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subject matter jurisdiction in their Motion to Dismiss. However, Brayer should address the issue in her Second

Amended Complaint.

 ORDER

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HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

FARRELL BRAYER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ST. CLARE HOSPITAL, FRANCISCAN

HEALTH SYSTEMS, SERVICE

EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION

LOCAL 1199 NORTHWEST, SERVICE

EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION

LOCAL 6 STAFF UNION,

Defendants.

Case No. C06-5291 RBL

ORDER DIRECTING A RESPONSE

FROM PLAINTIFF BRAYER

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b), Dkt. No.18

& 19. St. Clare asks this Court to dismiss Plaintiff Brayer’s Complaint, arguing that this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Count 1, Breach of Contract; Count 3, Violation of Right to Free Speech and Free

Association; and Count 4, Emotional Distress.1

 Brayer’s Amended Complaint and her Response to St. Clare’s

Motion to Dismiss are unclear as to the legal bases for Counts 1, 3, and 4. In her Response, Brayer asks the

Court for leave to amend her Complaint to further clarify the issues before the Court.

To aid the Court in determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims, Brayer shall

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 ORDER

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submit a Second Amended Complaint clarifying the legal bases for all of her claims against St. Clare and the

Unions. With regard to Count 1, Brayer seems to base her claim on St. Clare’s alleged violation of the

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). However, Brayer also seems to base her cause of action in Count

1 on St. Clare’s alleged violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Labor Management

Relations Act (LMRA). 

Likewise, with regard to Count 3, Brayer seems to base her claim on St. Clare’s alleged violation of

the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

(LMRDA). However, Brayer requested leave to amend her complaint to “re-characterize” this cause of action

as a violation of the NLRA. 

Finally, with regard to Count 4, Brayer seems to make a tort claim for emotional distress. Yet, in her

Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, she argues that her claim for emotional distress is related to her

breach of contract claim in Count 1 and is actionable as unfair labor practices under the NLRA.

This Court does not ordinarily have subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action involving activities

which are “either arguably protected by § 7 or arguably prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA.” William E. Arnold

Co. v. Carpenters District Council of Jacksonville and Vicinity, 417 U.S. 12, 15 (1974) (citations omitted).

Instead, the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 16. However, if “the activity in

question also constitutes a breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, the [National Labor Relations Board’s]

authority ‘is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.’” Id. 

Brayer shall submit her Second Amended Complaint by February 13, 2007. Any further reply by St.

Clare and the Unions in support of their Motions to Dismiss shall be submitted by February 16, 2007.

DATED this 6th day of February, 2007.

ARONALD B. LEIGHTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-05291-RBL Document 29 Filed 02/06/07 Page 2 of 2