III

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. EXEC. RES. 75

To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons

Convention, subject to certain conditions.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 17, 1997

Mr. HELMS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Foreign Relations

EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION

To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical

Weapons Convention, subject to certain conditions.

1 Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concur2 ring therein),

3 SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO

4 CONDITIONS.

5 The Senate advises and consents to the ratification

6 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in sec7 tion 3 of this resolution), subject to the conditions in sec8 tion 2.
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1 SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

2 The Senate’s advice and consent to the ratification

3 of the Chemical Weapons Convention is subject to the fol4 lowing conditions, which shall be binding upon the Presi5 dent:

6 (1) EFFECT OF ARTICLE XXII.—Upon the de7 posit of the United States instrument of ratification,

8 the President shall certify to the Congress that the

9 United States has informed all other States Parties

10 to the Convention that the Senate reserves the right,

11 pursuant to the Constitution of the United States,

12 to give its advice and consent to ratification of the

13 Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding

14 Article XXII of the Convention.

15 (2) FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS.—Notwith16 standing any provision of the Convention, no funds

17 may be drawn from the Treasury of the United

18 States for payments or assistance (including the

19 transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Ar20 ticle IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of

21 Article VIII, paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X,

22 or any other provision of the Convention, without

23 statutory authorization and appropriation.

24 (3) ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNAL OVER25 SIGHT OFFICE.—
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1 (A) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 240

2 days after the deposit of the United States in3 strument of ratification, the President shall cer4 tify to the Congress that the current internal

5 audit office of the Preparatory Commission has

6 been expanded into an independent internal

7 oversight office whose functions will be trans8 ferred to the Organization for the Prohibition

9 of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment of

10 the Organization. The independent internal

11 oversight office shall be obligated to protect

12 confidential information pursuant to the obliga13 tions of the Confidentiality Annex. The inde14 pendent internal oversight office shall—

15 (i) make investigations and reports re16 lating to all programs of the Organization;

17 (ii) undertake both management and

18 financial audits, including—

19 (I) an annual assessment verify20 ing that classified and confidential in21 formation is stored and handled se22 curely pursuant to the general obliga23 tions set forth in Article VIII and in

24 accordance with all provisions of the
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1 Annex on the Protection of Confiden2 tial Information; and

3 (II) an annual assessment of lab4 oratories established pursuant to

5 paragraph 55 of Part II of the Ver6 ification Annex to ensure that the Di7 rector General of the Technical Sec8 retariat is carrying out his functions

9 pursuant to paragraph 56 of Part II

10 of the Verification Annex;

11 (iii) undertake performance evalua12 tions annually to ensure the Organization

13 has complied to the extent practicable with

14 the recommendations of the independent

15 internal oversight office;

16 (iv) have access to all records relating

17 to the programs and operations of the Or18 ganization;

19 (v) have direct and prompt access to

20 any official of the Organization; and

21 (vi) be required to protect the identity

22 of, and prevent reprisals against, all com23 plainants.

24 (B) COMPLIANCE WITH RECOMMENDA25 TIONS.—The Organization shall ensure, to the
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1 extent practicable, compliance with rec2 ommendations of the independent internal over3 sight office, and shall ensure that annual and

4 other relevant reports by the independent inter5 nal oversight office are made available to all

6 member states pursuant to the requirements es7 tablished in the Confidentiality Annex.

8 (C) WITHHOLDING A PORTION OF CON9 TRIBUTIONS.—Until a certification is made

10 under subparagraph (A), 50 percent of the

11 amount of United States contributions to the

12 regular budget of the Organization assessed

13 pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall

14 be withheld from disbursement, in addition to

15 any other amounts required to be withheld from

16 disbursement by any other provision of law.

17 (D) ASSESSMENT OF FIRST YEAR CON18 TRIBUTIONS.—Notwithstanding the require19 ments of this paragraph, for the first year of

20 the Organization’s operation, ending on April

21 29, 1998, the United States shall make its full

22 contribution to the regular budget of the Orga23 nization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of

24 Article VIII.
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1 (E) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this

2 paragraph, the term ‘‘internal oversight office’’

3 means the head of an independent office (or

4 other independent entity) established by the Or5 ganization to conduct and supervise objective

6 audits, inspections, and investigations relating

7 to the programs and operations of the Organi8 zation.

9 (4) COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.—

10 (A) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Prior to the de11 posit of the United States instrument of ratifi12 cation, and annually thereafter, the President

13 shall submit a report to Congress identifying all

14 cost-sharing arrangements with the Organiza15 tion.

16 (B) COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENT RE17 QUIRED.—The United States shall not under18 take any new research or development expendi19 tures for the primary purpose of refining or im20 proving the Organization’s regime for verifica21 tion of compliance under the Convention, in22 cluding the training of inspectors and the provi23 sion of detection equipment and on-site analysis

24 sampling and analysis techniques, or share the

25 articles, items, or services resulting from any
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1 research and development undertaken pre2 viously, without first having concluded and sub3 mitted to the Congress a cost-sharing arrange4 ment with the Organization.

5 (C) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this

6 paragraph may be construed as limiting or con7 stricting in any way the ability of the United

8 States to pursue unilaterally any project under9 taken solely to increase the capability of the

10 United States means for monitoring compliance

11 with the Convention.

12 (5) INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND SAFE13 GUARDS.—

14 (A) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE INFOR15 MATION TO THE ORGANIZATION.—

16 (i) IN GENERAL.—No United States

17 intelligence information may be provided to

18 the Organization or any organization affili19 ated with the Organization, or to any offi20 cial or employee thereof, unless the Presi21 dent certifies to the appropriate commit22 tees of Congress that the Director of

23 Central Intelligence, in consultation with

24 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of

25 Defense, has established and implemented
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1 procedures, and has worked with the Orga2 nization to ensure implementation of pro3 cedures, for protecting from unauthorized

4 disclosure United States intelligence

5 sources and methods connected to such in6 formation. These procedures shall include

7 the requirement of—

8 (I) the offer and provision of ad9 vice and assistance to the Organiza10 tion in establishing and maintaining

11 the necessary measures to ensure that

12 inspectors and other staff members of

13 the Technical Secretariat meet the

14 highest standards of efficiency, com15 petence, and integrity, pursuant to

16 paragraph 1(b) of the Confidentiality

17 Annex, and in establishing and main18 taining a stringent regime governing

19 the handling of confidential informa20 tion by the Technical Secretariat, pur21 suant to paragraph 2 of the Confiden22 tiality Annex;

23 (II) a determination that any un24 authorized disclosure of United States

25 intelligence information to be provided
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1 to the Organization or any organiza2 tion affiliated with the Organization,

3 or any official or employee thereof,

4 would result in no more than minimal

5 damage to United States national se6 curity, in light of the risks of the un7 authorized disclosure of such informa8 tion;

9 (III) sanitization of intelligence

10 information that is to be provided to

11 the Organization to remove all infor12 mation that could betray intelligence

13 sources and methods; and

14 (IV) interagency United States

15 intelligence community approval for

16 any release of intelligence information

17 to the Organization, no matter how

18 thoroughly it has been sanitized.

