[Cite as State ex rel. Gordon v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-3174.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO EX REL. DANTE’ D. 

GORDON

Relator

v.

SUMMIT COUNTY COURT OF 

COMMON PLEAS, ET AL.

Respondents

C.A. Nos. 31131

 31132

 31133 

ORIGINAL ACTION IN 

MANDAMUS, PROCEDENDO, 

AND PROHIBITION

Dated: August 21, 2024

PER CURIAM.

{¶1} Relator, Dante’ D. Gordon, has petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus, 

procedendo, and prohibition. Respondents, Summit County Common Pleas Court, one retired 

common pleas court judge, and one active common pleas court judge, have moved to dismiss. Mr. 

Gordon did not reply in opposition. The motion to dismiss is granted.

{¶2} Mr. Gordon has filed nine prior cases in the last year that presented nearly identical 

claims. This Court dismissed six of those cases because Mr. Gordon failed to comply with the 

mandatory filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25. State ex rel. Gordon v. Summit Cty. Court of 

Common Pleas, 2023-Ohio-2465; State ex rel. Gordon v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 

2023-Ohio-4107. Mr. Gordon voluntarily dismissed three of the cases. State ex rel. Gordon v. 

Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Summit App Nos. 30963, 30964, and 30965.
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

Page 2 of 13

{¶3} Mr. Gordon has now filed three new cases, all presenting the same arguments in 

support of his complaints seeking writs of mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition. Respondents, 

retired Judge Jane Bond, the judge who accepted his plea and sentenced him in 1998, and Judge 

Susan Baker Ross, who currently presides over his criminal case, moved to dismiss. Mr. Gordon 

has not responded in opposition. 

Standard for Motion to Dismiss

{¶4} When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must 

presume that all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 

490 (1994). Unsupported conclusions, however, are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 

Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 193 (1988).

{¶5} Respondents’ motion detailed Mr. Gordon’s many prior cases in which he 

challenged his conviction and sentence and argued that the current cases present claims that are 

barred by res judicata. The Ohio Supreme Court recently explained that “it is generally 

inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based on res judicata because it is an affirmative 

defense.” State ex rel. Peterson v. Miday, 2024-Ohio-2693, ¶ 13. One exception to this general 

rule applies when the documents upon which the res judicata defense is based are attached to the 

complaint. Jefferson v. Bunting, 2014-Ohio-3074, ¶ 12. Because Mr. Gordon did not attach the 

decisions from his prior cases to his complaint, this Court cannot consider res judicata to decide 

the motion to dismiss.

{¶6} As noted above, when considering the motion to dismiss, we must presume that all 

of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the nonmoving party, recognizing that unsupported conclusions are insufficient to withstand the 
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

Page 3 of 13

motion to dismiss. Mr. Gordon’s complaint can only be dismissed when, having viewed it in this 

way, it appears beyond doubt that Mr. Gordon can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to 

the relief requested. Goudlock v. Voorhies, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7. With this standard in mind, we 

turn to consider the claims raised in the complaint.

Requirements for Writs of Mandamus, Procedendo, and Prohibition

{¶7} Mr. Gordon sought three writs based on the same facts. Because he combined his 

claims into one complaint, we will consider them together.

{¶8} “For a writ of mandamus to issue, a relator must demonstrate that (1) the relator has 

a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a corresponding clear legal duty 

to perform the requested acts, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy.” State ex 

rel. Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union, Dist. 925 v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 173, 176 

(1998). The relator must demonstrate all three elements in order for this Court to grant the writ of 

mandamus.

{¶9} To obtain a writ of procedendo, Mr. Gordon must establish that he has a clear legal 

right to require the judge to proceed, that the judge has a clear legal duty to proceed, and that there 

is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Ward v. Reed, 2014-

Ohio-4512, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio 

St.3d 461, 462 (1995). Procedendo is the appropriate remedy when a judge has refused to render 

a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey, 

2022-Ohio-2556, ¶ 10.

