2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
1-15-2004 

# U S A v . Kit che n P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 02-4290

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/1091NOT PRE CEDENT IAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT Case No: 02-4290 UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v.
SYLVE STER KIT CHEN, Appellant

__________________ On Ap peal f rom the U nited S tates D istrict Co urt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. No. 02-CR-00245) Distri ct Judge: The Honorable James T. Gil es

__________________ Su bm itted Pu rsua nt to LA R 3 4.1 January13, 2004 Be for e: B AR RY , SM ITH , and GR EE NB ER G, Circuit Judges (Fil ed: January 14, 2004)

_____________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

_____________ SM ITH , Circuit

Judge. Defendan t Syl vester Kitchen pleaded guiltyto 19 counts of making false statements to a f ederally licensed firearms d ealer in violation of 1 8 U.S .C. § 924 (a)(1)(A);1 We use the term “road rage” t o descri be the ci rcumstance s of the s hooting of Muniz,

as this term was u sed by both parti es. 2 Government authoriti es recovered two of the 19 fi rearms sol d by Kit chen. The firearm used to shoot

Muniz was seized on the day of t he shooti ng. A second firearm—also a 9 mm Bryco pist ol—was discovered al ong with 12 rounds of ammunition 2 one count of unl awful deali ng in firearms in vi olati on of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a )(1)( A) and 924(a)( 1)(D); a nd two counts of t ransfer ring fi rearms t o a convict ed felon i n violat ion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1) and 924( a)(2) . The District Court sent enced Kitchen to 57 months imprisonm ent. Kitchen appeals the D istrict Court’s decision at sen tencing to de part upward pursuant

to U.S.S. G. § 5K2.2 because of a s ignifi cant phy sicalinjury sus taine d by a thir d pe rson . I. Bet ween Marc h 20 00 a nd Oc to ber 200 1, Kit che n pu rc has ed 1 9 se par at e fi re ar ms from licensed firearms dealers i n the Philadelphia area and then il legallyresold those firearms to di fferent

indivi duals. Kitchen re sold multiple f irearms to two indi viduals who Kitchen knew to be dr

ug dealer s. On at l east one oc casion, Kitchen al tered or obliterate d the s erial num ber fro m a fire arm that h e res old
. On Apr il14, 200 0, Kit che n pu rc has ed a nd i ll ega ll y re sol d a 9 mm Bry co Arms semiautomatic pis tol. Thirte en months lat er, t hat fi rearm was used bya motoris t to s hoot Julio M uniz in an ap paren t “road rage” incide nt. 1 Muniz was shot multi ple ti mes in the abdomen and legs. Muniz suffered a shattered femur and sever e tis sue and nerve da mage, and required extensive surgeryto reconstruct one of his l egs. 2in a stud ent’s b ook bag a t Sprin g G arden Elem entary Sc hoo l in Ph iladelp hia. N o on e is

kno wn t o ha ve b een in

ju re d byth is se con d fi re ar m.

3 Ho w th e fir earm use d to sho ot M uni z trav eled fro m K itche n’s h and s is u nkn ow n. The indivi dual who shot Muniz did not obtain t he fire arm direc tly

from Kitchen, and the record cont ains no evi dence regar ding the i dentit y of t he person t o whom K itche n orig inall y sold that f irear m. Under the Sentencing G uidelines, Kit chen’s convictions resulted in a base offense level of 14. Kitc hen’s offens e levelwas adjust ed upward (a) two levels bec ause one of the fi rearms had an a ltered or obli terated seri al number, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1( b)(4); (b) four level s because t

