J-S60039-17 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON M. NAZARIO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 436 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order February 14, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County 

Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-42-CR-0000120-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, DUBOW, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2017

Appellant Aaron M. Nazario appeals from the February 14, 2017, Order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County classifying him as a 

sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10–9799.41. We affirm.

On May 26, 2016, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to a 

single count of indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age, a 

misdemeanor of the first degree.

1

 As part of his plea, the Commonwealth 

dismissed the remaining charges set forth in the Criminal Information. 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). The victim was born in 2005 and the offense 

date occurred sometime within 2012-2014 when the victim was between the 

ages of seven and nine. N.T. Sentencing, 2/14/17, at 9; N.T. SVP Hearing, 

12/23/16, at 54. The victim’s mother was appellant’s paramour. N.T. SVP 

Hearing, 12/23/16, at 32. 
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Pursuant to the plea, Appellant was sentenced to eighteen (18) months to 

thirty-six (36) months in prison with credit for time served of 126 days. 

On December 23, 2016, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Hearing was 

held following which the trial court determined Appellant met the criteria to 

be classified as an SVP and would be required to be a lifetime registrant.2 

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2 This Court has explained the process by which a trial court makes a SVP 

determination as follows: 

After a person has been convicted of an offense listed in [42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14], the trial [court] then orders an 

assessment to be done by the [SOAB] to help determine if that 

person should be classified as a[n SVP. An SVP] is defined as a 

person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense ... 

and who [has] a mental abnormality or personality disorder that 

makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent 

offenses. In order to show that the offender suffers from a 

mental abnormality or personality disorder, the evidence must 

show that the defendant suffers from a congenital or acquired 

condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the 

person in a manner that predisposes that person to the 

commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the 

person a menace to the health and safety of other persons. 

Moreover, there must be a showing that the defendant's conduct 

was predatory.... Furthermore, in reaching a determination, we 

must examine the driving force behind the commission of these 

acts, as well as looking at the offender's propensity to reoffend, 

an opinion about which the Commonwealth's expert is required 

to opine. However, the risk of re-offending is but one factor to 

be considered when making an assessment; it is not an 

independent element.

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189–90 (Pa.Super. 

2015), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 763, 125 A.3d 1199 (2015) (citation 

omitted). In addition, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 14, 2017, and the 

trial court issued its Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on March 20, 2017. 

Appellant filed his Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal on March 

24, 2017, wherein he challenged the admissibility of testimony presented by 

Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) Investigator Supervisor Paul 

Everett and SOAB expert Brenda Manno. Specifically, Appellant asserted the 

following:

1. [Appellant] appeals whether the trial [c]ourt erred in 

admitting the investigation report of Paul Everett at the hearing 

to determine whether [Appellant] meets the criteria as a 

sexually violent predator on December 23, 2016.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

[w]hen performing an SVP assessment, a mental health 

professional must consider the following 15 factors: whether the 

instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the defendant 

exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense; the 

nature of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the defendant's 

relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)' age(s); whether 

the instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the 

defendant during the commission of the offense; the victim(s)' 

mental capacity(ies); the defendant's prior criminal record; 

whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s); 

whether the defendant participated in available programs for 

sexual offenders; the defendant's age; the defendant's use of 

illegal drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental 

illness, mental disability, or mental abnormality; behavioral 

characteristics that contribute to the defendant's conduct; and 

any other factor reasonably related to the defendant's risk of

reoffending. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b).

Id. at 190. 
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a. [Appellant] asserts the report submitted by Paul Everett 

included allegations from the initial police report, 

including witness statements and facts involving 

charges for which [Appellant] was not convicted, and 

that no review of the actual transcript of the guilty plea, 

which included “agreed upon facts” to substantiate the 

guilty plea, was considered.

b. [Appellant] argues that while the determination of 

whether [Appellant] meets the criteria to be classified 

as a sexually violent predator is a collateral 

consequence to a conviction for a sexually violent 

offense, that the rules of evidence and procedural rules 

apply to this proceeding, and that [Appellant] was 

prejudiced by the [c]ourt’s consideration of facts and 

statements, admitted through the report of Paul Everett 

and subsequent testimony of Brenda Manno, which 

were either irrelevant to the charges for which 

[Appellant] was convicted, or sometimes wholly 

inconsistent with facts of record through the guilty plea 

or the trial transcript of another matter, which was also 

considered by the [c]ourt in making its ruling.

2. [Appellant] appeals whether the [c]ourt erred in permitting 

Brenda Manno to testify and render an expert opinion with 

regard to [Appellant’s] classification as a sexually violent 

predator, when the materials relied upon by Ms. Manno in 

reaching her opinion were inaccurate and/or inconsistent with 

the facts of record in [Appellant’s] matters pending before the 

[c]ourt. 

a. [Appellant] asserts that Ms. Manno’s opinion, which 

included consideration of the nature of the offense(s), 

whether the victim(s) were known to [Appellant], and 

several other considerations as outlined on the record 

at the time of hearing on December 23, 2016, was 

based on facts that were purely hearsay and not subject 

to confrontation or credibility determinations by Ms. 

