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48–491 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110–848 

NOMINATION OF MICHAEL LEITER TO BE 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

CENTER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 6, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

MAY 6, 2008 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Robb, Hon. Charles S., a Former U.S. Senator from Virginia ............................. 2 

Rockefeller, Hon. John D., IV, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West Virginia .. 4 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 5 

Feingold, Russell D., a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ........................................... 21 

WITNESS 

Leiter, Michael, Director–Designate, National Counterterrorism Center .......... 6 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Prepared Statement of Michael Leiter ................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Russell D. Feingold ................................. 23 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 30 

Harvard Law Review Article Dated June 2000 Concerning Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment ......................... 49 

Harvard Law Review Article Dated March 1999 Concerning Recent Cases ...... 63 

Statement of Michael Leiter Before the U.S. House of Representatives ............ 69 

Remarks Presented by Michael Leiter to the Washington Institute ................... 82 

Statement of Michael Leiter Before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 92 

Statement for the Record by Edward Gistaro, National Intelligence Officer/ 

Transnational Threats, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and 

Michael Leiter, Principal Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center .......................................................................................................................... 99 

Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report ....................... 105 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF MICHAEL LEITER TO BE 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

CENTER 

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:20 p.m., in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay Rockefeller (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Rockefeller, Feinstein, 

Wyden, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Warner, and Snowe. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. This hearing will come to order. 

The Committee meets today to consider the President’s nomination of Mr. Michael Leiter to serve as the next Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Before the Vice Chairman and I make our opening statements, 

I’m pleased to recognize our former colleague, Chuck Robb. Senator 

Robb not only served as a valued member of this Committee, a very 

good friend to me—southwestern Virginia and West Virginia share 

characteristics—but he went on to make an important contribution 

to intelligence reform as the Co–Chairman of the Commission on 

the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

It’s a pleasure to have you here today to introduce Mr. Leiter. 

And I recognize Senator Robb for so doing. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, might I interject and join you 

in recognizing the presence of our distinguished colleague, a very 

special colleague to me, having shared the responsibility of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia with him for many years. 

And I also wish to point out, Mr. Chairman, that he’s never lost 

a beat in continuing to do public service. You mentioned one commission; there are probably several others you could mention. 

But we thank you, Senator, and we welcome you before the Committee. When I had the pleasure of meeting with the nominee, we 

talked about you and I said he couldn’t have picked a more able, 

inspiring Senator to introduce than you. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Mr. Chairman, this is getting thick. 

[Laughter.] 

Vice Chairman BOND. We could all say things about our former 

colleague, Senator Robb, but I think maybe we ought to get on to 

hearing his introduction. 

2 

Senator WARNER. Well, it was a small matter of Virginia with 

the two of us representing it. I think that required a little—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. Oh, I thought it was—I thought you laid 

it on thick. I have a lot more I was going to say too. I don’t want 

to wait till I get to my formal remarks. 

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to proceed whenever you would like me to, but I do not want to interrupt my distinguished former colleagues. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Unless you choose to proceed, in which 

case you may do so. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES S. ROBB, A 

FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do indeed appreciate 

the warm welcome from you and from others, from the four Members who are currently at the Committee table, all friends of long 

standing, and I am truly delighted. As a matter of fact, this used 

to be my favorite Committee, so I’m especially pleased to be here. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the Committee, 

as all of you know, Senators are often asked to introduce someone 

from their home state who’s been nominated by the President. And 

in many cases, they may know this person only casually, and they 

do so as a courtesy. 

But for me, this introduction is personal. I’m delighted to have 

this opportunity to present the man that the President has formally nominated to become the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. I’ll let him present his son Zach in a few minutes 

for advice and counsel that he might want to share. 

Of course, Michael Leiter doesn’t really need an introduction to 

this Committee because you’ve been working with Mike as Acting 

Director since Scott Redd retired last fall, and prior to that, as 

Deputy Director of the NCTC, and before that when he helped 

stand up the ODNI as chief of staff to the Deputy Director of that 

organization. 

You already know his reputation in the intelligence community, 

and it is truly remarkable. As recently as early 2004, I had never 

heard of Mike Leiter. Yet in the last four years there is no one in 

the entire IC with whom I have had the pleasure of working more 

closely or for whom I have developed a higher regard. 

I give senior U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Larry Silberman full 

credit for bringing Mike into the intelligence orbit. When Judge Silberman and I agreed to co-chair the WMD commission—and were 

incidentally given preferential hiring and detailing authority 

throughout government—Larry recommended to me that the very 

first people we ought to bring on board the commission’s professional staff, even before choosing an executive director or general 

counsel, were a couple of recent super-bright Supreme Court law 

clerks to help us deal with the complexities of government organizations and requirements. 

He just happened to know two such men who fit that bill perfectly. And after we interviewed them, we agreed wholeheartedly 

and we hired them on the spot. The other man, Brett Gerry, is now 

chief of staff to the Attorney General of the United States. 

3 

And I would submit to you that Mike Leiter, who is here for confirmation at this particular hearing, is as prepared, as qualified, as 

motivated to continue leading the NCTC as anyone in the IC today. 

I like and admire Mike Leiter for a number of reasons, not the 

least of which is the diversity of his experience. As a naval officer, 

he served in Bosnia and Iraq. His peers chose him to be president 

of the Harvard Law Review. He clerked for Justice Breyer. 

He was a highly regarded fast-track federal prosecutor in the 

Eastern District of Virginia, where most of the cases involving terrorism are brought, known as the rocket docket. And he was a real 

leader on the WMD Commission. He was the go-to guy for all of 

us on the Commission when we needed something done right and 

done quickly. And he was also a major drafter of our final report. 

When Vice Admiral Scott Redd, who came out of retirement to 

serve as executive director of the WMD Commission and was then 

persuaded to come out of retirement again to stand up the NCTC, 

needed a Deputy Director at NCTC, he persuaded the DNI to let 

Mike move over to take the job, because Scott had worked very 

closely with Mike on the WMD commission and he knew just how 

good he was. 

Mike Leiter is a man wise beyond his years. He has a powerful 

intellect, impeccable integrity, indefatigable energy, and really 

solid judgment, even when he’s faced with the most difficult and 

complicated questions. If there’s anyone in the intelligence business 

who knows Mike Leiter and doesn’t think he’s the perfect fit for 

this incredibly difficult job, I simply haven’t met them. 

Mike has the trust and admiration of his peers and his subordinates, because they know he’ll speak truth to power and he’ll take 

full responsibility for his decisions. I’ve watched him conduct his 

0800 SVTC, his secure video teleconference, with participants from 

all over the globe, representing all elements of the counterterrorism 

network, dealing with raw intel reports in real time from every 

source imaginable, and he’s as nimble and impressive as they 

come. As a leader, he’s the real thing. 

There are, of course, no guarantees in countering the terrorist 

threats that we face 24/7, and Mike knows that as well as anyone. 

But with a consummate professional like Mike Leiter at the helm 

of NCTC, I’m confident that we’re currently doing the best job that 

we’ve ever done to stay ahead of those who would do us harm. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this Committee, I hope 

you can tell I have enormous confidence in and unqualified respect 

for Mike Leiter. And I hope, in your wisdom, you will confirm him 

as quickly as possible. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I leave you in his care 

and abandon him to your plight, and I thank you. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Robb. 

I’ve been passing around a note up here that I was at your wedding at the White House—— 

Senator ROBB. Yeah. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER [continuing]. Trying to impress my colleagues. [Laughter.] 

Vice Chairman BOND. I am impressed. 

4 

Senator ROBB. And Mr. Chairman, before I leave, I might add 

that I was at your very first swearing-in as well, so we go back a 

long way—as governor, not as Senator. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. And you were the only governor to 

show up. 

Senator ROBB. With that, Mr. Chairman, I seek your leave, sir. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I welcome Mr. Leiter to this Committee 

even as I thank the departing Senator Robb. I also extend our welcome to his son Zachary, which has me in thorough confusion, because there are two extremely cute boys who look very much alike. 

So I need to have Zachary identified. That’s Zachary. Hi, Zachary. 

Welcome. 

As outlined by Senator Robb, Mr. Leiter brings with him a demonstrated record of experience, which I believe will serve him well, 

should he be confirmed in his role as the Deputy and now Acting 

Director of NCTC. Mr. Leiter has demonstrated the leadership 

skills that are necessary for having that job. 

The NCTC was a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, 

was a central pillar of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In that Act, Congress made the Director of 

NCTC a Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed position to 

ensure the Director had sufficient standing to execute the broad 

range of responsibilities assigned to your incredibly complex work. 

The National Counterterrorism Center has two critical functions—number one, to serve as the primary organization in the 

United States government for integrating and analyzing terrorism 

related to intelligence; and, two, to conduct strategic operational 

planning to integrate all instruments of national power—not just 

intelligence—in the battle against terrorism. 

