!~u~1ll)7

Th~ QA un&r DU Hi1ko~tter
Part II: The CIA under DCI Hillenkoetter

The documents in Part II cover the period from the enactment of the National

Security Act in July 1947 to the opening months of the Korean war in 1950.

RAdm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter succeeded General Vandenberg in May 1947 and

served for three years as the Cold War mounted in intensity. Soviet expansion

ism in eastern Europe and Mao Tse-tungs victory in China increased demands

for CIA intelligence analysis and prompted the administration to assign CIA a

covert action mission. The formation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)

for covert operations was a watershed event, which completed the reassembly in

CIA of the authority and responsibilities of the wartime OSS. Admiral Hillen

koetter, however, had little control over the new OPC, and CIA drifted. By mid1949 two men, both OSS veterans, had gained substantial influence over CIA:

Frank Wisner, the aggressive chief of the well-funded and quasi-autonomous

OPC, and Allen Dulles. Although Dulles did not yet work for CIA, his survey of

the Agency for the new National Security Council (NSC) sharply criticized Hill

enkoetter and persuaded the NSC to press the Director to carry out significant

reforms. Hillenkoetter knew his time was up, but the Truman administration

took months to choose his successor.

129
30. National Security Act of 1947. 26 July 1947

(Excerpted photograph copy)

~i~hli~th tton~re~s o~ the ~niti~d ~~tatts o~

~t tfje jT~r~t ~,t~iiun

Begun and held at the City ol Wsahington on Friday. the third

of Januazy. one thousand nine hundred and I orty4even

AN ACT

To pro~te the national ~vur~ty by providing for a Secretary of

Def~n~e: f ~ N~t~on31 Miliary Esrub1ishmcnt~ for a Department

~ ~ ~a Depar1men~ of the Navy, and a Department of the

Air I.r~: r~nd for the coordination of the activities of the National

MihLarv E~tOWNh.flC0L with other doparcrnents and a itci~s of the

(;ov~iim1eI~i con~erneiI ~vith the nstional security.

Th~ it nact~d by thc Sena~c aiid Hou~c of Repr~entatiiee of the

(J~i~t.d .S~fet~...~ojAmeriru Ia CoI.9r.u j.~qrnbied,

~

That this Act may be cited as the National Security Act of 1947.

T.%BLE OF CO!~TE~TS

L~c1aratioIl of policy.

Trrt.z !_~ .~cAT~O~ FO~ Y,~TIo~M. SECcIIITY

.e 11)1. N;,t~I,LL1l Se~~urtry Conacil

See. 1cr.~. C~ntr3l Iotdil~aee Ageucy.

Sf~c. lCtL National Security 1k~onrcc~ Boer~.

flru 1ITui~ ~iTIO~-~I. ~IILT~fl~ £b~USHX~T

~ilL Nntit,on~ ~!t1itary EstabiithmCOt.

Se.. ZS2. Sccretnfl~ of L~fon!~.

~ .~ICL ~1iIirnry ~to tb~ S.vr~tJry.

$~. .1)4. CivIlian personneL

S... ~ lIopartu~fnC of th~ Arui3.

~ 2U~. I x~rUneflt a! the Na~.

S.v. Xfl. X)~partciCZU of the ,~ir lcrte.

~255. I:i.tced Siatia At~ ?orcv.

~v. 20.). ~date of.tfli~-fT~..

Sc. 210. ~cuur~cII.

S. ~1. J u~CMd~ of ~

~

~.i3. ~IUtlJ~t~ LtrU.

~... 214. Lt(1, ~.et: t ~}loard.

1rrL! I_-MiecrJL&X)~ot!

S U1, ~cj~ ~rv:nrir~

~.. 5U2. U~itkr in ~Dd A.!.~taat ~

~ .~i! r~ t~,lun~i.~ ,i.~ 041 ~

s.. ::I.4. st,!. ..r Lr.Lnarerrv.i clvtli:.u ~ri~i:,i,eI

~.. :~X; ~ ~

s. :~. ~.r tn.i~..

s. ~7 ti h.riZ~j 1w. ~..r &~,I,r..1ir1n1l..~i~.

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131
30. (Continued)

132
30. (Continued)

133
134

30. (Continued)

~L rebyt -
30. (Continued)

t tFFECJ1%}. flit

H Sn. a

10 (a) The first sentence of section 132 (a) and sections 1,

~, ~r tOt, and 310 shall take effect nuimedistely upon the enact

melit of tins Act

(b) Erceptis provided in subsection (a),tbe provisions of this Act

shati take efek on svhxchner of the followiiio days is the artier

The day aft4the da, zpon Defense first

appoinS Ui] of the ~act

nientof

Sit. loftJwAd

~ entitled dutien of the

office of]

i118,

~~

UI Mryof -

thel

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135
31. R. H. Hillenkoetter to the National Intelligence Authority,

National Security Act of 1947, 11 September 1947

(Attachment not included)

7 ONFJDNTIAI )

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

2430 £ STREET NW.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1]. September 19147

MEMORA~DUN FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRETARY OF WAR

~~bRETARY OF T1~ NAVY

/PERSONAL REPRESENTI~TIVE OF THE PRESIDENT ON NLk

Subject: National Security Act of 1947

1. TJnon the coming into effect of the National Security Act

of 1947, the National Intelligence Authority automatically ceases

to exist and the Central Intelligence Agency comes under the

National Security Council. Inasmuch as no date has been set for a

meeting of the Nations]. Security Council to carry on the work of the

National Intelligence Jorthority, the following suggestions and recom

mendations are made:

a. At the first meeting of the National Security Council, it is recommended that a].]. directives of the National Intelli

gence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group be con

tinued in full force end effect until the National Security

Council has had an opportunity to study the problem and to

make amendments and changes that they may consider desirable.

b. In order that the National Security Council make an

early approach to this problem, it is recommended that the

Director of the Central Ititelligence Agency be directed to

submit, within sixty days, his proposal for National Security

Council directives to bring former directiveslof the National

1 Intelligence .Authcrity and the Central Intelligence Group into

line with the Nations]. Security Act of 1947.

c In consideration of the size of the National Security

Council, as compared to the National Intelligence Authority,

~4- .~. it is recommended that a subcommittee be established to act

-

similarly to the National Intelligence Authority to furnish

c~,iJ~ ~ the active direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. This

,~ subcommittee should be composed of a minimum number of members

~and, as a suggestion, could be either the Secretary of State

-

and the Secretary of National Defense,- or the Secretary of

G11 J~ ~ State, Secretary of National Defense, and the three Secretaries

~,5jft ~ of ~ Navy ath Air Force. Personally, I believe the first

~~suggestion is better since the Secretary of State has equal

,,~ representation with the military. If the second suggestion is

~ followed, there may be ~ome complaints from State that. the

4 military is overshadowing tJ~em.

£&NF~EN~

137
31. (Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

2. The Director of the Central intelligence Group sat as a

non-voting me~ber of the National Intelligence Authority, and, while

I believe it presumptuous and awkward on my part to suggest that he

so sit with the Nations]. Security Council, stil]. it would be of

utmost assistance if he could attend all meetings of the National

Security Council in some capacity, either as observer, counsel or

advisor, in order to keep informed of what the thoughts of the

National Security Council may be. In addition, by being present, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency would also be

available for such direct questions as may be propounded.

3 If you will indicate your approval or disapproval of the

suggestions and recommendations above, I shall go ahead and have

formal statements prepared to be furnished to the National Security

Council at its first meeting.

Rear Adniiral, USN -

Director of Central Intelligence

2

CO~!FlDEN TI AL

138
32. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates,

CIA 1, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the

Security of the United States, 26 September 1947

~HE~

35348

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Review of the World Situation

as it Relates to the Security

of the United States

CIA I

26 September 1947

Cop~No. 45

139
32. (Continued)

THIS AFFECTING THE NA

TIONAL DEFThSE OF ~ATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF

THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S. ., 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANS

~4ISSION OR THE REVE ON OF IT NTHNTS IN ANY MANNER TO

AN UNAUTHORIZED ON IS PROHIB Y LAW.

WARNING

140
32. (Continued)

SECRET

REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO

THE SECURITY OF THE UNITEDSTATES

26 September 1947

SUMMARY

1. Among foreign powers, only the U.S.S.R. is capable of threatening the security

of the United States.

2. The U.S.SR. is presently incapable of military aggression outside of Europe and

Asia, but is capable of overrunning most of continental Europe, the Near East, northern

China, and Korea.

3. The U.S.S.R is unlikely to resort to open military aggression in present cir

cuxnstances. Its policy is to avoid war, to build up its war potential, and to extend

its Influence and control by political, economic, and psychological methods. In this

it is deliberately conducting political, economic, and psychological warfare against the

United States.

4. The greatest danger to the security of the United States is the possibility of

economic collapse in Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of Com

munist elements.

5. Stabilization and recovery in Europe and Asia would tend to redress the balance

of power and thereby to restrain the U.S.S.R

6. From the point of view of containing the U.S.S.R. and eventually redressing the

balance of power the order of priority among tte major regions of Europe and Asia Is:

a. Western Europe.

b. The Near and Middle East (but within the region the situation in Greece Is

of great importance and the utmost urgency, while the situation with respect to

Palestine is extremely dangerous).

c. The Far East (but within the region Japan is important as the only area

capable of relatively early development as a power center counterbalancing the

Soviet Far East).

SECRET

141
32. (Continued)

SEC RET

REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE

SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

1. Mnong foreign powers, only the U.S.S.R. is capable of threatening the security

of the United States. Even the U.S.S.R., lacking the requisite naval and air forces, is

incapable of direct attack upon the United States or of major military operations any

where outside of Europe and Asia. The preponderance of readily available Soviet

ground strength is such, however, that the U.S.S.R., at will, could speedily overrun

most of continental Europe, the Near East, northern China, and Korea. If the U.S.S.R

were to exercise this capability, the ultimate danger to the United States would be even

greater than that threatened by Germany and Japan, to avert which the United States

incurred the risk of war.

2. Soviet predomirtance in Eurasia is, for the present, less a matter of absolute

strength than of relative immediately available strength. The Soviet industrial war

potential is considered to be appro~dmately equal to that of 1939; it is almostcertainly

no greater. Since 1939, however, the power of Germany and of Japan has been obliter

ated, that of France and of Italy severely curtailed, and that of Great Britain seridusly

impaired. China also, no great power in 1937, is even more weak and disorganized in

1947. Thus the balance of power which restrained the U.S.S.R from 1921 to 1941 has

ceased to exist. The only effective counterpoise to the power of the Soviet Union is that

of the United States, which is both latent and remote. Consequently the U.S.S.R,

despite its present weaknesses, enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of power at every

point within logistical reach of its land forces.

3. Despite this initial advantage, the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to resort to overt military

aggression in present circumstances, primarily for the following reasons:

a. Forcible occupation of extensive additional territory, particularly in West

ern Europe, would impose upon the U.S.S.R. the additional burden of holding In

subjection large hostile populations, a task vastly greater than that assumed in

the satellite states of Eastern Europe and one likely to overtax the attenuated itsources of the Soviet Union.

b. Open aggression would entail risk of a war with the United States ultimately

disastrous for the U.S.S.R. Unable to strike directly at the United States, the

U.S.S.R. would be exposed to early long range air bombardment with conventional

and atomic bombs and to eventual amphibious attack. Moreover, Soviet industrial

The U.S.S.R. Is capable of a considerable number of one-way bomber sorties against targets In

the U.S. Such attacks, using conventional bombs, could be no more than harassing in effect, but,

with atomic bombs, would be extremely dangerous. Whether the U.S.S.R. now possesses a usable

atomic bomb can be neither proved nor disproved, but it is considered improbable that the U.S.S.R.

baa such a bomb or that It can develop one before 1950.

CECRE-T- 1

142
32. (Continued)

~ECILET

cap3bllitles for the support of large scale, highly developed warfare are and must

long remain greatly Inferior to those of the United States. The U.S.S.R. would be

unable to win a quick decision in such a conflict and could not support a protracted

. struggle with a determined and resourceful antagànlst far beyond Its own frontiers.

c Open military aggression would forego favorable prospects for the further

extension of Soviet hegemony by political and economic means. By indoctrina

tion, experience, and personal interest the rulers of the U.S.S.R are predisposed

toward the pursuit of their objectives by conspiratorial rather than by military

methods. In the economic dislocation, social unrest, political Instability, and mili

tary weakness prevailing generally In Europe and Asia they have an unprecedented

opportunity to extend the Soviet sphere by politico-revolutIonary action at less risk

than that entailed by military aggression, and with greater prospect of enduring

success.

4. Thus the greatest present danger to U.S. security lies, n~ot in the military strength

of the U.S.S.R. and the possibility of Soviet armed aggression, but in the possibility

of the economic collapse of. Western Europe and of the consequent accession to power

of elements subservient to the Kremlin. The economic weakness of Western Eu~Ope

is the result of the simultaneous Impact of extensive physical destruction, a breakdown~.

In pre-war economic relationships (supplanted In many countries by rampant Illegal

or black-market practices), a deterioration In the will and capacity to work and In other

driving forces of a virile economy, and a probably irreparable loss of large pre-war

i~IgIm~ for goods and servIces derived from.overseas Investments and from a donhinjLnt

position In colonial territories. As a result of these conditions and until indigenous

production can be Increased considerably beyond the pre-war level, Western Europe

Is confronted (In the absence of outside aid) with a prolonged period of low standards

of livirig, widespread dissatIsfaction, social unrest, and political Instability. There

are indications that the Kremlin Is clearly conscious of this opportunity and that Its

present plans for the extension of Its power are premised upon the assumption of con

tinuing economI~ crisis In Western Europe and an eventual depression In the United

States.

5. The policy of the U.S.S.R. In the foregoing drcumstances appears to be:

a. To avoid war with the United States, relying upon the disinclination of the~

United States to resort to war on Its own Initiative. (In the actual state of acute.

tension an accidental outbreak of hostilities Is a distinct possibility, but It Is prob

able that the U.S.S.R. would not intend Its provocations to lead to armed conflict

with the U.S. and will avoid that result Insofar as Its Intelligence provides adequate

guldance.)

b. To build up Its own strength, in anticipation of eventual war, by:

OEOflE-T- 2

143
32. (Continued)

OECIIDT

(1) An Intensive program of reconstruction and Industrial expansion

with particular reference to war industries. /

(2) An intensive program of research and development with particular

reference to an atomic bomb, guided missiles, and bactetlological warfare.

(3) The development of naval and strategic air forces.

c. To preserve Its existing relative predoniinsnice In Eurasia by ma1nt~lnIng

overwhelmingly preponderant ground strength and by consolidating control of

sateffite states a.nd occupied areas.

d. To extend Its own power and Influence and to undermine those of the

United States so far as is possible by political, economic, and psychological nieai~s,

Including action to:

(1) Prevent or retard recovery and stabilization In non-Soviet areas.

(2) Fasten on the United States responsibility for continuing dissatis

factions and distress; identify the United States with political reaction, eco

nomic imperiallsm,~and military aggression; and Identify the Soviet Union as

democratic, anti-Imperialistic, and peace-loving.

(3) ExploIf the wealmess, Instability, and confusion prevalent, in neigh

boring countries to bring to power therein Communist or Communist-con

trolled governments.

6. Although the conditions presently prevailing in European and Asiatic countries

surrounding the Soviet sphere constitute a danger to U.S. security, stabilization and

recovery in those countries would tend to redress the balance of power, thereby curb

ing Soviet aggressiveness and stabilizing the international situation.

7. From the point of view o redressing the balance of power the major regions of

Europe and Asia, outside the Soviet sphere, Ire not of equal Importance. Western

Europe merits first consideration for reasons of both urgency and potential value. The

most highly developed of these regions, it is at once the most vulnerable to disorganiza

tion and the most favorable for the early development of potential power. It Is also

most accessible from the center of Soviet power, and conversely, best located for the

eventual eiertlon of restr2-inlng pressure upon the Soviet Union. In Western Europe

a severe and possibly decisive economic and political crisis now Impends. Within the

general area the most critical situations exist In the United Kingdom, France, Italy,

and Germany.

8. The United Kingdom, supported by. the British Commonwealth and Empire,

was formerly a major stabilizing Influence in world economy and the balance of power,

but its capabilities in these respects are now greatly reducet. In view of Its critical

economic position, it must curtail drastically its overseas commitments, with a con

sequent reduction of Its power and influence abroad. Existing British overseas corn

- 3.

144
32. (Continued)

GECRET

mitments are so extensive and Important that their precipitate liquidation would create.

conditions prejudicial to security interests of the United States.

9. The4mmediate French economic situation Is even more critical than that of the

United Kingdom and the French are less able to cope with it, in large measure because

of the Instability of the internal political situation. The ineffectiveness of coalition

governments Increasingly encourages resort to political extremes. The Communists

are ~already the strongest single party in France; a swift economic collapse might well

lead to their accession to power. A more gradual decline would probably favor a trend

toward an authoritarian solution under the leadership of De Gaulle. It Is unlikely that

either extreme could establish its authority so effectively as to preclude the outbreak

of civil war on Its accession to power.

10. The Italian economic situation Is desperate and the political situation un

stable, for reasons ~im1Irn to those obtaining In France, with an even greater pos

sibility of Communist accession to power in the event of economic and political collapse.

Moreover, the proximity of Yugoslavia makes possible the development of a situation In

Italy ~inhIl~to that In Greece.

11. In Germany acute economic distress has been aggravated by continued par

tition and by uncertainties regarding the future status of the country and of Its In

dustrial establishments. Despite these conditions, Western Germay has shown itself

to be more resistant to Communist penetration than France and Italy have been. There

are Indications that even in the Soviet Zone the political situation is. unsatisfactory from

the Soviet point of view. The economic rehabilitation of Germany, particularly of the

Ruhr, Is essential to general European recovery as well as to local stabfflty. Effective

steps toward industrial rehabilitation will, tend to stabilize the situation In Western

Germany, bin will require convincing assurances to France against a recurrence of

German aggression. .

12. 0– important concern in relation to Western European recovery Is the existing

Instability In colonial (or former colonial) areas upon the resources of which several

European powers (the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands) have hitherto

been accustomed to depend. From Morocco to Indonesia the situation Is disturbed by

resurgent native natlomt1i~ni and communal strife. Armed conflict exists between na

tives and Europeans In Indonesia, Indochina, and Madagascar, and between native

communities in India and Pakistan. Armed ~ommusal strife is Incipient in Palestine.

Between Britain and Egypt the matter Is one of international dispute. Unrest Is wide

spread in French North Africa. None of these situations gives promise of early stabili

zation. The continuance of unsettled conditions hinders economic recovery and causes

a diversion oE European strength into efforts to maintain or reinipose control by

force. In these circumstances the traditional liberal policies of the United States and

Its Interest in early stabilization are in apparent conflict with its interest in supporting

OflET~ .4

145
32. (Continued)

SECRET

friendly European governments. There Is a consistent tendency to bring these matters

before the United Nations, where their effect Is to divide the non-Soviet powefs. Al

though the U.S.S.R. Is in no position to Intervene by force In these situations, It Is

actively exploiting them to create dissension, to undermine the economic and political

stability of European states, and to. discredit them and the United States.

13. As a region, the Near and Middle East is of second priority from the point of

view of containing the U.S.S.R. and eventually redressing the balance of powerbut

within the general area the situation In Greece Is of great Importance and the utmost

urgency, while the situation with respect to Palestine Is extremely dangerous. The

region differs from both Western Europe and the Far East In that (except In India)

Its human and materIal resources are Inadequate for the development of a significant

power potentIal. Its great Importance, second only to that of Western Europe, lies

in Its strategic location as a barrier to further Soviet expansion, as an essential link

In communications between the West and East, and as a potential base from which

power developed elsewhere could be brought to bear on the sources of Soviet power,

and in the vital Importance of the oil of the Persian Gulf states to the Western powers.

14. In Greece the U.S.S.R., acting Indirectly through Communist-led guerrillas

supported by the Balkan satellite states, Is In actual process of tAkThg over a major

portion of the country by force of arms. The Greek Government Is unable to cope with

this threat without active aid. At any time U.S. armed intervention may be required

to prevent Its collapse and to restore the situation. The loss of Greece would not only

impair the strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, but would also have pro

found psychological repercussions throughout Western Europe and The Near and

Middle East.

15. The Soviet effort to penetrate Iran Is still being conducted by political and

economic means. Iranian refusal of an oil concession to the USSR, which Is still

probable, would provoke a strong Soviet reaction, including a renewal of subversive

activity, though probably not an overt Soviet Intervention. If Iran should grant

the concession, Soviet penetration would be facilitated.

16. In contrast to Greece and Iran, Turkey Is not susceptible to Soviet penetra

tion. Turkey may be expected to resist Soviet domination in any circumstances, but

could not be expected to withstand for long a full-scale attack.

17. The situation with respect to Palestine is fraught with peculiar difficulties

and dangers. Zionist leadership, exploiting widespread hnmnnltarlan sympathy with

the surviving Jews of Europe, ha.s pursued Its objectives without regard fo~ the con

sequences. The Arab reaction Is bitter and potentially violent, endangering not only

the Jews in PalestIne but also the strategic interests of the Western powers in the

Near and Middle East, since the Arabs now Identify the United States and the United

CECI1ET 5

146
32. (Continued)

UllOflET

Kingdom with Zionism. The partition of Palestine, as proposed to the United Nations,

satisfies minimum Zionist demands, but will be bitterly resisted by the Arabs. Its

adoption and Implementation would precipitate Arab armed resistance possibly assum~

Ing the proportions of a Holy War against Europeans and Amedcans as well as Jews.

The Arab governments could not control this popular reaction; they would be coerced

by It, or would be supplanted by governments responsive to the popular will. ThŁI–

principal means of retaliation against the United States and the United Kingdom

would be the cancellation of British- and American oil concessions. Since the Arabs

could not operate the oil properties themselves, and since, In these circumstances, they

would be In-desperate need of powerful support, It is probable that they would event

ually transfer these concessions to the Soviet Union. Soviet control of Arabian. oil

would be disastrous to Western Interests. This course of events, of which there Is real

and grave danger, would not only wreck the strategic position of the Western powers

in the Near and Middle East, but would also have a fatal effect upon the economic

recovery of Western Europe and would seriously Impair the war potential of the

Western powers. -

-

18. Although the situation Is critical in both China and Korea, the Far East is

of only third priority from the point of view of containing the U.S.S.R. and eventually

redressIng the bilance of~ power. The proximity of Eastern. Siberia to the present

perimeter of Soviet and Chinese Communist control In Korea, Manchuria, and North

China, the remoteness of.the United States, and the weakness of the Chinese National -

Government, would render any U.S. attempt at containment by directly opposing force

to force a most unequal contest. The restraints upon Soviet aggression are political:

the undesirability of an open conflict with the United States and the possibility of

further penetration of China and Korea by political means. Moreover, the region Is

vast; an effort extensive In space and time would be required before the U.S.S.R. could

gain effective control of objectives strategically Important to the United States. From

the point .of view of power potential, the human and material resources of the region

are great, but, with the exception of Japan and of certain areas In Manchuria and

North China, they are generally undeveloped and incapable of development, by either

the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., within any period of present concern. Moreover, In compari

son with Western Europe and the Middle East, the accessible Far East Is too remote

from the vital areas of the Soviet Union to permit the exertion of effective Influence

therefrom upon Soviet policy. Whatever the course of events in continental Asia,

maintenance of effective U.S. control of the Pacific would afford a sufficient safeguard.

19. DespIte the low priority accorded to the Far East, as a region, In this reckon

ing, Japan is important as the only area within the region capable of relatively early

development as a power center. Under SCAP control, the political situation In Japan

is stable, despite economic difficulties. The Japanese economy is dependent upon

OECEET 6

147
32. (Continued)

3ECRET

the availability of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials from overseas. The re

moval of U.S. control, partIcularly if the economic problem remains unsolved, would

open the way to vigorous Soviet penetration. The rehabilitation of Japan under

Soviet influence or control (with provision of essential Imports from continental Asia)

would jeopardize the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific, as well as any U.S. position

In China. The rehabilitation of Japan under U.S. influence or control (with pro~

vision of essential Imports from Southeastern Asia), while It would tend to alienate

China, would create a power tending to counterbalance the Soviet Far East and so

to stabilize the regional situation.

20. The stalemate in Korea can be broken only by U.S. acceptance of terms

which would in effect surrender that country to the U.S.S.R. as a satellite. United

States efforts to make the best of the status quo must be conducted in the face of

persistent Soviet subversive activity and propaganda pressure.

21. There is no prospect of an early solution of the political and economic prob

lems of China. The Communists will accept no political solution which does not

render their existing territorial control secure while affording them opportunities for

further penetration by political means. Such a solution has been, the consls~ent

objective of the U.S.S.R The Kuomintang has been a1~nrnnt in refusing to consider

such terms so long as It has had hope of United States support. Losing such hope,

It might reconsider Its attitude with a view to salvaging what It oould of Its position.

Consequently, In the absence of large-scale U.S. aid, the prospect In China Is for either

continuing conflict, with further political and economic disintegration and an ex

pansion of the area of Ca~munist territorial control, or the eventual formation of

a coalition government through Soviet mediation and on Communist terms, with

a gradual penetration of Communist Influence throughout the national administra

tion. In either case acute political and economic disorganization would prevail In

China for many years, preventing an effective consolidation of Soviet control.

22. In Latin America local Communists, Isolated from direct Soviet support and

operating within the power orbit of the United States, cannot seize and hold political

controL The U.S.S.R. therefore jursues limited objectives In that area, its major

purpose being to $tenuate Latin Americas capacity arid willingness to give aid to

the United State~ in the event of war. This policy has already succeeded to such an

extent that the U.S.S.R. can probably count on Its undercover organizations and upon

Communist-controlled key labor unions to cut off U.S. access to some of Latin Americas

strategic materials whenever the U.S.S.R. considers such action desirable. The recently

concluded defense pact opens the way to marked Improvements in cooperative military

defense, but does notafect the scope and direction of these Communist activities arid

purposes.

I3ECRET . .

.

7

148
33. ORE 55, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine,

28 November 1947

CENTRAL INTEL.LIGENCE.AGENcY

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE

PARTITION OF PALESTINE

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150
33. (Continued)

this doa~ir bee b.i@

approved for zslui tbrm* -.

ORE 55 the HISTORICAL b.~vssd PPC~1I( of

tb. Osetral Int~ U25fl~ A~secy.

28 November 1947 ~ ~( ~ Copy No. 35

TRE CONSE(~U~~c-~ PARTITION OF PALESTINE

SU~ThfARY

Armed hostilities between Jews and Arabs will break out if the UN General Assembly

accepts the plan to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab States as recommended

by the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).

Inflamed by nationalism and religious fervor, Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,

Transjordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as well as Palestine are determined to fight

against any force, or combination of forces, which attempts to set up a Jewish state

In Palestine. While the governments of the Arab states are not expected to make

official declarations of war, they will not attempt to keep their people (especially

fanatical tribesmen) from joining the battle; they may even encourage such action and

furnish clandestine assistance as well.

In composition, the Arab forces will vary from relatively well controlled quasimilitary bands to the loose tribal organization of the nomads. The largest number

actively engaged against~ the Jews at any one time will probably be between 100,000

and 200,000. The Arabs are good guerrilla fighters, and they will be well supplied

with small arms and will, also undoubtedly obtain some planes and tanks.

The Zionists, for their part, are determined to have a state In Palestine or, In the

view of extreme elements, all of Palestine and Transjordan as well. Whatever the

UN recommends, they will attempt to establish a Jewish state after the British with

drawal (now set by the British for August 1948). The Jews are expected to be able to

mobilize some 200,000 fighters in Palestine, supplemented to a limited extent by volun

teers and recruits from abroad. The Jewish armed groups in Palestine are well equipped

and well trained In comrnsrndo tactics. Initially, they will achieve marked success

over the Arabs because of superior organization and equipment. As the war of attrition

develops, however, the Jewish economy (severely strained by mobilization) will break

down; furthermore, the Jews will be unable continuously to protect their extended

supply lines and isolated settlements or to plant and cultivate their fields In the face

of constant harassing, hit and run Arab attacks. Without substantial outside aid

In terms of manpower and material, they will be able to hold out no longer than two

years.

The US, by supporting partition, has already lost much of its prestige in the

Near East. In the event that partition Is imposed on Palestine, the resulting conflict

will seriously disturb the social, economic, and political stability of the Arab world,

and US commercIal and strategic interests will be dangerously jeopardized. While fr

responsible tribesmen and fanatic Moslems are haphazardly blowing up parts of the

oil pipelines and attacldng occasional Americans, It Is possible that the responsible

governments will refuse to sign pipeline conventions, oil concessions, civil air agree

ments, and trade pacts. The various projects which are necessary to raise the standard

Note: This paper ha~ been coordinated with the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of

State, Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

1

151
33. (Continued)

SEAr

of living cannot be carried through without US assistance and guidance. With the

US committed to partition, such developments will be shelved indefinitely. The poverty,

unrest, and hopelessness upon which Communist propaganda thrives will Increase

throughout the Arab world, and Soviet agents (some of whom have already been smug

gled Into Palestine as Jewish DPs) will scatter Into the other Arab states and there

attempt to organize so-called democratic movements such as the one existing teday

in Gresce.

If the UN recommends partition, It will be morally bound to take steps to enforce

partition, with the major powers acting as the instruments of enforcement. The dan

gerous potentialities of such a development to US-Arab and US-USSR relations need

no emphasis.

2

152
33. (Continued)

a:

T~ CONSEQUENCES OF TI~ PARTITION OF PALES~E

1. INTRODUCrION.

On 1 September 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)

completed its report, and a majority of its members recommended partition. as the best

solution of the Palestine problem. In spite of violent opposition from the Arab states

and the possibility that partition would not receive the necessary two-thirds majority

in the UNGA, there Isno doubt that this type of solution of the Palestine problem has

been more seriously studied and more generally accepted than any other. It is Impor

tant, therefore, to attempt to determine what the consequences of partition will be.

The General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine has presented to the GA a

partition plan based on the majority report of UNSCOP. Although no final decisions

have yet been reached on Implementing and enforcing the eventual UN recommenda

tion, certain basic assumptions can be made. If the UNGA (now debating the partition

scheme) accepts by a two-thirds majority partition for Palestine, the following situation

will result:

a. A sovereign Jewish state, comprising a substantial part of the area of Palestine,

will be established.

b. A substantial number of Immigrants will be permitted to enter this Jewish state.

c. The Arabs, not orUy of Palestine but of all the Near East, will strongly oppose both

a and b above, and armed hostilities between Jews and Arabs win take place.

d. Asslstence In the form of men, arms, and supplies will be afforded both the Jews

and the Arabs from outside Palestine.

e. The United Nations will not immediately organize an international police force

to keep the peace In Palestine.

On the basis of these assumptions, three questions must be answered:

a. How will the Arab-Jewish con~ict develop, and with what results?

b. How will the stability of the Middle East be affected?

c. How will US strategic and commercial Interestebe affected?

In order to answer these questions, an e,m~m11~~tlon of the political situation re

sulting from partition and the military developments which may arise from that situa

tion follows.

2. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

a. Internal Pressures on Arab Governments.

(1) Nationalist Pressure.

Arab naUo11~li.~n1 is the strongest political force in the Arab world. It

grew up in secret societies under Ottoman rule, came out lain the open in the Arab

Revolt of World War I, and has been the major factor In the independence movement

In the Arab world ever since; The independence of all the Arab states in the Near East

throws into high relief the continuing mandatory status of Palestine. Because of the

strong ties between the varous Arab states, political developments In any one country

are of vital concern to Arabs everywhere. Palestinian Independence Is, consequently,

3

8E7~

153
33. (Continued)

the major aim not only of the Palestinian Arabs but also of Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis,

Transjorth~nisnis, Egyptians, and Saudi Arabians. It would be political suicide for

any Arab government to ignore this situation.

The signing of the Arab League Pact in March 1945 was a victory for the

Arab nationalists in that It hastened the day when they could form~~th& own bloc In

relation to the other great powers of the world.

The Arab nationalist movement In Palestine has been as active as in any

other Arab country. The uprisings of 1929 and 1936 demonstrated the strength of this

movement. A stamp commemorating the signing of the Arab League Pact in 1945

appeared in Egypt showing a cluster of flags of country members, one of which was a

white flag Inscribed Palestine. Palestine has been represented at meetings of the

Arab League, first by independent individuals and then by the representatives of the

new Arab Higher Committee, formed in 1945. At the conference of the Political Com

mittee of the Arab League in October 1947 It Is significant that the Multi, as Chairman

of the Arab Higher Committee, played a leading role. Although the Arab Higher Com

mittee and the Arab League have differed as to the advisability of testifying before

UNSCOP, the members of the League are In complete accord over the Injustice of parti

tion to the Palestinian Arabs.

The ultimate aim of Arab nationalism Is to preserve and enrich the Arab

heritage, while the political alms are the independence of all Arab lands and the

establishment; of some degree of unity among them. The nationalists regard Palestine

as the chief stumbling block to the achievement of their political alms. Despite the

fact that Arabs and Jews have lived peaceably side by side, determination to make

Palestine an Independent Arab country Is strong in all of the Arab states, from the

more educated and ambitious classes down to the poorest and most poilticafly naive

peasants. Arab national fervor Is so explosive and pervasive a force that Arab govern

ment officials who recognize the political Implications involved in flouting a UN deci

sion will nevertheless have to oppose any decision for partition or run the risk of

losing office

(2) Religious Pressure.

The Arab governments are probably as greatly influenced by religious

pressures as they are by nationalist pressures. The Arabs are capable of a religious

fanaticism which when coupled with political aspirations is an extremely powerful

force. Whether or not the Arab governments are capable of guiding this force is

difficult to judge. It Is very possible that certain religious organizations will take the

initiative in organiing Arab resistance In Palestine.

The Ikhwan al Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood), with headquarters In

Egypt, Is an organization of young Moslems founded for the purpose of orienting

Arab society In accordance with Tc~m1C Ideologies. Branches of the Ikhwan have been

formed In Syria and Lebanon, and one of the most active branches Is In Palestine. The

Ikhwan regards Westernization as a dangerous threat to Islam and would oppose any

political encroachment of Zionism on Palestine with religious fanaticism. Should a

Jthad, or Holy War, be declared, the Jkhwan would be the spearhead of any crusade.

The Grand Mufti, as head of the Moslem Supreme Council, can count on the IIn~nimpus

4

154
33. (Continued)

support of all members of the Ikhwan, who are assured of entrance Into Paradise If

they dleonthefleldof battle.

(3) Tribal Pressure.

The tribes of the Arab countries are a powerful element In the political

and military pattern of the Middle East. The tribe Is a group of related families under

the leadership of a chief (sheikh) which may be jomed In a confederacy with other tribes

under a paramount sheikh. The economic basis of tribal life Is pastoral nomadlam

involving periodic migrations to seek pasturage for camels, ~eep~ and horses. The

nomad (Beduin) population of Iraq, Syria, TransJordan, and Saudi Arabia has been

estimated .at 2,500,000.

The conditions of Beduin life have developed a hardy type of fighting

man, not only Imbued with a warlike tradition (combining religious fanaticism with an

enthusiastic devotion to looting, plundering, and raiding) but also trained In the use of

small arms and the methods of desert warfare.

Large stlpendshave been.paid. annually to the tribes of the Near East by

whatever power wished to have their support, whether that power was British, French,

or the local Arab government. Since the Arab governments now pay the stipends, they

could rely on the tribes within their regions. The tribes would doubtless join the

crusade, not only for reasons of Arab patriotism but also for plunder, the assurance of

additional stipends, and the thrill of battle. The Syrian Defense Minister stated on

9 Ootober that as the Arabs marched Into PaleStine they would be buttressed by 100,000

loot-seeking Beduin described as mine fodder~.

The dramatic meeting of 500 Kurdlsh and Arab tribal shelkhs at HUla in

Iraq In October passed a resolution for a Holy War to defend Palestine. .

Although Prime

Minister Saleh Jabr took the Initiative in organizing this meeting, It Is significant that

the Arab and Kurdlsh leaders (many of whom are hostile to each other) consented to

meet and to agree to a common program.

b. probabie Attitudes of Arab Governments.

(1) Tosoard a Jewish.State.

The Arabs violently oppose~ the estabUsh1~lent of a Jewish state In

Palestine because they believe that Palestine Is an Integral part of the Arab world.

In addition, they fear that the Jews will consolidate their position through nnilrnlted

Immigration and that they will attempt to expand until they become a threat to the

newly won Independence of each of the other Arab countries. They believe that not

only politically but also culturally the JewIsh state threatens the continued develop

ment of the Islandc~.Asab civilization. For these reasons, the Arab governmentu will

not consider any compromise, and they categorically reject any scheme which would

set up a Jewish state in Palestine. The meetings of the Political Committee of the

Arab League in Lebanon crystallized this feeling. of ~n~n~n11ty. In a note, which

represents the views of all the Arab states, the Committee. stated, The Arab govern

ments, the~3selves,shafl not be able to restrain the feelings of.thelr nationals revolting

against the oppression falling on them, nor shall they stand with folded arms before a

danger threatenlæg-all the, Arab countries,. but- rather will they be compelled to. take

every decisive action, which will guarantee resistance to the aggression and the restora

5

155
33. (Continued)

tion of justice. In addition, leaders In all the Arab states have stated their determi

nation to resist.

(2) TowardtheUN.

The Arab governments are embittered by the UNSCOP majority report,

which they feel was not arrived at impartially. Speeches made before Zionist groups

by the Guaten,s~1an member of UNSCOP, following the return of the committee, have

convinced the Arabs that certain members of UNSCOP had made up their minds on

the question before the committee undertook its task.

However, the Arab governments are reluctant to break with the UN.

At the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League In Cairo following the

formation of UNSCOP, the Arab states were not willing to follow the lead of the Arab

Higher Committee in boycotting the hearings. The Arab governments supported the

Mufti in refusing to give testimony within the frontiers of Palestine, but they all pre

sented testimony to UNSCOP subsequently in Beirut.

The Arab governments realize the debt they owe to the UN. The raising

of the question of the evacuation of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon in the tIN

led to a speedy and satisfactory settlement among the French, British, and Levant

States. Egypt~has had an opportunity to air Its views on the evacuation of British

troops from Egypt and Its claime to the Sudan. The UN has provided a medium for

the Immediate recognition and participation in world affairs of the young Arab states.

Although the Arab states areaii~n~nt in their determination to make Palestine an

Arab state, they will probably avoid a complete rupture with the UNshould partition

be imposed.

(3) Toward the US and UK.

Since the Balfour Declaration the British have been the target of Arab

political feeling In Palestine. The recommendation for the partition of Palestine as

contained in the Peel Report of 1937 resulted in serious anti-British demonstrations by

the Arabs. After the dissolution of the first Arab Higher Committee in 1937, the arrest

of Arab political leaders, and the escape of the Mufti and others across the border, the

Arabs were convinced that Britain was crushing all hopes of Arab political Independence

in Palestine. Although the Arabs welcomed the White Paper of 1939, they have con

tinued to criticize the British for permitting Jewish immigration on a limited scale and

for refusing to disarm the Jewish underground. As a result, however, of the UKs

announced decision to terminate the mandate and to withdraw both Its troops and

administration from Palestine and Its refusal to Implement by force any settlement

not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, British prestige In the Arab world has

definitely improved.

