N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A, Plaintiff / Appe lle e , v. C ESAR C AB A LLER O, De fe nda

nt / Appe lla

nt. No. 16-10221

D.C . No. 2:15-C R -00191-JAM -1
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia J ohn A. M e nde z , Distric t Judge , Pre siding A rgue d a nd Subm itte d

August 15, 2017 San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : O’ SC A

NNLAIN a

nd R AW LINSON, C irc uit Judge s, a nd EZR A ,** Distric t Judge
. On April 26, 2016, C e sa

r C a ba lle ro wa s c onvic te d

by a jury of fa ilure to
surre nde r, in viola

tion of 18 U.S.C . § 3146(a )(2). C a b a lle ro tim e ly

a ppe a le d on the ba sis tha t the distric t c ourt e rre d in fa iling to instruct the jury tha t a n e le m e nt of the 

# FIL ED
N OV 06 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.

** The Honora

ble David A. Ezra , Unite d State s Distric t Judge for the Distric t of Ha

wa ii, sitting by de signa

tion.c ha

rge d offe nse is tha

t the de fe nda

nt “be re le a se d from

c ustody unde r the B a il R e form Ac t.” W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291 a nd 18 U.S.C . § 3742, a nd we AFFIRM C a

b a lle ro’ s c onvic tion. W e re vie w the form

ulation or wording of jury instruc tions for a

buse of disc re tion, but re vie w de nov o a lle ge d m issta te m e nts of la

w. Pe ralta v . Dillard

, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th C ir. 2014) (e n ba nc ) (c iting c a se s). “ The re l e va nt inquiry is whe the r the instruc tions a s a whole are m isle a ding or ina de quate to guide the j ury ’ s de l ibe ra t ion.” Unite d State s v . Hofus , 598 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th C ir. 2010) (inte rna l quota

t ions a n d c ita tions omitte d). B ut jury

instruc tions, “ e ve n if im pe rfe c t, a re not a ba sis for ove rturning a

c onvic tion a

bse nt a showing tha

t the y pre j udic e d the de fe nda

n t.” Unite d State

s v . C h riste nse n , 828 F.3d 763, 786 (9th C ir. 2016). Thus, the

om ission of a

n e le m e nt from

a jury instruc tion is subje c t to ha rm le s s e rror a

na ly sis. Unite d

State s v . J ime ne z-Borja , 378 F.3d 853, 858 (9th C ir. 2004) (c iting N

e de r v . Unite d State

s , 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999)). 1. Unde r e ithe r a

buse of disc re tion re v ie w or de nov o re vie w, se e Pe ralta , 744 F.3d at 1082, we find tha

t the jury instruc tions a s a

whole we re not m isle a ding or ina d e quate to guidethe jury ’ s de libe ra tion. S e e Hofus , 598 F.3d a

t 1174. In June 2015, C a ba lle ro wa s re -se nte nc e d for m a il obstruc tion c o nvic tions, a n d he wa s orde re d to se lf-surre n de r on Se pte m be r 8, 2015. It is undispute d tha t C a ba lle ro
Pag e 2 of 8fa ile d to se lf-surre nde r on Se pte m be r 8, a nd he wa s subse q

ue ntly c ha rge d with one
c ount of fa i lure to surre nde r. Prior to tria l, C a ba lle ro file d propose d jury instruc tions, re que sting tha t the c ourt a dd a

n e le m e nt to M ode l Jury

Instruc tion 8.195 tha t would re q

u ire the jury

to find tha

t de fe n da nt wa s “ re le a se d from c ustody unde r the B a il R e form

Ac t ” to be c rim ina lly

lia ble for fa ilure to surre nde r. The distric t c o urt de c line d to a dd this e le m e nt, finding tha t C a b a lle ro ha d be e n re le a se d
a s a m a tte r of la

w a n d noting tha

t the instruc tion c onte m

plate s only

four e le m e nts. Thus, the jury

wa s instruc te d using Instruc tion 8.195 a s writte n, whic h inc l ude s the following e le m e nts, none of whic h a re dispute d on a

ppe a l: (1) the de fe nda n t wa s se n te nc e d to a

te rm of im prisonm e nt; (2) the de fe nda nt wa s orde re d to surre nde r for se rvic e of the se nte nc e on [da te ] ; (3) the de fe n da

n t kne w of the orde r to surre nde r; a

nd (4) the de fe nda

nt inte ntiona lly fa ile d to surre nde r a s orde re d. Howe ve r, C a

ba lle ro a rgue s tha t, be c a use the la ngua ge in 18 U.S.C . § 3146(a ) – tha

t a de fe nda nt be re le a s e d unde r the B a il R e form Ac t – is c om

m on to both § 3146(a

)(1) fa ilure to a

ppe ar offe nse s and § 3146(a )(2) fa ilure to surre nde r offe nse s, the jury

should ha

v e be e n instruc te d tha

t a n e le m e nt of fa ilure to
surre nde r is tha

t de fe nda nt be “ re le a se d

from c ustody unde r the B a il R e form

Ac t” sinc e this e le m e nt is e xplic itly an e le m e nt of a

fa i lure to a

ppe ar c ha rge . C ompare Ninth C irc uit C om

m itte e on M ode l C rim ina l Jury Instruc tions, M anua l of M ode l
Pag e 3 of 8C rim ina l Jury Instruc tions for theDistric t C o urts of the Ninth C irc u i t (2010 e d.), Instruc tion 8.194 (Fa i lure to Appe ar), w ith Instruc tion 8.195 (Fa i lure to Surre nde r);
se e a lso W

e av e r v . Unite d State

s , 37 F.3d 1411, 1412–13 (9th C i r. 1994) (noting that , to e s ta

blish fa ilure to a

ppe ar unde r § 3146, thegove rnm e nt m u s t prove , inte r alia , tha t the de fe n da

n t “ wa s re le a se d pursua

nt to th[e ] sta

tute ” ) (c iting U

nite d State s v . Mc Gill , 604 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th C ir. 1979)). W e disa gre e . The e le m e nt of “ re l e a se unde r the sta tute ” is not ne c e ssa

ry for § 3146(a )(2) offe nse s be c a use , a s this C ourt ha s pre viously note d , the re is only

one sta tutory a uthority unde r whic h a

distric t judge c an re le a s e a

de fe nda nt from
c ustody : the B a il R e form

Ac t. Se e Unite d State

s v . Burns , 667 F.2d 781, 783 (9th C ir. 1982) (sta

ting tha t “ the re is no othe r statutory a uthority [othe r tha

n the B a il R e form Ac t] for the re le a se of c onvic te d pe rsons” in fe de ra l c ourt). He re , the distric t c o urt prope rly

found tha

t C a ba lle ro, a s a

m atte r of la

w, ha d be e n “ re le a se d unde r the B a il R e form

Ac t ,” and thus it wa s ne ithe r ina de quate nor m isle a ding to
om i t C a ba lle ro’ s re que s te d a dditiona l e le m e nt to thefa ilure to surre n de r instruc tion. Se e Mc Gill , 604 F.2d a t 1254 (e xpla ining tha

t, a lthough whe the r a de fe nda n t wa s re le a se d pursua

nt to theB a il R e form Ac t m a y involve both la

w a nd fa c t issue s, “ the a

ut hority by whic h a judge re le a se d a

de fe nda nt a nd whe the r the
c ourt c om plie d with sta

tutory proc e dure s a

re prim arily

que stions of la

w” ).
Pag e 4 of 8The re c ord shows tha t C a ba l le ro wa s issue d a

Notic e to Appe ar on the origina l m a il obstruc tion c ha rge s, whic h inform e d him of his a rra ignm e nt on Fe brua ry 28, 2011. The

Notic e to Appe ar pla c e d

C a ba l le ro “ in c ustody ,” whic h is why – whe n he wa s a

rra igne d – the judge wa s ta ske d with de c i ding, unde r the B a il R e form Ac t, whe the r to pla c e him on pre -tria l re le a se or de t a in him
. Se e Unite d State s v . Motame di , 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th C i r. 1985) (“ R e le a se pe nding tria l is gove rne d by the [B a il R e form

Ac t, whic h] m andate s re le a se of a pe rson fa c i ng tria l unde r the le a st re stric tive c ondition or c om bina tion of c onditions tha

t will
re a s ona bly a ssure the a

ppe aranc e of the pe rson a s re quire d.” (inte rna l c ita tions
om i tte d))

. He re , the re c ord shows tha t the arra ignm e nt judge , a c ting pursua nt to the B a i l R e form Ac t , “ re le a se d” C a ba lle ro on his own re c ogniz anc e , sta ting suc h
re le a se wa s subje c t to c e rta i n c onditions a n d subje c t

to c onse que n c e s if C a

ba lle ro fa ile d to a ppe ar for his judic ia l proc e e dings. W e have pre v iously

sta te d tha t “ ‘ [i] t is the fa c t a

nd tim i ng of notic e [of
re le a se ] , not its form , tha

t m a tte rs.’ ” Unite d State

s v . N i ght , 29 F.3d 479, 481 (9th C ir. 1994) (quoting Unite d State s v . Fe ldhac k

e r , 849 F.2d 293, 299 (8th C ir. 1988)). Thus, c ontra

ry to C a ba lle ro’ s a

rgum e nts on a

ppe a l , re ga

rdle ss of whe the r
a writte n re le a se orde r wa s issue d pursua nt to 18 U.S.C . § 3142(h), there c ord undispute dly

de m onstra

t e s tha t C a ba lle ro wa s, at le a st ora lly , prope rly put on
Pag e 5 of 8notic e at the arra ignm e nt of his re le a se on his own re c ogniz anc e unde r the B a il