{¶10} Finally, for this Court to issue a writ of prohibition, Mr. Gordon must establish, by 

clear and convincing evidence, (1) the exercise of judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is 

unauthorized by law, and (3) an injury would result from denial of the writ for which no other 
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

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adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Edward Smith Corp. v. 

Marsh, 2024-Ohio-201, ¶ 6.

Factual Background

{¶11} With these standards in mind, we begin with the facts alleged in the complaint. Mr. 

Gordon’s complaint covers 61 pages and asserts 13 interrelated claims for relief. It also includes 

almost 150 pages of attachments. The facts all center around Mr. Gordon’s criminal charges, 

pretrial proceedings, guilty plea, and sentence.

{¶12} The criminal case began in 1998 when Mr. Gordon was arrested in Hamilton 

County, Ohio, for a murder that occurred in Summit County, Ohio. Following his arrest, Mr. 

Gordon was returned to Summit County and held in the Summit County Jail.

{¶13} After extensive pretrial proceedings, Mr. Gordon entered a guilty plea to an 

amended charge of murder with a gun specification. He was sentenced to 15 years to life for 

murder and three additional years for the gun specification.

{¶14} The complaint alleges an extensive list of violations in support of the claims for 

relief:

- the complaint was unsworn;

- all of the evidence was false;

- a conspiracy including the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, 

magistrate, and Akron Police Officers was responsible for his 

conviction;

- defense counsel coerced and threatened him to plead guilty;

- the direct indictment was dismissed by the Akron Municipal 

Court;

- Judge Bond never had personal jurisdiction or subject matter 

jurisdiction;

- Mr. Gordon presented exculpatory evidence that proves his 

conviction is void;

- all of the government documents, police reports, criminal 

complaint, indictment, and journal entries are false;

- police officers lied to Mr. Gordon;

- the indictment was not signed by the grand jury foreperson;
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

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- the indictment was incomplete;

- an expert hired by Mr. Gordon many years later proved Mr. 

Gordon could not be guilty and that police falsified documents;

- Judge Bond forced Mr. Gordon to plead to an offense that does 

not exist;

- defense counsel did not speak to an alibi witness;

- new evidence from 2008 and 2022 show corruption of the 

prosecutor’s office;

The first 47 pages of the complaint allege these facts, along with many other that are not relevant 

to this decision. The summary of allegations noted above forms the basis of all 13 of Mr. Gordon’s 

claims for relief. These claims seek writs of mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition. In some 

instances, the same allegations are cited to support the grant of all three writs. For that reason, we 

will address some of the claims together.

The 13 Claims for Relief

{¶15} In his first claim, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of prohibition because, the complaint 

alleges, Judge Bond exercised judicial power where she patently and unambiguously lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Mr. Gordon alleges Judge Bond lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because the indictment was not signed, the conspiracy of the police and prosecutor, 

the use of false evidence, and the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The complaint further 

alleges that the writ of prohibition can be granted to order Judge Bond and Judge Ross to correct 

the result of the prior unauthorized judicial acts.

{¶16} As noted above, to issue a writ of prohibition, the relator must normally establish 

that the judge is about to exercise judicial power unauthorized by law and that the denial of the 

writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists. State ex rel. Jones v. Garfield 

Hts. Mun. Court, 77 Ohio St.3d 447, 448 (1997). If the judge’s lack of jurisdiction is patent and 

unambiguous, the relator need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 

of the law. State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 2016-Ohio-3529, ¶ 62. In those cases, prohibition will 
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

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lie both to prevent the unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction in the future and to provide relief from 

prior judicial actions taken without jurisdiction. State ex rel. Smith v. Frost, 74 Ohio St.3d 107, 

109 (1995); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Kirby, 2023-Ohio-782, ¶ 9.

