1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-22-00255-CV

__________________

TOSHA JOHNSON AND JACK LEE JOHNSON, Appellants

V.

JOE MICHAEL WALKER, Appellee

________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 1st District Court

Jasper County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 39786A

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Tosha Johnson and Jack Lee Johnson (“Appellants,” “Plaintiffs,” 

or “the Johnsons”) appeal the trial court’s order granting Appellee Joe Michael 

Walker’s (“Appellee” or “Walker”) Rule 91a motion to dismiss. We affirm.

Background

The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. On Christmas Day of 2019,

nineteen-year-old Anthony McGowan was visiting the Johnsons’ home in Buna, 

Texas. According to the Plaintiffs, Anthony was visiting their fifteen-year-old son 
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James. Anthony brought a stolen gun with him, and he gave the gun to James. The 

Plaintiffs allege that after Anthony told James the gun was not loaded James showed 

the gun to James’s ten-year-old cousin, H.J.,

1 who was also visiting the Johnsons. 

H.J. then accidentally shot James with the gun. James sustained injuries in the 

stomach and chest, and James later died from his wounds.

The Johnsons filed an Original Petition against Anthony and H.J. in 

November 2021 and a First Amended Petition in December 2021, stating claims for 

negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The Johnsons’ Second 

Amended Petition named H.J. and added a claim against the Defendant Joe Michael 

Walker as defendants.2 The Plaintiffs alleged in the Second Amended Petition that

9. Plaintiffs’ and James’s injuries and damages were proximately 

caused by the wrongful actions, neglect, negligent activity, 

carelessness, unskillfulness, and reckless conduct of [H.J.] and Walker 

in one or more of the following respects:

a) In [H.J.] negligently handling the gun.

b) In [H.J.] pulling the trigger of the gun.

c) In Walker leaving a loaded gun in his unlocked pickup truck.

Plaintiffs also allege that “[a]s a result of both Defendants’ negligence and 

recklessness, James Lee Johnson suffered conscious pain and suffering prior to his 

death for which, on behalf of his estate, Plaintiffs now sue.” 

1 We use initials to refer to the minor defendant. Cf. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.

2 The Second Amended Petition no longer named Anthony McGowan as a 

defendant.
3

Walker filed an Original Answer asserting a general denial. Walker also filed 

a Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss that restated the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations and 

moved for dismissal for three reasons: (1) Texas does not recognize a cause of action 

for negligent storage of a firearm; (2) Walker’s alleged acts or omissions were not a 

proximate cause of the incident because they were not a substantial factor in bringing 

about the incident; and (3) Walker’s alleged acts or omissions were not a proximate 

cause of the incident in question because it was not reasonably foreseeable. 

According to Walker the Plaintiffs’ claims have no basis in law. 

The Plaintiffs filed a Response to Walker’s Motion to Dismiss. Therein, they 

stated that 

3. The handgun that [H.J.] used to accidentally shoot and kill James had 

been stolen by McGowan from Walker, who left the handgun, loaded 

with ammunition, in his unlocked pickup truck.[3]

In their Response, the Plaintiffs also stated that, at the time of the shooting, Anthony 

was nineteen years old, James was fourteen years old, and H.J. was ten years old. 

Plaintiffs argued that they did not state a claim against Walker for negligent storage 

of a firearm. 

According to the Plaintiffs, several cases have addressed claims of negligence 

involving fact situations where a gun owner had left a gun where someone may find 

3 The record does not say where the pickup truck was located when the gun 

was stolen.
4

the gun and then the gun was used to injure or kill another person, citing some Texas 

cases and out-of-state cases.

4 Plaintiffs argued that “‘[a]lthough the criminal conduct 

of a third party may be a superseding cause which relieved the negligent actor from 

liability, the actor’s negligence is not superseded and will not be excused when the 

criminal conduct is a foreseeable result of such negligence[,]’” citing Roberts v. 

