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i 

91–812 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–127] 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY AND 

MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC 

STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 13, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, November 13, 2014, The Administration’s Strategy and Military 

Campaign Against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, November 13, 2014 ................................................................................ 47 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2014 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY AND MILITARY CAMPAIGN 

AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 9 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ............ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck ........................................................................................... 53 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 61 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 61 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Barber ......................................................................................................... 68 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 69 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 65 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 67 

(1) 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY AND MILITARY 

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND 

THE LEVANT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, November 13, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Before we begin, I would 

like to state up front that I will not tolerate disturbances of these 

proceedings, including verbal disruptions, photography, standing, 

or holding signs. I want to thank you at the outset for your cooperation. 

We have a hard stop at 1 p.m. today because of a House organizational meeting. Therefore, after consultation with Mr. Smith, I 

ask unanimous consent that each member shall not have more 

than 4 minutes, rather than the usual 5, to question the panel of 

witnesses so that we can get to as many members as possible. 

Thank you. 

The committee meets to receive testimony on the administration’s military campaign and strategy for Syria and Iraq. I would 

like to welcome Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey. We appreciate you being here to address these very consequential issues. 

When we last saw you in September, the Congress had just 

passed an authority to train and equip [moderate] Syrian rebels 

after a lengthy debate. The air campaign in Iraq had been underway for a few weeks and strikes in Syria had not yet begun. I stated then that I did not believe the President’s minimalist strategy 

was sufficient to achieve his objectives of degrading and destroying 

ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. This hearing is critical 

to our understanding of the progress made by the President’s strategy and to hear from our military leaders on what else may be 

needed. 

The OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] budget amendment 

that we received Monday afternoon pays for the air campaign and 

adds more advisors, but it does not appear to reflect any changes 

in strategy. However, we know that targeting and air strikes are 

getting harder as ISIL changes tactics, and limiting our advisors 

to headquarters buildings will not help newly trained Iraqi and 
2 

Syrian opposition, their forces, to hold terrain, much less defeat 

ISIL in the field. Yet the President has doubled down on his policy 

of no boots on the ground despite any advice you have given him. 

So my fundamental question is, how can you successfully execute 

the mission you have been given to degrade and ultimately destroy 

ISIL when some of your best options are taken off the table? Mr. 

Secretary, both of your predecessors, Bob Gates and Leon Panetta, 

have stated that we need boots on the ground if there is to be any 

hope of success in the strategy. Even Coach K, a West Point graduate and very successful basketball coach at Duke, told an Army 

conference last month that declaring we won’t use ground forces is 

like telling your opponent you are not going to play your best players. 

We may very well be considering a new AUMF [Authorization for 

Use of Military Force] in the future, but I would offer a warning 

that should the AUMF proposed by the President contain such limitations, it will be DOA [dead on arrival] in Congress. I will not 

support sending our military into harm’s way with their arms tied 

behind their backs. 

Lastly, the risk to our forces increases even more with terrorist 

detainees returning to the battlefield. ISIL’s leader, al-Baghdadi, is 

chief among them. There are reports of former GTMO [Guantanamo Bay Naval Base] detainees returning to the fight and recruiting militants for ISIL. Despite these disturbing trends, we have 

seen an increase in notifications regarding detainee transfers from 

GTMO. 

Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, you shoulder an immense 

responsibility each time you sign off on or concur on these releases. 

I understand you are under pressure to release even more. But the 

roughly 150 detainees that are left are the worst of the worst. To 

continue these releases just as we have had to open a new front 

in the war on terror is unwise. 

Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, again, thank you for being 

here today. This is likely the last hearing that we will have together, and all of the issues that bring us together are never easy. 

I have always appreciated your friendship and candid conversations, and your service, and your dedication to this Nation. And for 

those of us who will not be here in the 114th Congress, let me express our gratitude to you for your leadership, your service, and 

above all your devotion to our troops. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you again for being before us. 

Mr. Smith could not be here this morning, and so I will be reading his statement if it so pleases, and I hope the chairman. So, 

again, these are not my words, because, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I am probably very different than a lot of the thought that 

is going on in this committee in many ways. But these will be Mr. 

Smith’s words. 

He would like to thank the witnesses for appearing here today. 

Just 3 months ago, the President notified Congress that he had au-
3 

thorized the commander of Central Command to undertake air 

strikes in Iraq against ISIL. 

Just 2 short months ago, on September 23, the administration 

provided a War Powers notification of strikes in Syria against ISIL. 

And since that time, the U.S. has taken hundreds of strikes in Iraq 

and Syria, killing hundreds of ISIL fighters, eliminating their freedom to move in convoys, substantially impacting their ability to sell 

oil to fund their operations, and driving their leadership underground, which complicated their ability to command and control 

their forces. 

The DOD [Department of Defense] has deployed about 1,400 

troops to Iraq to protect the embassy and to advise and assist Iraqi 

security forces [ISF], including the Iraqi Army, counterterrorism 

services, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the President has announced 

that another 1,500 would go. We have also airlifted substantial 

stocks of weapons and ammunition to ISF and to the Syrian Kurds 

fighting ISIL, and the administration has enlisted somewhere 

around 60 countries to fight against ISIL. And a number of them 

have undertaken strikes in either Iraq or Syria, and some have volunteered to send special forces to Iraq to help. And of course Congress approved a temporary authority for the DOD to begin training and equipping elements of the Syrian opposition to fight ISIL. 

In other words, Mr. Smith says, we have come a long way in a 

fairly short amount of time. And thank you to the two of you for 

leadership in arriving at most of what I just mentioned. And even 

though we have made substantial progress, more remains to be 

done to combat the threat of ISIL. An ISIL able to control territory 

in Iraq and Syria will, without question, plot and plan attacks 

about the West. I think we all agree, as we have seen what they 

have been doing to the people that they have taken, the beheadings, the executions, et cetera. I am paraphrasing here in order to 

make this short, Mr. Chairman. 

But going forward, we have many decisions to make about combating the threat of ISIL. The President, for example, has requested that Congress authorize the use of military force against 

the group rather than relying on the 2001 AUMF to combat Al 

Qaeda. I agree that Congress should debate and pass an AUMF, 

but I am skeptical that we can assemble a majority to do so. The 

President has also requested $1.6 billion to train the Iraqi security 

forces, and we in Congress need to reauthorize the Syrian trainand-equip authority. And, again, these are the words of Mr. Smith. 

I will end, and I would like unanimous consent to put the entire 

statement into, let me end with just this last paragraph, Mr. 

Chairman, to make it much shorter. 

Going forward, prosecuting the campaign against ISIL in either 

Iraq or Syria will be extremely complex and challenging. We must 

not delude ourselves about this. Both Iraq and Syria are complex, 

messy situations where perfect outcomes are extremely unlikely. 

Whatever course of action we undertake will take years and dedicated effort. We will have major disagreements with our allies and 

partners about desired outcomes. 

Russia’s role in Syria will be challenging. And while we seem to 

have overlapping interests with Iran and Iraq, our desired outcomes do not clearly align, and we certainly do not have the same 
4 

overlapping interest in Syria. All of which is to say that these situations are going to be messy and require constant attention and 

management. 

Fortunately, managed correctly, we have a real path towards the 

goal of degrading ISIL, denying them safe haven, eliminating their 

leadership, and curtailing their ability to strike at our allies and 

at us. And I hope our panelists here will help to explain to us and 

the American people the strategy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask unanimous consent to put 

it forward into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith 10 days ago had surgery on his hip, 

and he is recovering. I want to let you know he is fully engaged. 

Yesterday we had our Big Four meeting working on the bill, and 

he was telecommuting it. Technology made it possible that he was 

in the room with us and fully, totally engaged. 

One other thing I would like to mention at the outset. Several 

of our members will not be with us next year, some retired, some 

lost their election. Let me thank each of you for your service to this 

Nation, to your service on this committee. It is much appreciated. 

This committee has always tried to work in a bipartisan manner. 

Anyway, I think enough said. Thank you. Thank you for your service. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary HAGEL. Chairman McKeon, Congresswoman Sanchez, 

members of the committee, thank you. 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair notes that there is a disturbance in 

the committee’s proceedings. The committee will be in order. I 

would like to formally request that those in the audience causing 

this disruption cease their actions immediately. 

Thank you very much. Thank you to the Capitol Police for restoring order. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary HAGEL. Chairman, obviously your last hearing is not 

going unnoticed and unrecognized. So we shall proceed. 

As I was saying, I very much appreciate, and I know General 

Dempsey does, an opportunity to come back after a couple of 

months and update this committee on what we are doing and how 

we are doing it, why we are doing it. I know that this has not been, 

as you all know, the only communication we have had with this 

committee. We have had many, many briefings with your staff. 

Many of you I have spoken to directly, as well as General Dempsey 

and many of our military leaders. So to have this opportunity to 

bring together in some convergence of explanation of what we are 

doing and why and how, I very much appreciate. 

Mr. Chairman, your leadership and your service to this committee, to this Congress, to this country over many years has been 

recognized many times, appropriately, over the last few months. It 
5 

will continue to be recognized. It should be recognized. I want to 

thank you personally for your support, your friendship. I have valued that over the last 2 years I have had the privilege of holding 

this job. I will miss you personally, and I know this committee will, 

but there are so many very able and capable and dedicated people 

that are right next to you that will carry on. 

So I didn’t want this opportunity to go without me expressing my 

thanks and best wishes to you and to your family and to the next 

chapter in your life and your many new adventures that lie ahead. 

As I noted, I am joined this morning by the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who I too have, like 

you, have appreciated his wise counsel and his partnership as we 

have dealt with some of the most complex and difficult issues that 

I think this country has faced in a long time, and I know General 

Dempsey appreciates all of your service as well. 

General Dempsey has played a critical role over the last 6 

months especially in shaping and developing our strategy, along 

with our CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] commander, who 

you all know, General Lloyd Austin. To General Austin and his 

commanders and to our men and women, I want to thank them. 

Mr. Chairman, President Obama, Chairman Dempsey, General 

Austin, all of our leaders and I have been very clear that our campaign against ISIL will be long and will be difficult. We are 3 

months into a multiyear effort. As we enter a new phase of this effort working to train and equip more counter-ISIL forces in both 

Iraq and Syria, we will succeed only with the strong support of 

Congress and the strong support of this committee. 

Since I testified before this committee 2 months ago our campaign against ISIL has made progress. ISIL’s advance in parts of 

Iraq has stalled, and in some cases been reversed, by Iraqi, Kurdish, and tribal forces supported by U.S. and coalition air strikes. 

But ISIL continues to represent a serious threat to American interests, our allies in the Middle East, and wields still influence over 

a broad swath of territory in western and northern Iraq and eastern Syria. 

But as President Obama has said, ISIL will not be defeated 

through military force alone. Our comprehensive strategy is focused on supporting inclusive governance, sustaining a broad-based 

regional and global coalition, and strengthening local forces on the 

ground. It also includes undercutting ISIL’s flow of resources, countering ISIL’s messaging, constricting the flow of foreign fighters, 

providing humanitarian assistance, and our intensive regional and 

global diplomatic effort. 

In Iraq, much more needs to be done to achieve political reform, 

but we are seeing steps in the right direction. In the wake of years 

of polarizing leadership, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi is leaning forward by engaging all of Iraqis’ diverse communities. He has appointed a Sunni defense minister after that post was left vacant for 

more than 4 years, and he is moving to create an Iraqi national 

guard which would empower local forces, especially in Sunni tribal 

areas of Anbar Province, while aligning them with the central government. 

And you may have noticed that yesterday it was announced that 

he replaced 36 of his most senior commanders, integrating the 
6 

Iraqi security forces with more senior Sunni leaders. This is essential to strengthening not only the Iraqi security forces, but 

strengthening a central government, a government in Iraq that in 

fact can build trust and confidence of the Iraqi people. 

Thanks to intensive diplomacy, America is not supporting this effort alone. We have built a global coalition to support local forces 

in both Iraq and Syria, a coalition of over 60 nations that are contributing assistance ranging from air support to training to humanitarian assistance. Since I testified here, 16 nations have joined the 

military campaign against ISIL. 

The first coalition air strikes in Syria involved Bahrain, Jordan, 

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, a tremendous 

demonstration of unity among our Middle East Arab partners. Coalition partners have carried out 130 air strikes against ISIL in both 

Iraq and Syria. Last week, Canada launched its first air strikes in 

Iraq, bringing the total to 12 nations participating in strike operations in Iraq and Syria, as additional partners provide tanker, 

command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. 

Coalition nations have also pledged hundreds of personnel to 

support our mission to train, advise, assist, and help build the capacity of Iraqi forces. Our global coalition is also helping shape the 

burden of the campaign, with nearly all our coalition partners 

funding their own contributions. With the President’s special envoy 

for our counter-ISIL coalition, General John Allen, General Allen 

is in the lead as he coordinates the coalition’s strategy and contributions across all our lines of effort with our coalition partners. 

As a coalition and as a nation, we must prepare for a long and 

difficult struggle. There will be setbacks, but we are seeing steady 

and sustainable progress. And, Mr. Chairman, I think that is an 

important part of answering the questions we have, the questions 

we have about our own strategy that we ask ourselves, the questions you have about our strategy. Can we sustain it? Can it be 

sustained after, at some point, we leave? That is a critical component of our strategy, asking that question and answering that 

question. 

We are seeing steady and sustainable progress along DOD’s two 

main lines of effort. First, we are seeing progress in degrading and 

destroying ISIL’s warfighting capacity and in denying safe haven 

to its fighters. Directly and through support of Iraqi forces, coalition air strikes have hit ISIL’s command and control, its leadership, its revenue sources, its supply lines and logistics, and impaired its ability to mass forces. 

In recent weeks, these strikes helped Peshmerga forces press 

ISIL out of Zumar in northern Iraq and helped Iraqi security forces 

begin retaking areas around the major oil refinery at Baiji. Last 

weekend, air strikes hit a gathering of ISIL battlefield commanders 

near Mosul. ISIL fighters have been forced to alter their tactics. 

We knew they would. They will adapt, they will adjust, maneuvering in smaller groups, sometimes making it more difficult to 

identify targets, hiding large equipment, and changing their communications methods. 

Sustaining this pressure on ISIL will help provide time and 

space, time and space for Iraq to reconstitute its forces and con-
7 

tinue going on the offense. This pressure is having an effect on potential ISIL recruits and collaborators, striking a blow to morale 

and recruitment. We know that. Our intelligence is very clear on 

that. And as Iraqi forces build strength, the tempo and intensity 

of our coalition’s air campaign will accelerate in tandem. 

We need to continue to help build partner capacity so that local 

forces can take the fight to ISIL and ultimately defeat it. Today, 

many of the approximately 1,400 U.S. troops in Iraq are engaged 

in advise-and-assist programs with Iraqi and Kurdish forces. 

As you know, last week the Defense Department announced that 

we will expand the support to Iraqi forces by deploying up to 1,500 

additional military personnel, including 2 new advise-and-assist 

centers at locations beyond Baghdad and Erbil, as well as 4 new 

training centers in northern, western, and central Iraq. 

I recommended this deployment to the President based on the request of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Central Command’s assessment of Iraqi units, General Dempsey’s recommendation, and the 

strength of the Iraqi and coalition’s campaign plan. These additional troops and facilities will help strengthen and reconstitute 

Iraqi forces, expanding the geography of our mission but not the 

mission itself. U.S. military personnel will not be engaged in a 

ground combat mission. 

Our phased plan to help strengthen Iraqi security forces has 

three major components. 

First, our advise-and-assist mission that is partnering coalition 

advisors with Iraqi forces at the headquarters level. U.S. and coalition advisors are already helping plan current and future operations. And, as noted, we will expand this mission with two new 

advise-and-assist centers that we have announced. 

