COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge Clem ents, Senior Judges Willis and Annunziata Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

DENNIS G. KING OPINION BY v. Record No. 2933-04-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. NOVEMBER 1, 2005 MARIAN R. KING

FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY James H. Chamblin, Judge Matthew P. Snow (Biberaj & Sn ow, PC, on brief), for appellant. Peter W. Buchbauer (James J. McGuire; Kelly C. Ashby; Buchbauer & McGuire, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Dennis G. King appeals the tria l court’s division of the partie s’ income tax refunds. He contends the trial court erred (1) “in its determinat ion that $9,781 of the fe deral income tax refund was jointly titled equally owned property rather than his separate property,” (2) “in its determination that $2,520 of the state income tax refund was jo intly titled equally owned property rather than his separate property,” (3) “in its determination that the federal and state ta x refunds were simply a return of income,” and (4) in denyi ng him an award of attorney’s fees . Both parties seek attorney’s fees and costs associated with this appeal. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND On appeal, we view the evidence and all reas onable inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire , 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990).- 2 - Dennis G. King (husband) and Marian R. King (wife) were married on September 19, 1998. Prior to the marriage, they executed a premarital agreement, expressly stating their intention to maintain their respective premarital property as separate after the marriage. The agreement provided that “all . . . issues, profits, incr eases, appreciation, a nd income from the Separate Property of [each]” should remain the sepa rate property of that one. Furthermore, “[i]n the event of separation, divorce or death” either spouse should “be free from any claim, demand, lien, interest and right of and by [the other].” The agreem ent provided that in the event of litigation to enforce its provision s, “the prevailing party shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the losing party for [attorney’s fees].” The parties separated on March 7, 2000. Nevert heless, they filed joint federal and state income tax returns for tax year 1999. By cl aiming on their joint retu rns a loss to husband’s separately owned beach property, they genera ted a federal tax refund of $25,447 and a state refund of $8,526. A dispute arose concerning thei r respective entitlements to the proceeds of those refunds. In her bill for divorce, wife asked the trial court to determine the division of the federal and state tax refunds. The trial court held that although the losses that gave rise to the refunds were generated by husband’s separate property, the tax refunds were jointly-titled marital property, equally owned by the parties. Acco rdingly, as provided by paragraph 14 of the premarital agreement, it divided the refund procee ds equally between them. It awarded wife a portion of her attorney’s fees as the “p revailing party.” Husband appealed. In King v. King , 40 Va. App. 200, 578 S.E.2d 806 (2003) (King I ), we held that under the terms of the parties’ premarital agreement “[t]he designation of separate property extended to all increases in value and changes in form.” Id. at 206-07, 578 S.E.2d at 810. We reversed the division of the tax refunds and remanded this issu e to the trial court, hol ding “[t]he trial court- 3 - should have given husband a credit fo r the portion of the refunds he wa s thus able to trace to his separate income.” Id. at 211, 578 S.E.2d at 812. We “h[e]ld th at any portion of the refunds in excess of what husband is able to trace to his se parate earnings and losses is marital property and should be distributed in accordance with Para graph 14 of the agreement . . . .” Id. On remand, the trial court found that had the parties filed separate tax returns, husband would have received a federal tax refund of $14,987 and a state tax refund of $6,006, and wife
would have received a federal tax refund of $679 and would have owed $175 in state taxes. These findings were based on credible evidence in the form of “dummy” returns. The trial court concluded that the amounts the pa rties would have received had th ey filed separately constituted separate property and that the remaining refund amount, $12,301, was marital property to be divided equally, as provided by their agreement. Holding that “[n]either party prevailed,” the trial court made no award of attorney’s fees.
ANALYSIS Tax Refunds Husband argues on appeal that the trial cour t’s division of the tax refunds fails to follow the mandate of King I

. In King I , we explained that tracing is the appropriate method to determine the correct distribution of the tax refunds. To the extent that husband is able to show that any of the joint re funds are directly traceable to his earnings and income, he is entitled to those funds as his separate property. Here, the “dummy” returns under the “Married, filing separately” status that husband o ffered into evidence provided the trial court with an appropriate basis to trace what was properly attributable to husband’s separate estate. The trial court should have given husband a credit for the portion of the refunds he was thus able to trace to his separate income. Id. at 210-11, 578 S.E.2d at 812.- 4 - Husband argues that “but for” the loss to his separately owned pr operty, the parties would not have received the federal tax refund of $25,447 and the state refund of $8,526. However, the loss to husband’s property was but one of the factor s that produced the amount of the tax refund. As the evidence demonstrates, had the parties not filed jointly, the tax re funds would have been substantially less. Jo int filing, a marital act, combined with the wage withholding of both parties, also contributed to the size of the refunds. Thus, husband succeeded in tracing to his separate property only a portion of the total tax refunds, the portion that he would have received had he filed separately. Th e federal refund of $14,987 and th e state refund of $6,006 derived from his separate property, the loss to his b each property. The remaining $12,301 in tax refunds derived from the parties’ marital state and their marital act in filing jointly. The trial court accurately calculated and correc tly divided those amounts. Accordingly, we hold that the tria l court correctly followed the King I mandate in its division of the tax refunds. Attorney Fees The trial court in King I made wife an award of attorney ’s fees, concluding that she was the “prevailing party” in that action. Our ruling in King I noted the split victory on appeal and therefore remanded the attorney’s fees issue for reconsiderati on. The parties’ premarital agreement provides for an award of attorney’s fe es and costs to the “prevailing party” in any action seeking enforcement of the contract. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial co urt’s conclusion that neither party prevailed in King I and that therefore neither part y was entitled to an attorney’s fees award. The trial court proceedings now on appeal were the execution of the mandate of King I , a complete victory for neither party. In following the remand mandate, th e trial court awarded each party less than he or she sought.- 5 - Both parties request costs and attorney ’s fees associated with this appeal. The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to determine the propriety of an awar d of attorney’s fees for efforts expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for requiring additional payment. O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). In this context, and upon consideration of the entire record in this case, we hold th at neither party is entitled to an award of costs or attorney’s fees. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.