Healey, 991 S.W.2d 873, 878 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. 

denied) (quoting Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992)).

Plaintiffs also alleged that no discovery had occurred, and the facts had not 

been developed enough for the trial court to determine whether Walker’s acts or 

omissions constituted a proximate cause as a matter of law nor to determine Walker’s 

knowledge about the likelihood of injury or death resulting from a stolen gun. 

Plaintiffs further argued to the trial court that guns are inherently dangerous, 

that severe harm to third parties is foreseeable, and that gun owners have a 

responsibility to use reasonable care to prevent accidental or intentional shootings. 

Plaintiffs argued that section 46.13(b) of the Penal Code makes it a crime to 

negligently fail to secure a readily dischargeable firearm when a child gains access 

4 Morin v. Moore, 309 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2002); Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 

727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999); Gallara v. Koskovich, 836 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2003); 

Richardson v. Crawford, No. 10-11-00089, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8150 (Tex. 

App.—Waco Oct. 12, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g); Ambrosio v. Carter’s 

Shooting Ctr., Inc., 20 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. 

denied); Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, 

pet. denied). 
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to the firearm, or to leave a firearm somewhere the person knew or should have 

known a child would gain access to it. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.13(b) 

(“Making a Firearm Accessible to a Child”). Plaintiffs alleged that placing a firearm 

in an unlocked vehicle without a disabling device is not securing the firearm as a 

reasonable person would do. Plaintiffs asked the trial court to deny Walker’s motion 

to dismiss.

The trial court signed an order on June 7, 2022, granting Walker’s Motion to 

Dismiss with prejudice. Thereafter, Walker filed a Motion to Sever, which the trial 

court granted, and this appeal followed. 

Issues

In Appellants’ first issue on appeal, Appellants argue that Walker’s alleged 

conduct was not too attenuated and remote from the shooting to constitute proximate 

cause of the incident as a matter of law. In Appellants’ second issue, Appellants

argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their lawsuit on the grounds that Texas 

does not recognize an independent cause of action for negligent storage of a firearm 

because Plaintiffs did not make an independent claim for negligent storage of a 

firearm.5 In their third issue, Appellants argue that Walker could have reasonably 

5 In Appellants’ Reply Brief, Appellants also state what Appellants call “Issue 

No. 2A,” wherein Appellants argue that this Court should adopt a new “analytical 

framework to determine legal duty [] in negligence cases to account for concerns 

and confusion arising from courts having to determine foreseeability as an element 

of legal duty and juries also having to determine foreseeability as an element of 
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foreseen that leaving his loaded handgun in his unlocked vehicle could result in the 

handgun being stolen and used in an accidental shooting. We consider all points as 

one issue—whether the trial court erred in granting Walker’s Rule 91a Motion to 

Dismiss.

Standard of Review

Rule 91a allows a party to move to dismiss a cause of action that has no basis 

in law or fact. See GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1). The rule provides in 

relevant part,

[A] party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it 

has no basis in law or fact. A cause of action has no basis in law if the 

allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn 

from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. A cause of 

action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could believe the 

facts pleaded.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1.

“We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo because the availability 

of a remedy under the facts alleged is a question of law and the rule’s factualplausibility standard is akin to a legal-sufficiency review.” City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 

494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 

proximate cause.” This argument was not made in Appellants’ initial Brief on 

appeal, nor was it before the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 38.3. We decline 

Appellants’ invitation.
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S.W.3d 71, 75-76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)); 

GoDaddy.com, LLC, 429 S.W.3d at 754. In determining whether the trial court erred 

in denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss, we take all the plaintiff’s allegations as 

true and consider whether a plaintiff’s petition contains “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” See GoDaddy.com, LLC, 429 S.W.3d at 754. 