Second, we will support the regeneration of Iraqi forces so that 

they are better equipped to launch offensive operations over the 

coming year. CENTCOM’s new training sites in northern, western, 

and central Iraq will help train 12 Iraqi brigades, and more than 

a dozen coalition nations have expressed their intent to send trainers and advisors to help build the capacity of Iraqi forces. 

Third, we will concentrate on broader security sector reform to 

help transform Iraqi forces into a more coherent and capable unified force. This includes Prime Minister Abadi’s initiative to develop provincially based national guard units, which I mentioned 

earlier. 

Coalition partners are playing an important role in all of these 

efforts by providing advisors and trainers to help regenerate Iraqi 

combat brigades. Together, we are also providing more arms and 

equipment to Iraqi security forces. This year, the United States 

alone has shipped more than $685 million in critical equipment 

and supplies to Iraq, ranging from grenades and small arms to 

tank ammunition, helicopter rockets, and Hellfire missiles, hundreds of which will be arriving this month. U.S. and coalition partners together have delivered over 2.7 million pounds of supplies, including 33 million rounds of ammunition to Peshmerga forces 

alone. 

Mr. Chairman, in Syria our actions against ISIL are focused on 

shaping the dynamic in Iraq, which remains the priority of our 

counter-ISIL strategy. But we are sober about the challenges we 
8 

face as ISIL exploits the complicated, long-running Syrian conflict. 

Because we do not have a partner government to work with in 

Syria or regular military partners to work with as we do in Iraq, 

in the near term our military aims in Syria are limited to isolating 

and destroying ISIL’s safe havens. 

Coalition air strikes in Syria are accomplishing this by containing or continuing to target significant ISIL assets, which has 

impaired ISIL’s ability to move fighters and equipment into Iraq, 

disrupted their command and control, damaged their training 

bases, and significantly limited their financial revenue by hitting 

captured oil fields and disrupting their crude oil distribution and 

collection sites. 

The Defense Department’s longer-term effort is to train and 

equip credible moderate Syrian opposition forces, especially from 

areas most threatened by ISIL. This will require at least 8 to 12 

months to begin making a difference on the ground. We know the 

opposition will continue to face intense pressure in a multi-front 

battlespace, and we are considering options for how U.S. and coalition forces can further support these forces once they are trained 

and equipped. 

These forces are being trained in units, not as individuals. Our 

strategy in Syria will demand time, patience, perseverance to deliver results. We cannot accomplish our objectives in Syria all at 

once. The position of the United States remains that Assad has lost 

the legitimacy to govern. 

But there is no purely military solution to the conflict in Syria. 

Alongside our efforts to isolate and sanction the Assad regime, our 

strategy is to strengthen the moderate opposition to the point 

where they, where they can first defend and control their local 

areas. Next, go on the offense and take back areas that have been 

lost to ISIL. And ultimately, as their capability and leverage develop, to create conditions for a political settlement in Syria. 

Thanks to the broad bipartisan support in Congress, Mr. Chairman, including majorities in both parties, preparations for our 

Syria train-and-equip mission are now complete. We have established a combined joint interagency task force to coordinate the 

coalition’s train-and-equip program for Syria. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other partner nations have agreed to host training sites. 

Development of those sites, recruiting, and vetting will begin once 

Congress has authorized the actual funding, but we are still moving forward doing what we must do to prepare for that vetting 

process and that training. 

We are still at the front end of our campaign against ISIL. As 

President Obama told leaders of both Houses of Congress last week 

during a session which I attended with General Austin, congressional support, your support is vital for the campaign to succeed. 

As you all know, the administration is requesting $5.6 billion in additional Overseas Contingency Operations funding for fiscal year 

2015 to help execute our comprehensive strategy in Iraq and Syria, 

$5 billion of it for the Department of Defense; $3.4 billion would 

support ongoing U.S. military actions against ISIL under Operation 

Inherent Resolve; $1.6 billion would go toward a new Iraqi trainand-equip fund devoted to helping reconstitute Iraq’s security 

forces. 
9 

This fund will be critical for enabling Iraqi security forces, including Kurdish and tribal forces, to go on the offense in 2015, and 

it will require the Iraqi Government and coalition members to 

make significant contributions as well. Over 60 percent or $1 billion of the $1.6 billion fund would be available initially. The remaining $600 million would not be released until the Government 

of Iraq and coalition partners have provided at least $600 million 

of their own contributions because the Iraqi Government must invest in its own security and its own future. 

As the President said last week, the administration will be engaging the Congress to support the effort against ISIL by enacting 

a new and specific authorization for the use of military force, one 

that reflects the scope and the challenges of our campaign against 

ISIL. DOD will work closely with the Congress on each component 

of this effort. As this mission continues to progress, we will continue to evaluate and reevaluate each element of our strategy. 

Having just marked Veterans Day earlier this week, let me again 

thank this committee for what you do every day to support all our 

men and women in uniform and their families serving this country 

across the world. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel can be found in the 

Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dempsey. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT 

CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman. I want to add my deep 

appreciation to you on behalf of the Joint Chiefs for your leadership 

and all you have done for the defense of our Nation. Your devotion 

to the men and women of the joint force, and, importantly, to their 

families, will continue to resonate throughout our ranks. 

I too appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee 

this morning to discuss our strategy against ISIL. Secretary Hagel 

has already detailed the elements and the progress of our comprehensive approach against ISIL. Broadly, our strategy is to reenforce a credible partner in the Iraqi Government and assist regional stakeholders to address the 20 million disenfranchised 

Sunnis who live between Damascus and Baghdad. They have to reject the ISIL ideology from within. 

We are implementing an Iraq-first strategy enabled by the coalition, but as I have said before, it is not an Iraq-only strategy. It 

will evolve through the coalition and with multiple lines of effort 

and over time. We need to squeeze ISIL from multiple directions. 

We need to deny them safe haven and disrupt their activities in 

Syria. We need to build up a Syrian opposition to confront them. 

And we need to take a long view. Achieving the outcome we desire 

requires that the multiple lines of effort all have to move apace of 

each other. 

These lines of effort include counter-financing, counter-foreign 

fighter flow, counter-messaging, humanitarian aid, economic 

progress, the air campaign, restoring an offensive capability to the 

Iraqi security forces, and a ground campaign managed by the Iraqi 

security forces with the ISF from Baghdad and the Peshmerga 
10 

from the north, with contribution from the tribes, and in particular, 

in Al Anbar Province and in Nineveh Province. 

In ongoing dialogue with my coalition counterparts there is a 

consensus across the coalition about our common vision and the objectives across those lines of effort, and there is a strong commitment to work together closely in this complex and long-term undertaking. Progress will be uneven at times, but with strategic patience, the trend lines favor the coalition over the long term. 

We are alert that the assumptions that underpin our campaign 

will be challenged. Most notably, we don’t yet know to what degree 

the new government of Iraq will be able to convince the Kurds and 

the Sunnis that it intends to have a government of national unity, 

one that gives the people of Iraq confidence that they have a future 

other than through ISIL’s radical ideology, and we don’t know how 

sectarianism will ultimately affect the region and our campaign. 

We will continue to revisit and review our assumptions as the campaign evolves, and we will adapt. 

Which brings me to resources. Our commitments across the 

globe, as you well know, are up. Resources are down. And to add 

to that, sequestration is only months away. Every day that we 

don’t have budget certainty, flexibility, and time means that we 

will continue to erode our readiness, and over time I will have 

fewer military options to offer. 

The Joint Chiefs and I appreciate your support to help us work 

our way through not only our national security challenges, but also 

the resources and the flexibility necessary to meet them. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, in September you testified to our colleagues in 

the Senate that, I quote, ‘‘If we reach the point where I believe our 

advisors should accompany Iraqi troops on attacks against specific 

ISIL targets, I will recommend that to the President,’’ end quote. 

However, during a recent interview on ‘‘Frontline,’’ Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes stated that the President will 

not reconsider his boots-on-the-ground limitation regardless of any 

recommendation you might provide. Furthermore, the President 

seems to equate boots on the ground to a 150,000-person U.S. invasion force. I haven’t heard anyone talk about sending in divisions. 

So please help us understand the circumstances where you would 

envision the need to introduce U.S. military troops into combat situations and the size and types of forces or capabilities that these 

would be. 

General DEMPSEY. Thanks, Chairman. 

First, I want to make sure that I mention, I have never been limited in my ability to make a recommendation of any size or sort to 

the President of the United States. 

As we look ahead to the campaign as it evolves, there are certain 

operations that could be more complex than the ones in which the 

Iraqi security forces are currently involved. They are doing a better 

job, and I think soon we would be able to describe it as a good job 

in Al Anbar and up moving north out of Baghdad, the Pesh[merga] 

moving south out of the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government]. 

But there are some places along the path that I think will be fairly 

complex terrain for them, including, for example, Mosul, and even-
11 

tually as they need to restore the border between Iraq and Syria. 

I am not predicting at this point that I would recommend that 

those forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be accompanied by U.S. forces, but we are certainly considering it. 

The CHAIRMAN. The size and types? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, back to your point, it is probably worth 

mentioning, there are two ways we could go about this strategy to 

defeat ISIL. We could take ownership of it entirely and then gradually over time transition it back to Iraqi security forces, 

Peshmerga, tribes, Sunni opposition; or from the beginning we 

could enable them and then hold them accountable for the outcomes, because, after all, it is their country that is most threatened 

by this threat. Obviously we have taken the latter course. 

In taking that latter course, we have established a modest footprint, one that is focused on the development of the security forces, 

assisting them with planning, integration of fires, and advising and 

assisting them from higher headquarters. Any expansion of that, I 

think, would be equally modest. I just don’t foresee a circumstance 

when it would be in our interest to take this fight on ourselves 

with a large military contingent. 

Could there be an exception? I mentioned assumptions in my 

prepared statement. One of our assumptions is that the Government of Iraq will be inclusive. One of the assumptions is that the 

Iraqi security forces will be willing to take back Al Anbar Province 

and Nineveh Province. If those assumptions are rendered invalid, 

I will have to adjust my recommendations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The U.S. and our allies are facing an increased terrorist threat 

from ISIL, and former U.S. detainees, in part, make up the leadership of ISIL and also are fighting alongside ISIL. 

Secretary Hagel, how can the administration continue to press 

ahead with transfers from Guantanamo at this time? Isn’t this in 

conflict with your policy of stemming the flow of foreign fighters? 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Congress delegated the responsibility and the authority to make that ultimate 

decision based on the risk, security risk to the United States and 

our allies, of whether we would release any and which detainees 

from Guantanamo. I have, as I have noted in testimony before this 

committee, taken that responsibility very seriously, and every time 

I certify and send up documentation to this committee, I am saying 

to this committee, with my name and reputation, that I believe 

that the assurances substantially mitigate the risk to this country 

and to our allies of certain detainee releases. 

Now, in September, this committee may be aware of this number, the Intelligence Community released a percentage, based on 

their intelligence, on those who have returned to violent extremism 

since their release from Guantanamo in this administration, and I 

am dealing with what I have right now. 

And over the course of this administration’s detainee release—I 

think there are over 80 total, I believe over 600 during the Bush 

and Obama administrations—the Intelligence Community assessed 

that more than 90 percent of those detainees had not intended to 

or had in fact, we had no evidence of returning to the battlefield. 
12 

Overall, you know what the President’s position and policy is on 

closing Guantanamo—Department of Defense supports that, I support that—but not at any cost, not at any cost. So every certification that I make, bottom line, with all the other requirements by 

law that I have to comply with, and I do comply with every part 

of the law, in my best judgment, the best judgment of our Intelligence Community, of our Joint Chiefs, of the interagency, of our 

Secretary of State, Homeland Security, has to be unanimous before 

I will seriously entertain it. I believe then, if I can get the assurances required by the host governments and the mechanisms, and 

I go into detail, that it substantially mitigates the risk, then I will 

sign it, and I have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to ask a little about what has changed with respect to 

working and training these Iraqi troops in order to make them effective. And I say it with all due respect because you gentlemen 

weren’t necessarily involved in this, but I have been here for 18 

years, so I have been clearly on this side asking some of these 

questions, because in Afghan, of course, we saw that, you know, we 

had ghost people in the Afghan Army meaning they didn’t really 

exist. We had 63-year-old men, illiterate people, you know, and 

that is one of reasons why I think we have been so ineffective with 

respect to the training and bringing up of the Afghan forces. 

But I am particularly very interested in the Iraq situation. This 

goes all the way back to the Bush administration where they were 

throwing out hundreds of thousands of numbers of who was being 

trained and who wasn’t, and of course they were completely and totally off and wrong. And so then what we saw was the Iraqi Army 

either run away from the fight with respect to ISIL or fall in with 

respect to ISIL. And some have said that it was the leadership, 

that Malaki, you know, wasn’t doing the 60/20/20 thing, et cetera, 

et cetera. 

But my question is, what has changed or what needs to change 

in order for us to continue what I see as your strategy in part, 

what I call the ‘‘Iraqification’’ of that army, of having Iraqis actually fight the battle so that our people don’t come in as boots on 

the ground? What is it that has changed or what did you learn 

from the fact that we haven’t gotten it right in Afghanistan and we 

then haven’t gotten it right in Iraq? What are you doing to change 

that so that these men actually do take the fight to ISIL and our 

men and women don’t have boots on the ground? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congresswoman, I will give you an answer, but 

I am going to also ask Chairman Dempsey to answer this because, 

as you all know, Chairman Dempsey spent a lot of time in Iraq, 

and there are few military leaders that we have today in this country who know as much about Iraq based on personal experience 

than General Dempsey. So I will give you my brief response, and 

then I think this committee will want to hear from General 

Dempsey on this. 

What has changed? Well, a number of things have changed. Let’s 

start with ISIL and the threat of ISIL and what it represents. I 

have said before this committee, I have said in other places and be-
13 

lieve it absolutely, we have never seen a threat like ISIL before. 

The comprehensive threat that ISIL represents, the sophistication, 

the armaments, the strategic knowledge, the funding, the capacity, 

the ideology, it is new. The threat is significantly worse than we 

have seen ever before, not just in Iraq but in the Middle East, what 

ISIL represents, certainly to the future of Iraq. 

Second, you have a—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Secretary, I understand the threat of ISIL. I 

am asking what is the difference in the Iraqi men that we have in 

the forces there in making a difference, not running away from the 

battle—— 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I am going to—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. Being trained correctly, being led correctly? 

Secretary HAGEL. I am going to get to that. But I think it is important, you ask what is the difference. There are a lot of differences, like I said, starting with ISIL. 

Second, a national unity government by a new Prime Minister, 

who in fact, as I said in my testimony, for the first time has designated, picked a minister of defense. We haven’t had a minister 

of defense in Iraq for more than 4 years. Prime Minister Malaki 

took that job unto himself, as he did the minister of interior. This 

new minister of defense and this new government are reconstituting the leadership of the Iraqi security forces. As I have noted 

in my testimony, 36 new commanders were switched, starting at 

the top, across the top. 

Men and women will not fight if they do not have confidence in 

their leaders, if they do not have confidence in their country, in 

their government, if their government won’t support them. Those 

are fundamental changes. 

Now, let me hand this off to General Dempsey, and I think get 

to more of the specific points. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And with respect to that second point, maybe, 

General Dempsey, you can clarify whether those 36 new commanders are a 60/20/20 split or the same as before. 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I am hoping we will find out. We don’t 

know yet. We have got some who have been retired, some of who 

have been relieved, some of who have been moved, we are not yet 

familiar with who is taking their place. And I hope it is not actually some artificial 60/20/20 ratio because what you really want to 

get into the ISF is somebody who can actually lead and fight and 

inspire and be inclusive. But we will see. We will see here very 

shortly actually who takes the place of those who have been 

changed. 

