1996 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-31-1996

Jones v. United States

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 95-1719

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Recommended Citation

"Jones v. United States" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 141.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/141
 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

 No. 95-1719 

 

 

 ROTHER JONES 

 Appellant 

 

 V. 

 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 Appellee 

 

 

 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 (D.C. Civil No. 94-05086) 

 

 

 Argued on March 11, 1996 

 Before: NYGAARD, SAROKIN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 

 (Opinion Filed July 31, 1996) 

 David C. Harrison (Argued) 

 2100 Arch Street, 5th Floor 

 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103-1399 

 

 Attorney for Appellant 

 

 

 

 Susan D. Bricklin (Argued) 

 Suite 1250 

 Office of United States Attorney 

 615 Chestnut Street 

 Philadelphia, PA 19106 

 Attorney for Appellee 

 

 

 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 

 Rother Jones alleges that, while he was a federal 

prisoner, prison officials denied him his prescription high blood 

pressure medication, causing him to suffer a debilitating stroke, 

which left him aphasic and quadriplegic. The district court 

granted the United States' motion for summary judgment and denied 

Jones' motion for reconsideration. We will reverse. 

 I. 

 Jones alleges that in 1991, while a prisoner at the 

Federal Correctional Institution at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, he 

suffered from high blood pressure and had been prescribed 

appropriate medication. In October, 1991, he was transferred 

from Lewisburg to the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean, 

Pennsylvania. He did not receive his medication the morning of 

the transfer, nor was he medicated when he arrived at McKean, 

although he did receive a medical examination. 

 Discovery revealed that within twelve hours of his 

medication being withheld he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, 

leaving him aphasic and quadriplegic. Jones alleges that this 

cerebral hemorrhage was a result of appellee's negligence in 

failing to provide him with his prescription medication despite 

knowledge of his need for it; that appellee failed to act with 

due regard for his rights as a federal prisoner, a status which 

denied him open access to the medication; and, that appellee 

deviated from the applicable standard of care. 

 II. 

 Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that 

this was a malpractice case and that Jones produced no expert 

testimony that established appellee's negligence. The district 

court, however, granted summary judgment on a ground not raised 

in appellee's motion. It stated that: 

 under a simple negligence theory, Plaintiff 

 has failed to show negligence because he has 

 failed to show a duty. There is no evidence 

 in the record to indicate that the prison 

 authorities had a duty to provide Plaintiff 

 with his medication at a certain period of

 time. . . . Plaintiff had a duty to establish 

 every element of his case. 

The court concluded that "Plaintiff has not 'set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" We 

disagree with the district court's conclusion that summary 

judgment was appropriate because Mr. Jones "produced no evidencethat there 

was a duty" to provide him his prescription medicine 

at a certain time. Rather than requiring evidentiary proof, 

"[w]hether a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff is a 

question of law." Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 

1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 328(B) 

(1965)) (other citations omitted). Therefore, we need 

only determine whether, as a matter of law, the defendant owed a 

duty to Jones. 

 In Paragraph 2 of his complaint, Jones specifically 

pointed to the relevant legal duty the government negligently 
breached: 

 Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA operates a 

 prison system and is responsible for the 

 care, health and welfare of federal prisoners 

 within its custody in the federal prison 

 system. 

Jones also alleged that federal employees "failed to supply 

Plaintiff with his medication although it knew or should have 

known that [the medicine] was necessary for his health." 

 We find the defendant's duty articulated in 18 U.S.C. 

 4042(a)(2) and (3), which provide: 

 The Bureau of Prisons . . . shall -- (2) . . 

 . provide for the safekeeping, care and 

 subsistence . . . (3) provide for the 

 protection . . . of all persons charged with 

 or convicted of offenses against the United 

 States. 

The statute is unambiguous, and to avert summary judgment, Jones 

was not required to provide a further basis for his contention 

that defendant had a duty of care toward him. United States v. 

Muniz, 374 U.S. 164-65, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1859 (1963). ("[T]he duty 

of care owed by the Bureau of Prisons to federal prisoners is 

fixed by 18 U.S.C.  4042 . . . ."). 

 The facts are undisputed that Jones had been prescribed 

medicine to treat his condition; that the medicine had been 

withheld; and that he then suffered a severe stroke -- just what 

the medicine was designed to prevent -- which left him 

permanently disabled. We conclude that this evidence is 

sufficient to allow a jury to determine that the government 

breached its legal duty of care toward Jones by failing to 

provide him with his medication within twelve hours of its normal 

prescription time. 

 III. 

 We will reverse the summary judgment of the district 

court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.