The trial court’s ruling must be based solely on the plaintiff’s pleadings of its claims. 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. We have previously explained that “dismissal is appropriate if 

the court determines beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to 

support a claim that would entitle him to relief.” GoDaddy.com, LLC, 429 S.W.3d 

at 754. To determine whether dismissal under Rule 91a is required in this case, we 

consider whether the pleadings, liberally construed, allege sufficient facts to state a 

claim against Walker. See Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d at 725.

Negligence Claim and Proximate Cause

A claim of negligence requires the claimant to show that damages were 

proximately caused by a breach of a duty. See Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 303 

(Tex. 2018). Proximate cause has two components: foreseeability and cause in fact.

Id. (citing Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 774 (Tex. 2010)). Harm 

is foreseeable if a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger 

created by an act or omission. Id. (citing Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 97 

(Tex. 2016)). “‘Foreseeability usually is determined by whether the defendant is 
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aware of prior, similar conduct by third parties.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louis, 349 

S.W.3d 729, 737 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet)). “The exact 

sequence of events need not be foreseeable; rather, the prior conduct must be 

sufficiently similar to give the defendant notice of the general nature of the danger.”

Id. (citing Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996); Doe v. Boys Clubs 

of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995); Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 358 

S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. 1962)). We consider not only the foreseeability of the general 

danger but also whether the injury to the plaintiff or one similarly situated could be 

anticipated. Id. (citing Mellon Mtg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 655 (Tex. 1999) 

(plurality); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. 1985)). 

Foreseeability requires more than someone, viewing the facts in retrospect, 

theorizing an extraordinary sequence of events whereby the defendant’s conduct 

brings about the injury. Id. (citing Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 103; Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 

478). 

Breach of a duty proximately causes an injury if the breach is a cause in fact 

of the harm and the injury was foreseeable. See Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 97-98

(examining whether judicial error can constitute an intervening or superseding cause 

in a malpractice action) (citing Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l 

Dev. & Res. Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 122 (Tex. 2009)). Cause in fact requires “‘proof 

that (1) the negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
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harm at issue, and (2) absent the negligent act or omission (“but for” the act or 

omission), the harm would not have occurred.’” Id. at 97 (quoting Akin, Gump, 

Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 299 S.W.2d at 122). “If a negligent act or omission 

‘merely creat[es] the condition that makes the harm possible,’ it is not a substantial 

factor in causing the harm as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting IHS Cedars Treatment 

Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. 2004)). “Conjecture, 

guess, and speculation are insufficient to prove cause in fact and foreseeability.” Id.

(citing Akin, 299 S.W.3d at 122).

Sometimes a new and independent, or superseding, cause may “‘intervene[] 

between the original wrong and the final injury such that the injury is attributed to 

the new cause rather than the first and more remote cause[.]’” Id. (quoting Dew v. 

Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. 2006) (plurality op.)). A 

new and independent cause destroys any causal connection between the defendant’s 

negligence and the plaintiff’s harm, precluding the plaintiff from establishing the 

defendant’s negligence as a proximate cause. Id. at 97-98 (citing Columbia Rio 

Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. 2009) (explaining 

how a new and independent cause “destroys the causal connection, if any, between 

the act or omission inquired about and the occurrence in question”); Dew, 208 

S.W.3d at 450 (same)). By contrast, a concurring cause “‘concurs with the 

continuing and co-operating original negligence in working the injury,’” leaving the 
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causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm 

intact. Id. at 98 (citing Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ballew, 66 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 

Comm’n App. 1933, holding approved)). Therefore, the crucial distinction between 

a superseding cause and a concurring cause is the intervening cause’s effect on the 

chain of causation. Id. To determine whether a superseding cause exists, we ask, 

“‘was there an unbroken connection? Would the facts constitute a continuous 

succession of events so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there 

some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury?’” 

Id. (quoting Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 38 S.W. 162, 164 (Tex. 1896)).

“In assessing whether an intervening cause disrupted the causal connection 

between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm and constitutes a new 

and independent cause, we consider a variety of factors, including foreseeability.”

Id. If the intervening cause and its probable consequences are a reasonably 

foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence, the intervening cause “‘is a 

concurring cause as opposed to a superseding or new and independent cause.’” Id.

(citing Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857). “But if ‘nothing short of prophetic ken could 

have anticipated the happening of the combination of events’ by which the original 

negligence led to an intervening force that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury, the harm 

is not reasonably foreseeable.” Id. (quoting Bigham, 38 S.W. at 164). “Foreseeability 

is a highly fact-specific inquiry that must be determined ‘in the light of the attending 
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circumstances,’ not in the abstract.” Id. (quoting Bigham, 38 S.W. at 164). We also 

consider whether the original negligence caused the intervening force to occur and 

operated with the intervening force in creating the harm. Id. at 98-99 (citing Hawley, 

284 S.W.3d at 857; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(d) (1965)). 

If the original negligence merely created a condition that enabled the injury to 

occur, the intervening cause may be a superseding, or new and independent cause. 

See id at 99. “An intervening cause can destroy the causal connection between the 

original negligence and the harm, even if the original negligence is the ‘but for’ cause 

of the intervening cause.” Id. (citing Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 120-22 (Tex. 

1968)). An intervening cause supersedes the original negligence when it “‘alters the 

natural sequence of events,’” causes injuries that would not otherwise have occurred, 

was not brought into operation by the original wrongful acts of the defendant, and 

operates entirely independently of the defendant’s negligent act or omission. Id.

(quoting Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857). 

Analysis

The Johnsons’ Second Amended Petition—the live pleading at the time 

Walker filed his Motion to Dismiss—stated a claim for negligence against Walker 

for “leaving a loaded gun in his unlocked pickup truck.” The petition also claimed 

that Walker’s conduct constituted “negligence and/or negligence per se[.]” In their 
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response to Walker’s Motion to Dismiss, the Johnsons argued that they had not 

stated a claim for negligent storage of a firearm.

To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must plead (1) a legal duty owed 

by one person to another, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) the breach was the 

proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. See Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 

793, 794 (Tex. 2006). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court 

to decide based on the particular facts surrounding the incident at issue. Brown v. 

Carrell, No. 09-15-00016-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13782, at *14 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Dec. 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

While the issue of proximate cause is generally a question of fact, some causes 

in fact do not constitute legal causation as a matter of law. See Phan Son Van v. 

Pena, 990 S.W.2d 751, 755-56 (Tex. 1999). As a general rule, “a person has no legal 

duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person[.]” Walker, 924 

S.W.2d at 375. 

The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a 

superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the 

actor’s negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an 

opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless

the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have 

realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a

third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a 

tort or crime.

Phan Son Van, 990 S.W.2d at 753 (emphasis in original) (citing Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 448 (1965)); see also Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 550 (explaining that 
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the criminal conduct of a third party is usually a superseding cause relieving the 

negligent actor from liability unless the criminal conduct is a foreseeable result of 

the negligence). 

In Richardson v. Crawford, the Waco Court of Appeals addressed a claim for 

negligent entrustment and negligent storage of a firearm. See Richardson v. 

Crawford, No. 10-11-00089-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8150, at *7, **9-24 (Tex. 

App.—Waco, Oct. 12, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g). The lawsuit arose 

from the murder of John Kennedy Richardson by his wife Gretchen. Id. at *2. 

Gretchen took a gun from a real estate office where she worked. Id. at **2-5. The 

gun was intended for use by women in the office for protection if they were working 

late or showing properties to “suspicious people or in bad parts of town.” Id. at **4-

5. Gretchen had been in a “downward spiral[,]” was depressed, and was abusing 

prescription medicine. Id. at *3. She took the gun with the intent to use it for 

protection during a drug deal. Id. at *5. As she was heading home after the drug deal, 

she realized her husband was driving behind her. Id. at *6. Gretchen and John both 

pulled over, and after an argument, Gretchen shot John with the gun she had taken 

from the office. Id. John died from the gunshot wounds inflicted by Gretchen. Id. at 

*7. 

