priorities it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk. 

For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments. For fiscal year 

2007, DHS will continue to use the risk and effectiveness assessments to inform 

final funding decisions, although changes have been made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said 

60 

23GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National Capital 

Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals, GAO–04–433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed 

to Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO–04–904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance 

Emergency Preparedness, GAO–04–1009 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: 

Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital 

Region, GAO–05–889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and Homeland Security: The Status 

of Strategic Planning in the National Capital Region, GAO–06–559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

29, 2006). 24GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic Plan, GAO– 

06–1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006). 

that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from grant funds 

are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the 

metrics to do so. 

Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust 

Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been focused on single 

jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors. However, well-documented 

problems with the abilities of first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first responders 

should be focusing their planning and preparation on a regional and multigovernmental basis. 

As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the National Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to building, sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP applications are to reflect regional coordination and show an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional 

security strategy integration. However, it is not known to what extent regional and 

multistate planning has progressed and is effective. 

Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our early 

work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) and 

National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported that the ONCRC and 

the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing federal funds in a way that 

maximizes the increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of expenditures.23 One of these 

challenges included a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder 

performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of expenditures 

in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work on National Capital 

Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that needed strengthening in the 

Region’s planning, specifically improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide 

decision makers.24 For example, additional information could have been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives to 

meet regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation; resources and investments; and operational commitment. 

Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons Learned 

Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform 

Act mandates a national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill 

and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first responders, exercises-especially of the type or magnitude of events for which there is little actual 

experience?are essential for developing skills and identifying what works well and 

what needs further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of personnel from many 

first responder disciplines and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and 

the private sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in developing the 

coordination and skills needed for effective response. 

For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and stress the system, 

involve all key persons who would be involved in responding to an actual event, and 

be followed by honest and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are 

implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise participants should 

61 

include, depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors, 

and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for such things 

as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal 

assistance. 

DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational Decisions 

Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS’s policies regarding 

oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that DHS has not been 

transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management areas and mission functions. 

While much of its sensitive work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, 

DHS has not been receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us 

with access to various documents and officials have impeded our work. 

We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has 

implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be sure 

it is effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars in funding 

it receives annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous 

legislative requirements and presidential directives. 

Concluding Observations 

Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of dollars 

in grants and assistance to state and local governments to assist in strengthening 

emergency management capabilities. DHS has developed several key national policy 

documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG to guide federal, state, and 

local efforts. The aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a reassessment 

of the federal role in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. The studies and reports of the past year—by Congress, the White House Homeland Security 

Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, and others—have provided a number 

of insights into the strengths and limitations of the nation’s capacity to respond to 

catastrophic disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for strengthening that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports paint a complex mosaic 

of the challenges that the nation—federal, state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental entities; the private sector; and individual citizens—faces in preparing 

for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post-Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy changes to respond to 

these findings and challenges. 

Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency preparedness, 

response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many stakeholders from a variety of first responder 

disciplines, levels of government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no ‘‘silver bullet,’’ no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances change 

and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do. 

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

you and subcommittee members may have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize Mr. Fugate to summarize his statement for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CRAIG FUGATE, DIRECTOR, FLORIDA 

DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, ranking members, and distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity to testify. 

My name is Craig Fugate, and I serve Governor Crist as his director of emergency management, a position I have served for two 

governors, Governor Bush and Governor Crist. 

My experiences go back 25 years, and I have been involved in numerous disasters, both as a first responder, as a paramedic and 

firefighter, later as an emergency manager for Alachua County, 

which is home to the University of Florida in Gainesville, as well 

as serving the state as state coordinating officer and the governor’s 

62 

authorized representative for the 2004 hurricane season, 2005, and 

currently serving Governor Crist as the state coordinating officer 

during the wildfire emergency that is occurring in Florida. 

There are several key areas that we would like to present for 

consideration as we talk about getting ready for the 2007 hurricane 

season. And the first one is all-hazard. When we talk about hurricanes, or we talk about specific disasters, many people, in trying 

to describe all-hazards, look for the common elements within the 

disaster itself. 

I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, there is nothing in common with 

a hurricane and the wildfires. They are entirely different creatures. 

What is all-hazards is the fact that the governor of the state of 

Florida will be the governor in all of those disasters. 

It is the team that you build to deal with a variety of threats to 

community space, those known and both unknown, that is truly allhazard. And when you try to define all-hazard by talking about disasters, you miss the point. So while we are oftentimes concerned 

about hurricane season, understand what we do in Florida isn’t 

just about hurricanes. 

As we are talking about right now, we still have major fires 

going in Florida. We have over five fire management grants issued 

by FEMA. We have emergency management assistance compact 

from other states, from Georgia and South Carolina. Blackhawks 

are flying in support of our Division of Forestry and our National 

Guard fighting these fires. 

And this is not a hurricane, but this is how we do business in 

Florida. It is the all-hazard approach. And that is why we have 

been so insistent that it needs to be the basis as we look at the 

variety of disasters we face in the nation. 

The second one, which is really a concern for my peers in other 

states and local government, is the Emergency Management Performance Grant. This is a 50–50 funding program that has been 

authorized by Congress for numerous years, starting back with the 

era of civil defense, that builds capability and capacity in our communities to share resources, respond effectively, and manage many 

of those local disasters without state or federal assistance, or, in 

many disasters, only require federal reimbursement assistance, because we built capacity. 

Again, to look at that is a wise investment for our country, to 

continue building that capacity. Because when you look around the 

nation, I don’t know how many fire trucks the federal government 

has, but I can tell you the state of Florida doesn’t have that many. 

They are at local government. And if we don’t build the capability to share the unimpacted resources of the nation, we leave too 

many resources off the table when the victims are in their time of 

need, and we need to support that capability-building. 

But you also have to be able to move those resources from state 

to state, and that brings us to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. It was something the late Governor Chiles realized 

after Hurricane Andrew, that we needed to have a better way of 

bringing assistance from other states, and through the Southern 

governors, developed the Southern Governors’ Compact. 

Congress thought that was a great idea, endorsed it, issued a 

public law to allow states to enter into that compact, and moved 

63 

it beyond just the Southern states. And now we have the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which all 50 states are a 

member of, as well as several of our territories and commonwealths. 

This allowed us in the state of Florida to send over 7,000 responders to Mississippi in their time of need during Hurricane 

Katrina. Not only was it sending resources or sending people, we 

were actually sending resources—food, water, and ice—that we did 

through our own contracts. As we were prepared to serve our citizens in their time of need, we were able to provide that assistance 

to our neighbors in their time of need. 

And finally, the last one I want to get to is one that hasn’t been 

discussed very much, and that is the Temporary Disaster Housing 

Program. 

Mr. Chairman, you know as well as I do that housing is an issue 

before a disaster strikes, and oftentimes it exasperates the program. The Stafford Act was never designed to heal the ills a community has in housing needs before a disaster, and yet we try to 

make that disaster program fit the needs. 

There has been a lot of talk about moving the Temporary Housing Program to HUD. I would suggest it again. We need swift and 

effective means to house people in the immediate aftermath of a 

disaster, or we are going to depopulate regions of this country, as 

we saw in Katrina. 

But I think we need to have a better understanding that FEMA’s 

role is the emergency, and many of these issues are longer-term, 

far beyond ever anticipated under the Stafford Act. There should 

be a better system that we can use the FEMA program to do the 

immediate housing needs, then realize many of these folks will 

have long-term housing issues. 

And perhaps the more appropriate will be a hybrid between 

FEMA and HUD, where at the end of the emergency, many of 

these people that still have long-term housing issues are then 

transitioned into HUD programs, versus creating a new program 

from scratch in the midst of another hurricane season. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Mr. Fugate follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ‘‘CRAIG’’ FUGATE

Introduction 

Thank you Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity testify before you on preparedness efforts for the 2007 Hurricane Season. I am Craig Fugate, the Director 

of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. I have over 25 years of experience in state and local emergency management, serving in various positions including ten years as the Emergency Management Director for Alachua County, Florida, 

Chief of the Bureau of Preparedness for the State of Florida, and the appointment 

to my current position in 2001. I continue to serve and have been reappointed to 

my position by Governor Charlie Crist. In my time with the State of Florida, I have 

served as the Governor’s authorized representative for major disasters such as the 

2004 Hurricane season including Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne 

and coordinated the State Emergency Response Team (SERT)’s response for all Florida disasters and for state-to-state mutual aid for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Emergency management is built upon three very basic concepts: 1) All-hazards 

preparedness is the foundation in which readiness is built for all disasters regardless of the cause or size; 2) The emergency management cycle includes preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation; and 3) All disasters are local. There are 

64 

several key areas that I wish to discuss with you today that need to be addressed 

in order to secure our preparedness for all disasters: 

1. We must maintain an all-hazards approach to emergency management; 

2. Funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) 

program should be increased, at least restored to FY 2005 levels; 

3. We need federal support of the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC); and 

4. The FEMA Temporary Disaster Housing Program can be more effective with a transition plan that includes HUD resources. 

MAINTAINING THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT 

All-hazards emergency preparedness is the key building block and foundation for 

emergency management. Natural hazards continue to be the pervasive disaster that 

occurs regularly. In the past several years, major disaster declarations were for 

events including severe storms and tornadoes, typhoons, tropical storms, multiple 

hurricanes, flooding, ice storms, snowstorms, and wildfires. Natural disaster preparedness must not suffer as a result of homeland security efforts, but rather should 

be viewed as the most frequent opportunity to validate domestic preparedness efforts and to also build best practices. We need to start looking at the system in 

terms of hazards preparedness. Furthermore, our emergency response system must 

be built for all-hazards and terrorism should be a component of the system. We cannot afford to build duplicate systems by hazard or to eliminate programs to support 

the homeland security effort. An all-hazards approach should be viewed as building 

a single team to deal with a large variety of hazards. 

Since I have been with the State of Florida, we have had had 22 major disaster 

declarations, five emergency declarations, and 45 fire management assistance declarations. While hurricanes are the most urgent and prevailing threat we have 

faced, we do not prepare for hurricanes alone. Florida was the first state with anthrax cases in 2001, the terrorists for 9/11 trained in Florida, we have three commercial nuclear power plant sites, host major sporting events including Superbowls, 

and boast three national championships in the past two years in college football 

(2006) and basketball (2006 and 2007). We have extensive threats for tornadoes, 

flooding, fires, and severe freezing. You will recall the February 2, 2007 tornado 

that left 21 people dead and destroyed hundreds of homes with more than $17 million in federal assistance for victims. Additionally, we have done significant influenza pandemic planning for our large special needs populations and planning for 

mass migration incidents from the Caribbean. 

While every state may not experience a disaster every single year, preparedness 

is essential. Florida took the lead in ensuring that localities were prepared for any 

disaster when our state legislature made changes after Hurricane Andrew that a 

surcharge is set aside for emergency preparedness from every insurance policy written in the state. This fund called the Emergency Management Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund, which exists only in Florida, helps us to ensure that localities 

have the necessary means to prepare for disasters and citizens do their part too. 

In addition, we utilize the only all-hazards funding source, the Emergency Management Performance Grants to supplement these funds to build our key preparedness 

programs. 

Hazards need to be explored in the context of disasters too. A disaster is really 

caused by humans as a result of getting in Mother Nature’s way. Humans build in 

harms way, we traditionally build at the cheapest costs, and we build power grids 

that are subject to wind damage. When we prepare for terrorism, we harden critical 

infrastructure and look for ways to prevent events. We develop strong public health 

systems and plans to address pandemics. However, addressing hazards before a natural disaster means stronger building codes, enforcing those codes, heeding warnings ahead of disasters and having business and family plans in place when disaster 

does occur. We have to begin looking at the complexities and scale of the consequences of hazards. 

