Act of May 18, 1993, 73d L eg ., R.S., ch. 625, § 3, 1993 Tex. Gen. L aws 2347, amende d 1 byAct of May 1, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 140, § 1, 1995 Tex . Gen. L aws 985, repeale d byAct of J une 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 847, 884 (c urre nt version at Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2004-05)). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00455- CV

Ant honyDa vis , A ppe lla nt

v. Ke ith L. Markey, M.D. and P atric k F. K elly, D.O., Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY , 340TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. C-03- 0637 -C, H ONO RAB LE TOM GOSSETT, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt A nth on y Da vis a pp e a ls fro m t he d is mi ss al o f hi s m edi cal mal prac ti ce cl a im
a g a ins t Ap pe lle e s, Ke ith Mark e y , M. D. and Pa tr ic k K e lly , D .O . D a vis a lle g e s th a t Ma rk e y and Ke lly
wer e neg lige nt in their treatment of his knee. Af

ter both phy sicians moved for dismiss al on the g round that Davis’s expert r eport failed to meet statutory require ments, the district court dismissed the cause . See former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01 (Section 13.01). We affir m the 1 jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.Section 13.01 did not provide a deadline by

which a de fenda

nt must obj ect to the a dequac y 2 of an e x pert re port. Se e ge ne ra lly Se c tio n 1 3. 01
. Th e su

pr e me c ourt

he ld t hat a de fe nd ant c ou ld wait until the deadline to file a repor t passed bef

ore f iling a motion to dismiss
. W alker v . Gutierrez , 111 S.W .3d 56, 66 (Tex. 2003). Howe ver, the curr ent statute states that “ [e] ach de fenda nt phy sician or he a lthc are pr ov ide r wh os e c on du c t is imp lic ate d in a re po rt mus t fi le and se rv e any ob je c tio n to the su ff ic ie nc y of the re po rt

no t late r t ha n th e 21 st d ay

a ft e r t he da te it w a s se rv e d, fa ili ngwh ic h a ll objections are waived.” Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a ) (West Supp. 2004-05). 2 BACK GR OUND Davis injured his kne e in

D e c e mb e r

2 0 0 1 a n d u n derw ent an a

nterior c ruciate liga

ment
rec onstruction the following month. Complications arose , and Davis require d additional surg erie s by sever al phy sicians. Davis filed suit o n M ay 28, 2003, alleg ing that Dr. Ke ith Markey and Dr
. P a t r i c k K e l l y c o m m i t t e d

v ar i o u s a c t s o f n e g l i g e n c e w h i l e D a v i s w a s u n d e r t h e i r c ar e . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, Davis alleg ed that Mar

key failed to use sterile equipment while perf orming surg ery

on Davis’s kne e and that he worsened an infec tion by presc ribing oral Ci pro and Cortiz one injections af ter sig ns of infec tion appear ed. Davi s al l ege d t h at Kelly delay ed in culturing a spec imen and in re moving or remounting hardw are in D avis’s knee. He c laimed that the neg lige nce of these phy sicians re sulted in “g rievous bodily

harm a nd other damag es.” On November 13, 2003, pursuant to Section 13.01(d), Da vis tim ely filed an e x pert repor t provided by

a California

phy sician, Dr. G regor y Bo h art. Appe llees did not object to the sufficie ncy

of Davis’s expert report until they both f iled motions t o dismiss in March 2004. Kelly ’s 2 mot ion c on te nd e d that B oh art ’s re po rt fa ile d to se t fo rt h the sta nd ard of c are a

pp lic a ble to K e lly

in his tr e a tm e n t o f D a v is , f

a il e d to s tate h o w K e ll y ’ s tr e a tm e n t f e ll b e lo w th a t s ta

n d ar d o f c ar e , and fa ile d to a dd

re ss c a us a tio n. Mark e y

cla im ed in hi s mo tio n th a t B oh art ’s re po rt fa ile d to a dd

re ss
causation.3 Af te r a he ari ngon

the mot ion s, the di stric t c ourt dis mis se d D a vis ’s c la ims a g a ins t both phy sicians, finding that Boha rt’s re port failed to mee t all three r equire ments of Section 13.01: the standar d of ca

