The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Impact of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing

on the Volume and Composition of Correctional

Populations

Author(s): Elsa Chen

Document No.: 187109

Date Received: March 6, 2001

Award Number: 98-IJ-CX-0082

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to

traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect

the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
- 

Impacts of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing on 

The Volume and Composition of 

Correctional Popula tions 

Elsa Chen 

Department of Political Science 

University of California, Los Angeles 

Report Submitted to: 

U.S. Department of Justice 

National Institute of Justice 

Graduate Research Fellowship Program 

Grant # 98-IJCX-0082 

March 

Approved By: 

Date: i / 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
The author of this report wishes to thank 

the following members of her dissertation committee 

for their valuable guidance, advice, and support: 

Committee Co-Chairs: 

-- 

Dr. James Q. Wilson and Dr. James DeNardo 

Committee Members: 

P. 

Dr. Peter Greenwood 

Dr. Mohan Penubarti 

Dr. Eric Monkkonen 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Abstract 

Three Strikes and You’re Out (“Three Strikes”) and Truth in Sentencing (“TIS”) have 

garnered a great deal of political and public support throughout the United States in recent years. 

Three Strikes policies mandate long sentences for certain habitual offenders, usually 25 years to 

life in prison for third-time violent offenders. TIS requires violent offenders to serve at least 85 

percent of their sentences before being considered for release. 

This study seeks to provide an objective, thorough, and methodologically rigorous 

analysis to the literature about these recent sentencing policies. While other studies focus on the 

impacts of these two policies on rates of crime, this paper examines their effects on several 

aspects of the correctional system, including the rate of prison incarceration, the likelihood of 

receiving a prison sentence for a felony, and the estimated time served by prison inmates, as well 

as the flow of admissions and releases to and from prison. Given limits on prison capacities, 

policies that send more inmates to prison or require longer terms may require the displacement of 

other inmates to alternative forms of supervision. Therefore, impacts on the volume of the 

parole population and flow of inmates into and out of the parole system will also be analyzed. 

The impacts of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing on the proportion of older inmates in 

prison, and rates of death among inmates will be tested. The analysis also explores whether 

these policies are associated with changes in the proportions of inmates entering prison whose 

offenses were violent, non-violent, or drug-related. These effects are estimated nationwide, and 

specifically in the states of California and Washington. 

The model in this paper entails pooled time-series analysis of a dataset that includes statelevel data for all 50 states over 12 years (1986-1997). The model is designed to determine the 

extent to which policy interventions change the trends in the dependent variables described 

above. Effects aremeasured while several factors are controlled, including pre-existing trends in 

the states, national trends, and demographic and economic factors that have been linked to crime 

and incarceration. 

The analysis finds that “Three Strikes and You’re Out” policies have had very limited 

impacts on any of the dependent variables nationally or in California. In Washington, there 

appeared to be some reductions in the growth of parole entries and exits associated with Three 

Strikes, but closer examination revealed that the onset of these declines preceded the passage of 

Three Strikes in Washington. The lack of impacts of “Three Strikes” nationally can be attributed 

in large part to the fact that the law is very rarely used in the majority of states that have a law by 

that name. By August 1998, two-thirds of states with Three Strikes laws had only used it a 

dozen or fewer times. Washington’s use of Three Strikes was higher than average, but still 

moderate (about 120 offenders in the first 5 years), and apparently not frequent enough to have 

an impact on the correctional system. 

In California, only one of the variables that was tested seemed to be affected by the 

combination of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing.’ The observed effect was an increase in 

’ Three Strikes and TIS were implemented concurrently in California; therefore the impacts of the two laws cannot 

be examined separately at this level of analysis. 

1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
the proportion of prison inmates over the age of 50. The lack of more influence of Three Strikes 

(or TIS) in California is somewhat surprising. California’s use of ‘Tnree Strikes and You’re 

Out” is several orders of magnitude greater that in any other state (over 40,000 defendants were 

sentenced under the law in the first 5 years). The lack of an effect may be due in part to 

relatively steep recent declines in crime rates in California (which may or may not be related to 

these policies), adaptation to the law by prosecutors, judges, and other participants in the 

criminal justice system, or the longer-term nature of most of the expected impacts of the law. 

Because many of the repeat offenders sentenced under Three Strikes would also have been 

sentenced to prison terms even in the absence of the law, a few more years may need to pass 

before the impacts of the longer mandatory sentences can be fully observed. 

Truth in Sentencing laws have also had limited national impacts on the volume and -- composition of correctional populations. Two of the three statistically significant impacts were 

not in the expected direction. The third effect, slower growth in property offenders entering 

prison, was in the expected direction, but very small. Like the effects of Three Strikes laws, the 

impacts of Truth in Sentencing may also be less apparent in the short-term than in the long run. 

TIS laws do not affect the number of offenders receiving prison sentences, but they postpone 

release dates by extending the proportion of time that must be served for already-imposed 

sentences. Thus, the law’s impacts will only begin to be noticeable towards the middle or end of 

existing sentences. Since the law is aimed primarily at convicted violent offenders, who would 

normally receive relatively long sentences, this additional time spent in prison may not yet have 

begun for most TIS inmates. Another reason for a lack of impacts may be a limitation of the law 

itself. While it requires that a fixed percentage of sentences be spent in prison, the law does not 

prevent judges or sentencing commissions from reducing “base” sentences so that the actual time 

served remains essentially unchanged. 

Washington’s TIS law appears to be associated with more change than the other policies 

chosen for examination in this study. Significant effects included more growth in the state’s 

incarceration rate and time served by prison inmates, as well as declining trends in the rates of 

total prison admissions, new court commitments to prison, and total and conditional releases 

from prison. Prisoners appear to be spending more time behind bars, and fewer inmates are 

passing through the system with short stays. In addition, the trend in the proportion of drug 

offenders among new prison admissions has also slowed with TIS in Washington. Because TIS 

was adopted relatively early in Washington (1990), some longer-term effects may already have 

emerged in that state over the seven years in which the law had been in place. These effects may 

foreshadow longer-term changes that may eventually surface in other jurisdictions that have 

passed similar laws. 

In summary, both Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing have had few observable shortterm impacts on the volume or composition of correctional populations, but there appears to be 

evidence of a longer-tern effect of Truth in Sentencing in a state that passed the law earlier than 

most other states did. Whether these impacts are unique to the state of Washington is unclear. 

Over time, continued examination of the questions explored here may shed more light on the 

effects of these two popular sentencing policies. 

.. 

11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Contents 

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ i 

.......................................................................................................... Introduction and Background 1 

Background on “Three Strikes and You’re Out” ........................................................................ 2 

Current Trends in Incarceration .................................................................................................... 28 

Potential and Expected Effects of Three Strikes and TIS on Corrections .................................... 33 

Background on “Truth in Sentencing” ...................................................................................... 16 

Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 37 

Data, Variables, and Model ........................................................................................................... 37 

Dependent Variables .................................................................................................................. 38 

Independent Variables: Policy Interventions - Building a Model ............................................ 41 

Independent Variables: Interaction Terms ................................................................................ 47 

.- 

Independent Variables: Control Variables ................................................................................ 47 

Variable transformation ............................................................................................................. 48 

Model Summary ........................................................................................................................ 49 

Impacts on Incarceration and Prison Admissions and Releases ................................................... 50 

Incarceration Rates, “Certainty, ” and “Severity” of Prison Sentencing ................................... 50 

Impacts on the Flow of Prison Admissions and Releases ......................................................... 56 

Impacts on Parole Populations and Flow of Offenders to and from the Parole System ........... 61 

Impacts on Percentage of Prisoners over Age 50, Deaths, and Suicides Among Inmates ....... 64 

Impacts on Offense Composition of Admissions to Prison ...................................................... 67 

Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 69 

References ..................................................................................................................................... 87 

Appendix A: Additional Detailed Tables ...................................................................................... 94 

Appendix B: Methodology for Calculating Percentage Changes in Non-Logged Dependent 

Variables ........................................................................................................................................ 97 

Appendix C: Data Descriptions and Sources ................................................................................. 98 

Appendix D: States Reporting to Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Corrections Reporting 

Program (NCRP), 1986-1997 ...................................................................................................... 101 

Appendix E: Measures of Capacity Used for Prison Capacity Variable .................................... 103 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Introduction and Background 

The American prison population has been growing at a rapid rate throughout the last two 

decades. Following a period of relative stability from the 1920s through the 1970s the U.S. 

prison population has more than quadrupled, from 278,141 to 1,244,554, between 1977 and 1997 

(Blumstein and Beck, 1999; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1998). Part of the growth 

in the incarceration rate has been necessary to keep pace with rising crime rates. Violent crime 

rates grew 28 percent between 1977 and 1997, peaking at 758 offenses per 100,000 residents in 

1991 and 1992. However, even though crime rates have apparently stabilized, and even dropped, 

since the early 1990’s, incarceration has continued to grow. This may be partly due to several 

changes in sentencing policy that have gained popularity in recent years. These changes include 

the imposition of mandatory prison sentences for selected crimes (including drug offenses), the 

lengthening of sentences for certain offenses, and limitations on the release of prisoners before 

their sentences are complete. 

p I 

Three Strikes and You’re Out (“Three Strikes”) and Truth in Sentencing (“TIS”) are two 

sentencing policies which have garnered a great deal of political and public support nationwide 

in recent years. Three Strikes laws mandate long sentences for certain habitual offenders, 

usually 25 years to life in prison for third-time violent offenders. TIS requires violent offenders 

to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences before being considered for release. 

This study seeks to add an objective, thorough, and methodologically rigorous analysis to 

the literature about these recent sentencing policies. This project examines the effects of these 

two policies on the rate of prison incarceration in the US., the likelihood of receiving a prison 

sentence for a felony, and the estimated time served by prison inmates, as well as the flow of 

admissions and releases to and from prison. Given limits on prison capacities, policies that send 

1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
more inmates to prison or require longer terms may require the displacement of other inmates to 

alternative forms of supervision. Therefore, impacts on the volume of the parole population and 

flow of inmates into and out of the parole system will also be analyzed. The impacts of Three 

Strikes and Truth in Sentencing on the proportion of older inmates in prison, and rates of death 

among inmates will be tested. The analysis also examines whether these policies are associated 

with changes in the proportions of inmates entering prison whose offenses were violent, non- 

- violent, or drug-related. 

This paper will start with a discussion of the background, content, and purpose of both 

sentencing policies. Some information about current trends in incarceration and sentencing will 

also be provided to put the policies in context. Then, the expected effects of Three Strikes and 

Truth in Sentencing will be described. The methodology will be presented generally, followed 

by a detailed explanation of the data, variables, and model specification, and a presentation and 

discussion of the findings of the analysis. The last section of the paper will summarize the 

findings and discuss their implications. 

Ti 

Background on “Three Strikes and You’re Out” 

Gmber Reynolds was an “All-American girl,” a bright, beautiful, athletic, and well-liked, 

18-year-old college student. One evening in June 1992, as she was entering her car outside a 

restaurant during a visit to her hometown of Fresno, California, she was accosted by two young 

men intent on stealing her purse. She resisted, and during the struggle she was shot point-blank 

in the head by one of the men. The attackers fled, leaving her purse behind. IOmber died 26 

hours later. The young man who shot her was found afterwards by police acting on an 

informant’s tip, and he was killed in the shootout that took place as they attempted to arrest him. 

2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
It later was disclosed that this man, Joe Davis, had been jailed numerous times for drug and gun 

charges, and had recently been released from a prison term for auto theft. Davis’s accomplice, 

David Walker, 27, had a long rap sheet for drug and theft charges. He pleaded guilty to robbery 

and accessory to murder, and received a sentence of nine years in prison (Skelton, 1993). 

In his grief and anger, Kimber Reynolds’s father, Mike Reynolds, launched an effort to 

put a voter initiative on the 1994 ballot in California. His proposed initiative, named “Three 

Strikes and You’re Out” after a similar law which had passed in Washington State the previous 

year, would require that second-time felons receive twice the normal sentence for their crimes, 

and that third-time felons be sent to prison for life, with limits on time off for good behavior.2 

Reynolds originally attempted to get the Three Strikes law passed through the California 

legislature. The measure was defeated in the Assembly Public Safety Committee, but Reynolds, 

undaunted, proceeded to file a petition to add the measure to the November 1994 ballot as a voter 

initiative. At first, public interest was lukewarm. 

I 

A dramatic event soon changed the course of events significantly for Mike Reynolds and 

other proponents of his ballot initiative. In October 1993, twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was 

abducted at knifepoint from her suburban Petaluma, California home during a slumber party. 

Her strangled body was eventually found at an abandoned lumber mill (Anderson, 1994). She 

had been murdered by Richard Allen Davis, a repeat offender with an eleven-page long rap 

sheet, listing seventeen prior arrests, including three for kidnapping and sexual abuse (Franklin, 

The movement to pass the Washington State “Three Strikes” ballot initiative had been spearheaded by David 2 

Lacourse, a policy analyst and advocate who had been motivated to seek the passage of a habitual-criminal law after 

he was attacked by two strangers and left with his cheekbone broken in several places. Although his assailants were 

not caught, he was angry to learn that if they had been caught, they would have been charged with second-degree 

assault, and a third-time offender convicted with that charge would have normally received a sentence of about 18 

months (Lewis, 1993). 

3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
1994). Davis was remorseless and repulsive to the public in his attitude and beha~ior.~ Atthe 

time that he murdered Polly Klaas, he had recently been freed from prison after being released 

for good behavior halfway through a sixteen-year sentence for kidnapping. The events of this 

case and Davis’s name and face were highly publicized by the media in California. This event 

drew the public’s attention to the issues of repeat offenders and early releases from prison. The 

petition in support of Mike Reynolds’s Three Strikes initiative, which had until then collected 

only 20,000 signatures, soon had well over the 385,000 signatures required to put it on the 

November 1994 ballot. The initiative also attracted the support of powerful interest groups and 

.- 

political candidate^.^ 

The Three Strikes ballot initiative was passed with 7 1.9 percent of the popular vote in the 

1994 California election. Shortly after the ballot measure was passed, the legislature also passed 

a version of the law. 

The concept of Three Strikes fit closely with dominant values and the prevailing political 

climate of the day. Crime was a hot political issue in California and the rest of the U.S., and fear 

of crime had been rising, although actual crime rites had recently started on a downturn. The 

law was quick to catch on in other states. From the time that the first such law was passed in 

Washington State in 1993 to the present, Three Strikes and You’re Out has been implemented in 

at least twenty-four states and for federal offense^.^ 

e. 

Davis so irritated California Governor Pete Wilson, for example, that Wilson told a reporter, “when I think of that 

son of a bitch, you cannot help but be angered. Did you see the picture of him on the front page of the [San 

Francisco] Chronicle? Smirking? Jesus, boy. I wanted to just belt him right across the mouth” (December 13, 

1993 LQS Angeles Times article by George Skelton, quoted in Vitiello, 1997b, p. 1645). 

The highly influential National Rifle Association offered political and financial support for Three Strikes, as did 

the 24,000-member California Correction Peace Officers Association, another politically powerful group. Three 

Strikes also had the support of the California Gun Owners Association, the Republican Party, and the campaign 

committees of Governor Pete Wilson and senate candidate Michael Huffington. (Vitiello, 1997b) 

Counts of the number of states with Three Strikes and TIS sometimes differ from one study to another because 

there is a degree of subjectivity involved in categorizing laws as ‘Three Strikes” or “truth in sentencing.” 

4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Although they share a common name, Three Strikes laws are quite diverse. The number 

of offenses which trigger the Three Strikes mechanism, the types of crimes counted as strikes, 

and the sentences mandated upon conviction vary widely, and these variations between states in 

Three Strikes legislation result in dramatic differences in the laws’ consequences. Table 1 below 

summarizes the Three Strikes laws in the states, including the eligible offenses and 

corresponding sentences. 

5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 1: “Three Strikes” and Similar Habitual Offender Enactments Vary Widely By 

State6 

STATFJLAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMES/OFFENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

ARKANSAS ‘Three strikes”-type measure 

S 123 (1995) requiring habitual offenders 

convicted oftwo violent crimes 

serve mandatory sentences or life; 

three-time habitual offenders 

convicted of certain violent 

crimes serve mandatory sentence 

or life. 

Two strike applies to serious felonies involving 

violence: first- or second-degree murder, some 

acts of kidnapping, aggravated robbery, rape, some 

terrorist acts, causing catastrophe. Three strike 

applies to broader list including those named 

above and first-degree battery, unlawful discharge 

of a firearm from a vehicle, some criminal use of 

prohibited weapons, a felony attempt or 

conspiracy, first-degree sexual abuse. 

CALIFORNIA 

A 971 (1994) 

and 

Proposition with offenders spending a 

184 (ballot 

initiative) 

(1 994) 

Mandatory life sentence for third 

felony if there have been two 

prior “serious” or violent felonies, 

minimum of 25 years imprisoned. 

The prison sentence also is 

doubled for any felony if there 

has been one prior serious or 

violent felony. 

“Violent felonies” include murder, mayhem, many 

sex crimes, any felony in which great bodily injury 

is inflicted. In addition, some 25 ”serious felonies” 

include those above plus some assaults, robbery, 

kidnapping, some attempted felonies, felonies in 

which defendant used deadly weapon, some drug 

sales to minors. 

COLORADO 

S 196 (1994) 

Life sentence for third felony if 

there have been two prior violent 

felonies. No parole eligibility 

until a minimum of 40 years has 

bem served. 

Applies to any Class One or Class Two or Class 

Three crime that is violent. Included is the 

possession, threat of use, or use of a deadly 

weapon when committing a crime against the 

elderly or handicapped persons. Also included are 

murder, first or second degree assault, kidnapping, 

sexual assault, robbery, first degree arson, first or 

second degree burglary, escape, criminal extortion, 

or any sexual offense in which bodily injury was 

caused. 

CONNECTI- Increases maximum sentence Manslaughter, arson, ludnapping, first degree 

CUT 

H 5385 (1994) 

court may impose under 

”persistent dangerous felony 

offender” law from 25 to 40 years 

with one previous violent felony 

conviction; and from 25 years to 

life for two previous. Life 

sentence is 60 years, determinate. 

assault, many sexual assaults including aggravated 

and with a firearm, first or second degree robbery. 

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, “Three Strikes” Legislation Update, December 1997. 

6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
-- 

STATEYLAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMES/OFFENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

FLORIDA 

S 168 (1995) 

“Officer Evelyn Gort and All 

Fallen Officers Career Criminal 

Act” provides three strikes-type 

penalties and includes 85% 

requirement for some. “Habitual 

felony offenders” have had 2 or 

“Habitual felony offender” has previously been 

convicted of 2 or more felonies. “Habitual violent 

felony offender” has had 1 or more previous felony 

convictions for any of a dozen crimes including 

arson, robbery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated 

assault, murder, aggravated stalking. “Violent 

more felonies and get terms from 

life to not exceeding 10 years; 

“habitual violent felony 

offenders” havefiad 1 or more 

previous violent crime 

convictions and get from life, 

with no release eligibility for 10 

years, to 10-year sentences with 

no release eligibility for 5 years; 

“violent career criminals” have 

been convicted as an adult 3 or 

more times for violent crimes and 

get from life, with no release 

eligibility, to mandatory 

minimum of 10 years. “Violent 

career criminal,” established in a 

separate proceeding, “gain time” 

limited to require 85% of 

sentence served. Courts must 

give written reasons for not 

imposing statutory sentences, 

addressing protection of the 

puljlic. Law also provides 

guidance for career criminal 

apprehension and prosecution. 

career criminal” has been convicted as an adult 3 

or more times of forcible felony, aggravated 

stalking, aggravated child abuse, indecent conduct, 

felony involving firearm, and has been 

incarcerated in state or federal prison. Convictions 

include those within 5 years of new felony or 

within 5 years of release from prison or parole. 

G E 0 R G I A 

S 441 (1994) 

“Sentence Reform Act of 1994“ 

provides mandatory life without 

parole for second “serious violent 

felony” conviction. Fourth 

conviction on any felony requires 

maximum sentence to be served 

before eligible for parole. 

“Three strikes” law, providing 

mandatory life without parole if 

in separate charge state proves 

two prior unrelated felony 

convictions. Court also has 

discretion (absent separate 

habitual charge) to sentence to life 

without parole if found subject to 

provisions. 

”Serious violent felonies” under “two strikes” are 

murder or felony murder, armed robbery, 

kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, 

aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual battery. 

INDIANA 

H 1063 (1994) 

Many serious felonies, including murder, battery, 

rape, sexual battery with a deadly weapon, child 

molesting, arson, robbery, burglary resulting in 

serious bodily injury or with deadly weapon, 

dealing drugs. 

7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATEnAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMES/OFFENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

KANSAS 

H 2788 (1994) 

Doubled sentences on sentencing 

guidelines grid for second and 

third "person felonies," at judge's 

discretion. 

"Three strikes" law strengthened 

existing Multiple Offender law, 

adding felony offenses for which 

third felony offense results in life 

without parole. 

"Person felonies" include many serious, violent 

crimes including various classifications of murder, 

sex crimes, battery, assault. 

All felonies that are crimes of violence, regardless 

of the term of imprisonment, and Dangerous 

Substances violations punishable by imprisonment 

for more than five years, as well as any other crime 

punishable by imprisonment for more than 12 

LOUISIANA 

H 18 (1994) 

- years. 

LOUISIANA 

H 2337 (1995 

amendment) 

With regard to sentences for 

second and subsequent offenses, 

extends the period of time 

elapsing from prior convictions 

for purposes of sentencing 

habitual offenders to 10 years. 

LOUISIANA Three strikes-type provision 

H 2410 (1995 

amendment) 

Life sentence applies to third felony or 

adjudication of delinquent for felony-grade 

violation of violent crime or controlled substances 

laws. If the third felony or either of the 2 prior 

felonies is a crime of violence, a controlled 

substances offense punishable by imprisonment 

more than 5 years or any other crime punishable 

by imprisonment for more than 12 years, the 

offender gets life without parole. "Crime of 

violence" is any 1 of 30 violent offenses, ranging 

fr6m first-degree murder to purse snatching. 

More than 20 "crimes of violence," including 

murder, rape, robbery, robbery with a deadly 

weapon, carjacking or armed carjacking, first and 

second degree sex offenses, arson, burglary, 

kidnapping, manslaughter, mayhem, maiming, use 

of handgun in commission of felony, attempt to 

commit any of the aforesaid, assault with intent to 

commit murder, rape, robbery, sexual offenses. 

requires offender convicted of 

third felony be sentenced to life 

under certain circumstances or to 

life without parole for third or 

fourth felony conviction under 

certain circumstances. 

~ 

MARYLAND Mandatory life sentence without 

H 1112 (1994) parole for fourth conviction of 

crime of violence, for which 

offender has served three separate 

prison terms. Third crime of 

violence after two such 

convictions and at least one 

prison term results in mandatory 

25 years. Second crime of 

violence following prison term 

results in mandatory 10 year 

sentence. Person sentenced under 

provisions who is 65 years old 

and served 15 years may petition 

for and be granted parole. 

8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATEYLAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMES/OFF'ENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

MONTANA Three strikes-type law, that 

S 66 (1995) 

Two strike applies to second conviction for 

deliberate homicide, aggravated kidnapping, 

certain sex crimes including sexual abuse of a 

child, ritual abuse of a minor. Three strike life 

without parole applies to mitigated deliberate 

homicide, aggravated assault, kidnapping, robbery, 

arson or to a conviction for any of the second list 

of offenses with 2 previous convictions for any of 

the first list of offenses. Previous offenses apply if 

less than 5 years has elapsed since previous 

offense or release from prison. 

people convicted of 2 specified 

violent offenses and 3 of other 

specified violent offenses (death 

penalty excepted) must be 

sentenced to life without 

possibility of parole or sentence 

credits, served in a prison, not a 

work release center, boot camp or 

nonsecure facility. 

NEVADA Three strikes-type measure, Applies to many violent felonies, including 

A 317 (1995) requiring habitually violent felon 

with 2 previous violent felonies 

be sentenced to life without 

possibility of parole, life with 

possibility of parole after 

minimum of 10 years served or 

to 25-year term with parole 

eligibility after 10 years. 

indicates that there are other felonies not listed, 

murder, robbery, kidnapping, aiding or abetting 

kidnapping, battery, abuse of children, arson, home 

invasion, others. 

NEW JERSEY "Persistent Offenders 

A 318 (1995) 

Third strike life without parole applies to criminal 

homicide, robbery, carjacking. Extended term 30 

years to life for third conviction with 1 or more 

prior first-degree or aggravated crime convictions; 

terms of 20 years to life if 2 or more previous 

convictions for crimes just named or seconddzgree crime; term of 10 to 20 years for third 

conviction for second-degree crime; and 5 to 10 

years or 3 to 5 years for third of combinations of 

lesser crimes. 

Accountability Act" is three 

strikes-type of law, that people 

convicted of the third of certain 

offenses shall be sentenced to life 

imprisonment without possibility 

orparole. Other extended terms-- 

30 years to life, 20 years to life, 5 

to 10 years, and 3 to 5 years-- 

apply to conviction of other 

specified offenses. 

NEW 

MEXICO 

S 73 AND 742, 

Chapter 24 

(1 994) 

NORTH 

CAROLINA third violent felony conviction 

H 39, Part 6 

Chapter 22, 

Extra Session "violent habitual felon." Separate D and E felonies. 

(1994) 

Mandatory life imprisonment, in 

addition to other term imposed, 

for third violent felony 

conviction. Parole eligibility after 

30 years of the life term served. 

Life without parole required upon 

and finding, under separate 

indictment, that offender is 

law (SB 2, also of Extra Session 

of 1994) provides for review after 

25 years served of life without 

parole sentence. 

Violent crimes including first and second degree 

murder; and several crimes resulting in great 

bodily harm, including shooting from a motor 

vehicle, kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration 

and robbery. 

Effective May 1, 1994, applies to 40 "violent 

felonies" enumerated in statute. After October 1, 

1994, when structured sentencing takes effect, 

provisions will apply to 47 Class A, B, B1, B2, C, 

9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATEnAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMES/OFFENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

NORTH Provides extended sentences for 

DAKOTA certain special, dangerous and 

H 1218 (1995) habitual offenders. If conviction 

offense is a Class A felony, court 

may impose up to life 

imprisonment; Class B felony, 

maximum 20 years; Class C 

felony, up to 10 years. 

Habitual offenders have been previously convicted 

of 2 felonies as adults; or convicted of offenses 

that seriously endanger the life of another person 

and the offender has previously been convicted of 

a similar offense; or the offender is especially 

dangerous because he used a firearm, dangerous 

weapon or destructive device in the commission of 

the offense or during flight. 

-- PENNSYL- Two and three strike-type habitual 

VANIA offender measure, providing that 

H 93 (1995) second or subsequent offenders 

convicted of first-degree felony 

may be sentenced to fixed term of 

not more than 20 years; second 

degree will serve fixed term of 

not more than 10 years; and third 

degree not more than 7 years, also 

fixed. Violent offenders who 

have one previous violent crime 

conviction and upon finding 

offender is a “high-risk dangerous 

offender,” must serve at least 10- 

year fixed sentence; and a third 

violent offense results in serving a 

25-year fixed sentence. Requires 

mandatory 5-year sentence 

enhancement during which 

offender not eligible for parole, 

probation, work release or 

furlough, for violent crime 

involving use of a firearm, or for 

violent offenses committed on 

public transportation. 

“High-risk, violent, dangerous offenders” who 

serve minimum 10- or 25-year sentences are those 

with convictions for murder; voluntary 

manslaughter; rape; involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse; robbery; arson; kidnapping, 

aggravated assault in which the offender 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes 

serious bodily injury; some burglary offenses; 

conspiracy or attempt to commit those offenses. 

Two strike and three strike violent offender 

provisions apply to convictions within 7 years of 

the instance of the offense, not counting time in 

prison, other detention or probation or parole. 

10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATEnAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMES/OFFENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

“No parole offenses” are Class A, B or C felonies 

including many serious, violent crimes punishable 

by 20 years or more in prison. Life without parole 

sentence applies to “most serious offenses,” 

including many serious violent felonies, drug 

trafficking, some bribery, embezzlement, certain 

accessory and attempt offense. 

SOUTH Has “two strikes” and “truth” 

CAROLINA features. Creates, defines “no 

H 3096 (1995) parole offense.” Requires that 

80% of sentence must be served 

before eligibility for work release 

and 85% for early release, 

discharge or community 

supervision. “No parole 

offenders,” must serve up to 2 

years community supervision 

following prison term. People 

with one or more prior, serious 

offense convictions must be 

sentenced to life without 

possibility of parole. 

TENNESSEE 

H 2759 (1994) 

Life sentence without parole if 

one is found to be a repeat violent 

offender. A violent offender is 

one who is convicted of a Class A 

felony or Class B felony after July 

1, 1994 with at least two prior 

Class A or B felony convictions 

where prior periods of 

incarceration have been served. A 

violent offender is also defined as 

one who is convicted of a Class A 

felony after July 1, 1994 with at 

legst one prior Class A felony 

conviction in which a period of 

incarceration was served. 

Many Class B felonies including murder, 

aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, 

aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated 

sexual battery, aggravated burglary, rape of a 

child, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated 

sexual exploitation of a minor, or any attempt to 

commit said felonies. Class A felonies include 

murder, or any of the Class B felonies that result in 

serious bodily harm. 

TENNESSEE Expands list of violent felonies Includes many violent felonies. 

H 1778 (1995 

amendment) 

which if committed by persons 

with a prior conviction for certain 

violent felonies, will be sentenced 

to life without possibility of 

parole. 

11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATEnAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMES/OFFENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

UTAH 

H 46 (1995) 

With some three strikes features, 

measure provides enhanced 

penalties for offenders court 

determines to be habitually 

violent. Second- or third-degree 

felony treated as first degree; 

penalty for first degree remains 

with no probation eligibility. 

Board of Parole is to consider it 

an aggravating factor that the 

convicted person is a habitual 

violent offender. 

"Habitual violent offender" is person convicted of 

a violent felony who has at least 2 prior 

convictions for any felony over the previous 10 

years and has been incarcerated, on probation or 

parole, or the subject of an unexecuted felony 

arrest warrant. Many violent crimes apply, 

including criminal homicide, aggravated assault, 

aggravated kidnapping, rapes and other sexual 

assault crimes, sexual exploitation of a minor, 

aggravated burglary, others. 

VERMONT 

S 51 (1995) 

Three strikes-type law provides 

that fourth felony conviction may 

result in imprisonment up to and 

including life. Third felony crime 

of violence shall have sentence 

from imprisonment up to and 

including life, with no probation 

eligibility or suspended sentence, 

early release or until expiration of 

minimum sentence. 

About a dozen crimes apply under the violent 

career criminal provisions, including arson causing 

death, assault and robbery with a dangerous 

weapon or causing bodily injury, aggravated 

assault, murder, manslaughter, several sexual 

assault crimes, first-degree aggravated domestic 

assault. 

VIRGINIA "Three strikes" law, providing 

H 273 (1994) mandatory life without parole for 

offender convicted of third felony 

involving designated acts of 

viblence. Those sentenced under 

this law who reach 65 years of 

age and have served five years 

may petition parole board for 

conditional release. 

"Acts of violence" include first and second degree 

murder, mob-related felonies, kidnapping or 

abduction, robbery and carjacking, sexual assault 

felonies, conspiracy to commit any of the above. 

VIRGINIA Amends three strikes law to 

S 940 (1995 require that three felony sex 

amendment) offenses are ineligible for the old- attempts. 

age release possibility for life 

imprisonment. Second time sex 

offenders subject to new penalty: 

Class 2 felony for certain sex 

crimes. 

Felony sex offenses include rape, sexual battery, 

aggravated sexual battery, forcible sodomy, 

WASHING- Provides life imprisonment 

TON 

Initiative 593 "persistent offenders" convicted many crimes against children. 

(1993) of third "serious felony." 

More than 20 serious felonies, including any Class 

without possibility of parole for A felony and any felony with a deadly weapon; 

12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATELAW NATURE OF THE LAW CRIMEWOFFENDERS APPLICABLE 

(YEAR /SENTENCE 

PASSED) 

WISCONSIN 

1993 S 781, Act 

289 (1994) felony“ convictions, receives 

“Persistent repeater” who has had 

two previous, separate “serious 

mandatory life sentence without 

parole. exploitation, abduction. 

“Serious felonies” include murder, manslaughter, 

battery and aggravated battery, mayhem, vehicle 

theft, robbery, and many crimes against children 

including sexual assault, physical abuse, sexual 

The broadest Three Strikes law, by far, is in California. California’s list of offenses 

$ -- 

eligible to count as strikes includes 21 “violent” felonies and 25 “serious” felonies (with some 

overlap between these two lists). If an offender already has one strike and then commits any of 

the state’s 500 felonies, the sentence is automatically doubled. With two strikes, any additional 

felony conviction sends the offender to prison for 25 years to life. The law requires a state 

prison sentence in all cases, restricts prison custody (“good time”) credits from 50% of the 

sentence to 20%, and prohibits plea bargaining. 

By August 1998, California had sentenced had 40,511 offenders under the two- and 

three-strike provisions of its law, 36,043 of whom were sentenced under the “two strikes” 

component [Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy (CECP), 19981. Together, second- and 

T, 

third-strike inmates made up about one quarter of California’s inmate population at the end of 

1997 (CECP, 1998). As of late August 1998, Washington, the first state to pass Three Strikes, 

had sentenced a total of approximately 121 third-strike offenders, and three second-strike 

offenders, under its much more restrictive law, which went into effect a year earlier than 

California’s (CECP, 1998).’ 

’ By October 1999, the number of offenders sentenced in California under two- and three-strikes had grown to 

nearly 50,000 (California Legislative Analyst’s Office 1999). In Washington, the number of Three Strikes offenders 

was 145 by October 1999 (Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Persistent Offender Sentence Report, 

1 0199). 

13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Most states have relatively narrow laws and have not sentenced many prisoners under 

Three Strikes. The laws of most states limit strikes-eligible offenses to a small number of violent 

felonies, and require three strikes to trigger a mandatory sentence such as life without parole, or 

25 years to life. In some states, the law can be triggered by more or fewer strikes. Maryland’s 

law, for example, mandates life without parole when an offender accrues four strikes from a 

short list of violent felonies, and furthermore requires that separate prison terms were served for 

the first three offenses. Georgia’s law actually stipulates mandatory life without parole after the 

second violent felony conviction from a list of specified offenses. However, the number of 

offenses covered by Georgia’s law is far fewer than those covered by California’s (Clark, Austin, 

and Henry, 1997). By the middle of 1998, three states which had implemented Three Strikes in 

1994 or 1995 had not sentenced any offenders under the law. Twelve other states had a dozen or 

fewer Three Strikes convictions, and the federal system had sentenced only 35 offenders under 

“Three Strikes” (Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy, 1998). The number of habitual 

offender convictions in each state and the federal system is summarized in Table 2 below. State- 

- 

to-state disparitiesclearly exist in the application of Three Strikes, 

14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 2: Number of “Three-Strikes”/Habitual Offender Convictions by State as of August, 

1998 (Source: Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy, 1998) 

State’ # of Convictions State # of Convictions State # of Convictions 

MT 0 WI 3 IN 38 

TJT 0 VT 4 FL 116 

VA 0 MD 59 WA 121 

AK’O 1 NC 5 NV 304l’ 

CT 1 TN 5 sc 825’’ 

NM 1 NJ 6 GA 942’’ 

co 2 m 12 CA 40,51114 

PA 315 Federal 35 

. .- 

Another factor that affects the impact of the implementation of a Three Strikes law is the 

extent to which the new law differs from preexisting or concurrently-existing sentencing 

legislation. Many states already had habitual-offender statutes before Three Strikes was 

introduced, and in some states, the severity of Three Strikes is not substantially greater than that 

of other existing laws. Indiana, for example, already had a law requiring enhanced sentencing 

for a third felony conviction; the new Three Strikes law required that the mandatory sentence be 

life without parole. Louisiana’s preexisting law required a sentence of life without parole for the 

third conviction from a specified list of violent and drug felonies, or for a fourth felony 

conviction if at least two of the prior convictions were on the specified list. The new law was 

c 

* Data not provided by Louisiana authorities. 

Io Alaska is considered a Three Strikes state in the study that serves as the source for this table, but other studies 

cited in this report, including the report by the National Conference of State Legislatures which is used to categorize 

Three Strikes states in the subsequent analyses in this paper, do not consider Alaska a Three Strikes state. 

Nevada has two categories of habitual offender statutes, “greater” and “lesser,” which provide sentences of no 

parole, life with parole possible after 25 years served, or 25 years in prison with parole possible after 10 years. By 

August 1998, 164 inmates had been sentenced to the “greater” category and 140 to the “lesser” category. 

By October 1997, South Carolina had sentenced 13 inmates under “two strikes” and one inmate under “three 

strikes” to life without parole. There were also 81 1 inmates sentenced to 20 or more years without parole under a 

new policy that was part of the state’s 1995 Crime Bill. 

l3 Georgia’s mandatory minimums law, implemented in 1994, includes “One-Strike” and ‘Two-Strike” provisions 

for a list of crimes known as the “seven deadly sins.” By March 31, 1998, there were 57 inmates serving life 

without parole for a second strike, and 885 inmates serving 20 years or more for a first strike (Center for an 

Effective Crime Policy, 1998). 

under the three-strikes provision. 

Maryland’s law is a four-strikes law, requiring separate prison terms served for the first three crimes. 

By July 30, 1998, California had convicted 36,043 offenders under the two-strikes provision of its law, and 4,468 14 

15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
actually almost exactly the same, except that the four-strike provision would be invoked if any 

one of the prior convictions was on the list of specified offenses. California actually already had 

a law which required a sentence of life without parole for 20 years for a third violent felony 

conviction if separate sentences were served for the first two offenses, but the 1994 law greatly 

expanded the extent of repeat offender legislation by increasing the number of eligible offenses 

and decreasing the number of strikes necessary to trigger the law (Clark, Austin, and Henry, 

1997). .- 

Background on “Truth in Sentencing” 

Truth in Sentencing, another popular sentencing policy, requires that certain sentenced 

offenders (usually violent offenders) spend a fixed percentage of their sentences - usually 85 

percent, but sometimes as much as 100 percent, and occasionally less than 85 percent -behind 

bars. These policies are intended to limit the common practice of releasing prisoners as a result 

of “good time” credits long before their sentences are complete, or freeing them on parole or 

other types of discretionary release. In the past, these practices have greatly reduced time served 

e< 

by prisoners. For example, violent offenders released from prison in 1994 had served an average 

of only 46 percent of their sentences, up slightly from 44 percent and 42 percent in 1993 and 

1992, respectively (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal 

Justice Statistics 1996). 

The process of TIS’S passage was not as dramatic or exciting as that for Three Strikes. It 

began in 1992 with two reports authored by then-Attorney General William P. Barr. Barr set 

Pennsylvania data were only available through 1996. 

16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
forth a series of policy proposals in a report entitled Combating Violent Crime: 24 

Recommendations to Strengthen Criminal Justice. Barr outlined four objectives: 

(1) providing more resources for law enforcement, 

(2) reforming the state and federal criminal justice systems, 

(3) focusing resources on high-impact operations targeting the most hard-core offenders, 

and 

(4) coordinating law enforcement and social programs to reinforce each other. 

The policy proposals were clearly set forth and highlighted some alarming statistics from the 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, including the facts that the average criminal offender was serving 

only 37 percent of his sentence, and that 30 percent of murders in the US were committed by 

people on bail, probation, or parole (Barr, 1992b). After noting that the federal system already 

had a requirement since 1984 that federal prisoners serve at least 85 percent of their sentences, 

Barr recommended that this system be implemented at the state level as we11.I6 A second report, 

entitled The Case for More Incarceration, was released by Barr on October 28, 1992. This 

report made three basic points: “First, prisons wo;k. Second, we need more of them. Third, 

inadequate prison space costs money” (Barr, 1992~). The Barr reports had both substantive and 

symbolic impact. Despite subsequent criticisms of them regarding their empirical findings, the 

statistics and anecdotes contained therein were nonetheless frequently cited in Congressional 

proceedings regarding the 1994 Crime Bill. 