The federal government must continue its commitment to ensuring national security through all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate numbers of state and local 

personnel to operate the all-hazards emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse. Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for adequate 

emergency management systems from the ground up. Instead of making unbalanced 

investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our response system for all disasters regardless of cause. 

65 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING 

EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness 

Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every state must be able to 

plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the capability to respond. EMPG is 

the only source of funding to assist state and local governments with planning and 

preparedness/readiness activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when 

our country is continuing long term recovery efforts from one of the largest natural 

disasters in history and making strides to improve the nation’s emergency preparedness/readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be just maintained. 

EMPG is the backbone of the nation’s all-hazards emergency management system 

and the only source of direct federal funding to state and local governments for 

emergency management capacity building. EMPG is used for personnel, planning, 

training, and exercises at both the state and local levels. EMPG is primarily used 

to support state and local emergency management personnel who are responsible for 

writing plans; conducting training, exercises and corrective action; educating the 

public on disaster readiness; and maintaining the nation’s emergency response system. EMPG is being used to help states create and update plans for receiving and 

distribution plans for emergency supplies such as water, ice, and food after a disaster; debris removal plans; and plans for receiving or evacuating people—all of 

these critical issues identified in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the following investigations and reports. 

State and Local Match 

EMPG is the only all-hazards preparedness program within the Department of 

Homeland Security that requires a match at the state and local level. The match 

is evidence of the commitment by state and local governments to address the urgent 

need for all-hazards emergency planning to include terrorism. EMPG requires a 

match of 50 percent from state or local governments. According to the National 

Emergency Management Association’s (NEMA) 2006 Biennial Report, states were 

continuing to over match the federal government’s commitment to national security 

protection through EMPG by $96 million in FY05, which is an 80 percent state and 

20 percent federal contribution. To bring all state and local jurisdictions up to the 

fifty percent level, $135 million is needed. This would allow as many as 3,030 additional local jurisdictions to become part of the program. To bring non-participating 

jurisdictions into the program at the 50 percent level requires an additional $152 

million. 

EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid 

During the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the interdependencies of the nation’s emergency management system were demonstrated and one of the success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). EMAC enabled 

48 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico to provide 

assistance in the form of more than 2,100 missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets 

to support the impacted states. The estimated costs of these missions will exceed 

$829 million. Of the personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,503 were 

National Guard personnel and 19,426 were civilians. Many of the civilians sent to 

provide assistance are supported by the EMPG program in their state. The nature 

of the nation’s mutual aid system vividly shows the need for all states to have appropriate capabilities to respond to disasters of all types and sizes. In Florida we 

used EMPG to build self-sustained response teams that are able to respond to disasters in our state and in neighboring states when called upon to provide assistance. 

The increased reliance on mutual aid for catastrophic disasters means additional resources are needed to continue to build and enhance the nation’s mutual aid system 

through EMAC. 

Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program 

While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after ten years of 

straight-lined funding, the program needs to be adequately resourced based on 

building capacity. The increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding shortfalls 

estimated in the NEMA Biennial Report in 2006 to be over $287 million for all 50 

states. The current total need is $487 million. The Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act 

authorized EMPG at $375 million for FY 2008. 

Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006 Quick Response Survey found 

that if states were to each receive an additional $1 million in EMPG funding for 

FY 2007, states would use the following percentages for each of the following activities: 88 percent of states responding would use the funding to support the update 

plans including evacuation, sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters 

66 

and others; 83 percent would provide more training opportunities for state and local 

emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide additional preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct more state and 

local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for state and local NIMS compliance. (States were able to respond to multiple activities, as each state has multiple 

emergency preparedness priorities.) 

Last year’s Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report completed by the Department 

of Homeland Security found that current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and 

not linked within a national planning system. The report cites that, ‘‘This is incompatible with 21st century homeland security challenges, and reflects a systematic 

problem: outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary contributors 

to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of the Review support the 

need for a fundamental modernization of our Nation’s planning process. The report 

goes on to explain that all states do not adequately address special needs populations, continuity of operations, continuity of government, evacuation plans, and resource management. EMPG is the ONLY source of funding that can address these 

significant and immediate needs. The current EMPG shortfall does not take into account these findings. 

BUILDING OUR NATION’S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC 

The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest deployment 

of interstate mutual aid in the nation’s history through the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned previously, EMAC deployed personnel 

comprised of multiple disciplines from all member states to respond to Louisiana, 

Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. The process enabled National Guard, 

search and rescue teams, incident management teams, emergency operations center 

support, building inspectors, law enforcement personnel, and other disciplines to immediately assist the requesting states in need of support. The National Guard even 

chose to continue under EMAC when deployed under Title 32 because of the organization, liability protections, accountability, and tracking abilities EMAC provides. 

EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor Lawton 

Chiles. The system was developed through the member states of the Southern Governors’ Association to establish mechanisms to enable mutual aid among member 

states in emergency situations. The Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs nationwide applicability by the National Governors’ 

Association and FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (P.L. 104–321). Currently 

all 50 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia are 

members of EMAC. EMAC requires member states to have an implementation plan 

and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC Operations Manual. EMAC takes 

care of issues such as reimbursement, liability protections, and workers’ compensation issues. 

The following is a synopsis of the historical support that the state of Florida provided to Mississippi in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the largest support mission in the history of EMAC. The State of Florida, acting under provisions of the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact and a direct request from the Governor of Mississippi, deployed a self-contained response team on the day of landfall 

to the impacted coastal area of Mississippi (3 coastal counties of Hancock, Harrison, 

and Jackson; 3 contiguous inland counties to the north consisting of Pearl River, 

Stone, and George). By the evening of landfall on August 29, 2005 assets of law enforcement, firefighting, search and rescue, medical, Incident Management Teams, 

and others were in the area of operations in coastal Mississippi performing lifesaving, safety, and security missions. Major logistical assets were sent to the area, 

as well, to include ice, water, food, fuel, and other commodities to support initial 

response operations. Due to the dire situation caused by Hurricane Katrina on the 

Mississippi coast, the mission of the Florida Task Force grew significantly and commodities and personnel continued to flow from the State of Florida continuously 

until the end of October 2005 (note: some smaller level missions continued with 

Florida support up until November 2006). The Florida Task Force set-up a major 

command and logistical staging area at Stennis Space Base which became the hub 

of the operation. This command communicated with and supported Incident Management Teams from Florida which were located in the 6 assigned counties to support the local Mississippi Emergency Management Directors. In relation to this effort, it must be noted that the State of Florida had itself been impacted by Hurricane Katrina (a weaker storm at that time) prior to its passage into the Gulf of 

Mexico. It is a tribute to the entire Florida State Emergency Response Team (state 

and local government, private entities, faith based organizations, etc. . .) that they 

were able to effectively rise to the challenge of responding to the South Florida imVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
67 

pact of Hurricane Katrina while providing significant and necessary assistance to 

our neighbors on the Gulf Coast. 

Overview of EMAC Support to the State of Mississippi 

• COMMODITIES: (Purchased and provided by the State of Florida) 

• Water—768 truckloads—3,648,000 gals. 

• Ice—457 truckloads—19,194,000 lbs. 

• Juice—16 trucks—16,000 cases 

• Shelf Stable Meals—138,000 meals 

• USDA commodities—6,000 cases 

• Baby food, formula, etc.—20,892 cases 

• Baby supplies (nipples, diapers, wipes)—4,962 cases 

• Adult diapers, wipes—376 cases 

• Children Liquid Supplement—10,200 cases 

• Adult Liquid Supplement—5,100 cases 

• 1,304 State Trucks of Commodities 

• 2,057 Trucks Total of Commodities 

• PERSONNEL and TEAMS: 

6,404 Personnel Total 

• Three Area Command Teams with 115 personnel to manage entire area of responsibility of six counties 

• Six Incident Management Teams sent to County Emergency Operation Center’s 

• Three Logistics Management Teams 

• Urban Search and Rescue Teams 

• Three Type I Teams 

• Four Type II Teams 

• Two Water Rescue Teams 

• One Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordination Team 

• 767 Law Enforcement Personnel with vehicles and equipment 

• 207 Fire Fighting Personnel 

• 70 ALS Ambulances and EMS personnel 

• 710 Medical Personnel in various disciplines 

• 30 Elder Care Specialists 

• 1 School Recovery Team 

• 1 FDOT Advance Recon Team (10 personnel) 

• 1 FDOT Bridge Recovery Team (7 personnel) 

• 14 Public Information Officers 

• 497 National Guard Personnel (also sent aircraft and equipment) 

• 3 zodiac boats w/trailers 

• 3 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV’s) 

• 2 GSA vans 

• 2 UH–60 ‘‘Black Hawk’’ helicopters 

• 1CH–47 ‘‘Chinook’’ 

• 4 Hazmat Teams (8 personnel) 

• 14 Volunteer, Donations and Reception Center Personnel 

• 13 Animal Control Teams (60 personnel) 

• 1 State Animal Response Team (5 personnel) 

• 16 Water/Wastewater Facility Teams (101 personnel) 

• 4 Communications Personnel 

• 38 Recovery Personnel 

Continued support of EMAC will allow Florida to focus on the implementation of 

lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, such as training and education 

for all mutual aid stakeholders, resource typing and credentialing, and information 

and resource management. 

ADDRESSING TEMPORARY DISASTER HOUSING PROGRAM 

CHALLENGES 

Housing is often seriously impacted following natural disasters, leaving many 

families in the impacted areas with no place to call home. Disaster housing consists 

of three phases: 

1. The initial phase focuses on retaining citizens in the affected area and providing interim housing solutions for them. 

2. The next phase focuses on rebuilding local housing resources. 

3. The final phase deals directly with developing long-term redevelopment strategies. 

Providing housing assistance following a disaster can not just be based on expiration dates and eviction dates; the focus must be on long term housing solutions for 

68 

the affected area. Disaster case management of survivors that deals with the entire 

scope of housing and human needs is necessary throughout all the phase to transition those affected from interim situations into longer term solutions. Typically in 

a community where the ability to transition disaster survivors into permanent housing is problematic, there is usually an existing housing problem before the disaster 

struck the community. 

A disaster housing partnership between the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) would provide a disaster housing solution that is more responsive, flexible and would provide a more 

cost effective long term disaster housing solutions. Bringing HUD’s financial resources and their subject matter expertise regarding building loans, subsidies and 

land management into the fold early on in the disaster housing process, would 

greatly improve an impacted community’s ability to recover and develop long-term 

housing solutions and strategies. Additionally, HUD is capable of providing case 

management experience for permanent solutions for affected citizens that will provide permanent solutions to local situations. Case management will result in accountability on all levels of disaster housing. 

CONCLUSION 

The first goal the State of Florida looks at when preparing for any sort of disaster 

is how we can best serve our citizens. This goes back to my previous statement regarding the fact that all disasters are local and that all groups involved in responding to disasters must use a team approach, regardless of the type of disaster, to prepare for and respond to these events. This team approach is imperative when addressing the federal role in responding to disasters, it is important that the response 

from the federal level is one of a supporting role for state and local emergency management, it cannot supplant these efforts. 