19 (ii) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—

20 (I) IN GENERAL.—The Director

21 of Central Intelligence may waive the

22 application of clause (i) if the Director

23 of Central Intelligence certifies in

24 writing to the appropriate committees

25 of Congress that providing such infor-
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1 mation to the Organization or an or2 ganization affiliated with the Organi3 zation, or to any official or employee

4 thereof, is in the vital national secu5 rity interests of the United States and

6 that all possible measures to protect

7 such information have been taken, ex8 cept that such waiver must be made

9 for each instance such information is

10 provided, or for each such document

11 provided. In the event that multiple

12 waivers are issued within a single

13 week, a single certification to the ap14 propriate committees of Congress may

15 be submitted, specifying each waiver

16 issued during that week.

17 (II) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—

18 The Director of Central Intelligence

19 may not delegate any duty of the Di20 rector under this paragraph.

21 (B) PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS.—

22 (i) IN GENERAL.—The President shall

23 report periodically, but not less frequently

24 than semiannually, to the Select Commit25 tee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
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1 Permanent Select Committee on Intel2 ligence of the House of Representatives on

3 the types and volume of intelligence infor4 mation provided to the Organization or af5 filiated organizations and the purposes for

6 which it was provided during the period

7 covered by the report.

8 (ii) EXEMPTION.—For purposes of

9 this subparagraph, intelligence information

10 provided to the Organization or affiliated

11 organizations does not cover information

12 that is provided only to, and only for the

13 use of, appropriately cleared United States

14 Government personnel serving with the Or15 ganization or an affiliated organization.

16 (C) SPECIAL REPORTS.—

17 (i) REPORT ON PROCEDURES.—Ac18 companying the certification provided pur19 suant to subparagraph (A)(i), the Presi20 dent shall provide a detailed report to the

21 Select Committee on Intelligence of the

22 Senate and the Permanent Select Commit23 tee on Intelligence of the House of Rep24 resentatives identifying the procedures es25 tablished for protecting intelligence sources
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1 and methods when intelligence information

2 is provided pursuant to this section.

3 (ii) REPORTS ON UNAUTHORIZED DIS4 CLOSURES.—The President shall submit a

5 report to the Select Committee on Intel6 ligence of the Senate and the Permanent

7 Select Committee on Intelligence of the

8 House of Representatives within 15 days

9 after it has become known to the United

10 States Government regarding any unau11 thorized disclosure of intelligence provided

12 by the United States to the Organization.

13 (D) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—The Presi14 dent may not delegate or assign the duties of

15 the President under this section.

16 (E) RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LAW.—

17 Nothing in this paragraph may be construed

18 to—

19 (i) impair or otherwise affect the au20 thority of the Director of Central Intel21 ligence to protect intelligence sources and

22 methods from unauthorized disclosure pur23 suant to section 103(c)(5) of the National

24 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–

25 3(c)(5)); or
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1 (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the

2 provisions of title V of the National Secu3 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).

4 (F) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5 (i) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF

6 CONGRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate com7 mittees of Congress’’ means the Committee

8 on Foreign Relations and the Select Com9 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate and

10 the Committee on International Relations

11 and the Permanent Select Committee on

12 Intelligence of the House of Representa13 tives.

14 (ii) ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Or15 ganization’’ means the Organization for

16 the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons es17 tablished under the Convention and in18 cludes any organ of that Organization and

19 any board or working group, such as the

20 Scientific Advisory Board, that may be es21 tablished by it.

22 (iii) ORGANIZATION AFFILIATED WITH

23 THE ORGANIZATION.—The terms ‘‘organi24 zation affiliated with the Organization’’

25 and ‘‘affiliated organizations’’ include the
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1 Provisional Technical Secretariat under the

2 Convention and any laboratory certified by

3 the Director-General of the Technical Sec4 retariat as designated to perform analytical

5 or other functions.

6 (6) AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION.—

7 (A) VOTING REPRESENTATION OF THE

8 UNITED STATES.—A United States representa9 tive will be present at all Amendment Con10 ferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative

11 or negative, on all proposed amendments made

12 at such conferences.

13 (B) SUBMISSION OF AMENDMENTS AS

14 TREATIES.—The President shall submit to the

15 Senate for its advice and consent to ratification

16 under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the

17 Constitution of the United States any amend18 ment to the Convention adopted by an Amend19 ment Conference.

20 (7) CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE AUSTRALIA

21 GROUP AND NATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS.—

22 (A) DECLARATION.—The Senate declares

23 that the collapse of the informal forum of states

24 known as the ‘‘Australia Group,’’ either

25 through changes in membership or lack of com-
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1 pliance with common export controls, or the

2 substantial weakening of common Australia

3 Group export controls and non-proliferation

4 measures in force on the date of United States

5 ratification of the Convention, would constitute

6 a fundamental change in circumstances to Unit7 ed States ratification of the Convention.

8 (B) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Prior

9 to the deposit of the United States instrument

10 of ratification, the President shall certify to

11 Congress that—

12 (i) nothing in the Convention obligates

13 the United States to accept any modifica14 tion, change in scope, or weakening of its

15 national export controls;

16 (ii) the United States understands

17 that the maintenance of national restric18 tions on trade in chemicals and chemical

19 production technology is fully compatible

20 with the provisions of the Convention, in21 cluding Article XI(2), and solely within the

22 sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;

23 (iii) the Convention preserves the

24 right of State Parties, unilaterally or col25 lectively, to maintain or impose export con-
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1 trols on chemicals and related chemical

2 production technology for foreign policy or

3 national security reasons, notwithstanding

4 Article XI(2); and

5 (iv) each Australia Group member, at

6 the highest diplomatic levels, has officially

7 communicated to the United States Gov8 ernment its understanding and agreement

9 that export control and nonproliferation

10 measures which the Australia Group has

11 undertaken are fully compatible with the

12 provisions of the Convention, including Ar13 ticle XI(2), and its commitment to main14 tain in the future such export controls and

15 nonproliferation measures against non16 Australia Group members.

17 (C) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—

18 (i) EFFECTIVENESS OF AUSTRALIA

19 GROUP.—The President shall certify to

20 Congress on an annual basis that—

21 (I) Australia Group members

22 continue to maintain an equally effec23 tive or more comprehensive control

24 over the export of toxic chemicals and

25 their precursors, dual-use processing
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1 equipment, human, animal and plant

2 pathogens and toxins with potential

3 biological weapons application, and

4 dual-use biological equipment, as that

5 afforded by the Australia Group as of

6 the date of ratification of the Conven7 tion by the United States; and

8 (II) the Australia Group remains

9 a viable mechanism for limiting the

10 spread of chemical and biological

11 weapons-related materials and tech12 nology, and that the effectiveness of

13 the Australia Group has not been un14 dermined by changes in membership,

15 lack of compliance with common ex16 port controls and nonproliferation

17 measures, or the weakening of com18 mon controls and nonproliferation

19 measures, in force as of the date of

20 ratification of the Convention by the

21 United States.

22 (ii) CONSULTATION WITH SENATE RE23 QUIRED.—In the event that the President

24 is, at any time, unable to make the certifi25 cations described in clause (i), the Presi-
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1 dent shall consult with the Senate for the

2 purposes of obtaining a resolution of con3 tinued adherence to the Convention, not4 withstanding the fundamental change in

5 circumstance.

6 (D) PERIODIC CONSULTATION WITH CON7 GRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The President

8 shall consult periodically, but not less fre9 quently than twice a year, with the Committee

10 on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the

11 Committee on International Relations of the

12 House of Representatives, on Australia Group

13 export control and nonproliferation measures. If

14 any Australia Group member adopts a position

15 at variance with the certifications and under16 standings provided under subparagraph (B), or

17 should seek to gain Australia Group acquies18 cence or approval for an interpretation that var19 ious provisions of the Convention require it to

20 remove chemical-weapons related export con21 trols against any State Party to the Conven22 tion, the President shall block any effort by

23 that Australia Group member to secure Aus24 tralia Group approval of such a position or in25 terpretation.
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1 (E) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:

2 (i) AUSTRALIA GROUP.—The term

3 ‘‘Australia Group’’ means the informal

4 forum of states, chaired by Australia,

5 whose goal is to discourage and impede

6 chemical and biological weapons prolifera7 tion by harmonizing national export con8 trols chemical weapons precursor chemi9 cals, biological weapons pathogens, and

10 dual-use production equipment, and

11 through other measures.

12 (ii) HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC LEVELS.—

13 The term ‘‘highest diplomatic levels’’

14 means at the levels of senior officials with

15 the power to authoritatively represent their

16 governments, and does not include diplo17 matic representatives of those governments

18 to the United States.

19 (8) NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.—

20 (A) REEVALUATION.—In forswearing

21 under the Convention the possession of a chemi22 cal weapons retaliatory capability, the Senate

23 understands that deterrence of attack by chemi24 cal weapons requires a reevaluation of the nega-
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1 tive security assurances extended to non-nu2 clear-weapon states.

3 (B) CLASSIFIED REPORT.—Accordingly,

4 180 days after the deposit of the United States

5 instrument of ratification, the President shall

6 submit to the Congress a classified report set7 ting forth the findings of a detailed review of

8 United States policy on negative security assur9 ances, including a determination of the appro10 priate responses to the use of chemical or bio11 logical weapons against the Armed Forces of

12 the United States, United States citizens, allies,

13 and third parties.

14 (9) PROTECTION OF ADVANCED BIO15 TECHNOLOGY.—Prior to the deposit of the United

16 States instrument of ratification, and on January 1

17 of every year thereafter, the President shall certify

18 to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the

19 Speaker of the House of Representatives that the le20 gitimate commercial activities and interests of chem21 ical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the

22 United States are not being significantly harmed by

23 the limitations of the Convention on access to, and

24 production of, those chemicals and toxins listed in

25 Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
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1 (10) MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF COM2 PLIANCE.—

3 (A) DECLARATION.—The Senate declares

4 that—

5 (i) the Convention is in the interests

6 of the United States only if all State Par7 ties are in strict compliance with the terms

8 of the Convention as submitted to the Sen9 ate for its advice and consent to ratifica10 tion, such compliance being measured by

11 performance and not by efforts, intentions,

12 or commitments to comply; and

13 (ii) the Senate expects all State Par14 ties to be in strict compliance with their

15 obligations under the terms of the Conven16 tion, as submitted to the Senate for its ad17 vice and consent to ratification;

18 (B) BRIEFINGS ON COMPLIANCE.—Given

19 its concern about the intelligence community’s

20 low level of confidence in its ability to monitor

21 compliance with the Convention, the Senate ex22 pects the executive branch of the Government

23 to offer regular briefings, not less than four

24 times a year, to the Committee on Foreign Re25 lations of the Senate and the Committee on
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1 International Relations of the House of Rep2 resentatives on compliance issues related to the

3 Convention. Such briefings shall include a de4 scription of all United States efforts in bilateral

5 and multilateral diplomatic channels and fo6 rums to resolve compliance issues and shall in7 clude a complete description of—

8 (i) any compliance issues the United

9 States plans to raise at meetings of the

10 Organization, in advance of such meetings;

11 (ii) any compliance issues raised at

12 meetings of the Organization, within 30

13 days of such meeting;

14 (iii) any determination by the Presi15 dent that a State Party is in noncompli16 ance with or is otherwise acting in a man17 ner inconsistent with the object or purpose

18 of the Convention, within 30 days of such

19 a determination.

20 (C) ANNUAL REPORTS ON COMPLIANCE.—

21 The President shall submit on January 1 of

22 each year to the Committee on Foreign Rela23 tions of the Senate and the Committee on

24 International Relations of the House of Rep-
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1 resentatives a full and complete classified and

2 unclassified report setting forth—

3 (i) a certification of those countries

4 included in the Intelligence Community’s

5 Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the

6 Director of Central Intelligence’s Arms

7 Control Staff and the National Intelligence

8 Council (or any successor document setting

9 forth intelligence priorities in the field of

10 the proliferation of weapons of mass de11 struction) that are determined to be in

12 compliance with the Convention, on a

13 country-by-country basis;

14 (ii) for those countries not certified

15 pursuant to clause (i), an identification

16 and assessment of all compliance issues

17 arising with regard to the adherence of the

18 country to its obligation under the Conven19 tion;

20 (iii) the steps the United States has

21 taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction

22 with another State Party—

23 (I) to initiate challenge inspec24 tions of the noncompliant party with

25 the objective of demonstrating to the
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1 international community the act of

2 noncompliance;

3 (II) to call attention publicly to

4 the activity in question; and

5 (III) to seek on an urgent basis

6 a meeting at the highest diplomatic

7 level with the noncompliant party with

8 the objective of bringing the non9 compliant party into compliance;

10 (iv) a determination of the military

11 significance and broader security risks

12 arising from any compliance issue identi13 fied pursuant to clause (ii); and

14 (v) a detailed assessment of the re15 sponses of the noncompliant party in ques16 tion to action undertaken by the United

17 States described in clause (iii).

18 (D) COUNTRIES PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED IN

19 COMPLIANCE REPORTS.—For any country that

20 was previously included in a report submitted

21 under subparagraph (C), but which subse22 quently is not included in the Intelligence Com23 munity’s Monitoring Strategy (or successor doc24 ument), such country shall continue to be in25 cluded in the report submitted under subpara-
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1 graph (C) unless the country has been certified

2 under subparagraph (C)(i) for each of the pre3 vious two years.

4 (E) FORM OF CERTIFICATIONS.—For those

5 countries that have been publicly and officially

6 identified by a representative of the intelligence

7 community as possessing or seeking to develop

8 chemical weapons, the certification described in

9 subparagraph (C)(i) shall be in unclassified

10 form.

11 (F) ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTEL12 LIGENCE.—On January 1, 1998, and annually

13 thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence

14 shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Re15 lations, Armed Services, and the Select Com16 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the

17 Committees on International Relations, Na18 tional Security, and Permanent Select Commit19 tee of the House of Representatives, a full and

20 complete classified and unclassified report re21 garding—

22 (i) the status of chemical weapons de23 velopment, production, stockpiling, and

24 use, within the meanings of those terms
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1 under the Convention, on a country-by2 country basis;

3 (ii) any information made available to

4 the United States Government concerning

5 the development, production, acquisition,

6 stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or in7 direct transfer of novel agents, including

8 any unitary or binary chemical weapon

9 comprised of chemical components not

10 identified on the schedules of the Annex on

11 Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;

12 (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals

13 potentially relevant to chemical weapons

14 programs, including all Australia Group

15 chemicals and chemicals identified on the

16 schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a

17 country-by-country basis;

18 (iv) the monitoring responsibilities,

19 practices, and strategies of the intelligence

20 community (as defined in section 3(4) of

21 the National Security Act of 1947) and a

22 determination of the level of confidence of

23 the intelligence community with respect to

24 each specific monitoring task undertaken,

25 including an assessment by the intelligence
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1 community of the national aggregate data

2 provided by State Parties to the Organiza3 tion, on a country-by-country basis;

4 (v) an identification of how United

5 States national intelligence means, includ6 ing national technical means and human

7 intelligence, is being marshaled together

8 with the Convention’s verification provi9 sions to monitor compliance with the Con10 vention; and

11 (vi) the identification of chemical

12 weapons development, production, stock13 piling, or use, within the meanings of those

14 terms under the Convention, by sub15 national groups, including terrorist and

16 paramilitary organizations.

17 (G) REPORTS ON RESOURCES FOR MON18 ITORING.—Each report required under subpara19 graph (F) shall include a full and complete clas20 sified annex submitted solely to the Select Com21 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the

22 Permanent Select Committee of the House of

23 Representatives regarding—

24 (i) a detailed and specific identifica25 tion of all United States resources devoted
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1 to monitoring the Convention, including in2 formation on all expenditures associated

3 with the monitoring of the Convention; and

4 (ii) an identification of the priorities

5 of the executive branch of Government for

6 the development of new resources relating

7 to detection and monitoring capabilities

8 with respect to chemical and biological

9 weapons, including a description of the

10 steps being taken and resources being de11 voted to strengthening United States mon12 itoring capabilities.

13 (11) ENHANCEMENTS TO ROBUST CHEMICAL

14 AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSES.—

15 (A) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the

16 sense of the Senate that—

17 (i) chemical and biological threats to

18 deployed United States Armed Forces will

19 continue to grow in regions of concern

20 around the world, and pose serious threats

21 to United States power projection and for22 ward deployment strategies;

23 (ii) chemical weapons or biological

24 weapons use is a potential element of fu25 ture conflicts in regions of concern;
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1 (iii) it is essential for the United

2 States and key regional allies to preserve

3 and further develop robust chemical and

4 biological defenses;

5 (iv) the United States Armed Forces

6 are inadequately equipped, organized,

7 trained and exercised for chemical and bio8 logical defense against current and ex9 pected threats, and that too much reliance

10 is placed on non-active duty forces, which

11 receive less training and less modern

12 equipment, for critical chemical and bio13 logical defense capabilities;

14 (v) the lack of readiness stems from a

15 de-emphasis of chemical and biological de16 fenses within the executive branch of Gov17 ernment and the United States Armed

18 Forces;

19 (vi) the armed forces of key regional

20 allies and likely coalition partners, as well

21 as civilians necessary to support United

22 States military operations, are inad23 equately prepared and equipped to carry

24 out essential missions in chemically and

25 biologically contaminated environments;
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1 (vii) congressional direction contained

2 in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass

3 Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Pub4 lic Law 104–201) should lead to enhanced

5 domestic preparedness to protect against

6 chemical and biological weapons threats;

7 and

8 (viii) the United States Armed Forces

9 should place increased emphasis on poten10 tial threats to forces deployed abroad and,

11 in particular, make countering chemical

12 and biological weapons use an organizing

13 principle for United States defense strat14 egy and development of force structure,

15 doctrine, planning, training, and exercising

16 policies of the United States Armed

17 Forces.

18 (B) ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE

19 CAPABILITIES.—The Secretary of Defense shall

20 take those actions necessary to ensure that the

21 United States Armed Forces are capable of car22 rying out required military missions in United

23 States regional contingency plans, despite the

24 threat or use of chemical or biological weapons.

25 In particular, the Secretary of Defense shall en-
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1 sure that the United States Armed Forces are

2 effectively equipped, organized, trained, and ex3 ercised (including at the large unit and theater

4 level) to conduct operations in a chemically or

5 biologically contaminated environment that are

6 critical to the success of the United States mili7 tary plans in regional conflicts, including—

8 (i) deployment, logistics, and rein9 forcement operations at key ports and air10 fields;

11 (ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie

12 generation at critical regional airbases; and

13 (iii) ground force maneuvers of large

14 units and divisions.

15 (C) DISCUSSIONS WITH REGIONAL ALLIES

16 AND LIKELY COALITION PARTNERS.—

17 (i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretaries of

18 Defense and State shall, as a priority mat19 ter, initiate discussions with key regional

20 allies and likely regional coalition partners,

21 including those countries where the United

22 States currently deploys forces, where

23 United States forces would likely operate

24 during regional conflicts, or which would

25 provide civilians necessary to support Unit-
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1 ed States military operations, to determine

2 what steps are necessary to ensure that al3 lied and coalition forces and other critical

4 civilians are adequately equipped and pre5 pared to operate in chemically and bio6 logically contaminated environments.

7 (ii) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not

8 later than one year after deposit of the

9 United States instrument of ratification,

10 the Secretaries of Defense and State shall

11 submit a report to the Committees on For12 eign Relations and Armed Services of the

13 Senate and to the Speaker of the House

14 on the result of these discussions, plans for

15 future discussions, measures agreed to im16 prove the preparedness of foreign forces

17 and civilians, and proposals for increased

18 military assistance, including through the

19 Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military

20 Financing, and the International Military

21 Education and Training programs pursu22 ant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

23 (D) UNITED STATES ARMY CHEMICAL

24 SCHOOL.—The Secretary of Defense shall take

25 those actions necessary to ensure that the Unit-
33

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1 ed States Army Chemical School remains under

2 the oversight of a general officer of the United

3 States Army.

4 (E) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—Given its

5 concerns about the present state of chemical

6 and biological defense readiness and training, it

7 is the sense of the Senate that—

8 (i) in the transfer, consolidation, and

9 reorganization of the United States Army

10 Chemical School, the Army should not dis11 rupt or diminish the training and readiness

12 of the United States Armed Forces to fight

13 in a chemical-biological warfare environ14 ment;

15 (ii) the Army should continue to oper16 ate the Chemical Defense Training Facility

17 at Fort McClellan until such time as the

18 replacement training facility at Fort Leon19 ard Wood is functional.

20 (F) ANNUAL REPORTS ON CHEMICAL AND

21 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.—

22 On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter,

23 the President shall submit a report to the Com24 mittees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations,

25 and Armed Services of the Senate and the
34

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1 Committee on International Relations, National

2 Security, and Appropriations of the House of

3 Representatives, and Speaker of the House on

4 previous, current, and planned chemical and bi5 ological weapons defense activities. The report

6 shall contain for the previous fiscal year and for

7 the next three fiscal years—

8 (i) proposed solutions to each of the

9 deficiencies in chemical and biological war10 fare defenses identified in the March 1996

11 report of the General Accounting Office

12 entitled ‘‘Chemical and Biological Defense:

13 Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve

14 Continuing Problems’’, and steps being

15 taken pursuant to subparagraph (B) to en16 sure that the United States Armed Forces

17 are capable of conducting required military

18 operations to ensure the success of United

19 States regional contingency plans despite

20 the threat or use of chemical or biological

21 weapons;

22 (ii) identification of the priorities of

23 the executive branch of Government in the

24 development of both active and passive

25 chemical and biological defenses;
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1 (iii) a detailed summary of all budget

2 activities associated with the research, de3 velopment, testing, and evaluation of chem4 ical and biological defense programs;

5 (iv) a detailed summary of expendi6 tures on research, development, testing,

7 and evaluation, and procurement of chemi8 cal and biological defenses by fiscal years

9 defense programs, department, and agency;

10 (v) a detailed assessment of current

11 and projected vaccine production capabili12 ties and vaccine stocks, including progress

13 in researching and developing a multi14 valent vaccine;

15 (vi) a detailed assessment of proce16 dures and capabilities necessary to protect

17 and decontaminate infrastructure to rein18 force United States power-projection

19 forces, including progress in developing a

20 nonaqueous chemical decontamination ca21 pability;

22 (vii) a description of progress made in

23 procuring light-weight personal protective

24 gear and steps being taken to ensure that

25 programmed procurement quantities are
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1 sufficient to replace expiring battle-dress

2 overgarments and chemical protective over3 garments to maintain required wartime in4 ventory levels;

5 (viii) a description of progress made

6 in developing long-range standoff detection

7 and identification capabilities and other

8 battlefield surveillance capabilities for bio9 logical and chemical weapons, including

10 progress on developing a multi-chemical

11 agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles,

12 and unmanned ground sensors;

13 (ix) a description of progress made in

14 developing and deploying layered theater

15 missile defenses for deployed United States

16 Armed Forces which will provide greater

17 geographic coverage against current and

18 expected ballistic missile threats and will

19 assist in mitigating chemical and biological

20 contamination through higher altitude

21 intercepts and boost-phase intercepts;

22 (x) an assessment of—

23 (I) the training and readiness of

24 the United States Armed Forces to
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1 operate in a chemically or biologically

2 contaminated environment; and

3 (II) actions taken to sustain

4 training and readiness, including

5 training and readiness carried out at

6 national combat training centers;

7 (xi) a description of progress made in

8 incorporating chemical and biological con9 siderations into service and joint exercises

10 as well as simulations, models, and war

11 games and the conclusions drawn from

12 these efforts about the United States capa13 bility to carry out required missions, in14 cluding missions with coalition partners, in

15 military contingencies;

16 (xii) a description of progress made in

17 developing and implementing service and

18 joint doctrine for combat and non-combat

19 operations involving adversaries armed

20 with chemical or biological weapons, in21 cluding efforts to update the range of serv22 ice and joint doctrine to better address the

23 wide range of military activities, including

24 deployment, reinforcement, and logistics

25 operations in support of combat oper-
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1 ations, and for the conduct of such oper2 ations in concert with coalition forces; and

3 (xiii) a description of progress made

4 in resolving issues relating to the protec5 tion of United States population centers

6 from chemical and biological attack, in7 cluding plans for inoculation of popu8 lations, consequence management, and a

9 description of progress made in developing

10 and deploying effective cruise missile de11 fenses and a national ballistic missile de12 fense.

13 (12) PRIMACY OF THE UNITED STATES CON14 STITUTION.—Nothing in the Convention requires or

15 authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United

16 States prohibited by the Constitution of the United

17 States, as interpreted by the United States.

18 (13) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—If the President deter20 mines that persuasive information exists that a

21 State Party to the Convention is maintaining a

22 chemical weapons production or production mo23 bilization capability, is developing new chemical

24 agents, or is in violation of the Convention in

25 any other manner so as to threaten the national
39

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1 security interests of the United States, then the

2 President shall—

3 (i) consult with the Senate, and

4 promptly submit to it, a report detailing

5 the effect of such actions;

6 (ii) seek on an urgent basis a chal7 lenge inspection of the facilities of the rel8 evant party in accordance with the provi9 sions of the Convention with the objective

10 of demonstrating to the international com11 munity the act of noncompliance;

12 (iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent

13 basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic

14 level with the relevant party with the objec15 tive of bringing the noncompliant party

16 into compliance;

17 (iv) implement prohibitions and sanc18 tions against the relevant party as required

19 by law;

20 (v) if noncompliance has been deter21 mined, seek on an urgent basis within the

22 Security Council of the United Nations a

23 multilateral imposition of sanctions against

24 the noncompliant party for the purposes of
40

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1 bringing the noncompliant party into com2 pliance; and

3 (vi) in the event that the noncompli4 ance continues for a period of longer than

5 one year after the date of the determina6 tion made pursuant to subparagraph (A),

7 promptly consult with the Senate for the

8 purposes of obtaining a resolution of sup9 port of continued adherence to the Conven10 tion, notwithstanding the changed cir11 cumstances affecting the object and pur12 pose of the Convention.

13 (B) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec14 tion may be construed to impair or otherwise

15 affect the authority of the Director of Central

16 Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and

17 methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant

18 to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security

19 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5)).

20 (C) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATIONS.—If

21 the President determines that an action other22 wise required under subparagraph (A) would

23 impair or otherwise affect the authority of the

24 Director of Central Intelligence to protect intel25 ligence sources and methods from unauthorized
41

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1 disclosure, the President shall report that deter2 mination, together with a detailed written ex3 planation of the basis for that determination, to

4 the chairmen of the Senate Select Committee

5 on Intelligence and the House Permanent Se6 lect Committee on Intelligence not later than 15

7 days after making such determination.

8 (14) FINANCING RUSSIAN IMPLEMENTATION.—

9 The United States understands that, in order to be

10 assured of the Russian commitment to a reduction

11 in chemical weapons stockpiles, Russia must main12 tain a substantial stake in financing the implementa13 tion of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agree14 ment and the Convention. The United States shall

15 not accept any effort by Russia to make deposit of

16 Russia’s instrument of ratification contingent upon

17 the United States providing financial guarantees to

18 pay for implementation of commitments by Russia

19 under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement or

20 the Convention.

21 (15) ASSISTANCE UNDER ARTICLE X.—

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—Prior to the deposit of

23 the United States instrument of ratification, the

24 President shall certify to the Congress that the
42

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1 United States shall not provide assistance

2 under paragraph 7(a) of Article X.

3 (B) COUNTRIES INELIGIBLE FOR CERTAIN

4 ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

5 ACT.—Prior to the deposit of the United States

6 instrument of ratification, the President shall

7 certify to the Congress that for any State Party

8 the government of which is not eligible for as9 sistance under chapter 2 of part II (relating to

10 military assistance) or chapter 4 of part II (re11 lating to economic support assistance) of the

12 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—

13 (i) no assistance under paragraph

14 7(b) of Article X will be provided to the

15 State Party; and

16 (ii) no assistance under paragraph

17 7(c) of Article X other than medical anti18 dotes and treatment will be provided to the

19 State Party.

20 (16) PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMA21 TION.—

22 (A) UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF UNIT23 ED STATES BUSINESS INFORMATION.—When24 ever the President determines that persuasive

25 information is available indicating that—
43

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1 (i) an officer or employee of the Orga2 nization has willfully published, divulged,

3 disclosed, or made known in any manner

4 or to any extent not authorized by the

5 Convention any United States confidential

6 business information coming to him in the

7 course of his employment or official duties

8 or by reason of any examination or inves9 tigation of any return, report, or record

10 made to or filed with the Organization, or

11 any officer or employee thereof, and

12 (ii) such practice or disclosure has re13 sulted in financial losses or damages to a

14 United States person,

15 the President shall, within 30 days after the re16 ceipt of such information by the executive

17 branch of Government, notify the Congress in

18 writing of such determination.

19 (B) WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FROM JURIS20 DICTION.—

21 (i) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than

22 270 days after notification of Congress

23 under subparagraph (A), the President

24 shall certify to Congress that the immunity

25 from jurisdiction of such foreign person
44

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1 has been waived by the Director-General of

2 the Technical Secretariat.

3 (ii) WITHHOLDING OF PORTION OF

4 CONTRIBUTIONS.—If the President is un5 able to make the certification described

6 under clause (i), then 50 percent of the

7 amount of each annual United States con8 tribution to the regular budget of the Or9 ganization that is assessed pursuant to

10 paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be with11 held from disbursement, in addition to any

12 other amounts required to be withheld

13 from disbursement by any other provision

14 of law, until—

15 (I) the President makes such cer16 tification, or

17 (II) the President certifies to

18 Congress that the situation has been

19 resolved in a manner satisfactory to

20 the United States person who has suf21 fered the damages due to the disclo22 sure of United States confidential

23 business information.

24 (C) BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY.—
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1 (i) CERTIFICATION.—In the case of

2 any breach of confidentiality involving both

3 a State Party and the Organization, in4 cluding any officer or employee thereof, the

5 President shall, within 270 days after pro6 viding written notification to Congress pur7 suant to subparagraph (A), certify to Con8 gress that the Commission described under

9 paragraph 23 of the Confidentiality Annex

10 has been established to consider the

11 breach.

12 (ii) WITHHOLDING OF PORTION OF

13 CONTRIBUTIONS.—If the President is un14 able to make the certification described

15 under clause (i), then 50 percent of the

16 amount of each annual United States con17 tribution to the regular budget of the Or18 ganization that is assessed pursuant to

19 paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be with20 held from disbursement, in addition to any

21 other amounts required to be withheld

22 from disbursement by any other provision

23 of law, until—

24 (I) the President makes such cer25 tification, or
46

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1 (II) the President certifies to

2 Congress that the situation has been

3 resolved in a manner satisfactory to

4 the United States person who has suf5 fered the damages due to the disclo6 sure of United States confidential

7 business information.

8 (D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:

9 (i) UNITED STATES CONFIDENTIAL

10 BUSINESS INFORMATION.—The term

11 ‘‘United States confidential business infor12 mation’’ means any trade secrets or com13 mercial or financial information that is

14 privileged and confidential, as described in

15 section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States

16 Code, and that is obtained—

17 (I) from a United States person;

18 and

19 (II) through the United States

20 National Authority or the conduct of

21 an inspection on United States terri22 tory under the Convention.

23 (ii) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The

24 term ‘‘United States person’’ means any

25 natural person or any corporation, partner-
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1 ship, or other juridical entity organized

2 under the laws of the United States.

3 (iii) UNITED STATES.—The term

4 ‘‘United States’’ means the several States,

5 the District of Columbia, and the common6 wealths, territories, and possessions of the

7 United States.

8 (17) CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES.—

9 (A) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the fol10 lowing findings:

11 (i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of

12 the United States Constitution states that

13 the President ‘‘shall have Power, by and

14 with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,

15 to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of

16 the Senators present concur’’.

17 (ii) At the turn of the century, Sen18 ator Henry Cabot Lodge took the position

19 that the giving of advice and consent to

20 treaties constitutes a stage in negotiation

21 on the treaties and that Senate amend22 ments or reservations to a treaty are prop23 ositions ‘‘offered at a later stage of the ne24 gotiation by the other part of the American
48

•SRES 75 IS

1 treaty making power in the only manner in

2 which they could then be offered’’.

3 (iii) The executive branch of Govern4 ment has begun a practice of negotiating

5 and submitting to the Senate treaties

6 which include provisions that have the pur7 ported effect of—

8 (I) inhibiting the Senate from at9 taching reservations that the Senate

10 considers necessary in the national in11 terest; or

12 (II) preventing the Senate from

13 exercising its constitutional duty to

14 give its advice and consent to treaty

15 commitments before ratification of the

16 treaties.

17 (iv) During the 85th Congress, and

18 again during the 102d Congress, the Com19 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

20 made its position on this issue clear when

21 stating that ‘‘the President’s agreement to

22 such a prohibition cannot constrain the

23 Senate’s constitutional right and obligation

24 to give its advice and consent to a treaty
49

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1 subject to any reservation it might deter2 mine is required by the national interest’’.

3 (B) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the

4 sense of the Senate that—

5 (i) the advice and consent given by the

6 Senate in the past to ratification of treaties

7 containing provisions which prohibit amend8 ments or reservations should not be construed

9 as a precedent for such provisions in future

10 treaties;

11 (ii) United States negotiators to a treaty

12 should not agree to any provision that has the

13 effect of inhibiting the Senate from attaching

14 reservations or offering amendments to the

15 treaty; and

16 (iii) the Senate should not consent in the

17 future to any article or other provision of any

18 treaty that would prohibit the Senate from giv19 ing its advice and consent to ratification of the

20 treaty subject to amendment or reservation.

21 (18) LABORATORY SAMPLE ANALYSIS.—Prior to

22 the deposit of the United States instrument of ratifi23 cation, the President shall certify to the Senate that

24 no sample collected in the United States pursuant to

25 the Convention will be transferred for analysis to
50

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1 any laboratory outside the territory of the United

2 States.

3 (19) EFFECT ON TERRORISM.—The Senate

4 finds that—

5 (A) without regard to whether the Conven6 tion enters into force, terrorists will likely view

7 chemical weapons as a means to gain greater

8 publicity and instill widespread fear; and

9 (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack

10 by the Aum Shinrikyo would not have been pre11 vented by the Convention.

12 (20) CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POW13 ERS.—

14 (A) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the fol15 lowing findings:

16 (i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention

17 allows a State Party to vote in the Organi18 zation if the State Party is in arrears in

19 the payment of financial contributions and

20 the Organization is satisfied that such non21 payment is due to conditions beyond the

22 control of the State Party.

23 (ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United

24 States Constitution vests in Congress the
51

•SRES 75 IS

1 exclusive authority to ‘‘pay the Debts’’ of

2 the United States.

3 (iii) Financial contributions to the Or4 ganization may be appropriated only by

5 Congress.

6 (B) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is therefore

7 the sense of the Senate that—

8 (i) such contributions thus should be

9 considered, for purposes of Article VIII(8)

10 of the Convention, beyond the control of

11 the executive branch of the United States

12 Government; and

13 (ii) the United States vote in the Or14 ganization should not be denied in the

15 event that Congress does not appropriate

16 the full amount of funds assessed for the

17 United States financial contribution to the

18 Organization.

19 (21) ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY.—It is the

20 sense of the Senate that the On-Site Inspection

21 Agency of the Department of Defense should have

22 the authority to provide assistance in advance of any

23 inspection to any facility in the United States that

24 is subject to a routine inspection under the Conven25 tion, or to any facility in the United States that is
52

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1 the object of a challenge inspection conducted pursu2 ant to Article IX, if the consent of the owner or op3 erator of the facility has first been obtained.

