THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

VIR

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THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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Cover

The Naval War College complex on

Coasters Harbor Island, in a photograph

taken about 2000, looking roughly

northeast. In the center foreground is

Luce Hall, with Pringle Hall to its left

and Mahan Hall hidden behind it;

behind them, to the left, are Spruance,

Conolly, and Hewitt halls. In the center,

partly obscured by Conolly Hall, is

McCarty Little Hall. On the extreme

right in the foreground is Founders Hall,

in which the College was established. In

recent years the College has expanded

into parts of several buildings of the Surface Warfare Officers School Command,

on the northern part of the island. In the

middle distance are facilities of Naval

Station Newport (the decommissioned

aircraft carriers ex-Forrestal and exSaratoga are visible at Pier 1) and, beyond that, of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. In the far distance can be

seen parts of the towns of Portsmouth and

Tiverton, Rhode Island.

Photograph © 2008 by Onne van der Wal

Photography, Inc.

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Friday, July 17, 2009 11:50:31 AM
Somalia . . . From the Sea

Gary J. Ohls

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Newport, Rhode Island THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

VIR

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IBUS M RI VICTORIA

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Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Thirty-four

July 2009

President, Naval War College

Rear Adm. James P. Wisecup, USN

Provost

Amb. Mary Ann Peters

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Robert C. Rubel

Naval War College Press

Director: Dr. Carnes Lord

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.1071

DSN exchange: 948

E-mail: press@usnwc.edu

Web: www.usnwc.edu/press

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Director, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the

President of the Naval War College consider of particular

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the

Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Director of the Naval War College Press.

To request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions

to the series, please either write the President (Code 32S),

Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI

02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax,

or e-mail addresses given.

Reproduction and printing are subject to the Copyright Act

of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This

document may be freely reproduced for academic or other

noncommercial use; however, it is requested that

reproductions credit the author and Newport Papers series

and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain

permission to reproduce this publication for commercial

purposes, contact the Press editorial office.

ISSN 1544-6824

ISBN 978-1-884733-59-8

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Contents

Foreword, by John B. Hattendorf 

Introduction 

Acknowledgments 

CHAPTER ONE Operational and Strategic Context 

CHAPTER TWO Operation EASTERN EXIT 

CHAPTER THREE Operation PROVIDE RELIEF 

CHAPTER FOUR Operation RESTORE HOPE: Prelude

and Lodgment 

CHAPTER FIVE Operation RESTORE HOPE: Operation

and Transition 

CHAPTER SIX Operation CONTINUE HOPE:

Operations and Conflict 

CHAPTER SEVEN Operation CONTINUE HOPE:

Reinforcement and Withdrawal 

CHAPTER EIGHT Operation UNITED SHIELD 

CHAPTER NINE Operational and Strategic Observation

APPENDIX A The Weinberger Doctrine 

APPENDIX B The Powell Doctrine 

APPENDIX C UNITAF Component Commanders 

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APPENDIX E Seven-Point Agreement 

APPENDIX F Somali Clans and Political Factions 

APPENDIX G Participating Nations 

APPENDIX H General Zinni’s Considerations for

Humanitarian and Peace Operations 

APPENDIX I Major Events Chronology 

APPENDIX J Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Bibliography 

About the Author 

The Newport Papers 

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Foreword

At the end of the decades-long Cold War, the United States displayed its militar

capability in a positive manner by responding to a severe humanitarian crisis in

Somalia. The goal of providing assistance amid starvation and chaos appealed 

better natures of the American people and their leaders. Highly influenced by m

coverage of starvation and privation, most Americans happily embraced a serie

operations conducted by their government to alleviate the suffering that appea

pervasive throughout that African nation. Regrettably, the best of intentions co

not prevent a continuing drift toward disorder, and the American relief effort

devolved into conflict and bloodshed. Although the operations were not entire

without success, the violence and casualties incurred during these actions left a 

impression that influenced American foreign policy and military thinking for s

time thereafter. In Somalia . . . From the Sea, Professor Gary J. Ohls has written 

account of those experiences and their subsequent impact on the policies of the

United States. Despite the fact that American incursions into Somalia entailed th

effort of all U.S. services, naval expeditionary forces provided the preponderance 

force during much of the involvement. Professor Ohls illustrates this, while analy

the operational and strategic aspects of these events.

Professor Ohls undertook this research and writing project in naval operational h

while serving as a faculty member in the Maritime History Department of the N

War College between August 2007 and December 2008. The tradition of studying 

recent and long-past historical events was firmly established at the foundation of 

Naval War College in 1884 with the contributions of the College’s founder, Steph

Luce, and his immediate successor, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Historical rese

and analysis has continued as a recognized element of the academic life of the in

tion for the past 125 years. Nowhere is there a more logical requirement for a cor

relevant source material and for an academic research department devoted to ne

research on naval history. Building on a tradition of publishing timely analyses, t

Naval War College initiated the book-length series of works known as the Newpo

Papers. In his study of American involvement in Somalia during the immediate p

Cold War period, Professor Ohls has participated in the Newport Papers traditio

making an original contribution to naval operational history that provides insi

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world that lies ahead.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF, D.PHIL.

Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History

Chairman, Maritime History Department

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Introduction

From January 1991 through March 1995, the United States conducted numerous 

sions into Somalia, undertaking a variety of missions and objectives. All of the ac

had humanitarian elements, yet the operations that made up this mosaic of Ame

involvement ranged from benign to aggressive—from purely humanitarian to cle

combative. Somalia . . . From the Sea is an account that attempts to explain and a

these actions and place them within the overarching strategic and operational co

developing in the first years following the end of the Cold War. During this perio

sea services sought to redefine their roles in a rapidly changing defense environm

well as the new world order of President George H. W. Bush and the assertive mu

lateralism of President William J. Clinton. In the minds of many leaders, these w

times of both relief and uncertainty. The world had gotten through the Cold War 

out a nuclear exchange or a major conventional confrontation between the world

great superpowers, and that was a good thing. But the lack of clarity about this n

world order created angst in the minds of many military leaders.

Political leaders and many American citizens saw this as a time of great opportun

would be possible to reduce defense costs and reallocate those expenditures to ev

thing from social programs to tax reductions. Even the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait a

subsequent war to reestablish Kuwaiti independence did not dampen the enthusi

the times, since most leaders viewed Saddam Hussein and his aggression as an an

in the new world order. Yet for many military and naval officers and a few politic

leaders there remained uncertainty in the defense environment, uncertainty that 

could ignore only at great risk. Within that context numerous operational and st

concept papers were developed and published. But despite the thought and profe

alism invested in this material, the impact of these concepts on the armed forces 

United States proved inconsistent and tentative.

The first chapter of this study (“Operational and Strategic Context”) identifies th

most significant of these new ideas and attempts to analyze their impact on the

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concepts with the major warfighting theories of the Cold War era—such as the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s—it becomes clear how the situation had changed and how

that shift influenced the operational nature of the Navy and Marine Corps. Although

this chapter addresses a number of papers from the period, such as “The Way Ahead”

and The Navy Policy Book, the focus is on three closely related concept documents that

typify this period: . . . From the Sea, Forward . . . From the Sea, and Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Not only did these have a great impact during the 1990s, but they

remain important influences in the operational and strategic environments today.

Among the more interesting aspects of these concepts is the concurrent nature of their

development and implementation. Thinkers in Washington and other centers of study

developed these ideas and innovative thoughts at the same time that operators in the

field conducted the actions that gave them definition. We will find this interaction

between concept development and operational implementation throughout as we

attempt to understand American involvement in Somalia within the operational and

strategic concepts of that period.

The initial military action in Somalia—Operation EASTERN EXIT—occurred from 5 to

7 January 1991 and involved naval forces committed to DESERT SHIELD. EASTERN EXIT

amounted to a noncombatant evacuation operation sent to rescue Americans and citizens of other nations from the war-torn and crime-infested city of Mogadishu. It was a

humanitarian operation in that it rescued people and saved lives. More accurately, how

ever, it was an armed incursion, conducted without the permission of the local government and authorized to accomplish its mission by force of arms if necessary. The

chapter on EASTERN EXIT and its effects makes it clear how aptly the operation fits into

the concepts of . . . From the Sea. It also demonstrates how the larger operations of

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM—involving some of the same forces that executed

EASTERN EXIT—contributed to both evacuation at Mogadishu and development of the

operational and strategic concepts of the period.

The chapter that addresses Operation PROVIDE RELIEF deals with the overarching concepts of this study somewhat less perfectly than is the case elsewhere in this work.

PROVIDE RELIEF amounted to a relatively small air-delivery operation commanded by a

Marine officer and operating through a joint staff. Its primary mission involved flying

emergency food aid from Mombasa, Kenya, into remote sites of Somalia ravished by

severe famine. Yet this episode is very important to our study, because it constituted

America’s entry into Somalia as a humanitarian force. Unlike EASTERN EXIT, PROVIDE

RELIEF implied an American commitment to Somalia and served as a precursor for the

much larger and more complex involvements that followed. Familiarity with PROVIDE

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of them closely intertwined with . . . From the Sea and other concepts from that p

It is not possible to appreciate America’s involvement in Somalia without a clear 

standing of PROVIDE RELIEF.

In addition to the air-delivery element of PROVIDE RELIEF, a small but important n

expeditionary action also occurred. The insertion of a group of Pakistani United N

peacekeepers into Mogadishu promised to be a tricky proposition, because of the i

bility within that city and the negative view of the UN held by the leader of a majo

tion and subclan within the city. U.S. naval expeditionary forces in the form of an

amphibious ready group facilitated that operation, ensuring its safe accomplishme

PROVIDE RELIEF chapter also describes the events that created such chaotic conditi

within Somalia and led to the enormous humanitarian relief response from many 

of the world. This background provides insight into the operational environment A

can forces faced while deployed to that part of the world. It also addresses Somali c

relationships, the political factions at play within that environment, and the lead

who contributed to the chaotic and confused society of Somalia in the 1990s. Wi

this knowledge, it is difficult to appreciate the factors that affected American thin

and actions before and during our larger involvements on the Horn of Africa.

Operation RESTORE HOPE exemplifies the application of . . . From the Sea and th

of naval expeditionary forces in a complex and disordered environment. The firs

two chapters on RESTORE HOPE (“Operation RESTORE HOPE: Prelude and Lodgm

addresses the growth of the crisis, the U.S. decision-making process for respondi

the situation, the planning and organization of the operation, and the initial incu

into Somalia for humanitarian relief. The second (“Operation RESTORE HOPE: O

tions and Transition”) deals with the problems of overcoming the friction and re

tance (whether subtle or overt) that resulted from an effort to change the status q

within the Somali nation. It addresses political and diplomatic efforts, organizati

activities, stabilization operations, and in some cases combat actions. Finally, thi

ter deals with the problems of transferring control of the Somalia mission from a 

operation to one under UN leadership, during Operation CONTINUE HOPE.

CONTINUE HOPE is also addressed in two chapters, beginning with “Operation

CONTINUE HOPE: Operations and Conflict.” This chapter completes the transitio

cess from RESTORE HOPE and describes the political, social, and military environ

that existed within Somalia from May to October 1993. It explains how the huma

ian relief operation morphed into a full-blown combat situation, with the CONT

HOPE/United Nations Operations in Somalia [UNOSOM] II force becoming em

in Somalia’s internecine fighting in the streets of Mogadishu. The chapter describ

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impact on the mission and subsequent operations. It includes the factors leading up to

the Battle of Mogadishu (also called the “Black Hawk Down” incident), the impact of

that encounter, and a brief description of the fighting.

The second chapter on this subject (“Operation CONTINUE HOPE: Reinforcement and

Withdrawal”) discusses the impact of the Battle of Mogadishu on American and coalition commitment to Somalia and other humanitarian activities. The shock effect of

unexpected American casualties, coupled with the desecration of the body of a U.S. sol

dier in the streets, caused a revulsion among Americans and had a great impact on this

undertaking as well as future deployments. We assess the subsequent decision to reinforce American troops while limiting use of the units arriving in Somalia as part of

Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. The schizophrenic nature of this period, wherein the

U.S. president proclaimed that America would remain involved while announcing a

withdrawal date only six months in the future, will also be addressed. The role of Army

and naval forces during this period and the complex yet efficient withdrawal of U.S.

forces during March 1994 is discussed and analyzed.

One year after the amphibious withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, the United

Nations conducted a similar evacuation, known as Operation UNITED SHIELD, under

the command of a U.S. naval expeditionary force. Although an efficient tactical and

operational action, this undertaking exposed the failure of policy and strategy for saving Somalia from chaos and anarchy. A study of this operation is followed by a chapter

entitled “Operational and Strategic Observations,” which concludes the narrative and

analytic elements of this work. Various appendices follow, including a chronology of

events, a list of abbreviations and acronyms, and other relevant information, as well as

a complete bibliography. The reader is encouraged to review all the appendices before

beginning the text, as this will greatly enhance understanding of the unique aspects of

this historic set of events.

Research for this study was conducted primarily in original sources. The most important element comprised original interviews by the author of many high-level leaders

involved in the decision-making, planning, or execution phases of these actions. A

second important resource involved the Operational Archives at the Navy Yard in

Washington, D.C., and the Marine Corps archives in Quantico, Virginia. In addition

to numerous chronologies, histories, messages, and other such material, these

archives contain various interviews conducted at the time of the events under study.

Memoirs in the forms of books and journal articles also contributed to this research

and proved particularly valuable when used in conjunction with personal interviews

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ics were also used.

Three aspects of this study make it unique among the literature of America’s incu

into Somalia. The most basic of these is the effort to address all the military actio

the period—from EASTERN EXIT through UNITED SHIELD. Many excellent accou

have covered one or several aspects of the Somalia experience, but no major stud

addressed the entire series of American actions or attempted to describe and ana

their interrelated nature. The events most extensively covered in the existing liter

are the December 1992 landing in Mogadishu to initiate RESTORE HOPE and the 

of Mogadishu during CONTINUE HOPE. These events are, of course, addressed in 

study, but as elements of the larger commitment rather than as isolated episodes

A second unique element of this study is its inclusion of the U.S. Navy’s contribu

America’s Somalia involvement. The naval contribution has generally been left o

accounts, whereas other aspects—Army, Marine Corps, humanitarian, diplomati

political, and United Nations—have been thoroughly covered. This work is not a 

history of U.S. involvement in Somalia; it is not possible to segment the roles of s

vices in any way that would permit a meaningful account. But it does include the 

role as an integral part of the larger activity and characterizes the value of naval f

in an expeditionary environment.

The third unique aspect of this study is its intention to connect the Somalia incu

and the operational and strategic concepts of the time. This element of the subje

particularly fascinating, since the two activities, operations and concept developm

occurred simultaneously and interactively. Through this analysis we not only und

stand the activity of the early 1990s but gain a broad insight as to how concepts a

influenced by action. By including the conceptual aspect of naval thinking throu

this study, we also understand how policy and strategy interact with operations a

tactics—at least within an expeditionary environment.

Note

The epigraph is a commonly quoted Somali proverb that served as a backdrop for American inv

ment in Somalia during the 1990s. Reproduced in U.S. Army Dept., United States Forces, Somali

Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994 (Washing

D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003), p. 55.

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Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the many people who shared their experiences, k

edge, and insights, especially Ambassador Robert B. Oakley; Admirals Stanley R.

Arthur and Jonathan T. Howe; Vice Admirals Lee F. Gunn, William J. Hancock, D

J. Katz, John B. LaPlante, James B. Perkins III, and John Scott Redd; Rear Admira

Joseph J. Dantone and Charles R. Saffell, Jr.; Captains Leroy T. Bortmes, Alan B. M

John W. Peterson, and Kenneth Pyle; Generals Michael W. Hagee, Joseph P. Hoar

Anthony C. Zinni; Lieutenant Generals Jan C. Huly, Robert B. Johnston, Frank L

Thomas M. Montgomery, and Gregory S. Newbold; Major Generals Carl F. Ernst

Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., and James M. Myatt; Brigadier Generals Matthew E. Brode

and Richard F. Vercauteren; and Colonels James J. Doyle, Jr., John Garrett, Willia

Hartig, Robert P. McAleer, William C. McMullen III, John W. Moffett, Larry D. O

Harry W. Peterson, and Patrick C. Sweeney. Research professionals at the Naval W

College provided invaluable service, including Evelyn M. Cherpak, Alice K. Juda, 

J. Rowe, Julie L. Zecher, and Janice L. Radke. Also at the Naval War College, I wou

to thank Dr. Carnes Lord and Pelham G. Boyer of the Naval War College Press an

Arthur Lamoureux of the visual communications department for their importan

tribution to this work. At the Operational Archives Branch of the Naval Historic

ter, I received excellent support from Dr. Regina T. Akers, Timothy T. Pettit, and

Commander Robert Moss. At the Marine Corps Research Center in Quantico, Vi

Michael Miller, Dr. James Ginther, and Martha Roberson provided outstanding a

tance. At the Marine Corps History Division the director, Dr. Charles P. Neimeye

key staff members, including Charles D. Melson, Danny J. Crawford, and Robert 

Aquilina, were most helpful. Finally, this project would not have been successful 

out the guidance, support, and friendship of Dr. John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. Kin

fessor of Maritime History, chairman of the Maritime History Department, and

director of the Naval War College Museum.

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Me and Somalia against the world,

Me and my clan against Somalia,

Me and my family against my clan,

Me and my brother against my family,

Me against my brother.

Somali proverb

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Operational and Strategic Context

Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps spent cons

able time and energy attempting to define their roles in the new security environ

created by the end of the Cold War. The decline of Soviet power, marked by large 

backs in military spending and a withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, le

United States without a peer competitor—politically, diplomatically, or militarily

the world scene.1

The aftermath of this climactic event created pressure in the U.

Congress for a “peace dividend,” in the form of deep reductions in the defense bu

By 1990, President George H. W. Bush recognized the security environment had

changed but also felt that it remained somewhat uncertain. The Soviet Union, Am

ica’s Cold War adversary, was less hostile, but it had not yet imploded (as it soon

would) into numerous successor states, and it continued to possess residual milit

strength, especially large quantities of nuclear weapons.

The president and his advisers wanted to avoid a haphazard disarmament—such 

occurred after most wars in American history—and therefore chose to limit defe

reductions to 25 percent over a five-year period.2

They also called for a revised se

strategy that reflected new realities in the post–Cold War world. This would perm

restructuring America’s armed forces to fit new requirements and avoid simple a

the-board reductions that would leave the United States with a hollow version of 

Cold War military force.3

This reassessment of national security resulted from th

ful and professional analysis, and offered substantial force reductions, but many 

believed it did not go far enough. In the political environment of 1990, opponen

the administration viewed the decision to reduce no more than 25 percent as ina

quate and essentially a victory for supporters of the Pentagon.4

During the defense buildup of the 1980s, naval leaders advocated constructing a 

hundred-ship force. They never fully attained that goal, but to defense planners a

time it seemed reasonable, because the Soviet Union possessed a strong and grow

navy with deployment patterns that threatened American interests.5

Additionally

CHAPTER ONE

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required naval involvement) underscored in the minds of most analysts the ongoing

importance of a large naval force.6

But under the reduced-threat scenario of the 1990s,

strategic thinking focused on addressing regional contingencies rather than worldwide

warfare against the Soviet Union. In response to that focus, defense leaders developed a

“Base Force” concept designed to provide a minimal yet stable defense capability that

could adequately protect the nation’s interests in the post–Cold War era. The notion of

a 25 percent reduction in U.S. military forces, in a manner closely tied to the revised

security strategy, resulted from the Base Force planning process. For the Navy, matching the Base Force structure to the new security strategy presaged a reduction from 526

to 450 ships, with associated cuts in manpower and budget.7

The Marine Corps also

faced a decrease from its Cold War force level of 197,000 to 170,600; planners had initially considered a force as low as 150,000 Marines.8

Faced with new geopolitical realities and reduced combat capabilities, defense officials

and naval analysts of the early 1990s created a series of strategic concepts that redefined the mission of the sea services. The catchword of the period became “expeditionary,” and for the Navy this implied a shift from a strategy of large-scale power

projection, antisubmarine warfare, and sea control based on the Soviet threat toward

concepts focused on the world’s littorals. This contrasted with the last important Cold

War strategy document—known as the “Maritime Strategy”—which had embodied the

Navy’s role and mission of that era. Published by the U.S. Naval Institute in January

1986 as a special supplement of its Proceedings magazine, the unclassified version of th

Maritime Strategy consisted of four white papers.9

The 1986 Maritime Strategy resulted

from a substantial effort conducted by numerous strategic thinkers over a fairly long

period.10 In fact, the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy constituted a comprehensive policy, one that addressed more than just the Soviet threat. Even so, it did not fit the security environment of the 1990s. The development of a new strategy as the basis for

reductions and restructuring was fundamental to the Base Force model.11 Over the next

several years, as ideas and concepts churned through the Department of Defense, the

Navy and Marine Corps issued a series of strategic and operational papers that defined

the new security environment and with it the roles and missions of the sea services.

The Navy Department issued the most relevant of these documents during the first hal

of the 1990s. Yet even as naval thinkers codified in their policy papers the concepts of

littoral-focused expeditionary warfare and sea-based forward presence, the Navy and

Marine Corps team were embodying those concepts in numerous incursions in

Somalia, on the Horn of Africa.

In April 1991, the Naval Institute Proceedings and the Marine Corps Gazette simultaneously published an article entitled “The Way Ahead.” Like the “Maritime Strategy”

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Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.12 But this time the 

leaders endorsed a single document rather than issuing separate papers, as they h

the 1986 Maritime Strategy. “The Way Ahead” clearly signaled the move away fro

Maritime Strategy’s focus on global warfighting and deterrence and toward a new 

egy based on multiple regional contingencies where American interests were thre

ened. Naval thinkers had recognized the need for a new vision as early as 1989, w

they first noticed a weakening in Soviet resolve and the prospect of an end to the 

War.13 Realizing that a new strategic environment would require new strategic th

the drafters of “The Way Ahead” emphasized the need for the Navy to focus on o

tions ashore rather than a hostile navy at sea.14 This implied, in addition to forwa

presence, involvement in humanitarian assistance, nation building, peacekeeping

counternarcotics, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and crisis response.15

“The Way Ahead” constituted the first major effort by leaders within the Navy D

ment to convey this policy shift to members of the sea services. It also communic

the uncertainty about the future threat environment, particularly the possibility 

resurgent Soviet navy.16 The ideas expressed in “The Way Ahead” proved prescien

its ultimate value lay in the awareness it generated among professionals within th

Department of the Navy. Most naval officers realized their operating environmen

changed, but few could grasp what that meant for themselves or their service. “T

Way Ahead” did not answer all their questions, but it did provide insight and aug

changes in deployment patterns, task force composition, and mission focus. Tho

thoughtful and well articulated, “The Way Ahead” never served as a lodestar for p

ning or operations, because larger events distracted from its message. But it cons

the first important effort to communicate a radically new direction in strategic th

ing; assimilating a message of that significance requires some time.17

Perhaps the most important paper to address post–Cold War security concerns w

September 1992 publication entitled . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Servic

the 21st Century. This concept document clearly stated a new direction for the na

services and defined a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps.18 Unlike 

Way Ahead,” the . . . From the Sea document became widely influential within the 

services and throughout the Department of Defense.19 Just four months prior to 

publication of . . . From the Sea, the Navy had issued a document entitled The Na

icy Book. Although it alluded to the Navy and Marine Corps team on various occ

The Navy Policy Book was essentially an internal document intended for parochia

within that service.20 But . . . From the Sea expressed the expeditionary nature of 

post–Cold War mission for both the Navy and Marine Corps while capturing the 

tegic temper of the time.21 It also reiterated the uncertainty within the operationa

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operational and strategic levels in the minds of some, . . . From the Sea clarified the

direction for the sea services at that time and for the near-term future. It unequivocally

directed the Navy and Marine Corps team to provide the nation with “Naval Expeditionary Forces—Shaped for Joint Operations—Operating Forward from the Sea—Tailored for National Needs.” Its strategic message emphasized the shift “away from openocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations from the sea.”23 The word “from”

was the key term in this new naval concept statement, elevating the role of the U.S.

Marine Corps within the larger naval mission of the time.24 An important assumption

underlying . . . From the Sea held that no peer threat—such as a resurgent Russia or

China—would threaten U.S. dominance for the next twenty years. Opinion differed on

the long-range threat, but an important concept (expressed in the “Manthorpe Curve,”

named for Captain William Manthorpe of the naval intelligence community)—suggested that the aggregate threat during that twenty-year window (roughly 1990–2010)

would be comparatively low.25

. . . From the Sea and the subsequent documents that built on its concepts (Forward . . .

From the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea) provided insight and direction to

the sea services, with an impact not realized since the publication of the 1986 Maritime

Strategy.26 Among other things, . . . From the Sea emphasized the importance of unobtrusive forward presence—as opposed to the forward-defense concept of the Cold

War—and the flexibility of sea-based forces. That meant that naval expeditionary

forces not only come from and return to the sea, they are also sustained from the sea.

Sea-based expeditionary forces can project either power or assistance ashore yet do not

encroach upon the sovereignty of nations while at sea.27 Once ashore, naval expeditionary forces present a relatively small “footprint,” because they are supported by sea,

thereby reducing exposure, vulnerability, and host-nation resentment.28 By concentrating on the littoral regions of the world and recognizing the importance of power projection and maneuver from the sea, . . . From the Sea reinforced the importance of the

Navy and Marine Corps team as, collectively, an integrated element of sea power.29

If . . . From the Sea constituted a new direction in strategy and structure in contrast to the

Cold War focus, in many ways it validated the historical and traditional role of the sea

services. As early as 1776, with the capture of New Providence in the Bahamas, and in the

1805 conquest of Derna, Tripoli, the Navy and Marine Corps team conducted joint expeditionary missions of crucial importance to the nation. Throughout the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries there occurred numerous expeditionary operations in the Caribbean

Central America, and the Pacific Basin by U.S. naval forces.30 The subjugation of California during 1846–47 resulted primarily from a series of amphibious landings along the

Pacific coastline spearheaded by the Navy and Marine Corps team. Such prominent Army

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manders (Commodores John D. Sloat and Robert F. Stockton) as adjuncts to the n

campaign that ultimately defeated the local Californios.31 Even during the Cold Wa

when both services had larger roles, oriented to the Soviet threat, they retained conting

missions, as exemplified by the 1958 landing in Lebanon and the 1965 incursion into th

Dominican Republic.32 Throughout American history, the Navy and Marine Corps wo

a team, establishing a model for joint operations in an expeditionary environment

By the time . . . From the Sea and subsequent documents relating to it appeared, t

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 had made the concept of

“jointness” an object of high devotion among many leaders within the Defense D

ment.34 Technically, the Navy and Marine Corps team constitutes a joint force, an

expeditionary incursions qualify as joint operations. But in reality the Navy and 

Corps team is something else—in fact, something much better—and for obvious 

sons. The two services have roots in a close and integrated tradition built over tw

turies of operating together, making them essentially two integral elements of a s

naval force.35 This connection goes far beyond simply working together in planni

operations. It includes such key elements as combined staffs, common doctrine, 

quent exercises and operations, and a sense of shared experiences, all of which co

ute to a common institutional culture in the field of expeditionary warfare. The f

that both services reside within the Department of the Navy is also important, bu

that does not adequately explain the symbiotic nature of their relationship. That 

more correctly found in the history and traditions of the two branches. As Lieute

Commander Terry O’Brien stated in a 1993 Marine Corps Command and Staff C

thesis paper, “[. . .] From the Sea has not discovered a new form of warfare—it h

rediscovered the capabilities of the Navy/Marine Corps team.”36

Although disagreement and discord often exist between the Navy and Marine Co

important issues, their disputes are typically of the productive type that results in

better policy, doctrine, plans, and operations through the interchange and vettin

ideas and concepts. Ultimately, this process contributes to improved war prepara

and to success in combat. Perhaps the most notable example of this process invol

the World War II relationship between two giants of that era, Richmond Kelly Tu

and Holland M. Smith. Of course, the Second World War in no way parallels the 

ditionary environment of the 1990s. But the effectiveness of the amphibious forc

the Fifth Fleet illustrates the practice that made the Navy and Marine Corps team 

that period exceptional—well beyond the level conceived even in joint operation

trine. As a rear admiral during the Central Pacific campaign of 1943–45, Turner 

as commander of the Navy’s amphibious forces, while Smith, holding the rank of 

general, commanded the Marines.37 Both men were highly intelligent, strong will

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some of their confrontations became legendary throughout the Pacific. Yet each valued

the role of the other’s branch, and the disagreements always focused on how best to

accomplish their mission. The result was often compromise, but only after all competing options received due consideration, under the strongest possible sponsorship. As

Smith characterized their relationship after the war, “Kelly Turner and I were to be

team mates in all my operations. He commanded Fifth Amphibious Force while I commanded the expeditionary troops that went along with the Navy and our partnership,

though stormy, spelled hell in big red letters to the Japanese.”38 It might be difficult to

determine which of these two powerhouses won more arguments. But the true winners

were clearly the United States and the U.S. naval service.

In light of this traditional relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps, it is only

natural that the concepts of . . . From the Sea were quickly amalgamated by the two services. In 1994, two years after its publication, a refinement and expansion of its ideas

appeared, under the appropriate title Forward . . . From the Sea.39 Like most strategic

concepts issued by the Navy Department during this period, Forward . . . From the Sea

bore the signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the

Commandant of the Marine Corps.40 If . . . From the Sea enhanced the role of the

Marine Corps in the expeditionary environment of 1992, Forward . . . From the Sea

tended to restore the Navy to its senior status by addressing its broader mission—

beyond the purview of littoral warfare.41 Although this concept paper maintained continuity with . . . From the Sea, it also upheld the importance of the Navy’s role in fighting and winning America’s wars at all levels while emphasizing the need to “be engaged

in forward areas, with the objective of preventing conflicts and controlling crises.”42

Forward . . . From the Sea underscored the point that forward-deployed naval forces

provide the linkage between peacetime operations and the initial responses to a crisis or

major regional contingency.43 Additionally, it places the aircraft carrier battle group on

equal standing with the amphibious ready group as the “building blocks” of forwarddeployed presence.44 Forward . . . From the Sea argues the importance of joint and combined operations while specifically affirming the traditional relationship between the

Navy and Marine Corps.45 Its drafters summarize the document’s main thrust in this

way: “Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the Nationa

Security Strategy: projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime

supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence.”46 Of

these five, only two—power projection and forward presence—are directly associated

with the expeditionary warfare concepts of . . . From the Sea. This caused some concern

within the Marine Corps that perhaps the Navy was seeking a return to a blue-water

focus at the expense of expeditionary warfare as conceived in . . . From the Sea.47

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intended to augment, not replace, the latter’s precepts. By including such traditio

naval missions as sea control, warfighting, and deterrence (coupled with the forw

presence and power-projection missions of . . . From the Sea) this strategy suppo

Navy efforts to resist further force reductions and budget cuts.48 In short, the mo

roles and missions the Navy claimed, the more ships it would need to support th

Forward . . . From the Sea also reflected—and was influenced by—the various eve

occurring throughout the world during that period, such as operations in Somal

Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq.50 (Either of these two capstone documents [. . . From the 

and Forward . . . From the Sea] would be a suitable basis for discussion of the Som

incursions of the 1990s. But since Forward . . . From the Sea includes material and 

tegic ideas beyond the expeditionary mission, the earlier publication seems more

appropriate for the purpose.)

In January 1996, the Marine Corps issued a document that augmented . . . From 

Sea, outlining the concept of “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” or as it becam

known, simply OMFTS. Published after the last American incursion into Somali

ideas and concepts of OMFTS were greatly influenced by those operations on the 

of Africa, as well as by other actions occurring in the early 1990s.51

Although many officers within the Navy and Marine Corps contributed to the de

ment of these various concepts after the end of the Cold War, one of the earliest 

to OMFTS emerged from the experiences of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr.

ing DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and the evacuation of the American embass

Mogadishu, Somalia (Operation EASTERN EXIT). In a 1991 memorandum to the 

mandant of the Marine Corps, Jenkins emphasized that future operations, either 

bat or humanitarian, should involve very rapid, long-range insertions along the

coastline at points where gaps in coastal defenses would permit the avoidance of 

strength. This would be accomplished primarily by the use of Landing Craft, Air

Cushion (LCAC) vehicles loaded with Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and helico

or V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. The key elements of Jenkins’s concept were high speed

maneuverability, and long range (perhaps from amphibious ships at sea as far as 

miles over the horizon). He suggested it be named “Maneuver from the Sea,” or p

haps “Maneuver War from the Sea.”52 Five years later, the OMFTS concept paper 

include all of Jenkins’s ideas.

In many ways, the OMFTS concept paper constitutes an intellectual exercise as m

a policy statement. Its clearly stated purpose is to begin a process of “proposal, d

and experimentation” while providing near-term vision for naval forces operatin

the expeditionary environment. Among other things, OMFTS addresses two maj

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littorals and the enhanced combat capability of American forces—and suggests that

these factors will greatly influence where, against whom, and how U.S. forces fight in

future operations. Implied is the question of whether or not conventional military

capability (even enhanced capability) is suitable for the challenges in areas likely to

require intervention by America’s expeditionary forces. Conceived as an adjunct document that builds on . . . From the Sea and Forward . . . From the Sea, OMFTS is essentially an operational concept, intended to create “forces capable of winning decisive

victories in littoral areas.”53 The essence of OMFTS is a “marriage between maneuver

warfare and naval warfare based on sea-borne maneuver, sea-based sustainability, and

rapid execution.”54 Despite the cerebral nature of the concept paper and the fact that it

addresses new dynamics in the expeditionary environment, the OMFTS terminology

and the tactical ideas behind it had been in play within the Department of the Navy

even before the issuance of . . . From the Sea.55

Historically, amphibious operations—especially large-scale landings—required a

buildup ashore after establishing the initial beachhead. Perhaps the most important

distinction between OMFTS and traditional amphibious warfare lies in the avoidance

of that operational phase. By inserting a landing element directly against enemy center

of gravity, the OMFTS model offers a sea-based version of “maneuver warfare” (then a

prominent concept among land-warfare thinkers and planners), one executed by naval

expeditionary forces.56 As stated in the OMFTS document, “Landing forces will move

directly from the ship to their objectives, whether those objectives are located on the

shoreline or far inland.”57 Elimination of the traditional need to establish a lodgment

ashore is made possible by greater use of sea-based logistics, improved long-range fire

support from naval ships (including precision-guided air munitions), and more efficient use of fuel and supplies ashore.58

By using the sea as maneuver space, ship-based expeditionary forces can create multipl

avenues of approach—to an extent that land maneuver warfare cannot match—and

project power from over the horizon or even farther away.59 By striking rapidly at critical objectives using modern Navy and Marine Corps transport systems (LHA, LHD, V22, LCAC, AAAV, LAV, etc.), amphibious forces create an intensively rapid operational

tempo, thereby acting “inside” the enemy’s decision-making process—that is, posing

challenges more rapidly than it can respond.60 With possession and use of the initiative

an inherent advantage of sea services in expeditionary warfare, landing forces can

attack objectives at times and locations of their choosing, thereby pitting friendly

strength against enemy weakness. These concepts, based on . . . From the Sea and

OMFTS, apply equally to wartime situations and operations other than war.61

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. . . From the Sea and OMFTS have application across the entire spectrum of con

fact, they were not radically new thoughts; the prominent status they achieved du

the 1990s resulted from an evolutionary process at various levels of warfare.62 Fo

instance, the 1950 landing at Inchon, Korea, and the subsequent capture of Seoul 

classic example of OMFTS within a conventional war setting.63 Often thought of 

World War II–style amphibious landing, the Inchon operation actually had sever

interesting differences. The maneuver started in southern California and progres

through Japan and the Pusan Perimeter, gaining in force at each stage, and then o

the landing at Inchon and the key objectives inland, principally Kimpo Airfield a

capital city, Seoul.64 By passing through the Inchon site and immediately capturin

inland objectives, the landing force cut off all support to the North Korean army

around the Pusan Perimeter, resulting in its destruction. The selection of Inchon 

landing site was in itself an astute application of maneuver warfare, in that the en

thinking an amphibious incursion impossible at Inchon, had left it lightly defend

The concept of attacking with American strength against North Korean weaknes

moving directly inland to key objectives resulted in an operational victory with s

gic implications.65 Had American forces struck a more “logical” place, such as Ku

or Posun-Myong, as some planners urged, and then established a supply buildup

ashore before attacking centers of gravity, the best they could have hoped for wou

have been a hard fight and in the end little more than tactical success.66

The Somalia incursions of the 1990s demonstrate an entirely different applicatio

the concepts associated with . . . From the Sea and OMFTS. In those various oper

we see these expeditionary principles at work in the post–Cold War environment

which they were crafted. The examples of Korea and Somalia illustrate the wide v

of missions that naval expeditionary forces can execute using these concepts. The

Inchon landing occurred in a conventional war, as a purely combat operation, wh

the Somalia incursions fit in the category of “military operations other than war

(MOOTW), though some fighting did take place. Expeditionary forces must alw

ready to fight once ashore, but that was not the primary intent in most of the inc

sions in Somalia during the 1990s. This study explores the various Somalia opera

in the context of . . . From the Sea and OMFTS, using those frameworks to explai

analyze operational and strategic implications. It also demonstrates how the Som

experience contributed to the subsequent development of concepts, doctrine, an

equipment.67 That culminated in the publication of the concept document entitle

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and the introduction of improved assault craft that c

support the rapid maneuver from ships directly to objectives ashore uninterrupt

topography or hydrography.68

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this chapter, particularly . . . From the Sea and OMFTS, are the cornerstones for

explaining and evaluating the Somalia incursions of the 1990s. The initial action discussed in this study involved an emergency evacuation of the American embassy in

Mogadishu, Somalia, which occurred in January 1991—before the publication of any

of these documents. Known as EASTERN EXIT, this operation illustrates the inherent efficacy of the Navy and Marine Corps team prior to the creation of the concept papers

issued in the aftermath of the Cold War. The evacuation at Mogadishu occurred

because of a collapse in social and political order throughout Somalia. This disastrous

situation also led to subsequent American involvement for the purpose—at least initially—of providing humanitarian relief, which is one of the missions envisioned by

MOOTW.69 From April 1992, when UN Security Council Resolution 751 created the

organization known as United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), until

March 1995, when American forces evacuated all UN personnel from Mogadishu, the

United States conducted numerous actions to assist the people of that nation. These

actions embodied and exemplified the expeditionary concepts of that time, particularly

those of . . . From the Sea and OMFTS.70 The EASTERN EXIT operation, coupled with

experiences in the Persian Gulf region during DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT

STORM, solidified the concepts later codified by the Navy in the naval doctrine publication Naval Warfare and by the Marine Corps in Operational Maneuver from the Sea.71

The ability to create theory and publish concepts while simultaneously conducting traditional and innovative operations was a distinctive characteristic of the expeditionary

environment during the first half of the 1990s.

Notes

1. National Security Strategy of the United States

(Washington, D.C.: White House, March

1990); National Security Strategy of the

United States (Washington, D.C.: White

House, August 1991); Michael Klare, “The

Rise and Fall of the ‘Rogue Doctrine’: The

Pentagon’s Quest for a Post–Cold War Military Strategy,” Middle East Report (Autumn

1998), pp. 12–15, 47.

2. Although numerous individuals—both military and civilian—contributed to policy development during this period, the key

advisers involved in force planning and strategy development included Gen. Colin L.

Powell, Lt. Gen. Paul Lee Butler, and Under

Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz. See

George H. W. Bush, In Defense of Defense

(speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium, 

August 1990), available at bushlibrary.tamu

.edu; Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the

Base Force, 1989–1992 (Washington, D.C.:

Joint History Office, Joint Staff, July 1993);

Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin

Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of

Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom

Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Project

Air Force, 2001), p. 10.

3. Bush, In Defense of Defense; Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, pp. 28, 33–34, 42.

4. Maureen Dowd, “Backing Pentagon, Bush

Says Military Can Be Cut 25% in 5 Years,”

New York Times, 3 August 1990.

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Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport: Naval War College

Press, 2004), p. 88; Soviet Naval Strategy and

Programs through the 1990s: National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-15/82D (Washington,

D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 15 November 1982), reprinted in Hattendorf, Newport

Paper 19, pp. 101–81.

6. Hattendorf, Newport Paper 19, pp. 49–51,

88; John F. Lehman, Jr., “The 600-Ship

Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Supplement, January 1986), pp. 32–33.

7. John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy

in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport

Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College

Press, 2006), pp. 11–12; Larson, Orletsky,

and Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade

of Change, pp. xiv, xv, 5, 9.

8. Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, pp. 21,

34, 38, 41, 44.

9. These papers include “The Maritime Strategy,” by Adm. James D. Watkins, Chief of

Naval Operations; “The Amphibious Warfare

Strategy,” by Gen. Paul X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps; “The 600-Ship

Navy,” by John F. Lehman, Jr., Secretary of

the Navy; and “Contemporary U.S. Naval

Strategy: A Bibliography,” by Capt. Peter M.

Swartz, USN.

10. Hattendorf, Newport Paper 19, pp. 54–91.

11. Bush, In Defense of Defense; Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, pp. 36, 48–50.

12. The authors include H. Lawrence Garrett III,

Secretary of the Navy; Adm. Frank B. Kelso

II, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. A.

M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

See “The Way Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings (April 1991), pp. 36–47;

Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 23–

37.

13. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 7–10.

14. Ibid., pp. 12, 23–24.

15. Garrett, Kelso, and Gray, “Way Ahead,” p. 41.

16. Ibid., pp. 37–38; Hattendorf, ed., Newport

Paper 27, pp. 11–12.

17. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 12,

23–24.

18. U.S. Navy Dept., . . . From the Sea: Preparing

the Naval Service for the 21st Century, Navy

and Marine Corps White Paper (Washington, D.C.: September 1992) [hereafter ...

reprinted in Newport Paper 27, ed.

Hattendorf, pp. 87–99; Thomas P. M

Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: W

Peace in the Twenty-first Century (Ne

G. P. Putnam, 2004), pp. 77–78.

19. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, p

87–88.

20. Ibid., pp. 12–13, 86.

21. The term expeditionary is subject to v

interpretations, but for purposes of t

per it “implies a mind set, a culture, 

commitment to forces that are design

operate forward and to respond swif

Naval Expeditionary Forces provide 

trusive forward presence which may 

tensified or withdrawn as required o

notice.” See . . . From the Sea, p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. 1.

23. Ibid., pp. 2–7.

24. E. T. O’Brien, From the Sea—to Wher

(Quantico, Va.: U.S. Marine Corps C

mand and Staff College, 1993), p. 6.

25. Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map, pp. 63–

26. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, p

27. Norman E. Ehlert, “Naval Expedition

Forces and Crisis Response,” in Nava

ward Presence and the National Milit

Strategy, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgriff, Jr., 

Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Annapolis, M

val Institute Press, 1993), pp. 211–12

28. Gary I. Wilson, Chris Yunker, and Fr

C. Spinney, “OMFTS: Innovation, D

neuver, and Aviation,” Marine Corps 

(December 1997), p. 21.

29. ...From the Sea, pp. 5, 9–10.

30. Leighton W. Smith, Jr., “. . . From the 

New Direction for Naval Forces,” in N

Forward Presence and the National M

Strategy, ed. Pfaltzgriff and Shultz, p

31. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the 

The United States Marine Corps, 1775

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pre

1962), pp. 6, 14–16, 53–56, 111–90, 5

And see Gary J. Ohls, “Roots of Trad

Amphibious Warfare in Early Ameri

(PhD dissertation, Texas Christian U

sity, 2008), pp. 55, 137–80, 233–68.

32. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The H

of the United States Marine Corps (N

Free Press, 1980), pp. 540–41, 557–59

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sis Response,” p. 203.

34. The term joint “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements

of two or more Military Departments participate.” Jointness is a slightly pejorative reference to an obsessive dedication to the

concept of some officers within the military

services. See U.S. Defense Dept., Department

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 12 April 2001, as

amended through 14 September 2007).

35. Rear Adm. Charles R. Saffell, Jr., USN (Ret.),

interview by the author, Fairfax, Virginia, 11

February 2008; Gen. Anthony C. Zinni,

USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, Falls

Church, Virginia, 10 October 2007.

36. O’Brien, “From the Sea,” p. 6.

37. Theodore Gatchel, “The Shortest Road to

Tokyo,” in The Pacific War Companion: From

Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, ed. Daniel

Marston (Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 2005), pp.

163, 165.

38. Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral

and Brass (New York: Scribner’s, 1948), p. 109.

39. Six months prior to the publication of Forward . . . From the Sea, the Navy issued a new

volume in the Naval Doctrine Publication

series, Naval Warfare. Intended as “the first

in a series of six capstone documents for naval forces that translate the vision and strategy of the white paper ‘. . . From the Sea,’” its

value was undercut, in part, by the failure to

create promised follow-on documents. See

Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 14–

15; U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Warfare, Naval

Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.:

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 28 March

1994) [hereafter NDP 1].

40. The signatories include John H. Dalton,

Secretary of the Navy; Adm. J. M. Boorda,

USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and

Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

41. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 15–

17.

42. U.S. Navy Dept., Forward . . . From the Sea

(Washington, D.C.: 19 September 1994), p. 1

[hereafter Forward . . . From the Sea, original

pagination], reproduced in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1994), pp. 46–

pp. 149–58 [emphasis original].

43. Ibid., p. 2.

44. Ibid., p. 4.

45. Ibid., p. 8.

46. Ibid., p. 10.

47. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, p. 16.

48. Ibid., p. 149.

49. Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map, pp. 72–80;

Leighton W. Smith, Jr., “. . . From the Sea: A

New Direction for Naval Forces,” in Naval

Forward Presence and the National Military

Strategy, ed. Pfaltzgriff and Shultz, pp. 230–

37.

50. Forward . . . From the Sea, pp. 1, 6.

51. Maj. Gen. Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., USMC

(Ret.), interview by the author, Chantilly,

Virginia, 11 February 2008.

52. Maj. Gen. H. W. Jenkins, Jr., memorandum

to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

“The Corps and Maneuver War from the

Sea,” 16 December 1991 (copy provided to

the author by Major General Jenkins).

53. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from

the Sea (Quantico, Va.: Concepts Division,

Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, 1993), p. 1.

54. Ibid., p. 14.

55. John H. Dalton, Frank B. Kelso II, and Carl

E. Mundy, Jr., “Department of the Navy

1994 Posture Statement,” Marine Corps Gazette (April 1994), p. 16.

56. John B. LaPlante, “It’s Time for the ‘Gators,’

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May

1993), p. 49.

57. The Marine Corps issued a follow-on document to OMFTS in 1997—U.S. Navy Dept.,

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (Quantico, Va.:

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 25 July 1997)—which outlined a tactical concept, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver,

or STOM, in support of OMFTS. STOM

would eventually be integrated into doctrin

as an adjunct to the ship-to-shore tactics of

traditional amphibious operations. See also

U.S. Navy Dept., Marine Corps Operations,

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0

(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 27 September 2001) [hereafter

MCDP 1-0]; and U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from the Sea, p. 6.

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Infestation and Investation,” Marine Corps

Gazette (April 1995), pp. 58–59.

59. Dalton, Kelso, and Mundy, “Department of

the Navy 1994 Posture Statement,” pp. 16–17.

60. Operating inside the enemy’s decision-making

process is another way of saying that one

makes decisions faster—and acts faster on

those decisions—than one’s opponent. This

has the obvious benefit of constantly placing

the enemy in a reactive mode. Military leaders often use the “OODA Loop” model (also

called the “Boyd Cycle”), a time-competitive

version of the observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA) process. See U.S.

Navy Dept., Tactics, Marine Corps Doctrinal

Publication 1-3 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 30 July 1997),

pp. 69–71; Terry C. Pierce, “. . . From the Sea:

Not a CVN Gator,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1993), pp. 74–75; and Anderson, “Implementing OMFTS,” pp. 57, 60.

61. MCDP 1-0, pp. 2-15 to 2-17; Ehlert, “Naval

Expeditionary Forces and Crisis Response,”

pp. 212–13.

63. Charles C. Krulak, “A Force-in-Read

Marine Corps Gazette (September 19

20–21.

64. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuv

the Sea, p. 7.

65. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., “Inchon, 1950,” 

sault from the Sea: Essays on the Histo

Amphibious Warfare, ed. Merrill L. B

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pre

1983), pp. 347–50, 352–53.

66. Ibid., p. 346.

67. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuv

the Sea, pp. 7, 10.

68. U.S. Navy Dept., Ship-to-Objective M

pp. II-3 to II-5.

69. NDP 1, p. 22.

70. Vice Adm. James B. Perkins III, USN 

interview by the author, Newport, R

Island, 11 September 2007 [hereafter 

first interview].

71. Jenkins interview.

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Operation EASTERN EXIT

During December 1990, the eyes of the world and the attention of its leaders foc

on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. For months, the United States had be

building a strong naval and military presence throughout the region in response 

Saddam Hussein’s 2 August 1990 attack and occupation of Kuwait. Under the lea

ship of Vice Admirals Henry H. Mauz, Jr., and Stanley R. Arthur, NAVCENT (tha

the naval component of U.S. Central Command) created a force in excess of a hu

ships, the largest American fleet assembled since World War II.1

The buildup had 

under Admiral Mauz and continued with Arthur, who assumed command of

NAVCENT just six weeks before the 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdraw

from Kuwait. Despite that cutoff date, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Ad

Frank Kelso II, did not consider war to liberate Kuwait as imminent and chose to 

out the already-planned change of command at NAVCENT on 1 December 1990

eral H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Command, consid

Arthur one of the most aggressive admirals he knew and interposed no objection

Additionally, Arthur had considerable experience within this operational area, ha

created the post of NAVCENT back in 1983.2

When Arthur took command in December 1990, Rear Admiral John B. “Bat” LaP

commanded its amphibious element, which would ultimately consist of thirty-o

ships, loaded with two Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) and one special opera

capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU [SOC])—roughly seventeen thousand

Marines. LaPlante’s Marine counterpart, Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., com

manded both the 4th MEB and—as senior Marine officer afloat—the overall Ma

landing force, which ultimately included 5th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC).3

In the 

guage of doctrine, LaPlante served as Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CAT

and Jenkins as Commander, Landing Force (CLF).4

(The Marine element afloat u

Jenkins’s command should not be confused with the I Marine Expeditionary Fo

I MEF, pronounced “One MEF”—ashore under Lieutenant General Walter E. Bo

the two had different missions and reporting structures.)5

The primary role, shar

CHAPTER TWO

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paring for an amphibious assault against Iraqi positions on the Kuwaiti coastline in the

upcoming Operation DESERT STORM. This required planning and operational rehearsals, the capstone event being a major landing exercise in Oman during late January

1991, designated SEA SOLDIER IV. This rehearsal was to include the entire force under

LaPlante and Jenkins; it would constitute the largest amphibious landing since Exercise

STEEL PIKE in October 1964.6

The threatened landing was intended primarily as a deception, but Schwarzkopf often

impressed on Arthur the importance of convincing Iraqi commanders that an amphibious landing would be part of any future war for Kuwait.7

Also, LaPlante and Jenkins

needed to prepare for an actual assault landing should the course of war so dictate.

With proper training, including large-scale rehearsals, the amphibious force would be

capable of both deception and combat.8

The importance of this exercise, coupled with

firm arrangements coordinated through Omani and U.S. State Department representatives, caused both Arthur and LaPlante to consider the scheduled dates for SEA SOLDIER

IV as fixed and definite. They also believed that the entire amphibious force had to par

ticipate in the landing, in order to achieve NAVCENT training objectives.9

The diversion of ships or Marines for any cause—no matter how important—would disrupt

their planning and degrade combat readiness. This issue was to influence the thinking

of Arthur and LaPlante when conditions within Somalia necessitated an American rescue mission in the days just preceding DESERT STORM.

10

As events eventually played out, the amphibious force under LaPlante and Jenkins did

not conduct an amphibious landing during DESERT STORM. But as a deception operation, theirs was the most successful since the Second World War.11 The major reasons

for its success include the degree to which the Navy and Marine Corps prepared for the

landing, especially the SEA SOLDIER IV rehearsal. Leaders at Central Command also

provided American news media opportunities to observe and report the amphibious

preparations. The film footage taken during the visits of the press to the fleet showed

up on television newscasts throughout the period leading up to the DESERT STORM

ground attack. Only the highest levels of command knew that the amphibious landing

was actually a ruse; even Jenkins—the senior Marine officer afloat—was not informed,

although he had suspected the truth for various reasons, including the constant press

coverage. The deception tied down five, sometimes six, divisions (depending on the

time frame) along the coast of Kuwait and drew an Iraqi reaction every time LaPlante

and Jenkins made a move in the Persian Gulf.12 The key commanders believed that the

hard training by the amphibious force during Operation DESERT SHIELD—capped by

SEA SOLDIER IV—provided the credibility that fooled Iraqi leaders.13

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been among the first naval forces to sail to the Arabian Sea after Iraq’s invasion o

Kuwait. Moser’s squadron consisted of five ships loaded with some 2,100 Marine

units of Jenkins’s 4th MEB. By January 1991 they had been at sea over four mont

conducting training and preparing for the looming battle with Iraq. Prior to dep

for DESERT SHIELD, Moser’s squadron had spent only a few weeks in port at Norf

Virginia, following a routine Mediterranean deployment.14 PhibRon 6 was typica

the Navy and Marine forces that deployed for DESERT SHIELD in that its elements

responded to the crisis on very short notice and in various stages of training.15 Bu

ing their time at sea, the sailors and Marines of the entire amphibious task force 

ducted a series of training exercises, including IMMINENT THUNDER and SEA SOL

I–III, and achieved a high level of preparedness.16 Nevertheless, they urgently n

to participate in SEA SOLDIER IV to ensure their ability to conduct a large-scale 

ing if required.17 SEA SOLDIER IV was particularly critical because Jenkins’s landin

force consisted of three distinct elements (4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU [S

that did not have a common higher headquarters. It amounted to a command ro

the size of a small Marine expeditionary force but without a MEF headquarters t

structure and direct it.18 Therefore, when LaPlante and Moser received the warnin

order to prepare for an amphibious evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Mogadish

immediate concern involved the new operation’s impact on this critical exercise a

subsequent combat landings should such action become necessary during the im

ing war with Iraq.19

On 1 January 1991, as LaPlante increased the tempo of war preparation, NAVCE

received an alert message indicating that internal clan warfare in Somalia might e

ger American citizens and so require a military response.20 This did not surprise A

who had been monitoring message traffic from Somalia and had noticed in it an

increasing sense of urgency.21 The following day, Ambassador James K. Bishop in

Mogadishu requested military assistance to evacuate Americans from the embass

to the chaotic violence occurring throughout the city.22 The Pentagon immediate

directed Central Command to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (N

to rescue American citizens from Somalia.23 Arthur tasked LaPlante with plannin

NEO and proposing a contingency task force to execute the mission. LaPlante su

moned Moser to a meeting on his flagship, USS Nassau (LHA 4), then in port at 

Having limited knowledge of conditions on the ground in Mogadishu, the two co

manders envisioned a force capable of performing missions across the entire ran

amphibious operations, including both surface and air actions. (Only later in the 

ning process did it become obvious that a surface evacuation across the beach wo

not be practicable.) In addition to identifying the necessary amphibious ships an

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Marines for the mission, they proposed

two destroyers, which could provide fire

and electronic-warfare support should

either become necessary.24

Despite the irregular nature of the

fighting in Mogadishu, amphibious

commanders had serious concerns that

sophisticated weapons systems might be

present, particularly within the government faction. During much of the

1970s, Somalia had been a Cold War

ally of the Soviet Union and had received both modern weapons and advisers.25 That

relationship soured and the Soviets eventually withdrew their support, but American

commanders needed to consider the possibility that Cold War weapons—especially

surface-to-air missiles and electronic-warfare equipment—remained in Somali hands

and could threaten the rescue mission.26 LaPlante therefore recommended a seven-ship

response force—four amphibious ships, two destroyers, and one oiler—to conduct the

operation, under Moser’s command.27

Concurrent with LaPlante’s planning, Jenkins considered issues relating to the landing

force that would conduct the operation on the ground. He tasked Colonel James J.

Doyle, Jr., the commander of Brigade Service Support Group 4, then located on the

amphibious dock transport USS Trenton (LPD 14), to command the mission to

Mogadishu. Jenkins instructed Doyle to create a special-purpose command element—

designated 4th MEB, Detachment 1—aboard the amphibious assault ship (and helicop

ter carrier) USS Guam (LPH 9) to plan the operation and exercise command and control during its execution. Doyle relocated from Trenton to Guam, taking several key

members of his own staff, which he integrated with officers from various headquarters

USS Guam.

USS Trenton.

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Guam’s commanding officer, Captain Charles R. Saffell, Jr., and the Marine comm

of troops aboard Guam, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer, along with their 

began planning for the operation even before the arrivals of Doyle and Moser. W

the two commanders reached Guam with their skeleton staffs, they found work a

advanced. The staff planning and subsequent execution thus amounted to a colla

tive effort among Navy and Marine officers who knew their jobs, knew their doct

and procedures, and in many cases knew each other personally.29

Arthur recognized the importance of rescuing Americans in Somalia, but he did 

want to send a seven-ship task force to do the job. He viewed the action as strictl

extraction, to get people out of and away from Mogadishu. There would be no on

operation ashore in Somalia or afloat within the Indian Ocean. At least, Arthur h

to limit the mission to that role, because he needed all his ships for DESERT SHIEL

DESERT STORM—as well as the critical SEA SOLDIER IV workup. Once he sent shi

of the operational area, Arthur and his commanders knew, getting them back cou

a problem. For example, the evacuees coming out of Mogadishu would require tr

to a safe haven. Could he bring them back to Oman, or would he have to send hi

to Mombasa, Kenya, or the island of Diego Garcia, even farther from the main sc

action? Additionally, commanders throughout the fleet remembered the 1990 ev

tion of Americans in Liberia, Operation SHARP EDGE, which had lasted five mon

and ultimately involved four ships and some 2,100 Marines. Not wanting to degr

combat readiness in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf any more than absolutely n

sary, Arthur decided a two-ship amphibious task force with the right mix of helic

and Marines could accomplish the mission in Somalia.30 Guam and Trenton, at an

near Masirah, Oman, not only had the necessary configuration but also were loca

nearest of any possible candidates to the Horn of Africa.31 LaPlante assigned thes

ships to conduct the operation and sent Commodore Moser—whom he held in h

esteem and hated to lose—to command the amphibious task force.32

The need for this rescue mission to Somalia had resulted from the breakdown of 

ernmental control and the subsequent breaking out of social strife occurring thr

out that nation, especially in the capital city of Mogadishu.33 By 1989, twenty yea

dictatorial rule under President Mohamed Siad Barre had produced three substa

clan-based rebel factions: the Somali National Movement (SNM), active in north

Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), primarily in the south; and the 

Somali Congress (USC), focused in Mogadishu and central Somalia.34 Over the n

two years, political turmoil became increasingly fierce, spawning clan warfare an

pant criminal activity. As Siad Barre lost grip on power in Somalia, the rebel elem

further broke down into subclan conflict, increasing the level of bloodshed and

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orated that Ambassador Bishop evacuated nonessential embassy personnel and called

on all American citizens to leave the country. He even sent his wife and daughter out o

Somalia, to underscore the seriousness of the situation and encourage others to

depart.36 Most foreign missions in Mogadishu took similar actions as the fighting

increased and social disintegration worsened. Although not specifically targeted by any

Somali faction, the U.S. embassy and its staff were often victimized by gunfire and

random acts of violence.37

After meeting with the Somali president and prime minister in the closing days of

December, Bishop concluded that the government had neither a plan nor the ability to

control the growing crisis. As carnage and lawlessness spread, the need to evacuate

remaining Americans increased, while the embassy’s own ability to do so decreased.

The situation constituted the kind of “chaos in the littorals” that the OMFTS concept

paper would later characterize as a war of “all against all.”38 In response, Bishop moved

Americans into relatively secure areas in and around the embassy, while Italian officials

made a fruitless effort to arrange a cease-fire among warring factions. With the failure

of this effort, the American ambassador realized that his options were narrowing, and

on 2 January he requested military assistance to evacuate the embassy. By the following

day, Bishop had perceived that conditions were so bad that only a helicopter-borne

evacuation had any chance of rescuing the remaining Americans from Mogadishu.39

His urgent request for help received immediate attention in Washington and set in

motion the planning and execution of Operation EASTERN EXIT, which was later to be

considered by many as a model for this type of action.40

In response to the Pentagon’s execution order for EASTERN EXIT, officers at Central

Command deployed two C-130 and one AC-130 aircraft to Kenya and ordered Guam

and Trenton to set sail toward Mogadishu. In reality, Central Command had already

initiated these actions in anticipation of orders from the National Command Authority

(referring, at the time, to the president and secretary of defense). After meeting with

LaPlante aboard Nassau, as described above, Moser took five members of his squadron

staff and four officers from Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 to Masirah in a P-3 Orion

and then helicoptered aboard Guam.41 Doyle had already arrived, and the two commanders collocated their operations center in the ship’s Supporting Arms Control Center.

Although this arrangement appears somewhat ad hoc, the creation of special-purpose

organizations for various expeditionary actions is normal for Marine and Navy officers

of the amphibious service.42 The officers assembling on Guam to plan and execute this

rescue mission had considerable experience in this type of operation, and many had

worked together before.43 The planning began immediately upon receipt of the warning

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January 1991.44

With the amphibious force in motion, officers at Central Command and NAVCE

continued to consider alternate methods for conducting the evacuation. In fact, v

possibilities had been under consideration at all levels of command from the beg

of the crisis, and it had not yet become clear that only one option remained viabl

tially, the preferred course of action involved sending aircraft carrying security d

ments into the Mogadishu airport and then flying American evacuees out of the

country. Several other foreign missions had done exactly that during the last few 

of December.45 But this required a “permissive” environment, and leaders at Cent

Command came to realize from Bishop’s messages that such conditions no longe

existed.46 The embassy could not even communicate with the Mogadishu airport 

obtain permission for landing evacuation aircraft; the telephone lines were all do

More significantly, the airport was nearly two miles from the embassy, and Bisho

not believe Americans could any longer move safely on the city streets. Central C

mand also considered the use of special operation forces, going so far as to direct 

six MH-53 Pave Low helicopters with tanker support be prepared to conduct the 

uation.47 This option never progressed beyond the initial concept, because the Pa

aircraft were preparing for the imminent launching of DESERT STORM.

48 Addition

the special operations forces were heavily committed along the Iraqi border and 

western desert, looking for Scud missiles.49 It now became apparent that only an

amphibious evacuation by ship-based helicopters offered a prospect for success r

less of the situation on the ground.50

By 4 January, conditions had deteriorated so much further that Bishop requested 

platoons of paratroopers be dropped to protect Americans until the amphibious 

force could arrive.51 Colonel Doyle and other commanders considered it a bad id

because the space available for a landing zone was so small that the paratroopers 

be scattered outside the embassy. Such an operation would also increase the num

people requiring evacuation.52 More important, by the time Bishop made his req

events had outpaced the rationale: Moser’s task force was nearing a position to la

its helicopters, sooner than Bishop had expected, and the rescue team would like

arrive before paratroops could be delivered.53 In any case, and fortunately for all 

cerned, Schwarzkopf refused to authorize the paratroop drop.54

Masirah, Oman, where Guam and Trenton were when they originally received ord

sail, is in the northern Arabian Sea, approximately 1,500 miles from Mogadishu. 

had a top speed of twenty-four knots, whereas Trenton could manage about eigh

knots maximum. There was no requirement to keep the ships together, and initia

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orders to slow to a more fuel-efficient speed, with which he complied. But as the

gravity of the situation in Mogadishu became clear, the ship resumed its initial speed

Neither Moser nor Saffell was concerned over fuel usage, because they had plenty on

board and could replenish in Mombasa if necessary.55 In any case, it had become essential that the ships close the distance to Somalia as fast as possible, and that trumped

fuel economy.

Planning and conducting operations had become second nature to Moser, Doyle, their

staffs, the officers of the ships, and the embarked Marines. In addition to considerable

practice, existing doctrine, standing operating procedures, and training in rapid planning techniques greatly facilitated their efforts and ensured the prompt issuance of wel

conceived orders.56 When to launch the rescue force remained under discussion, but

Bishop’s anxious messages forced the issue into the forefront. While Moser and Doyle

prepared for the evacuation in Mogadishu, LaPlante and Jenkins—exhibiting high con

fidence in their subordinates—monitored events from Nassau and continued preparation for SEA SOLDIER IV, scheduled to begin in Oman on 19 January 1991.57

In the early morning hours of 5 January, two Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion

helicopters lifted a small amphibious force from Guam’s deck and headed for

Mogadishu, 466 miles to the southwest.58 In hindsight, it was clearer than ever that only

the helicopter-borne amphibious option offered any hope for saving the Americans in

time.59 The CH53Es, because they

were designed to

conduct in-flight

refueling, had a

long-range insertion capability.