In accordance with these functions, the Director of NCTC has 

unique dual-reporting requirements. On matters of terrorism intelligence and analysis, the NCTC Director reports to the Director of 

National Intelligence, but on issues related to counterterrorism 

strategic planning, the Director of NCTC reports directly to the 

President. 

I look forward to hearing Mr. Leiter’s views on both of these critical functions, the position’s unique reporting requirements and the 

adequacy of the authorities given to the Director of the Center. I 

also hope to hear Mr. Leiter’s plans to advance and strengthen the 

important work now being conducted at the NCTC. 

The Committee, of course, is very familiar with the NCTC’s 

work. Not only are we a customer and a consumer of your intelligence analysis, but the Committee has had an opportunity to visit 

the NCTC just recently, where you presided over that, as I hope 

I told you, brilliantly. 

Our visit there inspired confidence in the Center’s capability to 

go after terrorists around the globe. It just did. The NCTC leadership, staff, analysts are undeniably dedicated to keeping this nation safe from terrorism. I take this opportunity to extend our public thanks to Mr. Leiter, his deputies, and the many analysts at 

NCTC who met with me and the Vice Chairman and other memVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:22 Jul 09, 2009 Jkt 045037 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48491.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
5 

bers of this Committee. We say that frequently, but what needs not 

to get lost is that we mean it. 

As we all know, the threat of terrorism is real, on-going, and 

evolving. The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism—a portion of which was declassified in July, 2007—stated 

that from its safe haven in Pakistan, al–Qa’ida had regenerated 

key elements of its U.S. attack capabilities. Most troubling is the 

judgment that they will continue to try to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials in attacks. Clearly 

the NCTC must succeed at the tasks assigned to it; our security 

and safety depend on it. 

Mr. Leiter is not a product of the intelligence community himself, 

but after meeting with him and reviewing his background I believe 

he has a resume that will serve him well. And, quite frankly, there 

are parts of me that welcome the fact that you don’t have that as 

part of your official background. It implies and infers to me a certain kind of objectivity, when necessary, irreverence, and that you’ll 

give us your thoughts, straight and true. 

Unlike many nominees, we have direct evidence of your ability 

to do this job since you’ve been Acting for six months. Undoubtedly 

there are many challenges ahead. And we will probe into some of 

those, but I now ask if Vice Chairman Bond wishes to make an 

opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Of 

course I’m delighted to be able to welcome Mr. Leiter to the Committee’s hearing on the nomination to be the next Director of the 

National Counterterrorism Center. And I expend a very special 

welcome to your young son, Zachary, and the guy who’s riding shotgun for him, Will. The two of them, I am sure, can provide any assistance that you need. If you need a little fire support, we can call 

in those two guys. 

But, Mike, if you’re confirmed as Director, the time period for 

which you would serve could be an abbreviated one due to a change 

in administration. But I strongly hope it will not. And whoever that 

person may be—and there’s a little disagreement on this panel— 

I will certainly urge that you continue to do so if you continue to 

realize the high accomplishments that you have already registered. 

But the potentially short term should in no way diminish the responsibilities and challenges that lie ahead. And our expectations, 

as you’ve heard from the Chairman, are very high that you will address these challenges head-on. 

The NCTC was created, as you well know, to address the shortcomings identified in the 9/11 Commission report. As such, we realize the NCTC is still in the building phase, is not a finalized entity, 

but there have been some very encouraging signs that its creation 

was indeed a very wise one. 

The Chairman has already ably outlined the major responsibilities of the NCTC. They include assigning responsibilities, making 

sure other agencies have access, and receive all source intelligence 

for the counterterrorism plans, and have the intelligence they need 

to carry out their missions. And if there is one area that I think 

6 

was sorely lacking, it was that sharing of information that put us 

in a position where we could not determine the extent of the threat 

to us prior to 9/11. 

But, Mr. Leiter, you’ve been with the NCTC for 15 months, and 

I’d be interested to hear your assessment of the progress, particularly as it comes to the role of strategic operational planner for the 

IC. I look forward to hearing your ideas on how to advance 

progress and resolve any concerns that may exist within the IC 

about NCTC’s role as a strategic operational planner. 

I was around when the initial effort was made to set up the 

NCTC, and let us say that that was not a painless birth. There 

were quite a few difficulties in getting it established. But the agencies who may have been somewhat under-enthusiastic at the first 

are the ones who will benefit from the NCTC’s counterterrorism 

analysis, and they should now be willing fully to assist in performing the mission, whether that means better information sharing or providing more analytic resources or support. 

As you and I have discussed in conversation, I find it particularly 

encouraging that, with your experience and knowledge of it and 

bringing a fresh view in, you have understood so clearly what is 

now being recognized much more widely, and that is that while 

there must be kinetic force to fight the immediate challenges of the 

radical terrorists who threaten us, that the 80 to 90 percent of the 

battle is still going to be in the rest of smart power. Smart power, 

in my view, encompasses the educational, economic, diplomatic, political, social, trade efforts that must go along if we are to stop the 

spread and stop the cancer of radical terrorists growing. 

So, Mike, I hope you can give us an idea of what you can do to 

move forward on all these areas. I’m particularly interested in your 

thoughts on the FBI co-locating its international terrorism headquarters within the NCTC; and the CIA’s al–Qa’ida analytic elements, thus far, refusing to co-locate at your facility. We’d like to 

hear which one’s the better decision, from your perspective, and 

why. 

Mr. Chairman, this is such an important job. I hope we can get 

the Committee to act on this and get it to the floor, and get him 

confirmed—so long as he doesn’t blow it in the coming few moments, which I am confident he will not. I look forward to his statement. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL LEITER, DIRECTOR–DESIGNATE, 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

Mr. LEITER. I felt okay until that last comment there, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

Mr. LEITER. Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond and 

Senators Feinstein and Warner, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear today. I would also like to add a very special 

thanks—I’m sorry he’s not here to hear it—to Senator Robb, for 

that incredibly kind introduction and his kind words. 

It has been my distinct privilege to serve at NCTC since February 2007, first as the principal Deputy Director and, for the past 

six months, as the Acting Director. I’m extremely honored to appear before the Committee today to discuss my credentials. I have 

7 

submitted for the record a longer statement, and I ask that it 

would be made part of the record, Senator. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. It will be. 

Mr. LEITER. Before going forward, although he’s been welcomed 

by all of you, I want to note how privileged I am to have my son 

Zachary with me today. And I honestly could ask for no better inspiration in the work that I have to do at NCTC than people like 

Zach and the Zachs all around the world. 

On September 11th, 2001, our nation experienced what was undoubtedly the most traumatic terrorist attack in our nation’s history. Now, this Committee and, I think, the public needs no reminder of that fact, but I begin here because it was in fact that 

event that was the impetus to the creation of NCTC. And from my 

perspective, it remains the guiding principle and the guiding vision 

for me at the Center. 

The goal at the time of the attack and the creation of NCTC was 

simple, and that was to provide greater security for the nation and 

do so while protecting fundamental American values. The means to 

doing that were equally straightforward: create in NCTC a center 

to organize the U.S. government’s intelligence and strategic planning response to terrorism in a manner that was simply not possible before 9/11. 

Should I have the honor of being confirmed by the Senate, it is 

these two foundational principles—greater security while simultaneously protecting fundamental American values—that will guide 

all of my actions. In many ways I believe, and I hope you believe, 

that my credentials speak very much to these principles and, moreover, to the type of work that NCTC must do. 

I am not, as the Chairman has noted, a product of a lifetime of 

service in a single government agency. Rather, my career includes 

service in the United States Navy—Senator Warner, I did not plan 

ahead—the Department of Justice, the office of the DNI, and in the 

judicial branch as a law clerk to federal judges, to include Associate 

Justice Stephen Breyer of the Supreme Court. And I believe I 

would also be remiss, considering what NCTC and this nation has 

to do, if I did not also note my seven-plus years of service as a first 

responder, as an EMT and firefighter working for local governments. 

I would proffer that such experience—the military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and as a first responder—are many of the 

same key elements that NCTC and we as a nation must bring together to address terrorism effectively. 

Now, in each of these roles, in addition to my service with the 

Robb–Silberman Commission, I have strived to gain the trust and 

confidence of my subordinates, my peers, and my superiors. And 

my approach has always been straightforward: listen to those 

around you and lead with vision, tenacity, judgment and, above all 

else, integrity. 

It is these traits that I have attempted to bring to NCTC over 

the past year, and it is my performance over the past six months 

as Acting Director that I would suggest best foreshadows how I 

would lead NCTC in the future. 

Throughout this time I have attempted to build strong partnerships throughout the U.S. government, within the intelligence comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:22 Jul 09, 2009 Jkt 045037 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48491.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
8 

munity, but also beyond. And I have urged all those within NCTC 

to similarly aggressively lead their community counterparts. 

With that overview, I would like to briefly provide you with my 

outline for my vision of NCTC and, by extension, the future of the 

U.S. government’s fight against terrorism. 

My first priority and the very first responsibility given to NCTC 

under the Intelligence Reform Act is to ensure that NCTC is the 

primary organization for analyzing and integrating terrorism information, ensuring counterterrorism information sharing among federal agencies, and supporting other agencies’ sharing of counterterrorism information with non-federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector partners. 

This is an area in which, from my perspective, we have made 

really tremendous progress, although much, much more remains to 

be done, especially, I would note again, as it relates to supporting 

the non-traditional partners outside of Washington who are so critical to this fight. 

Second, NCTC must further institutionalize U.S. governmentwide, beyond the intelligence community, strategic planning. From 

my experience working in the interagency system, I am more convinced today than ever before that our success in the fight against 

terrorism will only come through such coordinated and synchronized efforts, to include the full weight, as Vice Chairman 

Bond noted, of our diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, 

homeland security, and law enforcement activities. And it is up to 

NCTC—and, if I am confirmed, it is up to me as Director of 

NCTC—to drive those efforts. 

Third, again as the Vice Chairman noted, NCTC and, I believe, 

the entire U.S. government, must increase our efforts to combat 

violent extremism through greater ideological engagement. Despite 

our successful kinetic actions against the enemy, it has to be emphasized over and over again that the fight against terrorism will 

not be won solely through bullets and bombs. Rather, we must 

have an equally robust effort in what many term the war of ideas. 

If confirmed, I will take it as my charge to provide the intelligence analysis necessary to enable this engagement and equally, 

if not more important, to help bring together all the elements of national power beyond the intelligence community in this long-term 

effort. 

Fourth, NCTC must provide leadership and programmatic oversight of the intelligence community’s counterterrorism efforts beyond the NCTC and on behalf of the DNI. Ultimately, NCTC is 

simply one part of a much larger intelligence community effort 

against terrorism. In this regard, NCTC must help to lead that 

community to ensure that we function as more than the sum of our 

parts and make best use of what are limited resources. 

Fifth and finally, and perhaps in many ways the most important, 

NCTC must continue to attract the most highly motivated and 

qualified personnel to allow us to meet all of these challenges. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that you got to meet some of 

those highly qualified, highly motivated analysts and planners who 

do the work at NCTC, and I very much recognize that as a leader, 

NCTC’s ultimate fate will be based far more on my ability to enable that extraordinary workforce than my personal efforts alone. 

9 

In doing all this, from my perspective, little is more important 

than ensuring that this Committee and the larger Congress are appropriately informed of NCTC’s activities. And moreover, while I 

begin with the legal requirements as a lawyer—and they are paramount—I also heartily welcome your valuable insights into how 

NCTC, the intelligence community and the U.S. government should 

go about this business. 

Your years of experience are ones that I hope I can benefit from 

in leading NCTC, if confirmed. Let me stress that no single department, no agency and, most importantly, no branch of government 

has a monopoly on wisdom on how to fight terrorism. If confirmed, 

I look forward to the benefit of the Committee’s views and will seek 

its advice on how NCTC should proceed in this mission. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a note from my 

predecessor, Scott Redd, on the occasion of his confirmation hearing 

about three years ago. Then he noted that he was entering the 

realm of being a so-called political appointee and he noted that 

there was nothing political about the job of the Director of NCTC. 

I could not agree more strongly. 

Every day that I have served at NCTC I have been guided by the 

foundational principles that I noted when I opened—providing 

Americans and our allies with greater security while simultaneously protecting fundamental American values. In my view, 

NCTC’s mission has not been and must never be driven by political 

calculations, for whatever differences we may have on approach or 

emphasis, they pale in comparison with our very common goals. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you again for 

this opportunity, for which I am truly humbled and honored. I look 

forward to answering your questions today and, if the Senate 

chooses to confirm me, to working very closely with all of you and 

your staffs in the future to ensure that I wisely carry out my duties 

as Director of NCTC. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL LEITER, DIRECTOR (ACTING), THE NATIONAL

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond, members of the Committee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today on the occasion of my nomination 

to serve as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). It has 

been my distinct privilege to serve as the Center’s Principal Deputy Director since 

February 2007, to serve as its Acting Director for the past six months, and most 

recently to be nominated by the President to serve as the Center’s Director. I am 

further honored to appear before this Committee today to discuss my credentials to 

be confirmed as NCTC’s Director, as well as my vision for NCTC in the coming 

years. 

Before turning to these issues, however, I think it critical to reflect briefly on why 

NCTC was created by the Congress and President less than four years ago. On September 11, 2001, our nation experienced the single most traumatic terrorist attack 

in its history. NCTC was created to organize the U.S. Government’s intelligence and 

strategic planning response to the threat of terrorism in a manner that was not, 

for a variety of reasons, possible before the tragedy of 9/11. And we were created 

to do so in a manner that not only provides our citizens with greater security, but 

also simultaneously protects the civil liberties that are the very essence of our nation. 

I begin here because it is these foundational principles—providing greater security while protecting fundamental American values—that will, if I have the honor 

of being confirmed by the Senate, motivate all of my actions. And I would seek to 

10 

lead NCTC in a manner that fully honors all of those who have been touched by 

the scourge of terrorism. 

In many ways I believe that my credentials speak very much to these guiding 

principles and, moreover, to the type of work that is required of NCTC. I am not, 

as this Committee is well aware, a product of a lifetime of service in a single department or agency. Rather my career includes service in the United States Navy, the 

Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and in the 

Judicial Branch as a law clerk to two federal judges. And I believe I would be remiss 

if I did not also note my seven-plus years of experience working for local governments as a first responder. I would proffer that such experience—the military, law 

enforcement, intelligence, legal, and local first responder communities—are many of 

the same key elements that NCTC, and we as a nation, must bring together to address terrorism effectively. 

From my perspective my legal training and experience as a law clerk to Associate 

Justice Stephen Breyer and then as an Assistant United States Attorney is especially relevant to the NCTC’s work. As 9/11 so vividly illustrated, a substantial portion of counterterrorism intelligence and the U.S. Government’s response to terrorism must occur within our borders. Having led interagency investigative teams 

as a prosecutor, I believe I have a healthy appreciation of the issues faced by law 

enforcement agents in the United States. Moreover, having served for two federal 

judges of the highest caliber, I have developed an unshakeable and profound respect 

for the importance of the rule of law and respect for civil liberties. 

These experiences have, I believe, prepared me well to lead an organization that 

must not only analyze information that is collected within the United States, but 

also advise the Director of National Intelligence on operations relating to counterterrorism in the United States and assist the President’s National and Homeland Security advisors in devising forward-looking strategic plans to counter the potential 

spread of violent extremism here at home. 

I believe that my experience studying the Intelligence Community from the outside further qualifies me to lead the interagency element that is NCTC. As a lead 

investigator and report drafter for the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 

of the United States Concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) 

I had the distinct honor of working intimately with nine preeminent Commissioners, 

to include Senator Chuck Robb who was kind enough to introduce me to the Committee today. Equally important, I had the luxury of devoting more than a year to 

an in-depth, Intelligence Community-wide study of where we performed well and 

where reform was necessary. 

In this role I spent countless hours examining intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and structural characteristics and, much more significantly, formulating 

recommendations to improve the Intelligence Community’s performance. Much of 

my time at the Commission was devoted to the issues I have faced since arriving 

at NCTC—integrating counterterrorism information, confronting the spread of 

weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring that policy makers receive timely, accurate, and unbiased assessments of complex national security challenges. My subsequent service to then-Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and thenPrincipal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Michael Hayden provided the 

even more illuminating experience of turning the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 and the Commission’s freshly authored recommendations 

into real action and tangible results across the Intelligence Community. 

Ultimately, however, I believe that my strongest credential to serve as Director 

of NCTC cannot be distilled from a list of educational or professional accomplishments. Rather, I consider my proven leadership of NCTC to be the truest testament 

to my qualifications. During my time at NCTC—and in my leadership elsewhere, 

to include the U.S. Navy and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence— 

I have strived to gain the trust and confidence of my subordinates, peers, and superiors. My approach has been straightforward: listen to those around you and lead 

with vision, tenacity, judgment, and integrity. 

I am proud of the relationships that I have developed since arriving at NCTC, 

both within our walls and with key partners in the U.S. Government, among state 

and local leaders, and our foreign allies. I have undoubtedly made mistakes during 

this period, but I have done all that I can to learn from those mistakes and improve 

my—and NCTC’s performance. And I believe that overall, and in spite of the fact 

that I have served as both the Acting Director and Principal Deputy Director for 

the past six months, I have helped NCTC become more effective during this time. 

These are, from my perspective, the principal reasons that I am qualified to serve 

as the Director of NCTC. I would now like to provide you with my vision for the 

future of NCTC and, by extension, what the future holds for the U.S. Government’s 

fight against terrorism. More specifically, I will address five broad topics: (1) imVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:22 Jul 09, 2009 Jkt 045037 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48491.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
11 

proving NCTC’s intelligence support to ‘‘non traditional’’ partners; (2) institutionalizing cross-Government strategic operational planning; (3) advancing the U.S. Government’s global ideological engagement; (4) leadership and programmatic oversight 

of the Intelligence Community’s counterterrorism efforts on behalf of the Director 

of National Intelligence (DNI); and (5) ensuring that NCTC has the people to fulfill 

all of its responsibilities. 

