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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PAGE - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

MICHAEL RIDEAUX, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. C05-2100-RSL

)

v. )

)

REED HOLTGEERTS, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION

This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint while

confined as a pre-trial detainee at the King County Correctional Facility, Regional Justice Center

(“RJC”), in Kent, Washington. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that RJC classification policies and the

conditions of his confinement in the administrative segregation unit at the RJC violated his rights under

the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff names the following defendants in this

action: Reed Holtgeerts, Director of the King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention;

and, Major William Hayes, Captain Michael Woodbury, and Correctional Program Supervisor Teri

Hansen, all employees at the RJC during times relevant to plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff requests

injunctive relief and damages. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment and defendants have filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed a response to defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment

and defendants, at the direction of the Court, filed a supplemental brief in support of their crossmotion for summary judgment. The briefing is now complete and the parties’ motions are ripe for

review. The Court, having reviewed the pending dispositive motions, and the balance of the record,

concludes that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should be denied, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment should be granted, and plaintiff’s complaint and this action should be dismissed

with prejudice.

FACTS

On March 21, 2005, plaintiff was booked into the RJC for investigation of homicide. (Dkt.

No. 41 at 2.) Plaintiff was subsequently charged with one count of first degree murder, one count of

attempted first degree murder, and one count of first degree assault. (See Dkt. No. 28 at 2.) When 

plaintiff was booked into the RJC, he was apparently first placed in the administrative segregation unit

for protective custody, and was then transferred to the general population. (Dkt. No. 41 at 2.) 

Plaintiff remained in the general population until May 11, 2005, when he was returned to

administrative segregation for protective custody at his own request. (Id.) The basis of his request to

return to protective custody was that other inmates were harassing him about his charges and he had

concerns for his safety. (Id.) 

Administrative segregation is a designation given to inmates who require physical separation

from other inmates for various reasons. (Dkt. No. 17, Ex. 4.) Administrative segregation consists of

six categories: ultra security; legal; protective custody; pre-disciplinary hearing segregation; postdisciplinary hearing segregation or disciplinary deadlock; and, behavior management administrative

segregation. (See id. at 2.) Protective custody inmates are placed in administrative segregation

because they are deemed to be at risk in the general population. (Id.) At the RJC, all administrative

segregation inmates, regardless of designation, are housed in the same unit because of the subdivision

of space at that facility. (See id., Ex. 4.) Administrative segregation inmates are only allowed out of

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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their cells one hour each day, except for court appearances and medical appointments. (Dkt. No. 28 at

2.) In addition, inmates in the administrative segregation unit are not permitted to attend group

religious services with other inmates, but religious personnel are available to meet with administrative

segregation inmates individually upon request. (Id.)

During the time plaintiff was assigned to protective custody, he received regular reviews of his

custody status by classification staff. (See Dkt. No. 41 at 2.) According to the notes of these reviews,

between June 2005 and July 2006, plaintiff at no time expressed any concerns, nor identified any

problems, related to his housing in the administrative segregation unit. (Id. at 2-3.) In fact, the notes

of the October 2005 review indicate that plaintiff elected at that time to remain in protective custody. 

(Id. at 3.) The notes of the November 2005 review indicate that plaintiff asked to remain in protective

custody until his sentencing. (Id.) In December 2005, plaintiff filed this civil rights action in which he

complains about the conditions under which he was incarcerated while housed in the administrative

segregation unit. (See Dkt. No. 6.)

On July 25, 2006, plaintiff asked to be moved from protective custody. (Dkt. No. 41 at 3.) 

The request was denied because plaintiff was classified as “closed custody.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s security

classification was apparently related to the notoriety of his case and to the fact that plaintiff needed to

be kept separate from the co-defendant in his criminal case who was also housed at the RJC. (Id.) On

August 3, 2006, plaintiff demanded to be moved from protective custody to a closed custody unit in

the general population. (Id.) Plaintiff was not immediately moved because of the need for him to be

kept separate from his co-defendant. (Id.) On August 4, 2006, plaintiff was moved to general

population because a bed had opened up in the general population closed custody unit and because

plaintiff’s co-defendant had been moved to the Seattle jail facility. (Id.) Plaintiff was transferred to

the Washington Department of Corrections on December 12, 2006. (Id. at 2.) 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that because of classification policies at the RJC, protective

custody inmates are forced to live in the administrative segregation unit of the RJC with inmates who

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are housed there for behavioral or disciplinary reasons. Plaintiff contends that because of this

intermixing of various classifications of inmates, protective custody inmates are forced to live in

isolation and are subjected to “punishment” rules. Plaintiff identifies in his complaint a number of

specific disabilities associated with his placement in the administrative segregation unit which he

contends violated his federal constitutional rights.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, there exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact” such that “the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A material fact is a fact

relevant to the outcome of the pending action. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). Genuine issues of material fact are those for which the evidence is such that “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

In response to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not

rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue of fact for trial and produce evidence sufficient to establish the existence of the elements

essential to his case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a

factual dispute. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In ruling on summary judgment, the court does not

weigh evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994).

Section 1983 Standard

In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that he

suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that

the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v.

Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a

plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act,

or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the deprivation

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complained of. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

A defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on the basis of supervisory responsibility

or position. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-694

(1978). A supervisor is liable under §1983 only if he or she “participated in or directed the violations,

or knew of the violations and failed to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). If damages are sought, sweeping allegations against a prison official will not suffice; an inmate

must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s participation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d

628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

Due Process: Pretrial Detainee

When a detainee challenges some aspect of his pretrial detention that is not alleged to violate

any express guarantee of the Constitution, the issue to be decided is the detainee’s right to be free

from punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). As explained by the Supreme Court in

Bell, “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt

in accordance with due process of law.” Id. at 535. 

While the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from punishment, not every disability

imposed during pretrial detention constitutes “punishment” in the constitutional sense. Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537. Thus, the test to be applied in determining whether particular restrictions

and conditions imposed as a result of pretrial detention amount to punishment in the constitutional

sense is whether there was an express intent to punish, or “whether an alternative purpose to which

[the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in

relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]. Id. at 538 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,

372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that “maintaining institutional security and preserving

internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained

constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at

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546. The Supreme Court has further recognized that prison administrators “should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are

needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. at 547.

Plaintiff’s due process challenges to the policy which causes inmates who are assigned to

protective custody to be housed in the administrative segregation unit are properly analyzed under the

standard announced in Bell. Defendants argue in their supplemental brief in support of their motion

for summary judgment that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated by his placement in

administrative segregation. Defendants note that plaintiff was placed into protective custody pursuant

to his own request, and that he remained in protective custody in order to ensure his own safety. 

Defendants assert that there was no intent to punish plaintiff and that the reasons for his

placement in administrative segregation were not excessive considering the risk to plaintiff’s personal

safety if he had been placed elsewhere. Defendants also assert that while housed in the administrative

segregation unit, plaintiff had regular face-to-face interviews with classification staff to evaluate his

housing status. Notably, the record reflects that plaintiff had thirteen such interviews during the

fourteen months he was confined in protective custody and plaintiff apparently never reported any

concerns about his housing assignment to classification staff despite the fact that he filed this lawsuit

after only seven months in protective custody. And, when plaintiff finally did make a request to be

returned to the general population, this was accomplished as soon as space became available and

plaintiff’s co-defendant had been transferred out of the facility.

Defendants’ assertions support the conclusion that plaintiff’s placement and retention in the

administrative segregation unit was not done with the express intent to punish plaintiff. The question

thus becomes whether confining plaintiff in the administrative segregation unit was reasonably related

to a legitimate governmental interest. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 438-439. Defendants assert that safety

concerns mandated plaintiff’s confinement in the administrative segregation unit. The record reflects

that because of space limitations at the RJC, administrative segregation is the only housing option for

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1

 The Court notes that while plaintiff asserted an Eighth Amendment claim in his complaint, he

acknowledges in his response to defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment that the Eighth

Amendment did not apply to him and that that claim should be dismissed. As the parties appear to

agree that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed, the Court will not address that

specific constitutional claim further. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

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inmates, such as plaintiff, who need to be separated from other inmates for safety reasons. While it is

apparently true that plaintiff’s assignment to the administrative segregation unit resulted in more

restrictive conditions of confinement than plaintiff would have experienced had he remained in the

general population, the record supports the conclusion that the housing assignment was reasonably

related to a legitimate government objective; i.e., ensuring plaintiff’s safety. Accordingly, defendants

are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s due process claim.

Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff not only complains about the policy that caused him to be incarcerated in the

administrative segregation unit, he also complains about a number of specific restrictions/conditions

associated with that confinement. Plaintiff’s complaints related to the conditions of confinement in the

administrative segregation unit appear to be primarily directed at demonstrating the disparity of

treatment between protective custody and general population inmates. To the extent plaintiff intends

to assert independent constitutional challenges to his conditions of confinement, he fails to present any

meritorious claims for relief.1

1. Due Process

Plaintiff asserts that while in administrative segregation he was let out of his cell for only one

hour each day and that he was transported in chains or handcuffs whenever he was taken anywhere. 

Plaintiff also contends that this limited out-of-cell time was often interrupted by having to “rack back”

while “punished” inmates were being moved, and that he was not allowed to use a broom or mop to

clean his cell, but was instead required to use a small piece of rag. (Id.) These restrictions are

inextricably linked to the fact of plaintiff’s confinement in the administrative segregation unit and are

therefore subject to the due process analysis set forth above. The requirement that inmates housed in

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the administrative segregation unit be confined to their cells twenty three hours each day, that they be

transported in chains, that they be required to “rack back” when other inmates are moved, and that

their access to certain types of cleaning supplies be restricted, are policies which are clearly related to

maintenance of institutional security and internal discipline. Accordingly, these restrictions do not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation and defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment

with respect to plaintiff’s due process claims.

2. First Amendment

Plaintiff also asserts in his complaint that there are no church or prayer meetings in the

administrative segregation unit. In order to establish a free exercise violation, a plaintiff “must show

the defendants burdened the practice of his religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct

mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89

(1987)). “In determining whether the challenged conduct was reasonable, the court should consider

several factors such as whether the regulation has a logical connection with a legitimate government

interest, whether alternative means exist to exercise the asserted right, and the impact that

accommodation of the prisoner’s right would have on prison resources.” O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482

U.S. 342, 350-52 (1987)(citing Turner 482 U.S. at 84-89).

Plaintiff’s free exercise claim, as set forth in his complaint, does not even identify his religion

much less show that the restrictions associated with his confinement in the administrative segregation

unit burden the practice of that religion in any way. Plaintiff expands on his free exercise claim to

some extent in his motion for summary judgment where he alleges that he was denied the right to

receive visits from clergy, the right to confer privately with jail religious personnel, and the right to

communal worship, religious instruction, and religious counseling. However, plaintiff again fails to

identify in his motion for summary judgment the religion he ascribes to. Finally, in his response to

defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asserts that he is a Christian and that in 

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order to practice this religion he should have the opportunity to assemble with others of his religion

for communal services. 

While plaintiff asserts that he should have been provided the benefit of communal religious

services, he offers no evidence that his religion requires that its adherents meet in groups. Moreover,

the record reflects that the curtailment of group worship meetings in the administrative segregation

unit is reasonably related to the RJC’s goal of preserving internal order and security. The record

further reflects that the RJC provided inmates with the alternative of requesting individual meetings

with religious personnel, an alternative which plaintiff apparently never availed himself of. For these

reasons, defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment

claim.

3. Equal Protection

Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that protective custody inmates are not treated equally to

inmates in the general population and that such discrepancies in treatment constitute a violation of his

rights under the Equal Protection Clause. In order to state an equal protection claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the

plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th

Cir. 1998). Plaintiff makes no showing that any of the defendants knowingly or intentionally

discriminated against him or that he is a member of a protected class. Accordingly, plaintiff has not

stated a viable equal protection claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court recommends that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

be denied, that defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment be granted, and that plaintiff’s 

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complaint and this action be dismissed with prejudice. A proposed order accompanies this Report and

Recommendation. 

DATED this 5th day of July, 2007.

s/ James P. Donohue 

United States Magistrate Judge

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