They remain the

only U.S. heavy-lift

helicopters that can

fly into an uncertain environment

from such a distance.60 Assigned to

Trenton, these two

helicopters crossdecked to Guam to

load the evacuation

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consisting of forty-seven Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (an element o

Jenkins’s 4th MEB), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel McAleer; four Marines f

Doyle’s headquarters elements; and a nine-man Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team, und

Commander Stephen R. Louma, USN.62 McAleer’s 1st Battalion had been the helico

borne assault element of Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT-2), composed primar

the 2nd Marine Regiment.63 Accordingly, McAleer’s Marines had become very pr

cient in helicopter operations from the many exercises and rehearsals they had co

ducted at sea. Additionally, their predeployment training at Camp Lejeune, Nort

Carolina, had included noncombatant-evacuation exercises.64

Doyle ordered McAleer to accompany his Marines on their mission to Mogadish

while he himself remained at sea, where communications were better and he cou

keep close contact with Moser.65 In addition to assigning McAleer to command th

Marines and SEALs, Doyle appointed Lieutenant Colonel Willard D. Oates as ove

commander of the forward element.66 Oates would be the senior officer on the gr

in Mogadishu, working primarily with the ambassador after arriving at the emba

Major William N. Saunders would serve as the logistician for the mission, specifi

supervising the evacuation control center (ECC), which would process evacuees 

prepare them for departure.

Sending two lieutenant colonels, one Navy commander (Louma accompanied th

team), and a major in addition to the normal complement of officers and nonco

sioned officers seems top-heavy. But Doyle considered this “an unconventional o

tion with potentially extraordinary consequences” and wanted a “few guys with g

hair” in the landing zone. Loss of American life in the embassy at Mogadishu wo

distract the nation as it approached the critical point of warfare in the Persian Gu

Additionally, Doyle clearly remembered the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and how 

constrained American action for 444 days. Either scenario could unhinge DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM planning, resulting in unthinkable consequences.67

Essentially, Doyle organized the NEO team in a Marine air-ground task force (M

structure, as illustrated in figure 1. In Doyle’s organizational plan, Oates function

the senior officer ashore, although McAleer held the same rank and commanded 

of the Marines. Fortunately, command issues never became a problem, despite th

number of high-ranking officers ashore, because Oates and McAleer tended to b

one mind.68 Additionally, Bishop clearly understood his role in the operation and

remained firmly in control of events throughout.69 The ambassador had been inv

in the evacuation at Monrovia, Liberia (SHARP EDGE), a few months earlier, and

EASTERN EXIT clearly benefited from his experience.70

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While evaluating alternate courses of action, Moser and Doyle considered launching

the helicopters directly from their initial positions in the northern Arabian Sea, some

1,500 miles from the target area. They again considered launching when the ships

reached a point 890 miles away, but ultimately, as noted above, they launched from a

distance of 466 nautical miles.71 In addition to Bishop’s distressed calls for help, a number of issues contributed to this decision: in-flight refueling requirements, the availabil

ity of tanker support, the arrival time over Mogadishu, and the availability of AC-130

gunships to provide cover.72 Anticipating the issue of in-flight refueling, Arthur had

earlier contacted Air Force representatives at Central Command and learned that they

could not provide tanker support, due to other commitments. He then contacted

Major General Royal N. Moore, commanding general of 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and

arranged for Marine Corps KC-130 tankers to refuel the Super Stallions.73 This proved

challenging enough, as the 466-nautical-mile flight meant two refuelings, over open

water at night, by pilots who had not recently practiced the procedure.74 The first refueling would ensure that the helicopters could arrive at Mogadishu, and it would occur

at a point that would allow the helicopters to return to Guam should the refueling

prove unsuccessful. The second refueling provided sufficient fuel for locating the

embassy and guaranteeing that the outbound flight could clear the Somali coastline.75

Yet another refueling would be required during the flight back to Guam.

Doyle’s MAGTF Structure for Organizing the Mogadishu NEO Force

Sources: Doyle interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 16, 18, 21.

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variety of reasons. A lack of night-vision capability in the KC-130 tankers (one p

each of the CH-53Es wore night-vision goggles) made it difficult for the tanker c

to see the helicopters once they reached the rendezvous point. It had been over a 

since the helicopter pilots had practiced refueling, not having anticipated any suc

requirement during DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM. They had even taken the 

ing probes off their aircraft, making it necessary to reinstall them prior to takeof

tunately, Captain Saffell, himself an aviator, was acutely attuned to the problems 

risks of nighttime refueling over an open ocean.76 He delayed the helicopter laun

until he saw the KC-130s on radar, then tracked both the tankers and Sea Stallion

ensure a proper rendezvous.77 One helicopter experienced a fuel leak while refuel

the crew chief repaired it in flight, but not before the Marines and SEALs receive

good dousing of gas. It appears that the air crew had not only removed the probe

failed to service the equipment.78 The second refueling, just fifty-three nautical m

from Mogadishu, went somewhat more smoothly; the third refueling, during the 

back to Guam, would prove successful, though problematic.79

Navigation also caused problems during the flight to Mogadishu; the Omega nav

tion system on the CH-53Es could not always acquire the three land-based signa

needed to fix a position. The part of the Indian Ocean in which the task force op

had “dead spaces,” resulting in inconsistent readings.80 As a result, the pilots relie

dead reckoning (based on preflight calculations), pathfinding support from the K

refuelers, and positive control from the ships while within radar range.81 When th

Omega systems could obtain position fixes, the pilots used those reading as back

Launching beyond 466 miles would multiply the problems faced by the pilots in 

ducting this long-range insertion and extraction, due to refueling requirements a

navigational complications. Conversely, waiting for a closer departure point wou

likely have proven disastrous for the embassy personnel, as local conditions cont

to worsen. In retrospect, it seems that Moser, Doyle, and the planners of EASTERN 

aboard Guam calculated the launch point just about right.82

After receiving the last refueling and a final fix on their position from the KC-13

helicopter pilots began their approach into the city. If navigating across part of th

Indian Ocean had been difficult, locating the embassy proved equally vexing. The 

tial information available during the planning phase regarding the location and c

uration of the compound had proved to be out of date and inaccurate.83 A Marin

warrant officer who accompanied Doyle from Trenton had served on the Marine 

rity guard detachment in Somalia several years earlier, and he pointed out to the 

ners that the embassy had moved inland from the position indicated on their ma

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later in the planning process and proved helpful in identifying the new embassy location. They also eliminated any residual consideration of landing over the beach with

surface forces, because the Marines would likely have had to fight their way across

Mogadishu, and at that point American leaders wanted to avoid becoming involved in

Somalia’s civil war. Despite the updated information, the embassy compound proved

difficult to identity from the air, particularly at low altitude in the early morning light.8

The pilots spent nearly twenty minutes flying over Mogadishu and eventually made a

second approach from the sea before finally identifying their objective.86

As the Super Stallions arrived over the American embassy at approximately 0620 (that

is, 6:20 in the morning) on 5 January, the compound was receiving a large volume of

gunfire, and some 150 Somalis with ladders had gathered at one of the embassy walls.87

Flying low into the cantonment area, the helicopters scattered the assembled miscreants and landed within the embassy grounds.88 The Marines disembarked and established a perimeter to defend the compound and protect subsequent evacuations.89 The

SEAL team assumed responsibility for protecting the ambassador and reinforced the

Marine Security Guard detachment (Marines permanently stationed at the embassy, as

opposed to those arriving in helicopters) protecting the chancery building.90

The two helicopters remained on the ground for approximately one hour; an Air Force

AC-130 gunship loitered overhead to gather intelligence and offer fire support if

required. The Super Stallions departed for their return flight to Guam—now some 350

miles away—with sixty-one evacuees, including all nonofficial Americans in the compound; the ambassadors of Nigeria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; and the

Omani chargé d’affaires.91 The original plan called for the CH-53Es to return to Guam

and bring a second echelon of Marines into the embassy. Oates believed he needed

another forty-four Marines to ensure security and process the evacuees efficiently and

effectively. But when the two CH-53E helicopters departed with the evacuees, it would

be a one-way trip. After another difficult refueling en route, the Sea Stallions landed on

the deck of Guam just under eight hours after leaving the ship. They would not return

to Mogadishu with reinforcements but rather fly to Trenton, where their roles in the

mission ended.92

Despite the original plan for a second wave and Oates’s request for forty-four more

Marines, Doyle did not perceive a direct threat against the evacuation force in

Mogadishu and so, in coordination with Moser, chose not to dispatch additional

Marines.93 Sending in more troops implied a longer operation and increased the number of people needing evacuation from the embassy. It was a risky call, but events once

again bore out Doyle’s judgment. Even had Doyle wanted to insert the additional

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exhausted from the wearing flight in and out of Mogadishu and incapable of ano

demanding mission without rest. Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters stationed

aboard Guam would carry out subsequent evacuations, once they came within ra

the embassy.94

Meanwhile, Marines and embassy employees in Mogadishu prepared for subsequ

evacuations, although the shortage of staff to operate the ECC severely hindered 

process. Security remained marginal, despite arrival of the Navy and Marine Cor

team. There had not been enough Marines on the helicopters to process evacuees 

ciently and to provide adequate security as well.95 It was this that had motivated O

to request the forty-four additional Marines. He did not want to weaken perimet

security by using McAleer’s Marines in the ECC, but eventually he felt it necessar

do so. The final decision not to send more troops into Mogadishu forced Bishop, 

and the other hard-pressed Americans to complete their tasks with the personne

hand.96 Doyle, for his part, realized that Oates’s job was difficult, but absent a con

effort to storm the embassy, he felt that another high-risk insertion flight could 

be justified.97

After the departure of the Super Stallions, conditions worsened throughout

Mogadishu, and consular representatives from numerous nations continued to se

refuge at and evacuation through the American embassy. Bishop at first required 

eign nationals to make their own way to the embassy, but when the Soviet ambas

declared that he and his remaining staff would require assistance, he agreed to es

them with permanent embassy security personnel. To augment this force he cont

for Somali policemen, under a Major Sayed, who agreed to support the effort for 

The ambassador used a similar approach to escorting members of the British mi

into the American embassy.98 On one occasion, a team of Marines, SEALs, and em

security personnel ventured into Mogadishu in hardened vehicles to rescue twen

people from the Office of Military Cooperation and return them safely to the em

grounds.99 The twenty-two included Colonel David Stanley, the chief of the offic

along with the ambassador from Kenya and members of his family and staff.100

The understaffed ECC established by Saunders on the embassy grounds worked h

identify and process evacuees under difficult circumstances. Since augmentation 

evacuation force had been denied, Oates utilized not only some of McAleer’s Ma

but members of the embassy staff to provide administrative help (checking ident

screening potential evacuees, creating manifests, etc.) as best they could. Although 

mately successful, the preparation of evacuees for movement out of Mogadishu fel

short of ideal, causing problems at the departure site and aboard the ships—partic

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embassy struggled with their problems, the officers and crews of Guam and Trenton

began addressing the needs of evacuees. This included establishing a medical triage station, arranging berthing for both genders, addressing care for children, protecting indi

vidual property, accounting for evacuees by nationality and status, and providing food

and clothing, while at the same time supporting operations ashore.102

As night approached on 5 January, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters—flying in

four waves of five aircraft each—commenced evacuation operation off the deck of

Guam, now approximately thirty miles out to sea. To minimize the risk of hostile fire,

all evacuation flights conducted by the Sea Knight helicopters occurred at night, with

the embassy compound darkened. The Marine pilots and infantrymen used nightvision devices for visibility during the operation.103 Even with such equipment, flight

operations at night in an uncertain environment can be very dangerous, but the

Marines believed they had better control of these complications than they would have

over the hostile elements freely operating during daylight.104 The evacuation started

smoothly until Major Sayed, who had earlier assisted in the transportation of foreign

consular personnel into the American embassy, suddenly returned with two trucks full

of soldiers. Carrying a radio and hand grenade, Sayed demanded that the evacuation

cease immediately—his government had not approved the flights.105 Bishop and Oates

refused to halt the operations, and the ambassador ultimately persuaded the Somali

officer not to interfere.106 Bishop accomplished this by means of skillful negotiation,

several thousand dollars, and the keys to an embassy automobile of Sayed’s choice. In

the process Bishop managed to take possession of the major’s radio, to prevent him

from calling antiaircraft fire on the departing helicopters.107

This incident with Major Sayed created some confusion in the last evacuation waves,

because Bishop insisted on remaining within the compound so as to be available to

handle such problems until the end of the evacuation. He and his security team had

been scheduled to depart in the third wave; his decision to remain to the end meant

that only four helicopters on the third wave departed as planned, leaving the fifth

behind, not yet full. Having an extra helicopter on the final wave created confusion,

causing inaccuracies in the serial manifests and the helicopter loading plan. That confusion in turn resulted in a small communications team’s nearly missing the last flight

out of Mogadishu. (The crew chief on one of the Sea Knights spotted the Marines and

placed them aboard his aircraft.) Ultimately, all personnel approved or designated for

evacuation, including the entire NEO force, departed safely and arrived on board

Guam or Trenton.108 As the last helicopter departed, a large mob entered the embassy

grounds, looting and destroying everything in sight. Well before sunrise on 6 January

1991, the last Sea Knight set down on the deck of Guam, and Ambassador Bishop

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the support of the AC-130, because it had detected radar of the type associated w

Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air missile site tracking it and had to move off statio

presence of SA-2 missiles confirmed the commanders’ concerns about the existen

sophisticated weapons in Somalia. The SA-2 posed a definite threat to the AC-13

craft, but Doyle had not been concerned for the CH-46 helicopters, because he b

they would fly too low to be tracked by its radars.110

The amphibious evacuation in Mogadishu ultimately extracted 281 people, inclu

sixty-one Americans, thirty-nine Soviet citizens, seventeen British, twenty-six Ge

mans, and various numbers from twenty-eight other nations.111 There were twelv

heads of diplomatic missions—eight ambassadors and four chargés. Unfortunate

Bishop determined that none of the many Somali “foreign service nationals” wit

embassy compound could be evacuated, although they remained loyal. Bishop di

even have enough cash to pay all wages due to them. Though they faced an uncer

future, the Somalis accepted their fate, remained on their jobs to the end, and ne

attempted to rush the helicopters or create serious problems for the evacuation

effort.112

The influx of civilians on Guam and Trenton severely taxed the ships’ resources a

ability to support them, of course. But, as Saffell put it, the response of the sailor

Marines was “awesome”; they gladly gave up berthing space and personal items t

the plight of the evacuees.113 Guam’s medical staff treated one evacuee with an ab

nal gunshot wound and another with a knife wound.114 Also, the Sudanese ambas

dor’s wife gave birth to a baby boy onboard Guam. (In keeping with an old Navy

tradition, the newborn lad’s name was engraved on the inside of the ship’s bell.)1

On 11 January, Trenton and Guam off-loaded their passengers in Muscat, Oman, 

out fanfare and resumed their duties in support of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT S

Bishop had wanted the evacuees transported to Mombasa, but Schwarzkopf orde

the ships back into the area of impending conflict in the Gulf of Oman.116 Oman

cials were at first reluctant to accept the refugees, but stellar work by the America

ambassador in Oman persuaded them to do so. Before taking leave of the sailors 

Marines, Ambassador Bishop praised their competence and professionalism, con

ing his remarks by declaring, “Few of us would have been alive today if we had be

outside your reach. It was only due to your efforts that we made it.”117

In many ways, EASTERN EXIT provides a textbook example of how to conduct an

amphibious evacuation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred 

referred to it as a “very complex and somewhat dangerous mission.”118 Gray woul

known about complex and dangerous NEOs, since he had played a prominent ro

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“flawless,” in fact many problems arose throughout the action. But the professionalism of Marines and sailors overcame those obstacles with solutions sufficient to

ensure success.120 The operation demonstrated that the amphibious capability of the

United States could respond to nearly any exigency virtually anywhere in the world,

even when distracted by larger and more important missions. Navy and Marine Corps

leaders considered EASTERN EXIT a demonstration of the excellence of the sea services

and an example of the value of amphibious capability within the expeditionary environment. The operation also demonstrated that modern amphibious actions depend a

much on aviation assets—particularly helicopters—as on traditional surface landing

vehicles. This is not surprising, considering the U.S. Marine Corps pioneered the military use of helicopters for a variety of applications, including vertical assault, during

the Korean War.121

As part of the complete revision of Marine Corps doctrine that occurred during the

second half of the 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant from 1995 to 1999,

used EASTERN EXIT as a case study for understanding and implementing expeditionary

concepts in the emerging new world order.122 More important, EASTERN EXIT made

clear that the professional Navy and Marine Corps team that had matured over several

hundred years continued to provide American political and diplomatic leaders with a

range of military options unknown anywhere else in the world or at any other time in

history.123 The commitment to EASTERN EXIT had no impact on the subsequent war

with Iraq; after off-loading the evacuees in Oman, the entire task force returned to nor

mal duty and participated fully in SEA SOLDIER IV, the important final workup for

DESERT STORM.

124 As subsequent events showed, Schwarzkopf ’s air and ground war

proved sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces—with a little help from the

amphibious feint of LaPlante and Jenkins. The ability to move seamlessly from DESERT

SHIELD to EASTERN EXIT to SEA SOLDIER IV and on to DESERT STORM clearly illustrate

the capabilities needed to implement the operational and strategic concepts espoused

in . . . From the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

EASTERN EXIT received little press coverage, due to the larger events of DESERT SHIELD

and DESERT STORM, but many within the Department of Defense appreciated its signif

icance. The Marine Corps, as noted, included it as a case study in subsequent doctrinal

publications, and the Navy mentioned it in Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.

125 Captain Moser assisted in the lessons-learned process by preparing an instructional seminar that became part of the curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College,

in Norfolk, Virginia.126 Lieutenant Colonel McAleer also created a briefing, which he

presented to the Landing Force Training commands at the amphibious bases in Little

Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California.127 Notably, he briefed the material to

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during their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton, California. As comman

of Amphibious Squadron 1 and 11th MEU (SOC), respectively, Phillips and Hag

were to lead the next Navy and Marine Corps team to implement the precepts of 

From the Sea. In August 1992, the United States returned to Somalia to assist in h

itarian relief during operation PROVIDE RELIEF—a precursor to RESTORE HOPE. Tha

tember, the PhibRon 1 and 11th MEU (SOC) team deployed to the Indian Ocean a

returned to the Horn of Africa as the United States attempted to help a nation in c

In Somalia, after the American evacuation of its embassy in Mogadishu, conditio

continued to deteriorate. To some extent, the large quantities of weapons and am

tion previously supplied by the Soviet Union and later by the United States fuele

fighting. As rebel factions gained ground in the fighting with Siad Barre, they oft

captured armories and munitions supply centers with which to arm their forces 

allies.129 By late January 1991—about two weeks after the evacuation and just as G

eral Schwarzkopf began the air operations phase of DESERT STORM—forces unde

Mohamed Farah Aideed drove Siad Barre from Mogadishu and, in May 1992, int

in Kenya and Nigeria. Although many factors contributed to the defeat of Siad B

and the collapse of his rule, Aideed had been largely responsible for the final vict

He not only drove Siad Barre out of Somalia but also defeated his three subseque

efforts to regain control. Aideed believed that this victory earned him the right to 

the nation, but other warlords disagreed. The clans could not unite to form a new 

ernment; warfare continued, and chaotic conditions persisted. The extreme viole

made food distribution difficult, creating critical shortages in many parts of Som

This fostered an impression of widespread starvation, causing the United Nation

request international intervention to alleviate suffering and restore order. It was 

reason that, a year and a half after EASTERN EXIT, American naval expeditionary 

would return to Somalia and once again apply the concepts of . . . From the Sea.13

Notes

1. Adm. Stanley R. Arthur, USN (Ret.), interview by the author, Newport, Rhode Island,

21 November 2007; Edward J. Marolda and

Robert J. Schneller, Jr., Shield and Sword: The

United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War

(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center,

1998), pp. 52, 110, 325.

2. Arthur interview; Marolda and Schneller,

Shield and Sword, pp. 16–17, 135–40, 366;

Marvin Pokrant, Desert Shield at Sea: What

the Navy Really Did (Westport, Conn

Greenwood, 1999), pp. 169–71, 173–

lan Vego, The Battle for Leyte, 1944: A

and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and 

tion (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

2006), pp. 179–80; H. Norman Schw

It Doesn’t Take a Hero: General H. No

Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography, with 

Petre (New York: Bantam Books, 199

437.

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Amphibious Group (PhibGru) 2 (thirteen

ships), PhibGru 3 (thirteen ships), PhibRon

5 (five ships), 4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th

MEU (SOC), totaling thirty-one ships and

some seventeen thousand Marines afloat.

Jenkins interview; Vice Adm. John B.

LaPlante, USN (Ret.), correspondence to

Gary J. Ohls, 3 October 2007; Pokrant, Desert

Shield at Sea, pp. 78–86,164–68, 238.

4. JP 1-02, p. 103; Ronald J. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With

Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Shield and

Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: History and

Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1998), p. 103.

5. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p.

254.

6. LaPlante to Ohls; Brown, U.S. Marines in the

Persian Gulf, pp. 104, 107.

7. Arthur interview.

8. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp.

149–50; Pokrant, Desert Shield at Sea, pp.

100, 238.

9. Arthur interview; LaPlante to Ohls.

10. Arthur interview; LaPlante to Ohls.

11. Saffell interview.

12. Jenkins interview.

13. Arthur interview; Jenkins interview;

LaPlante to Ohls.

14. Capt. Alan B. Moser, USN (Ret.), interview

by the author, Virginia Beach, Virginia 13

October 2007; Commander, Amphibious

Squadron 6, Command History for 1991

(OPNAV Report 5750-1), 17 March 1992,

Post 1990, folder: Command File, Type, Amphibious, CH1991, Naval Historical Center,

Operational Archives, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. [hereafter NHC Operational

Archives]

15. Col. Robert P. McAleer, USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, Newport, Rhode Island,

28 November 2007; Jenkins interview; Saffell

interview.

16. Col. James J. Doyle, Jr., USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, Wayne, Pennsylvania, 20

October 2007; Marolda and Schneller, Shield

and Sword, p. 150.

17. LaPlante to Ohls.

18. Jenkins interview; LaPlante to Ohls.

20. Adam B. Siegel, Eastern Exit: The Noncomba

tant Evacuation Operations (NEO) from

Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, Octo

ber 1991), p. 8.

21. Arthur interview.

22. James K. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,”

Foreign Service Journal (March 1991), p. 27.

23. Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 11.

24. Moser interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 12.

25. Terrance Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar,

Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution, 1995), p. 15; Moser interview.

26. LaPlante to Ohls; Moser interview; Jonathan

Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S.

Policy in Somalia (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In

stitute Press, 1995), pp. 15–17.

27. Moser interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 12–

13.

28. Doyle interview; Jenkins interview; Moser

interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 13, 15.

29. Saffell interview.

30. Arthur interview; LaPlante to Ohls; Moser

interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 12; T. W.

Parker, “Operation Sharp Edge,” U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings (May 1991), pp. 102–

106; James G. Antal and R. John Vanden

Berghe, On Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in

West Africa, 1990–2003 (Washington, D.C.:

History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine

Corps, 2004), pp. 129–32.

31. Arthur interview; LaPlante to Ohls; Moser

interview; Saffell interview.

32. LaPlante to Ohls; Commander, Amphibious

Squadron 6, Command History for 1991.

33. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 27.

34. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, pp. 17–19;

Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed

Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: United

States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), pp. 6–

11; Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 7; Robert F.

Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates, with

Versalle F. Washington, “My Clan against the

World”: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia

1992–1994 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 2004), pp. 15–16.

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History of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet (Washington, D.C.: Naval

Historical Center, 2007), p. 48; Lyons and

Samatar, Somalia, pp. 19–21; Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, p. 36.

36. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 27.

37. Robert A. Doss, “Out of Africa: Rescue from

Mogadishu,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

(May 1992), p. 104; Bishop, “Escape from

Mogadishu,” pp. 27–28.

38. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on

Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington,

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,

1995), pp. 10–12; U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from the Sea, pp. 1–3.

39. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” pp. 27–

29.

40. Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 7–9, 11; U.S. Navy

Dept., Expeditionary Operations, Marine

Corps Doctrinal Publication 3 (Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 16

April 1998) [hereafter MCDP 3], pp. 35, 77,

111–15.

41. Capt. Alan B. Moser, USN (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 5 February 2008.

42. Doyle interview; Saffell interview.

43. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 84;

Moser interview; Doyle interview.

44. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 85.

45. Jane Perlez, “Effort to Evacuate Foreigners

from Somalia Stalls,” New York Times, 4 January 1991.

46. When considering incursions into areas not

controlled by friendly forces, the U.S. military categorizes the threat environment as

permissive, uncertain, or hostile, as a means

of determining the degree of force necessary

to accomplish its mission. JP 1-02, p. 390.

47. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,

p. 81.

48. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor,

The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the

Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown,

1995), p. 209.

49. Jenkins interview.

50. Saffell interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 3, 5,

11–12.

Saffell interview.

52. Doyle interview.

53. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p

54. Jenkins interview.

55. Moser interview; Saffell interview.

56. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian G

85; Doyle interview; Jenkins intervie

Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 11–15.

57. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian G

104, 107; LaPlante to Ohls.

58. For air and sea navigation, the U.S. m

services measure distance in nautical 

which are slightly longer than statute 

(1 nautical mile = 1.150779 statute m

One nautical mile is equal to one mi

arc on the earth’s surface, or 1,852 m

Mileage referred to in this Newport P

and in all U.S. operations since 1954 

nautical miles. See JP 1-02, p. 363, an

Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 22.

59. Ray L. Clark, Jr., “Noncombatant Eva

Operations: Major Considerations fo

Operational Commander” (professio

per, Naval War College, 16 June 1995

Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian G

87; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 2–3, 11.

60. William S. Bradley and Richard D. M

“Marine Super Stallions to the Resc

Marine Corps Gazette (April 1991), p

61. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian G

87.

62. Col. Robert P. McAleer, USMC (Ret.)

spondence to Gary J. Ohls, 3 June 20

Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 18.

63. In Marine Corps tradition, “Marines

conjunction with a unit designation 

a regiment. For example, the “2nd M

means the same as “2nd Marine Reg

A regimental landing team, a reinfor

iment, takes the numerical designato

base regiment. Therefore, if 2nd Mar

reinforced and designated a regimen

ing team, it becomes RLT-2.

64. Jenkins interview; McAleer interview

65. McAleer interview.

66. Oates was a member of the 4th MEB

section, who had been assigned to G

to space limitations on board Nassau

such MEB staff officer located on Gu

available to assist Doyle in both the p

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EASTERN EXIT. Jenkins interview.

67. Doyle interview; Col. James J. Doyle, Jr.,

USMC (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls,

9 June 2008.

68. Doyle to Ohls; McAleer interview.

69. McAleer interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 42.

70. Deborah Schmidt, “Marines Evacuate 260

from Embassy in Somalia,” Navy Times, 21

January 1991, p. 4; Brown, U.S. Marines in

the Persian Gulf, pp. 90–91.

71. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p.

86.

72. Moser interview; Saffell interview.

73. Arthur interview.

74. Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 22 note 44.

75. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p.

88.

76. The captains of both ships involved in the

NEO—Saffell of Guam and Capt. James A.

Curtis of Trenton—were naval aviators,

which proved very helpful throughout the

operation. Doyle to Ohls.

77. Saffell interview.

78. Ibid.

79. Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 3, 23, 25, 44.

80. C. W. D’Ambra, “The Need for Improved

Helicopter Navigation Systems” (course paper, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 1992), p. 7.

81. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p.

88; Saffell interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp.

3, 22–23, 26; Clark, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” p. 16.

82. Bradley and Mullen, “Marine Super Stallions

to the Rescue,” p. 56.

83. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p.

85; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. vi, 3.

84. McAleer interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp.

16, 20.

85. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p.

89.

86. McAleer interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp.

24, 26.

87. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” pp. 26,

30.

88. Bradley and Mullen, “Marine Super Stallions

to the Rescue,” p. 57.

eration Eastern Exit,” Marine Corps Gazette

(June 1992), pp. 75–76.

90. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp.

87, 89; Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 28.

91. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 30;

Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p.

89; McAleer interview; Jane Perlez, “U.S. an

Italy Evacuating Foreigners in Somalia,” New

York Times, 6 January 1991.

92. Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 24–25.

93. Doyle interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 30.

94. Jenkins interview.

95. Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 32.

96. Ibid., pp. 30, 32.

97. Doyle interview; McAleer interview.

98. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 30;

McAleer interview.

99. Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 28–29.

100. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 26;

McAleer interview.

101. Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 30–32.

102. Saffell interview.

103. McAleer interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp.

33, 35, 45.

104. Doss, “Out of Africa,” p. 104.

105. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” pp. 26,

30; Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,

p. 93.

106. McAleer interview.

107. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 30.

108. McAleer interview.

109. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp.

91–92; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 2, 33–34.

110. Doss, “Out of Africa,” p. 105; Doyle

interview.

111. Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 38.

112. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 30;

McAleer interview.

113. Saffell interview.

114. Clark, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” pp. 12–13; Saffell interview; Siegel,

Eastern Exit, p. 1.

115. Saffell interview.

116. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 31.

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Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1992), pp.

99–100.

118. Schmidt, “Marines Evacuate 260 from Embassy in Somalia,” p. 4.

119. Richard E. Carey and D. A. Quinlan, “Operation Frequent Wind,” Marine Corps Gazette

(February 1976), pp. 22, 24, and (April

1976), p. 40.

120. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p.

80; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 41–47; McAleer

interview.

121. U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953

(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954), vol.

1, p. 50, and vol. 4, pp. 163–65, 186–90, 206–

12.

122. MCDP 3, pp. 111–15.

123. Siegel, “American Entebbe,” p. 100.

125. NDP 1, p. 11; and MCDP 3, pp. 35, 1

126. Moser to Ohls.

127. In 1994, these two commands chang

Landing Force Training Commands 

ditionary Warfare Training Groups a

sult of the shift in focus in . . . From 

128. Capt. Braden J. Phillips, USN (Ret.), 

view by the author, 14 March 2008, L

Beach, California; Gen. Michael W. H

USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by 

thor, 23 October 2007; McAleer inter

129. Sahnoun, Somalia, p. 17; David Volm

rica and the New World Order,” Jour

Modern African Studies (March 1993

130. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian G

95; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and 

tion Restore Hope, pp. 12–16.

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Operation PROVIDE RELIEF

The final phase of the war against Siad Barre occurred throughout the south and 

tral parts of Somalia from January 1991 through May 1992. The combat in Moga

had reached its height in December 1990 and January 1991, creating the anarchy 

led to EASTERN EXIT. On 27 January 1991, rebel factions drove Siad Barre and his 

out of the capital, but the former dictator carried on the battle in the southern 

of Somalia. The fighting resulted in widespread devastation of the countryside—

worse by Siad Barre’s scorched-earth policy—particularly the area bounded by

Kismayo, Bardera, and Baidoa, which came to be known as the “Triangle of De

The destruction of crops, livestock, and essential infrastructure—especially wells

canals, water pumps, pipes, the telephone system, and other public utilities—cou

with an ongoing drought, laid the groundwork for the famine that spread throug

the region.1

This massive destruction was accompanied by looting, rape, and massacres, res

in the abandonment of the Somali agricultural heartland. Hundreds of thousand

to Kenya, Ethiopia, and the major cities of Kismayo, Baidoa, and Mogadishu, to f

conditions there only slightly better.2

In fact, the drought and famine were near

bad in northeast Kenya, prompting the U.S. ambassador, Smith Hempstone, to

describe that area—to which many Somali refugees had flocked—as “a slice of he

Hempstone also noted that not only had refugees flocked across the border but a

guns and bands of armed Somali men who ambushed truck convoys, robbed trad

and rustled livestock.4

The social and economic collapse that accompanied the rebellion against Siad Ba

had resulted in part from his own brutal suppression measures. Yet his downfa

complicated rather than solved the growing humanitarian crisis, by confusing t

issue of political leadership within Somalia. Even before the dictator’s final defea

exile, clan-based factions that had battled against the regime began to fight an in

cine war for supremacy in the regions and cities of southern and central Somalia

CHAPTER THREE

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Congress leaders who opposed Siad Barre—built strong militias during the civil war

and contested for national power and control of Mogadishu during and after Siad

Barre’s fall from power.5

Ironically, both of these warlords belonged to the Hawiye clan

as well as to the USC. Yet beginning in 1991 Aideed’s Habr Gidr subclan and Ali

Mahdi’s Abgal subclan clashed violently in a battle for primacy, increasing and perpetuating the agony of their nation.6

As Aideed and Ali Mahdi battled for control of

Mogadishu, Omar Jess of the Ogaden subclan fought Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi

(Morgan)—who commanded the remnant of Siad Barre’s army—near Kismayo,

Bardera, and the Kenyan border, an area already ravaged by Morgan during 1989 and

1990. Vicious fighting in Kismayo and Bardera further devastated the region, threatening hundreds of thousands of people with starvation.7

After Siad Barre’s expulsion from Somalia, a faction consisting of 144 moderate

political leaders known as the “Manifesto Group” proclaimed Ali Mahdi—one of its

members—as the nation’s interim president. The Manifesto Group had issued a procla

mation (or manifesto) calling for a new provisional government and national reconcili

ation in 1990, when Siad Barre was still in control of Mogadishu.8

This courageous

action resulted in the arrest of most members, but it gained credibility for the group.

Yet despite its standing among Somalia leaders, the effort of the Manifesto Group to

establish Ali Mahdi as president did not receive general acceptance.9

A reconciliation

conference was accordingly convened by the government of Djibouti in July 1991. It

confirmed Ali Mahdi as interim president for a period of two years.10

This support of Ali Mahdi infuriated Aideed, who had not attended the reconciliation

conference and refused to recognize its dubious selection, believing himself more

deserving of the office. He had made a greater contribution to the demise of Siad Barre

commanded stronger forces, and controlled more key locations in Mogadishu than had

Ali Mahdi.11 The Somali National Movement, consisting primarily of the Isaaq clan in

northwest Somalia, also refused to accept the decisions of the Djibouti conference. The

SNM had declared independence in May 1991 as the “Republic of Somaliland” and had

no desire to rejoin a nation ruled by either Ali Mahdi or Aideed.12 The civil war against

Siad Barre’s rule had actually begun with the Isaaq clan and its SNM faction during

1988, in the area that included the major cities of Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burao—

known as “British Somaliland” prior to independence in 1960. Siad Barre had brutally

suppressed that phase of the rebellion, killing five thousand, displacing five hundred

thousand refugees, and causing massive destruction before the violence shifted to central and southern regions of the country.13 The self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland

had been relatively free of violence since Siad Barre moved the bulk of his army out of

the area to deal with Aideed and Ali Mahdi.14 But things remained in turmoil in central

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nations and organizations during 1991 proved ineffective. The conflict over cont

Somalia continued, and the chaos in the streets showed little sign of abating.15

Sporadic fighting between the factions occurred throughout 1991, with open com

beginning in November of that year.16 Meantime, gangs of armed youths controll

neither Aideed nor Ali Mahdi roamed the streets of Mogadishu inflicting violenc

will.17 Unfortunately, atrocities by these young criminals—including rape, theft, a

murder—were not limited to Mogadishu.18 In February 1992, Aideed and Ali Ma

agreed to a vague cease-fire in Mogadishu while each continued to seek recogniti

the legitimate leader of Somalia.19 The cease-fire resulted from a series of negotia

in New York under the auspices of the UN and involving envoys from the Organ

of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organ

tion of African Unity (OAU), along with representatives of the Aideed and Ali M

factions.20 Special UN envoy James O. C. Jonah worked with the two factions the 

lowing month to create a more substantial cease-fire agreement, which the warlo

signed on 3 March 1992.21 By this time, Mogadishu had already suffered enormou

destruction from artillery fire and other ravages of war.

The cease-fire between Aideed and Ali Mahdi proved tenuous at best, and it did n

end violence, looting, or extortion by freelancing thugs who had emerged from t

political and social breakdown of Somali society. These chaotic conditions in

Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia made it difficult for humanitarian relief o

zations to provide services where they were needed most. The willingness of Aide

and Ali Mahdi to restrict the access to relief workers when it served their interest

frustrated efforts to provide aid. In the descent into anarchy, food became a weap

well as the only basis for a remnant economy.22 Widespread shortages in central a

southern Somalia—including Mogadishu—during 1991 and 1992 resulted from

severely reduced agricultural production, breakdown of the distribution system, 

insufficient deliveries from the humanitarian relief community. Additionally, the 

coordination effort by UN officials had been so bureaucratic and ineffective that 

der tended to increase as problems compounded.23 During the summer of 1992, t

relief organizations delivered less than a third of the food necessary to feed the n

according to the head of the World Food Program in Somalia.24 All this, combine

distribution problems created by factional conflict and general lawlessness, clear

meant that a major humanitarian disaster was taking shape.25

The United Nations took a major step to address the Somali crisis on 24 April 19

with the passage of Security Council Resolution 751, which established the Unite

Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Among other things, Resolution 751 

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humanitarian assistance, authorized the assignment of fifty unarmed observers to

monitor the precarious cease-fire between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and sanctioned the

future deployment of five hundred peacekeepers to Somalia if conditions warranted.26

The fifty observers, with their chief military observer, Brigadier General Imtiaz

Shaheen of Pakistan, would not be in place in Mogadishu until 23 July 1992 due to

resistance from Aideed, which proved difficult to break down.27

Resolution 751 also authorized creation of a special UN representative in Somalia, a

post to which Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali assigned Algerian diplomat

Mohamed Sahnoun. Sahnoun’s energetic and sensitive labor was to bring him into con

tact with every major figure—both domestic and foreign—having an interest in the

Somali crisis.28 But his credible efforts to create stability and reconciliation did not

stem the growing humanitarian crisis; food and medical supplies remained in short

supply.29 By the summer of 1992, approximately three hundred thousand Somalis had

died from hunger or diseases related to malnutrition. Additionally, the crisis had displaced over six hundred thousand people, creating refugee camps in Somalia, Kenya,

Ethiopia, and Djibouti.30

In an effort to gain control over this problem, Boutros-Ghali proposed an emergency

airlift, which the Security Council supported by passing Resolution 767 on 27 July

1992. This UN action called for the urgent delivery of food and medical supplies to the

most critical areas, particularly in the Triangle of Death.31 It also provided the vehicle

for America’s return to Somalia; President George H. W. Bush responded by authorizing Joint Task Force/Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. Intended to transport supplies into

stricken areas of northern Kenya and rural Somalia, PROVIDE RELIEF was a relatively

small operation, having no combat component. Since it was purely humanitarian in

nature—designed principally to help Somalis and Kenyans in need—American leaders

assumed a permissive environment. The only caveat to that presumption involved the

insertion of the five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers authorized under Security Counci

Resolution 751, an insertion that the United States agreed to facilitate.32

Although UN Resolution 767 supplied the mechanism for commencing PROVIDE

RELIEF, it was media coverage of the humanitarian crisis that provided the trigger that

caused President Bush to take action. A cable from Ambassador Hempstone in Kenya

describing hellish conditions in northeast Kenya also influenced the thinking of the

president and other American leaders. After making its rounds within the administration, Hempstone’s cable was published in the Washington Post, further contributing to

the public awareness of the crisis.33 On 14 August 1992, the president announced that

the United States would begin emergency relief flights using Mombasa, Kenya, as a

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assigned Andrew Natsi

the U.S. Agency for Int

tional Development (U

as Special Coordinator 

Somali Relief and direc

that an additional 145,

tons of American food 

provided.34

After the passage of UN 

lution 767, the internat

media descended on So

in even greater number

before. Their coverage 

starving children, displ

people in refugee camp

the devastation wrought by war and widespread criminal activity shocked the wo

and provoked its conscience.35 Powerful media images viewed daily on television 

newsprint during the summer of 1992 stirred overwhelming American support f

humanitarian relief efforts of President Bush. The power of the media to bring is

public attention and force policy decisions upon the government became particu

noticeable during the Somalia crisis. It appeared to many that the traditional “po

the press” had reached a new height; observers began to refer to this growing infl

as the “CNN effect.”36

On 15 August 1992, the National Command Authority issued an alert order to C

Command (now under the leadership of General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, who ha

replaced General Schwarzkopf a year earlier), followed the next day by an order t

cute Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.

37 Flying supplies into remote areas of Somalia h

dual advantage of avoiding impassable roads and bandits who attacked and loote

voys, while bringing food directly to some of the areas most severely stricken by 

famine.38 Within two weeks, C-130 flights had delivered emergency supplies to W

Kenya, near the Somali border, and Belet Uen (also spelled Belet Weyne or Beledw

within Somalia proper.39 The airlift into Wajir provided food intended for Somal

gees who had crossed the border as well as for numerous Kenyan victims of drou

and refugee pressure. The 29 August 1992 flights into Belet Uen—the first PROVI

RELIEF flights going into Somalia—consisted of four C-130s and delivered thirty

tons of food supplies to an area not accessible by ground transportation due to r

conditions and bandit activity.40 This flight set the pattern of PROVIDE RELIEF sta

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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local

clan elders to ensure security at landing sites and an

orderly distribution of

supplies.41 The joint task

force (JTF) commander,

Brigadier General Frank

Libutti, USMC, accompanied the initial flight into

Belet Uen and met with

local leaders and Somali

children while workers unloaded the cargo of beans, rice, and cooking oil from the C130 aircraft.42

Frank Libutti had been with Central Command only a few weeks—and a brigadier gen

eral only slightly longer—when notified that he would command PROVIDE RELIEF. He

had been in the process of mastering his new duties at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa,

Florida, when abruptly assigned to lead a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST)

to the East African country of Kenya. Libutti’s primary duties at Central Command

involved serving as inspector general and—far more important—conducting bilateral

planning for contingency operations with various countries throughout the region.

This task was highly classified, because many representatives of these nations did not

want it known that they were involved in such a relationship with the United States.43

His mission to Africa was to assess the situation relative to humanitarian support

efforts in Kenya and Somalia and then make recommendations to Central Command

for possible American action. Libutti selected a team of thirty-four personnel from

across the directorates at Central Command and headed for Kenya on a C-141 airplane

riding in seats rigged for paratroopers. The assessment team had been in Kenya only a

few hours when informed of the creation of JTF Provide Relief, with Libutti as commanding officer.44

The original mission upon departing Tampa—to assess the situation and make recommendation—had been somewhat vague, owing to the very short timeline everyone was

working under.45 The creation of JTF Provide Relief expanded the task to include planning and operations. In other words, the assignment now required action as well as

observation and analysis. To get the operation up and running, Libutti needed to identify

appropriate airfields and establish a system for delivery. This involved coordinating with

the government of Kenya, through the embassy, for permission to fly U.S. aircraft into

General Frank Libutti meeting with children.

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also need to cooperate with NGOs already working in those remote areas—parti

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—in order to make an efficie

substantive contribution. The relief effort in Somalia involved numerous people an

many organizations with similar goals; all were operating under the umbrella of UN

authority, but that did not necessarily guarantee collegial relationships.46

Upon arriving in Kenya, Libutti established his headquarters and base of operatio

an aviation facility at one end of the Mombasa airport. This hangar and its conti

ramp space represented one of several facilities the United States rented in Kenya 

just such contingencies.47 While his staff worked to organize and prepare this site 

support operations, General Libutti traveled to Nairobi for discussions with the A

can ambassador and his staff. Libutti, like most Marine officers, considered hims

operator, not a politician or diplomat. But his first independent assignment as a 

eral officer revealed that life is not so simple for those who wear the stars. Of cou

knew that his team would have to work with the embassy in Kenya, various gover

officials, and NGOs operating in famine-stricken regions of Somalia. Libutti assu

however, the State Department would obtain the necessary authority from Kenya

cials to initiate PROVIDE RELIEF, leaving him free to focus on operations. After a f

days in Kenya, the new JTF commander would learn otherwise.48 The visibility of

American military personnel and aircraft in Kenya would make the media aware 

activity, and that would spark the interest of political leaders at the highest level. 

spelled trouble, because the press hype—coupled with very short notice about th

operation—upset the Kenyan president, Daniel Moi. Some of his advisers, wheth

misinformed or intentionally misrepresenting the facts, had aggravated concern 

questioning U.S. intentions.49 In either case, this created a problem for the viabili

PROVIDE RELIEF.

Daniel Toroitich arap Moi had become president of Kenya on 22 August 1978, up

the death of Jomo Kenyatta, a national hero and the first president of postcoloni

Kenya. Although handpicked by Kenyatta as his successor, President Moi had nev

enjoyed the following of his predecessor and constantly struggled to maintain pu

support for his administration.50 While in Nairobi for his meeting with Ambassa

Hempstone, Libutti learned that President Moi wanted to talk with them regardi

operation. The two American leaders rounded up some key staffers and proceede

the Presidential Palace, where Moi expressed considerable dissatisfaction over PR

RELIEF. The polemic newspaper headlines coupled with comments of his adviser

piqued his attention. Not only did this crisis agitate the president, but it was also 

affect his public image, with national elections only four months away.51

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President Moi expressed outrage that the United States would consider operating in

Kenyan airspace without better coordination. Moi complained that he had not received

adequate notice or sufficient information about the mission. Hempstone suspected the

outrage stemmed from suggestions of certain anti-American advisers that the flights

offended Kenyan sovereignty and were intended to undercut the president’s public

standing. After a contentious discussion, in which both Hempstone and Libutti reassured the president of the veracity of American declared intentions, President Moi

agreed to permit food flights into northern Kenya and Somalia. In a follow-on press

conference, Hempstone and Libutti allowed the Kenyan officials to take credit for saving the operation, while making sure that everyone of importance went on record supporting PROVIDE RELIEF. Over the course of the next several days, Hempstone worked

to mollify Kenyan officials, further ensuring that Libutti’s aircraft would fly their missions as intended.52

While establishing his operational base at the Mombasa airport, Libutti noticed parked

across the airfield a C-130 airplane that he believed to be involved in relief operations.

He approached the pilot and learned that the plane flew food supplies to various locations inside Somalia for the World Food Program and the International Committee of

the Red Cross. Libutti decided to join a subsequent flight into Baidoa for an orientation

and some personal reconnaissance. The pilot flew his plane into the remote airfield

there, where the general met with NGO representatives on the ground. The NGO work

ers received the cargo of food and delivered it to the local village, where they had established feeding kitchens. Libutti also noticed the presence of media representatives,

several of whom showed an interest in him. When a reporter from the BBC asked why 

senior U.S. Marine officer would accompany humanitarian flights into the interior of

Somalia, Libutti replied that he was simply there to provide support as part of the UN

relief operations.53 Libutti decided to take advantage of the friendship exhibited by the

C-130 pilot and instructed key members of his staff to accompany future flights so they

could evaluate airfields for possible U.S. operations, assessing their runways and soil

composition. At that point, the PROVIDE RELIEF command consisted of Libutti, the

small staff from Central Command, a few U.S. Air Force air control personnel, and two

C-141s.54

In addition to resolving political issues in Kenya, establishing his base of operations at

the airport, and gathering information on possible airfields, Libutti wanted to be sure

that ongoing problems within Somalia would not endanger his mission or his people.

An important way to accomplish this involved building rapport with the NGOs operat

ing in the areas he would support. The relationship between military forces and NGOs

can be very difficult, and Libutti considered his initial contacts somewhat frosty.55 It is

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them, all with different charters and purposes. Although well intended and right

minded, many NGOs compete for donations or missions, and this tends to make 

very independent and somewhat self-focused. NGOs also operate within a very d

ent organizational culture than does the U.S. military, and bridging the gap can b

challenge for both sides.56 But Libutti and his staff made the effort to do so, and i

view, the NGO personnel “became good friends and good supporters over time.”

Ambassador Hempstone helped this process by facilitating a meeting between Li

and the ICRC early in the planning process. This experience helped convince the 

eral to work through that organization, because of its structure and communicat

system, which operated in both Somalia and Kenya.58 It also had four established 

fields in remote parts of Somalia, which supported roughly five hundred feeding 

tions within the areas served by the landing sites.59 Working with the ICRC requi

PROVIDE RELIEF operation to accommodate itself to some basic expectations, suc

placing red crosses on their airplanes and restricting arms from relief flights. Lib

had no problem with marking his aircraft with the red cross, as long as it did not

obscure other symbols; the question of weapons was more problematic, one th

needed to consider.60 The arrival of disaster assistance response teams (DARTs)

proved helpful in facilitating relations between NGOs and the military, as well 

clarifying aid requirements and security conditions at airfields where Libutti’s 

craft would land.61

Recognizing the need to open communications with key forces inside Somalia, L

established contact with Osman Ato, Aideed’s second in command and the finan

his operations.62 Libutti first met Osman Ato in Kenya and subsequently visited h

during trips into Mogadishu. They established a relationship that led to meetings 

Aideed and key members of his staff. Although plans did not initially call for PRO

RELIEF flights to deliver supplies into Mogadishu itself, Libutti saw that good rela

ships with the Aideed faction—which controlled the Mogadishu airport and por

ities—would be necessary to ensure future access to the city. His contacts proved

particularly valuable some weeks later when the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps tea

facilitated insertion of the five-hundred-man Pakistani peacekeeping battalion in

Somalia.63 They were also to help during the large-scale U.S. military commitmen

December 1992 under the rubric of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Additionally, the 

tion leaders were important in supplying guards and security teams for NGOs an

other agencies operating within Somalia; also, immediate access to the top leader

could be helpful in controlling certain situations.64

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had completed the survey of airfields, contacted key people

within the NGO community,

coordinated with government

officials, and connected with

Somali factions, a standard routine developed that assured maxi

mum efficiency in the delivery of

humanitarian aid.65 It was clear

from the beginning that C-141

aircraft could not operate in the

rugged terrain and makeshift landing fields in the remote parts of Somalia. Libutti

replaced them with the more rugged C-130s, which served as workhorses throughout

the operation. Libutti would have fourteen of these airplanes available at the height of

the relief activity during PROVIDE RELIEF.

66 The C-130s came primarily from the 403rd

Wing of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, based at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, and the

324th Airlift Wing from Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, although German and

Canadian partners provided a few aircraft at various times.67 The C-130s operated off

the tarmac at Mombasa airport near the PROVIDE RELIEF cargo staging areas and

Libutti’s headquarters. At this point, the PROVIDE RELIEF staff—though still relatively

small—had been somewhat enhanced to support the additional aircraft and expanded

mission.68 During the period of greatest activity, the total number of people supporting

PROVIDE RELIEF grew to about six hundred, including both military and civilian.69

The operational routine that developed for PROVIDE RELIEF started with food aid shipments arriving at the port of Mombasa from all over the world. Contractors would

transport the supplies to Libutti’s operational facility at Mombasa airport, where work

ing parties palletized the bags of food. During the evening hours, the cargo would be

loaded in the C-130s for the next day’s flights. At 0330 (3:30 AM), pilot briefings were

conducted; the aircraft departed between 0500 and 0700 for their designated landing

sites. If the designated airfield was secure when the aircraft arrived, NGO representatives on the ground would lay out a simple white sheet or flag, and the pilot would

land. If the airfield was not secure, the pilot had instructions to divert to another site o

return to Mombasa. Fortunately, that did not prove necessary during PROVIDE RELIEF,

due in part to superb advance communications.70 DART staffers supporting the operation coordinated with the NGOs inside Somalia on a daily basis to guarantee security

at the landing sites. They also verified the NGOs’ ability to off-load the supplies in a

timely manner, thereby reducing the exposure of aircraft and personnel on the ground

C-130s on the tarmac at Mombasa airport.

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hibited landing under unsafe c

tions, but aircraft on the groun

extended periods were bound t

attract attention. The NGOs’ u

local Somalis for both labor an

security at the remote airfields 

villages ensured the efficacy of 

process.71 This in turn allowed 

people executing PROVIDE REL

focus on flying aircraft and del

supplies.

Once PROVIDE RELIEF reached a normal operating rhythm, its pilots flew at a rat

high operational tempo. This level of activity attracted considerable attention in 

East Africa and Washington. At one point in the process, the vice chairman of th

Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, visited the operation and accompanie

Libutti on a flight into Oddur, Somalia. Jeremiah received a tour of the local villa

where he observed conditions and relief operations under way. He and Libutti 

met with local elders and clansmen to discuss humanitarian activity and the relie

operations.72

Although PROVIDE RELIEF did not have a combat mission and had to conform to 

tain peacetime standards, Somalia remained a dangerous place. The good relation

that developed between Libutti’s staff and NGO representatives, coupled with the 

of the DARTs, helped minimize the risk of delivering supplies to remote airfields

avoidance strategies can be uncertain, and they assume the cooperation of all ind

nous parties.73 As a prudent commander, Libutti did not intend to rely solely on 

intentions or polite relationships with his NGO counterparts for the protection o

ple and aircraft. In order to hedge against nasty surprises, he designated one of h

130s as a security plane and configured it to deal with unforeseen threats. He loa

the aircraft with armed soldiers from the 5th Special Forces Group, the major ele

of his ground security force.74 The airplane would circle landing sites while delive

were under way and respond to acts of violence on the ground. If a threat develo

an airplane took fire while unloading, the pilot would take off and fly out of harm

way if possible. If not, he could call for the security aircraft, which would land an

necessary action to rescue the people at the airfield and fly them to safety. Fortun

conditions never required employment of this security provision during Operati

PROVIDE RELIEF.

75 Two of Libutti’s C-130s received small-arms fire, but no injuri

resulted, damage to the aircraft was slight, and the incidents did not endanger th

General Frank Libutti and Admiral David E. Jeremiah meeting with

Somali elder.

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to operations. While accompanying the relief flights, the soldiers also collected intelligence on airfields, assessed the degree of danger within various regions, and obtained

other basic information that would be of use in case of future ground involvement. As

America’s commitment became larger and ground operations came to predominate,

the intelligence value of these flights was to prove vitally important.76

The leaders of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF established procedures and relationships tha

seemed appropriate for their mission while addressing the particular and uncertain situa

tions they found on the ground. They attempted to conform to standards acceptable to

the humanitarian relief community with whom they had to interface. This meant that

the military aircraft and crews did not carry weapons and landed only in relatively

secure areas. Of course, Libutti wisely allowed for the uncertainty of conditions, by cre

ating the separate security plane to protect his unarmed crews while on the ground. At

the remote airfields, as we have seen, NGOs were responsible for unloading, transporting, and warehousing

the food for use in the

feeding centers where

victims of famine gath

ered. They hired local

Somalis to perform

this work, usually paying them with a combination of money and

food.77 Despite the two

incidents of smallarms fire, Operation

PROVIDE RELIEF went

more or less as

intended and made an important contribution to limiting the extent of the crisis. It

served areas that aid organizations could not reliably reach by road, and its cargoes did

not suffer the looting, pilfering, and outright thievery that created problems in other

parts of Somalia, especially in the coastal cities.78

American pilots flew over 1,400 missions and delivered seventeen thousand tons of

food through 4 December 1992, when Operation RESTORE HOPE brought a larger mission and higher level of American involvement to Somalia.79 Yet despite the success of

PROVIDE RELIEF, which operated at full capacity between August and December 1992,

the food deliveries amounted to no more than 10 percent of the minimum needed to

stabilize the Somali crisis.80 Additionally, the mission, with its benign nature, did

C-130 flying into a remote airfield.

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against staging areas, truck convoys, and feeding stations remained an issue in m

parts of Somalia that did not enjoy a secure port like Mombasa or relatively secu

fields like those used by PROVIDE RELIEF.

81 Despite saving many lives and exhibiti

noblest aspect of the American character, PROVIDE RELIEF could not solve the lar

problems of Somalia with the limited mission and assets it commanded.

Militias of the contesting factions, local gangs and bandits, and other criminal el

at large in Mogadishu and the countryside—especially along the coastline—ham

humanitarian relief efforts throughout the crisis.82 Among other things, these thu

would often intimidate relief workers, sometimes people who had hired them for 

tection.83 Additionally, the fighting and violence often prevented unloading food 

plies, particularly at the port of Mogadishu.84 Some aid officials believed that as l

20 percent of the food arriving in Somalia actually reached the needy. Although d

puted by many analysts, that figure influenced the thinking of American leaders 

became an important factor in the decision to undertake Operation RESTORE HO

In mid-September 1992, American leaders were not yet contemplating a major d

ment such as RESTORE HOPE but remained focused on the five hundred peacekee

authorized under UN Resolution 751. That Pakistani battalion would find itself i

unenviable position of a small force in the middle of a big problem. It was also li

armed and had both a vague mission and a restrictive set of rules of engagement

imposed by the UN.86 Brigadier General Shaheen, who commanded the peacekee

force, considered the ROE far too restrictive under the circumstances, fearing the

could endanger his peacekeepers and prevent them from accomplishing their mi

Nonetheless, UN officials expected it to be a positive influence and a security for

protect food shipments at the port and airport.

Peacekeeping is a somewhat amorphous concept, loosely justified under Chapter 

the UN Charter. Although not specifically mentioned in the charter, the idea of p

keeping developed over time to include both military-observer missions and larg

bility operations.88 Though they are military in nature, the UN implements

peacekeeping operations in a nonthreatening manner, with the consent of all dis

tants. They apply principles of impartiality, mediation, and persuasion for maint

peace and restoring normalcy.89 In other words, the UN introduces peacekeepers 

presence intended to calm a situation, not to assert authority. Peacekeeping is fun

mentally different from “peace enforcement”—authorized under Chapter VII of 

UN Charter—which allows the use of coercive power, either economic or militar

This thinking leads to the (usually naive) presumption that peacekeepers will be 

favorably—that is, be valued as helpful neutrals—when introduced into violent

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involvement and accepted peacekeepers only under considerable pressure from Ambas

sador Sahnoun. This placed the Pakistanis in a precarious situation, since their primary

positions at the airport and the port of Mogadishu were in areas controlled by Aideed.9

Additionally, numerous crosscurrents existed within the factions, clans, and subclans in

Mogadishu, making effective control of people and events somewhat uncertain. Should

conflict develop between the peacekeepers and Aideed’s faction, the lightly armed Pakistanis would face adversaries with heavy guns, artillery, plenty of ammunition, and

serious attitude problems.92

Aideed had reasons for objecting to the deployment of peacekeepers, of course. Possessing the stronger force in Mogadishu, he rightly believed that any restraining factor

tended to favor his weaker enemy, Ali Mahdi. Beyond that, Aideed held deep suspicions

about UN intentions, because an airplane with UN markings had delivered arms to Ali

Mahdi’s faction in northern Mogadishu. Although this incident had actually involved a

contractor’s failure to repaint his aircraft after completing a UN contract and not UN

support for Ali Mahdi, it reinforced his tendency to distrust and resist UN involvement

in Mogadishu.93 Making things even worse, UN headquarters announced that it would

send another three thousand peacekeepers to Somalia just as Sahnoun had convinced

Aideed to accept the five hundred under discussion. The news incensed Aideed and

humiliated Sahnoun, since neither had known of this decision, learning of it from a

BBC radio broadcast.94 Nonetheless, under pressure from Sahnoun, Aideed reluctantly

decided to accept the initial five hundred peacekeepers, and the United States agreed to

fly them from Pakistan to Mogadishu in Air Force planes and use the Navy and Marine

Corps team to facilitate their entry into Somalia.95

American naval expeditionary forces within the Indian Ocean during September 1992

consisted of PhibRon 1, under Captain Braden Phillips, with 11th MEU (SOC)

embarked. Colonel Michael W. Hagee, a future Commandant of the Marine Corps,

commanded the Marines of 11th MEU (SOC). These commanders and their officers

had known of the instability on the Horn of Africa as they conducted their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton and off the California coastline. Noncombatant

evacuation operations—such as Captain Moser and Colonel Doyle had conducted at

Mogadishu during EASTERN EXIT—constituted an important element of their training

package. In this particular case, the Navy and Marine Corps team had the added advan

tage of a firsthand orientation on EASTERN EXIT from Lieutenant Colonel Robert P.

McAleer. McAleer’s briefing dovetailed nicely with the NEO training and provided the

leaders of the amphibious force significant insight into conditions in Somalia. Both

Phillips and Hagee believed their units benefited from that direct connection, especially

since Somalia would be within their area of responsibility upon deployment.96

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capable and well integrated Navy and Marine Corps team that had been emergin

1776 at New Providence in the Bahamas. The two commanders cooperated clo

during their workup for deployment, with Phillips participating in much of the t

ing that makes a MEU “special operations capable.” Phillips’s PhibRon 1 and Hag

11th MEU (SOC) completed their training and set sail in June 1992 as a four-shi

amphibious readiness group (ARG), with Tarawa its flagship.97 The Tarawa ARG 

ducted amphibious exercises in Hawaii, Okinawa, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia befo

steaming eastward toward Singapore in early September. While en route east, it r

orders to proceed at best speed to Mogadishu and facilitate the introduction of P

stani peacekeepers into Somalia.98 Central Command planners had originally con

ered using the ARG’s ships to transport the peacekeepers from Pakistan to Somal

they ultimately decided against it due to space limitations and cultural issues. Ins

as noted, the Air Force would fly them into Mogadishu with the Navy and Marin

Corps team orchestrating a safe insertion.99

En route to Somalia, Phillips and Hagee received notice to fly to Nairobi for a me

with the Central Command representative (General Libutti) and other key offici

discuss the upcoming operation. The two commanders, along with several key st

members, made a five-hundred-mile CH-53E helicopter flight from Tarawa to

Mombasa, where they boarded a C-130 for the trip to Nairobi. The subsequent c

ence occurred in the home of Ambassador Hempstone under Libutti’s overall dir

tion. In addition to the principals, this meeting included Mohamed Sahnoun; Br

General Shaheen; Raymond S. Marchand, of Conoco Somalia, Ltd. (who lived in

Mogadishu and understood its issues); John Fox, a U.S. embassy political officer 

evacuee from Mogadishu during EASTERN EXIT; and several other key staff office

The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate the safe arrival of the Pakistani pe

keepers into Mogadishu and guarantee their security until properly established. T

group discussed the current situation on the ground in Mogadishu, staging areas 

the arriving troops and their supplies and equipment, bivouac areas, and other su

administrative and logistical issues. It further addressed the need for a safe and c

trolled environment in which the large Air Force planes could land and disembar

peacekeepers. This constituted the most serious of the problems, and it was mad

vexing by the uncertainty of the situation.101 The group also agreed that the U.S. 

the operation should remain as inconspicuous as possible, although its members 

anced that against the deterrent value of having an American naval expeditionar

offshore.102 Once Phillips and Hagee returned to their ship, assessed the overall si

tion in Mogadishu, conducted a reconnaissance of the Mogadishu airport, and co

pleted their planning, they would be able to formalize the Air Force flight schedu

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went into “MODLOC” about ten miles offshore.104 Throughout the operation, the ships

remained in that general vicinity—sometimes within view of the land and sometimes

over the horizon—exerting a calming effect on events ashore, in the opinion of Hagee.

The leaders of the various Somali factions knew that the ships contained Marines and

that the ARG possessed a power-projection capability. The implied threat from such a

force proved sufficient to control the situation.105 By this time, the Tarawa ARG had

been at sea for some time, and Phillips had logistical concerns. While attending the

Nairobi conference, he had coordinated with Hempstone and Libutti to secure a source

for supplies and to receive mail. Throughout the Mogadishu operation, Phillips shuttled two of his ships—Fort Fisher and Ogden—between Mogadishu and Mombasa on a

daily basis to conduct the needed logistical tasks. This approach worked quite well, in

Phillips’s opinion, because it supported the mission while providing some activity for

the ships other than hovering on station throughout the operation.106

The plan for inserting the peacekeepers involved sending a Marine force into the

Mogadishu airport, accompanied by an Air Force combat control team, which would

conduct terminal guidance for the Air Force planes flying the missions. The Marines

provided security for the control team and the arriving C-141 aircraft with the peacekeepers. The Marines also protected the Pakistanis until they were in position to

assume their own security.107 The Air Force combat control team consisted of six airmen, whom Hagee characterized as “big and squared away making a strong military

appearance.”108 These Air Force teams are components of the special operations community, and they are trained to conduct such missions in covert and nonpermissive

environments when necessary. Libutti visited Mogadishu prior to the beginning of the

operation, coordinating with the Pakistani commander and the Aideed faction, which

controlled the area surrounding the airport. Using his relationship with Osman Ato,

the general obtained a commitment from Aideed not to interfere with the insertions by

attempting to shoot down the aircraft or attacking them on the ground. Once Libutti

accomplished this, he notified Central Command to execute the insertion plan.109

Libutti’s efforts to eliminate the threat from the Aideed faction reduced the risk but of

course could not guarantee perfect security. Phillips and Hagee felt it appropriate to go

ashore themselves prior the actual operation to conduct a reconnaissance and assess

the situation in and around the airport. After determining that the airfield could handle C-141 aircraft and that the situation was not prohibitively threatening, the two

commanders took a tour of Mogadishu. Raymond Marchand, the Conoco executive

whom Phillips and Hagee had met at the Nairobi conference, joined them at the airpor

and provided what Phillips considered an eye-opening experience. They traveled in

several vehicles, known as “technicals,” mounting .50-caliber machine guns and

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visit to the evacuated American embassy, which had been stripped of everything 

value and left an utter shambles.111

The Continental Oil Company (Conoco) in Somalia had acquired concessions an

begun exploring for oil in the northwest part of the country (the Republic of Som

land) in 1986. Marchand considered the prospect of finding oil in that region mo

promising, foreseeing yields perhaps amounting to three hundred thousand barr

day once developed.112 Conoco had also established a large operational headquar

Mogadishu well before the spread of anarchy in the city. This complex constitute

most secure location available to American officials after evacuation of the emba

January 1991. As president and general manager of Conoco Somalia, Ltd., March

proved to be an invaluable—though entirely unofficial—asset to American diplo

and military efforts throughout the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Marchand poss

substantial knowledge and understanding of the political, military, and social con

tions within Mogadishu and throughout the country. He also had key contacts w

most powerful leaders of various factions, connections that he readily made avai

to American authorities. The security arrangements Marchand had established to 

tect the Conoco compound and himself in his travels around Somalia were the b

available. He employed well-armed and well-paid guards who provided reliable s

to his company and its activities throughout the years of instability.113 The Conoc

headquarters in Mogadishu served as a focal point from which many Americans 

operate and where they could reside during the period in which no American co

services existed.114

One peculiar factor that affected the Mogadishu operation involved the use of kh

among Somali people. Ironically, this recreational drug proved to be the only com

ity that retained a viable market in Somalia’s general economic collapse and fami

Khat is a stimulant that Somalis chew in leaf form—as tobacco is chewed in som

of America—and that secretes concentrations of amphetamine. It is a very social 

uct, but after a full day of chewing khat, individuals become cranked up and irra

This often results in reckless and aggressive behavior, particularly in younger men. 

environment where every male over seven or eight years of age seems to have a gun 

plenty of ammunition, this can create dangerous situations.115 Although the Marin

11th MEU (SOC) did not operate under the highly restrictive ROE that constraine

Pakistani peacekeepers, neither were they in Mogadishu to conduct combat operat

Consequently, Phillips and Hagee decided to have their activities performed at the 

in the morning hours and to return all personnel to the ships by about 1300 (1:00 

each day. This would minimize the opportunity for violent encounters. That patter

proved very effective during the insertion operation.116 Only Hagee remained ashor

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compound and keeping in tune

with activities in the city.117

Throughout the operation,

Phillips and Hagee kept the

Marines and ships busy prepar

ing for contingencies in case of

problems ashore. Should Amer

ican forces at the airport come

under attack, they had a plan

prepared and rehearsed with

which to respond. If an antiair

threat developed that precluded

helicopters from flying,

Schenectady, with tracked vehicles on board, could put

Marines ashore over the beach

to prosecute any action that

might be appropriate. In fact, Phillips inserted SEALs onto the beach to be available

should any action on the ground become necessary. Because of these precautions, the

entire amphibious force—not just the Marines and airmen operating at the airfield—

participated in the mission in very real ways.118

The Marines and sailors of the Tarawa ARG remained busy and took their responsibilities quite seriously, but they received a large morale boost when visited by actress Audrey Hepburn, as goodwill ambassador of the United Nations Children’s Fund.119 Hagee

had met her in Mogadishu, where a UNICEF group had come to meet with American

leaders. He and Phillips arranged for her to have lunch on the flagship, meet with

some of the Marines and sailors, and talk a little about her mission. Within three hours

the troops had collected over four thousand dollars in donations for the UNICEF

cause.120 This received considerable press coverage that placed the Navy and Marine

Corps team in a very good light. Hepburn had been a UNICEF goodwill ambassador

since 1988 and visited many humanitarian disaster areas, but nothing had prepared her

for the experience of Somalia. She commented, “I walked into a nightmare. I have seen

famine in Ethiopia and Bangladesh, but I have seen nothing like this—so much worse

than I could have possibly have imagined.” Perhaps, after her dreadful experience

ashore, her visit with the Marines and sailors provided as much of a morale boost for

her as she did for the troops. Four months later Audrey Hepburn died from an incurable cancer, diagnosed after she returned home from the Somalia trip.121

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keepers were in place, helicopters would fly the Marines and Air Force controller

the airport every morning to support their arrival. The controllers would bring i

Air Force planes while Marines protected the landings, off-loading, and defensive 

arations. After completing the objectives for the day, helicopters returned the U.S

to its ships. The Marines also escorted some peacekeepers to the port area, where 

intended to establish a post for protecting relief aid that arrived by ship. (After th

departure of the Tarawa ARG, the situation in Mogadishu did not permit the Pak

to remain at the port, and they ultimately found themselves ensconced at, and lim

to, the Mogadishu airport.)122 After inserting the peacekeepers, the Tarawa ARG m

off station. But before departing the Indian Ocean, Phillips and Hagee conducted 

debriefing—primarily through message traffic—with leaders of an incoming nav

expeditionary force, consisting of PhibRon 3, commanded by Captain John W. P

son, and 15th MEU (SOC), under Colonel Gregory S. Newbold.123 That Navy and

Marine Corps team would lead the American forces ashore for Operation RESTO

HOPE three months later.124

After negotiating for deployment of the five hundred peacekeepers, Ambassador

Sahnoun became embroiled in a conflict with the UN bureaucracy and felt comp

to resign his post. This proved a serious loss to the peace process and humanitari

relief effort, as Sahnoun had demonstrated great skill and effectiveness in the vex

effort to save Somalia from total chaos and anarchy.125 When he left, relations bet

the UN and Somali factional leaders—particularly Aideed and Ali Mahdi—deterio

to the point that a solution to the problems seemed even farther out of reach.126 Sahn

replacement, Ismat Kittani, also a veteran diplomat, could not replicate the trust 

cooperation that Sahnoun had nurtured among the Somali factions despite his s

understanding of the problem. His approach to dealing with the issues and the le

of the most powerful factions proved overly structured, relatively ineffective in a

ronment that valued close personal interaction. It is not clear, of course, whether 

agreements Sahnoun had carefully crafted among the diverse Somali factions cou

have brought an ultimate solution to the conflict and famine. But it is clear that his d

ture marked an end to any hope for a near-term political or humanitarian solution.12

In November 1992, Brigadier General Paul L. Fratarangelo, USMC, replaced Libu

commander of JTF Provide Relief.128 Shortly after his return to Central Comman

headquarters, Libutti received a call from the Pentagon indicating that the chairm

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, wanted him in Washington to b

the Joint Staff on PROVIDE RELIEF and offer his impressions on Somalia and Ke

large-scale humanitarian incursion into Somalia was under consideration at the 

and in Washington Powell asked Libutti for his views on that as well. In his opini

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for nation building, which could be a ten-to-fifteen-year proposition.129 After a subsequent session with Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Libutti returned to

Tampa. A few days later, Libutti was ordered back to Mombasa to meet and work with

the new American special envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley. About a week later, the

United States would begin landing Marines in Somalia to implement Operation

RESTORE HOPE.

130

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF constituted a very important element of America’s Somalia

incursions of the 1990s. The participants gained a fundamental understanding of the

humanitarian crisis, social breakdown, and the military situation, with all its nuances

and intricacies. This information was to prove invaluable for the leaders of Operation

RESTORE HOPE, which absorbed PROVIDE RELIEF once the larger commitment got

under way. Both Libutti and Hagee returned to Somalia during the early stages of the

RESTORE HOPE to assist the JTF commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston,

USMC, and Ambassador Oakley in addressing the problems they faced and the duties

they performed.131

RESTORE HOPE proved to be an operation that would embody . . . From the Sea far

more than did PROVIDE RELIEF. Even so, thinkers within the sea services could draw

valuable insight from the accomplishments of PROVIDE RELIEF for the strategic and

operational concepts then in development. The skillful and casualty-free insertion of

Pakistani peacekeepers into Mogadishu clearly demonstrated the flexibility of forwarddeployed naval expeditionary forces operating from ships at sea. The deterrent value of

naval power projection contributed greatly to that success by deterring hostile actions

by militias and gangs ashore. The use of Air Force planes and controllers to fly peacekeepers into Mogadishu demonstrated the concept of shaping naval forces to support

joint operations. The very creation of PROVIDE RELIEF illustrated the strategic notion

of conducting joint operations tailored for national needs as described in . . . From the

Sea.132 Libutti’s operation—including the relief flights out of Mombasa and the insertion of peacekeepers into Mogadishu—reported directly to the commander in chief of

Central Command, who in turn operated under the direction of the National Command Authority.133 This permitted efficient command and control over operationally

agile forces maneuvering from the sea in response to strategic and policy objectives

from the highest level.134

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1. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 17; Matthew

Bryden, “Somalia: The Wages of Failure,”

Current History (April 1995), p. 147; Hirsch

and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore

Hope, p. 12; Sahnoun, Somalia, p. 20; John G.

Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid

in Somalia 1990–1994 (Washington, D.C.:

Refugee Policy Group, Center for Policy

Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues,

November 1994), p. 10.

2. The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996,

with Introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali,

Secretary General of the United Nations,

United Nations Blue Book Series (New York:

Department of Public Information, 1996),

vol. 8, pp. 11–13; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia

and Operation Restore Hope, pp. 12–13; Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, p. 22.

3. Cable from the U.S. ambassador in Kenya to

the State Department during July 1992, reprinted in Smith Hempstone, “Dispatch

from a Place near Hell: The Killing Drought

in Kenya, as Witnessed by the U.S. Ambassador,” Washington Post, 23 August 1992; Lyons

and Samatar, Somalia, p. 22.

4. Smith Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (Sewanee, Tenn.: Univ. of the

South Press, 1997), pp. 207, 215–16.

5. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 13–16.

6. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, p. 22.

7. Ibid., p. 23.

8. Ibid., p. 35.

9. Sahnoun, Somalia, pp. 6–8.

10. Ibid., pp. 9–10; Abul Fazal Md Sanaullah,

United Nations’ Operation in Somalia: The

Possibility of Success with a Different Approach or Application (Fort Leavenworth,

Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College, 2002), p. 43.

11. Brian Allen Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in

Somalia: A Reprise of America’s Failure in

Vietnam,” in To Oppose Any Foe: The Legacy

of U.S. Intervention in Vietnam, ed. Ross A.

Fisher, John Norton Moore, and Robert F.

Turner (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic,

2006), p. 514; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia

and Operation Restore Hope, pp. 12–15; Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and

Failure (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. 

2007), p. 53.

12. Bryden, “Somalia,” p. 147.

13. United Nations and Somalia, p. 11; H

and Oakley, Somalia and Operation R

Hope, pp. 10–11; Lyons and Samatar, 

lia, pp. 18–19, 27; Stevenson, Losing

Mogadishu, p. 34.

14. American Embassy Mogadishu mess

151318Z March 1990 to State Depart

in Conoco-Somalia Declassification P

College of DuPage, www.cod.edu [her

DuPage Project].

15. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 19; Sahnoun, Somali

9–11, 25–27.

16. Jane Perlez, “Barrier to Somali Unity

Rivalry,” New York Times, 28 August 

Sahnoun, Somalia, pp. 8–11.

17. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, pp. 13–16; Sahnoun, So

pp. 27–37.

18. Andrew Natsios, in U.S. State Dept. D

3, no. 36 (7 September 1992), availab

dosfan.lib.uic.edu.

19. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, p. 30.

20. Sanaullah, United Nations Operation 

malia, p. 47.

21. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 18–

ons and Samatar, Somalia, p. 30; Som

Hope Restored? p. 17.

22. Walter S. Poole, The Effort to Save So

August 1992–March 1994 (Washingto

Joint History Office, Joint Staff, 2005

9–10; Sahnoun, Somalia, p. 17; Jane P

“Theft of Food Aid Is a Business in S

Somalia,” New York Times, 4 Septemb

1992.

23. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, pp. 30–34; Sahnoun, So

pp. 16–21.

24. Jane Perlez, “U.N. Let the Somali Fa

Get Out of Hand, Aide Says,” New Yo

Times, 16 August 1992; U.S. Defense 

Joint Military Operations Historical C

tion (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 1

1997), p. VI-1.

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Restore Hope, pp. 21–24; Sahnoun, Somalia,

pp. 18–21.

26. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 18; Sahnoun, Somalia, pp. 16, 64–67; UN Security Council

Resolution 751, in United Nations and Somalia, document 12, pp. 166–67.

27. United Nations and Somalia, p. 25.

28. Bryden, “Somalia,” p. 147; Lyons and

Samatar, Somalia, p. 32; Sahnoun, Somalia,

pp. vii–viii, 15–18.

29. Sommer, Hope Restored? pp. 17–19.

30. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 18, 23; Sahnoun, Somalia,

pp. 15–16, 18, 28.

31. UN Security Council Resolution 767, in

United Nations and Somalia, document 17,

pp. 179–80.

32. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 24; Sahnoun, Somalia, pp.

68–71; David J. Zvijac and Katherine A. W.

McGrady, Operation Restore Hope: Summary

Report (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval

Analyses, 1994), p. 22; U.S. Defense Dept.,

Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, p. VI-2.

33. Hempstone, “Dispatch”; Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 21.

34. Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Additional Humanitarian Aid for Somalia, 14

August 1992, available at bushlibrary.tamu

.edu/research/public_papers; U.S. Defense

Dept., Joint Military Operations Historical

Collection, p. VI-2.

35. Bryden, “Somalia,” p. 148; Lyons and

Samatar, Somalia, pp. 24, 31; U.S. Central

Command, USCENTCOM in Somalia: Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope (n.p.:

History Office, November 1994)[hereafter

Central Command in Somalia], OOTW, Operation Restore Hope, box 2, folder 33, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections,

Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia

[hereafter Marine Corps Archives], pp. 8, 10.

36. Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” pp.

530–31; Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, pp. 31–

32; Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 21; Peter

Woodward, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn

of Africa (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006), p.

62.

which comprises the president and the secretary of defense or their authorized alternates, exercises authority over the armed

forces operationally through the combatant

commanders, in this case, that of the U.S.

Central Command. See U.S. Defense Dept.,

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Join

Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: Joint

Staff, 10 July 2001), pp. ix, I4, I7.

38. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Interventions, p. 54.

39. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia, pp. 9–10.

40. Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. Starts Relief Effort

in Somalia,” Washington Post, 29 August

1992.

41. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, p. 226;

Natsios, in U.S. State Dept. Dispatch 3; Central Command in Somalia, p. 17.

42. Jane Perlez, “U.S. Delivers Tons of Food to

Somalia,” New York Times, 29 August 1992;

Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. Relief Flights Reach

Hunger-Ravished Somalia,” Tech, 29 August

1992, p. 2.

43. Gen. Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 9 September

2008.

44. Commandant of the Marine Corps, message

R 121954Z November 1992 (MCNEWS 46-

92), Folder: Somalia: Opn Provide Relief

(1991), Reference Branch, Marine Corps

History Division, Quantico, Virginia [hereafter MCNEWS 46-92]; Lt. Gen. Frank

Libutti, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview

by the author, 31 March 2008; Sommer,

Hope Restored? p. 23; Central Command in

Somalia, p. 16.

45. Hoar interview.

46. Ibid.; Libutti interview.

47. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, pp. 215–16.

48. Libutti interview.

49. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, pp. 217–19.

50. Angelique Haugerud, The Culture of Politics

in Modern Kenya (New York: Cambridge

Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 2, 54–55.

51. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, p. 218.

52. Ibid., pp. 219–21; Libutti interview; Somme

Hope Restored? p. 23.

53. Libutti interview.

54. Ibid.

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56. Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, Falls Church, Virginia, 10

October 2007.

57. Libutti interview.

58. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 25.

59. The landing sites that the ICRC and subsequently PROVIDE RELIEF used within Somalia

included Bardera, Baidoa, Oddur, and Belet

Uen. See Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, p.

221; and Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and

Operation Restore Hope, p. 25.

60. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, pp. 221–24;

Libutti interview.

61. DARTs are elements within the Office of U.S.

Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) that deploy to areas requiring disaster or humanitarian relief, such as Kenya and Somalia

during PROVIDE RELIEF. See Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, pp. 55, 112–13;

Sommer, Hope Restored? pp. 23–24.

62. Osman Ato, whose real name was Osman

Hassan Ali, was a major figure in financing

and supplying Aideed’s forces. Some observers believed he was deeply involved in the

khat trade between Kenya and Somalia, but

he always denied such connections. See

Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, pp. 3–5, 73–74.

63. Libutti interview.

64. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, p. 222.

65. Libutti interview.

66. Ibid.

67. “USAF Fact Sheet, 403rd Wing,” Keesler Air

Force Base, www.keesler.af.mil/library/

factsheet; “A Brief History of Little Rock AFB

and the 324th Airlift Wing,” Little Rock Air

Force Base, www.littlerock.af.mil.

68. Libutti interview; Poole, Effort to Save Somalia, p. 11; Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 23.

69. Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 24; Central Command in Somalia, pp. 17–18.

70. Libutti interview.

71. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, p. 225;

Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 24.

72. Libutti interview.

73. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention,

pp. 40–41.

way,” Navy Times, 7 September 1992.

75. Hoar interview; Libutti interview.

76. U.S. Army Dept., United States Forces

lia After Action Report and Historical 

view: The United States Army in Som

1992–1994 (Washington, D.C.: Cente

Military History, 2003) [hereafter U.

Dept., Somalia After Action Report], p

Commandant of the Marine Corps,

(MCNEWS 44-92), folder: Somalia: 

Provide Relief (1991), Reference Bra

Marine Corps History Division, Qua

Virginia.

77. Jane Perlez, “Accord Reached, Somal

Will Start Today,” New York Times, 28 

1992; Zvijac and McGrady, Operation 

Hope, p. 22 note.

78. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 25; Seybolt, Humani

Military Intervention, p. 54.

79. Figures on the number of missions flo

the quantity of supplies delivered vary 

accounts of PROVIDE RELIEF. The num

used here are at the lower end of the ra

President George H. W. Bush, Human

Mission to Somalia, address to the na

December 1992, available at bushlibr

.tamu.edu/research/public_papers;

Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, p. 22

Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 25; Seybolt, Humani

Military Intervention, pp. 112–13; an

Sommer, Hope Restored? pp. 24–25.

80. Zvijac and McGrady, Operation Resto

Hope, pp. 22–23.

81. Theo Farrell, “United States Marine 

Operation in Somalia: A Model for t

ture,” in Amphibious Operations: A C

of Papers, ed. Geoffrey Till, Theo Far

Mark J. Grove (New Baskerville, U.K

tegic and Combat Studies Institute, 1

pp. 44–45; Zvijac and McGrady, Ope

Restore Hope, p. 23.

82. Baumann and Yates, with Washingto

Clan against the World,” pp. 19, 23–2

Sahnoun, Somalia, p. 15.

83. Tom Clancy, Anthony C. Zinni, and T

Koltz, Battle Ready (New York: G. P. 

2004), p. 235; Lyons and Samatar, So

pp. 22–23; Sahoun, Somalia, pp. 29, 3

Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, pp. 9–

Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 14.

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85. Analysts agree that much food aid was pillaged and diverted, but many think that 80

percent shrinkage is far too high a number.

See Bryden, “Somalia,” p. 148; U.S. Defense

Dept., Joint Military Operations Historical

Collection, pp. VI-1 to VI-2; Sommer, Hope

Restored? pp. 28–29.

86. United Nations and Somalia, p. 26; Hagee interview; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 27; Stevenson, Losing

Mogadishu, p. 101.

87. Hagee interview; Central Command in Somalia, p. 19.

88. Myron H. Nordquist, What Color Helmet?

Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping

Mandates, Newport Paper 12 (Newport, R.I.:

Naval War College Press, 1997), pp. 7–8, 15.

89. Ibid., pp. 15–16.

90. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945,

Chapter VI, in Avalon Project at Yale Law

School, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/

unchart.htm; Stephen M. Hill and Shahin P.

Malik, Peacekeeping and the United Nations

(Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 6–

11, 14–16, 217–27; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 26.

91. Hill and Malik, Peacekeeping and the United

Nations, p. 109; Lyons and Samatar, Somalia,

pp. 23, 32.

92. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 26–27.

93. Ibid., pp. 21–22; Sommer, Hope Restored? p.

26.

94. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 26; Sahnoun, Somalia, p. 39;

Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, p. 46.

95. Hagee interview; Jane Perlez, “Somalia Warlord Agrees to Allow UN to Protect Its Relief

Supplies,” New York Times, 13 August 1992;

Central Command in Somalia, p. 19.

96. Capt. Braden J. Phillips, USN (Ret.), interview by the author, Long Beach, California,

14 March 2008; Hagee interview; McAleer

interview.

97. The ships constituting the ARG included

USS Tarawa (LHA 1), USS Ogden (LPD 5),

USS Fort Fisher (LSD 40), and USS

Schenectady (LST 1185). See Phillips

interview.

98. Ibid.

100. Hagee interview; Phillips interview;

Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 12.

101. Phillips interview.

102. Ibid.; Hagee interview.

103. Phillips interview.

104. MODLOC is an acronym in the Navy’s

Movement Report system for “miscellaneou

operational details, local operations.” Amphibious forces loitering offshore to suppor

operations ashore often report their location

in this way. See JP 1-02, p. A-86.

105. Hagee interview; Phillips interview.

106. Phillips interview.

107. Ibid.

108. Hagee interview.

109. Lt. Gen. Frank Libutti, USMC (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 9 July 2008.

110. “Technicals” is the term given to pickup

trucks and similar vehicles with heavy guns

or other armament mounted on the beds.

Every faction, militia, and gang used them

for protection and combat. NGOs, corporations, and other agencies operating in Soma

lia often hired these vehicles for security,

paying for them out of the “technical assistance” accounts in their operating budgets,

hence the name “technicals.” See Lyons and

Samatar, Somalia, p. 23; Anthony C. Zinni

and Tony Koltz, The Battle for Peace: A

Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),

pp. 101–102.

111. Phillips interview.

112. American Embassy Mogadishu message

2111502Z March 1990 to Secretary of State;

American Embassy Nairobi message

180601Z June 1991 to Secretary of State;

American Embassy Djibouti message

2012332Z June 1991 to Secretary of State; al

in DuPage Project.

113. American Embassy Nairobi message

1113302Z October 1991 to State Department, in DuPage Project.

114. Martin L. Cheshes, State Department letter

to Herman J. Cohen, 31 March 1992; Secretary of State message 166020Z December

1992 to USDEL Secretary; both in DuPage

Project.

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Phillips interview.

116. Phillips interview.

117. Hagee interview.

118. Phillips interview.

119. UNICEF, the UN Children’s Fund, addresses

issues of the rights and protection of children and responds to disasters and humanitarian crises. See its website, www.unicef.org.

120. Hagee interview; Phillips interview;

Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, p. 41.

121. Thompson Rivers University, www.tru.ca/

news/websites/web audrey perezdoizi/

charity2.html.

122. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 26–27, 31.

123. As we will see, 15th MEU (SOC) was not actually a complete MEU, because of inadequate amphibious shipping to carry all its

Marines and equipment. Although commonly referred to as 15th MEU (SOC), it

was officially a “special-purpose Marine airground task force,” or SPMAGTF. Lt. Gen.

Gregory S. Newbold, USMC (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 2 June 2008.

124. Hagee interview; Phillips interview; Dennis

P. Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope: In Somalia

with the Unified Task Force, 1992–1993 (Washington, D.C.: History Division, U.S. Marine

Corps, 2005), pp. 16–32.

Command in Somalia, pp. 19–20; Jan

“U.N. Envoy to Somalia Says His Ou

Official,” New York Times, 30 Octobe

126. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, pp. 32–33.

127. Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 27.

128. MCNEWS 46-92.

129. Don Oberdorfer, “The Path to Interv

A Massive Tragedy ‘We Could Do So

About,’” Washington Post, 6 Decembe

130. Libutti interview.

131. Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, USMC 

telephone interview by the author, 1

2008, and correspondence to Gary J. 

July 2008.

132. . . . From the Sea.

133. During the 1990s, commander in chie

the title given joint commanders of g

graphical and force commands. In th

years of the first decade of the twent

century, the secretary of defense chan

to unified combatant commander.

134. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., “The U.S. Marine

Old Hands at Humanitarian Interven

Armed Forces Journal International (F

1993), pp. 42–44.

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Operation RESTORE HOPE

Prelude and Lodgment

Throughout November 1992, the Bush administration pondered the question of 

ing a large-scale humanitarian intervention into Somalia. General Libutti’s trip t

Washington contributed to that process, particularly the assessment under way w

the Department of Defense. President Bush and his key advisers also received inp

from intelligence sources, UN officials, members of Congress, U.S.- and internat

based NGOs, and various African specialists.1

On 21 November, the interagency 

ties Committee of the National Security Council, headed by retired admiral Jona

Howe, approved a concept paper—based on planning conducted at Central Com

mand—that offered three options for augmenting the humanitarian response in 

lia.2

These options comprised increased American support for existing and enhan

UN peacekeeping operations, a new coalition organized by the United States but 

out American troops, and a major multinational venture led by U.S. ground forc

26 November, after intense deliberations within the administration and at the UN

President Bush offered to send American troops into Somalia.3

Although influenced by discussions with Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell, and Acting Secretary of Sta

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and input from the Deputies Committee, President Bus

decision appears to have been very personal, based on his compassion for starvin

Somalis.4

Many top leaders within the U.S. government also felt deep-rooted ang

over the human suffering, while remaining ambivalent about the idea of a major 

military commitment in Somalia. But the shortcomings of UNOSOM—includin

successful but insufficient PROVIDE RELIEF—had become increasingly apparent t

observers as the year wore on.5

Although food shortages had abated somewhat by

November 1992, conditions remained horrific for many Somalis in the worst-str

areas. Additionally, the humanitarian tragedy continued to receive substantial att

in the press, with an ongoing impact on the administration and American people

CHAPTER FOUR

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thousands of Somalis still faced the prospect of starvation despite some improvement in food supplies. Many came to believe that only a strong U.S.-led coalition

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter offered hope for mitigating the humanitarian

catastrophe. President Bush concurred and favored the heavy application of U.S.

ground forces, from among the options provided in the Deputies Committee paper.

Initially the administration considered sending a division-sized component but this

increased to a three-brigade approach under pressure from General Hoar at Central

Command.7

Originally, Hoar wanted the United States to provide command and control, airlift, and communications for a UN force but no ground troops. When overruled, he developed the three-brigade concept, including a brigade of Marines, a

brigade of American soldiers, and an international brigade (the nucleus for which was

already in Somalia).8

The prevailing theory of massive and overwhelming application

of U.S. military force—derived from the Weinberger and Powell doctrines—undoubtedly influenced thinking in this regard.9

Developed and published during the 1980s as

an outgrowth of the Vietnam War, these so-called doctrines were somewhat inconsistent with the new concepts of expeditionary warfare in the post–Cold War environment. Yet the remarkable success of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM kept them aliv

in the minds of many military and political leaders.10

After deciding on this course of action, President Bush contacted thirteen heads of

state and solicited their participation, believing that a major military commitment in

Somalia required international forces to legitimize the UN mandate. All but Great Brit

ain agreed to send troops or provide other support functions.11 Once the operation

actually began, under American leadership, as many as forty-four nations offered to

contribute to the effort; of these, twenty-one had provided forces at some level by the

end of January 1993.12 On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council responded to

President Bush’s offer by unanimously passing Resolution 794, endorsing the offer of a

member state (the United States) to lead an international force to protect humanitarian

relief operations in Somalia.13 Among other things, Resolution 794 authorized, under

Chapter VII, “the Secretary General and all member states to use all necessary means

to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation

in Somalia.”14

The ensuing operation—generally known as Operation RESTORE HOPE—set a precedent for UN action. The Security Council had authorized Chapter VII military operations by member states on four previous occasions, but those interventions had

resulted from external actions against sovereign nations. In Somalia, the situation

involved an internal conflict and focused on humanitarian relief rather than combat

operations.15 At this point, the president’s concept of a “New World Order” meshed

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sioned a liberal use of Chapter VII peace-enforcement operations. Both leaders

believed that the end of the Cold War had created opportunities for a more asser

UN involvement in dealing with problems of the world.16 Moreover, the use of U

naval expeditionary forces to execute this mission to Somalia—jointly supported 

major elements from the Army and Air Force—served to demonstrate the efficac

the . . . From the Sea concepts then evolving within the American sea services. Ind

the entire set of U.S. incursions into Somalia during the 1990s tends to exemplify 

expeditionary precepts.17

Not everyone believed that the drift toward a major American deployment to So

during November and December 1992 was a good idea.18 Those who supported t

commitment had the recent examples of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to i

trate the capabilities of an American-led coalition effort. Of course, the crisis in 

lia differed from the Iraqi conflict in many ways, yet the model seemed applicabl

the minds of some leaders.19 Those who held reservations about the undertaking

ever, did not believe the short-term commitment President Bush had in mind wo

provide much more than temporary relief. In the minds of dissenters, only a sub

tial involvement in Somali affairs over a long period could address the underlyin

causes of famine and anarchy, and that could be costly in American blood and

treasure.20 Some humanitarian-relief experts—particularly Frederick C. Cuny, th

founder of Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corporation and a consultant to 

in Somalia—believed that numerous, relatively small-scale incursions at various 

along the Somali coastline and directly to points inland would be preferable to a 

scale effort operating out of a primary base at Mogadishu. Cuny proposed a serie

security zones established by naval expeditionary forces and Army airborne unit

where relief agencies and Somalis could freely interact. This concept would utiliz

small ports, over-the-beach deliveries, and helicopter insertions to disburse emer

deliveries throughout the stricken areas.21 With the elimination of major supply d

and overland delivery routes, opportunity for factions and clans to influence the 

cess would also diminish. This would have the effect of lessening the importance 

major warlords, who used control of the food supply to enhance their power. Bu

an approach differed from current thinking within the Department of Defense, a

received little consideration. In retrospect, it remains unclear whether Cuny’s app

would have been more successful than the course of action actually undertaken.2

One of the more thoughtful contrarian viewpoints came from Ambassador Smit

Hempstone, whose earlier dispatches from Kenya had aroused so much awarenes

the humanitarian crisis.23 In a message to Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State 

International Security Affairs, Hempstone expressed his “jaundiced view of appa

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UN fig leaf.” The ambassador acknowledged that the humanitarian issues were compel

ling but expressed grave concern at the haste with which the government appeared to

“embrace the Somali tarbaby.”24 Hempstone allowed that the United States could effect

a landing and take control of Mogadishu with few if any casualties, but he expressed

concern for the longer term, when Somalis would likely revert to guerrilla tactics. In

Hempstone’s words, “If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.” He acknowledged tha

American involvement would save tens of thousands of Somalis from starvation in

1993 but was convinced that they would all probably starve to death in 1994 anyway,

unless the United States was prepared to remain in the country.25

Hempstone believed that it would take at least five years to “get Somalia not on its feet

but just on its knees.” American involvement would move from providing food to

guarding and distributing food supplies, hunting guerrillas, establishing a judicial system, forming a police force, creating an army, encouraging the formation of political

parties, and conducting free and fair multiparty elections. “This putative operation is

not a map exercise in Tampa,” he cautioned.26 “It is not a PR exercise. Real lives (Ameri

can and Somali) are going to be lost. Billions of the American taxpayers’ dollars are

going to be spent. To what end?” Hempstone concluded his dispatch, “We ought to

have learned by now that these situations are easier to get into than out of. No good

deed goes unpunished. Somalia is an African and Islamic country. If international

intervention is contemplated, let it be led by African and Islamic countries. Take the

advice of the people on the ground. Inshalla. Think once, twice and three times before

you embrace the Somali tarbaby.”27

On 4 December 1992, President Bush addressed the nation on the situation in Somalia

He described and praised U.S. contributions during PROVIDE RELIEF but also portrayed

the continuing anarchy and famine. He pointed out that “in many cases, food from

relief flights is being looted upon landing; food convoys have been hijacked; aid workers assaulted; ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them

from docking. There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down.

Anarchy prevails.” The president then announced a commitment of U.S. forces—under

overall command of General Hoar at Central Command—to ensure the delivery of

emergency relief aid to the starving people of Somalia. He identified the major forces

to be used: the naval expeditionary force then deployed off the coast of Somalia (the

Tripoli ARG); major elements of I MEF, in California; units of the U.S. Army 10th

Mountain Division, in New York; various ancillary support units from other services;

and unspecified elements from “about a dozen countries.”28 Planners estimated the

total number would amount to twenty-eight thousand Americans and about ten thousand personnel from coalition nations.29 Although the actual numbers fluctuated

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twenty-eight thousand U.S. troops and as many as eleven thousand from over tw

countries dispersed throughout central and southern Somalia.30 At this point, t

president’s actions had strong support from the American public, Congress, and 

President-elect William J. Clinton.31

The American and coalition forces operating in Somalia during RESTORE HOPE u

variety of names and designators. Initially created by General Hoar on 27 Novem

1992 as Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, the command progressed to become Com

Task Force (CTF) Somalia as coalition forces joined the organization within Som

Shortly thereafter it officially became Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia.33 Li

ant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, served as commander of the task force

throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE. The UN special representative to Somalia

Kittani—who replaced Mohamed Sahnoun in October 1992—objected to the exc

use of U.S. force designators. It was this that produced the change to UNITAF, refle

UN role, limited as it was. The United States had agreed to place the operation un

the UN Security Council with the understanding there would be no interference 

U.S. command and control over the entire force.34 Since American leaders intend

transfer responsibility for operations in Somalia back to UN authority upon brea

the famine, they believed it prudent to make that desired name change.35 Throug

these evolutions, most of the media—within the United States and international

continued to refer to the undertaking as “RESTORE HOPE.” In short, “UNITAF” b

the command designator, while RESTORE HOPE served as the operational name. I

General Johnston’s words, “Restore Hope was the message we were trying to send

Although intended as a mission of mercy, RESTORE HOPE had authority for first 

deadly force to ensure the success of its mission and the protection of its personn

Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations, which use a minimal number of troo

and place strict limitation on the application of military power, RESTORE HOPE w

operate in concert with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force a

under rules of engagement that allowed expeditious use of weapons when necess

Nonetheless, Americans going ashore for RESTORE HOPE—like those in EASTERN 

and PROVIDE RELIEF—did not view combat operations as their primary purpose

fact, Johnston stated before leaving for Mogadishu that the mission would be str

humanitarian and would use force only to protect troops and food convoys. To th

consternation of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, this declaration appeared to n

the intentionally broad Security Council Resolution 794. It also seemed to mode

the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force, as least as far as the use o

power was concerned.38 Yet this policy of self-restraint in the use of weapons was 

sistent with the humanitarian purpose of the mission.

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cation in the amorphous world of relief operations. One area where the concept played

an important role involved the development of a clearly defined and specific mission

statement, coupled with a definite exit strategy. In this case, that meant a rapid transfer

of responsibility to the UN once UNITAF had broken the famine.39 Within this context

U.S. leaders planned on a short-term, limited mission that focused on distributing food

and saving lives.40 UN leaders, however—particularly Boutros-Ghali—wanted a longterm U.S. commitment, including an assertive role in restoring political and social stability. Boutros-Ghali’s expectations included the disarmament of clans, militias, and

gangs by the American-led force, as well as an active attempt at nation building.41 But

American commanders would go no farther than to require the factions to keep crewserved weapons and technicals within cantonment areas and to confiscate weapons

found within prohibited areas or directly threatening to UNITAF members.42 This policy—occasionally enforced with combat action—did remove some of the most powerful weapons from the environment and contribute to a more stable situation during

RESTORE HOPE.

43

General Hoar wanted full authority to act forcefully under Chapter VII when necessary

but did not want orders that required him to conduct a general disarmament. Since

rifles and assault weapons were pervasive throughout the operational area, full disarmament would be possible only by means of door-to-door and person-by-person

searches, creating constant confrontations with both organized and unorganized bands

of fighters. That would far exceed the mission conceived by American commanders and

lead to numerous casualties.44 Besides, Hoar pointed out, “We were having a very bad

time disarming warlords in Los Angeles and New York and it was less likely we could

do it in Mogadishu.”45 Hoar did support and enforce a selective disarmament should it

be necessary in order to accomplish the mission or protect UNITAF forces. The cantonment of heavy weapons and enforcement of that policy by inspections, along with

weapons sweeps when the security situation demanded, fit within his criteria, whereas

general disarmament did not.46

American leaders understood the Secretary-General’s perspective regarding disarmament and the need to deal with deep-rooted problems within Somalia. They also recog

nized that the solution to Somalia’s problems required a long-term commitment that

would address humanitarian relief, economic recovery, and political stability. But that,

they felt, should occur through a follow-on effort under UN leadership and not as part

of the RESTORE HOPE mission.47 RESTORE HOPE would focus on creating a secure environment for delivery of relief supplies, thereby breaking the grip of famine in the coun

try. To accomplish this, UNITAF would secure major air and seaports, control certain

key installations, protect major food distribution points, and ensure free passage for

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controlled forces, under a command that later became UNOSOM II. In other wo

UNITAF would solve the short-term crisis, and UNOSOM II would address long

problems.49 American leaders hoped to effect this transfer of responsibility by Ma

1993 (there had even been some early talk of 20 January—inauguration day); in 

event, it did not happen until May.50

As it became clear in late November 1992 that President Bush was moving towar

commitment in Somalia, Central Command created JTF Somalia under comman

General Johnston, who also commanded I MEF, headquartered at Camp Pendlet

California. I MEF would provide the core headquarters and a substantial portion 

forces committed to JTF Somalia and its successor commands (CTF Somalia and

UNITAF). As the JTF commander, Johnston reported to General Hoar, who serve

directly under the secretary of defense and thus the NCA.51 Concurrent with the 

dent’s decision-making p

and the planning at Cent

Command, the State Dep

ment established a U.S. L

Office (USLO) in Mogad

to coordinate among var

American and UN entiti

indigenous political fact

within Somalia.

The president selected R

A. Oakley—who had ear

served as ambassador to

Somalia and knew key m

and political leaders—to head the USLO, with the rank of ambassador.52 Oakley

résumé included duty in Vietnam and Lebanon as well as service with the Unit

States Institute of Peace, where he had chaired studies on peacekeeping and the

Somalia crisis. In his role as special representative to Somalia, Oakley would wo

closely with Johnston and other key officials to achieve U.S. objectives during

RESTORE HOPE.

53 Oakley arrived in Mogadishu on 7 December and immediatel

out to persuade the major political and military leaders to cooperate with the

American-led forces soon to arrive in Mogadishu.54

General Johnston had known by late November that I MEF would probably lead 

U.S. mission to Somalia once the president made a firm commitment. This woul

logical choice, since the headquarters and major subordinate elements had condu

Ambassador Oakley and General Johnston meeting with Congressmen

Weldon and Murtha—Mogadishu.

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tured, trained, equipped, and manned for expeditionary operations, as its name

implies.55 In a discussion with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E.

Mundy, Jr., Johnston learned that Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni was available to

support the operation as a member of the I MEF staff. Mundy had first coordinated

with General Hoar, who immediately blessed the idea of bringing General Zinni into

the operation. Hoar served with Zinni in Vietnam and had a very high regard for his

professionalism.56

Johnston considered Zinni the “number one warfighter in the Marine Corps” and the

prospect of his services as the J-3 (operations) officer for Operation RESTORE HOPE an

“absolutely priceless offer that I would not refuse.”57 Johnston saw Zinni as not only a

Marine officer of solid reputation but also one who had recent experience in humanitarian operations. Zinni had participated in CTF PROVIDE COMFORT at the end of

DESERT STORM, serving as chief of staff under Lieutenant General John M.

Shalikashvili—a future chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.58 That operation had protected, sheltered, and fed some five hundred thousand Kurds in the rugged terrain

along the Iraqi-Turkish border after a failed rebellion against Saddam Hussein.59

PROVIDE COMFORT had saved thousands of lives and created conditions that eventually

allowed the Kurds to return to their homes. The primary work of CTF PROVIDE

COMFORT occurred during the spring and summer of 1991 but continued through

1997 and ultimately evolved into Operation NORTHERN WATCH, which remained in

effect until 2003.60

After returning to the United States in May 1992, Zinni served as deputy commander

of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) at Quantico, Virginia.

Knowing in November 1992 that a decision on Somalia was imminent and I MEF the

likely candidate to lead the operation, Zinni suggested that his experience could contribute to the effort. This suited his immediate superior, Lieutenant General Charles C.

Krulak—a future Commandant of the Marine Corps—who wanted to make MCCDC

more relevant and valuable to the operating forces of the Marine Corps. He believed

that offering Zinni’s services for the Somalia operation would be a move in that direction. After discussions with Commandant Mundy and General Johnston, Zinni joined

the I MEF staff in early December, just days before it deployed to Somalia. General

Mundy had intended for Zinni to serve as chief of staff, but Johnston wanted him as

director of operations (J-3). Although J-3 was technically a lower-level position, the

arrangement proved satisfactory to Zinni, who held Johnston in very high esteem and

“would rather do operations than anything else.”61

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cuted as written.62 But without a plan, there is no basis for action, there are no tro

for maneuvering, no weapons for fighting, no equipment for working, no logistic

sustainment, and no means for communicating. Even if all this is available, witho

plan they will not be in the right configuration, at the right places at the right tim

and could not move when and where needed. Planning—as every officer in the U

services knows—is both continuous and concurrent. Although deliberate planni

the primary model, the Somalia operation required crisis-action planning, as do 

many operations that naval expeditionary forces conduct.63 In fact, Johnston—on

the most experienced and professional officers in the U.S. military—has stated, “

thirty-five years I cannot think of ever executing a deliberate plan.” He also conte

that Marines and sailors are at their best in crisis-action planning.64 Throughout 

process, constant deliberations occur at various levels, providing a flow of inform

well before decisions become final.

In preparing for the Somalia commitment, leaders conducted discussions in Was

ton while planning occurred simultaneously at Central Command, I MEF, and lo

levels of command.65 As the president and his advisers made key decisions and cr

policy guidance for the Somalia operation, Central Command hammered out an 

ation plan in conjunction with the JTF Somalia/I MEF future-planning cell. Alth

officially established on 25 November 1992, the future-planning cell for Somalia 

ally began work as early as 20 November. On 1 December, the NCA issued a warn

order for the Somalia incursion, and an execution order followed on 5 December

tral Command issued its operation order the following day.66

By the time the warning order from the NCA reached Central Command, Gener

Hoar, for the most part, already knew what it would contain and had an operatio

order well on the way to completion. In fact, Generals Hoar and Powell, acting u

guidance from the secretary of defense, made all high-level military decisions thr

out the planning phase.67 Similarly, no surprises greeted Johnston and the I MEF 

when they received directives from Central Command, because they had contrib

their development. The skills that Navy and Marine Corps officers develop throu

rapid planning process during short-notice amphibious operations contributed t

effort, by ensuring the most efficient use of limited time. The operation order th

resulted involved a four-phase approach to executing RESTORE HOPE.

68 The first 

entailed gaining control of key objectives in Mogadishu and then rapidly moving 

Baledogle and Baidoa; phase II involved occupying relief centers at Belet Uen, Od

and Gialalassi; phase III included capturing the port and airfield at Kismayo, secu

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phase IV involved the transfer of responsibility from UNITAF to a UN peacekeeping

force, which would be known as UNOSOM II.69

Ambassador Oakley proposed that he, or key members of his team, would precede each

major move into a new area and prepare local communities for the arrival of UNITAF

forces.70 This included coordination with local leaders and a cross section of the population to explain the impending action and seek cooperation.71 Oakley’s approach was

implemented and proved very effective in gaining acceptance of, and even participation

in, the relief activity by residents and refugees in many of the affected areas.72 In the

event, Oakley felt secure when he went into these areas, because of the presence of

naval aircraft from carriers offshore. He later stated, “I’d go into these places first. But

with aircraft overhead, I didn’t have anything to worry about.”73

The operation plan for RESTORE HOPE envisioned a timeline of 90–180 days for

achieving the objectives of phases I through III. American leaders hoped to be out of

Somalia no later than March 1993, which would occur at about the ninety-day point.

Of course, the worst-case scenario envisioned that the plan could take twice that long.

(As things turned out, UNITAF accomplished all objectives well ahead of schedule,

making it theoretically possible to transfer control before the ninety-day period and

meet the goal of a March departure.74 But other factors were to intervene, and UNITAF

would not actually be able to terminate operations and transfer command to

UNOSOM II until May.) Additionally, in negotiating a transition, the United States

agreed to leave American elements in Somalia to provide a quick-reaction force (QRF)

and ongoing logistical support for UN operations. Ultimately, this provision was to

embroil the United States in Somalia’s internal conflict.75

Despite efficient communications among levels of authority and good cooperation in

the planning process during November and December 1992, the entire effort was

highly compressed, causing everyone to operate on short timelines.76 After the president announced his commitment to send forces into Somalia, Johnston, Zinni, and the

staff at I MEF had little time to complete the planning that would initiate the flow of

personnel and material under the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

(JOPES) necessary to accomplish the mission.77 The initial lodgment in Somalia would

be conducted by the Tripoli ARG, which had been positioned offshore at Mogadishu.78

Captain John W. Peterson served as commodore of the ARG and Colonel Gregory S.

Newbold commanded the embarked Marines. The Tripoli ARG would provide a spearhead for the leading elements of JTF Somalia.79 The landing needed to be closely coordinated with the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies that followed to ensure a

fluid, efficient, and professional operation. It would be unimpressive to Somali

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and the follow-on echelons. To have the best possible effect, the operation needed 

occur rapidly and forcefully. The flexibility of the Navy and Marine Corps team a

competence of the commanders within the ARG made this possible, in the opini

Johnston.80

During October 1992—after completing its predeployment training in Californ

the Tripoli ARG departed U.S. waters for the Indian Ocean. Regrettably, it fell sho

having a full naval expeditionary force on the model of the Navy and Marine Co

team (Tarawa ARG/11th MEU [SOC]) that inserted the Pakistani peacekeepers 

September 1992 during Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. The Navy had initially propo

two-ship naval element for this deployment, rather than the traditional four-ship

amphibious task force (ATF).81 Navy leaders wanted to relieve the pressure on the

ors created by the high operational tempo resulting from the recent DESERT SHIE

and DESERT STORM operations.82 Although a worthy goal, this policy severely red

shipping available to the operating forces and deprived the nation of an adequa

forward-deployed, ready-response capability. To Peterson, Newbold, and many o

interested parties, this arrangement was unconscionable. Should they be commit

a fight having only the combat strength available from two amphibious ships, it c

result in embarrassment to the nation and unnecessary loss of young American l

General Johnston fiercely argued against this option, taking his case to Lieutenan

eral H. C. (Hank) Stackpole III, Commander, Marine Forces Pacific/Commandin

General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. The two commanders that would take the AR

sea, Colonel Newbold and Captain Peterson, also protested up their chains of com

mand, with the issue ultimately getting the attention of the Commandant of the

Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations.84 Because of all this effort, U.S

Pacific Fleet headquarters reluctantly acquiesced and agreed to source a three-sh

force. A three-ship ATF is able to deploy a full MEU (SOC) if among the vessels i

of the larger and more capable LHA or LHD amphibious assault ships.85 Unfortu

none of these “big decks” were available, due to turn-around times and long-ran

scheduling issues. Peterson and Newbold would have to make due with the older 

less capable LPH. When an LPH served as the centerpiece of an ARG, it required 

additional amphibious ships to load a full MEU.86

Although restoring one ship to Peterson’s squadron constituted somewhat of a m

victory for the operating forces, Peterson and Newbold would deploy to the Indi

Ocean with an ARG that would still be one ship under strength.87 This reduction 

capacity caused the Marines to have shortages in transportation, engineering equ

ment, aviation assets, logistics, and manpower. A traditional MEU would deploy 

2,000–2,200 Marines and sailors, whereas Newbold would have only 1,850. Altho

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ously meant that Newbold did not have full MEU (SOC) mission capability.88 Even

though the ARG could deploy and execute some missions, the shortage of men and

equipment strained the capacity of Newbold’s headquarters, logistics, communications

and combat power. This limited his ability to mitigate unintended events and left the

MEU with no reserve capability.89

In an awkward and inadequate effort to compensate, the Navy assigned a ship from

Maritime Prepositioned Ships Squadron Three (MPSRon 3) operating out of the

Mariana Islands to join Peterson in the Indian Ocean.90 That ship—USNS 1st

Lieutenant Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011)—contained valuable operational equipment and

supplies that would be available to the Marines, but required a benign, deepwater port

facility for off-loading.91 It also required a fly-in naval support echelon to conduct the

offload once in port.92 The contents of Lummus would therefore not be available durin

the early stages of an operation. Additionally, Lummus had not been available to partic

ipate in the predeployment workups off California and could not operate tactically

with the amphibious ships.93 In other words, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)

ship could not contribute to the initial power projection that is critically important in

all amphibious operations.94 Of course, the equipment, ammunition, food, water, and

spare parts available in large quantities on board Lummus would be of great value once

off-loaded later in the campaign.95

Not having a fully structured ATF, Peterson properly designated his squadron as an

amphibious task unit (ATU) in a “3 + 1” configuration, with USS Tripoli serving as the

flagship.96 Marine Corps authorities designated Newbold’s unit an SPMAGTF, thereby

emphasizing its reduced capability.97 If Newbold’s unit had been able to deploy at full

strength in personnel and equipment, it would have been designated 15th MEU (SOC)

As a result, many pundits have referred to it as 15th MEU in their writings. But this

gives an inaccurate impression of the capability of that unit and wrongly implies an

acceptance of deploying suboptimal naval expeditionary forces. The suggestion by

some senior officers that the reduced ATU/SPMAGTF could call for additional assets

should a crisis occur during the deployment seemed the epitome of naiveté to

Newbold. In his words, “Crises don’t wait for adequate forces—you meet the crisis with

what you have.”98 Yet in October 1992, this understrength, underequipped, and undermanned amphibious force with its odd mix of ships constituted the leading edge of

American power in the region and at the time that America needed them for Operation

RESTORE HOPE.

99 Generals Hoar and Johnston would have to depend on this force to

take and prepare the ground in Mogadishu—a very uncertain environment—for

arrival of American and coalition units that would constitute UNITAF.

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the mission in Somalia because it met very little resistance during landing operat

Additionally, in keeping with the amphibious culture of the U.S. sea services, the

Phillips and Hagee team on the Tarawa ARG maintained close communications w

Peterson and Newbold before they arrived on station. This provided some orient

regarding the city of Mogadishu and a frame of reference for operations in and a

its airport.100 Equally important, Peterson, Newbold, and their blended staffs had 

oped a strong, efficient, and professional relationship, which helped overcome de

cies inherent in their suboptimized force.101 Nonetheless, Newbold considered his 

spread “very, very thin” at certain locations during the early period of the Mogad

operation.102

Operation RESTORE HOPE began in Somalia on 9 December 1992. Navy SEALs a

Marine reconnaissance units from the Tripoli ARG landed in the early morning h

followed shortly thereafter by the full strength of Newbold’s SPMAGTF. Newbold

tical operation plan specified four objectives his Marines would quickly capture: 

main airport, the port facilities, coastal sites suitable for landing beaches, and the 

embassy, which had been abandoned since the evacuation in January 1991.103 The 

ation also called for the surface landing to occur at GREEN Beach (as planners na

the landing site) and then push on inland to capture the embassy. Upon arriving

Marines found the newest—and at one time the most beautiful—American facil

that part of the word a filthy wreck.104 Indeed, all of Mogadishu had suffered the 

ages of war, reminding many Americans of the images of bombed-out European 

during and immediately after World War II.105

The Marines and sailors of the Tripoli ARG had very little information about th

uation ashore as they prepared for their landing. Although Peterson and Newb

had included Mogadishu as a notional target during some of their training exe

back in California, they did not anticipate actually operating within Somalia w

they departed U.S. waters.106 In fact, by the time they reached Singapore, Centra

Command had placed the ARG on alert for a possible humanitarian operation 

Bangladesh, not Somalia. But by 24 November, the prospect of an involvement 

Bangladesh had diminished, and the two commanders began receiving indicati

that an operation in Somalia might be in the offing.107 As they started planning 

that prospective mission, Peterson and Newbold realized they had very little up

information on the situation and even less insight into the cultural dynamics o

Somalia and its people. The knowledge they received from the Tarawa ARG wa

ful, but far from being the detailed and current information needed for mission 

ning. The officers of the SPMAGTF were desperate for good maps, information 

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environment.108 The intelligence material they did receive tended to be outdated,

irrelevant, repetitive, and of such a high volume that it was very difficult to sort

through.109 More significantly, Somalia had been an intelligence vacuum since the

EASTERN EXIT evacuation in January 1991. There simply was not much current information available, and as a result, both Peterson and Newbold considered themselves

astoundingly ignorant about the environment they were entering.110 For this and other

reasons, the commanders were amazed when they arrived offshore at Mogadishu in the

middle of the night on 2 December 1992 to find the largest city in Somalia completely

dark due to lack of electricity.111 Equally surprising, the sky over Mogadishu would

occasionally light up with the eruption of gunfire and tracer rounds. They later learned

that this nightly custom resulted in great part from random acts of violence conducted

by youths after daylong bouts of chewing khat.112

For two nights prior to the landing, Peterson sent SEAL teams to reconnoiter the near

shore of GREEN Beach, the prospective landing site just south of the city. He also sent

teams to assess an alternate landing site, named BLUE Beach north of the harbor, and

ordered swimmers into the port area. Peterson needed substantial information to lay

out the beach approaches because he considered the charts available for that part of the

world abysmal. He tasked the SEALs with providing information relating to currents,

tides, coral heads, vertical faces, and other hydrographic aspects of the potential landing sites. During reconnaissance of the port area, Peterson’s swimmers also observed

the security procedures for its defense, concluding that the landing force could take the

entire port area very quickly.113 After the landing occurred, Peterson had the SEAL

teams conduct a thorough hydrographic survey of the port and harbor to prepare for

the movement of numerous U.S. and coalition ships needed to support Operation

RESTORE HOPE.

114

The general division of labor regarding reconnaissance for the amphibious force had

SEALs conducting surveillance within the water and near shore, and Marine force

reconnaissance units surveying shore-based areas. Unfortunately, the ARG could not

get permission from Central Command or Washington to insert SEAL or reconnaissance teams until 6 December despite continued requests starting on 2 December when

they first arrived offshore.115 The SEALs conducted two days of work in the water prior

to the landing and joined Marine force reconnaissance units as advance elements of the

landing force. The only “boots on the ground” insertions for Marine reconnaissance

units prior to D-day involved a team sent into Mogadishu the night before the landing

to conduct liaison with the Pakistani battalion.116

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The sight of nightly firefights in Mogadishu reinforced that awareness and create

questions among members of the landing force about what might happen during 

amphibious operation.117 In that respect Peterson and Newbold labored in what G

eral Hoar referred to as “that twilight area between peace and war”; they had no 

knowing for sure what would happen upon landing.118 They were neither politica

culturally knowledgeable about the current situation, and they had no opportun

improve their understanding before going ashore.119 The intelligence obtained by 

teams during their reconnaissances provided only physical information about th

hydrography, harbors, and beaches. The violence in Mogadishu and uncertainty 

the attitudes of various Somali factions and clans caused many members of the l

force to go ashore expecting a possible shoot-out.120

The scheme of maneuver for the amphibious operation involved a simultaneou

face landing over GREEN Beach, a helicopter insertion at the airport, and a Zod

soft-boat attack to secure the port and harbor.121 When the landing force went 

at GREEN Beach, Peterson attempted to watch from the bridge of Tripoli, despit

darkness of early morning. At H-hour he observed what appeared to be a mass

firefight from the landing beach. Peterson immediately called sick bay and orde

“to stand by for casualties,” explaining, “We have a giant firefight on our hands.”

Shortly after giving the alert, Peterson’s chief of staff suggested, “Commodore, I t

that might be flashbulbs.” The international press had gotten word of the landin

had awaited the Marines and SEALs at GREEN Beach to capture the event on cam

The situation offered the potential for disaster, since nobody in the landing force 

expected such reception ashore and, as noted, even thought it possible that there 

be resistance.122

For many people, the beach episode amounted to little more than an amusing—t

embarrassing—occurrence at the nexus of world events. Some leaders even consi

the incident a good way to advertise America power and demonstrate its capabili

But to others it represented an act of gross irresponsibility. Peterson and Newbol

welcomed a large number of media representatives on board Tripoli the day befo

landing and provided them a detailed briefing on the operation. The media perso

had then been sequestered and not allowed outgoing communications until the o

tion had taken place. But other members of the press had remained ashore and le

the exact time and location for the beach landing. Apparently, well intended Ame

officials back in Washington—who hoped for some good publicity about the inc

sion—had alerted the press but failed to inform the Tripoli ARG that they had do

so.124 No one in the landing force or on board the ships had any idea the press wo

there. Peterson and Newbold were livid, feeling the incident brought into questio

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idea what they were getting into in Somalia? Conversely, Peterson and Newbold also

felt that the incident demonstrated the quality and discipline of the enlisted personnel

and junior officers. Highly professional and trained for combat, they had gone into an

uncertain environment and had been surprised by klieg lights and flashbulbs, and yet

they had been able to think on their feet, assess the situation, and restrain the impulse

to fire. In Peterson’s words, “To this day, I’m amazed that they didn’t blow away a number of the international press.”126

The two main factions that American leaders needed to co-opt during RESTORE HOPE

were those belonging to Aideed and to Ali Mahdi. Ambassador Oakley and General

Libutti—who had returned to Somalia to work with the ambassador just days before

the landing operation—conducted several meetings with the warlords to procure their

cooperation during the landings and subsequent operations ashore.127 This cooperation

included acceptance of the ongoing aircraft flights and ship traffic that would bring in

the follow-on forces and deliver equipment and supplies to support the operation.128

But numerous other clans, subclans, gangs, and thugs not controlled by Aideed or Ali

Mahdi also existed in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. Their existence created

enormous uncertainty for leaders unfamiliar with the current political situation and

the conflict among major factions within the operational area. Tapping into a knowledgeable resource, Oakley established his USLO headquarters in the Conoco compound, making use of the firm’s local executive, Raymond Marchand, before and

during the early phase of the U.S. incursion.129 As seen above, Marchand and his staff

had already provided important service to the United States and now continued to be

valuable, providing facilities, assistance with travel into dangerous areas, and help in

communicating with local chieftains.130 Libutti’s prior relationship with key Somali

players, such as Osman Ato, also aided in this regard. Libutti helped smooth the way fo

the initial incursion and continued working with Oakley and his staff for several weeks

thereafter.131 In addition to assisting with security, he helped establish an effective liaison relationship between Oakley’s USLO and the growing military structure, which

included Johnston, Zinni, Newbold, and the other high military officials arriving on

the scene.132

Despite the media fiasco during the landing and a brief and ineffectual resistance at the

port, the landing force quickly secured all of the D-day objectives.133 Newbold was

aware of the efforts of Oakley and Libutti to persuade the major warlords not to resist

the landing or the subsequent incursion. In fact, Newbold and Libutti had intermittent

contact before the 9 December landing. Nevertheless, Newbold was unaware of the

results of Libutti’s efforts and so had to be concerned that unaffiliated rogue elements

might try to test his forces. Being a prudent commander, Newbold “planned for the

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best.”134 By moving 

sively with speed an

determination, he o

whelmed and deter

potential opposition

Once Newbold—wh

accompanied the in

landing wave on the

beach—had visited 

four objectives and 

mined they were sec

he transferred comm

ashore; at that poin

Peterson assumed a 

porting role.136 The

SPMAGTF then pre

to hand over control of Mogadishu to incoming forces of the 1st Marine Division

under Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, and then to move on quickly to captur

Baledogle and Baidoa in accordance with the operation plan. The early capture o

Baledogle proved particularly important, because it provided an additional airfie

the strategic airlift of military personnel, as well as needed “bed-down” space for 

tactical aircraft.137 Wilhelm arrived in Somalia with a relatively small staff on 11

December and assumed duties as the Marine Forces commander under Johnston

component organizational structure. Newbold and his SPMAGTF would come u

Wilhelm’s command for the remainder of their time in Somalia.138

During the amphib

landing at Mogadis

and subsequent op

tions ashore, F-14 T

cat and A-6 Intrud

aircraft from USS R

(CV 61) provided a

cover for the Marin

coalition forces. Th

missions could pro

close air support fo

troops on the grou

Marine helicopter over Mogadishu.

RESTORE HOPE: Initial insertions by surface and air into Mogadishu and rapid push to

Baledogle and Baidoa.

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tate the need. They also

reminded all parties in

Mogadishu of the

immense power available to the task force.

Equally important,

Ranger provided imaging of the operational

area—particularly,

beach and city views—

from F-14s equipped

with Tactical Aerial

Reconnaissance Photo System (TARPS) pods.139 Ranger furnished this imagery to Tripoli for distribution to Marine commanders in the field.140

Prior to the Somalia incursion, the Ranger battle group had operated in the Persian

Gulf, where its planes enforced the no-fly zone over southern Iraq (Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH).141 During the early days of December, it became clear in the mind

of many American leaders—particularly General Hoar at Central Command and

Admiral Jeremiah at the Joint Chiefs of Staff—that it made no sense to put twentyeight thousand American troops ashore in Africa without air cover. After discussions a

Central Command headquarters between Hoar and his naval component commander,

Vice Admiral Douglas J. Katz, the NAVCENT commander ordered the Ranger battle

group, commanded by Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, to support Operation

RESTORE HOPE.

142 Just prior to the 9 December landing, Hancock arrived on the scene

and met with Peterson and Newbold aboard Tripoli. In addition to coordinating support for the operation, he attempted to identify areas where the capabilities of his battl

group could complement the plan and assets of Peterson and Newbold.143

As a result of this meeting, Hancock placed all his F-14s and A-6s in a standby status

loaded with five-hundred-pound laser-guided bombs. All flights supporting the landing or subsequent operations ashore would have airplanes with five-hundred-pound

bombs under each wing available to the Marines and coalition forces should the need

arise. During the first several days of Operation RESTORE HOPE, Hancock cycled his

entire air wing through patrol duty, focusing on recognizing roads, observing force

concentrations, and identifying built-up areas, a process that familiarized his aircrews

with the layout of the country.144 Through the energetic use of his carrier assets, Han

cock made a significant contribution to the safety and success of the amphibious

operation. His support would continue to have an impact as coalition forces began

Colonel Newbold with wounded Marine.

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ern Somalia.145

For Peterson and Newbold, the entire operation—from training in California thr

establishing command ashore in Somalia—validated the efficacy of existing tacti

doctrine, the emerging strategic and operational concepts as articulated in . . . Fr

Sea, and two hundred years of naval tradition, notwithstanding an ARG hamstru

inadequate force allocation. Just as Peterson’s Tripoli ARG and Newbold’s SPMAG

embodied the tenets of . . . From the Sea, so too did Hancock’s Ranger battle grou

exemplify the emerging concept “Forward . . . From the Sea.” The complementar

of the amphibious ready group in conjunction with the aircraft carrier battle gro

foreshadowed the formalization of that coequal relationship—coupled with the r

mation of the traditional Navy and Marine Corps relationship—expressed two y

later in the Department of the Navy concept paper Forward . . . From the Sea.146

Notes

1. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 35–42; Andrew S. Natsios,

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of

the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies (Westport, Conn.: Praeger,

with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), pp. 52, 57; Oberdorfer,

“The Path to Intervention.”

2. The NSC Deputies Committee serves as the

senior subcabinet interagency forum for policy issues. It consists of the Deputy Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs,

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,

the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. See Organization of the National Security Council, Presidential Decision

Directive (PDD) 2 (Washington, D.C.: White

House, 20 January 1993); Adm. Jonathan T.

Howe, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by

the author, 29 August 2008.

3. Central Command in Somalia, pp. 20–21;

Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 42; Don Oberdorfer and

Trevor Rowe, “U.S. Offers Ground Troops

for Intervention in Somalia: U.N. Moves Toward Sending Armed Force to Deliver Food,”

Washington Post, 26 November 1992.

4. James L. Woods, “U.S. Government D

Making Process during Humanitaria

ations in Somalia,” in Learning from 

The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian 

vention, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey 

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), p. 

John G. Fox, “Approaching Humanit

Intervention Strategically: The Case 

malia,” SAIS Review (Winter–Spring 

p. 150.

5. Joseph P. Hoar, “A CINC’s Perspectiv

Force Quarterly (Autumn 1993), p. 5

Oberdorfer, “Anatomy of a Decision

Bush Made Up His Mind to Send Tro

Somalia,” International Herald Tribu

December 1992; Woods, “U.S. Gover

Decision Making Process,” p. 157.

6. Bryden, “Somalia,” p. 145; Hirsch an

Oakley, Somalia and Operation Resto

p. 35; Oberdorfer, “The Path to

Intervention.”

7. Fox, “Approaching Humanitarian Int

tion Strategically,” p. 149; Poole, Effo

Save Somalia, p. 24.

8. Some observers refer to the structure 

division,” thinking of the 1st Marine 

sion and 10th Mountain Division, w

provided the American element of R

HOPE. But these two divisions did no

their entire forces to UNITAF, only e

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alition forces already in Somalia, augmented

by those that would arrive at a later point,

constituted the third brigade, of course.

Hoar interview.

9. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, telephone interview by the author, 21 October 2008.

10. For a listing of the key elements in the Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell doctrines

see appendices A and B, respectively. Thomas

G. Weiss, “Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Interventions,” in Learning from Somalia, ed. Clarke and Herbst, pp. 207–209;

Woods, “U.S. Government Decision Making

Process,” pp. 157–58.

11. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 40–47; Robert B. Oakley,

“An Envoy’s Perspective,” Joint Forces Journal

(Autumn 1993), p. 46.

12. United Nations and Somalia, p. 235; Zinni

interview.

13. Bush, Humanitarian Mission to Somalia;

United Nations and Somalia, pp. 214–16;

Oakley, “Envoy’s Perspective,” pp. 45–46.

14. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 32, 214–16.

15. The previous Chapter VII enforcement actions comprise response to the North Korean

attack against the Republic of Korea in 1950

and tanker intercepts relating to Southern

Rhodesia in 1966 and twice involving the

Iraq-Kuwait conflict of 1990 and 1991. See

United Nations and Somalia, p. 33.

16. Hill and Malik, Peacekeeping and the United

Nations, pp. 92, 98, 109–10, 174, 228–29;

Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 40, 45 note; I. M. Lewis, A

Modern History of the Somali (Athens: Ohio

Univ. Press, 2002), p. 268.

17. Farrell, “United States Marine Corps Operations in Somalia,” pp. 47–49; Johnston interview; Perkins first interview; Woods, “U.S.

Government Decision Making Process,” p.

157; Zinni interview.

18. Oberdorfer, “The Path to Intervention.”

19. Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” pp.

523–28; Robert B. Oakley, “Somalia: A Case

Study,” in Two Perspectives on Interventions

and Humanitarian Operations, ed. Earl H.

Tilford, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1

July 1997), p. 2.

Clan against the World,” p. 24; Fox, “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically,” pp. 151–54.

21. Frederick C. Cuny, Operational Concept Plan

2: Military Intervention in Somalia, PBS

Frontline, www.pbs.org, 21 November 1992.

22. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia

and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Learning from Somalia, ed. Clarke

and Herbst, pp. 242–43; Woods, “U.S. Government Decision Making Process,” p. 157;

Fox, “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically,” p. 152.

23. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, pp. 229–31.

24. Smith Hempstone, message O 115112Z December 1992 from American Embassy Nairobi to Secretary of State, for Under

Secretary Wisner, “The Somalia Tarbaby,”

Folder: OOTW, Operation Restore Hope,

box 3, folder 1, Correspondence: The Somalia Tarbaby, Marine Corps Archives.

25. Ibid.

26. The headquarters of U.S. Central Command

is located at MacDill Air Force Base, in

Tampa, Florida.

27. Hempstone, message O 115112Z December

1992 [emphasis original].

28. Bush, Humanitarian Mission to Somalia;

Hoar, “CINC’s Perspective,” pp. 58–59.

29. The original plan called for sixteen thousand

Marines from I MEF, 1,800 from the deployed SPMAGTF in the Indian Ocean, five

thousand from the Army’s 10th Mountain

Division, and about 5,200 personnel from

other services. See Director of Public Affairs

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, to General Officers, (MCNEWS 18-93) 30 April

1993, Folder: Somalia, Opn Restore Hope,

Articles, November–December 1992, Marine Corps History Division, Reference

Branch, Quantico, Virginia [hereafter

MCNEWS 18-93].

30. The number of U.S. and international troop

reported as participants in UNITAF varies

slightly among various reports. See

Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 31; Sommer,

Hope Restored? pp. 32–33; Clancy, Zinni, and

Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 255.

31. Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” p.

531; Natsios, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Fou

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“Somalia,” p. 3.

32. “Combined Task Force,” or CTF, is often

used as if equivalent to “Combined Joint

Task Force” (CJTF). This can be confusing,

since CJTF also means “Commander, Joint

Task Force.” In the literature of RESTORE

HOPE, it is possible to find both usages; this

study uses “CTF” throughout. See JP 1-02,

pp. 101, 297, A-27.

33. Kevin M. Kennedy, “The Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” in

Learning from Somalia, ed. Clarke and

Herbst, p. 100; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope,

pp. 12, 34; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 38.

34. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 2; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 5.

35. Central Command in Somalia, p. 24; Zinni

interview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle

Ready, p. 252.

36. Johnston interview; U.S. Defense Dept., Joint

Military Operations Historical Collection, p.

VI-3.

37. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 43, 47; Hoar, “CINC’s Perspective,” p. 58.

38. John Drysdale, “Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift

from UN Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and

Its Consequences,” in Learning from Somalia,

ed. Clarke and Herbst, p. 128; Colin L.

Powell, “U.S. Forces: The Challenges Ahead,”

Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/1993), pp. 32–

45.

39. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 3.

40. Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Plans Short Stay for

Forces in Somalia: Bush’s Goal Is Return of

Troops by Jan. 20,” Washington Post, 1 December 1992.

41. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 46–47; U.S. Defense Dept.,

Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, p. VI-3; Seybolt, Humanitarian Military

Intervention, pp. 150–51.

42. Woods, “U.S. Government Decision Making

Process,” p. 159; Poole, Effort to Save Somalia,

p. 23; Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” pp. 536–37; Eric Schmitt, “A General

Says Armed Vehicles Will Be Seized on Sight

1992.

43. Oakley interview; Central Command 

malia, pp. 30–32, 43–44; Hirsch and 

Somalia and Operation Restore Hope

57–59.

44. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 10; Clancy, Zin

Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 253.

45. Hoar interview.

46. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 43; Hoar, “CINC’s P

tive,” p. 58; Poole, Effort to Save Soma

23; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, pp

Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, 

269–70; U.S. Army, Somalia After Ac

port, p. 56; Hoar interview.

47. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, pp. 36–

48. Central Command in Somalia, pp. 21

Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Read

240; Seybolt, Humanitarian Military 

vention, p. 151.

49. Walter Clarke, “Failed Visions and U

Mandates in Somalia,” in Learning fr

malia, ed. Clarke and Herbst, pp. 4–5

Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The U

American Military Force in the Post–C

War World (Washington, D.C.: Carn

dowment for International Peace, 19

44; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and 

tion Restore Hope, pp. ix–x, 46, 102–1

Zinni interview; Jonathan T. Howe, “

tions between the United States and 

Nations in Dealing with Somalia,” in 

ing from Somalia, ed. Clarke and Her

176.

50. Hoar, “CINC’s Perspective,” p. 62.

51. Johnston interview.

52. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 22.

53. General Hoar considered Oakley one 

toughest men in the State Departme

the trio of Oakley, Johnston, and Zin

namic force. Hoar interview; Hirsch 

Oakley, Somalia and Operation Resto

pp. xvii, 49–50; Central Command in 

lia, p. 22.

54. Hoar interview; Oakley, “Somalia,” p

55. Hoar, “CINC’s Perspective,” p. 58;

Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 13.

56. Hoar interview.

57. Johnston interview.

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in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation Provide Comfort (Washington, D.C.:

History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine

Corps, 1995), p. 7; Zinni and Koltz, The Battle for Peace, pp. 68–86; Zinni interview.

59. Brown, Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, p. 1.

60. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, pp.

200–21; Zinni interview; Zinni and Koltz,

The Battle for Peace, p. 29; “Operation

Northern Watch Stands Down,” U.S. European Command Public Affairs, 1 May 2003,

www.news.navy.mil.

61. Zinni interview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz,

Battle Ready, pp. 230–31.

62. Johnston interview.

63. “Deliberate” (or contingency) planning is

undertaken when the use of military forces

can be anticipated and operation plans developed in advance of action. “Crisis action”

planning occurs when there is little or no

warning and accelerated decision making is

required. JOPES (discussed below) provides

additional procedures for the time-sensitive

development of operation orders necessary

for a military response. See U.S. Defense

Dept., Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 26

December 2006), p. xi; Johnston interview.

64. Johnston interview.

65. Commanding General, Marine Forces Somalia/I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward),

Command Chronology for the Period 7 December 1992 to 28 February 1993, Folder:

Operations Other than War, Operation Restore Hope, box 1441, Marine Corps Archives, Quantico, Virginia [hereafter MFS/

IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology],

pp. 1–2; Maj. Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, interview by Lt. Col. Charles H. Curitan and

Capt. David A. Dawson, American Embassy,

Mogadishu, Somalia, 11 March 1993, Folder:

Operations Other than War, Operation

Restore Hope, box 6, folder 6, Marine Corps

Archives.

66. Zinni interview; Zvijac and McGrady, Operation Restore Hope, pp. 35–36.

67. Hoar interview.

68. Central Command in Somalia, p. 22;

Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 21.

240–41; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, pp.

27–29; Oakley, “Somalia,” pp. 4–6, 13; Poole

Effort to Save Somalia, p. 25; Hirsch and

Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope

p. 44.

70. Zvijac and McGrady, Operation Restore

Hope, p. 41; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle

Ready, pp. 243–44.

71. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 52.

72. Col. Gregory S. Newbold, interview by Capt

David A. Dawson, Mogadishu, Somalia, 13

January 1993, Folder: Operations Other

than War, Operation Restore Hope box 5,

folder 13, Marine Corps Archives; Oakley,

“Envoy’s Perspective,” pp. 48–50.

73. Oakley interview.

74. Poole, Effort to Save Somalia, p. 25.

75. Hoar interview; Zinni interview.

76. Zvijac and McGrady, Operation Restore

Hope, p. 5.

77. The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) forms the foundation

of the U.S. command and control systems. I

consists of “policies, procedures, and report

ing systems supported by automation used

to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization,

deployment, equipment, and sustainment

activities in peace, exercises, crisis, and war.”

U.S. Defense Dept., Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System (JOPES) (CJCSM

3122.01), vol. 1, Planning Policies and Procedures (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 21 Feb

ruary 1989), p. xvi and (14 July 2000), pp.

A-2, GL-32.

78. Johnston interview.

79. The Tripoli ARG consisted of USS Tripoli

(LPH 10), USS Juneau (LPD 10), USS

Rushmore (LSD 47), and an MPF ship, USN

1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011).

Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Capt. John

W. Peterson, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 8 April 2008.

80. Johnston interview.

81. An “amphibious task force” (ATF) or “amphibious task unit” (ATU) refers to the ship

themselves. When combined with a Marine

unit (usually an MEU but possibly units of

other sizes), the total force becomes an “am

phibious ready group” (ARG).

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interview; Zvijac and McGrady, Operation

Restore Hope, p. 12.

83. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

84. Johnston to Ohls.

85. The amphibious assault ship (general

purpose), or LHA, and the amphibious assault ship (dock), or LHD, are larger and

more capable versions of the amphibious assault ship (helicopter), LPH, which they were

designed to replace. The LHA and LHD are

so large and capable that they would be considered aircraft carriers (which they resemble) in any other navy in the world. Unlike

the older LPH, the LHA and LHD also have

a well deck, further enhancing their flexibility and capability. See U.S. Navy Dept., Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft, Marine

Corps Reference Publication 3-31B

(Quantico, Va.: Doctrine Division, Marine

Corps Combat Development Command, 29

August 2001), pp. 3–8.

86. Capt. John W. Peterson, USN (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 6 June 2008.

87. Johnston interview; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June

2008.

88. Johnston interview; Newbold-Dawson interview; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

89. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

90. Peterson to Ohls, 6 June 2008.

91. 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus is one of the sixteen ships of the Military Sealift Command

(MSC) that support Marine Corps operations. Most are container and roll-on/roll-off

types. Lummus is part of MPSRon 3, which

normally supports operations in the western

Pacific, from bases in Guam and Saipan. The

MSC also has ten ships that support Army

operations, known as “Army Prepositioned

Stocks 3” (APS 3). These ships are also rollon/roll-off but are much larger than the

MPS ships that support the Marines. See

Military Sealift Command, www.msc.navy

.mil

92. Zvijac and McGrady, Operation Restore Hope,

pp. 28–29.

93. Peterson interview.

94. Johnston interview.

95. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

96. The “3 + 1” configuration simply means that

the ATU had three amphibious ships plus

son’s ATU included Tripoli, Juneau,

Rushmore, and Lummus. Perkins first

interview.

97. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Newb

Dawson interview; Perkins first inter

98. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

99. Peterson interview.

100. Phillips interview; Newbold-Dawson

interview.

101. Peterson interview.

102. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Newb

Dawson interview.

103. Peterson interview; U.S. Defense Dep

Military Operations Historical Collect

p. VI-4.

104. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

105. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Read

239; Libutti interview.

106. Peterson interview.

107. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Peter

terview; Newbold-Dawson interview

108. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

109. Capt. John W. Peterson, interview by 

John W. Partin aboard USS Tripoli (L

San Diego Navy Yard, California, 18 

1993, Folder: Operations Other than 

Operation Restore Hope, box 5, fold

Marine Corps Archives.

110. Kennedy, “Relationship between the 

and Humanitarian Organizations in 

tion Restore Hope,” p. 100; Newbold 

2 June 2008; Peterson interview.

111. Baumann and Yates, with Washingto

Clan against the World,” p. 39.

112. Peterson interview; Clancy, Zinni, an

Battle Ready, p. 266; Jane Perlez, “Mi

Somalia: Reporter’s Notebook; Guns

and Khat Define a Once-Graceful So

City,” New York Times, 7 December 1

113. Peterson interview.

114. Ibid.

115. Peterson-Partin interview.

116. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

117. Peterson interview.

118. Hoar, “CINC’s Perspective,” p. 58.

119. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

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2008.

121. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

122. Ibid.; Peterson interview.

123. Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 33.

124. Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, pp.

268–69; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 54 note; Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 3.

125. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Peterson

interview.

126. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Peterson interview; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 38.

127. Mark Fineman, “The Oil Factor in Somalia,”

Los Angeles Times, 18 January 1993; Keith B.

Richburg, “U.S. Envoy Tells Somalia’s Warlords Not to Interfere,” Washington Post, 8

December 1992; Secretary of State, message

080345Z December 1992 to Ambassador

Oakley, “Deployment Instructions for Ambassador Oakley,” in DuPage Project.

128. Libutti interview; Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 3.

129. Fineman, “Oil Factor in Somalia”; Hirsch

and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore

Hope, pp. 55, 58.

130. United States Liaison Office Mogadishu,

message 151818Z December 1992 to Secretary of State, in DuPage Project.

131. Oakley interview.

132. Libutti interview; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June

2008.

133. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 54–55; Jane Perlez, “Mission to Somalia; U.S. Forces Arrive in Somalia on Mission to Aid the Starving,” New York

Times, 9 December 1992.

134. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

135. Newbold-Dawson interview.

136. Peterson interview; Peterson-Partin interview; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 33.

138. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology,

pp. 2–4; Newbold-Dawson interview; Central Command in Somalia, p. 24; WilhelmCuritan/Dawson interview.

139. Vice Adm. William J. Hancock, USN (Ret.),

telephone interview by the author, 30 June

2008; Col. Jeffery E. Scheferman, interview

by Capt. David A. Dawson, MARFOR Headquarters, Mogadishu, Somalia, 21 January

1993, Folder: Operations Other than War,

Operation Restore Hope, box 5, folder 18,

Marine Corps Archives.

140. Vice Adm. William J. Hancock, USN (Ret.),

correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 24 July

2008; Chief of Information, U.S. Navy Dept

message P 162300Z December 1992

(NAVNEWS 65-92), Folder: Somalia: Opn

Restore Hope, Articles, November–

December 1992, Marine Corps History Divi

sion, Reference Branch, Quantico, Virginia.

141. The Ranger battle group comprised the carrier USS Ranger (CV 61), the Aegis cruiser

USS Valley Forge (CG 50), the destroyer USS

Kinkaid (DD 965), and the oiler USS Wabas

(AOR 5). Hancock interview; Mroczkowski,

Restoring Hope, pp. 17, 176.

142. Vice Adm. Douglas J. Katz’s full title was

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central

Command, or simply NAVCENT. Katz

served as NAVCENT from October 1992

through September 1994. See David F.

Winkler, Amirs, Admirals, & Desert Sailors:

Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

2007), pp. 132–35, 223.

143. Hancock interview.

144. Ibid.

145. Vice Adm. Douglas J. Katz, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 16 September 2008.

146. Forward . . . From the Sea.

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Operation RESTORE HOPE

Operations and Transition

The quick success of the special-purpose marine air-ground task force (SPMAGT

9 December 1992 permitted a synchronized flow of U.S. and coalition forces into 

operational area to begin almost immediately. Generals Johnston and Zinni, alon

key staff officers, arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December and established headqua

in the remains of the American embassy.1

Their immediate task was to supervise 

complex deployment and logistical activity that would determine the efficiency o

Operation RESTORE HOPE. Concurrently, they recognized the importance of add

political and military issues that would also have great effects on their mission.

Johnston, Oakley, and UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani arranged a meeti

with Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and their top aides for the following day.2

Despite some 

table bickering, the meeting’s participants agreed on a variety of issues, including 

strategy to secure the newly organized humanitarian relief sectors established as 

the RESTORE HOPE plan.3

More important, in Oakley’s view, “the Somalis reached 

seven-point agreement on a cease-fire, free movements in the city, removal of

‘technicals’ and militias from the city and to designated locations, and establishin

joint committee on security matters.”4

Oakley would later believe that the work o

security committee was the key to the low casualties and relative stability that we

mark RESTORE HOPE. All principal leaders participated in the new committee’s m

ings, either personally or through highly placed representatives, permitting the d

opment of relationships and the sharing of information. In Oakley’s words, “We

decided the top priority was going to be dialog, followed by the threat of force, a

very, very rarely, the use of force.”5

General Hoar shared Oakley’s view of the imp

tance of information sharing. Although he felt confident in the ability of UNITA

forces to handle any necessary actions, Hoar wanted to avoid “a misunderstandin

where we found people shooting at one another because they were unaware of w

was they were trying to do.”6

When UNITAF later transitioned into UNOSOM II

CHAPTER FIVE

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ally ended.7

As Oakley, Johnston, Wilhelm, and Newbold worked to make things happen on the

ground in Somalia, U.S. and coalition forces flowed into the Mogadishu airport, and

their supporting equipment and supplies arrived at the port. Yet by December 1992,

just when UNITAF operations needed these facilities the most, conditions had deteriorated so much in Mogadishu that use of the seaport and airfield had become problematic. For example, no ground-controlled approach (GCA) capability existed at the main

airfield. During the early stages of the operation—before the Air Force airfield kit and

radars arrived in Somalia—Johnston had to depend on Admiral Hancock’s Ranger battle group to furnish services normally provided by a Joint Force Air Component Commander. Hancock utilized his E-2C Hawkeye aircraft to supply theatre air control in

support of the C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy flights, and he placed his Aegis cruiser

(USS Valley Forge) close to shore, where it could provide the GCA. The E-2Cs also supported ground convoy operations with airborne communications relay, while simultaneously conducting the air control mission.8

Johnston believed that “the value of the

carrier was priceless,” both for the aircraft it could put in the sky during operations and

for its control of air operations during the early days of RESTORE HOPE.

9

A well synchronized and efficient off-loading of the maritime prepositioning ships

(and other ships with valuable cargoes) would be critical for supporting and sustaining

the operational forces. For this crucial job, Johnston selected a naval officer he held in

the highest regard: Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III.10 Perkins and his staff of twelve

officers also arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December, shortly after General Johnston. In

his normal duties, Perkins commanded Amphibious Group 3 (PhibGru 3), located in

San Diego, California. PhibGru 3 supported I MEF deployments by assigning and

training the ships and sailors that team with West Coast MEU(SOC)s for deployment

to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.11 All but one of the officers Perkins brought to Somalia were members of his PhibGru 3 staff.12 Johnston and Perkins had great respect for

each other and developed a strong professional and personal relationship, working out

of their respective headquarters at Camp Pendleton and San Diego.13 Perkins was a pro

fessional naval officer in every sense; Johnston considered him a “real gunfighter” and

“as much a Marine as a Marine could be.” (Johnston meant that as a compliment, of

course, although he was not sure that Perkins would so take it, being such a dedicated

Navy officer.) Johnston admired Perkins’s “can-do attitude” and considered him a true

“champion” of RESTORE HOPE.

14

In Mogadishu, Perkins would take charge of and operate the port facility, off-load

ships, and coordinate issues afloat for Johnston and his command.15 Overseeing port

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Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:38 PM
(MPSRon 2) had set sail with three ships from Diego Garcia for Mogadishu on 7 D

ber.16 USNS 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus—from MPSRon 3, on Guam—had alrea

arrived in the operational area with the Tripoli ARG. It entered the port of Moga

on 11 December; Perkins and his team began off-loading it at the earliest opport

All these ships were part of the U.S. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), thirty

ships stationed around the world under control of the Military Sealift Command

(MSC). The MPF consists of three distinct elements—sixteen ships supporting th

Marine Corps, ten larger ships that support the Army, and eight ships that suppo

Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency. Ultimately, sixteen ships of the M

fleet delivered cargo for RESTORE HOPE.

18 The MPF concept involved Marine Cor

Army units designated to fly into crisis areas, where they would unite with equip

and supplies delivered on the MPF ships.19 Of course, this requires a port, an airf

and a benign environment. If the port or airfield is under hostile control, the evo

is still possible, but only if preceded by the forced entry of an expeditionary force

insertion of Newbold’s SPMAGTF into Mogadishu and its subsequent control of 

port and airfield is an example of this principle in action. Although the Somalia 

ture falls in the category of military operations other than war, the concept is app

ble across a broad range of military options.20

Perkins needed to off-l

the MPF ships in the p

Mogadishu very quickl

forward the equipmen

supplies necessary to su

the U.S. and coalition e

ments arriving daily at 

Mogadishu and Baledo

airfields. He had not on

synchronize off-loadin

material with arriving 

tary units but also to c

nate with the many

humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) regarding delivery of their own aid su

plies.21 Perkins had to accomplish this through a very small and dysfunctional po

facility that was too shallow to allow all the arriving vessels to enter.22 Yet within 

five days, the admiral had off-loaded thirty-four military and fourteen civilian sh

while doubling the historical throughput of the port. This amounted to some 11

tons of supplies (39,700 tons of which were relief supplies), 6,668 vehicles, and 5

Port of Mogadishu.

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Perkins arrived on the scene, but by the end of December it was among the busiest in

Africa.23 His off-loading of Lummus at the earliest possible time proved critical to

Newbold, who needed much of its equipment—especially the seven amphibious tractors he immediately commandeered—if he were to move as quickly and robustly as his

mission required.24

Logistical support in the earliest days of RESTORE HOPE—before the off-loading of the

MPF ships—came in the form of material and equipment that arrived on the Tripoli ARG.

As Peterson and Newbold shared their assets with newly arriving forces and Admiral

Perkins off-loaded the MPF ships, Brigadier General Marvin T. Hopgood, Jr., commander of 1st Force Service Support Group (Forward)—or 1st FSSG (Fwd.), an element of I MEF—assumed command responsibility for support and sustainment of the

task force.25 By 27 January 1993 the U.S. Army Joint Task Force Support Command,

under Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, USA, had assumed responsibility for supporting UNITAF. This freed up approximately 2,700 Marines from Hopgood’s 1st FSSG

(Fwd.) to return to Camp Pendleton.26 At its height, Solomon’s operation consisted of

some 5,200 American personnel supporting a coalition force of over thirty-seven thou

sand troops located throughout central and southern Somalia.27 Several thousands of

Solomon’s soldiers would remain in Somalia after the transition from UNITAF to

UNOSOM II.28 Perkins would continue to oversee port operations in Mogadishu for

about six weeks until relieved by the U.S. Army’s 7th Transportation Group, under the

command of Colonel Daniel L. Labin, USA.29

An unfortunate incident early in RESTORE HOPE illustrated the flexibility of naval

expeditionary forces. Shortly after the SPMAGTF had secured its objectives on D-day

a company of the French Foreign Legion, about 150 strong, arrived at the Mogadishu

airfield, the first coalition unit on scene.

30 Although its participation in RESTORE HOPE

had been coordinated at higher levels, Newbold learned of its planned arrival only the

day before his own landing. Newbold considered the legionnaires excellent troops and

assigned them to positions at the “Kilometer Four” traffic circle, which controlled the

roads between the port, airport, and embassy.31 This checkpoint, under a French lieutenant and jointly manned by legionnaires and U.S. Marines, was there to prevent hostile

elements from approaching American and coalition positions. On one occasion, a vehi

cle full of civilians drew near the checkpoint and, in apparent confusion, failed to

respond to commands to halt. French legionnaires and U.S. Marines are both very

sensitive to this type of situation, because some ten years earlier both services had suffered large loss of life in Beirut, Lebanon, after failing to act decisively under similar

circumstances.32 The legionnaires and Marines opened fire, killing two Somali national

and wounding seven.33 Upon hearing the report, Peterson decided to bring the most

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which had the best medical facilities an

gical teams within the ARG—within th

entire area, for that matter. After a seri

long surgical procedures, the Somalis

treated on Tripoli survived and eventu

recovered.34

Although a tragic event, the outcome o

incident served a humanitarian purpo

while illustrating the confusion that ex

in the early period. It also illustrates th

value of sea-based medical facilities an

importance of having them available a

very beginning of an operation. At the 

this incident occurred, no U.S. Army o

coalition hospitals had yet arrived. The 

civilian hospitals in Mogadishu were in 

horrible condition and badly overburd

with casualties.35 Without the facilities on board Tripoli and Peterson’s willingnes

make use of them, these Somali civilians would undoubtedly have died. Even as l

the operation as 23 December 1992, American lives were to be saved only becaus

the availability of medical facilities aboard Tripoli. In that instance, four Ameri

officials operating independently and covertly east of Bardera struck a mine or im

vised explosive device, and Newbold’s Marines rescued them under fire. All had s

fered severe wounds, but three survived due to the medical treatment received 

board Tripoli.

36

Among General Johnston’s first thoughts about RESTORE HOPE were plans for m

support. Having no idea how violent the operation might become, he chose to pr

for a worst-case scenario. As task force commander, Johnston believed that “med

care has got to be at the top of the shopping list.”37 Of course, other leaders share

concerns, including the Surgeon General of the Navy, who, with Johnston’s heart

currence, personally selected Captain Michael L. Cowan to serve as surgeon for t

operation.38 Should conditions in Somalia become hostile, Johnston and his med

planners did not want to have to fly casualties to an air-transportable clinic in

Mombasa.39 He wanted medical care facilities immediately at hand, either ashore 

afloat. The JTF planning staff attempted to obtain a Navy hospital ship, but none 

available, due to higher-priority missions—although it is difficult to understand 

could have been more important at that time.40 Johnston planned to establish a

Somali being treated by U.S. Navy personnel.

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lematic. The MSC ship that carried the hospital could not off-load due to the limitations of the port of Mogadishu.41 Consequently, the hospital did not become available

for several weeks.

The inadequate conditions at the port of Mogadishu affected more than just the Army

hospital.42 Two LASH (lighter aboard ship) vessels, the SS Green Valley and SS Green Harbor, could not launch their preloaded lighters (barges) offshore due to sea conditions.43

The containerships SS Titus and SS Gibson could not enter the port because of their deep

drafts. These four vessels had to return to Diego Garcia, where they cross-decked their

cargo onto “handysize” ships capable of operating in the port of Mogadishu.44 The port

of Mogadishu had not only shallow water and limited berthing space but insufficient

staging room for cargo transfer. This made it especially critical to synchronize the offloading of material with the arrival of operational units for which it was intended, so as

not to clog the “lay-down” space in the port area.45

A standard ARG—in fact, even a reduced ARG like Peterson’s—has a superb medical

capability, although not normally staffed to support a force as large as UNITAF would

become. But it would have been possible to augment quickly the medical element on

board Tripoli enough to triple its casualty-handling capacity; this capability is an

important but often overlooked dimension of the Navy and Marine Corps team.

Fortunately, casualties during RESTORE HOPE were low, and expanding the medical

staffs on the amphibious ships proved unnecessary. Yet as with so many aspects of

expeditionary warfare, the best solution to the medical issue—at least in the early

stages—was to provide that critical function from the sea.46 Eventually, UNITAF headquarters established several military hospitals in Somalia, but the medical facilities

aboard Tripoli were available and used from the very outset, serving American and

coalition medical needs.47

In addition to the Navy’s contribution to medical support during RESTORE HOPE, the

U.S. Army deployed an evacuation company into Somalia from Germany. Led by Majo

Pauline Knapp, whom Johnston described as a “dynamic commander with a ‘we can do

it’ attitude,” the 159th Air Ambulance Company of the 421st Medical Evacuation Battalion used UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters in its rescue and evacuation missions.48

The Black Hawks represent a strong capability in an area where the Navy and Marine

Corps are a little “light”—powerful, fast, long-range medevac helicopters. Major Knapp

staged her Black Hawks at various locations in the operational area as the U.S. and

coalition troops extended their occupation of Somalia. The rapid-evacuation capability

of the Black Hawks, coupled with the presence of the ships of the ARG and later two

field hospitals ashore, ensured that casualties could be delivered to a surgeon’s care

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and coalition forces during RESTORE HOPE demonstrated joint and combined op

tions at their very best.

As capability built up in the Mogadishu area, UNITAF elements branched out in

countryside to occupy key locations and establish secure food-delivery routes.50 G

Zinni created eight humanitarian relief sectors—later increased to nine—during 

planning for RESTORE HOPE. These provided a structure for the military occupat

the countryside and 

support of humanit

relief.51 In a tradition

military operation, p

ners would use such 

as “zones of action” 

“tactical areas of res

bility.” But Zinni had

learned during PROV

COMFORT that it is b

minimize military te

nology when workin

NGOs and civilians 

ally.52 Zinni named t

tors after the major 

within their respecti

confines, configurin

to address such conc

as clan and political boundaries, military capabilities and span of control, lines o

tribution and communications, and security.53

Even after the arrival of UNITAF and establishment of its control in the operatio

environment, UNOSOM did not cease to exist. The Pakistani force under Genera

Shaheen and UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani continued to operate with

designated area at the airport compound under Chapter VI peacekeeping rules.54 

original mission of guarding the airfield, port, and convoys had proved unsucces

due to the resistance of Aideed and the inherent weakness of the peacekeeping fo

Its light armament and restrictive ROE rendered the Pakistani battalion ineffectiv

against the more forceful militia of Aideed. Ironically, American leaders had to a

to bolster the UN operation while simultaneously eclipsing its function. Introdu

of the more robust UNITAF forces into the operational area reduced the relative 

of UN peacekeepers. This resulted in friction and resentment, which exacerbated

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HOPE. Yet despite this situation, Oakley and Johnston believed it important to work

with Kittani and Shaheen, believing that UNOSOM would be the agency for transferring authority back to the UN once RESTORE HOPE terminated.56

The primary purposes of RESTORE HOPE were breaking the famine and saving lives.