My first priority, and the first responsibility given to the Center by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is to ensure that 

NCTC is truly the primary organization for analyzing and integrating terrorism information, ensuring counterterrorism information sharing among federal agencies, 

and supporting other agencies’ sharing of counterterrorism information with nonfederal partners. In all of these roles I report to the DNI, Michael McConnell, and 

serve as his Mission Manager for counterterrorism. On several occasions prior and 

subsequent to the President’s decision to nominate me to serve as Director, Director 

McConnell and I have spoken to discuss my potential leadership of NCTC and I am 

confident that we share a common vision for the Center’s future. 

I believe that NCTC has, since its inception, made enormous progress toward fulfilling this primary responsibility. Today NCTC authors the majority of terrorism 

analysis that goes to senior policy makers and it ensures that all such products are 

appropriately coordinated among Intelligence Community components. But whereas 

this progress has been significant, we have moved more slowly in our support to 

‘‘non traditional’’ partners such as FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces; state, local, and 

tribal homeland security officials; and military commanders in the field. NCTC has 

not—and will not if I am confirmed—seek to displace the FBI, DHS, and DIA as 

they serve these respective customers, but we can and must do a better job of 

crafting our analytic product to support these diverse consumers. 

In addition, we must continue to strengthen our focused information sharing efforts to these customers, as best embodied by our Defense Intelligence Unit (costaffed by personnel from DIA’s Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism and U.S. Northern Command) and the Interagency Threat Assessment and 

Coordination Group (ITACG, staffed by state and local law enforcement officers). 

These targeted information sharing components not only push information to these 

customers with unique counterterrorism needs, they also help to educate the rest 

of NCTC’s staff on how our products can be shaped to speak more effectively to 

those combating terrorism outside of Washington. 

Second, NCTC must further institutionalize U.S. Government-wide strategic operational planning (SOP). In its essence, SOP bridges the gap between coordinated 

interagency policy and strategy, and operations by Departments and Agencies to implement that strategy. From my experience working within the interagency system 

I am more convinced than ever that success against terrorism will only come 

through such coordinated and synchronized efforts—to include the full weight of our 

diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security and law enforcement 

activities. 

Since the President’s approval of the first-ever National Implementation Plan in 

2006, SOP has matured and evolved very significantly. Although we continue to 

pursue broad strategic plans that meaningfully guide department and agency programs and budgets, we have also initiated far more granular, targeted efforts to ensure department and agency implementation of plans on key topics (e.g., terrorists’ 

acquisition of weapons of mass destruction). I strongly believe that this combination 

of ‘‘deliberate’’ and ‘‘dynamic’’ planning, with forceful support from the National and 

Homeland Security Councils, will ultimately lead to cohesive government planning 

and execution against terrorism. 

Third, NCTC must—through both its intelligence and strategic operational planning components—increase our efforts to combat violent extremism through ideological engagement. Despite our successful kinetic actions against the enemy, it must 

be emphasized that the fight against terrorism will not be won solely with bullets 

and bombs in the central battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Rather, 

we must have an equally robust effort in what many term the ‘‘War of Ideas.’’ 

This global ideological engagement constitutes a key center of gravity in the battle 

against al-Qa’ida, its associates, and those that take inspiration from the group. 

Terrorist leaders aggressively employ messages related to current events, leverage 

mass media technologies, and use the Internet to engage in a communications war 

against all who oppose their oppressive and murderous vision of the world. We must 

engage them on this front with equal vehemence and we can do so in a way that 

makes quite clear how bankrupt their extremist ideology is. If confirmed as the Director of NCTC, I will expend significant time and energy to make sure that the 

Center’s analysts address this issue from all perspectives, and I will spend equal 

time working to bring together all elements of national power—from the DepartVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:22 Jul 09, 2009 Jkt 045037 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48491.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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ments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and elsewhere—to tackle this 

long-term effort. 

Fourth, NCTC must provide leadership and programmatic oversight of the Intelligence Community’s counterterrorism efforts on behalf of the DNI. As IRTPA clearly recognized and as the WMD Commission further noted, there is a dire need for 

interagency coordination on key mission areas such as terrorism. Ultimately NCTC 

is only one part of a much larger counterterrorism effort within the larger Intelligence Community. In this regard NCTC must help to lead that community to ensure that we function as more than the sum of our parts. If confirmed, I intend to 

continue working closely with Director McConnell as well as the leadership of the 

Intelligence Community to coordinate counterterrorism efforts and provide budgetary advice to the Director as he formulates future National Intelligence Program 

budget requests. 

Fifth, NCTC must continue to attract highly motivated and qualified personnel 

to allow us to successfully meet all of the preceding challenges. Doing so will require 

us to hire officers directly to NCTC as well as working extremely closely with our 

partner agencies to obtain qualified detailees. NCTC has experienced substantial 

growth since its inception and I believe that this growth must continue through Fiscal Year 2009 in order to provide the analytic and strategic planning support mandated by IRTPA. As the Center grows we must provide our workforce—both permanent and those detailed from elsewhere in the interagency—the resources, opportunities, and incentives necessary for success. As a leader I know that NCTC’s ultimate fate will be based far more on my ability to enable NCTC’s extraordinary 

workforce than on any personal efforts. 

In doing all of this, little is more important than ensuring that this Committee 

and others are appropriately informed of NCTC’s activities. One way the Center 

does so is through the daily provision of intelligence directly to the Congress. Already this year NCTC has provided more than 223 separate analytic terrorism products over CAPNET, a secure Internet link between the Intelligence Community and 

the Congress. These products include Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessments, NCTC’s Terrorism Dispatch, and the NCTC’s Spotlight. I am completely 

committed to ensuring that this Committee has the information it needs to perform 

its constitutional oversight duties. The principle of checks and balances is one of the 

fundamental tenets of our form of government and it is one that I fully appreciate 

and look forward to supporting through open and honest communication with the 

Congress. 

Moreover, while the legal requirements for oversight are clearly paramount, I also 

heartily welcome your invaluable insights on how NCTC and the counterterrorism 

community should go about its business. Your many years of experience in intelligence and elsewhere are a strength that I intend to benefit from in leading NCTC 

if confirmed. No single department, agency or branch of government has a monopoly 

on wisdom when it comes to fighting terrorism. If confirmed, I look forward to the 

benefit of the Committee’s views and will seek its advice on how NCTC should proceed in its vitally important missions. 

In closing, I would like to take a note from my predecessor, Vice Admiral Scott 

Redd’s confirmation hearing. Almost three years ago Admiral Redd noted that although he was entering the realm of being a ‘‘political appointee,’’ there was nothing 

political about the job of Director of NCTC. I could not agree more strongly. Every 

day that I have served at NCTC I have been guided by the foundational principles 

that I noted when I opened—providing Americans and our allies with greater security while simultaneously protecting fundamental American values. In my view 

NCTC’s mission has not been and should not be driven by political calculations, for 

whatever differences we may have on approach or emphasis, they pale in comparison with our common goals. 

Thank you again for this opportunity for which I am truly honored. I look forward 

to answering your questions and, if the Senate chooses to confirm me, to working 

very closely with you in the future to ensure that I carry out my responsibilities 

wisely. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Leiter. That’s a comforting statement, delivered with, I believe, the core values that are 

within you. 

We sent you some questions, and in one of your answers, you 

wrote, ‘‘Our former Director concluded that the NCTC permanent 

cadre should comprise 20 percent of the NCTC’s total personnel 

strength. Over the past six months, I have concluded that a slightVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:22 Jul 09, 2009 Jkt 045037 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\48491.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
13 

ly higher percentage would be optimal. In this light—this is what 

you said—‘‘in this light, if I should be confirmed, I would pursue 

a strategy to ensure that the NCTC permanent cadre be approximately 30 to 35 percent of the NCTC total workforce.’’ 

Now, this is one of those questions which is always hard to answer but, generally speaking, in an era of leniency and scarce resources and flexibility and cutting through the waters rapidly, I’m 

somewhat concerned at this strategy of the growth of the permanent staff of the NCTC. I believe that a certain percentage of experienced permanent staff is required, obviously, for the sake of the 

overall, and that’s a very large number, and I recognize that. I’m 

not convinced that the permanent cadre needs to be as high as 35 

percent. I’m not necessarily criticizing that before I hear what your 

response is, but I worry about hiring a permanent cadre of new analysts without intelligence community experience. 

I understand that some intelligence agencies continue to resist 

detailing their personnel to what will hopefully be your agency. 