{¶17} In many prohibition cases, the relator only seeks to prevent anticipated 

unauthorized judicial action. This reflects the well-established rule that the writ of prohibition 

provides a preventative rather than corrective remedy. (Quotation omitted) State ex rel. Feltner v. 

Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 2020-Ohio-3080, ¶ 6. In this case, however, Mr. Gordon seeks 

the writ to correct Judge Bond’s past actions. For a corrective writ of prohibition to issue, Mr. 

Gordon must demonstrate that Judge Bond patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to take 

the action about which he complains. Id. at ¶ 6, 8. As noted above, under these circumstances, 

Mr. Gordon is not required to demonstrate that he lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary 

course of the law. State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590 (1994).

{¶18} The complaint repeatedly alleges that because the indictment was unsigned, Judge 

Bond lacked jurisdiction. This Court has held, however, that the fact that an indictment was not 

signed does not implicate the court’s jurisdiction. State v. White, III, 2022-Ohio-605, ¶ 14 (9th 

Dist.). As this Court and the Ohio Supreme Court have recognized, a sentence is only void when 

a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal jurisdiction 

over the accused. Id. citing State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 42. Judge Bond and the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction over the offense and Mr. Gordon, notwithstanding 

his unsupported allegations to the contrary. Id. Because Judge Bond had jurisdiction and authority

to act, Mr. Gordon can present no set of facts warranting relief and he is not entitled to a writ of 

prohibition.
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

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{¶19} In his second claim for relief, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of mandamus to order Judge 

Ross to correct the conviction and sentence entered by Judge Bond, allegedly without jurisdiction. 

The complaint sets forth no factual allegations in support of the conclusion that Judge Bond acted 

without jurisdiction. Because we have already determined the Judge Bond did not act without 

jurisdiction in resolving the first claim, and because the complaint sets forth no facts at all in the 

second claim, we conclude that Mr. Gordon can present no set of facts warranting relief as to the

second claim for relief.

{¶20} In his third claim for relief, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of prohibition to order Judge 

Ross to vacate his guilty pleas that were entered to a crime that does not exist in Ohio. The 

complaint alleges that, according to the transcript, Judge Bond took his plea to an offense that does 

not exist in Ohio, “Murder – wrongfully took the life.”

{¶21} According to the complaint, Mr. Gordon entered a guilty plea to this nonexistent 

offense. The complaint includes an excerpt of what purports to be a portion of the transcript of 

the plea and sentencing hearing and the full transcript is attached to the complaint. According to 

the excerpt in the complaint, Judge Bond asked Mr. Gordon if he “wrongfully took the life” of the 

victim and Mr. Gordon responded “Yes.” Mr. Gordon ignores the first two exchanges that are also 

set forth in the complaint.

{¶22} First, Judge Bond asked Mr. Gordon how he “plead to the amended charge of 

murder as a special felony of the first degree?” and Mr. Gordon responded “Guilty.” Next, Judge 

Bond asked Mr. Gordon if he entered “that plea because you committed that offense?” and Mr. 

Gordon responded “Yes.” In context, then, Judge Bond next asked Mr. Gordon if he ”wrongfully 

took the life” of the victim and, again, Mr. Gordon responded “Yes.”
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

Page 8 of 13

{¶23} The judgment of conviction is also attached to and incorporated into the complaint. 

That entry reflects that the trial court amended count 1 of the indictment from aggravated murder 

to the lesser included offense of murder. It further states that Mr. Gordon entered a plea of guilty 

to murder as contained in amended count 1 of the indictment.

{¶24} Judge Bond did not accept a plea to an offense that does not exist in Ohio, as the 

complaint sets forth in an unsupported conclusion in this claim for relief and in several others still 

to be considered. Instead, Judge Bond asked Mr. Gordon a series of questions as part of Mr. 

Gordon’s entering a guilty plea to murder, as reflected in the complaint and the transcript and 

judgment of conviction attached to the complaint. Considering the factual allegations in the light 

most favorable to Mr. Gordon, the complaint fails to state a claim as to the third claim.