US prestige, on the other hand, has steadily decreased with each new

indication that the US supports the Zionists. The good will enjoyed by the US at the

time of the Roosevelt-Thn Saud Conference and following US backing of Lebanese and

Syrian tbth~nç for independence was short lived as a result of President Trumans sup

port of Jewish Immigration to Palestine and the Anglo-American Committee report.

After the publication of the Anglo-American Committee report, Arab popular feeling

expressed Itself In the bombing of the US Legatlon at Beirut and In the attempt to burn

* .6

156
33. (Continued)

r

the USIS office In that city. The Arab governments~ official attitudes were made ksown

at the BIUdan Conference, in which the US bore the brunt of the attaŁks. Britishsponsored newspapers In the Levant States placed the responsibility for the AngloAmerican Committees findings on the US, Indicating that the UK members of the

Committee could only follow the recommendations of the US members. Gradually,

within the last two years, the blame for the Palestine situation has passed from the

UKtotheUS.

Because of long-standing cultural ties between the US and the Arab

world, thefriendly role that the US played In the achievement of Syrian and Lebanese

Independence, the partial dependence of certain Arab states on oil royalties from US

companies, and the promise of increased royalties In the future, the Arab states would

like to maintain friendly relations with the US. The Arab governments realize that

without US financial aid and technical assistance, they will be unable to carry through

the extensive projects that are needed if the standard of living Is to be raised above Its

present subsistence level. Little of this development will be possible, however, if the

US supports a Jewish state in Palestine.

c. Probable Actions of Arab Governments.

(1) Against Palestine.

In the event of the partition of Palestine, It Is unlikely that the Arab

governments will openly proclaim war against the Jews. Pressure from the Arab

people for an open declaration of war will be strong, but the governments doubtless

realize that such a step In defiance of a decision passed by the UN would seriously

jeopardize the Arab position in the UN. However, It Is probable that large numbers of

Arabs from the surrounding countries will Join the Arabs residing within Palestine for

the war against Zionism. These Arabs will be loosely organized under national leaders

and tribal shelkhs. Volunteers will leave the armies, and ammunition and military

equipment win find their way from the Arab armies to the resistance movement.. The

Arab governments, though not officially endorsing such action, will .doubtiess allow

It to continue. . .

.

.

(2) Against Jews in Arab Lands.

Before the enunciation of the Balfour Declaration In 1917, the Jews In

the Near East fared as well as other minority groups throughout the world. Since

1917, however, they have had to bear the brunt of Arab antagonism to the development

of political Zionism In Palestine. In the event of partition, the lives of the million

Jews throughout the Arab world (Including Palestine) will be Imperiled. The lower

element in the population would look forward to attacks on Jewish quarters because

of the excellent opportunity for lootingas Illustrated at the tithe of the Baghdad

revolt In 1941 when the Jewish quarter was attacked. A representative of the Jewish

Agency has stated that in the event of partition the 400,000 Jews In the Arab states

outside Palestine m~y have to be sacrificed In the Interest of the Jewish community as

a whole.

7

157
33. (Continued)

SE

(3) Against the US and UK.

The Bhidan Conference of 1946 established a course of procedure* to be

followed by the Arab states in the event that the recommendations of the .Anglo-Anieri

can Committee should be implemented. Following the publication of the UNSCOP

report and the speech of Secretary Marshall before TJNGA, the Arab League PolitIcal

Committee met and decided in general terms to apply the Bludaxi recommendations

if partition were voted by the UN. However, in the discussions on the manner in which

these recommendations should be applied, there was considerable disagreement in the

Political Committee. Some of the Arab governments refused to consider a break in

diplomatic relations with the Western powers, and others refused to cancel oil conces

sions. Nevertheless, there is complete unanimity among the Arab states as regards aim.

They are all unalterably opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Whether or not they now agree on retaliatory measures against the US is beside the

point; in time US interests will be seriously affected, if not by the decisions of the Arab

governments, certainly by the instability and hostility which will inevitably be aroused

in the Arab world.

The bombing of the American Consulate General in Jerusalem on 13

October is evidence of the Arab resentment against US support of the majority plan.

This action was reported to have.been taken by the newly formed Arab terrorist group

which calls itself the Jihad. Whatever the official position of the Arab governments

may be, attacks onUS property, installations, and personnel by Irresponsible groups or

individuals can be expected.

d. Aims of Jewish State.

(1) Consolidation.

In spite of increasing tension and hostilities between various factions

in the Jewish community, it can be expected that all Jewish groups In Palestine will join

forces against the Arabs in defense of the newly formed Jewish state. The chief aims

of the Jewish government will be organization of defense and increased immigration.

(2) Territorial Ambitions.

In the long run no Zionists in Palestine will be satisfied with the territorial

arrangements of the partition settlement. Even the more conservative Zionists will

hope to obtain the whole of the Nejeb, Western Galilee, the city of Jerusalem, and

eventually all of Palestine. The extremists demand not only all of Palestine but

Transjordan as well. They have stated that they wili refuse to recognize the validity

of any Jewish government which will settle for anything less, and will probably under

take aggressive action to achieve their ends.

(3) Soliciting of Foreign Aid.

The Zionists will continue to wage a strong propaganda campaign in the

US and in Europe. The injustice of the proposed Jewish boundaries will be exag

The secret procedure decided on Is reported to include the following provisions:

1. Not to give the US and UK or their local communities any new concessions, economic or

otherwise.

2. Not to support US and UK special Interests In any educational Institution.

S. To Institute a moral boycott against the US and UK.

4. To consider cancellation of any concession In the ~rab world.

5. To make a strong case of the Srab cause before the UN.

* .5.

158
33. (Continued)

SE

gerated, and the demand for more territory will be made as Jewish immigration floods

the Jewish sector. In the chaos which will follow the implementation of partition,

atrocities will undoubtedly be committed by Arab fanatics; such actions will be given

wide publicity and will even be exaggerated by Jewish propaganda. The Arabs will be

accused of aggression, whatever the actual circumstances may be. This propaganda

campaign will doubtless continue to influence the US public, and the US Government

may, consequently, be forced into actions which will further complicate and embitter

its relations with the entire Arab world.

e. Attitude of the USSR.

The USSRs aims in Palestine are: (1) to end the British mandate and bring

about the removal of British troops from the area; (2) to keep the situation unsettled;

and (3) to take an active part in maintaining order in the country. The USSR has

been highly successful in carrying out the first two aimswithout any effort on its part.

The accomplishment of the third aim would give the USSR a base in the heart of the

Near East from which to disseminate propaganda, carry on subversive activities, and

attempt to organize democratic movements in the Arab states.

By first recommending a bi-national state in Palestine, the USSR has made at

least a gesture toward the Arabs. By supporti~g partition, the USSR has set itself

up as the champion of minorities and has posed as a power attempting to find the

just solution for Palestine. The USSR could now logically claim that Kurdist.an

should be set up as a Kurdish state and that Kars Province of Turkey should be joined

to Soviet Armenia.

Meanwhile, the USSR has been actively but secretly assisting the Jews. In

addition to reports that the USSR is assisting Jewish underground agents in Europe,

large ships filled with illegal immigrants have been leaving the Rumanian port of

Constanza. The British have watched with suspicion Soviet lumber ships leaving the

Black Sea for Palestine which, the British claim, are carrying arms below decks to both

the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

In the event of Arab-Jewish hostilities, the USSR will continue to support the

Jews and will probably also attempt covertly to aid the Arabs.

f. E9ect on US Economic Interests in Near East.

(1) Oil.

U partition is to be implemented in Palestine, it appears unlikely that the

Arab governments will initially cancel existing oil concessions. Such action would have

the combined effect of alienating the US and cutting off future oil royalties. The sub

ject of cancellation of oil contracts was discussed at the meeting of the Arab League

Political Committee in Aley, Lebanon, in October 1947. The Saudi Arabian delegate,

stating that the oil companies were private corporations and did not represent the US

Government, opposed the Iraqi delegates stand that the contracts should be cancelled.

However, all oil installations and oil pipelines in the Near East would be

endangered. Desert pipelines are vulnerable to attack by small Arab bands, which

could cut the lines and disappear before they could be arrested. The Arab governments

probably would not support such irresponsible~ action, but they would not be able to

9

SE~*

159
33. (Continued)

SE/r

stop it. Operations outside the actual oil centers, such as Kirkuk and Dhahran, would

be greatly hampered, and the oil companies would be forced to restrict production.

Although existin~, oil contracts will probably not be cancelled, it is possi

ble that the Arab governments will refuse to enter into any new oil contracts with the

US. The Syrian Government, for example, has already postponed ratification of the

pipeline agreement with the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. Whatever their indi

vidual desires may be, pressure from the people as well as from the Arab League as a

whole may prevent them from entering into any new concessions.

(2) Commerce.

In the event of partition US trade and commercial relations with the

Arab world will be seriously aftected. The estab]ishment of an Arab boycott, even

though only partially effective, would act as a brake on the slowly but steadily improv

ing commercial relations between the US and the Arab states. Such a boycott would

also serve as a bar to American participation in projects for the improvement of living

standards, increased production, and expanded irrigation programs, many of which

would otherwise include the employment of considerable American materials and tech

nical skills. Even more important, perhaps, would be the general instability in the area.

Such instability could be expected to reduce the size of US investments in the area as

well as the returns from present or contemplated investments, thereby impairing the

dollar-earning capacity of the area and its ability to purchase from the US.

It is unlikely that existing air agreements will be cancelled, but the nego

tiation of new ones may well be delayed throughout the area. Othor countries will be

quick to take advantage of the inevitable deterioration of relations between the US and

the Arab states.

3. MILiTARY CONSEQUENCES.

a. The Arab Forces.

(1) Character.

The bulk of the Arab forces fighting the Zionists will be semitrained

guerrilla groups and loosely organized tribesmen. There are three main sources from

which the Arabs can raise men to fight in Palestine: (1) Arab quasi-military organiza

tions led by ex-army officers, which will form the core of the guerrillas; (2) soldiers

volunteering from the official armies of the Arab states to participate in action against

the Jews; and (3) tribesmen, who will probably be the largest source.

(2) Strength.

it is estimated that the largest number of Arabs actively engaged against

the Zionists at any one time will be between 100,000 and 200,000, including Palestine

Arabs, volunteers, Beduin, and quasi-military crganizations from the other Arab states.

The armed strength of the Arabs in Palestine itself is estimated at 33,000, most of whom

are members of such quasi-military organizations as the Futuwwa, the Najjada, the

Arab Youth Organization, and,the Ikhwan (Moslem Brotherhood). Moreover, the 11thwan will send contirgants from its Egyptian and Syrian branches, which number 15,000

and 10,000, respectively.

The la:gest Arab group of potential fighting men is the tribesmen

(Beduin) of whom some 30,000 are in the area immediately adjacent to Palestine.

10

160
33. (Continued)

SIT

They are expected to come to the aid of the Palestinian Arabs as soon as hostilities break

out, and additional men may be expected to swell the total Arab force as time goes on.

Their service will probably be sporadic; but other tribesmen win replace any who drop

out of the fighting so that the total Arab strength will undoubtedly be maintained.

The ground forces of the Arab League states (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,

Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen) total abuut 223,000 men, Including

gendarmes, security troops, and police forces. Besides these ground forces, Egypt has

a small navy, and several of the states have infant air forces and commercial planes.

Although the Arab armies are not expected to be officially committed to the fighting,

they will supply leadership to the fighters. These armies may also be asked by the new

Arab state to enter Arab Palestine to maintain order.

(3) Materiel.

The Arab governments may be expected covertly to furnish arms and

aminul3ition as well as trained military leadership to the guerrillas. Even before

World War U, the Arab states had adequate supplies of weapons suitable for guerrilla

fighting. These have been supplemented with arms taken from both Axis and AngloAmerican dumps following the campaigns In the Near East and North Africa, and with

purchase of materiel and equipment from US and DX surplus stocks. Negotiations

for the purchase of Czech arms have been reported. The Arabs will, for the most part,

rely on small arms rather than the elaborate materiel of modem warfare, though they

may be expected to make use of armored trucks and tractors for attacking Jewish

settlements. It is aLso probable that some light tanks and a few planes which can be

used for strafing and bombing will find their way into Arab hands.

Supply constitutes no serious problem for the Arabs. Each fighter will

carry his own equipment and will be supplied with funds for buying food from sympa

thetic villagers. The tribesmen, in particular, are hardy and well accustomed to bare

subsistence rations and life in the open. Since they will be moving toward Palestine

through Arab territory, they will have no difficulty gaining access to the water holes.

(4) Incentive.

The chief incentive to many of the leaders of this struggle will be oppor

tunism, coupled with nationalist aspirations and religious fervor. The leaders, In turn,

will appeal to the newly awakened nation~Bsn~ as a strong incentive to many Arabs,

particularly the better educated townsmen. Volunteers deserting from the armies of

the Arab states probably will not incur the disfavor of their governments, and many will

even receive secret encouragement from them. The proclamation of a Jthad will also

be employed to secure volunteers although such a proclann.tion Is not expected to kindle

a mass uprising. The current drought in the northeastern Arabian desert will make

the tribesmen restless, and the promise of loot from Jewish settlements will be attractive

to many.

(5) Organization.

The Arab forces are expected to vary from relatively well-cüntrolled

quasi-military bands to the loose tribal organization of the Beduin, led by their sheikhs.

Singleness of purpose will be the main unifying force. Extensive guerrilla warfare In

Palestine will give great power to opportunisdc. aggressive, extreme national~t leaders,

11 SEC/

161
33. (Continued)

JET

who (in some instances) may even take over the governments of their countries. It has

recentiy been reported that a unified command for all Arab guerrilla forces has been

establi.shed.

(6) Course of Action.

Arab action will be directed ndt only against the Jews but also against

any police force attempting to maintain order in Palestine. Guerrilla action is not

anticipated until the final TIN decision is made known. The manner and timing of the

British withdrawal will be an important factor in the fighting, which is expected to

increase steadily in intensity after the British withdrawal, eventually taking the form

of an undeclared war of attrition against the Jews.

The Arab is a good guerrilla fighter while relatively few Jewish soldiers

have had experience in guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, the terrain of Palestine is well

suited to the Arabs traditional method of fighting. The quasi-military groups, com

posed of ex-army men and townspeople, will specialize in direct assaults on ZioniSt

colonies, demolition of bridges and railroads, and other sabotage. The tribesmen will

engage in activities not requiring technical training or extensive coordination such as

attacks on isolated villages, assassination, continual sniping to prevent cultivation of

the fields, and attacks on transportation, communications, and supply lines. Per

sistent harassing attacks can be expected in time to wear the Zionist economy to the

breaking point.

The Arab intelligence system has always been quick and accurate. The

traditional grapevine can be supplemented by telecommunications and some aerial

reconnaissance. Positions in the highlands will provide good observation posts. Also,

since nearly hail the population of the Jewish state proposed by UNSCOP will be Arab,

the Arabs will have a ready-made Fifth Column in enemy territory.

(7) Sources of Support.

The bulk of support for the Arab cause will come from the member states

of the Arab League. Responsibility for financial support for the Arab cause will devolve

primarily upon Egypt, and to a lesser extent upon the states receiving oil royalties, por

ticularly Saudi Arabia. Support in the form of arms and men will come from all the

Arab countries, but its extent will be conditioned by availability of transportation, par

ticularly from such countries as Yemen and the more distant parts of Saudi Arabia.

Aid from other Moslem areas, such as Pakistan and North Africa, is expected to be

limited in quantity and to consist chiefly of money and moral support. Although the

USSR has advocated the adoption of the majority report of IThTSCOP with certain

modifications, the Soviets will probably give covert aid to the Arabs as well as to the

Jews in an effort ~to create chaos in the Near East. The Arabs will, of course, appeal to

world opinion, but more for non-interference or for diplomatic support than for armed

assistance.

b. The Jewish Forces.

(1) Character and Composition.

Although it has been estimated that Jewish and Arab forces will be

almost equal numerically, the Arabs will have large numbers of replacements while

* 12

162
33. (Continued)

the Jews wifi have no reinforcements unless they can facilitate additional emigration

from Europe or obtain volunteers from the United States. The Jews will be well

equipped, but it is doubtful whether the amount of ammunition they have on hand will

be sufficient for a long campaign.

The Jewish forces in Palestine are composed of three organizations: (1)

Hagana, the Zionist army; (2) Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL); and (3) the Stern Gang. The

three groups differ in their tactics and in the degree of ruthlessness employed in their

operations, Hagana being the most sensitive to world opinion. IZL and the Stern

Gang are illegal terrorist groups engaging in sabotage and assassination.

Hagana is sponsored by the Jewish Agency. The original and largest

group, it is left of center in political sympathy. Because of its defensive work, its

restraint, and Its non-extremist intentions, Hagana is supported by a majority of the

Jewish community of PaleStine and by most Zionists. It has become primarily an

instrument for the advancement of Zionism and would be a ready-made army for a

Jewish state in Palestine.

it is estimated that in the event of hostilities Hagana could mobilize

about 200,000 men and women with some combat or supply experience. At present

Hagana is believed to have approximately 70,000 to 90,000 members organized into

territorial commands under a central headquarters and consisting of three branches:

(1) the static force; (2) the field army; and (3) the Palmach or storm trooper unit.

The static force consists of settlers and townspeople based at Jewish settlements as a

sort of home guard. The field army consists of about 16,000 troops trained in mobile

operations. The Palmach is composed of approximately 5,000 permanently mobilized

troops trained in commando tactics and supplied with their own transportation. It

includes a smaller group known as Palyam or Palteck, a kind of coast guard trained

especially to assist illegal immigrants arriving by ship.

Social and economic pressure has, in effect, made It compulsory for all

able-bodied Jewish men and women in Palestine to serve one year in some armed

organization. Thus, a years term of enlistment is prerequisite to enrollment iii Hebrew

University. Hagana is well financed by a semilegal tax Imposed upon the settlements

by the Jewish Agency, by subscriptions, and by contributions from Jews In other coun

tries. The organization also has European branches.

It has been estimated that enough modern weapons are available to arm

up to 200,000 members of Hagana. There are also sufficient automatic weapons for

each squad of Palmach, as well as some mortars. Hagana has been procuring arms

over a period of years, many from the residue of the campaigns In the Near East and

others smuggled in from abroad.

The effectiveness and timing of Haganas diversionary attacks designed

to aid illegal immigration are proof that it possesses an excellent Intelligence system

and that it maintains a high standard of security. The Voice of Israel, a clandestine

radio, is one of its chief mediums for disseminating propaganda.

The Irgun Zvai Leumi Is estimated to have a strength of from 6,000 to

8,000 members. It is organized on a regional basis similar to that of Hagana but is

cellular In character. It employs sabotage and terrorism as the only effective means

of attaining its ultimate objective of an independent state in Palestine and Trans~ordan.

13 SEr

163
33. (Continued)

SE/Zr IZL is rightist In political sympathy. It has foreign branches and in

creases its Palestinian membership with illegal immigrants, apparently being more

interested in securing new recruits with military abilities than in finding a home for less

fortunate displaced Jews. IZL members are well armed and trained in sabotage,

particularly in the use of explcsives. It has been reported, but not confirmed, that IZL

and the Stem Gang have sufficient armor plate for transforming 500 to 600 tractors

into improvised light tanks and for converting an unestimated number of automobiles

into armored cars. IZL is believed to cooperate closely with the Stern Gang, and the two

organizations are known to have conducted operations jointly. The infrequency of

tactical errors in IZLs operations indicates that the organization has an excellent intel

ligence system with very tight security. It has its own clandestine radio station known

as the Voice of Fighting Zion.

The Stern Gang consists of from 400 to 500 extreme fanatics. They do

not hesitate to assassinate government officials and police officers or to obtain funds by

acts of violence against Jews as well as others. Like iZL, they are well supplied with

small arms, and the security of the group is excellent as its organization is limited to

cells of three.

The founders of the Stern Gang were formerly members of IZL. How

ever, when IZL restrained its activities against the British during the early days of

World War II, the most extreme section of its membership formed a more terroristic

body called FF1 (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) but more commonly known as the

Stem Gang. The political connections of the organization are paradoxical and appear

to be the result of opportunism born of necessity. Recent reports confirm the fact that

the Stern Gang has connections with the USSR, which is furnishing it with money.

The organization has stated that it considers a turn towards Soviet Russia necessary

because of the present world situation. It explains that the USSR and the Stem Gang

both desire the creation of a strong and independent Palestine which would consti

tute a rampart against British imperialist designs but would not be hostile to the

Soviet Union.

(2) Course oj Action.

In the far~e of an Arab attack, the three Jewish armed groups will be

forced to unite. Members of IZL and the Stem Gang will probably be assimilated into

Hagana, which is already established along military lines and could readily absorb the

other two groups into its commando units. Initially, the Jews will gain marked success

over the Arabs because of superior organization and equipment, but the Jews will be

unable to stand up under the long war of attrition which will develop.

The Jewish sections of a Palestine partitioned in accordance with the

UNSCOP majority report will be vulnerable to attack by the Arabs. The northeast

sector is entirely surrounded by Arabs: Palestinian on the south and west, Lebanese

and Syrian on the north, and Transjordanian on the east. The central Jewish sector

is flanked on the east by the central Arab sector, while the southern Jewish sector is

surrounded by Palestinian Arabs on the west and north, Transjordanian on the east,

and Egyptian on the south. The Arab sectors contain the strategic highlands of

Galilee and those surrounding the proposed International zone of Jerusalem.

14

164
33. (Continued)

r

Two major dI~culties facing the Jews will be the large numbers of Arabs

within Jewish territory (in the northeast Jewish sector, for Instance, there are some

72,700 Arabs as opposed to 44,700 Jews) and the extreme vulnerability of outlying Jewish

settlements and supply routes to Arab attack. The Jews will be forced to expend a

large proportion of their forces in static defense of isolated villages and colonies, or

organize many mobile units in key locations so that settlements under attack can be

aided quickly. Furthermore, many units will have to be used to convoy supply cara

vans. The establishment of strong defensive positions, within which normal economic

life can be maintained, and the protection of transportation routes will be the main

strategy of the Jewish forces. The Zionist colonies are estimated to have sufficient

stores of food for a months supply. Owing to the fact that many agricu.ltural laborers

will be engaged in combat and that Arab attacks will prevent cultivation of the fields,

the Jews will have dl~culty in producing food. Moreover, mobilization over a long

period of time will so strain the manpower of the Jewish community that Its economy

will collapse unless large numbers of immigrants and substantial material assistance

are supplied from abroad.

The Jews may be expected to employ small-scale, commando-type offen

sive operations against Arab concentrations if they are able to locate them, or attempts

may be made to pursue retreating Arab raiders. Large-scale Jewish efforts to pene

trate territory adjoining the contemplated Jewish state are unlikely because such actions

would necessitate over-extending the already vulnerable supply lines and would entail

the risk of combined rear, frontal, and flanking attacks by Arabs.

it is a diStinct strategic advantage to the Jews that the important port

of Haifa and the smaller port of Tel Aviv are included In the Jewish sectors, since any

assistance to the Jews in the event of open conflict will come from the west. It is

expected, however, that all cities will be centers of heavy fighting.

c. European Support for Jewish Forces.

There is already In existence a well organized system for transporting Jewish

DPs from Eastern E~irope southward, particularly through the B~1knns to Palestine.

In the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict, this system would be employed to furnish man

power to the Jewish forces in Palestine.

Jewish immigrants from Poland, the Soviet Zone of Germany, Hungary, and

the Balkens are gathered together in Austria, Italy, and Germany for transportation to

Palestine. It has been estimated that about 1,800 Jews cross into Austria every month.

In Italy, Hagana is reportedly operating a secret immigration service for the estimated

30,000 Jewish refugees registered there. Both the Thimanian and Bulgarian Govern

ments are helping Jews reach Black Sea ports in order to board ships which attempt

to run the blockade into Palestine.

There has been some evidence that European agents of IZL and the Stern

Gang have been trained and are assisted by the USSR The Jews will doubtless con

tinue to solicit aid from the USSR, but in the event of a Jewish-Arab war, it is unlikely

that either side would receive overt material aid from the USSR or its satellites, with the

The predominantly Arab port of Jaffa, although allocated to the Arab state by UNSCOP,

is cut off from the Arab hinterland and thus will not be immediately useful to the Arab forces In

the event of war.

15

165
33. (Continued)

SF/ET

exception of Czechoslovakia. France and Belgium, as well as Czechoslovakia, are

thought to be likely sources of arms and ammunition for the Jewish forces. There

have been unconfirmed reports of smuggling from France, Belgium, and Luxembourg

for Jewish terrorist groups in Palestine. The Czechs are reported willing to sell arms

to the Arabs; they would also be willing to supply arms to the Jews if the transaction

were financially advantageous. No estimate can be made of the amount and types of

weapons which would be supplied.

d. Support Obtainable in the US.

No information is available upon which to base an estimate of the specific num

ber of volunteers or the amount of funds and supplies to be made available to Jewish

armed forces from US sources.

The Zionist movement is very strong in the US, but every organization claiming

to represent all American Jewry does not in fact do so, and many Zionist organizations,

while supporting the objectives of a National Home for Jews, do not advocate an

independent Jewish nation in Palestine. The American Jewish Conference, the Jewish

Congress, the New Zionist Organization, and the American League for a Free Palestine

are among the leading groups interested in the political aspects of Zionism which may

be expected to support Jewish forces. The principal non-Jewish bodies espousing the

Zionist cause are the American Palestine Committee, headed by Senator Robert F.

Wagner of New York, the Christian Council on Palestine, and the Political Action Com

mittee for Palestine, Inc. The last-named organization has recently expended approxi

mately $80,000 for purely military supplies. Because it is illegal to supply arms from

the US to Jewish groups in Palestine, figures are difficult to obtain, although part of

most Zionist funds collected is probably allotted to the purchase of military supplies.

While no authentic figures are available, it is estimated that support of Jewish

armed forces by US private organizations will be on the order of, or somewhat greater

than, similar support by US citizens of Government forces in the Spanish Civil War.

4. Co~cx.msoi~s.

If the UNGA accepts partition as the best solution of the Palestine problem, it is

almost certain that armed hostilities will result in Palestine; that the social, economic,

and political stability of the Arab world will be seriously disturbed; and that US com

mercial and strategic interests in the Near Bast will be dangerously jeopardized.

Although the DIIGA Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine is now considering establishing

a Commission responsible to the Security Council to oversee the implementation of par

tition, it is unlikely that any sizable international police force will initially be available

to the Commi~.cion. It is highly probable, therefore, that Jewish and Arab forces will

clash over the attempt; of the Jews to establish a Jewish state.

Into this struggle between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the people of the Arab

states will inevitably be drawn. Although most of the Arab governments will be reluc

tant to act in opposition to a UNGA decision and against the wishes of the major

powers, nationalist, religious, and tribal pressures will compel them to support unoffi

cially the Palestine Arabs. Inevitably the extremists, the chauvinists, will increase

their influence at the expense of those statesmen in the Arab world who believe that

the development of their countries depends on the maintenance of close ties with the

16

166
33. (Continued)

SE~~ US and the UK. While irresponsible tribesmen and fanatic Moslems are haphazardly

blowing up parts of the pipelines and attacking occasional Americans, it is possible that

the responsible governments will refuse to sign pipeline conventions, oil concessions,

civil air agreements, and trade pacts. The various projects which are necessary to

raise the standard of living cannot be carried through without US assistance and guid

ance. With the US committed to partition, such developments will be shelved indefi

nitely. The poverty, unrest, and hopelessness upon which Communist propaganda

thrives will increase throughout the Arab world, and Soviet agents (already being

smuggled into Palestine as Jewish DPs) will scatter into the other Arab states and there

attempt to organize so-called democratic movements such as the one existing today

in Greece.

In the meantime, the war in Palestine, barring International armed intervention,

will increase in intensity. The Jewish forces will Initially have the advantage. How

ever, as the Arabs gradually coordinate their war effort, the Jews will be forced to with

draw from isolated positions, and having been drawn into a war of attrition, will

gradually be defeated. Unless they are able to obtain significant outside aid in terms

of manpower and materiel, the Jews will be able to hold out no longer than two years.

The UN, having recommended partition, would have to consider the serious threat

to the peace resulting from the recommendation. It would, in effect, be compelled to

take steps to enforce partition, with the major powers acting as the instruments of

enforcement. The dangerous potentialities of such a development to US-Arab and

US-USSR relations need no emphasis.

17 SE~

167
34. National Security Council, NSCID 1, 12 December 1947

____SECRET NSCID 1 : OECI~P

12 December 192~7 COPY NO. .

~IONAL SECURITY COW~CIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National

Security Act of l911~7, and for the purposes enunciated in para

graphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security CouncU here

by authorizes arid directs that:

1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordi

nation between the Central Intelligence Agency and the

intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Advisory Com

mittee consisting of the respective intelligence chiefs

from the Departments of State Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCSj, and the Atomic Energy Com

mission, or their representatives, shall be established ~

advise the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director

of Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or his repre

sentative, of any other intelligence Agency having functions

related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence

Advisory Committee whenever matters within the purview of

his Agency are to be discussed.

2. To the extent ~authorized by Section 102 (e) of the

National Security Act of l9~7, the Director of Central In

telligence, or representatives designated by him, by arrange

ment with the head of the department or agency concerned,

i~Tl make such surveys and inspections of depa~tmenta1 ~n

~efli~ence materia of the various Federal Departments and

~iicies relating to the national security as he ma~i deem

neceasary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and

~to make recommendations f or the coordination of intelligence activities

3. Coordination of intelligence activities should he

designed primarily to strengthen the overall goverrunental

intelligence structure. Primary departmental requirements

shall be recognized and shall receive the cooperation and

support of the Central Intelligence Agency.

~. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recommendations or givlng advice to the

National Security Council pertaining to the intelli

gence activities of the various Departments and Agencies., transmit therewith a statement indicating the concur

rence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelli

NSCID 1 - 1 - SLOI1ET

SECRET

169
34. (Continued)

p SECREF 3ECRET

gerice Advisory Committee; provided that, when una

nimity is not obtained among the Department heads of

the National Military Establishment, the Director of

Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the

Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the

National Security Council.

b. Recommendations of the Director of Central

Intelligence shall, when approved by the National Se

curity Council, issue as Council Directives to the

Director of Central Intelligence. The respective in

telligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives, when applicable, are

implemented within their intelligence organizations.

~. The Director of Central Intelligence shall

~ct for the National Security Council to insure full

~nd proper implementation of Council directives by

issuing such supplementary DCI directives as may be

required. Such implementing directives in which the

Intelligence Advisory Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented within the Departments and

~gencies as provided in paragraph ~. Where disagree cent arises between the Director of Central Intelli

gence and one or more members of the Intelligence Ad

iisory Committee over such directive&, the proposed

lirective, together with statements of non-concur

~ence, shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as

provided in paragraph a.

k. The Director of Central Intelligence shall ~

duce intelligence relating to the national securitX here

aftei~i~Øferred to as national intelligence. in so far as

practicable, he shall not du~.icate the intelligence ac

tivities and research of the various JJepartments and Agen cies but shaLL make use of existing intelligence facilities

and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such pro

duction purpo3es. For definitions see NSCID No. 3.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall dis

seminate National Intelligence to the President, to mem

bers of the National Security Council, to the Intelligence

Chiefs of the IAC Agencies) and to such Governmental De

partments and Agencies as the National Security Council

from time. to time may designate. Intelligence so dissemi

nated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence

Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial

dissent.

NSCID 1 - 2 - ~EC1~T

~EORE~

170
34. (Continued)

// ) SECRET

6. When Security Regulations of the originating

Agency permit, the Director of Central Intelligence shall

disseminate to the Federal, Bureau of Investigation arid

other Departments or Agencies intelligence or intelligence information which he may possess when he deems such dis

semination appropriate to their functions relating to the

national security.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall per

form for the benefit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of common concern to these Agencies as the

National Security Council determines can be more efficient

ly accomplished centrally.

8. The intelligence organizations in each of the De

partments and Agencies shall maintain with the Central In

telligence Agency and with each other, as appropriate to

their respective responsibilities, a continuing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence available to

them.

9. Thc intelligence files in each intelligence or

ganization, including the CIA, shall be made available

under security regulations of the Department or Agency con

cerned to the others for consultation.

10. The intelligence organizations within the limits

of their capabilities shall provide, or procure, such in

telligence as may be requested by the Director of Central

Intelligence or by one of the other Departments or Agencies.

11. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make

arrangements with the respective Departments and Agencies to assign to the Central Intelligence Agency such experi enced and qualified officers and members as may be of ad

vantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in

addition to such personnel as the Djredtor of Central In

telligence may directly employ. In each case, such depart

mental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel

procedures of each Department.

NSCID1 -

3 -

~EC11T

171

35. National Security Council, NSC 4-A, 17 December 1947

(Photograph)

173
35. (Continued)

flnerabsr 17, 19~37 Co~ jg0

~ I

Bone

Thdtod ZtetsI 2zz its ot8mavon to pfloote

-1-

WY

174
35. (Continued)

:~Etka A .:~ ~

Ii

ii

HI ~.. 3~ ~TheDinctop t Ii ge a ia~çherged with

2!~r~~8 tbats

with

I ~Pn

j~C1 .2

1..:

175

io SECRET

.

~. ~ ~~>SL. ~.

.

,.~

it t .

.

~x. ~ M~,,.. ~ 1 2- .

ii

.

:. . . .. .~ .:
36. National Security Council, NSCID 7, 12 February 1948

(Typed copy)

COP!

c c ECID 7 SEC~

12 February 19h8 .

~NO. ~

NLITON.AL SEQJ!~TY C~]YNCq. in~ u~w~DI~CTIV& ~7

DOMESTIC ~LOITAflON

Porsuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National

Security Act of l9~i7, and for the purpose enunciated in paragraphs

(d) and (e) thereof, the !~8tional Security Council hereby authorises

and directs that:

1. Th. Central Intelligence Agency ah31 be responsible

for the exploitation on a highly a elective basis, within the

United States of business concerns, other non-governuental

organizations and individaala~ as acurees f foreign. intelli-.

gene. information.

2. To implement this undertaking, the Central Intelli

gence Agency a hailt

a. Determine the foreign intelligence potential

of so~rces so that the best available may be selected

expeditiously for exploitation upon the receipt of col

lection requests from the intelligence agencies. For this

purpose, CIA, will maintain a central index of ~

gounromental sources in the United States.

b. Bet~li~h uniform procedures and standards for

security clearance of all contacts in this field, and

ai~angs mach clearances.

c. Establish uniform p rocedurse to insure that the

imtersts of organizations .and individuals contacted

sil]. not be je.pardie.d.

d. Collect through the establishment of field

offices within the United States, foreign intelligence

information required in the interests of the national

security er by the iniividual intelligence agencies.

a. Arrange for direct contact between intelligence

agency representatives and non-.govermaental sources with

in the United States whenever conditions require inch action

or upon the request of ~ member agency to secure technical or

other foreign intelligence information.

f. Obtain the agreement of responsible po1icy.~ri~ng

officrala of American organi5atious having a foreign in

te].].igence potential before establishing and maint.~1M~g

contacts within ~t organization.

~CID 7 -.1 SEC1~1~

SECRET

177
36. (Continued)

g... InfOrm the intelligence agencies of the pro

spectlve departure er return to the United States of

selected American c itisens having a high foreign intelli

genc, potential, so that the agencies may furnish re

quirements or provide specialists for briefing or interro

gati.*.

h. Disseminate to the a ppropriat. agencies all

foreign intelligence information obtained through this pro

gram. Reports prodneed by the agencies shall be identified

as such, unless the originating agency stipulates to the

contrary.

3. Further t. implement this undertaking the intelligenee

agencies shall:

a. Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency

fieldoffices, if they do desire and within their capabilities,

representatives to serve their interests under the direction

of the CI& managers. Member agencies may, at their discretion,

establish active working liaison between their Regional Offices

and CIA Field Offices,

b Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency

for c~Lleetion all their requests for foreign intelligenc.

infonaatin to be obtained frau nongovei~enta]. sources

within the United States.

0. Thansmit to the Central Intelligence Agency f~

~pro~riate dissemination full information and reports re

suiting from approved direct contacts by agency representatives with aon-.gover~nta]. sources, identifying such sources by

CIA. code number.

d. Obtain, to the eakiume extent possible, frau their

depar~nente and agenc~s the foreign intelligence information

which the departhmnt.s and agencies have received as a by

product .1 the normal relationship with tusineas concerns

and other nongovernmental organinations and individuals in

the United States in connection with non-intelligence activities, and transmit to the wt.~ri ~ extent possible, the informatiok

t. the Central Intelligence Agency for editing for source se

curity and for appropriate dissemination.

e. Obtain, in so far as is practicable, and within ex

isting security regulations, free their departments and agencies

information concerning business concerns and ether nongovern

mental organizations and individuals in the United States havQ

ing foreign intelligence potential, which the 4artmant or agency

possesses or subsequently- acquires, and make the information avail

able to the Central Intelligence Agency.

NSCID 7 2 SECRET

178
36. (Continued)

/

f. N~inate representatives to serve on a conmittee under

the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, to meet periodi-.

sally to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with

this program.

~. Further the implement this undertald.ng, the National S.curity Resources Board and the components of the 3tilitary ~stab].isheaent, .ther

than the components represented on the IAC, shall it~rth.eh direot1~ to the

CIa, to the ~extent p>asible all foreign intelligence information

which is received as a by-product of their normal relationship with business

concerns and other nongover~ntal organizations and inilviduala in the

United States, in connection with nonintelligence activities.

S. Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the establi

shed relation~bip f the lMparbaents and Agencies with business concerns,

other nongoverneental organizations, and individuals in the United States

for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelligence information.

Nor shall it affect the normal interchange of documents betseen libraries

of the departnents and other libraries, r the development of research pro

jects with individuals or nongover~ntal institutions.

NSCID7 SEC1~T

179
37. ORE 47/1, The Current Situation in Italy, 16 February 1948

r.oq gi*i-i.....

-

-

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~ _c.

Ti~is d~cu~~t ~s b~e.~

ap~rov.d~ for re.L~asa .th~

th. EISTORICAL B~7IEW. ?~

t~. C~ntra~ Inte i~ca ~

Dat2/~J.9.2..

ORE.47/1 ~pp 92-f -

181

.~c~c,c%2

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ITALY

Published on

16 FEBRUARY 1948

Copy
37. (Continued)

DIS8~1DiATION NOTICE

1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the ieciplent

designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdidtion of the reeipienS~ office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Furthr~1.

disseiæinÆtion-elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa

tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for

the Department of State

b. Director of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army

~ :Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

d Director of Intelligence USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for ~

the: Atomic Energy. Corn

mission

f Deputy Director for Intelligence Joint Staff for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and DissŁmin~tion, CIA, for any other.

Department or Agency

2. ThIs copy may be either retained or destroyed by. burning th accordance with

applicable security rØgulatlons~ .

or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by

arrangement with the Office of Collectlonand Dissemination, CIA.

V

-

w~RNINO --

-

V

V

V

-

-

Tins docent con–~1ns Information affecting the national

defense or the vnite~at~tes wtthln the meaning of the -

V

V.:: ~.

~1on~A~5O U~C~ 3j~2, as amende~ fl~ ~~V; -

mission or the ~of Its ~hte~s In any manner ~ :- ~V V

an imautborlzed person Is prohibited ~y-4~ -~

-

182
37. (Continued)

ORE 47/1 ~

Copy No. 81

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ITALY

SU1~IMARY

Because of its position on the edge of the Soviet sphere, Italy is important in terms

of US security. The present Italian Government, composed of centrist Christian Demo

crats and a few representatives of the moderate Left, is anti-Communist and Westernoriented. Mainly because of Vatican support and popular association with US aid,

Premier De Gasperis Christian Democratic Party stands out as the. strongest opponent

of Italian Communism. Certain members of the Moderate Left, however, are also

attempting to form an electoral combination to combat the Communist-led Peoples

Bkc in the spring elections. Rightist factions in Italy have no leader comparable to

De Gaulle but are unanimous in their opposition to Communism and, therefore, find It

expedient to support a Western orientation.

The present Government will continue without radical change until the national

elections in April, the outcome of which will be influenced by the results of US interim

aid and the prospect for the ERP. It appears that neither the Communist-led bloc,

nor the Christian Democrats will gain a clear-cut majority and that the moderate Left

will probably do poorly. As a result, the rightist parties will hold the balance of power.

Eavmg failed to win dominance through the elections, the Communists are

expected to launch a campaign of general strikes, or even to attempt armed insurrec

tion should the Kremlin find such extreme measures necessary.

In the event of a Communist uprising, the Italian Governments armed forces

would be capable of maintaining internal security provided: (1) the current reorgani

zation had achieved an integrated defense system; (2) additional modern equipment

had been secured; and (3) the Communists had not received appreciable outside aid.

The armed forces are incapable of offensive and could fight only a limited defensive war.

The Communists are believed to possess the military capacity of gaining temporary

control of North Italy. If they receive material assistance from Yugoslavia and/or

France, the Government will require foreign aid to regain control of the area.

Although US interim aid totaling some 200 million dollars will provide food and

fuel to prevent extreme hardship until 31 March 1948, most Italians are still enduring

privations and are dissatisfied with their working and living conditions. The cessation

of essential imports from abroad would lead to a politically explosive situation.

Current foreign policy is basically influenced by problems of economic rehabilita

tion. The country looks to the US for necessary economic aid and protection against

Soviet and Yugoslav demands. Because Yugoslavia continues its attempts to gain

complete control of the Free Territory of Trieste, the US and 13K are determined to

postpone appointment of a governor indefinitely.

Note: The information In this report Is as of 26 January 1948, at which time the report was submit

ted to the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council for coordination.

The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force have

concurred In this report.

1

183
37. (Continued)

TEE CURRENT SITUATION D~ ITALY

1. IMPORTANCE OF FrALY.

It is of vital strategic importance to prevent Italy from falling under Communist

controL Such a development would have demoralizing effect throughout Western

Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. In particular, it would greatly facili

tate Communist penetration in France, Spain, and North Africa. Militarily, the avail

ability to the USSR of bases in Sicily and southern Italy would pose a direct threat to

the security of communications through the Mediterranean. Italy, however, is of rela

tively little direct value to the United States. The present and prospective political,

economic, and military weakness of the country is such as to render it a strategic lia

bility rather than an asset, except insofar as its territory constitutes a potential base of

operations.

Currently, the importance of Italy in terms of US security is in its position on the

edge of the Soviet sphere and in the non-Communist and Western orientation of its

Government. Furthermore, the successful implementation of the European Recovery

Program (ERP) depends to some extent upon the effective participation of Italys indus

tries and surplus workers.

2. POLiTICAL SITUATION.

The present Government consists of a coalition of the centrist Christian Democrats

(the majority party) and the moderate Left (the Rep~blicans and the Saragat rightwing Socialists) plus a few independents. Because of its substantial parliamentary

majority, the parliamentary position of the Government is secure until the April elec

tions. Furthermore, its prestige has been relatively improved In recent weeks by evi

dence of US aid and interest in Italys recovery and independence. The Government

has also increased its prestige and its popular following by its firmness during the

recent wave of strikes and agitation.

The Christian Democratic Party, led by Premier Alcide De Gasperi, stands out as

the principal opponent of the strong leftist bloc. Its political assets are essentially

the following: its possession of necessary US friendship and of promises of aid for

Italys recovery, its calm and firm insistence on law and order against Communist

violence, its centrist position, and its support by the Church. Furthermore, in recent

montha the Party through Premier De Gaspen has cooperated with progressive elements

in inaugurating several essential economic reforms and in granting concessions to

workers. The Party, however, suffers from the onus of responsibility for a huge gov

ernment deficit and failure to close the gap between wages and the cost of living

despite some progress in its anti-inflationary program. Its prospects in the national

elections are good, mainly because of Church support and the popular association of

the Party with US aid.

The leftist block is led by the Communists and includes the Nenrn (left-wing) Social

ists, the Labor Democrats, and remnants of the Action Party. Their combined popular

strength is believed approximately equal to that of the Christian Democrats. The

2 ~13r LJUtJIUJT

184
37. (Continued)

TOPRLF

Communists are using the same political device so successful in other countries, namely

the Peoples Frontrecently called the Popular Democratic Front for Liberty, Peace,

and Workto gather all the forces of democracy in the campaign against the forces

of reaction. To this end they have also organized a strong labor-management

movement among industrial and agricultural workers, and a League of Cornmunez,

an association of towns and villages which have Communist or Socialist Mayors and

Councilmen. The Communists are energetically promoting the expansion of womens

and youths organizations.

Between the two major opponents are the Saragat (right-wing) Socialists, and the

Republicans. These two left-of-center parties, which joined the Government in midDecember, have not been in a position to assert themselves or impress the public either

with a specific attractive program or with direct tangible result.s of their governmental

participation. At present, both parties have proposed to join in a Democratic League

as a counter-weapon to the Communist Popular Democratic Front. Unless this

Republican-Socialist bloc should attract many dissident elements from Left and Right,

these moderate parties are expected to secure not more than 5 to 10% of the national

vote.

To the right of the Christian Democrats is a recently formed National Bloc under

the leadership of aged ex-Premier Nitti, who has temporarily, at least, brought together

followers of his National Reconstruction Union, the Liberal Party, Glaiminls much

reduced following in the Common Man Front, and some splinter rightist groups. On

the extreme right are two neo-Fa.scist organizations, the Italian Social Movement and

the Nationalist Movement for Social Democracy. It is quite apparent that as yet no

leader comparable to De Gaulle in France has appeared to unite the various rightist

factions. All, however, are unanimous in their opposition to Communism and, there

fore, thud it expedient to support a Western orientation.

Despite the variety of political parties and views, the position of the present Gov

ernment is secure at least until April because US interim aid has assured enough food

and fuel to alleviate the hardships of the winter months. Basic adverse economic con

ditions and widespread unemployment continue to stimulate popular discontent which

the Government can allay only by holding out the hope of the ERP.

3. Ecoz~oa&ic SrruA.TION.

The Italian economy, normally dependent upon imports, currently requires sub

stantial imports of foodstuffs, fuel, and certain raw materials from the US in order to

maintain minimum food rations and enable production to attain a higher level of

recovery. US interim aid totaling about 200 million dollars will provide food and fuel

to prevent extreme hardship until 31 March 1948, but the Government may be con

fronted with the politically disastrous necessity of reducing bread rations before the

forthcoming elections.

In recent months the Italian Government ha_s taken several steps to put the

Italian economy on a sounder basis. Tight restrictions have been placed upon bank

credit; exchange controls have been improved for the marshaling and allocation of

3 TOP~rRET

185
37. (Continued)

TOP I~RET

foreign exchange, and the exchange rate of the lira has been adjusted to realistic

levels. Considerable success has been achieved, through tight credit controls, in check

ing rising prices, particularly of raw material and semiprocessed goods prices, and the

cost-of-living rise has been slowed. Although the anti-inflationary measures have

caused some increase in business failures, this result undoubtedly is more than offset

by the benefits of the program.

The strikes and demonstrations of November and December 1947, while disruptive,

were not of sufficient duration to set back appreciably industrial production which,

during 1947, increased approximately 35% over that of 1946. Concessions to strikers

and unemployed, however, are placing an increased burden on the budget which is still

running a substantial deficit.

Most Italians are still enduring severe privations and are dissatisfied with their

working and living conditions. More than a million workers are completely without

work and many others are only partly employed. Lack of adequate wheat supplies have

already caused the suspension of the pasta ration and the substitution of flee.

The general economic situation, therefore, is still conducive to agitation and

unrest. The cessation of essential imports from abroad, particularly train the US,

would lead to a politically explosive situation higlily favorable to the Communist cause,

especially with national elections impending.

4. MiLrrAitv SITUATION.

The Italian armed forces are limited by treaty to an over-all strength of 300,000

men. For economic reasons, their actual strength is only 286,000, including a recent

increase in the Carabinieri (internal security troops) from 65,000 to 75,000. The armed

forces are loyal to the Government and generally anti-Communist in sentiment. Train

ing is fundamentally good, and morale is improving.

The Italian Government, fearful of a Communist uprising, has recently increased

the size of the Pubblica Sicurezza (security police), which is expected to reach 80,000

by the end of February 1948. The Government has also appealed to the US for addi

tional equipment to supplement obsolescent and insu~cient material, and negotiations

are in progress. Provided Italy is able to secure additional equipment and to achieve

an integrated defense system (organization of which is now in progress), and provided

the Communists do not receive appreciable aid, the armed forces are capable of main

taining internal security. They are incapable of waging offensive war. If attacked by

a relatively well armed power such as Yugoslavia, for example, Italy could at best fight

a brief delaying action.

5. Fonzmrr POLICY.

Italys post-war policy is basically influenced by its immediate problems of economic

rehabilitation. It looks primarily to the US for aid in regaining its prewar interna

tional position and resisting any future Yugoslav and Soviet demands and threats.

When reparations payments begin in 1949, Italian economy will be brought inevitably

into closer relationship with the USSR. More immediately the USSR can use part of

its present wheat surplus to bolster the position of the Italian Communists before the

4 TOP~~~T

186
37. (Continued)

national elections this spring. Hence, eventual Eastern orientation through economic

necessity cannot be entirely discounted.

Italy has already resumed diplomatic relations with all the major and many of the

minor powers of the world and has concluded commercial and/or emigration agree

ments with numerous countries. With active US sponsorship, Italy has applied for

membership in the Tm. Italy is particularly desirous of working legally for a revision

of punitive peace terms. -

As illustrations of Italys willingness to contribute to world cooperation: the new

Italian Constitution contains a clause which permits limitations on the national

sovereignty; Foreign Minister Sforza is an outstanding exponent of the idea of a

United States of Europe; and Italy has already taken steps toward a Franco-Itallan

customs union looking ultimately to a European economic union.

6. PRoBABLE DEvELoPMxwrs.

The present Government will continue without radical change until the national

elections in April.

The Communists and Nenni Socialists will strive, as they did during 1947, to dis

credit the Government and interfere with Italian economic recovery under the ERP.

Hunger and inflation will continue to afford many opportunities for valid strikes.

Such strikes, if concluded advantageously for the workers, will enhance the prestige

of the Communist leaders of the Italian General Confederation of Labor. These strikes

will also financially embarrass the Italian Government whose budget needs all available

revenue. The Communists will continue to devote considerable money and all their

organizational energies to activities and maneuvers which may be concomitantly

preparations for a general strike, for a possible insurrection, or for a campaign to

improve Communist prospects in the national elections.

The outcome of these elections will be influenced by the results of US interim aid

and the prospects for successful implementation of the proposed European Recovery

Program. Favorable developments in this connection would operate to the decided

advantage of the present Government, led by the Christian Democratic Party.

Despite the granting of US aid and other evidence of US support, the leftist bloc

has not lost strength and the Christian Democrats (and their allies) have not gained

any considerable political following. Hence, it appears that neither will gain a clear-cut

majority in the April elections; the leftist bloc and the Centrists will each probably

receive approximately 30 to 40% of the vote. The balance of power will thus be held by

the rightist parties with approximately 15 to 25%. Hence, the next Government would

probably be headed by the Christian Democrats with rightist support. Because such

a coalition would be bound together largely by common opposition to Communism, it

would suffer from clashing policies and programs.

Following the failure of the Communists to win power at the elections and con

ceivably before the elections are held, the Communists are expected to launch a cam

paign of general strikes. Should the Kremlin decide an insurrection in Italy necessary

5 TOP)t(REr

187
37. (Continued)

_

TOP~LWF to the fnlflhlment of its primary objectivewrecking the ERPan armed uprinng

might be ordered.

The Communists are believed to possess the military capacity of gaining temporary

control of North Italy. If the Italian Communists receive material assistance from

Yugoslavia and/or France, the Italian Government will require foreign aid to regain

control of the area.

7. SITUATION IN TEmaTE.

Yugoslavias efforts to gain complete control of the Free Territory of Trieste have

not diminished in recent months, and consequently the area remains a potential source

of Great Power conflict. Since the Yugoslav Armys unsuccessful attempt to penetrate

the US-UK Zone on 15 September 1947, the Yugoslav-directed Communist Party in

Theste has continued its intensive campaign to undermine the authority of the Allied

Military Government (AMG) and to lay the groundwork for Communist control of the

area after the appointment of a governor by the Security Council.

The Communist effort has been directed primarily against Triestes precarious eco

nomic condition. Thestes economic recovery has been retarded by the general eco

nomic depression in Europe and by the reluctance of Italians and others to risk invest

ment in Theste business in view of the Territorys uncertain future. The Communists

have exploited this situation through continuing pressure on labor to strike for higher

wages, the purchase of business establishments in the city, and the diversion of traffic

to the rival Yugoslav port of Fiume. AMGs ability to combat this Yugoslav pressure is

dependent on its ability to finance an adequate public works program and to develop

the city as a transit port. This in turn is dependent upon the continued willingness of

the Italian G~*emment to supply Thestes currency needs and finance its balance-ofpayments deficit. Although Italy is reluctant to assume this obligation, failure to do

so would tend to undermine AMGs authcdty, make later UN control impossible, and

assure eventual Yugoslav domination.

Politically, the Communists are actively preparing for the general elections that

must be held after the appointment of a governor. In addition to attempting to make

political capital of the economic depression, the Communists have conducted a violent

and unrelenting propaganda campaign against the US and UK. Because the Commu

nist Party in Theste is now so openly associated with Yugoslavia, however, the pro

Italian non-Communists have strengthened their political organization, probably with

some clandestine aid from within Italy, and are in a better position to combat the

Communists in any future elections.

The Yugoslav Government, meanwhile, realizing that the presenc.. of US-UK troops

in Trieste not only thwarts its aims in that city, but acts as a strong stabilizing influence

on Communist thtentions in North Italy, is now pressing vigorously for early appoint

ment of a governor by the Security Council. Although the US and UK are prepared

if necessary to postpone appointment of a governor indefinitely, the USSR and Yugo

slavia may agree to a US candidate in the hope that even a strong governor would not

be as great a deterrent to Yugoslav designs on the Territory as continued US-UK mili

tary controL

6

TO~ET

188
37. (Continued)

DISTRIBUTION

The President

Secretary of State

Chief àf Staff to Commander In Chief

Secretary of.Defeuae

Secretary of. the Army

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Air Force

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Chairman, National Security Resources Board

Chief of Staff, US Army

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, US Army

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)

Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Research and Intelligence

Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army

Chief of Naval Intelligence

Director of Intelligence., US Air Force V

V

Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group V

Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee V

Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Cothmtttee to the Atomic Energy COn~1~n~

Director of, Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comrni~~~infl

Chief, Acquisition and Distribution, OICD, Department of State

189
38. Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the Assistant Director for

Special Operations Galloway], Additional functions of Office

of Special Operations, 22 March 1948 (Excerpted carbon copy)

TOP~ SECRET

DCCtJ~cEi~ rio.

00 ~ ~

io~o o eE~sr~~ +~ CLASs, ~TC~ TS IEXT REVIEW &ATi.i

aumr 110 ~O2

064540.

E~O~&ID~I P05 AU1~UT 501 705. 3P~X&L OPI~!I~1

s~acT £ddit4-~i r~ti.m. of Offi.. of lps.isl Opsre.ttons

w~~is i~ers~ fror Dtro.tor, Cli, Æs~ 55 0s~sr 3041,

.ntitiwi Pee.ti~ of ~of p.~ ~S$t1~Ir

1. Zn addition to t~ t~tion. sadbst 1* *~of$1l$Ss _

~the Aaiistsnt D1XS.t~ f55 .~S1!e.tLon* _

e. group vithin the ~I1o. of ~ciai ~s.ti, to he ~n ~.

.11.1 PrO.S&S$ for the p ~of t~ p~shelagioni spore.-

ti.o~ ataide of the ~its4 ltst.o ~ its p..awt.

2. Corset piyuhsl~sgiosl .pore~ ~ t~ml~ all e.s~ of

~ poruorsien .~t of p~i*ienL Tb. origientisg roL. of

the ~it.d Ststss G...~ will a~s a. a.~e :ss~lwi.

5. Corset p. ob.leg*~.l .pore.tiens dli ho senduetsd in scenrdass.

with isstrootiesa fren the Direnter of Control lnt.11i.genen eM appli..

osbil stsade.rds aM rs~ioto s~M4.~ within ~ &fI.. of ~sMsl

~ors~ for o.or.~rt fsevi~ astiTitiaa. $~ epseotiens ~iil be hept

ontix.3~ diatinst fren the amoo...rt eM open Z.roigv jof,~~4d~3

of other ~tsd 1~tSS $.....a.~bu1 eg~.i in ~4- the open-.

orship of th. ~1~sd atoto is openly ~

4. The priz~ .bj.Ittuw of *voh .,sest* will be. ( to

Ihe Dtr..th of foreign is.tr -

iti.s ~g..... ~..t.u

ieiiv4Aonla. VIIiIh $10 ~ig~t Sn e.łti~iti.. ~~1

to ~ ~ltot.. sM, (2) to .5. 1. foreign poliq by i.fi..

forwign p~U. opinion in a dirs.ti fmrsbl. to the Lt~~

ofT. a. estiwen.

5. 10 .avsrt psy~ol~(4M.1 spss~ttass ~iZl b. ~wni.eP

.ro folly suvslatsrat with the faroign poliap aM ~of th~

InttM Stotos .

6. Zn ents.bll-hiig ~ fenstien of Dpesial Presaduru in

with ~ fmgoiug, the Aasiatont Dtrs.t.r for ~.d&l ~senti~ wills

a. Stilis. m~h fsniut@.., -aM resose~ of the ~fies

of ~.ej&l ~sratiens as he ~ deen ry.

loPiEcla

191
38. (Continued)

io~

b. Ii~b1i.~. with tb. pisp.r łov.rm~t ~ or authority,

sua~ 1LI.iaon a. ho r.quir.d to lnaws tMt oovirt payohelogi

~ srs SOD*latumt with t~ tor.i~ po1i~ s~d

of t)a Uui~d ~s.

a. Tsk. spprv~ri&t. aotLo~ to i~.ur. tMt ~v.rt ps7~o1.~i-

~ .p&ttto~a do sot c~t1~t w~tb, or .vsrisp. t~ ipso tw.lj*

1~or~4~ s.tLYt~S .r t~ ~1tM $~tss.

d. Etb1~ p.U~ ~ ~1~t3.., itsblish with

oth.z Cli ~fis. ~ with ~itsiL. ~a~ privtt. .ow~

in t~ TMt.d 1~tss, s~ ~eauiuy 1$..I~.m for the pru.~~i.nt of

tQt~tS. sipt ~ t~L~ adv1~s or other ..rvi~, for sos

in c~st1oL with o~w~t ~.~~rtti..a .

a. boors ~p.li~ .~ pvs~ ..crd1~tic~ IL the f.r.i~

field.

a. a. m.mç~w

Va

Dir.ot~ of O~s1 1~tsfli~

192
38. (Continued)

TOP. SECRET

c~ c~ SPECIAL PRO~~UXE8

In acoardon.. with dir.ctiw.a s~ policiss of th* Las istont Dir..

tor for ~oiol Op.roti.ns, t~ Chiof of ~isoial Pr~.~nrss s~m.il

1.. d.tr..tion oisr all oorort piy.bologissl op.votiass outsid.

~ ~itsd tatss sad its poas.e.ion. In ss.rryia~ oat this r.spoasi

bili~, Le wills

(a) Lot as adwis.r to t~ Assistont Dir.st.r r,Istiv. to oovsrt

psy.~logi.al spssatioas .ad a~it to hi.. for spprassl, aps.ifIs dir.o

on .p.ysho]..gi.sl sporot1~ for fi.ld I~lsaontaties through ~ f~41 itiss of the Chi.f of ~

(b) La diroatud by t~ Msiatsat Director, ask. r.m--~tionp

for the flasi opproeci of .11 prupos.d ~pay. ogical operations fron the atuadp.int of ~fr so~t~~i~r to U. 3. fassig. poliay, suits

bI1L~ of ~sn.zs1 pr~js contont sad objecti,.., ad the ~i~nt of

(.) ~srds. direct sontrol sad s~erviaion aver oil por.oimal sod

fonsti~ of the ~shiogtuo ~fftec of ~.uisl Proesdarec.

(d) ~eiec guasr.l pro~on sod t~4on1 dirsetion o,.r .11 fLuid

sontotiv.s ~ug~gmd in ocourt psyobo3~ogLon1 opsrati.as, .oordionting

.l.s.ly with the Chi.f of ~ecstices obo will aasrsiss .p.rstioasl fLuid

~ol aver sash vepsssontotivss.

(~) ~.4iv~ain doss p)~S1.Ig sad apsra~4~1 11.1.. with the Chiof

or ~srstioos in on~ection with plons, 4izsoti~ss, sod ot~ astt.rs

relatiug to oavort ~ohelsgissl spsratiaas ~ioh rs~uLr. Intstion

~ Iksiliti.e sad rss~oss of ~ Chiof of ~srstiona.

(Z) Prurid. for the dossl~t of pzsgron plans to I~1nt poll otos sod d.bsstivss ojiplisabi. to the ectivitios of apocial Proosdorss.

(g) Provide for .11 ~e-~~y opsrsti~l action isolodiog the

pr~ratian of d.toil.d ~ersti1 diroatj,.s, sqatred for the onsoation

or p1,rav4 pro~ plans sod pr,j.ot. dav,lcpsd by or d.lsgstsd to ~ssial

(b) ~tsblisb a projsot ontusl over oil timId opsontiona inroiwiag avert ~opsaations,

(I.) *~~1n a. directed by th. &adn~ Dirsotso s~ lt~

with ~

Dopsr~t of Ituto, or other utherity shorgud with foasulatiss

TOP SE(RFF

193
38. (Continued)

TIth crnirr

of foreign policiy, na any be ncoessary to abts.in guidance en ~. 8.

foreign polioy end objectives no they effect the op.rntiena of ip.oiel

Proosdores.

(3) laaizs. with the epproesi of the M.ictont Director, direstiran

defining the editorial ..M politiosl policisa to be tollesed in conduct

ing covert piya lagicol op.rotiosi in the field.

(k) lrtsblish, for approval of the Aseistont Direotur and on the

best, of ~itsd 2tntss foreign police and ..ias, the basic prepsa obj.o..

tives targets for covert payohologissl operations.

(1) In soeordanos with liaison requir~nta end proo.dur.a of

*ndget end Liaison OantrcJ. ..thblisb sad control nuthorissd unison of

gp.einl Procedure. with other .1snts of 080, ~Zio.s of the Central

Int.liigsnos Agsn~ and other U. 8. D.psr~nt. and Agencies whish pro

wide for direst l~ees an aanr.t spsratil antt.ra

(n) Develop and nsinte.th, as diroetad by the Assis~t Director,

sosh liaison with peiveto ~organizations or instituttees in

the ~itad Btat.e as any be ae-wuy to the .tt~stir. .of

payehelogiesi operations ab~d, hesØng )edg.t ~ Lisisen C~trsl

&.we.ll7 indor~ of sash lta~-~

(n) Insure thet opsratican of ~ooinl ~roc.duros do not oosfliot

with or overlap the open foreign infesantionni activities of the S~to

Dspsrtaunt, and, to thet end, effect ouch liaison and ooerdinstton with

~ Dsç*r~nt of B~ts as ~ be diractad by the Assistant Director.

(o) Coordinato with the Chief of A~nirtrativ 8.rwiess to mews

fe support of cpernti~ of Lpeeial Proosdines b~ 080 .~4~4strntivo

and s~psrtisg .or,ioes.

(p) lasers ad.guat. treiniog for ill psrsesn.l ~agsd in ocrort

psy~~logSesl opoostiew. using for such purpose the fi..iliti.s of ~

Training 8~ff. oi ~2O end, with prastiosi Units. ~ing availabl, to

~.~rj~j~g 8tsff. for lco~ and other instrootion in oururt porysbolegi

osi opesatiew. ~urionecd porsoonsi nd Sp..ial Pros.dwec.

(ii Proviso tee the .of inspection. of band activities of

his stun. sfl&, when dire.tsd by the Aseiatsnt Direetor, of w~ opera

tionol activities iorolviag .payobsl~giecl operations, .ffcoting the

seMinstion with the Chief of

(r) Per the purpose at insuring proper polisy sad proglon osordi

in the field. tohe oppropriete ess~ in esuottanties with the

of Operations and tbreag~i his field tsoi1itie~ tsr heaping the

ahist dipltis repros Lative is an res or the Chief U. 8. C~-4~g

~ftew in an oeoupi.d noes gecue3ly infornod of oovsrt popoboingisal

z

~O~5EERET

194
38. (Continued)

T~ follouing .4ditian to 1. 0- Dtr.ctiv. ~o. 18 L poblls)wd for t)~ inforoa~tion and g4itno of .11 osn~msds

~cTZ~ 6.

A~ORIMTI~

In sgooidsno. ith tha ri~ti~ .sntoin.4 In *1*

f~ tho *aaistont D1zs.t~ fox ~ox1a1 ~.vsti~ fy~ t~ ~ro~

c~t,~1 Int,llig.ae., dat.d ______

________

the t~.ti~ ~iagi~i psrftt~~ to

be ~os ~.di1 Proosd~,~ is actlii~bsd within the ~tio. of

apseisi ~sx~tise., off.o~________

T~T1~B

?h. bsaio f~atise of ~,eoia1 Preo~se will b. to ~_

in

sa,.rt psy,helogiosl opus~tisea o~ataide the ~1t~ ~tse s~ its po.

..saic~~ fox ~ p~wp.a. of (1) , doxeIndz~ the Itosogth of

ins~mtolLUai. ~ joxsYa~t oxr~~.stises, .r iMiyIA~~].

whj~ ar. ~in ..tivitims tni.I~1 to the ioit~ sbe~, (2) to a~port V. I. tsr.*~ p.lio~- hi iaf1lIiroinz~ p~lic spiwise abroad

in a dirsotise fatarabi. to U* a.tt~-~ot of Uoit~ ~.b~s.tii.s.

~xixrx~ ~ ~p~xc~laii~ o~n~a

La va.d herein and as oonth~otsd within the ~fis of aisoisi Cp.r..

ti~., oseert payoo1o6iaa~1 sp.rattcns s.y iar~lnde all ~sars. of

infesostlos end pare~Mos ahert of p~q.iss1 In ~ish the srigi~tia~ rol. of t~ ~3.tad bet.s G.rsrar.snt will .lw~. be kept ~

~SEERH

195
39. Pforzheimer to Arthur H. Schwartz, 6 May 1948 (Photocopy)

510.

~abiflgton~ D.C.

B ,~1948

Thi$ do ha b.afl

~Xóesd toc ralaase. through the nxsec~ ~P~o~x of

th~ ~fltxal !~tail~9snce Z9ency.

Daar Arthuri .

.: ~~

A~r the inn of the last ~ ~ee~ t i~a~

but

that

~j

Coverror

itfljape~lseeus

Dausy 1.ng

to

off

mndiosto

the intellig.eee

that be La

~

et. it:

~js~ ~ ~:quotea bin u stating that

the r~~t Bàgota,~rLai us5:a~denenstration of the tiful failure of our intsiligeno& iervtee. Just to keep the r~Oord

atraQht between .us~ I~. t1,o~t I. might sat dam a few points for oral. interest. in thin co~i~tion~ ~se

centim~ation of the Gova~nórg broadcast ~ Nebraska of

12 AprIl. ~ ~ ~e~ out that had us had adequet. in

teuigeuce ~.we us~ ha~ ~about the Bogota out

break. An a. result ef mob ebargom, a Congrssnien.]. aubc~itthe,

headed by Rep. ~ Br~ of Objo. - j~4j~g ~p~ C)a.rs

Hoffosn of Michigan .~. Jo~ HoCórusok of Massachusetts, ~st in

Bxaoutive Session. ~iththe~ Direótor of Cent~al Xntelligsnoo end

u~ue1t, and revLseód~ the ~ole intell.tgeiioe piobzr~. with regard to Bogota. You haVe doubtieli seen the noTepaper e1~artea sub

sequent t~ +~ Dti~~e. appeacenue. ebioh indicated that ~

tral Iut.l1igTeee~ Ag~oydLd~ow of the probabilities of

trouble in E~gota end bad en. j~fa~ the State De~arbent..

However, the following quótatióu from Clarence Brom a statement

aft the hearings ~r be of interest. Re stated, Our Central

Intelligence Agonoy obviously was in olose touch with Coesazuist

~ ~.~ COloibia but in several other oomtrlas

f South end Central Anez~ica... In. all: but one i~atanOo, the

U. S. .e reports .t~ Bogata mere tr~zwaitted p.....~tly

to the Stat. Dsp*~~t!~ .

.

The Wiin4,~ton,. Dslamara Newu..Journal pointed cut

editorially o~ ~.6 April, O~ .f~ that the United Stet.e Intel

ligonoe Soriioe had f lien .dOwi~ bn the job wan effectively, and

happily, dissipated. yesterday in the testi~ given a Hones

bao~itteo by AdItLrÆl. .li1lenkeettor,~ chief ~f the ~~t2o3.

Intelligence Agency. .. , ~ all leericanc will be glad to

learn that the nation. into1lige~o aor7ico was fully on the

alert.

cceg~ee5~ ~~~anb ~flznirmen-et U~

domeittee ~ ~on~:ft~~ of the ooittee which

Mr. Arthur L Sohearta

1450 Broa~

New York, New. York. :.

197
39. (Continued)

tnvesttgut.d the Bogota incident had this to state on IT April in a fornel releaen.m.. 50ur Central Intelligene. &g~IO7 had

agsut~on.thogreendi~Bogotoo It per or~ its. dut~. It

learned .~hat ~ h~ewig diyi before the riàtiflg afld bIo~d

in Bo~t~ .: ~. - ~.

.

The Washington Post, ihiob bad been soenithet anti

eel editorially-on 13 ~4PLIquostioning thethoren had be,fl

caught napping, stated.editoniallyon 17 April that, ~

qnettione.~.rm~t5ed~lestEonda7 : ehether .

~inte11ig~

agency h*~been~oang1~ apping in iogst~ or ~.ther:.it. hOd

been jgo are . ~flIwered. ,Adsiral Hhllenhoettcr has

ocquittod t}~~ Central Intelligence. Agenoy of tguorane of

Co~,mm4~~t plane to scuttle the Tnter~Amorteau Oonferenoe.

NvidentIy the State~. D~taent ens. at ra~rt in .oo1~-shou~4ering the warnings end that. 1O*~t. One Oaae .

in p venting their dii..

patch to We -

. ~:. .

..

in telldng of thin in

veetigation, st&ted~ ~Eiilçn cotters .doaw~k_s,

the subeoenittee.eae.

~

t~rOeeed by- the CIAS eff~~ainay,~

you *o

that it ~y.net~ appear that ~ Ue ise?el7 aelt..eerving

dealarations on behalf. ot:the ~ but are .

ether the

general acns~ne of op ofl.~Xt reenine a continual

.of~se~ut.te~t1m~Gofl,rnor.chouldoontinue

attaa~re.., it~oOnOOly-~ neon;:~~ .

being very. .~fl Odvtned

in this ratter. ~. .

..: .

.

: .

~Ø7 are the .g~ atteeks ehioh uer hurled at us

prior to the passage of the. Unifiestion Act in the apningof

1947. For instance, in his final 3ebru,~ broadcast, the

New York Tin.. cc. 13 April1948 quotes the Governor as stating

that1. The ~rk of our intelligence emit should be the. nest.

secret thing in our Govera~nt, And jet, leftwing newspapers

in Paris aetuni1y~printe&th. came of the new head of the

service, before he knOw it .hiacolf and six iveehe, before, it w~s

aenounoed to the ~nj~ press. .The story of the pntioular

article in the Panic newspaper .Pranoe-Soir was. read into the

Congressional. hearings last spring by Congreesran Busb~y of

Illinois and qneetinne enre raised also by ~Brid~ea.

General ~o~t 3.. Vandenberg, w~e was then our Director, sent

them a letter pointing out. that much of the inforontiÆ ~

tamed in the French article ens inacourate and that ~of

it could be obtained .frnm the President a ~ecutiv. Order Of

22 Jariunry 1946 ibioh ens a public doa~nt~. .~ator Bridge.

raised soen qt*stj.ona with the Dir~c~tor in comeotten with.

this article at the hearing last .pring.~t upon the mre.tàz4u

anmre expreewed hienoif oe.qwite satisfied. ~d

198
39. (Continued)

.. 3. ~

voted for his confjrtmtjon as t~reator. it ~a pointed out

that the A iralvastiOnsfezrod from the Offlee ofNeval

Lttaohe in Paris to the:Otfice at the Secretary of .t)~e *fty for duty an Director at Cent*ul In~11i co on orders ihioh

Waxs ~mr~ trjetod~, There j3~flO5SOret an to shorn. the Director

~ and these orders ~re ught to the att~biQn of t~

French N~a1.Atah6;bi~ebi~ton ~o,eabl.d.:Parie in order

that the 7~4i eight have on cpportmiity to oongrat~4ats the

Admiral in bj~ ~ ., .

.

. .

.

1 .sha~i at. ~yàu ith further details about

this Paris ertlole on ~idh th.~Gov.mor ~elted, Other then

that it states that1 eAdui~i1~IlllOakoettex~ ~all be dir~ot1y

responsible to ~ President om1y~~ ~on in effect he

responsible to the gatienal Intelli~snoo J13rthcrity.. Th

article further ita~d ~th~t the Admiral ~ehafl be reaponaibli. for the security of the thilted łtates in case of sudden tttaak

by eras or atosic ~:~ 0! lone i13~0O~12~ØjH Of~ ~4th

are clear.

Aaisaidabove, Idoncteenttoburdenpeuwith

the.. details otha! then to indisats to you the inacoursoy of the infornatian the aoveroor appears to be receiving en

thi, subject. ~I ~t to be abl to beak up for

you any asertinne thatT.~rto you is a netter of ~

personal ~ ~~~xiti~4p i b~pe du not miei~heatng gea

on. at thi5 great length.. :~ ,

)~y beet. to you end all of the boys, par

tio~zlarly those ~ rapidly eging and doq~ricg indiViduals,

Herbert ad Heerett. . ~. .

Sis rely yours,

Waiter 7.. Pforsheiser

199
.1
40. Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the Executive Secretary

Souers], Psychological Operations, 11 May 1948

(Typed transcript)

transc1ibe~ far ABD by e,d 6/3O/~3 ~j ~_-,~- fro&i~xecuti1Te Registry 1 3 tabbed ~.- T 1

NSC~ SERfl~5

This document iias

~A(2~NCY

approved for release through ~ L~7O the HIsTop~rrjj~ REVIEW o(9~ of the Central. Inte.Uigence Agecc~.

_______

11. Nay 19L~8

~MORAhTUM FOR: The Executive Secretary

The National. Security Council

Subject: Psychological Operations

1. Reference is made to the proposed ~C Directive, as

drafted 7 Nay 19L48, pertaining to covert (psychological) opera

tions. This Agency has several tines, during the discussion phases

of this proposed directive, placed itself on record as opposed to

the plan on which the proposed directive is based. The proposed

directive, if enacted, will establish a staff function providing for AUTH~ITI in a delicate field of o~ration-without the

HESP~SI3ThITL

2. This Agency again strongly urges that the provision

of NSC L~-.A, as written, be continued without change. If the

National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel the

need for en~rgency and wartine planning in the covert psychological warfare field, then we again suggest that advance planning be made

the responsibility~ the facility currently in operation.

3. However, if the National Security Council approves

this proposed draft of 10 May l9L~8, the Central. Intelligence

A~cnoy, of course, will cooperate to the best ci its ability in

an endeavor to make a going concern of the proposed Special. Studies organization.

s/ RH1~ to lir. Childs for hand delivery

~ NO WCTlflt~~

~

R. H. HILI~NX0E TIER

~ Rear Admiral, USN

_

~ ~~rir Director of Central Intelligence

,u-~

~~?~ QAT~_26DEC 1990

D ________

Distribution: ~

Director -

(1) ~ Cedau~tod

Deputy Director - (1) CIau. C~aa~e~ to: TS(j) c

Hnt RevMw Date

______

AStIL HR7O-3

HS/HC- 307-J Date 4~4.. .

I-r~e~ ~ .000150

~- ~ ~ c~LJ.., ~..., c-L. ~y-~ / 0 ~ ~ $/ ~7

201

41. Hillenkoetter to J. S. Lay, 9 June 1948 (1~rped transcript)

C (C

~tranpcr~.bed for ABD by ed 3/26/S3

7 June l91~8

?~r. J. S. Lay

Assistant Executive Secretary

National Security Council

Washington, D. C.

Dear Jinmy~

The attached represents our general tbinld.ng about

the new dzaft. I should like to suggest that, since State

evidently wi].1 not go along with CIA operating this political

warfare thing in anys ane or sound manner, we go back to the

original concept~ that State proposed. Let State run it and

let it have no connection at all with us. It seems to me that

this is the only thing that will satisfy State in any way and

rather than try to keep a makeshift in running order, subject

to ccimtless restrictions which can only lead to. continued

bickering and argument, I think ma~be the best idea is to go

back and make the C~P work for State alone.

I am sending this letter for your ~in information and,

of course, for Admiral Soners and have made it separate in

order that it need nd~ be forwarded with oi~ c~.ments on the

last draft.

This do~t hu b

.pp~oved for relcas through Sincerely

the aISTORICAL REVIEW P ~Y~T~1( of

the Central 1~t~~~° £fl~ Signed RHH Disp by hand RAR 6/9/I~8

Date2 ~ H. H. Hiflenkoetter

-

Rear Admiral, IJSN

~9 ~ Director of Central Intelligence

D

Distribution:

Director Note for Record: Pwo copies of Draft

Deputy Director Directive of 8 June I~& (CIA #22672)

Addressee made by CIA; Cy #1 to Gen Todd;

Maj Gen W. E. Todd, JIC/JS Cy#2 to DD.

HS/HC~ 00 0~~ ~_____ IaN ___

-~ rb-b-, ~ ~

203
41. (Continued)

c c

transcribed by ED for ABD 3/26/53

~

9 June l91~8

This document has been

MEMORANDUM FOR tt J S La approved for release t]uough

Assistant ~ecutjve Sec~etar~ HISTORICAL ~PRO~N of

National Security .Council the Central Intelligence A~7anc~r.

Subject: Proposed NSC Directive Date_________

HRP____

1. The draft directive of 8 June l9I~8 is considered much weaker

and less satisfactory than that of last friday, I~ June. Further, the

latest draft is much more inconsistent and much less organizationally sound than the li June paper.

2. For example, in para. 2 of the draft of 8 June, reasons are

stated why the new office should be placed under the Central Intelli

gence Agencythen along in para. 3e are stated a number of restric

tions on what can and cannot be done, all of such restrictions leading

to confusion and chaos. Suppose the Director of Central Intelligence is out of town, then does the work of the Special Projects stop, does

it free wheel, or does it work with the Acting Director of Central

Intelligence? ill of this remains in doubt by the statement the head

of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director

of Central Intelligence. In the present set-up of the Central Intelli

gence Agency, the head of any branch can see the Director of Central

Intelligence any time des fred--the door is always open. It would seem

that a new branch should come in, in a ~.mi].ar manner. The need for

special measures, security or otherwise, exists as much for our

present Office of Special Operations as it would Ior the new Office of

Special Projects, and the present set.~ip does not seem to hamper the

Office of Special Operations, nor can I see why a similar set-up should

hamper the Office of Special Projects.

3. Also, what is meant by to the maximwn degree consistent with

efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency? Does this mean

that the Office of Special Projects will have its own administrative

staff, its own budget staff, its own comimmications net, its own

services, etc. and etc? And, who is to decide what is the maximum

degree consistent with efficiency--the Director of Central Intelligence, The Qiief of Office of Special Projects, the National Security Council, or who? This paragraph cannot be accepted as is. I should much prefer the wording of the corresponding paragraph (3b) in the draft of 1~ June.

l C~d.~Li C C~j ~ ~ y ~&k~ PIQ-.

204
41. (Continued)

~ans~-ibed for ABD by ed 3/26/53

~. It would seem that either the National Security Council has

confidence in the operation of the Office of Special Projects by the

Central Intelligence Agency or it has not. If such confidence

exists, then the Central Intelligence Agency should be directed to.

operate the new office subject to a general declaration of policy by the National Security Council. If such confidence does not exist, then the Central Intelligence Agency should not be expected or

directed to operate the Office of Special Operations in any manner.

Signed R11H - Disp by hand RAR 6f9/I~8

R. H. HUJENKOETTER

Rear Admiral, USN

Director of Central Intelligence

D

Distribution:

Director

Deputy Director

Addressee orig& 1 cc

Maj Qen W. E. Todd, JIC/JS

2

ifote for Record: T~io copies of Draft

Directive of 8 June 148 (CIA #22672)

made by CIA; Cy #1 to Gen Todd;

Cy #2 to DD.

ror-onoimt--

205

42. ORE 4 1-48, Effect of Soviet Restrictions on the US Position

in Berlin, 14 June 1948

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

EFFECT OF SOViET RESTRICTIONS ON

THE US POSITION IN BERLIN

-

Document No. ~ _____

-

.

~

OCiCUMENTI -

.

.

0

N~CMf~IN Ci~

rs $ C -

77

Ai 33

029004 iate:\>~/,fti .~is £)L3

E. ~~/ 0RE;:41-48 : -

~ia ~~- .

fO~ .

-

Published .

-

th. ~~I!~ t- -

-.

~tza.l ~~I-4~ U JUNE 1.48~.

~. ,gj~j ~

.~ -

COPY.:1W.~7. .- -. -. .

FOR THE DEPUTt DIRECTOR - -

OF CENTRJ1L IJITE~IUEPJ~ FOR. FUfiTft~R

ROUTLN~:TO.THE.EJ~CUTIVE DIRECIOK,

-

THE ADY1SOEY COUNCIl.. ANL CET~1L~iL

S

~or RE~JI~T

-

- -. : ~-

207
42. (Continued)

-

DTSRT~MT?~ATZON NOTICE

1.. This copy of this publication Is for thà Information and use of the recipient

designated on the front:cover-anci of Indivldualsimder the jurisdiction of the recipients.

office who require the Information for the performance of their official duties.. Further

n1~In~nRtin elsewhere in the department tOother offices which require the Informa

tion for the performance of official, duties may be authorized by the foliowing:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for

the Department of State

b. Director .of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army

c. Chief, Naval Inteuigence, for the Department of the Navy

d. Directorof Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Afr Force

- a; Director :°~ Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com

mission ,

I. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

p. Assistant Director for Càllectlon, and Dlsseniinntio; CIA, for any other

-. Department or Agency ,

, ~

2. This copy maybe either retz~lnŁd or destroyed by burning in accordance with

-

applicable security: regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by -

arrangement with the OfflcŁof Collection and Dissemination, CIA. ,

- - :. WAENINO

This docŁn thins Information ting the national

defense of the U States the meaning of the

-

-

Espionage A* 50 U.S.C., 32. as amended. Its trans

-mission or the reve]a of Its tents In any manner to

-

~ unauthorized n Is prohibite -

law.

208
42. (Continued)

ORE 41-48

EFFECT OF sovi~rr RESTRICTIONS ON TRE US POSiTION IN BERLIN

SUMMARY

Contrary to many published reports, the chief detrimental effect on the US of the

Soviet restrictive measures imposed In Berlin, since the walkout of the USSR from

the Allied Control Council, has not been interference with transportation and supply

but curtailment of certain US activities having to do for the most part with Intelligence,

propaganda, and operations of the quadripartite Komni~ndatura.

Concurrently with attempted Inspection of US mifitary rail traffic, the Soviets

both tightened their security measures and manifested greater Intransigence In afl

city affairs. As a rciult: (a) the general usefulness of Berlin as center of an intelligence

network has been Impaired, ~crhile in particular, access to Soviet deserters and antiCommunist Germans has been made more difficult; (b) since friendly Germans

cannot move freely to and from the Soviet Zone or within the city, the US cannot

as before, support antl-Cothmunlsm within the Soviet Zone; (c) US propaganda

cannot be freely disseminated except by radio; (d) commodities manufactured in

Berlin cannot be shipped to the Western zones; and (e) the ACC and the Kon1~rn~nda~

tura have, at least temporarily, lost their usefulness In keeping up German hope of

unity, revealing c~mlng Soviet moves, and easing US-Soviet tension below the govern

mental level.

Note: The lnormatlon In this report Is as of 1 June 1948.

The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, and the Navy have con

curred In this report; the~ Air Intelligence Division, Air Intelligence Directorate, Depart

ment of the Air Force, concurs with those portions which pertain to air Intelligence.

1

209

r~y~

~I
42. (Continued)

~~__~,,~jj

ZFFECT OF SOVIET RESTRICEIONS ON TEE US POSITION IN BERLIN

Imperative as It Is for the US to remain In Berlin, Its mere physical presence there

does not insure continuance of all the strategic benefits that might be derived therefrom,

and this strategic position has, In fact, been undermined already by unpubucized

Soviet action, taken for the most part in general security and local political matters.

The hindrances imposed by the USSR during the past several weeks on transpor

tation to and from Berlin have not seriously interfered with the logistic position of

the US but rather with its strategic position.

Continued US occupation of Berlin requires supply from the west of food and such

other necessities as coal for both the US personnel and the German population of the

US sector of the city. Incoming barge transport, carrying the bulk of food for the

western sectors of the city, reportedly Is unchanged and continues adequate, notwith

standing stoppages of short duration on British transport through the Soviet Zone.

Inbound military and civilian rail freight, hauling the necessary coal and other supplies,

Æontinues to move as before, except that the civilian freight routes have been some

what restricted.

The present transport situation is the result of Soviet efforts to extend the right

of civilian rail traffic Inspection, which the USSR has always exercised, to Western

Power military traffic. Civilian passenger traffic apparently continues unchanged,

but military passenger traffic does not function because of Western Power refusal to

accede to Soviet demands for the right of personal Inspection. Incoming road trans

port continues normal except for slight difficulties in routing; as yet, the USSR has

not attempted seriously to restrict Western Power air transportation. The trans

portation situation, as outlined above, indicates that the necessities for the German

population and for the US personnel in Berlin are still being supplied.

The US strategic position in Berlin, as contrasted with Its logistic position, has

been impaired both by the Soviet transportation restrictions and, more particularly,

by other Soviet measures taken concurrently with the imposition of logistic hindrances.

These comparatively unpublicised measures, which soon followed the walkout of the

USSR from the Allied Control Council, have Involved: general tightening of Soviet

security measures throughout the Soviet Zone; greatly Increased police controls

in and around Berlin; and Soviet efforts to block the operations of both the Allied

Konimsn~datura and the non-Communist city government. As a result the following

material benefits to the US arising from the presence of US officials and troops In Berlin

have been reduced or e1in~fn~ted:

(1) The value of RerUn as a center of an inteulgence net covering the city Itself,

the Soviet Zone of Germany, the eastern satellites, and the USSR has been threatened.

(2) The value of Berlin as a sanctuary and transfer point for anti-Communist

refugees or Soviet Army deserters has been reduced, In that: (a) heightened Soviet

security precautions make access to the western sectors of Berlin from the adjacent

2

210
42. (Continued)

7T~7i 11 fl. -J

~p II~~k~V~

Soviet Zone Increasingly difficult; (b) Soviet travel restrictions on westbound pas

senger rail traffic have curtailed the means of evacuation of refugees and deserters,

who must now be limited to relatively high-level personnel warranting air transport

(3) ~cept for the capacity of the Berlin radio of the US sector, the value of

Berlin as point for the dissemination of Western propaganda through the Soviet

Zone has been, and despite new Soviet assurances Is expected to be, curtailed by Soviet

Interference with the dissemination of Western publications and Impediments to the

Issuance of any German pro-Western material in the Soviet Zone.

(4) The security and transport regulations have limited the value of Berlin

as a base from which the US can support anti-Communism in the Soviet Zone. West

ern Zone Germans can no longer easily enter or leave the Soviet Zone, while tightened

police controls have reduced the capabilities and. the freedom of movement of antiCommunist elements already within the Zone.

(5) The Soviet-Imposed demands for Inspection of all westbound freight have

prevented the shipment of Berlin manufactures that contribute to the finished pro

duction of the Western Zones and ~1~mft1i~ almost all commerce between Berlin

and the west.

(6) Although the Allied Control Council rem~n~ In the city to embarrass the

USSR as a symbol of quadripartite agreement in Germany, Its functional Impotence and

failure to meet since the USSR abruptly terminated the 20 March session has: (a)

d~miniRhed reTnfLln11~g German hope of Implementing the Potsdam method of unifying

Germany politically and economically; (b) pllmInRted a soaInilng board for the revela

tion of future Soviet moves; and (C) e1in1in~ted a useful safety valve for easing US-USSR

tension below the governmental level.

The USSR still has at Its disposal further means for harassing the US and Tnnldng

the latters position In Berlin more difficult. These means Include: Imposition of uni

lateral traffic regulations on Inbound food and freight shipments, attempted enforce

ment of unilateral regulations on the flight of Western Power aircraft over the Soviet

Zone, complete repudiation of quadripartite Komni~ndathra jurisdiction over the So

viet sector of the city and the Incorporation of that sector Into the Soviet Zone, and,

finally, increased efforts to create unrest among the civil populatlŁn of the Western

sectors of the city.

Strategic losses such as the ~i~n~ge to US propaganda machinery, to intelligence

operations and to the use of the US sector as a sanctuary for refugees from the Soviet

system, cannot be completely retrieved except by the removal of all the Soviet-Imposed

restrictions and Impediments referred to above. Though the US could recapture a

degree of the strategic Initiative by Intensified clandestine Intelligence operations, such

action could do nothing to remedy the unfortunate situation In which recent Soviet

hindrances have placed the anti-Communist Berlin city government or to relieve the

tension brought by increased Soviet Intransigence in the quadrlpartite KmfiAtura.

3

211
42. (Continued)

DISTRIBUTION

The President -

Secretary of State

Chief of Staff to Commanderin Chief

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of the Array . .

.~

Secretary of the Navy .: -.

Secretary of the Air Force .

Executive Secretary, National Security Council .

.. ..

..

,.,

.,. ...

~National .

Chief of Staff, US Army .. .. .

.~ ~. . ~,

Chief of Naval Operations . . -~

Chief of Staff, US Air Force. .

. .

.

.

Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff. US Army .

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations) .

..

.

Director of Plans and perations, US Ai Force ~ -

.

-

Special Assistant to-the Secretary of State, Researcb.and Intelligence

Director of intelligence, General Staff, US Army .

Chief of Naval Intelligence .

.

.

.

.

Director of intelligence, US Air Force. .

.

..

.

Secretary, Jolnt.Chiefs of Staff ,-.

.

Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group .

.

.

Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee .

-,

Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee to the At~mlc Energy om~ on

Director. of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Conim1~Ion. .

Chief, Acquisition and Distribution, OICD, Department of State :

212
43. National Security Council, NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948

(Photocopy)

TOP CECRET

NSC 10/2

June 18, 1948

NOTE BY.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

Reference: NSC 10/I

At its 13th Meeting the National Security Council

approved the Directive in NSC 10/1 subject to deletion of

paragraph 3d and amendments toparagraphs 3a and e and 4.

The revised Directive, as approved,, is circulated

herewith to the Council for information and to the Director

of Central Intelligence for appropriate action.

Special security precautions are being taken in

the handling of this report. For this reason it is suggested

that each member ot the Council may wish to return his copy

for filing in the office of the Executive Secretary, where it

will be held available upon request

SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Executive Secretary

Distribution:

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air, Force

The Chairman, National Security

Resources Board

NSC 10/2 TOP CECIU~T

213
43. (Continued)

CE0rLBT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

on

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of

the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite coun

tries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the.aims

and activities of the United States and other Western powers,

has determined that, in the interests of world.peace and US

national security, the overt foreign activities of the US

Government must be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the

National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter

espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for

operational, reasons, not to create a new agency for covert oper

ations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for

them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency

and correlate them with espionage and counterespionage oper

ations under the overall control of the Director of Central

Intelligence.

3. Therefore, under the authority of Section l02(d)(5)

of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security

Council hereby directs that in time of peace:

a. A new office of Spec.al Projects shall be

created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan

and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the con

duct of such operations in wartime.

b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the

Secr~tary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central

Intelligence -and approved by the National Security Council,

shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Pro

jects.

c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects

shall report directly to ,the Director of Central Intelli

gence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of

operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with

efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate

independently of other components oVCentral Intelligence

Agency.

NSC 10/2 -

- 1 - TOP OECItCT

214
43. (Continued)

TOP-GECRET

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be

resp~nsible for:

(1) Ensuring, through designated representa

tives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary

of Defense, that covert operations are planned and

conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and

military policies and with overt activities. In dis

agreements arising between the Director of Central

Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary

of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans,

the matter shall be referred to the National Security

Council for decision.

(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert oper

ations are also drawn up with the assistance of a

representative of the Joint Chiefs of,Staff and are

accepted by the latter as being. consistent with and

complementary to approved plans for wartime military

operations.

(3) Informing, through appropriate channels,

agenciesof the US Government, both at home and abroad

(including diplomatic and military representatives in

each area), of such operations as will affect them.

e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare

wiliThe conducted by the Office of Special Projects under

the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible

for the planning of economic warfare.

f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the pro

pose~ operations fox~ fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately

requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes

shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency

Budget requests.

4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans

for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are

engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct com

mand of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be

transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise

directed by the President.

5. As used in this directive, lcovert operations are

understood to be a11 activities (except as noted herein) which

are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile

foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states

or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US

Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthor

ized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can

REVISED

NSC 10/2 . 2 - .

TOP ~ECI1ET

215
43. (Continued)

TO~PiJflCflET

plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifi

cally, such operations shall include any covert activities

related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct

action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and

evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, in

cluding assistance to underground resistance movements,

guerrillas and refugee liberations groups, and support of

indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries

of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed

conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter

espionage, and cover and deception for military operations..

6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained

in NS~ 4A, which is hereby cancelled.

NSC 10/2

216
44. ilillenkoetter, Memorandum for the Record, 4 August 1948

Caa a.~.79I

TOP SECRET

4 August 1948

?MORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

1. About noon today Mr. Frank G. Wisner of the State

Department called me on the telephone and informed me that

the State Department, at the present time, disapproved of

the idea of using meteorologic balloons to carry propaganda from the Occupied Zone in Germany to the Satellite States

and to Russia. Mr. Wianer said that he had diacuØsed this

with Mr. George KennÆn, and that the State Department a view

was that the time was not propitious.

2. Aa regards the project for the clandestine radio

transmitter, the State Department approved the idea in

principle, but,before they could give a definite approval to

it, they desired to know the details of the transnitter

who (the nationality)~ was to operate the transmitter, to whom

the transmissions would be directed, and who would set up the

raw material to be transmitted.

R~iI~OETT~1&

Rear Admiral, USN

Director of Central

Intelligence

DOciattity 1~.

HO CHAR2E it:

o D~CLAS3?FI5D Ctast, ~TO~ r$ ~XT iLYrcw Ii~ra~ _____________ Aunt, iffi 7u.2

OATELLtLZ......8EVIEWMZ_ 06454Q

TOP SECRET

217

45. ORE 25-48, The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its

Implications for US Security, 3 September 1948

co IAL

COPY NO.86

FOR THE ASSISTAr~rr DIRECTOR

FOR REPORTS AND.ESTIUATES

THE BREAK-UP OF THE COLONIAL

RMPIRES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

FOR US SECURITY

ORE 25-48

Published 3 September 1948

:~

k.~t~:

By;

CENTRAL ft~TELLIGENCE

CO N~NTI AL

~a do ~u

~mv~d ~or thro~*

~sroBzc~L R~crItV p~~Pi~M of

t~. C~itra3~ ~~a~cy.

-~

-I

AGENCY

219
45. (Continued)

WARNXNG

This documen ~ta~ns information a ing the na

tional defense of the ted Stat ithin the meaning

of the Espionage Act, 50 31 and 32, as amended.

Its transmission or velation ts contents in any

manner to an thorized person is p ited by law.

220
45. (Continued)

CO~IAL

DISSE~ATION NOTICE

1. ThIs copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of the recipient

designated on the front cover and of Individuals under the Jurisdiction of the recipients

office who require the Information for the performance of their official duties.. Further

dissemination elsewhere In the department to other offices which require the Informa

tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for

the Department of State

b. Director of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army

c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

d. Director of Intelligence, USAP, for the Department of the Air Force

e. Director of Security and Intelligence, ARC, for the Atomic En~rgy Corn

1. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and D1ss~n~~tlon, CIA, for any other

Department or Agency

2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordance with

applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by

arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DISTRrnUTION:

Office of the President

National Security Council

National Security Resources Board

Department of State

Office of Secretary of Defense

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Mr Force

State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Atomic Energy Co~~~n

Research and Development Board

~W~TIAL

221
45. (Continued)

ORE 25-48 CONAFtIAL

TRE BREAK-UP OF THE COLONIAL E!~IRES AND

ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US SECURITY

SUMMARY

The growth of nationalisra In colonial areas, which has already succeeded In

breaking up a large part of the European colonial systems and. In areatlng a. series

of new, nationalistic states In the. Near and Far Eatt, has major Implications for

US security, particularly in terms of possible world conflict with: the USSR~ This

shift of the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens

the probable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access

to vital bases and raw materials In these areas In event o~ war. Should the recently

liberated and currently emergent states become Oriented toward the USSR, US military

and economic security would be serlondy threatened.

World War U gave a tremendous Impeths to the colonial Indepe–idence move

ment. The UK withdrew from India-Pakistan and Burma, while the Dutc. arid

Fren~h, exhausted by war, appear unable tO suppress the Indonesian and Indochinese

nationalists by force, or, despite any tempOrary coinpi~omIse solutions, to be able to

rtest their eventual achievement of genuine Independence. Growing natlon~1ten,

in French Noi~th Africa threatens French hegemóæy. While, the colonial issue In most

reinnlnlng dependencies Is not yet acute, native haUonc~iIam in many of these areas

too will exert th~reaslng presstlre for autonOmy or thdependence.

This mArked ~oàtWar. development of the colonial Irideperidence mOvement has

rØsülted froth: (1) the release of bottled-up natiOnaliSt activities In the Far East

as a rEthilt of Japans defeat Of the colonial pow rs In World War U arid Its encourage

mOnt of local naUonall~mi In occupied areas; (2) the postwar military and economic

weSknOsa of the colonial powers, which has made them less able to resist natio–iallst

demands and led them to grant concessions or even independence to their dependencies;

(3) the increasing tendency of liberal-socialist elements In the colonial po*ers to favor

voluntary liquidation of restive coloniAl possessiOns; (4) wldespread.sdppOrt of colonial

independence movementS by a laige g–nup of recently liberated and other ~ympathetic

states, particularly the USSR; and (5) creatIon of the UhitØd Nations, which has

provided ~ forum for agitating the colonial issue and a hiechanlSm for ItS liquidation.

Becams of these factors, further disintegration Of the reinnining colonial empires

appears Inevitable. Belated concesszons by the colonial powers, at least on the limited

Note: The iSformatlon In this report is as of 9 August 1948.

The Intelligence orgSnlzatlons Of the Departments Of State, Army, and the Navy have con

curred In this report; the Air elilgence DivisiOn, Mr Intelligence Directorate, Department

of the Air Force, had nO cOmment.

In this paper the term colonial Is used In a broad sense to denote the relationships be

tween the metropolitan powers and their dependent md semi-dependent areas, whether theSe be

colonies, mandates, protectorates, or trOat5r relationships. Similarly the phrase colonial Issue is

meant to encompass all differenceS between the colonihi powers and their dependent areas arising

from the development of local nationalism.

.lcoNlrzAL

222
45. (Continued)

scale presently contemplated, do not meet the basic nationalist demand for independ

ence and are unlikely to be more than temporarily effective, except in more backward

areas. The colonial powers appear unwilling for the most part to recognize fully

the force of nationalism in their remaining dependencies and to take the leadership

in guiding these toward genuine independence or self-government.

As a result of the rapid breaking-up of the colonial systems, a new power situation

is developing in the former colonial world. No longer can the Western Powers rely

on large areas of Asia and Africa as assured sources of raw materials, markets, and

military bases. In contrast to the ever closer integration of the Satellites into the

Soviet system, there is an increasing fragmentation of the non-SOviet world. This

process is already largely completed, with many of the most important colonial and

semi-colonial areas, like India, Burma, the Arab states, and the Philippines already

independent,, and Indonesia and Indochina well on the road. These new states will

be free to choose their future alignments, which will be largely conditioned by the at

titudes of the Soviet and Western Power blocs toward the colonial issue and their

economic demands.

The colonial independence movement, therefore, is no longer purely a domestic

issue between the European colonial powers and their dependencies. It has been

Injected into the larger arena of world politics and has become an element in the

broader problems of relations between Orient and Occident, between Industrialized

and underdeveloped nations, and between the Western Powers and the USSR.

The newly independent and older nations of the Near and Far East strongly sympathize

with the aspirations of still dependent areas, to which they are bound by racial and

religious ties. These nations are further bound together In varying degree by two other

issues which tend to set them off against the colonial powers and the US: namely,

the growing economic natlonsth~~n, of the underdeveloped areas and the underlying

racial antagonism between white and native peoples. All intensely nationalistiC,

the Near and Far Eastern nations tend to unite In opposition to the Western European

powers on the colonial issue and to US economic domirin~nce. As a result there has

been a tendency toward the formation in the UN and affiliated bodies of a so-called

colonial bloc, whose members have already brought colonial disputes Into the UN

and will likely take the lead In attempting in this manner to hasten the liberation

of further colonial areas. The colonial Issue and economic nationalism, therefore, win

continue to be a source of friction between the colonial powers and the US on the one

hand, and the states of the Near and Far East on the other. The gravest danger

to the US is that friction engendered by these issues may drive the so-called colonial

bloc Into alignment with the USSK

The USSR is effectively exploiting the colonial issue and the economic nationa1i~n,

of the underdeveloped areas as a means of dividing the non-Soviet world, weakening the

Western Powers, and gaining the good will of colonial and former colonial areas. Ever

since World War I the USSR has sought to Infiltrate the nationalist parties in de

pendent areas and, more recently, to play up the colonial issue and the so-called eco

nomic Imperialism of the Western Powers in the UN. The poverty and underprivileged

co~*~ 2

223
45. (Continued)

CON~~AL

position of the population in these areas, their latent hostility toward the occupying

powerspast or presentand the existence of leftist elements within them, make them

peculiarly susceptible to Soviet penetration.

consequently, the good will of the recently liberated and emergent Independent

nations becomes a vital factor in the future strategic position of the US in the Near

and Far East. In addition, the restoration of the economic contribution of their

colonies is important to the economic stability of the Western European powers, which

the US is endeavoring to create. Short-sighted colonial policies, however, will In the

long run cause the colonial powers to lose the very economic and strategic advantages

in their dependencies which they are anxious to retain. Unless, therefore, the Euro

pean colonial powers can be induced to recognize the necessity for satisfying the as

pirations of their dependent areas and can devise formulae that will retain their good

will as emergent or independent states, both these powers and the US will be placed

at a serious disadvantage in the new power situation In the Near and the Far East.

Moreover, unless the US itself adopts a more positive and sympathetic attitude toward

the national aspirations of these areas and at least partially meets their demands for

economic assistance, it will risk their becoming actively antagonistic toward the US.

3 CONFI~~IAL

224
45. (Continued)

CO~AL

TRE BREAK-UP OF THE.COLONIAL EMPIRES AND

ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US SECURiTY

1. DHVELOPMENT OP THE COLOaIAL INDEPHEDENCE MOVEMm~r.

A major trend In the twentieth century world power situation Is the development

of a strong colonial Independence movement which Is In process of breaking up the

colonial systems and creating a series of new, nationalistic states. The primary cause

of the break-up of the European colonial empires Is the growth of native natlonn1~sm

In these areas, simultaneously with the decline In power and prestige of the colonial

powers. This striking growth of local nation~Hrnn Is primarily the result of: (a) the

rising level of political, economic, and social development In dependent areas, with

resultant growing sensitivity to inequality of treatment; (b) the short-sighted policies

of the colonial powers, whose discriminatory treatment of subject populations and ex

ploitation of colonial resources without attendant benefits to these populations have

aroused strong resentment; (c) a deep-seated racial hostility of native populations

toward their white overlords, due largely to these policies, which has taken the fOrm of a

reaction against white superiority; (d) the exposure of colonial areas to Western Ideas

of nat1oniffl~m and the right to self-determination, which has made them Increasingly

conscious of their dependent status; and (e) the meteoric rise of Japan, whose defeats

of the European powers In the Russo-Japanese War and es~edaily World War U

punctured the myth of white superiority. The colonial powers, while exposing their

dependencies to the technological advances and democratic ideals of the West, failed

to reckon with their aspirations to achieve the same type of national self-expression

which the West exemplified.

While nation~il~ In dependent and quasi-dependent areas first reached signifi

cant proportions In the early twentieth century, it was given its greatest Impetus by

World Wars I and II. These conflicts, particularly the last, greatly weakened the

colonlalpowers, thereby reducing their ability to control their colonial holding by force.

At the same time, reliance of these powers on colonial resources and manpower forced

them to grant concessions which greatly advanced the nationalist cause. In World

War I Great Britain also fanned Arab national aspirations In order to hasten the

downfall of the Turks.. President Wilsons Insistence upon the self-determination of

peoples and the creation of the League of Nations gave a powerful stimulus to colonial

aspirations for independence.

The period between wars saw further development of nationalism in dependent

areas, particularly in the Near East and India. The repercussions of the world de

pression of the 1930s, which forced the colonial powers to retrench In colonial develop

mont, and shattered the world raw material price structure, increased colonial resent

ment and led to pressure for self-government and a larger share of the proceeds of

economic exploitation. Indigenous nationalists, resentful of political, economic, and

social discrimination against them, tended to attribute the depressed state of colonial

5

CO~~IAL

225
45. (Continued)

CONP~AL

econ~es to the ineptitude of the great powers. States like Iraq and Egypt, which

had been under British tutelage, tended to assume a more Independent course intheir

affairs. The US groomed the Philippines for independence, while Britain was forced

to make some concessions to the growing pressure of Indian nationalism. The ag

gressive policies of Japan, whose propaganda stressed the racist doctrine of Asia

for the Asiatics, greatly.stimulated the racial hostility of East toward West.

World War II delivered another blow to the declining colonial empires When

the colonial powers proved unable to defend their Southeast Asian possessions against

the Japanese onslaught, Japan, capitalizing on local feelings, set itself up as liberator

of the Asiatic peoples from white oppression. Although the Japanese actually kept a

tight rein on Southeast Asia, they granted a shadowy independence to Burma., the

Philippines, Indochina, and Indonesia which further stimulated their national am

bitions. At the end of the war most Allied Far Eastern dependencies were wholly

unwilling to revert to their former status, and the exhausted Allies have been unable

to re-establish the status quo ante. The UK labor government, no longer willing or

able to hold off the violent demands of the Indian nationalists, granted independence to

India, Pakistan, and Burma and dominion status to Ceylon. A weakened France

was forced to recognize the independence of Its Levant mandates, Syria and Lebanon.

The US fulfilled its promise of freedom to the Philippines. Korea was freed from

Japanese bondage.. France and the Netherlands, unwilling to relinquish their rich

Southeast Asian possessions to the native nationalists, became embroiled in an uneasy

struggle with indigenous regimes established in these areas.

2. Cunzmrr Sr~vus CT TBZ COLONIAL I PENDENCE Movmszxr.

As a result of the stimulation of native nationalism in the chaotic war and postwar

periods, the r~in~ining colonial world is in a ferment of nationalist aôtivlty. This

movement is in varying stages of growth In different areas, depending largely upon

the level of local political, economic, and social development, but in most of them the

eventual goal Is Independence. In the more backward areas of Asia and Africa, which

are at a relatively early stage of politiÆal and economic growth, nationalhsen Is still

Inchoate. On the other hand, In relatively highly developed areas like Indonesia,

Indochina, and French North Africa, it has reached an advanced stage~

The two most critical colonial issues are in Indonesia and Indochina, where the

Dutch and French, exhausted by war, have been unable to suppress the local national

ists by force and, despite temporary compromises which may be worked out, ÆrØ un

likely to be able to arrest the eventual achievement of native independence. The

Dutch and the Indonesian Republic are attempting to negotiate a settlement designed

to bring the Republic within a Netherlands-dominated United States of Indonesia

while allowing It a large degree of autonomy in all but foreign affairs and defense.

In Indochina the French have been unable either to suppress the nationalist Viet

~inh Party or to reach mutually acceptable agreement with It. In view of ..the pro

tracted strain of paclilcation expenditures on. the unstable French economy, it Is

likely that France eventually will have to make sweeping concessions to the National

~

but another step along the road to independence.

226
45. (Continued)

.Wbile.nat1on~m In French. North Africa has not yet reached the fighting stage,

the development of Tni1it.~nt native Independence movements In Algeria, Morocco, and

Tunisia Is a growing threat to French hegemony. In Tunisia. and Morocco, both

protectorates, the nationalists have concentrated on restoration of national sovereignty

under the existing dynasties. A bureau has been established at Cairo where exiled

North African leaders like Abd-el-Krlm coordinate the nationalist program. French

North African nation~1ts~n is stimulated by common Moslem ties with the chauvinistic

Arab League, which, while as yet giving little overt support to North AnnatiomilL~vn,

may be expected to step up Its activity as soon as the more pressing Palestine problem

Is settled.. Mounting U tinnalikTn in Libya, particularly among the Cyrenaica.n Senus

si trlbes,is complicating the disposal of. this former Italian colony.

Although natlon~Jiqyn In other dependent areas has not yet attained critical

proportions, there ~st well defined movements in several regions which foreshadow

RjmHRT problems. In most of these areas the demand at present Is not so much lot

linmediate Independence as for a greater measure of self-government. In Malaya the

heterogeneity of the pàpu]atlon and the relatively enlightened British Oolonlal admin

Istration so far have retarded rapid growth of nation~lI~m, but the success of neighbor

ing areas In achieving sell-determInatIon cannot help but stuinulate It to some extent.

Frances suppression of the 1947 rebellion In Madagascar has set back the Malagasy

nationalist movement several years, but tension will recur. Ii~ the relatively b~ck

ward Central African colonies the low stage of development has limited the growth

of nationJ~th~m, and will do so for a long period. The Zik movement In Nigeria and

the tlrdted Gold Coast Convention, though neither very strong, are examples of rising

nationalist movements In this area.

3; TEE COLONIAL ISSUE ur WORLD P.iTICS.

The colonial Independence movement Is no longer purely ,a domestic Issue ~o

tween the Individual European colonial powers and their dependencies. It has been

Injected into the larger arena of world politics and has become an element In the

broader problems of the relations between the Orient and Occident, between In

dustrialized and underdeveloped nations, and between the Western Powers and the

USSR.

a. ExteriwA Support of Coionial Independence Movements.

The newly liberated and older nations of the Near and Far East strongly

sympathize with the aspirations of still dependent areas, to which they are bound

by racial and religious ties. All Intensely nationalistic, these countries resent the po

litical and economic domination of adjacent areas by European powers. States like

India and Egypt have already brought colonial Issues Into the UN and may be expected

increasingly to take the leadership In attempting to hasten In this and other ways the

liberation of remaining colonial areas. Moreover, many of these states are exploiting

the colonial Issue In their own self-interest, with a view to supplanting the Western

Powers in certain areas. India and China both have ambitions to dominate South

east Asia, and the latter also aspires to replace Japan as the major power In the Par

COAL

227
45. (Continued)

CON~AL

East. Some of the Eastern states covet portions of the moribund colonial empires:

Egyptthe Sudan and Cyrenaica; Ethiopiathe adjacent former Italian colonies; and

ChinaHong Kong.

The colonial issue, therefore, will be a major source of friction between the

Western European powers and the rising nations of the Near and Far East. To the

extent that the US supports the European powers on this issue, it too will incur the

rn-will of these new, nationalistic states.

b. Economic Nationalism and the Colonial Issue.

The nations supporting the colonial independence movement are bound to

gether by another major issue, closely related to the struggle for political independence,

which also tends to build up antagonism toward the Western European powers and

the US. This is the development, more pronounced since World War II, of economic

nationalism in the underdeveloped countries. These countries, most of them with a

colonial background, find that though they have achieved political independence, their

undeveloped economies, producing mostly raw materials and agricultural products, are

still tied to those of~ the industrialized Western nations which provide markets for

their goods. They are in essence still semi-colonial areas, for their economic depend

ence upon the metropolitan economies tends to vitiate their political independence.

Therefore native nationalists have not been wholly satisfied by the achievement of po

litical independence; they demand economic independence as well.

The aim of this economic nationsth~n is to attain greater economic self-suffi

ciency through development of a diversified economy, usually by industrialization. It

has led the underdeveloped countries to favor tariffs, import restrictions, and other trade

barriers to protect their infant industries. This attitude has characterized not only

the recently liberated countries but many long since independent, like the Latin

American nations, which still have semi-colonial economies. It was most clearly

displayed at the recent Havana Trade Conference, where the underdeveloped coun

tries strongly opposed multilateral free trade and charged that the US and other in

dustrialized nations were stunting their economic development in order to keep them

permanently dependent.

With the largest segments of the colonial systems either already liberated

or in the last stages of liberation, this aspect of the colonial problem becomes increas

ingly important. The economic nationalism of the underdeveloped nations conflicts

sharply with US trade objectives and these countries tend to resent US economic domi

nance. On the other hand, they urgently need external assistance in their economic

development, and the US is at present the only nation able to supply It. The desire

for US loans and private investment will have some effect in tempering the antagonism

of these states toward US policie& However, the underdeveloped countries display an

increasing tendency to demand US aid as a natural right, Irrespective of any conces

sions on their part, and to feel that the US will be forced to invest abroad because of

insufficient internal demand for Its existing capital resources.

c. The Colonial Issue in the UN.

Colonial problems have been brought Increasingly into the UN, which native

nationalists and their supporters have found an ideal forum for agitating the colonial

CO4~AL 8

228
45. (Continued)

issue. There Is a pronounced tendency toward the formation in the UN of a colonial.

bloc consisting of formerly dependent states like India and the Arab nations, others

like China and Iran with strong racial and religious sympathies. toward colonial

peoples (also characteristic of the first group), and yet. a third group like many

Latin American republics and Australia, which sympathize on liberal, .htlmRnitarlan,

and economic grounds. The colonial bloc has consistently sought to broaden the UN

trusteeship system. China, India, the USSR, the Philippines, and the Arab states

contend that Article 73 of the UN charter, which binds members to promote the pro

gressive development of self-government In their dependencies, Implies that the UN

should have broad supervisory powers over these dependencies. Critical colonial

situations like the Indonesian question and Egypts demand that Great Britain w1th~.

draw her troops have been brought before the Security Council as potential threats to

world peace. The underdeveloped countries have insisted on emphasizing their own

economic problems in UN economic bodies. Thus, through the tIN, the colonial Issue

has been placed squarely on the worl4 stage and local colonial problems have become

matters of global concern. The colonial bloc and the USSR may be expected to

bring more and more of such problems before the TIN and to attempt to use it as a

mechanism for liquidatli g the colonial empires.

d. Soviet Ea~ploitation of the Coloniai Issue.

The USSR Is effectively exploiting the colonial Issue and the allied Issues of

economic naUo1~~Iis~ni and racial antagonism in an. effort to divide the non-Soviet

world, weaken the European allies of the US, and gain the good will of the colonial

bloc~ In pursuit of these objectives, the USSR Is: (1) givIng active support through

agitators, propaganda, and local Communist parties to thern nationalist movements

throughout the colonial world; and (2) consistently injecting colonial and Allied prob

lems Into UN and affiliated activities. .

The Soviet regime has always looked upon the so-called depressed areas as a

fertile field for penetration, and since 1918 the Comintern has stressed the Importance

of stirring up discontent In these areas. As a non-colonial power, the USSR Is In the

fortunate position of being able to champion the colonial cause unreservedly and there

by bid for the good will of colonial and former colonial areas. Its condemnation of

racial discrimination pleases native nationalists and tends to exclude the USSR from

the racial animosity of ~ East toward West. The Communists have sought to infiltrate

the nationalist parties In dependent and formerly dependent areas and have been, as

In Burma, Indonesia, and Indochina, among the most vocal agitators for Independence.

The Soviet.Union has four~d the World Federation of Trade Unions an effective weapon

for penetrating the growing labor movements In Asia and Africa and for turning them

against the colonial powers.

At the San Francisco Conference in which the UN Charter was framed the

USSR fought for a provision categorically demanding eventual independence for all

colonies. Since that time, it has frequently Injected the colonial Issue. into UN dis

cussions and has strenuously supported the colonial bloc on all colonial and. allied

questions brought into the UN. Persistent Soviet support of the colonial. bloc on

229
45. (Continued)

CO~LAL

purely colonial issues may win adherents from the colonial bloc for the USSR

on other major issues between the USSR and the Western Powers in the tfl~. Thus the

Soviet Union clearly recognizes the potential of the colonial issue for weakening its op

ponents and has made of it an important element in the power struggle between the

Western Powers and the USSR.

4. Ir ~aan,ny or Fwrr~a CowNmx. DISrNTEGRATION.

Under these circumstances, some further disintegration of the remaining colonial

empires appears inevitable. Native nationalism in these dependencies will increase as

the inhabitants, spurred on by the example of the already liberated nations, seek to

emulate them. Indonesia and Indochina are apparently already in the final stage

before full Independence, and crses will arise in other colonial areas as local nationalists

clamor increasingly for self-government. The USSR and the colonial bloc will lend

external support to these groups and utilize the UN as a means of assisting them.

The weakened colonial powers, stricken by war and economic crisis, will find it difficult

to cope with these insistent nationalist pressures.

The colonial powers, belatedly aware of the threat to their empires, have shown

some willingness to liquidate the most troublesome of their possess ons and to make

concessions in others. The Western European socialist parties, now a major influence

in many governments, appear more willing than their conservative predecessors to

adopt colonial reforms although their colonial policies to date have shown little change.

Some of the colonial powers have adopted more progressive colonial policies, offering

concessions to their dependencies in an effort to stave off the demand far independence.

~The UK in particular, after recognizing that independence for India and Burma was

inevitable, is cautiously promoting greater self-government in its rei~Thing colonies

/ and has earmarked large sums for their economic development (~1though Britains

present economic weakness has prevented full development of these schemes). The

Netherlands has granted substantial concessions in Indonesia, although clearly de

termined to make every effort to keep this rich area under her control. France, too,

while making minimal reforms in critical areas, seeks to draw her dependencies closer

to the mother country In a French Union.

These concessions, however, at least on the limited scale presently contemplated,

appear unlikely to do more than temporarily placate local nationalism and at most

delay the demand for liberation. Differences in race, language, and religion, intensi

fied by a strong East~West antagonism, make Dutch and French plans for integration

of their colonies into French and Netherlands Unions unlikely to succeed in areas like

Indochina, Indonesia, and French North Africa where native nationalism is already

well advanced. Moreover, stimulation of colonial economic and social development

and granting of greater political autonomy may well promote local nationalism rather

than weaken it. As the colonies become more highly developed, they will become

more conscious of theIr dependent status and more insistent upon independence. They

also will be better able to create viable economies and to function as independent

states. Under these circumstances limited concessions are likely to be effective; In

CONfPENTIAL 10

230
45. (Continued)

CON NTIAL

the long run, only in relatively small or backw rd areas which would In any case be

likely to remain under a protecting power.

5. EMERGENCE or a NEw Powxi~ SrrtjaTzoN IN im~ Fouz~tsa COLONIAL WORLD.

As the result of the gradual disintegration, of the colonial systems and the emer

gŁnce of young, nationalistic states, a new power situation Is In the making in the former

colonial world. No longer will the western colonial powers control large areas of Asia

and North Africa which are sources of manpower and raw materials and provide as

sured military bases. The economic and political policies formerly Imposed by the

colonial powers on their colonies will give way to a welter of conflicting national policies.

This process is already largely completed, with many of the most important dependent

and semi-dependent areas, such as India, Burma, the Arab states, and the Philippines

already Independent, and Indonesia and Indochina well on the road. These new and

emergent states will be free to determine their own economic policies and future align

ments.

For a long period, however, these new states will find it difficult to stand alone.

Though actively promoting their own political and economic development, they will

remain for some time semi-dependent Oreas, forced to rely on the great powers for

protection and assistance. Their relatively backward stage of political, economic, and

social evolution, their lack of developed resources, and the absence of technical skills

and education among the mass of their peoples make them dependent upon. outside

help in their development. Militarily, they will be unable to withstand any major

power. Economically, they will still be undeveloped countries, tied to the larger metro

politan economies. The effect, therefore, of the disintegration of the colonial systems

and the withdrawal of the colonial powers is the creation of a power vacuum In the

Near and Far East.

There is danger that unless the Western European nations, and with them the US,

can secure the good will of these newly liberated and as yet dependent areas, they may

become aligned with the USSR. Several factors: friction over the colonial issue, eco

nomic nat1or~n1iqm, and the racial antagonism between East and West, may tend to

orient these areas away from the US and the Western Powers. The newly liberated

states will entertain some hostility toward the former colonial powers, and as these

powers belong to the Western bloc supported by the US, this hostility will extend

in some degree toward the US also. US support of the colonial powers In the UN also

has tended to make the dependent peoples and their supporters suspicious of US

motives. In the econoaiic sphere, the new and undeveloped countries tend to resent

US economic dOminance and to fear that the US and other industrialized nations

intend to keep them economically dependent.. The USSR, pursuing an ~-c5drnth~ttve

racial policy and able to represent itself to colonial peoples as largely Asiatic, escapes

much of the resentment of colored toward white peoples; while US treatment of its

Negroes, powerfully played up by Soviet propaganda, embarrasses the US on thIs

Issue. Racial restrictions in areas like South Africa and Australia also arouse colonial

resentment. Moreover, the poverty and backwardness of the colonial and former

colonial world, combined with the restrictive policies of the colonial powers, has en

11 CON~~1TIAL

231
45. (Continued)

CO4AL

hanced the appeal of radical political philosophies and tended to place leadership of

indigenous nationalist groups in the hands of extremists. This tendency is evident

in the existence of active pro-Communist parties in such areas as China, Indochina,

Burma, and Indonesia. Thus the basic backwardness of these areas, their resentment

toward the past or present dominating powers, and the existence of strong leftist

elements within them, make them peculiarly susceptible to Soviet penetration. Should

the USSR in turn, however, become in the eyes of these areas a threat to their inde

pendence, they would actively oppose Soviet domination too.

6. IlaucarxoNs FOR US Szcumn.

The break-up of the colonial systems and the creation of a series of new national

istic states may adversely affect the present power balance of the US and Western

Europe versus the USSR, particularly if these new states become friendly toward the

USSR and hostile toward the US and its allies.

a. The loss of their dependencies weakens the colonial powers, which are the

chief prospective US allies. These nations rely upon their colonies as sources of raw

materials, military manpower, and revenue, and as strategic military bases. France,

for example, draws heavily upon its North and West African empire in most of the

above respects; and the breaking away of these areas, especially North Africa, would

seriously weaken its strategic position. UK withdrawal from India and Burma already

has substantially affected its strategic capabilities in the Middle and Far East. The

Netherlands would be weakened economically by the defection of Its rich Indonesian

possessions.

b. The drift of the dependent areas away from the orbit of the colonial powers

deprives the US itself of an assured access to bases and raw materials in many of these

areas, an increasingly serious loss in view of global US strategic needs and growing de

pendence on foreign mineral resources. Bases in French North Africa and the Middle

East, for example, would be strategically vital in event of conflict. The growing US

list of strategic and critical materialsmany of which like tin and rubber are available

largely In colonial and former colonial areasillustrates the dependence of the US

upon these areas. The US has heretofore been able to count upon the availability of

such bases and materials in the colonial dependencies of friendly powers; but the new

nations arising in these areas, jealous of their sovereignty, may well be reluctant to

lend such assistance to the US.

c. Possible Soviet domination of certain former dependent areas or their orienta

tion toward the USSR would create a major threat to US security. Such a possibility

Is strongest in Asiatic peripheral areas around the USSR, where the danger of Soviet

penetration is acute. Soviet control of areas like Iran, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia,

or Korea, whether through occupation, alliance or friendly neutrality, would help com

plete Soviet control of the Asiatic continent, make the USSR more invulnerable to

external attack, assure its access to vital materials like oil, tin, and rubber, and place

it astride strategic sea lanes.

d. Colonial antagonism toward the US would hamper the US in its relations with

colonial areas should their metropolitan powers fall within the Soviet orbit In event of

Cor*~NTIAL 12

232
45. (Continued)

CO*AL war. While governments-in-exile probably would be formed, they might prove unable

to control their dependencies, which might seize this opportunity to further their own

nationalist aims by revolt. Were the US forced to occupy these territories for strategic

reasons, its task would be much more di~cult if they were hostile.

a. The colonial Issue also tends to create recurring crises which promote world

unrest. Increasmg resort to the UN to deal with the swelling chorus of colonial griev

ances and the pressure in behalf of dependent peoples by a large bloc of sympathetic

states tends to magnify these grievances out of all proportion to their local significance.

The USSR, seeking to promote any unrest in colonial areas, will quickly exploit its

disruptive possibilities.

Consequently, the good will of the recently liberated and emergent independent

states becomes a vital factor in the future position of the US in the Near and Far East.

The breaking up of the colonial systems and the gradual withdrawing of the colonial

powers from these areas has faced the US itself with the problem of ~lBng the gap

left by their withdrawal. The US stand on the colonial issue and economic nationalism

will have a major effect on the attitudes of these colonial and former colonial areas.

Yet the US is currently in an unfortunate position vis-à-vls the USSR with respect to

such issues. On the one hand, the US has historically sympathized with the aspirations

of dependent peoples for self-government and has pledged Itself to this end in the

Atlantic Charter and in the United Nations. As a result, the dependent and semi-de

pendent areas have come to expect and demand US backing in their struggle for In

dependence. To the extent that the US acquiesces in or supports restrictive colonial

policies on the part of the Western European nations, it will jeopardize its position in

these areas. Such a policy will lay the US open to charges of inconsistency and Im

perialism and may lead to loss of the voting support of the colonial bloc in the UN.

It will allow the USSR, In particular, to pose as champion of the colonial cause and thus

gain the good will of the dependent and former dependent areas.

On the other hand, the European colonial powers are the chief prospective US

allies In its power struggle with the USSR and it 15 difficult for the US to oppose these

powers on colonial Issues. These nations are anxious to retain as much of a hold as

possible on their dependencies, partly for economic and strategic reasons, but also for

prestige. Should these countries lose the benefits of their colonial empires, It would

hamper their economic recovery and possibly threaten the stability of governments

friendly to the US.

If, however, the colonial powers do not basically modify their present colonial

policies, they will in the long run lose the very strategic and economic advantages in

their dependencies and former dependencies that they are seeking to retain. Such re

strictive policies will not arrest the development of local nationalism but may in fact so

aggravate it as to alienate the local populations and minimize the possibility of re

taining any benefits whatsoever. Moreover, attempts at forcible retention of critical

colonial areas in the face of growing nationalist pressure may actually weaken rather

than strengthen the colonial powers. French and Dutch efforts to suppress local

nationalism by force in Indonesia and Indochina, for example, are a drain on funds

13 CON~TIAL

233
45. (Continued)

CON*TL&L

urgenti/needed for reconstruction and may create such antagonism that no profitable

economic development will be feasible for an extended period.

The colonial powers must fully recognize the Irresistible force of nationnThmi In

their dependencies and take leadership in guiding these dependencies gradually toward

eventual self-government or independence, If they are to retain their favored position

in these areas. A policy of far-reaching colonial reforms, designed to foster colonial

political, economic, and soiial development, would do much to neutralize the more

violent aspects of native natiorR1i~Tn and to substitute orderly evolution toward the

inevitable goal of independence for the violent upheavals characteristic of the present

situation. Only through such a new cooperative relationship can the colonial powers

In the long rim hope to retain their close ties with these areas and the ,n~thium of

political and economic advantage. Unless the colonial powers can be induced to

recognize this necessity for satisfying the aspirations of their dependencies and can

devise formulae which will retain their good will as emergent Independent statni,

both these powers and the US will be placed at a serious disadvantage In the new power

situation In the Near and Far East.

In the economic sphere, since the US plays a dominRnt role in world trade and

Is the nition currently most capable of supplying the capital needs of the under

developed countries, the attitude of the US Itself toward the efforts of these areas to

achieve greater economic self-sufficiency will have a great effect on their goodwilL US

failure to adopt a more sympathetic attitude toward the economic nationr~Jkrn of the

underdeveloped countries or at least partially to meet their demands for capital as

sistance will stimulate the charges, already heard, of US economic imperiAlism and

seriously affect US relations with these areas.

The US, therefore, is faced with a serious dilemma. On the one hand US en

couragement of colonial self-determination and economic development may Itself

Incur the charge of US Imperialism and run the risk of alienating the colonial powers.

On the other hand, the US may be unable to afford to let Its policy on colonial lsues

be swayed by the colonial powers If such support of Its allies tends to alienate the de

pendent peoples and other non-European countries, lay the groundwork for future

disruption, and In the long run weaken the power balance of both the US and the

Western European nations vls-à-vls the USSR.

~ONF~~I~AL 14

234

\
4~. Lawrence R. Houston, Memorandum for the Director,

Responsibility and Control for OPC, 19 October 1948

19 October 1948

~LORA1~DUM FOR: The Director

SUB3E~T: Responsibility and Control for OPC

REF~ERENC~: a.~ NSC 10/2

B. Memorandum of Conversation, and Under

standing, dated 12 August 1948.

a. Memorandum for the Acting Director of

~entra1 Intelligence, dated 11 October 1948,

from, tho ~eoutive Secretary of the National

Security Council.

(As used herein, the phrase covert operations refers only to the operations of OPC.)

I. A1~AL!SIS OF NSC 10/2

A. Paragraph 2 contains the basic decision of the

National Security Council in the following words:

It therefore seems desirable, for operational

reasons, not to create anew agency for covert

operations, but in time of peace to place the res

ponsibility for them within the structure of the

Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them

with espionage and counterespionage operations under the overall control of the Director of

Central Intelligence. (~nphasis added.)

B. In paragraph 3, the National Security Council

directs the creation of the Office of Special Projects within

CIA to plan and conduct covert operations. The Chief of

this Office is nominated by State and approved by the NSC

but must be acceptable to the DCI, and he shall report directly to the DCI. Bat OPC shall operate independently of other

components of CIA.

C.. The Director of Central Intelligence is made

specifically resnonsible for insuring, through representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U. S.

foreign and military policies. He is also responsible for

insuring the planning for wartime covert operations in con

junction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The funds £ or support of these operations are to be CIA funds605~ç~1~ked_for OPC.

NO CHANCE DI CLASS. 0

IL~.P__.s.I-4-H1-1- 0 DECLASSIFIED

UI ~- CUSS. CHANGED TO, TS C

NEXT BEVIEW DATE:

AUTh~ HR 10.2

6 I~ RFVIEWEII 064540

235
46. (Continued)

TOP SECREF

D. As set forth in NBC 10/2 therefore, the intent

of the Council is to look to the Director for the proper

functioning of covert operations. He is specifically held

responsible for their control which presupposes the right

to initiate and to veto projects, subject only to NBC rulings

in the event of dispute. As the funds involved are to be

CIA funds, unvouchered expenditures will, by law, be the

Directors personal responsibility. To carry this out, he

must have power to set controls for all such expenditures

and provide means, by audit or otherwise, to insure that

the funds are properly expended under regulations laid down

by him. It therefore appears that the Council intended no

limitation of the Directors operational control outside of

that which may be exercised by the NSC in case of dispute.

But there is a limitation from a policy point of view in that

the Director must meet the policy requirements of the Depart

ment of State in connection with foreign affairs and of

the Joint Chiefs military planning. But he is to be guided

by them, .not controlled.

II. AN&L!SIS OF TilE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AND

DNDERSTANDING ON TEE IMPLE2~ENTATI0N OF NSC 10/2, DATE~)

12 AUGUST 1948

A. In the discussion of NBC 10/2, Mr. Kexman

of the State Department asserted the principle that covert

operations, as an instrument of foreign policy, must function

to the fullest extent possible as a direct instrwnentality of State and the National Military Establishment. He recog

nized that, since OPC was placed in CIA, regard must be

given to the organizational requirements of CIA. It follows,

according to State, that OPC must take its policy direction

and guidance from State and the National Military Establish

ment and that the Chief of OPC must have the fullest and

freest access to the proper representatives of those depart ments.

B. Mr. Souers stated specifically that the NBC

had intended in 10/2 to recognize the principle that State

and the National Military Establishment are responsible for

the COndUCt of the activities of OPC. Mr. Souers expressed

the view that this principle is manifest in the document.

The analysis made under Section I above indicates to the

contrary  that responsibility f or conduct of OPC activi

ties was specifically placed, in the Directorof Central

Intelligence

C. The Director stated that OPC should and could

be given all the necessary freedom and flexibility within CIA

and that State bad responsibility for political decisions,

making such decisions in regard to individual projects. Mr.

RET

236
46. (Continued)

Neiman agreed that this was necessary and that he, as Statets

representative, would be accountable for providing such deôi

sions. This political, as apart from operational, responsi

biJ.ity seems to be in accord with the analysis of NSC 10/2, set forth under Section I above.

D. The Chief, OPC stated that he should have

continuing and direct access to the appropriate departments without going through the CIA administrative hierarchy but

that the Director should be kept informed in regard to all

important projects and decisions. NBC 10/2 recognizes the

special. relationship between OPC and the Department of State

and the National Military Establishment. But since the Chief

of OPC is directed to report directly to the Director of

Central Intelligence and responsibility for the conduct of

OPCs activities was placed in the Director, the apparent

intent of NBC 10/2 is that the Director have actual control

or all projects and decisions, subject to NBC rulings on

disputed it~ns, rather than that he be merely kept informed

on important projects and decisions.

E. In the letter, dated 11 October, to the Acting

Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Boa era elaborates on

his interpretation of the NBC action taken in 10/2. He

states, in connection with the question whether the. NSC

should tell the Director of CIA how his organization would

function, that whereas the intelligence organization of CIA

was created by statute under the Directors control, OPC,

which is not a truly intelligence operation, was created by NSC itself to operate independently of other components of

CIA to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency. The

authority cited by the NSC in establishing OPC is section

].02(d)(5) of the National Security Act, which authorizes NBC

to direct CIA to perform functions and duties related to

intelligence affecting the national security. 10/2 specifi

cally says that the new. Office £hall be created within CIA.

By any normal interpretation therefore, OPCs covert opera

tions are functions of CIA and, as such, are the legal ax~

actual responsibility of the Director. Furthermore, even

the NSC has no authority to create a completely new and

separate operating entity.

III. ANAL~BIS OF TI~ PRESENT SITUATION

A. NSC 10/2 is the official mandate to which the

Director im~st look to ascertain his responsibilities. As

set forth in Section I above, this mandate on its faoe places full administrative and operational control and responsibility on the Director. As it is presently worded, it is to him

alone that the Council will look for results It is for him

to obtain the necessary policy guidance, and only such guidance is outside his control.

237
46. (Continued)

TOP SECREf

B. Mr. Souers states that it was the intent of the

Council to make State and JCS responsible for the conduct

of OPC activities. The State Department representative and

the Chief, OPC do not assert flatly that responsibility is

in State and JCS but, by inference, shift the emphasis so

that decisions are apparently to be made by the outside

agencies, and the Director is merely to be kept informed.

Such transfer of the basic responsibility and control is

incompatible with the responsibilities of the Director under

law and under NSC 10/2 as presently worded. He would be

supporting a portion of the CIA budget over ~thich he would

have no supervision or control. He would be responsible fox

personnel and procurement, although he would only be informed

by outside agencies of what his responsibilities were. He

would be giving his personal certification as to the propriety

of unvouchered expenditures, without any right to control or

approve the expenditures in advance or to ascertain the actual

propriety.

IV R~0MMENDATI 0~

A. In view of the divergenôe in views apparent in

Section III above, it is recommended that steps be taken to

make a final clarification on responsibility and control for

OPC covert operations in the following manner.

1. If NSC 10/2 was intended to carry the meaning its present wording appears to bear, there should be

specif1~ and detailed acknowledgment that the Director,

in carrying out his mandate to conduct and be responsible

for covert operations, has full Æd~.nistrative control

of personnel and supplies, final authority over the

expenditures of funds, and the right to initiate or veto

projects. In time of war, of course~ control would be

transferred to the Joint Chiefs, as provided in 10/2.

2. If it was the intent of the Council, as stated

by Mr. Souers, that responsibility be in the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs, it is felt that I~SC 10/2 should be carefully amended to make the respective duties and responsibilities quite clear. This is parti

cularly desirable in view of the possibility of a change of regime, bringing ins whole nel Security Council,

which might find itself faced with a hopelessly confused

situation. In the event that Control and responsibility

are to be placed outside of CIA, it is reeoended that

the Directorts responsibility be clearly limited to that

of affording a~inistzative support only. It should be

made clear by the NSC, itself, that the Director has no

administrative control, that he has no authority to veto

projects, and thAt he has no control over unvouchered

238
46. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

expenditures. If this deciaton is made, it iS felt

that at least two basic principles, believed to be

generally accepted, would be involved: - (1) that a].].

covert activities should be subjeotto a single coordi

nation and control, and (2) that there is no means by

which the Director can divest himself of, or be separated

from, his personal responsibility for the expenditure of unvouchered funds. Certainly the problems raised by

such an arrangement would be many aid diff5~Zt, whereas

the organization apparently intended by 10/2 se~is not

only practicable but also efficient.

L&WR~NCE R. HOUSTON

SECRET~

239

47. Frank G. Wisner, Memorandum for the Director of Central

Intelligence, OPC Projects, 29 October 1948

CI- a~oo6

TO? SECRET

29 Ootobor 1.948

V~fnBAND~ FOR, D~ECT0R 0? C~RAL ~!ELLIOENCE

SUBJECT $ OPC Projects

R.fereuo, (a) National 8.ourity Dirootiv. 10/2.

(b) Manoran~ of 25 Ostobor 1948 fran

th. Director to AD~ ret Fiscal

Tour 3.949 Budpt.

1. D~tng yoor abunos, OPC has boon hol41ii~ a ssri.s of

.tfngs of an Ad,isory- Coouoil uhich eonaifls of hi~].vs1,

s.om~ity-oloui.ed repro ssnt.tiv.s of Ar~, 1*iy, Air Pore. JCS

and Stat.. mcii r.prountativea were 4.t.d by tb. respec

tive 8sorst~riss to assist 1* tO2uU1at~n5 and coordinating

policies for OPC in cosordaucs with tbs charter eutlinod in

ref.reno. (a). Although this pe.4~4~.y pl4g has not

yet bun ec.pl.t.d, the overall propu is bog44~g to ta~

chaps along the following general lines of o1~stin. activity,

Fanotional Group I - Psychological ~rfsr.

Propu A - Press Cp.riodicsl and uon-p.riodioal)

Progau B .~ Radio

Propan C I.tso.l1~ous (direct neil, poison pen,

rnecrs,st..)

F~otional Group II Political lirfar.

Progran A - Support of Rasistane. (Vad.rgroimd)

Progron B - Support of ~s and Esfugiss

Propsa C Support Of auti-0~ists in Piw. Co~trie.

Propan D - Racourtge~.nt of Df.otion

Fanotional Group III Zcan~.o ~rfars

Progran A - Coinedity opsr.tions C

Progr.a B - Fiscal operations (

DOCU~ENT lit. ___________________

NO CHAIGE UI CLASS. ~

0

CU.~. ~~ T~ ~

NE.<i~ 1W ~r:~ ______________

t.uTa:

u ~

Copy No.1 of 4

241
47. (Continued)

TOP SE(~EI

2

Pi~ational Group XV Prs~Ætjve. Direct Aotjcn

Progran A -

Support of Gu.rrlllss

Program B -

Sabotage, Oeust.rubotag. and Demolition

Program C Evacuction

Program D -

Btay-b.hind

Fnoo*ional Group V - Iiao.llsn.cus

Program A - Trout Orpniàstious

Program B - War Plans

ogr~ C - A4~j,tpa$jon

Program D - Iisoollausous

2. Watil th. overall plans and polioi.s our fcvmolst.d, it was obviously inpousibi. to pr.sanb an aocmsts or realistie out line for budgetary- allocations a$ sit fioth In refusno. (b).

Hawe,er, the ianior staff officer, of OPC are correctly wor~ng on such spscl.fio plans ~iob X obafl b. In a position to review with you In tb. very- near fvtnzs.

3. In th. sntl, us hay, had no alternative but to so

o.pt certain subproj.et. ~ieh have bean litrally thrust upon us, snob as th. old ~4~h was Inherited from S~, and C..oh Refuge. Grasp. You nay be iou. that us

have dons svsrything possibi. t. hold such .rgansy assigsm.nts to a ~ In the.. instance, nh.re us had so altsrnstjy,, us have limited oou oo~tnauts and have set up sar-narhad Loud. to control expenditures.

Assistant Director for

!olioT Coordination

~

~ ~py ~~Øf 4

242
48. Gustav Huger], Observations on the Communist Peace

Offensive, 21 January 1949 (Ditto copy)

G.I.1. Ito. 7

~9~RDE~ffiAL #1

.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~.

21

Jr~nuary io~

O~TIOi~S OE T~ COL~L]JI2ST P~C O~ISIVt

In jud~in~ the political aims of the Soviet Governnont~ ~o re

poatodly etrossod the fact that present Soviet polioy pivots on the

fo1lo~iin5 oontral idoacs

1. The principal ain of the extensive Soviet props

ganda is to oonvinoe the Soviet people and uorld public of its peaceful intentions. Simultaneoua3.y, that props.

g~znda describes the ~ectern Po~orc, particularly the

~:nitod States, as usreozigora pursuing inporialistic ama

of iiorld d~i~i~tion. The Soviet Govorn~nnt seems to be

lievo that such propaganda is en appropriate noons for

croating in the vend .

a mood which, in case of ver, would

serve the Soviet oausó.

2. For the timo boin~, the Soviet Govermont is not

interested in ~loaehing a uar against the ~ostorn ?o~ierc,

since it is oonaóious of the technical superiority of the

Uzzitod St~tos in its possession of the stemic bomb. The

Soviet C-ovonzu~ont heewu that it would not win tho war oven

if it succeeded in overrunniæ~ the major part of ~urope

within a. relatively s!xort tine after the óutbronh o2 hoc

bilitioc.

3. Tho Soriot Government Iaiorzs that the Unitod Statos

also wants to avàid ~mr.. Therefore, the Soviet ~ovoruaent

vonturos to extend its spheres of influence all over the world

in order to obtain as many strateGic jumpinGoff positions

as possible for an armed conflict with the ~ostorn Pormrl3.

But, at the sono tine, the Soviot Government is anxious not

to overetrain the ,bc~ and proceeds with its provocations only

as lons,~ as they re~in tolerablo to the Unitod flta.tec. From

exporionce .Liith Soviet policy one can draw tho conclusion

that, at a ~.;iven ~nm~nt the Soviet Government will be able

to prevent the cold war a GettinG too hot for hor.

4. The Soviot Union connidors the dotor.1imtion.of the

~ostorn ~a~zere to ~o ahead with the l~orth atlantic Security

Pact a goat inoonvonionce. Therefore, it trios to lull the

~uropoan states iuv-itocl to join the puot into a ft~].so feelinG

of security (Italy); en the other ]uizid, it loaves them iiith

out doubt that an antiSoviet attitudo would involve 5roet

danGers ior their political and economic situation (Sweden).

_EONF~

243
48. (Continued)

.~O~4FI~E~*1 ..)

se~s

The

to o~fir~

latest poli.t–oel

the above

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C~- at. ~4 Ps2~ao ?~1.1a*W.,, tbo bled of ~1~l1~ O-~~t

1~. des 2~sp~rsd by looe~. ~is doubts ~e dIsp.13.d by tbs

e~~i&bÆt of ~ est*2. ~daIt ve~ sppoured th ~ S~tet Intor~

tia ~gi.ti~ a~ ~

~Ai1 those an ~ou~ts am at one co~an goal, nes~1y, to

persuade the ~orld public that the s~intenznico of torld peace depoudo

colol:. on the furthcr attitude of t3:~ cotoru i~o~orc becauoe the ;oviot

Union had sufficiently proved that it ~cnto peace ~.nd considoro r.~t~ml

undorotondin~ poe oible.

Although at procont tin Soviet Union ~rnntz peace. It deco not

~cnt it for tho sohe of ~oaco itceif. it ~:ozitz a ,onco of convciiiont

tha-ation because it needs a broath3.n~ epaco now end is co~inood that,

in the lon~ i-un, tino is workmn~ in its favor. The Soviet Governraant

beliovoc that, by uurdc and deeds, it uill succeod in ureckin~ the

~uropeen Rocovorj Pro~ren end time strengthen the uorld CoTinmist

novcucnt.

The rovcrhcrations in the ;.~ericon prese from the speeches of

Usroel Cachin and lalniro To~liatti, as well as the ctrtlclo in tho

~oviot Dullotin, prove that ucithor the .~rurican public nor of.~icial

cudoe of tho United States are prone to ho toi:on In by thoso ~oviot

mchinations, ~thich represent only a tactical ~nouvor of tho ~renlin

and not a change of political strategy.

Thoroforo, the United Ctatoo should noie the ~oviot Cov~ernnont

clearly understand that Its intentions are evident. Ioreovor, the

~3nited States should porcuzido the rest of the t~orld that the Unitod

States Ic al~~uye roa~r to roach an a~oenont ~4th the ~oviot Union,

provided that ouch an a~roo~ut rests on conditions corresponding

with

~

the iutoroctc not only of tho Soviet Union but of the non

et states as ~ofl.

Tho fact that :oscot~ newspapers have rocently displayod an

appeal by Uenry ~cllacos Progressive inrty for a nootin~ Qott7een

President Trui~n and Prino iinistor Stalin tlnows an additional

significant. light on the a,th pux~suod by the Soviot Govornaont through

the alleged peace offensive Since pronoiniccnoizts of the Soviot

press never happen spontaneously but only when the ~roi~lin wants

then to happen, the nentioning of the suggested nooting Lluct ho con

sidorocl as a trial balloon iloa.tod by i occow to tost tho reaction

of the ;:ostorr. Powers and to interpret it, at a given .iornnt, in

relation to the political air.ic of the Soviot Union.

Those ains could be s~.m.rizoc1 as follows:

(

244
48. (Continued)

.D(ottFI?E–ffIAL

3.. Above all, the. Soviet Government tinxrtc to gain

time for dzvolopimg, perfecting and coi~1eting the arming of the Soviet Union.

2. Tho Soviet Union is c~ous to estab3.j.sh in China

a situation which, if the Soviet Union wore to suffer a

docisivo defeat, would enable the Soviet Government to

vithdrut7 into ~bina and to ooutinme the tier from there.

Thoroforo, using the ~ before the outbreak of tho tier,

the Soviet Union Trill do her boot to reconstruct the

armenont industry provioua1y built up in ilanohuria by the

Japanese.

~. The Soviet Government will urge the oo~ncemont

of nogotiations for peace troatios with Austria and Ger2mzy. In those negotiations the Soviet will try to induco the

.;ostorn Pc~ier8 to consent to a withdraoal of their forces

from Europe because it is interested in pushing the ~7ootorn

Powers, especial1~r the United States, out of o.ll positions in Central Europe. Should the 7estern Potiers rofuze, tho

Soviet Go~vcrnmont~ will try to put the blame for the con

tinuation of the occupation regime on the ~ootern Powors

and,. thus, to cos~roniso thorn in the eyes of the Austrian

and Germon people.

To achieve the aforomentionod goals, the Soviot Union might oven be roady to lilt the Berlin blockade or, at least, to mitigate it to such a degree that it would be difficult for the ~estern Pororo

to rojoot a Soviet proposal to meet the USSfl at a oonforonoo table

without putting themselves in the wrong beforo tho world public.

Theorting of those plans of the Soviet Govor t will require both a firn end prudent policy on the port of the ~osteru Poeore in

the forthcoming months.

~ONR~EN~

245
49. Wisner, Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence,

Observations upon the report of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa

report to the National Security Council, 14 February 1949

(Typed transcript)

Transcribed for ~) by cern,.

20 May 1.953

MF~LORLNDIJM FOR TRE DIRECTOR OF CENTR&L INT~.LIGENCE

SUBJECT: Observations upon the report of the DullesJackson

Correa report to the National Security Council

1. I return to you herewith copy #17 of the report of the

DuflesJacksonCorrea committee to the National Security Council,

dated 1 January 19149. Pursuant to your req~iest, I am subsitting

to you in this memorandum my comments upon those portions of the

report which pertain specifically to the Office of Policy Coordina

tion, its activities and its relationships to various of the other

officeŁ of the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that you

have likewise solicited the comments of the chiefs of other offices

and divisions of the Agency which are applicable to their respec

t~ve areas of responsibility and. I trust that my rather limited

observations may be of some assistance to you in your overall con

sideration of this matter.

2. The most important feature of the report having direct

application to OPC is the recommendation that the Office of Policy

Coordination, the Office of Special Operations and the on Ct

Branch of the Office of Operations be integrated unde a single

overall direction in a new Operations Division. I agree with

this recommendation and with the reasoning which supports it and

I further agree that any such new office should be established and

should operate as a distinctly separate entity, having a considerable

degree of autonomy within the Agency. The considerations which are

marshalled in support of this conclusion and recommendation appear

at pp. 9L~, 96, 97, 99, 100 and 131 through 1314 in the report. It was

my original conviction that a very close degree of coordination between

the three activities mentioned was essential and inevitable and I

believe that our experience to date hasfurnished many proofs of this

basic premise.

The report itself takes cognizance of a technical difficulty in this regard which arises from the anomalous setup of the Office of

Policy Coordination within the Central Intelligence Agency. This

arrangement, which was originally ordained by the National Security

Council, could doubtless be revised as a part of the very important

readjustment which is the substance of this recommendation.

114 February 19149

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247
49. (Continued)

-2-

3. Of particular importance to the effe~.ve and secure opera

tion of OPCor of OSO or the proposed new Operations Division, is

the recommendation that these covert operations have their own

administrative support serviôes. The arguments which a~port this

reoommendation- are, I believe, concbsive and are set forth at pp~ .10,

32, 115 and 1.6. The gist of these ,contentioni is an follows.

The general administrative problems of tl3e5e coveit operat

ing offices are unique becausØ of their secrecy and consequent security

requirements. They differ importantly from that part of the work of

Cli which is concerned with the coordination of activities and the more

or less overt work of research and analysis. The security of covert

operations is inevitably prejudiced when overt and covert administra

tive units are placed tgether. Of equal importance is .

the fact that

th. unique character of secret operations renders inapplicable most

ordinary rules of administration., One the results of the moving of

the administrative smppor~ from the direct, authority of the officials

responsible for secret öperatións is ,tbat administrative considera

tions d~e bound td guide and Ł~en control intelligence and operational

policy. Aæ~r gains in o~erail efficiency which may appear to result

from the centralization of: all adininjstratjve services are much more

than offset, by the resultant losses in the efficiency, effectiveness

and security of operationsand it is Æuhnitted that the latter should

be the paramount consideration.

~. Although the comment at p. 37, in regard to the serious results

of delay in obtaining security clearance is obvious, it is neverthe

less of sufficient importance to warrant mention in this memorandue.

While recogeizing the essentiality of care and thoroughness in personnel

investigations, it is imperative that a degree of fled.bility be

retained in the system of security clearance if the agency is to ful

fill its responsibilities. In a limited rnssber of caSes, it will be neces

sary to request iSivers on persons who have long and well knoen records

of loyalty and responsibility in the public service. The seven may name

check is no doubt desirable in all c.ses but the full investigation in

cases of the kind mentioned should be allowed to go on after the mdi

vidua].s have entered upon their duties. MoreOver, there must be a

balancing of interests as between absolute security on the one hand and

the necessity of obtaining talent, imagination, initiative and ~owledge

in certain fields. :

5. A re]Atively small but nevertheless important point which I

should like to raiSe for the rOcord is that ~the report appears to sug

gest that the role of OPC is subordinate to that of 080 in the field of

encouraging the defectiOn of strategically placed personnel in the Soviet

and satellite government services It is our interpretation of our

charter

SEçRET

248
49. (Continued)

-3-.

charter (1136 10/2) that OPC is given this responsibility, but we

fully recogeize the special interests of both 080 and tJ~ Contaaj~

Branch of 00. You Jill recall the memorandum which was prepared by. i~ office and concurred in by the other two branches, which outlined

a proposed method of coordinated aotivity both within and without the

Central Intelligence Agency in this increasingly important field. I

hope that you wi-il be able to reconsider your adverse decision in

this matter in the interest of enabling the three interested branches

to discharge their respective responsibilities in a coordinated and

effective manner. (See recomnendation #3 at p. 129)

6. I should also like to make a comment for the record upon the

observations of the committee at p. 123 about the insecurity of the

present physical setup of the Washington Headquarters of 030 (and OPC). I agree that it is very prejudicial to the security of the personnel

and contacts of these secret operations offices to be isolated in a

conspicuously identifiable building, and that it would be vastly pre

ferable for them to be covered in a large establishment having no

previous 035 aM CIA taint and having so many services and visitors

that the identification of the staff members and their visitors would

be rendered most difficult. I fully recognize tnst because of the

drastic shortage of gover~nt housing space in Washington, this

criticism is easier to make than to remedy, but I nevertheless believe

that it should be made the subject of serious and continued considera

tion by all concerned. The problem is aggravated by the inability to

date of the Services Branch to provide sufficient space for present

OPC staff personnel even in Temporary L Building.

7. The observations of the committee at pp. ].h8 and 1Jj9 of the

report concerning the repute of intelligence as a career within the

armed services baa an important bearing upon the work of the Central

Intelligence Agency and OPC. Because of the important use which CIA

should always make of military intelligence personnel, as well as the

many relationships which CIA must have with the armed services in

order to be an effective and useful agency, it would be to the interest

of a].]. concerned if steps could be taken to improve the lost and pros

pects of service intelligence personnel.

8. My final comnent is made in connection with the recommendation

of the committee that a socalled Intelligence Officer within the

Department of State be created to serve as the principal liaison between

that Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, including the

Office of Policy Coordination. My reaction to this proposal would

depend

249
49. (Continued)

~~ECP~ ~:

depend very largely upon the identity of the individual selected

for this new position and the level at w~iich he is placed in the

hierarchy of the State Department. Unless this In~lligence Officer

is situated at a very high policy level within the Department of

State, the result would be very detrimental. Un4er no ;Circwnstances

should the lia~son ~betwØen OPC and the Department of State be tied

in with the research and intelligence staff of the Department.

Attachment:

23083-A

FRA1~K a. WISNER

Assistant Director of

PoliçyCoordination

250
50. ORE 4 1-49, Effects of a U.S. Foreign Military Aid

Program, 24 February 1949

GP-~

COPY NO

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

GON1IDENTIM

~J~J~CTS. OF i. U.S.

FOREIGN MILITARY AID PROGRAM

~c~z:tIM~.~\p. ~ -

~CH.~.NQE CLA~r~

OE~ASS~

~3. CiIANG~ : ~ C

TR~VIEW~.

/~Th: P4RTC

DATa. / ~V A: ~

Doaument No. ______________

ORE 41-49

Published 24 February 1949

This doci~t bai bees 5pprov~ for r1e~~ the through HI3?ORX~ RZVXEV the Cen~ PROGR~J( ~f

Agency

Date.L ~S~j 9~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7~-/~/7~ ~fi ~r ~ T

~~: ~?r ~

.& 3 cz

251
50. (Continued)

WARNING

This documen ontains Information cting the na

tional defense or United Sta Ithin the meaning

of the Espionage ~.ct, U .. 31 and 32. as amended.

Its transmission or t V tion of Its contents in any

manner to an orized per Is prohibited by law.

252
50. (Continued)

~eeNflUEm1~t

DISSEM~ATION NOTICE

1. This copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of the recipient

designated on the front cover and of individuals under the Jurisdiction of the recipients

office who require the Information for the performance of their official duties. Further

dissemination elsewhere In the department to other offices which require the Informa

tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for

the Department of State

b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army

c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

e. Director of Security and Intelligence, ABC, for the Atomic Energy Corn

mission

j. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Stafl

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other

Department or Agency

2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with

applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by

armngement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DISTmBUTION:

Office of the President

National Security Council

National Security Eesources Board

Department of State

Office of Secretary of Defense

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Atomic Energy Co~niI~Ion

Research and Development Board

C~~N~

253
50. (Continued)

~~d1JI-iüENTtAL ORE 41-49 -~LI~d

EFFECTS OF A U.S. FOREIGN MIlITARY AID PROGRAM

TEE PROBLEM

1. For the purposes of this problem It is assumed that:

a. A North Atlantic Pact providing for a system of collective security embracing

the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Pact Powers, and perhaps also Norway,

Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy, will be consummated during 1949.

b. During FY 1950 limited US military aid will be provided to the European sig

natories of the Pact, and also to Austria, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, and the Philip

pines, the amount and type of aid being gdverned, in each case, by limitations upon

available US resources and the absorptive capacity of the recipient.

c. The foreign military aid program thus initiated could not be expected to create,

in Western Europe, sufficient military strength to oppose and delay materially a Soviet

military invasion until sometime during the period 1952-1955.

d. The ECA program will continue without serious Interference by the rearma

ment program.

2. By direction, we estimate herein:

a. The effect of the US foreign military aid program assumed above on:

(1) The ~iin o~ the recipients to resist aggression by the USSR or its satelllteÆ.

(2) The ability of the recipients to maintain their internal security and

political integrity.

(3) The Intentions and future action of the USSR.

b. Conversely, the effect of a US failure to provide such aid during FY 1950.

DISCUSSION

3. General considerations affecting the psychological response of the recipients to

the assumed military aid program are discussed in Appendix A, the effect on particu

lar recipients in Appendix B, and the probable Soviet reaction in Appendix C.

CONCLtJSIONS

4. The US military aid program and, more importantly, the Atlantic Pact, will

encourage resistance to Soviet aggression insofar as they are recognized as a basis of

hope for the eventual achievement of real peace and security. Inasmuch as they

Note: This report has been concurred In by the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of

State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. It Is based on information available to CIA

on 10 February 1949.

1

-o~uu~

254
50. (Continued)

UO~,~IAL

DUo~

afford no immediate assurance of security, this effect will be in some degree offset by

widespread popular apprehension that they involve grave risk of unnecessary involve

ment in a war between the United States and the USSR. In any case, the will to resist

is unlikely to outrun the visible means of resistance.

5. In general, the prospective recipients of US military aid are less interested in the

amount of direct aid to themselves than in the over-all strength of the combination

achieved through the rearmament of Its principal members and particularly In assur

ance of prompt and effective US military intervention in their defense if need be.

6. U, however, US military aid were to be withheld, this default would be regarded as

a breach of faith and would tend to undermine confidence in any assurances of US

support explicit or Implicit in the Pact. This disillusionment would affect adversely

the will to resist Soviet aggression.

7. US military aid Is essential to the maintenance of internal security and political

integrity in Austria, Greece, and Korea. Elsewhere It Is not essential for that purpose,

although It would be of appreciable benefit In France, Italy, and Iran.

S. The Pact and military aid program will neither convince the USSR of the futility

of its present tactics nor provoke preventive war. The immediate Soviet reaction will

probably be an intensification of Soviet and Communist effort in forms currently

f~mi1u~r with the purpose of preventing the accomplishment of their intended effect.

CO~~NTIAL

2

255
SO. (Continued)

APPENDIX ~A

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. The effect of the assumed military asssstance program would be primarily psycho

logical. By the terms of the assumptions the material effect would not be appreciable

except with respect to internal security in some countries. Tns~cmuch as the program

itself would not guarantee the security of the recipient states, the psychological effect

would depend on whether it and the Atlantic Pact were regarded as an essential step

toward the achievement of peace and security or merely as preparation for a new war.

2. None of the assumed recipients of US military aid would willingly submit to Soviet

domination and all realize that their existing individual and collective weakness invites

Soviet political, and possibly military, aggression. On this account, all would have

reason to welcome US aid in rearmament and, more Importantly, the assurance of active

US military support explicit and implicit in a collective security pact. In thoughtful

opinion it would be realized that, while the Pact and program afforded no immediate

guarantee against invasion and hostile occupation, they would constitute an essential

first step toward the development of an effective system of collective defense which

might deter Soviet aggression and that only by this means was there any apparent

hope for the ultimate achievement of peace and security.

3. It would also be realized, however, that this first step could not be taken without

incurring Soviet displeasure and the risk of involvement in war, especially in the

interim before hopes and promises could be transformed into actual strength. Most

of the countries concerned have had bitter experience of war and hostile occupation.

The result is a popular dread of involvement in war. This sense of insecurity cannot

be overcome by paper plans for future security or implicit promises of eventual libera

tion if war and hostile occupation should come first. This psychological obstacle

inhibits response to anything less than a convincing guarantee of immediate security.

4. One consequence of this psychosis is a disposition to let George do it. A state

such as Denmark or Iceland, helpless in any case, can avoid the risks of participation

in a scheme of collective security and still receive its fundamental benefits insofar as

the participation of others serves to stabilize the general situation. In Greece it can be

felt that the struggle is essentially between the United Sates and the USSR, with Greece

a bystander caught in the crossfire. In general application this idea provides an excuse

for apathy In the supposition that the United States, the only possessor of real power

in the non-Communist world, should bear the responsibility for curbing the USSR and

the attendant risks.

5. Even where governments, more farsighted in this matter, accept responsibility to

contribute to the common cause, they will do so with a high sense of having accepted

grave risks. In consequence they will not regard US military aid as a gratuity, but

3

T2~

256
50. (Continued)

rather as well deserved quid pro quo. If the aid received should fall short of their

expectations, there would be not only disappointment, but a tendency to doubt the

validity of their reliance on US support and to consider whether Sweden had not

chosen the better course.

6. France, in particular, has peculiar psychological reasons, derived from a sense of

former power and present helplessness, for demanding special consideration and

deference and the reassurance of the actual possession of renewed military strength.

But most of the European recipients are small states long accustomed to depending for

security on the protection of greater powers or committed in principle to hope for the

eventual achievement of an effective system of collective security. These states are

less interested in direct military aid to themselves (given some token amount) than in

the over-all strength of the combination achieved through the rearmament of Its prin

cipal members. In particular, they would probably derive more reassurance from the

existence of US military strength capable of prompt intervention in Europe than from

military aid to themselves. They would be reassured by the existence of such strength,

not merely in the expectation of Its Intervention in their defense if need be, but In .the

hope that Its existence would prevent the need for its intervention from arising.

4

257
50. (Continued)

APPENDIX B

EFFECTS ON PARTICULAR RECIPIENTS

1. Tax UNITaD KINGDOM.

A British determination to resist Soviet aggression already exists, but British

thought on this subject assumes the support of the United States as well as that of the

Commonwealth. British ability to resist is dependent on US support: in particular,

Britisli resources cannot be further diverted to rearmament without prejudice to

economic recovery. Moreover, the United Kingdom Is concerned to promote the

defensive organization and rearmament of Western Europe as a means of enhancing

British security. For these reasons the United Kingdom, whatever its Independent

determination to resist, would be greatly encouraged by the consummation of an

Atlantic Pact and the initiation of a US foreign military aid program, not only because

of direct benefits, but also because of the general strengthening of Western Europe

and above all because of implicit as well as explicit assurances of continuing US support.

Conversely, US failure to adopt a foreign military assistance program, for whatever

reason, would have a discouraging effect on the United Kingdom and might lead to a

reconsideration of British policy.

The maintenance of British Internal security and political integrity is not In doubt.

2. FasRca.

The consummation of an Atlantic Pact and the receipt of US military aid would

encourage French resistance to Soviet aggression. The will to resist, however, would

not outrun the visible means of resistance. The French would oppose political pressure,

but would not accept serious risk of war while incapable of preventing the invasion of

France, whatever the assurance of eventual liberation.

The French armed forces are presently capable of suppressing a Communist insur

rection, but only after considerable damage had been done. To the extent that US

military aid made possible the prompter accomplishment of this task it would reduce the

damage and perhaps prevent resort to violence. Accordingly the receipt of such aid

would tend to render the governments attitude more firm, to relieve popular appreheri

zion, and to stimulate economic recovery.

If US military aid were to be withheld or were to fall short of expectations, the

French would be disappointed and discouraged, and would become correspondingly

reluctant to antagonize the USSR. The French would still resist actual attack on

Western Union countries, but In these circumstances their resistance would be affected

by low morale as well as material shortages.

3. Bsz~atvx.

These states are already disposed to resist Soviet aggression, but must depend on

the support of greater powers. Insofar as the Atlantic Pact and US military aid pro258
50. (Continued)

gram gave promise of an eventually effective system of collective security, they would

be encouraged.

The internal security and political integrity of these countries Is not seriously

threatened. As in France, US military aid would serve to render the situation more

secure, with beneficial effects.

These states are as much interested In US military aid to Great Britain and France

as they are in direct aid to themselves. If such aid were to be withheld, they would be

deeply discouraged, but would still tend to follow the British lead.

4. Noawa~.

Norway is disposed to resist Soviet aggression in any case. Insofar as the Atlantic

Pact and military aid program gave assurance of prompt and effective support, this

disposition would be encouraged. Norway would be reluctant, however, to risk pro

voking the USSR without greater assurance in these respects than is apparent In the

assumptions.

US military aid Is not required for the inaintenance of Norwegian internal security

and politteal integrity, although suŁh aid would, of course, render the situation more

secure.

Norway would be little influenced by a denial of US aid as a consequence of its own

failure to adhere to the Atlantic Pact, but would be greatly discouraged by a denial of

aid to the actual signatories If, having signed the Pact at the risk of provoking the

USSR, Norway were denied appreciable aid, the political repercussions within that

country would be severe.

5. DENMARK.

D~nim~rks will to resist Soviet aggression is qualified by a sense of the futility of

anned resistance in the event of war. The Pact and program would encourage Den

mark to the extent that they served to stabilize the situation, but would not be likely to

alter the Danish appreciation of theprospects for a successful defense of Denmark in the

event of attack.

US military aid Is not required for the maintenance of Danish internal security

and military integrity. The Danes, however, expect It In return for their complaisance

respecting Greenland, regardless of their position with respect to the Atlantic Pact.

They would be greatly discouraged by denial of aid to the major signatories of the

Atlantic Pact.

6. IcELAND.

Icelands will to resist Soviet aggression Is Irrelevant in the total absence of any

capability of doing so. The existence of an Atlantic Pact with Scandinavian participa

tion, however, would facilitate Ice]and.lc cooperation with respect to US determination

to resist Soviet aggression against Iceland.

Ice]a~id has no effective security forces. There Is no serious internal threat to

Icelandic security and political Integrity, but the country is vulnerable to a clandestine

6

259
SO. (Continued)

expedition. Some military aid might improve this situation, but not greatly in the

absence of effective organization for utilizing it. Denial of aid would not alter the

status quo.

7. IRELAND.

The Irish will to resist Soviet aggression is beyond question and requires no

encouragement. The Irish position would be rendered more secure by the Pact and

program, with or without Irish participation. No US military aid is required for the

maintenance of Irish internal security and political integrity. Denial of such aid to

Ireland would be without appreciable effect. Denial of aid to the major signatories of

the Atlantic Pact, however, would give Ireland reason for some concern.

8. PORTUGAL.

The Portuguese will to resist Soviet aggression and abifity to maintain internal

security are not dependent on US military aid, but would be strengthened by it. Denial

of aid would not materially affect the situation in these respects.

9. ITALY.

The will of the Italian people to resist Soviet aggression is compromised by their

fear of involvement in another war, particularly in the absence of effective means of

self-defense. The Pact and program would encourage Italian resistance to Soviet

political pressure and Communist subversion, but the Italians would remain unlikely

to fight with a will in any war unless rearmed, convincingly assured of prompt and

decisive US support, and directly attacked.

As in France (pam. 2), the Italian armed forces are capable of suppressing a Corn

munist insurrection, but only after severe damage had been done. To the extent that

US military aid enhanced their capabilities in this respect, its results would be beneficial.

Denial of US military aid to Italy or to the major signatories of the Atlantic Pact

would be extremely discouraging to non-Communist Italians and would influence them

toward adopting a noncoithnittal attitude.

10. Ausvam.

Austrian will to resist Soviet aggression is meaningless in the absence of effective

means. Even for the maintenance of internal security and political integrity Austria

is dependent on the presence of Western occupation forces or on sufficient US military

aid to permit the establishment of an effective security force. Denial of aid in one form

or the other would probably result in the eventual Soviet domination of Austria despite

the anti-Commw~ism of the Austrian people.

11. GREECE.

The Greeks are now resisting a form of Soviet aggression. Their morale is adversely

affected by the absence of decisive results, but, with US support as at present, their

7

T~

260
50. (Continued)

resistance may be expected to continue. Any reduction of US aid might have dis

astrous effect. Some increase may be required to maintain the status quo.

12. Tua~r.

The Turkish will to resist Soviet aggression and ability to maintain internal secu

rity are not dependent on US military aid, but have been strengthened by It. The

implications of the Atlantic Pact and the development of a systematic program of mili

tary aid would afford further encouragement to the Turks provided they were assured

that there would be no consequent diminution of US support for Turkey. Conversely,

a reduction or CIeniB.1 of US aid would be discouraging In effect. If the entire aid pro

gram were rejected, or If essential aid were denied to Greece and Iran, so that Turkey

became isolated, that country might be compelled eventually to submit to some form of

accommodation with the USSR.

13. IRAN.

The will of Iran to resist Soviet aggression Is more dependent on confidence in US

political and military support than on the receipt of any specific amount of military

aid. Such aid would strengthen Irans ability to maintain internal security and tend

to reassure Iran with respect to a continuation of US support in the broader sense.

Conversely, denial of aid would have adverse effect in both respects and, Insofar as It

undermined Iranian confidence in US suppàrt, might cause Iran to hedge in Its rela

tions with the United States and the USSR.

14. Koxaa.

US mifitary aid is essential to the maintenance of internal security and political

integrity in South Korea and the will to resist North Korean Invasion or Infiltration.

More than this is not to, be expected. Denial of such aid would probably result in

eventual Soviet control of all Korea.

15. TxsP~.wpn~us.

The Philippines depend on the United States for protection from Soviet aggression.

Some further military aid would facilitate the maintenance of internal security. Such

aid is expected, and Its denial would have unfavorable political repercussions.

8

261
50. (Continued)

APPENDIX C

SOVIET REACflON TO THE ASSUMED PROGRAM

~. me members of the Politburo (the Kremlin) are at once the directors of an

international revolutionary movement and the rulers of the USSR. Thew ultimate

objective is a Communist world order under their own domination. To achieve this

goal they can employ with equal facility the apparatus of international Communism or

the power of the Soviet state, whichever is better suited to the need of the moment, each

with the implicit support of the other.

2. In Stalinist doctrine, the function of militant Communism is to hasten a dissolution

of capitalist society expected, with scientific certitude, as the inevitable consequence

of that societys inherent contradictions, and the role of the USSR is to provide, during

the interim, a secure base and powerful support for international Communism. In

this concept the Kremlins primary instrument of aggression Is the international Com

munist movement, to which the war-making power of the Soviet state is essentially

auxIliary.

3. The Kremlin, however, pursues Its ends in a world in which power politics is the

prevailing mode of international relations. It expects capitalistic states to resort to

war rather than submit to subversion or dissolution. Consequently, in its conduct of

political and subversive operations, the Kremlin must keep constantly In view the

strategic position of the USSR in relation to a constant possibility of armed attack and

must view the conduct of non-Communist states in the same light.

4. It is estimated that, in present circumstances, the Kremlin is content to pursue Its

ends by normal Communist te~hniques and is unlikely to resort to open military aggres

sion. It has at present no compelling reason to resort to war. It has reason to avoid

war in the still vastly superior war-making potential of the non-Communist world and

in exclusive US possession of the atomic bomb. The consideration most likely to cause

the Kremlin deliberately to resort to war would be conviction that an attack on the

USSR was actually in preparation and impossible to prevent by other means. The

problem is whether consummation of an Atlantic Pact and adoption of a related US

foreign military aid program on the scale envisaged would convince the Kremlin of

the futility of its present tactics, leading to a detente in international relations, or

convince the Kremlin that an attack on the USSR was actually in preparation, leading

to a preventive war on Soviet initiative, or confirm the Kremlins adherence to its pres

ent policy and cause an intensification of its current efforts.

5. In the eyes of the Kremlin the Pact and program would appear to confirm the

validity of Communist doctrine regarding the conduct to be expected of a capitalistic

society in its imperialistic stage. The military aid program would be taken, like ERP,

9 TO~

262
50. (Continued)

to reflect the imperative necessity of such a society (t1~e United States) to sustain Its

economy through exports. Regardless of the defensive terms employed, the Pact and

program together would be mterpretŁd as essentially hostile toward the USSR.

6. The Kremlin would seriously consider whether the Pact and program constituted

specific preparation for eventual attack on the USSR. If their implementation were

to include such specific actions as, for example, the construction of heavy bomber

bases In Norway, the Kremlin might conceivably consider Its apprehensions confirmed

and deem it vital to prevent such developments, by force if they could not be prevented

by other means. If, however, no more definite threat developed, the Kremlin would

probably regard the danger as still potential rather than immediate in view of the time

and effort required to make the Atlantic Powers capable of a decisive attack on the

Soviet Union, and the possibilities for counteraction during the interval. Soviet

counteraction on the basis of this appreciation would be political, psychological, and

subversive in character. If (in Communist reckoning) this policy served only to delay,

rather than to prevent, inevitable conflict, the delay would be advantageous in permit

ting the further development of Soviet power and the further undermining of that of

the enemy. Except as attack may appear inlTnhIent and unavoidable, the Kremlin

has no reason to abandon a strategy successful hitherto, and conceived to be scientifi

cally certain of ultimate suŁcess, to accept the doubtful arbitrament of war.

7. The consummation of an Atlantic Pact and adoption of a US foreign military aid

program, then, will neither convince the USSR of the futility of Its present tactics

nor provoke it to immediate preventive war. The Immediate effect will be an intensifi

cation of Communist effort in forms already familis~r with the purpose of nullifying

and defeating the Pact and program. These efforts would include:

a. Intensification of the peace offensive with a view to exploiting the universal

desire for peace and Confusing Western opinion by identifying the USSR as a peaceloving nation and the United States as an imperialistic warmonger. This effort

would also seek to undermine support for the program in the United States and to

curtail appropriations.

b. Direct attack on the Pact intended to persuade European participants that

it was a device of US imperialism designed to impair their national sovereignty and

to involve them in a new war for US benefit.

c. Pressure on perlpheralstates (e.g., Norway, Italy, Iran) to prevent their adher

ence to the Pact or acceptance of US aid. (The pressure might involve risk of .war if

the USSR were to miscalculate Western determination to resist.)

d. Propaganda intended to arouse mutual jealousy and distrust among the par

ticipants, especially with reference to the apportionment of military aid under the

program.

e. Further consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, including the possi

ble announcement of a corresponding defense pact.

10

263
50. (Continued)

8. If these efforts failed to prevent the successful implementation of the Pact and

program, the Kremlin would still not be obliged either to abandon its basic purposes

or to resort to preventive war. It could still continue its efforts to obstruct and retard

Western European stabilization and recovery. Whenever convinced that these tactics

had become unprofitable, it could seek a detente in Europe on terms Intended to facili

tatE the long-term development of Soviet sti~ength. Accustomed to the idea of an ebb

and flow in the tide of revolutionary opportunity, the Kremlin would regard such a

stabilization of the European situation as merely temporary and preliminary to a new

crisis of capitalism opening the way to new revolutionary advances supported by an

ever more powerful USSR.

9. If the assumed US military aid were to be withheld from the prospective recipients,

the USSR would take advantage of the ensuing disillusionment in its efforts to extend

its hegemony by all political, psychological, and subversive means.

11 ~

264
51. ORE 3-49, Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal From

Korea in Spring, 1949, 28 February 1949

C-ONFI DEN 1IAt~ COPY NO. 95

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

~O22O59

CONSEQUENCES OF US TROOP WiTHDRAWAL

FROM KOREA ~N SPRING, .1949

ftt. ~baa b.s~

approved for raises. througb the IISTCR1c~ R~vjgw P~G~JJg of th* C~rsi Zetsiliguacs 1g~y.

D*t ~92

AGENCY

c-eft~N~L

ORE 3-49

Published 28 February

Auth:

Date:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

~ET~JJ~ ~ ~CZNTL,

..~TEY ~iT~ U~E

LiI-L~ t ii I I ~ ~l ~

L~J I~IUI ~J ! III~fl ~1

I

7~-fC7

~63,- ~ Li.

A3$O ~ç/f

265
51. (Continued)

Ths docu~e,~4~Ins Information affectl~a tional defei~ of~ the. dStales e meaning

of the ,E~plonage. Act, .50 U and 32, as amended.

Its transmission o~ vei~tióii contents in any

manner nauthorized person is pro d by law.

.266
Si. (Continued)

eONFtDENTIAE 2rv ~tmllT

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of the recipient

designated on the front cover and of Individuals under the Jurisdiction of the recipients office who require the Information for the performance of their official duties. Further

dissemination elsewhere In the department to other offices which require the Inhorma

tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for

the Department of State

b. Director of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army

c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

d Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

e. Director of Security andjntelllgence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Corn

misalon -

-

f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and DiAecn~Inntion, CIA, for any other

Department Or Agency

2. ThIs copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordance with

applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by

arrangement with the Office of Collection and DInumIi~tIon, CIA.

D1~RmtlTION:

Omce of the President

National Security Council

National Security Resources Board

Department of State

Once of Secretary of Defense

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Mr Force

State-Army-Navy-Mr Force Coordinating Committee

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Atomic Energy Co,~~mI~fnn

Research and Development Board

267
51. (Continued)

ORE 3-49 TOP~tRET

CONSEQUENCES OF US TROOP WIThBRAWAL FROM KOREA Di SPRING, 1949

SU1~4MARY

Withdrawal of US forces from Korea in the spring of 1949 would probably in time

be followed by an Invasion, timed to coincide with Communist-led South Korean revolts,

by the North Korean Peoples Army possibly assisted by small battle-trained units from

Communist Manchuria. Although it can be presumed that South Korean security

forces will eventually develop sufficient strength to resist such ai~/1nvasion, they will

not have achieved that capability by the spring of 1949. It Is unlikely that such

strength will be achieved before January 1950. AssumIng that Korean Communists

would make aggressive use of the opportunity presented them, US troop withdrawal

would probably result In a collapse of the US-supported Republic of Korea, an event

which would seriously dinthilsh US prestige and adversely affect US security Interests

in the Far East.

In contrast, continued presence, in Korea of a moderate US force, would not only

discourage the threatened Invasion but would assist in sustaining the will and ability

of the Koreans themselves to resIst any future invasion once they had the military

force to do so and, by sust.aining the new Republic, maintain US prestige In the Far East.

Note: The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Navy, and the Air Force have

concurred In this report. For a dissent by the Intelligence Division, Department of the

Army, see Enclosure A, p.7. The thlormatlon herein Is as of 24 February 1949.

1 TOP/4~r

268
51. (Continued)

TOP pI~t~REr

CONSEQUENCES OF US TROOP wrr~RAWAL FROM KOREA IN SPRING, 1949

Assumptions:

1. FInal US troop withdrawal would begin before June 1949;

2. Economicand military aid, to the extent presently projected would continue;

3. ContInued antagonism between northern and southern Koreans to a degree

presenting a constant danger of open hostilities.

Despite the real progress toward stability that has been achieved by the Republic

of Korea in both political and military fields, it is doubtful if the Republic could survive

a withdrawal of US troops in the immediate future. While Korean security forces now

have the capability of maintaining Internal security in the face of opposition from

strong and efficient underground Communist forces In South Korea (see ORE 32-48),

they are neither sufficiently trained nor sufficiently experienced to undertake actions

requiring coordination on regimental and brigade leveLs. Such coordinated action

would be necessary against the large-scale border penetrations and simultaneous coun

trywide internal disorders which would undoubtedly follow the withdrawal of US troops.

In the face of combined Invasion and uprising, in which local Communists and the North

Koreans Peoples Army might have the assistance of battle-trained Communist units

from Manchuria, as well as Soviet aid and advice, the maximum capability of Korean

security forces would be control of certain isolated urban and rural areas. Despite a

large turnover of personnel resulting from the recently Instituted screening system

calculated to rid the ranks of infiltrating Communists, the Army has added a consider

able number of recruits in the past few months and has now reached a strength of

65,000. The present schedule cans for completion of all basic, battalion, and regi.

mental training by 1 June 1949. It Is estimated that an additional six months, at

least, will be necessary to develop proficiency with organic equipment In large-scale

field operations. Additional training in countering guerrilla techniques would enable

the security forces to deal more effectively with large-scale Communist infiltrations.

Completion of such additional training would be necessary before any appreciable ability

to resist Invasion could be guaranteed.

If US troops are withdrawn before the security forces of the Republic of Korea

achieve such capabilities, they will not Inspire confidence among their people, and

until the people possess this confidence, a spirit of defeatism will grow; popular support

of the government will diminish, and its will to resist Communist encroachment will be

undermined. Although Soviet propaganda has been able to exploit the inherent

Korean sentiment against foreign interference, the majority of thinking Koreans in

the South have come to accept the continued presence of US troops as a condition

necessary to free survival.

The presence of the American Mission In Korea (AMLK) and the United Nations

Commission on Korea (UNCOK), alter the withdrawal of US troops, would mitigate

ATvUK Includes the Diplomatic Mission, the ECA Mission, and the Provisional Military

Advisory Group (PMAG). AI~ Is generally responsible for supply and training of the Korean

security force.

2

TOP~T

269
51. (Continued)

TOP~~ the adverse effects of the withdrawal on the will of the southern Koreans to resist

Communist revolts and invasions. Their presence probably would not, however, pre

vent the disintegration of the Republic of Korea and eventual Communist domination

if US troops are withdrawn before the Korean security forces are capable of resisting a

combination of external and internal attacks.

1. EFFECTS DI JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

a. Political and Psychological.

The political and psychological consequences of US troop withdrawal from

Korea would be felt most acutely In Japan. Although many Japanese may anticipate

eventual Communist domination of all Korea as a logical development, the Impact of

actuality would be considerable. Japanese fear of Communist power would increase

along with doubts of US willingness or ability to defend Japan. The Japan Communist

Party would be strengthened by easier communication with Communist forces across

the Tsushima straits and by the adherence of opportunistic converts. Similar political

and psychological effects would follow to a lesser degree in other Far Eastern countries.

Groups who have received or hoped for US support might question the sincerity of US

intentions to oppose Communism and might feel forced to collaborate with heartened

native Communists and assume a more moderate attitude toward the USSR.

b. Military.

Assuming that US troop withdrawal meant Oonsolldation of Communist con

trol over a]] Korea, the USSR would be able to develop bases in the South from which

they could launch air, airborne, or amphibious attacks on Japan, Formosa, and the

Ryukyus, or submarine forays against shipping in Japanese waters.

c. EØonornic.

Economiô consequences, as such, would be unimportant. Japan would lose a

potential small market for industrial goods and a potential producer of rice. The USSR

would gain an additional source of iim~ldl1ed labor for projects in the Soviet Far East.

The potential contribution of consumer goods, particularly textiles, might also enhance

the total productive effort of an Integrated Korean-Manchurian-Soviet Far East

economy.

d. Propaganda.

US troop withdrawal would, of course, enhance the US position by weakening

Soviet propaganda on the issue of imperialism and aggression, but it would subject

Koreans to inevitable terror propaganda that would play upon their Isolated position

in the Far East. Furthermore, it niust be realized that the probable subsequent col

lapse of the Republic of Korea would be a news item of such magnitude as to offset any

favorable propaganda effects that had been achieved either in Korea or hi the Far

East generally.

The deep concern aroused In Japan over the recent newspaper reports that the US might

withdraw troops from Japan is a sample of the reaction that would follow US troop withdrawal

from Korea. The concern over a withdrawal from Korea, of course, would not be as great

as that over a US withdrawal from Japan.

3

TOP~~ET

270
51. (Continued)

ToP6Ø/~ET 2. EFTECTS ON US SEcuzuu.

Withdrawal of US troops stationed in South Korea iwould permit consolidation

of US Far Eastern troop strength in the home Islands of Japan and also eliminate

the danger of having some forces in an untenable position In the event of hostilities

with the USSR. Againstthis gain, however, must be weighed the fact that such with

drawal would allow immediate exploitation of South Korea by the USSR. Bases built

there before the outbreak of hostilities would.greatly assist~Soviet forces in their war

task of interdicting US positions in Japan; the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. In other

Far Eastern countries, US withdrawal could and probably would be interpreted as weak

ness, and might fui~ther contribute to the fundamental, realignment of forces in the

Far East in favor of the Soviet Union for practical reasons.

(For a discussion of Korean strategic and economiC problems and of the contribu

tion of US tactical troops to South Korean stability, see AppendiL)

4

271
51. (Continued)

TOPALT

APPENDIX

Koazas STRATEGIC VALUE

a. Geographic Considerations.

A major military power holding Korea~ would be in a favorable position to

dominate the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Gulf of ChIhil, to threaten the

Soviet Maritime Province and southern Manchuria by ground attack; to threaten

Japan and adjacent mainland areas by air, airborne, and amphibious attack, and to

threaten targets deep within the USSR and China by long-range air attack. The Soviet

Union, by means of interior lines of communication and relative proximity to sources

of supply could maintain a military position in Korea at much less cost and effort

than could the US.

b. Military Importance.

Southern Koreas strategic importance to the US rests principally on the fact

that Its denial to the USSR prior to an outbreak of general hostifities would prevent

the development of advanced bases from which Soviet forces could threaten or neutralize

US operational bases in Japan and the Ryukyus immediately upon any outbreak of

hostilities. Such value as southern Korea would have as a defensive or offensive US

base after the start of war with the USSR would, however, tend to be negated to the US

by the scope of military operations required to hold and maintain a position there.

Unless the US strategic plan permitted employment of the major forces necessary to

maintain a base there, any US force present in southern Korea at the outbreak of

hostilities would have to be written oft or evacuated.

The present function of US troops. in South Korea is purely psychological but

no less important for that reason. Aside from the entirely unlikely event that the

USSR would be willing to risk war over the Issue of Korea, It Is most improbable, so

long as US forces are present, that Soviet troops would participate In an invasion of

South Korea. It is similarly less likely that the North Koreans themselves, with or

without other Communist aid, would make war on the South. It Is obvious, however,

that should an invasion take plaŁe despite their presence, US forces would either have

to furnish active assistance to the South Korean Republic or be withdrawn, with

serious loss of US prestige.

In the absence of US troops, it Is highly probable that northern Koreans alone,

or northern Koreans assisted by other Communists, would Invade southern Korea and

subsequently call upon the USSR for assistance. Soviet control or occupation of south

ern Korea would be the result.

The armed forces of southern Korea, although completely dependent on the

US for training and logistic support, are of considerable strategic significance to the

US insofar as they enhance the security of Japan. If fully developed, the Korean

Array could, by itself, deny southern Koreas exploitation as a Communist offensive

5 TOP/4~RET

272
51. (Continued)

TO~ base In the period prior to an open attack by either major units of the Chinese Com

munist forces or by the USSR. The security of US bases In Japan would thus be

enhanced while the strain on US manpower Involved In occupying southern Korea

would be decreased. Furthermore, If the Korean Army were specially trained In guer

rilla warfare techniques, it might continue to serve US strategic Interests by carrying

on guerrilla warfare against a Soviet occupation.

C. Economic Importance.

Southern Korea~ as a separate entity apart from northern Korea, has a deficit

economy and Is a liability to the US. The area can supply no strategic raw materials

other than small amounts of tungsten and graphite. Only the Intensive application

of Imported chemical fertilizers can bring about the surplus rice production which would

increase Korean economic and political stabifity as well as contribute to the feeding of

VS-occupied Japan. Industrial production, presently Insufficient for domestic require

ments, is confined mainly to consumer goods. It Is not of strategic value to the US

except to the degree that rehabffltatlon and development may reduce the economic

strain on the US involved In sustaining the economy.

Southern Korea is of some potential economic significance to the US In that

integration of the economy of the Republic of Korea with economies of Japan, Formosa,

and the Philippine Islands could result in a greater degree of economic stability in all

the countries concerned.

d. Political Importance.

Survival of the Republic of Korea in the southern zone Is strategically impor

tant to the US. The Republic not only serves as a deterrent to physical Infiltration of

Communist agents Into Japan but, more Important, represents for the Japanese and

other nationals In the Far East, a symbol of US determination to resist further

encroachments of Communist forces In eastern Asia. The Republic of Korea Is one con

crete evidence that the US Is sincere in Its professions of support for the struggle of the

Far Eastern world against Commilnlern. The continued survival of the Republic of

Korea would be proof to the peoples of the Far East that Communist domination Is not

inevitable and would lessen the psychological Impact of the fall of China.

US tactical forces In Korea now number approximately 8,000 as opposed to the

original force of over 40,000. TheIr task has been reduced or has been turned over to

indigenous institutions as the latter developed strength and efficiency. US troops today

are only concerned with serving as a limited reserve which might be used to assist

Korean security forces In maintaining Internal order and stabifity; * as a deterrent to,

but not an absolute guarantee against, an overt invasion by northern Korean forces;

and, most Important, as concrete and visible evidence to the Korean Army and to the

Korean people generally that the US continues to support their government against

threatened Communist domination.

Present Army inrces In Korea are not Charged, except Indirectly, with assisting Korean

security torces In maintaining Internal order. United States troops, according to their present Instructions, may Intervene to maintain Internal order In Korea only If attacked or If required to protect us nationals or property.

6

273
51. (Continued)

TOP~

ENCLOSURE A

pISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF TEE ARMY

1. The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, dissents, from ORE 3-49,

Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea In Spring, 1949. The Intelligence

Division does not believe that US troop withdrawal would be the major factor In the

collapse of the Republic of Korea.. Neither does the Intelligence Division believe that

such withdrawal would allow immediate exploitation of South Korea by the USSR.

2. The Intelligence Division believes that an invasion of South Korea by the

North Korean Peoples Army Is a possibility at present, and recognizes that the likeli

hood of such an invasion will Increase somewhat, following the departure of United

States troops. However, the Intelligence Division considers that an invasion is a pos

sibility, rather than a probability, for the following reasons:

a. Action short of invasion might bring about the result desired by North

Korean and, presumably, Soviet authorities, without Incurring the risks involved In a

military operation. Such action could include the Instigation of Communist-led diS

turbances In South Korea, the Infiltration Into the south of armed and trained agents

and guerrillas, and continuation of border Incidents on the 38th paralleL

b. The Peoples Army still is a relatively small, although well trained and

efficient, military force. At present It does not have, of Itself, the preponderance of

strength over South Korean military forces wlilÆh would be required to Insure victory

In an armed struggle. The Peoples Army, as a force In being, may well be considered

by North Korean authorities to have greater value as a constant threat than if it were

committed to a military adventure which conceivably could result In Its defeat or In

expenditure of Its strength without proportionate returns.

3. The Intelligence Division concludes, for the reasons cited above, that an In

vasion of South Korea by North Korean forces is a possibility rather than a probability

at the present time; and further, that this state will continue until such tithe as South

Korean mIlitary~ forces are reduced to such a state as to render them incapable of resist

ing significant North Korean military action.

4. Further, it Is the belief of the Intelligence Division that political and economic

factors other than the presence or absence of United States troops will have a decisive

Influence on~,he future course of events In Korea, and that the continued maintenance

of a small United States Army force In South Korea would be only a relatively minor

psychological contribution to the stability of the Republic of Korea. If continued eco

nomic and military aid to the Republic of Korea, to the extent presently projected, plus

the presence of a United Nations Corrnn~inn, are not sufficient to sustain South Korean

morale and will to resist Communist expansion, It appears doubtful that the presence

of a small United States combat force would do so.

274
52. ORE 29-49, Prospects for Soviet Control of a Communist

China, 15 April 1949

115 COPT NO.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

FOR REP3RTS AND ESTIMATES

4~4~J

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET C~NTROL

OF A COMMUNIST CHINA

This doe~tnt has b.~

approved fox releas. through the Exs~uucA~, REflEW PROGRM( of the Central ZnteUjgen~ ~eney.

Date 2~~I 92

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~ T~ ARCHiVES & R~C~}~1i1~ ~t1~

I~ECIAiE1Y AFTER ~SE

~tG~-k,~1 gux ~5

G/si

: 0RE29-49

Published 15 April 1949Luth:

I~ate:

275
52. (Continued)

WARNING

This docum ontains Information a g the na

tional defense of Ited Sta ithin the meaning

of the Espionage Act, 50 . 31 and 32. as amended.

Its transmission e revelation contents in any

manner unauthorized person is pro ed by law.

276
52. (Continued)

~e~r

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient

designated on the front cover and of individuals under the Jurisdiction of the recipients

office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further

dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the Inforena

tlon for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for

the Department of State

b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army

c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com

mission

f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other

Department or Agency

2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordance with

applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by

arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Joint Chiefs of Staf

Atomic Energy CommL~ioa

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277
52. (Continued)

ORE 29-49

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET CONTROL OF A COMMUNIST CBINA

It Is the intention of the Soviet Union toadvance toward its goal of eventual world

domination by adding to the Soviet orbit the enormous territory and population of

China, and by employing China to facilitate Soviet expansion Into other Far Eastern

A coalition govØrnrneæt formed by the Chinese Communists, while representing a

temporary tactical maneuver, win contain no elements capable of offering real opposi

tion to the Communists.

A moderate Chinese Communist policy toward small business proprietors, land

owners, and peasants will help to gain popular support, at least until the government

feels strong enough to launch into the more vigorous phases of communization.

The Communist timetable in China will be flexible and will be influenced by internal

conditions in China generally, as well as by the international situation. The complexi

ties of ruling a country like China will, undoubtedly, retard the consolidation of Com

munist control, but these complexities in themselves probably cannot, In the long run,

prevent it.

The Chinese Communists will support Soviet foreign policy by diplomatic moves

calculated to embarrass the Western Powers, by blatant anti-Western propaganda, and

by assistance to the Communist parties and nationalist movements of Asia.

Foreign loans which involve no political commitments will be negotiated by the

Chinese Communists wherever possible, and foreign trade (under state supervision)

will undoubtedly be continued with non-Communist countries. This policy does not

imply permanent benevolence toward foreign business interests In China.

The Soviet Union will attempt to use the CCP as its chief instrumelit to consolidate

control over China as it has successfully used the various national Communist parties

of Eastern Europe. The strong influence exerted by the Soviet Union over the Chinese

Party has been variously revealed and provides ample indication that the present lead

ership of the Chinese Communists Identifies itself solidly with International Corn

munlsni as promulgated by Moscow. The Kremlin will endeavor to prevent possible

cleavages in the Party leadership from jeopardizing eventual Soviet control over China.

The present Sino-Soviet Treaty can be directed at the US and its allies, and other

agreements may provide for a high degree of economic and military integration be

tween the USSR and China. At the same time, in accordance with its strategy of

creating cii Its borders easily dominated political entities, the Soviet Government will

probably press for political autonomy in all present Chinese border areas adjacent to

the USSR.

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departhients of State Army, Navy, and the Air Force

have concurred in this report. The information herein is as of 12 April 1949.

This paper discusses a pattern of developments which should become apparent prior to 1951.

1 s~r

278
52. (Continued)

s~r

It must be emphasized that the process of coæÆolidatlon of Soviet Øontrol over

China will unquestionably enôountercoi~atdŁrab1e thfficult~, in view of the many potas

tial points of conflict between the USSR and the Chinese Communists, e.g., the Issues

of US Ł.id, control of pŁrlpheial ai~eas, co~tro1 of asslàtancØ to Comii~iunlst movements

in other Far Eastern areas, arid the subServience which Moscow will undoubtedly de

mand of the CCP. While sme opposition to Moscow control probably exists in the

CCP, fo~ such opposition to be effective the dissident groups must wrest the control

apparatus from the pro-Moscow leadershlj, Or that leaders p Itself must change Its

policy toward Moscow. Until evidence Is available that ai effective, opposition is dØ

~ping, it is concluded that the cc~ will remain loyal to MoScow.

2...

.279. : ,,
52. (Continued)

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET CONTROL OF A COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Sovxrr INTE1qTION8 IN CmNA.

Present Soviet policy Is aimed at eventual world domination, to be achieved

through the establishment of national Communist regimes controlled and directed

from Moscow.

Soviet intentions In China are twofold. The first involves adding to the Soviet

orbit the enormous territory and population of China (thereby bringing under Soviet

control three-fourths of the Eurasian land mass) and, conversely, denying China to the

West as a potential base of operations against the USSR. The second embraces use of

China as an advance base to facilitate Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia, including

Indonesia and the Philippines; the oufflsLnklng of India-Pakistan and the strategically

Important areas of the Middle and Near East; and eventually control of the entire

Asiatic continent and the Western Pacific.

2. PRospEcTs FOR CRINESE CoMX~(tJ1~INr CONTROL OF CBINS.

a. Communist-Controlled Coalition.

The Communists have announced that they will form a coalition government

upon coming to power In China. By their own definition, such a coalition government

will be one led by the Chinese Communist Party, the various democratic parties

and the representatives of the various peoples associations which truly represent the

Chinese people, and will exclude all reactionary elements. The coalition will enable

the CCP to claim establishment of a truly representative government for all China.

The coalition will be Communist-controlled from the outset, which from a Marxist

point of view, will be a revolutionary phase beyond that seen in those Eastern Euro

pean governments in which the Communist minority parties entered legally and later

wrested control from the others. Thus the coalition will avoid what is usually a difficult

and dangerous step on the road to Communist dictatorship, but the CC? will still be

faced with the problem of gaining the support of the people it claims to represent

b. Chinese Communist Internal Policy.

The internal policies of the Communist-controlled government win be deter

mined, not by the policies currently in force in the USSR, but by the present stage of

development of the Chinese revolution according to orthodox Communist theory. This

stage, at the moment of Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, would correspond

roughly to that represented in the Bolshevik Revolution, when in 1920 the Bolsheviks

had defeated their enemies inside Russia. The NEP (New Economic Policy), a tempo

rary tactical retreat, was aimed at conciliating the hostile elements In the Rii~!nn

population and thereby hastening the economic reconstruction of the country. Mao

Tse-tungs concept of interim capitalism, the first stage of revolution In a colonial

area, has much the same ends in view.

3

280
52. (Continued)

o~cnvr

The moderate CCP policy toward small business proprietors and landowners,

as well as the peasant class, will probably gain wide support for the Communist regime.

While the basis for future development of Chinese industry will, in all likelihood, be

established by the nationalization of large-scale industrial and commercial enterprises,

the toleration of small business by the regime at this time should win the favor of a

large segment of the population. Limited agricultural reforms, on the other hand,

such as reduction of land rents and interest rates, and land distribution, will be wel

comed by the peasants. Agricultural cooperatives axe also likely to be a goal of the

Communist Government. Collectivization on the Soviet model, however, will probably

not be attempted on a large scale for many years to come, both because of the opposition

it would arouse among the peasants and because It is at the present time technically

impracticable In southern Chinas rice-growing area&

A government-sponsored movement to increase the size of fields under cul

tivation would, nevertheless, help to create the physical conditions necessary for the

development of collective farms. Through preferential taxes, subsidies for cooperative

farmers, and a system of machine-tractor stations for use of the cooperatives alone, a

strong trend In the direction of collectivized agriculture could be established.

The Communist Government can be expected eventually to incorporate these

economic aspirations in a Three- or Five-Year Plan which will lay down the blueprint

for development in the immediate future.

At the outset, the Communists will devote their energy toward establishing

complete control over the central government. (The strength of this government may,

however, be reduced by Soviet territorial annexations in Sinkis~ng and Inner Mongolia,

and by the maintenance of a special Soviet position in Manchuria.) As control of this

central government is consolidated in the various areas~ local governments, theoretically

exercising complete autonomy within their own territories, will be created along the

lines of the Soviet political structure, and eventually the form, If not the name of a

Union of Democratic Republics of China will be utilized.

In addition, a constitution modeled on that of the Soviet Union will be drafted

to provide, on paper, for freedom of speech, worship, and assembly, while guaranteeing

local and racial autonomy, and the right to use their own languages in schools, courts,

and other o~cial institutions to Chinas minority groups. The constitution may also

provide for the limited nationalization of industry envisaged by Chinese Communist

leaders as applicable in the present stage of revolution.

The Communists, In reorganizing the armed forces, will iUmins–e those

elements which have already proved unreliable, and devise means to detect others as

they appear.

The Communists also will not neglect to integrate existing Communist police

organizations Into the present Nationalist police force, attempting to Improve, perhaps

with the aid of Russian specialists, the secret police which they have formed on the

Soviet modeL

c. Obstacles to Communist Consolidation of Power.

In implementing the measures outlined above, the Communist timetable will be

flexible and will be influenced by internal conditions In China generally, as well as by

4

281
52. (Continued)

the international situation. The underdeveloped and often non-existent communica

tions in this vast country render most difficult any effective centralized controL Other

formidable obstacles to Communist consolidation of power in China are: (1) The

problems inherent in collectivizing a small-scale agrarian economy; (2) the difficulties

involved in superimposing state control on the present decentralized financial- Struc

ture; and (3) the cultural conservatism of the Chinese people and their stubborn

resistance to encroachment on their innate sense of property rights. The complexities

of ruling a country like China will, undoubtedly, retard the consolidation of Communist

control, but these complexities in themselves probably cannot, in the long run, prevent it.

3. CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN Poucv.

a. Pro-Soviet and Anti-Western.

In accordance with the frequently expressed belief of Communist spokesmen

that the world is divided into two camps, Chinese Communist leaders may be expected

to give aggressive support to the diplomacy of the progressive-democratic countries.

This will involve Chinese diplomatic measures calculated to advance the ends of Soviet

foreign policy and to embarrass the Western Powers; blatant anti-Western propaganda;

and assistance to the Communist parties and nationalist movements of Asia.

The new government will continue to explain its actions against the Western

Powers in terms of protecting Asia against Western (particularly US) Imperialism,

and of safeguarding Chinas territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The Com

munist government will probably bring pressure to bear upon the US to withdraw its

military forces from Tsingtao or from any future bases established on Taiwan; and, in

time, upon Great Britain to give up Hongkong. China will continue to assert its claim

to Taiwan, and perhaps, to the Ryukyu Archipelago, which is presently under US

occupation.

b. Foreign Trade and Assistance.

It seems likely that foreign loans which involve no political commitments will

be negotiated wherever possible, and foreign trade (under state supervision) will

undoubtedly be continued. Trade agreements with non-Communist countries will for

the most part be calculated to procure for China petroleum, machinery, steel, rnanufac

tured goods, and other products which cannot be readily supplied by the Soviet Union.

The USSR will seek to obtain, by means of a trade agreement with the new government,

required amounts of such Chinese products useful to it as tin, antimony, and tungsten,

supplying (or promising to supply) In return Soviet manufactured goods and possibly

agricultural producta. In addition to these direct economic advantages for itself, the

USSR will endeavor to make use of Chinese trade and the resources of Manchuria to

exert political pressure upon Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia.

The Communists have given some indication that they would like foreigners

to continue business as usual. This seems to be a move calcuiated to win easier

recognition for their government and minimize foreign opposition to the change of

regime. Such a policy recognizes the transitional contribution that foreign Interests

5

282
52. (Continued)

can make to economic and social stability; it does not imply permanent benevolence

toward foreign business interests In China.

4. SovIET REi.&TiowS wiTH THE Camsss COMMUNISTS.

a. The CCP as a Soviet Instrument.

The Soviet Union will attempt to use the CCP as the chief instrument to extend

its control over China as It has successfully used various national Communist parties of

Eastern Europe. While the basic techniques for the extension of Soviet control

will be drawn from the experience gained in Eastern Europe, these techniques will be

adapted to the peculiarities of China: its vast size as compared with the countries of

Eastern Europe, the absence of Soviet military occupation except In parts of Manchuria,

and the lack of ethnic and cultural bonds with the Soviet Union. In adthtion, Stalin

will be mindful of the unfortunate results of Moscows attempt to direct developments

In China during the 1920s.

b. Solidarity of Chinese Communists with Moscow.

Coming at a time when it would appear to the advantage of the Chinese Com

munists to profess some degree of independence, the constant profession by the leaders

of the Chinese Communist Party of their place In the world Communist movement and

reiteration of the absolute primacy of the Soviet Union In this movement, is ample lMi

cation that the present leadership of the Chinese Communists Identifies Itself solidly

with international Communism as promulgated by Moscow.

The Chinese Communists have not deviated in any way from the Soviet

line on International affairs, as was strikingly demonstrated, for example, in their

endorsement of the Cominforin condemnation of Tito. Whether this action was the

result of Soviet pressure or of the ideological affinity of the CCP to the world Communist

cause, it revealed the powerful influence exerted by the Soviet Union over the Chinese

Party. By this action, furthermore, the CCP Central Committee was condemning a

tendency toward national independence which many of its members might previously

have thought compatible with the international Communist movement and certainly

applicable to their own country.

Later, Mao Tse-tung, in commemorating the 31st anniversary of the Bolshevik

revolution, called on the revolutionary forces throughout the world to unite behind

the Soviet Union against American imperialism. A more recent revelation of the

strong pro-Soviet orientation of the Chinese Communists was the series of articles by

Llu Shao-chi, Deputy Chali~man of the CCP Politburo, reconciling nationalism and

proletarian internationalism. The author clearly announced that the Chinese

Communist Party is committed to a positive pro-Soviet line. Neutrality, he said,

is Impossible. If you do not stand in the Imperialist camp helping American impe

rialism and its stooges to enslave the world and your own nation, you must stand in the

anti-imperialist camp. ..

Soviet Liaison with. CCP.

The Soviet Union in its relations with the Chinese Communists has, in the

past, been most circumspect. It may be assumed that Sovlet-CCP liaison exists, and

,0 6

283
52. (Continued)

It has been frequently claimed by the Chinese Nationalist Government and others that

military and political advice is given to the Chinese Communist leaders by R~c.~i~ns

However, there is no positive evidence to substantiate these claims. The proximity to

the USSR of Chinese Communists in North China and Manchuria would make liaison

easy and concealment of such liaison effective. Furthermore, it is a basic practice of

the Kremlin carefully to hide Its connections with foreign Communists until their

accession to power.

The consolidation of Communist control in China during the first phase will

probably be influenced by Soviet representatives operating unobtrusively under the

cover of diplomatic, technical, commercial, or military missions. Undoubtedly, addi

tional Russian diplomatic and consular omcers, as well as cultural and newspaper

representatives, will be sent to China soon after the Communist accession to power.

These people will be charged with keeping a watchful eye on the activities of the

Chinese Communists. As a recent Pravda article pointed out: The experience of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union is basically, fundamentally, and essentially

acceptable to, and compulsory for, the Communist parties of all lands that are fighting

for a socialist revolution or have launched upon the building of socialism.

d. Chinese Communist Leaders1z~p.

Almost half of the present members of the CCP Central Committee and the

Political Bureau have had training in Moscow, and many other members have received

indoctrination through the French Communist Party. Although training in Moscow

or Paris is no guarantee of fidelity, suCh training is regarded by the Kremlin as one

of the most Important factors in developing the loyalty and discipline of non-Soviet

Communis~

e. Soviet Methods to Effect Compliance of CCP.

The Soviet Union and those Communist leaders whose loyalty to the Kremlin

is unquestioned are well aware of the danger of cleavages in the Party leadership and

will endeavor to prevent the development of any movement which might jeopardize the

Soviet effort to establish control over China.

A tested tactic employed by the USSR in maintaining control over local parties

is the establishment of a system of checks and balances within the party leadership

through pitting one personality against another. Although it has been. claimed that

the relationship between Mao Tse-tung and Li Li-san might lend itself to such a

technique, at present evidence is lacking either that Lis standing in the Party, or his

actual power in Manchuria, is sufficient to be an effective check on Mao. It is likely

that the principle of checks and balances is operating within the CCP, but its applica

tion to specific figures is unknown.

f. Soviet-Chinese Mutual Assistance Pacts.

The Soviet Union will continue to include China in Its existing system of

mutual assistance pacts with countries bordering on the Soviet Union. The Sino

Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed in August 1945, provides that both the

USSR and China will undertake . . . jointly all measures in their power to render

7 SE

284
52. (Continued)

impossible a repetition of aggression . . . by Japan. Thus, the Treaty can be aimed

at the US and its allies, while ostensibly intended for a former enemy. Additional

agreements will probably call for close collaboration in the Interests of peace and

the strengthening of economic and cultural ties, and may provide for a high degree of

economic and military integration between the two countries, including the dispatch

of military and technical advisers to China, the construction, reconstruction, and

equipping of airfields in Chinese territory, and the formation of Soviet-Chinese stock

companies for the development of industrial and mineral resources, especially those

which contribute directly to the Soviet military potential.

Similar pacts have been concluded by the Soviet Union with the Mongolian

Peoples Republic and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Northern Korea. An

interlocking series of bilateral agreements among the Far Eastern republics may also

be negotiated.

g. PoUtical Control of Peripheral Areas.

The Soviet Government will probably press for political autonomy of all present

Chinese border areas adjacent to the USSR. Such an arrangement might open the way

for eventual Soviet annexation of these areas. In any event the policy would be in

accordance with the Krem]ins strategy of creating easily dominated political entitles

on the Soviet borders.

In line with guaranteeing Soviet economic interests in Manchuria, the USSR

will probably retain some special rights in Dairen and In the Port Arthur naval base

area. This is possible under the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance,

which provides for the special Soviet position in Manchuria.

The Soviet Government, while attempting to establish in Manchuria the

virtual autonomy of an absolutely reliable wing of the Chinese Communist Party, will

not necessarily attempt to deprive the Chinese Communist Government of a nominal

sovereignty over Mstni-huna, but will certainly seek to preserve hegemony in that area.

In this manner, the USSR could better insui~e Its access to the raw materials of Man

churi~, while at the same time creating a safeguard against possible political deviations

on the part of Chinese Communist leadera

In all llkpllhood, the USSR favors the formation of an autonomous territory

of Sinkiang, possibly with a view to creating a new Soviet Union Republic at some time

in the future.

The Soviet Union might also Induce a Chinese Communist Government to

relinquish Its claim to sections of Inner Mongolia, in favor of the Mongolian Peoples

Republic.

5. POTENTIAL Ponqrs op Coripi,icr Brrw~i vnx USSR AND CHINESE CoMaw~Isre.

a. The Issue of US Aid.

The USSR, intent upon the elin~ins~tion of US influence from Chins, would

almost certainly disapprove a Communist effort to obtain US aid under ECA. Although

It Is most unlikely that the Issue of US aid could in itself effect a change in the orien

tation of a Communist-dominated government, It Is possible that this issue, especially

8

285
52. (Continued)

if the USSR were unable or unwilling to supply the aid Itself, would strengthen the

Influence of those groups within the CCP that seek to avoid Soviet domination.

b.~ The Issue of the Border Ares.

The Issue of cont*olof peripheral areas will probably prove to be one of the

most lm~ortant testing rounds Sino-Soviet rolatlons. The objective of the USSR in

seeking control of thŁseareas Is pritharily to streflgthen Its basic strategic position In

the Far East. If, however, It appears to tIle Chir~j~e Commuflists, as It may, that the

USSR Is attempting to wŁa~en the Communist Government of China by depriving It

(whether actually or In effect) of control over the border regions, the possibility of a

schism within the ~or between the CCP~ and Moscow will be Increased. While the

Communist Government of China would probably nt risk open rebellion against the

USSR over the Issue of border areas aggressive and clumsy maneuvers by the USSR

In those areas would probably reSult In the disaffection and Insubordination of a sig

nificant section of the ~Srty.

c. The Issue of Communist Movements In. thà Far East.

The USSR wIll of course welcome the assistance of the CCP in promoting the

growth of Communism in the F9x ESst, but the USSR must prevent the CCP from

exercising independently a majo influence over these movements. The USSR will

attempt to control this assistance through existing Soviet ~h~n~e1s for liaison and

direction. This will be one of the most Important areas of potential conflict between

the USSR and the Chinese Commüfllsts.

d. The Is,sue of Subservience to MoscOw.

As extensIon of Soviet control over the CCP becomes more obvious, it can be

expected that some cleavages In the Communist high covnninnd will occur, possibly

resulting in the defection of certainleaders. Adding to the potential dangers facing

the Soviet Union In Its consolidation of power Is the large number of present members

of the Chinese Communist Party who are not convinced Sta1lnists~ arid hence not

altogether reliable as Communists. ThOse leaders who wish to oppose Moscow control

are potential rallying points for the lukewarm elements In the party and the popula

tion. For such opposition to be effective, however, the dissident groups must wrest

the control apparatus (I.e., party organization, secret pollce~ army) from the proMoscow leadership, or that leadership Itself must change Its policy toward Moscow.

Until evidence Is available that an effective opposition Is developing, It follows that

the Chinese Communists will remain allies of Moscow.

9:.
53. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 20 June 1949

(Photograph)

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53. (Continued)

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dot ie ,.t~ pt Ill iii,. I,~Pitt . or for I raiulrit_ or for rent tentat ton for

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r tt~ Tot t tint ten unti o~s~ tuti~, lease of ah~euoe Tu1~d

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(4) hota ithatanding tha provisuinsof any other lsw,t

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53. (Continued)

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to traneftfr L seth sums without regei&to

Jfl) pros inms 1f law ltmtting or proinbitnig transfers between eppn

iwia~inu~~. ~transferred to the %geney in accordance with this

paragraph masjbe expeiuled for the purpose. and under the amhorifl

I tlii~ ~cl ss itl~ itt rigani to hniitatiorisof upproprintiolis from whit+h

I riit4* rred

291
53. (Continued)

lit

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(3IUS~Cb44t). \

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egard to th~ir

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ngta sti .ns perituning to nanns,iibiliiv Provided

of aliens end nu,sstbcrs of these untnethatt fssnuhet. eaten

~tase tinder site tintin nts sit tin ,ertson hail in no ui-e ntaed one

I nndnd jstrwmln ns;vtnsetsssaj sear

292
53. (Continued)

nuilar or~

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association and hbrar3 I

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61 Stat t,Th 6 U S C 14 piçs ziWftt of claim puPlmfthlt

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293
53. (Continued)

H

IL It. tni4,8 ~

to Qst ~. C acqinsit ion of iieee~nn hind and the clearin,, of

-orb land conetniction of buildings sod faulities without regard

to It Stat 6I~ 40 IT ~ C ~$$ ~G1 rspnn rental operation, and

narntensure of buildings, utihtìes faulniea,iind ap~

and S S~

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erw~*itth~r~tby

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S5?ASSSUATT ~ P50115!

Sac, IL If any pros isnia of this Act or the apphcat

pros inca to ant parson or arcunotancea. is held invalid, the

of this Act or the application of sistli pronsion to persons i

states other than abate as to which a is heM invalid, sh

affected thereby aRCS? IflIZ

San it This Act ins; he cited as the ~Ce

tet of 1949

APPROVED

JUN 20 194

294
54. National Security Council, NSC-50, 1 July 1949 (Photograph)

NSC Re~stry

TOP SECRET

A REPORT

TO THE

COPY NO-22

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE SEC~~R~S OF STAIE AND IEF~~Z

on

THE ~ThrEILI~ AG~CT

NATIt2~AL O~AI,IZ.12IoN FOR ~

Ju3~ 1~ 1949

WA$HWIGTON

TOP SECRET

295
54. (Continued)

ISC 50 TOP GECTtET

July 1, 1949

NOPE BY 1~ ~CUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

TRE CENTRAL INTElLIGENCE AGENCY AND

NATIONAL ORGAr~IzATION FOR INTELLJGENCE

References: A. NSC Action No. 202

B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same

subject, dated January 24, March 2, March 8, and April 4, 1949, respectively.

At its 37th meeting the National Security Council considered

the report by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey Group on the subject and cosiserits with respect thereto (Reference B), and referred them

to the Secretaries of State and Defense to prepare, in consultation

with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, and in

the light of the discussion at that Council meeting, specific recom

mendations for Council action. (Reference A)

The enclosed report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on

the subject prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 202 in consultation

with the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, is suheitted here,

with for consideration by the National Security Council at its next

meeting of the reoc~ndations contained therein.

The Attorney General is being invited to participate in the

Councils consideration of this report.

The Secretary of Defense expressed the view that, upon approval, the reccmeendationa should be put into effect at once and the Council

should plan to have a suitable review of the progress made after a

reasonable period of implementation. -

It is requested that this report be handled with special

security procautions

Distribution: SIDNEY V. SOUBRS

The President Executive Secretary

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, National Security

Resources Board

I:sc 50 ~OF 3ECI~ET

296
54. (Continued)

COPY TOF~EO11ET

July 1, l9k9

CO!~NTS AND RECOt~ENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCZJ

ON THE REPORT OF ~ DULLES-JACKSON-CORREA COM~TT~ PREPARED

BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF D~~SE

The Report on The Central Intelligence Agency and National

Organization for Intelligence includes 57 individual conclusions

and reco~endations which we. have regrouped in order to facilitate

Council consideration. Although some of the conclusions do not

require Council action, we wish to bring them to the Councilts

attention with our cosents Other conclusions and recomeendations

call for concurrence or non-concurrence by the Council and appro

priate implementing action.

1. L~I~JATIVE PROVISIONS GOVZRNI~ CIA AND ITS POSITION

UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

a. S1m~n~17 of the Report

The Survey Group report concludes that:

(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act

of 19~7 which sets up CIA is sound and that. no amendments are neces

sary at this t1~

(2) CIA is properly placed under the National

Security Council, but that its Director should establish closer

liaison with the two members of the Council on whom the Agency

chiefly depends, namely, the Secretaries of State and Defense.

b. Comments

We concur in these conclusions and reco~ndations

which do not require specific Council action or authorization. It

NSC 50 TOP DECIILT

-1

297
54. (Continued)

TOP ~conr~i

should be noted, however, that the National Military Establishment

and CIA are presently studying the wartime status and respond

bil.tties of CIA and that recommendations may be presented at a

later date on this subject. It may be determined that certain

functions and responsibilities should be under the control of the

military in time of var.

C. Reco~nded Action

That the National Security Council concur in the

Survey Group conclusions on this subject, with the understanding

that study may determine that certain functions end responsibilities

should be under the control of the military in time of war.

2 TEE COORDINATION OP INT~LIGENCE ACTIVITIES

B. Su~ry of the Report

The Report concludes that:

(1) The responsibility of CIA with respect to

the coordination of intelligence activities baa not been fully dis

(2) The Intelligence Advisory C~ittee is

soundly coneelved as an advisory body, but should, under the forth

right initiative and leadership of the Director of Central Intelli

gence, participate more actively in the continuing coordination of

intelligence activities and in the discussion and approval of in

telligence estimates.

b. C~ents

We concur in the observations and conclusions of the

Report on this general subject. We believe that the objectives

NSC 50 TOl 3ECI1~T

-2-

298
54. (Continued)

TOP ~COI~T

sought for can be achieved by the recognition and implementation of

these principles and by the organizational and operational improve

ments reco~nded elsewhere in the Report.

In accordance with these principles and as partial

implementation thereof, we recommend certain amendments to National

Security Council Intelligence Directive No. ~l, as indicated in

Annex A, appended hereto. These amendments would (1) define the

status of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the

Intelligence Advisory committee and (2). clarify the procedure whereby

dissents are included in coordinated intelligence estimates.

C. Recor~euied Action

That the Natiooal Security Council (1) concur in the

conclusions end recoamiendationa stated under para. 2 a above as a

statement of principles to be followed by the Director of Central

Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (2) amend

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 1 in accordance

with the changes proposed in Aimex tA appended hereto.

3. M~~S~P OF T~ INTE LI~sC~ ADVISORY CO~u~rr~

a. StmImAry of Report

The Report recommends that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation be added to the membership of the Intelligence Ad

visory Coiittee and that the Joint Staff (JCS) and Atomic ~ergy

Commission be dropped from memberski.p.

b. Comments

We concur in the proposal that the Federal Bureau

of Investigation be added to the membership~of the Intelligence

I~SC 50 TOP 5ICREL

-3-

299
54. (Continued)

Tor CIOrwT

Advisory Cozmnittee, but do not agree that the Joint Staff (Jcs) and

Atomic ~ergy Commission be dropped from membership. A sufficient

number of problems arise which are of joint concern to foreign

intelligence and domestic security intelligence to warrant the

membership on the IAC of the PBI in order that coordination and

cooperation in the national interest may be achieved.

We also wish to point out that the Reoo~nded Actior~

under paja. 2 C above would, if approved, have the effect of clan

rying the status of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member

of the Intelligence Advisory Comeittee.

C. Reconmiended Action

That the National Security Council (1) invite the

Attorney General to have the Pederal Bureau of investigation become

a member of the Intelligence Advisory Comeittee; (2) it this invita

tion is accepted, amend National Security Council Directive No. 1

accordingly, as provided in Annex A appex~ed hereto.

~. PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS B Thfl~ COORDINATION

OR ATTENTION

a. Sm~vi~~y of the Report

Throughout the Conclusions and Recommendations of

the Survey Group Report, attention is drawn to a number of panticu

lay intelligence questions requiring special attention or coordina

tion. These may be listed as follows:

(1) Scientific Intelligence.

(2) Domestic Intelligence and counter-intelli

gence insofar as they relate to the national security.

I~SC 50 Tor c~oRE~

-~ -

300
54. (Continued)

TOP C~0RtT

(3) Provisions for prompt coordinated intelli

gence estimates in crisis situations.

(k) The proper allocation o(~ responsibility for

political simwn~iies.

(5) The exploitation of intelligence from

foreign nationality groups and foreign individuals in the United

States.

(6) The coordination of covert intelligence

activities in occupied areas.

(7) Coordination of the handling of defectors.

(8) Increased emphasis on the counter-espionage

activities abroad of the Ceütral Intelligence Agency and closer

liaison for counter-espionage matters with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

b. Co~senta

We concur in these conclusions and co~enta as inter

preted above and point out that recent progress has been made in

some of these fields. For exasiple, that of scientific intelligence

through the creation of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, by

an agreement on a procedure for providing prompt coordinated national

intelligence estimates in crisis situations, and by an agreement

under consideration by the I.AC agencies and the FBI with respect to

the exploitation of defectors and other aliens.

For the purpose of clarity and guidance:

Paragraph k a (2) is considered to refer to the ooordina.

tion of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence with

NSC 50 TOP 3ECItEt

-5-

301
54. (Continued)

.~ - ~

domestic intelligence and domestic counterintelligence for the

purpose of correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to

national security.

Paragraph 4 a (3) Is considered to refer to provision for

prompt coordinated national Intelligence estimates in crisis situa

tions.

Paragraph 4 a (5) is considered to refer to the exploita

tion of foreign nationality groups and foreign individuals in the

United States for the purposes of foreign intelligence.

We anticipate that the addition of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation to the memberShip of the Intelligence Advisory Com

mittee vii]. contribute particularly to the objectives ~nx1er points

(2), (3), (5) and (7) above. With respect to paragraph 4 a (8)

above, we believe the meintenance of close liaison for these pur

poses is essential.

C. Recoa~rat~ed Action

That the National Security Council:

(1) Draw the particular attention of the Di-.

rector of Central Intelligence and Intelligence Advisory Cc~ittee

to the need for early and sustained action for more effective oo~

ordination in the fields listed under para. 4 a above as discussed

in the Survey Group Report;

(2) Request the Director of Central Intelli

gence to sutmit to the Council within a period of siz months a re

port on progress in these matters.

(3) Invite the Attorney General to have the

£iSC 50 TOP 3~CflET

302
54. (Continued)

. Tor cEoI~r

Federal Bureau of Investigation become a member of the Intelligence

Advisory Committee.

(k) If this invitation is accepted, a~nd

I~ational Security Council Directive No. 1 accordingly, as provided

in Lnnox A appended hereto.

(5) Note that nothing contained in NSCID1, as

amended, is intended to affect or change NSC 17,4, approved by the

President on March 23, l9~9 and the Director of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation is a. member of the Intelligence Advisory Coiittee

for the purpose of coordinating domestic intelligence and related

matters with foreige intelligence matters and his relations with

the CIA shall be as provided in Section 102 of the National Security

Act of 19k7.

5. NATIONAL INT~LIGENCE BSTIMATES

a. Sia~vui~y of the Report

The report concludes that in CIA there has been a

confusion between the responsibility for producing coordinated

national intelligence estimate8 and the responsibility for miscel

lameous research and reporting. It finds further that the Councils

Intelligence Directives on this subject are sound, but have not been

effectively carried out It reco~nds, aside from organizational

changes described in the following section, that CIA should draw

upon and review the specialized intelligence production of the

agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence esti

-.ates ai~d that these estimates should be discussed and approved by

~ I~C, wi.ose aembors should be collectively responsible. Such

~3C 50 - ~DCflET

-7-

303
54. (Continued)

~ TOP CECU2T

estimates should be recognized as the most authoritative available

to policy makers.

b. Comments

We concur in these conclusions except that we do not

believe that the Director a~ the LAO should be bound by the concept

of collective responsibility, because this would inevitably reduce

coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denoninator

among the agencies concerned. A procedure should be adopted which

would pex~nit the Director and the lAO to fulfill their respective

responsibilities to the President and the NSC regardless of -

mous agreement, but providing for concurrent submissions of dissent.

The CIA, however, should interpret and follow the NSC Intelligence

Directives so as to refrain as far as possible from coispetitive

intelligence activities in the production of research intelligence

estimates.

c. Reco~nded Action

That the National Security Council concur in the

conclusions and reco~eMationS stated above, as interpreted by our

comments, as a statement of principles to be observed by the Director

of Central Intelligence and the LAC.

6. ORGANIZATION 0? THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~. ~of the Report

The Survey Group Report proposes a number of major

changes in the internal organization of CIA with a view to supporting

the objectives set forth in the Report. These changes are the

f~].lowing:

NSC 50 - 0]~T~LT

304
54. (Continued)

-

~ Tor cz~onrr

(1) The operations of the Office of Special

Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination and the Contact Branch

of the Office of Operations should be integrated under single over

all direction in an operations division, with its separate ~~ntn1~-

tration, within CIA.

(2)- Out of the present Office of Reports and

Estimates there should be created (a) a small estimates division

which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product

of the depar~ental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national

intelligence estimates and (b) a research and reports division to

accomplish central research in, and coordinated production of, in

telligence in recognized fields of common interest.

(3) The Foreign Documents Branch of the present

Office of Operations should be included in the proposed research and:

reports division.

(k) The Foreign Broadcast Information Branch

should be included in the proposed operations division.

(5) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and

Planning Staff should be reconstituted as a staff responsible only

to the Director of Central Intelligence, with the task of developing

plans for the coordination of intelligence activities. It would

also perform the present tasks of the Office of Collection and Dis

semination with respect to the coordination of collection require

ments and requests and the dissemination of intelligence.

b. Comments

-

We concux in these recommendations with the exception

NSC 50 Tor 3ECRET

-9-

305
54. (Continued)

TOP CECil~~

that we do not agree that the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch

thould be included in the proposed operations division. This

division should include those activities (the present Office of

Speci~.l Operations, Office of Policy Coordination and Contact Branch

of the Office of Operations) which conduct covert or semi-covert

field intelligence and related operations which are closely inter

dependent and have similar admirdstrative and security problems.

With regard to the reconmsndations regarding the

Office of Reports and Estimates, the Interdepartmental Coordinating

o.nd Planning Staff and the Office of Collection and Dissemination,

we concux in them and in the concept of CIA upon which they are

based. However, we recognize that there may be other methods of

organization which will accomplish the same objectives.

c. Recoended Action

That the National Security Council (1) approve the

recoiendations of the Survey Group Neport on the reorganization

of CIA as listed in para. 6 a above, subject to the exception and

coients noted in para. 6 b; (2) direct the Director of Central In

telligence to carry out these reconmiendations, as approved by the

Council, and report to the Council in ninety days on progress toward

their implementation.

7. T~ SECURITY OF INFORMATION AI~) T~ AVOIDANCE OP PUBLICITY

a. S1t?vm~ry of the Report

The Report recommends that (1) the Director of Central

Intelligence should, in cases where the disclosure of secret informa

tion is sought from him and he has doubt as to whether he should

NBC 50 - ~LCfl~

- 10 -

306
54. (Continued)

~ ~

TOP 5~RET

comply, refer the question to the National Security Council; (2) in

the interest of security, the Central Intelligence Agency should

increasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence

rather than its secret intelligence activities in order to reverse

the present unfortunate trend where it finds itself advertised

almost exclusively as a secret service Organization.

~. Co~nts

We concur in these recoeniations with the reserva

tion that, in principle, all publicity is undesirable and that only

where it is unavoidable should the procedure set forth in s~ibpara

graph 7 a (2) above be followed.

C. Recommanded Action

That the National Security Council (1) approve the

recommendations of the Survey Group Report on the security of in

formation and the avoidance of publicity, subject to the reservation

noted in parc. 7 b above; (2) instruct tho Director of Contral In

telligence to prepare appropriate National Socurity Council Intelli

gence Directives covering these points and suhoit them for approval

within a period of thirty days.

8. CHAIRMANSHIP OP T~ unj~I) STATES COMMUNICATIONS

II~T~LIG~CE BOARD

a. S11nm~1.y of the Report

The report recr~TmnAnda that the Director of Central

Intelligence should be made permanent chairman of the United States

Communications Intelligence Board.

NSC 50 Tor 0~fl~T

- 11 -

307
54. (Continued)

Tor ~:1LcflLT

b. Co=ents

We do not concur in th.i.s recommendation. This matter

when the U, S. Communications Intelligence Board was

present arrangements decided on. These arrangements,

for a rotating chairmanship, are operating satisfac

seems undesirable to make a change.

c. Recommended Action

That the National Security Council not concur in the

reCommendation contained in the Report.

9. OPER.ATING PROBLEMS RELATING TO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES

a. Si1nm~y of the Report

The Report sets forth certain recoxmnendations re

garding individual operating problems of the clandestine activities

of CIA. These are questiona which, according to the Report, require

particular emph~~sis or have been neglected in the past. The princi

pal questions so indicated m~iy be summarized as follows:

(]~) r

(2) Relations with departmental agencies should

be brought closer and the guidance which the Office of Special

Operations receives from intelligence consumers should be strength

ened. This might be achieved by including representatives of the

Service agencies and the State Department in approrr–ate sections

I;sc 50 - ~EC~~T

- 12 -

was considered

set up and the

which provide

torily and it

308
54. (Continued)

of the Office of Special Operations.

(3) The Director of Centra]. Intelligence should

assure himself that the operating services of CIJ~ receive adequate

guidance on the current and strategic intelligence and policy needs

of the Government.

(~)

b. Coi~ents

We concur in these reco~nendations all of which point

to significant operating problems relating to clandestine activities

which require particular and constant emphasis.

c. Reconended Action

That the National Security Council (1) approve the

recon~eMation of the Report as listed in para. 9 a above; (2)

direct the Director of Central Intelligence to carry them out with

the assistance of the other departments and agencies concerned and

report to the National Security Council on any difficulties en

countered.

10. T~ QUESTION OP CIVILIAI~ OR MILITARY PERSONN~ IN KEY CIA

POSITIONS

a. Su?m~y of the Report

The Report concludes that:

(1) The placing in key positions in CIA of a

large percentage of military personnel, many of the~i on relatively

r:sc 50 ~or c:cr~DT

-

13 -

309
54. (Continued)

TOP 3ECR!T

short tour of duty assignment, tends to discoulage competent civil

ion personnel from looking to employment in the Agency as a career.

(2) Continuity of service is essential for the

successful carrying out of the duties of Director of Central Intelli

gence The best hope for insuring this continuity and the greatest

assurance of independence of action is for a civilian to be Director

of Central Intelligence A serviceman selected for the post should

resign from active military duty.

b. Comments

We do not wholly concur in these conclusions. It is

most important that both civilian and military personnel be repre

sented in the key positions in the Central Intelligence Agency a].

though we do not believe it is desirable to attempt to fix a~ pre

cise ratio for the two This is a matter to be worked out by the

Director in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense.

We agree that continuity of service is esaentia]. for the

post of Director. The most qualified person available should be

selected for the post. In order to insure continuity and independ

ence of action, he should be either a civilian, or if a service man

or a foreign service officer, he should be either retired or one

whose service as Director will be his final tour of active duty.

c. Recommended Action

That the National Security Council:

(1) Concur in the above comments as an expres

sion of its views on this question.

(2) Inform the President of these views insofar

NSC 50 - 3ECRET

- 1k -

310
54. (Continued)

- C~O~~T

as they concern the post of Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) Inform the Director of Central Intelligence

of these views insofai as they concern the staffing of other key

positions in CIA.

11. GEI~ERAL APPRAISAL OFT~ LE~DERS~P AND POLICIES OF TRE

CEIYThAL I~7PULIG~JCE AGENCY

a. St~inm~~?7 of the Report

The Report concludes that:

(1) The directing staff of CIA has not demon

strated an odequate understanding of the mandate of the organization

or the ability to discharge that mandate effectively.

(2) Administrative organization aid policies

tend to impede the carrying out of the essential intelligence

functions of CIA under the Act.

b. Comeents

We do not wholly concur in these conclusions. While

we reco~1ze the existence of important defects in the organization

and operation of CIA, we believe that these conclusions are too

sweeping. Complicating factors in appraising CIAs efficiency have

been the shortness of time during which to develop an effective

organization aid a lack of cozon understanding as to the respective

nissions of CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies. How

ever, as indicated in the Report and concurred in by us, numerous

and important improvements are necessary aid need to be carried

out promptly aid effectively.

NSC 50 TO! CDCIIET

- 15 -

311
54. (Continued)

. ~

rr.

c. Recommendod Action

That the Nationa~. Security Council (1) note the Con

clusions and Recommendations of tho Report on thi3 subject: (2)

approve the above Comments thoreon.

12. T1~ S~VICE INT~LIGENCE AGENCIES

a. Comments

The National Military Establishment concurs in the

Conclusions end Recommendations of Chapter 1]. of the Report except

that it does not agree that the Service intelligenec agencies should

be staffed with personnel who concentrate in intelligence over the

major portion of their careers. It is the policy of the Military

Establishment to assign qualified personnel to intelligence duties

even though they have not had previous intelligence experience.

However, continued efforts are made to attract the highest type

personnel to intelligence duty.

b. Recommended Action

That the National Security Council note the above

Comments by the National Military Establishment.

13. T~ DEPART~NT OF STATE

~. Comments

The Department of State concurs in the Ccnclusic~ns

and Recommendations of Chapter 12 of the Report and is undertaking

to put them into effect as part of general plans for reorganization

within the Department.

b. Recommended Action

That the National Security Council note the above

Comments by the Department of State.