re, the manner

in which each phy sician failed to meet the standa rd, and the causa l
re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th a t f a ilure and the inj ur y c la ime d. Th e c ourt awa

rd e d a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to K e lly in the amount of $14,351.50.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW We a pp ly an a bu se of dis c re tio n s tand ard

wh e n r e vie wi nga ll Se c tio n 1 3. 01 ru lin g s. W alker v . Gutierrez , 111 S.W .3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2003); Bowie Mem ’l Hosp. v. W right , 79 S.W .3d 48, 52 (T e x. 20 02 ); A m e r ic a n Tra n s it io n a l C a r e Ct r s . o f T e x . , I n c . v . Palacios , 4 6 S .W.3d 873, 878 (T e x. 20 01 ); Str om v . Me m’ l H e rm an n H os p. Sy s. , 1 10 S.W. 3d

21 6, 22 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Di st. ] 200 3, pe t. de nie d)
. A tri a l court a bu se s its disc re tio n if it ac ts in an arb itr ary or un re a so na

ble
ma nner w ithout refer ence to any g uiding r ules or princ iples. Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc

. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-242 (Te x . 1985). In revie wing matters committed to the trial cour t’s dis c re tio n, a

c ourt of a pp eal s may not su

bs tit ute its ow n ju dg me nt f

or the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. W right , 79 S.W .3d at 52.

Under Section 13.01(d), medic al-malpra ctice pla intiffs were req u ir e d to p r o v id e eac h defen d an t phy sician or he alth-ca re pr ovider a

n expert repor

t, with the expert’s curr iculum vitae, wi thi n 1 80 da

y s o f f ili ngsu it. Se c tio n 1 3. 01 (d ); Palacios , 46 S.W .3d at 877. The expert repor t was require d to provide a f

air summary

of the e x pert’s opinions re g ardingapplicable standards of car e, the manner

in which the ca

re r ende re d b y t h e phy sician or he alth car e provide r fa iled to meet the standards, a

nd the ca usal relationship between that f ai l u re and the dama g es cla imed. Section4

13 .0 1( r) (6 ); W

right , 79 S.W .3d at 51. Acc ording to Sec tion 13.01( l), a court was require d to gr ant a motion to dism iss challeng ing the adequa cy of an e x pert re port only

if it appea

red to the c ourt, afte r a hea ring , that t h e re p o rt did not repre sent a g ood faith ef fort to comply

with the definition of an
e xpe rt re po rt un de r 1 3. 01 (r)( 6) . Se c tio n 1 3. 01 (l ); W right , 79 S.W .3d at 51-52. To constitute a g ood faith ef fort to comply

with the statutory

definition, th e r e p o r

t was require d to (1) inform the de fenda nt of the spec ific conduc t the plaintiff ca lled into question and (2) provide a basis for the tr ial court to conc lude that the cla ims had merit. W right , 79 S. W
. 3 d at 52 (c i t i n g Palacios , 46 S.W .3d at 879). The trial c ourt could look no furthe r than the f our cor ners of the document. Id . The re port was r equire d to include the expert’s op i n i on on eac h of the thre e statutorily require d elements: standar d of ca re, br eac h, and ca

usation. Id . The re port could not be conclusory ; it was require d to expl ain the basis of the expert’s statements and link his conclusions to the fac ts. Id
.

Ac c or din g to Sec tio n 13. 01 (g ), if the c ourt de te rm ine d th a t th e pla int if f’ s r e po rt did not comply

wi t h t h e st atutory

definition, the court wa s require d to gr ant the plaintiff a thirty -day g rac e per iod if, after a hearing , the cour t found that the fa ilure of the pla intiff or plaintiff’s attorney
was n o t in te n ti o n a l o r th e r e s u lt o f c o n s c io u s in d if f e r e n c e b u t w a s th e r e s u lt o f an a c c ident or mis take . Se c tio n 1 3. 01 (g ); W alker , 11 1 S.W. 3d a t 62
. To de te rm ine wh e the r the fa ilure to f ile adequat e reports was due to ac cident or mistake r ather than intentional disreg ard or conscious indiffer ence , the cour

