Headquarters United States Air Force

Reinvigorating the Air Force

Nuclear Enterprise

Prepared by the Air Force Nuclear Task Force

24 October 2008

 

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e 
Air Force Nuclear Task Force

Director

Major General C. Donald Alston

Director, Nuclear Operations, Plans, & Requirements

DCS/Operations, Plans, & Requirements

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e


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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................................1

COMMITMENT TO CHANGE ........................................................................................................................................1

STRATEGIC CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................................1

RECENT EVENTS AND RECURRING THEMES...............................................................................................................2

CHANGE IMPERATIVE ................................................................................................................................................2

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF REBUILDING THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE...............................................................3

EXTENDED DETERRENCE...........................................................................................................................................3

OBJECTIVES OF THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ROADMAP ...............................................................................................3

SUMMARY OF KEY ACTIONS .....................................................................................................................................5

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................................6

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................9

PURPOSE OF THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE ROADMAP ................................................................................9

ONGOING USAF COMMITMENTS / GLOBAL CHALLENGES / EXPECTATIONS............................................................10

CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ..........................................................................................................11

AIR FORCE COMMITMENT TO REBUILD PUBLIC TRUST ...........................................................................................11

DEFINITION OF AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE..................................................................................................12

ATTRIBUTES OF A SUCCESSFUL AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE ........................................................................12

ATROPHY OF THE USAF NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE .....................................................................................................12

ROADMAP ORGANIZATION ......................................................................................................................................13

CHAPTER SUMMARIES .............................................................................................................................................14

SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................................................................17

CHAPTER 2 — RE-ESTABLISH A CULTURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND RIGOROUS SELFASSESSMENT...........................................................................................................................................................19

PROBLEM STATEMENT.............................................................................................................................................19

SUCCESS CRITERIA AND DESIRED SUB-OBJECTIVES................................................................................................19

ROOT CAUSES..........................................................................................................................................................20

ACTION PLAN ..........................................................................................................................................................24

CHAPTER 3 — REBUILD NUCLEAR EXPERTISE ..........................................................................................29

PROBLEM STATEMENT.............................................................................................................................................29

SUCCESS CRITERIA AND DESIRED SUB-OBJECTIVES................................................................................................29

ROOT CAUSES..........................................................................................................................................................30

ACTION PLAN ..........................................................................................................................................................32

CHAPTER 4 — SUSTAINMENT............................................................................................................................37

PROBLEM STATEMENT.............................................................................................................................................37

SUCCESS CRITERIA AND DESIRED SUB-OBJECTIVES................................................................................................37

ROOT CAUSES..........................................................................................................................................................38

ACTION PLAN ..........................................................................................................................................................39

CHAPTER 5 — INVESTMENT: REQUIREMENTS, ACQUISITION, AND PROGRAMMING.................45

PROBLEM STATEMENT.............................................................................................................................................45

SUCCESS CRITERIA AND DESIRED SUB-OBJECTIVES................................................................................................45

ROOT CAUSES..........................................................................................................................................................46

ACTION PLAN ..........................................................................................................................................................48

CHAPTER 6 — ADVOCACY ACROSS THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE.................................53

PROBLEM STATEMENT.............................................................................................................................................53

SUCCESS CRITERIA AND DESIRED SUB-OBJECTIVES................................................................................................53

ROOT CAUSES..........................................................................................................................................................54

ACTION PLAN ..........................................................................................................................................................55
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CHAPTER 7 — ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES...................................................................................59

PROBLEM STATEMENT.............................................................................................................................................59

SUCCESS CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................59

SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATION................................................................................................................................63

AIR FORCE FIELD OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION......................................................................................................66

AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION ..........................................................................................................69

SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................................................................73

CHAPTER 8 — ASSESSMENT ..............................................................................................................................75

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................75

SUCCESS CRITERIA ..................................................................................................................................................75

ASSESSMENT METHOD ............................................................................................................................................75

CAPTURING LESSONS LEARNED ..............................................................................................................................77

APPENDIX 1 — SECAF & VCSAF GUIDANCE LETTERS .............................................................................A1

APPENDIX 2 — METHODOLOGY......................................................................................................................A7

APPENDIX 3 — AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT TOOL....................................A17

APPENDIX 4 — REPORT FINDINGS................................................................................................................A21

APPENDIX 5 — DEVELOPMENT OF THE AF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY ROADMAP ..........A31

APPENDIX 6 — ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................................A35

APPENDIX 7 — REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................A45

APPENDIX 8 — AIR FORCE NUCLEAR TASK FORCE MEMBERS..........................................................A53
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Executive Summary

Commitment to Change

Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise is our highest priority. We‘ve taken 

many actions over the past year based on the recommendations of several internal and 

external investigations, but more work remains. We have developed a strategic plan to 

revitalize the nuclear enterprise and reclaim the trust of our nation and confidence of our 

allies. We need the commitment of every Airman to this priority.

This roadmap identifies a comprehensive set of actions the Air Force must and will take 

to overcome documented deficiencies and set the conditions for sustainable excellence 

across the Air Force nuclear enterprise.

Strategic Context

At the end of the Cold War, significant changes in the global security environment 

prompted Air Force senior leaders to restructure the force. Anticipating and adapting to 

global challenges, commanders at all levels shaped the combat forces under their 

control through a number of initiatives. In his 2008 report to the Secretary of Defense, 

Dr. Schlesinger stated, ―Changes made by the Air Force after the Cold War were in 

response to the defense downsizing of the 1990s as well as national leadership 

priorities.‖ During that time, ―the Air Force and other services were experiencing severe 

resource constraints. With less national emphasis on nuclear weapons during this 

period, the Air Force failed to grasp the continued need to maintain a viable airpowerbased nuclear deterrent capability. Moreover, as the size of the nuclear arsenal was 

reduced and emphasis shifted to conventional missions, the Air Force failed to articulate 

the continuing value of the nuclear deterrent.‖1

The primary cause of the systemic breakdowns in the Air Force‘s nuclear enterprise 

was the failure of leadership at many levels to provide proper emphasis on the nuclear 

mission. The loss of focus stemmed from changes in the operating environment at the 

end of the Cold War, exacerbated by the profound changes in the security environment 

following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In 1992, the Air Force implemented the largest 

organizational change since its inception leading to the organizational and 

supervisory fragmentation of the nuclear enterprise. This was reinforced by the 

1995 Base Realignment and Closure decisions that dispersed depot support for nuclear 

systems and components. As a result, the Air Force‘s nuclear sustainment system 

became fragmented, the pool of nuclear experienced Airmen atrophied, and nuclear 

expertise eroded as less time was allocated to maintain nuclear operational 

proficiency. The Air Force failed to properly resource many nuclear mission areas 

effectively relegating the Air Force‘s nuclear enterprise to a  ̳care-taker‘ status with 

limited modernization or recapitalization. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and 

 

1 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: The 

Air Force‘s Nuclear Mission, September 2008, page 21.
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Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) further shifted 

focus and institutional priorities away from the nuclear mission. Subsequently, Air Force 

leadership failed to advocate, oversee, and properly emphasize the maintenance of 

nuclear-related skill sets. Deficiencies in inspection processes also contributed to 

the erosion of the culture of accountability and rigorous self-assessment 

associated with high standards of excellence.

Recent Events and Recurring Themes

The erosion of mission focus was highlighted by two recent events. In 2006, critical,

nuclear-related ICBM parts, labeled as helicopter batteries, were mistakenly sent to 

Taiwan. In 2007, a B-52 crew mistakenly flew six nuclear weapons from Minot AFB, 

North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. These incidents triggered a series of 

reviews and investigations ordered by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

the Air Force. The reports converged on six recurring themes reiterated in the

Schlesinger Task Force Report:

Underinvestment in the nuclear deterrence mission is evident, undercutting the 

nation‘s deterrence posture – no comprehensive process exists to ensure 

sustained investment advocacy

Nuclear-related authority and responsibility are fragmented

Processes for uncovering, analyzing, and addressing nuclear-related compliance 

and capability issues are largely ineffective

Nuclear-related expertise has eroded

A critical self-assessment culture is lacking

Air Force Nuclear culture has atrophied resulting in a diminished sense of 

mission importance, discipline, and excellence

Change Imperative

First, we must address the institutional, long-term commitment to the nuclear deterrence 

mission. We must re-establish our nuclear culture of discipline and accountability, rekindle pride in our mission, and renew our heritage of excellence as we reinvigorate the 

Air Force nuclear enterprise. We face an uncertain and potentially dangerous future 

that includes nuclear weapons. More countries possess nuclear weapons than during 

the Cold War, and that number is likely to grow. While we faced many security 

challenges during the Cold War, over time, we came to understand the motivations and 

the likely responses of the single adversary that could do catastrophic harm to the 

United States and our allies. Today, we face national and transnational adversaries 

whose motivations and responses are perhaps less predictable and have potential to do 

great harm to the United States or our allies.
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First Principles of Rebuilding the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

Credible strategic deterrence, with unwavering commitment to nuclear deterrence as its 

cornerstone, is foundational to the security of our nation, allies, and friends. The 

roadmap, Reinvigorating the USAF Nuclear Enterprise is our strategic plan to ensure 

day-to-day excellence in the stewardship of our nuclear deterrence capability, mission 

and enterprise. These changes will be institutionalized across our nuclear enterprise 

ensuring our commitment to excellence regardless of changes to our force structure, 

competing mission requirements, or the size of our nuclear arsenal. The hallmarks of 

our performance standards when it comes to the nuclear deterrence mission are 

precision and reliability. A culture of compliance, clear organizational structures, and 

active governance processes are the principal pillars to help us achieve sustained 

excellence in this most vital mission area.

We must build a composite structure of sustainment, operational, and Headquarters Air 

Force organizations that are appropriately resourced with focused processes to ensure 

safe, secure, reliable operations. We must enable current and future capability, 

advocacy, and a culture of compliance; institutional focus; accountability/oversight; and 

provide governance of these activities--a principal focus of this roadmap.

Extended Deterrence 

Credible nuclear deterrence is essential to our security and that of our allies and friends. 

Many allied and friendly countries continue to depend on the security umbrella provided 

by the nuclear deterrence capability of the United States. In the absence of this 

―security umbrella,‖ some non-nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and 

deploy their own nuclear capability.2 Recent geopolitical events underscore the 

necessity for extended deterrence.

The Air Force provides two of the three critical legs of the nation‘s nuclear deterrent 

forces. Flexible Air Force bombers and forward-based, dual-capable aircraft (DCA) 

fighters best exploit the political element of nuclear weapons by being able to visibly 

demonstrate resolve or the potential for escalation through the scalable generation of 

forces and recallable airborne alert postures. Ready, capable, and secure ICBMs 

provide the unique, sovereign-based, stabilizing, and responsive capability to hold any 

target on the globe at risk 24/7.

Objectives of the Air Force Nuclear Roadmap

The Air Force will not simply chart a path to resolve the six recurring themes/problem 

areas discussed earlier. The composite actions that comprise this roadmap will 

reestablish a recognized standard of excellence in the United States Air Force ̳s nuclear 

enterprise. To that end, five major focus areas have emerged:

 

2 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: The 

Air Force‘s Nuclear Mission, September 2008.
4

Restore the culture of compliance

Rebuild our nuclear expertise

Invest in our nuclear capabilities

Organize to enable clear lines of authority providing sustained institutional focus

Reinvigorate our Air Force nuclear stewardship role

Culture of Compliance

The Air Force will rebuild a nuclear culture of compliance that reflects robust 

inspection processes under the independent oversight of the SAF/IG. All assessments 

and inspections will apply common standards derived from inputs of all stakeholders to 

effectively uncover, analyze, address, and review systemic weaknesses within our 

nuclear enterprise. This overarching goal is achievable, but will require the combined 

efforts of leaders and multiple organizations committed to these objectives. Leadership 

at all levels must make nuclear mission oversight and self-assessment a priority. 

Leaders must take ownership and responsibility for assessments, be self-critical and 

enforce accountability. At the same time, leaders must support regular cross-talk 

activity at all levels.

Nuclear Expertise

We will rebuild our expertise through Air Force-wide training, education, and career 

force development initiatives designed to ensure that we create a basic atmosphere of 

understanding for our nuclear stewardship responsibilities. The nuclear enterprise must 

have properly trained, seasoned nuclear professionals focusing on the daily deterrence 

mission. These initiatives will be driven by senior leadership involvement and oversight 

of force development of the nuclear enterprise.

Investment

We will provide needed investments and resources for this vital mission area. The Air 

Force must invest in the nuclear deterrence mission and have a clear, long-term 

commitment to sustain, modernize, and recapitalize its nuclear capability. Based upon 

national guidance and vetted combatant command and major command requirements, 

the Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) process will recommend the proper balance 

of capability and risk to senior leadership to ensure funding decisions are based upon 

relevant, accurate, consistent, defendable, repeatable, and transparent data and 

analysis. These funding decisions must be made with a full understanding of the 

implications for the Air Force nuclear enterprise. In addition, the requirements, 

acquisition, and programming processes must be aligned to provide a solid program 

baseline and acquisition strategy to minimize the cost, schedule, and performance risks 

inherent in delivering reliable and modern operational systems/capabilities to preserve 

the Air Force portion of our Nation‘s nuclear capability.
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Organization

We will create a composite operational, sustainment, and headquarters 

organizational structure that concentrates nuclear mission oversight in order to 

dramatically improve focus and provide clear lines of authority for the nuclear mission. 

Success in rebuilding the nuclear enterprise can only be achieved when certain 

imperatives are realized: restoring confidence and credibility; elevating the importance 

of the mission; Airmen are consistently held accountable for their performance; and the 

Air Force commits itself as an enduring provider of two legs of the nation‘s nuclear 

deterrent forces. The composite organizational construct will be an enabler for these 

imperatives.

Nuclear Stewardship

Finally, we will restore our allies‘ and public‘s confidence in our nuclear 

stewardship role through accomplishing the actions identified in this roadmap. These 

actions will ensure we have the right culture, the right people, the right investments, and 

the right organizational structure in place to ensure the Air Force provides widely 

recognized and respected capabilities with the intended strategic effect: enduring 

nuclear deterrence.

Summary of Key Actions

To effectively reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force must undertake a series 

of root cause-based action plans that implement the objectives of restoring the culture 

of compliance and exacting adherence to standards; rebuilding our expertise base; 

investing in our nuclear capabilities; effectively organizing around a composite 

operational, sustainment, and headquarters construct; and securing public confidence in 

our stewardship role through an integrated set of measurable implementation plans and 

processes.

In summary, the roadmap is a ―contract for change.‖ Contained within the 100 action 

items is a composite set of major actions that define the essence of the roadmap and, in 

aggregate, represent a bold step forward. The following is a summary of the major 

actions required:

Consolidate all nuclear sustainment functions under AFMC/AFNWC. (OPR: 

AFMC, create Mission Directive, by Apr 09)

Establish positive inventory control measures for nuclear weapons-related 

materiel. (OPR: AF/A4/7, modify AFMAN 23-110, AFI 21-203 and create 

applicable new AFRs, by Apr 09)

Enhance Nuclear Inspection processes: establish an AF-wide inspector training 

and certification program; implement independent oversight of all command-level 

NSIs by SAF/IG; establish a centrally managed core team of highly experienced 

NSI inspectors; establish procedures for adjudicating discrepancies between 

MAJCOM and oversight teams (these procedures will be approved by the 

Nuclear Oversight Board); and recommend to the Nuclear Oversight Board how 
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AF nuclear inspection processes might be further improved, including whether 

Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI) should be SAF/IG led or remain MAJCOM-led. 

(OPR: SAF/IG, recommendations to the NOB by Dec 08, modify AFI 90-201, by 

Apr 09)

Align strategic deterrence/nuclear operations-based education, training, career 

development and force development activities. (OPR: AF/A1, modify AFI 36-

2302, AFI 36-2640, by Apr 09)

Increase nuclear mission focus, by placing all ICBMs and nuclear-capable 

bombers into a single command: establish Air Force Global Strike Command.

(OPR: AF/A3/5N, stand up Provisional HQ, by Dec 08; write PAD 08-04, by Dec 

08; stand up MAJCOM, by Sep 09)

Increase USAF institutional nuclear focus, policy oversight, integration and 

establish air staff nuclear accountable officer: establish AF/A10. (OPR: 

AF/A3/5N, stand up NLT 1 Nov 08)

Improve nuclear stewardship in AF corporate processes: Consolidate nuclearrelated Program Elements into one panel or a similarly robust management 

portfolio; revise Group, Board, Panel and Council structure; develop a beta-test 

nuclear enterprise virtual Major Force Program (vMFP). (OPR: AF/A8, modify 

AFI 16-501) (by Dec 08)

Create strategic plans that address long-term nuclear requirements...Cruise 

Missile; Bomber; DCA; ICBM. (OPR: AF/A8, modify AFI 16-501)

Charge the Under Secretary of the Air Force with ongoing broad policy and 

oversight responsibilities for nuclear matters.

The Secretary of the Air Force establishes policy for nuclear matters. The SecAF 

and CSAF will jointly chair the Air Force Nuclear Oversight Board (NOB) which 

shall meet at least quarterly to resolve outstanding issues, and specifically to: 1.) 

oversee implementation of this roadmap, and report progress to SECDEF and 

Congress; 2.) review nuclear policies, standards, performance metrics, and 

compliance; and 3.) ensure continuing effective stewardship of the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise. (OPR: AF/A10 establish NOB NLT Nov 08)

Conclusion

Nuclear forces continue to represent the ultimate deterrence capability that supports 

U.S. national security. Because of their immense destructive power, nuclear weapons, 

as recognized in the 2006 National Security Strategy, deter in a way that simply cannot

be duplicated by other weapons. Additionally, the special nature of nuclear weapons 

demands precise performance across the Air Force nuclear enterprise, with no 

tolerance for complacency or shortcuts. In short, we will continue to fortify current 

operations, develop our people, and sustain and modernize current capabilities.
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This roadmap is the foundation for reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear enterprise and to 

re-establish the confidence in our ability to provide nuclear deterrence for our nation and 

our allies.

The American people depend on the United States Air Force to deliver precise and 

reliable nuclear deterrence capabilities and have done so for over 61 years. America‘s 

Airmen accept this mission with pride, professionalism and a solemn commitment to the 

hallmark standards of excellence of the United States Air Force. We will make this 

important work a success.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction

Purpose of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap

This roadmap is a contract for change, containing approximately 100 action items that 

are designed as building blocks for the combined governance, structure, and cultural 

foundation. It contains comprehensive action plans that describe the actions required to 

restore public trust and ensure a credible nuclear deterrence. It also advocates the 

institutional way ahead to regenerate the culture of absolute excellence and develop 

trained and prepared Airmen to execute the extraordinary and unique demands of 

nuclear operations.

This document focuses primarily on the stewardship of the nuclear mission from an 

operational level. Major commands (MAJCOMs) are expected to create follow-on 

documents, specific to their commands, from this roadmap. Concepts of Employment 

(CONEMPs), tactics, threats, and capabilities are also not discussed in this document. 

These topics should also be explored and defined by the MAJCOMs.

The Department of the Air Force is responsible by Congressional statute to organize, 

train, and equip our nuclear forces to ensure effective nuclear deterrence and flawless 

nuclear surety. This roadmap provides fundamental guidance on how to better 

organize, train, and equip our nuclear forces to ensure effective nuclear deterrence and 

flawless nuclear surety. We must rebuild a culture that embraces the importance and 

criticality of the nuclear deterrence mission, conveys our credibility and commitment to 

potential adversaries and our mission partners, and creates an atmosphere in which all 

Airmen understand and value the Air Force nuclear mission. We are committed to 

improving our headquarters, sustainment, and operational organizational construct to 

enable coherent lines of authority, drive institutional focus, and ensure unambiguous 

accountability for the nuclear mission.

This roadmap aims to identify common actions that must be standardized to ensure 

safe, secure, and reliable nuclear operations. The action plans will be underpinned by 

organizational change that better enables day-to-day excellence throughout the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise and clearly aligns mission focus with that of the combatant 

A credible nuclear deterrent is essential to our security and that of our 

allies and friends. The Air Force has an essential role in this national 

mission. We were created as a separate service over 60 years ago with 

nuclear responsibilities foremost in our mission set. There is no mission 

more sensitive than safeguarding our vital nuclear capabilities and 

maintaining nuclear deterrence. We have a sacred trust with the American 

people to safely operate, maintain, and secure nuclear weapons. We must 

constantly strive for perfection in this mission area. Rigid adherence to 

standards, personal accountability at all levels, and leadership are the 

foundations upon which our success depends.

Honorable Michael B. Donley, 26 June 2008
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commanders it supports. The strategic action plans guide and leverage the scores of 

associated and cascading action items directed in this roadmap and form the foundation 

of an implementation strategy that is action-focused, timely, and measurable with clear 

accountable leads for each plan.

(Leadership) SecAF will establish Air Force Nuclear Oversight Board to oversee 

implementation of this roadmap and report progress to SECDEF and Congress. 

This Board will ensure enduring stewardship of the nuclear enterprise. The 

Board will be jointly chaired by SecAF and CSAF. Members include USecAF, 

VCSAF, Nuclear MAJCOM Commanders, AFNWC/CC, SAF/GC, AF/JA, SAF/IG, 

AF/A10, and other members as designated by SecAF

Ongoing USAF Commitments / Global Challenges / Expectations

We remain committed to fighting terrorism, sustaining our current joint operations, 

assuring our allies, and adapting our ability to detect, deter, dissuade, and defeat 

adversaries to protect America and achieve national objectives. America‘s Airmen are 

battle-tested and have proven capabilities applicable and adaptable across the entire 

spectrum of conflict. Today‘s Global War on Terror (GWOT) missions are only the 

latest in a string of more than 18 years of continuous combat, beginning with our initial 

Operation DESERT SHIELD deployments in August 1990. Years of persistent conflict 

in Southwest Asia, Somalia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Haiti, and around the globe 

represent a dramatic change from military operations during the Cold War.

Today‘s Air Force provides the Joint Force Commander a range of capabilities that set 

conditions for success. We apply agility, reach, speed, stealth, payload, firepower, 

precision, and persistence to achieve global effects. Dominance of air, space, and 

cyberspace domains provide the essential foundation for effective joint operations. To 

achieve these capabilities, our Airmen currently fly approximately 430 sorties daily as 

part of OIF and OEF, including inter-theater and intra-theater airlift; aeromedical 

evacuation (AE); aerial refueling; command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); strike; close air support (CAS); 

and electronic warfare (EW).

Since 2001, the active duty Air Force further reduced its end-strength by almost 6%, but 

our deployments have increased by at least 30% – primarily in support of the GWOT. In 

addition to the 25,000 Airmen deployed to CENTCOM‘s AOR at any one time, 

approximately 213,000 Airmen (183,000 active duty plus an additional 30,000 Guard 

and Reserve) fulfill other daily combatant commander requirements, missions and tasks 

24 hours a day, seven days a week. Approximately 40% of our total force (including 

53% of the active duty force) is globally and directly engaged. From controlling 

satellites to flying unmanned aerial systems (UASs), from standing on strategic missile 

alert to parsing intelligence information, Airmen directly engage America‘s adversaries 

and influence events worldwide every day.

To accomplish our increasing, diverse taskings, many of our Airmen require a great deal 

of additional training. Such extra training means even more time away from units 

already stretched thin by the Air Force‘s high operational tempo (OPSTEMPO) and 
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force drawdown. Because deployed units and Airmen are no longer available for core 

Air Force or home-station missions, and because our core missions must still be 

accomplished, the workload shifts to other Airmen at home and abroad. In addition, 

Airmen‘s skills in their core competencies are perishable, and we must give them time 

for training to hone those skills.

Within this challenging and dynamic environment, the Air Force will nurture a 

professional nuclear force, ensure we are postured to deter potential adversaries, 

employ upon Presidential direction, and support allies in ways that strengthen US 

national security.

Changes in the Strategic Environment

Over the past two decades, radical changes in the strategic environment shaped the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise and affected nuclear enterprise-related decisions. Through 

analysis, a common set of strategic root causes emerged:

The Cold War victory led to substantial arms reductions and changes to the 

National Security Strategy, de-emphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons 

in the strategic deterrence mission

In 1992, the Air Force implemented the largest organizational change since its 

inception that led to the organizational and authoritative fragmentation of the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise

Military down-sizing since the end of the Cold War, specifically in organizations 

that were part of the nuclear mission, has fragmented nuclear sustainment and 

reduced the pool of nuclear expertise

Since 1992, the Air Force reduced the priority to invest in some nuclear mission 

areas, and modernization or recapitalization of some systems in the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise was extremely limited

Air Force concepts of operations evolved to emphasize new missions and 

capabilities that began to overshadow nuclear operations. Advancement of Air 

Force contributions to Joint and Composite Force operations increased focus on 

expeditionary operations and a renewed emphasis in irregular warfare

Air Force Commitment to Rebuild Public Trust

The Air Force must ensure we have national trust and confidence in our institutional 

ability to organize, train, and equip professional nuclear forces across the spectrum of 

peacetime and wartime missions. In order to accomplish this overarching purpose, the 

Air Force must revitalize enterprise-wide efforts with a specific set of priorities outlined 

in this roadmap. We have a sacred trust with our Nation to safely maintain and secure 

nuclear weapons while maintaining the capability to employ them effectively, if directed 

by the President. Therefore, we must maintain flawless nuclear weapons safety, 

security, and reliability and readiness programs. The Air Force brings unique 
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capabilities to the nation‘s nuclear deterrence posture: a robust alert force comprised of 

Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and bomber and fighter forces 

comprised of B-52, B-2, and dual-capable aircraft (DCA) fighters that provide our nation 

and our allies the ability to visibly signal our resolve to potential adversaries by aircraft 

movement and generation.

Definition of Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

The Air Force nuclear enterprise consists of the people, organizations, processes, 

procedures, and systems that are used to conduct, execute, and support nuclear 

operations and forces. It includes the infrastructure and life-cycle activities for nuclear 

weapons, delivery platforms, and supporting systems; intellectual and technical 

competencies; and cultural mindset that ensure sustainable, responsive, safe, reliable,

and secure Air Force nuclear deterrence capabilities. In addition, it includes Air Force 

organizations responsible for nuclear policy and guidance, and Air Force relationships 

with other entities who contribute to the Nation‘s nuclear deterrence mission.

Attributes of a Successful Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

Air Force leadership must clearly and consistently emphasize the premium our nation 

puts on strategic deterrence and the vital contribution the AF makes in this mission 

area. These words must be reinforced by actions, to include robust training and 

rigorous adherence to standards that is measurable and repeatable. The Air Force 

nuclear enterprise systems and processes require redundancies and safeguards to 

achieve fail-safe operations. There is no tolerance for complacency or shortcuts as we 

rebuild a ―zero-defect‖ culture. Our culture of reliability, adherence to standards, and 

rigorous self-assessment relies on constant, realistic training and exercises combined 

with robust inspections. However, inspection is not the end state—it is a means to 

provide the feedback necessary to continuously improve processes and performance. 

In addition to training, exercises, and inspection, the Air Force nuclear enterprise relies 

on meticulous systems engineering and operational safety, suitability, and effectiveness 

(OSS&E) processes. Nuclear Weapon System Operational Safety Reviews and the 

safety design certification process are crucial to ensure AF compliance with the four 

DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards. Additionally, it relies on true 

enterprise management tools to ensure the reliability of the entire system. Furthermore, 

the Air Force requires advocacy for all aspects of the nuclear mission, both inside and 

outside the Air Force. Finally, our investment in the Air Force nuclear enterprise must 

be sufficient to safely, securely, and reliably sustain current requirements as well as 

meet future modernization and recapitalization requirements.

Atrophy of the USAF Nuclear Enterprise

Recent incidents highlighted breakdowns in the Air Force nuclear enterprise and 

pointed to systemic weaknesses. In response to these incidents and the subsequent 

investigations and studies, the Air Force created the Air Force Nuclear Task Force 

(AFNTF). The AFNTF was comprised of nuclear experts from across the enterprise and 

charged with comprehensively evaluating and consolidating findings and 

recommendations from the Commander Directed Investigation Concerning an 

Unauthorized Transfer of Nuclear Warheads, 30 August 2007 (CDI); Blue Ribbon 
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Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures, 8 February 2008 (BRR); The 

Defense Science Board (DSB) Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety –

Report on Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons, April 2008; Air Force Inventory 

and Assessment: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons-Related Materiel, 25 May 

2008 (AFRIT); Admiral (ADM) Donald Investigation into the Shipment of Sensitive 

Missile Components to Taiwan, 22 May 2008 (ADM Donald Report); and the Air Force 

Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment Report , July 2008 (CANS). In 

addition, the AFNTF reviewed and incorporated results from the recently completed 

Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons 

Management, Phase I: the Air Force’s Nuclear Mission, September 2008 (Schlesinger 

Report). The Air Force nuclear enterprise roadmap, Reinvigorating the Air Force 

Nuclear Enterprise, is the product of these investigations and internal assessments. 

The reports converged on six recurring themes to focus our revitalization efforts:

Rebuild a culture of accountability and rigorous self-assessment dedicated to 

high standards of excellence in the Air Force nuclear enterprise

Rebuild nuclear expertise and codify career paths

Construct an end-to-end Air Force nuclear sustainment enterprise system and 

revitalize the sustainment community

Develop a comprehensive investment plan committed to meeting the 

requirements of the nuclear deterrence mission

Create an environment of sustained advocacy for the nuclear deterrence mission

Align authorities and responsibilities for nuclear deterrence mission requirements

Roadmap Organization

Each chapter in this roadmap addresses one of the themes listed above. Each chapter 

includes a problem statement, root causes, attributes of success, objectives, and action 

plans. During action plan development, the AFNTF applied a Doctrine, Organization, 

Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 

approach to each specific task in order to build a comprehensive solution set. Below is 

a brief definition of the DOTMLPF Change Recommendation (DCR) process, listed in 

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.1:

Doctrine – The way we fight (in addition to traditional doctrine, the category 

includes Air Force Instructions (AFIs), policies, and guidance)

Organization – How we organize to fight (includes staff and support)

Training – How we prepare our people (basic training to joint exercises)

Materiel – All things necessary to equip our forces
14

Leadership and education – How we prepare out leaders to lead the fight from 

squad leader to 4-star general/admiral; professional military education (PME)

Personnel – Availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and

contingency operations

Facilities – Real property, installations, and industrial facilities

Each action lists the DOTMLPF approach, OPR, action plan description, associated 

report findings (with finding text outlined in Appendix 4), timeline, and policy and 

guidance references. These actions, and their supporting detailed (tactical) actions, are 

tracked and managed in the Nuclear Enterprise Management Tool (NEMT) described in 

Appendix 3. Air Staff and MAJCOM OPRs are responsible for both the actions outlined 

in the Roadmap and the supporting actions maintained in the NEMT.

Chapter Summaries

Re-establish a Culture of Accountability and Rigorous Self-Assessment

To restore a culture of compliance and rigid adherence to standards, Secretary of the 

Air Force Inspector General (SAF/IG) will implement centralized, independent oversight 

over Air Force nuclear inspections and assessments, while preserving MAJCOM 

organize, train, and equip authorities and responsibilities. It will ensure common 

inspection standards that will include consistent inspection policy, accurate functional 

guidance, and standardized checklists; expanding oversight of all Nuclear Surety 

Inspections by SAF/IG, USSTRATCOM, or Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),

and establishing a cadre of experienced nuclear surety inspectors at the Air Force 

Inspection Agency (AFIA) for participation in nuclear inspections. SAF/IG will also 

establish procedures for reporting and adjudicating discrepancies between inspection 

teams and oversight authorities for Nuclear Oversight Board (NOB) approval.

Rebuild Nuclear Expertise

To overcome the erosion of nuclear expertise, the Air Force set forth a path to examine 

education and training across the enterprise, improve identification and tracking of 

nuclear experience and expertise, and establish a force development governance 

construct to ensure continual, formalized senior leadership involvement in the 

development of future nuclear leaders.

The Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services (AF/A1), in conjunction with Air 

University (AU) and a panel of functional and major command representatives, reviewed 

the complete spectrum of officer and enlisted PME. The full scope of formal training 

courses, some taught within the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) structure 

and some outside, was also reviewed. Inspection and evaluation criteria are being 

developed by Air Force training experts for non-AETC courses to ensure consistency 

and adherence to training objectives.

Key nuclear billets have been formally identified and Special Experience Identifiers 

(SEIs) developed and assigned to ensure individuals filling key positions posses the 
15

required background and experiences to effectively lead the nuclear enterprise. 

Identifying key billets outside of standard AF organizations (e.g., Dept of Energy, DTRA, 

etc.) will broaden the expertise and experience of Air Force nuclear leaders.

Finally, senior leadership involvement in developing nuclear leaders will be 

institutionalized through the Nuclear Enterprise Advisory Panel (NEAP). The NEAP, 

chaired by the new AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N), serves as a cross functional review and 

advisory panel to the Force Management and Development Council (FMDC) chaired by 

the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The NEAP will provide force development 

oversight for officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel -- those within purely nuclear 

career fields and those in supporting, and equally important, roles.

The combination and maturation of these efforts addressing education and training, 

identifying and tracking nuclear expertise, and formal senior leadership oversight of 

nuclear force development is designed to reverse the erosion of nuclear skills and 

expertise within the Air Force. More work remains to be done, but the Air Force has 

already moved forward and shown commitment to rebuilding expertise in the nuclear 

enterprise.

Security expertise is a common thread for all personnel associated with nuclear 

weapons and a key piece of the nuclear enterprise. Although security was not 

associated with specific findings, Appendix 5 of this roadmap outlines our efforts to 

improve security performance. Additionally, AETC will expand its current 

responsibilities from providing initial training to include mission-specific training for 

security duty at nuclear-capable wings.

Sustainment

The Air Force will organize nuclear sustainment with clear lines of authority and 

responsibility, comprehensive logistics and supply chain management (SCM), fail-safe 

maintenance, inventory, and distribution processes, responsive engineering support, 

and robust and comprehensive training at all levels. To achieve these standards, the

Air Force must reestablish a clear and focused organizational structure. Nuclear 

weapons-related materiel (NWRM) must be defined and subsequently treated with extra 

levels of control and oversight. Units responsible for handling NWRM must be 

appropriately equipped with personnel, tools, infrastructure and guidance to establish 

and maintain an auditable, standardized positive inventory control system for all such 

materiel. Fail-safe logistics processes and engineering support throughout the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise must be documented, attributable, and authored by a 

cognizant engineering authority. Finally, the Air Force must institute robust and 

comprehensive training programs for nuclear sustainment at all levels, including 

oversight and assessment.

Investment: Requirements, Acquisition, and Programming

To ensure appropriate, sustained institutional commitment to the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise and Air Force nuclear-related capability, mid- and long-range planning and 

programming strategies must be refined.
16

AF/A8, with inputs from appropriate MAJCOMs and Air Force Council deliberation, will 

create strategic plans that address Air Force mid-term requirements (i.e., F-35 dual 

capability, tanker replacement, and weapons storage area (WSA) alignment), and longterm requirements and acquisition strategies to ensure future viability of our nuclear 

deterrent forces (i.e., weapons, delivery systems, communications, and supporting 

infrastructure).

AF/A8 has refined the headquarters Air Force (HAF) corporate process by assigning 

AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) to the Air Force Group and Board. In addition, AF/A8 will continue 

the evaluation of the portfolios of the existing 12 panels of the AFCS to identify Program 

Elements (PE) which directly or indirectly impact and comprise the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise; continue the evaluation of consolidating all nuclear-related PEs into one 

panel, or a similarly robust management portfolio; and evaluate a ―beta-test‖ virtual 

Major Force Program dedicated to the Air Force nuclear enterprise in order to 

consolidate all nuclear-related programs into one robust management and data 

repository.

Advocacy Across the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

Air Force senior leaders, through concerted actions and communications focused on the 

nuclear mission, will drive advocacy for the Air Force‘s nuclear enterprise. This will 

ensure nuclear education and training is valued and will emphasize the importance of 

the nuclear mission to all Airmen. Finally, the Air Force will build a cadre of experts who 

can engage and influence combatant command, joint force and Office of the Secretary 

of Defense policy and guidance regarding the nuclear mission and relate the 

uniqueness and importance of the nuclear mission in overarching national strategy and 

operational plans.

To communicate the Air Force commitment to re-invigorating the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise, Secretary of the Air Force Directorate of Communication and Public Affairs, 

in coordination with the Special Assistant for Air Force Strategy, AF/A8, AF/A10 

(AF/A3/5N), and MAJCOM CCs, will create a coordinated, advocacy-based 

engagement strategy that enables thoughtful Air Force input to national and joint policy, 

strategy and planning processes, and puts the Air Force on notice that real, enduring 

changes and improvements are needed throughout the Air Force nuclear enterprise.

Organizational Alternatives

After analyzing several courses of action (COAs), the Air Force has further consolidated 

its nuclear sustainment activities under AFMC, specifically AFNWC, which is consistent 

with Dr. Schlesinger‘s Task Force Report recommendations. Under this COA, the 

commander of AFMC is responsible for consolidated sustainment of Air Force nuclear 

weapons and nuclear weapons-related materiel.

The Air Force considered several reorganization alternatives to reinvigorate the nuclear 

enterprise as part of the roadmap development. The field operations organization 

attributes used to develop, analyze, and compare the organizational alternatives were 

derived from the previously mentioned SECDEF directed reports and studies, as well as 

inputs from nuclear MAJCOM staffs. During the Fall 2008 CORONA Conference, it was 
17

decided to establish a new major command (Air Force Global Strike Command) focused 

on and dedicated to the nuclear deterrence and global strike missions.

At the Nuclear Summit held 18 September 2008, a decision was made to create a new 

AF/A10 headquarters directorate. The establishment of the AF/A10 sends a clear and 

visible signal that the Air Force is committed to resolving the fragmented lines of 

authority across all levels of the nuclear enterprise and provides a headquarters

Assistant Chief of Staff that reports directly to the CSAF with authority to drive nuclear 

enterprise policy, guidance, requirements, and advocacy across the HAF staff. The 

AF/A10 will be the single HAF authority for all nuclear related issues and will have lead 

responsibilities for nuclear operations, plans, policy, and requirements.

Assessment

The action plan assessment processes identify and measure assessment metrics that 

display the progress made toward reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise and meeting 

strategic objectives such as rebuilding a culture of rigorous self-assessment or 

rebuilding expertise in the Air Force nuclear enterprise. This is accomplished through 

the development of measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness

(MOE). These measures require agreement of subject matter experts (SMEs) and 

leadership throughout the enterprise and those most involved with the mission. These 

measures will ensure a precise and objective assessment of the enterprise‘s health and 

highlight areas in which additional progress is still required. (See Appendix 2 –

Methodology for greater detail).

Summary

Nuclear weapons, along with the operations, support, maintenance, infrastructure, and 

security associated with them, are a unique national capability. The destructive power 

of nuclear weapons and their political effects places them under the direct control of the 

President. Nuclear operations are the linchpin of strategic deterrence. Their flexibility 

provides decision space to the President to exercise escalation control measures, 

demonstrate resolve, negotiate with authority, assure friends and allies, ensure US 

national security against disruptive technological challenges, and defeat adversaries 

with prompt, overwhelming force.

As stated in Dr. Schlesinger‘s Task Force Report, ―Because nuclear weapons have 

been less prominent since the end of the Cold War and have not been used since World 

War II, their importance and unique role as a deterrent have been obscured, but not 

diminished. Though our consistent goal has been to avoid actual weapons use, the 

nuclear deterrent is ―used‖ every day by assuring friends and allies, dissuading 

opponents from seeking peer capabilities to the United States, deterring attacks on the 

United States and its allies from potential adversaries, and providing the potential to 

defeat adversaries if deterrence fails.‖3

 

3 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: The 

Air Force‘s Nuclear Mission, September 2008, Page 1.
18

Our existing national military strategy (NMS) addresses the importance of nuclear 

weapons in deterring a wide range of threats, not just nuclear attacks. During the Cold 

War, the potential destructive power of nuclear weapons helped to prevent war between 

great powers. In the emerging international security environment, nuclear weapons will 

continue to play a major role in deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) and large-scale conventional attacks against US vital interests. Moreover, the 

United States extends its nuclear security umbrella in support of our allies and our 

common vital interests. US extended deterrence also mitigates incentives for allies to 

develop their own nuclear weapons programs and deploy independent nuclear forces.

The probability of a chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear (CBRN) attack 

against the US or its interests has increased since the end of the Cold War. Rogue 

nation-states and terrorist groups seeking to develop and/or acquire WMDs are enabled 

and motivated by technology transfers, surrogate resourcing, misplaced phobias, and 

posturing for attention within the international community. The US, its allies, and likeminded nations, fully aware of the growing threat, must determine how to deter such 

attacks and protect their interests. To this end, the strategic deterrence provided by the 

US nuclear enterprise is vital in preventing the proliferation of WMD by our allies and its 

use by our enemies. The Air Force has a responsibility to recognize and embrace the 

indispensable role of nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence and its role on US 

nonproliferation efforts.

Regardless of the size of the US nuclear arsenal, the continued development of foreign 

nuclear capabilities and the uncertain political trajectories of potential US adversaries,

our enduirng responsibility is the effective stewardship of our nuclear enterprise. 

Related to these conditions, the DSB Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety stated: 

―Those are the only facts needed to understand the requirement for sustained, intense 

attention to the nuclear enterprise and to robust nuclear weapons surety.‖
19

Chapter 2 — Re-establish a Culture of Accountability and 

Rigorous Self-Assessment

Problem Statement

The Air Force lacks clear accountability and effective processes to identify and correct 

systemic weaknesses through its inspection and self-assessment programs.

Success Criteria and Desired Sub-Objectives

The Air Force will rebuild a nuclear culture that has a robust self-assessment and 

inspection process in order to effectively uncover, analyze, address, and review 

systemic weaknesses within its nuclear enterprise. This overarching goal is achievable, 

but will require the combined efforts of leaders and organizations committed to these 

objectives.

Combatant commands should commit to clear requirements regarding the nuclear 

mission and the Air Force. The Air Force, along with our joint partners, should revise 

Technical Order (T.O.) 11N-25-1 to provide clear guidance on nuclear inspection 

criteria.

Quality assurance (QA) activities must have clear guidance, standardized processes 

and criteria, and certified QA evaluators. Unit commanders must actively manage 

vigorous self-inspection programs. In addition, the Air Force must have standardized 

training, qualification, and certification requirements for all inspection team members, 

establish common checklists, employ root cause analysis (RCA), improve overall trend 

analysis for systemic issues, and instill rigor in tracking findings to closure. Unit 

commanders must implement and encourage a day-to-day culture of self-assessment 

whereby unit members routinely use root cause analysis methodologies to identify the 

root cause of problems and deficiencies as they are discovered.

Leadership at all levels must make nuclear mission oversight and self-assessment their 

highest priority. Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities to shift 

priorities and adjust policies and resources in ways needed to maintain robust nuclear 

stewardship, resulting in the inattention that led to the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan 

incidents. Leaders must take ownership and responsibility for assessments, be selfcritical, and enforce accountability. At the same time, leaders must support regular 

cross-talk activity at all levels.

To restore a culture of compliance and rigid adherence to standards, SAF/IG will

implement centralized, independent oversight over Air Force nuclear inspections and 

“... We must build a wider understanding of the importance of deterrence

and the logic of building forces that deter effectively...it is a major

undertaking.”

Larry Welch, Gen (ret) 12th CSAF
20

assessments while preserving MAJCOM authorities and responsibilities for training and 

readiness of their assigned forces. It will ensure common inspection standards, 

consistent inspection policy, accurate functional guidance, and standardized checklists. 

SAF/IG will establish a cadre of experienced nuclear surety inspectors at AFIA for 

participation in nuclear inspections. SAF/IG will continue to work with the DTRA to 

establish a common understanding and application of Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) 

criteria. SAF/IG will also establish procedures for reporting and adjudicating 

discrepancies between inspection teams and oversight authorities for Nuclear Oversight 

Board (NOB) approval that will ensure the nuclear inspection process is accountable, 

independent, and transparent to outside review.

Root Causes

Weaknesses in Nuclear Inspections, Staff Assistance Visits and Unit 

Quality Assurance Programs

The Air Force nuclear inspections, nuclear surety staff assistance visits, and unit quality 

assurance programs are not consistent across MAJCOMs or agencies supporting 

and/or inspecting the nuclear enterprise. The ADM Donald Report identified oversight, 

inspections, and internal audits as ineffective in resolving recurring deficiencies and 

highlighted ineffective follow-up to ensure identified problems were adequately 

addressed.

Inspection weaknesses include:

Non-standardized and insufficient metrics to identify trends or inadequate trend 

analysis to drive process improvements (weakness in causal analysis and 

corrective actions in response to deficiencies identified during inspections) 

(ADM Donald Report)

Deficiencies documented as minor potentially indicated more systemic problems 

associated with compliance or training, resulting in narrow corrective actions 

associated with specific findings rather than a recognition of more fundamental 

problems (ADM Donald Report)

Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-201 cause code for all findings lacks sufficient 

detail to enable thorough analysis and identification of long-term corrective 

actions to correct root issue (ADM Donald Report)

Inconsistent documentation of identified deficiencies limited the ability to 

recognize trends across similar maintenance activities (CANS)

Inconsistent practices to capture and implement best practices between units 

(ADM Donald Report)

Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) weaknesses include:
21

Lack of common NSSAV processes across all nuclear MAJCOMs, NAFs, and 

Centers (ADM Donald Report, BRR)

Lack of formal system to track observations and lack of follow-up to ensure 

deficiencies were resolved (ADM Donald Report)

Lack of timely, formal crosstalk between wing leadership after staff assistance 

visit (SAVs) to identify issues or highlight best practices (ADM Donald Report)

Lack of statistical rigor to identify trends and potential root causes (CANS)

Quality Assurance issues include:

Nonexistent quality assurance evaluation criteria to ensure high standards (ADM 

Donald Report)

Some functional compliance checklists are stove-piped. Individual unit task 

checklists are narrowly focused and not adequately tied to unit checklists (ADM 

Donald Report)

Deficiencies often binned into general categories, limiting trending ability (does 

not address potential underlying causes of the deficiency or identify corrective 

actions to address deficiencies) (ADM Donald Report)

Deficiencies identified and corrected by technicians and supervisors are not 

documented or captured for future trend analysis (ADM Donald Report)

Unit Self-Inspection issues include:

No formalized training within unit self-inspection programs (Schlesinger Report)

Deficiencies corrected within 5-days of identification are not entered into 

databases. This results in a sparse database and limits trend analysis or 

identifying potential command-wide problems (ADM Donald Report)

Inadequate, Insufficient, and Conflicting Policy and Guidance

Inadequate, insufficient, and conflicting guidance and policy from Air Force, MAJCOMs 

and combatant commands have created a variety of challenges for the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise. In some cases, combatant command priorities and taskings have 

limited mission performance evaluations during Nuclear Operational Readiness 

Inspections (NORIs).

A number of nuclear policies, procedures, and processes affecting nuclear operations 

are confusing and non-standard. Policy and guidance issues include:

Leadership does not adequately review or update nuclear policy and guidance 

(BRR)
22

Non-standard oversight and assessment processes for nuclear activities

including external and internal inspections/SAVs across the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise (IG, SAVs, QA, unit self-inspection) (ADM Donald Report)

Absence of a process to harmonize interpretations of T.O. 11N-25-1, Department 

of Defense (DoD) Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System, between Air 

Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/DTRA has resulted in 

grading disagreements (BRR)

Lack of governing policy for managing nuclear weapons-related materiel 

(NWRM); also insufficient definition of NWRM (CANS)

Lack of Air Force-level inspection checklists (CANS)

Non-standardized nuclear inspection processes and subjective grading criteria 

has reduced efficiencies and created confusion; Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection 

(INSI) guidance needs improvement and unit certification/decertification guidance 

requires formalization (BRR, CANS)

Incomplete guidance on accountability of nuclear certified equipment (CANS)

Inadequate weapon technical order guidance prevalent (ADM Donald Report)

Current Air Force Instructions are interpreted as being less directive than prior 

year‘s Air Force Regulations (AFRs) (August 2008 GreyBeard Panel Report)

Culture of Accountability Eroded

Over time, handling bomber nuclear weapons has come to be regarded as an 

exercise activity rather than a serious operational activity (DSB)

Bomber nuclear exercises are not meeting current requirements in frequency or 

scale (BRR)

Key nuclear leadership billets are filled by personnel who do not have nuclear 

experience or depth (BRR)

Dispersed lines of authority contributed to a loss of systems engineering 

discipline within the ICBM program (CANS)

Erosion of Rigid Adherence to Standards and ―Zero Defect‖ Culture

Nuclear missions are unique and require a ―zero defect‖ culture. However, the Air 

Force embraced a ―risk management‖ mindset. The continuing drive for efficiencies 

outweighed redundant checks and inspections that identify deficiencies or errors before 

they became critical. Often, individuals focused on quickly correcting the symptoms of 

failure rather than identifying core weaknesses and implementing enduring solutions.
23

Air Force leadership and supervisors failed to communicate in actions and words the 

enormous responsibility associated with the nuclear mission. Conflicting or limited/nonexistent guidance further eroded a rigid adherence to standards. Inadequate 

supervision and training and limited accountability all contributed to the Air Force 

diversion from a nuclear ―zero defect‖ culture. Findings include:

Failure to adhere to established policies coupled with multiple independent 

data/messaging systems caused confusion and consumed time and resources 

(CANS)

Informal technical guidance issued (contrary to technical order guidance) (ADM 

Donald Report)

Confusion over the applicability of nuclear weapons handling procedures for 

nuclear weapon systems that do not contain nuclear warheads (DSB)

Lack of clear and detailed direction in instructions and technical orders 

particularly in light of a less experienced workforce (BRR)

Air Force nuclear-related inspection processes do not emphasize or assess the 

quality of self-assessment performed by inspected commands (ADM Donald 

Report)

ADM Donald‘s investigation identified long-term supply chain process failures 

and weaknesses that indicated systemic issues had not been corrected (ADM 

Donald Report)

Loss of Nuclear Focus

Findings identified that limited nuclear focus built a culture of disinterest and apathy 

rather than the required culture of critical self-assessment.

The various levels of inspection activities have failed to detect changes in 

process which compromised established procedures (DSB)

Leadership does not adequately oversee or review nuclear sustainment areas. 

A review found little officer engagement in the execution of maintenance work—

little formal or visible supervision of the work by responsible officers. (ADM 

Donald Report, CANS)

Focus on the nuclear mission, especially in dual-capable bomber units, has 

diminished from the robust nuclear culture that existed during the Cold War 

(BRR)

Unit self-inspections lack commander emphasis (ADM Donald Report, CANS, 

CDI)
24

Some nuclear related inspections have omitted areas of importance to nuclear 

surety (ADM Donald Report)

Changes to Air Force policies and processes degraded the level of control for 

sensitive missile components (ADM Donald Report)

Lessons-learned from the unauthorized weapons transfer were not shared in a 

manner to allow each of the nuclear related sites to gain an understanding of the 

event and determine if similar weaknesses existed at their sites (ADM Donald 

Report)

Action Plan

The following action plans highlight initiatives to standardize nuclear inspection 

processes, refine policy and guidance, restore a culture of accountability, rebuild a ―zero 

defect‖ culture, and increase the nuclear focus across the Air Force.

Robust Nuclear Inspections, Staff Assistance Visits, and Unit Quality 

Assurance Programs

(Doctrine, Organization) SAF/IG will 1) implement complete, independent

oversight of the nuclear inspection and assessment processes, including 100% 

oversight of NSIs; 2) establish a centrally-managed core team of highly–

experienced NSI inspectors to participate in nuclear inspections; 3) recommend 

procedures for reporting and adjudicating discrepancies between inspection 

teams and oversight authorities for consideration by the Nuclear Oversight Board 

(NOB); 4) establish an AF-wide inspector training and certification program; and 

5) incorporate a robust no-notice program into nuclear evaluations at all CONUS 

units and where feasible at OCONUS units. (BRR-06; CANS-18; CDI-02; 

Schlesinger Report-16, -25) Complete within 6 to 18 months, with oversight of 

NSIs to begin immediately (AFI 90-201)

Note: MAJCOM/CCs will retain full NSI certification authority and retain responsibilities 

to conduct NORIs.

(Doctrine, Organization) SAF/IG will lead Air Force efforts to rewrite AFI 90-201, 

Inspector General Activities, and advocate modifying T.O. 11N-25-1, DoD 

Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System, to improve standardization and 

clarify inspection guidance; to include expanding the scope of nuclear 

inspections, and oversight of unit quality assurance evaluators and processes. 

(ADM Donald Report-05; BRR-14, -22; CANS-19; Schlesinger Report-16) 

Complete within 6 months (AFI 90-201; T.O.11N-25-1)

(Doctrine) AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) in concert with MAJCOM commanders will 

promulgate policy requiring Inspector General involvement in the process of 

developing operational and procedural guidance for nuclear-related inspections.

(Schlesinger Report-26) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 90-201)
25

(Organization, Training, Materiel) The SAF/IG and MAJCOMs will develop formal 

processes to impart information throughout the nuclear enterprise in order to 

share trend information and potential systemic issues as well as best practices. 

Examples include NSI Process Review Conferences, Nuclear Mission Summits, 

Nuclear Surety Councils, Wing Cross-talks, and information technology (IT) 

solutions. (BRR-06, -12; CANS-18; DSB-13) Complete within 6 to 18 months 

(AFI 90-201)

(Organization, Training) AF/A4 will coordinate with MAJCOMs to expand quality 

assurance programs to comprehensively review functional areas in order to 

proactively detect errors and deficiencies. (ADM Donald Report-06; CANS-18) 

Complete within 6 months (AFI 21-204)

(Doctrine, Leadership, Training) SAF/IG will institute positive measures at all 

levels to overhaul documentation and causal analysis, applying depth and rigor 

missing from current processes. Improved processes must be able to identify 

trends, discern systemic issues and remedy longstanding deficiencies. (ADM 

Donald Report-05, -06; CANS-18, -19) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 90-

201)

(Materiel) SAF/IG will create an Air Force-wide common findings data 

management construct that supports automated trend analysis and regularly 

updates commanders to enhance identification of systemic nuclear 

weaknesses—e.g. Dashboard. (ADM Donald Report-04; BRR-06, -12; CANS19; DSB-04; Schlesinger Report-16) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 90-

201)

(Doctrine) Secretary of the Air Force‘s Smart Operations for the 21st Century 

(SAF/SO) will develop an AFI to standardize Air Force Corrective Action 

Processes targeted at unit-level deficiency resolution. (BRR-14; CANS-18; CDI02) Complete within 6 to 18 months

Refine Policy and Guidance

(Doctrine) AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) will coordinate with HAF and MAJCOM team to 

develop a systematic process to identify nuclear-related AFIs and transform them 

into publications which are comprehensive and directive. (BRR-14; Aug 2008 

GreyBeard Panel Report) Complete within 12 to 18 months

(Doctrine) AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) will coordinate with HAF Directorates to develop a 

systematic process of conducting recurring, comprehensive reviews of Air Force 

guidance and instructions on nuclear-related operations, maintenance, security,

safety, support, and inspections to ensure currency, clarity and reduce all 

ambiguity. (BRR-06, -14, Schlesinger Report-03, -14, -15) Complete within 90 

days

(Doctrine) AFMC Sustainment Engineering and Technical Data Operations/Policy 

Branch (AFMC/A4YE) will establish an agile and fully resourced system for 
26

managing interim changes for nuclear-related procedures and publications. 

(Schlesinger Report-03, -15) Complete within 6 months (AFI 33-360)

(Doctrine) SAF/IG will update inspection guidance to eliminate ambiguities with 

DoD guidance and standardize across MAJCOMs. SAF/IG will adjudicate all 

questions regarding standards and criteria as they arise and will establish 

procedures to adjudicate discrepancies between the AFIA and MAJCOM 

inspection teams. (BRR-06) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 90-201)

(Doctrine) MAJCOMs will standardize Nuclear Staff Assistance Visit (NSAV) and 

NSSAV guidance with SAF/IG and Air Force Safety (AF/SE), where applicable 

(e.g. tracking, trend analysis, closure). (AFNTF; DSB-04; Schlesinger Report-24, 

-26) Complete within 6 to 18 months (MAJCOM-level directives)

(Doctrine) SAF/IG will revise applicable guidance to add inspection of nuclear 

weapon related materiel management and accountability during inspections. 

(CANS-18; CDI-02) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 90-201)

(Doctrine) Air Force Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support (AF/A4/7) will 

revise 21-, 23-, and 63- series AFIs to consolidate and standardize quality 

assurance guidance. (ADM Donald Report-06; CANS-19; CDI-02) Complete 

within 6 to 18 months (21-, 23-, 63- series AFIs)

(Doctrine) SAF/IG will publish AF-level inspection/evaluation checklists across 

the nuclear enterprise and establish processes to maintain currency and 

standardization of functional inspection checklists. HAF Directorates and 

MAJCOMs will assist SAF/IG. (ADM Donald Report-06; AFRIT-07; CANS-18) 

Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 90-201; AFI 33-360)

(Doctrine) AF/SE will review and update 91- series policy instructions to codify 

the culture of accountability. (Schlesinger Report-03) Complete within 6 to 18 

months (91- series AFIs)

(DOTMLPF) Air Force senior nuclear advocate will request the combatant 

commands provide clear nuclear mission requirements, to include rapid response 

commitment. (DSB-04; Schlesinger Report-16) Complete within 6 months

Restore Culture of Accountability

(Leadership) MAJCOMs will ensure officer and NCO engagement/oversight in all 

nuclear enterprise activities to improve formal supervision. (AFRIT-02; BRR-13; 

Schlesinger Report-28, -30) Enduring (MAJCOM-level instructions)

(Leadership) MAJCOMs will re-invigorate wing commander ownership of unit 

self-inspection programs. (ADM Donald Report-05, -06; Schlesinger Report-24, -

25, -26) Enduring (MAJCOM-level instructions)
27

Restore Rigid Adherence to Standards and ―Zero Defect‖ Culture

(Leadership) Leadership at all levels will declare, unequivocally and frequently, 

that a reliable, safe, secure, and credible nuclear deterrence is a high priority and 

essential to national security. (BRR-13,-32; CANS-01; DSB-07, -08; Schlesinger 

Report-13, -14, -17) Enduring

(Leadership) Commanders at all levels will establish a zero defect nuclear culture 

that communicates and enforces rigid adherence to standards. (Schlesinger 

Report-17) Enduring

Increase Nuclear Focus

(Organization, Training) Air Combat Command (ACC) established, and Air Force 

Global Strike Command (AFGSC) will continue to refine, the implementation of a 

Global Deterrence Force (GDF) dedicated to supporting the USSTRATCOM 

mission. The GDF is a rotational approach designed to create a balance 

between the strategic/nuclear deterrence mission and current conventional 

operational requirements. The end state for the GDF is to build and sustain long 

term-nuclear expertise while maintaining the conventional capability to support 

today‘s fight. (Schlesinger Report-28, -30) IOC October 2008—Enduring (ACC 

directive)

(Doctrine, Training) MAJCOMs will develop NORI scenarios that validate a unit‘s 

ability to meet rapid response commitments. (CDI-02; DSB-04; Schlesinger 

Report-16) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 90-201)

(Training, Leadership) Career Field Managers (CFMs) in coordination with Air 

Education and Training Command (AETC) will develop training plans to ingrain 

root cause analysis, self-assessment culture, and nuclear purpose values early 

and often (e.g. basic training, technical school, First Term Airman‘s Center 

(FTAC), Career Development Course (CDC), Nuclear Munitions Officer Course 

(NMOC), formal training unit (FTU), Space 100). Increase the coverage of 

nuclear policy, technical and operational issues at all levels of officer, enlisted 

and civilian professional military education. (BRR-18, -20; CANS-19; DSB-13; 

Schlesinger Report-25, -26) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AETC Instruction)
28
29

Chapter 3 — Rebuild Nuclear Expertise

Problem Statement

Air Force nuclear expertise has eroded to the point that multiple positions throughout 

the enterprise reflect a requirements/assignments mismatch.

Success Criteria and Desired Sub-Objectives

The Air Force is committed to revitalizing nuclear expertise at all levels. Trained and 

qualified personnel will demonstrate proficiency and rigid adherence to standards in the 

nuclear mission. The key to successfully revitalizing our nuclear expertise is a 

development system that matches requirements with assignments. This process will 

ensure the Air Force assigns the right airman, with the right skills, to the right job, while 

continuing to develop tomorrow‘s leaders.

To overcome the erosion of nuclear expertise, the Air Force examined education and 

training across the enterprise, improved the identification and tracking of nuclear 

experience and expertise, and established a force development governance construct 

to ensure continual, formalized senior leadership involvement in the development of 

future nuclear leaders.

The AF/A1, in conjunction with Air University and a panel of functional and major 

command representatives, reviewed the complete spectrum of officer and enlisted 

Professional Military Education (PME). Course modifications are underway to ensure a 

stair-stepped approach to Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Knowledge, Comprehension, 

and Application) across the continuum of education from basic to senior developmental 

education. The full scope of formal training courses, some taught within the Air 

Education and Training Command (AETC) structure and some outside, was also 

reviewed by the expert panel. Additional nuclear content is necessary in the curriculum 

of some advanced courses. New courses are required for nuclear leadership roles and 

institutional rigor (standards of learning and formalized objectives) are necessary in 

courses outside the AETC classroom. Inspection and evaluation criteria are being 

developed by Air Force training experts for non-AETC courses to ensure consistency 

and adherence to training objectives.

Key nuclear billets have been formally identified and Special Experience Identifiers 

(SEIs) developed and assigned to ensure individuals filling key positions possess the 

required background and experiences to effectively lead the nuclear enterprise. 

Identifying key billets outside of standard AF organizations (e.g., Dept of Energy, 

“In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained

personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military."

General Douglas MacArthur
30

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, etc.) will broaden the expertise and experience of 

Air Force nuclear leaders.

Finally, senior leadership involvement in developing nuclear leaders will be 

institutionalized through the Nuclear Enterprise Advisory Panel (NEAP). The NEAP, 

chaired by the new AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N), serves as a cross functional review and 

advisory panel to the FMDC, chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The 

NEAP will provide force development oversight for officers, enlisted, and civilian 

personnel — those within purely nuclear career fields and those in supporting, and 

equally important, roles.

The combination of these efforts addressing education and training, identifying and 

tracking nuclear expertise, and formal senior leadership oversight of nuclear force 

development is designed to reverse the erosion of nuclear skills and expertise within the 

Air Force. More work remains to be done, but the Air Force has already begun moving

forward and shown commitment to rebuilding expertise in the nuclear enterprise.

Root Causes

Detailed analysis revealed common root cause categories: 1) reduced priority of the 

nuclear mission, contributing to 2) reduced focus on development and management of 

nuclear subject matter experts; both of which culminate in 3) inadequate education and 

training programs or guidance for personnel in some areas of the nuclear mission. In 

addition, concerns arose over the quantity of nuclear experts, depth of the nuclear 

expertise, and quality of Air Force processes for building expertise.

Reduced Priority of the Nuclear Mission

Nuclear-related aviator experience and expertise is diminishing within the 

bomber and DCA units (BRR)

Nuclear exercises are not meeting current requirements in frequency or scale 

(BRR, DSB)

Focus on nuclear training has shifted as a result of the increased COCOM 

requirements for conventional force capabilities (BRR)

Reduced Focus on Development and Management of Nuclear Subject 

Matter Experts

Insufficient manning has been provided to nuclear commanders to execute their 

missions and manpower authorizations supporting the nuclear mission have 

decreased below long-term sustainment levels (Schlesinger Report)

The diminishing base of nuclear experience in some support specialties makes it 

difficult to select and prepare leaders for command and supervisory positions 

(BRR)
31

The lack of understanding as to which manpower authorizations are vital to the 

nuclear mission has resulted in the deployment of key nuclear personnel 

elsewhere and the inability to determine which critical billets require special 

management (Schlesinger Report)

Air Force leadership needs to develop a more effective approach to personnel 

management for manning critical nuclear positions (Schlesinger Report)

Current management of nuclear-related career fields is not adequate without a 

complementary program to support the development of people within the nuclear 

community (Schlesinger Report)

The Air Force needs to increase opportunities for presence and influence in key 

nuclear billets, especially in joint and interagency organizations, by filling these 

positions with highly-qualified individuals (BRR)

Nuclear sustainment manpower is inconsistent with today's mission requirements 

(CANS)

Leadership in the Air Force's nuclear enterprise is professional and dedicated, 

but experience levels continue to decline (BRR)

The Air Force is not consistently leveraging educational opportunities to optimize 

follow-on assignments or presence in key nuclear billets (BRR)

There is no deliberate force development and retention management for the 

nuclear sustainment enterprise workforce (CANS)

Inadequate Education and Training Programs or Guidance

The nuclear force requires clear and detailed direction in instructions and 

technical orders particularly in light of a less-experienced workforce, especially in 

aircraft units (BRR)

Accountability of nuclear weapons in the Air Force is sound; however, additional 

experience and training for Munitions Accountable Systems Officers (MASOs) 

will enhance the current process, particularly on the Defense Integration and 

Management of Nuclear Data Services system (DIAMONDS) (BRR)

Major commands and Numbered Air Forces have created specific nuclear 

training programs that are external to the formal and institutionalized training 

curriculum oversight (BRR)

The curricula of professional military education schools and courses devote at 

best only minimal time and attention to nuclear-related topics (BRR)
32

The curricula of resident and nonresident professional military education (PME) 

for officers and enlisted personnel turns up only a very small number of nuclearrelated topics (Schlesinger Report)

Training in nuclear operations—for example, the Strategic Weapons School—

was streamlined to the point of elimination (Schlesinger Report)

Training required within the nuclear sustainment enterprise is inadequate (CANS)

Action Plan

Rebuilding nuclear expertise in the Air Force will require senior leadership involvement 

in requirements determination and prioritization, personnel and development processes, 

and realistic education, training, and exercise participation.

(Personnel) AF/A1 will review nuclear manpower standards to ensure all nuclear 

workload is captured. (AFRIT-08, -09; BRR-33, -34; CANS-05; CDI-10; 

Schlesinger Report-21, -29, -34, -35) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 38-

201)

(Personnel) AF/A1 will assess nuclear mission career fields to ensure program 

budget decision reductions were appropriately targeted and left no seams in 

enterprise support. (BRR-04, -34) Complete within 6 months (AFI 38-201; AFI 

38-204)

(Personnel) AF/A1 will review medical manpower requirements at installations 

with large Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) populations to ensure adequate 

documentation and resourcing of manpower requirements. (BRR-33) Complete

within 6 months (AFI 41-210; AFI 38-201)

(Personnel) AF/A1 will review logistics composite models (LCOM) to determine if 

they provide enough manpower for dual-tasked and prime nuclear airlift force 

(PNAF) units to meet mission requirements. (AFRIT-09; BRR-33; CANS-05) 

Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 38-201)

(Personnel) AF/A1 will review existing manpower (non-LCOM) determinant 

products to determine if dual-tasked and PNAF workloads are adequately 

reflected in each product. (AFRIT-09; BRR-33; CANS-05) Complete within 6 

months (AFI 38-201)

Air Force Senior Leader Oversight of Air Force Nuclear Enterprise 

Personnel Development

Senior leader involvement is imperative to ensure that the personnel planning and 

development processes support the needs of the nuclear enterprise. Leaders must 

ensure that processes are in-place and followed for requirement identification, 

development, and tracking to support a highly reliable nuclear enterprise end state. The 
33

NEAP will institutionalize this process serving as the nuclear cross functional review 

under the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force‘s FMDC.

(Doctrine, Organization, Leadership) The FMDC will charter a NEAP to improve 

oversight of the management and development of personnel for the nuclear 

enterprise. Because the nuclear enterprise is manned by personnel from many 

career fields, membership in the NEAP will be broad. The NEAP will be chaired 

by the new AF/A10 and will provide regular updates to the FMDC. The NEAP 

generally will be responsible for detailing personnel management and/or 

development requirements and for providing similar personnel oversight for the 

nuclear mission area as a career field manager would provide to a career field.

(AFRIT-08; BRR-18, -20; CANS-04; Schlesinger Report-18, -29, -31) The NEAP 

charter, and its relationship to the overall FMDC construct will be drafted and 

staffed within 30 days (AFI 36-2640; NEAP Charter)

Robust Management of Nuclear Subject Matter Experts

Air Force senior leaders remain critical in developing the actionable steps for resolving 

the erosion of nuclear enterprise expertise. AF/A10 (A3/5N), with support from AF/A1, 

HAF functional authorities, and MAJCOM commanders and their staffs, will provide an 

actionable plan to ensure the Air Force develops nuclear expertise. Already, AF/A1 has 

led efforts, in coordination with MAJCOMs and Functional Managers, to identify key 

nuclear billets, and has identified and assigned Special Experience Identifiers (SEIs) to 

ensure individuals filling key positions possess the required background and 

experiences to effectively lead the nuclear enterprise. Further work remains. Emphasis 

will be placed on six strategic processes:

(Personnel) AF/A1 will develop a comprehensive list of all key nuclear-related 

positions in the nuclear enterprise and ensure they receive priority for assigning 

experienced personnel. (AFRIT-09; BRR-33; Schlesinger Report-34, -35) 

Complete within 6 months (AFI 38-201)

(Doctrine, Training, Personnel) Once the nuclear key billets are identified, the 

NEAP will coordinate with MAJCOMs and COCOMs to define the training, 

education, and experiential requirements for key positions within the nuclear 

enterprise. (AFRIT-08; BRR-07, -18, -20; CANS-04; Schlesinger Report-05, -29) 

Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 36-2302)

(Doctrine, Personnel) The NEAP will work with Air Force Functional Managers to 

formalize a career development plan for officers, enlisted, and civilians. These 

plans will define the depth and breadth of experience necessary for them to 

assume leadership positions in the nuclear enterprise. (BRR-01, -03, -04, -18; 

Schlesinger Report-18) Complete within 6 months (AFI 36-2640)

(Doctrine, Personnel) AF/A1, in coordination with the NEAP, will ensure officer 

and enlisted nuclear career fields are viable and adequately manned (AFRIT-09; 

BRR-01, -04, -33; CANS-04; CDI-01, -02, -10; Schlesinger Report-05, -34, -35). 

Complete within 6 months
34

(Doctrine, Materiel, Personnel) AF/A1 will develop a reliable and easily 

accessible system to track nuclear experience across the entire Air Force. 

(BRR-01, -04) Complete within 6 to 18 months (Airman Capability Management 

initiative guidance (to be developed following pilot effort))

(Doctrine, Personnel) The NEAP will work with Air Force Functional Managers 

and AF/A1 to ensure appropriate career broadening opportunities (such as 

maintenance, system engineering, program management, and policy related 

assignments) are in place to develop officers for leadership roles in nuclear 

enterprise. (BRR-01) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFI 36-2640)

The nuclear personnel development process must be part of the larger, integrated Air 

Force leadership development process. Recapturing nuclear mission excellence is the 

Air Force‘s top priority and demands a collective effort, balanced across the institution, 

to ensure excellence in every mission discipline.

Improve Education and Training Programs and Guidance

Realistic training and exercise participation is required at all levels of the enterprise to 

hone operational expertise. The Air Force must invest time and resources to refine 

nuclear proficiency. Realistic training and exercises provide opportunities to cement 

sound standards of behavior and create a feedback mechanism for developing 

consistent duty performance. The AF/A1 led a team to review the complete spectrum of 

officer and enlisted PME. Course modifications are underway. Formal training courses

were also reviewed. As a result, additional nuclear content is necessary in the 

curriculum of some advanced courses. New courses are required for nuclear 

leadership roles and institutional rigor (standards of learning and formalized objectives) 

are necessary in courses outside the AETC classroom. Inspection and evaluation 

criteria are being developed by Air Force training experts for non-AETC courses to 

ensure consistency and adherence to training objectives. The Air Force will take the 

following actions to restore rigor to nuclear operations, exercises, and inspections, with 

lessons learned/conclusions shared across the Air Force:

(Training, Leadership) AF/A1 facilitated an initial joint training and education 

review on 3-4 Sep 08 with nuclear enterprise career field managers to establish 

nuclear training and education baselines and determine if current training and 

education portfolios are sufficient. The results were reviewed by curriculum 

development experts at Air University and proposed curriculum modifications 

have been forwarded to the Air Force Learning Committee, a subordinate panel 

to the FMDC, for validation and approval. (AFRIT-08; BRR-18, -20; CANS-04; 

Schlesinger Report-11, -29) Complete within 6 months (AFI 36-2201; AFLC 

CONOPS; IDE/SDE CONOPS; AFI 36-2301)

(Training, Leadership) Air University (AU) will develop a short course at Maxwell 

Air Force Base (AFB) for new commanders to address nuclear doctrine, 

procedures, and operational arts to include instruction on accountability and 

custody. (BRR-04) This item is complete (AFI 36-2302)
35

(Training, Leadership) AF/A1, in conjunction with functional managers and 

appropriate MAJCOMs, will identify key billets in the nuclear enterprise to be 

filled with graduates of the National Laboratory Technical Fellowship Program 

(NLTFP) and/or Air Force Institute of Technology nuclear engineer program 

graduates. (BRR-21) Complete within 6 months (IDE/SDE CONOPS; AFI 36-

2301; AFI 36-2302)

(Training) MAJCOMs will utilize focused nuclear-related leadership training for 

Airmen prior to assuming command or supervisory roles in the nuclear 

enterprise. (BRR-04; CDI-03, -05) Complete within 6 months (MAJCOM-level 

directives)

(Training, Leadership) MAJCOM commanders will ensure unit mission and 

quality assurance training is sufficient to meet mission needs and their staffs will 

certify results to the NEAP. (CDI-01, -02, -06) Complete within 6 months

(Training, Leadership) AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N), in coordination with MAJCOMs and 

COCOMs, will review/validate frequency, scale, of nuclear exercises. NORIs will 

execute to the DOC statement. AF/CV will be waiver approval authority for

movement/cancellation of scheduled nuclear exercises. (BRR-13, Schlesinger

Report-16) Complete within 6 months

(Doctrine, Training) SAF/IG will develop a standardized training, qualification, 

and certification program for all members of IG teams that conduct nuclear 

inspections. (BRR-06, -12; CANS-18; Schlesinger Report-16, -25, -26) Complete 

within 6 to 18 months

The combination of these efforts addressing requirements, education and training, 

identifying and tracking nuclear expertise, and formal senior leadership oversight of 

nuclear force development is designed to reverse the erosion of nuclear skills and 

expertise within the Air Force.
36
37

Chapter 4 — Sustainment

Problem Statement

The Air Force lacks an end-to-end systems approach to nuclear life-cycle sustainment.

Success Criteria and Desired Sub-Objectives

The Air Force must organize the nuclear sustainment enterprise with clear lines of 

authority and responsibility, comprehensive logistics and supply chain management, 

sound maintenance, inventory, and distribution processes, responsive engineering 

support, and robust and comprehensive training at all levels. Desired sub-objectives 

include:

The Air Force must reverse the dispersion of nuclear expertise and sustainment 

capability by reestablishing a clear and focused organizational architecture, 

consolidate and clarify responsibility and authority, and eliminate interorganizational confusion (Organizational change attributes are incorporated into 

Chapter 7)

The Air Force must positively control nuclear weapons-related materiel (NWRM) 

separate from normal supply chain items. Directives must be thoroughly 

reviewed to eliminate inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and confusion. New 

directives pertaining directly to NWRM processes and management must be 

written

Units responsible for handling NWRM must be appropriately equipped with 

personnel, tools, infrastructure, and guidance to establish and maintain a 

streamlined, auditable, and standardized positive inventory control (PIC) system 

for all such materiel

Engineering support throughout the Air Force nuclear enterprise must be 1) 

documented; 2) attributable; and 3) authored by a cognizant engineering 

authority

The Air Force must institute robust and comprehensive training programs for 

nuclear sustainment at all levels, including oversight and assessment (Overall 

training and expertise is addressed in Chapter 3)

“I don’t ever, ever, ever want to hear the term logistics tail again. If our

aircraft, missiles, and weapons are the teeth of our military might, then

logistics is the muscle, tendons, and sinews that make the teeth bite down

and hold on—logistics is the jawbone! Hear that? The JAWBONE!”

Lt Gen Leo Marquez, USAF

M)
38

Root Causes

The AFNTF identified the following areas as root causes of issues within the nuclear 

sustainment enterprise.

Lack of Critical Self-Assessment

Oversight, inspection, and internal audits have been ineffective in resolving 

recurring deficiencies (ADM Donald Report, BRR, DSB)

The ICBM communities, including maintenance, engineering, operations, and 

logistic organizations, have a poorly developed self-assessment culture (ADM 

Donald Report, DSB)

The Air Force failed to implement methodologies and processes for identifying 

systemic weaknesses and root causes (ADM Donald Report, BRR, CANS)

Inadequate Guidance

The Air Force has not sufficiently defined nor provided governing policy for 

managing NWRM (ADM Donald Report, AFRIT, CANS)

Deficient supply chain processes and noncompliance with related procedures 

degraded control of sensitive missile components (ADM Donald Report)

The informal process for engineering support delays responsiveness, hinders 

trend analysis, and introduces unnecessary technical and programmatic risk 

(ADM Donald Report, CANS)

Logistics and supply chain management policies, procedures, and processes 

across the Air Force nuclear enterprise are not clear, concise, nor standardized 

(ADM Donald Report, CANS)

The current Air Force supply chain does not effectively manage or positively 

control NWRM (ADM Donald Report, AFRIT, CANS)

Nuclear policy, procedures, and processes affecting wing sustainment operations 

are confusing and non-standard (ADM Donald Report, CANS)

Policies for DULL SWORD nuclear reporting are not clear, resulting in 

inconsistent or random reporting (CANS)

There are systemic breakdowns in the technical order sustainment process

(CANS)

Shortcomings exist in the training for Munitions Accountable Systems Officers 

(MASO), particularly on the Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear 

Data Services system (AFRIT, BRR, CANS)
39

Air Force oversight and assessment processes for nuclear sustainment activities 

to include inspections, Logistics Standardization and Evaluation Team 

(LSET)/Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Team (MSET), and selfinspections are non-standard across the nuclear sustainment enterprise (BRR, 

CANS)

Changes to Air Force policies and processes degraded the level of control for 

sensitive missile components (ADM Donald Report, CANS)

Multiple independent data/messaging systems cause confusion, and consume 

time and resources (CANS)

Air Force documentation was inadequate to demonstrate that current personnel 

and area radiation exposure and monitoring practices are sufficient to ensure 

exposure is less than Air Force requirements and maintained as low as 

reasonably achievable. No evidence of recent oversight of this program by 

authorities, either external or internal, was found (ADM Donald Report)

Lack of Sustainment Advocacy

Dispersed authority and responsibility have created an environment ill-suited for 

setting and maintaining standards necessary for nuclear weapons (ADM Donald 

Report, BRR, DSB)

The ICBM engineering community lacks a clear major command owner and has 

deteriorated in the exercise of technical authority (ADM Donald Report, CANS)

There is no single funding advocate for the Air Force nuclear sustainment 

enterprise (BRR, CANS)

Leadership does not adequately oversee nor review nuclear sustainment areas 

(ADM Donald Report, BRR, CANS)

Action Plan

Given the unequivocal need for positive control, redundancy, and reliability, achieving 

efficiencies within the Air Force nuclear enterprise is not always desirable or attainable.

(DOTMLPF) AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) will coordinate with HAF and MAJCOMs to 

refine the definition of the Air Force nuclear enterprise sufficiently to identify and 

execute all respective activities. (AFNTF; August 2008 GreyBeard Panel Report) 

Complete within 6 months

Establish a Functional Organizational Structure with Clear Lines of 

Authority and Responsibility

See Chapter 7.
40

Develop Comprehensive Logistics and Supply Chain Management 

Processes

(DOTMLPF) AF/A4/7 and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) will 

continue the process of identifying, physically marking, controlling, and 

overseeing NWRM to achieve PIC for these assets. The AFNWC PIC facility will 

store all NWRM inventory that is not authorized to support base required 

inventory levels. They will also oversee inventory that is in transit, depot repair, 

and contract repair. A group of dedicated, nuclear-trained professionals 

assigned to the AFNWC will manage, control and store this NWRM. PIC for 

these and other critical assets require a phased approach that will initially be 

manually intensive until processes are automated and transitioned to the new 

logistics electronic records program solution, the Expeditionary Combat Support 

System (ECSS). Specific responsibilities for the AFNWC are outlined in AFMC 

Mission Directive 421, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. (ADM Donald 

Report-01, -02, -03, -07; AFRIT-01, -03, -04, -05, -06; CANS-10, -11, -12; 

Schlesinger Report-15) Complete within 6 months (AFMAN 23-110; AFI 21-203)

Phase I: Gain immediate PIC of the National Stock Numbers (NSNs) identified 

by the AF and OSD as NWRM by transferring these assets from Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA) into Air Force owned and managed facilities. Completing 

this phase will require Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) to develop a 

programming plan (P-Plan) that addresses the following:

o Warehouse facility and security upgrades

o Warehouse IT and item identification systems

o Warehouse manning

o Training

o Policy and procedures

o On-base transportation capability

o Dedicated distribution network

Re-warehousing these assets under Air Force control will eliminate excess 

―handoffs‖ between the Air Force and DLA. The Air Force is developing a 

concept of operations (CONOPS) including people, processes and systems to 

provide PIC for these assets. Where current system capability will not 

provide the automated level of in-transit and serial number tracking needed, 

the Air Force will assign additional manpower to provide aggressive manual 

tracking as required. An interim IT solution is projected for December 2008 to 

automate some manual management tasks.
41

Phase II: Expand PIC to include additional nuclear-related materiel not identified 

as NWRM (as required). Expand IT solution capability to incorporate increased 

automated capability.

Phase III: Enable ECSS to provide the real-time visibility and serial number 

tracking needed to establish fully automated positive inventory control. Full 

operational capability (FOC) is currently scheduled for 2013.

(Personnel) AF/A4/7 will differentiate assigned Logistics Readiness Squadron 

personnel to distinguish those directly involved with NWRM and additional 

nuclear-related materiel not identified as NWRM from inventory managers. 

(Schlesinger Report-15) Complete within 6 to 18 months (Enlisted Classification 

Directory)

(Doctrine) The Nuclear Weapons System Safety Group (NWSSG) will review the 

NWRM list and identify any changes to the critical component list. (AFRIT-03; 

CANS-10) Complete within 6 to 18 months (Master Nuclear Certification List)

(Doctrine) AF/A4/7 will schedule and assign systematic assessments and 

updates of all required publications, directives, and technical orders to correct 

errors, clarify/deconflict guidance, and reinvigorate assessment processes. This 

review will be separate from other reviews and applied specifically to supply 

chain management. (AFRIT-07; BRR-22; CANS-11, -12; Schlesinger Report-15)

Complete within 18 months (AFMAN 23-110; AFPD 23-1; AFI 21-203)

(Doctrine, Materiel) AFMC will verify excess backlog and create a 5-year 

disposition plan for NWRM service spares items no longer required. (AFRIT-11; 

CANS-12) Complete within 18 months (AFMAN 23-110; AFI 21-203)

Refine Maintenance, Inventory, and Distribution Processes

(Materiel, Facilities) AF/A4/7 will assess current and future nuclear maintenance 

concepts to determine if nuclear-related facilities and equipment meet nuclear 

sustainment requirements while solving Air Force-wide deficiencies. (CANS-15;

Schlesinger Report-23) Complete within 6 to 18 months

(Doctrine) AFMC will develop new and revise existing technical order(s) for 

NWRM storage and handling with emphasis on thorough documentation, 

inventory management, and traceability. (AFRIT-07; BRR-22; CANS-11, -12; 

Schlesinger Report-15) Complete within 6 to 18 months (T.O. 00-20-3 and new 

T.O. for field level PIC use; all applicable NWRM item technical orders that 

currently exist)

(Doctrine, Facilities) AF/A4/7 will evaluate the benefit of consolidating munitions 

and missile maintenance requirements into a single 21-200 series instruction and 

provide a recommendation to Air Force leadership for consideration. (CANS-16; 

Schlesinger Report-15) Complete within 18 months
42

(Materiel) Commanders of nuclear units must ensure personnel who require 

access to nuclear weapons, have adequate availability to common 

communication modes (Defense Message System (DMS), Secure Internet 

Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet)). (CANS-15, -16) Complete within 18 

months (AFI 21-204)

To mitigate non-standard scheduling and tracking, the ICBM community is 

transitioning from the Improved Maintenance Management Program (IMMP) to 

the Integrated Maintenance Data System (IMDS). This usage of IMDS is an 

interim solution until ECSS is fielded in 2013. (BRR-27; CANS-12, -14, -16; CDI03, -05):

o (Doctrine, Materiel) AF/A4/7 will mandate the use of a single approved 

software application in Munitions Control Elements for required asset 

tracking/visual aid purposes. Complete within 6 months (AFI 21-204)

o (Doctrine, Materiel) Electronic Systems Center (ESC) will develop a 

solution for shortfalls with IMDS in associating missiles to launcher/pylons. 

Complete within 18 months

o (Doctrine) AF/A4/7 will mandate IMDS use for re-entry system mate, demate and handling operations. Complete within 6 months (AFI 21-202)

o (Leadership) Commanders at all levels will enforce IMDS use for weapons 

maintenance activities. Complete within 18 months

(Doctrine, Materiel) ESC will replace IMMP with IMDS. (BRR-26; CANS-14) 

Complete within 18 months (AFI 21-202; AFSPCI 21-202 VI)

(Materiel) AFNWC will accelerate Re-entry System Test Set (RSTS) replacement 

to mitigate capability loss prior to initial operational capability (IOC). (CANS-15) 

Complete within 18 months

(Doctrine) AF/A4/7 will schedule and assign systematic assessments and 

updates of all required publications, directives, and technical orders to correct 

errors, clarify/deconflict guidance, and reinvigorate assessment processes. This 

review will be separate from other reviews and applied specifically to 

maintenance, inventory and distribution processes. (AFRIT-07; BRR-22; CANS13; DSB-02,-03; Schlesinger Report-15) Complete within 18 months (AFPD 21-

101)

(Doctrine, Materiel, Facilities) AF/A4/7 and AFNWC assess and implement 

weapons storage area (WSA) portal monitoring and move right tracking. (BRR26) Complete within 6 to 18 months (AFMAN 31-108)
43

Improve Weapons Maintenance and Storage Safety

(Doctrine) Air Force Safety (AF/SE) will update and standardize the intrinsic 

radiation (INRAD) program guidance in AFI 91-108. (ADM Donald Report; 

Schlesinger Report-15) Complete within 6 months (AFI 91-108)

(Doctrine, Training) Air Force Surgeon General (AF/SG) as lead, with AF/SE and 

Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA), will develop an INRAD Safety Inspection 

Checklist and evaluate requirements, training practices, and assessment of 

intrinsic radiation monitoring programs to ensure that exposure levels are tracked 

and are as low as reasonably achievable. (ADM Donald Report; Schlesinger

Report-15) Complete within 6 to 18 months

Build Responsive Engineering Support

(Doctrine, Leadership) AFMC will enforce use of written communication for 

engineering assistance and limit approval of engineering direction to the 

cognizant engineering authority. (ADM Donald Report-04; CANS-02) Complete

within 6 to 18 months (T.O. 00-25-107)

(Doctrine, Organization) AFMC and the AFNWC will develop formal processes 

for the engineering community that focus on technical assistance, trend analysis, 

and Operational Safety, Suitability and Effectiveness. (ADM Donald Report-04; 

CANS-06) Complete within 6 to 18 months (T.O. 00-25-107)

(Doctrine, Materiel) AFMC will implement Product Lifecycle Management (PLM)

capabilities to support ICBM engineering and sustainment. PLM will become the 

automated tool for Electronic Technical Assistance Requests (ETARS) to include 

appropriate direction to submit and process DULL SWORD reports as required. 

(CANS-02, -06; Schlesinger Report-15) Complete within 6 to 18 months (T.O. 00-

25-107; AFMAN 91-221)

(Doctrine, Training, Leadership) AF/SE update Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 91-

221 and AFI 21-101 to direct use of Air Force Safety Automated System for 

DULL SWORD reporting and provide guidance for units conducting maintenance 

on aircraft, major subsystems, support equipment, or software involving nuclear 

certified equipment. (BRR-17; CANS-08) Complete within 6 to 18 months 

(AFMAN 91-221; AFI 21-101)

Bolster Training and Standardization at All Levels

(Doctrine, Training) MAJCOMs will assess and establish a training architecture 

across the sustainment enterprise and revise policy to make specific training 

mandatory. Modify training programs to accommodate item managers, depot 

maintainers, transportation experts, warehousing personnel and unit-level 

munitions, missile, and materiel managers to ensure they are familiar with 

implementation, system requirements and procedures. (AFRIT-08; CANS-17) 

Complete within 6 to 18 months
44

(Training) AF/A4/7 will develop/expand training requirements and courses for 

item managers, equipment account custodians as well as MASOs and nuclear 

accountability personnel. (AFRIT-02, -08; BRR-17; CANS-17) Complete within 6 

to 18 months (AFI 21-204; AFMAN 23-110; CFETP; AFI 21-203; new AFI 

covering Nuclear Accountability to include weapons and NWRM)

(Doctrine, Training, Materiel, Facilities) MAJCOMs will identify and procure 

trainers and equipment and develop facilities and lesson plans as necessary to 

ensure a robust and realistic training environment, (i.e., Realistic Weapon 

Trainer, Rotary Launcher, Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear Data 

Services (DIAMONDS) laptop, and facility requirements). (BRR-35; CANS-15; 

Schlesinger Report-22)
45

Chapter 5 — Investment: Requirements, Acquisition, and 

Programming

Problem Statement

The Air Force has underinvested in the nuclear deterrence mission and has no clear, 

long-term commitment to recapitalize, refresh or replace current nuclear capability.

Success Criteria and Desired Sub-Objectives

The Air Force must invest in the nuclear deterrence mission and have a clear, long-term 

commitment to sustain, modernize, and recapitalize its nuclear capability.

Based upon national guidance and vetted COCOM and MAJCOM requirements, the Air 

Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) process will provide the proper balance of capability 

and risk to senior leadership so that funding decisions are based upon relevant, 

accurate, consistent, defendable, repeatable, and transparent data and analysis, and 

are made with full understanding of the implications to the Air Force nuclear enterprise. 

The Air Force nuclear enterprise must be clearly defined with respect to the AFCS. 

Requirements, acquisition, programming, and programmed budget funding processes 

must be aligned to provide transparency into the risk, resourcing, and funding execution 

of all Air Force nuclear enterprise elements.

To ensure appropriate, sustained institutional commitment to the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise and Air Force nuclear-related capability, mid- and long-range planning and 

programming strategies must be refined.

AF/A8, with advocated inputs from appropriate MAJCOMs and Air Force Council 

deliberation, will create strategic plans that address Air Force mid-term requirements 

(i.e., F-35 dual capability, tanker replacement, WSA alignment, and personnel), and 

long-term requirements and acquisition strategies to ensure future viability of our 

nuclear deterrent forces (i.e., ALCM, bomber, and ICBM replacements).

AF/A8 will refine the headquarters Air Force corporate process by assigning AF/A10 

(AF/A3/5N) to the Air Force Group and Board. In addition, AF/A8 will continue the 

evaluation of the portfolios of the existing 12 panels of the AFCS to identify Program 

Elements (PE) which directly or indirectly impact and comprise the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise; continue the evaluation of consolidating all nuclear-related PEs into one 

panel, or a similarly robust management portfolio; and evaluate a ―beta-test‖ Virtual 

Major Force Program (vMFP) dedicated to the Air Force nuclear enterprise in order to 

The expenses required to prevent a war are much lighter than those that

will, if not prevented, be absolutely necessary to maintain it.

Benjamin Franklin
46

consolidate all nuclear-related programs into one robust management and data 

repository.

Root Causes

End of the Cold War – De-emphasis of the Nuclear Mission

Our nation‘s emphasis on the nuclear enterprise and mission has eroded since the end 

of the Cold War. This erosion links the demise of the former Soviet Union and the 

change in perception of the nuclear mission and threat. The nuclear mission shifted 

from a national, strategic, and operational imperative of large numbers of on-alert 

nuclear forces, to a significantly reduced nuclear force and posture. This shift further 

solidified as a result of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the force protectionfocused realization that terrorists might possibly target nuclear storage and operations 

facilities. Absent the perceived urgent need for an immediate massive nuclear 

response against a nuclear peer, the main focus of the nuclear mission shifted to 

providing strategic deterrence options and actively pursuing risk avoidance through 

nuclear surety and systems reliability. This new strategic environment facilitated a 

changed resource requirement and management mentality at COCOM and MAJCOM 

levels wherein sustainment and modernization programs for nuclear missions were 

supported and maintained, but recapitalization and investment in next generation 

systems, technology upgrades, or a future industrial base were identified but not made 

a budget priority. Coincidentally, the nation (and the Air Force) has, since August of 

1990, been engaged in continuous conventional combat operations. As such, the 

resultant strategic and operational shift in priorities directly influenced COCOM and 

MAJCOM requirements from maintaining a robust Air Force nuclear enterprise, to an 

investment strategy more heavily focused on conventional Air Force capabilities 

supporting current operations. Further complicating the nuclear mission equation was 

the focus of both the American public and elected officials to capture a ―peace dividend‖ 

in response to the end of the ―Cold War.‖ Operations tempo and personnel tempo 

increased substantially over the past two decades, further stressing DoD budgets, and 

shifted DoD-wide focus from recapitalization of aging weapon systems to funding and 

sustaining current operations. Findings include:

Focus on the nuclear mission, especially in dual-capable bomber units, has 

diminished from the robust nuclear culture that existed during the Cold War 

(BRR, DSB, Schlesinger Report)

The level of focus within major headquarters from Joint Staff to Air Force major 

commands was drastically reduced with little apparent consideration or 

understanding of the impact of such reductions across virtually all such 

headquarters (DSB, Schlesinger Report)

The conventional roles of the B-52 force so dominate the nuclear role that there 

is minimum daily attention to the nuclear role outside the restricted area where 

nuclear weapons are stored and maintained. Moving nuclear weapons from 

where the majority of B-52 strategic bombers are based is likely to further 
47

complicate focus on the nuclear mission and further devalue the nuclear mission 

(DSB, Schlesinger Report)

No Single Advocate for Requirements, Acquisition, and Programming for 

Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Funding

Nuclear mission requirements span a wide spectrum of organizations to include 

COCOMs and MAJCOMs. Air Force requirements, acquisition and programming 

processes lack a single entity focused on Air Force nuclear capabilities. Diffusion of 

responsibility for resourcing across several entities has resulted in nuclear-related 

requirements, acquisition and programming initiatives not receiving a focused review 

within the AFCS process.

Nuclear mission requirements span a wide spectrum of organizations to include 

COCOMs and MAJCOMs. Air Force requirements, acquisition and programming 

processes lack a single entity focused on Air Force nuclear capabilities. Diffusion of 

responsibility for resourcing across several entities has resulted in nuclear-related 

Requirements, Acquisition and Programming initiatives not receiving a focused review 

within the AFCS process.

No comprehensive process exists to ensure sustained investment advocacy 

(Schlesinger Report)

When reorganized in the 1990s, the Air Force dispersed command authority and 

responsibility for the nuclear mission. This left no central advocate, undercut 

mission alignment with its primary customer, and blurred lines of authority 

(Schlesinger Report)

There is no single funding advocate for sustainment of the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise (CANS)

Current Air Force nuclear organizational construct fragments nuclear weapons 

advocacy and policy (BRR)

To improve upon missile field security, there is a critical need to fully fund a 

replacement helicopter and to fund the sustainment costs of the remote visual 

assessment (BRR)

Funding for second destination transportation to move nuclear weapons is 

inadequate (BRR)

Air Force Requirements, Acquisition, and Programming Processes must 

Enhance Capabilities and Define Risk to the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

In addition to the conscious national-level decision to reduce nuclear force structure, the 

Air Force has balanced nuclear sustainment and life cycle management via corporate 

decisions in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) exercises since the 1990s. The 

AFCS is designed to bring together cross-functional issues, however, the process is not 

optimized to segregate, or identify connections to portions of program elements which 
48

may have first, second, or third order effects on the Air Force nuclear enterprise, its 

operations, sustainment, or other elements of the nuclear mission. This overall 

challenge is further complicated by the fact that the term ―Air Force nuclear enterprise‖ 

was neither previously defined, nor refined for the AFCS.

Aging transportation and handling equipment is adding to the stress on units with 

a nuclear mission (BRR)

Systems and equipment supporting the nuclear mission are aging and continue 

to impact reliability and availability (BRR)

Disconnects Between Final Budget and Execution in the Air Force Nuclear 

Enterprise

In a post-POM environment after Congress passes the budget and the President signs 

it, Air Force leaders continue to be faced with evolving and increasing real-time 

operational needs that must be addressed. This changing environment sometimes 

results in a diversion of funds from specific program areas designated in the POM to 

other programs during "current year‖ execution to meet these urgent priorities. This 

critical tool allows, and must continue to allow, commanders to respond to changing 

environments that may be driven by existing time delays from programming to actual 

expenditure of funds; however, there may be unintended consequences to the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise as a result of these actions.

Budget execution may have caused resource allocation weaknesses in field 

support for the nuclear mission (BRR, Schlesinger Report)

Dedicated, focused, and more robust advocacy will help the requirements, acquisition, 

and programming processes ensure the Air Force can adequately sustain, modernize, 

and recapitalize the Air Force nuclear enterprise.

Action Plan

Re-emphasize the Nuclear Mission

In accordance with the Air Force number one priority to revitalize the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise, the Annual Planning and Programming Guidance (APPG) will reflect minimal 

risk to the Air Force nuclear enterprise during the POM process. This clear statement of 

the level of minimal risk to the Air Force nuclear enterprise in the APPG will further 

bolster the efforts of a single nuclear advocate during requirements, acquisition, and 

programming process deliberations.

(DOTMLPF) AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) will clearly refine the definition of the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise with respect to AFCS processes. (ADM Donald Report-02, -

07; BRR-08; DSB-02, -03, -07, -12; Schlesinger Report-32) Complete in less 

than 6 months (AFI 16-501)

Programs which are DX-rated indicate the highest national defense priority within the 

Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS). Minuteman III, Air Launched Cruise 
49

Missiles (ALCM), and B-2 Aircraft Programs have historically been rated as DX 

programs. In 2006, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics (OSD/AT&L) removed the DX rating from all Air Force nuclear programs, deemphasizing the importance of the Air Force nuclear mission and holding future delivery 

schedules and sustainment efforts at risk due to the lower DPAS rating competing in a 

common supplier base. The Navy Trident D-5 Program remains a DX-rated program, 

emphasizing the high priority placed on the US Navy‘s nuclear mission. The US Air 

Force needs long-term commitment, resources, and robust advocacy from national 

leadership, DoD, and other agencies to sustain, recapitalize, replace, and/or refresh 

nuclear capability and personnel in-accordance-with the recommendations made in the 

Air Force nuclear enterprise roadmap.

(Doctrine) Under Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/US) and Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force Acquisition (SAF/AQ) will request Office Secretary of Defense, 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD/AT&L) reinstate the DX rating for 

Air Force nuclear systems and programs (in line with those of the US Navy). 

(BRR-07) Complete within 6 months (Memorandum from SecAF requesting 

nomination for DX status will be submitted to the DUSD(IP) IAW DoD 4400.1-M 

―Department of Defense Priorities and Allocations Manual‖)

Single Advocate for Requirements, Acquisition, and Programming for Air 

Force Nuclear Enterprise Funding

With focused advocacy and an increased effort to deliberately vet nuclear requirements, 

acquisition, and programming processes, the Air Force will ensure the appropriate level 

of investment in the Air Force nuclear enterprise while providing a long-term 

commitment to sustain, modernize, and recapitalize its nuclear capability.

(Organization, Leadership) Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) will designate a 

senior leader who will be responsible to advocate on behalf of the entire Air 

Force nuclear enterprise during requirements, acquisition, and programming 

processes. This leader will be responsible for collecting data on Air Force 

nuclear enterprise risk and resource options, and for formulating a 

comprehensive POM position which adequately captures the impact of resource 

decisions across the Air Force nuclear enterprise. This senior leader must also 

be a member of and/or represented at every level of the requirements process so 

that requirements match advocacy for nuclear issues presented to the AFCS. 

The Air Force nuclear enterprise funding leader must be responsible for ensuring 

all levels of the AFCS are made aware of any issues with regards to the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise requirements, acquisition, and programming processes. 

(BRR-05, -30, -32; CANS-01; DSB-08, -08c; Schlesinger Report-01, -08, -09, -

10, -20, -31, -32) Action Complete—See Chapter 7 (AFI 16-501; AF/A10 

Implementing Directive)

(Organization, Leadership) Air Force Strategic Plans and Programs (AF/A8) has 

established Headquarters Air Force Operations, Plans, and Requirements 

Nuclear [AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N)] leadership as a full member of the Air Force Group 
50

and Air Force Board (beta test) (BRR-30; Schlesinger Report-10) Actions 

Complete (AFI 16-501)

Air Force Requirements, Acquisition, and Programming Processes must 

Enhance Capabilities and Define Risk to the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

The Air Force must create strategic investment plans that address mid-term 

requirements and acquisitions (i.e. F-35 dual capability, tanker replacement, and WSA 

alignment) and long-term requirements and acquisition strategies (i.e. ALCM, bomber, 

and ICBM replacements) to ensure future viability of our nuclear deterrent forces. The 

AFCS must know which Program Elements (PE) comprise the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise and fully understand the implications of resource decisions. There must be a 

thorough analysis of funding across the entire Air Force nuclear enterprise. 

Additionally, some program elements will not be directly attributed to the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise, but will impact it through the infrastructure and sustainment links.

(Doctrine, Organization) AF/A8 is currently evaluating the portfolios of the 

existing 12 panels of the AFCS to identify PEs which directly or indirectly impact 

and comprise the Air Force nuclear enterprise. (BRR-28, -31; CANS-03) 

Complete by Dec 2008 (AFI 16-501)

(Doctrine, Organization) AF/A8 is currently evaluating the consolidation of all 

nuclear-related PEs into one panel, or a similarly robust management portfolio. 

(BRR-28, -31; CANS-03) Complete by Dec 2008 (AFI 16-501)

(Doctrine, Organization) AF/CV will direct evaluation of a ―beta-test‖ Virtual Major 

Force Program (vMFP) dedicated to the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise in order to 

consolidate all nuclear-related programs into one robust management and data 

repository—pending evaluation of ―beta-test,‖ coordinate final recommendation 

and request approval to establish an Air Force Nuclear Enterprise vMFP to 

OSD/PA&E. (AFNTF) Complete within 12 months (AFI 16-501)

(Organization, Leadership) CSAF will direct AF/A3/5 to align nuclear enterprise 

requirements and capability champions processes to mirror any changes to the 

PE and panel structure within the AFCS. (BRR-28, -31; CANS-03) Complete 

within 6 months (AFI 16-501)

(Organization, Leadership) SecAF will direct SAF/AQ & SAF/USA to align 

nuclear enterprise acquisition processes to mirror the revised AFCS process. 

(BRR-28, -31; CANS-03) Complete within 6 months (AFI 16-501)

Manage Final Budget and Execution in the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

In order to ensure we allocate and execute resources with a full understanding of the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise, the AFCS must consider current budget execution in addition 

to the POM process.
51

(Doctrine, Organization) AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) will develop a process to ensure Air 

Force nuclear enterprise risk is adequately considered and vetted when 

resources are redirected to more urgent priorities during budget execution. 

(AFNTF) Complete within 6 months (AFI 16-501)
52
53

Chapter 6 — Advocacy Across the Air Force Nuclear 

Enterprise

Problem Statement

The Air Force does not demonstrate sustained advocacy and commitment to the 

nuclear deterrence mission while helping to win today‘s fight.

Success Criteria and Desired Sub-Objectives

This chapter discusses the lack of advocacy in many forms including organization, 

accountability and culture, expertise, investment, and strategic communication. The 

action plan presented in this chapter is specific to strategic communication and presents 

a phased plan for the Air Force institution and leadership to correct the deficiency. 

Other advocacy-related action items in categories such as organization and investment 

are presented in their respective chapters of this roadmap.

Advocacy is necessary to reinvigorate the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Success in the 

Air Force nuclear enterprise will be apparent when confidence and credibility are 

restored, the importance of the mission is elevated, Airmen are consistently held 

accountable for their actions, and the Air Force re-commits itself as the nation‘s 

enduring sole provider of nuclear deterrence weapons launched from US soil.

Communicating our message is a key component of advocacy. We must inform key 

audiences such as Airmen at all levels, Air Force senior leaders, Congress, OSD, Joint 

Staff, COCOMs, national leaders, think tanks, influencers, allies and partners, and the 

American public about the importance of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. In addition to 

measuring opinion and attitude shifts, success will be measured according to how well 

the specific actions outlined in this roadmap are executed and how well those actions 

strengthen the Air Force nuclear enterprise.

To communicate the Air Force commitment to re-invigorating the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise, Secretary of the Air Force Directorate of Communication and Public Affairs, 

in coordination with the Special Assistant for Air Force Strategy, AF/A8, AF/A10 

(AF/A3/5N), and MAJCOM CCs , will create a coordinated, advocacy-based 

engagement strategy that enables thoughtful Air Force input to national and joint policy, 

strategy and planning processes, and puts the Air Force on notice that real, enduring 

changes and improvements are needed throughout the Air Force nuclear enterprise.

Deterrence is not just aircraft on alert and missiles in the silos. It is not

defined by the size of the defense budget. It is the product of both

capability and credibility.

General Jerome F. O’Malley
54

Root Causes

Perspective and History: The Erosion of Advocacy

Advocacy for the Air Force nuclear mission fragmented over the past two decades as 

the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence slipped in national priority. Since the end of 

the Cold War, the strategic environment and associated national security strategy deemphasized nuclear deterrence. Specifically, the threat of state-state nuclear war has 

diminished, driving major changes in Air Force priorities and organization.

The quality and credibility of US nuclear forces are critical to an effective 

deterrence (Schlesinger Report)

Senior leadership decisions have had the cumulative effect of compromising the 

Air Force‘s deterrence capabilities (Schlesinger Report)

There has been a steady long-term trend minimizing the perceived importance of 

the nuclear deterrence to national security (DSB)

Air Force MAJCOM restructuring in the 1990s led to fragmentation of advocacy. The 

Air Force MAJCOM reorganization was quickly followed by the fundamental reposturing of the Air Force into an expeditionary force. This was perhaps just as 

significant as the MAJCOM restructure due to the shift of people, resources, and 

priorities to conventional operations.

No single command to advocate for the resources required to support nuclear 

capabilities (Schlesinger Report)

Nuclear missions became embedded in organizations whose primary focus is not 

nuclear (Schlesinger Report)

By embedding nuclear mission forces in non-nuclear enterprise, and a general 

devaluation of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission (DSB)

Current USAF nuclear organizational construct fragments nuclear weapons 

advocacy and policy (BRR)

Unintended Consequences: The Leadership and Investment Bathtub

Given the national importance of the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force must develop

leaders who understand and value the nuclear mission. Without a senior Air Force 

nuclear enterprise leader at the three- or four-star level, it may be difficult to develop 

future leaders within the nuclear enterprise. With a senior mentor, junior Airmen will 

better recognize the nuclear mission‘s importance. With a larger cadre of personnel 

with nuclear expertise who value the mission, the Air Force will be able to populate key 

joint nominative billets with Airmen who are also advocates of the nuclear enterprise.

It is essential that leaders restore discipline and pride among the Airmen who 

perform the Air Force‘s nuclear mission (Schlesinger Report)
55

The imperative to ensure discipline in regard to adherence to regulations and 

technical data needs to be constantly reinforced by supervisors and commanders 

(BRR)

With the restructuring of nuclear forces and equipment into multiple organizations, 

combined with a new expeditionary focus, the Air Force was distracted from the task of 

advocating for investment in the Air Force nuclear enterprise. In other words, when 

multiple MAJCOMs became stewards for nuclear investment, it became more 

challenging to advocate with one voice. Without strong investment advocacy, the Air 

Force budget for nuclear-related equipment, facilities, and personnel eroded.

Underinvestment in the nuclear deterrence mission is evident, undercutting the 

nation‘s deterrence posture (Schlesinger Report)

No comprehensive process exists to ensure sustained investment advocacy 

(Schlesinger Report)

Action Plan

A Strategic Communication Plan: Focus on Key Audiences

The action plans for many of the root causes listed above are answered in their 

respective chapters; however, advocacy in the form of a strategic communication plan 

will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Advocacy for the Air Force nuclear enterprise must be executed by developing a 

deliberate communication plan with specific audiences in mind. In general, those 

audiences are the internal Air Force and the external audience, to include DoD, lawand policy-makers, and the American public. Assessing the effects of the plan over 

time is essential. Success will depend upon leaders matching words with deeds.

(Doctrine, Leadership) Secretary of the Air Force Directorate of Communication 

and Public Affairs will develop an Air Force nuclear enterprise advocacy plan 

using a cyclic process of researching, planning, executing, and assessing. 

(DSB-08; Schlesinger Report-13, -14) Complete within 6 months

(Doctrine, Organization, Leadership) SAF/CM will measure effectiveness by 

comparing the current level of advocacy to levels measured after the plan is 

implemented in the near-, medium-, and long-term horizons. (DSB-08a) 

Enduring

Near and Mid-Term Horizons: Leadership and Doctrine

Internal Air Force and external audiences will pay the most attention to actions taken 

sooner rather than later. Both audiences have been sufficiently informed by the actions 

and statements of the Secretary of Defense and accompanying media coverage to put 

the Air Force on notice that real, enduring changes and improvements are needed 

throughout the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Air Force senior leaders, to include the 

Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and 
56

general officers (GOs) who lead elements of the Air Force nuclear enterprise, must take 

steps now that will plant the seeds of sustained improvement. They must be vocal, 

visible, and credible. Near- and mid-term outreach should first center on the internal 

audience. Near-term advocacy is defined as that period expiring approximately 90-days 

after release of the Schlesinger Panel Report, or approximately 31 December 2008. 

Mid-term advocacy will span the following six months, or until July 2009. This initial Air 

Force nuclear enterprise advocacy timeframe should focus on outreach, doctrinal 

revision, policy change, organizational structure, training, personnel, and leadership and 

education (loosely, a DOTMLPF construct).

(Leadership) Air Force senior leaders must visit ICBM, bomber, DCA fighter, 

nuclear command and control, storage, and sustainment bases and facilities. 

During these visits, they will be prepared to speak directly to those Airmen and 

civilians performing missions that directly underpin the nation‘s nuclear 

deterrence credibility. They will present awards, give advocacy briefings related 

to the importance of the Continental United States (CONUS)-based and Outside 

the Continental United States (OCONUS)-based deterrence mission, and attend 

inspection outbriefs. (BRR-10) Complete within 6 to 18 months—enduring

(Leadership) Air Force leaders will participate in outreach by writing scholarly 

articles for publication in the many Air Force journals, such as ―Air & Space 

Power Journal,‖ ―Strategic Studies Quarterly,‖ and ―High Frontier.‖ Outreach will 

then move to the external audience, to include law- and policy-makers, think 

tanks, the other Services, and the American public. The same scholarly writings 

will again be used for publication in ―Armed Force Journal,‖ ―Joint Force 

Quarterly,‖ and ―Air Force Magazine.‖ Such articles spawn op-eds, written by 

scholars and policy-makers, in local and national newspapers. (BRR-21) 

Complete within 6 to 18 months—enduring

(Leadership) Air Force leaders will make public addresses on the importance of 

the Air Force‘s role as sole provider of land and air based nuclear deterrence and 

the steps taken to improve our stewardship of the mission. Specifically, senior 

uniformed and DoD civilians will speak both on and off the record with 

Washington, DC think tanks and universities that specialize in discussing national 

security topics. The result of proactive external engagement is often sustained 

symbiotic relationships between the Air Force and those who were, and may be, 

in the seats of power. (Schlesinger Report-09) Complete within 6 to 18 

months—enduring

(Doctrine) LeMay Center for Doctrine Development & Education (LeMay Center) 

will revise Air Force nuclear doctrine to reflect the renewed understanding of the 

mission‘s importance. (BRR-14) Complete within 6 months (AFDD 2-1.5, 

Nuclear Operations (soon to be redesignated AFDD 2-12))

(Training, Leadership, Personnel) AETC/AU will ensure requisite emphasis of the 

nuclear mission is placed in the appropriate officer and enlisted accession 
57

training, professional military education (PME), and technical training schools. 

(BRR-20, Schlesinger Report-11, -19) Complete within 6 to 18 months

Far-Term Horizon: National Leadership Advocacy

A more demanding task for the Air Force will be to influence Joint doctrine, OSD policy, 

and National Security Strategy.

On the far planning horizon (July 2009 and beyond), advocacy must focus on three 

fronts: a budget and Congressional dialogue to reflect our nuclear priority; an Air Force 

cultural shift that embraces the importance of the Air Force nuclear deterrence mission; 

and taking account of the current benchmark for excellence, such as the US Navy‘s 

nuclear program. These three changes depend upon actions taken now, but must be 

monitored for continued relevance and adjusted to meet the changing context of 

national security threats, Presidential priorities, and the views of American society.

Dialogue with Congress must be regular, deliberate, and transparent.

(Leadership) Secretary of the Air Force Legislative Liaison (SAF/LL) will interface 

with Congress on a regular basis and expand nature of dialogue to include the 

Air Force nuclear enterprise. (BRR-07) Complete within 6 to 18 months—

enduring (AFI 90-402)

In addition to Congressional interface, the Air Force must also participate in debate and 

discussion that lends to evolution of National Security Strategy. These discussions 

occur between Services, the Joint community and OSD, coalition services, and other 

nations.

(Leadership) Air Force senior leaders will participate in forums that bolster the Air 

Force role in the US nuclear deterrence mission. (BRR-29) Complete within 6 to 

18 months—enduring

SAF/CM and AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) will measure and track the deliverables contained in 

this report and determine progress of this advocacy plan.
58
59

Chapter 7 — Organizational Alternatives

Problem Statement

Air Force nuclear-related authority and responsibility are fragmented, and are not 

aligned with nuclear deterrence mission requirements.

Chapter Organization

To provide context that led to organizational decisions made at the 18 September 2008 

Nuclear Summit/1-3 October 2008 CORONA, this chapter reflects the attributes of a 

composite sustainment, field operational and headquarters organizational structure 

required to ensure reinvigorated USAF stewardship of our nuclear deterrence mission.

Success Criteria and Methodology

No amount of change in a single organizational category (at the exclusion of 

corresponding change in the other categories) can address all the attributes of success 

across the Air Force nuclear enterprise. The attributes of success are discussed in the 

sections following each respective organizational change section.

The Air Force Nuclear Task Force developed a construct (Figure 7-1) for evaluating the 

interrelated sustainment, field operations, and headquarters elements.

”The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and preserve change

amid order.”

Alfred North Whitehead
60

Figure 7-1: Baseline for AF Nuclear Deterrence Operations

The ―Baseline for Nuclear Deterrence Operations‖ model has five levels:

The first level is the foundation of the Air Force nuclear enterprise: An 

institutional focus and commitment to the stewardship of the nuclear mission by 

all Air Force personnel, from the Service Secretary and the Chief of Staff down to 

the newly recruited Airman in training

The second level shows the three structural areas to implement organizational 

change:

o Governance reflects changes to the higher-headquarters structure that 

oversees the entirety of the Air Force nuclear enterprise

o Sustainment focuses on weapons, stockpile, and systems stewardship. 

Some of the systems included are warheads, ICBMs, cruise missiles, and 

the integration of weapons into delivery systems

o Operations relates to the organization of fielded operational units. While 

this can include levels down to the squadron and below, the AFNTF 
61

narrowed the development of courses of action to MAJCOM and NAFlevel structures

The third level contains those attributes a structural component contributes to 

providing the desired lines of authority and responsibility vital to the nuclear 

enterprise. The easiest course of action is to modify one structural component to 

simultaneously maximize all attributes. However, that ―silver bullet‖ does not 

exist. In reality, each component enhances certain attributes of the entire 

structure, but does not reach the same level of effectiveness that composite 

changes across all components can achieve

The fourth level shows measurable qualities. The Air Force can distill metrics 

from these qualities to empirically evaluate how well the attributes are 

contributing to the overall target of the nuclear enterprise

The fifth and final level incorporates the broader strategic targets already 

identified in this roadmap

Based on the combination of external reviews plus the Task Force deliberations, the ―as 

is‖ Air Force nuclear deterrence picture is shown in Figure 7-2. This stands in contrast 

to Figure 7-1 and shows there is a critical need for reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise now.
62

Figure 7-2: Current Assessment of AF Nuclear Deterrence

Composite Organization

When evaluating competing component courses of action, it was important to consider 

the overall effects of organizational change on the Air Force nuclear enterprise. The 

interrelated organizational change decision considered the composite organization 

recommendations found in the core reports such as:

Ensure effective nuclear operations and flawless nuclear surety

Establish clear lines of responsibility and authority

Air Force nuclear enterprise senior leaders must have sufficient influence over 

acquisition, requirements, planning programming budgeting execution (PPBE), 

operations, logistics, personnel, etc.

Organization should have similar attributes to the Navy‘s Strategic Systems 

Program (SSP)

Must be properly sized and resourced given current realities
63

Must retain a robust Washington, DC presence to effectively engage with 

mission partners

The insights gained from the internal/external reviews, additional considerations such as 

protecting our ability to support the current fight, enhancement of domain excellence, 

etc; and USAF-leadership approved organizational attributes formed the foundation for 

a composite organizational approach with sustainment, field operational, and 

headquarters elements.

Sustainment Organization

Attributes of a Successful Sustainment Enterprise

Two key attributes were identified to ensure successful management of the nuclear 

sustainment enterprise with the second attribute highlighting six critical functions.

A single center responsible for sustainment of nuclear weapons and related 

nuclear certified systems

A single center led by a General Officer (GO)/Senior Executive Service (SES) for 

nuclear weapons and systems sustainment which provides:

o Systems engineering for nuclear weapons sustainment, certification, and 

weapons effects

o Overall system management for Air Force nuclear weapons, ICBMs, 

cruise missiles, aircraft weapons interface, and weapons trainers

o Programmatic and technical leadership for sustainment of all Air Force

nuclear weapons, ICBMs, cruise missiles, aircraft weapons interface, and 

weapons trainers

o Funding advocacy for the nuclear sustainment enterprise

o Oversight of nuclear facility infrastructure – facility certification (i.e., ICBM 

Launch Facilities, Launch Control Centers and Launch Critical 

Infrastructure); tracks storage facility deviations for CSAF; new facility 

designs

o Nuclear unique and nuclear-related support equipment management with 

cognizance of dual-use nuclear certified support equipment

Sustainment Organization Course of Action

After analyzing several COAs, Air Force senior leadership chose to place the AFNWC 

under AFMC which is consistent with the Dr. Schlesinger‘s Task Force Report 

recommendations. Under this COA, the commander for AFMC will serve as the lead 

agent for Air Force nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related materiel (as shown 

in Figure 7-3).
64

The portfolio of the AFNWC‘s plan for Phase I and II includes all responsibilities needed 

to sustain nuclear weapons and related nuclear certified systems for 1) Life Cycle 

Support; 2) Stockpile Stewardship; 3) Nuclear Engineering; and 4) Nuclear Facility 

Management. The Schlesinger Panel also recommended that the CSAF direct the 

consolidation of CONUS and USAFE-controlled weapons storage areas under the 

AFNWC and the realignment of functions associated with ICBMs and cruise missiles, 

including Program Executive Officer (PEO) responsibilities. Realignment of PEO 

authority for ICBMs and cruise missiles is currently being analyzed for implementation in 

Phase IV of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center implementation plan. The 

recommendation to consolidate OCONUS weapon storage areas under the AFNWC will 

not be addressed in this roadmap but has been tasked to the USAFE/CC for 

assessment and recommendation. All assessments and recommendations will be 

conducted with full transparency between USAFE and the host nations.

Under AFNWC Phase III, responsibility for all CONUS-based nuclear weapons 

maintenance, storage, accounting, moving, handling, and control will belong to AFMC. 

Specifically, AFNWC will provide nuclear munitions support to operational missions of 

Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), and ultimately Air 

Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). The mission of the WSA munitions 

organizations under the AFNWC will be to provide operationally ready nuclear weapons

when and where needed. AFNWC will provide robust nuclear weapons maintenance 

management capability across the spectrum of operational and sustainment 

requirements. The implementation of AFNWC Phase III will provide focused and 

enhanced oversight and standardization of nuclear weapons maintenance, storage, 

accountability and control, integrate the AF‘s CONUS nuclear sustainment capabilities 

in support of the combatant commander through the full range of Air Force strategic 

operations and align our peacetime train and equip organization to safely, securely, and 

reliably meet the nation‘s strategic deterrence posture while continuing to prepare for 

and, when necessary, conduct warfighting operations.
65

Figure 7-3: Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC)

Air Force Sustainment Organization Action Plan

The Air Force has directed the AFMC commander serve as the lead agent for Air Force 

nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related materiel. AFMC/AFNWC reorganization 

consolidated the 526th ICBM Systems Group; with draft plans to incorporate wing-level 

technical engineering support under the 526th ICBM Systems Group. Realignment of 

PEO authority for ICBMs and cruise missiles is currently being analyzed for 

implementation in Phase IV of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center implementation 

plan.

The Air Force has directed the consolidation of all CONUS-based WSAs under 

AFNWC, as discussed earlier. However, a decision to consolidate USAFE-controlled 

weapons storage under the AFNWC will not be made until a full analysis is conducted 

on the potential impacts on the USAFE mission and that of our allies. Additionally, 

AFMC and AFSPC will conduct an analysis to determine a way ahead regarding the 

requirement and feasibility of realigning the Space and Missile Center from AFSPC to 

AFMC.
66

Air Force Field Operations Organization

Figure 7-4: Current Nuclear-Focused Command Relationships

Attributes of Successful Field Operations Organizational Structure 

In developing COAs to solve the field operations organizational issue, the following 

attributes were identified:

Clear lines of authority with dedicated nuclear focus

o Single chain: mission authority, responsibility, and accountability

o Culture of compliance and primacy for the nuclear deterrence mission

Advocacy/Influence

o Resources...advocate mission requirements

o Influence manpower, policy, and strategy decisions

o Long-range planning, funding, and readiness
67

o System-of-systems enhancements

Seamless integration with HAF and AFNWC

o HAF influence...application of AF capability across full range of national 

security objectives

AF-wide expertise + robust force development

Coherent presentation of strategic deterrence capability...shape COCOM plans

Ensure readiness: test, exercises, inspections, and requirements

Authority/assets to drive culture of compliance

Posture AF for rapidly changing global environment

Enable suite of global options for crisis management

Field Operations Organization Course of Action

The Air Force considered several reorganization alternatives to reinvigorate the nuclear 

enterprise as part of the roadmap development. The field operations organization 

attributes used to develop, analyze, and compare the organizational alternatives were 

derived from the findings of the ADM Donald, Defense Science Board (Gen Welch), 

Blue Ribbon Review reports, Dr. Schlesinger‘s Task Force Report, as well as inputs 

from nuclear MAJCOM staffs. In developing the COAs, the Air Force gave careful 

consideration to the Schlesinger Panel Report recommendations concerning the Air 

Force organization construct; 1) The SecAF and CSAF should redesignate Air Force 

Space Command as Air Force Strategic Command; 2) The SecAF and CSAF should 

direct the assignment of all Air Force bombers to 8th Air Force; 3) the SecAF and CSAF 

should direct the removal of all non-bomber related missions from 8th Air Force; 4) the 

SecAF and CSAF should direct the reassignment of the reconstituted 8th Air Force from 

Air Combat Command to Air Force Strategic Command.

During CORONA (1-3 October 2008), based on a careful assessment of the previously 

mentioned attributes as well as other relevant considerations, USAF leadership 

approved the following operational command structure (Figure 7-5):
68

Nuclear/Strategic MAJCOM 

Figure 7-5: Nuclear/Strategic MAJCOM 

This organizational construct clearly aligns nuclear operational units under a single 

command and demonstrates a visible, bold commitment to the nuclear deterrence and 

global strike missions while taking full advantage of the existing Air Force field 

organizational structure. The establishment of AFGSC will not include DCA fighters and 

will have no impact on USAFE operations. All nuclear organize, train, and equip 

functions, to include the implementation and execution of a Global Deterrence Force 

(GDF), will be the responsibility of the AFGSC/CC. In this role, AFGSC could provide 

value-added support to USAFE in the form of standards integration and nuclear mission 

requirements advocacy. Additionally, where required and beneficial to the AFGSC‘s 

focus on nuclear deterrence and global strike mission responsibilities, designated 

functions (CAF support for conventional operations, etc) will be supported through 

relationships with existing commands. By keeping the operational focus on the nuclear 

mission, AFGSC will be able to foster a robust nuclear culture, as well as establish an 

effective self-assessment culture. Finally, in order to ensure optimum execution of the 

GDF and to achieve a proper balance between the nuclear/strategic deterrence mission 

and today‘s current fight, the activation of a fourth B-52 Squadron will be critical to the 

success of the GDF. 
69

AF/A10 will be the OPR for Program Action Directive (PAD) development and has

formed an integrated product team to finalize roles and responsibilities as well as 

identify what units will be assigned to AFGSC. Development and implementation of the 

PAD may require the near-term establishment of a provisional AFGSC organization and 

designation of a provisional commander. This provisional commander will be 

responsible for implementing the associated PAD and prepare the command for 

activation.

Air Force Field Operations Organization Action Plan

The USAF will:

o Stand up a new MAJCOM (AFGSC), dedicated to the nuclear and global 

strike missions. Projected IOC September 2009. AFGSC will consist of 

8

th AF (B-2s and B-52s) and 20th AF (ICBMs)

o All ISR, command and control platforms and cyber assets will be removed 

from 8th AF

o As part of the program action directive guidance, the Air Force will direct a 

review of the manning requirements for the AFGSC, ACC, 8th AF, and 20th

AF headquarters as well as the assigned wings under Air Force Global 

Strike Command

Air Force Headquarters Organization

Current Air Force Headquarters Structure

The current Air Force headquarters organizational structure consolidates the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise office within the Operations and Requirements directorate (AF/A3/5) 

as a matrixed entity, made up of dedicated personnel from AF/A3/5N and non-dedicated 

personnel from across the headquarters. This construct is indicative of the 

fragmentation of the Air Force nuclear enterprise at the headquarters level.
70

Figure 7-6: Current Air Force Headquarters Nuclear Structure

Attributes of Successful Air Force Headquarters Nuclear Structure

Unlike Air Force domain operations, the Headquarters Air Force structure to manage 

the Air Force nuclear enterprise suffers from organizational weakness across the Air 

Staff. In developing COAs to solve the headquarters‘ organizational issue, the key 

attributes used to evaluate the various COAs were:

Visible Air Force commitment

Direct access to the SecAF/CSAF

Coordination with MAJCOM(s) to develop operational requirements

Advocate requirements within the AFCS to ensure appropriate level of 

investment

Advocate with DC-based mission partners and Congress

Posture Air Force for rapidly changing global environment
71

o Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 

National Military Strategy (NMS), etc., inputs

o Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), Nuclear Weapons Council, 

ongoing Forums

o Unified Command Plan (UCP), Arms Control, etc., for inputs

o Global options for crisis mitigation

Sustained USAF leadership focus

o Culture of primacy for the nuclear deterrence mission...top to bottom

Orchestrate on-going assessments/root cause analysis

Objective arbitrator for nuclear issues and nuclear clearing house

Lead Headquarters Air Force nuclear enterprise

o Oversee action items performance

o Integrate functionally-based guidance and standards

o Develop, align, and present speeches, testimonies, and positions for the 

Air Force nuclear enterprise

Air Force Headquarters Course of Action

At the Nuclear Summit held 18 September 2008, a decision was made to create a new 

AF/A10 headquarters directorate. The establishment of the AF/A10 sends a clear and 

visible signal that the Air Force is committed to resolving the fragmented lines of 

authority across all levels of the nuclear enterprise and provides a headquarters 

Assistant Chief of Staff (ACS) that reports directly to the CSAF with authority to drive 

nuclear enterprise policy, guidance, requirements, and advocacy across the HAF staff. 

The AF/A10 will have direct access to the CSAF and SecAF and be responsible for

nuclear related issues and will have lead responsibilities for nuclear plans, policy, and 

requirements. In addition, the AF/A10 will be responsible for the synchronization and 

integration of all related issues across the nuclear enterprise. The ACS will have the 

status of the other HAF ACS/DCSs and will have the same voting authority as other 

ACS/DCSs in the Air Force Corporate Structure. In addition to the AF/A10 staff, the 

ACS will be supported by a combined SAF/HAF nuclear issues resolution/integration 

team that is patterned after a current successful template used to work cross 

Headquarters (SAF and HAF) issues while enabling institutional focus at both the 

Secretary of the Air Force and CSAF levels.

The Air Force is strengthening nuclear oversight and policy functions by establishing a 

separate directorate (AF/A10) focused solely on the nuclear enterprise (Figure 7-7). 

Analysis of the billets required to execute the AF/A10 mission is ongoing and will be 
72

fully resourced once that number is validated. AF/A10 is required to stand up by 1 

November 2008.

The Secretary of the Air Force will charge the Under Secretary of the Air Force with 

broad ongoing policy and oversight responsibilities for the nuclear enterprise. To 

facilitate this, the Under Secretary will be provided with a senior member of the Senior 

Executive Service, and appropriate supporting staff.

Figure 7-7: New HAF Directorate

Air Force Headquarters Organization Action Plan

(Organization, Personnel) AF/A3/5 in partnership with AF/A1 developed, 

assessed, and recommended an Air Force Headquarters construct for SecAF & 

CSAF approval. (AFNTF) Action 1 November 2008

(Organization) CSAF designated a headquarters organizational structure that 

includes attributes previously listed. (ADM Donald Report) Action Complete

SAF/AA, in coordination with AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N), will finalize details including 

manning, location, CONOPs, etc.
73

In addition to standing up the A10 and forming the SAF/HAF Nuclear Oversight Board, 

Air Force senior leadership will determine final details of the Under Secretary‘s broad 

policy and oversight responsibilities on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force 

(including supporting staff structure).

The combination of all the headquarters initiatives will provide a robust SAF/HAF 

governance structure to ensure appropriate civilian oversight and sustained reporting of 

the health of the nuclear enterprise to the CSAF and SecAF while precluding 

fragmentation of nuclear-related accountability at Headquarters USAF.

Summary

In summary, based on a leadership-approved set of attributes plus insights gained from 

external/internal reviews and additional considerations such as protecting USAF 

capability to support the current fight, the USAF will pursue a composite sustainment, 

field operational and headquarters‘ structure designed to enable the reinvigoration of 

the USAF Nuclear Enterprise (Figure 7-8).

Establish a way ahead and provide resources for the AFNWC expansion of 

nuclear sustainment responsibilities including warhead maintenance and tracking

Establish an AFGSC with clear lines of authority enabling a dedicated focus on 

the nuclear and global strike missions

Create a Headquarters Air Force organization, AF/A10 focused on operations, 

policy, plans, requirements, strategy, guidance, integration, and synchronization 

of the nuclear enterprise
74

Figure 7-8: Composite USAF Organizational Approach
75

Chapter 8 — Assessment

Introduction

On 12 August 2008, then-Acting Secretary of the Air Force Donley drew an important 

distinction between the Air Force conventional mission and its nuclear mission. He 

stated, ―There has been, for a variety of reasons, a culture of needing to manage risk 

and to take risk across a lot of different mission areas in the Air Force mission set that 

we can't always meet at a hundred percent.‖ Secretary Donley continued, ―But on the 

nuclear side, it's really such an important mission that we shouldn't be managing risk. 

We should be eliminating risk. And this is what we need to get back to.‖ The goal of 

risk elimination requires identifying all potential risks and analyzing the impact of our 

actions on the nuclear mission. We must continually strive to reduce existing and new 

risks to the extent possible. This is a never-ending task since all risk can not be 

completely eliminated.

Nuclear operations demand robust, standardized, stable, and even redundant 

processes and procedures in many critical areas in order to reduce risk to the lowest 

possible level. Risk reduction costs—both financially and in terms of mission flexibility 

and versatility. This ―purposeful inefficiency‖ is required to provide the level of safety 

and surety demanded by the American people. This chapter presents the Air Force‘s 

assessment approach, which is similar to a balanced scorecard, to ensure we achieve 

and maintain the needed standards.

Success Criteria

Success in the Air Force nuclear enterprise depends on attaining and maintaining 

performance objectives at all levels. Initially, the assessment focus is on evaluating 

implementation of this roadmap and adjusting action plans where necessary. The 

assessment process identifies and measures the progress made toward reinvigorating 

the Air Force nuclear enterprise and meeting strategic objectives described in the 

preceding chapters. Future assessments need to go beyond the strategic findings and 

evaluate the entire Air Force nuclear mission.

Assessment Method 

The Air Force requires an assessment method capable of measuring the progress 

made to improve the nuclear enterprise through the nuclear roadmap action plans. The 

assessment process uses measures of performance (MOPs) that address the 

roadmap‘s objectives/sub-objectives and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that 

evaluate the continued accomplishment of a safe, secure, effective, and efficient 

nuclear mission. The MOPs indicate how well the Air Force is implementing the nuclear 

roadmap‘s objectives, and the MOEs assess how well the Air Force is accomplishing 

the overall objective of a safe, secure, effective, and efficient nuclear mission. In simple 

terms, the MOPs depict if the Air Force is doing things right, and the MOEs indicate if 

the Air Force is doing the right things. Various subject matter experts (SMEs) and 

leaders throughout the nuclear enterprise need to agree on the particular measures. 
76

The evaluation of the measures will deliver a precise and objective assessment of the 

nuclear roadmap‘s health and highlight areas where additional progress is still required.

Before identifying the offices to implement the assessments, SMEs will evaluate and 

validate the MOPs (which measure objectives) and MOEs (which measure mission 

effects). SMEs will also propose the scoring formula for each measure. Air Force 

Senior Leadership will have approval authority for the ―weights‖ (importance) of each 

measure so that scores can be combined. The weighted MOPs will produce a score for 

each sub-objective and an overall performance score. Similarly, the weighted MOEs 

will be combined for a score by major effect (safe, secure, efficient, and effective) and 

an overall effectiveness score. The performance scores indicate the progress on 

roadmap objectives while the effectiveness scores depict the achievement of tangible 

results from the nuclear activities. (See Appendix 2 - Methodology for greater detail.)

Following validation and leadership approval of the measures, the appropriate offices 

will collect the required data and construct an initial or baseline assessment. Many 

measures identified have not been collected and evaluated before. This first 

assessment will serve as the baseline comparison for future assessments to evaluate 

the progress made or regression on any particular objective. Leadership will direct 

periodic assessments to maintain visibility on current performance and to track trends. 

Figure 8-1 shows one possible approach to depicting the impact of the roadmap over 

time.

 

Figure 8-1: Notional Operational Assessment Stoplight Chart

Assessment scores evaluate whether the actions being performed in the nuclear 

enterprise are achieving the desired sub-objectives and effects. If the nuclear 

enterprise is implementing the action plans intended to eliminate root causes and the 

assessment indicates the enterprise is failing to achieve its objectives or desired effects, 

then leaders need to re-assess the applicable action plans or appropriateness of 
77

implemented measures. Lack of improvement in the performance measures may 

indicate that the action plans are either not being implemented appropriately or they are 

not correcting the root cause of the report findings. Similarly, poor results in the effects 

measures would cause an investigation into the results of action plans or an 

examination for new challenges in the nuclear enterprise. Leaders must review the 

measures and their weights periodically to ensure that the appropriate aspects of the 

enterprise are being addressed. Once new procedures are institutionalized, some 

measures may become unnecessary or experience may indicate the need for revision 

or additional measures. Since the roadmap has focused on correcting known problems, 

another reason for adding additional measures would be to broaden the scope of the 

assessment to encompass the entire nuclear mission. Hence, future assessments need 

to expand beyond the nuclear roadmap to ensure the Air Force does not regress on 

tasks that have been successfully accomplished over the years.

Figure 8-2 depicts the process to perform overall assessment.

Current requirements will drive the following schedule: Data collection will be 

completed at the wing and MAJCOM level and submitted to Headquarters Air Force 

quarterly for assessment and feedback. This will allow Air Force leadership to analyze 

progress and provide updates to external oversight committees (i.e. NSPD-28 Oversight 

Committee (NOC), Nuclear Oversight Board (NOB), etc.)

In the long term, data collection will be completed at the wing and MAJCOM level. The 

MAJCOMs will complete the collections every quarter and submit their data to 

Headquarters Air Force for assessment and feedback. Additionally, the Air Force will 

deliver status reports to external oversight committees and agencies.

 

Figure 8-2: Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Assessment Process

Capturing Lessons Learned

The Air Force will capture lessons derived from implementation of the nuclear roadmap 

and from activities throughout the nuclear enterprise. The Air Force Lessons Learned 

process will assist the Air Force nuclear enterprise in applying a full range of lessons 
78

learned activities. This process assists in identifying and implementing best practices 

for senior decision makers, commanders, staff members, and Airmen working in the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise. Air Force Studies and Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons 

Learned (AF/A9) will assist in coordinating with the Headquarters Air Force, MAJCOMs, 

NAFs, centers, and agencies lessons learned offices as appropriate. The AF/A9L 

MAJCOM community will share lessons within the Air Force and with other joint and 

governmental lessons learned offices. The information gathered will provide inputs that 

could influence decisions across the spectrum of DOTMLPF-related policy and program 

areas.

The Air Force Lessons Learned process will be closely associated with identifying 

improvement opportunities, aggressively tracking the development of effective solutions, 

and disseminating lessons to the war-fighting community. AF/A9L MAJCOM community 

will focus on the nuclear roadmap implementation timeline and other Air Force Lessons 

Learned offices will assist and support when appropriate.

AF/A9L MAJCOM community will measure the effectiveness of the identified action 

plans based off of the suggested assessment process. Other Air Force Lesson Learned 

offices will assist AF/A9L with the collection effort for an independent assessment of the 

action plan's effectiveness. This will ensure a qualitative assessment of the relative 

effectiveness of various actions to feed the overall assessment process.

The most critical functions performed by the Air Force Lessons Learned community in 

assessing the Air Force nuclear enterprise will be the following:

Collection: Identify and report "observations" during implementation of the 

nuclear roadmap and ongoing nuclear activities. Ensure lessons are 

documented. Disseminate "best practices" to the entire Air Force nuclear 

enterprise in a timely and efficient manner.

Validation: Aggregate common observations and/or review a significant 

observation as a "lesson identified" or an "issue identified" and validate them at 

the appropriate level, usually by a Headquarters Air Force functional office. The 

purpose is to verify accuracy and appropriateness of an observation. 

Observations do not necessarily imply inadequate, incorrect, or outdated 

DOTMLPF. Validation also distinguishes between information and sound 

knowledge to be shared and lessons. The office of primary responsibility (OPR) 

validates the lesson or issue identified. For validated lessons, the OPR develops 

an approach to institutionalize that lesson. For validated issues identified, the 

OPR implements a resolution plan.

Dissemination: One item highlighted by the AFNTF during its Air Force Smart 

Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) process in identifying root causes was 

the need to share lessons and best practices. The established and mandated 

method for capturing the issues which are 'Identified' and 'Lessons Identified' is 

through the use of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). The 
79

appropriate lessons learned office disseminates formal reports to spread 

knowledge and experiences across the greater Air Force community.

Tracking: To determine if a lesson was implemented, OPRs will review results 

and the appropriate Air Force Lessons Learned office will accomplish long-term 

tracking. Organizations evaluate DOTMLPF changes to determine effectiveness 

of these changes.
80
A1

Appendix 1 — SecAF & VCSAF Guidance Letters

SecAF MEMO, Rebuilding the Nuclear Enterprise, 26 Jun 2008
A2
A3
A4
A5

VCSAF Memo, Air Force Nuclear Task Force, no date
A6
A7

Appendix 2 — Methodology

Introduction

This appendix explains the methods used in two phases: building the nuclear roadmap 

and assessing the roadmap implementation. The AFNTF applied a disciplined 

approach to determine the root causes of problems and to propose solutions. The 

assessment process lays out a rigorous approach to evaluate progress in correcting 

identified problems and improving the Air Force‘s ability to achieve its nuclear mission. 

This appendix contains three sections: 1) Use of the AFSO21 process improvement 

approach to construct the roadmap; 2) the resulting six comprehensive findings; and 3) 

the action plan assessment method.

Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century Process (AFSO21)

AFSO21 serves as the Air Force‘s Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) approach 

which leverages: Lean, Six Sigma, Theory of Constraints and Business Process 

Reengineering Improvement Methods.4 The AFSO21 Eight-Step problem solving 

process is also mapped to the common military framework of the Observe, Orient, 

Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop Figure A2-1.

 

Figure A2-1: OODA Loop and the  ̳8-Step‘ Process

Numerous study groups had already accomplished the Observe Phase and 

documented their results in reports with respective findings. Therefore, the AFNTF 

entered the OODA loop with these findings and focused on the Orient and Decide 

Phases. This section describes the activities used to determine the root causes in the 

Orient Phase and the development of countermeasures in the Decide Phase. 

Countermeasures are generally called action plans within the roadmap. The 

 

4

AFSO21 Playbook (October 2007)
A8

assessment method described in the last section of this appendix focuses on preparing 

for the Act Phase.

The AFNTF consolidated and evaluated findings and recommendations from various 

reports, specifically the Commander Directed Investigation, Blue Ribbon Review, 

Defense Science Board, Air Force Inventory and Assessment, ADM Donald Report, 

Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment, and the Schlesinger Panel. The 

resulting 136 consolidated findings were categorized into one of seven bins:

1. Organization

2. Leadership/Culture

3. Guidance & Policy and Assessment & Oversight

4. Nuclear Mission

5. Requirements/Programs/Acquisition

6. Sustainment/Modernization

7. Personnel/Education/Training

The AFNTF assembled a working group of over forty Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to 

conduct root cause analysis and develop countermeasures (action plans) on each of the 

seven bins of findings. The SMEs represented a cross-section of the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise. AFSO21 experts from the Secretary of the Air Force‘s Smart Operations 

(SAF/SO) office led this 7-day event. Furthermore, the AFNTF has continued to refine 

this work and accomplished additional root cause analysis on subsequent reports, 

specifically the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear 

Weapons Management.

For each of the bins, the AFSO21 working group determined the root causes of the 

consolidated report findings. As shown in Figure A2-2, they searched for primary 

sources in the causal chain that led to the findings.
A9

Figure A2-2: Root Cause Analysis as part of OODA Loop

The AFSO21 team primarily employed four techniques to determine root causes. First, 

SMEs, relying on their experiences in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, brainstormed to 

determine contributing causes. For postulated causes, they applied the 5 Whys 

approach, which repeatedly asks ―why did that occur‖ until root causes are identified. 

They grouped the potential causes on Ishikawa diagrams or fishbone diagrams, which 

categorize the contributing causes of the findings. They also used affinity diagrams to 

consolidate and group similar root causes. The AFSO21 working group brainstormed 

countermeasures or action plans to eliminate or alleviate the impact of these root 

causes. Affinity diagrams were used to group the proposed action plans. The group 

recommended action plans deemed most likely to resolve the root causes. Figure A2-3

portrays the steps and techniques in this AFSO21 event.
A10

Figure A2-3: Root Cause Analysis and Developing Action Plans using AFSO21 Tools

One of the products of this review was the identification of six strategic comprehensive 

findings. The AFNTF writing team used the six comprehensive findings to organize the 

roadmap and the root-cause analysis as the foundation for each chapter.

Comprehensive Findings

The AFNTF consolidated and evaluated findings and recommendations from the 

previously listed reports. From the report findings, the AFNTF employed six 

comprehensive findings as a management construct to organize and guide roadmap 

development. The comprehensive findings were:

Air Force nuclear-related authority and responsibility are fragmented/not aligned 

with nuclear deterrence mission demands/requirements/expectations

The Air Force does not have a comprehensive Air Force nuclear enterprise 

methodology/discipline to insure day-to-day excellence as measured in the field

Air Force nuclear-related expertise has eroded to the point that multiple positions 

throughout the enterprise reflect a requirement/assignment mismatch

Air Force processes for uncovering, analyzing, addressing, and reviewing 

systemic weaknesses (self-assessment/culture) are ineffective

The Air Force has underinvested in the nuclear deterrence mission and has no 

clear, long-term commitment to recapitalize, refresh, or replace current nuclear 

capability

The Air Force does not have a comprehensive process for ensuring sustained 

advocacy, focus, and commitment to the nuclear deterrence mission while 

helping to win today‘s fight
A11

Each comprehensive finding was rewritten into a positive statement and became a 

strategic objective of the roadmap. These six strategic objectives, along with fourteen 

sub-objectives, will correct the six comprehensive findings. The six strategic objectives 

are:

The Air Force will implement effective processes for uncovering, analyzing, 

addressing, and reviewing systemic weaknesses

The Air Force will sufficiently invest in the nuclear deterrence mission arena

The Air Force will implement comprehensive process for ensuring sustained 

advocacy, focus, and commitment

The Air Force will develop adequate nuclear-related expertise and ensure 

positions throughout the enterprise reflect a proper match-up of requirements 

and assignments

The Air Force will implement an end-to-end inter-related, systems, life-cycle 

nuclear enterprise methodology/discipline

The Air Force will ensure that nuclear-related authority and responsibility is unfragmented and aligned with nuclear deterrence mission demands, requirements, 

and expectations

The fourteen sub-objectives (associated report findings):

Self-assessments and root-cause analysis conducted in conjunction with nuclear 

inspections

Nuclear Inspections are conducted in a standardized and consistent manner 

across the Air Force nuclear enterprise

Units utilize inspections and lessons learned to improve and enhance policy and 

processes

The Air Force has sufficiently invested in manpower

The Air Force has sufficiently invested in infrastructure

The Air Force has sufficiently invested in nuclear systems, and nuclear-related 

equipment

The Air Force is focused on, and committed to, the nuclear deterrence mission

The Air Force advocated for the nuclear deterrence mission

Air Force nuclear enterprise personnel possess adequate levels of training, 

expertise, and qualifications
A12

Air Force nuclear enterprise leadership possesses adequate levels of training, 

expertise, and qualifications

Air Force nuclear-related positions throughout the enterprise reflect a proper 

match-up of requirements and assignments

The Air Force has a robust supply chain management (SCM) system with 100% 

visibility

Air Force leadership communicates clear and detailed nuclear enterprise policy 

and guidance

Air Force nuclear-related authority and responsibility is aligned with nuclear 

deterrence mission demands, requirements, and expectations

Action Plan Assessment Method

Headquarters Air Force Studies & Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned

(AF/A9) developed an assessment methodology that correlates with Step 7, Confirm 

Results and Process, of the AFSO21 process, as shown in Figure A2-4.

Figure A2-4: Root Cause Analysis and Developing Action Plans using AFSO21 Tools

The AF/A9 assessment approach is a variant of the value-focused thinking or the 

balanced scorecard techniques. The goal of this approach is to assess progress in 

improving the Air Force nuclear mission. The approach employs two scoring 

hierarchies. The first value hierarchy is based on Measures of Performance (MOPs), 

which assesses how well the Air Force is accomplishing tasks. The initial hierarchy was 

developed based on the findings (basis of the sub-objectives) from the various reports 

and builds to the six strategic objectives that correspond to the six comprehensive 

findings. If we implement the appropriate action plans, the scores in this hierarchy will 

improve over time. This MOP hierarchy will need to be expanded to assess the other 

areas of the nuclear mission that have not had problems. The second hierarchy is 
A13

based on Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), which assess how well the Air Force is 

accomplishing its mission. This MOE hierarchy builds to the four objectives of safe, 

secure, effective, and efficient. Air Force and other organizations will be able to 

determine the current status and trends of the nuclear mission by referring to the scores 

from these two hierarchies.

Figure A2-5 shows the MOP and the MOE hierarchies. The feedback arrow indicates 

that low scores in the Roadmap MOPs would indicate a need to investigate the 

implementation of the action plans or appropriateness of the measures. Low scores 

from the MOE hierarchy would call into question the appropriateness of the action 

plans. The ―Ongoing‖ MOP hierarchy expands the approach beyond deficiencies and 

problems identified in the previous reports to encompass the entire nuclear mission. 

The following discussion will present the MOE selection and construction, evaluation, 

and trends.

 

Figure A2-5: Holistic View of Assessment Process

While the AFNTF has an initial proposed set of MOPs and MOEs, the Air Force needs 

to agree on the selected measures to track. For each selected MOP and MOE, a 

scoring criterion will be established. The raw measure will be normalized to a score 

between zero and one. The simplest approach is a linear scoring formula

Measure Score = (Raw Score – Worst Possible Score) .

(Best Possible Score – Worst Possible Score)

More complex scoring formulas will allow values higher than the desired value or lower 

than the least tolerable value. Scores will be scaled so that they follow a typical grading 

scheme.

A – Outstanding quality for scores greater than 90 percent
A14

B – Excellent quality for scores in the range of 80 to 90 percent

C – Meets standards quality for scores in the range of 70 to 80 percent

D – Marginal quality for scores in the range of 50 to 70 percent

F – Fails standards quality for scores below 50 percent

With a consistent scoring standard, the scores for any measure immediately indicate the 

corresponding level of performance. The individual scores are combined to produce 

scores corresponding to each level of the hierarchies. This combination evaluation 

requires importance or significance weights to be assigned to each score. To maintain 

the grading scheme, the weights at each level need to sum to one. For example, the 

sum of weights for all the MOPs that contribute to the first sub-objective must equal one. 

These MOP or MOE weights indicate the relative importance of that measure to the 

successful accomplishment of an overall objective measurement. For a simple example 

with only two measures, if leaders determine that MOP 1 is twice as important as 

MOP 2 to measure sub-objective 1, then MOP 1 will receive a significance weight of 

0.66 and MOP 2 will receive a significance weight of 0.34. After the weights are 

determined, each scaled measure is multiplied by its significance weight. The sum of 

weighted scores equals the score at the next level. Figure A2-6 shows an example of 

how these assessment scores are calculated for a sub-objective one with only two 

MOPs.

 

Figure A2-6: Effect Score Calculation

This process is repeated at higher levels with appropriate significance weights. Figure 

A2-7 illustrates that the method to calculate a mission score, which is analogous to the 

method to calculate sub-objective and strategic objective scores. That is, sub-objective

scores are ―rolled up‖ into a strategic objective score and strategic objective scores are 

―rolled up‖ into an overall mission score. A similar process is applied to the Mission 

Effect side of the methodology.
A15

 

Figure A2-7: Mission Score Calculation

With each score following the grading scheme, we can also evaluate these higher 

scores using the grading criterion.

The assessments over time will present trends in the Air Force nuclear enterprise. After 

establishing a baseline, future assessment can show where improvement is occurring. 

The Air Force will also ensure that as it adjusts to ensure continued improvement, that 

follow-up AFSO21 events will be conducted to guarantee the root of all identified 

problems are addressed and acted on in order to measure future improvement. Using 

these assessments as a guide, leaders will know where to focus attention. In addition, 

this assessment process provides a means to reassure the Department of Defense and 

our national leaders on the status and trends of the Air Force nuclear enterprise.
A16
A17

Appendix 3 — Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Management Tool

The initial Air Force nuclear enterprise data management strategy was to capture, task, 

track, and archive every recommendation from every oversight report stemming from 

the August 2007 unauthorized nuclear weapons transfer incident. The AFNTF copied 

the recommendations into a spreadsheet, assigned OPRs for action, and periodically 

updated them to reflect current corrective action status. The recommendations were 

taken at face value from the reports without ever being independently validated or deconflicted across the reports. Detailed root cause analysis was not accomplished or 

documented on most of the detailed studies. Only after extracting root causes, 

developing action plans and identifying measurable effects stemming from all the 

findings could a credible roadmap be drafted.

When the AFNTF conducted root cause analysis on every report finding to determine 

core problems and potential solutions, the need for a more robust data management 

tool quickly emerged. A relational database capable of correlating findings, root causes, 

action plans, recommendations, etc. was required to effectively capture, manage, crosslink and correlate the data.

The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Management Tool (NEMT) has become the short-term 

solution. The NEMT enables the evolution from simply tracking a list of report 

recommendations to employing a ―Strategy-to-Task‖ hierarchy that traces all levels of 

data (findings, analysis, action plans, measurements, etc.) from the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise (strategic level) all the way down to action plans and recommendations 

(tactical level) and back again. The NEMT allows users to trace the connections and 

interdependencies of any or all of the following levels of information within the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise (Figure A3-1).

6 Strategic Objectives

14 Sub-Objectives 

136 Findings

57 Root Causes

100 Strategic Action Plans

200+ Action Plans

300+ Report Recommendations

250+ Nuclear Logistics Surety Team (NLST) Action Items
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I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e

NEMT “Traceability”

Objective

Finding

Root Causes

Action Plans NLST 

Action Items

Objective

SubObjective

Finding Finding Finding

Nuclear Roadmap

MOP

Report 

Recommendation

SubObjective

SubObjective

SubObjective

Figure A3-1: Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Management Tool Framework

The NEMT is envisioned to be hosted on the AF/A10 (AF/A3/5N) website with a webbased interface to enable OPRs the ability to provide real-time status updates and the 

entire community, especially Air Force senior leaders, access to current status via ondemand slides, reports, and/or queries. The NEMT will be tailored with various levels of 

read and write accesses, depending on the roles and responsibilities of the users.

A sample notional output of the NEMT is shown below (Figure A3-2). It provides a 

summary view of the overall assessment of the Air Force nuclear enterprise with 

respect to roadmap implementation. Also shown is a sample notional supporting slide 

(Figure A3-3) which provides additional details about the overall status of the six 

strategic objectives. Further, tailored reports and queries may be generated on any 

combination of data within the database.
A19

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e

Nuclear Roadmap

 Overall Assessment

 Accountability and Self-Assessment

 Nuclear Expertise

 Advocacy Across the Nuclear Enterprise

 Reliability and Sustainment

 Investment: Requirements, Programming and 

Acquisition

 Organization

Strategic Objectives

– Previous Status – Current Status

Figure A3-2: Notional Output of the NEMT Showing Overall Status

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e

 Overall Status

 Self-assessments and root cause analysis are 

conducted in conjunction with nuclear inspections.

 Nuclear inspections are conducted in a 

standardized and consistent manner across the 

Nuclear Enterprise.

 Units utilize inspections and lessons learned to 

improve and enhance policy and processes.

– Previous Status – Current Status

Sub-Objectives

Accountability and

Self-Assessment

Figure A3-3: Notional NEMT Supporting Slide Showing Status of Sub-Objectives 

Affecting the Overall Strategic Objective from Figure A3-2

In addition to the 6 strategic objectives, 14 sub-objectives, 136 findings, etc. that are 

tracked using the NEMT, there are 4 effects that provide an independent assessment of 
A20

the Air Force nuclear enterprise roadmap implementation. The Directorate of Lessons 

Learned in Headquarters Air Force Studies, Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons 

Learned (AF/A9L) will provide a long-term, sustained process for the collecting, 

validating, disseminating and tracking these effects. The Joint Lessons Learned 

Information System (JLLIS) will be used to task, track, compile, and report on the effects 

using measures of effectiveness. Further, JLLIS can easily identify and report 

―observations‖ during implementation of the Air Force nuclear enterprise roadmap and 

identify those lessons not previously captured by the various reports. Additionally, the 

program allows easy dissemination of ―best practices‖ throughout the national nuclear 

enterprise.
A21

Appendix 4 — Report Findings

The table below contains the report findings from the Commander Directed Investigation 

(CDI), Blue Ribbon Review (BRR), Defense Science Board (DSB), Air Force Review 

and Inventory Team (AFRIT) report, Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear 

Sustainment (CANS), ADM Donald Report, and Dr. Schlesinger Report.

Finding ID Finding Text

AFRIT-01

One opportunity to enhance a critical enabler involves expanding the 

capability of the current enterprise information technology system 

used for inventory management.

AFRIT-02 Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO) training represents 

a process enabler enhancement opportunity.

AFRIT-03 A commonly defined population of nuclear weapons-related materiel 

does not exist within the Department of Defense.

AFRIT-04 Not all Air Force nuclear weapons-related materiel is managed in a 

tightly controlled environment.

AFRIT-05

Current inventory management-related processes were 

characterized by a series of transactions between responsible 

organizations that lack an enterprise view. As a result, gaps and 

seams exist between and within elements of the Air Force supply 

chain compromising the necessary level of control and accountability 

for nuclear weapons-related materiel.

AFRIT-06

The Air Force inventory management system for nuclear weaponsrelated materiel relied on a series of legacy data systems. No single 

automated system existed to provide an enterprise view of Air Force 

managed items in all elements of the supply chain.

AFRIT-07 Responsibilities and accountabilities for enterprise-wide control of 

nuclear weapons-related materiel are not clearly assigned.

AFRIT-08

The experience and training of the supply chain workforce involved 

in the management of Air Force inventory assets requires attention 

at all levels.

AFRIT-09

Enlisted manpower resources for specialties involved with the 

storage and movement of nuclear weapons-related items is 

adequate. However, deployment operations tempo and planned 

personnel draw-downs negatively impact available manning and 

capability of related enlisted logistics specialties, particularly in the 

cargo movement career field.

AFRIT-10 Management of all nuclear weapons-related components lacks a 

single manager for acquisition and sustainment.

AFRIT-11

Many of the inventory overages for nuclear weapons-related 

components resulted due to lack of completion of demilitarization 

and/or disposal actions.

BRR-01 Leadership in the USAF's nuclear enterprise is professional and 

dedicated, but experience levels continue to decline.

BRR-02 Nuclear-related aviator experience and expertise is diminishing 

within the bomber and dual-capable aircraft units.
A22

Finding ID Finding Text

BRR-03

Intercontinental ballistic missile units find it difficult to attract and 

retain nuclear-experienced Airmen because of the perceived 

emphasis on and desirability of serving in space operations as 

opposed to intercontinental ballistic missile-related duties.

BRR-04

The diminishing base of nuclear experience in some support 

specialties makes it difficult to select and prepare leaders for 

command and supervisory positions.

BRR-05

USAF relationships with combatant commands for the presentation 

of forces are sound; however, United States Strategic Command 

noted some difficulty dealing with the USAF skip-echelon 

organizational construct.

BRR-06

Disagreement over nuclear surety inspection standardization 

negatively affects the relationship between the USAF and the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

BRR-07 The USAF relationship with the OSD is strong, but there are 

concerns regarding USAF nuclear enterprise management.

BRR-08

The USAF nuclear enterprise is large and diverse, so direct 

comparison with the United States Navy nuclear organization is 

difficult.

BRR-09

Nuclear surety and security in the USAF are sound, but 

improvements can and should be made to enhance performance, 

particularly in light of evolving threats and the opportunities afforded 

by advanced technology.

BRR-10

Focus on the nuclear mission, especially in dual-capable bomber 

units, has diminished from the robust nuclear culture that existed 

during the Cold War.

BRR-11

Existing forums for integrating USAF nuclear issues exist, but these 

disparate groups can and should be used more effectively to serve 

as an enterprise-wide integrating function.

BRR-12 Nuclear surety inspection criteria are being applied differently by 

each major command inspection team.

BRR-13 Bomber nuclear exercises are not meeting current requirements in 

frequency or scale.

BRR-14 Doctrine is the cornerstone of military operations and training, but 

the current manual on USAF nuclear doctrine needs updating.

BRR-15

Recent DoD and USAF guidance positively changed the USAF 

Personnel Reliability Program, but many commanders and 

administrators still consider the system to be needlessly 

cumbersome.

BRR-16

Focus on nuclear training has shifted as a result of the increased 

combatant command requirements for conventional force 

capabilities.

BRR-17

Shortcomings exist in the training for munitions accountable systems 

officers, particularly on the Defense Integration and Management of 

Nuclear Data Services system.
A23

Finding ID Finding Text

BRR-18

Major commands and numbered air forces have created specific 

nuclear training programs that are external to the formal and 

institutionalized training curriculum oversight.

BRR-19

AF needs to increase opportunities for presence/influence in key 

nuclear billets, especially in the joint/inter-agency organizations by 

filling positions with highly qualified personnel.

BRR-20 Curricula at PME schools and courses devote at best only minimal 

time and attention to nuclear related topics.

BRR-21 The USAF is not consistently leveraging educational opportunities to 

optimize follow-on assignments or presence in key nuclear billets.

BRR-22

The nuclear force requires clear and detailed direction in instructions 

and technical orders particularly in light of a less experienced 

workforce, especially in aircraft units.

BRR-23 Aging transportation and handling equipment is adding to the stress 

on units with a nuclear mission.

BRR-24

Accountability of nuclear weapons in the USAF is sound; however, 

additional experience and training for munitions accountable 

systems officers will enhance the current process.

BRR-25

Custody and transfer processes of nuclear weapons between bases 

or commands are consistent; however, transfers of assets within a 

wing require auditable documentation.

BRR-26 Advanced technology for accountability and tracking can enhance 

USAF custody of nuclear assets.

BRR-27 Tracking location and status of assigned weapons and components 

is being accomplished using locally generated systems.

BRR-28 Potential vulnerabilities in missile field convoy operations continue to 

be a key concern.

BRR-29 Host nation security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from 

country to country in terms of personnel, facilities, and equipment.

BRR-30 Changing and growing requirements have prompted USAF units to 

request nuclear security waivers.

BRR-31

To mitigate missile field security vulnerabilities, there is a critical 

need to fully fund a replacement helicopter and to fund the 

sustainment costs of the remote visual assessment.

BRR-32 Current USAF nuclear organizational construct fragments nuclear 

weapons advocacy and policy.

BRR-33 Manpower requirements in some nuclear-capable aircraft career 

fields and units may not be commensurate with total workload.

BRR-34 Program budget decision execution may have caused resource 

allocation weaknesses in field support for the nuclear mission.

BRR-35 Systems and equipment supporting the nuclear mission are aging 

and continue to impact reliability and availability.

BRR-36 Funding for second destination transportation to move nuclear 

weapons is inadequate.

CANS-01 A fragmented organizational structure prevented AF corporate focus 

across the nuclear sustainment enterprise.
A24

Finding ID Finding Text

CANS-02 Dispersed lines of authority contributed to a loss of systems 

engineering discipline within the ICBM program.

CANS-03 There is no single funding advocate for the AF nuclear sustainment 

enterprise.

CANS-04 There is no deliberate force development and retention management 

for the nuclear sustainment enterprise workforce.

CANS-05 Manpower requirements in some nuclear-capable aircraft career 

fields and units may not be commensurate with total workload.

CANS-06

The informal process for engineering support delays 

responsiveness, hinders trend analysis, and introduces unnecessary 

technical and programmatic risk.

CANS-07 The ICBM process for tracking completion of TCTOs is 

unsatisfactory.

CANS-08 The policies for DULL SWORD nuclear reporting are not clear 

resulting in inconsistent or random reporting.

CANS-09 There have been systemic breakdowns in the TO sustainment 

process.

CANS-10 The AF has not sufficiently defined nor provided governing policy for 

managing NWRM.

CANS-11

Logistics and supply chain management policies, procedures and 

processes across the nuclear enterprise are not clear, concise, nor 

standardized.

CANS-12 The current AF supply chain does not effectively manage or 

positively control NWRM.

CANS-13 Leadership does not adequately oversee nor review nuclear 

sustainment areas.

CANS-14

Failure to adhere to established policies coupled with multiple 

independent data/messaging systems cause confusion, and 

consume time and resources.

CANS-15 Inadequate facilities and aging equipment drive work-arounds and 

consume resources.

CANS-16 Nuclear policy, procedures, and processes affecting wing 

sustainment operations are confusing and non-standard.

CANS-17 Training required for the nuclear enterprise is inadequate.

CANS-18

AF oversight and assessment processes for nuclear sustainment 

activities to include inspections, LSET/MSET, and self-inspections 

are non-standard across the nuclear sustainment enterprise.

CANS-19 The AF failed to implement methodologies and processes for 

identifying systemic weaknesses and root causes.

CDI-01 Classified

CDI-02

The chain of events shows an erosion of adherence to rigid, Air 

Force nuclear procedures. The intricate system of nuclear checks 

and balances was either ignored or disregarded.

CDI-03 Numerous scheduling errors and ineffective production meetings 

contributed to the transfer of nuclear warheads.
A25

Finding ID Finding Text

CDI-04

The 2nd Operations Group did not emphasize to the flying 

squadrons that Combat Mission Ready-Nuclear (CMR-N) 

crewmembers were required for ferry sorties.

CDI-05 The ineffective production meeting procedures and lack of 

supervision of the scheduling process led directly to this error.

CDI-06 The Munitions Squadron supervision did not pay close attention to 

the schedule components.

CDI-07 The 2 OG has fundamentally changed the calculus to conventional 

weaponry at all levels of leadership to the core training focus.

CDI-08 The initial B-52 training course has, over time, reduced the nuclear 

syllabus in lieu of accomplishing conventional preparation.

CDI-09

The nuclear academia has eroded and focuses on conventional 

only. The B-52 Weapons Instructor Course does not teach its 

premier "weaponeers" the fundamentals of their nuclear trade craft.

CDI-10

The operational chain of command never read or followed the 

COMACC REPORD message nor was aware of the guidance in the 

tactical ferry book.

Donald-01 Deficient supply chain processes and noncompliance with related 

procedures degraded control of sensitive missile components.

Donald-02 Classified

Donald-03 Classified

Donald-04

The ICBM engineering community lacks a clear Major Command 

owner and has deteriorated in the exercise of technical authority.

Donald-05

Oversight, inspection, and internal audits have been ineffective in 

resolving recurring deficiencies.

Donald-06

The ICBM communities, including maintenance, engineering, 

operations, and logistic organizations, have a poorly developed selfassessment culture.

Donald-07 Changes to Air Force policies and processes degraded the level of 

control for sensitive missile components.

DSB-01

Over time, nuclear weapons movement procedures for bomber 

weapons have been compromised for expedient work processes. 

This evolution has occurred without adequate review and approval 

above the wing level.

DSB-02

There is confusion over applicability of nuclear weapons handling 

procedures for nuclear weapons systems that do not contain nuclear 

warheads.

DSB-03

The practice of storing nuclear munitions/missiles in the same facility 

with nuclear-training, nuclear-test, and nuclear-inert devices can 

lead to confusion and unnecessary access to nuclear weapons.

DSB-04

The various levels of inspection activities have failed to detect 

changes in process which compromised established procedure. The 

Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection process requires only 

limited mission performance, sometimes generating as few as one 

aircraft.
A26

Finding ID Finding Text

DSB-05

While the size of the nuclear force and the deployed nuclear 

weapons stockpile has been greatly decreased, the complexity of 

the mission remains demanding. Despite these complex demands, 

the level of focus on the nuclear enterprise has been drastically 

reduced.

DSB-06

The nuclear enterprise within OSD has been dispersed and 

downgraded with the responsibilities of the principal office within 

OSD (AT&L) expanded to include chemical and biological weapons, 

and the nuclear enterprise within OSD (Policy) subordinated to 

ASD/SOLIC which has a wide-ranging portfolio.

DSB-07

With no strategic nuclear bomber forces under the operational 

control of the combatant command or its Air Force component and 

the skip echelon approach that removed 8th Air Force responsibility 

for B-52 operations, training, and maintenance, there was no 

headquarters above the wing that focused on the strategic nuclear 

mission.

DSB-08

The level of focus within major headquarters from Joint Staff to Air 

Force major command was drastically reduced with little apparent 

consideration or understanding of the impact such reduction across 

virtually all such headquarters.

DSB-08a Daily focus on nuclear mission within the Joint Staff has been 

reduced to an O-6 strat operation division chief

DSB-08b

The nuclear mission within USSTRATCOM has been dispersed 

across 24 offices within the headquarters. The most senior officer 

whose daily focus is on the nuclear enterprise is an O-5 in an O-6 

billet.

DSB-08c

The positions maintaining daily focus on the nuclear mission within 

Air Force and the Navy Staffs has been reduced to that of O-6 

(Colonel/Captain).

DSB-08d

The nuclear mission within the Air Force has been dispersed from a 

single-focused strategic command to three operational commands 

that have had little or no focus on the nuclear mission. With that 

dispersal, the level of daily focus on the strategic nuclear bomber 

mission was reduced from senior flag-level to O-6 level.

DSB-09

The conventional roles of the B-52 force so dominate the nuclear 

role that there is minimum daily attention to the nuclear role outside 

the restricted area where nuclear weapons are stored and 

maintained. Moving nuclear weapons from where the majority of B52 strategic bombers are based is likely to further complicate focus 

on the nuclear mission and further devalue the nuclear mission.

DSB-10

The B-52 initial training and advanced weapons school both largely 

ignore the nuclear mission. There are no flying sorties devoted to 

the nuclear mission in either course.

DSB-11

Over time, handling bomber nuclear weapons has come to be 

regarded as an exercise activity rather than a serious operational 

activity.
A27

Finding ID Finding Text

DSB-12

Public debate about the nuclear deterrent, the long-term future of 

nuclear weapons, approaches to sustaining the deterrent, and 

related subjects is inevitable and necessary as the world 

environment changes. There are legitimate questions about all 

these issues. Still, this debate cannot be allowed to obscure the 

most obvious and relevant facts about the nuclear enterprise. We 

still have a large stockpile of nuclear weapons and will almost 

certainly have a significant stockpile for a very long time. Those are 

the only facts needed to understand the need for sustained, intense 

attention to the nuclear enterprise and to robust nuclear weapons 

surety.

DSB-13

While this assessment was motivated by a specific incident of 

unusual magnitude, there are a large number of reports 

commissioned by the DoD on existing or developing concerns with 

the nuclear enterprise that have produced few lasting course 

corrections.

Schlesinger-01

Senior leadership decisions during the past 15 years have had the 

cumulative effect of compromising the Air Force's deterrent 

capabilities.

Schlesinger-02

The change in bomber mission focus away from a cadre of nuclearexperienced personnel to conventional-warfare-experienced Airmen 

was accompanied by a gradual decline in nuclear expertise, 

including in senior leadership.

Schlesinger-03

Stewardship of and focus on the policies, procedures, munitions 

handling processes, security, and operational exercise of nuclear 

weapons have been dramatically weakened.

Schlesinger-04

The decision that junior officers assigned initially to ICBMs will 

spend the remainder of their careers in the space mission area and 

thus outside the broader Air Force both devalued the mission area 

and had the effect of reducing the depth of Air Force nuclear 

experience, especially among midcareer and senior officers.

Schlesinger-05 The readiness of forces assigned to the nuclear mission has 

seriously eroded.

Schlesinger-06 Nuclear missions became imbedded in organizations whose primary 

focus is not nuclear.

Schlesinger-07 Overwhelming emphasis was given to conventional operations.

Schlesinger-08 The grade levels of line and staff appointments of those whose daily 

business involved nuclear weapons were lowered.

Schlesinger-09 The nuclear mission and those who performed it were generally 

devalued.

Schlesinger-10

There was no single command to advocate for the resources 

required to support nuclear capabilities. Collectively this meant that 

no one Command in the Air Force had "ownership" of the nuclear 

mission.
A28

Finding ID Finding Text

Schlesinger-11

The New Triad concept in National and Defense policy documents is 

not generally understood by many of those involved in the Air Force 

nuclear mission. This lack of clarity is sensed all the way down to 

the crew level. In addition, the Air Force has not updated its doctrine 

on nuclear deterrence since 1998.

Schlesinger-12

Lacking a complete understanding of the importance of the nuclear 

mission, the Air Force has experienced instances where personnel 

have failed to maintain discipline in following procedures, and some 

airmen do not view the nuclear mission as vital.

Schlesinger-13

Air Force leaders have failed to support appropriate resource 

allocation for the nuclear deterrence mission. As a result, mission 

readiness has been significantly degraded.

Schlesinger-14

Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities to shift 

priorities and adjust policies and resources in ways needed to 

maintain robust nuclear stewardship, resulting in the inattention that 

led to the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan incidents.

Schlesinger-15

The Air Force has failed to establish adequate procedures and 

technical orders related to nuclear operations and support. Air 

Force streamlining efforts and personnel reduction and allocation 

decisions have led to significant degradation in the nuclear mission.

Schlesinger-16

Inspection processes are not standardized across major commands, 

inspectors are not appropriately trained and inspections are not 

sufficiently comprehensive and frequent.

Schlesinger-17 The Air Force nuclear exercise program has been marked by 

infrequency and low levels of unit participation.

Schlesinger-18

The Air Force needs to focus on developing and managing nuclearexperienced personnel, particularly in maintenance and security 

personnel. A bias exists in promotion boards against airmen in 

nuclear-related fields.

Schlesinger-19

The concept of nuclear deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons 

in current circumstances have fallen out of the core military doctrine 

taught in the Air Force PME.

Schlesinger-20

Today no senior leader in the USAF "owns" the nuclear mission. 

The current organization is not properly structured to meet 

requirements.

Schlesinger-21 Bomber and ICBM forces today suffer from manpower shortages in 

numerous areas.

Schlesinger-22 There is inadequate equipment for training.

Schlesinger-23 Support and handling infrastructure require new funding for 

modernization and sustainability.

Schlesinger-24 In the past decade, no-notice inspections have been almost entirely 

replaced by those carried out according to a published schedule.

Schlesinger-25 Air Force inspection teams tend to lack the organic wherewithal to 

conduct effective nuclear inspection activities.

Schlesinger-26 The Staff Assistance (SAV) program is underused, under resourced, 

and in need of guidance.
A29

Finding ID Finding Text

Schlesinger-27

"Skip echelon" arrangements (from Wing to MAJCOM without going 

through the NAF staff) have undermined NAF leadership's sense of 

responsibility and accountability for its subordinate units.

Schlesinger-28

GDF changes do not fully address the numbers of bombers 

available for training and test purposes, which may divert combatcoded aircraft for these purposes.

Schlesinger-29

Unit Manning Documents are not universally coded to identify key 

nuclear billets for those positions deemed critical for a unit to 

conduct its nuclear missions.

Schlesinger-30

Current Air Force organizational practices and readiness status do 

not satisfy the national security need for a bomber force that is 

credible, visible, and responsive to the nuclear deterrent role.

Schlesinger-31

ACC has been strained to support Combatant Command demands 

of the past decade and a half to provide conventional forces to 

support joint operations.

Schlesinger-32 The headquarters of Commander, 8th Air Force is inadequately 

manned to manage a significant span of control.

Schlesinger-33

An officer completing a standard four-year tour as a missileer, while 

well steeped in ICBM nuclear operations, has limited intermediate 

rank opportunity in the missile career field...The result has been a 

fairly rich mix of middle grade officers in the space specialty, but a 

correspondingly leaner number of experienced missileers, especially 

in the field grand ranks.

Schlesinger-34

AFPC can assign the individual based on the volunteer statement, 

usually for a one year tour, without the supervisor's or commander's 

knowledge or approval.

Schlesinger-35 AFPC provide no backfill for the volunteer until the volunteer's 

overseas tour is completed, often 12 months long.

Schlesinger-36 Rarely do unit personnel receive current intelligence relative to their 

nuclear mission.
A30
A31

Appendix 5 — Development of the Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Security Roadmap

Introduction

The top priority of the AF is reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise. To achieve this goal 

we must effectively secure, maintain, operate, and sustain our Nation‘s nuclear 

capabilities. To properly address security, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, 

Installations and Mission Support (AF/A4/7) chartered the Air Force Security Forces

(SF) to develop the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Roadmap 2010. Functional 

experts from the Air Staff, Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Sandia National 

Laboratory (SNL), Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and field 

agency nuclear communities met to initiate/complete the nuclear weapons security 

roadmap process.

The purpose of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security (NWS) Roadmap is to present 

the vision for sustaining Air Force nuclear security, and provide a detailed way ahead 

through continued refinement and enhancement in order to meet the intent of National 

Security Presidential Directive-28. The Air Force NWS Roadmap is a separate but 

contributing effort to the Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap.

The data gathered for the NWS Roadmap ensures effective readiness of our nuclear 

security forces, and provides a key source document for the Department of Defense 

(DoD) and the Air Force regarding current Air Force nuclear security requirements, 

plans, and programs. In particular, the security roadmap presents the Air Force SF 

strategy for the future.

Risk to our nuclear weapons will never be eliminated; however the NWS Roadmap 

strives to reduce risk wherever possible. The focus of this process was to gain needed 

insight from nuclear security, intelligence, and use control experts on the vulnerability, 

threat, and consequence of an attack to US nuclear weapons under Air Force control in 

a variety of configurations and environments. The data collected was factored into the 

risk model to determine relative risk between different nuclear security environments.

The Air Force NWS Roadmap has two major objectives. The first is to further 

synchronize the nuclear security roadmaps of the Air Force MAJCOMs with the Air 

Force as a whole, and effectively integrate operations, maintenance, active and passive 

defenses, use control, weapons design and intelligence to ensure security standards 

are met. To accomplish, it will be necessary to invest additional resources to close the 

desired capability gaps and mitigate security shortfalls. The second objective of the Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Security Roadmap is to develop a tool for determining a 

comprehensive and analytically-based investment strategy for the most pressing 

nuclear weapons security needs. The analytical foundation provided by the relative risk 

model can strengthen the arguments for nuclear security requirements and enable the 

security community to better compete for scarce resources in the Air Force corporate 

process.
A32

The Air Force NWS Roadmap is part of an on-going process in analyzing nuclear 

security vulnerabilities (capability gaps and shortfalls) and the effect of various 

mitigation measures. As the Air Force nuclear community gains experience with the 

risk methodology, refines and refreshes the input data, and develops additional risk 

reduction options, it will continue to be used to update the assessment. Particularly 

valuable will be more definitive data on the effectiveness of current and projected 

technologies and materiel solutions. Further iterations of the model will provide updated 

information on the resulting effect on vulnerability of various options and how each 

component of the model can be considered in the overall risk reduction effort. 

Additionally, further refinement of the relative risk model could include factoring 

localized threat assessments into the analysis.

Background and History

An attempt to produce a nuclear weapons security roadmap was made in 2005. This 

effort hypothesized how the Air Force nuclear MAJCOMs could achieve denial 

capability by the 2018 time frame through potential manpower increases; upgrades to 

facilities, equipment, and security systems; training reforms; and through changes to 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). It was later re-designated a program of 

record (POR) by retaining the programmed elements and discarding the hypothetical 

elements. The POR did not, however, effectively integrate the MAJCOM security 

roadmaps into an overall Air Force strategy for nuclear weapons security. Additionally, 

the POR was not based on risk reduction, nor did it have an investment strategy.

Air Force Nuclear Security Risk Model

The concept of risk is fundamental to making sound decisions regarding security of 

critical assets when there is uncertainty surrounding the timing, nature, scope and 

success of potential threats. It is also a fundamental consideration when making 

investment decisions and tradeoffs in a fiscally constrained environment. While our 

nuclear assets will never be free from risk, an analytic process ensures we strive to 

reduce risk across all environments.

For Air Force nuclear weapons security, relative risk is a function of the vulnerability of a 

given target containing one or more nuclear weapons, the consequence of failure if an 

attack on the weapon(s) occurs, and the probability of an attack occurring. It is 

important to note the use of the term relative. Risk is never zero, and as it is discussed 

and used in this report, it does not have an absolute value -- only a relative one to other 

operational environments. 

The input for each component of the model is derived from qualitative and quantitative 

data. The probability of attack and consequences of failure data were taken from 

previous studies and year long processes with AF/A3S, AF/A2, and SAF/IGX to develop 

this risk approach. The nuclear weapons security SMEs considered these components 

independently of one another, and each was weighted equally.

Nuclear Security Analysis of Alternatives

Sandia National Labs prepared an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the Air Force on 

behalf of Headquarters AF/A7S. This AoA complements and supports the efforts of the 
A33

NWS to improve and synchronize the nuclear security roadmaps for the MAJCOMs and 

the Air Force as a whole. The overall process improves the effective management and 

prioritization of limited resources to reduce the risk associated with Air Force nuclear 

weapons to the greatest extent practical.

While the AoA is essentially a cost versus performance analysis, it also provides a level 

of detail to address the most critical vulnerabilities with systematic and performancebased solutions. The primary purpose of the AoA is to identify solutions and 

complementary solution sets that provide the greatest risk reduction in the most critical 

environments.

The AoA supports the Air Force investment strategy and POM efforts by evaluating 

data, including relative risk and vulnerability for each environment, and the relative 

contribution of risk by attack type, condition, and other factors. SNL used information 

from current MAJCOM roadmaps, existing data and analyses, and discussions with Air 

Force personnel and SNL SMEs to prepare the AoA.

Sandia National Labs staff prepared an estimate of the system performance and cost 

for each upgrade set. This cost versus benefit analysis demonstrated, at a high level, 

the optimal approach for each environment. This evaluation followed the SNL 

developed methodology for evaluating physical protection systems for critical and highvalue assets. The SNL risk and performance evaluation process has been used for 

more than 30 years, and is recognized, accepted, and well understood in the broad 

security community, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, 

and Department of Homeland Security. When quantitative data is used, the equations 

generate quantifiable results.

Summary

The top priority of the AF is reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise. A key contributor to 

the nuclear enterprise is security. The AF NWS Roadmap will identify and implement 

the most cost-effective security performance improvements. The Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Security Roadmap provides a living document to maintain a secure nuclear 

stockpile and supporting infrastructure through a fiscally responsible manner. It directly 

contributes to the reinvigoration of the Air Force nuclear enterprise.
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A35

Appendix 6 — Acronyms

ACC Air Combat Command

ADCON Administrative Control

ADM Admiral

ADP Airmen Development Plan

AE Aeromedical Evacuation

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AF Air Force

AF/A1 Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services

AF/A3/5 Air Force Operations, Plans, and Requirements

AF/A3/5N Air Force Operations, Plans, and Requirements Nuclear 

(now AF/A10)

AF/A4/7 Air Force Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support

AF/A8 Air Force Strategic Plans and Procedures

AF/A9 Air Force Studies & Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned

AF/A10 Air Force Nuclear Operations, Plans, and Requirements 

(previously AF/A3/5N)

AF/CV Vice Air Force Chief of Staff

AF/SE Air Force Safety

AF/SEW Air Force Safety Weapons

AF/SG Air Force Surgeon General

AF/TE Air Force Test and Evaluation

AFB Air Force Base

AFCS Air Force Corporate Structure

AFGSC Air Force Global Strike Command

AFI Air Force Instruction
A36

AFIA Air Force Inspection Agency

AFMAN Air Force Manual 

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFNGOSG Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group

AFNTF Air Force Nuclear Task Force

AFNWC Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center

AFR Air Force Regulation

AFRIT Air Force Review and Inventory Team

AFSC Air Force Specialty Code

AFSO 21 Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

AFSTRAT Air Forces Strategic Command

AF/TE Air Force Test and Evaluation

AFTO Air Force Technical Order

AIT Automatic Identification Technology

ALC Air Logistics Center

ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile

AMC Air Mobility Command

AoA Analysis of Alternatives

AOR Area of Responsibility

APPG Annual Planning and Programming Guidance

AU Air University

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

BRR Blue Ribbon Review

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
A37

CANS Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment

CAS Close Air Support

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CC Commander

CCDE Command and Control Display Equipment

CCM Capability and Credibility Model

CDC Career Development Course

CDI Commander Directed Investigation

CDP Civilian Development Plan

CDR Commander

CENTCOM Central Command

CF Comprehensive Findings

CFETP Career Field Education and Training Plan

CFM Career Field Manager

CJCSI Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

COA Course of Action

COCOM Combatant Command

CONEMP Concept of Employment 

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CONUS Continental United States

CPI Continuous Process Improvement

CSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

DCA Dual-Capable Aircraft

DCR DOTMLPF Change Recommendation

DCS Deputy Chief of Staff

DIAMONDS Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear Data Services
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DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DMS Defense Message System

DOC Designed Operational Capability

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 

Education, Personnel, and Facilities

DPAS Defense Priorities and Allocations System

DRU Direct Reporting Unit

DSB Defense Science Board

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EBAO Effects-Based Approach to Operations

ECSS Expeditionary Combat Support System

EDP Enlisted Development Plan

EET Exercise Evaluation Team

ESC Electronic Systems Center

ETARS Electronic Technical Assistance Requests

ETIC Estimated Time of Completion

EW Electronic Warfare

FMDC Force Management and Development Council

FOC Full Operational Capability

FTAC First Term Airman‘s Center

FTU Formal Training Unit

FTX Field Training Exercise

FY Fiscal Year

FYDP Future Year Defense Program
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GO General Officer

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HAF Headquarters Air Force

HQ Headquarters

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICBMSG Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems Group

IG Inspector General

IGEMS IG Evaluation Management System

IMDS Integrated Maintenance Data System

IMT Information Management Tool

INRAD Intrinsic Radiation

INSI Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection

IOC Initial Operational Capability

IPT Integrated Process Team

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

JFCC Joint Functional Component Command

JLLIS Joint Lessons Learned Information System

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

LCOM Logistics Composite Model

LRU Line Replacement Unit

LSET Logistics Standardization and Evaluation Team

MAJCOM Major Command

MAJCOM/CV Major Command Vice Commander

MASO Munitions Accountable Systems Officer

MMXG Missile Maintenance Group
A40

MOE Measures of Effectiveness

MOP Measures of Performance

MSET Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Team

MUNS Munitions Squadron

MUNSS Munitions Support Squadron

NAF Numbered Air Force

NAF/CC Numbered Air Force Commander

NATO North American Treaty Organization

NCE Nuclear Capabilities Exercise

NEAP Nuclear Enterprise Advisory Panel

NEMT Nuclear Enterprise Management Tool

NLTFP National Laboratory Technical Fellowship Program

NLST Nuclear Logistics Surety Team

NMOC Nuclear Munitions Officer Course

NMS National Military Strategy

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NOC NSPD-28 Oversight Committee 

NORI Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NSAV Nuclear Staff Assistance Visit

NSI Nuclear Surety Inspection

NSN National Stock Number

NSSAV Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit

NWRM Nuclear Weapons-Related Materiel

NWS Nuclear Weapons Security

NWSSG Nuclear Weapons System Safety Group
A41

OCONUS Outside the Continental United States

OCR Office of Coordinating Authority

ODP Officer Development Plan

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act

OPLAN Operation Plan

OPR Office of Primary Responsibility

OPSEC Operational Security

OPSTEMPO Operational Tempo

OSD Office Secretary of Defense

OSD/AT&L Office Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

OSS&E Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PAD Program Action Directive

PBD Program Budget Decision

PE Program Element

PEM Program Element Manager

PEO Program Executive Officer

PIC Positive Inventory Control

PME Professional Military Education

PMR Program Management Review

PNAF Primary Nuclear Airlift Force

POM Program Objective Memorandum

POR Program of Record

P-Plan Programming Plan
A42

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

PRP Personnel Reliability Program

QA Quality Assurance

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RCA Root Cause Analysis

RLA Repair Level Analysis

RSTS Re-entry System Test Set

RWT Realistic Weapons Trainers

S-FRD Secret-Formerly Restricted Data

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAF Secretary of the Air Force

SAF/AQ Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition

SAF/AQP Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisitions, Global Power

SAF/CM Secretary of the Air Force Strategic Communications

SAF/IG Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General

SAF/LL Secretary of the Air Force Legislative Liaison

SAF/SO Secretary of the Air Force‘s Smart Operations 

SAF/US Under Secretary of the Air Force

SAF/USA Secretary of the Air Force Space Acquisitions

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

SAV Staff Assistance Visit

SBSS Standard Base Supply System

SCM Supply Chain Management

SecAF Secretary of the Air Force

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SES Senior Executive Service
A43

SF Security Forces

SIPRNet Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SME Subject Matter Expert

SNL Sandia National Laboratory

SORTS Status of Resources and Training Systems

SSP Strategic Systems Program

TIG The Inspector General

T.O. Technical Order

TP Technical Procedure

TRAC Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

TTP Tactics Techniques Procedures

U&TW Utilization and Training Workshop

UAS Unmanned Aerial System

UCP Unified Command Plan

UK United Kingdom 

URL Unfunded Requirements List

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces Europe

USC United States Code

USN United States Navy

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

vMFP Virtual Major Force Program

WIC Weapons Instructor Course

WIP Weapon Integration Plan

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
A44

WS3 Weapon Storage and Security Systems

WSA Weapons Storage Area

WSR Weapon System Reliability

WSSR Weapon System Safety Rule
A45

Appendix 7 — References

REPORTS

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces, 

2004

Strategic Capabilities Assessment - 2004 (S//FRD//NF)

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities Report 

Summary, 2006

Commander Directed Report of Investigation Concerning an Unauthorized Transfer of 

Nuclear Warheads Between Minot AFB, North Dakota and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana -

30 August 2007 (S//FRD//MR)

Air Force Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures, 8 

February 2008

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety 

– Report on Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons (Gen Welch), February 2008 

(Revised April 2008) 

NSS Oversight of USAF Nuclear Surety Inspections, 1 April 2008

Investigation into the Shipment of Sensitive Missile Components to Taiwan (ADM 

Donald Report) - 22 May 2008 (S//FRD//NOFORN)

Air Force Inventory and Assessment: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons-Related 

Materiel, 25 May 2008

Air Force Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment (CANS) - July 2008 

(S//FRD//NOFORN)

SECDEF Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management (Dr Schlesinger), 

September 2008 (T)

NATIONAL STRATEGIES

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006

National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS), June 2008

National Military Strategy of the United States of America (NMS), 2004

The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 13 February 

2006
A46

NATIONAL DIRECTIVES

National Security Presidential Directive-3, Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and 

Procurement, 15 February 2001 (S)

National Security Presidential Directive-4, Transforming Deterrence, 15 February 2001 

(S)

National Security Presidential Directive-10, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force, 21 December 

2001 (S)

National Security Presidential Directive-28, United States Nuclear Weapons Command 

and Control, Safety, and Security, 20 June 2003 (S)

National Security Presidential Directive-35, Nuclear Weapons Deployment 

Authorization, 6 May 2004 (S//FRD)

Presidential Initiative on Nuclear Arms, 27 September 1991

Presidential Nuclear Initiative II, 28 January 1992

The Alliance's Strategic Concept, April 1999

Fiscal Year 2005 Joint Surety Report, IAW NSPD-28 - 2005 (S//FRD)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DoD Publication, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, February 2006

Department of Defense Directive S-5210.81, United States Nuclear Weapons 

Command, Control, Safety, and Security, 2005 (S)

Department of Defense Directive 0-5 100.30, Department of Defense Command and 

Control, 2006

Department of Defense S-5210-41-MIAir Force Manual 3 1-108, Nuclear Weapon 

Security Manual, 2007 (S//NF)

Department of Defense Directive 5210.42, Personnel Reliability Program, 2001

Department of Defense Directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs 

(PA) Guidance, 1993

T.O. 11N-25-1, DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System
A47

JOINT SERVICES

CJCSI 3260.01A, Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices, 2002 

(S//FRD)

CJCSI 3 110.04-B, Nuclear Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (TS)

Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP) (TS)

Unified Command Plan (draft), 8 August 2008

Nuclear Response CONOPS, version 9, 11 October 2006 (S//20140428)

Integrated Operations Directive (IOD) A, Guidance for Global Deterrence Force 

Operation, 1 Jul 2008 (S)

Joint Publication (JP) 1; Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 

2007

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 

2001 (as amended through March 2004)

JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Final Coordination (2), 15 March 2005

Joint Vision 2020, June 2000

Joint Air Tasking Order Processes (JATOPC) Course; Student Guide Book 1, February 

2004

Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept; Version 2.0, December 2006

Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0, 11 September 2007

Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept Version 1.0, 7 February 2006

Seabasing, Joint Integrating Concept, v1, 1 August 2005

Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept 

Version 2.0, 1 October 2007

Force Management Joint Functional Concept Version 1.0, 2 June 2005

Joint Integrating Concept Final Version 1.0, 1 Sep 2005

Joint Integrating Concept for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Version 1.0, 10 

December 2007

Joint Training Functional Concept Version 1.0, 14 August 2007

Joint Urban Operations Joint Integrating Concept Version 1.0, 23 July 2007
A48

Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, v1, 10 January 2005

Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Planning and Direction, Joint 

Integrating Concept, v1, 29 March 2007

Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, December 2006

Seabasing, Joint Integrating Concept, v1, 1 August 2005

JROC Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness, 31 December 2003

JROC Joint Command and Control Functional Concept, February 2004

JROC Force Application Functional Concept, 5 March 2004

JROC Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, Version 1.0, December 2003

JROC Protection Joint Functional Concept, Version 1.0, 30 June 2004

JROC Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness, 31 December 2003 

JROC Joint Command and Control Functional Concept, February 2004

JROC Force Application Functional Concept, 5 March 2004

JROC Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, Version 1.0, December 2003

JROC Protection Joint Functional Concept, Version 1.0, 30 June 2004 

Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, December 2006

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0, August 2005

Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept, Version 1.0, 7 April 2005

Net-Centric Operational Environment Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0, 31 October 

2005

Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations 

Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, December 2006

USSTRATCOM

USSTRATCOM ICBM and Bomber Strategic Employment Requirements, 30 July 2007 

(S//FRD)

USSTRATCOM Operational Plan (OPLAN) 8010-08, Global Deterrence and Strike, 1 

February 2008 (S)
A49

AIR FORCE

SecAF MEMO, Rebuilding the Nuclear Enterprise, 26 June 2008

VCSAF Memo, Air Force Nuclear Task Force, no date

2007 US Air Force Posture Statement

Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720 Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 20 

December 2005

Program Budget Decision (PBD) 725 (USSTRATCOM TRIAD)

Air Force Vision 2020, Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power, 2002

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003

AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, 18 February 2006

AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 February 2000

AFDD 2-1.5, Nuclear Operations, 15 July 1998

AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, 12 June 2007

AFDD 2-1.8, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations, 26 

January 2007

AFPD 91-1, Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety, 13 February 2007

AFI 21-101, Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management, 29 June 2006

AFI 36-2640, Total Force Development (Active duty Officer) Volume 1, 23 January 2004

AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities, 22 November 2004

AFI 91-101, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, 19 December 2005

AFI 91-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation Safety Program, 29 

November 1993

AFI 91-111, Safety Rules for US Strategic Bomber Aircraft, 14 February 2006

AFMAN 91-221, Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports, 18 June 2004

AFMAN 10-3902, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program, 13 November 2006 

(supplement to DOD)

ACCI 91-109, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program and Responsibilities, 25 

May 2006
A50

AFSO21 Playbook

509 BW Nuclear Operations Review – Policy Memorandum, 11 July 2008

ACC Nuclear Operations Memorandum, 24 June 2008

Graybeard Panel Report, August 2008

Transition of the B-52 Bomber from SAC to ACC: A Case Study of Transformation, 

Major Tyrell A. Chamberlain, USAF, June 2006

8 AF/CC briefing, SecAF Nuclear Deterrence Briefing, 1 July 2008

CAF/MAF Commander‘s Conference briefing, Nuclear Deterrence Operations, 2008

Background Paper on Global Deterrence Force, HAF v1, July 2008

NAVY

Naval Power 21 ... A Naval Vision, October 2002

Sea Power 21 Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities, Adm Vern Clark, US Navy 

Proceedings, October 2002

Naval Doctrine Publication 1 Naval Warfare, 28 March 1994

Navy Strategic Systems Programs Program Overview Presentation, December 2007

REPORTS TO CONGRESS

GAO-08-1032T Report: NUCLEAR WEAPONS Views on NNSA’s Proposal to 

Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 17 July 2008

Nuclear Posture Review, December 2001 (S//FRD//NF)

Nuclear Posture Review: Implementation Plan, March 2003 (S//FRD//NF)

TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba)

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 22 June 1973

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 8 February 1987

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol
A51

Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, 31 December 1980

Non-Traditional Strike Final Report, 26 September 2007

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF 

Treaty), 27 December 1988

National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21'' Century, March 2008 (S//FRD)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under 

Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty), 10 October 1963

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic 

Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty), 24 May 2002

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States 

of America, 19 January 1960

Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of 

America, 17 November 1954

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 5 March 1970

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 

Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), 10 

October 1967

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons 

of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

(Seabed Arms Control Treaty), 18 May 1972

South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, 6 August 1985

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, 27 March 1997

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), 

31 July 1991

The Antarctic Treaty, 23 June 1961

The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 22 April 1968

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, 11 December 

1990
A52

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Testing (Threshold Test 

Ban Treaty), 11 December 1990

Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation 

on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes (UK - US Mutual Defense 

Treaty), 4 August 1958; with Amendments/ 23A. 2004 Amendment to the UK - US

Mutual Defense Treaty / 23B. UK - US Exchange of Letters

Taiwan Relations Act, 1979

Joint Statement of the US Japan Security Consultative Commission, 1 May 2007

Joint Communiqué 2006 US Korea, 20 October 2006

OTHER

Can Deterrence Be Tailored? M. Elaine Bunn, Strategic Forum, National Defense 

University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, No. 225, January 2007

Center for Strategic International Studies, The Department of Defense and the Nuclear 

Mission in the 21st Century A Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 4 Report, March 2008

The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Presented to Parliament by The 

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs By Command of Her Majesty, 

December 2006

Keeney, Ralph L., Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decision-making, 

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992

Sagan, Scott D. The Limits of Safety, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1993
A53

Appendix 8 — Air Force Nuclear Task Force Members

Leadership

Maj Gen C. Donald Alston, AF/A3/5N, Chair

Maj Gen (ret) Charles Henderson, AF/A3/5N, Deputy Chair

Dr. Billy Mullins, AF/A3/5N, Deputy Chair

Col Jeffrey Kindley, AF/A3/5N-R, Chief Strategy Cell 

Lt Col Tyrell Chamberlain, 2BW/SE, Deputy Chief Strategy Cell

Col Gregory Boyette, AF/A5RS, Chief Integration Cell

Lt Col Lloyd Ringgold, AF/A3/5N-O, Deputy Chief Integration Cell

Col Michael Shoults, AF/A3/5N-P, Organizational Development Cell

GreyBeards

Maj Gen (ret) Thomas H. Neary, Chair

VADM (ret) James W. Metzger

Maj Gen (ret) Kenneth L. Hageman Sr.

Maj Gen (ret) Gregory H. Power

Maj Gen (ret) Robert L. Smolen

Dr. Theodore Hardebeck

Col (ret) Larry S. Chandler

Core Team Members

Lt Col Scott Boushell, SAF/XCD

Lt Col Phillip Boroff, 498MUMG/CD

Lt Col Earl Bennett, AF/A8PC

Lt Col Tony Crews, USAF CMD/DS/J1

Lt Col Scott Diezman, SAF/USA

Lt Col Eric Johnson, AF/A1PF

Lt Col John Moes, AF/A7SO

Lt Col Joseph Newberry, NGB/A4M

Lt Col Lenny Richoux, SAF/CMX

Maj John DeVincenzo, AF/SEI

Maj Walter Jackim, AF/A5XP

Maj Thad Middleton, AF/A9R

Maj David Slye, SAF/IGI

Maj Kendal Stevenson, AF/A3O-ST

Capt Elizabeth Aptekar, SAF/PAD

Ms. Jacqueline Clark, SAF/CMX

Mr. Robert Tilson, AF/A3/5N-O

Mr. James Vaz, AF/A3/5N-P
A54

Additional Team Members

Task Force Support

Col Charles Armentrout, AF/A1PP

Col James Dunn, ACC/CV-N

Col Sandra Finan, AFSPC/CVN

Col Mohammed Khan, AF/A8PS

Lt Col Lance Adkins, AFSPC/A8XN

Lt Col Robert Drozd, AF/A5XP

Lt Col Juan Gacharna, AFSO21

Lt Col John Sweeney, ACC/A3SD

Maj Jason Knudson, AF/A7SO

Maj William Lynch, AF/A8PC

Col George Farfour, AF/A3/5N-O

Col Timothy Ferguson, ACC/A7S-2

Col Donald Flowers, AFIA/CV

Col Michael Morris, AFPC/DPAP

Lt Col James Baxter; AF/A9LG

Lt Col Laura Berry, SAF/CMX

Lt Col Reyes Colon, AF/A5RS

Lt Col David Fewster, AFSPC/CVO

Lt Col Rodney Hart, AFSPC/A8XN

Lt Col Joseph Heilhecker, SAF/SO

Lt Col Matthew Keihl, AFIA/EL

Lt Col David Miller, AF/A3O-I

Lt Col Clark Risner, AF/A3O-SO

Maj Paul Cazier, AETC/A3TB

Maj Veronica Hutfles, ACC/CCX

Maj Michael Miller, AF/A3O-AT

CMSgt Lorne Larson, USAFE/A3NM

SMSgt Jeffrey Haakinson, AFSPC/A7SON

SMSgt John Mister, AFSPC/A4MI

MSgt Miguel Garza, AFSC/SEWN

MSgt Shawn Joy, AMC/A3NA

MSgt John Oblinger, AF/A7S

Dr. David Carter, AF/A3/5N

Dr. Todd Fore, AF/A1D

Dr. Suzanne Logan, AETC AWC/CD 

Mr. Larry Akin, ACC/CV-N

Mr. John Howard, AETC/MXDB

Mr. Thomas Noon, AF/A4R-1

Mr. James Thompson, AFMC 708NSS/DD

Mr. Jeff Tibbits, AF/A1MR

Mr. Michael Watt, AFMC 709NSS/CXD

Capt Brian Stone, AF/A9AO

Capt Yuri Taitano, AF/A9AO

Mr. James Crum, AF/A3/5N-O

Dr. Mark Gallagher, AF/A9R

Ms. Julie George, SAF/CMX

Mr. Stephen Key, HAF/IMEP

Mr. Benny Martin, AFSC/SEWN

Mr. Darphaus Mitchell, AF/A3/5N-O
A55

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e 

 

A Roadmap to

Reinvigorate the Air Force

Nuclear Enterprise