The policy proposals drafted by Barr in support of Truth in Sentencing surfaced at a time 

when the political environment and level of problem awareness were highly favorable to the 

passage of such a measure. In 1993, George Allen had been elected governor of Virginia in a 

l6 Less than 10 percent of ail prisoners in the U.S. are housed in federal prisons, while the rest are in state-operated 

facilities. 

17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
landslide, with crime as one of the central issues of his campaign. Specifically, he had promised 

to abolish parole if elected. Following his successful campaign, Allen appointed former US 

Attorneys General Richard Cullen and William Barr to head a Commission on Parole Abolition 

and Sentencing Reform, which created a plan which proposed to require violent offenders to 

serve at least 85 percent of their sentences, double the average time served by violent offenders, 

increase the time served by repeat offenders by 300 to 700 percent, and limit good-time credits. 

The price tag for this plan was hefty - $850 million, a $200 million increase over preexisting 

expenditures. However, the plan garnered a great deal of attention in the media and in the 103rd 

C~ngress.'~ This plan and the 85 percent benchmark from the preexisting 1984 federal statute 

provided a framework for legislation to apply to the states. 

Interest groups also played a role in creating pressure on the 103rd Congress to pass TIS. 

One major advocate was the Safe Streets Alliance, a Washington, D.C. lobbying organization 

whose primary objective is to promote TIS laws nationwide. This organization was involved in 

the Polly Klaas murder trial, which had also played a role in Three Strikes passage, as described 

above. 

By 1994, Truth in Sentencing, in the form of a requirement that violent offenders serve 

85 percent of their sentences, had been passed in Virginia and Washington, and included in the 

Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing section of the Violent Crime Control and 

Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (generally known as the 1994 Crime Bill). 

l7 Information in this paragraph and the next was obtained from Politics and Precedence: The Legislative History of 

Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing in the I994 Crime Bill and I995 Amendments, an 

unpublished report drafted by Albert Yoon and Peter Greenwood of the RAND Corporation. 

1s 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
TIS laws requiring sentenced offenders to serve 85 percent or more of their sentences are 

currently in place in 27 states (General Accounting Office, 1998)18, and several other states have 

TIS laws in place with lower requirements for percentages of time served (National Conference 

of State Legislatures, 1997). These laws are listed and described in Table 3. 

Table 3: Truth in Sentencing Laws in the States, 1993-199719 

r* 

I 

STATE 

Alaska 

H 38 (1996) 

DESCRIPTION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING LAW 

Eliminates good time for offenders serving mandatory 99-year sentences and provides 

that those offenders may apply just once for modification or reduction of sentence, after 

serving one-half of the mandatory or 30 years. Also adds, for purposes of considering 

prior convictions in imposing “three strikes” sentences, convictions in another 

jurisdiction for offenses having similar elements to applicable serious felonies. 

Truth in Sentencing Act requires the court to state and include in the sentencing report 

information on the minimum term that the defendant is expected to actually serve prior 

to release or parole. 

Alaska 

S 67 (1997) 

Arizona 

(1993) 

Requires inmates to serve 85 percent of their sentence, with 15 percent reduction 

possible through good behavior credits. Despite the lack of discretionary parole-release 

decision, offenders sentenced to prison are supervised upon release for a period of 15 

percent of the sentence imposed. 

Arkansas 

S 820 (1995) 

California 

(1994) 

Offenders convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, rape and 

causing a catastrophe must serve 70% of sentence. 

Requires offenders in prison for violent felonies to serve 85 percent of the sentence 

imposed. Limits worktime credits to 15 percent of the sentence. 

~ 

l8 The states which had implemented Truth in Sentencing by 1997, requiring violent offenders to serve at least 85% 

of their sentences, were Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 

Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 

Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington (U.S. GAO, 1998). In 

addition, at least four more states have de facto Truth in Sentencing laws; that is, while there is no law that violent 

offenders must serve at least 85 percent of their sentences, these additional states do so in practice. 

Sources: National Conference Of State Legislatures, “1993 - 1997 State Laws Related To ‘Truth In Sentencing”’ 

(1997), General Accounting Office, Truth in Sentencing: Availability of Federal Grants Influenced Laws in Some 

States ( 1998), state applications to Corrections Program Office for funding through Violent Offender Incarceration / 

Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants. For states marked with asterisks (*), source of law’s description is 

application for Violent Offender Incarceration / Truth-in-Sentencing incentive grants submitted to the Corrections 

Program Office (Department of Justice) for FY 1996 (unpublished). 

19 

19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
-- 

STATE DESCRIPTION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING LAW 

Connecticut 

S 927 (1995) 

Requires certain offenders serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed and directs the 

parole board to adopt guidelines and procedures for classifying people as violent 

offenders not limited to the elements of the offense or offenses for which they are 

convicted. Applies to offenders eligible for parole who used, attempted or threatened use 

of force against another person. (Previous law makes a capital felony, murder, or any 

offense committed with a firearm at or near school ineligible for parole.) 

Applies minimum sentence to habitual criminals convicted of a fourth felony, when the 

fourth conviction is for any one of more than 50 designated “violent felonies.” 

Authorizes sentencing courts to require that a specified portion of a prison term be 

served without any form of early release, good time, furlough, work release, supervised 

custody or any other reduction of sentence. 

The Prison Release Reoffender Punishment Act requires mandatory minimum sentences 

and that 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence be served for offenders who commit 

a qualifying offense within five years of release from prison. Offenses include weapon 

use in a criminal offense and various crimes against children. 

“Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act” requires offenders to serve a minimum of 85% of the 

sentence imposed, with gain time limited accordingly. State prisoners sentenced to life 

imprisonment, including for capital felonies, will be incarcerated for the rest of their 

natural lives. All prison sentence offenses are affected. 

Establishes eight-year revision cycle for crime and other public safety statutes and 

guiding principles for justice information technology. Redefines habitual and violent 

felony offenders to include felonies committed while serving prison sentence and limits 

gain time for such offenders to ensure 85 percent of sentence served. Also limits gain 

time for felonies involving weapon or firearm; and includes drug, sex offender, juvenile 

provisions. 

‘‘Officer Evelyn Gort and All Fallen Officers Career Criminal Act” provides three 

strikes-type penalties and includes 85% requirement for some. “Habitual felony 

offenders” have had 2 or more felonies and get terms from life to not exceeding 10 

years; “habitual violent felony offenders” have had 1 or more previous violent crime 

convictions and get from life, with no release eligibility for 10 years, to I0-year 

sentences with no release eligibility for 5 years; “violent career criminals” have been 

convicted as an adult 3 or more times for violent crimes and get from life, with no 

release eligibility, to mandatory minimum of 10 years. “Violent career criminal,” 

established in a separate proceeding, “gain time” limited to require 85% of sentence 

served. Courts must give written reasons for not imposing statutory sentences, 

addressing protection of the public. 

GA criminal code section 17-10-6.lrequires that any offender convicted of murder, rape, 

armed robbery, kidnapping, aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, or 

aggravated child molestation is required to serve 100 percent of the court-imposed 

sentence. Offenders convicted of voluntary manslaughter, attempted rape, or aggravated 

battery are required to serve 50 percent of their sentences for a first offense, and 75 

percent for a second offense before parole consideration. 

Delaware 

H 507 (1996) 

Delaware 

S 131 (1997) 

Florida 

H 1371 (1997) 

Florida 

H 687 (1995) 

Florida 

S 156 (1996) 

Florida 

S 168 (1995) 

Georgia 

(1994)” 

20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATE DESCRIPTION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING LAW 

Illinois 

s 187 (1995) 

Limits good conduct credits to require offenders serve at least 85% of sentence imposed. 

Also creates Illinois Truth-in-Sentencing Commission, charged with facilitating and 

monitoring implementation of 85% of sentence measure. 85% applies broadly to 

serious, violent crimes. Offenders imprisoned for first-degree murder receive no good 

conduct credit and will serve 100% of sentence. 

Requires persons to serve twice the maximum term for a “sexually predatory” serious or 

aggravated misdemeanor offense when they have one prior such conviction, and a 

mandatory ten year sentence and serve at least 85 percent of the sentence if they have 

two or more prior such convictions. Requires twice the maximum term or 25 years, 

whichever is greater, with sentence reductions limited so that no less than 85 percent of 

the sentence is served, for conviction of a “sexually predatory” felony. Also requires up 

to two years of community supervision (parole or work release) for sexually predatory 

offenders, as defined in the act to broadly include sexually violent or abusive crimes. 

Requires that persons imprisoned for forcible felonies serve 100 percent of the maximum 

sentence term, without eligibility for parole or work release. Also directs legislative 

council to establish sentencing task force. 

K.S.A. 21-4706 (a) requires that “for crimes committed on or after July 1, 1993, the 

sentences of imprisonment shall represent the time a person shall actually serve, subject 

to a reduction of up to 15% of the primary sentence for good time as authorized by the 

law.” (Provision became effective April 20, 1995.) The preexisting Sentencing 

Guidelines Act, which went into effect July 1 1993, limited good time credits to 20 

percent. However, certain crimes, including first degree murder, second degree murder, 

and treason, are considered ‘‘off-grid” crimes which are not subject to sentencing 

guidelines but carry a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for good time. 

Kansas does not have a statutory definition that equates a certain number of years with a 

life sentence. Offenders sentenced to life are eligible for parole consideration after 

serving a mandatory minimum of 25 or 40 years (determined at sentencing) for first 

degree murder, 15 years for felony murd‘er, or 10 years for second degree murder. 

Requires certain offenders serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed before being 

eligible for parole. Life sentences must be commuted to fixed term of years to be 

eligible for parole consideration. 

Changes computation of good time for prisoners. Sets rate of 30 days for every 30 days 

good behavior and self improvement for some prisoners; for others convicted of a crime 

of violence the rate is three days for every 17 days good behavior. 

Provides set sentences that must be served, without benefit of probation, parole or 

suspension of sentence and with good conduct limitations. Rape, 25 years; sexual 

battery, 10 years; aggravated sexual battery, 15 years. 

Iowa 

H 2316 (1996) 

Iowa 

S 2114 (1996) 

Kansas” 

(1993,1995) 

Louisiana 

H 146 (1995) 

Louisiana 

H 1915 (1997) 

Louisiana 

S 1418 (1995) 

21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
~- 

STATE DESCRIPTION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING LAW 

Maine 

S 201 (1995) 

Reduces statutory meritorious good time to ensure that the term of imprisonment 

imposed closely approximates that which will be served. Applies to all crimes and 

prisoners. 

A person convicted and sentenced for the commission of any of the Part I violent 

offenses2’ is not eligible for parole until the person has served “the minimum term 

imposed by the court less an allowance for disciplinary credits.” These minimums, 

according to the state’s application for federal VOYTIS grants, “exceed the 85% 

threshold identified in the Federal Crime Bill.” 

Michigan 

SB 40,§ 33b 

(1994) 

Minnesota* Under statute 244.101, all felons sentenced to prison are required to serve the full term 

set by the court at sentencing. For crimes committed on or after August 1, 1993, all 

“good time” was abolished. The amount of time the offender serve may be extended for 

violations of disciplinary rules or conditions of supervised release. 

Earned-time credits are limited to require that inmates serve at least 85% of prison term. 

Having served 85% and once released, inmates are placed under earned-release 

supervision until expiration of the full term. Inmates serving life sentences, except those 

imprisoned for life for capital murder, may petition for conditional release after age 65 

and at least 15 years served. The law also establishes a reconstituted state parole board, 

and on July 1,2000, transfers those duties, responsibilities to the Department of 

Corrections, eliminating the parole board, as such. All prison inmates affected. 

Requires certain categories of repeat or dangerous felony offenders to serve 50 percent, 

80 percent, or 85 percent of a sentence. Retains parole release after those minimum 

sentences are served. 

._ (1992) 

Mississippi 

S 2175 (1995) 

Missouri 

(1994) 

Montana 

H 356 (1995) 

Simplifies and calls for phasing out all good time by 1997, pending recommendations of 

a sentencing commission, established in the legislation. Meanwhile, actual time served 

not substantially affected. Applies to all prison inmates. 

Requires a fixed, minimum term of 85 percent of sentence for first and second-degree 

violent crimes, plus a three to five year period of parole supervision. Violent crimes 

include those causing death, serious bodily injury, or use or threatened immediate use of 

a deadly weapon. Also includes any aggravated sexual assault or such assault using or 

threatening physical force. 

New Jersey 

S 855 (1997) 

2o part I violent offenses, as defined by the FBI, are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larcenytheft, and motor vehicle theft. 

22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATE DESCRIPTION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING LAW 

New York 

S 5281 (1995) 

Sentencing Reform Act includes truth, 85%-type provisions and habitual offender 

measures. Also changes previous law for second felony offenders. Establishes 

determinate sentences under which offenders are not eligible for discretionary release 

and may not be paroled prior to serving six-sevenths of the set term. Determinate 

sentences are imposed on violent felony offenders with a prior felony conviction. Also 

creates commission to study the effects of the Sentencing Reform Act. The six-sevenths 

of sentence determinate sentences apply to Class B violent felony offenders’who must 

serve 8 to 25 years; Class C violent felony offenders who are to serve 5 to 15 years; 

Class D violent felony offenders who must serve 3 to 7 years; and Class E violent felony 

offenses, which carry set sentences of 2 to 4 years. The parole sentence provisions for 

second nonviolent felony offenders applies to specified offenses including, but not 

limited to, criminal mischief, grand larceny, forgery, some controlled substance felony 

offenses. 

-- 

North 

Carolina* 

(1993) 

North Dakota 

H 1089 (1997) 

Per N.C. General Statutes, Criminal Procedures Act Q 15A-1340.13 (c) and (d), all felony 

offenders are required to serve 100 percent of the court’s minimum sentence, which is 

determined by the state’s sentencing guidelines. Maximum term is also set at the time 

of sentencing. Good time credits cannot reduce the minimum term. 

Requires that violent offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole 

will serve a term computed as life expectancy based on a recognized mortality table, 

without parole eligibility until that requirement is met. 

Requires imprisoned, violent offenders must serve 85 % of sentence. Violent offenders 

include those convicted of murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, gross 

sexual imposition, robbery, burglary or attempts to commit the offenses. 

Establishes new framework for felony sentencing, sets principles to guide courts in 

imposing sentences and specifies presumptions for imposing prison terms for certain 

felonies. Some mandatory minimum sentences required under law, including for repeat 

violent offenders on whom the court must impose a prison term from the range 

authorized for the offense, which cannot be reduced by judicial release, earned credit or 

any other provision for release. Reclassifies drug trafficking and possession offenses. 

Specifies financial sanctions, residential and nonresidential prison alternatives. Sets 

sentencing procedure and sentence appeals. Establishes sentence of life imprisonment 

without parole as additional alternative to the death penalty in applicable cases. 

Truth in Sentencing act requires that 85 percent of the sentence be served by serious, 

violent offenders. Non-violent offenders are required to serve 75 percent of sentence, 

some in community corrections, which is expanded locally under the act. Establishes 

sentencing commission to review impact of legislation, and so establishes planning 

process for future prison bed needs, including selection process for private prisons. 

Creates mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes. Extends to 25 years the period 

of time that a person sentenced to life imprisonment for aggravated murder must serve 

before parole board considers rehabilitation, release. Includes many violent crimes, 

including murder, attempt or conspiracy to commit murder, manslaughter, assault, 

kidnapping, rape, sodomy, unlawful sexual penetration, others. 

North Dakota 

H 1218 (1995) 

Ohio 

S 2 (1995) 

Oklahoma 

H 1213 (1997) 

Oregon 

H 3439 (1995) 

23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATE 

Pennsylvania* 

(1911) 

DESCRIPTION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING LAW 

Part 1 offenders are required to serve 100 percent of their minimum sentences as 

established under the state’s guidelines or mandatory sentences. Pennsylvania has no 

good time provisions. The PA Board of Probation and Parole, which has authority over 

all parole decisions, has no authority to release an offender prior to completion of the 

minimum sentence (releases can be made before completion of the maximum sentence). 

A life prisoner can only be paroled with a commutation from the Governor. 

Creates “no parole offenses.” Requires that 80% of sentence must be served before 

eligibility for work release and 85% for early release, discharge or community 

supervision. “No parole offenders, ”must serve up to 2 years community supervision 

following prison term. “No parole offenses” are Class A, B or C felonies including 

many serious, violent crimes punishable by 20 years or more in prison. Life without 

parole sentence applies to “most serious offenses,” including many serious violent 

felonies, drug trafficking, some bribery, embezzlement, certain accessory and attempt 

offenses. 

south 

Carolina 

H 3096 (1995) 

-- 

South Dakota 

S 273 (1996) 

Eliminates good time and establishes minimum sentence that must be served before 

parole eligibility for each felony class. Number of felony convictions is a factor in 

sentence length. Less serious offenses and offenders may serve 25% of sentence before 

parole eligibility; more serious and frequent offenders will serve 75 and 100% of 

sentence. Requires DOC to keep conduct record of each inmate which can be used in 

considering parole release, but without sentence credits related to conduct. 

Eliminates release eligibility for persons convicted of certain crimes and limits sentence 

credits to require at least 85% of sentence is served. Applies to 11 violent, often 

aggravated, crimes including murder, rape, rape of a child, kidnapping, robbery, sexual 

battery, arson, child abuse. 

Aggravated offenders must serve 50 percent of their sentences or 30 years, whichever is 

Tennessee 

H 1762 (1995) 

Texas (1993) 

Utah* 

(1985)*’ 

Sentences are imposed within a statutorily defined range and “the sentence and judgment 

of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate tern of not less than the minimum and not 

to exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular crime” (Utah Code Ann. 

4 77-18-5). The same ranges are used by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Utah 

Code Ann. 4 77-27-9). 

No more than 15 percent earned early release time can be earned by offenders sentenced 

for the following offenses: Murder 1 or 2, Homicide by Abuse, Rape 1 or 2, Rape of a 

Child 1 or 2, Child Molestation 1, Kidnapping 1, Assault 1, Assault of a Child 1, and any 

non-sex offense with a finding of sexual motivation. For offenses committed on or after 

December 2, 1993, the following mandatory sentences must be served before the 

remainder of the sentence becomes eligible for a maximum of 15 percent early release 

time: Murder 1,20 years; Rape 1,5 years; Assault 1,5 years. 

Washington 

(1990) 

2’ Utah was listed as a TIS state in the 1998 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, but not in the 1997 National 

Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) report. Utah is an indeterminate sentencing state (its sentencing guidelines 

have voluntarily been adopted by the Utah Board of District Court Judges, the Utah Judicial Council, and the Utah 

Board of Pardons and Parole, but they are not in statute. The state applied and qualified for federal VOVTIS 

funding by demonstrating that its Part I offenders were serving not less than 85% of their prison terms. 

24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
STATE 

Virginia 

(1994 special 

session) 

DESCRIPTION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING LAW 

Abolished parole and good conduct allowance for anyone convicted of a felony. Permits 

the court to add a post-release supervision term to the imposed prison sentence. 

A trend toward passage of Truth in Sentencing laws began around 1994.22 In that year, 

the federal government first offered substantial material incentives to states to encourage them to 

pass Truth in Sentencing law$ Under-Title 11, Subtitle A of the Violent Crime Control and Law 

Enforcement Act of 1994, as amended (“the Crime Act”), funding was authorized by Congress to 

be used in an effort to increase prison and jail capacity to insure the incapacitation of violent 

offenders for a substantial proportion of their sentences. The Crime Act included authorizations 

of about $10 billion from the federal budget to the states for each of two programs, Violent 

Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing, from 1995 through 2000. The intent of the TIS 

appropriation was to encourage states to require violent offenders to serve 85% or more of their 

sentences.23 

- 

Table 5 dilplays the findings of a 1998 rgport by the U.S. General Accounting Office 

(GAO) that these grants were a key factor in the implementation of TIS legislation in four states, 

and a partial factor in the adoption of TIS in eleven more states (U.S. GAO, 1998). 

22 Some states, such as Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Washington, already had TIS-type laws on their books. 