t was re quired to look to the knowledg e and a cts of the plaintiff. W alker , 111 S.W .3d at 64. A medical- malprac tice plaintiff was c harg ed with knowledg e of Sec tion 13.01 and its requireme nts. Id . An attorney ’s mistaken belief that an expert re port satisfied the statutory5

require ments would not neg ate a finding of intentional disreg ard or conscious indiffe renc e, and thus it would not entitle the pl aintiff to a gr ace period. Id . at 65 ; Hutchinson v. Monte mayor , 144 S.W .3d 614, 619 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.); Ha ns e n v . S tar r , 1 2 3 S.W. 3 d

1 3 , 2 1 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 2003, pe t. denied).

Un de r S e c tio n 1 3. 01 (e ), if the tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th a t the e xpe rt re po rt fa ile d to c omp ly with the statutory

require ments and that the fa ilure wa s not an ac cident or mi s t ak e, t h e court was require d to dismi ss the plaintiff’s cla ims with prejudice and a war d rea sonable attorney ’s fe es to the defe ndant. Section 13.01(e ). ADEQUACY OF EXP ERT REPORT Da v i s fi rs tar gu es t h at Bo h ar t ’s ex p er t r e p o rt co mp l i edwi t h S ec t i o n1 3
. 0 1 's require ments with reg ard to both Kelly and Mar key . He a

rg ues that the re port constituted a g oodfa ithe ff or t to pr ov ide a fa ir su mma

ry of B oh art ’s op ini on s re g ard ing the sta nd ard of c are a pp lic a ble to eac h phy sician, how e ach phy sician bre ache d the standar d of ca re, a nd how the bre ach c aused D a v i s ’ s i n j u r y.
Causation We first addre ss the sufficie ncy of Bo h ar t ’s re port with reg ard to c ausation. To establish causation bey ond a mere conclusory statement, a repor t must provide information linking the expert’s conc lusion to t he phy sician’s a lleg ed bre ach. W right , 79 S.W .3d at 53. The W right court he ld that an expert repor t was conc lusory

as t o causation beca

use t he re port did not include an explanation of how a hospital’s alleg ed err ors cause d plaintiff’s alleg ed injury
. Id . at 53. B arba ra6

Wright wa s admitted to Bowie Memorial Hospital afte r she sustained fr actur es to her r ight kne e and foot in a ca

r ac cident. Af

ter takingx -ra

y s of bo t h t h e knee a

nd foot, a phy sician’s a ssistant at the h o s p i t a l d i a g n o s e d

h e r w i t h a f r a c tu r e d kn e e . H o w e v e r , h e h a d m i s p l a c e d o r m i s r e a d t h e f o o tx - r a y, and thus did not discover that Wright had also fra cture d her f oot. A month later, af

ter a n operation on her kne e, W ri gh t ’s o rthopedic sur g eon discove red he r foot fr actur e, re quiring two additional surg erie s within the n ex t ten months. To establish causation, W rig ht relied on the f ollowing state me nt f

ro m he r expe rt re po rt : “if the x-r ay s wou ld have be e n c or re c tly re a d a nd the a pp ro pr ia te medical pe rsonnel acted upon those finding s then Wright would have had the possibili ty of a be tter outcome.” Id
. at 52-53. The supreme court held that the statement was c onclusory and thus did not constitute a g ood-fa ith effor t to summ arize ca

usation beca

use the re port did not provide any information linking the f

ailure to rea d and act upon the x -ra y s to the expert’s conc lusion that W rig ht would have ha d a better

outcome if not for

the bre ach. Id . at 53. Othe r c ourt s h a ve sim ila

rl y he ld that an expe rt re po rt is co nc lus or y and ina de qu a te when it fa ils to provide a

n explanation connectingthe def endant’ s actions to the plaintiff’s a lleg ed injury
. See Lopez v. Montem ayor , 131 S.W .3d 54, 60 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (holding that expert’s statement that “it is the aspiration of the bridg e sec tion whi ch ca u s ed and prec ipitated the medica l circumstanc es lea ding to the patient’s demise” w as conc lusory and ins uf fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli shc a us a tio n be c a

