NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

FABIAN DEMETRICK WILLIAMS, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D14-4011 

 ) 

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

Opinion filed August 24, 2016. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Emmett Lamar 

Battles and Lisa D. Campbell, Judges. 

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer, 

Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, 

for Appellant. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Bilal A. Faruqui, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee. 

SILBERMAN, Judge. 

 Fabian Demetrick Williams seeks review of his judgment and sentences 

for robbery with a firearm, felony murder, and two counts of attempted robbery with a 

firearm. Because the evidence was insufficient to support one charge of attempted 

robbery, we reverse the conviction on that count. And because the trial court admitted 
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evidence of Williams' "flight" without a sufficient nexus between the flight and the 

pending criminal investigation, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the remaining 

charges. 

 Just before midnight on April 5, 2012, two men brandishing guns ran up to 

Myron Stokes and Michael Gilbert outside of Stokes' "party house" in Progress Village. 

One of the men demanded money from Stokes. When Stokes did not immediately 

respond, the man said, “Do you want to die?” The man ordered Stokes and Gilbert to 

lie on the ground, and they complied. The man then went through Stokes’ pockets, 

removed his wallet, and removed the cash. Apparently unsatisfied with the amount, the 

man demanded more money. Stokes said he had more in his house, and the man told 

Stokes to get up and go inside. The man told his accomplice to watch Gilbert who was 

still lying on the ground. 

 As the man walked Stokes into the house at gunpoint, Stokes' cousin 

Eugene Ghent was walking out. Ghent attempted to brush past the two men but 

stopped when the robber turned his gun on Ghent. Ghent recognized the robber as 

someone Ghent had played Little League baseball with twenty years before. Ghent 

thought the men must be playing a joke on him, but the robber said, "You're not going 

nowhere. . . . I'm not playing." Ghent was surprised and replied, "For real, Fabian?" 

The robber hesitated, and Ghent grabbed the gun, turned it toward the robber's chest, 

and pushed him and the gun out of the house. The robber tripped over a bicycle that 

was near the door and dropped the gun. As Ghent stumbled out behind the robber, he 

saw the robber's accomplice standing over Gilbert with a gun. The accomplice briefly 
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turned his gun on Ghent, and Ghent took off. As Ghent was running away, he heard 

gunshots. 

 Stokes took advantage of the distraction and ran to the kitchen to warn his 

other guests. Stokes and his guests fled out the back door. Stokes ran to the next 

street; he too heard gunshots as he was running away. Meanwhile Ghent reached his 

nearby home and called 9-1-1 from a cell phone. He stayed on the phone with the 

9-1-1 operator as he walked back to the scene. 

 By the time the police arrived, the robbers had left the scene and Stokes 

and Ghent had returned. Stokes found Gilbert lying on the ground and gasping for 

breath. Gilbert had been shot multiple times in his legs and buttocks, and he died at the 

scene. Deputy Lucius arrived on the scene and interviewed Ghent and Stokes. Both 

men told him the robber was named "Fabian." Ghent and Stokes were taken to the 

police station where they positively identified a photograph of Fabian Williams. 

 Detective Hollis obtained an arrest warrant for Williams, and he and 

Deputy Lucius went to Williams' address in Sampson Park the next morning. Williams 

was not at home. Detective Hollis went to Williams' girlfriend's home, but she did not 

provide any information about Williams' whereabouts. Despite additional attempts to 

locate Williams, he was not seen or heard from again until over a year later, on June 4, 

2013, when he was arrested in Sylvester, Georgia. Williams' accomplice was never 

identified or located. 

 The jury found Williams guilty of the felony murder of Gilbert, robbery with 

a firearm of Stokes, and attempted robbery with a firearm of Gilbert and Ghent. The 

court sentenced Williams as a prison releasee reoffender to life in prison for the murder 
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and completed robbery and to concurrent terms of fifteen years in prison for the 

attempted robberies. Williams raises two meritorious arguments on appeal: (1) the trial 

court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempted 

robbery with a firearm of Ghent, and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion in 

limine to exclude evidence of his "flight" to Georgia. 

 First, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Williams' motion for 

judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempted robbery with a firearm of Ghent. The 

evidence was insufficient to establish Williams' intent to rob Ghent. There was no 

evidence that Williams knew Ghent was inside Stokes' home when Williams decided to 

rob Gilbert and Stokes outside the home. And Williams did not make any statements to 

Gilbert and Stokes that suggested an intent to rob anyone else. In fact, Williams only 

entered Stokes' house so Stokes could get more money. Williams' encounter with 

Ghent inside Stokes' house was brief with Williams pointing a gun at Ghent to keep him 

from continuing out the door. Williams did not say or do anything to indicate he 

intended to do anything besides keep Ghent from leaving. Accordingly, the trial court 

erred in denying Williams' motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. 

 The State suggests that the proper remedy upon reversal is to remand 

with directions for the court to enter a judgment for the permissive lesser-included 

offense of aggravated assault with a firearm. Section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2014), 

permits an appellate court to direct entry of a judgment for a permissive lesser-included 

offense if the jury has determined all the elements of that crime. See State v. Sigler, 

967 So. 2d 835, 844 (Fla. 2007). However, aggravated assault with a firearm requires a 

finding that the defendant actually used the firearm while robbery with a firearm requires 
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only that the defendant carried a firearm. State v. Baker, 452 So. 2d 927, 928-29 (Fla. 