This is a very brief answer to a very complex question. We left 

Iraq, and we left it with some things undone. We hadn’t fully established a logistics architecture, an intelligence architecture. They 

did not have close air support and the capability to integrate fires. 

And we left there with a Ministry of Defense that was largely dysfunctional in the way that it would assign leadership. And they 

knew that, they knew we knew that. But it was not a completed 

work. It remained a work in progress. 

And then to couple that back to the Secretary’s comments, what 

creates courage on the battlefield is confidence that you have got 
14 

somebody at the central government that actually will care for you 

and your family. I mean, look, you don’t think we would be out 

there swinging and fighting if we didn’t have the support of the 

Congress of the United States and the kind of support that the 

American public provide to our men and women in uniform. So we 

really can’t hold the Iraqis to a higher standard that just simply 

didn’t exist. 

That is why I have said that one of the important assumptions 

about this campaign is that the Iraqi Government does establish its 

intent to create a government of national unity. I can predict for 

you right now, if that doesn’t happen, then the Iraqi security forces 

will not hold together. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that the President said that he 

would be engaging Congress to support a new, updated, revised authorization for the use of military force. My understanding is in 

every previous instance an administration has proposed language 

and sent it up to the Congress. Is this administration going to propose language and send it up to us, and if so, when? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, I don’t know specifically what 

they are going to propose. I don’t know specifically if they are going 

to send it up as a legislative proposal. I do know that conversations 

are being held right now, have been with various Members and 

their staffs about the right approach. The President said, as you 

know, last week, that he intends to engage Congress on this. I 

know the President has had specific conversations with specific 

Members of both the House and Senate on this. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I would just comment that having conversations is one thing, but as we learned with the authorization 

to train and equip the folks in Syria, until you get words on paper, 

it is kind of hard to make progress. 

Let me follow up a little bit with some of your comments that 

you made to Ms. Sanchez, and I noted, never before seen a threat 

like ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria], or ISIL, worse than we 

have ever seen before. One of the key questions underlying all of 

this is to what extent we can ultimately be successful against ISIS 

without dealing with Assad. And what is your view of that? Some 

people believe, some of our closest allies involved in this effort believe that we can only be successful against ISIS if we become involved in the effort against Assad. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, it is a fundamental question you 

ask, and I will answer it this way. First, let me just make a brief 

comment about my assessment about ISIL. I make that assessment—and by the way, it is not only mine—but when you look at 

the brutality, the slaughter, the indiscriminate brutality and 

slaughter of what ISIL is doing and has been doing, killing, slaughtering, murdering women and children, Sunni, Shi’a, Kurd, minorities of any kind, completely indiscriminate, and the sophistication 

of that, and again, when you add all that up, represents a pretty 

clear and different kind of threat. 
15 

Now, how does that relate to your question about Syria? I think 

it is also clear that Assad, because of how he has governed, has 

brought this astounding instability on himself, on his people, on his 

country, and it has allowed groups like ISIL, Al-Nusra, Al Qaeda 

is still there, other terrorist organizations, to be strengthened for 

obvious reasons. But just alone dealing with Assad where we are 

now, maybe 2 years ago, 3 years ago, that is not going to put ISIL 

back in the box or defeat, beginning with degrading or defeating 

ISIL. 

Assad is part of the equation, of course, but when you look at 

what ISIL dominates now, the swath of the control they have, eastern Syria, much of northern and western Iraq, you could change 

Assad today and that is not going to change all the dynamics 

quickly, certainly in Syria. But who are you going to replace Assad 

with, and what kind of an Army would take on ISIL? 

So, yes, Assad is part of it. Yes, it is the longer term part of this. 

To find a stable government, leaders in Syria, to be able to bring 

some stability to that country is part of it. But ISIL is right now, 

and ISIL is threatening the country of Iraq and the Government 

of Iraq. And so that is why we are dealing with that component 

first, because we must. They are a threat to our allies. They are 

a threat to us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel, you have my first 2 minutes, and, General 

Dempsey, you get the next 2. 

So for Secretary Hagel, there has been no discussion yet of the OCO request for 2015, which is $5.6 billion, and I am wondering 

not what is in it. We have some information on that. But what do 

you know about the current 2014 OCO request through the end of 

the CR [continuing resolution], what is in that, and why do you 

need an additional 5.6 in the 2015 given that there is authority for 

you, at least through the CR, for out of 2014 money? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, the quick answer to your question as to 

why do we need additional. As I have noted in my testimony, part 

of that new additional money, the $5 billion for defense, is for a 

new train-and-equip program in Iraq. When we had the budget 

hearings, when the original OCO submissions were made months 

and months ago, that wasn’t the case. So it is a new and sustaining 

effort. 

The other dollars are for the continuation, which we didn’t have 

6 months ago either, of our efforts in Syria and Iraq, air strikes, 

train and assist, train and equip, will be in the 1.6, but the continued assistance and other assistance that we are giving Iraq. 

So it is separate, it is new, it is different, and particularly the 

sustainability of us being able to do that and carry it out. And we 

thought too it was the most honest way to do it, set up a fund, let 

everybody know the accounting and how we are doing it and why. 

So that is essentially the bottom line of why we presented it the 

way we did. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Two minutes. Good job. Thanks. 

General Dempsey, somewhat related. The defense has requested 

a broad waiver of existing laws in this request for the Iraq train 
16 

and equip, and I understand there is a discussion about requesting 

a similar waiver for the Syria train and equip. Why does the Department need such a waiver and what would the impacts be if you 

didn’t get waivers and you, for example, had to follow existing acquisition laws in order to implement? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, the issue is pace, I think, is probably 

the short answer to your question, Congressman. We think that a 

national security waiver in the hands of the Secretary of Defense 

allows us to move with the pace we believe we need to move in an 

environment that where—you know, it is interesting, one of the realities of this campaign is kind of the conflict between progress and 

patience, you know what I mean. And so I have mentioned that 

strategic patience is actually a virtue in this kind of conflict. I 

think progress purchases patience, and in that context the waiver 

would allow us to move at a pace that would allow us to produce 

that kind of progress that would, as a result, result in patience. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. That is fine. Thank you both for giving me 

some food for thought. I appreciate it. I appreciate you coming in. 

Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, it is kind of ironic, the last time that I heard before today a Secretary of Defense talk about military involvement 

in Iraq was Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that got us into a war that 

was unnecessary. 

I know ISIL is evil. There is no question about it. They need to 

be taken out. But I looked at some of your statements from 2002 

when you were a Senator and how you felt about the obligation of 

a Member of Congress to make a decision to send a young man or 

woman to die. I also looked at your statements in 2007 when, like 

myself, you came out against the surge in Iraq. 

Now we are possibly going to be asked by the President of the 

United States, like we were by George Bush, to authorize an 

AUMF. This is nothing but an abdication of our constitutional responsibility to give any President an AUMF. We tried this past 

year in June when we had the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] bill, Adam Schiff tried to sunset out the AUMF that we 

gave to President Bush, which has been used by President Obama, 

and I do not understand how we in Congress can continue to abdicate what the Constitution says is our responsibility. 

Before I get to a brief question, James Madison once said, ‘‘the 

power to declare war, including the power of judging the causes of 

war, is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature.’’ And I do not 

believe, sincerely, because when this happens to be President 

Obama, he wants to have another AUMF or an extension of what 

we have, I hope that the Congress, both parties will look seriously 

at what is our responsibility. 

Because it is not going to be but so long. You have sent more and 

more troops to Iraq to train. Many of these are former Saddam 

Hussein loyalists, and now they are fighting with ISIL, and then 

some are still now fighting with the other side. It is very complex, 

I understand that, and I agree with that. But for goodness sakes, 
17 

why in the world should we make such a commitment and we don’t 

have an end point to it? 

I would like for you or General Dempsey, I have great respect for 

both of you, to submit for the record two things very quickly. 

Mr. JONES. How does this new war end, in your opinion? 

And I realize it is just your opinion, but that is very important 

because of who you are. 

What is the end state of what we are trying to accomplish? The 

American people—over 50 percent of the American people do not 

want our personnel in Syria or in Iraq. And I will be honest with 

you, I don’t know how we can convince the American people that 

a nation that is financially broke—you sat right here, General 

Dempsey—and you are exactly right—sequestration and all the 

budget problems coming your way and yet you are asking for $5 

or $6 billion to drop more armaments in Iraq and Syria. Where is 

it coming from? 

Please explain to the American people and to this Congress how 

this war is going to end someday, whether we are advisors or we 

are fighting. And I hope to God we are not fighting, and I hope we 

do not give the President a new AUMF. 

So if you will get those into the committee for written form, then, 

you won’t have to answer the questions. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

Mr. JONES. But this, again, it looks like we are going down the 

same road that Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told us we had to do, 

we had to do, and yet we had no end point to that as well. 

So thank you very much. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman Jones, if I might just respond 

very briefly. 

You very accurately described my position when I was in the 

United States Senate. But it is basic, as you have noted, to the responsibilities of Congress. And an AUMF comes out of Congress. 

The authority of military force for a President, that authority 

comes from the Congress of the United States. And I too hope that 

Congress will engage in this. And I have great confidence the Congress will. They need to. They must. It is a responsibility of the 

Congress. 

So I am right with you in that point, and I will give you my best 

thoughts on your other question as well. 

Thank you. 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. Secretary Hagel, and, General Dempsey, thank 

you for your time today. 

As I have stated before, I believe that ISIL could become a direct 

threat to the United States or our allies in Europe, and we must 

make efforts to avoid that threat. While I believe that we must 

keep all our options open, it must be a joint effort with our coalition and allies to stop ISIL. 

Secretary Hagel, what additional U.S. or allied military support 

do you believe it will take for the Iraqis, the Kurds, or the Syrian 
18 

rebels to hold their current position and eventually advance to retake areas now controlled by ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congresswoman, as I noted in my statement, 

that is a very important part of what we are doing to assist Iraqi 

security forces as they strengthen their capacity, capabilities. That 

is obviously a big part of the train-and-equip effort as our coalition 

partners are with us on this, as well as a reinstitution of the Iraqi 

security forces at the top with confidence, with trust of the men 

and women in uniform and a unity government that they, in fact, 

believe is worth fighting for, as General Dempsey said, that they 

have some confidence in, not just for themselves, but their families. 

And so, as I have noted, it is a comprehensive strategy. I believe 

it can be done, but this is an Iraqi fight. It is their future. And we 

can help. We are helping. We are doing everything we can. And we 

will continue to support them as we will with our coalition partners. But that is the way I would just very briefly respond to the 

question. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, in testimony before the Senate back in October, you mentioned that OCO is not the solution to funding. And 

I have stated before that I agreed that the OCO credit card is going 

to come to an end sometime very soon. However, as the ranking 

member on Readiness, I am deeply concerned about the impact of 

the loss of OCO on readiness. 

When will you have a better sense of what this is going to cost, 

both monetarily and in manpower to continue operations against 

ISIL? What is the Department doing to plan and budget for this 

and other activities into the base budget? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah thanks, Congresswoman. I did say that. 

In fact, I think I went on to say that OCO or the Overseas Contingency Operations fund was gas money and that the service chiefs 

actually also need the base to support the recruiting, training, organizing, and equipping of the force over time. You can’t sustain 

the force with OCO. You can use it, and that is why I described 

it as gas money. 

To your question, we actually have a pretty good idea of what it 

is costing right now. And given that we think that our level of commitment is about what it will be for the foreseeable future, it is approximately $8 million a day. And the funding requests that the 

Secretary mentioned accounts for that. 

We are well aware of the desire to rely less on OCO and more 

on base. That is a debate—you know, from a military perspective, 

I can just tell you what I need. And you all have to guide how to 

provide what I need. 

But the base budget is an important component of readiness because it is the foundation on which we build. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlelady yields back the balance of time. 

Mr. Secretary, we understand that you recently had to postpone 

your trip to Vietnam and Burma to prepare for this hearing and 

others on Capitol Hill. And I know our allies and partners in the 

region are concerned with senior administration officials postponing important travel to the region, and I share their concern. 
19 

But I hope they can understand that our government has the ability to walk and chew gum at the same time. 

While we are focused in this hearing on the ISIL challenge, we 

remain as committed as ever to America’s enduring interests in the 

Indo-Pacific area, and I appreciate your attendance here on this 

important topic and the accommodations you have made to the 

hearing. 

But, also, I hope you will reschedule your trip and continue your 

strong record of engagement in Asia. And thank you for being here. 

The last time you were here, we asked a question about a strategy to cut off the finances for ISIL. And I think you were kind 

enough to acknowledge then that we needed to develop that, and 

I was just wondering if you could outline for us a little bit about 

the strategy that we have now in trying to cut off the finances of 

ISIL. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you for your thoughts on 

the Asia-Pacific emphasis in rebalance. 

As you have accurately noted, I unfortunately had to make a decision and I didn’t want to have to do that for the reasons you mentioned. As you probably know, since I have been Secretary of Defense, I have had six major trips to the Asia-Pacific. This would 

have been my seventh. I will reschedule. We are planning on that 

rescheduling. I talked to all of our Asian partners—Pacific partners, explained to them why I was having to reschedule. And I get 

the emphasis. I agree with you completely. 

But at the same time, to your point about the administration 

being able to walk and chew gum at the same time, as you know, 

the President is there now and will be in that area for a few more 

days in different countries. We will have other follow-up visits as 

well. But I am rescheduling. It is important. There is no less emphasis on the importance of the rebalance. 

On your question about financing on ISIL, I alluded to a couple 

of things in my statement. When I talked about cutting off their 

more obvious oil sales as they have, as you know, taken control of 

some of the oil fields in eastern Syria as—and they did have some 

in western Iraq. We have been able to take back some of that, the 

Iraqis have, in most all of it, Baiji oil refinery and so on. 

But that is one thing that we are doing and have been pretty effective. Have been able to not only disrupt that, but stop that oil 

flow out of there that gets into the borders. And they were getting 

a few million dollars a day from that. 

Now, other things, our Treasury Department is taking a lead on 

this, with partners all over the world, United Nations, European 

partners, Middle Eastern partners. We are trying to shut those 

money markets off, any way of funding and resourcing ISIL has, 

continues to have. We have made a global effort that we lead. 

As you know, they also get funds from contributions inside. We 

try to stop that through our intelligence communities. So this is as 

much of a focus as it was when I was here 2 months ago. It has 

to be for the reasons that I mentioned. And as I also said in our 

comprehensive strategy, cutting off those funds is a very big part 

of what we are doing and what we are attempting to do and will 

continue to do. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
20 

My time has expired. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized for 

4 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

Earlier Secretary Hagel, some of your predecessors were cited as 

sort of some grounds or authority for the notion of boots on the 

ground, larger presence of boots on the ground in Iraq and, I suppose, in Syria. 

I want to just, for the record, again remind people that Secretary 

Gates in his farewell address to the West Point stated, I think, correctly that any Secretary of Defense who advises the President to 

engage in a ground invasion in the Middle East ought to have their 

head examined. And I think the approach that you have described 

here today, which is to strengthen local forces to provide assistance 

as we have seen unfold in Kobani is really the right approach to 

adhere to Secretary Gates’ good advice, I think, which is that, you 

know, we are not going down that path again. 

And as someone who voted for the title 10 authorization, I just 

want to share with you: A mother from London, Connecticut, of a 

Marine came up to me and said, you know, I am with you to this 

you know, to this extent; but, you know, I am counting on you not 

to, again, open the door to just—a redux visit of what this country 

went through over the last 8 years or so. So I just want to share 

that input with you. 