Florida is successful and is looked to as a leader due to the fact that our leadership has invested in emergency management through the creation of the Florida 

Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and Emergency Management Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund. Additionally, the state has worked to develop strong partnerships that will ultimately insure the state’s success in affecting positive outcomes 

for those impacted when a disaster occurs in our state. This type of investment was 

on display recently when the Florida Legislature, based on Governor Crist’s budget 

recommendations, approved an appropriation of $895,000 in the state’s FY 07–08 

budget to upgrade Florida’s State Warning Point. The Florida State Warning Point 

is a function of the Division of Emergency Management and is housed in the Emergency Operations Center. The Florida State Warning Point is responsible, through 

Florida Statutes and federal regulations, to be the central clearing house for all 

emergencies occurring in the State that require response by or resources from multicounty incidents, multi-State agency incidents or any incident requiring County/ 

State/Federal communications and/or coordination. 

With the passage of the Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act, Congress has affirmed 

their support for ensuring preparedness for our nation’s continuous vulnerability 

against all-hazards. We must continue to build national preparedness efforts with 

a multi-hazard approach. We appreciate Congress’ increased attention and focus on 

disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts. We ask that Congress look at ways to immediately influx the system with resources, encourage and 

reward innovation in order to face the challenges of the day. We cannot afford to 

continue to repeat history as we did with Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina. 

We must, once and for all, learn the lessons of the past and resolve ourselves to 

ensure that Federal, State and local governments have adequate funding for baseline emergency preparedness so exercises and training can ensure that plans and 

systems are effective before a disaster. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your committee today and 

want to affirm Governor Crist’s dedication to continually working with our federal 

partners to improve the nation’s capabilities to respond to all types of hazards that 

our communities may face on a daily basis.William ‘‘Craig’’ Fugate, Director, Florida 

Division of Emergency Management 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now will recognize Mr. Becker to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes. 

69 

STATEMENT OF JOE BECKER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, AMERICAN RED CROSS 

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 

Mr. BECKER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee. My name is Joe Becker, and I lead the American Red 

Cross’s national disaster relief efforts. Thank you for your invitation to speak today. 

I was asked to cover three topics: to review what the Red Cross 

does for victims of disasters and what we don’t do, to share the 

steps that we have taken since Katrina, and to discuss our changed 

role in the National Response Plan. 

What we do in times of disaster for people? We shelter, we feed, 

we distribute items that people need, the supplies that they would 

need to get through the immediate next few days. We have learned 

over the years that there are some supplies where it is difficult to 

give the actual item?gas for a car or shoes where sizes matter—and 

we give some financial assistance so people can obtain those when 

their economy recovers. 

We provide mental-health counseling. We provide health services 

with our nurses and shelters. We provide information to connect 

families with lost loved ones, and we work in the longer-term recovery to help families plan and find resources—our resources and 

others—on their longer-term recovery. 

What we don’t do: We don’t evacuate cities. That is a state and 

local, particularly local, operation. We don’t rescue people. That belongs in the first-response community. 

We don’t give everybody money who had a loss. We are not a 

bank. We are not an insurance company. And we don’t build 

houses. There are others that do that very well. 

You hear of the Red Cross charter to provide a national system 

of disaster relief. That means we don’t pick and choose which disasters we respond to. We don’t think about if it is a big enough one, 

that we will come, or if our people are available, or if we have 

money in the bank. We respond regardless, to about 200 events a 

day, around the country. 

If the event is larger than the very small event, such as a multifamily fire, we will be joined by our usual key partners, mainly 

faith-based groups. The Southern Baptists will be there to help 

feed, Catholic Charities will often serve, Salvation Army would be 

there to help feed. 

If an event is much larger, or if there is an event that is very 

visible in the news, we will be joined by many from the community, 

and others who arrive to do good work, mostly faith-based groups, 

some businesses and civic groups. 

The challenge is for the local quarterback, the local emergency 

manager, and whatever structure the community has, to incorporate their good works into a coordinated response. And how that 

is done varies community by community. 

What did the Red Cross learn from Katrina? I will give you a list 

of key learnings. Briefly, we learned instead of moving our supplies 

in ahead of a storm, it is better for us to expand our stockpile and 

permanently keep them in risk areas. We learned where our systems need to be bigger, especially our systems to use untrained 

70 

spontaneous volunteers, and to move large numbers of people 

around the country to help. 

A key learning, we learned where our relationships with community groups, particularly faith-based groups, were not as strong as 

needed. These are nondisaster organizations who step forward in 

a very large disaster and don’t know how to plug into the system 

and help. We learned which of these community groups, such as 

churches, would step forward and didn’t know how to get support, 

and we learned how we can do that better. 

We learned that we needed year-round staff to work with state 

government in risk areas, and where we needed a larger team to 

work with our federal partners. We learned where our infrastructure, particularly our IT infrastructure, was completely overwhelmed and had to be rebuilt post-Katrina. We learned where our 

satellite communications system wasn’t big enough, and where we 

needed more redundancy. 

In short, we learned about our capacity, and we learned about 

our relationships, and we learned that we needed to grow both. We 

had a large number of projects post-Katrina that just had to be 

done by last hurricane season last year. 

We gave ourselves 4 months to acquire 1.5 million square feet of 

warehouse space, to put in those warehouses additional supplies to 

shelter 500,000 people for a 6-day period of time, buying a half million cots, a half million blankets, and those related supplies. We 

now have 6 million prepackaged meals ready to go. 

We now have 21 cities in risk areas with permanent triple-redundant communications equipment along the coast, and we are adding more cities. We have hired full-time staff for 14 state emergency management offices, such as Mr. Fugate’s, and staff to work 

with partner groups to help national partners, national organizations, become part of the disaster response. We redid our IT systems, and we did a lot of work on our supply chain. 

Locally, our chapters have created new partnerships, especially 

with faith-based groups, to enable the work, and we even worked 

with about 100 national partners. A good example would be the 

NAACP, where we trained over 1,000 of their members, and they 

helped respond to the tornadoes in Florida and to Alabama and 

Georgia. 

You might also remember that our role in the National Response 

Plan has changed recently. We have a separate team that supports 

the federal structure in disaster. They help receive requests from 

states for support items for mass care, and help the federal agencies fill those requests. 

This team is very different from our operating team. It does not 

direct our operating team. It takes information from the operating 

team, and gives it to federal partners. 

In the new construct, in the new National Response Plan, in a 

key learning from Katrina, if you are going to be a primary agency 

in the National Response Plan, you need to be able to help make 

quick and decisive commitments of federal assets. 

It is clear that the Red Cross can’t commit federal resources. I 

can’t sign a contract on behalf of government for water or fuel to 

appear. And now that ESF6 is growing to include evacuation planVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
71 

ning and pet planning, it is appropriate that a federal agency take 

that role, and FEMA has agreed to do so. 

The key point here is that there will be no change in our service 

delivery on the ground. This is a separate team from the people 

who feed and shelter and do those seven things that I described. 

Are we ready? We are never ready enough. We have made big 

strides with our people, in our supplies, in our plans, in our systems, but we work every day and we see the problems at county 

level, we see the problems at state level, we see the problems in 

our federal family. And we know there is much more to be done. 

The Red Cross has learned a lot. We have done a lot, but we 

have a lot more to do. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Becker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH C. BECKER

Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, and Members of the Committee on 

Homeland Security, thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify before you 

today on this important topic: Hurricane Season 2007. I am pleased to inform the 

Committee that we have made substantial improvements in our capacity to respond 

to the challenges that may come our way. 

I would like to start by recognizing the selection of Mark W. Everson as the next 

president and chief executive officer of the American Red Cross. Many of you know 

Mr. Everson, who has led the Internal Revenue Service for the past four years. We 

at the American Red Cross are excited and encouraged about his selection and look 

forward to him officially joining the organization on May 29. 

I also want to take this opportunity to thank each of you for your support of H.R. 

1681, the American National Red Cross Governance Modernization Act of 2007, 

which was signed into law by President Bush on May 11. This legislation modernizes the governance structure of the American Red Cross and enhances the Red 

Cross Board of Governors’ ability to support the critical mission of the Red Cross 

in the 21st century. 

In today’s testimony, I will focus on the significant improvements made by the 

American Red Cross since Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma devastated the Gulf 

Coast during the 2005 hurricane season. I will also address recent changes to the 

National Response Plan (NRP), in which the American Red Cross plays a significant 

role. 

About the American Red Cross 

For more than 125 years, the American Red Cross has been our nation’s partner 

in preventing, preparing for, and responding to disasters. Our past and present Congressional Charter mandates that the Red Cross ‘‘maintain a domestic and international system of disaster relief.’’ In fact, the Red Cross responds to more than 

70,000 disasters each year, ranging from single family home fires to large scale hurricanes and tornadoes. In addition to family home fires and small scale events, 

today the Red Cross has 39 large scale disaster operations in 26 states and the 

Northern Mariana Islands, including the tornado that struck Kansas earlier this 

month and our continuing work to support the tragedy at Virginia Tech. 

The Red Cross must function at many levels and across multiple jurisdictions. It 

is simultaneously a local responder, a state partner and a national organization. At 

the local level, we provide immediate services: food, shelter, immediate and longerterm assistance, for people in all disasters ranging from home fires to large scale 

disasters. 

While the American Red Cross is the nation’s largest mass care provider, we are 

not the only mass care provider. As an independent, nonprofit organization, we rely 

on the generosity of the American people to provide services to victims of disasters. 

We also rely on our partners, such as the Southern Baptists, the Salvation Army, 

Catholic Charities, and the United Way, to provide their services in larger events. 

Since Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross has reached out to hundreds of organizations across the nation to ensure our partnerships are solid, to find mutual ways 

of providing services during times of disasters, and to ensure that the gaps that existed in our response to Katrina are filled. 

Hurricane Katrina 

In August 2005, our nation awoke to the inconceivable wrath that was Hurricane 

Katrina. Millions of people were immediately displaced. The sheer magnitude of 

72 

Katrina’s impact was unprecedented, and the American Red Cross, along with all 

other response and human services organizations, was not prepared for the magnitude of the response required by such a disaster. In our planning, we failed to 

‘‘think big’’ enough. 

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest domestic events the Red Cross ever responded to were the 2004 hurricanes—Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne—which 

crisscrossed their way across the southeast. Our response to these storms easily surpassed anything done in prior disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992. After 

those storms, we made significant strides to increase our feeding, sheltering, and 

emergency assistance capacity. 

Before Katrina made landfall, we enhanced local Red Cross chapter capacity with 

supplies, emergency response vehicles (ERVs), kitchens, communications equipment, 

and a first wave of almost two thousand additional volunteers—a force that would 

ultimately grow to 240,000 workers. But, for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, 

this was not enough. The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes were 20 times larger than our 

previous largest disaster. 

To say that the organization was stretched beyond capacity is an understatement. 

Some shelters became exceptionally crowded, we were slow to reach some rural 

areas, and when we gave emergency financial assistance our systems became overwhelmed. We responded by creating new systems utilizing our relationships with 

some of the best and brightest in corporate America to give aid to people in need. 

We also ramped up our workforce and trained tens of thousands of spontaneous volunteers who stepped up to help their neighbors. 

It was not perfect—it was far from perfect—but we were successful, with the help 

of our partners, in getting the critical emergency aid to those who had nothing else 

on a scale that was unprecedented. 

Hurricane Katrina exposed systemic vulnerabilities for the Red Cross and governmental agencies that respond to disasters. Yet, by bringing them to light, we were 

given the opportunity to identify them, fix them, and ensure that we are prepared 

for future disasters that may lie ahead. 

Lessons Learned and Improvements, 2005–2007 

Mr. Chairman, I shared lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina in preparation 

for the 2006 hurricane season with this Committee last June. While we were fortunate as a nation to have a relatively quiet hurricane season last year, that did not 

give the Red Cross reason to delay our progress, it simply gave us time to do more— 

time to ensure that we rebuilt our systems right, and to create the necessary capacity. 

Today, I welcome the opportunity to address two specific issues that might have 

characterized the Red Cross in years past. The first is a cultural issue, the second 

is capacity. 

First our culture. The Red Cross had a history of acting as an insular organization too many times and in too many places. As the nation’s largest mass care provider, we have been successful in responding to disasters for more than a century. 

On larger relief efforts, we have worked with key partners over the years, typically 

faith based groups like the Southern Baptists and the Salvation Army. In very large 

events, like Katrina, many new groups step forward, especially the faith community. 

Our ability to work with these non-traditional disaster response organizations was 

limited. While overwhelmed providing service, we had difficulty helping them become part of the community response. This was a hard, but valuable lesson for the 

Red Cross to learn. In very, very large events, non disaster groups and new partners 

come forward to serve—and the Red Cross can take a lead role in helping them become part of the response. 

Katrina also was a wake up call for the Red Cross that partnering in fact is important in all disasters—small and medium ones, not just the catastrophes. Since 

Katrina, the Red Cross at the national level and our more than 700 chapters nationwide have worked diligently to create and foster strong partnerships with many new 

organizations that would typically not be in the disaster response business. From 

faith groups and businesses to local civic organizations, our chapters have been 

working with local community organizations to ensure that partnerships are in 

place so that organizations—that selflessly step up to help their neighbors—know 

in advance how to access supplies, resources, and expertise. Through partnerships, 

Red Cross chapters are providing training and supplies to community-based organizations to strengthen response efforts across the nation. If and when a disaster 

strikes, these community-based organizations will be better prepared to assist in 

their response efforts, and the Red Cross will be better prepared to identify and 

reach out to people are that may need assistance. We have seen the benefit of working with these new partners in many significant responses over the last year. The 

73 

Red Cross does not think or act alone. . .our commitment to partnerships is here 

to stay. 

The second area is capacity. The Red Cross has significantly increased the investment in our capacity to respond. Today, we have six million pre-packaged meals are 

at the ready, and sheltering supplies, like blankets, cots, toiletry kits, and clean up 

kits for up to a half million people are stored in warehouses spread along the coasts 

and in other high risk areas. 

For many years we had mobile communications vehicles, complete with interoperable satellite and redundant communications that we would roll in ahead of a storm. 

Today we have 21 cities stocked with permanent satellite equipment along the Gulf 

Coast, and are working to add more. 

We have worked even more effectively with the state and federal governments as 

well, hiring full-time Red Cross employees for 14 state emergency management offices, and for each of the FEMA regions. This is in addition to the employees we 

have added to work with NGO partner groups to help coordinate relief efforts. We 

have trained more than 165 government relations volunteers and have worked hard 

to strengthen our relationship with FEMA, clarifying and redefining roles and responsibilities. We have increased our efforts to work with and accommodate people 

with disabilities and continue to seek appropriate community partnerships to help 

us serve other vulnerable communities. We have changed our information sharing 

policies to allow transparency with other organizations and local law enforcement 

while respecting client confidentially. 

We also have added the following capacity: 

• A web-based shelter management application developed in conjunction with 

FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security. This system has the ability 

to track shelter inventory, facility survey data, and population counts of the 

shelter population nationwide. Data on our 44,000 shelters is entered in the system. 

• Improvements to the Disaster Services Human Resources (DSHR) system to 

track in real-time staff assigned to relief operations and strengthen the process 

used for registering spontaneous volunteers. The DSHR system software has 

also been modified to accommodate DSHR ID Smart Card technology. These improvements provide better information about our volunteers, their skills and 

availability. 

• Addition of six on-staff disaster relief operation directors to provide leadership 

to major relief operations as well as mentor and coach chapter and multi-chapter relief operation directors. This will improve the skill sets of administrators 

and managers in the DSHR system. 

• Development of national partnerships that chapters can utilize at the local 

level to engage underserved groups in their communities. 

• A ‘‘Disaster Welfare Information’’ system for chapters to provide ‘‘safe and 

well’’ status information to the families and loved ones of disaster victims. 

• Response Center Network expansion for a group of chapters that staff the 1– 

866–GET–INFO line. We have 250 simultaneous workers in chapters nationwide supporting the information center’s work. 

• An enhanced Volunteer Match Portal to help manage expectations of large 

numbers of spontaneous volunteers and provide updated guidance. 

All of this was completed by the beginning of the 2006 hurricane season. Since 

last fall, we have worked to sharpen our planning, starting with the six of the highest disaster-risk regions of the country. Working with partner organizations, state 

and local governments, and our federal partners, we have tried to quantify the 

worst case catastrophic scenarios: (1) a hurricane hitting New York City; (2) a terrorist incident in Washington, D.C.; (3) a hurricane on the Carolina coast; (4) multiple hurricane strikes in the Gulf Coast; (5) an earthquake in southern California; 

and (6) an earthquake in northern California. Taking these scenarios, we are asking 

real-world questions. How many would need shelter and are we prepared to shelter 

this many people? How many would need to be fed? How many would need to be 

cared for? These numbers are daunting, Mr. Chairman, and the Red Cross—and the 

country—have many challenges to be prepared to respond. 

Changes to the National Response Plan 

As you know, the American Red Cross role in the National Response Plan (NRP) 

is evolving. This is the result of an expansion of responsibilities in Emergency Support Function (ESF) 6 (ESF6) and a change in the expectations of the role of the 

Primary Agency. 

Historically, the Red Cross role in the National Response Plan (and its predecessor, the Federal Response Plan) has been the primary agency for mass care, and 

as a support agency for six other functions. In the primary role, the Red Cross has: 

74 

• Received, evaluated and forwarded State requests for mass care related support to FEMA for approval and fulfillment by the federal government in time 

of disaster; 

• Assisted in federal planning efforts; 

• Participated in federal level planning for mass care; and 

• Provided liaisons to FEMA locations in support of ESF6 Mass Care activities. 

Three years ago when the NRP was created, the American Red Cross assumed 

the role of the only nongovernmental organization named as a ‘‘primary agency’’ in 

an Emergency Support Function. We were very proud of this important role and approached it with the care and consideration necessary to serve in this function. Nevertheless, over the years, one of the lessons we learned is that this ‘‘primary agency’’ 

role was never fully understood, and for good reason. The American Red Cross is 

not a government agency, and we do not have, nor have we ever requested, the federal authority or ability to assign federal assets during times of disaster. 

Additionally, our operation as a mass care sheltering service provider is separate 

and distinct from our role in the NRP. We have a separate Red Cross NRP team 

that supports the federal structure in disaster. This team receives requests from 

states for mass care (feeding and sheltering) and helps the federal agencies determine how to best fill the requests. This team is very different from our service provider team operating on the ground running Red Cross shelters and feeding clients—the Red Cross NRP team does not direct sheltering or other mass care services. 

In the new NRP, currently being rewritten, the confusion regarding the Red Cross 

roles as a federal surrogate and a NGO mass care services provider is eliminated. 

It is imperative that the primary agency in the ESF needs to the authority to make 

quick and decisive commitments of federal assets. As I stated above, the Red Cross 

is not a federal agency, and does not have the authority to require or commit the 

federal resources of several cabinet agencies. The Red Cross is very pleased with 

the redesign of the NRP and its designation as a support agency. 

For these reasons, and because of the expanded ESF6 role in the post-Katrina reforms implemented in the fiscal year 2007 DHS Appropriations bill, the American 

Red Cross and FEMA have concurred that it is imperative that it is much more appropriate for FEMA to perform the federal role of ‘‘primary agency.’’ The Red Cross 

will become a ‘‘support agency’’ under ESF6, and our support role for the other six 

emergency support functions will continue unchanged. We participated significantly 

in rewriting the NRP along with FEMA and other federal agencies. In the end, we 

believe it is in the best interest of the American people for FEMA to perform the 

federal government’s role as the Primary Agency for all areas of ESF6. It has the 

needed federal statutory authority to commit federal resources of other federal agencies and to ensure a unified command structure during operational response. 

While our ‘‘NRP status’’ has changed, our operations—as a service provider—have 

not. The American Red Cross and our partners, regardless of our role in the NRP, 

will continue to provide shelter, feeding, bulk distribution, welfare inquiry, recovery 

planning, emergency assistance, heath and mental health assistance, and long term 

recovery. 

Hurricane Season 2007 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I have outlined the steps the Red 

Cross has taken to prepare for Hurricane Season 2007. We have made immense 

strides in our supplies, plans, systems, and culture. We have learned that what was 

‘‘unimaginable’’ can, in fact, become reality. 

While we have made significant improvements, the fact is that we—and federal 

government agencies—can never be ready enough. 

There are significant national issues that still exist. The NRP is not complete. 

While we applaud the work that FEMA, DHS and all the contributors have done 

on the NRP, we need to have an operational plan complete. 

We also need to see significant improvement in the areas of community and personal preparedness. The greatest defense to surviving a disaster is being prepared. 

The American Red Cross works with individuals, communities, states and the federal government to help our nation and our citizens become prepared for any disaster that comes their way. Red Cross programs are configured to disaster risk, that 

is, we design programs for individuals and families to prepare for natural disasters 

that are conducive to their geographic areas. As we rely on the neighbor helping 

neighbor philosophy, we encourage local communities to become more aware of potential hazards that could adversely impact their regions and prepare accordingly. 

The Red Cross firmly believes in the importance of preparedness and has developed numerous tools and resources offered in a number of different languages to 

help families prepare for any unexpected disasters, from a house fire to a hurricane. 

75 

Over the past several years, organizations that help to prepare communities, as 

well as local, state and federal governments, have made efforts to streamline our 

messages on preparedness. We know that a single national message helps individuals better understand what they need to do to protect themselves and their loved 

ones during times of disaster. It is important that all levels of government and the 

Red Cross convey a unified message to the public on preparedness. 

We encourage families and individuals across this country to ‘‘Be Red Cross 

Ready.’’ Our campaign, which parallels the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Ready Campaign, provides tools for individual households to take three important 

steps: (1) Get a Kit; (2) Make a Plan; and (3) Be Informed. 

Get a Kit—Every household should have prepared and ready to go a disaster kit 

that includes enough food and supplies to last each family member for three days. 

This could be an old knapsack or backpack with water, basic first aid supplies, any 

critical documents (such as photocopies of driver’s licenses), necessary medicines, a 

change of clothes, and a small amount of cash. This kit should be replenished as 

necessary to ensure that food, water, and medicines are fresh. This should be the 

one thing that anyone needing to leave in a hurry can grab to take with them. In 

addition, families should consider any special needs, including those of loved ones 

as well as their family pets. 

Make a Plan—This plan should incorporate such things as where an individual 

and their loved ones would go in the event of a disaster, how they would communicate with a friend or loved one to let someone know where they are and that they 

are safe, particularly when critical infrastructure like phone lines are down. A good 

family plan also considers the care of pets. 

Be Informed—Get information from either your local Red Cross chapter or another organization that offers critical trainings on making a disaster plan, a communications plan, and first aid/CPR. Knowing what to do during a time of disaster is 

critical to ensuring one’s safety and the safety of their loved ones. 

Despite our collective efforts, there has not been a significant improvement in preparedness by individual households. We believe that Members of Congress could 

have an impact on this by addressing their constituents on preparedness issues, and 

partnering with organizations that promote disaster preparedness. 

While we speak today of the upcoming hurricane season, other threats loom. One 

threat that continues to merit careful planning and attention is the potential pandemic influenza. In this regard, I come today with a specific request. While the Red 

Cross will be sharing vital family care information, providing a safe and adequate 

blood supply, and helping to meet the needs of isolated or quarantined people, we 

all know that our medical facilities will be overwhelmed. The medical community 

will turn to the Red Cross and other organizations for volunteers to help in overflow 

facilities. There is great risk in asking for volunteers to serve in support roles for 

those providing medical care, particularly in temporary facilities full of contagious 

people. 