{¶25} In his fourth claim for relief, Mr. Gorden seeks a writ of mandamus to order Judge 

Ross to vacate his guilty plea, conviction, and sentence, for reasons already discussed above (plea 

to “wrongfully took life” murder and conspiracy among trial court, police, and prosecutor) and for 

a reason not previously mentioned: the Akron Municipal Court dismissed the direct indictment

filed in his case. We first consider this new allegation.

{¶26} There is no question that, as a matter of law, a municipal court cannot dismiss an 

indictment, which is pending in a court of common pleas, but the complaint alleges that is what 

happened in this case. The complaint includes a printout from the Akron Municipal Court’s online

docket as an exhibit to support this allegation.

{¶27} The printout shows the case number of a case that was filed in Akron Municipal 

Court. That case included one count of aggravated murder. The exhibit also shows that the 

“finding” for this offense was “Dismissed Direct Indictment.” The complaint alleges that this 

means the Akron Municipal Court dismissed the indictment for aggravated murder and, therefore, 
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

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Mr. Gordon could not plead guilty to the dismissed offense. That conclusion misunderstands the 

clerk’s office printout. This exhibit reflects that the case in municipal court, where Mr. Gordon 

might have been arraigned, had a preliminary hearing, and had his case bound over to the grand 

jury, pursuant to Crim.R. 5, was dismissed because Mr. Gordon was indicted. Crim.R. 5(B)(1).

{¶28} Having already considered the other facts alleged in support of this claim, and 

adding to them the unsupported allegation that the Akron Municipal Court dismissed the 

indictment, and considering all of these factual allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. 

Gordon, the complaint fails to state a claim as to the fourth claim.

{¶29} We consider the fifth, sixth, and seventh claims together because they rely on 

factual allegations we reviewed when addressing the first four claims for relief.

{¶30} In his fifth claim for relief, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of prohibition because Judge 

Bond exercised judicial power based on falsified evidence, a conspiracy, and ineffective assistance 

of counsel. In his sixth claim for relief, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of mandamus to order Judge Ross 

to vacate his guilty pleas, conviction, and sentence because Judge Bond lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction based on the use of false evidence and the Akron Municipal Court’s dismissal of the 

indictment. In his seventh claim for relief, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of mandamus to order Judge 

Ross to vacate his pleas, conviction, and sentence because he was convicted on an indictment that 

was dismissed. We have already considered these allegations and concluded that they do not 

support the granting of an extraordinary writ. Considering these factual allegations in the light 

most favorable to Mr. Gordon, the complaint fails to state a claim as to the fifth, sixth, and seventh 

claims for relief.

{¶31} In his eighth claim for relief, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of mandamus to order Judge 

Ross to vacate his conviction and sentence on the gun specification. The complaint alleges that 
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

Page 10 of 13

because Mr. Gordon was improperly convicted of “wrongfully took life” murder, which is not an 

offense in Ohio, there could be no gun specification enhancement to a non-existent crime. We 

have already concluded there is no factual support to the allegation that Mr. Gordon was convicted 

of the “wrongfully took life” murder offense as the complaint alleges. Thus, there is no support 

for the allegation that he could not be convicted of the firearm specification. Accordingly, 

considering the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Gordon, the complaint fails 

to state a claim as to the eighth claim for relief.

{¶32} In his ninth claim for relief, Mr. Gordon seeks a writ of procedendo to order Judge 

Ross to vacate his void guilty pleas, void plea contract, void convictions, void sentence, and void 

journal entry. The complaint alleges Mr. Gordon is entitled to the writ or procedendo because of 

the exculpatory evidence he has presented with the complaint.