here were bet ween 8 and 24 firearms ill egall y sol d, § 2K2.1(b) (1)(B); and (c) four levels be cause K itchen distributed firearm s to individuals w hom he kne w w ere involved i n ill egal drug s ales, § 2K2.1(b)(5) . Kitc hen’s offens e levelwas adjust ed downw ard three levels for accept ance of responsibility. U.S.S. G. § 3E1.1. Because Kitchen had no criminal hist ory , his offense le vel y ielde d a sentenc ing range of 37 to 46
mon ths. Pursuant to § 5K2 .2 and ba sed on the injuries to M uniz, the D istrict Court depa rted up wa rd tw o leve ls for e ngag ing in c ond uct tha t resulted in sign ifican t injury to another pe rson, yielding a sentencing range of 46 to 57 mon ths. The D istrict Court
sen tenc ed K itche n to the m axim um 57 m ont hs im priso nm ent. Kitchen appeal s onlythe Dist rict Court’s upward de partur e under § 5K2.2. The Distric t Cou rt had ju risdiction pursu ant to 1 8 U .S.C. § 323 1. W e hav e app ellate juri sdiction pursua nt to 28 U.S. C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742( a). As this i s an appeal3 Section 401( d)(2) of the Prose cutori al Remedies and Tool s Against t he Exploit ation of Childre n Today Act of 2003 ( the “PROTECT Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 670 , am end ed 1 8 U .S.C . § 37 42, w hich gov ern s ou r rev iew of s ente ncin g ap pea ls. See United Stat

es v. Fraz ier , 340 F.3 d 5, 1 4 (1 st C ir. 20 03) , cert. denied , ___ S.Ct. ___, 2003 WL 229 268 14 (D ec. 15 , 2003 ); United Stat es v. Jone s , 332 F.3d 1294, 12 99 (10th C ir. 200 3), cert. denied , 124 S.C t. 457 (2003 ).
4 The Distric t Cou rt’s judg men t was entere d on No vem ber 1 9, 200 2. In res pon se to the PROTEC T Act, and duri ng the pendencyof this appeal, the Unite d States Sentenci ng Commission amended U.S.S. G. § 5K2.0 effecti ve October 27, 2003. Pursua nt to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a )(4)( A) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1. 11(a), we follow the gui deline s in effec t on the d ate th at K itche n w as se nten ced
. See United St ates v. Brannan , 74 F .3d 4 48, 4 50 n .1 (3d Cir . 199 6). 4 ch al le ngi ng a

de pa rt ur e f ro m t he ap pl ic ab le gui de li ne s r an ge , w e r ev ie w de novo the District Court’s application of the guideli nes to the facts. 3 II. A distri ct court

may “i mpose a sentenc e outsi de the ra nge establ ished bythe applic able gui deline s, i f the court finds ‘that there e xist s an aggravat ing or mitigati ng circumst ance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequatel y t aken int o consider ation by the Sentenci ng Commission in formulati ng the guide lines that s hould res ult i n a sentenc e diffe rent fro m tha t descr ibed.’” U.S .S.G . § 5K 2.0 (q uoting 18 U .S.C. § 355 3(b)); see also United Stat

es v. Phi lipos ian , 267 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 200 1). 4 The Sentencing Gu ideli nes pro vid e a lis t of “ enc our age d fa ctor s” u pon wh ich d epa rture ma y be b ase d. Koon v. United St

ates , 518 U .S. 81, 9 4 (19 96); see U.S .S .G. § 5K2 .0 (“ id entif y in g so me of the facto rs that the Co mm ission h as no t been able to take in to acc oun t fully in formulating the gui deline s”). Section 5K2. 2 of the Sent encing Guidel ines i dentif ies5

“signi ficant

personalinjury” as an encouraged fac tor for departure: If si gnific ant phy sicalinjury r esult ed, the court mayincrea se the s entence above the authorized gui deline range. The extent of the incre ase ordi naril y shoul d depend on the ext ent of the injur y, the degre e to which i t may prove permanent, and the exten t to w hich th e injury w as inten ded o r kno win gly risked . Wh en the victim suff ers a m ajor, pe rman ent disa bility and w hen s uch in jury wa s intentio nally infli cted, a substantialdeparture may be appr opriate. If t he injur y i s less seri ous or if the defendant ( though cri minall y negl igent) did not knowingl y cr eate the ris k of harm, ale ss sub st antia l d epartur e wou ld be i ndi cated. In gen er al , t he s ame consideration s apply as in § 5K 2.1 [D eath]. Departures based on encouraged factors are authorized i f the substantive offense Gu ideli ne d oes not alrea dy tak e the fac tor in to ac cou nt. Koon , 518 U.S . at 96
. Kitchen conced es that the injuries suffe red by M uniz are significa nt and w ere caused by the use of one of the firearms that Kitchen il legallyresold. Nevertheless, Kit che n ar gue s tha t the s ubs tanti ve g uid eline app licab le to f irear ms off ens es, U .S.S .G. § 2K 2. 1, alr ea dyad dr es se s t he fa ct or s o n w hi ch t he Di st r i ct Co urt ba se d i t s d ep art ur e. We disa gre e. Our cases est ablis h that § 2K2. 1 general ly preclude s departure based on t he potential that i llega lly sold fire arm s w ill be use d in futu re cr ime s. United Stat es v. Cicire llo , 301 F .3d 13 5, 143 -45 (3 d C ir. 2002 ); United States v. Bass , 54 F.3d 125, 130- 31 (3 d C ir. 1995 ); United Stat es v. Uca , 867 F .2d 78 3, 788 -90 (3 d C ir. 1989 ). This is because “the guidel ines r egarding i llega l gun activit y alreadycontai n some presumpti on of inte nded unlawful use that i s factored into t he base offense level .” Cicire llo , 301 F.3d at 144. But although § 2K2.1 general ly addresse s the potential for the c riminaluse of6

illegally sold firearms, that guideline doe s not accou nt for actual injury inflicte d w ith such weapons. Section 2K2.1 thus does not addr ess the critical factor present ed to the Dis trict C our t in th is ca se, n am ely, the sign ifica nt p hysica l inju ries to M uni z. Com pare U.S.S.G. § 2B3. 1(b)(3) (adjus ting t he offense l evel for

robbery“[i]f any vi ctim sus taine d bodily injury”) ; U.S.S. G. § 5K2.0 (“[P]hy sicalinjury would not warrant departur e from the guidelines w hen the rob bery offense g uideline is applicab le because the robbery gui delin e inc lud es a spe cific adju stm ent b ase d on the e xten t of a ny inju ry.”). W e theref ore agree with the Dis tri ct Court t hat Muniz’s i njuri es take t his cas e out of the “heart land” of § 2K2.1. U.S.S.G., Ch.1, pt . A § 4(b) (“ The Comm issi on intends the sentenci ng courts to treat each gui deline as carvi ng out a ‘heartl and,’ a s et of typi cal cas es emb odying the co ndu ct that ea ch gu ideline desc ribes.”); Koon , 518 U.S . at 92 -94
. III. Kitchen further argues that § 5K2.2 requires a “le gal nexus” be tween the defe ndan t’s con duct a nd th e injury tha t is the ba sis for d epartu re, and that suc h a ne xus is absent in this case. Kitchen explains: [N]o evidence exi sts t

he Appellant

sold the handgun [that

was used to shoot Muniz] to a known felon; no evidence exi sts t he Appellant

sold the handgun to the buyer of the handgun so t

hat the buyer

could engage i n crimina l activit y; no evidence exi sts as to how many hands t he handgun passed prior to the shooting thirteen (13) months later; no evi dence exis ts the buyer of the handgun was the shooter ; no evide nce exist s the Appell ant was invol ved in, part of, or aware of the shoo ting of M r. M uniz; a nd, the serial nu mb er of th is han dgu n w as no [t] oblitera ted ind icating that ne ither the Ap pellan t, the bu yer, nor the ultima te possessor (s) of t

he handgun sought t o conceal t he identity

of the handgun for

any ill egal purpos e.5 As d is cu ss ed ab ove , K itch en ’s se nt en ce was en ha nc ed fo r s el li ng f irea rms to kno wn crimina ls (i n this case, known drug dea lers ) and for obl iter ating t he seri al number fr om one fire arm. These enhanc ements, neithe r of which is chall enged on appeal, reinforce our conc lusion that K itchen wa s aw are of the po ssible d ow nstrea m u se of illegally resold firearm s. Alth oug h the re cord conta ins no evide nce th at the f irearm used to sho ot M uniz wa s sold to a kno wn felon , or that its se rial num ber w as rem oved , his con duct w ith respect to other firearms sale s confirms his appre ciation of the risk of signi ficant

physi cal 7 Br. at 14-15. A care ful reading o f § 5K 2.2 dem onstrates that the nex us sufficien t to support departure is br oader tha n that a dvanced by Kitchen. Section 5K2. 2 expressl y appl ies where the i njuryis “knowingl y risked, ” as opposed t o “inte nded.” Inde ed, the Guideli ne applie s—albeit wit

