Supreme Court

No. 2020-57-C.A.

(P1/13-3759A)

State :

v. :

Cesar Vazquez. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

December 2, 2021
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Supreme Court

No. 2020-57-C.A.

(P1/13-3759A)

State :

v. :

Cesar Vazquez. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, Cesar Vazquez, was 

convicted following a jury trial on four counts of first-degree child molestation

sexual assault. He was sentenced to four concurrent terms of forty-five years

imprisonment, with thirty years to serve and the balance suspended, with 

probation.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice erred by denying his

motion for a new trial because, defendant argues, the trial justice overlooked 

material evidence. The defendant maintains that this error entitles him to have his 

conviction vacated and to be granted a new trial. After careful consideration of 

defendant’s arguments and a thorough review of the record, we affirm the 

judgment of conviction and the denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial.
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I

Facts and Travel

The complaining witness, Jane, was born in 1990.1 In May 2013, Jane

revealed to her mother and aunt that defendant had sexually assaulted her on 

several occasions when she was a child. A short while later, Jane went to the 

Pawtucket police station and filed a police report containing allegations against 

defendant. 

On December 12, 2013, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment 

against defendant. Counts one and three alleged first-degree child molestation

sexual assault in the form of digital/vaginal penetration, in violation of G.L. 1956 

§ 11-37-8.1; counts two and four alleged first-degree child molestation sexual 

assault in the form of penile/vaginal penetration, in violation of § 11-37-8.1; and 

count five alleged third-degree sexual assault, in violation of § 11-37-6. Count five 

was dismissed by the state prior to trial pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior 

Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

A jury trial began on November 18, 2015, and concluded on November 23, 

2015. At trial, the state called four witnesses. The defendant presented two 

witnesses. The testimony given at trial revealed the following.

1 We refer to the complaining witness and her half-sister by pseudonyms.
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Jane is the daughter of Yanira Rentas, who separated from Jane’s father 

when Jane was very young.

2 When Jane was around three years old, Yanira began 

dating defendant, who then continued to be in Jane’s life for years. In 1996 

defendant and Yanira had a child together, Jane’s younger half-sister, Janelle. Jane

described her initial relationship with defendant as “normal[,]” although she also 

stated that, when living with defendant, Yanira, and Janelle, she felt like a “bonus 

child[.]” However, eventually the nature of her relationship with defendant 

drastically changed because, as Jane testified, defendant sexually assaulted her on 

two occasions during her childhood. 

According to Jane, the first incident, encompassing counts one and two of 

the indictment, occurred on an unspecified date in early 2000 while Jane was living 

with her mother, Janelle, and defendant in Pawtucket. 

At the time, Jane was in elementary school, and her mother “worked a lot[.]” 

Jane testified that while her mother was working and Jane was not in school or 

after-school care, she was usually in the care of her grandmother. Jane stated,

however, that on this particular occasion, she was watched in the family’s home 

only by defendant, who was also caring for then-three-year-old Janelle. Jane

testified that she began to doze while she, Janelle, and defendant were in her 

mother’s bedroom watching a movie. She added that Janelle was running in and 

2 We refer to members of the Rentas family by their first names for purposes of 

clarity. No disrespect is intended. 
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out of the bedroom, as if playing a game. Jane testified that, at one point, she 

heard the door to the bedroom close, leaving Janelle outside. According to Jane, 

defendant then got onto the bed with Jane and touched her under her shorts and 

underwear. Jane further testified that defendant then removed her shorts and 

underwear and put his fingers, and then his penis, into her vagina. According to 

Jane, after the incident, defendant threatened to kill her mother if she said 

anything, which left Jane feeling “[t]errified.” 

Jane also testified to a second incident, encompassing counts three and four

of the indictment, which occurred on an unspecified date in late 2003 or early 

2004. 

Jane testified that the second incident took place in the apartment in Lincoln 

where she lived with her mother and Janelle; defendant did not live in the 

apartment because defendant and her mother had broken up by that time. Jane

testified that the three of them lived in a second-floor apartment in a four-unit 

building with two units on each floor. Jane also testified that her aunt Sofia

Rentas, her mother’s sister, lived in the apartment next door. 