Your request for additional resources obviously is in the middle 

of a lame duck where it is not clear where we are going yet in 

terms of whether it is going to be an omnibus with an additional 

amount as you have requested. There has been talk that the majority is actually, at least, discussing the notion of a continuing resolution into the next Congress. 

And I am just wondering if you could share your thoughts about 

what a CR would mean in terms of being able to, again, implement 

the operations that Congress authorized. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, recognizing the purview of the Congress 

on appropriations, I will answer your question this way because 

you have asked me for my thinking on it. I will begin with what 

Chairman Dempsey said. Any enterprise must have the flexibility 

and essentially the authority to plan, as best we can, every business, every nonprofit. 

And to take away that critical management tool for the Pentagon 

where we cannot plan, based on a continuing resolution every few 

months—maybe this will happen. Maybe this will happen, or 

maybe it won’t happen, is really disastrous. And it does damage to 

our institution. It does damage to the confidence of our men and 

women that we ask to go out and serve. It does huge damage to 

our future investments. 

You know, people don’t recognize sometimes that our defense enterprise has to be thinking years and years down the road. The 

platforms that we have today, the sophistication of our technology 

and our platforms far superior to anything since World War II or 

anybody else’s. This just didn’t happen. It didn’t happen a year ago, 

2 years ago, 2 years ago. 

These planning stages and investments in having some certainty 

that you have got to budget and you know what you are going to 
21 

have in that budget is critical to planning. So continuing resolutions are not good for the Department of Defense. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And in terms of the specific operations that we 

are discussing today, I mean, again, is that just sort of, again, 

make it difficult for you to figure out what, you know, extent of operations you can conduct? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, you factor that in. That is exactly right. 

And when you take away—those are hugely important management tools, but we are talking about our national security here. We 

are not talking about putting out a new product or a new colored 

shoe or overcoat or automobile. We are talking about the national 

security of our country. 

So as much ability, flexibility that we have to have some certainty as to what is ahead, also, to retain a force that these young 

men and women, smart, they have got other options. And these 

young enlisted and officers think about what is ahead. Am I financing or are we going to continue to drawdown? What is the future? 

I understand it is an uncertain world, unpredictable world, but we 

all do. 

But you can’t run institutions—especially the Department of Defense—responsibly on continuing resolutions. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, is recognized 4 

minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for being here 

today. 

The American people are counting on you to provide information, 

counsel to our President. And you have indicated, Secretary, national defense is your priority. And I am just so concerned that the 

President has an odd world view. 

It is inconceivable to me the release of trained mass murderers 

as detainees from Guantanamo builds goodwill anywhere. But it 

does put the American people at risk. It puts our military at risk. 

And I have a personal interest. Two of my sons served in Iraq. 

They developed a great appreciation of the people of Iraq who do 

want to live in a democratic society, not a totalitarian or authoritarian. Additionally, I have got four sons now serving in the military. And I believe in peace through strength. I am counting on 

you, and so are my constituents, the American people. 

In this regard, Mr. Secretary, the Islamic State, does it still pose 

an imminent threat to the people of the United States and is it an 

imminent threat to our allies? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I—thank you, Congressman, and thank 

your sons. Again, I am well aware of their service and what your 

family has done for our country, continues to do. 

As I said in my statement and, I think, in some of the comments 

I have made here this morning, it is a threat. It continues to be 

a threat, a significant threat to the United States, to our interests, 

to our allies. And we have seen every dimension of that play out. 

So, yes. 

Mr. WILSON. And, in such a threat, would the capabilities—say, 

the seizure of an extraordinary city, Mosul, that enhances the 

threat, doesn’t it? 
22 

Secretary HAGEL. It does. And we are very honest about that. As 

I said in my statements, I think that there is good progress being 

made by the Iraqi security forces, Peshmerga, as we—just to give 

you one example. Over the weekend—you may be aware of this— 

there was a ceremony in Anbar Province. And about 2,000 Sunni 

tribesmen were there and are preparing to be sworn in to the Iraqi 

security forces. This is in the province, the general area of Mosul 

and the area that will have to be taken back. 

The ISIS—ISF forces have taken much of that back, not Mosul 

yet. They will. But the Mosul dam, Haditha dam—I mentioned in 

my comments Zumar, Baiji oil field, a lot of good news there. 

But, yes, of course, any time they hold significant, identifiable 

cities or pieces of geography, it makes it more difficult. 

Mr. WILSON. And we should remember that, indeed, Osama bin 

Laden operated from a cave, a safe haven in the middle of Afghanistan and was able to conduct mass murder in this country and 

around the world. 

And in regard to achieving a stable, self-reliant Iraq, can this be 

done with the personnel that you have sent or what do you anticipate? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, first, we, the United States, cannot assure a stable Iraq. The Iraqi people will have to do that. As I have 

said, we are supporting them. We are doing the things that we 

think are most important, the things they have asked us for, they 

have requested from us and that is a significant difference from recent years. They have invited us in. They have invited us with our 

coalition partners in to help them. 

But I believe Prime Minister Abadi and others understand the 

seriousness of this. It is imperfect, but they have to do it. And we 

will help them do it, but they have to do it. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The Chair recognizes Ms. Tsongas from Massachusetts for 4 minutes. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you—both of you for being here. 

I, like my colleagues, remain greatly concerned with recent developments in both Iraq and Syria. But given the long-term consequences of U.S. operations in the region, I think we have to be 

sure that the administration’s overarching strategy and objectives 

are fully discussed and robustly debated here in Congress. This is 

especially important, given the lessons of the last decade when, despite 7 years of conflict in Iraq, 4,500 American lives lost and more 

than $1.5 trillion spent, our military efforts did not resolve the sectarian conflict we are now confronted with. 

Given these harsh lessons and because a full-throated debate has 

not occurred, I have voted against a short-term authorization to 

train and equip the moderate Syrian forces. Before we move forward, we need to be clear on what we are asking and will ask of 

our brave service men and women, what the costs might be, how 

we are going to pay for any operations against ISIL, what the exit 

strategy is, what we are asking of our regional partners, their willingness and capability to meaningfully engage in this effort, and 

what our ultimate goal might be. But it seems to me the horse is 

ever more out of the barn. 
23 

While I have appreciated the President’s current commitment to 

not send U.S. ground troops into combat, I am troubled by the recent tasking of an additional 1,500 troops to Iraq and President 

Obama’s statement that he has not ruled out deploying more 

troops. 

General Dempsey, I appreciate your candor. I think you are very 

forthcoming when you describe a complex, multifaceted, long-term 

effort that requires strategic patience in a situation that will continue to evolve. And you have said in the past and are clear about 

today saying that there are situations in which you could consider 

recommending ground troops. 

You also just described the very important role of the Iraqi security forces and the deep investment that we are making in bringing 

their capability back to par so that they can take on this task. 

But what if they are not up to the task? Could you talk about 

some scenarios you might envision? As you said, you only make 

recommendations. I would like you to talk, if you could, about some 

of the recommendations you might make if it becomes clear that 

the Iraqi security forces cannot take this on. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. What I would like to do, Congresswoman, is give you kind of an unclassified answer, but promise you 

that, in a classified session next week, we can talk about contingency planning. 

So if—I mentioned earlier, if some of the assumptions we have 

made are rendered invalid, of course, we will have to have a 

branch, as we call it in military terms, to our campaign plan. 

There are other—look, we absolutely need a credible partner to 

provide ground forces in that region so that we don’t have to provide the ground combat power to accomplish the task. If the Government of Iraq fails to reach the kind of national unity agenda 

that we think they need, which would empower and encourage the 

Iraqi security forces, then, we will have to look for other partners 

in the region to assist us or build other partners in the region. But, 

again, I would defer to a classified setting anything more than 

that. 

I will say that since we—I think we agree that this is a longterm commitment. You mentioned end state. It is—the end state is 

defined as the—ultimately, the defeat of ISIL. I have actually said, 

including in my opening statement, that will occur when the 20 

million disenfranchised Sunnis that live between Damascus and 

Baghdad reject that ideology and we see some indication, just, 

again, a glimmer of indication that that is beginning. 

ISIL has to continue to advance to succeed. It has to maintain 

momentum. And we have begun to break that momentum. And, 

then, I think we will have a clearer picture in answer to your question. 

One last point: This campaign will be marked or characterized— 

I have described it this way—three steps forward, two steps back 

and, at every step forward or back, we will debate about the size 

of the step. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I look forward to your classified briefing. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the chairman of the Tactical Air and Land 

Subcommittee, Mr. Turner from Ohio. 
24 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel, I want to personally thank you for your support 

for a provision that is in the National Defense Authorization Act 

that protects the custody rights of our service men and women. 

As you know, the House, on a bipartisan basis, has in the past 

6 years taken action to provide a national standard to protect men 

and women in uniform custody rights. 

I appreciate your letter of October 30th where you both affirm 

the DOD support for that provision, but also go further in to say 

that this legislation does not affect other State custody laws and 

precludes Federal court jurisdiction. 

Thank you for the time you spent with me and for your thoughtfulness in this matter. 

General Dempsey, you said that you have never been limited in 

your recommendations to the President. We are also aware that he 

has never been limited in his ability to reject them. Our inquiry to 

you is not whether or not you have been forthcoming in your recommendations, but in the gap that might exist between your recommendations and the President’s proposal that is before us. We 

all have concerns about how effective the air strikes have been as 

they have both been intermittent and in—and dispersed. 

Also, the issue, as Loretta Sanchez has raised, as to how—having 

the—you know, the diversity of populations participate in being 

able to take Iraq, how, the Kurdish and other forces might be able 

to be armed and your assurances that that will be able to be accomplished, working with the Iraqi regime. 

So our question to you is: Is in evaluating our support for the 

President’s proposal, we would like to know what is missing in 

your recommendations versus what we are receiving from the 

President? 

General DEMPSEY. Before I actually answer the question, you 

have described the air campaign as—I think you described it as erratic or episodic. 

Mr. TURNER. Intermittent. 

General DEMPSEY. Intermittent. I knew there was a word. 

Mr. TURNER. I would never say ‘‘erratic’’ because I have such regard for you. 

General DEMPSEY. Thanks for the opportunity. 

But the word I want to add is ‘‘precise.’’ And, you know, look, the 

thing that will cause the Sunni population to actually take heart 

and begin to reject ISIL is if we are very careful not to create circumstances of civilian casualties or to, in some way, impact on 

other groups, tribes, for example. 

So we have got to be very, very deliberate and very precise in our 

air campaign. And I think we are accomplishing that. In just over 

800 strikes to date, I think we have been both successful and careful. 

To your point about whether there is a gap? I can say to you 

today there is no gap. Both General Austin and I have made recommendations, and those recommendations have been accepted. 

Any recommendation is made with a risk assessment. You know 

there is high-risk options, moderate-risk options, and low-risk options. 
25 

A low-risk option to the campaign would probably include the introduction of U.S. ground forces to take control of the fight. Neither 

General Austin nor I and certainly the Secretary of Defense believe 

that is the right thing to do at this point. So our—there is no gap 

right now. 

Mr. TURNER. You know that we will continue, obviously, to provide oversight and inquiry in that. And we hope that you will certainly share with this committee, to the extent that that gap 

evolves, because we are very concerned about the success of what 

the President’s goal is to defeat and degrade ISIS. And we look to 

your leadership for that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack, is recognized for 4 minutes. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thanks to both of you for 

being here. 

I was writing down lots of questions while you were talking because I think I probably reflect my constituents’ concerns about 

what we are doing there and the number of questions that they 

have. This doesn’t even begin to get at what I have been hearing 

over the course of the past several months in my district in Iowa, 

at least. And I may be repeating some things. I had to step out for 

about half an hour, so I apologize if I am. 

But if you could, first, explain in, at least, some detail, what is 

the ISIS threat regionally or otherwise? Can you lay that out? 

What is the threat? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, the threat—you started, I think, with regionally or otherwise, is the extent of the brutality and the inhumanity of what they have been doing, what they continue to do as 

they have expanded their base up until—most recently until we, 

the United States and our coalition partners, got into this about 3 

months ago. They are a threat to the Iraqi Government. As was 

noted here in an earlier question about, they still control the second largest city in Iraq, Mosul. 

As they—if they would be allowed to continue, they would not 

only, as they already have, to a great extent, inflame a sectarian 

war and continue to gather momentum with their ideology, which 

brings in their successes and momentum foreign fighters who hold 

passports from the United States, from European nations. That 

starts to extend the threat to not just the region and to Iraq and 

countries there, but to Europe, to the United States. And I could 

continue, but I think you get the picture. 

Mr. LOESBACK. Yeah. Thank you. 

We have not heard the word ‘‘counterinsurgency’’ in this debate, 

I don’t think, because that was obviously our approach to Iraq and 

Afghanistan earlier on. And then, correct me if I am wrong, but it 

seems, though, we kind of then transformed whatever military operations we have been doing in this regions to counterterrorism 

perhaps. 

Where would this fall? What you are trying to do, where would 

this fall if there was a contingency as such—maybe there isn’t. Explain to me if there isn’t—but between counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency? 
26 

Because, in fact, ISIS or ISIL is creating a state if they are actually creating governments. And if they are consolidating their control, might counterinsurgency be really the way to go as far as responding to them? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I think our—— 

Mr. LOEBSACK. I am not advocating that. I am just asking from 

an analytical standpoint. 

Secretary HAGEL. No. I think our strategy—and it is a good question—is pretty clear on this point because you have really, I think, 

hit the centerpiece. 

Our strategy is counter-ISIL. And if you were here for my testimony, I walk through a number of those points. General Dempsey 

has further refined those points as to how we are countering ISIL, 

what are we doing about that. 

And one of the points that I noted, it is a comprehensive strategy. It has to be. Many of the questions here this morning have 

gotten into that, one, being their funding, cutting off their funding, 

coalition partners, all the partners of the region involvement—involved strengthening the Iraqi security forces, doing everything we 

can to support a new Iraqi unity government that reaches out to 

everybody, the Sunni, the Shi’a, the Kurds, all the minorities, giving everyone some participatory power in their government, which 

elicits confidence and trust in their government. So that is our 

strategy. 

Now, we can frame it up by however way you want. But it is 

counter-ISIL. It is a strategy that is focused on this particular 

issue, this particular threat. And the world is dynamic and 

changes, and we are not going back to what worked in—12, 10 

years ago. We learn from mistakes. We learn from things that 

worked. But this is a unique threat. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman—— 

General DEMPSEY. May I, Chairman? I can do this in 30 seconds. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General DEMPSEY. Clearly, we are alert to any threats that could 

emanate from Iraq and Syria with planning and operational activities that could threaten the homeland. And you have seen us take 

some actions here of late that clearly align with a counterterror 

strategy. 

I would suggest to you that Iraq is actually conducting a 

counterinsurgency. And we are enabling it with our air power, our 

planning, and our assistance. Because they do have an insurgency 

on their hands. And, actually, it allows them to think about, not 

just the military component. So as they clear an area, whether it 

is up to Baiji or out to al Assad, they have got to follow it up with 

governance, economic development, humanitarian assistance. Otherwise, that insurgency will persist. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. All right. Thank you. 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline, is recognized. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Just following up on this discussion here the last minute or two, 

I think it is important for all of us in this committee, all of us in 
27 

America for that matter and certainly you gentlemen to keep the 

focus on what the policy is. The policy is to defeat ISIS, our enemy. 

Whatever we do with Iraq is a tool in achieving that policy. 

It is not—our ultimate goal here isn’t to protect Iraq and build 

a stable Iraq. We just need that tool to affect our policy of defeating 

ISIS. 

And sometimes I think we forget. We start talking about how 

many wars we are in or what are we doing, can the Iraqis defend 

their own country and so forth. All useful discussion. But the policy 

is to defeat ISIS. 

General Dempsey, are Americans flying helicopters now in Iraq? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

And in a classified session, I would like to get some more information about what that force looks like. 

