UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4957

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JAIME NOEL AYALA ARRIAZA,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00190-TSE-1)

Submitted: September 2, 2010 Decided: November 24, 2010

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Todd Richman, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Research 

and Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil 

H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Karen L. Dunn, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jaime Noel Ayala Arriaza appeals his conviction and 

seven-month sentence after entering a conditional guilty plea 

pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession of a 

firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5), 924(a)(2) (2006). Arriaza’s sole 

argument on appeal is that the district court erred when it 

denied his motion to suppress the fruits of a warrantless police 

search on his impounded vehicle because he alleges that the 

automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not justify 

the search post-Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1710 

(2009). Because we disagree, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment.

In reviewing the district court’s denial of Arriaza’s 

suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual 

determinations for clear error and any legal determinations de 

novo. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). Because the district 

court denied Arriaza’s motion, we construe the evidence “in the 

light most favorable to the government.” Id.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 

seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee 

requires that “searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant 
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issued by an independent judicial officer.” California v. 

Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). An established exception to 

this rule is the “automobile exception.” Kelly, 592 F.3d at 

589. Under this exception, police may search a vehicle without 

a warrant if “probable cause exists to believe it contains 

contraband” and the vehicle is “readily mobile.” Pennsylvania 

v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). If both conditions are 

met, police may conduct a warrantless search “that is as 

thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant[.]” 

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982). 

We conclude that the totality of the facts and 

circumstances known to police were sufficient to support a 

reasonable belief that Arriaza’s vehicle contained a firearm. 

Moreover, a car is “readily mobile” for purposes of the 

automobile exception so long as it is “‘being used on the 

highways’ or is ‘readily capable of such use’ rather than, say, 

‘elevated on blocks.’” Kelley, 592 F.3d at 591 (quoting Carney, 

471 U.S. at 392-93). So long as a vehicle is “clearly 

operational[,]” we have found the vehicle to be “readily mobile” 

for purposes of determining whether a warrantless search of that 

vehicle was constitutional. See United States v. Brookins, 345 

F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, “[t]he 

justification to conduct a warrantless search under the 

automobile exception does not disappear merely because the car 
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has been immobilized and impounded.” See United States v. 

Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding 

warrantless search of a car impounded by the police for thirtyeight days). 

Despite the foregoing, Arriaza asserts that, like the 

search-incident-to-arrest exception at issue in Gant, “[t]he 

automobile exception to the warrant requirement has become 

untethered from its original reasoning” and “has been 

unconstitutionally expanded beyond its proper scope.” In Gant, 

the Supreme Court determined that a search of a vehicle incident 

to a recent occupant’s arrest is justified “only when the 

arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 

passenger compartment at the time of the search” or when “it is 

reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest 

might be found in the vehicle.” Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Supreme Court nonetheless explicitly mentioned 

that a broader application of the search-incident-to-arrest 

exception was unnecessary “to protect law enforcement safety and 

evidentiary interests” because “[o]ther established exceptions 

to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under 

additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns 

demand.” Id. at 1721 (recognizing, for instance, that “[i]f 

there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence 
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of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-

821[ ] (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in 

which the evidence might be found”). Thus, we hold that Gant

does not undermine this court’s jurisprudence pertaining to 

warrantless searches of impounded vehicles. Cf. United States 

v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 154 n.8 (4th Cir. 2009) (declining to 

apply Gant’s reasoning to protective searches where suspect had 

not yet been arrested).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED