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ORDER DENYING ROLLNESS’ 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD ALLEN FABEL, 

RODNEY ROLLNESS, 

JOSHUA BINDER, and 

RICKY JENKS, and

PAUL FOSTER.

Defendants.

Case No. CR06-041L

ORDER DENYING ROLLNESS’

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on defendant Rollness’ “Motion To Suppress

Evidence” (Dkt. #290). Rollness moves to suppress all evidence obtained during the February

14, 2006 and February 17, 2006 searches of his property as well as the fruits of those searches. 

In support of his motion, Rollness argues that the warrant was based on evidence that was

speculative and stale and therefore not “sufficient to justify a conclusion that the property which

is the object of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is

issued.” United States v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1991). Rollness also contends

that agents exceeded the scope of the search warrant and that the warrant was impermissibly

overbroad.

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ORDER DENYING ROLLNESS’ 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 10, 2006 a search warrant was signed and issued for the Rollness residence

by Magistrate Judge James Donohue. The warrant was based on an affidavit prepared and

signed by FBI Special Agent Dennis O’Dell. The primary search was executed on February 14,

2006 with a follow up search taking place on February 17, 2006.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Was There Probable Cause?

A magistrate judge’s determination of probable cause is “accorded great deference and is

reversed only if that determination is clearly erroneous.” United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272,

275 (9th Cir. 1990). As such, this Court need only determine that the magistrate judge “had a

substantial basis for finding probable cause.” United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973,

978 (9th Cir. 2002). In making a probable cause determination, “[a] magistrate may ‘draw

reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the

evidence and the type of offense.’” United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993)

(quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 The Court believes that the O’Dell affidavit contained sufficient facts to provide a

substantial basis for Magistrate Judge Donohue’s finding of probable cause. Similarly, the

Court does not believe that the evidence contained in the affidavit was prohibitively stale. As

the defendant concedes, “‘[t]he mere lapse of substantial amounts of time is not controlling in a

question of staleness.’” United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993)). Information is not stale if “there is

sufficient basis to believe, based on a continuing pattern or other good reasons, that the items to

be seized are still on the premises.” United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 1984)). The affidavit at issue here

provided a sufficient basis to conclude that the pattern of activity would have been ongoing at

the point the search warrant was issued and that evidence related to the crimes at issue would

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ORDER DENYING ROLLNESS’ 

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still be present on the property. Though Rollness may have left the Hells Angels in September

2003, the affidavit explicitly describes why relevant evidence would likely still be found in

February 2006:

HAMC members are required to possess items showing their association or

membership with the HAMC, including but not limited to vests, colors,

patches, pins, stickers, t-shirts, documents, photographs, and other

memorabilia depicting HAMC association or membership. These items are

typically maintained at the residences and business of the members and

associates. Although former members are required to give back their club

colors, it is likely that even former members such as Rollness and Binder

will still maintain documents, photographs, and other memorabilia

depicting their past association with the HAMC as V-1 and CI-1 did. 

Motion, Appendix A at p. 45. The Court believes the magistrate court’s probable

cause determination was sound.

B. Was the Warrant Overbroad?

Defendant also argues that the warrant at issue was impermissibly overbroad. In a RICO

action, “any evidence relevant to prove any element of the RICO offense is potentially seizable.” 

United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 793 (9th Cir. 1984). The Government maintains that the

warrant was crafted to target “association” evidence and was thus not overbroad. In order to

support the seizure of broad associational evidence, however, the affidavit must do more than

just establish that the suspect was associated with a particular enterprise. Id. at 794. Instead, the

affidavit “must also provide probable cause to believe that the subject has conducted the affairs

of the enterprise, at least in part, through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. The affidavit

here did not rest on a simple allegation of Rollness’ association with the Hells Angels. Rather,

the affidavit established probable cause to believe that there was a “nexus” between Rollness’

association with the Hells Angels and some form of criminal activity, including the murder of

Michael Walsh and the trafficking of stolen motorcycles. See Id. As such, the Court concludes

that the affidavit was sufficiently tailored to support the seizure of a broad category of

associational evidence.

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C. Did the Government Exceed the Scope of the Warrant?

Defendant contends that agents also exceeded the scope of the search warrant when it

seized “boxes and boxes” of evidence from the Rollness home. Motion at p. 11. The Ninth

Circuit has held that broad seizures of evidence may be permissible in some instances: “If

commingling prevents on-site inspection, and no other practical alternative exists, the entire

property may be seizable, at least temporarily.” United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1340

(9th Cir. 1982). In light of the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the Court

concludes that on-site inspection of all the seized material was impractical given the layout of

the property, the volume of the material to be searched, the time limitations on the search and

the way in which the property was stored by Rollness. The Court also concludes that evidence

related to the “Filthy Few” patch, photographs depicting individuals known to be associated with

various criminal activities, and other records and property discussed at the evidentiary hearing

all had a sufficient nexus to the crimes under investigation to justify seizure. See United States

v. Kane, 450 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1971).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Rollness’ motion to suppress (Dkt. #290) is

DENIED.

 DATED this 6th day of February, 2007.

A

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

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