But it reminds me that, while we may have forces in compounds 

doing various intelligence and logistics and so forth, we actually 

have Americans out and about in harm’s way. And that makes me 

think that I hope, and, again, this is probably a discussion for another day—that we have good American medical support for those 

soon to be 3,000 or so American forces there. We don’t want Americans in harm’s being reliant on, in this case, Iraqi medical support. 

So, again, probably a discussion for another day. 

And then my question, General Dempsey, is: You said in an earlier answer to a question, as you were talking about turning over 

to Iraqi security forces some responsibility to do some fighting, 

that, if they can’t do it, we would, quote, ‘‘hold them accountable.’’ 

I can’t understand what that means, ‘‘hold them accountable.’’ 

What would—how would we do such a thing, hold them accountable? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. I actually think, Congressman, maybe 

there is two answers that have been—that have been pulled together into one to create that confusion. 

What I said was that, among the tenets of our strategy is that, 

as we assist the ISF and the Peshmerga, that the Government of 

Iraq has to be held accountable for progress that matches the military progress. 

Mr. KLINE. But what does that mean? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, what that means is, if they do not form 

and actually manifest this national unity agenda, then, frankly, it 

will be among—I will be among those that recommend that we do 

not support them to the degree we are supporting them. Because 

that has got to—there has to be some conditionality to our support, 

it seems to me. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, I—clearly, I mean, I agree with you. I am just 

not sure that we know yet what that ‘‘hold accountable’’ means. We 

don’t give them any more money? What? I don’t know what that 

means. 

But I do think that is important that we all—and certainly the 

two of you—think about—and the President and so forth, what 

does that mean, hold them accountable? Again, keeping in mind 

what our policy is and what your job is, is to defeat ISIS. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 
28 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 4 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, thank you very much for your service and, Mr. 

Secretary, the same. We appreciate all that you are attempting to 

do. 

My question, General Dempsey: Are we at war in Iraq and Syria? 

General DEMPSEY. We are at war against ISIL, yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Since that is the case, would you, Secretary, 

please provide in writing the most recent legal authority for the 

United States to conduct such a war. We know that, previously, 

there was talk of the War Powers Act. But, apparently, that is no 

longer the case since 90 days has passed and we are still at war. 

Perhaps there is the Iraq or the Afghanistan authorization to use 

military force, but I would like to have the most recent legal justification, if you would please, for the record. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Also, we heard the chairman in his opening remarks say that any authorization to use military force that is not 

unlimited is dead on arrival. Since the chairman is not here, perhaps his staff could tell the chairman that, at least, this member 

of this committee would love to see his proposed authorization to 

use military force as broad as he might like to do. Bottom line 

here—this is more for us than for you two gentlemen—is the obligation that we have under the Constitution to declare war. 

Now, there may be some legal justification in the past that could 

be stretched for this war. I don’t think so. So we have an obligation 

here, and we should be about that. We ought not wait until the 

next Congress. You have said, the President has said, to conduct 

a war successfully, we all need to be supporting it. We are not at 

the moment. 

Now, my questions to you two gentlemen have to go with two 

issues that have not yet been discussed. You have mentioned the 

coalition, but you have not specifically mentioned Turkey or Iran. 

Would you please do so. What are they doing? What is their role 

now? And what do you see it in the future? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, Iran is not a member of the coalition. As 

you know, historically, Iran and Iraq have had cultural, religious, 

economic ties. That doesn’t stop. It hasn’t stopped. We are not coordinating with the Government of Iran. We are not working with 

the Government of Iran. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is the Government of Iran involved in any of 

the military activities in Iraq? 

Secretary HAGEL. They are not involved in anything that the 

United States or the coalition is involved in. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is not my question. Are they involved in 

any military activities in Iraq? 

Secretary HAGEL. As far as I know, the Iranian army is not engaged in Iraq. There may be other components, Shi’a militia, those 

kinds of groups that have been there that have—over the years, we 

have dealt with over the years. But as far as an official Iranian 

Government military presence in Iraq, I am not aware of any. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And now Turkey. 
29 

Secretary HAGEL. Turkey, as I noted in my comments, has 

agreed to be one of the training sites for the train and equip of the 

Syrian moderate opposition. They, as you know, worked with us 

opening up the airspace to get in supplies into Kobani for the 

Peshmerga to resupply their forces. They continue to work with us 

on other areas of common interest that are important to our efforts 

there and, of course, their own border. They, as you know, are 

hosting one and a half million refugees coming out of Syria. 

So, no. They are part of the coalition, an active part. And we continue to work with them on those areas. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Texas—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 4 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield 

my time to Dr. Heck, Chairman of the O&I [Oversight and Investigations] committee—subcommittee. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Heck is recognized, then, for 4 minutes. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Secretary, General 

Dempsey, thanks for being here today. 

Mr. Secretary, I appreciated your general comments regarding 

GTMO detainees earlier in the hearing. As you know, since early 

June, this committee has undertaken an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the five Taliban detainees 

from GTMO to Qatar. The committee appreciates the Department’s 

cooperation in this very important matter. 

In addition to previous requests, the committee recently sent two 

letters to you requesting additional material and support. Just ask 

if the committee will continue to have your commitment for the Department’s cooperation with the items noted in these letters and 

with other aspects of the committee’s ongoing work? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. Of course. And we will continue to cooperate as we have been. 

Dr. HECK. Okay. And, Secretary, I am curious as to whether or 

not you are being kept up to date regarding the Qatar Government’s compliance with the terms of the memorandum of understanding [MOU] for the prisoner exchange? And, if so, who in the 

Department is specifically responsible for keeping you updated? 

And are you satisfied with the terms of the MOU being met? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. Every 2 weeks, I receive a report. We 

have a special envoy in the Department that we work with, along 

with the General Counsel’s office. I talk with the General Counsel 

every 2 weeks about this. Steve Preston. 

I am continually assured that the Qatari Government is fulfilling 

its commitments that it made to us in exercising the operations 

that they said that they would in order to maintain the security 

of these five individuals. But, yes, every 2 weeks—sometimes more 

often than not. But every 2 weeks, I get a readout. 

Dr. HECK. I would ask. You know, there has been some report 

in open source media about some of the visitors that the detainees 

have received and whether or not they are having access to commu-
30 

nication systems that are outside of what is permitted through the 

MOU. Any concerns from us in regards to that type of activity? 

Secretary HAGEL. I—within the limits of an open hearing here, 

I am aware of those reports. And I—nothing that I have seen so 

far concerns me more than what we are doing now, and it is within 

the boundaries of the assurances that we received and—and the 

agreement that we have from the Qatari Government. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you. And I appreciate the Department’s continued support as the subcommittee continues its investigation. 

Secretary HAGEL. And we will. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier, is recognized for 4 

minutes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Thank you, Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, for your leadership. 

The Chair early on spoke about Guantanamo detainees joining 

the fight with ISIL. He has repeated that on a number of occasions. 

Is there any evidence that detainees from Guantanamo have 

joined the fight with ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. Not that I am aware of. 

Ms. SPEIER. General Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. The Secretary, in his comment, referred to approximately—of the 89 or so released, that 90 percent of them we 

have clear evidence that there has been no recidivism. The other 

10 percent are largely unaccounted for. 

ISIL, of course, is a recent manifestation, within about the last 

9 months. But, if I could, we will take that one for the record. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

You know, sometimes I feel like we are in a time warp. As we 

have been sitting here talking about ISIL, CNN has been reporting 

that there is a change in strategy by the administration. And it is 

now going to potentially refocus its effort on toppling Assad. So 

while we are focused here on ISIL, it appears that yet another 

strategy is being undertaken by the administration. 

Can either of you respond to that, please? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I believe the administration has addressed that last night and again this morning, as well as the State 

Department, as well as the Defense Department. 

No, there is no change in the strategy. And, again, the National 

Security Council has addressed it. The State Department has. We 

have. So—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, let me ask you—— 

Secretary HAGEL [continuing]. That is all I can tell you. There 

is—there is no change, and there is no different direction. 

Ms. SPEIER. Let me ask you this question, then. Our presumption 

has been that we would train the Free Syrian Army and that they 

would, as trainees, then fight ISIL. There have been many reports 

that suggest that they are not willing to fight ISIL. They want to 

first topple the Assad regime. 
31 

So what confidence do we have that, by training them, they are 

going to be fighting ISIL and not Assad? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, that is the essence of the training and 

the purpose of the training. And this is, also, part of the vetting 

process, a clear understanding of what they would be doing. 

But let me get to a more basic point. One of the points that I 

made in my statement as to why moderate Syrian opposition would 

be part of this training effort, and I noted that their homes and 

their families are in jeopardy from ISIL, from the brutality and the 

slaughter and the murder of ISIL. That is their first issue. Yes, 

they want to see Assad go. Yes, there is no question. Yes, there are 

other forces and interests, yes. 

But the most absolute immediate threat to most of these people 

is ISIL and what ISIL is doing to their villages and to their families and their homes. So it is clearly in their own interest. But this 

is also part of the—the vetting process. 

Ms. SPEIER. I only have 19 seconds, so maybe you can provide 

this answer in writing. I continue to be concerned about how we 

shut off ISIL’s revenue stream, and I want to know what we are 

doing to try and shut down their revenues by closing down the oil 

refineries that they appear to have taken control of. 

And I yield back. 

Secretary HAGEL. I will do that in the interest of time. Thank 

you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 4 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, thank you for joining us 

today and thanks so much for your service. 

Each of our service branches, I think, has a significant challenge 

in front of them. 

Today, there are haves and the have-nots, those units that are 

trained, those units that are not current in training. I think a significant challenge for them, it affects not only today’s mission, but 

future missions as to what our capability might be. 

Each of our service branch chiefs have talked about this concept 

of tiered readiness and what that means for their force, the risk it 

places upon their force, how it affects morale and retention. 

And now today, my question to you is: How do we address that 

current situation? And, then, how do we integrate into that the 

challenges that we are now facing in Syria, in Iraq with ISIL in 

accomplishing that mission in addition to missions around the 

world that we want to continue to try to be successful at? 

It seems like, to me, that we are a mile wide and an inch deep. 

So I want to get your perspective on that, too. And how do we get 

to a point where we are returning to full-spectrum training and 

making sure that we have a continued full complement of readiness 

across our force structure? 

General DEMPSEY. Let me take a shot at this, Congressman. It 

is a very, very profound question, meaning intricate. 
32 

But I will say this: You are correct that we are generally consuming readiness as soon as it is built. You know, if we would have 

had this hearing 6 months ago, we wouldn’t be talking about the 

necessity of reassuring our European allies, we wouldn’t be talking 

about ISIL, we wouldn’t be talking about Ebola, all of which have 

had a—have pressurized our readiness. 

On the other hand, that is why we exist. I mean, you know, to 

one of the earlier questions, you know, when will this all end? You 

know, personally, I believe that the current state of security affairs 

is about what it will be for about the next generation. 

Stated another way, peace is probably not the norm, as you look 

back at history, and it is certainly not the norm today. So the military has to respond or—to whether it is a security threat or a 

threat of infectious disease. 

To answer your question, it is why I mentioned in my opening 

remarks that we really need budget certainty, flexibility, and time. 

And I will say, to your question, I think that we will need additional funding to account for new requirements. I mentioned the 

three of them that were new just over the last 6 months. 

I also think we are going to need to gain your support for some 

of the reforms we have recommended: pay compensation, health 

care, weapons systems, and BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment]. Because that will allow us to be more predictable and sustainable over time. 

And I think we have absolutely got to get rid of this—this horrible shadow of sequestration because it places such a—both a 

physical, but also a psychological shadow over the defense budget 

that it has very bad, long-term effects. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, let me ask this question. Specifically, today, as we 

speak, if sequester comes back in 2015 and we have the reduction 

in OCO funding that is projected to go from $60 billion to $30 billion, give me a one-sentence assessment of where you believe our 

military will be. 

General DEMPSEY. We will be less ready than at any time in my 

40-year career. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Secretary Hagel. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I haven’t had a 40-year career in the 

military. But I would completely agree with the Chairman, and I 

have been on the record on this point. It will put the military and 

our national security enterprise in a very, very deep hole. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Davis 

from California. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your leadership, Secretary Hagel, and 

Chairman Dempsey. 

I wanted to ask about the level of expertise that would give us 

confidence in the troops that we are training right now in order to 

pull out of our activity. And I know that we are not talking about 

boots on the ground here, but in an advisory capacity. Because I 

think Americans are well aware of the fact that, in order for us to 
33 

do our job, we need highly trained professionals like our SEALs 

[Sea, Air, Land teams], like our special operations. 

And I would like to know whether we are in any position to see 

that level of expertise and really hair-triggered preparedness that 

is required of SEALs and of those who go into special operations 

like that. I would have to believe that the possibility of something 

occurring that would require that kind of professionalism is something that we must be planning for. And how do we respond to people that are wondering if they are having that level of expertise. 

Which wouldn’t require only consulting, but clearly boots on the 

ground and, again, whether or not there are those who would be 

on the ground who could order air strikes effectively in order to 

make that happen. 

General DEMPSEY. Well, Congresswoman, I can absolutely assure 

you I would never come to the Secretary of Defense and suggest 

that he send anyone into any mission unless they are, in our judgment, the Joint Chiefs, the best trained, best led, best equipped 

force on the planet. And so we—there is no shortage of skills and 

expertise whether it is in the conventional forces or the special operation forces. And by the way—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. I am talking about our Iraqi partners or the Syrians 

as well. 

General DEMPSEY. Well, what—of course, the—there is always a 

gap between our level of expertise and theirs that we try to close 

to the extent we can. 

I guess maybe the only thing I am suggesting, it is conventional. 

It is special operating forces. It is air, sea, and ground. And, you 

know, we kind of gloss over—not you—but we tend to focus on 

what are we doing on the ground. But we have been flying, for 8 

weeks now, a very—an extraordinary air campaign. And those 

young men and women are executing that, frankly, exceeding expectations in my view. 

So I am not sure how to address your question about the expertise issue. If you could elaborate a bit more, I would—I will give 

it a shot. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Thank you. 

Is there a metric? Do we need to have a certain level of expertise 

and a quantity of those who were trained? 

General DEMPSEY. On their part? On the part of the—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. On their part. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. Absolutely. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do we know that our—our team will not be required 

to go in—— 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. That kind of an operation. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, and I will give you this briefly. So there 

is—the Iraqi security forces have an organization called the CTS, 

Counter-Terrorism Service. They are absolutely capable. In fact, if 

anything, they have been overused because they are the best of the 

Iraqi security forces. 

So what we are trying to do with them is reconstitute them. They 

are also very well led, by the way, which means they have both capability and leadership. 
34 

On the other side of it, we believe we need three capable divisions. A division is roughly 9 brigades, which is to say we are going 

to need about 80,000 competent Iraqi security forces to recapture 

the territory lost and, eventually the city of Mosul, to restore the 

border. 

And we are on path to conduct that training. It is why we are 

setting up these training centers in the locations the Secretary 

mentioned. 

Mrs. DAVIS. So we didn’t necessarily see a lack of response on 

their part in the latest—when we were looking at the Iraqi forces 

and they basically—— 

General DEMPSEY. When we did our assessment? 

Mrs. DAVIS. When we did the assessment, but just in terms of 

what happened. 

General DEMPSEY. Oh, what happened when they collapsed? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. 

General DEMPSEY. Two divisions and a few more brigades collapsed in northern Iraq. They collapsed because of corrupt leadership. 

There was a period of time just a couple of years ago when a 

man could purchase his command of an Iraqi division. That was a 

terrible outcome, as we saw, for Iraq in general. 

Anyway, they collapsed because of poor leadership, no confidence 

in the central government, and a kind of mythology that it built up 

around ISIL that it was unstoppable. ISIL has now been stopped. 

Some of the forces that have—that abandoned their post have 

been reintegrated into the military, which is a very positive sign, 

I think. And the assessment that we have been making suggests 

that we can recover from the shortcomings they exhibited. So—but 

that is all part of this campaign. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you, both of you. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hunter from California. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here. 

I guess, the—the first question I have I am going to lead with 

a quote from you, Secretary Hagel: ‘‘I disagreed with President 

Obama, his decision to surge in Afghanistan, as I did with President Bush on the surge in Iraq. It wasn’t a matter if we could win 

at the moment. Of course, no force in the world can stand with the 

sophisticated power of the American military. Nobody could stay on 

the field with you, but that is not the issue. That never was the 

question. The question is, then, what happens next? Where is this 

going? What is the end game?’’ 

So where is this going? What is next? And what is the endgame? 

The Iranians are training more Iraqis than we are. They are getting more influence in Iraq right now. You have no plan for Syria. 

You don’t know what you are going to do with Assad. You don’t 

really want to take him out because you don’t know who is going 

to take his place. 

And both of you right now work for an administration that had 

Iraq finished, completed, and handed to it on a silver platter. And 

you talk about the long view, General. The long view would have 

been we wouldn’t be here right now if we had stayed in Iraq in the 
35 

first place. And we are talking about this like we weren’t there for 

10 years and that this administration didn’t give it up. 

I don’t get it. I am completely confounded and, frankly, I guess 

I would question the administration’s credibility on this and their 

ability to even do anything, based on the fact that you didn’t see 

this coming, you didn’t react quick enough, you got in way late in 

the game, and we literally wouldn’t be where we are right now if 

the administration had made the right decisions in the first place. 

Do we even have a status of forces agreement now with Iraq? Do 

we have a status of forces agreement now with Iraq? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, we have a diplomatic note. 

Mr. HUNTER. So we don’t even have a status of forces agreement 

now, which was the reason we left in the first place, is because we 

lacked that? 

Secretary HAGEL. We have privileges and immunities that we believe satisfy our requirements to protect our troops. 

Congressman, I will respond to some of your points. 

Mr. HUNTER. Secretary, let me give you one of your quotes, if I 

could too: ‘‘The plan to revive the Iraq war by sending a surge of 

30,000 troops’’—obviously this was then—‘‘is the most dangerous 

foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam. If it is carried 

out, I will resist it.’’ 

You were adamantly against and consistently against the Iraq 

war as a Senator, and now you are basically the second-highest 

ranking military officer in a civilian capacity in the country in 

charge now of leading our forces in a strategy in Iraq again. I am 

really confounded on how the American people are looking at our 

team right now, at your team, and saying, how do we do this? You 

are now in charge of what we lost because of decisions made outright and forthright by the administration. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, let me see if I can pull some of this 

apart. My past record and statements stand, and that was a situation that is different from today. I can’t go back and replay 2011 

or 2012 or why did the United States leave or not leave. We will 

let history decide that. 

Mr. HUNTER. But we didn’t leave, because we are there now, 

right? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, we never left. We have the largest diplomatic compound in the world. Our embassy there is the largest in 

the world. So we have never left. But regardless, we are where we 

are. My responsibility today, Congressman, is not back in 2007 or 

2002 or 2003. I have a new responsibility, new set of threats and 

challenges, new dynamics. That is what I am dealing with 

Now, I said earlier this morning, sustainability. We had 150,000 

troops in Iraq. Yes, we are the most powerful military in the world, 

but we are trying to build and help the Iraqis build—not us, them, 

it is their country, their interest—a sustainable—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I was there. 

Secretary HAGEL. I know, and we appreciate your service. A sustainable government force where they can protect themselves, they 

can support themselves, they can do all the things that sovereign 

governments must do. 

Mr. HUNTER. Right. 

I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. 
36 

Secretary HAGEL. My role today is the threat that ISIL poses 

against the Government of Iraq, against us, and against our allies. 

That is my threat responsibility today. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gabbard for 4 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

As both of you walked through your testimony, I couldn’t help 

but think that it does sound very familiar to other testimonies we 

have heard in the past about training and arming Iraqi security 

forces, of training and arming a local security force, now called a 

national guard. And overall, I am wondering how we can be walking down this same path that we have walked down over the last 

decade or more and hope for a different outcome. 

You have outlined your intentions to train and arm 12 Iraqi security forces, brigades, to include arming them with Hellfire missiles, and I have got a few questions with regards to that. How 

many Kurdish Peshmerga brigades will you be training, and will 

you be arming them directly and not funneling those weapons 

through the central Iraqi Government as we have seen, very recently, has been very resistant to passing on any of those weapons 

or arms, ammunition that we have provided through that central 

government. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I will take a couple of the specific questions you asked. One, I noted the 12 brigades that we will be training. You asked how many of those are Peshmerga. Three of those 

12 brigades are Peshmerga brigades. You ask about the request 

that the Peshmerga has made for armaments and for the materiel. 

That is all being funneled through the Iraqi Government. 

Ms. GABBARD. How can you be assured that they are getting any 

of that? Because publicly their ministers of defense and others are 

saying that they are not receiving those arms. 

Secretary HAGEL. They are being given the armaments. All of the 

requests are ongoing. So just as I said in any statement, all of the 

requests from the Iraqi security forces aren’t there yet. As I said 

in my statement, a good deal of this is still coming. I mean, you 

just don’t produce large inventories of armaments in weeks or in 

a month. All of that is being worked through the Iraqi security 

force, through the Iraqi Government. 

And I also noted, by the way, in my statement, Congresswoman, 

there were very specific amounts, significant amounts of armaments given directly to the Peshmerga from coalition partners over 

the last few months. 

Ms. GABBARD. So up until this date, as well as with the funding 

request that you will have before Congress, none of those arms will 

be provided directly to the Kurds and the Peshmerga from the U.S. 

Government? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Kurds’ request will be worked through the 

Iraqi Government. 

Ms. GABBARD. Has the Iraqi Government stated publicly that 

they will provide those arms to the Kurds? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, that is an Iraqi Government issue. I can’t 

sit here and—— 
37 

Ms. GABBARD. But they have stated publicly that they will not 

in the past. 

Secretary HAGEL. It is clear that the Iraqi security forces want 

a strong and viable and armed and trained Peshmerga. It is in the 

interest of the country of Iraq. So whether the Peshmerga is given 

every item on that list—and by the way, I have seen some of the 

list, their pretty spectacular list. 

Ms. GABBARD. Well, understandably, but they are also the trusted fighting force on the ground that has been most effective against 

fighting ISIS—— 

Secretary HAGEL. We appreciate that. 

Ms. GABBARD [continuing]. And with very limited resources. 

I guess my last question—we are running out of time here—is 

how can we have the confidence that this Iraqi security forces at 

this early stage of this government will not end up with the same 

outcome of units deserting and leaving weapons in the hands of 

ISIS? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, again, I think we have covered some of 

these questions before this morning, but I will say, first, there is 

risk in everything, there is no guarantee of anything. But we believe what we are doing now to help rebuild the Iraqi security 

forces, as the Abadi government is changing their leadership, so it 

will instill, we believe, a new level of trust and confidence and support in Sunni forces and the Sunni tribes. I noted an example over 

the weekend of 2,000 Sunni tribesmen in a ceremony this weekend 

preparing to go into the Iraqi security forces being sworn in. All 

those different things we are doing now we believe can lead to the 

kind of strong Iraqi security forces that will be required to take 

back their country, but also that must reside within an inclusive, 

unity, strong participatory government in Iraq. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Franks for 4 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, let me begin by saying that I think you have very 

accurately described ISIS. I think that your description there is 

well considered and very accurate, and I appreciate it. You have 

kind of told it like it was. 

I remember that George Bush said almost verbatim: If we leave 

Iraq before our commanders say that we are ready we will be risking the future of Iraq. We will see mass killings on a horrific scale, 

and we will be increasing the chances of American troops having 

to return and face an even more dangerous enemy. 

And I have to say to you, Mr. Secretary, in all due respect to you, 

I think that this President owes Mr. Bush, Mr. Hunter, and thousands like him an apology for standing by as ISIS entered Iraq and 

essentially made this Bush prediction come almost precisely true. 

And the concern I have, of course, is that I am afraid that it is the 

same ideology or the same approach is being borne out in other 

fronts. 

As dangerous as ISIS is, as again you have so accurately described, the greater danger is if some of the core elements of that 

insidious ideology, which is in some of the leadership of Iran right 

now, gets their finger on the nuclear button. And this President 

seems equally oblivious to that as he has been to ISIS entering 
38 

Iraq. And my concern is that their latest funding request includes 

a significant portion that would go to ISF that we will be fighting 

along beside Quds and Iranian Shi’a militia, and that has a way 

of elevating Iran’s credibility or increasing their credibility to some 

extent, and I think increasing the chances and hastening the day 

when they will gain access to nuclear weapons, and this administration seems oblivious to all of that. 

And I know that this is a contentious issue, but do you think 

that we are doing enough to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear 

weapons? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, I am going to answer that, but 

also let me lead into that answer by the first comments and questions you ask about whether we are oblivious to the ISIS threat. 

Mr. FRANKS. Certainly the President was. We wrote. Certainly 

he did nothing to stop them. A very small force could have prevented them from coming in, very small force, and it could have 

prevented them from gaining the base of operation that they have 

gained. We wrote letters. They were ignored. This is for over a period of months. 

Secretary HAGEL. Yeah. Let me just remind all of us that, first 

of all, our Defense National Intelligence Agency earlier this year 

had noted the threat of ISIS, specifically ISIL. We were all aware 

of it. We were talking to the Iraqi Government about it. This was 

the government of Prime Minister Malaki. 

Now, let’s also remember Iraq is a sovereign nation. We have to 

be invited into Iraq to help. We were telling Prime Minister Malaki 

he had a problem he was going to have to deal with. We couldn’t 

have just arbitrarily—I suppose we could have—invaded Iraq without the sovereign country and the elected Government of Iraq inviting us in. We were not. We were not asked to help, even though 

we were talking to the Iraqi Government. So I think it is important 

we just set the stage. 

This also was at the time, if you recall, Congressman, Iraq was 

at the front end of changing governments. And a new government 

didn’t take over, if you recall, until September of this year. But 

even then, we were invited in, in late summer, and we did get involved in it in late summer, but we had to be invited in. And so 

that is first. 

On Iran, this administration is very aware of the dangers of Iran, 

and the President has said again that his policy is the same as 

President Bush’s policy that Iran—— 

Mr. FRANKS. It is not the same as President Bush’s policy, but 

continue. 

Secretary HAGEL. On Iran, it is, that Iran will not, cannot have 

a nuclear weapon. That hasn’t changed. 

Mr. FRANKS. In all due respect, the Bush policy was in keeping 

with the U.N. [United Nations] Security Council, which was we 

would dismantle and make sure that they didn’t have the ability 

to enrich uranium or produce plutonium. And this administration 

has written an agreement that allows that protocol to be a protected policy. 

Secretary HAGEL. That is what this administration has been 

doing, working with IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. 

What the talks are about, as you know, Congressman, which we 
39 

may see something come out of it, we may not, the P5+1 [United 

States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, and Germany], 

through the United Nations, the five members of the Security 

Council of the United Nations plus Germany in those talks is to 

dismantle, is to do all the things that we want to do to move Iran 

away from the capacity, capability of building a nuclear weapon. 

This Department has the responsibility to continue to provide the 

President with all the options on the table. We have and we will. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Johnson from Georgia for 4 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I am prompted to ask you, Secretary 

Hagel, to set the record straight as to what factors led the U.S. to 

withdraw all of its troops from Iraq because of the inability to attain a status of forces agreement. Can you remind us of what major 

factor precipitated our inability to enter into an agreement with 

the Iraqis? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, without going into the long history, and 

I think everybody recalls it, I was not in this job at the time, but 

the United States could not get the assurances that it required, 

that it always requires when we have troops in a country, assurances to protect our troops. That is normally done through a status 

of forces agreement, but in the case of Iraq now we have privileges 

and immunities. But the fact is we were not invited to stay. Malaki 

had said that he couldn’t get it through the parliament. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the point that I want to make. Thank you. 

I also would like for you to explain what interests the U.S. and 

Iran have jointly with respect to this ISIL issue? What are some 

of the things that we have joint interest about? 

Secretary HAGEL. ISIL, as it has demonstrated through its indiscriminate brutality of killing all groups and sectors of people, 

Sunni, Shi’a, Kurds, minorities, Christians, that ISIL is a threat to 

Iran. It is a threat to the entire region. It is a threat, as we have 

said all morning, a clear threat to Iraq because it now controls 

large swaths of the country of Iraq. But at the same time, we, the 

United States, are not coordinating with Iran. We are not working 

with Iran. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are there any areas where the U.S. and Iran can 

cooperate with respect to this ISIL threat? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, each sovereign country in the Middle 

East must protect its own interests, as Iran certainly is doing, will 

do, as Iraq is doing, as Jordan is doing, Turkey is doing, but that 

is an independent effort that the—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are there any areas where we can have joint concerns? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, we have joint concerns, but not joint cooperation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you see joint cooperation being a possibility? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, that is not our policy, and it may some 

day be possible. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It wouldn’t be a bad thing, would it? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I am all for cooperation and getting along 

in the world in peace, but the realities of the fact that Iran is a 
40 

state sponsor of terror, they have continued on a path of trying to 

nuclearize weapons and make those efforts, so it is hard to be unmindful of that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is good to be mindful that dialogue can help to 

create better conditions also. But let me ask you this about Mr. 

Baghdadi. Is he alive? Is he injured? Was he involved in the situation that occurred, the air strike that occurred last weekend? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, those are areas that we probably should 

get into in a classified hearing. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you, sir. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. We will have a classified follow-up 

next week. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, what is the current strength of ISIL? We have 

heard reports, 30,000. I have heard reports of 50,000. Can you clue 

us in as to what that current strength is? 

General DEMPSEY. The Intel Community does put kind of a band 

around it. At one point, 21,000 to 31,000. Frankly, I think that includes groups that they may have scooped up along the way, 

former Baathists, for example. So I would suggest to you that the 

core group of ideological ISIL, probably about two-thirds of them 

are in Syria, about a third of them in Iraq, and in total it is probably 15,000 to 18,000. 

Dr. FLEMING. 15,000 to 18,000 core, but then maybe another 

20,000 or so that may be cooperative with, fight alongside is, I 

think, what you are saying, 30,000 to—— 

General DEMPSEY. I think that is where the number 31,000 

comes from, the affiliates, if you will. 

Dr. FLEMING. Now, I get your strategy in Iraq, which is to go 

back and undo the things that went wrong in Iraq. We have got 

better leadership. Certainly we are helping them stand up their 

military so they can go on the offensive. Eventually restoring the 

border. But I think we can assume that most of those ISIL members will end up in Syria if we move them out of Iraq. 

So what about the Syrian piece, the Free Syrian Army, how long 

will it take and how many strong will we be at when they become 

an effective force? 

General DEMPSEY. I think we have testified previously that in 

the first year we think we can produce about 5,400, that we think 

the total required in order to put enough pressure on the ISIL 

forces in eastern and northern Syria would probably need to number about 15,000. 

Dr. FLEMING. 15,000. So would that be an offensive force where 

they could actually march into Syria and actually attack, take out, 

degrade, destroy? 

General DEMPSEY. No, let me describe it this way. It will be a 

force large enough to defend initially so that it can actually hold 

territory that heretofore is more fluid, and then it should have the 

capability over time to become offensive. 