h “a less substant

ial de partur e”—w here “the defendant ( though crimin ally neglige nt) did n ot kn ow ingly crea te the risk of h arm.” “Crim inally neg ligent” is defined elsewhere in the Sentencing Guidelines as referri ng to “conduct that involves a gross devi ation f

rom the st andard of car e that a reasonabl e person would exercise under the c ircu ms tanc es, b ut w hich is no t reck less.” U.S .S.G . § 2A 1.4 c mt. n .2. We conclud e that Kitchen was su fficiently culpable to w arrant departure under § 5K2.2. As our deci sions i n Cicire llo , Uca , and Bass make clear, the ri sk that ill egal fi re ar ms wi llbe u se d i n fu tu re cr ime s l ie s a t t he c or e of

th e s ubs ta nt iv e fi re ar ms guideli nes. Alt

hough this potenti al, standi ng alone, ordinarily is not a proper bas is for departure, here that potentia l was real ized. By engagi ng in the of fense of convi ction, Kit che n kn owi ngl y cr eated a nd d el ib er at el y di sr egard ed t he ris k t hat

one ormor e fi re ar ms would be used to criminal ly injure another person. 5 We therefore agree with the Districtinju ry resu lting fro m h is of fen se. 8

Court that

Kitchen’s ill egal sal e of a fir earm reckl essly initiate d “the chai n of circum stance s that res ulted in injury to M r. M uniz.” Ap p. at 66 ; see United St ates v. Diaz , 285 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Ci r. 2002) (“We see no basi s for fore closi ng departure under § 5K2.1 when a defendant put s int o motion a chai n of events t hat ri sks serious i njuryor death , even wh en an intent to harm is entirely ab sent an d the d efen dant w as no t directly respo nsible f or the d eath.”) ; Un ited Sta tes v. W hite , 979 F.2d 539, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming departure under § 5K2.1 for defendant convi cted of i nters tate trans portation of a minor f or the purp ose of p rostitution; defenda nt’s offense know ingly risked the mino r’s death beca use it “‘p ut into m otion a scen ario tha t had th e inev itable trag ic resu lt that this one d id’” (q uoting senten cing c ourt)); United States v. Ihegworo , 959 F .2d 26 , 29-3 0 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming upward departure under § 5K2.1 for defendant convi cted of distribu tion of hero in bas ed on the ac ciden tal ove rdose of o ne of his cu stom ers; co urt held that de fend ant “‘re ason ably fore saw death or serio us bo dily injury as a re sult of the he roin he w as d istrib utin g’” (qu otin g se nten cing cou rt)). Importan tly, the District Cou rt did take K itchen’s attenuated role in M uniz’s injuries i nto account

in dete rmining t

he extent of the departure, which is not chall enged
on a ppe al. See, e. g., Diaz , 285 F.3d at 101 (observi ng, in t

he context

of § 5K2.1, that defendant’ s int ent shoul d bear on the extent of departure). The Government had moved for a si x-leveldeparture. Kit chen argued that, if a departure were gr anted, it s hould be9

limited to two lev els because Kitchen ’s condu ct was o nly indirectly related to M uniz’s injuries. The D istri ct Court agreed, limiting the departure to two levels: There is no pr oof, though, that t he person t o whom he sold the guns, the one involved i n the cl assroom and the one that shot Mr. Muniz, were sold t o drug dealers, or t

hat the persons who possessed them at the end w ere drug dealers. The guns were not those with obl iter ated serial number s. There’ s no evidence that t he persons who posse ssed the m were convicted f elons.
. . . [A]nd there’ s no evide nce th at the p erson s wh o po ssesse d the g uns a t the en d of the ev ents pertai ning to t

hose guns were the persons who purcha sed the guns directly from M r. K itche n. Ap p. at 6 6-6 7. IV. Departure i n this case was avai lable under § 5K2.2 because the guide lines applic able t o Kitchen’s offense do not a dequatel y acc ount for t he actualinjuries suf

fered by Muniz. Furthermore, because Kit chen reckl essly init iate d a course of eve nts that resulted in M uniz’s injuries, d epartu re w as w arrante d in this case. A ccord ingly, we will affirm the jud gm ent of the D istrict Co urt.

______________________________________ TO THE C LERK: Please fi le the foregoing Opini on. /s/ D. Brooks Smith Circuit Judge Date: January 14, 200410