Manno or the [c]ourt, and that were sometimes 

inconsistent with either the trial record from 

[Appellant’s] prior case or the facts agreed upon 

through entry of a plea for the matter presently before 

the [c]ourt.
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3. [Appellant] appeals the [c]ourt’s ruling, by Order dated 

December 23, 2016, which found that the Commonwealth had 

presented by clear and convincing evidence that [Appellant] 

meets the criteria as a sexually violent predator.

a. [Appellant] asserts that Ms. Manno’s prior assessment 

of [Appellant] in another matter, where she indicated that 

he did not meet the criteria as a sexually violent predator, 

calls into significant question whether the Commonwealth 

could prove that [Appellant] had engaged in predatory 

behavior or that he suffers from a mental abnormality, 

which would be necessary in order to find that [Appellant] 

meets the criteria to be classified as a sexually violent 

predator. 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, filed 3/24/17, at ¶¶ 1-3. 

In his appellate brief, Appellant presents the following issue for our 

review: 

(1) Did the trial court err in finding, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that Appellant meets the criteria to be classified 

as a sexually violent predator?

Brief for Appellant at 4. 

A challenge to a trial court's SVP designation is a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, for which our standard of review is de novo and 

our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Meals, 510 Pa. 110, 

119, 912 A.2d 213, 218 (2006). When reviewing a trial court's SVP 

determination, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth and may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our 

judgment for that of the trial court. Id. The question for the trial court is 

whether the Commonwealth's evidence establishes that the defendant has a 

mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him or her likely to 
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engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 

7 A.3d 852, 863 (Pa.Super. 2010). We will reverse an SVP determination 

only if the Commonwealth did not present “clear and convincing evidence 

that each element of the statute has been satisfied.” Commonwealth v. 

Baker, 621 Pa. 401, 24 A.3d 1006, 1033 (Pa.Super. 2011), aff'd, 78 A.3d 

1044 (Pa. 2013).

Appellant does not dispute that his guilty plea to a charge of Indecent 

Assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3126(a)(7) constitutes a conviction of a sexually 

violent offense under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14. Brief for Appellant at 17. 

Instead, “Appellant focuses his argument on the assertion that the SOAB 

completed [its] investigation and assessment based solely on the unproven 

allegations contained in the initial police filings and reports, rather than in 

review of actual facts of record proven at trial or in a guilty plea transcript. . 

. .” Brief for Appellant at 19 (footnote omitted). The focal point of 

Appellant’s argument essentially challenges the admissibility of Mr. Everett’s 

report and of Ms. Manno’s expert opinion at the SVP hearing.

“To preserve a claim of error for appellate review, a party must make 

a specific objection to the alleged error before the trial court in a timely 

fashion and at the appropriate stage of the proceedings; failure to raise such 

objection results in waiver of the underlying issue on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 235 (Pa.Super. 2014), reversed 

on other grounds, 111 A.3d 168 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 
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302(a) (Issues not raised before the trial court are waived and cannot be 

advanced for the first time on appeal). At the SVP hearing, Appellant did not 

specifically object to the introduction into evidence of Mr. Everett’s report, to 

Mr. Everett’s testimony with regard thereto, or to Ms. Manno’s testifying as 

an expert witness. To the contrary, Appellant affirmatively stated “no 

objection” to both the admissibility of the investigative materials and report 

Mr. Everett sent to Ms. Manno and to his ensuing testimony. N.T. SVP 

Hearing, 12/23/16, at 10-13, 15. In addition, Ms. Manno’s curriculum vitae 

was admitted into evidence without objection, and the parties stipulated that 

Ms. Manno was qualified to offer an expert opinion as to whether Appellant 

met the criteria of a SVP. Id. at 28. Also, Appellant asked to have admitted 

as “Defense Exhibit Number A” the initial report Ms. Manno had prepared in 

June of 2016 wherein she did not find Appellant to be an SVP. Id. at 41. 

Because he failed to raise specific objections regarding the foregoing 

before the trial court, Appellant cannot now complain that the court erred in 

admitting the evidence. Akbar, supra. However, Appellant did lodge a 

“blanket objection” regarding Ms. Manno’s anticipated reliance upon 

“hearsay and unproven allegations in making her assessment based on Mr. 

Everett’s testimony as to what he forwarded her.” N.T. SVP Hearing, 

12/23/16, at 28. In addition, Appellant objected to the admission of 

“Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4,” Ms. Manno’s second report which included 

information provided to her by Mr. Everett, on the grounds that “she 
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testified about her reliance of [sic] hearsay to render the opinion.” Id. at 

39-40. To the extent these objections have preserved Appellant’s challenge 

to the trial court’s admission into evidence of Ms. Manno’s second report and

her accompanying opinion based upon it and rendered to a reasonable 

degree of professional certainty that he is an SVP, we note that Ms. Manno’s 

opinion constitutes evidence. “[A] Board report or opinion that the individual 

has an abnormality indicating the likelihood of predatory sexually violent 

offenses is itself evidence. Also, while a defendant is surely entitled to 

challenge such evidence by contesting its credibility or reliability before the 

SVP court, such efforts affect the weight, not the sufficiency of the 

Commonwealth's case. Accordingly, they do not affect our sufficiency 

analysis.” Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa.Super. 2008) 

(citations omitted). Furthermore, “[SORNA] does not limit the expert’s 

consideration of information only to that admitted at trial or at the guilty 

plea proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 360 

(Pa.Super. 2014). 

At the SVP hearing, Ms. Manno testified that when she completed her 

initial evaluation of Appellant in June of 2016, he had a prior criminal 

conviction from 2015 for his sexual assault of a twenty-three year old victim. 
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N.T. SVP Hearing, 12/23/16, at 38.3 Ms. Manno determined that although 

Appellant met the definition of predatory, she did not find him to be an SVP 

in her initial report “because he lacked the mental abnormality or personality 

diagnosis at that time” as “there was no time span of a period of six months 

or more where he had engaged in any behavior sexually.” Id., at 38-39. 

Notwithstanding, at the time of the SVP hearing on December 23, 2016, and 

after considering the statutory factors following Appellant’s guilty plea 

herein, she opined he did meet that criteria. Id. at 39, 49. Appellant did 

not present expert testimony to contest Ms. Manno’s conclusions, although 

he thoroughly cross-examined her regarding her assessment and in doing so 

highlighted her contrary findings in her initial report. Id. at 40-54. 

In Prendes, this Court stated that “[o]nce expert testimony has been 

admitted, the rules of evidence then place the full burden of exploration of 

facts and assumptions underlying the testimony of an expert witness 

squarely on the shoulders of opposing counsel[],” who “bears the burden of 

exposing and exploring “‘any weaknesses in the underpinnings of the 

expert’s opinion.’” Id. at 358 (citation omitted). Relying upon that decision, 

the trial court reasoned herein as follows: 

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3Ms. Manno explained that the victim had been diagnosed with Asperger’s 

and had “mental limitations that made her more vulnerable.” Id. at 33. 

She also acknowledged that Appellant had a juvenile criminal history and a 

prior, adult criminal history. Id. at 34. 
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Mr. Paul Everett (Tr. pp. 15-27) gathered various reports, 

including [] Appellant’s criminal complaint with affidavit of 

probable cause in the current case and the same information 

from Appellant’s 210 of 2015 case. He did not analyze the 

documents but simply gathered the information that he could 

find available and, in the course of his work for the Board, 

passed these on to Ms. Manno to use in making her assessment. 

She relied on the information provided to her and testified as to 

the sources of her information on which her opinion was formed. 

She testified that she made specific findings regarding all of the 

criteria set forth in “Title 42, Section 9799.24” (Tr. pg. 31, lines 

11-12). She explained that she has to evaluate all the factors 

but that all the factors need not be met in order for someone to 

be classified as an SVP. (Tr. pg. 31, lines 14-pg. 32, lines 1-

6)[.] This comports with the case law on SVP evaluations. 

Prendas, Supra. at 358, 359. Her qualifications as stated on the 

record (Tr. pg. 29, lines 3-24) enabled her to testify as an 

expert. . . . 

This court need not argue the issue of whether Ms. Manno 

could change her opinion from an earlier assessment on [ ] 

Appellant in which she found him not to be an SVP. As stated 

above, she is required to base her opinion on information 

provided to her including the current and most recent jury 

verdict of guilty of a particular offense. Obviously she had 

additional information in 2016, including the history of the 

previous non-SVP offense which she reviewed prior to making [ ] 

Appellant’s current evaluation. On cross-examination defense 

counsel thoroughly interrogated her on this issue and she 

provided him with an explanation as to how her testimony was in 

accord with the permitted methods of evaluation. There is no 

foundation for [ ] Appellant’s argument that, just because he 

was found not to be an SVP in 2015 that he could be shielded 

from being found to be an SVP in 2016, one year later. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/12/17, at 3-4 (unnumbered).

 Our review of the record substantiates the trial court’s determination the 

Commonwealth presented clear and convincing evidence that Appellant met 

the statutory criteria to be classified as an SVP under SORNA. Appellant, 

essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence and find in his favor, 
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which we cannot do. See Commonwealth v. Meals, 590 Pa. 110, 912 

A.2d 213 (2006) (holding this Court erred in reweighing the SVP evidence 

presented to the trial court to give more weight to factors that were absent 

than to those found and relied upon by the trial court). 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/2017