R e form Ac t. Se e Burns , 667 F.2d a t 783 (a ffirm ing tha

t the distric t c ourt’ s “ a c tion in a l lowing [thede fe nda

n t] to le ave on the sa

m e te rm s a s unde r the sum m ons a nd to re turn on thedate se t by the c ourt, wa s a

re le a se on pe rsona l re c ogniz a n c e unde r the [B a il R e form

Ac t] ,” e v e n if the te rm s of suc h re le a se “ we re le ss we ll de fine d tha n the y c ould ha ve be e n” ). Furthe r, the re c ord shows tha t C a b a lle ro wa s c le arly

“ re le a se d” unde r the B a il R e form Ac t for the e ntire pe nde nc y of his judic ia l proc e e dings, from

the tim e of his initia

l a rra ignm e n t

on the m a il obstruc tion
c ha rge s, through his a

ppe a l of those c onvic tions a nd his re -se nte nc i ng, a

nd up until his se lf-surre nde r date , re g ardle ss of whe t he r he wa s or wa s not “ re -re l e a se d” at his
va rious a ppe aranc e s . Se e Mc G ill , 604 F.2d a t 1255 (re je c ting de fe nda

nt’ s
argum e nt tha

t his re le a se wa s not pursua nt to theB a il R e form

Ac t be c a use “ the
c ourt did not re

pe a te dly te ll him he wa s c ontinue d on bond a nd did not a

m e n d the origina l orde r of re le a se e a c h tim e ” ). In fa c t, the re c ord shows tha t, whe re C a

ba lle ro re que ste d se ve ra l e xte nsions of the se lf-surre n de r date a fte r his re -se nte nc ing, C a ba lle ro e xplic itly and im

plic itly indic a te d tha

t the se re que s ts we re m a de pursua nt to theprovisions of the B a il R e form Ac t. Ac c ordingly , we find it is undispute d both tha t C a ba lle ro wa s
re le a se d pursua nt to theB a i l R e form

Ac t, a n d tha t C a ba lle ro unde rstood hewa s so
Pag e 6 of 8“ re le a se d.” For the se re a sons, re vie wing the fa i lure to surre nde r instruc tion unde r

e ithe r an a

buse of disc re tion sta

nda rd or d e nov o re vie w, it wa s not m i sle a ding or ina d e quate for the distric t judge to (1) find tha t C a b a l le ro ha d be e n “ re le a se d unde r the B a i l R e form Ac t ” a s a m a tte r of la w, a nd thus, (2) e xc lude this e le m e nt from the i nstruc tion. Thefa i lure to surre n de r instruc tion provide d to the jury he re

“ fa irly and a de quate ly

c ove r[e d] the issue s pre se nte d [and] c orre c tly sta te [d] the la w.” Se eDang v . C

ross , 422 F.3d 800, 804 (9th C i r. 2005) (inte rna l quota tions
and c ita tion om itte d ). 2. Eve n if it wa s e rror to instruc t the jury using Instruc t ion 8.195 without the
e le m e nt tha

t the de fe n da

nt “be re le a se d unde r the B a il R e form Ac t,” the e rror wa s ha rm le s s a n d not pre judic ia l to C a

ba lle ro. Se e J

ime ne z-Borja , 378 F.3d a

t 858 (c iting N e de r , 527 U.S. a

t 10). Ha rm le ss e rror oc c urs whe re , upon re vie wing the
e ntire re c ord, a

c ourt c a n “ c o nc lude be y ond a

re a sona b l e doubt tha

t the jury ve rdic t would ha ve be e n the sa

m e a bse nt the e rror.” N

e de r , 527 U.S. a

t 19. He re , be c a

use it is undispute d on a

ppe a l tha t (1) C a ba lle ro wa s re -se nte n c e d

to a te rm of im prisonm e nt, (2) C a

ba lle ro wa s orde re d to surre nde r for se rvic e of his ne w
se nte nc e on Se pte m

be r 8, 2015, (3) C a

b a lle ro kne w of the orde r to surre nde r, and (4) C a ba lle ro inte ntiona lly