Our efforts on behalf of the Red Cross and other volunteers throughout the United 

States, their families and organizations to extend federal protections to them have 

been met with no success to date. We need strong health care protections for our 

volunteers, either through appropriate amendments to the Federal Volunteer Protection Act or new legislation that affords liability and benefits protections to volunteers who are placed in harms way. We ask your help here. America will need volunteers to help in medical situations. I encourage this Congress to act while we still 

have time. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman King, and Members of the Committee, thank you 

again for the opportunity to provide testimony on Red Cross improvements leading 

up to the 2007 hurricane season. We want to assure you, and the American people, 

that you can rely on the American Red Cross to be there whenever, wherever disaster strikes. 

I am happy to address any questions you may have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

What I would like to do to start the questioning, Mr. Jenkins, in 

your analysis of FEMA, can you capsule what you think, postKatrina, what you have seen FEMA do that is their politics, and 

what items if any that cause you pause with respect to FEMA not 

being up to what you would consider an acceptable standard? 

Mr. JENKINS. Well, as Mr. Paulison pointed out in his testimony 

earlier, there is a number of things that FEMA has done in each 

76 

of the areas that I mentioned in terms of situational awareness, 

where they now have teams that go out, they have automated 

trucks with capacity to do that. 

There is the same thing with regard to assistance. They have got 

now a greater capacity to do that, and a capacity to be able to do 

that in a way that also tries to identify duplicates and fraudulent 

applications. So in each of those areas that I mentioned, they have 

taken positive steps. 

I think with regard to logistics, they have a long way to go. They 

can now, as you point out, track trucks that leave from two of their 

principal warehouses, but they still have quite a bit to go in terms 

of how they are going to refine what their requirements are and 

work with the private sector in that area. 

They recognize that it is a multiyear effort, that they are not 

going to have that implemented for this hurricane season. They 

really just need to revamp that system from A to Z, and they are 

working on that. 

The thing that I think I am a little bit concerned about is, I 

think it is important that if in this hurricane season, the new NRP 

comes in places he suggested in late June, it is whether or not you 

really want to try to implement that plan, that new plan, in the 

midst of the hurricane season? 

Or do you want to go with what you have got, where that is what 

you have trained on, that is what people understand their roles 

and responsibilities are. They are not trained in the new system, 

whatever it might be? And so, I think that is one question as to 

whether or not you want to do that. 

I think it is also important that there be a clear understanding 

of the roles of the FCO and PFO, and that is not always clear. 

Under the existing NRP, the secretary of homeland security can 

appoint a single individual to serve as PFO and FO except in the 

case of terrorist events, and the reason for that exception is not 

clear in the NRP. 

But it is, in our view, probably better that that particular person, 

one person, serve both roles, as opposed to having it in two roles. 

It definitely provides clearer lines of communication and authority. 

There is, at least, by having them predesignated, however, that 

these positions—now being predesignated for three regions and two 

states—there is an opportunity for both the FCO and the PFO to 

meet with state and local counterparts so that there can be a better 

discussion of what their roles would be, how they would interact 

with the states, what their individual roles would be in terms of 

the federal response. But that is an area of concern for us. 

I think the other thing is that FEMA has put a lot of things into 

place that potentially are certainly much better than Katrina was. 

I think the real issue that we have is the extent to which these initiatives can actually be successfully deployed and implemented on 

a very large-scale basis, like a hurricane IV or V strength. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I am glad you mentioned that. Mr. 

Paulison talked about a hurricane V scenario for Florida, Mr. 

Fugate. And part of that, phase one, focused on developing a regional response and recovery in the counties around Lake Okeechobee. Are you familiar with that scenario? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. It was at my request. 

77 

Last year, the Army Corps of Engineers responded to Governor 

Bush, who had asked for a review of the dike, came back with the 

water management district with concerns that the dike may have 

a higher percentage chance of failure in certain scenarios. That was 

not something we had previously planned for. 

So we approached Director Paulison. We knew they were looking 

to do catastrophic planning in South Florida, and said, as a part 

of that, can we first look at Lake Okeechobee, and what would happen if we had a dike failure there, all along those very small rural 

communities, and lack of resources. 

So we began there. We are going to shift that focus, as we have 

completed that planning, into South Florida. And much of what we 

are looking at is building upon the system that is already in place 

in Florida, with the state and locals. 

Again, our critical issue is not what many people are talking 

about. Quite honestly, sir, the National Response Plan doesn’t respond. People do. 

Here is the challenge I want to talk about: We look at a Category 

V hurricane hitting South Florida, similar to the Great Miami Hurricane that actually hit in 1926. Based upon today’s population, 

that would result in losing over 300,000 housing units in less than 

24 hours in a band that will stretch from the Miami-Dade-Broward 

County line all the way through Tampa. 

I have yet to hear anything in the National Response Plan, or 

anything that is being proposed in the Katrina after-action reports, 

that tells me how we are going to house 300,000 families—close to 

1,000,000 people—without having to disperse them all over this 

country. 

Those are the kind of challenges, when we talk about catastrophic planning, we are trying to get down to, not who is on first 

base or who is in charge. We knew that in Florida the day our constitution got written. It is the governor of the state of Florida and 

the local official declares the emergency. 

Chairman THOMPSON. And I appreciate this line of discussion. 

Have you shared any of your concerns with anyone at FEMA, or 

anything of this nature? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir, and that is part of why we were very fortunate to receive that catastrophic planning. Our primary emphasis, 

as we move into the South Florida areas, will be, again, looking at 

our existing plans for evacuation response, but really starting to 

challenge some of these things that we don’t have answers for. 

In Florida, we have moved millions of people in hurricanes. We 

have responded after disasters, but there are some challenges that 

we have yet to see the impacts of what people term catastrophic. 

I tend to still term that a major disaster, but what happens when 

you have the challenges of housing loss of that nature, based upon 

not theoretical, but actual hurricanes that have hit and applied to 

today’s population. 

Chairman THOMPSON. And I think part of what we saw with 

Katrina—even though we had a scenario run before Katrina—it 

was whether or not we knew what the outcome would be. 

But we did not prepare for the impact on the population, so we 

saw that dispersal of people, and to some degree, the abandonment 

78 

of quite a few. But we knew the physical damage, but it was the 

human aspect of it that was not included. 

And we will probably come back to another round. I see my time 

has expired. 

I yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 

much. And I want to thank you for calling us back. This is really 

important, and I am glad you extended the time. I appreciate it 

very much. 

And thank you for your patience, panel. 

And I love these recesses, because my seniority increases every 

time we come back—climb the ladder of seniority. 

Director Fugate, I would like to thank you for testifying, of 

course, before this committee. The state of Florida has been the national leader in disaster prevention and response. 

I know I am a little biased, but I think it is true. Mississippi 

doesn’t do bad either. I want to thank you for your years of service 

in making our state a national standard, and under, as you said, 

Governor Chiles first, Governor Bush, and now Governor Crist. 

Maybe you can elaborate on this, but what do you attribute Florida’s success to? I know you touched upon it, but if you can elaborate, we would appreciate it. 

Mr. FUGATE. I appreciate the question. And again, I think it is 

the leadership that our governors have given us. But more importantly, it is the fact we learned we had to be a team. 

Mr. Chairman, I am looking around me, and you have got two 

government officials and the Red Cross. That is not the team. We 

don’t have the private sector here. For a long time, when we talked 

about volunteers, we only talked about the Red Cross. We left the 

faith-based off the table. 

When we talk about disasters and building a team, it has to be 

all levels of government as partners. And partners mean you bring 

something to the table. You just don’t hand your hand out and say, 

‘‘Give me something.’’ 

It means that we have to have our volunteers, and all of our volunteers, both those that deal with disasters as a primary, to those 

that step forward with resources that may be emergent during an 

emergency. You can’t say no when you need the help. 

But following the other leg of that stool is the private sector. We 

oftentimes find ourselves competing and duplicating with our private sector when what we really should be doing in many disasters 

is not ordering up more ice and water, but spending more time 

thinking about how we get those local retailers back on line, so 

FEMA’s disaster assistance can go to people and they can go out 

and take care of themselves. 

And again, when you talk about building a team, it has to be 

something that is not seen as a local issue, a state issue, or a federal issue. It cannot be seen as government solution or volunteer 

solutions. You have to look at what works in a community on a 

day-to-day basis, and look at those elements. 

And from that, that is how you build a team. And the focus is 

always going to be on our citizens we serve. But without the private sector, without the volunteers, government is one leg of a broken stool. That was the lesson of Hurricane Andrew. 

79 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, appreciate that. Again, Director 

Fugate, would you also address the National Guard issue, if you 

would like, with regard to readiness to respond to a natural disaster? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, in the state of Florida, we currently have 

more National Guardsmen back in Florida with more equipment 

than we had in the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons. Throughout 

all of the response to the world terrorism and to the deployments, 

we had more National Guardsmen available for deployment than 

we had deployed at any time during Hurricane Andrew. 

I think there is a clear distinction between the warfighting mission and the long-term impacts on the Guard to carry out that federal mission at the expense of training and equipment. But in the 

short term, the disaster response in Florida has not been compromised. 

We use our Emergency Management Assistance Compact very effectively. I currently have authorized, and we have EMAC missions 

from the state of Georgia and South Carolina supporting us with 

firefighting helicopters fighting fires. Those are the types of things 

we do every day to get ready for disasters, and I think it is the way 

to multiply and maximize our forces. 

But I do think long term, the nation needs to look at the role of 

the National Guard in the federal mission, and how do you keep 

them equipped and trained for the long term. But I am not concerned about the ability of the Florida National Guard to support 

Governor Crist and the team this hurricane season. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Unfortunately, we have been seeing 

numerous disasters have plagued our country. Tornadoes, floods, 

and recently, wildfires have caused millions of dollars in damage 

and tragically, have taken lives. Do you believe that the standards 

outlined in EMAC need to be revised to ensure the states are best 

prepared for these disasters? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, I think in our process that we are using, the 

thing that we lose sight of when we talk about disasters are local 

is, we always look at the community’s impact. And we forget about 

the communities nearby that weren’t impacted, and the states that 

weren’t impacted. 

Our ability to leverage our responders in those communities is 

our biggest force multiplier. They will bring more to the table faster than any federal program or any state program. And so, as we 

continue to enhance and develop our Emergency Management Assistance Compact, we have asked for is the National Emergency 

Management Association funding to support that. 

Again, our goal is, don’t leave the resources of this nation off the 

table just because they are not part of the federal or state response. 

And to do that effectively, we have to have a system across state 

lines, get into the areas and serve citizens without the paperwork 

becoming so burdensome that it stops a response. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, thank you. I know I have got 10 more seconds. 

Quickly, any additional suggestions you may have, how the federal government can help out the states? 

80 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. We have got to stop responding to disasters 

as our only course of saving the taxpayers’ dollars and saving lives, 

and start mitigating them before they happen. Most of these disasters are well known. The hazards are well known. 

And we have a backwards system of dealing with disasters. We 

spend billions of dollars after a disaster fixing what would have 

cost hundreds of millions to fix beforehand, at the loss of life and 

misery that is unimaginable. 

I think again, because of our priorities, we need to go back and 

look at how do we get citizens to take greater ownership of mitigating their homes, protecting their families, so they are not a burden to you and me when disaster strikes, but we have given them 

the tools to make their homes safer and protect their family. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Very good. I have a couple of suggestions. 