us e it did no t pro vid e inf

or ma tio n li nk ingde nti st’ s a c tio ns to patie nt’ s d e a th) ; Villa v. Hargrove , 1 10 S.W. 3d 74 , 78-7 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 03 , p e t. de nie d) (f ind ing tha t e xpe rt ’s state me nt that “ ha d e ith e r of the se de fe nd ants pr ov ide d the a pp ro pr ia te
car e, to an ove rwhe lming proba bility , [t he patient] would be alive a nd well today ” wa s conclusory7

and ina de qu a te to s ho w c a

us a tio n b e c a

us e it f a ile d to lin k act io ns of phy sic ian o r m e dic a l f a c ili ty wi th p a tie nt’ s d e a th) ; Hightower v . Saxton , 54 S.W .3d 380, 385 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (finding that expert’s statement t hat phy sician’s failure to corr ectly rea d MRI scan “was be low the sta nd ard of c are and c a us e d d a ma g e s and de lay

of tr e a tme nt” to p a tie nt w a s in su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh
c a u s a ti o nb e c a

u s e it p r o v id e d n o in s ig h t a s to a c a

u s a l r e lati o n s h ip b e tw e e n b r e a c h an d in ju r y )
. We
n o w tu r nt o t h e i s s u e o f c a

u s a t i o nw i t h r e g ar d

t o e a c h p h ys i c i ani nt h i s c a s e , b e g i n n i n g w i t h M a r k e y. Dr. Markey

Davis contends that the repor t a ddresse s Marke y ’s alleg ed neg lige nce a nd its causal lin k to Da vis ’s inj ur

y in t he fo llo wi nge xce rp t:
Pos top e rativ e inf

e c tio ns or int ra op erative inf

e c tio ns c an c e rt a inl y

oc c ur a ft e r A CL re c on str uc tio n s ur g e ry

and are we ll k

no wn . I t is imp or

tant that th e y

be qu ic kly dia g no se d a

nd a pp ro pr ia te ly

tr e a te d. I t is no t un c omm on fo r a hem art hrosis postoperatively

to be aspriate d [si c] but it is uncommon for a knee to be aspirated on thr e e se pa rate oc c a sio ns and

fo r c or tis on e to b e inj e c te d o n e a c h o c c a sio n. Iwo uld raise que stions and I

think not considering infec tion at the time of the last aspiration would be bene ath the st andar d of care. Standard of c are would require the surg eon to be vig ilant in the postoperative pe riod and would require appropr iate ana ly sis of ma te ri a l a sp ir a te d f

ro m th e kn e e inc lud ingc ul tu re and se ns iti vit y and c e ll c ount. This would have a llowed for a more timely

diag nosis of postoperative infe ction by Dr . M ark e y . . . . Th e se qu e nc e and c omb inatio n o f t

he se mana g e me nt e rr or s le d to and inc re a se d th is p a tie nt ’s di sability . Wh a t be g a n a s a sim ple re c on str

uc tio n w ill likely end up with a life time of disability for this patient’s kne e.
Davis ar g ues that the followingstatement establishes causation a s to Ma rkey : “The
s e qu e n c e an d

c o mb i n a t i o no f

t h e s e m an a g e m e n te r

r o r s l e d t o an d i n c r e a s e d t h i s p a t i e n t ’ s d i s a b i l i t y. What be g an a s a

sim ple re c on str

uc tio n w ill lik e ly

e nd up wi th a l if

e tim e of dis a bil ity fo r t his patient’s knee .” He contends that this statement is not conclusory beca use it is supported by

fac tual8

details set forth e arlier

in the repor

t. Specifica lly , Davis arg ues that ca usation is supported by Boha rt’s stateme n t that vigilanc e in the postoperative period a nd appropr iate ana ly sis of material aspirate d from the kne e would have allowed f or a more timely diag nosis of postoperative infec tion b y M ar k e y. Howeve r, like the statement in W right , Boha

rt’s statements he re a

re c onclusory

and insufficient to establish ca usation. Boha

rt fails t o link Markey ’s alleg ed bre ach ( a fa ilure to be vigilant in the postoper ative per iod and to appro p riately analy ze material a spirated f

rom Davis’s kn e e ) t o th e c on c lus ion that Mark e y ’s e rr or s “ inc re a se d [Davis ’s ] d isa bil ity” and c a

us e d “ a lif e tim e of dis a bil ity fo r [his ] k

ne e .” F or e xamp le , B oh art ne ve r e xpla ins ho w Ma rk e y in app ropr ia te ly analy zed aspirated material or how such inappropriate ana ly sis would increa se Davis’s disability or lead to a life time of disability
. I n fac t, B ohart ne ver e ven identifies Da vis’s disability

or how it was
worsene d by

Marke y ’s ac ts or omissions . Rather, he simply concl u des that Mar

key ’s conduc t cause d a lifetime of disa

bility . Such a conc lusory statement is not sufficient to establish ca usation.
Dr . Ke lly Boha

rt is simi larly

conclusory

in setting for

th causation reg ardingKelly ’s alleg ed brea ch. Davis relies on the following ex cer pt of Bohart’s report to descr ibe Kelly ’s involvement and to establish causation:
The sec ond surg ery was im portant t o remove all fore ign material. Dr . Kelly remove d the Endo button and a bioa bsorbable f

emora l scre w and appar ently some of the tibial interfe renc e scr ew but some of i t was left behind. L ater x -ra y s sugg ested ther e wa s osteomy elitis in t he tibia. I t h i n k that standard of car e would nec essitate over

rea ming, particula

rly the tibial inter fer ence tunnel and not over -re aming this tunnel in the setting of

osteomy eli t is of the tibia would lead to and e x plain the re curr ent9

infec tion that occurr ed af ter the A CLwas late r re vised. The se quence and c o mb i n a t i o no f t h e s e m an a g e m e n te r r o r s l e d t o an d i n c r e a s e d t h i s p a t i e n t ’ s d i s a

b i l i t y. What be g an a s a simpl e re c on str uc tio n will lik e ly

e nd up wi th a lif e tim e of dis a bil ity for this patient’s kne e.
Da vis c on te nd s th a t B oh art ’s state me nt t hat K e lly fa ile d to ov e r- re a m pr ov ide s a fac tual basis for his conclusion that Kelly ’s er rors c aused a

lifetime of disability . Howeve r, B ohart’s statement that Kelly failed to over-r eam is a state ment of the a lleg ed bre ach, not a fac tual statement
connec ting the br eac h to the alleg ed inj ury . I n fac t, Boha rt wholly fails to provide a ny information l i n k i n g a f a i l u r e t o o v e r - r e a m t o h i s c o n c l u s i o n th a t K e l l y’ s f a i l u r e “ i n c r e a s e d

[ D a v i s ’ s ] d i s a

b i l i t y” and ca used “a lifetime of disability

for [his] knee.” For

example , wh i l e Bo h ar t indicates that not
over- rea ming on the pa

rt of Kelly would lead to infec tion, he never ex plains how i t would cause a
wo rs e ne d in

jur y or a lif e tim e of dis a bil ity . In a dd iti on , a s w e have a lr e a dy no ted wi th regard to Mark e y , B oh art

wh oll y fa ils to i de nti fy

Da vis ’s dis a bil ity or how it was wo rs e ne d b y Ke lly ’s a c ts or omissions. He mere ly

sets forth a g ener al statement that Ke lly ’s alleg ed er rors incr ease d Davis’s disability . Be cause Boha

rt’s re port fails to pr ovide any information linking his conclusion to either phy sician’s a lleg ed bre ach, the repor t is conclusory

and insuffic ient to establish causation. A conc lusory

repor t does not meet Section 13.01' s require ments beca use it does not satisfy the Palacios test, requiringthat the re port inform the de fendant of the spec ific conduc t the plaintiff is calling into question, and that it p ro vide a ba sis for the trial c ourt to conclude that the claims have merit. Palacios , 46 S.W .3d at 879. A re port also does not constitute a g ood-fa ith effor t if it omits any of t he st atutory require ments. Id . Thus, even if we we re to find that the e lements of standard of