23 In order to receive TIS money, a state is required to demonstrate that it implemented or enacted a TIS law 

requiring violent criminals to serve at least 85% of their sentences, or that as a result of TIS laws, prisoners 

sentenced for Part I violent crimes serve an average of 85% or more of their sentences, or (in indeterminate 

sentencing states) at least 85% of the term established under sentencing guidelines or at least 85% of the maximum 

allowed under sentence imposed by court. Eligibility requirements for various levels of VOI funding include 

demonstration of increases in sentence length and average sentences served by criminals, decreases in violent crime 

rates, and other indications of increasing toughness with violent criminals (Office of Justice Programs, Corrections 

Program Office, 1995, 1996). All of the states qualified for some funds, and about half of the states were able to 

meet all levels of these requirements. 

25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 5: Influence of Federal TIS Grants on State Laws24 

Grants Grants Grants 

- Year Date nota apartial akey 

State passed effective factor factor factor 

Arizona 

California 

Connecticut 

Delaware 

Florida 

Georgia 

Iowa 

Kansas 

Louisiana 

Maine 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Mississippi 

Missouri 

New Jersey 

New York 

North Carolina 

North Dakota 

Ohio 

Oklahoma 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 

South Dakota 

Tennessee 

Utah .-_ 

Virginia 

Washington 

1993 

1994 

1995 

1989 

1995 

1994 

1996 

1992 

1996 

1995 

1994 

1992 

1995 

1994 

1997 

1995 

1993 

1995 

1995 

1997 

1995 

191 1 

1995 

1995 

1985 

1994 

1990 

1/1/94 

912 1/94 

7/1/96 

6/30/90 

101 1/95 

1/1/95 

7/1/96 

7/1/93 

1/1/97 

101 1/95 

6/27/94 

8/1/93 

7/1/95 

8/28/94 

6/9/97 

10/1/95 

101 1/94 

8/1/95 

7/1/96 

7/1/98 

4/1/95 

191 1 

1/1/96 

7/1/95 

12/1/85 

1/1/95 

7/1/90 

Given the enormous amount of money involved in the TIS grants, the potential changes 

in prison and jail populations, and the delays in court case processing that may ensue from the 

policy’s implementation, it is important to use available data and methods to examine the 

consequences of TIS on the criminal justice system. Where possible, it is also informative to 

compare the effects of Three Strikes and TIS, two sentencing policies with similar objectives, but 

Source: Truth in Sentencing: Availability of Federal Grants Influenced Laws in Some States, GAO Report (1998). 24 

26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
whose passage, implementation, and approaches to the problem of violent crime have significant 

differences. 

Figure 1 below summarizes the presence of Three Strikes and TIS laws in the states as of 

1997. 

Figure 1: Which States Have Three Strikes and TIS?*’ 

Q- .-.I .D 

3 Strikes only 

TIS only 

both 3 Strikes and TIS (14) 

-=a&. 

”Three Strikes states based on National Conference of State Legislatures, “Three Strikes” Legislation Update, 

December 1997, TIS states based on GAO (1998). 

27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Current Trends in Incarceration 

Continuing increases in toughness in sentencing and crime control strategies appear to be 

taking a heavy toll on prison populations. Figure 2 shows the trend in incarceration rates 

throughout the past two decades, from 1978 through 1997. The felony incarceration rate has 

grown each year throughout this period. The prison and jail population reached 1.7 million in 

- -- 1996, up approximately 7 percent per year since 1990 (Butterfield, Sept. 28, 1997). 

FIGURE 2: U.S. Incarceration Rates Have Been on the Rise 

State Prisoners Serving Sentences over 1 year, per 100,000 residents, 1978 - 199726 

450 

400 

350 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 

On the other hand, as shown in Table 6, the rate of growth of the US incarceration rate, 

which fluctuated from year to year, decelerated from 1992-93 to 1996, rising only slightly in 

26 Source: BJS, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. 

28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
1997. The slowdown of prison growth could be the result of various factors, including policy 

changes, demographic changes, declines in crime, or prison capacity limitations. 

Table 6: Rates of Incarceration Rate Growth, US Total 

Year Rate Year Rate 

1977-78 

1978-79 

1979-80 

1980-81 

1981-82 

1982-83 

1983-84 

1984-85 

1985-96 

1986-87 

2.3% 

1.5% 

2.4% 

10.1% 

10.7% 

4.8% 

7.2% 

7.6% 

6.4% 

4i9% 

1987-88 

1988-89 

1989-90 

1990-91 

1991-92 

1992-93 

1993-94 

1994-95 

1995-96 

1996-97 

6.6% 

11.7% 

8.5% 

5.2% 

6.0% 

8.9% 

8.1% 

5.8% 

3.4% 

4.2% 

In addition, we can see from Figure 3 that the composition of prison populations has 

undergone interesting changes since 1980. Violent offenders now make up more than 50 percent 

of prison populations, and the majority of the increase in prison populations since 1980 is 

comprised of violent offenders. However, the number of drug offenders has shown the most 

dramatic percentage increase. This number grew more than tenfold from 1980 to 1996, and is 

c. 

now almost equal to the number of property crime offenders in prison. 

29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
FIGURE 3: 

Correctional Facilities, by Most Serious Offense, 1980-199627 

WHO’S IN PRISON? Sentenced Prisoners in Custody of All State 

50,000 - 

0 

500,000 

450,000 

400,000 

350,000 

300,000 

250,000 

200,000 

100,000 

150,000 

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 

-C- Violent 

+ Property 

Drug 

/a+---- / 

The decline in the proportion of prison inmates who are violent offenders caused concern P. 

among some policymakers. Most Truth in Sentencing and Three Strikes laws were designed 

with the intent of malung the incarceration of violent offenders a priority, particularly given the 

shortage of prison space in many jurisdictions. From 1990 through 1997, the state prison 

populations averaged between 114 and 118 percent of capacity nationally (BJS, Prisoners in 

1997).28 Overcrowding is highest in California, where prisons were filled to 206 percent of their 

design capacity at yearend 1997. Several other states report prison populations which are over 

150 percent of capacity (BJS, Prisoners in 1997). 

Sources: BJS, Correctional Populations in the United States; BJS, Prisoners in 1997. 27 

28 These figures are based on population as a proportion of highest reported capacity. Jurisdictions have the option 

of reporting one or more of three different capacity measures: rated, operational, and design capacity. These three 

30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
California’s Three Strikes law, which has much more breadth to its wording and 

implementation than the Three Strikes law in any other state, is atypical in that it is widely 

applied toward nonviolent offenders. According to the data generated by the California 

Legislative Analysts’s Office in October 1997, about 50 percent of California’s Third Strike 

cases (those triggering sentences of 25 years to life), and 85 percent of second-strike cases (those 

earning doubled sentences) were for non-violent or non-serious crimes (Legislative Analysts’s 

Ofice paper, 1997). In cont&t, all but five of the cases prosecuted under Three Strikes in 

Washington by February 1999 were for violent offenses.29 

The relationship between incarceration and crime rates is complex. On the one hand, 

incarceration is intended to control or reduce crime rates, so one might expect to see 

correspondence between increases in incarceration (resulting, perhaps, from increased toughness 

in sentencing policies) and decreases in crime. On the other hand, increases in crime are likely 

to result in more arrests and convictions, and eventually, increases in incarcerated populations. 

A look at crime rates over the past few decades shows a trend which is not as monotonic 

as that for incarceration rates. From Figure 4, we can see that both index and violent crime rates 

have risen dramatically from 1960 through 1996. A closer look at the last decade, however, 

reveals an increase, followed by a decrease of about the same magnitude, in crime rates over this 

period. Following substantial growth in the 1960s and 1970s, index crime rates dropped to 

almost exactly the same rate in 1996 (5078.9 per 100,000 residents) as in 1977 (5077.6 per 

100,000). Violent crime rates rose by 33.2% during these two most recent decades, going from 

475.9 per 100,000 in 1977 to 634.1 per 100,000 in 1996, with a peak of 758.1 per 100,000 in 

measures may or may not be the same. The average of state prison populations as a percentage of lowest reported 

capacities was between 124 and 131 percent for all years from 1990 to 1997. *’ The other five were for “burglary 1.” Data provided by the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission. 

31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
.- 

1991. Index crimes rates in the United States have been declining since 1991, and violent crimes 

have been declining since 1992. 

FIGURE 4: U.S. INDEX AND VIOLENT CRIME RATES, 1960 - 199S3' 

I 7000 T 800 

il: 

Y 

6000 

2 

i? 5000 

- B 

VI 

0 

c d' 4000 

3000 

*c 2000 

3 

t 

VI 

E 

2 1000 

u 

x 

a 

I t 

m 

700 

z 

600 E 

500 z400 5 

300 

w 

0 

0 

2 

L 

.I 

t 

E 

Q) 

200 2 

100 E 

> 

Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing began to gain widespread popularity around 1993 

and 1994. Thus, one important characteristic to note about the national trends in index and 

violent crime rates is that the most recent downturn began before Three Strikes was first 

implemented, and before TIS began to gain popularity. Similar trends occurred in most states, 

with and without Three Strikes and TIS. 

The fact that drops in crime rates preceded the implementation of Three Strikes and TIS 

is a reminder that phenomena as complex as the rise and fall of crime rates cannot easily be 

explained by one, or even by a small number of factors or policies. While it suggests that Three 

30 Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports. Please note that y-axis labels for index crimes are on the left, and those for 

violent crimes are on the right. 

32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Strikes and concurrently-implemented policies were not the only reason behind drops in crime, it 

does not disprove that they lowered crime rate (Beres and Griffith, 1998). A great deal of publjc 

speculation has been made about the reasons behind this decline, which has aptly been labeled a 

“conundrum” (Monkkonen, 1997). While the two policies’ impacts on the crime rate is a topic 

of paramount importance, this project will focus on the policies’ impacts on the correctional 

system. The question of impacts on crime is being addressed in other projects on which the 

author is working. - 

Potential and Expected Effects of Three Strikes and TIS on 

Corrections 

By increasing the frequency with which repeat offenders are sentenced to prison, and 

requiring that these offenders serve longer terms in prison, Three Strikes might be expected to 

further accelerate the growth of prison populations. Truth in Sentencing would not increase the 

number of sentenced offenders, but it would require that those who are sentenced spend more 

time behind bars. P. 

However, in many states, severe limits on prison capacity may place upper bounds on the 

growth of prison populations. Under such capacity constraints, the imprisonment of a larger 

number of repeat offenders may result in an increase in release rates for selected other inmates, 

such as nonviolent offenders, to accommodate the serious or violent offenders serving mandatory 

extended sentences. If a law like Three Strikes were to mandate prison sentences for many 

offenders who would otherwise have received lesser (non-prison) sentences, we would observe 

an increase in the rate of new admissions to prison. On the other hand, if the law were to have an 

impact primarily on the sentence length of offenders who would already have received prison 

terms (which is the case for most Three Strikes laws that only target serious and violent 

33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
offenders), or if (like Truth in Sentencing) it were to leave sentences unchanged but mandate that 

a greater percentage of the existing sentence must be spent behind bars, then the rate entry to 

prison might not change. Furthermore, nationwide, the total population of inmates in state 

prisons has consistently exceeded prison capacity throughout the last decade. From 1990 to 

1998, state prison populations ranged between 113 and 116 percent of highest reported capacity 

. levels (Beck and Mumola, 1999). At yearend 1998, thirty-three states reported prison 

- populations at or above 100% of their highest reported capacity levels, and California had the 

most overcrowded prisons, at 203% of capacity (Beck and Mumola, 1999). Given these capacity 

constraints, it is possible that prison populations might actually shrink following the passage of 

mandatory sentencing laws, as inmates with shorter terms are replaced by fewer prisoners 

serving longer terms. 

At first, therefore, the rate of exits from prison might grow faster than the rate of entries 

into prison, but eventually the flow of offenders leaving prison would slow down, as fewer shortterm inmates would be behind bars. 

.s = 

If limited prison capacity requires the release of certain less-serious offenders, then we 

would expect there to be a displacement of prison inmates to other parts of the criminal justice 

system, such as the parole system. Parole populations might therefore grow, or if the capacity of 

the parole system is constrained, there might be an increase in parole admissions, accompanied 

by an increase in parole releases, as the less-serious parolees are in turn displaced. 

In addition, if Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing succeed in their primary objectives, 

the incapacitation of potential recidivists or deterrence of potential criminal offenders could 

result in declines in crime rates, which would then reduce the flow of inmates into the prison 

system and offset some of the effects described above. 

34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
While Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing may not increase the volume of prison 

populations, the composition of these populations might change. The percentage of violent 

offenders among prison inmates would be expected to increase, and the number of older prison 

inmates might increase over time as inmates are required to serve longer sentences. Eventually, 

rates of death among prisoners could also increase. 

Figure 5 below provides a flow diagram summarizing these processes by which the 

implementation of Three Strikes and TIS could result in impacts on the corrections system and 

crime rates. 

35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Figure 5: Flow Diagram of Impacts on Crime and Corrections 

THREE STRIKES or TIS IMPLEMENTED 

deterrence 1 certainty severity 1 

may offset 

some 

increases 

in prison 

admissions 

and 

population 

1 ++ + 

A increased prison admissions 

limited 11 capacity increased 

capacity -RT[ conditional 

population releases 

I property offenders more 

more 

m ::aging prisoners 1-1 more deaths*, 

crimes by pris,oners. 

1 

I more parole entries It 

increased limited 

capacity capacity hh in parole parole 

1 limited 1 increased 

capacity capacity 

36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Methodology 

The impacts of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing laws are empirically estimated in 

this study using pooled time-series analysis with fixed effects.31 This method can be employed 

when measurements of relevant variables are available for numerous observations over a series 

of points in time. The procedure combines time-series analysis, which looks for changes in 

dependent variables as the sTe observations are measured over a period of time, with crosssectional analysis, which examines many different observations simultaneously. It allows for 

concurrent analysis of states which did and did not implement new laws, so that the latter can 

function as control cases for the interventions that took place in the former. Using this method, 

researchers can look for consistent effects of new legislation in states which have widely varying 

“starting points” and whose implementation of new laws occurred in several different years. 

Benefits of this method include substantial increases in sample size for a single analysis, which 

improves the statistical efficiency of the estimates (Sayrs, 1989). Wicharaya (1995), who used 

this method in an zhalysis of the impacts of 1980s sentencing policies, states that it maximizes 

generalizability because it “offers statistically significant tests of policy impacts across 

jurisdictions tested.” 

- 

Data, Variables, and Model 

The unit of observation for the data used in this analysis is the state-year. The data are 

measured at the state level, and the dataset covers all states and years from 1986 to 1997. A full 

~~ 

31 This method has also referred to as multiple time series analysis (Marvel1 and Moody, 1996) and time series 

cross-sectional analysis (Beck and Katz, 1996). 

37 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

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Department of Justice.
summary of the definitions, availability, and sources of the variables coded in the dataset can be 

found in Appendix C. 

Dependent Variables 

Incarceration, “Certainty,” and ‘Severity” 

The analysis of impacts on prisons examines possible changes in several aspects of 

- corrections: the rate of incarceration of inmates, estimated average time served in prison by 

offenders, and the certainty of being sentenced to prison. The incarceration rate is measured as 

the number of inmates serving felony sentences of longer than one year, per 100,000 residents in 

a state.32 “Certainty” of prison sentencing is represented by the conditional probability of a 

prison sentence given the disposition of a felony case. It is estimated by dividing the number of 

felony cases disposed by the number of new court commitments to prison in a given year and 

state. The number of months served in prison is used to represent “severity” of sentencing, and 

is estimated by dividing the total number of inmates in a state by the number of prison 

admissions in that year (see Beck and Blumstein, 1999, for discussion of this measurement). The 

PI 

incarceration rate and “certainty” data were available for the years 1986 through 1997; the 

“severity” proxy was available from 1986 through 1996. 

Prison Admissions and Releases 

Two categories of admissions are tested, total admissions and new court commitments. 

New court commitments differ from total admissions in that they only include inmates who are 

sent to prison as a result of a new conviction, and exclude prisoners who are readmitted as a 

32 Inmates serving sentences of one year or more meet the standard definition of “felons.” The number of inmates in 

a state’s jurisdiction includes a state’s inmates who are being held out of state, such as Alaska’s prisoners being held 

in private contract facilities in Arizona. 

38 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
result of violations of parole or other forms of conditional release. It is not clear which one of 

these two measures of admissions would be more strongly impacted by Three Strikes and Truth 

in Sentencing. One possible difference may result from the way these laws affect the court 

system. Defendants who face sentencing under Three Strikes tend to request jury trials more 

often than other defendants, since there is no advantage to pleading guilty when a lengthy 

mandatory sentence would be the result of any guilty plea. Inmates who are subject to Truth in 

Sentencing would also have more to lose from a guilty plea. This may result in delays in the 

processing of court cases, and declines in the rate of new convictions, especially in the early 

years of a new law’s implementation. It is administratively much easier to return a recidivist to 

prison for a technical violation of release conditions (such as failure to report to a parole officer 

or a “dirty” drug test) rather than prosecuting the offender for a new crime, so the ratio of new 

court commitments to other types of admissions might drop. The existence of Three Strikes or 

TIS as a prosecutorial bargaining tool may make recidivists more willing to accept a revocation 

of parole, and serve the remainder of a pre-existing term, rather than risk a long mandatory 

sentence if convicted. Judges, defense attorneys, or even prosecutors who are uncomfortable 

c. 

with the use of lengthy mandatory sentences may also favor the use of parole revocation, instead 

of the imposition of a Three Strikes or TIS sentence, when the option is available. The 

dependent variables used here are the numbers of total prison admissions, new court 

commitments, total releases, and conditional prison releases in each ~tate-year.~~ All of the 

measures of admissions and releases were available from 1986 through 1996. 

33 The Bureau of Justice Statistics report series, Correctional Populations in the United States, served as the source 

of the data on prison admissions and releases and parole populations, admissions, and releases. Prison population 

and capacity data come from the BJS report series, Prisoners in 1986 (and corresponding reports for subsequent 

years through 1998). 

39 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Parole Population, Entries, and Exh 

Impacts on parole are estimated using actual counts of the parole population, and the 

number of entries and exits from parole in each state-year. These data were available from 1986 

through 1997. 

Proportion of Inmates Over Age 50, Death Rates, and Suicide Rates Among Prisoners 

The percentage of state prison populations over the age of 50 was available for the years .- 

1990 through 1997. These data were reported by state departments of correction in response to 

annual surveys, fielded by the Criminal Justice Institute (Camp and Camp, 1986-1998). 

Death and suicide rates were reported by most states from 1986 through 1996. However, 

these numbers are very low. On average, there were only 41 reported inmate deaths, and 2.4 

inmate suicides, per year. As a result, these data may be highly sensitive to random fluctuations. 

Inmate Composition by Offense 

The impact of Three Strikes and TIS on the offense composition of inmates in prisons 2. 

was analyzed using dependent variables representing the percentage of inmates in a state whose 

primary offense was a violent offense, a property offense, or drug-related offense. The source 

for these data was the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), a voluntary reporting 

program run by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Reporting states submit 

descriptive statistics on every inmate in the states’ prison populations with regard to several 

characteristics, including the ones used in this section. The most recent year of data available 

was 1997. On average, 36 states report annually to the NCRP, but unfortunately, the specific 

states that report change from year to year. As a result, the time series for many states have gaps 

or missing data. Smaller states tend to report less frequently to NCRP. All of the dependent 

40 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
variables were available for California for all 12 years from 1986 through 1997, and all of the 

time series were complete for the state of Washington. A more complete description of the 

available NCRP data can be found in Appendix E. 

The National Corrections Reporting Program collects data on the characteristics of 

offenders admitted or released from prison in a given year, as opposed to characteristics of each 

state’s standing prison population. For this reason, it is difficult to draw conclusions from 

analyses using NCRP admissions data regarding prison populations as a whole. For example, 

one can examine whether more violent offenders are being admitted to prison as a consequence 

of Three Strikes, but the proportion of inmates who are violent offenders may eventually 

increase even if the proportion of violent new admissions does not, if the average violent 

offender admitted is now required to serve a longer term. While it would be preferable to use 

data on the composition of total inmate populations, rather than admissions, appropriate timeseries data by state were unfortunately not available for offense breakdowns of prison 

populations. 