Thank you very much, appreciate it. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We have been joined by the gentleman from Colorado for 5 minutes. Mr. Perlmutter? 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

And Mr. Fugate, I think the comments you made right at the end 

is just so on the mark. We can always find—whether it is in business or something else—you can always find time when the car 

breaks down to take it to the shop and get it fixed, most of the time 

you can. 

And it takes much more time and it takes a lot more in dollars 

if you just spend a few bucks early on to prevent it, you have saved 

yourself the time and the money. And we always kind of forget 

that. And the same thing applies on a much grander scale when 

it comes to disasters. 

But I want to go back to the National Guard piece, because you 

heard my questions earlier, I assume, of Mr. Paulison. So, I am 

looking at your testimony, and I apologize, I didn’t hear all of you 

testimony. But it says that you deployed 497 National Guard personnel to Mississippi during Katrina? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Did you deploy any to Louisiana? 

Mr. FUGATE. No, sir we did not deploy battalion strength. We 

provided technical advisor and aircraft to the request we got from 

Louisiana. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Did you retain National Guardsmen and 

women in Florida at the same time you deployed to Mississippi? 

Mr. FUGATE. Oh, yes, sir. We probably had about 8,000 Guardsmen available. In fact, we were faced with a couple of tropical 

storms and hurricanes during that deployment. It did not result in 

us having to back off our support to the states when we were facing 

other threats, not as severe, of course. And then we were able to 

respond full speed to Hurricane Wilma with many of the folks that 

had rotated back out of Mississippi when they had been released. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So you maintained some in Florida, just in 

case something bad happened in Florida, but you were able to send 

some to Mississippi to assist them? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. And also, understand that over 7,000 responders went from Florida to the National Guard. In many cases, 

81 

the majority of the resources that came from other states under 

EMAC were National Guard. 

In the state of Florida, that was actually local governments. Over 

half those responders came from local governments through mutual 

aid and EMAC. So again, we were able to reach out to all our resources, including the National Guard, and still be ready in Florida 

for other disasters. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Do you know how many in total, in terms of 

the National Guard, were deployed to either Mississippi or Louisiana during Katrina? 

Mr. FUGATE. No, sir. I believe you can get that information from 

General Blum, commander of the National Guard Bureau. It was 

in the tens of thousands. I want to say in testimony—I don’t want 

to guess—but it was in the tens of thousands. He can give you the 

best number. And they were coordinated under the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Do you know whether—and again, this may be 

outside of your purview, but how many—you said in Florida today, 

you have more Guardsmen available than you did in 2004–2005? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Do you know how many in Florida have been 

deployed today to Iraq? 

Mr. FUGATE. Actually, sir, the Florida National Guard, in the 

war on terror, had been deployed. We had one full brigade. The 

53rd Infantry Brigade was deployed to Afghanistan. We have units 

that have been deployed to Iraq as well as to Africa, and also Bosnia. 

So our Florida National Guard has pretty much been everywhere 

in this world that our Department of Defense has called upon 

them. I can ask General Burnett to provide that information. But 

the Florida National Guard has been in a lot of countries and a lot 

of wars since the September 11 attack. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. But today, do you know how many, actually 

from Florida, are deployed outside of Florida to another country? 

I assume that you don’t have anybody deployed to any other state 

today? 

Mr. FUGATE. No, sir. We actually have other states deployed to 

us fighting fires today. One of our main? 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Why? 

Mr. FUGATE. The helicopters that fly the firefighting mission, the 

Florida National Guard does not have—as organic to their mission—sufficient platforms. So it is not an issue of the war on terror 

or any other war. It is actually that we don’t have that many 

Blackhawks, so when we are fighting wildfires, we routinely—and 

this is well before September 11—reach out to our neighboring 

states for more rotary wing. 

We had more air defense units, most of our infantry-type units. 

We did not have a lot of aviation assets. So, we used the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which we have been using 

since I have been in the division back in 1997, to access those National Guards that have particular units that we did not have. And 

that gives us the ability to reach out. 

82 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right, because I just want to understand 

the system. So the system, what you have in place, basically it is 

a national system? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. If you don’t have the Blackhawks, they come 

in from New York City, or someplace like that, who might have 

them. Some National Guard will be deployed to Florida when 

called upon, or from Colorado or wherever? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Let me go back to my other question. My other 

question was, from Florida today, how many units, if you know, 

have been deployed outside of the United States? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would have to defer to General Burnett. I know 

we just got back one of our combat engineering units—the Red 

Horse came back. I think that our Special Forces just came back. 

And so, the last count I got, was we actually had our highest number of troops back since we actually engaged in the airport security 

missions right after September 11. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. I do have one more question, if I 

could, Mr. Chairman. When they return, are they bringing their 

equipment, or are they leaving some or all of it in Iraq, or wherever it was they were deployed outside the country? 

Mr. FUGATE. By and large, when they deploy their equipment, 

they don’t come back with their equipment. But we have been successful in getting equipment moved back into Florida, and releveling those units. 

I think our primary concern isn’t being able to respond to disasters in Florida. I think it is the longer-term issue of the federal 

mission, of the equipment and training that will be a deficit for the 

National Guard, but from what we see in Florida, is not an immediate threat to our ability to respond to disasters, particularly this 

hurricane season. 

But I think it is nationally a long-term concern that we don’t 

equip the National Guard for their federal mission, particularly in 

the training, as we go in the out years without this equipment. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

And I think we will do another round, since we only have these 

members present. 

Mr. Becker, you referenced some operating agreements that you 

have in place, you said Catholic Charities, Southern Baptist Convention, and Salvation Army. Now, those are three agreements you 

have? 

Mr. BECKER. On a national level, we have about 130 agreements 

with national partners. Those are the partners that we know are 

going to respond on a larger-scale disaster. A lot of our other partnerships are with the types of partners that Mr. Fugate was referring to. They are not necessarily disaster organizations, but they 

have great resources that the country needs in time of disaster. 

Chairman THOMPSON. What I am trying to get at is, are you 

talking about Tier 1 operating agreements with those three organizations that I talked about? Are all operating agreements the 

same? 

83 

Mr. BECKER. We specify what each party can expect of the other, 

and what we think they will bring in a disaster, and what they can 

expect from us in terms of support. But I think what is important 

here is, when it is a very small disaster, when there is going to be 

six houses burnt tonight in the Capital area, the Red Cross will be 

there at 2 in the morning with our volunteers. 

If the disaster is a little bit bigger than that, a small flood or a 

tornado, the Salvation Army will most likely be there, Southern 

Baptists would most likely be there. And we work nationally and 

locally with them. It is a well-oiled machine. 

That part worked during Katrina. What didn’t work during 

Katrina was the local faith-based groups in particular, who stepped 

forward and said, ‘‘I have got a kitchen,’’ or ‘‘I will be a shelter,’’ 

and it was a pastor and a key and an empty building. 

And after 2 or 3 days, they fatigued. They didn’t know where to 

get supplies, they didn’t know where to get help. And the local 

emergency management didn’t know they were there, didn’t know 

they needed law enforcement, didn’t know they needed infrastructure. 

What we have done in our local chapters is ask the community, 

in a common structure, to say who will be willing to step forward. 

And we have sought out partners, partners in hard-to-serve locations, maybe very rural areas, that speak specific languages that 

we don’t have a competence in. So those are local partnerships— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Not to cut you off, but let me tell you personal experience, what happened to me. A number of those individuals came to offer help, and was rejected, turned away. They said 

that you were not qualified to serve as a volunteer in time 

Many of them were people in the faith community. And I am of 

the opinion that that is not the time to turn help away. Now, I am 

glad to hear that you indicate that that is not the case any more. 

But you have not changed the national operating agreement. 

One other issue is that in many instances, like in New Orleans 

and areas where there is a high percentage of minority populations, you don’t have an operating agreement that provides reimbursement for expenditures, to my knowledge. Now, I stand corrected. But you called three organizations. 

One of the problems associated with Katrina is, you could not get 

individuals to go into the impacted areas for quite some time, fear 

of harm or what have you. So a number of people suffered because 

of that. 

Now, other than the three groups I identified based on your testimony, you talked about NAACP and some other groups. But that 

is down the line. Southern Baptist Convention, wonderful group, 

but they are not the only religion in America. Catholic Charities is 

another, but there are a number of other faith groups that ought 

to have a similar operating agreement with the Red Cross. Now, 

are you saying that they do have one? 

Mr. BECKER. Yes sir, Mr. Chairman. We have operating agreements, particularly with churches, where we will train them ahead 

of time, we will give them access to our supplies, our cots and our 

blankets, and we will pay their expenses if they are feeding or if 

they are sheltering or doing our core work. That is new since 

Katrina. 

84 

Chairman THOMPSON. What I would like for you to do for the 

committee, and I appreciate you, because that was one of the difficulties—a number of churches offered shelter. They were told, 

‘‘You are not a qualified shelter.’’ 

I had an armory in my district that offered shelter. They were 

told, ‘‘You are not a qualified shelter,’’ even though they housed 

men and women who served us every day. So I would hope that 

we have bridged the Red Cross bureaucracy, and moved it into the 

service bureaucracy for the community, because that was one of the 

major criticisms we heard all along. But I would like for you to get 

me the new list of people you have operating agreements with. 

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, just to address the one issue you 

raised, we need to be clear about who designates a shelter, who declares a building to be a shelter. The local emergency manager 

would declare a public building to be a shelter. 

The Red Cross just can’t show up and take over a school and say, 

‘‘We are here and we are going to run a shelter.’’ We have about 

40,000 shelters in our Red Cross system. We don’t own those buildings. 

Those are typically high school gyms, and the ones that are 

churches now would be typically outside the emergency management system. And that is where we can reimburse, that is where 

we can enter into those types of agreements. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, what I am of the opinion is that my 

experience with the Red Cross and the state of Mississippi in trying to get an armory that had a full kitchen, full bathrooms, showers, cots, mattresses, air conditioning, everything you would need, 

the Red Cross personnel said, ‘‘This is not an approved shelter for 

us.’’ Do you understand? 

Mr. BECKER. Thank you. I would like to look into that, if I can. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Greenwood, Mississippi. 

I yield to Ranking Member. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 

much. And thanks for bringing that up, too, on the shelters. 

Mr. Fugate, following up on your comments regarding the private 

sector as an equal partner in disaster preparedness and response, 

will you please discuss how Florida encourages the private sector 

to participate before, during, and after a disaster? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. After the Hurricane Wilma response, we 

realized that in many cases, we were handing out food, water, and 

ice in front of an open store, oftentimes within hours to a day after 

the storm had hit. Didn’t make sense to us, didn’t make sense to 

them why we were competing. 

So we had individual meetings with all of our major retailers in 

the grocery and in the hardware chains, and sat down. And the 

first question we began asking was, how they could do more of our 

job? 

We realized very quickly we asked the wrong question. The question should have been, what can we do to get them open? Because 

when you can get the private sector back open in a disaster area, 

you put people back to work, you jump-start the economy, and they 

are much more effective with their already existing logistical 

chains to meet demand. 

85 

We then can focus on our more vulnerable citizens in those areas 

the retailers don’t serve, which if we go back to Hurricane Wilma, 

we should not have been setting up in front of an open grocery 

store. We should have been in Belle Glade and Pahokee, where 

there were no stores, and where our most vulnerable citizens were 

at. 

Because quite honestly, the other thing we never talk about in 

disasters is, who is the most vulnerable in this nation? And it is 

generally the poor. Poverty is the most underestimated impact in 

trying to deal with disasters, because without resources ahead of 

time, they are not prepared. 

They end up in these programs the most vulnerable. The programs were never designed to fit them. And they are the ones that 

much later, we find, that are still in need, and there are still challenges. 

So we said we should be focusing on those folks, our most vulnerable citizens, and support, and asked a question of how do we get 

our retailers back up faster, so they can serve the rest of us?those 

of us that can afford to go get our food, water, and ice after a disaster?so that government and volunteer agencies can focus on our 

most vulnerable citizens. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Mr. GREEN. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. 

Mr. Perlmutter is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

And Mr. Jenkins, I would like to ask you a couple questions 

about the quotation that I read to Mr. Paulison, where it says: 

‘‘Thus it is difficult to assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving response to major catastrophic disasters, such as 

a category IV or V hurricane.’’ 

Can you explain what you meant by that sentence, and how you 

came to that conclusion that you are concerned there is not a good 

plan in place, or I don’t know what it is you are saying. Let me 

just ask you what you meant by that sentence. 

Mr. JENKINS. Well, it is not so much that there is not a good plan 

in place. FEMA has taken certain actions. Let me just give you an 

example. 

They had a major problem in Hurricane Katrina registering people for individual assistance. If you registered by Internet, they 

could then check for duplicates and check your address, and so 

forth. If you registered by telephone, they couldn’t, and a lot of people that registered by telephone who were not eligible or made multiple applications. 

They now say that they can register up to 200,000 people a day 

with their system, and that they have the ability to check addresses and make sure that those addresses are correct. And the question that we have is it has never been tested for 200,000 people a 

day. 

In other words, it has never been stressed to that point, and it 

is not clear what would happen, and what kind of contingency plan 

they have if that system goes down, for being able to register people. 

86 

There is another issue, is a particular file they are using to check 

addresses is a file that very often election officials use, and it has 

one particular flaw. And that is that it tries to identify residential 

addresses, but in that particular file, if you live above your business, the address may be shown to be a business address, not a 

residential address. 

And therefore, you might not be able to register, because it 

doesn’t show that this was a residential address. So it is those kind 

of issues that we are concerned about. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. In the next paragraph, you talk about the National Guard, and you say, ‘‘The National Guard needs to respond 

to large-scale disasters that have not been fully identified because 

the multiple federal and state agencies—such events have not completed and integrated their plans.’’ 

I mean, when you put together your report, what kind of research did you do into the National Guard’s part of any disaster 

response? 

Mr. JENKINS. Well, this particular paragraph is actually a very 

high-level summary of a much more detailed report that we issued 

on the National Guard and domestic preparedness in January. 

And that did look at the equipment that the Guard had, how 

they were determining what equipment was needed for their domestic missions, what kind of equipment they had, how DOD was 

assessing their role in domestic missions. 

As we point out in that report that DOD doesn’t routinely measure the readiness of the Guard for domestic missions. So this is a 

high summary of a much more detailed report which I can send 

you that was issued in January of this year. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Yes, I would appreciate it if you would send 

me a copy of that, please. 

No further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I am the acting 

chair, as you can see. 

And Chairman Thompson made a salient point that I would like 

to revisit just for a moment, if I may. He talked to you about the 

relationship between the Red Cross and what I would call other 

NGOs. 

And I assure you, I was not in his district, so I have no idea as 

to what was said, other than what I heard him say. But I heard 

similar comments in my district, and I want to help improve the 

image that has been somewhat tarnished because of what happened in the aftermath of Katrina. 

So my first question to you is this: What is the most important 

thing that you have done since Katrina to help you become 

proactive as opposed to reactive with reference to your emergency 

response? 

Mr. BECKER. You are referring to the partnerships or to our capacity to respond in general? 

Mr. GREEN. Capacity to respond as well as partnerships. 

Mr. BECKER. I would say one of the most significant things we 

have done is, rather than roll resources to a hurricane area ahead 

of the storm—which we have done in the past, and prepositioned 

items as the storm is coming. 

87 

We now have every state, from here to Texas along the coast, 

with at least one prepositioned warehouse with what it takes to 

shelter 500,000 people for a 6-day period of time. To have the supplies already in the affected area helps us, because we had problems moving items into the affected areas and through the affected 

areas post-Katrina. 

I would say of all the action we took, and there were 40-something projects that we undertook before last hurricane season, that 

was probably the most significant, to have our capacity there before 

the storm, to have it there year-round. 

Mr. GREEN. And with reference to the NGOs other than yourself, 

your entity? 

Mr. BECKER. I would say the most powerful thing that we have 

done is to enable each of our chapters to work within their communities on those right relationships, and give them ability to bring 

resources and money to the table, to the conversation. 

When we go to a church and say ‘‘Would you like to help this 

community in time of disaster?’’, the answer is typically, ‘‘Well, call 

us when the big one hits and we will come if we can.’’ And we need 

to do better than that. 

And what we are trying to do is to work with the faith community in particular and say, ‘‘Would you help the Red Cross, would 

you be part of this community’s disaster response? And if you will, 

we will give you the training you need so that you can run the 

Church X shelter when they have the shelter manager and the 

shelter workers and your supplies. 

‘‘We will train you, we will give access to our supplies. We will 

give you our cots.’’ And then more importantly, what they really 

wanted to know is, ‘‘Will you pay my bills at the end of all of this?’’ 

Mr. GREEN. How is this message being conveyed to the masses? 

Mr. BECKER. I am sorry? 

Mr. GREEN. The masses. How is this message penetrating to the 

entities that you desire to impact? 

Mr. BECKER. What we ask our chapters to do is to look strategically at the community and see who the right partners would be. 

Some of it is about geography. Where are we slower to get to because it is very rural, or very far away from where our volunteers 

are? 

Some of it is demographic. It is language, it is parts of town that 

were slower to respond to, or where do we not look like the people 

we are saving. So it is asking our chapters to reach out and form 

those right partnerships now and ahead of time, as we have done 

on the national level. 

And then I mentioned before, we have about 130 national partnerships, and some of these are with organizations that aren’t disaster responders. We trained 1,000 members of the NAACP, and 

resourced them. They responded in the Daytona area to tornadoes. 

They responded to Alabama with us. They responded to Georgia 

with us. They were doing mass care work, but they were representing the NAACP, not the American Red Cross. We all think 

that was a significant improvement. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Permit me to ask Mr. Jenkins a question 

if I may, sir. Mr. Jenkins, sir, with reference to the National Guard 

88 

and your survey, do you have a comparison between when we were 

at our peak of readiness at home, as opposed to where we are now? 

Mr. JENKINS. The survey that we did really wasn’t designed to 

do that. What we did is, we asked the various National Guard bureaus what kind of equipment they had, and what they thought 

their inventory was compared to what they needed, in other words, 

if you have 40 percent, 50 percent, or whatever. 

But the survey wasn’t really framed in terms of peak readiness 

versus current readiness. It was like, what equipment do you have 

and what kind of shortages do you have? 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Does Mr. Perlmutter have any additional questions? 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. No, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. All right. Well, we would like to thank all of the witnesses for your valuable testimony today, and the members for 

their questions. 

The members of the committee may have additional questions for 

you, and we will ask that you respond expeditiously to their questions in writing, of course. 

And the hearing is going to be adjourned, given that there is no 

further business. And I am instructed to strike the gavel. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(89) 

Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for 

Catastrophic Response and Recovery 

Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and 

capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by 

the unprecedented degree of damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how, and how well it should 

be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPGs. 

The nation’s experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the 

questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic 

disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) 

emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and 

(6) mass care and sheltering. 

FEMA is taking actions to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas. 

Examples include designating national and regional situational awareness teams; 

acquiring and deploying mobile satellite communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving and tracking the status of requests for assistance and 

supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to 

areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. This appendix provides 

additional details of FEMA’s actions in each of these areas. 

FEMA Taking Steps to Improve Situational Assessment Capabilities 

One of the critical capabilities that FEMA is working to improve is their situational assessment and awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly 

deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal presence to facilitate managing the national response for catastrophic incidents. FEMA is planning to establish three national-level teams and ten regional-level teams, one in each of the ten 

FEMA regions. These teams will support efforts to meet the emergent needs during 

disasters such as the capability to provide initial situational awareness for decisionmakers and support the initial establishment of a unified command. According to 

FEMA’s plans, these teams will have a multi-agency composition to ensure that the 

multi-disciplinary requirements of emergency management are met. The teams are 

envisioned to have the capability to establish an effective federal presence within 

12-hours of notification, to support the state, to coordinate federal activities, and to 

be self sufficient for a minimum of 48-hours so as not to be a drain on potentially 

scarce local resources. National-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with 

permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a collateral 

duty basis. Team composition will include representatives from other DHS components, interagency and homeland security partners. When not deployed, the teams 

will team-train with federal partners and provide a training capability to elevate 

state and local emergency management capabilities. The teams will also engage in 

consistent and coordinated operational planning and relationship-building with 

state, local, tribal, and other stakeholders. 

According to FEMA officials, these teams are still being designed and decisions 

on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not yet been finalized. 

The new teams are envisioned to eventually subsume the existing FIRST (Federal 

Incident Response Teams) and ERTs (FEMA’s Emergency Response Teams), and 

their mission and capabilities will incorporate similar concepts involving leadership, 

emergency management doctrine, and operational competence in communications. 

FEMA plans to implement one National Incident Management Team and one Regional Incident Management Team by May 25, 2007. 

90 

1GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability. 

GAO–07–301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007). 2See 6 U.S.C. § 194(a). 

Some Progress Has Been Made on Interoperable Communications 

As our past work has noted, emergency communications is a critical capability 

common across all phases of an incident. Agencies? communications systems during 

a catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient communications to 

meet everyday internal and emergency communication requirements. Once operable, 

they then should have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., 

public works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across 

agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. 

DHS officials have identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally. DHS’s Office for 

Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) was established to strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to improve local, tribal, state, and 

federal emergency preparedness and response. SAFECOM, a program of OIC which 

is transitioning to the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)—in response to 

the Post-Katrina Reform Act—is developing tools, templates, and guidance documents, including field tested statewide planning methodologies, online collaboration 

tools, coordinated grant guidance, communications requirements, and a comprehensive online library of lessons learned and best practices to improve interoperability 

and compatibility across the nation. DHS officials cited the development of the following examples in their efforts to improve interoperable communications: • Statement of Requirements (SoR) to define operational and functional requirements for emergency response communications. 

• Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) to help emergency response 

agencies map interoperable communications system requirements and identify 

system gaps. 

• Project 25 (P25) suite of standards and a Compliance Assessment Program. 

This project is in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) to support the efforts of the emergency response community 

and industry; 

• Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning Methodology to offer 

states a tangible approach as they initiate statewide interoperability planning 

efforts. SAFECOM also collaborated in DHS grant guidance to help states develop statewide interoperability plans by the end of 2007. 

According to FEMA officials, the agency is taking actions to design, staff, and 

maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable, and highly reliable emergency communications capability using the latest commercial off-the-shelf voice, 

video, and data technology. FEMA’s Response Division is the designated lead for 

tactical communications, along with situational awareness information technology 

enablers that are provided by FEMA’s Chief Information Officer. Mobile Emergency 

Response Support (MERS) detachments provide robust, deployable, command, control, and incident communications capabilities to DHS/FEMA elements for catastrophic Incidents of National Significance. The MERS mission supports Emergency 

Support Function partners at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The 

plan is to utilize enhanced MERS capabilities and leverage commercial technology 

to provide real-time connectivity between communications platforms in a manner 

consistent with emergency communication deployment doctrine being developed by 

DHS and FEMA. According to FEMA officials, emergency managers at the federal, 

state, and local levels of government will benefit from an integrated interoperable 

emergency communications architecture that includes the Department of Defense, 

United States Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau. 