{¶33} This claim for relief sets forth no factual allegations that would support the grant 

of a writ of procedendo. This claim for relief sets forth one long sentence that simply asserts that 

because exculpatory evidence is attached to the complaint, this Court must order Judge Ross to 

vacate the plea, conviction, and sentence. The complaint fails to allege how or why Mr. Gordon 

is entitled to a writ of procedendo. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Gordon has a clear legal 

right to require Judge Ross to proceed, that Judge Ross has a clear legal duty to proceed, and that 

there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Ward v. Reed, 

2014-Ohio-4512, ¶ 9. Because there are no factual allegations in the ninth claim for relief to 

support the grant of a writ of procedendo, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief.

{¶34} We consider the tenth and eleventh claims for relief together because they reassert 

factual allegations we previously considered when addressing the first nine claims for relief.
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

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{¶35} In the tenth claim for relief, the complaint alleges Mr. Gordon is entitled to a writ 

of prohibition because he entered a guilty plea to “wrongfully taking life” murder, which is not an 

offense in Ohio, so the plea, conviction, and sentence are void. In the eleventh claim, the complaint 

alleges Mr. Gordon is entitled to a writ of mandamus for the same reason and that Judge Ross has 

a duty to vacate his void plea, conviction, and sentence.

{¶36} We have already considered the unsupported factual allegation that Mr. Gordon 

entered a guilty plea to a non-existent offense. Having concluded there is no support for this 

allegation, we further conclude that there are no factual allegations to support the tenth and 

eleventh claims for relief and, therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief.

{¶37} In the twelfth claim, the complaint alleges that Mr. Gordon is entitled to a writ of 

prohibition because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him for the gun 

specification. The complaint alleges two different things. First, it alleges that when the count of 

aggravated murder was amended to murder, the specification had to also be amended. Second, the 

complaint restates the unsupported allegation that Mr. Gordon entered a guilty plea to “wrongfully 

took life” murder, which is not an offense in Ohio, so he could not be convicted of a specification 

to a nonexistent offense.

{¶38} We have previously considered the second argument and there is no support for the 

allegation that Mr. Gordon entered a guilty plea to a nonexistent offense. As to the first argument, 

even if we consider the allegation that the specification should have been amended, because we 

take that allegation in the light most favorable to Mr. Gordon, that would merely be a defect in the 

indictment. A defect in an indictment does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction. State ex rel. 

Martre v. Cheney, 2023-Ohio-4594, ¶ 18. Having considered both arguments in support of the 
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

Page 12 of 13

twelfth claim for relief, and considering the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Gordon, we 

conclude there are no factual allegations to support this claim for relief.

{¶39} In the thirteenth claim for relief, the complaint alleges that Mr. Gordon is entitled 

to the writ of mandamus to order Judge Ross to vacate the three-year gun specification sentence. 

This claim is based on allegations we have previously considered: the indictment was dismissed 

by the Akron Municipal Court and Mr. Gordon entered a plea to the nonexistent “wrongfully took 

life” murder charge. We have already concluded that there is no factual support for either of these 

allegations. Having concluded there is no support for these allegations, we further conclude that 

there are no factual allegations to support the thirteenth claim for relief.

Conclusion

{¶40} We have fully considered Mr. Gordon’s complaint and the respondents’ motion to 

dismiss. When reviewing the motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we have presumed that 

the factual allegations in the complaint are true and made reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. 

Gordon. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d at 490. We have also distinguished factual allegations from 

unsupported conclusions because those are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Mitchell, 

40 Ohio St.3d 193.

{¶41} After reviewing the complaint with these standards in mind, we conclude that it 

appears beyond doubt that Mr. Gordon can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to the relief 

requested. Goudlock, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted.

{¶42} The cases are dismissed. Costs taxed to Mr. Gordon.
C.A. No. 31131, 31132, and 31133

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{¶43} The clerk of courts is hereby directed to serve upon all parties not in default 

notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. See Civ.R. 58(B).

BETTY SUTTON

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.

STEVENSON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

DANTE D. GORDON, Pro Se, Relator.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JENNIFER M. PIATT, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondents.