NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0287n.06 Filed: Apr il 16, 2009 No. 08-3723 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

MI RASH PEPA J; RI T A

PEPAJ; EVA P E P A J; N I K O P E P A J, P e ti ti one r s,

v. ERI C H

. HOL DER, J R., U nited States Attor ne y Ge ne ra l, Respondent.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON P ETIT ION F OR RE VI EW FROM THE B OARD OF IM M IG RA T IO N A P P E A LS

O P I N I O N

Be for e : B OG G S, C hie f Judg e ; M OORE and SUT TON , C ir c uitJudg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Petitioners Miras h P epaj, Rita Pepaj, Eva Pepaj, and Niko Pepa

j (collec tively , the “Pepa

js”), natives a

nd citizens of A lbania, see k revie w of a dec ision of the Boa

rd of I mmigration Appe als (“B I A”) denying the ir untimely motion to reopen the ir re mov a l pro ceedi ng s und e r 8 C.F .R. § 1 00 3. 2. Th e Pe pa js a rgue that th e B I A a

bu se d it s discretion when it de nied their reque st to equitably toll the time limi t for their motion to reope n. The P e p a j s d i d n o t f i l e t h e i r m o t i o n t o r e o p e nu n t i l M ar c h 3 1 , 2 0 0 8 , m o r e t h ans e v e ny e ar s a f t e r t h e B IA dismiss ed their initial appe al as untimely on J une 14, 2000. Although the Pepajs contend that they did not learn that their a

ppeal ha d been dismissed and that their counsel’s perfor mance had bee n de fi c ie nt u

nti l Ma rc h 2 00 5, the y sti ll wa ite d mor e tha n thr e e y e ars to fi le the mot ion to r e op e n w ith2

the B I A. Beca

use we conclude that the B I A did not abuse its discretion in deny ing e quitable tolling on the g round that the Pepa js did not ex erc ise due dilig ence , we DENY the petition for re view.

I. BACKG ROUND Mirash Pepaj e ntere d the United States on Marc h 5, 1995, as a nonimmigra nt visitor. He wa s later joined b y h is wife, Rita, and c hildren, Eva a nd Niko, in September a nd October

of 1997. Mirash subseque ntly

applied for

asylum and withholding of r emoval, listing his wife and childre n as der ivative applica

nts. On Marc h 25, 1998, an asy lum o ff i ce r wit h the forme r I mmigration and Natura liz ation Service (“I NS”) re fer

red the asylum application to an im migr ation judge (“I J ”). After

a mer its hearingon Marc h 24, 2000, the I J denied a sy lum and withholding of r emoval and or dere d the Pepajs depor

ted to A lbania. Althoug h a Notice of Appe al must be filed with the B I A within 30 day s of an I J ’s dec ision (in this case by April 24, 2000), the Pepajs’ counsel did not file a Notice of Appea l until M ay 12, 2000. The B I A there fore dismiss ed the a ppeal f or lac k of jurisdiction in an opinion dated J une 14, 2000. The gove rnment does not dispute that the P epajs rece ived i neff ective assistance of

counsel in their 1998–2000 asylum proce eding s. I n 1997, the P epajs retained attorney Valer ie Yae g er, w ho prac ticed immigr ation law in Michig an bef ore be ing suspe n d ed b y t h e S tate B ar of Michig an on Dec ember

20, 20 0 0

. Ya ege r ac companied Mira sh and Rita Pepaj to their interview with the I

NS asylum officer

in 1998. Yaeg er br oug ht an interpre ter to that interview, but the i nterpre ter did not speak the same diale ct of Alba nian as the Pepa

js. Yaeg er a l s o t o l d the asylum officer at the interview that she would submit certain m is s in g d o c u me nts that wer e aw aiting tr anslation. Howe ver, unknown to the Pepajs at the time, Ya eg er ne ver submitted the documents. B oth Yaeg er—w ho subequently

acknow ledg ed her

defic ient perf

ormanc e—and Rita Pepa

j attribute the asylum officer ’sYae g er w as suspende d from the pr actice of law by the S tate Bar of Michig an on De cembe r 1 20, 2000, but continued to work a s a “le gal as s i s t ant” for her fathe r—who took over

Yae g er’ s prac tice—bef

ore r elocating to California in 2002. I n Marc h 2005, Yae g er a g ree d to a stipulated order of discipline by

the Stat e of Michig an’s Attorne y Discipline Boa

rd in which she ple aded no contest to a number

of allegations, including fa ilure to notify clients and c ourts of her

suspension, failure to file pleading s, and failure to notify clients of hea

ring s, to list a fe w. Under the disciplinary order , Yae g er was require d to pa y restitution to various former clients and g iven a two-y ear term of probation ef

fec tive upon her r einstatement to pra ctice la w in Michig an. 3 decision to ref

er the as y lum application to an immigration judge to Ya eg er’ s failure to submit the promised documentation. J oint Appe ndix (“J.A.”) at 53 (Ya eg er Aff. at 1); J.A. at 35 (Rita Pepaj L etter at 1). Yae g er c ontinued to repre sent the Pepajs at the me rits hear ing be fore the I J on Marc h 24, 2000. Although Y aeg er’ s father , Noel L ippman, acte d as l ea d counsel at the hear ing, Y aeg er

rema ined the primar

y attorney on the ca se and wa s re sponsible for docume nt prepa ration and obtaining a

competent tra

nslator. Ag ain, howeve r, Ya eg er’ s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt. A ccor ding to both Ri ta Pepaj and Y aeg er, the I J reje cted se vera l key documents at the he aringbeca use of tr ans la tio n p ro ble ms, and the tr ans la tor a t the he ari ng int e nti on a lly ma de tr ans la tio n e rr or s b e c a us e of alleg ed per sonal animosity toward Y aeg er. A fter the I J denied a sy lum and withholding of

remova l on March 24, 2000, the Pepajs asked Yae g er to f ile an appe al with the B I A. The Pepa js (as well as Ya eg er’ s father , who s e name was now on the case as counse l) believe d that Yae g er ha d proper ly perf ecte d an appe al of the I J ’s dec ision. However , Yae g er missed the thirty -day deadline to file a Notice of Appe al by more than two wee ks, and never submi tted a brief to the B I A. J .A. at 53 (Ya eg er A ff. at 1); J .A. at 35 (Rita Pepaj L etter at 1). 1The g overnme nt sugg ests that the P ep aj s l earned that their a ppeal ha d been dismissed as 2 un tim e ly so me tim e be fo re Marc h 2 00 5, wh e n th e y we nt t o L ipp man’ s o ff

ic e to i nq uir e a bo ut t he ir case . W e, l i k e t h e BIA, will assume for pur poses of this appea l that the Pepajs did not learn that their appe al was dismissed until March 2005. Ev a Pe pa j, n owan a du lt a

nd no t e lig ibl e fo r d e ri vativ e a sylum , f ile d a se pa rate mot ion

to 3 reope n and aske d that her case be seve red f rom her pa

rents’ c ases. B eca

use, howe ver, the case s were primarily based on the same inef

fec tive-assistance claims, the B I A treated the motions to reopen a s one. The BIA stated that even though Eva, like her mother Rita, had an a pproved e mploy

ment-base d I -1 40 vis a pe tit ion , th a t di d n ot r e qu ir e it t o s e ve r t he c a se s. 4 A c c o r d i n g t o t h e P e p a

j s , t h e y d i d n o t l e ar

n t h a t t h e i r a

p p e a l h a d b e e n d i s m i s s e d b y t h e B IA (and that their counsel had been ineffe ctive) until Mar ch 2005. On Marc h 4, 2005, the Pepajs filed 2

a re ques t fo r an i nvestig ation of Ya eg er w ith the State of Michig an’s Attorne y Grieva nce Commi ssion. I n an attache d letter, Rita Pepa j de tailed Yae g er’ s various err ors during the interview wi th t he a sylum

of fi c e r a nd the me ri ts h e ari ngbe fo re the I J and e xpla ine d tha t Ya e g e r h a d r e c e ntl y

c on fe sse d to he r t

hat Y a e g e r ha d no t pe rf

e c te d an a pp e a l wi th the B I A. I n a Ma rc h 7, 20 05 , a ff

ida vit , Yae g er admitted the err ors descr ibed by Rita Pepa j a nd conce ded that her repr ese n t at i o n o f t he Pepajs befor e the a sy lum officer , the I J , and the B I A was ine ffe ctive. Mo re tha n thre e y e ars la te r, on

Marc h 3 1, 20 08 , th e Pe pa js f ile d a mo ti on to r e op e n th e ir

remova l proce eding s with the BIA. The Pepa js arg ued that the B I A should reope n their ca se under 3 8 C.F .R. § 10 03 .2 (c ) ba se d up on the ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Th e Pe pa js a lso a sk e d the B I A to e xer c ise its su a sp on te dis c re tio n to re op e n th e c a se un de r 8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(a)

. On May 20, 2008, the BI A denied the P epajs’ motion to reope n. Noting that the motion was filed m ore than seven y ear s afte r t he B I A dismissed the appea l, the BIA conc luded that the motion

wa s unti me ly

un de r t he nin e ty -d ay

de a dli ne of

8 U .S. C. § 12 29 a (c )( 7) (C )( i) and 8 C. F .R.5

§ 1 00 3. 2( c )( 2) (p ro vid ing that, wi th c e rt a in e xce pti on s n ot r e le va nt h e re , a mot ion to r e op e n mu st be fi le d w ith in n ine ty

da y s o f a fi na l a dmi nis tr a tiv e or de r of rem ova l) . T he B I A r e fu se d to a pp ly

e qu ita ble tol lin g to e xcu se the Pe pa js’ fa ilure tim e ly

to f ile , f ind ingthat th e Pe pa

js d id n ot e xer c ise due dilige nce in f

iling the mo t i o n to reope n afte r lea rning that they

had re ceive d ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. The B I A as s u m ed t h at the Pepajs did not learn that their appe al had be en dismiss ed and that their counsel had been ineffe ctive until Mar ch 2005. Stil l, the BIA conc luded, the Pepajs wa ited more than thre e y ear s to file the motion to reope n. Additionally , the B I A ruled that the Pepajs had f

ailed to show “e x ceptional circ umstances” that would war rant the exercise of

its sua sponte authority

to reope n the proc eeding s. The Pepajs timely filed a pe tition for review

. II. AN AL YSI S I t is undisputed that the Pepajs’ Marc h 2008 motion to reopen their r emoval proc eeding s was untimely and that the Pepa

js’ counsel was ineffe ctive. The sole que stion presented is whe ther the BIA abuse d its discr etion by ref using to e quitably

toll the ninety -day

filing de adline for

the motion to reope n. “We re view the B I A’s denia l of a m o t i o n t o reopen under a n abuse- of-discr etion standard.” Barry v. M

ukasey , 5 2 4 F

. 3 d

7 2 1 , 7 2 4 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 8 )

. A p p ly

in g th is s ta

n d ar d , we consider w hether

the B I A’s den i al o f t h e motion “was ma de without a rational expl anation, inexpl icably depar

ted from e stablished policies, or re sted on an impermissible basis such a s invidious di scrimination ag ainst a par ticular ra ce or

g roup.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). “Strictly define d, equitable tolling is [t] he doctrine that the s tatute of limit ations will not bar a cla im if the plaintiff, despite diligent eff orts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period ha d expired.” Tapia-Martinez v. Gonzales , 482 F.3d 417, 4 2 2 (6 th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation marks omitted) (alter ation in orig inal). “We pre viously have a ppl i ed t h e d o ctrine of6

equitable toll ing to otherwise time-ba rre d motions t o reope n.” Ba rry , 524 F.3d at 724. We also have

rec og nized that “[e] quitable tolling may apply when a petitioner has rec eived inef fec tive assistance of c ounsel.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). I n deter mining whe ther to equitably toll an otherwise time-barr ed motion to reope n, we c onsider the f ollowing f

ive fa ctors: “( 1) the pe titioner’s lack of notice of the filing r equire ment ; (2 ) t h e p eti tioner’s lac k of construc tive knowledg e of the fi lin g re qu ir e me nt; (3 ) d ili g e nc e in pur su ing on e ’s ri g hts ; (4) a bs e nc e of pr e jud ic e to t he re sp on de nt;

and (5 ) t he pe tit ion e r’ s r e a so na

ble ne ss i n r e ma ini ngig no ra nt o f t he le g a l r e qu ir e me nt f

or fi lin g his claim.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). Her e, the B I A conc luded t hat the Pepajs did not establish that they exercised due diligenc e in filing the moti on to reope n afte r di scover ing that Yae g er had provided ineffec tive assistance of counsel. We a g ree . We pr eviously have held that waiting fiftee n months to file a motion to reope n afte r lear ning of counsel’s ineffe ctive assistance shows a lack of due dilig ence . Tapia-Martinez , 482 F.3d at 424. Even assuming, as did the BI A, that the Pepajs did not lear n that their appe al had be en dismiss ed (a

nd that their counse l was ineff ective) until Marc h 2005, the P epajs sti ll waited more tha n thr e e y e ars to f

ile a mot ion to r e op e n w ithth e BI A. Th e Pe pa js o ff e r n o r e a l e xplanatio n f

or thi s thr e e -y e ar d e lay , n or

any g ro un ds fo r d ist inguis hin g thi s c a se fr om Tapia-Martinez

. Th e Pe pa js a rgue that th e B I A e rr e d b e c a us e it re lie d sole ly up on the dil ig e nc e fa c tor and did

no t a d dr e ss t he oth e r f our e qu ita ble -t oll ingfa c tor s art ic ulate d b y thi s c ou rt . H ow e ve r, our p re c e de nts do not sugg est that the B I A must address a ll five fac tor s . I n d ee d , we pr eviously have de nied equitable tolling w hen the petitioner’s only err or wa s a fa ilure to exercise due diligenc e. Se e Ba rry , 524 F.3d at 725 (denying e quitable tolling for lack of diligenc e where the petitioner “did not i nquire about her immigration status for approximately one y ear despite havingactua l knowledg e that theB oth Rita Pe pa j and Ev a Pe pa j ha ve ob ta ine d a

pp ro ve d I -1 40 pe tit ion s. 4 7 BIA dismissed her case , and, afte r lear ning of the need to f

ile a motion to reope n, she wa ited over thr e e mon ths to f

ile ” ); Tapia-Martinez , 482 F.3d at 424 (deny i n g eq u itable tolling for lack of due dil ig e nc e wh e re pe titio ner “ did no t f ile a mot ion a lle g ingine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e by Ya e g e r u

nti l fiftee n months after she discovere d Yae g er’ s deficie nt perfor mance ”). Th e Pe pa js a lso po int to the ir e ff

or ts un de r the a lte rn a tiv e imm ig ra tio n r ou te of

e mpl oy me ntba se d v isa s. Th e y

argue that th e se e ff

or ts d e mon str a te the re qu isi te dil ig e nc e in p ur su ingthe ir ri g hts 4

and that it wa s r e a so na

ble fo r t he m to, a mon g oth e r thi ng s, “ wa it fo r the ir la bo r c e rt if ic a tio ns pr oc e ss to conclude” befor e filing their motion to re open. Pepajs Br

. at 10. Howeve r, we fail to se e how the Pe pa js’ a pp a re nt dil ig e nc e in t

he e mpl oy

me nt- ba se d- vis a

c on te xt exc us e s th e ir

la c k o f d ili g e nc e in pursuing their asylum and withholdi n g-o f- remova l claims. Reg ardle ss of alternative avenue s of relief potentially available , a petitioner must exercise due dilig ence in pursuing a motion to reopen

or e lse e qu ita

ble tol lin g wi ll n ot b e a va ila ble . By Mar ch 20 05 the Pe pa js w e re awa

re that th e ir

a pp e a l to the B I A ha d be e n dis mis se d a nd that Y a e g e r h a d p ro vid e d in e ff e c tiv e re pr e se ntatio n. Ye t, without ex planation, they did not file a motion to re open alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e until March 2008. I n sum, the BIA did not abuse its discr etion in finding that the Pepajs failed to e x erc ise due diligenc e bec ause the y did not file a motion to reope n alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e ag ainst Yae g er until more than three y ear s afte r they discovere d Yae g er’ s deficie nt repre sentation. Acc ording ly , we cannot sa y that the B I A abuse d its discreti o n i n d ec l i n i n g to equitably toll the tim e per iod for the Pepajs to file their motion to reopen.8 III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we DENY the petition for re view.