John’s surviving heirs sued Gretchen and realtor Michael Crawford and other 

realtors in the group asserting wrongful death and survival claims under theories of 
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negligent entrustment and negligent storage of a dangerous instrumentality. Id. The 

trial court granted Crawford’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at *8. The Waco 

Court of Appeals explained that “no Texas court has recognized an independent 

cause of action for negligent storage of a firearm.” Id. at *23. In considering the 

claim for negligent entrustment, the court concluded that, even assuming Crawford 

was negligent in leaving the gun at the office for others to use, that the appellantsurvivors had not demonstrated that Crawford knew or should have known that 

Gretchen would use the gun to shoot her husband. Id. at *18. The court upheld the 

summary judgment because the record conclusively negated proximate cause. Id. at 

**21-23, *27. 

In Ambrosio, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed a claim of 

negligence brought by parents whose son Alek was shot and killed during a 

carjacking. The shooter used a gun that had been stolen from a gun store. See 

Ambrosio v. Carter’s Shooting Ctr., Inc., 20 S.W.3d 262, 263 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The parents alleged that the store had violated its 

duty to exercise care in the storage and display of its firearms. Id. The gun used in 

the shooting had been stolen by someone other than the shooter. The thief had 

reached over the counter at the store and grabbed the gun from an unlocked display 

case. Id. at 264. 
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The trial court granted the defendant-store’s motion for summary judgment. 

Id. at 263-64. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court noted that, after the gun was stolen, 

it changed hands several times before it was used to murder Alek. Id. at 266. The 

court concluded that the store’s failure to exercise care in the storage and display of 

its firearms was too remote and attenuated from the criminal conduct of the 

carjackers to constitute a legal cause of injury to Alek or his parents. Id. The court 

explained that the store’s failure to exercise care in the storage of firearms “did 

nothing more than create the condition” that enabled someone to steal the gun, and 

“[t]he forces generated by [the store’s] failure to safely maintain its guns had come 

to rest long before” Alek was shot. Id. at 268. Therefore, the summary judgment 

proof failed to raise a fact issue as to how the store’s failure to safely maintain its 

guns was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury that would not otherwise

have occurred. Id. at 269.

In this case, the gun was stolen by Anthony and thereafter he took the gun to 

the Johnson’s home and gave the gun to James, who then handed the gun to H.J., 

who then accidentally shot James with the gun. So, as in Ambrosio, the gun was 

stolen and then changed hands before it was used by someone else to shoot James. 

We conclude, as the court did in Ambrosio, that any failure by Walker to secure his 

firearm merely created a condition that may have enabled someone to steal the gun 

and that any failure by Walker to exercise due care in storing the gun inside his truck
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was too remote and attenuated from the shooting that caused James’s death. See id.

at 266-69. Further, as in Richardson, the Johnsons failed to state a cause of action 

alleging that Walker knew or should have known that his gun would be stolen and 

thereafter used in an accidental shooting involving minors, thereby negating 

proximate cause. See 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8150, at **18-19. The alleged criminal 

conduct by Anthony in stealing Walker’s firearm is a superseding cause that 

destroyed the causal connection (if any) between Walker leaving his firearm in his 

unlocked truck and the accidental shooting. See Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 97-98 

(citing Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857). Additionally, the Johnsons did not plead facts 

that establish that Walker should have anticipated the harm that was created by 

Walker’s alleged negligence. Even after taking the Johnsons’ undisputed allegations 

as true, the Johnsons failed to state a viable clam against Walker. See GoDaddy.com, 

LLC, 429 S.W.3d at 762. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Walker’s 

motion to dismiss. 

We overrule Appellants’ issues, and we affirm the trial court’s order.

AFFIRMED.

_________________________

 LEANNE JOHNSON

Justice

Submitted on January 27, 2023

Opinion Delivered February 23, 2023

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.