# IIYj UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA KAREEM X. McCRANEY, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 

# FILED APR 1 32009 NANCYMAYERWHITTINGTON,

### CLERK U.S. DISTRICTCOURT 

# 09 U687

This matter is before the Court on initial consideration ofplaintiffs application to proceed informapauperis andpro se complaint. The application will be granted, and the complaint will be dismissed. When plaintiffwas 17 years ofage, under the so-called "direct filing" provision, the United States Attorney for the District ofColumbia charged him as an adult with first degree murder while armed. See D.C. Code §§ 16-2301(3)(A) (excluding from the definition ofthe term "child" an individual "who is under 18 years ofage ... and ... [is] charged bythe United States attorney with ... murder"), 16-2307( e-2) (establishing "arebuttable presumption that a child 15 through 18 years ofage who has been charged with [murder] shouldbe transferred for criminal prosecution in the interest ofpublic welfare and the protection ofthe public security"). Plaintiffargues that the "direct filing" provision violates his rights to equal protection ofthe laws and to due process, thus subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment due to his long incarceration with adults. He demands injunctive reliefin the form ofa hearing to determine
1whether he should have been tried as ajuvenile, as well as a declaratoryjudgment deeming the time he has served thus far "sufficient." The Court will dismiss the complaint for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction. The United States Attorney "exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be prosecution in a particular case," and, "as an incident ofthe constitutional separation ofpowers, ... the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise ofthe discretionary powers ofthe attorneys ofthe United States in their control over criminal prosecutions." United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335- 36 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). The United States Attorney's "exercise ofdiscretion ... under Section 2301(3)(A) ... is simplythe result of[his] determination ... that there is sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution ofthe [criminal defendant] for the offense charged and that adult prosecution is appropriate." Id. at 1337-38. "By excluding from the definition of'child' sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who are charged by the United States Attorney with certain serious offenses, [D.C. Code § 16-2301(3)(A)] automatically terminates the jurisdiction ofthe FamilyDivision and transfersjurisdiction over thejuvenile to the Criminal Division for prosecution as an adult." Partlow v. United States, 673 A.2d 642, 644 (D.C. 1996) (citations omitted). This Court neither can direct a prosecutor's discretion to prosecute a case, see, e.g., Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of[the Attorney General's] discretion "ofwhether or when prosecution is to be instituted"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966), nor review the decisions ofthe District of Columbia courts, see, e.g., Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (applyingDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995). 2An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this same date.

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