Independent Variables: Policy Interventions - Building a Model 

An econometric model has been developed to estimate the impacts of the two policy 

interventions on the rates of incarceration and other dependent variables. To explain the choice 

of policy intervention variables, it is useful to consider how the hypothesized effect of one of the 

policy interventions on a dependent variable would “look.” In the following examples, the 

hypothesized effects of Three Strikes on the incarceration rate will be used to illustrate the steps 

that were involved in building the model. 

41 

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of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
In its simplest incarnation, the impact of Three Strikes on incarceration might be 

visualized as follows: 

Figure 6: What Might a Policy Impact Look Like? A Simple Illustration 

Policy Intervention 

\ 

3-Strikes states 

------------------ 

non-3-Strikes states 

Time (years) 

>. 

In this case, the independent variable representing a policy change of interest is a dummy 

variable representing the presence or absence of Three Strikes in a given state-year. The dummy 

variable would be coded as 1 in every state-year where the policy was in place, and 0 in all other 

state-years. For example, in California and Virginia, where Three Strikes was passed in 1994, 

the Three Strikes dummy variable is coded as 0 from 1986 through 1993, and as 1 from 1994 

through 1997. In this case, the relationship between the law and crime rates could be 

summarized with the equation, “Incarceration = 01 + 

would be expected to increase in Three Strikes states, but not in states without the law, so the 

coefficient PI would be positive. 

(3 Strikes).” Rates of incarceration 

42 

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Department of Justice.
-- 

The above diagram is somewhat unrealistic, however. One reason is that incarceration 

trends were clearly not flat before or after the implementation of the law. As summarized in 

Figure 2 above, we know that incarceration was steadily growing before most Three Strikes laws 

went into effect, and then continued to grow after the laws were in place. If this national trend is 

not taken into consideration in our analysis, it is possible to overestimate the impact of the law 

on increases in the incarceration rate, which was already growing. Thus, year fixed effects are 

added to the model as a prox8 representing factors which may have driven national trends in the 

dependent variables that may have taken place over this twelve-year time period. Year fixed 

effects are simply dummy variables representing each year from 1987 through 1997. The year 

1986 is the baseline year and is not assigned a dummy. With these dummy variables included, 

the hypothesized relationship between Three Strikes and incarceration might look more like this: 

Figure 7: Year Fixed Effects Allow the National Trends to Vary 

43 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
As a result of including the year fixed effects, the pre-existing national trends in 

incarceration rates are now taken into consideration. The diagram depicts a situation in which 

the impact of the policy is to cause the incarceration rates in the states with Three Strikes to 

depart from the increase that would already have taken place, even in states without the policy. 

“Incarceration = a + p1 (3 Strikes) + p2 (Year Fixed Effects),” where the term p2 (Year Fixed 

Effects) actually refers to a series of terms, “p2 (year 1987) + p3 (year 1988) + . . . + p12 (year 

1987).” 

Up to this point, the assumption has also been implicit that the rates of incarceration for 

the different groups of states (with and without Three Strikes) are the same before the 

implementation of Three Strikes. In fact, the rates of crime (and of the other dependent variables 

examined in this study) vary widely. For this reason, fixed effects, or individual dummy 

variables, are also incorporated for each of the states used in the analysis. These allow each state 

to have a different Y-intercept. This is depicted, in a simplified manner, in the following 

diagram, which corresponds to the equation, “Incarceration = a + p1 (3 Strikes) + p2 (Year Fixed 

Effects) + p3 (State Fixed Effects),” where the term “p2 (Year Fixed Effects)” represents the 

series of 10 separate year dummy variables described above, and “p3 (State Fixed Effects)” 

similarly represents a series of separate dummy variables representing each of the states.34 In the 

diagram below, the slope on ‘Three Strikes” is again positive, but national trends are taken into 

account, and the different states have different intercept terms, as allowed by the state fixed 

effects. 

34 Using the statistical software program STATA, this process corresponds to the “XTREG’ command with fixed 

effects, and year dummies added. 

44 

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Department of Justice.
Figure 8: State Fixed Effects Allow States to Have Different Intercepts 

I 

Q) 

E 

c 

0 .- 

I 

5 

0 

: 

- C 

3-Strikes states / 

Time (years) 

The final assumption that is relaxed in the development of this model is that incarceration 

rates followed parallel trends in states with and without Three Strikes before the adoption of the 

policy. It is quite possible (and further analysis indicates that it is probably true) that ThreeStrikes and non-Three-Strikes states differed not only in their levels of incarceration, but also in 

the rates of change in incarceration that preceded the adoption of the policy. With that in mind, 

the policy intervention variables were designed so that post-Three-Strikes trends in incarceration 

were measured, while controlling for pre-Three-Strikes trends. Separate variables were created 

to represent pre-existing trends in Three Strikes states before Three Strikes, and trends in Three 

Strikes states after Three Strikes. A simplified illustration of this last step might look like this: 

c 

45 

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of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
.- 

Figure 9: Separate Variables for “Before” and “After” Allow Trends to Vary 

In the above (hypothetical) diagram, incarceration rates in Three Strikes states were 

rising more steeply than those in states without Three Strikes for most of the years before the 

policy implementation, tapering off slightly, and then growing even more sharply after the policy 

implementation. The equation corresponding to this scenario can be summarized, “Incarceration 

= a + p, (Trend in 3 Strikes states before law) + p2 (Trend in 3 Strikes states after law) + p3 (Year 

Fixed Effects) + p4 (State Fixed Effects).”35 The coefficient of particular interest here would be 

p2, the change in the trend associated with each year in the post-Three Strikes period, where preexisting trends are already controlled. Corresponding variables are also introduced for Truth in 

Sentencing states before and after adoption of that policy. 

35 In the model used in the present analysis, the “before” variables are coded 0 for the year of implementation, -1, -2, 

-3, ... for the years t-1, t-2, t-3, etc., and 1,2, 3, ... for the years t+l, t+2, t+3, etc. The “after” variables are coded 0 

for all years until adoption, then 1,2,3, ... for years after implementation. 

46 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Independent Variables: Interaction Terms 

In addition, special attention is given in the model to California, which has the broadest 

and most widely used Three Strikes law, and also to Washington state, which was the first state 

to implement Three Strikes, has the one of the five most widely implemented laws, and was an 

early adopter of Truth in Sentencing. California has also adopted Truth in Sentencing. Three 

- separate interaction terms are introduced to represent the presence of Three StrikesmIS in 

California, Three Strikes in Washington, and TIS in Wa~hington.~~ Since both Three Strikes and 

Truth in Sentencing were implemented in 1994 in California, the dummy variable for 

California’s Three StrikesRIS measures changes in the dependent variables that took place from 

1994 through 1997, but it is impossible, using the available data at this level of analysis, to 

separate the effects of Three Strikes from those of Truth in Senten~ing.~~ In Washington, on the 

other hand, TIS was adopted in 1990, three years before Three Strikes was passed there, so the 

effects of these two policies can be measured separately in that state. 

+. 

Independent Variables: Control Variables 

Two control variables are also included to account for key demographic and economic 

factors that have been cited as major causes of changes in crime and incarceration rates. These 

two control variables are the percentage of the state’s population between the ages of 18 and 24, 

and the employment rate (in percentage points) in each state and year. Other factors were used 

36 The California Three StrikesflIS variable, for example, is coded as 1 in California from 1994 through 1997. and 0 I 

in ail other state-years. Comparable interaction terms were created for Washington Three Strikes and Washington 

TIS. 

37 In fact, the effects of other, concurrent, policy changes or other factors which may have impacted the dependent 

variables in these same years would also be “picked up” by these interaction terms, and the same may be true of the 

other dummy variables for Three Strikes and TIS. 

47 

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Department of Justice.
in early versions of the model, but were removed after they were found to have no effect. These 

included the percentage of blacks or nonwhites in a state’s population, and average household 

income in a state. The former is probably almost completely “absorbed” by the state fixed 

effects, and the latter was found to be collinear with the other variable representing economic 

conditions, employment rate. 

Variable transformation - 

Natural-logarithm transformations were performed on most of the dependent variables, 

for easier interpretation. The semi-log functional form, “ln(Y) = a + PX,” was used. In 

regressions of the natural logarithm of a dependent variable on untransformed independent 

variables, the coefficients on the continuous independent variables (e.g. unemployment rate, 

percentage ages 18-24) can be interpreted as the percentage change in Y which results from a 

one unit increase in X, at the means of the independent variables. The percentage changes 

associated with policy implementation in this paper will be based on this calculation. (In these 

analyses, a one-unit increase in each of the dummy variables representing Three Strikes or TIS 

c. 

can be substantively interpreted as the implementation of that policy.) The natural-log 

transformation was not used in cases where the dependent variable was a probability or a 

percentage (i.e. conditional probability of a prison sentence given felony disposition, and 

percentage of violent, property, or drug offenders among new admissions), because doing so for 

dependent variables constrained between 0 and 1 creates irregularities in the magnitudes of the 

estimated coefficients on the independent variables. For these variables, percentage changes 

were calculated “by hand” using the methodology explained in Appendix B. 

48 

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Department of Justice.
Model Summary 

In short, the model measures whether the policy interventions resulted in faster or slower 

growth or declines in crime, incarceration rates, and other variables. The model tested for each 

of the dependent variables has the following functional form: 

In (Dependent Variable) = 

Constant term + 81 (Trend@ Three Strikes states before the law) 

+ 82 (Trend in Three Strikes states after the law) 

+ 83 (Trend in California before Three Strikes & TIS) 

+ 84 (Trend in California after Three Strikes & TIS) 

+ P5 (Trend in Washington without Three Strikes & TIS) 

+ 86 (Trend in Washington after Three Strikes) 

+ 87 (Trend in Washington after TIS) 

+ 8s (Trend in Truth in Sentencing states before TIS) 

+ 89 (Trend in Truth in Sentencing states after TIS) 

+ 810 (Employment rate)it 

+ fill (Percent of population between the ages of 18 and 24)it 

+ 812 (YEAR FIXED EFFECTS) + 813 (STATE FIXED EFFECTS) 

r. 

The subscript i represents the state, and the subscript t represents the year (i.e., time). The term 

“YEAR FIXED EFFECTS” represents 11 dummy variables, one for each year from 1987 to 

1997; and the term “STATE FIXED EFFECTS” represents 50 dummy variables, one for each 

state. 

Nonzero coefficients on the variables representing the trend in Three Strikes states before 

the law, the trend in TIS states before TIS, and California and Washington before Three Strikes 

and TIS (PI, p3, ps, and p8) would indicate that pre-existing differences between “adopters” and 

“non-adopters” existed even before the passage of Three Strikes or Truth in Sentencing. Unless 

otherwise specified, the coefficient on each “before” trend variable represents the percentage 

49 

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Department of Justice.
difference each year between the corresponding group (e.g. states that eventually adopted Truth 

in Sentencing) and the other states (e.g. states that never adopted TIS) in the growth rate of the 

dependent variable. 

The coefficients of particular interest are those associated with the “after” trends for 

Three Strikes and TIS nationally, in California, and in Washington (pz, p4, 66, p7, and fig). 

Nonzero values of these coefficients would indicate that even controlling for national trends, pre- 

- 

existing trends in the adopting states, and selected economic and demographic factors, 

differences in the trends in the dependent variables were found to be temporally and spatially 

associated with the presence of Three Strikes or Truth in Sentencing. Nonzero coefficients on 

the specific interaction variables for California and Washington (p4, p6, and p7) would indicate 

that the trends in these states differed significantly from those in the other states that adopted 

Three Strikes or Truth in Sentencing. 

This paper now proceeds with the analysis of effects of Three Strikes and TIS on prison 

incarceration rates, certainty, and severity of sentencing. This will be followed by a discussion 

of the two policies’ impacts on the flow of admissions and releases, impacts on parole, and 

c. 

effects on the composition of prison popuIations. 

Impacts on Incarceration and Prison Admissions and Releases 

Incarceration Rates, “Certainty,” and “Severity” of Prison Sentencing 

As depicted in Figure 5 earlier, there are two main processes by which policies such as 

Three Strikes and TIS would be expected to impact crime rates: deterrence and incapacitation. 

To test the incapacitation hypothesis, three measures of impacts on the correctional system were 

50 

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also examined. Table 7 below summarizes the results of the analyses examining the impacts on 

prison incarceration rates, estimated time served (“severity”), and new prison admissions per 

felony disposition (“certainty”). 

The results displayed in Table 7 show that the incarceration rate is not affected by Three 

Strikes or Truth in Sentencing nationally, or in the state of Washington. This finding makes 

sense; Three Strikes is so infrequently used in most states that the law would have very little 

impact on prison populations. In Washington, Three Strikes was used about 120 times over five - 

years, and even in those cases, it was applied to offenders whose sentences would most likely 

have been five or more years long even without the law, so the changes in their sentences will 

not emerge until future years. Prison populations have also been affected by dramatic, 

unforeseen drops in crime rates which have taken place throughout the nation since about 1992. 

This has reduced the number of offenders entering the sentencing process. Finally, laws have 

not been fully implemented in many jurisdictions. Observers in states with narrowly defined 

Three Strikes laws have reported little impact on courts and prisons (Cunningham, 1997). In 

many cases, new laws labeled “Three Strikes” did not differ significantly from pre-existing laws h 

e 

(Clark, Austin, and Henry, 1997). 

51 

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Table 7: Impacts on Incarceration Rates), New Prison Admissions per Felony Disposition 

(“Certainty”), and Time Served (“Se~erity”)~~ 

Coefficient 

(S.E. in parentheses) 

New Prison Estimated 

Admissions Time 

Served 

Disposition3’ (Months) 

* significant at pc0.10 Incarceration per Felony 

** significant at p<0.05 Rate 

Trend in 3 Strikes states before law 

Trend in 3 Strikes states after law - 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after TIS 

Trend in TIS states before law 

Trend in TIS states after law 

e. 

Employment rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Prison Capacity 

Constant 

R-squared withinm 

-0.7% ** 

(0.3%) 

0.2% 

(1.3%) 

1.2% 

(1.2%) 

(4.3%) 

-6.0% 

(3.8%) 

-5.8% 

(4.7%) 

11.1%** 

(5.6%) 

-1.0% ** 

(0.2%) 

0.9% 

-0.4% 

(0.5%) 

0.6% * 

(0.4%) 

-1.7%** 

(0.8%) 

(0.0%) 

(0.2) 

0.85 

0.0% ** 

4.9 ** 

-0.2% 

-9.8% 

16.7% 

30.2% 

-0.8% 

-6.0% 

26.6% 

-5.3% ** 

-10.5% ** 

-0.4% 

2 1.4% ** 

0.0% 

-0.38 ** 

(0.20) 

0.10 

- 1.4% 

(1.8%) 

10.9% 

(10.3%) 

-1 1.9% * 

(6.7%) 

(3 3.5 %) 

-5 1.2% ** 

(20.2 %) 

-14.6% 

-34.1% 

(31.3%) 

71.4%** 

(30.6%) 

- 1 .O% 

(1.5%) 

-0.7% 

(2.9%) 

-1.1% 

(2.5%) 

6.3% 

(5.9%) 

(0.0%) 

( 1-01 

0.2 1 

0.0% ** 

5.7 ** 

Number of Observations (n) 600 502 550 

38 Incarceration rate and “severity” are natural-log transformed; “certainty” is not transformed. 

39 Percentage changes in this column were calculated using coefficients derived from model without natural-log 

transformed dependent variable. For actual coefficients, corresponding standard errors, and methodology for 

calculating percentage changes, please see Appendices A and B. 

fixed effects results in extremely high R values, since state-to-state differences explain most of the variation that is 

observed. 

In this and all similar tables, the “R-s uared within” is the R2 with state fixed effects excluded. Including the state 9 m 

52 

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Department of Justice.
Even in California, where one might expect that there would have been an impact on 

incarceration rates due to the high frequency with which the Three Strikes law is applied, no 

such impact was found incarceration rates. One reason for the lack of an observed impact, as 

shown in Table 8 below, may be that the capacity of California’s prison system .only increased 

about 12 percent from 1994 through 1997. Furthermore, prison overcrowding has been 

__ increasing in California to the extent that facilities are now holding more than twice as many 

inmates as they were designed to accommodate. In the absence of dramatic increases in prison 

capacity and in-the face of already-severe prison overcrowding, it is unlikely that new policies 

could increase the population of prisons much more than they already appear to have done. In 

fact, in the presence of severe capacity constraints, it would even be possible for incarceration 

rates to decrease after the passage of a law like Three Strikes, if multiple offenders with short 

sentences need to be released to accommodate a smaller number of inmates with longer 

sentences. While other states, such as Washington, are also above 100% of capacity, the 

overcrowding problems elsewhere are not as severe as they are in California. 

Table 8: California Prison Capacity Levels and Changes, 1986-1997 

Year Design % Change # of Inmates % Over 

Capacity Capacity 

1986 32853 57725 75.7% 

1987 4 1094 20.1 % 64812 57.7% 

1988 46279 11.2% 73780 59.4% 

1989 48311 4.2% 84338 74.6% 

1990 52698 8.3% 94 122 78.6% 

1991 55692 5.4% 98515 76.9% 

1992 57367 2.9% 105467 83.8% 

1993 63293 9.4% 115573 82.6% 

1994 68366 7.4% 121084 77.1% 

1995 71641 4.6% 131745 83.9% 

1996 7262 I 1.3% 142865 96.7% 

1997 76352 4.9% 154368 102.2% 

53 

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Department of Justice.
Another factor that could prevent incarceration rates from increasing would be 

effectiveness of any of these interventions in the deterrence of crime. If crime rates fall because 

would-be offenders are afraid to incur a long prison term, then this reduces the “supply” of 

inmates entering prison. Reductions in crime rates that result from unrelated reasons would also 

temper impacts on incarceration rates. As discussed earlier, crime rates started a downward 

swing before either Three Strikes or TIS became widely popular. 

The lack of an impact on incarceration rates may also be a measurement issue. Because 

the size of the prison population is very large compared to any changes in the size of the 

population that may occur from year to year, effects may need to be very large to appear as 

changes in the overall incarceration rate. 

Finally, while Three Strikes and TIS are not specifically associated with changes in 

incarceration rates, it is important to point out that the year fixed effects, not shown in Table 7, 

reveal a dramatic growth in incarceration rates (see Table A in Appendix for full results 

including year fixed effects). As discussed earlier and illustrated in Figure 2, states were 

incarcerating more and more inmates throughout the country. In states that had Three Strikes or 

”. 

Truth in Sentencing, these policies might have been behind that growth; in other states, 

alternative policies, such as stricter policing, abolition of parole, or Truth in Sentencing policies 

that did not meet the 85% federal criteria, might have been applied with similar results. 

The only significant finding about TIS is that the states that implemented it had slightly 

slower growth in their incarceration rates before implementing the law, which continued 

unchanged after TIS was pa~sed.~’ This suggests that there may be fundamental differences in 

41 For convenience, positive coefficients are discussed as increases in rates of growth and negative coefficients as 

decreases in rates of growth. Statistically significant negative coefficients such as this one actually indicate either 

slower rates of growth or faster rates of decline. Technically, a positive coefficient simply indicates that the slope 

has a greater value and a negative coefficient means the slope has a lesser value. 

54 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
approaches to sentencing between states that passed TIS and those that did not. For example, 

states that adopt Truth-in Sentencing are more likely than non-TIS states to have sentencing 

guidelines commissions, which are responsible for forecasting prison populations and designing 

states’ sentencing structures, and often have influence on the nature of sentencing legi~lation.~~ 

Truth in Sentencing is not designed to affect the rate at which felons receive prison 

sentences, but only the proportion of their sentences that they spend behind bars once they have 

c“ -. 

been sentenced. ‘“Three Strikes and You’re Out,” however, may affect the certainty of prison 

sentencing by requiring that repeat offenders receive prison sentences instead of less severe 

penalties. Given the actual rate at which Three Strikes has been used, however, it is unlikely that 

the law would have much of an impact on certainty at the statewide level, except perhaps in 

California. In fact, no impacts of Three Strikes on the conditional probability of receiving a 

prison sentence nationally, in Washington, or in Calif~rnia.~~ Unexpectedly, Truth in 

Sentencing states were found to have a 5.3 percent slower rate of growth in this “certainty” 

measure before TIS was adopted, and this rate grew 10.5 percent slower each year afterwards. c. 