4 (22) LIMITATION ON THE SCALE OF ASSESS5 MENT.—

6 (A) LIMITATION ON ANNUAL ASSESS7 MENT.—Notwithstanding any provision of the

8 Convention, and subject to the requirements of

9 subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) the United

10 States shall pay as a total annual assessment

11 of the costs of the Organization pursuant to

12 paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more than

13 $25,000,000.

14 (B) RECALCULATION OF LIMITATION.—On

15 January 1, 2000, and at each 3-year interval

16 thereafter, the amount specified in subpara17 graph (A) is to be recalculated by the Adminis18 trator of General Services, in consultation with

19 the Secretary of State, to reflect changes in the

20 consumer price index for the immediately pre21 ceding 3-year period.

22 (C) ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS REQUIR23 ING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.—

24 (i) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding

25 subparagraph (A), the President may fur-
53

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1 nish additional contributions which would

2 otherwise be prohibited under subpara3 graph (A) if—

4 (I) the President determines and

5 certifies in writing to the Speaker of

6 the House of Representatives and the

7 Committee on Foreign Relations of

8 the Senate that the failure to provide

9 such contributions would result in the

10 inability of the Organization to con11 duct challenge inspections pursuant to

12 Article IX or would otherwise jeopard13 ize the national security interests of

14 the United States; and

15 (II) Congress enacts a joint reso16 lution approving the certification of

17 the President.

18 (ii) STATEMENT OF REASONS.—The

19 President shall transmit with such certifi20 cation a detailed statement setting forth

21 the specific reasons therefor, and the spe22 cific uses to which the additional contribu23 tions provided to the Organization would

24 be applied.
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1 (D) ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR

2 VERIFICATION.—Notwithstanding subparagraph

3 (A), for a period of not more than ten years,

4 the President may furnish additional contribu5 tions to the Organization for the purposes of

6 meeting the costs of verification under Articles

7 IV and V.

8 (23) ADDITIONS TO THE ANNEX ON CHEMI9 CALS.—

10 (A) PRESIDENTIAL NOTIFICATION.—Not

11 later than 10 days after the Director-General of

12 the Technical Secretariat communicates infor13 mation to all States Parties pursuant to Article

14 XV(5)(a) of a proposal for the addition of a

15 chemical or biological substance to a schedule of

16 the Annex on Chemicals, the President shall no17 tify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

18 Senate of the proposed addition.

19 (B) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.—Not later

20 than 60 days after the Director-General of the

21 Technical Secretariat communicates informa22 tion of such a proposal pursuant to Article

23 XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a posi24 tive recommendation by the Executive Council

25 pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever is
55

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1 sooner, the President shall submit to the Com2 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a re3 port, in classified and unclassified form, detail4 ing the likely impact of the proposed addition to

5 the Annex on Chemicals. Such report shall in6 clude—

7 (i) an assessment of the likely impact

8 on United States industry of the proposed

9 addition of the chemical or biological sub10 stance to a schedule of the Annex on

11 Chemicals;

12 (ii) a description of the likely costs

13 and benefits, if any, to United States na14 tional security of the proposed addition of

15 such chemical or biological substance to a

16 schedule of the Annex on Chemicals; and

17 (iii) a detailed assessment of the ef18 fect of the proposed addition on United

19 States obligations under the Verification

20 Annex.

21 (C) PRESIDENTIAL CONSULTATION.—The

22 President shall, after the submission of the no23 tification required under subparagraph (A) and

24 prior to any action on the proposal by the Exec25 utive Council under Article XV(5)(c), consult
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•SRES 75 IS

1 promptly with the Senate as to whether the

2 United States should object to the proposed ad3 dition of a chemical or biological substance pur4 suant to Article XV(5)(c).

5 (24) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate

6 affirms the applicability to all treaties of the Con7 stitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation

8 set forth in Condition (1) of the resolution of ratifi9 cation with respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes

10 of this declaration, the term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ refers

11 to the Treaty Between the United States of America

12 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the

13 Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short14 er Range Missiles, together with the related memo15 randum of understanding and protocols, approved by

16 the Senate on May 27, 1988.

17 (25) FURTHER ARMS REDUCTIONS OBLIGA18 TIONS.—The Senate declares its intention to con19 sider for approval international agreements that

20 would obligate the United States to reduce or limit

21 the Armed Forces or armaments of the United

22 States in a militarily significant manner only pursu23 ant to the treaty power as set forth in Article II,

24 section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.

25 (26) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.—
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1 (A) PERMITTED USES.—Prior the the de2 posit of the United States instrument of ratifi3 cation, the President shall certify to Congress

4 that the United States is not restricted by the

5 Convention in its use of riot control agents, in6 cluding the use against combatants who are

7 parties to a conflict, in any of the following

8 cases:

9 (i) UNITED STATES NOT A PARTY.—

10 The conduct of peacetime military oper11 ations within an area of ongoing armed

12 conflict when the United States is not a

13 party to the conflict (such as recent use of

14 the United States Armed Forces in Soma15 lia, Bosnia, and Ruanda).

16 (ii) CONSENSUAL PEACEKEEPING.—

17 Consensual peacekeeping operations when

18 the use of force is authorized by the receiv19 ing state, including operations pursuant to

20 Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

21 (iii) CHAPTER VII PEACEKEEPING.—

22 Peacekeeping operations when force is au23 thorized by the Securtity Council under

24 Chapter VII of the United Nations Char25 ter.
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1 (B) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President

2 shall take no measure, and prescribe no rule or

3 regulation, which would alter or eliminate Exec4 utive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.

5 (C) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the

6 term ‘‘riot control agent’’ has the meaning

7 given the term in Article II(7) of the Conven8 tion.

9 (27) CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION.—

10 Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument

11 of ratification of the Convention, the President shall

12 certify to the Congress that all of the following con13 ditions are satisfied:

14 (A) EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATIVE

15 TECHNOLOGIES.—The President has

16 agreed to explore alternative technologies

17 for the destruction of the United States

18 stockpile of chemical weapons in order to

19 ensure that the United States has the

20 safest, most effective and environmentally

21 sound plans and programs for meeting its

22 obligations under the Convention for the

23 destruction of chemical weapons.

24 (B) CONVENTION EXTENDS DESTRUC25 TION DEADLINE.—The requirement in sec-
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1 tion 1412 of Public Law 99–145 (50

2 U.S.C. 1521) for completion of the de3 struction of the United States stockpile of

4 chemical weapons by December 31, 2004,

5 will be superseded upon the date the Con6 vention enters into force with respect to

7 the United States by the deadline required

8 by the Convention of April 29, 2007.

9 (C) AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY A DIF10 FERENT DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY.—

11 The requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of

12 the Convention for a declaration by each

13 State Party not later than 30 days after

14 the date the Convention enters into force

15 with respect to that Party, on general

16 plans of the State Party for destruction of

17 its chemical weapons does not preclude in

18 any way the United States from deciding

19 in the future to employ a technology for

20 the destruction of chemical weapons dif21 ferent than that declared under that Arti22 cle.

23 (D) PROCEDURES FOR EXTENSION OF

24 DEADLINE.—The President will consult with

25 Congress on whether to submit a request to the
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1 Executive Council of the Organization for an

2 extension of the deadline for the destruction of

3 chemical weapons under the Convention, as pro4 vided under part IV(A) of the Annex on Imple5 mentation and Verification to the Convention,

6 if, as a result of the program of alternative

7 technologies for the destruction of chemical mu8 nitions carried out under section 8065 of the

9 Department of Defense Appropriations Act,

10 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104–208),

11 the President determines that alternatives to

12 the incineration of chemical weapons are avail13 able that are safer and more environmentally

14 sound but whose use would preclude the United

15 States from meeting the deadlines of the Con16 vention.

17 (28) CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST

18 UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—In order to protect

20 United States citizens against unreasonable

21 searches and seizures, prior to the deposit of

22 the United States instrument of ratification, the

23 President shall certify to Congress that—

24 (i) for any challenge inspection con25 ducted on the territory of the United
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1 States pursuant to Article IX, where con2 sent has been withheld, the United States

3 National Authority will first obtain a

4 criminal search warrant based upon prob5 able cause, supported by oath or affirma6 tion, and describing with particularity the

7 place to be searched and the persons or

8 things to be seized; and

9 (ii) for any routine inspection of a de10 clared facility under the Convention that is

11 conducted on an involuntary basis on the

12 territory of the United States, the United

13 States National Authority first will obtain

14 an administrative search warrant from a

15 United States magistrate judge.

16 (B) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this

17 resolution, the term ‘‘National Authority’’

18 means the agency or office of the United States

19 Government designated by the United States

20 pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Convention.

21 (29) RUSSIAN ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL

22 WEAPONS.—Prior to the deposit of the United

23 States instrument of ratification, the President shall

24 certify to the Congress that—
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1 (A) Russia is making reasonable progress

2 in the implementation of the Agreement be3 tween the United States of America and the

4 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruc5 tion and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons

6 and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral

7 Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons,

8 signed on June 1, 1990 (in this resolution re9 ferred to as the ‘‘1990 Bilateral Destruction

10 Agreement’’);

11 (B) the United States and Russia have re12 solved, to the satisfaction of the United States,

13 outstanding compliance issues under the Memo14 randum of Understanding Between the Govern15 ment of the United States of America and the

16 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a

17 Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Ex18 change Related to Prohibition on Chemical

19 Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on

20 September 23, 1989, also known as the ‘‘1989

21 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding’’,

22 and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement;

23 (C) Russia has deposited the Russian in24 strument of ratification for the Convention and
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1 is in compliance with its obligations under the

2 Convention; and

3 (D) Russia is committed to forgoing any

4 chemical weapons capability, chemical weapons

5 modernization program, production mobilization

6 capability, or any other activity contrary to the

7 object and purpose of the Convention.

8 (30) CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN OTHER STATES.—

9 (A) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Prior

10 to the deposit of the United States instrument

11 of ratification the President, in consultation

12 with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall

13 certify to the Congress that countries which

14 have been determined to have offensive chemical

15 weapons programs, including Iran, Iraq, Syria,

16 Libya, the Democratic People’s Republic of

17 Korea, China, and all other countries deter18 mined to be state sponsors of international ter19 rorism, have ratified or otherwise acceded to

20 the Convention.

21 (31) EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO BAR CERTAIN IN22 SPECTORS.—

23 (i) IN GENERAL.—The President shall

24 exercise United States rights under para25 graphs 2 and 4 of Part II of the Verifica-
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1 tion Annex to indicate United States non2 acceptance of all inspectors and inspection

3 assistants who are nationals of countries

4 designated by the Secretary of State as

5 supporters of international terrorism under

6 section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control

7 Act, or nationals of countries that have

8 been determined by the President, in the

9 last five years, to have violated United

10 States nonproliferation law, including—

11 (I) chapters 7, 8, and 10 of the

12 Arms Export Control Act;

13 (II) sections 821 and 824 of the

14 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act

15 of 1994;

16 (III) sections 11b and 11c of the

17 Export Administration Act of 1979;

18 (IV) the Export-Import Bank Act

19 of 1945; and

20 (V) sections 1604 and 1605 of

21 the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of

22 1992.

23 (ii) OTHER GROUNDS OF EXCLU24 SION.—The President shall also bar such

25 nationals from entering United States ter-
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1 ritory for the purpose of conducting any

2 activity associated with the Convention,

3 notwithstanding paragraph 7 of Part II of

4 the Verification Annex.

5 (32) STEMMING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEM6 ICAL WEAPONS.—Prior to the deposit of the United

7 States instrument of ratification, the President shall

8 certify to Congress that—

9 (A) the State Parties have concluded an

10 agreement amending the Convention—

11 (i) by striking Article X; and

12 (ii) by amending Article XI to strike

13 any provision that states or implies dis14 approval of trade restrictions in the field of

15 chemical activities, including paragraphs

16 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e); and

17 (B) no provision has been added to the

18 Convention or to any of its annexes, and no

19 statement, written or oral, has been issued by

20 the Organization, stating or implying the right

21 or obligation of States Parties to share or facili22 tate the exchange among themselves of chemical

23 weapons defense technology, chemicals, equip24 ment, or scientific and technical information.

25 (33) EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.—
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1 (A) CERTIFICATION.—Prior to the deposit

2 of the United States instrument of ratification,

3 the President shall certify to Congress that

4 compliance with the Convention is effectively

5 verifiable.

6 (B) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:

7 (i) EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE.—The

8 term ‘‘effectively verifiable’’ means that the

9 Director of Central Intelligence has cer10 tified to the President that the United

11 States intelligence community (as defined

12 in section 3(4) of the National Security

13 Act of 1947) has a high degree of con14 fidence in its ability to detect militarily sig15 nificant violations of the Convention, in16 cluding the production, possession, or stor17 age of militarily significant quantities of le18 thal chemicals, in a timely fashion, and to

19 detect patterns of marginal violation over

20 time.

21 (ii) MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT.—The

22 term ‘‘militarily significant’’ means one

23 metric ton or more of chemical weapons

24 agent.
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1 (iii) TIMELY FASHION.—The term

2 ‘‘timely fashion’’ means detection within

3 one year of the violation having occurred.

4 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

5 As used in this resolution:

6 (1) CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OR CON7 VENTION.—The terms ‘‘Chemical Weapons Conven8 tion’’ and ‘‘Convention’’ mean the Convention on the

9 Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling

10 and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their De11 struction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the

12 United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, includ13 ing the following protocols and memorandum of un14 derstanding, all such documents being integral parts

15 of and collectively referred to as the ‘‘Chemical

16 Weapons Convention’’ or the ‘‘Convention’’ (con17 tained in Treaty Document 103–21):

18 (A) The Annex on Chemicals.

19 (B) The Annex on Implementation and

20 Verification.

21 (C) The Annex on the Protection of Con22 fidential Information.

23 (D) The Resolution Establishing the Pre24 paratory Commission for the Organization for

25 the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
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1 (E) The Text on the Establishment of a

2 Preparatory Commission.

3 (2) ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Organization’’

4 means the Organization for the Prohibition of

5 Chemical Weapons established under the Conven6 tion.

7 (3) STATE PARTY.—The term ‘‘State Party’’

8 means any nation that is a party to the Convention.

9 (4) UNITED STATES INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICA10 TION.—The term ‘‘United States instrument of rati11 fication’’ means the instrument of ratification of the

12 United States of the Convention.

Æ