Dr. FLEMING. And at what point do we get to 15,000, at what 

point, I am talking timeline here, do we get to an offensive force? 
41 

General DEMPSEY. Those details are actually part of what is happening at CENTCOM this week. There is about a 30-nation, 190- 

planner contingent down there that is talking about ISIL both as 

it exists in Iraq and in Syria. And so the question is, where along 

the way will there be enough of a critical mass to employ it, and 

that is a conversation that is ongoing right now. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Will we be able to get more details tomorrow? 

General DEMPSEY. Sure. I don’t know about tomorrow, but you 

will be able to get more details, yes, sir. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here. I know you have got a lot on 

your plate with budgets and other things and big decisions on our 

national security, the different things that are going on in the 

world, and I certainly respect you, and I will try to be brief about 

this. 

Secretary Kerry was before this committee. I believe the two of 

you were with him a couple of months ago when he was asking for 

the ability to move into Syria, and I asked Secretary Kerry at that 

point what were the principles of war under which the Obama administration operated. He could not give them to us. He promised 

to get them to us within 24 hours. He has not responded, nor has 

his staff responded in any way when we have again asked for those 

principles. 

But I quoted at that point Colin Powell’s doctrine. Is there a 

plausible exit strategy? Do we have a clear obtainable objective? 

And then I go and I look, you know, again at where Colin Powell 

has expanded on that, and when a nation is engaging in war, every 

resource and tool should be used to achieve decisive force against 

the enemy, minimizing U.S. casualties, and ending the conflict 

quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. 

Why should we approve an authorization that doesn’t give you, 

General Dempsey, and you, Secretary Hagel, the ability to do what 

it takes to win the war? 

General DEMPSEY. Congressman, that is a great question, and 

you are obviously a student of warfare. Let me answer it this way. 

The use of the military instrument in state-on-state conflicts does 

comport better to General Powell’s principles than the use of military instrument against something like ISIL. And so as we have 

looked at mass, which is one of the principles of war, as we looked 

at mass, mass has a coherence and a quality all its own when it 

is applied against the mass of another force, notably a state. But 

when you are applying mass against something like ISIL, you can 

have a particular kinetic effect against it, but you can also generate 

antibodies within the population that could actually be counterproductive to what you are trying to achieve. 

I would like to unpack this a bit in a longer conversation with 

you or a paper, but I will tell you this. In terms of what we are 

doing in Iraq and what we are doing in Syria, I referred to a command sergeant major that I had as a young lieutenant colonel, and 

I was trying to figure out, of these five or six or seven things that 

we really had to get done, how would I possibly prioritize them. 
42 

And he said to me simply—his name was named Don Stockton, he 

has passed away since—he said, look, Colonel, just make sure that 

you keep the main thing the main thing. 

And so ISIL is the main thing, and our priority is in Iraq, and 

then we will figure out, while disrupting it in Syria, what to do 

about it in Syria. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, I am certainly not a student of war, but I 

have a tremendous amount of respect for both of you. I guess my 

problem with this administration, as respectfully as I know how to 

say this, I believe that the indecisiveness at the White House has 

led to a lot of the problems and the challenges that we are facing 

today. And when we first saw ISIL, we knew that no good was 

going to come from that. 

And the indecisiveness is what bothers me. I don’t feel like you 

have that indecisiveness. I feel like it is the President of the United 

States’ indecisiveness that, quite honestly, puts our men and 

women in uniform and our American citizens at risk because he is 

not willing to make the decision to turn it over to somebody who 

will go do what it takes to protect this country. 

And so I respect you, and I would love to have one that just gave 

you the authority to do what our military leaders think it takes to 

protect Americans. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, Secretary, thank you all for being here. Happy 

Veterans Day. Happy Veterans Day to the veterans behind you. 

Happy birthday, Marine. There is cake downstairs if you haven’t 

had enough. Very important topic. Thank you all for being here. 

Previous hearings, we have discussed how ISIS is self-financing 

and how that is kind of unique compared to some other Islamic extremist organizations in Syria and other places. They are selffinancing through smuggling, extortion, murder, you name it, I 

mean, these are bad people. I think, General Dempsey, you mentioned some of the things that we are doing. Have we been able to 

truly disrupt their financing source that will lead us to helping, I 

guess, break up their logistics? 

General DEMPSEY. We have certainly disrupted it. There are 

some things that I would be more willing to share with you in a 

classified setting where we have reflections of the impact of some 

of the things we have done against their oil revenue, for example. 

But again, some of that is probably best described in a classified 

setting. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. 

General DEMPSEY. But I will tell you, the answer is, yes, we have 

significantly disrupted their financial support. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Because, after all, if we can dry up the ability to 

buy beans, bullets, and Band-Aids, I mean, hopefully another way 

to break their will to fight. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, I would just add to that a couple 

of points we made this morning on this. It is your point, question, 

observation is part of the comprehensive effort that we are using 

to stop them, and it isn’t just force. Yes, that is a big part of it, 

but all the other pieces. And just as you said, you don’t cut off that 
43 

funding source, they will keep coming. And so it is a priority piece 

of the overall strategy, and we are making progress. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Earlier, the status of forces agreement was brought 

up, and it was said that we have more of a diplomatic note, and 

you all said you feel like that is enough to protect our men and 

women in uniform from any form of prosecution in Iraq, which led 

me to believe, usually when there is a military force there is a civilian contractor force. Is there currently a civilian contractor force 

providing LOGCAP-type [Logistics Civil Augmentation Program] 

services to our men and women in uniform, and what kind of protections do they have, and how many do you think may be over 

there? 

General DEMPSEY. We intentionally have approached this mission in an expeditionary way, so we are not dragging in a big 

LOGCAP to provide life support for our forces. We are dealing with 

it as a military. 

Now, that said, as you know, there is an Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq that deals with the FMS [foreign military sales] 

case. It is the part that the Secretary referred to as the part that 

never left Iraq, where these 200 military men and women who are 

helping procure weapon systems and then provide them to the 

Iraqis over time. That is supported by a contract, whether it is with 

a particular weapon system dealer or in some cases trainers, and 

they have, as part of the contract, they have protections and immunities under the contract. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. 

Secretary Hagel, I think this week you were quoted as saying— 

you were actually at a Veterans Day speech at the Vietnam War 

Memorial, and you publicly stated, we must openly acknowledge 

past mistakes and learn from them because that is how we avoid 

repeating them. I would have to agree with you. I mean, Congress, 

I think, has been honest and saying that sequestration and placing 

those devastating defense cuts on top of our men and women in 

uniform was a mistake. There is a huge appetite to, you know, remove those defense caps. 

But also I think a lot of people look at this administration and 

see that they made some mistakes in how we have handled ISIL, 

how we have handled Iraq, the 2011 withdrawal. And I hope that 

through your comments alone, that this administration and others 

will be honest and not glossing over the past, but looking at it honestly so we can avoid making these mistakes, because our men and 

women in uniform, their lives depend on it. So thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I really want to thank both of you for your service to the 

country. Belated happy Veterans Day to you. You both deserve our 

congratulations and our respect. 

You are responsible for the lives of our service men and women, 

and I appreciate both of your positions. And Secretary Hagel, I appreciate your past comments in regards to putting our sons and 

daughters at risk. I have three sons that are currently serving, and 

so that hits a point for myself and my wife. 

But as we move forward, and two of my sons were in the drawdown in Iraq in 2011, I just wonder, and I know you weren’t re-
44 

sponsible because you weren’t in that position as it relates to the 

status of forces agreement, but also an enduring presence in Iraq, 

do you think, as we move forward, as this starts to—and you mentioned it is going to take years—but shouldn’t we have a status of 

forces agreement? Would that be preferable as we move forward 

that we have an enduring presence in Iraq instead of walking away 

like we did? And then because it is so unstable there, who knows 

what it looks like again after we stabilize it, would it be a good 

idea that we have a status of forces agreement that allows us to 

have an enduring presence there? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, Congressman, first, thank you for your 

sons’ contributions and service and for your family’s sacrifice and 

service. 

As to your question, I think good question, and it is something 

we are thinking through, but these are the kinds of things you continually think through, but they evolve. What that place looks like, 

what the world looks like in 6 months, I can’t predict. I can do 

what I can do now with knowing what I know now, anticipating. 

Mr. NUGENT. I think we have talked about strategically looking 

forward. I mean, that should be part of our strategic plan. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, it always is, but, again, we are not intending to stay there in an indefinite way in the same capacity that 

we are now at the invitation of the Iraqi Government to come back 

in to help them, training and equipping and so on. I mean, that is 

not an indefinite mission. And our air strikes, that is not indefinite. 

So we think through what we need now and what the coalition 

requires, and then what we are going to need as we go along. And 

we get wiser as we go, too. So you adjust. You have to adjust. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. And I understand. You know, I am not trying to—I guess I am trying to pin you down. 

Would you recommend to the President at some point in time, 

and I know things change, would it be in our best interest to have 

a status of forces agreement with Iraq and have an enduring presence of some type within Iraq? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, what I have recommended to the President, what General Dempsey has recommended and our leaders, 

first, protection of our forces. That is it. Whether you call it a status of forces agreement or whatever it is, whatever the piece of 

paper or document, it has to mean something. The privileges immunity document that we have now, the diplomatic note, our commanders—I—feel that it is adequate to protect our forces and what 

we need now. 

Now, into the future, we adjust, we have to adjust, and we may 

want something different. We are looking at this. We will continue 

to look at it. But right now what we have now is essential and it 

is adequate for what we require to protect our troops. 

Mr. NUGENT. General. 

General DEMPSEY. I was the Chief of Staff of the Army at that 

time. The reason that we believed the status of forces agreement 

was the right instrument to achieve, to seek to achieve, was the 

scale, the size of the residual force, which was going to be approximately 10,000. 

Secondly, the nation of Iraq was a stable platform. There was no 

ongoing conflict within its borders. And so we thought that requir-
45 

ing a status of forces agreement from a responsible government as 

an expression of a shared commitment was the appropriate instrument. We couldn’t get it. 

The difference? We reentered Iraq in an extremis situation with 

a brand new government that actually hadn’t even named all of its 

ministers, and so we accepted the diplomatic note as adequate to 

the task because of the scale and also because we don’t have these 

men and women traveling all over Iraq. At some point in the future, as the Secretary says, when this platform is more stable, I 

think—— 

Mr. NUGENT. I would think that because it was important to 

have an enduring force back in 2011 when talks broke down, I 

would think that would remain the same today and maybe even 

be—the reason to have that is what we are facing today in Iraq 

with ISIL, just as observation. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. Maybe. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, sir, and I thank both of you. 

The CHAIRMAN. That concludes our questions from the members 

of the committee. I want to thank you again both for your service 

for being here and—boy, oh boy. You just made it. Mr. Bridenstine. 

General DEMPSEY. Only if it is an easy one, Congressman. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I am 

down to 4 minutes now? Okay. 

Mr. NUGENT. Three. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Three minutes. 

Well, first of all, thank you guys both for being here, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman. Our country is facing a major challenge 

in the Middle East, and I am sometimes deeply troubled by the 

way things are going. And today we are here to talk about a $5.6 

billion ask, and it seems as though we are in the middle of replanning or changing our strategy, changing our tactics. There are 30 

nations that are meeting to talk about the next steps. 

It seems to me that we are actually in a position where we are getting ready to allocate $5.6 billion and not fully understanding 

ultimately what our approach is going to be. Could you guys each 

take a few seconds and respond to that so that I can go back to 

my constituents and say we are not just giving $5.6 billion but we 

are actually taking a serious approach at this? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you. It is a pretty important and basic question, so I get it. 

I tried to lay at least the general parameters of that out, that 

question in my statement as to the general breakdown of where 

would it be used, why, and why we think it is important. Also, the 

dimension that you mentioned and others had this morning, well, 

what are others doing, what are the other coalition partners doing. 

And as you just noted, one of the reasons that General Austin has 

over 30 of our coalition partners in Florida this week is working 

through where their contributions specific, money, planes, people, 

logistics, so on, are going to come from. And you know we have conditioned in our request, actually the Congress does this, that we 

can only draw down so much of that train-and-equip part, the $1.6 

million, until others have put their money in. 

But the specifics of how all that is broken down, the timeframe, 

I mean, we have all that, and we would, in briefings that we will 
46 

start, and we have generally started, we will continue to have with 

staff and explaining why we have asked for this much money, we 

are prepared to do that. 

General DEMPSEY. I would like to take about 30 seconds and 

swing at this myself because you asked what are we doing. Well, 

we have a counter-ISIL strategy. It is not an Iraq strategy. It is 

not a Syria strategy. It is a counter-ISIL strategy. 

Secondly, the strategy is built around what I think is a remarkable coalition. If you look at the countries in that coalition, and if 

you had told me a year ago you could draw these countries into 

that coalition, I would have said probably not. So the coalition is 

on board. And the campaign is built around the principle of by, 

with, and through allies, to include the Iraqis, the Peshmerga, and 

eventually a moderate Syrian opposition, so that we don’t own this 

problem, we enable it. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. One last question with my 41 seconds. I have 

got a study here from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and they make a case that when you look at the seriousness of the campaign regarding air strikes, they make the case 

that in Kosovo we were doing 86 air strikes a day, which was another campaign where there were no troops on the ground, and in 

this campaign we are doing 7 air strikes per day. Can you guys 

shed any light on what the discrepancy there is? 

General DEMPSEY. Sure. Very different enemy. It is not a nationstate. It is a terrorist organization. They have adapted their tactics 

to our strengths. And so they are just not sitting around waiting 

to be bombed, frankly, in a way that a traditional military might 

have to because you can’t hide it. These are individuals in pickup 

trucks that can hide in and among the population. 

Actually, we ought to be taking credit for this, not being criticized for it, because we are being so precise and deliberate, limiting 

civilian casualties in order to disrupt but not create additional 

problems for the coalition. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Might it be a challenge with gathering intelligence? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I mean, look, any military leader worth 

his salt would always say, oh, I need more intelligence. Of course, 

intelligence is a challenge, but we have got our assets focused like 

a laser beam on learning more about this enemy. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Will the audience please remain seated while the 

Secretary and General leave and their party? Thank you. 

Thank you. The hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

NOVEMBER 13, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

NOVEMBER 13, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

NOVEMBER 13, 2014 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

Secretary HAGEL. As the President articulated on September 10, 2014, the objective of the counter-ISIL campaign is to ‘‘degrade, and ultimately defeat, ISIL 

through a comprehensive and sustained counter terrorism strategy so that it’s no 

longer a threat to Iraq, the region, the United States, and our partners.’’ [See page 

17.] 

General DEMPSEY. The goal of our strategy is to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL): to halt its progress, destroy it as an organization, and help 

local forces liberate the territories it now controls. Our effort seeks to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL so that it no longer threatens the region and the 

national security of the U.S. and our allies. It ends when the Sunni population rejects it. The U.S. military line of effort will enable that to occur, but the military 

cannot do it alone. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Secretary HAGEL. The U.S. Government is working to target the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) revenue across multiple lines of interagency effort. According to the Department of the Treasury, until recently, ISIL was earning several 

million dollars per month through diverse efforts, including oil sales, ransom payments, extortion and crime, and support from foreign donations. Coalition airstrikes 

are impeding ISIL’s freedom of movement and ability to pump, refine, and sell oil, 

reducing its revenue stream. In addition to physically impairing ISIL’s ability to sell 

oil, the Treasury Department also prioritizes disrupting the market for oil derived 

from ISIL-controlled fields by targeting with financial sanctions anyone who trades 

in ISIL’s stolen oil or refined product, among other efforts. [See page 31.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

NOVEMBER 13, 2014 

(65) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Department of Defense has requested a broad waiver of existing laws in the request for the Iraq Train and Equip Program (ITEP) and I understand there is discussion about requesting a similar waiver for the Syria Train and 

Equip program. Why does the Department need such a waiver? What would the impacts be if you didn’t get such waivers and you, for example, had to follow all the 

acquisition laws? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department requested a broad waiver authority that could 

be exercised by the Secretary of Defense in the draft Iraq Train and Equip Program 

(ITEP) provision for flexibility and to hedge against unforeseen circumstances. The 

waiver request was not intended to encompass the Department’s responsibilities in 

the Leahy provision. Leahy vetting of Iraqi security force units intended to be 

trained is ongoing. The ITEP waivers that are in the recently enacted fiscal year 

2015 appropriations and authorizations acts are more narrow than requested, and 

authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive statutes relating to the acquisition of 

items and support services if he makes the specified determinations. This more specific waiver addresses our core concerns regarding flexible and timely acquisition to 

facilitate training and equipping the security forces of Iraq. 