Since TIS was not designed to have an impact on certainty of imprisonment, and since 

differences already existed before the adoption of TIS, it is likely that this apparent effect is a 

reflection of underlying differences in sentencing approaches between TIS and non-TIS states. 

California and Washington had slower than average growth in their rates of prison time 

served before the adoption of Truth in Sentencing and “Three Strikes and You’re Out.” This 

suggests that the new sentencing policies may have been passed, in part, in response to the 

42 This result was found using a cross-sectional time series probit regression model where the adoption of Truth in 

Sentencing was the binomial dependent variable, and the independent variables included the political parties of the 

governor and legislature, the violent crime rate, presence of sentencing guidelines, prison capacity, and corrections 

spending dollars per capita. 

55 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
perception that inmates were not serving adequate prison terms. After Three Strikes was passed, 

no significant effects were found on estimated time served, nationally, in Washington, or in 

California. In addition to the infrequency with which Three Strikes is used in most states, the 

time lag involved with increases in time served is probably a primary reason for the lack of 

observed effects thus far. Truth in Sentencing may demonstrate impacts on estimated time 

served in the long run, unless base sentence lengths are reduced as the percentage of sentences 

served is increased. In Washington, TIS does appear to have had a substantial influence on time -_ 

served already: the rate of growth has increased 71 percent. Because Washington was an early 

adopter of Truth in Sentencing, effects are more likely to be observable in that state than in most 

others. 

Impacts on the Flow of Prison Admissions and Releases 

While incarceration rates may remain stable, especially when the reason is limited prison 

bed capacity, new sentencing policies can have dramatic effects on the rate at which inmates 

enter and exit the prison system. As discussed previously, more inmates may receive mandatory 

.=. 

sentences, resulting in increases in admission rates, more inmates may have longer stays, 

resulting in increases in release rates for other offenders, or an increase in those serving long, 

mandatory terms may lead to the diversion of other offenders to alternative punishments, leading 

to a decline in the number of inmates entering and leaving prison. 

Table 9 below shows the results of analyses where two different measurements for prison 

admission rates, total new admissions to prison and new court commitments to prison, were 

used. Likewise, two different measures of releases, total releases and conditional releases, were 

~ 

43 “Conditional probability of receiving a prison sentence” was estimated by dividing the number of new admissions 

to prison by the number of felony cases disposed in the same state and year. Appropriate data on the number of 

56 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
used to generate the results shown in Table 10. The differences between these four measures 

were discussed in an earlier section of this paper. The impacts of Three Strikes and TIS 

nationally, in California, and in Washington are measured, controlling for pre-existing trends, 

employment rate, the proportion of young people in the population, and violent and property 

crime rates. 

felony cases that resulted in convictions, which might have been a more accurate denominator, could not be found. 

57 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
.- 

Table 9: Impacts on Total New Admissions and New Court Commitments to Prison (all 

dependent variables natural-log transformed) 

Coefficient 

(S.E. in parentheses) 

Total New New Court 

* significant at peO.10 Admissions Commitments 

** significant at ~~0.05 Rate Rate 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law 1.2% 0.4% 

(1.7%) (1.8%) 

Trend in Three Strikes states after law -8.8% 

(9.7%) 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes & TIS 

11.9%* 

(6.5%) 

5.5% 

(32.8%) 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes & TIS 49.3% ** 

(19.8%) 

21.7% 

(30.5 %) 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after TIS -62.3% ** 

(29.8%) 

Trend in TIS states before law 

Trend in TIS states after law 

s. 

Employment rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Violent Crime Rate 

Property Crime Rate 

Constant 

-0.6% 

(1.4%) 

1.1% 

(2.8%) 

1.5% 

(2.3%) 

-8.2% 

(5.9%) 

-0.1%** 

(0.0%) 

0.0% 

(0.0%) 

(0.9) 

5.2 ** 

-6.8% 

(10.4%) 

13.0% * 

(6.9%) 

-20.8% 

(35.1 %) 

(21.2%) 

16.7% 

(32.7%) 

7 1.6% ** 

-84.3% ** 

(31.9%) 

-0.1 % 

(1.5%) 

-0.3% 

(2.9%) 

0.5% 

(2.5%) 

(6.3%) 

-0.1 % ** 

(0.0%) 

(0.0%) 

(1.0) 

-5.1% 

0.0% * 

4.7 ** 

R-squared within 0.05 0.05 

Number of Observations (n) 550 550 

58 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 10: Impacts on Total and Conditional Releases from Prison (all dependent variables 

natural-log transformed) 

Coefficient 

(S.E. in parentheses) 

Total Conditional 

* significant at p<O. 10 Releases Releases 

** significant at ~~0.05 Rate Rate 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law 1.4% 2.5% 

(1.7%) (1.9%) 

Trend in Three Strikes states after law 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

-9.4% 

(9.8%) 

7.4% 

(6.5%) 

-9.3% 

(11.1%) 

8.9% 

(7.3%) 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes & TIS 15.1% 23.7% 

(32.9%) (37.3%) 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

(19.8%) (22.5%) 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 23.5% -4.3% 

(30.6%) (34.7%) 

44.2% ** 75.1% ** 

Trend in WA after TIS 

Trend in TIS states before law 

Trend in TIS states after law 

.. 

Employment rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Violent Crime Rate 

Property Crime Rate 

Constant 

R-squared within 

-59.3% ** -80.8% ** 

(29.8%) (33.8%) 

-0.5% -1.2% 

( 1.4%) (1.5%) 

1.8% 

.. (2.8%) 

4.3% 

(3.1%) 

1.6% 2.3% 

(2.4%) (2.7%) 

-7.8% -8.4% 

(5.9%) (6.6%) 

-0.1 % ** -0.1%** 

(0.0%) (0.1%) 

0.0% 0.0% 

(0.0%) (0.0%) 

(0.9) (1.0) 

5.1 ** 4.7 ** 

0.04 0.07 

Number of Observations (n) 550 550 

59 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
When pre-existing trends in prison admissions and releases are compared, using any of 

the four measures described above, states that implemented Three Strikes were not found to 

differ significantly from states that did not implement these policies. This js also true for states 

that adopted TIS. Admissions rates were increasing more rapidly in California before 1994, 

however. Total new admissions were rising about 12 percent faster, and new court commitments 

13 percent faster before the laws were passed in California. This growth continued, but did not 

increase or decrease significantly, following the adoption of Three Strikes and TIS. 

-- 

In the absence of Three Strikes and TIS, Washington State faced dramatically higher 

baseline growth rates in prison admissions than the rest of the nation. Growth in total new 

admissions exceeded that in other states by an average of 49 percent each year, and growth in 

new court commitments to prison was 72% higher than elsewhere. Correspondingly, the prison 

release rates in Washington States were also growing more rapidly. Compared to the rates in 

other states, the total release rate was 44 percent higher, and the conditional release rate was 75 

percent higher. 

Washington’s narrowly-focused Three Strikes law, passed in 1993, was found to have no 

statistically significant impacts on admissions or releases, but TIS appears to have had some 

large impacts. After TIS was adopted, total admissions and new court commitments grew 62 and 

84 percent more slowly, respectively, and total released slowed by 59 percent, and conditional 

releases by 81 percent in each post-TIS year in Washington.44 The combination of faster growth 

in incarceration, as found in the earlier analysis, and slower growth in admissions and releases, is 

consistent with growth in sentence lengths. When more inmates are serving long sentences, 

The magnitude of these variables seems unusually large. This may be related to the artificial control imposed for 

the pre-existing trend, which had a fairly large positive coefficient. It may also indicate a misspecification of the 

model related to the logarithmic functional form. Though the magnitude might not be accurate, the significance and 

direction of the coefficients are of interest. 

44 

60 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
fewer short-term prisoners can flow in and out of the system. Compared to most other states, 

Washington was an early adopter of TIS, which could be one reason that effects of the law on 

prison admission and releases were detected in that state but not in California or the rest of the 

nation. 

Impacts on Parole Populations and Flow of Offenders to and from the Parole System 

i I 

As shown in Table 11 below, the analysis finds that Three Strikes states and non-Three 

Strikes states had differing trends in their rates of parole usage and the number of entries to 

parole before the policies were adopted. Parole rates were already growing 3 percent faster, and 

entries to parole were increasing 4 percent faster, in Three Strikes states. This suggests that 

Three Strikes may have been adopted in response to a perception that too many offenders were 

being given parole sentences. For Three Strikes states in general, these trends did not appear to 

change after Three Strikes was passed. Growth in exits from parole, while not noticeably faster 

before Three Strikes, did increase after the law’s passage. The explanation for this is not 

obvious. Parole exits include released offenders such as those who have completed their terms 

or are discharged early, as well as inmates whose parole terms are revoked and who are 

recommitted to prison (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 

1993). Thus, increases in exits from parole could reflect, among other things, more inmates sent 

back to prison for parole violations, more inmates released from parole to make room for inmates 

whose parole terms are longer, or a decline in the use of parole. 

61 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 11: Impacts on Parole Population, Entries, and Exits (all dependent variables 

natural-log transformed) 

Coefficient 

(S.E. in parentheses) 

* significant at p<O.lO Parole Entries to Exits from 

** significant at ~~0.05 Population Parole Parole 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law 

Trend in Three Strikes states after law 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes & TIS . 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after TIS 

Trend in TIS states before law 

Trend in TIS states after law 

Employment rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Violent Crime Rate 

Property Crime Rate 

Constant 

R-squared within 

2.6% ** 

(0.8%) 

-0.7% 

(3.4%) 

0.7% 

(3.2%) 

-8.3% 

(11.6%) 

4.2% 

(10.1%) 

-19.1% 

(12.6%) 

-46.5% ** 

( 15.1 %) 

0.8% 

(0.6%) 

-0.5% 

(1.2%) 

-2.8% ** 

(1 .O%) 

5.0% ** 

(2.1%) 

0.0% 

(0.0%) 

(0.0%) 

(0.4) 

0.58 

0.0% ** 

9.3 ** 

3.5% ** 

(1.3%) 

1.2% 

(5.1%) 

1.1% 

(4.8%) 

-9.9% 

(17.4%) 

-49.1 % ** 

(15.3%) 

-69.8% ** 

(18.8%) 

30.9% 

(22.6%) 

-0.7% 

(1 .O%) 

-2.1 % 

(1.9%) 

-3.8% ** 

(1.5%) 

3.7% 

(3.2%) 

-0.1 % ** 

(0.0%) 

0.0% 

(0.0%) 

(0.6) 

0.46 

9.3 ** 

0.7% 

(1.1%) 

(4.5%) 

3.5% 

(4.2%) 

8.7% * 

-15.5% 

(15.3%) 

21.3% 

(13.5%) 

-1 10.5% ** 

(16.6%) 

-2.6% 

(19.9%) 

-0.6% 

(0.8%) 

0.0% 

(1.6%) 

-3.0% ** 

(1.3%) 

3.2% 

(2.8%) 

-0.1%** 

(0.0%) 

0.0% 

(0.0%) 

(0.6) 

0.46 

8.7 ** 

Number of Observations (n) 595 530 53 1 

The results in Table 11 provide only weak evidence that the growth rates in parole rates 

and parole entries and exits were faster than average in California before Three Strikes and TIS, 

and slower than average afterwards. These findings would be consistent with the belief that 

62 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Three Strikes and TIS were reducing the practice of allowing inmates to be released to parole, 

but while the signs on the coefficients were consistent, none of these coefficients was significant 

at the 10% level. 

Washington State had a lower baseline rate of entries to parole before either Three Strikes 

or TIS was passed. Even controlling for the pre-existing trends, Three Strikes in Washington 

was associated with much slower growth in parole rates, entries, and exits. However, a close 

-. 

examination of the trends in Washington reveals that there appears to have been a decade-long 

effort to reduce the use of parole in Washington State, which accelerated after the passage of TIS 

in 1990, and before the adoption of Three Strikes in 1993. As illustrated in Figure 10 below, the 

reported use of parole in Washington decreased dramatically from 1987 through 1997, with the 

most dramatic deches taking place after 1992. Exits from parole have exceeded entries to 

parole every year from 1989 to the present. Thus, while Three Strikes is statistically associated 

with major changes in parole in Washington, the policy’s implementation seems to have 

followed the onset of substantial changes. s. 

63 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
.- 

Figure 10: Parole Population, Entries, and Exits in Washington, 1986-1997 

(Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Correctional Populations in the United States. 199 1 data 

for entries and exits unavailable) 

12000 

10000 

8000 

6000 

4000 

2000 

0 

-Parole Population 

1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 

.*. 

Impacts on Percentage of Prisoners over Age 50, Deaths, and Suicides Among Inmates 

The following analyses examine whether the presence of Three Strikes and TIS is 

associated with an increase in the percentage of prison population over age 50 or increases in 

deaths or suicides among inmates. Critics have argued that laws like Three Strikes would 

increase the number of older offenders in prison, at periods of their criminal careers when their 

risks of recidivism are lowest, thus leading to inefficient use of prison resources, especially in the 

long run. Offenders who are eligible to be sentenced under Three Strikes are likely to be older, 

because of the time that it would have taken to have accumulate two prior serious offenses (and 

in many states, to have served two prior sentences). Inmates sentenced under Three Strikes and 

TIS also stay longer, and over time this may lead to increases in the percentage of prison 

64 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
population over age 50, and even a higher mortality rate among prisoners. Three Strikes and 

Truth in Sentencing inmates, who face long prison terms with little hope of sentence reductions, 

may experience feelings of desperation, causing them to act out against other inmates, staff, or 

themselves. 

Changes in the proportion of inmates over 50 and rates of death that are related to aging 

are unlikely to be observed in the short run, especially because most violent or serious offenders 

who have been convicted under Three Strikes or Truth in Sentencing since most of the laws were 

- 

passed around 1994 probably would have been required to spend at least three years in prison 

even in the absence of the policies. Changes in these variables are more likely to be observed 

when prisoners who would have been freed before Three Strikes or TIS will have to remain 

behind bars as a consequence of these policies. 

With that in mind, it is not surprising to find that there were no observable changes in 

death rates among prisoners, and none in the expected direction for suicide rates or the 

proportion of inmates over age 50. Growth in the latter variable actually seems to have declined 

about 10.6 percent more each year following the adoption of Three Strikes and TIS in California. 

This might be due to a need to release certain inmates to make room for those with mandatory 

F. 

sentences. The inmates who are most likely to be released would be those with the lowest risk of 

reoffending, and those who are older generally fall into that category. The suicide rate trend 

seems to be about 9 percent lower in post-TIS years, which is an inexplicable outcome. One 

explanation might simply be that the very low numbers of suicide in general (many states report 

none or single digits in several years) make this variable highly susceptible to randomly 

occurring fluctuations; therefore analyses based on this variable may not be very meaningful. 

65 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 12: Impacts on Average Age of Population~~~, Deaths and Suicides of Inmates (all 

dependent variables natural-log transformed) 

Coefficient 

(S.E. in parentheses) 

% of Prison Suicide Rate 

* significant at pc0.10 Population Over Death Rate per per 1000 

** significant at pc0.05 Age 50 1000 Prisoners Prisoners 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law 1.4% 0.7% -4.0% 

(1.7%) (2.4%) (3.6%) 

Trend in Three Strikes states after law -10.6%** 17.4% 3.4% 

(4.7%) (14.5%) (19.3%) 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes & TIS -3.9% -9.0% -5.5% 

(6.8%) (9.2%) (10.8%) 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes & TIS 11.4% 12.2% -12.5% 

(16.5%) (46.4%) (54.5%) 

(8.7%) (28.0%) (33.4%) 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes & TIS -6.0% -27.0% -3 1.4% 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after TIS 

Trend in TIS states before law 

Trend in TIS%tates after law 

Employment rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Constant 

R-squared within 

10.0% -18.5% -90.5% 

(15.2%) (43.4%) (64.4%) 

(dropped) 28.6% 53.1% 

(42.3%) (55.1%) 

2.4%" 1.6% 0.7% 

(1.2%) (2.0%) (3.0%) 

~ -1.4% 

(2.3%) 

2.3%* 

(1.4%) 

1.4% 

(2.7%) 

0.33 

(0.66) 

0.2 1 

1.9% 

(3.9%) 

(3.4%) 

-38.4% ** 

(8.3%) 

(1.3) 

0.08 

6.3% * 

2.4 * 

-9.2% * 

(5.5%) 

-4.5% 

(5.2%) 

-19.1% 

(14.0%) 

2.9 

(2.0) 

0.10 

Number of Observations (n) 425 520 372 

45 Data for this variable were only available for years 1990-1997. Because Washington adopted TIS in 1990, there 

were no pre-TIS data points for Washington; therefore the Washington post-TIS trend variable was dropped from 

the analysis. 

66 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Impacts on Offense Composition of Admissions to Prison 

As shown in Table 13 below, states that would later choose to adopt Three Strikes had a 

slightly (1.2 percent) higher baseline growth rate in the proportion of property offenders among 

their new prison admissions, but the adoption of Three Strikes laws nationally, in California, and 

in Washington has not led to any noticeable impacts on the composition of inmates admitted to 

prison, States that eventually adopted TIS had slightly faster baseline rates of growth in their 

proportions of both violent and property offenders (1.4% and 0.6% faster, respectively) among 

- 

prison admi~sions.~~ Theproportion of property offenders entering prison declined about 1 % 

faster after the law’s passage. This slight decrease in the proportion of property offenders was 

the only significant effect of Three Strikes on offender composition that had been expected. 

With regard to the proportion of drug offenders among prison admissions, no significant 

differences before policy adoption, or changes after policy adoption, were observed that 

separated the trends in Three Strikes or TIS states from those in other states at the national level, 

and no effects were detected in In Washington, the proportion of drug offenders 

among new admissions was growing about 14 percent faster than the national trend before the 

state adopted Three Strikes. The post-3 Strikes trend in Washington has a negative but 

statistically non-significant coefficient, but the post-TIS trend in Washington was significantly 

lower than the national trend by about 12 percent. As violent and serious offenders served 

longer proportions of their prison sentences, Washington State may have had to reduce the 

number of drug offenders who were kept in prison. 

46 Aside from violent, property, and drug offenses, other categories of offenses included parole and probation 

violation, certain white collar crimes, vice, public order offenses, driving while intoxicated, weapons offenses, sex 

offenses other than rape, escape from custody, flight to avoid prosecution and several other types of felonies. 

The dependent variable used was the proportion of prison admissions whose most serious offense was a drug 

offense of any type. Total drug offenses included both possession and trafficking of marijuana, cocaindcrack, 

heroin, and other controlled substances. Possession and trafficking could not be analyzed separately because many 

states did not appear to report these offenses separately. 

41 

67 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 13: Summary of Calculated Percentage Impacts of Three Strikes and TIS on 

Proportion of Violent, Property, and Drug Offenders Among New Prison Admissions 

Coefficient (S.E. in parentheses) 

-~ 

% Violent % Property 

* significant at p<O.lO Offenders Among Offenders Among % Drug Offenders 

** significant at ~~0.05 Admissions Admissions Among Admissions 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law -0.1% 1.2% ** 0.8% 

Trend in Three Strikes states after law 0.9% 2.3% 1.1% 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes or TIS -1.7% -0.9% -2.1% 

0.8% -2.6% 3.6% -- 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes and TIS 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes -7.5% -4.1% 13.7% ** 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes -5.6% -3.3% -4.8% 

Trend in WA after TIS 10.7% 6.5% -12.2% * 

Trend in TIS states before TIS 1.4% ** 0.6% * 0.1% 

Trend in TIS states after TIS 0.3% -1.2% * 1.8% 

Employment Rate -1.9% ** -1.1%** 0.7% 

% of population ages 18-24 2.1% -3.8% ** 3.6% 

R-squared within 0.19 0.65 0.57 

Number of Observations (n) 43 1 430 433 

Overall, Three Strikes was not associated with any significant changes in the offense 

composition of inmates entering prison nationally, in California, or in Washington; and Truth in 

Sentencing was only associated with a decrease in drug offenders in Washington and a very 

slight decline in property offenders nationwide. The lack of substantial impacts of these two 

policies on the offense composition of inmates admitted to prison is not an entirely surprising 

finding. While laws like Truth in Sentencing and Three Strikes were intended, in part, to 

increase the proportion of violent offenders in prisons, they probably do not affect the arrest and 

prosecution of violent offenders, and therefore do not change the “mix” of inmates entering 

prison. As violent offenders serve longer mandatory sentences, the composition of inmates who 

are released may include proportionately more property offenders, and as a result, the percentage 

of violent offenders among the “standing populations” in prisons may increase. Unfortunately, 

68 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
appropriate time-series data were not available for the offense composition of standing prison 

populations, or for release populations, at the time of this report’s ~ompletion.~~ 

Summary and Conclusions 

“Three Strikes and You’re Out” and “Truth in Sentencing” were adopted by many states 

- in the 1990s. They can be viewpd as part of a national trend to “get tough on crime.” Both of 

the laws were intended to ascertain that certain offenders would spend more time behind bars. 