Jane testified that the front door to the apartment building was often left 

unlocked and that the doors between the apartments on the second floor, which 

allowed Sofia access to the apartment Jane and her family lived in, were also 

unlocked during the day; the apartment doors could be open or closed depending 
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on various factors, such as her mother wanting to keep heat inside their apartment. 

However, Sofia testified at trial that the front door to the apartment building was 

kept locked, and Janelle testified that the doors between the apartments were 

always open. 

Jane further testified that defendant often stopped by the Lincoln apartment 

and spent time with both Janelle and Jane—although, according to Jane, after the 

first incident of sexual assault she wanted to “not have to have interactions with 

[defendant] if not necessary.” 

Jane testified that, on the day of the second incident, defendant entered her 

bedroom in the Lincoln apartment, where she was sitting in a chair at her desk

using her computer. Jane stated that defendant grabbed her arm, led her from the 

chair to the bed, pushed her onto the bed, covered her mouth with his hand, and 

removed her jeans and underwear. Jane testified that defendant then touched her 

vagina with his fingers and inserted his fingers, and then his penis, into her vagina. 

Jane testified that defendant then left the room. According to Jane, after the 

second incident she felt “hurt[,]” “betrayed[,]” and “broken.” 

Jane stated that, after the incidents occurred, she did not want to continue a 

relationship with defendant and often refused to spend time with him, although 

sometimes her mother required her to do so. Jane also acknowledged that she 
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appeared in various photographs with defendant that were taken after the incidents 

occurred; according to Jane, she did so “to keep everything appearing normal.” 

Jane testified to various rationales for delaying her disclosure of the 

incidents. Jane stated that shortly after the second incident she was “terrified” and 

“scared of what would happen if [she] told[.]” She testified that she “was scared of 

[defendant], especially after he threatened [her].” She also stated that she was 

worried that even if she revealed the incidents, they would be “brushed under the 

rug,” and she would still be required to see defendant. Jane further testified that 

she did not disclose as time went on because she had “built a life” and she “didn’t 

want it crashing down.” She also stated that she did not “want to relive what had 

happened[,]” nor to “hurt family members”—she simply “wanted to leave things as 

they were.” 

However, eventually Jane did disclose the abuse. Both Jane and her fiancé, 

Andrew Sabourin, testified that Jane had disclosed general information about the 

assaults to Sabourin, her then-boyfriend, in 2011. She then disclosed the incidents 

to others in May 2013—first to her aunt Yanitza Rentas, then to her mother, and 

finally to the police. 

Both Jane and Sabourin testified that Sabourin insisted that Jane disclose the 

incidents of molestations, and that Jane ultimately did so. Jane and Sabourin both 

testified that, because of the incidents’ traumatic effect on Jane, she did not allow 
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any man other than Sabourin to watch their daughter. This included one occasion

when Jane was at work and Sabourin needed to leave home for a job interview;

Jane did not allow their daughter to be left with Sabourin’s own father. Jane

testified that, because of the impact of this rule on her and Sabourin’s relationship, 

as well as on her relationship with members of both their families, Sabourin gave 

Jane an ultimatum: either reveal the incidents to her family or possibly end the 

relationship. 

In his closing argument, defense counsel suggested that the true motivation 

for Jane’s allegations was not Sabourin’s ultimatum, but, rather, Jane seeking 

vengeance on defendant for punishing Janelle. Janelle had testified that, sometime 

between 2012 and 2013, defendant punished her for text messages referencing 

drugs and alcohol that he had found on her cell phone. Janelle stated that her 

punishment included both having her telephone taken away and being told not to 

associate with certain people, including Jane. According to Janelle, she told Jane

about the punishment in January 2013, shortly after it happened. However, Jane

testified that she did not know exactly when Janelle’s telephone was taken away, 

nor did she know who had inflicted the punishment. 

On November 23, 2015, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four 

remaining counts. On December 1, 2015, defendant filed a motion for a new trial 

pursuant to Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, asking the 
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trial justice to vacate the judgment of conviction. The motion was heard before the 

trial justice on December 7, 2015. The trial justice denied the motion for a new 

trial in a bench decision rendered on the same day. On January 25, 2016, the trial 

justice sentenced defendant. The defendant filed a premature notice of appeal on 

January 25, 2016, and a judgment of conviction was ultimately entered on June 30, 

2016, placing defendant’s appeal properly before us. See Butler v. Gavek, 245 

A.3d 750, 753 n.1 (R.I. 2021) (noting that a notice of appeal filed prematurely will 

be treated “as if it had been timely filed after judgment was entered”) (quoting 

Sullivan v. Coventry Municipal Employees’ Retirement Plan, 203 A.3d 483, 486 

n. 4 (R.I. 2019)). 

II

Standard of Review

The defendant has raised as the sole issue on appeal the propriety of the trial 

justice’s denial of his motion for a new trial. As we have repeatedly held, when a 

trial justice considers a motion for a new trial after a jury trial, the trial justice “acts 

as a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of 

witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.” State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321, 

328 (R.I. 2020) (quoting State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 1050-51 (R.I. 2019)).

A trial justice considering a motion for a new trial after a jury trial “must 

undertake a three-step analysis: (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury 
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charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of 

the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result 

different from that reached by the jury.” State v. Vidot, 253 A.3d 401, 409 (R.I. 

2021) (quoting State v. Stokes, 200 A.3d 144, 152 (R.I. 2019)). “If, after 

conducting this independent review, the trial justice agrees with the jury’s verdict 

or if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could differ as to the outcome, the 

motion for a new trial should be denied.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1051). 

“Only when the trial justice does not agree with the jury’s verdict, must he or she 

embark on a fourth analytical step.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1051).

Ultimately, “[t]his Court’s review of a denial of a motion for a new trial is 

deferential because the trial justice is in an especially good position to evaluate the 

facts and to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Vidot, 253 A.3d at 409 

(brackets omitted) (quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1051). Thus, “[i]f the trial 

justice has articulated adequate grounds for denying the motion, his or her decision 

is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned by this Court unless he or she 

has overlooked or misconstrued material evidence or was otherwise clearly 

wrong.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1051).
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III

Discussion

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice was clearly wrong when 

she denied his motion for a new trial because, defendant argues, she overlooked

critical material evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial justice did 

not consider evidence of internal inconsistencies in Jane’s testimony, evidence of 

contradictions to Jane’s testimony, the purported implausibility of Jane’s 

allegations, and evidence of Jane’s motivation to fabricate allegations against 

defendant. 

The defendant points to the following purported inconsistencies in Jane’s 

testimony as material evidence that the trial justice overlooked: (1) that Jane

initially alleged, in her police statement, that the first incident began while she was 

asleep and with the bedroom door closed, but she testified at trial that it occurred 

while she was awake and watching television and began when the bedroom door 

was open; (2) that Jane initially told police that the second incident occurred when 

she was lying on her bed watching television, but she testified at trial that it 

occurred while she was on a chair at her desk using her computer; (3) that, before 

the grand jury, Jane did not testify to digital penetration occurring during the 

second incident, whereas she did at trial; and (4) that Jane varied in her reasons for 

delaying disclosures of the incidents. 
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The defendant further argues that the trial justice ignored evidence of 

contradictions to Jane’s testimony and that such evidence was material. 

Specifically, defendant contends that the trial justice ignored photographic and 

testimonial evidence that Jane continued a relationship with defendant after the 

incidents occurred, when Jane testified that she did not. Also, defendant points to 

several contradictions between Jane’s testimony and the testimony given by other 

witnesses as to the characteristics of the apartment in Lincoln where the second 

incident occurred. For example, defendant contends that, although Jane testified 

that her mother’s bedroom was in the attic, her mother testified that the attic was 

used only for storage. The defendant also notes that, although Jane testified that

she was left alone in the apartment, other witnesses testified that her aunt Sofia 

frequently checked on her in the apartment, and that, although Jane testified that

the front door to the building was left unlocked, other witnesses testified that it was 

kept locked. 

The defendant also alleges that the trial justice impermissibly overlooked 

what defendant refers to as the “entirely implausible” nature of Jane’s testimony. 

The defendant specifically points to: (1) Janelle’s alleged presence in the home 

during the first incident, despite defendant being described by some witnesses as a 

“good dad”; (2) defendant entering the apartment building on the day of the alleged 

second incident despite some witnesses testifying that the front door was always 
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locked; (3) the alleged occurrence of the second incident despite the possibility of 

Jane’s aunt Sofia and others easily entering the apartment; (4) no family members 

suspecting that anything unusual was occurring between defendant and Jane; (5) 

Jane being willing to leave Janelle alone with defendant; and (6) only two alleged 

incidents occurring, despite defendant having continued access to Jane. 

Lastly, defendant avers that the trial justice erred by overlooking evidence of 

Jane’s motive to lie. The defendant contends that Jane had a motive to fabricate 

her claims because she was angry at defendant for his punishment of Janelle, 

which stopped Janelle from communicating with Jane. The defendant argues that 

the timing of Jane’s disclosure—allegedly a few months after defendant punished 

Janelle and while the punishment was ongoing and years after the assaults

themselves took place—was strong evidence of Jane’s motivation to lie. 

In issuing her decision, the trial justice began by articulating the correct 

standard for assessing a motion for a new trial, stating that she was required to act 

as a “thirteenth juror” and to “exercise[] independent judgment on the credibility of 

witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.” Gumkowski, 223 A.3d at 328

(quoting Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1050-51). She also correctly indicated that her 

process could be either three or four steps, depending on whether she agreed with 

the jury’s verdict. See Vidot, 253 A.3d at 409 (noting that a trial justice’s review of 
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a motion for a new trial involves at least three steps, and, when the trial justice 

does not agree with the jury’s verdict, the review involves four).

The trial justice then carried out each analytical step in a proper analysis of a 

motion for a new trial. First, she considered the evidence in light of the 

instructions to the jury: She stated each charge for which defendant had been 

convicted, discussed the jury instructions given for each charge, and then assessed 

the evidence in light of those specific charges. Next, she considered the credibility 

of each major witness. Finally, the trial justice found that, in the instant case, her 

analysis “ended without applying the final step because if [she had] been sitting on 

this case without a jury, [she] would have issued the identical verdict reported by 

the jury[,]” thus completing the final step. 

Because in this case the trial justice “applied the correct standard for 

assessing the motion for new trial and articulated sufficient grounds for denying 

the motion[,]” her denial is “entitled to great weight and deference[.]” Johnson, 

199 A.3d at 1051.

We note that a “trial justice is not required to ‘refer to all of the evidence in 

supporting the decision.’” State v. Ogoffa, 159 A.3d 1043, 1049 (R.I. 2017) 

(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Muralles, 154 A.3d 925, 932 (R.I. 2017)).

Instead, a trial justice must only “refer to enough to allow this Court to determine 

whether or not [she] conducted the appropriate analysis.” Id. at 1051. Thus, 
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although here the trial justice did not discuss every purported inconsistency, 

contradiction, or implausible allegation, she correctly applied the standard for a 

motion for a new trial and articulated sufficient reasoning; therefore, her 

determinations are given due deference. See id. (acknowledging that the “trial 

justice did not discuss every inconsistency or improbable fact that defendant 

alleges[,]” but nevertheless, that the trial justice did not commit clear error in 

denying a motion for a new trial).

Ultimately, defendant’s contentions with respect to the alleged 

inconsistencies in Jane’s testimony, the purported contradictions to Jane’s 

testimony, the supposedly implausible nature of Jane’s claims, and Jane’s alleged 

motive to fabricate her allegations all hinge on the question of Jane’s credibility. 

As the trial justice stated at the outset of rendering her analysis of the evidence,

“[t]his was a case of credibility, pure and simple.” And, ultimately, the trial justice 

found Jane to be a “reliable[,] credible witness on material issues.” The trial 

justice stated that Jane’s testimony regarding how she had taken “control over her 

life rang true[.]” This determination of Jane’s credibility by the trial justice is 

entitled to due deference.

Importantly, we also note that Jane’s credibility was not necessarily 

tarnished by the purported inconsistencies and contradictions that defendant has 

pointed to. The alleged inconsistencies in Jane’s testimony describing the first and 
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second incidents are explained by the differing level of detail of her testimony at 

different stages—as the trial justice pointed out, at trial Jane “described in detail” 

the incidents, whereas her police statement recounting both incidents was less than 

two pages long. As we have previously stated, “the existence of some 

inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony does not ‘preclude a determination that the 

witness was credible.’” Ogoffa, 159 A.3d at 1051 (brackets omitted) (quoting State 

v. Lopez, 129 A.3d 77, 85 (R.I. 2016)). 

In addition, some of the purported inconsistencies and contradictions are not 

necessarily inconsistent or contradictory at all. In rendering her decision, the trial 

justice stated that she believed that during the first incident Jane was “sleepy” and 

“half dozing[,]” a state not inconsistent with Jane’s assertions both that she was 

awake and that she was asleep. The trial justice also reconciled the photographs 

showing Jane and defendant together after the incidents with Jane’s testimony that 

she did not have a relationship with defendant after the incidents by stating that 

“[t]he [c]ourt, and likely the jury, understood that [Jane] went on with her life as a 

child and as a teenager making the best of it. The jury would not have expected 

her to totally isolate herself from her family and extended family. This was her 

life.” Thus, the existence of the photographs, which the trial justice clearly 

considered, does not necessarily contradict Jane’s testimony; rather, it highlights 

Jane’s precarious position as a child who did not want to continue a relationship 
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with defendant, but who wanted to maintain the appearance of normality and to 

make the best she could out of a horrific situation.

The trial justice also determined that other witnesses were credible and 

found that their testimony “clearly supported [Jane’s] version of events.” 

Specifically, the trial justice found that Sabourin, Jane’s fiancé, was an “excellent” 

and “very credible” witness who “presented very compelling testimony that totally 

corroborated” important elements of Jane’s testimony. 

By contrast, the trial justice determined that defendant’s main witness, 

Janelle, was not credible. The trial justice found that Janelle’s testimony “did not 

have a ring of truth to it[,]” noting that she had “an interest in the outcome of the 

case.” Ultimately, the trial justice found that Janelle was “neither credible as a 

witness, nor was her testimony reliable.” 

Additionally, despite defendant’s contentions to the contrary, the trial justice 

considered the evidence that defendant claims points to Jane’s motive to lie. 

However, the trial justice found that this evidence was not compelling. She

determined that there was no testimony that placed Janelle’s punishment at the 

same time as Jane’s disclosure of the incidents to her family and the police. The 

trial justice further found that “[Janelle]’s punishment was more of a non-event in 

[Jane]’s life than [d]efense counsel suggested[,]” and thus the evidence presented 

by defendant did not show that Jane had a strong emotional reaction toward the 
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punishment that would serve as an impetus to lie about defendant. Instead, the 

trial justice believed Jane and Sabourin’s testimony as to the motivation behind the 

disclosure, which, according to the trial justice, they explained occurred because 

Jane “risked losing” Sabourin over her “rules” barring men other than Sabourin

from watching their young daughter, a rule Jane implemented because of the 

trauma she had suffered as a result of the incidents of abuse. Ultimately, the trial 

justice considered defendant’s proffered evidence to the contrary, but nevertheless 

stated that she “accepted [Jane] and [Sabourin]’s testimony as to why [Jane] 

disclosed when she did.” Thus, the trial justice did not overlook material evidence 

of Jane’s motive for disclosure.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, including the trial justice’s decision 

denying the motion for a new trial, we are satisfied that the trial justice articulated 

adequate grounds for denying the motion and that she did not overlook material 

evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the trial justice properly denied the 

defendant’s motion for a new trial. 

IV

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of 

conviction. The record in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Cesar Vazquez.

Case Number No. 2020-57-C.A.

(P1/13-3759A)

Date Opinion Filed December 2, 2021

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For State:

Virginia M. McGinn

Department of Attorney General

For Defendant:

Angela M. Yingling

Office of the Public Defender