car e and br eac h wer e suff icient, the omiss i o n o f the ca usation element still requires10

dismiss al. As a r esult, we ne ed not dec ide her e wh et h er t h e st andar d of ca re a nd brea ch we re adequate re g ardingeither phy sician. Be cause the re port wholly lacke d information as to ca usation for both phy sicians, we f

ind that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it conc luded th at the re port failed to mee t the require ments of Section 13.01.
SEC TIO N 1 3. 01 (g ) G RA CE P ER IOD Davis also argues that the trial court err ed in de ny ing him a thirty -day g rac e per iod to amend his repor

t pur suant to Sec tion 13.01( g ). Under that section, a pla intiff was e ntitled to the g rac e per iod if

, afte r a hear ing, the court found that the failure of the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorne y
was n o t in te n ti o n a l o r th e r e s u lt o f c o n s c io u s in d if f e r e n c e b u t w a s th e r e s u lt o f an a c c id ent or mis take . Se c tio n 1 3. 01 (g ); W alker , 111 S .W.3d at 62. The W alker court he ld that the attorney ’s mis taken be lief that the re port was a dequate did not constitut e an “ acc ident or mistake” unde r the statute. Id . at 64-65. In W alker , the trial cour

t dismi ssed t he Gutierrez family ’s medica l malprac tice lawsuit for failure to pr ovide an expert repor t that c omplied with Section 13.01's re quirements. Id
. a t 60 . T he Gutie rr e zes a rgued on app e a l th a t th e y we re e nti tle d to a

g ra c e pe ri od

be c a us e the ir attorney “at a ll tim es believe d that [t heir] orig inal expert repor ts satisfied the re quirements o f Section 1 3
. 0 1 ( d).” Id
. at 59-60. The supr eme c ourt held that an attorney ’s mistaken belief that a re port complies with Section 13.01 does not neg ate a finding of intentional or consc ious indiffere nce a nd does not constitute a mi stake of law that entitles the pl aintiff to a gra ce period. Id
. a t 64 -6 5; see , e.g. , Hutchinson , 144 S.W .3d at 619; Hansen , 123 S.W .3d at 21.

I n th is c a se , D a vis make s th e ve ry argument tha t th e su

pr e me c ourt

re je c te d in W a lk er : t h at the re port’s inade quacy was not a r esult of intentional disreg ard or consciousMarke y ’s attorne y did not testify

as to attorney ’s fe es at the he aring
. 3 11 i n d i f f e re n ce b ec au s e h i s at t o rn ey at al l t i m es b el i ev edt h e r ep o rt co mp l i edwi t h S ec t i o n1 3
. 0 1 's
re qu ir e me nts
. Th e a tto rn e y ’s mis take n be lie f in the a de qu a c y of the re po rt sim ply do e s n ot c on sti tut e th e ty p e o f a c c id e n t o r

mi s ta k e th a t e n ti tl e s a p la in ti f

f to a g r a c e p e r io d

u n d e r Se c ti o n1 3
. 0 1 ( g )
. We there fore hold that the trial court pr operly denied Da

vis’s reque st for a g rac e per iod.
AT TOR NE Y’ S F EES Davis’s fina l argument is that the trial court e rre d in gr anting $14,351. 50 in attorney ’s fee s to K el l y . W e re view a tr ial court’s r uling on attorney ’s fe es under an abuse of discre tion 3 standard. St rom v . M

e m’ l H e rm an n H

os p. Sy s. , 1 10 S.W. 3d

21 6, 22 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (finding that “the abuse- of-discr etion standard g overns a ll [ Section 13.01]
ru lings.” ). Attorney ’s fe es ar e not re cover able unless a statute or contr act be tween the parties provides for

such re cover

y . Tra v e le rs In de m. Co. v . M ay fie ld , 923 S.W .2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996); Grace v. Duk

e , 54 S.W .3d 338, 343 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2001, pet. denied)
. Acc ording to Section 13.01(e) , a cour

t was re quired to aw ard r easona ble attorne y ’s fe es to the def endant if the court found that the plaintiff fa iled to provide an a dequate expert repor t within th e t i m e required. Sec tion 13.01(e) . Reasonable n es s o f at t o rney ’s fe es is a question of f act a nd must be supported by the evidenc e. Petco Animal Suppliers, Inc. v. Schuster , 144 S.W .3d 554, 567 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). The supreme c ourt has held that a fac t-finder

shou l d co n s i d er eig ht fac tors when deter mining the r easona

bleness of attorney ’s fee s: ( 1) the time and la bor re quired, the nove lty

and difficulty of the que stions invol ved, and the skill re quired to per form the leg al servic e prope rly ; (2)12

the likelihood that the acc eptanc e of the pa rticular e mploy

ment will preclude other e mploy ment by the lawy er; (3) the fee customarily char g ed in the locality for simil ar leg al service s; ( 4) the amount involv ed and the r esults obtained; (5) the time limitations im posed by the client or by

the circ umstan c e s ; ( 6 ) th e n a tu r e an d le n g th o f th e p r o f e s s io n a l r e lati o n s h ip w it

h th e c li e n t; ( 7 ) the experience , reputation, and ability of the law y er or lawy ers pe rfor ming the se rvice s; and (8) w hether the fee is f ix ed or conting ent on results obtained or unce rtainty of collec tion before the leg al servic es have be en re ndere d. Arthur Andersen &C o . v. Perry Equip. Corp. , 9 4 5 S. W. 2 d 8 1 2 , 8 1 8 ( T e x. 1997). The eig ht f

actor s are g ener al g uidelines, and a ll of them need not be considere d. Petco , 144 S.W .3d at 567. I n th is c a se , D a vis c on te nd s tha t Ke lly c ou ld have mov e d to dismi ss fo r a n in a de qu a te
re po rt a s e arl y a s N ov e mbe r 2 4, 20 04 , the e xpir a tio n of 180 da y s, bu t did not fi le his mot ion un til four months later, on Ma

rch 24, 2004. At the hea

ring , Kelly ’s attorne y

testified that her

attorney ’s fee s totaled $14,351.50. She testi fi ed t hat she billed $120 per hour, and that her time billed afte r Dec ember

2004 included obtaining Davis’s medic al re cords, dr afting discovery reque sts and respons es, fili ng motions t o compel discove ry , taking Davis’s de position, preparingKelly for de po sit ion , atte nd ingKe lly ’s de po sit ion , a nd re ta ini nge xpe rt

wi tne sse s. Davis ar g u e s th a t K e ll y s h o u ld n o t h a v e b e e n aw ar d e d th e e n ti r e a mo u n t o f fe es beca use Kelly ’s attorney testified that at least some of the fe es we re inc urre d afte r Ke lly could have fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss . Howev e r, no ne of the e ig ht f

a c tor s se t f

or th b y the su pr e me c ourt

in Arthur Andersen implies that a court should consider whether an attorne y

could have moved for dismiss al ea

rlier. The fifth fac tor, “the time limitations . . . imposed by the circ umstances” comes13

the closest, but Sec tion 13.01 did not impose a dea dline to file a motion to dismi ss and did not place any other re strictions on attorney ’s fe es other tha n that they

be “r easona

ble.” Thus, Ke lly ’s attorne y was not subject

to a ti me li mi tati o nin

th is c a s e . I na d d it io n , th e me r e f a c t t h a t a tr ia l j u d g e may decide a matter within his discretionar y authority in a diffe rent manne r than a n appellate judge in a simil ar circumstanc e does not demonstrate that an abuse of discre tion has occur red. Downer , 701 S.W .2d at 242. Althoug h the re cord doe s not provide information as to why Kelly chose not to move fo r d ism iss a l e arl ier , we do not f ind tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

awa rd ingKe lly
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a c c ru ingun til the date of dis mis sa l.
CO NC LU SION Be cause the trial cour

t properly exercised its discre tion, we af firm the dismissal of Da vis ’s c la ims a g a ins t Ma

rk e y and Ke lly , th e de nia l of

a g ra c e pe ri od , a

nd the awa rd of re a so na ble
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Mar ch 24, 2005