Three Strikes is present in 24 states; TIS has been adopted by 27 states. The laws were passed 

against the backdrop of rapid growth in incarceration throughout the nation. 

While Three Strikes laws share a common name, there is a great deal of variance from 

state to state in the specific nature of the laws. California has, by far, the nation’s most wideranging and frequently-used Three Strikes policy. In four years, California sentenced over 

40,000 offenders under either the “two strikes” or “three strikes” provision of its law. 

Truth in Sentencing is designed to ensure that parole and other forms of early release are 

severely curtailed for violent offenders. In most states, TIS laws require that violent offenders 

spend at least 85 percent of their sentences behind bars. TIS is heavily promoted by the federal 

government. 

Using a more extensive dataset and more rigorous methodology than previous studies 

analyzing Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing, this study examined the impacts of these two 

laws on correctional populations in the U.S. as a whole, and in the states of California and 

Washington. Pooled time-series analysis was used to determine the impacts of these policy 

Eventually, the author hopes to combine NCRP release data with admissions data for the corresponding years, to 48 

better assess the potential impacts on inmate populations. 

69 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
interventions, while controlling for variables such as national trends, pre-existing trends, and 

selected demographic and economic factors. 

As summarized in Figures 11 and 12 below, Three Strikes was found to have no 

statistically significant nationwide impacts on any of the dependent variables that were studied, 

except for exits from parole, which appeared to grow about 8.7 percent faster after the law was 

implemented. These findings are not surprising, since the Three Strikes laws passed in most 

states are seldom used, or not used at all. In two-thirds of the states that have a Three Strikes 

I 

policy, it was applied in a dozen or fewer cases by August, 1998. Furthermore, in most of these 

jurisdictions, the Three Strikes law did not differ greatly from pre-existing policy. In the tables 

below, the light gray striped bars correspond to coefficients that are not statistically significant, 

the solid light gray bars represent statistical significance at p=10%, and the coefficients depicted 

by the solid dark gray bars are significant at p=5%. 

70 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
.- 

-9.8% 

-8.8% 

-6.8% 

-9.4% 

-9.3% 

-0.7% 

Figure 11: Changes in Trends in Volume and Flow of Correctional Populations Associated 

with 3 Strikes Nationwide 

1 

1 

10.9% 

Dlncarceration Rate 

OCertainty of Imprisonment 

OEstimated Time Served 

ONew Admissions Rate 

ONew Court Commitments 

OTotal Releases 

0 Conditional Releases 

DParole Population 

OEntries to Parole 

MExits from Parole’ 

0.2% I 

7-l 1.2% 

sig. at p <IO% -15% -10% -5 yo 0 Yo 5% 10% 15% 

71 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Figure 12: Changes in Trends in Age, Deaths, Suicides of Prison Inmates and Offense 

Composition of Prison Admissions Associated with 3 Strikes Nationwide 

ODeath 

DAge of Prison Population 

Rate among Inmates 

-10.6% 1 

OSuicide Rate among Inmates 

Doh Violent Offenders among New Admissions 

0% Property Offenders among New Admissions 

0% Drug Offenders among New Admissions 

I 1 

I 17.4% 

3.4% ? 0.9 Yo 

2.3% 

1 .l % 

I 1 = not significant 1 -20% -1 0% 0% 10% 20% 

The analysis also found that states that adopted Three Strikes had some significant preexisting difference; from non-adopting states, as ihown in Table 14 below. While the 

incarceration rate was already growing more slowly before the adoption of Three Strikes, the 

proportion of those entering prison who were property offenders was growing slightly more 

rapidly. In addition, the flow of offenders through the parole system was greater. Entries to 

parole were growing 3.5 percent faster, and exits were increasing 0.7 percent faster, leading to a 

2.6 percent more rapid annual rate of growth in the parole population in states that would later 

pass Three Strikes. 

72 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 14: Differences in Trends Associated with 3 Strikes Nationwide 

-- 

Before After 

Dependent Variable 3 Strikes 3 Strikes 

Incarceration Rate ’ -0.7% ** 0.2% 

”Certainty” of Imprisonment -0.2% -9.8% 

Estimated Time Served - 1.4% 10.9% 

New Admissions Rate 1.2% -8.8% 

New Court Commitments 0.4% -6.8% 

Total Releases 1.4% -9.4% 

Conditional Releases 2.5% -9.3% 

Parole Population 2.6% ** -0.7% 

Entries to Parole 3.5% ** 1.2% 

Exits from Parole 0.7% 8.7% * 

Age of Prison Population 1.4% ** -10.6% 

Death Rate among Inmates 0.7% 17.4% 

% Violent Offenders among New Admissions -0.1 % 0.9% 

% Property Offenders among New Admissions 1.2% ** 2.3% 

Suicide Rate among Inmates -4.0% 3.4% 

% Drug Offenders among New Admissions 0.8% 1.1% 

Figures 13 and 14 below show the changes associated with Three Strikes in the state of 

Washington. Washington’s Three Strikes law was the first such policy passed in the United 

States, and it has been used moderately. One hundred and twenty one offenders were convicted 

under Washington’s Three Strikes in the first fivgyears of its implementation. Although this rate i. 

of usage places Washington among the five states with most frequent application of Three 

Strikes, the law’s effects have been very modest there. No observed changes were found in any 

of three measures of incarceration (incarceration rate, “certainty,” or “severity”), nor were any 

changes in the flow of prison admissions or releases detected. There were no discernable 

changes in the composition of prison populations or new admissions. However, the analysis did 

indicate that large declines in the number of inmates entering and exiting parole were associated 

with the presence of Three Strikes in Washington. Upon closer examination, however (as 

73 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
illustrated in Figure 10 earlier), it appears that the onset of these declines preceded the 

implementation of Three Strikes in that state.49 

Figure 13: Changes in Trends in the Volume and Flow of Correctional Populations 

Associated with 3 Strikes in Washington 

0 Incarceration Rate 

UCertainty of imprisonment 

DEstimated Time Served 

ONew Admissions Rate 

ONew Court Commitments 

OTotal Releases 

OConditional Releases 

Parole Pop uta tio n 

-5 .a 70 rl 

-6.0% 

-34.1 % 

21.7% 

16.7% 

23.5% 

-4.3 % 

-1 9.1 % d 

.Entries to Parole" -69.8% 

-1 10.5% Exits from Parole" 

-120% -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 

"''''~'' 

Furthermore, the coefficient on "exits from parole" produces an unrealistic decline of more than 100%. This in 

likely to be due to the fact that the actual relationship between the dependent and independent variables analyzed 

here is not accurately captured by the functional form used in the model. Logarithmic functions deviate from linear 

trends the most at values far from the average; in Washington, the changes in the variables representing parole 

entries and exits were unusually extreme. 

49 

74 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
-- 

Figure 14: Changes in Trends in Age, Deaths, Suicides of Prison Inmates and Offense 

Composition of Prison Admissions Associated with 3 Strikes in Washington 

OAge of Prison Population 

ODeath Rate among inmates -1 8.5% r 

ClSuicide 

0% 

among 

in m 

Violent Offenders 

a tes 

New 

Rate 

Admissions 

among 

' 

i 

e 

0% Property Offenders 

among New Admissions 

0% Drug Offenders among 

New Admissions 

i -5.6 % 

i -3.3% 

L -4.8% 

-1 1 I I 

10.0% 1 

~ = sig. at p <IO% -100% -75% -50% -25% 0% 

I 

25% 

Before adopting Three Strikes, the trends in Washington did appear to be quite different 

from those in othef states. Estimated time served-in prison was growing 5 1% less annually than 

elsewhere, and while admissions to prison (both total and new court commitments to prison) 

were growing much more rapidly than in other states, releases (total and conditional releases) 

were growing correspondingly, suggesting that inmates may have been serving shorter sentences 

in general. These factors may have encouraged lawmakers to change sentencing policies. 

Entries to parole were also growing significantly slower, which seems to suggest that those being 

conditionally released were going to some form of supervision other than parole. The number 

and flow of parolees in Washington declined dramatically from its peak in 1988 to the present. 

75 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
-- 

Table 15: Differences in Trends Associated with 3 Strikes in Washington 

Before After 

Dependent Variable 3 Strikes & TIS 3 Strikes 

Incarceration Rate -6.0% -5.8% 

"Certainty" of Imprisonment -0.8% -6.0% 

Estimated Time Served -5 1.2% ** -34.1% 

New Admissions Rate 49.3% ** 2 1.7% 

New Court Commitments 71.6% ** 16.7% 

Total Releases 44.2% ** 23.5% 

Parole Population 4.2% -19.1% 

Conditional Releases 75.1%** -4.3% 

Entries to Parole -49.1 % ** -69.8% ** 

Exits from Parole 21.3% -1 10.5% ** 

Age of Prison Population -6.0% * 10.0% 

Death Rate among Inmates -27.0% -18.5% 

Suicide Rate among Inmates -3 1.4% -90.5% 

% Violent Offenders among New Admissions -7.5% -5.6% 

% Property Offenders among New Admissions -4.1% -3.3% 

% Drug Offenders among New Admissions 13.7% ** -4.8% 

Since it has been so frequently applied compared to other policies by the same name, 

California's Three Strikes law might be expected to have more influence on the volume and 

composition of correctional populations than the national policy. Before the law's adoption, 

P. 

many scholars predicted that the impacts on the correctional system could be overwhelming and 

prohibitively expensive. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising to find that following the 

concurrent implementation of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing in California, there were no 

statistically significant changes in the trends of any of the variables examined in this study, 

except for an 11.4% faster growth rate in the proportion of prison populations over the age of 50. 

This one change was in the expected direction, since offenders with multiple strikes tend to be 

older." Figures 15 and 16 below illustrate the magnitude and direction of the estimated changes 

in the sixteen dependent variables that were analyzed, but since none of the corresponding 

"On the other hand, it is probably too early for the extra time served in prison due to Three Strikes and TIS to have 

increased the proportion of prisoner over age 50 by a substantial amount. 

76 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
coefficients except the proportion over age 50 was statistically significant even at the 10% level, 

ONew Court Commitments -20.8% 

OTotal Releases 

OConditional Releases 

OParole Population 

OEntries to Parole 

OExits from Parole 

-8.3% 

-9.9% 

-1 5.5% 

we ought to have very low confidence in the accuracy of most of these estimated parameters. 

15.1% 

23.7% 

"""" 

Figure 15: Changes in Trends in Volume and Flow of Correctional Populations Associated 

with 3 Strikes and TIS in California ~~ 

Olncarceration Rate 

DCertainty of Imprisonment 

h 0.9% 

1-13 o .2 % 

5.5% 

OEstimated Time Served -+4.6% 

ONew Admissions Rate 

77 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
-- 

Figure 16: Changes in Trends in Age, Deaths, Suicides of Prison Inmates and Offense 

Composition of Prison Admissions Associated with 3 Strikes and TIS in California 

OAge of Prison Population" 

DDeath Rate among Inmates 

OSuicide Rate among Inmates -1 2.5% 

El% Violent Offenders among 

New Admissions 

0% Property Offenders among 

New Admissions 

0% Drug Offenders among 

New Admissions 

I 112.2% 

4l 

-2.6% 

0.8% 4 ti 3.6% 

-20% -1 0% 0 % 10% 20% 

Although the analysis found no changes in post-adoption trends associated with Three 

rc? 

Strikes and TIS in California, the trends in California did have some distinguishing 

characteristics before these policies were adopted. As shown in Table 16 below, estimated time 

served in prison was already about 12% lower annually in California, while the two measures of 

admissions to prison, new admissions and new court commitments, were about 12 and 13 percent 

above the national trends each year. The phenomenon of more offenders going to prison for 

shorter lengths of time may have been one of the factors that motivated California's voters and 

legislators to support the passage of Three Strikes. 

78 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
.- 

Table 15: Differences in Trends Associated with 3 Strikes and Truth in Sentencing in 

California 

Before After 

Dependent Variable 3 Strikes & TIS 3 Strikes & TIS 

Incarceration Rate - 1 .O% ** -0.4% 

“Certainty” of Imprisonment -5.3% ** -10.5% ** 

Estimated Time Served -1.0% -0.7% 

New Admissions Rate -0.6% 1.1% 

Total Releases -0.5% 1.8% 

Conditional Releases - 1.2% 4.3% 

Entries to Parole -0.7% -2.1 % 

Exits from Parole -0.6% 0.0% 

Death Rate among Inmates 1.6% 1.9% 

% Property Offenders among New Admissions 0.6% * -1.2% * 

% Drug Offenders among New Admissions 0.1% 1.8% 

New Court Commitments -0.1% -0.3% 

Parole Population 0.8% -0.5% 

Age of Prison Population -3.9% 11.4% ** 

Suicide Rate among Inmates 0.7% -9.2% * 

% Violent Offenders among New Admissions 1.4% ** 0.3% 

The lack of substantial change in incarceration rates associated with “Three Strikes and 

You’re Out” is somewhat unexpected, especially in California, where over 50,000 prisoners have 

been sentenced to date under this policy. The lack of an effect may be due in part to relatively 

steep recent declines in crime rates in California (which may or may not be related to these 

policies), adaptation to the law by prosecutors, judges, and other participants in the criminal 

justice system, or the longer-term nature of most of the expected impacts of the policy change. 

Because many of the repeat offenders sentenced under Three Strikes would also have been 

sentenced to prison terms even in the absence of the law, a few more years may need to pass 

before the impacts of the longer mandatory sentences can be fully observed. 

Furthermore, it may be difficult to link effects specifically to Three Strikes in California 

or other states because a variety of major sentencing reforms were being adopted throughout the 

nation at about the same time that Three Strikes laws were being passed. Other policy changes, 

79 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
such as the abolition of parole, the passage of other mandatory sentencing laws, the construction 

of more correctional facilities, or the use of private prisons, may have caused prison populations 

to grow dramatically in states without Three Strikes policies. There is strong evidence for this: 

throughout the United States, incarceration rates have increased rapidly and steeply, especially in 

1994 through 1997, as states passed many different policy measures in efforts to “get tough on 

crime.” Concurrent interventions in other states that resulted in similar effects could 

“camouflage” any impacts that Three Strikes might have produced. 

-_ 

The national effects of Truth in Sentencing are illustrated below in Figures 17 and 18. 

Most of the coefficients summarized in these two tables are small and not statistically significant. 

Unexpectedly, the conditional probability of going to prison given a felony disposition appeared 

to have 10.5% slower growth each post-TIS year. Since TIS was not designed to have an impact 

on certainty of imprisonment, and since differences already existed before the adoption of TIS, it 

is likely that this apparent effect is a reflection of underlying differences in sentencing 

approaches between TIS and non-TIS states. This is somewhat confirmed by the finding (shown 

in Table 16 below) that the pre-TIS trend in states that later adopted Truth in Sentencing was 

** 

also significantly slower. Another unexpected finding, significant at the 10% level but not at 

5%, was a decline in the suicide rate among inmates of about 9 percent each post-TIS year. 

There does not appear to be any obvious explanation for this finding; however, the very low 

suicide rates in general make this variable more susceptible to random fluctuations, and therefore 

less reliable, than most of the others used in this study. 

The final statistically significant coefficient corresponded to a change in the proportion of 

new admissions sent to prison for a property crime. This trend declined 1.2 percent, a very 

modest amount. Given capacity limits, a law that keeps violent offenders behind bars for more 

80 

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of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
-- 

time could reasonably result in a need to divert less serious offenders to some alternative form of 

punishment . 

Figure 17: Changes in Trends in Volume and Flow of Correctional Populations Associated 

with TIS Nationwide 

Olncarceration Rate 

-0.4 % 

OEstimated lime Served 

ONew Admissions Rate 

ONew Court Commitments 

OTotal Releases 

OConditional Releases 

OParole Population 

OEntries to Parole 

-0.7% L 

-0.3 % 

-0.5% 

-2.1 % 

0.0% 

1 .l % 1 

1.8% 

4.3% 

OExits from Parole 

I 

-1 0% -5 % 0% -1 5% 

= sig. at p <IO% 

2. 

81 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Figure 18: Changes in Trends in Age, Deaths, Suicides of Prison Inmates and Offense 

Composition of Prison Admissions Associated with TIS Nationwide 

1.9% 

OAge of Prison Population 

-1.4% 

ODeath Rate among Inmates 

EJSuicide Rate among -9.2% In mates. 

0% Violent Offenders among 

New Admissions 

&I% Property Offenders 

among New Admissions. 

0% Drug Offenders among 

New Admissions 

=rig. at p <IO% 

0 = not significant 

-1.2% 

1 .E% 

-1 0% -5 % 0% 5% 

Did states that later adopted Truth in Sentencing have pre-existing differences from states 

that chose not to pass the law? In addition to the differences in the “certainty” of incarceration 

described above, the rate of incarceration was also growing slightly less rapidly in the states that 

would eventually pass TIS. The proportion of new admissions to prison who were violent 

offenders was growing 1.4% faster, and the proportion who were property offenders was also 

increasing faster, but very slightly so (0.6%). These observations, taken together, may suggest 

that the states that were to pass Truth in Sentencing, had somewhat better control over the 

growth and composition of their prison populations, even before TIS was implemented. This 

hypothesis finds some support in the fact that TIS states are also more likely to have sentencing 

guidelines, as determined in a separate analysis. 

82 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 16: Differences in Trends Associated with TIS Nationwide 

Dependent Variable Before TIS After TIS 

Incarceration Rate - 1 .O%** -0.4% 

"Certainty" of Imprisonment -5.3 % ** - 10.5%** 

Estimated Time Served - 1 .O% -0.7% 

New Admissions Rate -0.6% 1.1% 

New Court Commitments -0.1% -0.3% 

Total Releases -0.5% 1.8% 

Conditional Releases -1.2% 4.3% 

Parole Population 0.8% -0.5% 

Entries to Parole -0.7% -2.1 % 

Exits from Parole -0.6% 0.0% 

Age of Prison Population 2.4% -1.4% 

Death Rate among Inmates 1.6% 1.9% 

% Property Offenders among New Admissions 0.6%* - 1.2%* 

Suicide Rate among Inmates 0.7% -9.2%* 

% Violent Offenders among New Admissions 1 A%** 0.3% 

% Drug Offenders among New Admissions 0.1% 1.8% 

The state of Washington was an early adopter of Truth in Sentencing, implementing its 

policy in 1990, several years before the federal government began to offer substantial monetary 

incentives to encourage states to pass TIS laws. This might be one reason why the impacts of 

TIS on corrections in Washington appear to exceed those found nationally, or in California, 

where Truth in Sentencing was passed in 1994. 

3. 

As shown in Figures 19 and 20 and Table 17 below, many statistically significant effects 

appear to be associated with Truth in Sentencing in Washington. After the law's adoption, the 

incarceration rate grew about 11 % faster each year. The growth in estimated time served 

changed from well below the trend in other states (-51.2%) to well above it (+71.4%), and with 

dramatic declines in all of the measures of admissions and releases, the flow of inmates into and 

out of prison slowed dramatically. All of these results seem to indicate that Truth in Sentencing 

was having many of its intended effects by seven years after its adoption. The results may also 

foreshadow some potential future impacts in other Truth in Sentencing states, which passed their 

laws after Washington did. 

83 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
.- 

Figure 19: Changes in Trends in Volume and Flow of Correctional Populations Associated 

with TIS in Washington ~~ ~ 

Inca rce ra ti0 n Rate** 

OCertainty of Imprisonment 

.Estimated Time Served" 

.New Admissions Rate" 

=New Court Commitments 

T o ta f Re le a re so* 

=Conditional Releases" 

I Parole Population** 

OEntries to Parole 

t. 

1 

b- 1 1 .1 Yo 

I 126.6% 

71 .4% 

30.9% 

-2.6% 

OExits from Parole 

-1 00% -50% 0 % 50% 100% 

Figure 20: Changes in Trends in Age, Deaths, Suicides of Prison Inmates and Offense 

Composition of Prison Admissions Associated with TIS in Washington 

OAge of Prison Population 

ODeath Rate among Inmates 

1 

(variable dropped) 

28.6% 

1 DSuicide Rate among Inmates 53.1 % I 

0% Violent Ollenders among 

New Ad m iss io ns 

0% Property Offenders 

among New Admissions 

10.7% K 6.5% 

R!3% Drug Offenders among -12**% 

New 

= slg. 

Admissions' 

at p 40% -2 0 

I 

% 0 % 20% 40% 60% 

84 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table 17: Differences in Trends Associated with TIS in Washington 

Before 

Dependent Variable 3 Strikes & TIS After TIS 

"Certainty" of Imprisonment -0.8% 26.6% 

Estimated Time Served -51.2%** 7 1.4%** 

New Admissions Rate 49.3%** -62.3 % * * 

Incarceration Rate -6.0% 11.1%** 

New Court Commitments 71.6%** -84.3%** 

Total Releases 44.2%** -59.3%** 

Conditional Releases 75.1 %** -80.8%** 

Parole Population 4.2% -46.5%** 

Entries to Parole -49.1 %** 30.9% 

Exits from Parole 21.3% -2.6% 

Age of Prison Population -6.0%* (dropped) 

Death Rate among Inmates -27.0% 28.6% 

Suicide Rate among Inmates -3 1.4% 53.1% 

% Violent Offenders among New Admissions -7.5% 10.7% 

% Property Offenders among New Admissions -4.1% 6.5% 

% Drug Offenders among New Admissions 13.7%** -12.2%* 

.- 

Like Three Strikes laws, Truth in Sentencing laws, on the whole, have also had negligible 

national impacts on prison incarceration rates and time served. One reason for a lack of 

observed effects i~~probably the fact that TIS laws do not affect the number of offenders 

receiving prison sentences, but only extends the proportion of time served for already-imposed 

sentences. Thus, the law's impacts will only begin to be noticeable towards the middle or end of 

existing sentences. Since the law is aimed primarily at violent offenders, who would have 

received relatively long sentences, this additional time spent in prison may not yet have begun 

for most TIS inmates. Another reason for a lack of impacts may be an apparent loophole in the 

law. While it requires that a fixed percentage of sentences be spent in prison, the law does not 

prevent judges from reducing sentences so that the actual time served remains essentially 

unchanged. Finally, the lack of publicity about TIS probably diminishes any deterrent effect it 

may have had. 

85 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
In summary, both Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing appear to have had few 

observable short-term impacts on the volume or composition of correctional populations, but 

there appears to be evidence of a longer-tern effect of Truth in Sentencing in a state that passed 

the law earlier than most other states did. Whether these impacts are unique to the state of 

Washington is unclear. 

The lack of observed impacts on most of the dependent variables selected for analysis 

-- 

here does not necessarily indicate a failure of Three Strikes or Truth in Sentencing. The impacts 

of these policy interventions may not have developed fully yet. Over time, continued 

examination of the questions explored here, using methods such as those developed for this 

study, may shed more light on the effects of these two popular sentencing policies. 

86 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
References 

Ainsworth, Bill. 1998. “Lungren polishes role as anti-crime crusader; Says ‘get-tough’ policies 

are working statewide.” The San Diego Union-Tribune, February 3, 1998. 

Anderson, David C. 1994. “The Crime Funnel.” The New York Times, June 12, 1994. 

Austin, James. 1994. “ ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’: The Likely Consequences on the Courts, 

Prisons, and Crime in California and Washington State.” 14 St. Louis University Public Law 

Review 1: 239-268. 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

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of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

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90 

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of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

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.=. 

93 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Appendix A: Additional Detailed Tables 

Table Al: Full Results from Regression Model with Incarceration Rate as Dependent 

Variable, Including Year Fixed Effects5' 

~~ ~~ ~~ 

Incarceration Rate Coefficient P>ltl 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law 

Trend in Three Strikes states after law 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes & TIS 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after TIS 

Trend in TIS states before law 

Trend in TIS states after law 

Employment rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Capacity 

Year Fixed Effect for 1987 

Year Fixed Effect for 1988 

Year Fixed Effect for 1989 

Year Fixed Effect for 1990 

Year Fixed Effect for 1991 

Year Fixed Effect for 1992 

Year Fixed Effect for 1993 

Year Fixed Effect for 1994 

Year Fixed Effect for 1995 

Year Fixed Effect for 1996 

Year Fixed Effect for 1997 

-0.7% ** 

0.2% 

1.2% 

0.9% 

-6.0% ** 

-5.8% ** 

11.1% 

-1.0% ** 

-0.4% ** 

0.6% 

-1.7% ** 

0.0% ** 

4.9% ** 

9.3% ** 

20.6% ** 

26.5% ** 

32.9% ** 

37.6% ** 

4 1.8% ** 

47.5% ** 

52.8% ** 

59.5% ** 

66.0% ** 

0.039 

0.896 

0.319 

0.832 

0.109 

0.218 

0.048 

0.000 

0.379 

0.075 

0.027 

0.000 

0.021 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

Constant 492.8% ** 0.000 ~.. 

Year fixed effects represent the difference in the slope in the corresponding year, 

compared to the slope of the dependent variable in 1986, the baseline year. For example, the 

incarceration rate was growing 66% faster in 1996 than it was in 1986. 

5' The year fixed effects shown here are the coefficients corresponding to dummy variables for each of the years. 

Here, they represent the percentage difference in the corresponding year, compared to 1986, which was the baseline 

year (not assigned a dummy variable). 

94 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table A2: Impacts on “Certainty,” Calculated as New Prison Admissions Divided By 

Felony Dispositions (dependent variables not natural-log transformed) 

New Prison Admissions per Felony 

Disposition Coefficient P> It[ 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law 

Trend in Three Strikes states after law 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes or TIS 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes and TIS 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after TIS 

Trend in TIS states before TIS 

Trend in TIS states after TIS 

Employment Rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Capacity 

Constant 

R-sauared (within) 

0.00 0.915 

0.00 

-0.02 0.459 

0.03 

0.01 0.421 

0.02 

0.04 0.645 

0.09 

0.00 0.973 

0.05 

-0.01 0.867 

0.08 

0.05 0.534 

0.08 

-0.01 ** 0.005 

0.00 

-0.02 ** 0.006 

0.01 

0.00 0.913 

0.01 

0.05 ** 0.002 

0.02 

0.00 0.588 

0.00 

-0.38 ** 0.058 

0.20 

0.10 

i 

95 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Table A3: Impacts on Percentage of Violent, Property, and Drug Offenders Among Prison 

Admissions (all dependent variables not natural-log transformed) 

9% Violent % Property % Drug 

Offenders A Offenders Offenders 

mong Among Among 

Admissions P>ltl Admissions P>ltl Admissions P>ltl 

Trend in Three Strikes states before law 

' Trend in Three Strikes states after law 

- __ 

Trend in CA before 3 Strikes or TIS 

Trend in CA after 3 Strikes and TIS 

Trend in WA before 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Trend in WA after TIS 

Trend in TIS states before TIS 

Trend in TIS states after TIS 

-. 

Employment Rate 

% of population ages 18-24 

Constant 

-0.03 

0.13 

0.18 

0.53 

-0.38 

0.42 

0.17 

1.49 

-1.97 

1.29 

- 1.55 

1.63 

2.5 1 

1.94 

0.28 ** 

0.10 

0.07 

0.20 

-0.39 ** 

0.16 

0.43 

0.40 

37.45 ** 

6.90 

0.849 

0.736 

0.367 

0.907 

0.129 

0.341 

0.195 

0.004 

0.737 

0.015 

0.283 

0.000 

0.29 ** 

0.1 1 

0.56 

0.44 

-0.2 I 

0.34 

-0.60 

1.23 

-0.75 

1.07 

-0.55 

I .35 

1.12 

1.60 

0.16* 

0.08 

-0.30 

0.17 

-0.28 ** 

0.13 

-0.94 ** 

0.33 

5.5.60 ** 

5.70 

0.008 

0.201 

0.547 

0.625 

0.481 

0.683 

0.486 

0.05 1 

0.075 

0.03 1 

0.004 

0.000 

0.19 0.261 

0.17 

0.25 0.716 

0.69 

-0.70 0.196 

0.54 

1.20 0.536 

1.94 

4.46** 0.009 

1.69 

-1.76 0.408 

2.13 

-4.54* 0.074 

2.53 

0.02 0.854 

0.13 

0.41 0.122 

0.26 

0.16 0.428 

0.2 1 

0.84 0.106 

0.52 

-2.34 0.796 

9.01 

R-squared (within) 0.19 0.65 0.57 

96 

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has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Appendix B: Methodology for Calculating Percentage Changes in 

Non-Logged Dependent Variables 

Percentage changes in all dependent variables that were not natural-log transformed were 

calculated by dividing the numerator in the left-hand column of the table below by the 

corresponding denominator listed in the table below. 

~~ 

Numerator Denominator 

Coefficient on Trend in Three Strikes states before law 

Coefficient on Trend in Three Strikes states after law 

Coefficient on Trend in CA before 3 Strikes or TIS 

Coefficient on Trend in CA after 3 Strikes and TIS 

Coefficient on Trend in WA before 3 Strikes 

Coefficient on Trend in WA after 3 Strikes 

Coefficient on Trend in WA after TIS 

coefficient on Trend in TIS states before TIS 

Coefficient on Trend in TIS states after TIS 

Coefficient on Employment Rate 

Coefficient on % of population ages 18-24 

Overall Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) 

Overall Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) 

Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) In CA 

Value of Dependent Variable In CA, 1994 

Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) In WA 

Value of Dependent Variable In WA, 1993 

Value of Dependent Variable In WA, 1990 

Overall Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) 

Overall Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) 

Overall Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) 

Overall Mean of Dependent Variable (All Years) 

97 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Appendix C: Data Descriptions and Sources 

Variable Definition Availability Source 

Incarceration Rate Number of inmates serving All 50 states, all years Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

prison terms of one year or 

longer, per 100,OOO residents 

1986-1997 Prisoners in 1986 and 

corresponding reports for 

years 1987 through 1998 

"Certainty" of Calculated as New Court All 50 states, years See listings for the separate 

Imprisonment Commitments to Prison 1986- 1996 components 

divided by Number of 

Felony cases that were closed 

- Felonies Disposed 

Number of Felonies Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Disposed in the given year 1986- 1997 State Court Statistics 

Estimated Time Calculated as Total Prison All 50 states, years See listings for the separate 

Served ("Severity") Population divided by Total 1986- 1996 components 

New Admissions All inmates entering prison AI1 50 states, years Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

1986-1996 Correctional Populations in 

All 50 states, years 

Admissions to Prison 

the United States, 1986- 

1996. 

New Court Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Commitments result of a new conviction. 1986- 1996 Correctional Populations in 

the United States, 1986- 

1996. 

Inmates sent to prison as a 

Excludes prisoners readmitted 

as a result of violations terms 

of conditional release 

All 50 states, years 

Total Releases All inmates released from All 50 states, years Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

prison, for any cause, 1986-1996 

including completion of 

sentence, parole, death, and 

Correctional Populations in 

the United States, 1986- 

1996. 

escape 

Conditional Releases Inmates released to another All 50 states, years Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

form of supervision 1986-1996 Correctional Populations in 

the United States, 1986- 

1996. 

Parole Population All offenders under parole All 50 states, all years Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Populations (press release), 

and Sourcebook of Criminal 

Justice Statistics, 1986- 

1998. 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Populations (press release), 

and Sourcebook of Criminal 

Justice Statistics, 1986- 

1998. 

supervision 1986-1997 Probation and Parole 

Entries to Parole All offenders entering parole All 50 states, all years 

1986-1997 Probation and Parole 

98 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Variable Definition Availability Source 

Exits from Parole All offenders released from 

parole 1986-1997 Probation and Parole 

All 50 states, all years Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Populations (press release), 

and Sourcebook of Criminal 

Justice Statistics, 1986- 

1998. 

Percentage of Prison Data as reported by All 50 states, 1990-1997 The Corrections Yearbook, 

Population over Age 1990- 1997, published by 

50 reponse to survey Criminal Justice Institute, 

Inc. 

Death Rate among Number of inmate deaths Most states, 1986-1996 Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Inmates reported by state departments Sourcebook of Criminal 

of correcti s, divided by Justice Statistics, 1986- 

thousands r f prison inmates 

departments of corrections in 

1998. 

Suicide Rate among Number of inmate suicides Most states, 1986-1996 Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Inmates reported by state departments Sourcebook of Criminal 

of corrections, divided by Justice Statistics, 1986- 

thousands of prison inmates 1998. 

% Violent Offenders Proportion of new prison All years 1990-1997. Data compiled using 

among New admissions whose most NCRP is a voluntary National Corrections 

Admissions serious conviction was reporting program, and Reporting Program files 

murderhon-negligent approximately 36 states provided by Bureau of 

manslaughter, forcible rape, report each year. Non- Justice Statistics 

robbery, or aggravated assault reporting states vary, but 

in general they tend to be 

those with smaller 

populations. See 

Appendix D for full list. 

% Property Proportion of new prison All years 1990- 1997 Data compiled using 

Offenders among admissions whose most (see above for details). National Corrections 

New Admissions . serious conviction was Reporting Program files 

burglary, larceny-theft, or 

motor vehicle theft Justice Statistics 

provided by Bureau of 

% Drug Offenders Proportion of new prison All years 1990-1997 Data compiled using 

among New admissions whose most (see above for details). National Corrections 

Admissions serious conviction was drug Reporting Program files 

possession, drug trafficking, 

other, or unspecified drug 

offense 

provided by Bureau of 

Justice Statistics 

Three Strikes states States reporting adoption and All years 1990-1997 National Council on Crime 

Survey of State Sentencing 

implementation of "Three (see above for details). and Delinquency, 1997 

Strikes and You're Out" or 

similar habitual offender laws Structures 

by 1997 

to receive Truth in Sentencing 

grants (implementation of a 

law requiring FBI Part I 

violent offenders to serve 85% 

or more of their sentences, or 

de facto TIS policy) 

TIS states States meeting federal criteria All 50 states, 1996-1997 GAO report: Truth in 

Sentencing: Availability of 

Federal Grants Influenced 

Laws in Some States 

(February 1998) 

99 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
~~~~ 

Variable Definition Availability Source 

Employment rate Civilians employed as a All 50 states, 1996-1997 US Department of 

percent of the civilian Commerce, Bureau of the 

noninstitutional population. Census, Statistical Abstract 

of the United States 

% of population ages Inter-census data calculated All 50 states, 1996-1997 Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

18-24 by Census Bureau Sourcebook of Criminal 

Justice Statistics, 1986- 

Prison Capacity Capacities as reported to 

Bureau of Justice Statistics by 

state departments of 

correction. Please see 

Appendix E for details. 

Violent crimes defined by FBI 

as murderhon-negligent 

manslaughter, forcible rape, 

robbery, and aggravated 

Violent Crime Rate 

1998. 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Prisoners in I986 and 

corresponding reports for 

years 1987 through 1998 

All 50 states, 1996-1997 

~ ~~~ 

All 50 states, 1996-1997 FBI Uniform Crime 

Reports, published as 

Crime in the United States 

assault 

FBI as burglary, larceny, and 

motor vehicle theft 

Property Crime Rate Property crimes defined by All 50 states, 1996-1997 FBI Uniform Crime 

Reports, published as 

Crime in the United States 

100 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Appendix D: 

Corrections 

States Reporting to Bureau of Justice Statistics, National 

Reporting Program (NCRP), 1986-1997 

Denotes that state reported in given year 

# of years 

reported for 

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 thisstate 

Alabama ............ 0 

Alaska . 0 

Arizona 0 

Arkansas ......... 0 

California ............ 0 

Colorado ............ 0 

Connecticut 0 

Delaware 0.. 0 

Florida .......... 0 

Georgia .......... 0 

Hawaii ............ 0 

Idaho 0 

Illinois ............ 0 

Indiana 0 

Iowa ........... 0 

Kansas . 0 

Kentucky 0. ......... 0 

Louisiana ...... 0 

Maine . ...... 0 

Maryland ............ 0 

Massachusetts ..... .... 0 

Michigan ............ 0 

Minnesota ............ 0 

Mississippi ............ 0 

Missouri ............ 0 

Montana . 0 

Nebraska . ...... a 0 

Nevada ............ 0 

New Hampshire ............ 0 

New Jersey ............ 0 

New Mexico . 0 

New York ......... 0. 0 

North Carolina ............ 0 

North Dakota ............ 0 

Ohio ............ 0 

Oklahoma ............ 0 

Oregon ............ 0 

Pennsylvania 0.. ........ 0 

101 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
~~ 

# of years 

reported for 

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 thisstate 

Rhode Island 0. . 0 

South Carolina .... ....... 0 

South Dakota . ....... 0 

Tennessee ............ 0 

Texas 0.. ........ 0 

Utah 

Vermont 

............ 0 

0 

Virginia ............ 0 

Washington ............ 0 

West Virginia ............ 0 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming 

............ 0 

. 0 

Total states 

reporting in year 35 35 34 32 35 35 38 38 39 38 37 36 432 

102 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
Appendix E: Measures of Capacity Used for Prison Capacity Variable 

The source for all prison capacity data was the Bureau of Justice bulletin, Prisoners in 

1986, and corresponding bulletins for years 1987-1997. There are three different measures of 

capacity: design, rated, and operational. While these three measures are often the same or close, 

at times they differ considerably. States may report one or more of these measures each year. 

Unfortunately, there is a lack of consistency from state to state with regard to the measurement 

that is reported. In addition, some states do not report the same measure each year. 

Different capacity measures had to be combined to construct time-series data for use in 

the analyses. Because state fixed effects were included that captured many underlying 

differences between states, and the phenomenon of interest was the change within each state 

associated with the implementation of a new policy, the variables were selected with consistent 

time series within states in mind. 

The most frequently reported measure was operational capacity, and this variable was 

selected in all states that reported this measure in most years. Where operational capacity was 

infrequently reported, design or rated capacity was used depending on which measure was 

reported in the most years. In one state, Michigan, a combination of operational and rated 

capacity measures was used to construct the time series for the entire 12-year period studied. 

State 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

Alabama 000000000000 

Alaska R RRRRRRRRR 

Arizona 000000000000 

Arkansas 0000000000 

California D"-D D D D D*D D D D D D 

Colorado 0 0000000000 

Connecticut 000000000 

Delaware 000000000000 

Florida 000000000 00 

Georgia 00000 000 

Hawaii 0000000000 

Idaho 000000000000 

Illinois 000000000000 

Indiana RRRRRRRRRRRR 

Iowa 000000000000 

Kansas RR R RRRRRR 

Kentucky RRRRRRRRRRRR 

Louisiana 000000000000 

Maine 0000000000 0 

Maryland 000000000000 

Massachusetts DDDDDDDDDDD 

Michigan OORRRRRRROOO 

Minnesota 000000000000 

Mississippi 0000000000 

Missouri 000000000000 

103 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
State 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

Montana 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey 

New Mexico 

New York 

North Carolina 

North Dakota 

Ohio 

Oklahoma 

Pennsylvania 

Rhode Island 

South Carolina 

South Dakota 

Tennessee 

Texas 

Utah 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 

.- Oregon 

0 

D 

D 

0 

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0 

0 

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0 

Wyoming 0 - - 0 

104 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report

has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.