And I wonder if your strategy is a way to deal with this intransigence. So would you please describe your efforts and authorities 

available to you as Director to ensure agencies are living up to 

their expectations and providing the requisite number of staff to 

you, and that they are of the requisite quality that matches your 

standards. I’m especially interested in learning more about the participation of the Department of Homeland Security and of State. 

Mr. LEITER. I’d be happy to, Mr. Chairman. 

First, one point I would like to make, that in terms of hiring of 

new analysts directly to NCTC, in all but the rarest occasions, 

those individuals who are being hired do have prior analytic experience. So simply because we are hiring them does not mean that 

they have not previously worked at different agencies before, and 

bring that experience with them. 

Now, I’d like to set some foundational principals also. I am firmly 

committed to ensuring that there’s a flow of people back and forth 

from NCTC to other agencies. I think it is that expertise that gives 

NCTC strength. The reason behind moving above that original 20 

to 25 percent was purely born out of our experience, and much less 

so in terms of difficulty getting people from other agencies and 

much more so in ensuring that our teams at NCTC have sufficient 

continuity, that there wasn’t excessive flow in and out based on 

detailees going back and forth. 

Now, in terms of the Director’s authorities to ensure that agencies are providing sufficient staff, my authorities are co-extensive 

with the Director of National Intelligence’s authorities. So if an 

agency fails to provide detailed analysts, I work with the DNI to 

ensure that those people are transferred. Now, I can pledge to you 

that, if confirmed, Senator, I will not hesitate in the least to go to 

the DNI and suggest that the DNI use his budgetary authority and 

reduce funding to individual elements if they are not supporting 

NCTC. 

Now, you asked about DHS and State. I want to start with the 

basic premise that most agencies have done an outstanding job of 

supporting us. And although there were earlier bureaucratic fights, 

I do want to highlight CIA has been stellar in its support of NCTC, 

and they should be commended for that. 

14 

Other agencies have not been quite as forthcoming in some of 

their support. The recent inspector general report noted some 

shortcomings on the part of both DHS and the Department of 

State. I am pleased to say that, after I read that report last week, 

I called up the office of the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 

the Secretary’s office has already committed additional support to 

immediately fill critical needs. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. May I interrupt, only to this point— 

since my time is up—that when you get new people, you know the 

intelligence world and you know the agency’s world very well. And, 

you’re very forthright and I deem you to be dogged. Do you say, 

‘‘This is who I want,’’ or do you select from those that they send 

you? 

Mr. LEITER. There is some combination. We go out, initially, and 

we recruit. We then ask those people to go through their chains 

and provide names. Those names are then submitted to us from the 

agency and we either accept or reject people that the agency has 

submitted. In many, cases people are submitted to us that we do 

not believe are of sufficient experience or skill level that they will 

not help NCTC, and we send them back, and we say, please try 

again. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. So in the mixture, you go to the CIA, 

or some other agency, and you say, ‘‘I really need these six people.’’ 

Mr. LEITER. We will select both based on skill set and, in some 

instances, we do by-name requests working with that agency. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Bond. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Leiter, as you probably well know, last summer, Congress 

passed the Protect America Act, and after that, this Committee 

worked long and hard and came up with what I think was an excellent bipartisan measure to make sure that the FISA operations 

could continue. However, we have yet to see a positive action by 

the House on that bill, which is set to expire in August. 

To the extent that you can say so in this forum—obviously, details would not be appropriate—to what extent does NCTC rely on 

intelligence information collected under Protect America Act certifications in conducting terrorism analysis, and what impact would 

there be on your ability to conduct that analysis of counterterrorism should this intelligence source stop? 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Vice Chairman, I would begin just by saying 

that NCTC, obviously, does not collect any intelligence. 

Vice Chairman BOND. That’s correct. 

Mr. LEITER. So we are a consumer of the intelligence that is collected by organizations like the National Security Agency. That 

being said, a significant percentage of the information that we analyze comes from signals intercepts, most notably from FISA and, 

since its passage, the Protect America Act. So that is a significant 

portion of what we look at to understand terrorists’ plans, intent 

and the like. 

We do not, as a general matter, know whether or not something 

is collected through standard FISA or Protect America Act. We 

don’t delve into that level of detail. I will say that, as I understand 

it, the flexibility that the Protect America Act is quite helpful and 

allows us to be more agile in our collection, which, of course, proVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:22 Jul 09, 2009 Jkt 045037 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\48491.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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vides us with greater information as analysts. And in that regard, 

it’s quite important. 

Vice Chairman BOND. In the Committee’s pre-hearing questions, 

you were asked about the benefits of co-location, particularly given 

that only the NCTC and FBI’s al–Qa’ida analytic elements are located at the NCTC. You noted that there are some significant advantages to having some CIA analysts remain closer to the operational counterparts at CIA headquarters. 

Given that no other al–Qa’ida analytic elements are located at 

ALX1, does it still make sense for the FBI to have their international terrorism headquarters there? And without getting into 

classified matters, can you give us an analysis of what significant 

advantages there are in having the CIA analysts remain at CIA 

headquarters—and other reasons other agencies have given for not 

locating with the NCTC? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I do think there are enormous benefits to 

having the FBI Counterterrorism Division co-located. I think it 

makes sense for FBI—and, obviously, I can only speak so much for 

FBI and CIA—I think it makes sense for FBI because they are able 

to co-locate their analysts and their operators together while at the 

same time having them co-located with NCTC. That is a luxury 

that CIA does not have. CIA cannot both co-locate its analysts with 

NCTC and its operators. 

So in that regard, I think the approach for FBI and for CIA 

makes sense. And I would be fearful—and again, I don’t want to 

speak too much for CIA—but I would be fearful of removing the 

CIA analysts from their operational counterparts. I think that is a 

very important co-location. We, I believe, have been quite successful in coordinating and collaborating regardless of whether all of 

our analysts are co-located at NCTC. 

Vice Chairman BOND. In our previous discussion, you and I 

talked about advancing the United States’ global ideological engagement and fighting the ideological war against violent extremists. What’s the NCTC currently doing to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology and how would you judge the effectiveness 

of these efforts? And how can we measure them in the future? 

Mr. LEITER. On the analytic front, Senator, we’re doing a tremendous amount and looking at radicalization from a number of angles. 

To begin, I would say we look at it obviously from a religious 

angle, we look at it from ethnographic angle, we look at it from a 

psychological angle. And these are all critical elements of understanding the process of radicalization and then designing strategies. That’s the most advanced effort and it’s an effort that I’m very 

proud of. 

On the coordination and strategic planning efforts for the U.S. 

government, those are far more nascent. And I think that, if confirmed, I would view it as my number one strategic planning priority to forcefully coordinate and synchronize U.S. government efforts. 

We’ve been at this from NCTC’s perspective for only about four 

months, five months. I think we’ve made excellent progress in coordinating some of the U.S. government messaging. But this is 

about much more than messaging. It is forcefully coordinating 

16 

things like foreign aid, private investment overseas and the like, 

both overseas and domestically, to counter the spread of the ideology which contributes to terrorism. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Feinstein, if you’d forgive me, I have certain standard 

preliminary questions which I failed to ask you. 

Mr. Leiter, do you agree to appear before the Committee here or 

in other venues when invited? 

Mr. LEITER. I do. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Do you agree to send officials from the 

NCTC or the intelligence community to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? 

Mr. LEITER. I do. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Do you agree to provide documents or 

any material requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities—— 

Mr. LEITER. I do. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER [continuing]. And think it through carefully before answering. 

Mr. LEITER. I do, consistent with past precedent. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Will you ensure that the NCTC and the 

intelligence community provide such material to the Committee 

when requested? 

Mr. LEITER. I do, Senator. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Leiter, I very much appreciate the time we’ve had to spend, 

and at that time you mentioned the absence of sufficient support 

from the State Department of Intelligence and Research and also 

from the Department of Homeland Security. You just said that you 

had talked to both and you believe the situation would be remediated. 

I’d like to ask you a simple question. If it is not, would you 

please let us know? 

Mr. LEITER. I will happily let you know, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

In your written responses to the pre-hearing questions, you noted 

that DNI McConnell had specifically tasked you to ‘‘increase the 

quality of NCTC’s analytic products.’’ 

In what way have you found those products deficient? And how 

do you plan on or have you increased the productivity and the quality? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think some of our products—if I look back 

a year or more—some of those products did not include, for example, the regional context that was required; I mean, terrorism occurs in regions. And we didn’t always integrate regional expertise 

sufficiently. So I think our readers could not get the full picture. 

I think in some areas we ran the risk—I’m not sure it ever happened—but we ran the risk of groupthink as quickly-emerging plots 

are being uncovered. 

So what we’ve tried to do in the first instance is make sure that 

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gional counterparts. And on the second, we have actually done integrated red team and alternative analysis during threat streams as 

they emerge to ensure that we are not getting caught or pushing 

the intelligence community down the avenue of groupthink that 

has been so harmful in the past. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Now, we are being told that al–Qa’ida is in 

its strongest position since the attack on 9/11. The unclassified 

judgments from the NIE on terrorism last summer stated, ‘‘Al– 

Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the 

homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact 

plots while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to 

mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the 

group has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland 

attack capability, including a safe haven in the FATA areas of 

Pakistan, its operational lieutenants and its top leadership.’’ 

The classified reports since then are even more blunt. ‘‘Despite 

tens of billions of dollars spent since 9/11 and countless lives lost, 

al–Qa’ida remains firmly ensconced in the FATA region. It’s able 

to plot and we are still revising our counterterrorism strategy.’’ 

What is your vision of how we should be fighting terrorism into 

the next administration? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, thank you for that question—and I’ll obviously have to leave it at a level of generality considering the unclassified nature. 

First, I think we have to fight a full spectrum war. There are 

pieces of al–Qa’ida and other terrorist groups which will only be incapacitated through either kinetic means or law enforcement—actual incapacitation. 

That being said, that is one end of the spectrum. And I would 

say in the FATA and elsewhere, whether or not it’s North Africa 

or East Africa, we have to do a better job of coordinating with that 

kinetic force the other elements of national power. 

We have to—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Explain kinetic force—that’s a bit above my 

pay grade. 

Mr. LEITER. I apologize. Kinetic force is high explosives. It’s 

going out and killing people. And there is a certain population that 

that is probably the right answer. 

But we have to combine with that and build around that the 

other elements of diplomacy, political engagement, financial sanctions and ideological engagement to ensure that the people who are 

trying to incapacitate do not find support in their society. 

I think that is particularly important in Pakistan. We have to 

continue to work with our allies, we have to have a government 

that is a long-term partner with the United States, that does not 

fluctuate when their administration changes or our administration 

changes. And we have to ensure that they are able to drain the 

swamp which supports the individuals who are actively plotting 

against the United States and our allies. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, those are generalities. Any specifics? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I would be happy to go into extensive discussion of specifics of my thoughts on the FATA. Again, I think in 

an open session, it’s difficult to give you many of those specifics. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay, fair enough. My time is up. 

18 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator WYDEN. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Leiter, I want to follow up a different path in the same area 

as Senator Feinstein discussed to get your assessment of where we 

are today. Director McConnell gave us some stunning testimony 

three months ago. He said that al–Qa’ida central leadership in 

Pakistan—and I’ll quote here—‘‘has been able to regenerate the 

core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks in our country.’’ So extra points for the Director’s, you know, candor, but I still 

want to get your sense. 

As of today, are our counterterrorism efforts succeeding? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think our counterterrorism efforts are succeeding along a number of fronts, and along a number of fronts, we 

obviously haven’t succeeded well enough. I think—— 

Senator WYDEN. But Mr. Leiter, how can you say we’re succeeding when al–Qa’ida actually appears to be regenerating its capabilities? I think we’d agree there’s no bigger terrorist threat than 

al–Qa’ida. So tell me specifically, how can you say we’re succeeding 

when al–Qa’ida appears to be regenerating its capabilities? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, what I was trying to say about that success 

is in terms of our intelligence capabilities of watching plots as they 

develop, tracking those plots, disrupting those plots and defending 

the homeland, there have been successes. We are doing far better 

today, I think, at NCTC—but beyond NCTC—than we were. 

Where we have clearly not succeeded—I agree with the premise 

of your question—we have clearly not succeeded in stopping core 

al–Qa’ida plotting. We’re better at disrupting it, but we have not 

disrupted the senior leadership that exists in the FATA, and we 

have also not stopped the organization from promulgating a message which has successfully gained them more recruits. 

Senator WYDEN. First of all, this isn’t my analysis; this comes 

from the Director and it reflects, in my view, great credit on the 

Director for his assessment. And if he says they’re regenerating 

and you’ve said that, in many respects, the problem is not being 

addressed, that to me suggests that there needs to be changes in 

our strategy for dealing with the principal threat. 

What is your view about the changes that need to be made? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think the change in the government in 

Pakistan offers real possibilities. I think it offers possibilities to 

work with that government and then have them develop a plan. Ultimately, our success will rest on the success of the Pakistani government to address the problem which is, to a significant degree, 

within their borders. I think that is one area where we have to further our engagement with the Pakistanis and work with them to 

help them defeat it. 

Senator WYDEN. Do you believe that any time soon, the Pakistani government will be capable of taking away al–Qa’ida’s safe 

haven in the Pakistani tribal areas? 

Mr. LEITER. I think we have to work with the Pakistani government both on capability and in—— 

19 

Senator WYDEN. The question was, do you think any time soon 

the Pakistani government will be capable of taking away al– 

Qa’ida’s safe haven in that area? 

Mr. LEITER. I think there is much more that the government of 

Pakistan could do. 

Senator WYDEN. I will ask you that question for the record so we 

get a closed—— 

Mr. LEITER. I’d be happy to. 

Senator WYDEN [continuing]. Transcript, because that to me is 

the central question. Are we going to be able to get them to take 

away that safe haven any time soon? 

One last question, if I have the time, Mr. Chairman. You’ve been 

very indulgent. I’m also concerned about terrorism financing from 

Saudi Arabia. The high prices that Americans pay at the pump 

right now are creating huge profits in Saudi Arabia, where oil 

wealth has made a large number of people very rich. And the problem, of course, is that many of these Saudi citizens turn around 

and use their oil money to finance terrorism around the world. 

Now top Treasury officials have said publicly—I was in the Finance Committee when they did—that more money flows from 

Saudi Arabia to the Taliban and Sunni terrorist groups than from 

anywhere else in the world. In your view, how serious is this problem? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, the problem of terror funding from Saudi 

Arabia and elsewhere is very serious. The Saudis have been extremely effective in disrupting major portions of al–Qa’ida within 

the peninsula, but they continue to face challenges in stopping 

funding elsewhere. I think they have been extremely effective in 

some ways, but there are many potential sources of funding. 

Senator WYDEN. How cooperative are they being now when it 

comes to cutting off funding for terrorists outside Saudi Arabia? I 

mean, it seems to me that they’re interested in protecting their 

own country, but I don’t see a lot of cooperation as it relates to the 

area outside Saudi Arabia and that this is a problem today. Is that 

true? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I’m not sure I would characterize it exactly 

that way and I would ask—considering the sensitivities here—I’d 

be happy to talk to you about that in a closed session. 

Senator WYDEN. I’ll be glad to talk to you some more about it. 

But, I mean, this is a matter of public record. I mean, we’re not 

talking about something that’s classified. Stuart Levey came to the 

Finance Committee and, in response to my questions, said in public 

the Saudis are dragging their feet with respect to the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Charities Commission, and that’s how they 

get all their money out around the world to finance terrorism. Is 

Mr. Levey right? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, first I would largely defer to Under Secretary Levey, who I think is closer to this problem on a day-to-day 

basis than I am. I think that there are many things that we could 

discuss in closed sessions about particular efforts by the Saudis, 

both within the peninsula and overseas, that would give greater 

clarity to what the Saudi efforts have been. 

Senator WYDEN. I would like greater clarity, but I’d like some of 

it on the public record. I mean, Stuart Levey in particular talked 

20 

about Saudi failure in two kinds of key areas. With oil at $100 a 

barrel, I mean, the Saudi government certainly can’t say they can’t 

afford to take these steps. What arguments would there be for the 

Saudis not to take action to follow through on pledges they made 

to our country, both with respect to the Financial Unit and the 

Charities Commission? What possible argument would there be for 

their not following through? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I’m not here to defend the government of 

Saudi Arabia as to why they have or have not followed through on 

these commitments. I think the problem of funding of terrorism in 

Saudi Arabia and elsewhere is one that we have to pursue, and I 

think that Under Secretary Levey, as I said, who is extremely close 

to this, understands the challenges of Saudi Arabia. I think the 

Saudis have made great progress in some areas, and in other 

areas, like other countries, they have likely fallen short. And I 

would happy to discuss it in great depth in a closed session. 

Senator WYDEN. Chairman, can I ask one final question? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. One. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Leiter, you told Senator Bond that NCTC has only been engaged in counterterrorism messaging efforts for the last four 

months. Why did the NCTC decide to do this after not doing it for 

so long and what has been started in the last four months? 

Mr. LEITER. And Senator, I apologize. I really misspoke in saying 

that. 

The NCTC, since we first helped author the National Implementation Plan in 2005 and 2006, one of the key pillars of that plan 

was ideological engagement. So in that sense and in many respects, 

we’ve been involved since 2005, when we were first established. 

What we have started over the past four months—a bit longer now, 

since January—was a more forceful integration of efforts across the 

U.S. government, principally with CIA, Department of Defense and 

the State Department to coordinate messages and other outreach 

in a way that we were not given the opportunity to do before. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Leiter. 

I’d like to follow up on questions that you’ve been asked by Vice 

Chairman Bond and by Senator Wyden relating to the whole question of ideological engagement—what you referred to as ‘‘draining 

the swamp of ideology.’’ And I couldn’t agree with you more that 

we can attack with kinetic means and should and must attack with 

kinetic means certain individuals and certain structures. But if the 

purpose of the whole exercise is simply to have others come up and 

replace them and you haven’t won the underlying battle, you really 

aren’t making the kind of progress that the country needs. 

And I see your initiative as a correct one. I see it as a bold one. 

And I look at you as an individual reporting to the Director of National Intelligence, which is an agency still sort of seeking to find 

its way administratively, and on something like this, probably having to bump into not only CIA and various components of Defense 

and the State Department and USAID within State and Homeland 

21 

Security perhaps—who knows who all you all have to be involved 

with. 

From a point of view of administering that purpose, do you have 

the clout that you need to even convene people, let alone get direction? What would be the primary motivating administrative force 

behind this effort, if it’s not yourselves and your organization? And 

if it is yourself and your organization, how do you compete among 

bigger, stronger, closer-to-the-President entities that you would 

seek to bend to your will? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, thank you for the question. I do want to 

clarify. Although on the analytic front, for ideological engagement, 

I report to Director McConnell, for this planning and coordination 

of the war of ideas, in fact, I report to the President directly. 

And in that regard, what I require and what I so far have gotten 

over the past five to six months is a strong hand from the National 

and Homeland Security Councils, because in that coordination of 

those, if I may, big dogs, I need a National and Homeland Security 

Council and a White House that is supportive of our efforts to force 

them together to get that message out and coordinate. I have thus 

far had that, and in the process I have been assured that I will 

continue to have that. And the authority that we were given came 

directly from the principals committee. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Well, that’s very good to hear. I appreciate 

it. That’s more than I thought you’d been given, and I was worried 

that you were getting off on a mission from which some people 

never return to have the bureaucratic support behind them to 

make it happen. 

Mr. LEITER. And Senator, I don’t want to underestimate the challenge there. The challenge remains, and it’s a significant challenge. 

And I do think there was great wisdom, from my perspective, in 

having a dual reporting chain. Although it is complicated, I think 

a dual reporting chain—the DNI on intelligence and the President 

on strategic planning—is critical. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have further questions. I am supportive of this nominee and hope that he can be confirmed rapidly. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Well, he might be pleased to hear that. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a full 

statement I’d like to enter into the record, if I could. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Please. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And let me also say that I really enjoyed our 

meeting the other day. Thank you for the time. And I think you’re 

highly qualified for this, and I look forward to supporting your 

nomination. 

Mr. LEITER. Thank you, Senator. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RUSSELL D. 

FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, while this is a nomination 

hearing, it comes at an opportune time to discuss the challenges we 

face in our fight against al–Qa’ida and its affiliates. The State Department’s Country Report on Terrorism, released last week, painted a bleak picture. Al–Qa’ida has reconstituted some of its pre–9/ 

22 

11 operational capabilities in the FATA, while its network in the 

Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe and Central Asia is 

working to attack U.S. and other western interests. 

To name just two regions that we talked about that I follow 

closely, the terrorist threat in North Africa is growing and al– 

Qa’ida continues to pose a serious threat to the United States and 

allied interests in the Horn of Africa. Yet, almost seven years after 

September 11th, I think the administration still lacks comprehensive coordinated strategies to fight al–Qa’ida and its affiliates globally or regionally. 

Perhaps most dangerous of all is our lack of information not only 

on current terrorist safe havens but, as we talked about, on future 

ones. Despite the 9/11 commission’s warning that we must focus on 

‘‘remote regions and failing states,’’ I think we’ve basically failed to 

do that. 

We’ve also failed to establish a global collection strategy that encompasses not only the intelligence community but other means by 

which our government gathers information, especially our State 

Department. Simply put, we need to ask what it is we need to 

know to protect ourselves, now and in the future, who is best positioned to learn it, and how do we direct resources accordingly? 

Those questions have not been asked, much less answered, which 

is why Senator Hagel and I have supported legislation to establish 

an independent commission to examine these issues and make recommendations to Congress and to the next President. And this legislation was, of course, approved by this Committee last week, and 

I’m certainly very pleased with the process that we went through 

in that regard. 

Mr. Leiter, do you agree with the DNI that we have devoted disproportionate resources toward current crises rather than longterm threats? And would you agree that we do not have enough resources devoted to tracking potential terrorist safe havens around 

the world? 

Mr. LEITER. Largely yes, Senator. I wish I had more resources 

to dedicate to longer-term threats, absolutely. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Obviously you’re part of the intelligence community. But in trying to understand conditions that can lead to farflung regions to become safe havens, how important is State Department reporting? 

Mr. LEITER. I consider State Department reporting absolutely 

critical, Senator, because much of the information about the instability that can lead to safe havens or ideological radicalization 

comes not from covert collection but from open collection, best done 

by Foreign Services Officers. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In that spirit, there are, of course, times in 

which the intelligence community is better suited to collect information on the terrorist threat. But do you agree that there are 

times in which diplomatic reporting can get us information more effectively than the intelligence community? 

Mr. LEITER. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Shouldn’t we find ways to direct resources toward whoever is best positioned to learn about safe-haven conditions? 

Mr. LEITER. Yes, I believe we should. 

23 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, last week CIA Director Hayden gave a speech in which he discussed a number of threats to 

the United States, including how changes in population demographics result in violence, civil unrest and extremism, as well as 

the rise in ethnic nationalism. 

In that speech he mentioned the CIA, the FBI and DOD, as well 

as academia and the business sector, but not the State Department. While the Director understandably was talking about what 

the CIA brings to the table, his failure to even mention that diplomatic reporting could help us understand these threats, I think, 

highlights the enormous challenges we face and the reason why 

this commission is so important. 

Mr. Leiter, do you agree, on another matter, with the State Department’s conclusion included in its Country Report on Terrorism 

issued last week that incarcerating or killing terrorists will not 

achieve an end to terrorism? 

Mr. LEITER. Yes, I do. 

Senator FEINGOLD. For example, would you agree that the strike 

acknowledged by DOD in Somalia last week is not a substitute for 

a comprehensive strategy to stabilize the country? 

Mr. LEITER. I believe they are complementary. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And in that regard, what is that strategy? 

What is the road map to start to reverse Somalia’s status as a terrorist safe haven? Specifically, who should we be reaching out to 

as potential partners in Somalia? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think the importance of a central government and authority in areas like Somalia cannot be underestimated. So we must identify those parties that can, in fact, consistent with American values, govern that region and provide security that we can support but we can never be a replacement for. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And who would those parties be, if you can 

say? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I have to admit—I’d be happy to take that 

back for the record—I’m not familiar. As you know, the parties in 

Somalia are rapidly changing and numerous, and I simply couldn’t 

give you a detailed explanation of who would be best fit for a variety of purposes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, as you know from our conversation, I’ll 

be very interested in the details when you have an opportunity to 

do that. And I certainly wish you well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Feingold follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

The State Department’s Country Report on Terrorism released last week painted 

a bleak picture of the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates. According to the report, Al Qaeda has reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities in 

Pakistan’s FATA region while its network includes associates throughout the Middle 

East, Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe and Central Asia who are working to attack 

U.S. and other Western interests. In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Al Qaeda has 

greater mobility and ability to conduct training and operational planning, particularly for attacks targeting Western Europe and the United States. Portions of Pakistan have become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and a host of other dangerous organizations and the threat is expanding, with extremists gaining footholds in settled areas 

of the country. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda has expanded its presence in Afghanistan. 

Among the litany of threats described in the report are two other regions that I 

have followed closely. First, the terrorist threat in North Africa is growing. Al 

24 

Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb operates across the Sahel region, including in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria and Chad, to recruit for training and terrorist operations. And Al Qaeda continues to pose a serious threat to U.S. and allied 

interests in the Horn of Africa. Somalia’s political instability, among other factors, 

permits terrorist transit and safe haven. 

Almost seven years after September 11, the Administration still lacks comprehensive, coordinated strategies to fight Al Qaeda and its affiliates. I have pushed for 

legislation to require a global strategy to fight Al Qaeda, which the Administration 

has resisted. I have succeeded in requiring the administration to produce a regional 

strategy for the Horn of Africa. Unfortunately, the GAO found that this strategy 

was ‘‘incomplete’’ and lacking numerous characteristics needed for an effective strategy, including information on necessary resources, investments and risk management. Meanwhile, the Administration appears fixated on a purely military approach 

to the region. Indeed, the very week that DOD announced another strike in Somalia, we were reminded yet again—by no other than the State Department—that ‘‘incarcerating or killing terrorists will not achieve an end to terrorism.’’ 

Perhaps most dangerous of all is our lack of information, not only on current terrorist safe havens, but on future ones. The leadership of the Intelligence Community 

has acknowledged a lack of ‘‘global reach.’’ It has also admitted that ‘‘disproportionate’’ resources are directed at current crises, rather than long-term threats. Despite the 9/11 Commission’s warning that we must focus on ‘‘remote regions and 

failing states,’’ we have simply failed to do so. We have also failed to establish a 

global collection strategy that encompasses not only the intelligence community, but 

other means by which our government gathers information, especially our State Department. Simply put, we need to ask what it is we need to know to protect ourselves, now and in the future, who is best positioned to learn it, and how do we 

direct resources accordingly. Those questions have not been asked, much less answered. For that reason, Senator Hagel and I have supported legislation to establish 

an independent commission to examine these issues and make recommendations to 

Congress and to the next president. The Senate Intelligence Committee approved 

this legislation last week, and I will fight to get it passed into law. 

Mr. LEITER. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

I just have one comment to make, and then Vice Chairman Bond 

may have a question or so. 

When Senator Wyden was talking about Saudi Arabia, I could 

sort of feel my blood pressure rising. And it’s almost fascinating. 

I think that oil was discovered there as late as the early 1930s. 

And I have this general view that virtually everything we do in 

that part of the world is dominated by our need for oil. 

And I was stunned—I guess it was approximately a year ago, 

maybe a little bit less—when the President gave them $20 billion 

to buy arms. It had not occurred to me that the Saudis were either 

in need of arms or in need of money with which to buy arms. And 

I was thinking, somewhat irreverently, that that could go a long 

way towards finding the way to take carbon dioxide out of everything that we burn and make it virtually carbon-neutral. 

But nobody seems to want to address this issue. And it’s either 

because the hold that they have over us—and some other countries 

around there but particularly them—the hold they have over us 

based upon the friendships that go back over the years and the visits and the ambassadors here and there, that it, in effect, ends up 

psychologically tying our hands in order to do exactly what it is 

your job to do, and that is to make sure that they are doing everything they can to cut off money for terrorists, that they are not just 

doing that within their own country—and granted, they’re very 

good at that, because they’re a regency. None of them are elected, 

and they could be overthrown, have been before. 

25 

That’s a profound sense of unease on my part about America facing the world. It’s like we’re facing the world and mouthing all the 

right sounds, but in fact not doing what’s needed to be done. 

And I don’t necessarily ask for a response on your part, although 

I would welcome one, but I think it’s an overridingly important 

matter, not only with the credibility to our own people of our efforts in the war on terrorism, but I cannot believe that people all 

over the world who wish us ill are not watching that very closely 

and taking some either amusement or at least interest from that 

fact. 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, three quick points. One, as the Acting Director of NCTC and, if confirmed, as Director, obviously I have a 

piece of the Saudi Arabia portfolio, and that is the counterterrorism 

piece. And I always remind my staff, and I remind myself that 

counterterrorism is only one piece of the national security puzzle. 

It may be a critically important piece, but it is one piece. 

Second, I would say that the one thing that I can assure you is 

that I would never allow NCTC analysts—and I will always support them in every way I can—to not have their work colored by 

the discomfort or political consequences that you fear we as a nation experience. 

I will demand of them—I have in the past and I will in the future demand of them—that they give the straight truth and speak 

to power about what the Saudi actions are or are not, and explain 

what the counterterrorism consequences are, completely and utterly unclouded by other political consequences. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I believe you. 

Vice Chairman Bond. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

agree with the concern that you have raised and Senator Wyden 

has raised about the financing coming from Saudi Arabia. This is 

a very serious question. I know that, having worked with Stuart 

Levey and the others, we know what has been done and there is 

much more that needs to be done, and we will look forward to following up with you to see what the NCTC can bring forward. 

Also, with respect to al–Qa’ida and its planning capability in the 

FATA, I think that there have been some recent newspaper op-ed 

pieces talking about a better strategy for dealing with the FATA. 

And I hope we can go into those, because I think we can take those 

as a stepping-off point to see where you would go from there. 

I would note that with all the planning capabilities, there are a 

number of high-level al–Qa’ida operatives who have kinetically disappeared on a regular basis in the FATA, and that has limited 

their ability to carry out operations. And I also think that the fact 

that we have been kept free from attacks since 9/11 is in no small 

part due to the information collection, the activities in the groups 

you serve as well as our military efforts there. 

But I would ask you first, some people say that the battle with 

al–Qa’ida is no longer in Iraq. Now, that is directly military. But 

I would ask your assessment of where al–Qa’ida is posing the 

greatest threat to United States interests. Is it not in Iraq? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, to the extent that we have military forces 

in Iraq, al–Qa’ida in Iraq, which continues to exist, poses the most 

26 

direct threat to U.S. interests, those troops on the ground in Iraq, 

in Iraq.—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. What would the impact on terrorism be if 

we departed and Iraq was open as potentially a safe haven for al– 

Qa’ida again? What would the impact on the terrorist threat to the 

United States be? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, were al–Qa’ida to have a safe haven in 

Iraq, I would assess that that safe haven would pose a very similar 

threat to the United States and U.S. interests as does the FATA 

in Pakistan. And, from my perspective, that’s a dire threat. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, I would think there would be much 

greater opportunity for establishing command and control and 

operational activities than they have in the FATA. 

But I’m very interested in the points that Senator Feingold 

raised about the comprehensive view of where the threats to the 

United States come from terrorism and how we’re going to deal 

with them. 

Now, it seems to me that what he outlined pretty much fits with 

what I thought the NCTC was supposed to do—figure out where 

the terrorist threats are, where the emerging threats are, and be 

able to take those recommendations through the principals committee to all of the agencies, whether it’s State Department, military, CIA, or anyone else that has something to do with them. 

Am I wrong? Is this not pretty much what he outlined what your 

responsibility is? And if it is, are you lacking in statutory authority? Or what do you and the NCTC need to answer those very important questions that Senator Feingold raised? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I do think that’s NCTC’s responsibility. It 

is to identify where the threat is and then help write the plan and 

implement the plan for attacking that threat. 

I think that we have done that and we continue to try to do that. 

We are trying to grow the capacity every day to do more of that 

in more places. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And would you not say that developing 

threats—and he indicated the challenges that he sees in the various locations in Africa—is that part of your portfolio? 

Mr. LEITER. Absolutely, Senator. We’ve been instrumental in authoring regionalization counterterrorism plans in North Africa, 

East Africa, Southeast Asia, and the like. 

Vice Chairman BOND. My personal view is that we ought to see 

that you have the resources, the horsepower to do it. I think you 

are in the best position to do it. You have the assets; you have the 

analysts and others. My view is that we need to look to you to get 

this job done. 

If you need a commission, tell us. If you need resources, tell us. 

Or, as I am concerned, there isn’t adequate legislative structure for 

the DNI, through exercising his powers, to develop an effective, integrated intelligence collection operation and assignment of responsibilities activity. 

This all goes to, I guess, the strategic operational planning, and 

I would like to know your views on that and if you see any weaknesses in the strategic operational planning that is going on at the 

NCTC, and what we can do to fix them. 

27 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think the strategic operational planning 

construct, as I said in my opening statement, is exactly what the 

U.S. government needs because it is the only place in the government that can have concerted, continued effort at interagency coordination beyond simply the NSC and HSC. 

That being said, it is a construct which runs up against many entrenched institutional both executive branch and congressional interests. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Stop! Congress? I say that mockingly because we do turf about as well as anybody else. But we do see it 

in there. 

So we need to discuss with you, are there additional statutory 

authorities needed to get this job done? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I actually think, with what I’ve seen thus 

far, that with a strong National Security Council this can be done 

well. But I would absolutely take from you the charge to look, if 

I’m confirmed, at how we can improve this. And I am more than 

happy to come back to this Committee and make those suggestions 

to give us a stronger hand to coordinate U.S. government efforts if 

that is what needs to happen. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I believe it’s absolutely essential. You referenced the State Department and others. And, frankly, right now, 

our best diplomacy is being conducted by the U.S. Army and National Guard. And I’d like to see the State Department get in the 

game. That’s just—I won’t ask you to comment on that. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll leave that one lying out there. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Well, it would also be good if we gave 

them the money to be in the game. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Exactly. That’s our responsibility, our failure. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Vice Chairman Bond. 

Mr. Leiter, I just would like to say things which would be excessive, so I won’t. But if there were a single negative vote on you in 

this Committee, I would be very surprised. And that’s not just because there is the absence of fault or the absence of commission on 

your part as Acting, but also because of what I feel is the truly extraordinary abilities that you bring and the role model that you 

serve as, not only to us but to Zachary, who has long since disappeared—decided not to defend you in critical situations—but that 

you’re kind of an ideal of what a public servant ought to be. 

So this hearing is a pleasure. I would like to see you get confirmed next week. We have to get the record of this hearing transcribed and made available to all Members, then there are other 

small details that we have to do. But if it could be done next week, 

I’d like to do it simply as a way of giving you a faster start. If it 

can’t be, it will not be because we don’t want to, but because of 

technical questions which will not remain about you but remain in 

our process. 

So I thank you, and this hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. LEITER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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