Our recent work noted that $2.15 billion in grant funding has been awarded to 

states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005 for communications interoperability enhancements helped to make improvements on a variety of 

interoperability projects.1 However this work noted that the SAFECOM program 

has made limited progress in improving communications interoperability at all levels of government. For example, the program has not addressed interoperability 

with federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable communications required 

by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.2 The SAFECOM 

program has focused on helping states and localities improve interoperable communications by developing tools and guidance for their use. However, based on our review of four states and selected localities, SAFECOM’s progress in achieving its 

goals of helping these states and localities improve interoperable communications 

has been limited. Officials from the states and localities we reviewed often found 

91 

3GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response 

to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO–06–643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 4States participating in the PPDS program sign a Memorandum of Agreement with FEMA 

for the use of the containers. 

that the tools and planning assistance provided by the program were not helpful, 

or they were unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. The program’s 

limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program management practices, including 

the lack of a plan for improving interoperability across all levels of government and 

inadequate performance measures that would provide feedback to better attune 

tools and assistance with public safety needs. Until SAFECOM adopts these key 

management practices, its progress is likely to remain limited. 

Further, little progress had been made in developing Project 25 standards—a 

suite of national standards that are intended to enable interoperability among the 

communications products of different vendors. For example, although one of the 

eight major subsets of standards was defined in the project’s first 4 years (from 1989 

to 1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed that 

could be used by a vendor to develop elements of a Project 25 system. The privatesector coordinating body responsible for Project 25 has defined specifications for 

three additional subsets of standards. However, ambiguities in the published standards have led to incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and 

no compliance testing has been conducted to ensure vendors’ products are interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has strongly encouraged state and local agencies to use 

grant funding to purchase Project 25 radios, which are substantially more expensive 

than non-Project 25 radios. As a result, states and local agencies have purchased 

fewer, more expensive radios, which still may not be interoperable and thus may 

provide them with minimal additional benefits. Thus, until DHS takes a more strategic approach here, progress by states and localities in improving interoperability 

is likely to be impeded. 

FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s performance in the logistics area came 

under harsh criticism. Within days, FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially 

asked the military to take over much of the logistics mission.3 In the Post-Katrina 

Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and 

responsive. FEMA’s improvements to their logistics strategy and efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a disaster site 

mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish sustained 

supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. 

According to FEMA officials, the agency is building forward-leaning capabilities 

that include, for example, its MERS resources designed to support a variety of communications requirements—satellite, land mobile radio, computer and telephone 

systems?with the ability to operate from one or more locations (mobile and stationary) within the response area of operations. FEMA has also developed a PrePositioned Disaster Supply (PPDS) program to position containers of life-saving and 

life-sustaining disaster equipment and supplies as close to a potential disaster site 

as possible, in order to substantially reduce the initial response time to incidents.4

Further, FEMA is developing a Pre-positioned Equipment Program (PEP) that also 

consists of standardized containers of equipment to provide state and local governments responding to a range of major disasters such equipment as personal protective supplies, decontamination, detection, technical search and rescue, law enforcement, medical, interoperable communications and other emergency response equipment. According to FEMA officials, currently FEMA has established 8 of the 11 PEP 

locations, as mandated by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, and FEMA is currently conducting an analysis to determine where the additional PEP sites should be located. 

FEMA has also stated that it has enhanced its relationships with the public sector 

with its disaster logistics partners and has worked to utilize the public sector’s expertise through Inter-Agency Agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency, the 

Department of Transportation and Marine Corps Systems Command. 

According to FEMA officials, another critical component of creating an effective 

logistics system is based upon FEMA’s ability to work collaboratively with and leverage the capabilities of its public and private partners. FEMA’s logistics efforts 

have identified private sector expertise to improve and develop software systems to 

increase logistics program efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the Logistics 

Information Management System (LIMS) is FEMA’s formal accountability database 

system for all property managed within FEMA nation-wide or at disaster field locations. At the same time, FEMA is also developing a multi-phased Total Asset VisiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:00 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-35\48910.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
92 

bility (TAV) program with the assistance of the private sector to leverage the collective resources of the private and public sector to improve emergency response logistics in the areas of transportation, warehousing, and distribution. The current phase 

of the program, which is operational at two FEMA logistics centers (Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort Worth, Texas), encompasses two software management packages designed to provide FEMA the ability to inventory disaster response commodities upon 

arrival at a warehouse, place the commodities in storage, and track the commodities 

while stored in the warehouse. FEMA plans to expand the capabilities of this first 

phase of the system to all FEMA Regions during 2007. This will provide FEMA with 

sufficient logistics management and tracking capabilities until an expanded phase 

two can be implemented. For the second phase, FEMA is currently conducting market research to solicit input from the private sector and other sources to facilitate 

final design of the program’s second phase. According to FEMA officials, initial operational capabilities for this phase are scheduled to be in place by June 2008, and 

fully-operational in June 2009. According to FEMA, the completed product will provide a more comprehensive approach to producing real-time, reliable reporting and 

incorporate FEMA’s financial resource tracking requirements. It will also be able to 

support other federal departments and agencies, non-government organizations, and 

state, local and tribal organizations under the guidelines of the NRP. 

While FEMA has been working to address its logistics capabilities, it is too early 

to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a 

broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system. 

Below, we describe these five areas along with FEMA’s ongoing actions to address 

each. 

Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place to address 

disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information on states? capabilities 

and resources. As a result, FEMA does not have information from these sources 

to define what and how much it needs to stock. However, FEMA is developing 

a concept of operations to underpin its logistics program and told us that it is 

working to develop detailed plans and the associated stockage requirements. 

However, until FEMA has solid requirements based on detailed plans, the agency will be unable to assess its true preparedness. 

Inventory management: FEMA’s system accounts for the location, quantity, and 

types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in-transit is limited. FEMA 

has several efforts under way to improve transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as expanding its new system for in-transit visibility 

from the two test regions to all FEMA regions.Facilities: FEMA maintains nine 

logistics centers and dozens of smaller storage facilities across the country. 

However, it has little assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in the right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where they should be located. 

Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA’s distribution system, including poor 

transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and lack of distribution sites. 

FEMA officials described initiatives under way that should mitigate some of the 

problems with contractors, and has been working with Department of Defense 

and Department of Transportation to improve the access to transportation when 

needed. 

People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the logistics 

area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff, supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff. However, FEMA’s recent retirements and losses of staff, and its difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to 

a January 2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls 

in staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently hired a logistics coordinator and is 

making a concerted effort to hire qualified staff for the entire agency, including 

logistics. 

In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics program to be 

more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other initiatives hold 

promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will be years before they are 

fully implemented and operational. 

Revisions Made to Evacuation Planning, Mass Care, Housing and Human Services 

In an April 2007 testimony, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Operations said 

that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA’s most pressing priority 

93 

5GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO–07–88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning; the Department of Justice and 

Red Cross are developing methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing 

family members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data 

system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification activities. 

Evacuation. Recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially for those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state and local governments are 

generally not well prepared to evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations 

(i.e. planning, training, and conducting exercises), but some states and localities 

have begun to address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006, DHS reported that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the urban 

area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include collaboration with social service and transportation providers and transportation planning organizations—some of which are Department of Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders—to determine transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency 

use of drivers and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance 

to state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered many of 

these governments’ ability to sufficiently prepare for evacuations. This includes the 

lack of any specific requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in the usefulness 

of DHS’s guidance. We recommended that DHS should clarify federal agencies’ roles 

and responsibilities for providing evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed. DHS should require state and local evacuation preparedness for transportation-disadvantaged populations and improve information to assist 

these governments. DOT should encourage its grant recipients to share information 

to assist in evacuation preparedness for these populations. DOT and DHS agreed 

to consider our recommendations, and DHS stated it has partly implemented some 

of them. 

In his April 26, 2007 testimony statement for the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator stated that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuation support planning to help State and local government plan and prepare for hosting large displaced populations. The project is to 

include the development of an evacuee registration and tracking capability and implementation plans for federal evacuation support to states. 

Mass Care and Shelter. During the current NRP review period, FEMA has revised 

the organizational structure of ESF–6, Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, 

and places FEMA as the primary agency responsible for this emergency support 

function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the responsibilities 

and activities of ESF–6. FEMA continues to maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Red Cross that articulates agency roles and responsibilities 

for mass care. The MOU and addendum were recently revised in May 2006 and December 2006, respectively. FEMA is currently working with Red Cross and other 

support agencies to revise ESF–6 standard operating procedures. According to a 

February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will not take place until the 

NRP review process is complete and all changes are approved. According to FEMA’s 

Deputy Administrator, FEMA and the Red Cross have developed the first phase of 

a web-based data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility 

identification activities. The system is intended for all agencies that provide shelter 

service during disasters to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the shelter 

populations and available shelter capacity. 

Temporary housing. Other recent GAO work noted that FEMA needs to identify 

and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal government and outside the 

federal government, including temporary housing. In a recent report on housing assistance we found that the National Response Plan’s annex covering temporary shelter and housing in ESF 6 clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two 

primary responsible agencies—FEMA and the Red Cross.5 However, the responsibilities described for the support agencies—the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, 

Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs—did not, and still 

do not, fully reflect their capabilities. Further, these support agencies had not, at 

the time of our work, developed fact sheets describing their roles and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities, as 

called for by ESF–6 operating procedures. Our February 2007 report recommended 

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that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that fully reflect each respective support agency’s capabilities for providing temporary housing under ESF– 

6, develop the needed fact sheets, and develop operational plans that provide details 

on how their respective agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities. 

The Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration, and 

Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations. The Red Cross did not comment 

on our report or recommendations. As part of a housing task force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by private sector 

organizations. FEMA says it has also developed a housing portal to consolidate 

available rental resources for evacuees from Federal agencies, private organizations, 

and individuals. 

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Appendix II: Related GAO Products 

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO–07–833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007 

First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability. 

GAO–07–301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007. 

Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will be Challenging. GAO–07–411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007 

Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA’s Efforts to Protect 

Workers’ Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO–07–193. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 

2007. 

Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: Evolution of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress. GAO–07–485R. Washington, 

D.C.: March 23, 2007. 

Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has Occurred and 

Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. GAO–07–356. Washington, D.C.: 

March 19, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse. GAO–07–300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO–07–395T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete Regarding 

Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. GAO–07–205. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2007. 

Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and Other Health 

Care Needs. GAO–07–67. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007. 

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic 

Disasters. GAO–07–88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007 

Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal Imbalance and 

Long-term Sustainability. GAO–07–245. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2007. 

Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO–07–114. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007. 

Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes Highlights 

Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO–07–484T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness of Certain State–Administered Federal Support Programs. GAO–07–219. Washington, 

D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds to 

Selected Urban Areas. GAO–07–381R. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO–07–452T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments. GAO–07–386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to Minimizing 

Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO–07–418T. Washington, D.C.: 

January 29, 2007 

GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO–07–60 Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2007 

96 

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to–Day Operations, GAO–07–139. Washington, D.C.: January 

19, 2007. 

Transportation–Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO–07–44. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006. 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO–07–235R. Washington, 

D.C.: November 17, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. 

GAO–07–252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006. 

Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could Enhance Education’s Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and Universities. GAO–07–64. 

Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the Individuals 

and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO–06–1013. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO–06–618. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO–06–834. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross 

Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO–06–712. Washington, 

D.C.: June 8, 2006. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues to 

Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO–06–746T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 

2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO–06–442T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with 

Major Emergency Incidents. GAO–06–467T. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All–Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO–05–652. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2005. 

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better Oversight Could 

Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO–05–577. Washington, D.C.: April 

28, 2005. 

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