50 - 16 - - ~2Cr~T

312
54. (Continued)

-. ~. TOP ~EC11ET

AN?~C A

1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination

betveen the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organi

zations, an Intelligence Advisory Co~ittee consisting of the

Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chairman thereof~.,

Director of Federal Buiea~.t of Investigation, and the respective

intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and

Air Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCs), and the Atomic Energy

Coission, or their representatives, shall be established to advise

the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central In

telligence will, invite the chief, or his representative, of any

other intelligence Agency having functions related to the national

security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory- Coittee whenever

matters within the purview of his Agency are to be discussed.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate

National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National

Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the lAO Agencies,

and to such Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National

Security Council from tine to time may designate. Intelligence

Sc disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence

~gencies or shall carry an-agwee4 a statement of eubst8ntial~

d&eee~t differing opinions

NSC 50 TOP C~RE~

- 17 -

313
55. Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for CIA Assistant Directors,

Approval by the NSC of Much of the Dulles Report,

12 July 1949 (Carbon copy)

~OP-SEORET12 JUL 1949

M~0RANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, OCD

Assistant Director, 00

Assistant Director, ~

Assistant Director, 060

Assistant Director, 061

Assistant Director, OPC

Chief, Inspection and Security

General Counsel

Chief, Advisory Council

~ecutive

&~proval by the USC of Much of the Dubs Report

On July 7 the National Security Council mat and approved

of the recosinendations in USC ~O, which was the StateDefense Report

on the Dubes Report. USC ~0 recommended:

1. L~}ISL&TIVE PR0VISIC~18 n

that the National Security Council concur in the

Dulles survey groups conclusion that Section 102 of the

National Security Act of l9l~7, ~ich sets up CIA, is sound

and that no amendments are necessary at this time; with the

understanding that study may determine that certain functions

and responsibilities should be under the control of the

military in time of war.

2. C0(F.DIMATION

that the National Security Council concur in the

conclusions and recommendations I and confirm as a statement

of principles to be foliawed by DCI and lAG:

a. that the responsibility of CIA with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities has

not been fully discharged,

b. that the lAG is soundly conceived as an

adv3sory body, but should, under the forthright initiative and leadership of the DCI, participate more actively in the continuing coordination of

intelligenoe activities and in the discussion and

approval of intelligence estimates.

3. M~IBERSHIP OF IAC

that the USC invite the Attorney General to have

TOP SECRET

315
55. (Continued)

TOP SEC~EF

the FBI bee am. a member of the L&C, and lean. a revised NSCID

No. 1 as proposed in this report. (Both of thee. steps ham

already been taken by the ~ecutive Secretary of the NSc). The JIG arid ABC remain members of the IA~, and added thereto

are the ~I as member and chairman, and the FBI. The f~mction

of the D.C ~ an advisory group re~ n~ unchanged.

L PARTICULAR QULSTIC~S RE~I~} ATf&~rIONs

that particular attention of the DCI I~C be drawn

to the need for early and sustained act~ for more effective

Coor~.natjon in the following fields, discussed by the Duules

Reportz

Scientific intelligence;

Dasestic int~1 ligence and counterintelligence in so far

as they relate to the national security;

provisions for pro~t coordinated intelligence estimates

in crisis sithations;

The proper allocation of reaponsibilit~ for political

s~~ries;

The euploitation of Intelligence fron foreign nationality

groups and foreign individuals in the U. S.;

Coordination of covert intelligenc, activities in occupied

areas;

Increased .on the counterespionage activities

abroad of CIA, and closer liaison on counterespionage matters

with the FBI,

and that the DCI subeit to the NSC, within a period of six

months, a report of progress in these matters.

S. NATIONAL ~LTfll~(~E ~FU&?~~

that, as a statement of principles to be observed

by the DCI and the IAC, the CIA s ould interpret and follow

the NS~s so as to refrain so far as possible iron eanpetitive

Intelligence activities in the prudnction of research intelli

gence estimates; that CIA shoul4 drow upon and review the

specialized intelligence production of the- ~enciea in order to

prepare coordinated na~-onnl intelligence estimates; that a

procedure should be adopted which would permit the -m.rectcr

and the IAC to fulfill their respective responaibilitiea to the

President and the NSC regardless of mimtl~nus agreewnat, but

provide for concorrent ~n1.,i1.wi1 on of -~ dissent.

6. a~a&N~in~

(1) that the NSC approve the rec~ia~Aiations of the

Dulles Report to conbine Into one office the Office .t Special

Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination and Contact &anch

H)P SECRET

316
55. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

(2) that further con deration will be given to

establishing a separate administration for the new office

irxuicated above after determination and further discussions

of comparative coats.

(3) that the concept in the Dulles Report on the

organizational matters indicated below be approved while

recognizing that other methods of organization will accomplish

the sane objectives.

(a) Out of the present Office of Reports and

Estimates there should be created (1) a email estimates

division which would draw up and review the speci.it*.d

intelligence production of departmental agencies

in order to prepare coordinated National Intelligence

Kstinates, and (2) a Research and Reports Division

to accomplish central research in, and coordinated

production of, intelligence in recognized fields of

coon interest~

(b) The Foreign Docmnents Branch of the present

Office of Operations should be included in the proposed

Research and Reports Division.

Cc) ICAPS should be reconstituted as a staff

responsible only to the Director of Central Intelli

genc. with the task of developing plans for the

coordination of inte~–gence activities. It would

also perform the present task of the Office of

Collection and Die sewination with regard to the

coordination of collection requirements and requests,

and the dissemination of intelligence.

NOTh, The above recommendations are being et~sd by the Director

and the Enacutive ~ later discussion with Assistant Directors

prior to reporting to the Council withIn 90 days.

7. SECURiTY OF DIFORMATION AND AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICITYs

that all publicity is undesirable, and that a NSCID

should be issued to this effect within 30 days. (Iciys is

compiling the first draft of such a NSCID, to cover both

security of information and avoidance of publicity, based on

Section 102 (d) of the l91~7 Let, and upon the recent discussions

within CIA to protect security of sources so that dissemination

will be made on the basis of only those who need to ~ow rather

than those who desire to know).

-3-

317
55. (Continued)

TOP SECREF

8. a1ANDESTD~E ACTIVIT~

that the DClcarry out certain rec~ndatious ab~ut

operating problems relating to clandestine activities with the

assistance of the other Departnenta and Agencies concerned, and report to the NSC on any difficulties encountered. The

principal questions are mno~arized as Zellowet

(2) Relations with depar~nta1 agencies shoud

be closer.

(3) The DCI should ass~e himself that the operating

agencies of CIL receive adequate guidance on the

cmTent and strategic intelligence and policy needs

of the Government.

(1~) The operating services of CI& should have

access to c~~jcatione intelligence to the Lu].].

extent required, for guidance in directing operations, and for the more effective cendect of counterespionage.

9. Other than as indicated above, no changes are contemplated

by the Security Council in cection with the Dullea Report

reco~ndatjons.

S. H. Hfl.L~KD~T~

Rear .Adud.ral, TJSN

~.rector of Central Intelligence

cc: TS Control

Retmn to ICAPS

Signers Cop

File Copy V

318
56. ORE], Intelligence Memorandum 225, Estimate of Status of

Atomic Warfare in the USSR, 20 September 1949

(Excerpted photocopy)

rU 50852

~TELL IN~.LI0I~cE ~NCY -

20 September 19I~9

~)4~A0RAZUTh1 NO. 22$ -

S1ThJECV: ESTIM&~E OF STA?US 01 A~(iC WA~ARZ ~N TP~ ~SS~

(Gategoiy Be. ~)

Cateror~ as a ~ho1s~

The ~S~.has a atomic ener~ ~rogren vhi~ sthrted in let. l9l~5

eM which to being vigorously ~mrsue~ under a too oriority. The cor

rent estinate ci the Joint Nuclear Zner~r Intelligence Committee is

that the .arliest possible date ~ which the USSR ai~t be expscte&

to produce am atomic bomb is mid-19$0 and the most orobable date is ci d~

1953. (Secret)

NSTIM&~ Bt TECUIC.~L O3JECTI~

No forei~ country is known to be developing a large.se~le uranium

otseiparatice o~am, althou~ a ucabar of countries are plaumiug

to 6eveloo plutonium production facilities. It is believed, that ~1u~-

tug Britain, the USSR, end. possibly CmmsAsi~ ~o foreign oocntry has the

~abil2ty of prodeciug sufficient fissionable material to a&~e am atomic

bomb within the next tam years. (Secret)

Present imSo~tiom indicates that a plutonium pro3.et for the

prodnettom of fissionable materials is being developed. It is reasonable

to soppore that the Soviet, have ha.d at least one lew-snsr~- pu.. (probably

grophit.) operating for a yeca or nor. although no iricontrovestibi.

evidence ~ste. It is probable that production piles are now in the

~OCOTnBOt lb. 

~

P~o Clt~ngebo Class. 0

0 ~e~sslfl~d .

Class. Cft~n~d to: IS S (~) ~, ____

Nexi

;sm~t

Review

U~7O4-

Datc. -

~JffL_ -______

~

:~te: ~ ~y:Oi2~Z?~

319
56. (Continued)

~L~ ~

proces, of dm;iga cad/or eonstroctio~ bat their exact status is

knc~. These is ~ evidenee of a la~~s~~eoale ~anLtZu isotope .Spara.

U.n project. (Secret)

Thrn is no infoxu~at3on indicating that n~ foreign cousti~~ is

e*~ag.d in a project dealing urit~1 radiological warfare agents. (Seeret)

A~ the pro&ietton of radiological varfare egents requires opust

ing pro~ation piles. itt. appar~nt that no foreign county can ha,.

dono very such in this field.. (Secret)

lo fozuation ii available.

1~sfenstve neacuzes e~ge3nst radiological verfare agent, have not

been apparent ~ithiu the USSR. The single possible e~e.otion Is a ret,ort

that a large p ion of the oounterc being n~nnfaaturs~ by on. Gezuan

pl~t for the VSSZ is r~ors& to b. for distribution to thi ).~ Axa~,- dovn

to the ecap~ level. I~ge prodootion of field eountrn for the Soviets

has been reported in G.raa~ end .l.svh.re; bat, as tar as can be detez~.

sinod~ th*se are prinarily for use in ~ ~.~j~jag operations. Al

though protective aessure. for the general pnblic uny be. in the p~~g

$t8~*r it is difficult to believ, that vi4.apread. education prDgraas

would escape detection. (Secret) .

-2-

320
57. Finance Division to Executive, OPC Wisner], CIA Responsi

bility and Accountability for ECA Counterpart Funds Expended

by OPC, 17 October 1949

~ ~

r -

r

MEMORANDUM 17 October 1949

TO ~cecutjve, OPC

FROM : Finance Division

SUBJECT: CIA Responsibility and Accountability for ~A Counterpart

Funds ~cpended by (PC

1. Background

(a) Reference is mede to the various raneral and ~ecific ~gre~

~between ~L and CIA, wherein certain pdi~ions of the 5%

Counterpart funds of ECA are i~de available to CIA for the

purpose of furthering the )~rshai.l Plan by conbatting

C~~mm4 °t elements in participating countries.

(b) It is our understanding that, originAlly, each grant Of funds

was node mv4 l~~bl~ for a specific purpose, such as the aubaidi

zation of a Zoreign labor or political group. Further, that in

every instance the proposed activity had the mutual concurrence

of the Administrator, 3~A, the American Ambassador concerned and

the Director, CIA. lastly, we understand that the ADPC has been

charged with the responsibility for directing the operational

expenditures of these funds.

Cc) It is also understood that ~L prescribes no specific policies or regulations to g~,vezn the expenditure of these funds, but

merely requires achaow1edge~nt of receipt of the funds by CIA, a s~ary staten_ant of funds expended and the return of any

balances not expended for the approvea purposes.

(d) It was our orig1.i~ understanding that CIA assumed accountability,.. and responsibility for these funds only an the agent of RCA; 1tbat _

~

CIA was merely the temporary custodian end transmitting agent4 of ~

thesefundsforRCA. I. ~

(e) Accordingly, the Finance ie4~ .baŁ noi.ntained a separate a4t ~ of financial records for these fends, based upon reports xecei~v~d ~

from their CIA custodians, sbo*iug monies received, disbursed,l L~

and balances on hand. The Finance Divici~ has also confinned\ ~2 5

these reports by ~ru ng receipts obtained from either the i ~ ~ principals of subsidized groups or receipts from the operational~

principals disbursing the funds. Security factors presuambly ~

deternined whether or not receipts of the first type were oh ~ - -

tamed. OPC, however, presuambly ban in its files detailed op~ ~

erational. reports and/or f~ru~ncial accountings disclosing the ~ ~ LId ~ a

purposes, approvals, and amounts of monies expended for each in

dividual transaction.

2. Deve1o~nents

(a) Recent developsents, however, I di~te that our original concept

~

321
57. (Continued)

, ~F~!M~-

( -2-

that disbursements would be ]inited to lump sum subsidy grants

to specific foreign labor, religious and political groups is no

longer valid.

(b) We are advised that disbursements have been made for specific

purposes, such as the purchase of a newspaper for a labor group,

the undexwriti.ng of a peace conference, direct propaganda and

other wiscel3.aneous activities. In addition, we are informed it

is now proposed to use ~1 portions of these funds for indirect

expenses incurred ~ lusive1~ in furthering the joint ~CA-OPC

activities. These ænitial2y would consist of entertainment and

developnental expenses incurred in dealing with principals of

forei~ political and labOr groups.

(c) We have also just been. advised that the GAO has approved the

expenditure of these ~.L Amds by GIL for approved ~L purposes, i.

with the assumption that CIA would expend and account for these

funds in the eama detail and in accordance with the same policies

as it does its awn funds.

~d) Last],y, we have just been informed by the Budget Officer that the

DCI wishes a menthly report on all subsidy ~euditures. Since

the bulk of the ~A Lund activities of OPC are in the nature of

subsidies, it is assumed that such a report should lnclnde these

funds.

3. Recommendations

(a) In view of these developuents, it is rec~~ed that the normal

financial policies, practices and procedures of CIA for the

h~m1flng of its confidential f~m4s be extOnded to these ~L funds.

(b) To the extent that sane of these disbursements are subsidies as

defined in the Confidential Funds Begu].ations, it is rec~muiended that pertinent subprojects be placed with the Covert Coordinating

Committee for the establisthaent of adequate fl~~wlcial controls

and reviews.

(c) If you concur with these rec~tmw~nd*tious, it is requested that

we be so advised in order that the (PC Certifying and Liaison

Officer can make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate OPC operating officials.

~

3;?_6~? ~

322
58. C.V.H. Charles V. Hulick], Memorandum for the Record, Pol

icy Guidance, 19 April 1950 (Carbon copy)

~-~ECRET

/7

~at ~. ~tfl.a baa.. ~ 1$ &~i3, atl~Nii

L~rtt., ~ ~!~rrts~ ~ ~4jeb. ~. J~, be4 ~U,d this ~tia~ 1~ ~he ist~ ~)7C tbe~

C~s.t1 had J~ r.astv~ad tar r~i ~.1Asra.tt~ ~

uh Ia a ~msl4 i*tI~ pra~ ~ ~io~ *no1~*. a

irs~r~. -I? ~~i11 h15~ ~ ~t1~&1 .ff~t

~ _______

d

2. ~. J~ ths~ r~ att-~ 1a.r sad ~p3mtas4 that

~s~tIate~ ~s bis s~ 1s~ he ~Iaa~ the Mi~tM~s at thin ~sra~rq*Is he ~o a~he~ that it ~ i~Ira at

~

at Stahe ~t t~C ~,~ at!t~ at

. at~m~ ~ta

astt~ita.s

fr ~PC at

~a

uØAt~a.il

that the

t~

Z~~t~

~s

a~U

~

be

he ~th ~ .

rs~r.I ta t~t.....4 aet

~ ~~

2. 1. L~~l dt~msi~ a! the et~uI.. at the attaihed ~heha

~t taU.d ~ esU as the b2. att.at is t~ius a! ..rk$* ~p.. at

~PC ap~atis~a. I~ ea~ectt~ ~th the ~at ~C ~1 ~eia~th.

~

c~ ~.

s~sratL~a

~

~14 ~ as pr&d~*1

~

~the ~. at

~

f~e a~~he end tndI~1. psrs~1 uS ~ hess ~ the r~itti~ at

a~ iubstenttal isesber at ASsF$~ ~rao~*si. ~r. 4~ius ~Ld that be

~~ti~ ~  ~j1 ~tr~~ ~~ ~i~4 ~ r) t~

ta

~

t~e,~* ~a prapa.~ paUa~ as ~st t~ !j~s n4 ~ ~ i be i~diata~ sasILsb~. it the 3~ su~ the astirs

61J~PShe4 ths Z~ep~~ at ~heIhe he i~kt ~t ~.svt&2

___

r~.

4~ ttth i*tsrasm, te tha ~C i,p~et at ~i*pU~.its ~~W?C

Xd ~aat~p4 tar ~. J~as $tar he hi. rtep~ tar ~apas ~.

that he 1~ia14 prapsrs a at Li. ,~ be

ta thenrs. ~f~ J~s~ sad ead ~t be nasid fas3.ah .~ .4~

~Cut*aee~r.

~* t~r(*e~. ~> ~,,

~ ~J&4-I ~v..a.

~ ~

~ PC RilIST8Y 1

~, IL~ L~I~ jg

f &.~~X 00

q

-

hi o~ ~ ~i.vigj ~

~J~C~a

323
59. C. Offie to ADPC Wisner], Conversation with Messrs.

]15, 16 April 1950, 24 April 1950 (Carbon copy)

24 April 1950

~1RAND~I P~: ADPC

su~JEcr~ CouIv.~ation with Messrs.

15, 16 April 1930.

1.. After my con ersatinc on April. 15 wIth Messrs.

-, I saw these gentlaiso again on 3un~y earning, together with ~i. There tack place a conversation in connie

tion with the possible organiwation of thi venous Russian groups

in exile both ~ th United States and abroad, *i.h I wili not take

the troub]~e to record here as ~ ~ev ideea ver brought torusrd,

except that .von though their con Lg~. uss strongly Me.zwist in

its philoeopty it Us nsveZthebess Dusoorstic in its objective. and their group would be glad to cooperat. with all. other Russian

groups, except ~usinn Ionerehist..

2. There developed, ~ou point which I considered

most important. As cer aesting Us breaking up, stated

with a large metl.s and whan are ve going to $ww~u~ toi orp.ni.~ tion of an American-sponsored Ukrainian ~a~4a~a1 C~tt..?~ I told

him that I was not infozusd on the subject of Ukrainians.

retorted, still with a knowing eall., that it usa too bad that to.

Americans were going so far in cono.stice with UkraInian wviorgroond

.xc~.4atan,ci novea~a and vera not taking adwentigs of concunr~t overt

politicil activities which would be very .ffectivs in the cold war

agairiRt the Soviet Union. I told . that I was sussuhat

perplexed as to just what he want and h. , Dont you know that

even the Voice of Americas broadcast. an. being used to transmit

code macsag.. to the (&rciriian usdsr~xs.4? I told him to stop

jolcing and we separated. ,

-.

3. It so happened that Mr. ~~qbl~of the Voice of AmerIca,

spent the night of April 17 at my house and in a gscszul discussion

on a lot of subjects to~~~h4ng upon venous netionel c~it.tees of

interest to us and hi. inquiry regarding th. progress made thus far ~

relating to the formation of a Russian ~at.. hi inforned ca about

a terrible boner node in connection with a proposed code message on

behalf of OSO in connection with the Ukrainian ond.rground resistance. ~

4. In viav of your instr tions to JO~XO ~ker to discuss vitkl I

DO~ ~ub3ect Of Ukrainian *mderground resistance, I qusrIi~~

CLASSiFICATION REVIEW DIVISION ~

,~OR DO 0 JAN. 1980 .

~of~.ecpiea

325
59. (Continued)

-

~

2

Baker, who stated that he had not yet been able to obtain the infoznatjon he ~–esired on this subject. In view of 4DS0~~

written request that OPC, and sp,cifisally ~s.].t, atteept to renove s~ of the h.at from 030 brought upon thee b~

I inforoed Dick Helm, of ~ cccsurest4on with. 05 this subject a. set forth in a previous aeworendee to you. At the closo of my conversation, I tcl4 I~x, Helms thu I bad picked up in Nsw York the statecent with regard to Ukrainian undrpotmd róÆistanc. and the use of the Vol.c. of America for cods s.eecg p~possa, which inforeation usa ap~azsntly being goipsd about in Hew York.

~reased atonjate~t, and his .t~ewunts on this subject constituted a caaplet. adsisajon that 030 baa been and i. pretty far gous in

connection with the Ukjaj~ und.rgrousd the results of which thus far are unknown to s.

Distribution:

Copy 1 - ADPC

2SADO

3&4flegy.

CO :ha

C. OFflE

SAX

COp7..~of_~copies

326
60. ORE 3 2-50, The Effect of the Soviet Possession of Atomic

Bombs on the Security of the United States, 9 June 1950

COPY NO. i/~

ToP.~s.ecT!T FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

FOR REPORTS AND ESTIL~ATES

THE EFFECT bF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF

ATOMIC BOMBS ON THE SECURITY

OF THE UNITED STATES

Report by a Joint Ad Hoc Committee

This e~n~r~t bza h~e~ i~.~k fi-~ ,~,

~ ~ ~

~ ~~a11cy.

Date~j~r~.

Published 9 June 1950

~ i~o. o I

~bCHAIIGE Cia . 0

~DECLASSIF

Class. CHM1G TS S C

By.OI~

CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE

A-18

AG~NC~

~T~ ARC~W~E~ ~ /

~FI~ u~t .

/

i~~&LZ_.. ~x1L~,~L

OR~ 32-50

AGENCY

/

327
60. (Continued)

WARNING

This

tional defense ~0 nlted inform~e~g-thena State in the

of the Espionage Act, 50 31 and 32, as a

Its.

mann~te-~i

~

unauthorized person is prohibTt~d~r law.

328
60. (Continued)

DISSEI~W~ATION NOTICE

1. ThIs copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of the recipient

designated on the front cover and of Individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipients office who require the Information for the performance of their official duties. Further

dissemination elsewhere In the department to other offices which require the informa

tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for

the Department of State

b. Director of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army

c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

d. Director of Intelligence, USAP, for the Department of the Air Force

e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com

mission

f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and DIssemiltatlon, CIA, for any other

Department or Agency

2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordance with

applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by

arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DlsrluBuTION:

Office of the President

National Security Council

National Security Resources Board

Department of State

Office of Secretary of Defense

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Atomic Energy (lon~mt~iQfl

Research and Development Board

329
60. (Continued)

THE EFFECT OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF ATOMIC BOMBS ON THE SECURITY

OF THE UNITED STATES

Report by a Joint Ad Hoc Committee *

THE PROBLEM

1. The problem is to estimate the effect of the Soviet possession of atomic bombs upon the

security of the United States.

2.. The possibility of US or Soviet development of hydrogen bombs has not been considered.

DISCUSSION

3. See Enclosure A.

CONCLUSION

4. The Soviet possession of atomic Weapons has Increased the military and political

subversive capabilities of the USSR and the possibility of war. Accordingly the security of

the United States is in increasing jeopa~dy.

Pursuant to the undertaking In the Foreword of ORE 91-49, thIs estimate has been pre

pared by a joint ad hoc committee representing CIA and the Intelligence agencies of the

Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Mr Force. This estimate Is limited In

scope: It does not deal with ail controversial aspects of ORE 91-49. JoInt agreement existing

with respect to this much of the subject, however, the committee (excepting the Navy repre

sentative) has recommended Its publication without further delay pending further considera

tion of the broad aspects of the problem..

The Intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, the Army, and the Air Force have

concurred In this estimate. For the dissent of the Office of Naval Intelligence see Enclosure B.

The date of the estimate Is 26 May 1950.

fl~ ~r

330
60. (Continued)

r

ENCLOSURE A

TEE EFFECT OF SOVIET ~ITABY

CAPABILITIES

1. Soviet possession of atomic wOapons has in

creased the military capacity of the USSR rela

tive to that of the United States~ and its allies.

2. The success of an atomic attack depends

upon four basic elements: (a) adequate stock

pile of atomic bombs; (b) adequate means of

transport; (C) sound selection of targets; and

(d) effectiveness of delivery.

a. The USSR will be able to develop an

Increasing stockpile of atomic bombs. The

growth of the Soviet stockpile Is estimated

tentatively as follows:

Mid-1950 10- 20

Mid-1951 25- 45

Mid-1952 45- 90

Mid-1953 70-135

Beyond 1953 a well-founded estimate can

not be made, and even for mid-1953 there Is

a large degree of uncertainty. For planning

purposes, however, an estimate for mid-1954

of 120-200 bombs Is suggested on the basis

that plant capacity may be Increased by ap

proximately 50 percent after 1952.

b. The USSR has and wifi continue to have

means of transportair, maritime, clandes

tinecapable of carrying Its entire stockpile

of atomic bombs.

c. It must be presumed that the USSR Is

capable of compiling an effective target list.

d. Soviet achievement of the fourth ele

menteffectlveness of deliverywill depend

primarily upon the defensive capabilities of

the United States and It.s allies.

3. The USSR could inflict critical damage on

the United States through atomic attack.

a. A Soviet capability for direct attack on

the continental United States has existed

since the USSR acquired long-range aircraft

and long-range submarines. Addition of

atomic bombs to Soviet armament gives the

USSR the additional capability of inflicting concentrated destruction in a single attack

and of denying areas within the United States.

b. The mn~hnuin threat to the United

State of Soviet possession of atomic bombs

Is the possibility that the USSR In a single

surprise attack on the United States and Its

foreign installations could seriously limit the

offensive capabilities of the United States,

possibly to a critical degree.

c. The preparation of a single Soviet attack

of this scope would obviously face serious dif

ficulties, primarily (1) productIon of a suf

ficient number of atomic bombs to cover se

lected vital targets and yet allow for delivery

losses, faulty functioning, and Inaccurate

aiming; and, to a lesser degree, (2) produc tion of sufficient means of transport to ensure

coverage of those targets, and (3) determina

tion of those targets the destruction of which

would most seriously limit the offensive capa

bilities of the United States. Each of these

three difficulties, however, can be resolved In

time by the USSR.

d. Since the USSR will have an increasing

capacity to deliver bombs on target, if not pre

vented, the extent of destruction that the

USSR could Inflict on the United States will

depend primarily on the defensive capabilities of the United States.

4. The USSR could more readily inflict critical

damage on the North Atlantic Treaty allies of

the United States through atomic attack.

THE EFFECT ON SOVIET POLTrICAL

SUBVERSIVE CAPABflITIES

5. Soviet possession of atomic weapons in

creases the possibility that the USSR will be able

to weaken seriously the power position of the

United States without resorting to direct military action.

a. Soviet possession of atomic weapons in It

seif does not increase the Instruments already

T 2

331
60. (Continued)

3

available to the USSR for the extension of its

political control by means short of an all-out

military conflict. But Soviet capabilities of

extending political control will be ~nh~wced

to the extent that Soviet possession of atomic

weapons weakens the will of non-Commu

nists to take adequate and timely counter

measures, and strengthens the determination

and self-confidence of the Soviet Union.

b. Soviet efforts to confuse and divide pub

lic opinion in non ommunisi, countries will

benefit from Soviet possession of atomic weap

ons. Moscows current campaign, to prohibit

the use of atomic weapons and to attach a

moral and legal, stigma to their use is en

hanced by the fact that the USSR can pose as

willing to accept the same restrictions that It

demands of other countries. By exploiting

the universal fear of war as a means of at

tracting foreign support for Soviet policy14he

USSR may be able to Influence popular

opinion In some countries to Induce the local

government to adopt a position less favorable

to the security Interests of the United States.

c. Fear of a growing disparity between US

and Soviet military power, and fear of atomic

war In any case, may Influence the present

allies of the United States to refrain from

joining, this country In taking a more positive

political position against the USSR.

d. Segments of American public opinion

also may conceivably become less willing to

support more positive US counter-measures

against the USSR.

e. The USSR, accordingly, will be in a posi

tion to exploit non-Communist hesitation and

reluctance to resort to strong counter-nseas

ures. These conditions would facilitate the

piecemeal extension of Soviet political control

over so much of Eurasia as virtually to Isolate

the United States without resort to direct rail

Itary actto~

EFFECT ON T~ POSSIBILITY 0F WAR

6. The possibilily of direct military conflict be

tween the Soviet Union and the United States

is increased as a result of Soviet possession of

atomic Weapons.

a. The basic objective of Soviet policy Is

clearly the attainment of a Communist world

under Soviet domination. In pursuit of this

objective the USSR regards the United States

as Its major opponent and will wage against

It a relentless, unceasing struggle in which

any weapon or tactic Is wimf~ib1e which

promises success In terms of this over-all So

viet objective.

b. With the continued development of the

Soviet atomic stockpile and Soviet defense

capabilities against atomic attack, the United

States superiority In total numbers of atomic

bombs will no longer in Itself be a strong

deterrent to war.

c. With its doctrinaire concepts of capital

ist behavior and Its hypersensitivity over se

curity, the USSR may Interpret as potentially

aggressive future steps which the United

States and its allies may take to Improve their

defensive position against the threat Inher

ent In Soviet military power. Similarly, West-.

em efforts to increase military preparedness

in response to Soviet moves in the ~coId war

could create a situation In which the USSR

might estimate that the Western Powers were

determined to prevent any further spread of

Communlem by military action against the

USSR It Is always possible, therefore, that

the USSR would Initiate war if it should estl

mate that a Western attack was Impending.

d. As the Soviet military potential increases

relative to that of the United States and Its

allies, the USSR will doubtless hi willing to

take greater risks than before In pursuit of

Its aims. Although the USSR undoubtedly

calculates the capacity and determination of

the non-Communist powers to take counter

measures, the Kremlin nevertheless may mis

calculate the cumulative risk involved in Its

various aggressions. Accordingly It may un

dertake an action which In itself appears unlikely to lead to war, but which, when added

to all previous Soviet aggressions, might be

come an Issue out of proportion to its actual

merits and thus precipitate war.

e. If, after Soviet attainment of a large

atomic stockpile, US defensive and retaliatory

capabilities were to remain so limited as to

permit a Soviet belief that the USSR could

make a decisive attack on the United States

with relative Impunity, there would be grave

danger of such an attack.

332
60. (Continued)

ENCLOSURE B

DISSENT BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. ONI dissents from ORE 32-50 because It

believes that this estimate Is too narrow and

limited In Its approach to a problem which

. obviously Involves considerations of ex

tremely broad scope and Implications,..

and thus Is subject to serious snisinterpreta

tion. ORE 3250 purports to discuss Soviet

possession of the atomic bomb in relation to

Its effect on Soviet political-subversive capa

bifitles and military capabifities, and It con

cludes that there has been an Increase In these

capabilities, a consequent Increase In the pos

sibility of war and an increasing jeopardy to

the security of the U.S. A discussion so nar

row in scope and so limited with respect to the

factors discussed does not, Indeed cannot, In

dicate how much increase has occurred nor

what basic situation existed from which the

indeterminate increase can be measured. The

reader is actually led to Infer that the only

factor under Soviet control which would In

fluence a decision to attempt a surprise and

crippling atomic attack on the Us., Is pos

session of what they estimate to be a requisite

number of atomic bombs to accomplish the

task. It Is Inconceivable that the Soviets

could arrive at such a decision without regard

to political or economic factors and all the

other military factors, offenslve~ and defen

sive.

2. The security of the U.S. Is affected by So

viet objectives and Intentions as well as ca

Quoted from CIA memorandum p29694 dated 29

September. 1M9 to IAC agencies requesting an ad

hoc committee on recent atomic developmenta

pablllties, since It Is the combination of these

factors that produces the end product, prob

able courses Of action. Soviet objectives and

intentions stem principally from political,

ideological and economic factors, historical ex

perience and aspirations. Only when weighed

together In the light of objectives and Inten

tions will total capabffltlespolitical, aubver

sivo, economic and militarycombine to pro

duce the probable course of action which must

be correctly estimated In order that proper

steps may be taken to Insure the security of

the kU.S. While many considerations affect

ing the Soviet objectives and IntentiOns are

controversial, these considerations are, In

this case, the vital Issues In the problem.

Their nnlteRirm f~ the estimate ~ a fatal

error.

3. 0141 believes that our bases for estimat

ing Soviet objectives and Intentions are at

least as well founded as our bases for estimat

ing their capabilities. They are, therefore,

entitled to a full consideration In the estimate,

particularly In view of the uncertainty which

must be expressed regarding quantities, dates

of availability, and characteristics of Soviet

atomic bombs.

4. Tim position set forth above Is the one

ONI has maintained throughout the commit

tees consideration of this problem. ONI dis

approves of the publishing of this paper be

cause It believes that the limited discussion,

by avoiding the vital Issues, dàes not ade

quately support the conclusion, does not an

swer the problem, and could be misleading.

4

333
61. ORE], The Korean Situation, 16 September 1950

(Ditto copy)

S,ft-c43/~ I.

-

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 September 1950

MEMQ~.ANDUM Doct~e~~t No. _..DL~ NO C.~.

SUBJECT: The Korean Situation ~ TS S 0 D:A ~-iio, 4 Apr 77

I,,

ApproxImately

Military Situation

17,000 UN personnel are

~

now

~

ashore at Inchon.

Elements of the US 1st MarIne Division have advanced to positions

three miles east of Inchon, astride the Seoul road. Along the front

in southeast Korea, slight gains have been made by UN forces In

attacks from Chindong to Tongchoa. UN naval surface and carrier

air ~mfts supported ground~ troops In the Inchon-Seoul area while

surface units bombarded the east coast In support of ROK marines

who landed on the east coast north of Pohang.

Ground

InchonArea The attack by the US Tenth Corps is gaining

momentum. The city Of Inchon has been secured, and ROK forces

have been charged with the maintenance of internal security and

the establishment of a government for Iæchon. Meanwhile elements

of the US 1st Marine Division have advanced three miles east of

Inchon along the road to Seoul. Approximately 17,000 troops, with

tanks and 155mm. howitzers, have been put ashore at Inchcm. The

local North Korean security forces were quickly overcome. Enemy

units attempting to converge on Inchon with additional support have

been attacked by UN naval aircraft which destroyed 200 vehicles

and an uÆdetermlned number of tanks.

Southeast Korea. Along the 90-mile front from Cblndong In the

south to Tongchon In the north, UN forces took the offensive, and

made slight overall gains against enemy resistance varying from

light to heavy. UN forces made slight gains in the south sector

from Chindong to flyonpung, reached the east bank of the Naktong

River below Waegwan, and entered Angang in the east. Patrols of

the ROK 3rd Division, however, on the eatreme east sector, were

repulsed by withering small arms fire. ROK marines have landed

on the east coast north of Pohang.

SECflET

335
61. (Continued)

-

SECRET

Rear Areas Air observers reported approximately 50 vehicles

and 20 thnks moving south below Antung (near the northeast Korea

Manchurtan border). In the Seoni area, UN naval air reconnaissance

fl1ght~ reported several thoue~nd troops dressed In white moving In

the direction of inchon.

UN naval vessels supported ground troops on both coasts with

artillery fire, while carrier air units struck at enemy forces attem~tlng to converge on inchon. The Coma~nd Post of the US Tenth Army Corps

has been established afloat off Inchon.

Air Forces

Air forces made strikes against marshallIng yards and storage

facilities near the southeastern battle zone at Taejon, Andong, and

Chonju. Other units assisted In neutralizing enemy resistance

against the ROE marine 1~nd*ngs on the east coast. Bad weather

prevented planned strikes by heavy bombers In the Waegwan area,

but other heavy bomber units struck secondary targets at Pyongyazig

and Wonsan, where marshalling yards and dock areas were hit with

excellent results.

IL General Situation

No significant reports have been received during the past 24

hours.

DM-l01

1

SECRET

336
62. Chief, DfPub R. Jack Smith] to AD/ORE Theodore Babbitt],

Contents of the CIA Daily Summary, 21 September 1950

E&IWJF 422~

4~~8~3 Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GovERN!cI~r~h

TO : AD/ORE DATE: 21 September 1950

FROM : Chief, D/Pub

SUBJECT: Contents of the CIA Daily Summary.

Reference: ~i; memorandum to AD/ORE, dated 7 February 19149, subject The Dulles

Report,; my memorandum to AD/ORE, dated 5 April 1950, subject

Distribution of the CIA Daily Summary; my memorandum to 1W/ORE,

dated 20 April 1950, same subject; my memorandum to AD/ORE, 3 August

1950, same subject.

1. The CIA Daily Summary was set up in response to a request from the

President for a brief daily digest of the most important cables and telegrams.

This original request has always been the guiding concept for the Daily Summary,

and any suggestion that the publication be broadened in scope, that it might

become a sort of daily estimate rather than a daily digest of what cables came

to hand, has been held contrary to the Presidents request. The limitation

imposed by this concept means that dn any given day the Daily Summary can contain

only those items which have appeared in the cable traffic for the day (or the day

before). The sporadic flow of cable traffic makes it highly likely that for a day

or two at a time there will be no cables comcernimg a highly sensitive situation

and that for this reason the Daily Summary will carry no item on the matter. At

the same time, it is highly possible that cables concerni~ng this situation have

arrived in Washington but that CIA has either been exc1ud~d from distribution or

has been given distribution and has been requested not to use the material ~.n any

publication.

2. The guiding concept that the CIA Daily Summary is published in

response to a request from the President places a premium on sensitive cables,

those which most deserve to be brought to the Presidents attention. These are

the cables which are most jealously guarded hy the several agencies. The record

of the agencies ii~ maldmg these cables available to CIA is very uneven. The

service agencies have always made a rigid distinction betwecm operational and

intelligence materials and have freely given CIA what they regard as. intefligence

materials but have refused to give CIA operational materials. Under this guise,

they have withheld from CIA such sensitive materials as Oeneral LiacArthur s reports

from Tokyo, General Clays reports from Berlin, Admiral Struble s reports from

the Seventh Fleet, Admiral Badgers reports from Tsingtao, General Van Fleets ~

reports from Athens, etc. CIA does not receive reports made to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, mary of which must, because of their origin and their subject, be worthy

of the Presidents attention. On the other hand, the Department of State has

steadily maintained a good record in maidng sensitive materials available to CM,

a fact which accounts to a fair degree for the predominance of State materials in

the Daily Snmmary. During the past year, however, as StateDefense relations have

deteriorated and as State has become increasingly aware that through the CIA Daily

Summary the Departzaent of Defense is receiving sensitive State materials without

reciprocating, State has been more and more reluctant concerning its sensitive

337
62. (Continued)

~SE~T~ 42)pQ~

telegrams. Therefore, on a few occasions State has withheld from CIA certain

telegrams, either temporarily or indefinitely. Much more frequently, State has

distributed these telegrams but has enjoined CIA not to use then in any publica

tion, an injunction which CIA has had to respect for both practical and ethical

reasons. These factors have further reduced the supply of materials suitable for

inclusion in a Daily Summary designed for the President.

3. Several solutions to remedy the sparseness and inadequacy of the CIA

Daily Summary are available. They are:

a. To change the nature of the publication, relieving it of

the necessity to digest those cables which CIA has avail

able and making it more in the nature of a daily estimate;

b. To make urgent efforts on a high level, as I have repeatedly

requested be done, to have the sensitive cables of the Defense

Department made available to CIA, a development which would in

turn ease the State Departments concern.

Recommendation Under present circumstances, I recommend that the

second of these courses be followed and that the DCI be urged to take the matter

to a level h–~~Jthan the IAC.

-

.

R. J. SIIIITH.

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338