fa ile d to surre nde r a s orde re d on Se pte m be r 8, we c an
c onc lude be y ond a

re a sona ble doubt tha

t the jury ’ s ve rdic t would ha ve be e n the
Pag e 7 of 8sam e , e v e n if the e le m e nt tha t C a ba l le ro wa s “ re le a se d

unde r the B a il R e form

Ac t” ha d be e n inc l ude d. Se e id. Furthe r, we have pre v iously sta t e d tha t, “ in m ost c a se s , the que s tion whe the r
a re l e a s e wa s pursua

nt to the[B a il R e form

Ac t] will be one on whic h the tria l judge should instruc t the jury a s a m atte r of la

w.” Mc Gill , 604 F.2d a

t 1254. The Mc G ill c a se de a l t with a

fa ilure to a

ppe ar jury

instruc tion. The re , we he ld tha t the re wa s no re ve rsible e rror in instruc ting thejury a s a m a tte r of la

w tha t the de fe nda n t ha d be e n re le a se d be c a use , “ [a ] lthough te c h nic a lly the tria l judge m ight have se gre gate d

the fa c tua l a

n d le ga l unde rpinnings of this e le m e nt, a nd pe rm itte d the j ury to c onside r the que stion . . . there wa s no e v ide nc e or le ga l the ory tha t
c ould e xc ulpa

te [the de fe n da

n t ] on the fa c tua l c om

pone nts of the first e le m e nt.” Id. Thus, for simila

r re a sons, we find he re too tha t it wa s ha

rm le s s e rror to not instruc t the jury that “ re le a se unde r the B a il R e form Ac t” wa s a

n e le m e nt of fa ilure to surre nde r be c a

use the re is no e vide nc e or le g a l the ory on the re c ord tha

t c ould
e xc ulpa te C a ba lle ro on the issue of “ re le a se .” AFFIRM E D.

Pag e 8 of 8United States v. Caballero , No. 1 6

- 10221 O’SCANNLAIN, Ci rcuit Judge, concurring : I join in Part 2 of the court’s memorandum and in the judgment. I cannot join Part 1 , which concludes that, in a criminal prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2), the jury need not be instructed to find that the defendant was released from custody under the Bail Reform Act. A defendant cannot be convicted under § 3146(a)(1) (failure to appear) or § 3146(a)(2) (failure to surrender) unless he was “ released under ” the Bail Reform Act. Id. § 3146(a). W e have held that the government must indeed prove such element in a § 3146(a)(1) prosecution
. See United States v. Weaver , 37 F.3d 1411, 1412

– 13 (9th Cir. 1994). The court ’s memorandum concludes , however, that such element “is not necessary for § 3146(a)(2) offenses because . . . there is only one statutory authority under which a district judge can release a defendant from custody: the Bail Reform Act.” Mem. at 4 (citing United States v. Burns , 667 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1982)). That may be true. But there remain other ways that a defendant prosecuted for failure to surrender might have been f ree of the court’s custody without having been formally released by the court at all
. For example, as Burns itself suggested , the defendant might have absconded from custody and become a fugitive prior to the order compelling him to surrender at the specifie d date
. See Burns , 667 F.2d at 782 ; United States v. Castaldo , 636 F.2d 1169, 1171 

# FILED

NOV 6 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S(9th Cir. 1980)
. Or the defendant might never have been taken into custody in the first place
. See United States v. Bodiford , 753 F,2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1982)
. A defendant in either scenario would not fall within the parameters of § 3146. See Bodiford , 753 F.2d at 382; B urns , 667 F.2d at 782
. Admittedly, these scenarios seem rare. But that fact, and the fact that the Bail Reform Act is the only authority unde r which the court may release a defendant, simply suggests that it may be rather easy to prove that the defendant indeed was released under the Bail Reform Act. Namely, where the government prove s that the defendant was taken into the court’s custody and then was released formally by the court, this elemen t will presumably be satisfied. But this does not mean the element will always be satisfied; there remain ways that a defendant prosecuted for failure to surrender under § 3146(a)(2) could fall outside the scope of that law. Thus, as with § 3146(a)(1) prosecutions, we should not relieve the government of its burden to prove this element in a § 3146(a) (2) case. I cannot join the memorandum ’s conclusion otherwise. Nevertheless , I do agree that the failur e to require the jury instruction in this case was harmless, because the record clearly demonstrates that Caballero was formally released from the court’s custody under the Bail Reform Act. I therefore concur in the judgment.U.S. v. Caballero, Case No. 16 - 10221

Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in the result. 

# FILED
NOV 6 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S