1984), reaffirmed, Taylor v. State, 608 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1992). While the evidence may 

have established that Williams used the firearm by turning it on Ghent, the charging 

document did not allege that Williams used the firearm. And while the jury's verdict for 

attempted robbery with a firearm satisfies the element of carrying a firearm, this does 

not establish that the jury found the essential element of aggravated assault that 

Williams used a firearm. See Coicou v. State, 39 So. 3d 237, 243-44 (Fla. 2010) 

(holding that it was error to direct entry of a conviction for a permissive lesser-included 

offense based on the fact that it was supported by the evidence because the greater 

crime was not charged in a manner that encompassed the intent element of the 

permissive lesser-included offense and the jury did not make a finding regarding that 

intent element). Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for this single count with 

directions for the court to enter a judgment of acquittal. 

 Second, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Williams' motion 

in limine to exclude evidence of his "flight" to Georgia without a sufficient nexus 

between the flight and the pending criminal investigation. Evidence of flight or 

concealment after a crime may be admissible to show consciousness of guilt. Twilegar 

v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 196 (Fla. 2010). Because evidence of flight creates an 

inference of consciousness of guilt, it may not be admitted unless there is evidence of a 

nexus between the flight or concealment to the specific crimes charged. The ultimate 

issue regarding admissibility is whether the evidence of flight is relevant to the charged 

crimes. The probative value of evidence of flight is weakened if (1) the suspect was not 

aware at the time of the flight that he was a suspect in an investigation for the charged 
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crimes, (2) there were not clear indications of flight, or (3) there was a significant delay 

in time between the flight and the commission of the crimes. Id. 

 All three of the factors that weaken the probative value of evidence of 

flight are present in this case. As to the first factor, there is very little evidence from 

which it can be inferred that Williams was aware at the time of his "flight" to Georgia that 

he was a suspect in an investigation for the charged crimes. In fact, it is unknown when 

Williams even went to Georgia. The State correctly notes that there was evidence that 

Ghent indicated to Williams at the scene that Ghent recognized him. Additionally, the 

police did go to both Williams' and his girlfriend's homes looking for him the morning 

after the crime. If Williams had been discovered in Georgia within a few weeks or even 

a month after the crimes, the evidence of flight may well have been admissible. See 

Brown v. State, 756 So. 2d 230, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) ("We likewise find no abuse of 

discretion in the instant case where the victims knew Brown by name and the police had 

been to his house attempting to locate him during the fourteen days between the 

robbery and Brown's arrest."). 

 The problem is that Williams was not seen or heard from until fourteen 

months after the crime when he was arrested in Georgia. While Deputy Lucius patrolled 

Samspon Park looking for Williams, he did not offer any details supporting his efforts. 

There was no information that Williams was not at his usual haunts or had not reported 

for work. And there was no testimony that the police inquired of Williams' family and 

friends beyond the day after the crime. While Detective Hollis testified that he 

attempted to locate Williams' friends, family members, and girlfriends, he did not give a 

time line or indicate that he actually came into contact with any of these people beyond 
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the day after the crime. Cf. Diaz-Gonzalez v. State, 932 So. 2d 528, 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2006) (holding that "a reasonable juror could infer defendant knew of the officer's 

investigation" for a crime that occurred a few months before his arrest because the 

investigating officer went to the residence of the defendant's ex-wife, made ten separate 

visits to the defendant's business during which he informed those present that he 

wanted to talk to the defendant about something that happened on the date of the 

crime, and gave this information to the defendant's alibi witness). 

 This lack of evidence also supports the second factor, that there were not 

clear indications of flight. Flight is generally established when the defendant leaves the 

scene when confronted by the police. However, the defendant's abrupt relocation to 

another state can also be evidence of flight. See, e.g., Twilegar, 42 So. 3d at 196; Leon 

v. State, 68 So. 3d 351, 353-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). In such cases, there is generally 

evidence of some other incriminating behavior. But in this case, there was no additional 

evidence beyond Williams' relocation to Georgia at some unknown point in time. 

 This all ties in with the third factor, that there was a significant delay in 

time between the flight and the commission of the crimes. Williams was not seen or 

heard from for fourteen months until he was arrested in Georgia. This is a much longer 

period of time than that in which courts have found a nexus between a relocation to 

another state and the specific crimes charged. Cf. Twilegar, 42 So. 3d at 186-87, 196 

(considering a two-week time period); Leon, 68 So. 3d at 354 (considering a five-week 

time period). 

 Under the totality of the circumstances, the factors that weaken the 

probative value of evidence of flight make the evidence surrounding Williams' flight in 
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this case more prejudicial than probative. Thus, the trial court erred in denying Williams' 

motion in limine to exclude the evidence of flight. 

 We are not persuaded that any error is harmless. There was no physical 

evidence linking Williams to the crime, and he was convicted based on identification 

testimony that was significantly impeached. Stokes and Ghent said that they 

recognized Williams from Little League baseball, but that was some seventeen years 

beforehand. Also, Ghent failed to mention Williams by name in the 9-1-1 call even 

though he testified he recognized Williams as soon as he walked in the door. In fact, at 

first Ghent told the 9-1-1 operator, "I didn't know who it was." Later in the call he said, "I 

think I know who the person is." Only after the two men returned to the scene and 

spoke together did they both positively identify the perpetrator as Fabian Williams. 

Furthermore, because the evidence of flight established an inference of consciousness 

of guilt, we simply cannot say that that this evidence did not contribute to the verdict. 

See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986) (holding that the harmless 

error test places a burden on the State to prove "that the error complained of did not 

contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility 

that the error contributed to the conviction"). 

Because the evidence was insufficient to support the charge of attempted 

robbery with a firearm of Ghent, we reverse the conviction on that count and direct the 

court to enter a judgment of acquittal. And because the trial court admitted evidence of 

Williams' "flight" without a sufficient nexus between the flight and the pending criminal 

investigation, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the remaining charges. 

 Reversed and remanded with directions. 
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LaROSE and SLEET, JJ., Concur.