The Syria Train and Equip program waiver as enacted authorizes the President 

to waive any provision of law if he makes the specified determinations, but provides 

that such waiver will not take effect until 30 days after congressional notification. 

This waiver will allow waiver of provisions that would otherwise prohibit financial 

or other assistance to the country of Syria (which would preclude assistance even 

to groups within Syria that are in conflict with the Government of Syria). In addition, provisions regarding acquisitions may be waived to enable contracting overseas 

or expedited contracting in order to facilitate the Syria train and equip effort. The 

possible effects of having to follow all acquisition laws are less flexibility and longer 

lead times, which could severely affect the Department’s ability to meet emergent 

requirements. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary, after U.S. airstrikes in Syria last week, Charles 

Lister, with the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, was quoted in the Washington 

Post as saying ‘‘the U.S. may now have lost Syria.’’ While I do not yet share Mr. 

Lister’s pessimism, I am very concerned that we may have ceded the space that 

really matters in this fight—the economic, political, and cultural battles that will 

ultimately be what decides this conflict. If there’s one lesson that we’ve learned in 

the last 13 years, it’s that we need to be realistic about what military force alone 

can and cannot do. With so many factions engaged in Syria, who have multiple competing objectives and who are unfriendly to U.S. interests or are terrorist organizations outright, what is the United States’ strategy to win the information campaign, 

and do we have the institutional and organizational capability to manage that campaign? 

Secretary HAGEL. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Much reference has been made to the longer-term problems of U.S. 

and Western persons currently fighting with ISIL eventually returning home. These 

individuals may well have violent intentions and the training and capabilities to 

carry them out. Keeping tabs on these threats, in the numbers that we are talking 

about, is going to, at the very least, severely tax the abilities of many of our allies, 

if not overwhelm them, and pose a huge challenge here domestically. How can we 

act now to ameliorate the worst of this coming problem—for example, with intelligence or law enforcement cooperation? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department of Defense remains concerned with the threat 

posed by Westerners who travel to fight in Syria and Iraq and who may return 

home to carry out attacks. Constricting the flow of foreign fighters is an essential 

element of the U.S. Government’s comprehensive strategy to degrade and defeat the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The Department of Defense is acting through 

a coordinated, whole-of-government effort, engaging with international partners to 

highlight the threat, urging international partners to interdict the flow of foreign 

fighters, and disrupting those who facilitate the travel, related fundraising, or other 
66 

support wherever possible. This involves sharing information and intelligence with 

our partners and encouraging them to collect and share information on suspected 

foreign fighters and facilitators as well. Other elements of the U.S. Government are 

working to build law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities to address this 

threat. 

The Department of Defense also recognizes certain common factors that contribute both to the challenges posed by homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) and 

to the phenomenon of westerners traveling to join extremist organizations abroad. 

As we recently saw in the case of the attack on the Canadian Parliament, an individual motivated to engage in violence, but not able to travel abroad to fight may 

become a domestic threat. Recognizing the history of HVE targeting of Department 

of Defense personnel and facilities within the homeland, the Department of Defense 

is working in close coordination with both the intelligence and law enforcement communities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to protect Department of 

Defense personnel and facilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary, in your (Senate-side) testimony in September you 

said ‘‘we believe that Iraq’s new Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, is committed to 

bringing all Iraqis together against ISIL.’’ I’m confident we’d all agree that a military solution alone will not quell the rise of radical Islamic extremism in the Middle 

East. Could you expound upon why you have such confidence in Prime Minister alAbadi’s intention and ability to be inclusive and more successful in efforts towards 

a political solution, particularly after Mr. Maliki, who once held our confidence, 

failed so miserably? Will the new government prove more capable at reconciling 

with alienated Sunni tribes? 

Secretary HAGEL. Our confidence to date in Prime Minister Abadi is based on the 

early signals of his commitment to building an inclusive government—a commitment that distinguishes him from his predecessor. Prime Minister Abadi is facilitating cooperation among Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia. For example, he has named a 

Sunni Minister of Defense and directed outreach to Sunni tribes in an effort to incorporate tribal fighters into Iraq’s security forces. The Iraqi government is also 

working on legislation to establish a National Guard that would incorporate Sunni 

tribesmen, devolve local control, and help build trust in the central government. At 

the same time, much work remains to be done and Prime Minister Abadi faces 

many competing pressures. Although the State Department leads on U.S. Government engagement with the tribes, the Department of Defense will continue to work 

through the Iraq government to support Sunni fighters and establishing an Iraq National Guard. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As you stated in your testimony, our comprehensive strategy to 

combat ISIL includes undercutting their flow of resources. Shutting down access to 

revenue, and closing the means by which funds flow to and from ISIL is a critical 

component of that strategy. To what extent were coordinated efforts made between 

the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, and other intelligence and national security agencies to identify and restrict ISIL’s access to revenue, restrict revenue flow, including 

through Hawala networks, and restrict access to international financial systems 

prior to August 7, 2014 (President’s authorization of airstrikes); prior to June 2014 

(ISIL’s seizure of Mosul); prior to January 2014 (ISIL’s seizure of Fallujah and 

Ramadi), and currently? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department of Defense coordinates routinely with other 

U.S. Government departments and agencies to identify and disrupt the finances of 

terrorist groups. Even prior to January 2014, the Department of Defense was reviewing threat assessments and supporting interagency planning efforts against 

ISIL. Between January and August 2014, these efforts evolved through increased 

interagency collaboration to identify non-kinetic disruption priorities. In May, U.S. 

Central Command issued a theater directive tasking components to pursue counterthreat finance activities with interagency counterparts. U.S. Special Operations 

Command compiled information on ISIL foreign fighter facilitators and proposed 

disruption options through military, law enforcement, and diplomatic levers of 

power. Defense Department elements also participated in interagency exploitation 

of documents seized from ISIL, including exploitation for financial-related information, the results of which were included in finished intelligence disseminated widely 

across the U.S. government. Currently, the Department of Defense is coordinating 

with interagency partners to degrade the financial health of ISIL, capitalizing on 

lessons learned during recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Inter-agency partners coordinate directly on the military’s targeting process against financial nodes, 

including pre-strike and post-strike planning and assessments. Additionally, the Department of Defense is reviewing data sets developed during Operation Iraqi Freedom to identify options to disrupt ISIL’s illicit networks and financial facilitators. 
67 

Defense components continue to examine ISIL financial resources and 

vulnerabilities in order to contribute to the whole-of-government campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To the extent possible, please describe the policy concerning when, 

and to what degree, actions are taken with respect to terrorist financing, and what 

role the DOD plays in identifying networks and informing those decisions. What is 

the threshold for an organization to receive our attention with respect to terrorist 

financing action, and given the current environment, is that strategy and threshold 

being revisited? Finally, how effective have our economic pressures been to date, 

and how can our military leverage past progress in their role as advisors to ground 

forces? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department of Defense in coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, and other interagency stakeholders, assists in the determination process of a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation. These FTOs have engaged in terrorist activity and retain the capability or intent to conduct future terrorist acts, which threaten the security interests of the 

United States. Once a group has been identified as an FTO, the U.S. Government’s 

counter-threat finance community will take action against it. Department of Defense 

counter threat finance policy states DOD will work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny, disrupt, or defeat and 

degrade adversaries’ ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to negatively affect U.S. interests. 

Internal to the Department of Defense, the counter threat finance (CTF) mission 

is often driven by intelligence assessments on a terrorist group’s attack plans, Geographic Combatant Commander priorities and resources, and also, requests for support from other U.S. Government agencies and international partners. The Department of Defense prioritizes its CTF efforts by those terrorist organizations and networks that pose the most significant threat to U.S. national security and Department of Defense personnel worldwide. 

The Department of Defense continues to disseminate within the Department of 

Defense and among the interagency the Department’s lessons learned from supporting the Iraq Threat Finance Cell and Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell. Those 

cells yielded many successful investigations and operations, such as the takedown 

of the New Ansari Money Exchange in Afghanistan. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense initiated a multi-year effort to improve the integration of counter 

threat finance principles and programs into military doctrine, training, and education as another key component of the U.S. Government’s counterterrorism strategy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. Given that the administration has already opened lines of communication with Iran, an enemy that holds ‘‘Death to America’’ parades and regularly 

expresses its desire to destroy our ally Israel, do you envision any scenario where 

you would work with Iran in the fight against ISIL? Is the administration currently 

in regular communication with the government of Iran regarding ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. No, the United States is not in regular communication with the 

Government of Iran regarding the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We 

do not coordinate our activities with Iran. 

Mr. SHUSTER. In your estimation, how effective have coalition airstrikes been in 

countering ISIL on the ground? Given the nature of the threat and the current state 

of ISIL forces, by what metrics would you define ‘‘success’’ in the air campaign? 

Secretary HAGEL. Airstrikes have been effective by disrupting ISIL’s offensive, 

killing multiple senior ISIL leaders, and forcing them to change their tactics to 

avoid our strikes. We have achieved a 95% accuracy rate on kinetic targeting. Success for the air campaign in Iraq, however, is to actively enable Iraqi and Kurdish 

Ground forces in making steady advances and retaking ground as recently demonstrated in Beiji. Air power is a critical component of our overall strategy, but it 

is complimentary to the main effort, Iraqis retaking, controlling, and governing their 

own soil. In Syria we continue to use airstrikes to successfully target ISIL leaders, 

disrupt their lines of communication, and means of finance by targeting sources of 

oil revenue. 

Mr. SHUSTER. How involved are you and the rest of DOD with the President’s 

strategic decisionmaking in the campaign against ISIL? Have you been in regular 

consultation with the President during the formulation of this strategy, and is the 

President consulting military leaders as new developments arise on the ground? In 

what areas do you feel there needs to be better communication? 
68 

Secretary HAGEL. Both the civilian and military leadership of the Department actively participate in National Security Council meetings with the President. The Department has been represented at all interagency meetings about the counter-ISIL 

strategy convened by the National Security Council Staff. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Given that the administration has already opened lines of communication with Iran, an enemy that holds ‘‘Death to America’’ parades and regularly 

expresses its desire to destroy our ally Israel, do you envision any scenario where 

you would work with Iran in the fight against ISIL? Is the administration currently 

in regular communication with the government of Iran regarding ISIL? 

General DEMPSEY. We did not envision a scenario by which we would collaborate 

with Iran in our effort to defeat ISIL. While U.S. Forces are working with coalition 

partners to train, advise, and assist Iraqi and Peshmerga forces, they are not in 

communication, collaboration, or cooperation with Iranian forces which may be operating in proximate areas. 

Mr. SHUSTER. In your estimation, how effective have coalition airstrikes been in 

countering ISIL on the ground? Given the nature of the threat and the current state 

of ISIL forces, by what metrics would you define ‘‘success’’ in the air campaign? 

General DEMPSEY. Airstrikes have been effective by disrupting ISIL’s offensive, 

killing multiple senior ISIL leaders, and forcing them to change their tactics to 

avoid our strikes. We have achieved a 95% accuracy rate on kinetic targeting. Success for the air campaign in Iraq, however, is to actively enable Iraqi and Kurdish 

Ground forces in making steady advances and retaking ground as recently demonstrated in Beiji. Air power is a critical component of our overall strategy, but it 

is complimentary to the main effort, Iraqis retaking, controlling, and governing their 

own soil. In Syria we continue to use airstrikes to successfully target ISIL leaders, 

disrupt their lines of communication, and means of finance by targeting sources of 

oil revenue. 

Mr. SHUSTER. How involved are you and the rest of DOD with the President’s 

strategic decisionmaking in the campaign against ISIL? Have you been in regular 

consultation with the President during the formulation of this strategy, and is the 

President consulting military leaders as new developments arise on the ground? In 

what areas do you feel there needs to be better communication? 

General DEMPSEY. The Secretary of Defense and I personally consult with the 

President regarding the campaign and the broader strategy. At each of these engagements, we have in depth strategic discussions where I offer my best military 

advice. From the very beginning, the Department of Defense participated in the formulation of the counter-ISIL strategy. Communication between the White House 

and the Pentagon is open and frank, and the President remains advised of all new 

developments on the related to the campaign. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER 

Mr. BARBER. We must prevent ISIL from gaining a safe haven from which to attack Americans, abroad or here at home. As you have said, a critical piece of our 

fight is to train and equip moderate Syrian opposition groups. However, in a recent 

Newsweek article, one former CIA vetting expert declared that the U.S. and CIA 

was ‘‘completely out of its league.’’ 

Can you give us any indication as to how the vetting process is working? How 

can we make sure that we are not arming the enemy with training, aid and weapons that may be used against us? 

Secretary HAGEL and General DEMPSEY. The Department of Defense will follow 

a layer vetting approach that uses long-standing and well developed U.S. military 

procedures and practices for vetting international forces. This approach applies processes from the U.S. Intelligence Community and interagency partners, while also soliciting sustained assistance from regional and international partners. Further, the 

Department of Defense will assess trainees and monitor recipients of assistance and 

training when they return to Syria. It will be a challenge to ensure certainty that 

the weapons and training will not be misused. The Department of Defense will discontinue support to any person, unit, or commander associated with credible evidence of end use violations. 

Mr. BARBER. The Indiana Air National Guard’s 122nd Fighter Wing has been deployed to the CENTCOM area of operation with a number of A–10s. It seems logical 

to me to use the A–10 in our fight against ISIL, especially since we are operating 

in contested territory mostly without the help of forward air controllers. The A–10 

is one of the best airframes at a low altitude and can see the total battlefield much 

better than high-flying, high speed aircraft 
69 

You have both testified to this committee that the Pentagon is preparing for a 

multi-year campaign against ISIL. Have you considered a role for the Warthog in 

the fight? Is there a reason we would not use one of our best tools, particularly one 

that is already deployed to the area? 

Secretary HAGEL and General DEMPSEY. A–10s deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operation are supporting the counter-ISIL air campaign. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Can you explain the current vetting process for training and 

equipping opposition fighters and what mitigation measures are in place to ensure 

that those we train and equip are fighting in accordance with U.S. strategic objectives? Furthermore, who will be doing the training and who will be providing the 

long-term logistical support? For example: where and how will they get U.S. caliber 

ammunition for the U.S.-made rifles and machine guns we are supplying? Will all 

of these logistical requirements be the responsibility of American forces, or of contractors, our allies, etc.? 

Secretary HAGEL and General DEMPSEY. The Department of Defense will follow 

a layered vetting approach that uses long-standing and well developed U.S. military 

procedures and practices for vetting international forces. This approach applies processes from the U.S. Intelligence Community and interagency partners. The approach 

also solicits sustained assistance from regional and international partners. Further, 

the Department of Defense will assess trainees and monitor recipients of assistance 

and training when they return to Syria. U.S. special operation forces and partner 

nation personnel will conduct the required training. Existing U.S. and partner nations will provide necessary supply and logistics, to include initial and periodic resupply. 

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