UNITAF could make this possible through improved security and control of the environment, but the humanitarian relief community had to accomplish the actual delivery

and preparation of food for suffering Somalis. Recognizing the importance of working

closely with NGOs and HROs from his experiences in PROVIDE COMFORT, General

Zinni directed that a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) be established and

made operational upon arrival in Somalia. Underscoring its importance, General

Johnston demanded that the leaders of the CMOC “get things going very fast.”57 Marin

colonel Kevin M. Kennedy—who had served as General Libutti’s highly effective chief

of staff during PROVIDE RELIEF and understood relief operations—would head the

UNITAF CMOC.58 Its staff came from soldiers of the Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) and Marine Corps personnel from Zinni’s J-3 organization. The fundamental purpose of the CMOC would be to coordinate UNITAF’s military support for

humanitarian operations.59 Among the first things on Kennedy’s agenda was connecting with representatives of the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

(OFDA) and its disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) to establish a system for

coordinating with the humanitarian relief organizations.60 The principal figures

involved in accomplishing this included Bill Garvelink and Kate Farnsworth, who

successively headed up the OFDA element in Somalia.61

The UN headquarters in Somalia operated a similar organization, called the Humanitarian Operations Center, or HOC, designed to coordinate relief and assistance

throughout the stricken areas of Somalia. Located at UNOSOM headquarters, the

HOC came under Philip Johnston, the UN coordinator of humanitarian operations.

Johnston also held the position of president and chief executive officer of the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).62 Zinni and Kennedy agreed to

colocate the UNITAF CMOC with Philip Johnston’s HOC at UN headquarters to facili

tate communications and coordination with the NGOs and HROs. The CMOC developed into an integral component of the HOC, with Philip Johnston at the head,

Kennedy the military deputy, and Garvelink (later Farnsworth) the civilian deputy.63

Despite some tension between UNOSOM and UNITAF, the HOC and CMOC arrangement proved effective, because it focused on the mission and not prerogatives. Additionally, the officers and staff working within the HOC and CMOC made an effort to

overcome institutional and cultural differences, which can easily undercut the

effectiveness of such organizations.

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NGOs, other HROs, ICRC, etc.) and established links to the various CMOCs wit

each humanitarian relief sector.64 This arrangement produced invaluable commu

tion, although the level of cooperation and effectiveness varied among the sector

Mogadishu proving the most contentious and difficult. Not all NGOs—especiall

Somali organizations—felt they had full access to the CMOC or that their knowl

was fully utilized to the benefit of the mission.65 Yet even with difficulties and im

tions, the HOC/CMOC concept proved effective in helping the relief community 

military forces accomplish their missions during RESTORE HOPE.

66

Despite American leaders’ laserlike focus on the basic mission to end famine in S

lia, a certain amount of “mission creep” occurred from the very beginning: such 

ity as engineering services to repair or rebuild roads, bridges, airfields, orphanag

schools, and clinics; the reestablishment of the Somali police force; and assistanc

refugee resettlement.67 Although some of this work was mission critical, UNITAF 

beyond simply addressing the essentials.68 In the words of Brigadier General Hop

“If it is good, if it is legal, and if it feels right and doesn’t hurt anybody, do it.”69 T

civic-action projects created goodwill for UNITAF among the population and wi

tain Somali leaders. The fact that UNITAF tried to avoid favoring any clan or fac

tended to reinforce the positive message. Generals Hoar and Johnston recognized 

value of goodwill, as is apparent in their self-imposed restraint on weapons use a

atively liberal authorization of improvement projects. Even so, the commanders 

not intend to permit Somali factions or gangs to perpetrate violence or threaten

UNITAF forces. In the event, several incidents occurred that required military

responses to ill-advised actions against American troops.70

The first major incident occurred on 12 December, when U.S. helicopters receive

from forces northwest of the American embassy compound. The helicopters retu

fire, destroying two technicals and damaging one M113 armored personnel carri

(APC).71 On 6 January 1993, Somali gunmen from Aideed’s militia fired upon M

convoys from a weapons cantonment site near the embassy.72 The Marines establ

blocking positions to seal off the area, and Colonel Michael W. Hagee—who had

returned to Somalia at Johnston’s request—informed Brigadier General Mohame

Kedeye Elmi, a member of Aideed’s staff, that all weapons from those sites would 

confiscated the next day.73 On 7 January, a psychological operations (PSYOPS) te

using loudspeakers warned the defenders to surrender. The weapons cantonmen

actually consisted of two sites; one complied, but the other responded with gunfi

The Marines attacked the second facility from both air and ground, forcing it to 

render, while taking no casualties.74 In the words of General Wilhelm, “We unleas

firestorm on them.”75 The Marines confiscated all weapons within the cantonment 

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and various armored vehicles.76 The exact number of Somali casualties is unknown, bu

most of the Somalis involved in the firefight were either killed or captured.77

As forces continued to assemble in Somalia, Johnston rapidly moved them into the

humanitarian relief sectors where they would undertake the mission of RESTORE HOPE

Of course, the actual work of assigning the forces to geographical locations and placing

them within the organizational structure fell to his operations officer, General Zinni.

For a period early in the operation, this became so demanding a function that Zinni’s

staff took to calling him the “Century 21 Man” (recalling a well known advertising

campaign of an American realty firm).78 The variety of forces from the United States

and coalition nations created a very complex grouping that Johnston and Zinni structured into a component-type organization. It was similar to the command structure

that General Schwarzkopf had used in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990–91,

when Johnston had been Schwarzkopf ’s chief of staff. Simply stated, “components” are

subordinate organizations assembled around a service or function.79 In the case of

RESTORE HOPE, Zinni integrated most of the coalition forces under one or another of

the four service components, primarily the Marine Forces component.80 Several contributing nations required their forces to report directly to the UNITAF commander, as

illustrated in figure 2.

FIGURE 2

Lieutenant General Johnston’s UNITAF Component Command Structure

Source: Allard, Somalia Operations, p. 27; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 31; MFS/IMEF

(Fwd.), Command Chronology, secs. 1, 8; Resource Guide, p. 1.

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tional structure and took control of their sectors. For example, even as Newbold’

SPMAGTF moved through Mogadishu and on to Baledogle and Baidoa, it becam

element within the Marine component, under command of General Wilhelm. W

also commanded the 1st Marine Division, which provided the major elements to 

Marine Forces component within UNITAF.81 Brigadier General Lawson William

Magruder III served briefly as the Army component commander, followed by the 

manding general of the 10th Mountain Division, Major General Steven L. Arnold

Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik served as the Air Force component com

mander. The Naval component had seven different commanders, whoever was se

officer in the theatre at a given time.83 Appendix C provides more details on the s

component commanders during Operation RESTORE HOPE. Figure 2 shows the c

nent structure of Johnston’s UNITAF force.

After establishing ascendan

Mogadishu, UNITAF force

idly moved into the surrou

areas of central and southe

Somalia to oversee the sect

and support the humanitar

relief community. From 13

through 31 December John

coalition had gained contro

Baledogle, Baidoa, Kismayo

Bardera, Oddur, Gialalassi, 

Uen, and Merca.84 Although 

was nothing easy about the planning or execution, the operation had been efficie

effective, and successful. That did not mean the country had become peaceful or 

factions always respected their cease-fire agreements. For example, on New Year’s 

1992, clan warfare broke out in Mogadishu, resulting in major casualties.85 Despi

initial success of RESTORE HOPE and the growing prospect for breaking the famin

Somalia remained a very violent place.

President Bush himself arrived in Somalia on 31 December 1992 for a three-day 

meet with American troops and the Somali people.86 Ironically, a leader who held 

different view of America’s role in Somalia, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, vis

Mogadishu only a few days later.87 Somalis received President Bush enthusiastical

wherever he visited, whereas Boutros-Ghali’s motorcade received stones and rott

fruit. On one occasion, an angry mob even prevented his vehicles from entering t

President Bush being greeted by General Johnston.

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Somalia visit proved to be an upbeat

experience, whereas the SecretaryGeneral’s was a humiliation. Never

popular in Somalia, because of a per

ception that he had collaborated with

the Siad Barre regime when he had

been the Egyptian deputy foreign

minister, Boutros-Ghali’s status, and

that of the UN in general, had deteri

orated even further after the departure of Mohamed Sahnoun.89 For a variety of reasons, Somalis viewed the United States

and UNITAF as alternatives to the UN at this point and as untarnished by it.

Although President Bush spent much of his time ashore visiting various commands

and meeting with troops and Somalis, he spent two nights on board Tripoli and mingled with the sailors and Marines.90 In the opinion of the commodore of the Tripoli

ARG, Captain John Peterson, President Bush inspired everyone he met and was the nic

est of any of the dignitaries who spent time on board his ships. In Peterson’s words, “It

was like having dinner with your grandfather; he was amazing.”91 President Bush would

leave office on 20 January, less than a month after his Somalia visit, having been defeated

in his bid for reelection by William J. Clinton. But that did not seem to matter to the

sailors and Marines, who genuinely appreciated his visit and the manner in which he

related to them.92 To the troops, he seemed a far more genuine person than the many senators, congressmen, and news celebrities who frequently visited their environment.93

On 20 January 1993 the United States would inaugurate a new president, but UNITAF

would still be in the field. Originally, President Bush had hoped to have American

forces out of Somalia by inauguration day rather than leave his successor with unfinished business. But serious-minded planners and operators had known that it was

never a possibility.94 Many American officers believed that March 1993 was a reasonabl

exit date, but even that proved elusive. Although RESTORE HOPE appeared to be successful and working according to plan well before that date, the transition to UNOSOM

II proved far more difficult than any American leader had expected. Ultimately, the

United States could terminate UNITAF only by agreeing to remain involved in the subsequent UNOSOM II operations and participating in their nation-building efforts.95

Among the more volatile areas where UNITAF operated during RESTORE HOPE was

Kismayo, a coastal city some 250 miles south of Mogadishu, not far from the Kenyan

border. During much of the period of RESTORE HOPE, fighting continued in and

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.

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Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan). General Morgan was Siad Barre’s son-in-law an

leader associated with grave atrocities under that regime.96 General Hoar conside

Morgan “one of the most recalcitrant guys in the country.”97

A large percentage of the casualties that UNITAF was to suffer during the five mo

of RESTORE HOPE occurred in the Kismayo area. The total number of casualties f

UNITAF forces amounted to eight killed and twenty-four wounded (another ten 

resulted from various accidents during the operation). The Somali casualty coun

amounted to about two hundred militiamen killed and perhaps a hundred civilia

deaths, mostly people caught in cross fire.98 Virtually all of these casualties occur

and about Kismayo and Mogadishu, the two toughest cities in Somalia. Of cours

figures do not include casualties that various Somali factions inflicted on each ot

during this same period.

In the original plan for RESTORE HOPE, planners scheduled the occupation of Ki

to occur during phase III. But depredations by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess—an al

Aideed—and his Ogadeni-based Somali Patriotic Movement militia caused John

accelerate that action.99 Equally important, UNITAF needed the port of Kismayo 

airfield to help handle the heavy inflow of troops and material.100 Johnston and Z

had designated elements of the 10th Mountain Division, from Fort Drum, New Y

along with a reinforced battalion of Belgian paratroopers to occupy and adminis

Kismayo sector.101 In the interest of efficiency and in response to necessity, plann

wanted to fly as many troops as possible directly into the city rather than stage th

through Mogadishu.102 To do so, UNITAF needed control of the airfield and port

with a somewhat stable military environment. In the broader scope of the RESTO

HOPE mission, UNITAF needed Kismayo and its facilities to support humanitari

activities in southern Somalia.

Kismayo promised to be difficult, because the militia of Omar Jess had taken con

the port and was attempting to charge exorbitant rates for all transactions.103 As i

Mogadishu before the arrival of U.S. forces, commerce and transportation in Kis

had slowed to a virtual standstill.104 Additionally, heavy fighting had broken out

between Omar Jess and Morgan, further prompting Johnston to take quick actio

gain control of Kismayo.105 To accomplish this, Johnston created a task force—tem

rarily under General Wilhelm’s Marine component—consisting of the Belgian 1s

chute Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Marc Jacqmin; a company o

Marines from Battalion Landing Team 2/9 (that is, a landing team formed from 2

Battalion, 9th Marines, an element of Newbold’s SPMAGTF); two ships from Ca

Peterson’s Tripoli ARG (USS Juneau and USS Rushmore); and the French dest

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ment involved an amphibious landing, the task force

included not only the company of U.S. Marines but

also Major John L. Ledoux,

of Newbold’s staff, who

served as S-3 (operations)

officer for the action.106

Peterson would act as the

Commander, Amphibious

Task Force (CATF), and

Jacqmin as the Commander

Landing Force (CLF).107

As a critical part of the overall RESTORE HOPE “game plan,” the principal leaders had

agreed, as noted, that Oakley or his representative would precede military forces in the

occupation of various humanitarian relief sectors. He would meet with elders and

other leaders as well as individual Somalis to explain UNITAF actions and reduce the

potential for confrontation. This had proved effective during the occupation of

Baledogle and Baidoa, and it was thought that the situation in Kismayo would likely

benefit from this approach.108 On 17 December, Oakley and his team met with Omar

Jess and Morgan to find a basis for future operations in southern Somalia. Oakley did

not personally meet with Morgan, because of the general’s association with the Siad

Barre regime and his responsibility for the 1988 destruction of Hargeisa, with great los

of civilian lives.109 Even now, most of Morgan’s Somali National Front forces were remnants of Siad Barre’s old

national army.110 The upshot

of Oakley’s effort to pacify

the area were the establishment of Kismayo as an open

city and separation of the

warring parties. Omar Jess’s

faction would remain in the

city, while Morgan would

move his forces away from

Kismayo to the north.111 The

political groundwork had

Oakley and Magruder addressing Somalis in Kismayo.

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Somalia. This latter aspiration proved overoptimistic.

On 20 December, the Marines and the Belgian paratroopers—on board helicopte

surface amphibious assault craft—landed at PURPLE Beach in Kismayo, with no o

sition.112 Jet aircraft from USS Ranger roared overhead, providing air cover and p

logical impact, just as they had done for the Mogadishu landing. The USS Kitty H

battle group had relieved the Ranger group on 19 December, and Kitty Hawk’s air 

would take over air support on the second day of the Kismayo operation.113 (Com

manded by Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, the Kitty Hawk team was the very epito

professionalism, holding nothing back in its support of forces ashore during RES

HOPE.)114 After going ashore at Kismayo, the landing force immediately secured t

port and airfield, while the Belgian contingent continued to flow reinforcements

ashore.115 Peterson and Jacqmin met with Omar Jess, who agreed to keep his forc

the street during subsequent operations of the landing force.116 The following day

Jacqmin released the Marine detachment, which back-loaded onto Juneau and

Rushmore, returned to Mogadishu, and resumed its duties with the SPMAGTF.117 

set the stage for arrival of 10th Mountain Division units, which would augment t

Belgian paratroopers and establish Task Force Kismayo under command of Briga

General Magruder.118

By late January 1993, the situation in Kismayo again became critical, threatening

UNITAF with the worst level of violence yet experienced. To contain the escalatin

conflict, Magruder met with Morgan on 23 January and demanded that he conso

his technicals at Dhoobley (northwest of Kismayo near the Kenyan border), pull 

all forces from Beer Xaani (also spelled Bir Hane, thirty-five kilometers west of

Kismayo), establish cantonment areas for his infantry, and desist from fighting w

other factions. Morgan acknowledged these demands, but the following day he a

an element of Omar Jess’s militia guarding a weapons cantonment at Beer Xaani

Magruder again ordered Morgan to withdraw, and when he failed to respond, Task 

Kismayo engaged his militia.120 Attacking with Belgian paratroopers and U.S. Army 

copters, UNITAF destroyed six technicals, four howitzers, an armored vehicle, and 

rocket launcher.121 Magruder now demanded yet again that Morgan remove all tech

from the Kismayo area and withdraw from Beer Xaani, and this time he complied.

A second major incident occurred on 22 February, when Morgan infiltrated troo

Kismayo for another attack on his adversary.123 Omar Jess and his militia fled nor

toward Jilib but in the process had looted a warehouse they had been guarding an

fired random shots at Belgian soldiers. Johnston and Oakley issued an ultimatum

ordering both forces out of the lower Jubba Valley (in the Kismayo vicinity) and 

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show strength and to conduct weapons-control operations. Although both factions

complied with Johnston’s ultimatum, misinformation about events filtered into

Mogadishu, sparking demonstrations and several firefights. These were inspired by

Aideed and his followers, who wrongly concluded that UNITAF had favored Morgan,

the enemy of Aideed’s ally.125 Additionally, efforts by UNITAF to empower leaders at

various localities in Somalia and encourage them to take responsibility for their communities had offended and angered Aideed. They tended to undercut the system he had

installed during the civil war and to infringe upon his power base.126 Aideed therefore

was already of a mind to oppose UNITAF, although only up to a point.

The Mogadishu flare-up ran its course for several days, after which conditions returned

to normal (by Somali standards) and remained so through the end of RESTORE

HOPE.

127 By March 1993, UNITAF leaders felt able to resume their planning for transition to UNOSOM II. Kismayo experienced an additional clash between Omar Jess and

Morgan during March, which frustrated UNITAF commanders and again resulted in

dispatching a QRF to the town. But this crisis passed and ultimately did not appear to

endanger the transition process.128 Yet this incident caused UN officials to believe that

Kismayo—and by extension all of Somalia—was far from stable.129

Despite the sporadic problems in Kismayo and Mogadishu, by 4 February 1993 American leaders in Somalia believed that UNITAF had completed its humanitarian mission.

At that point, they began planning for transition to UN control and the redeployment

of U.S. forces.130 UNITAF leaders wanted a degree of stability during the handoff to

UNOSOM II, but that had never been the criterion for transition in the minds of most

American officials. For them, breaking the famine and saving lives constituted mission

success for Operation RESTORE HOPE; nation building would occur in the follow-on

phase, under UN cognizance.131 This was the view not only of American leaders in

Somalia and at Central Command but of the top levels of the U.S. government.132 As

President Bush stated in a letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali the day after the

Security Council passed Resolution 794, “I want to emphasize that the mission of the

coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the

feeding of the starving people and allow transfer of these security functions to the UN

peacekeeping force.”133

Despite the president’s unequivocal message, American officials in both Washington

and Somalia felt it necessary to reaffirm constantly the limited nature of RESTORE

HOPE and to resist efforts by UN officials to expand and extend the mission.134 Boutros

Ghali and key UN officials did not want the transition to occur before midsummer.

Neither did they want to accept responsibility on the ground without a major

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among other reasons, it was clear that many coalition forces would not remain in

Somalia under UNOSOM II if the United States did not participate.135 UN officia

wanted UNITAF to accomplish a greater degree of disarmament and establish wi

geographical control before turning over responsibility.136 Essentially, Boutros-Gh

expected UNITAF to accomplish tasks that most American leaders considered th

of UNOSOM II. If United Nations officials could persuade UNITAF to accompli

these goals during RESTORE HOPE, UNOSOM II would be able to function under

Chapter VI peacekeeping rules rather than as a Chapter VII peace-enforcement o

tion. UNITAF would have a better chance than the UN to succeed at peace enforc

ment, in the opinion of UN leaders, because only the United States had the milit

strength and organizational structure to accomplish the difficult tasks that rebui

the Somali state required. The reticence of UN leaders became clear as early as Ja

1993, when they failed to meet their commitment to General Johnston and the S

Department to send a “technical team” to UNITAF headquarters to plan the

transition.137 This seeming indifference did not surprise General Zinni, who belie

that UN leaders considered the Somali predicament a “poison apple and were ve

reluctant to take control.”138 Because of ongoing resistance by the UN, the transit

dragged out three months beyond the point at which Johnston believed UNITAF 

accomplished its mission.139

As the February and March incidents in Kismayo and Mogadishu subsided, a pea

conference occurred in Addis Ababa that once again appeared to achieve reconci

between Aideed and Ali Mahdi.140 There had actually been a series of sessions in t

Ethiopian capital throughout RESTORE HOPE, culminating in accords reached in 

Ababa on 27 March 1993. Fifteen of the most powerful Somali warlords and fact

leaders signed this agreement, causing many observers to believe that it had a goo

chance to resolve the crisis.141 The participants named it the “Addis Ababa Agreem

concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in So

implying an ongoing process rather than a final agreement.142 On 26 March 1993

the Addis Ababa conference moved toward its conclusion—the UN Security Cou

passed Resolution 814, which officially established UNOSOM II under Chapter V

authority and provided for transition from UNITAF control.143 Among other thin

Resolution 814 called for a secure environment and the rehabilitation of Somalia

political institutions and economy.144 It also demanded “that all Somali parties, in

ing movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have unde

. . . at Addis Ababa, and in particular with the agreement of implementing the ce

fire and on modalities of disarmament.”145 This language clearly tied the mission 

UNOSOM II to the Addis Ababa accords.

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important warlords and faction leaders had committed themselves to reconciliation,

reconstruction, development, the establishment of an impartial police force, and peace

in Somalia. Interestingly, the agreement also invited “the Secretary-General of the

United Nations and his Special Representative in Somalia, in accordance with the

mandate entrusted to them by the Security Council, to extend all necessary assistance

to the people of Somalia for the implementation of this agreement.”146 Considering

Aideed’s distaste for the UN and its Secretary-General, it is somewhat surprising that

he agreed to this provision. Ironically, the United States, which generally endeavored to

reduce its direct involvement and presence in Somalia, had pressed at UN headquarters

for this larger mission. To some extent, this resulted from the new foreign-policy concept of assertive multilateralism articulated by the new administration of President

William J. Clinton.147 Clinton’s ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, reflected

this thinking in stating that the Resolution 814 amounted to “an unprecedented

enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country.”148

The two key UN officials who would oversee the implementation of Resolution 814

and the Addis Ababa agreement were the UN special representative, Admiral Jonathan

T. Howe, USN (Ret.), and the UNOSOM II force commander, Lieutenant General

Cevik Bir, both recently appointed by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.149 The United

States appointed Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, USA, to serve as Bir’s deputy

and senior American commander in Somalia during UNOSOM II.150 By 20 March, all

three officials had arrived in Mogadishu, completing the high-level command structure

for the new entity.151 General Johnston approved on 14 March the UNITAF transition

plan, intended to facilitate the assumption of command by the new leadership team.

He also provided General Bir office space at UNITAF headquarters and made similar

arrangements for supporting staff sections as UNOSOM II personnel arrived for

duty.152 Yet despite this preparation, the transition from UNITAF would be anything

but efficient, and the command relations under UNOSOM II anything but clear.153

Admiral Howe became the UN special representative in Somalia when Ismat Kittani—

who had always considered his role as interim—departed from that position in March

1993. In an obvious attempt to ensure continued American involvement in Somalia,

Boutros-Ghali asked the United States to recommend a replacement. When the United

States suggested Howe, Boutros-Ghali quickly agreed. Howe offered impressive credentials for the job, having attained the rank of full admiral in the U.S. Navy and served as

deputy national security adviser under President Bush. In his latter role, Howe had

been the president’s focal point on issues relating to Somalia and had played a major

role in planning and decision making for RESTORE HOPE during November 1992. Many

key members of the Bush administration considered Howe a highly skilled manager

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him as a Washington insider whose primary influence came from his considerab

on staffs within the departments of Defense and State.155 In either case, Howe wa

connected with both the outgoing Bush administration and the new Clinton team

Just before Howe arrived in Somalia to assume his duties, Robert Oakley returne

the United States, considering his role in RESTORE HOPE complete. Oakley intend

leaving to signal a change in leadership and responsibility in Somalia.157 The func

of the UN special representative (the position that Kittani now tendered to Howe

relation to that of the U.S. special envoy (which Oakley now relinquished) had b

ambiguous and subtle during RESTORE HOPE. Oakley’s close relationship with

Johnston and Zinni—coupled with Kittani and Boutros-Ghali’s lack of credibilit

among many important Somali leaders—had thrown the U.S. envoy into a leadin

during UNITAF. Now that Oakley had left Somalia, most observers assumed that 

would restore the UN special representative to a more dominant position for the 

tion of UNOSOM II. Oakley’s replacement, Robert Gosende, did not attract the 

attention or assert the same influence as his predecessor. Of course, the circumst

had changed, and the United States wanted a more prominent role for the UN du

UNOSOM II. The appointment of General Bir—a Turkish officer with broad NA

experience—as the military commander for UNOSOM II further underscored th

expectation of UN preeminence.158

Yet despite these important changes, the operation in Somalia retained an Ameri

flavor. Howe might be the UN special representative, but he was still an American

access to the highest levels of his government. Moreover, Bir’s deputy commande

General Montgomery, had a separate reporting structure—through General Hoa

Central Command—for the use of U.S. forces during UNOSOM II.159 This left th

sion to use American forces, the most capable in Somalia, clearly in the hands of 

ican authorities. Also, notwithstanding the prominence of Americans in the new

organization, the changeover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II remained bogged do

throughout March and April, causing a high level of frustration and angst for the 

commanders of UNITAF.160

The provisions of Security Council Resolution 814 and the Addis Ababa accords 

prescribed Howe’s responsibilities as UN special representative in Somalia.161 How

not believe the UN had adequate preparation or sufficient resources to assume th

sion.162 He tried to convince Johnston and Zinni to extend UNITAF through June 

to expand its operation into the northern parts of Somalia—just as Boutros-Gha

wanted.163 Unable to convert either officer to his viewpoint, Howe attempted to u

high-level connections in Washington, but this time to no avail.164 Johnston and Z

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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Hoar and Johnston argued that the action

requested by UN leaders would constitute a new mission, requiring additional

resources and further presidential approval. Despite considerable lobbying, SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali and Admiral Howe could not persuade the White House to

override the position of the military.165 In the view of most American leaders, RESTORE

HOPE had been a success, UNITAF had served its purpose, and the time had come for

the UN to assume the responsibility for rebuilding Somalia.

The problems associated with transition stemmed from differences in perception of th

RESTORE HOPE mission that had dogged relations between the United States and UN

all along. Not only did Americans see RESTORE HOPE as a short-term and limited oper

ation, but they also believed that the handoff to UNOSOM II should be rapid and efficient. UN leaders—acting in accordance with the views of the Secretary-General—

feared that UNITAF units would “withdraw hastily, before the reestablishment of a

truly secure environment in which the transition to traditional peace-keeping envisaged by UN Security Council Resolution 794 could proceed successfully.”166 In the opin

ion of Boutros-Ghali, the outburst of violence in Kismayo during February and March

1993, coupled with sporadic violence in Mogadishu, clearly demonstrated that the rela

tive stability resulting from RESTORE HOPE was precarious at best. He also concluded

that a return to simple peacekeeping as originally intended would not be possible, that

UNOSOM II required Chapter VII enforcement powers to have any hope of success.167

When Resolution 814 passed, it not only authorized Chapter VII actions by UNOSOM

II forces but also threatened individual accountability, including prosecution of individuals responsible for “breaches of international humanitarian law.”168 In short, it

intended to put teeth (at least on paper) into the enforcement authority of UNOSOM

II. Interestingly, this constituted the first Chapter VII operation organized and commanded directly by the United Nations itself. In previous cases, the UN had only mandated actions, whereas member states actually executed the missions.169 In promoting

this concept, the United States found itself in the curious position of promoting a

larger UN commitment to Somalia—through the action of its ambassador to the

UN—while simultaneously reducing American support and commitment to the

undertaking.170 As Madeleine Albright later stated, “This was an ambitious mandate,

requiring the UN to do more than the United States had accomplished but with fewer

and far less potent forces.”171

Despite American action to terminate RESTORE HOPE, disband UNITAF, and withdraw

the bulk of its forces from Somalia, the Secretary-General continued to press for at

least two major milestones before transferring operations to UNOSOM II. The first

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gangs and the confiscation of the heavy weapons (artillery, large-caliber machine 

assault weapons like rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifles, and anything

mounted on technicals, etc.) from the organized factions. This demand was noth

new, of course, but rather a refinement on the Secretary-General’s ongoing effor

have U.S. forces achieve general disarmament in Somalia. The second condition

required an expansion of the UN mandate throughout Somalia. UNITAF had foc

its efforts only where the famine actually existed, in the central and southern sec

of the country. That constituted only about 40 percent of Somalia; the northern 

of the nation were relatively stable, and people there were not dying of starvation

From the American point of view, expanding operations into the northern areas 

nothing to do with the original purpose of RESTORE HOPE. These two conditions 

Secretary-General were highly unrealistic, because the United States had no inten

of undertaking a large-scale disarmament effort or of sending additional forces t

occupy areas where no humanitarian crisis existed.173 Nevertheless, it became obv

to American leaders that they would need to make some concession if the UN wa

assume responsibility under UNOSOM II.174

The United Nations intended to assemble a force of about twenty-eight thousand

troops to conduct operations. Some of these would be coalition troops already in

Somalia serving in UNITAF. As part of the American accommodation with the U

American officials agreed to leave about 4,200 soldiers in Somalia for duty with

UNOSOM II. This included a quick-reaction force and a logistical support eleme

both to be provided by the U.S. Army.175 The QRF consisted of a reinforced infan

battalion from 10th Mountain Division and an aviation task force of six Cobra a

helicopters, eight scout helicopters, and fifteen Black Hawk helicopters, along wit

support battalion, all under a brigade-level headquarters—a total of about 1,100 

diers.176 The logistics package would consist of some 3,100 U.S. troops from the J

Task Force Support Command, which had assumed responsibility for general log

support of UNITAF in late January.177 These forces constituted a price the United 

paid to extricate itself from its large commitment in Somalia.178

Nevertheless, many American leaders remained nervous about turning these forces 

to UN authority. That would be very different from the RESTORE HOPE model, wh

United States had operated under UN authority but maintained command and con

over coalition forces.179 To mitigate this concern, American officials placed all U.S. f

under General Montgomery, who would exercise command within two reporting c

One of Montgomery’s superiors would be General Bir (the UNOSOM II military c

mander, under Jonathan Howe) for issues relating to the UN. The other would be G

eral Hoar at Central Command for operations involving U.S. forces.180 This awkwa

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progressed and as conflict with Somali factions became more prevalent.181

Just as the command designator changed from UNITAF to UNOSOM II on 4 May

1993, so too did the U.S. operational name change, from RESTORE HOPE to CONTINUE

HOPE.

182 Yet unlike the RESTORE HOPE name, “CONTINUE HOPE” did not catch on with

the media or American public. Instead, “UNOSOM II” became the label commonly

associated with that segment of the Somalia incursions. Whatever the name, the UN

command element finally took control of operations in Somalia on 4 May 1993—too

soon from Howe’s point of view, not soon enough in the minds of Johnston and

Zinni.183 Johnston had actually been redeploying forces back to the United States as

early as February 1993. Throughout March and April, elements of the U.S. contingent

had “retrograded” units and heavy equipment out of Somalia.184 By the time transfer of

responsibility actually occurred, only the two elements designated to support

UNOSOM II (the QRF and logistics team) remained within Somalia.185 Also during thi

period, Johnston began transferring responsibility for the nine humanitarian relief sectors to coalition forces designated to control them during UNOSOM II.186 Yet all this

was not to contain the American involvement in Somalia. The number of Americans

committed to UNOSOM II would increase substantially in the future, and the scope of

their involvement would expand. Ultimately, the warnings of Smith Hempstone proved

correct: “These situations are easier to get into than out of.”187

By the end of April, only those units identified as part of UNOSOM II remained in

Somalia.188 The impact of this drawdown had been somewhat mitigated by the arrival of

the USS Wasp ARG, commanded by Captain Kenneth Pyle, and the 24th MEU (SOC),

under Colonel Matthew E. Broderick.189 They collectively represented for UNITAF (and

UNOSOM II) commanders a naval expeditionary force that could act as an operationa

reserve during the redeployment and transition process. In fact, the MEU proved to be

of far greater service, providing forces ashore during the remainder of RESTORE HOPE

and sporadically under CONTINUE HOPE. When the ARG arrived in Mogadishu on 23

March, Commodore Pyle assumed duties as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Somalia.

Pyle, Broderick, and key members of their staffs coordinated with the UNITAF leadership to prepare for operations. Meanwhile, AV-8B Harrier aircraft flew missions over

Mogadishu, to demonstrate the strength of the ARG, and conducted reconnaissance

flights throughout the Kismayo sector.190 General Johnston immediately sent the ARG

down to Kismayo, where, he believed, it could help control the potentially explosive

situation.191 Before departing, Broderick assigned a detachment of Marines to remain

in Mogadishu and help patrol the city streets.192 On 26 March, the 24th MEU (SOC)

went ashore on PURPLE Beach at Kismayo to assist the Belgian and U.S. Army forces

operating within the city and throughout southern Somalia. During its time in the

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interdiction operations, and roadblock and strongpoint duty; they also escorted 

convoys and undertook civic-action programs.193

On 27 March, a reinforced company of 24th MEU (SOC)—designated Task Forc

RESOLVE—conducted a mechanized march to Dhoobley.194 Intended primarily as 

show of force and demonstration of the MEU’s reach, the 180-mile trip (one way

enjoyed an escort of helicopters to provide airborne radio relay and fire support 

needed.195 After entering Dhoobley unopposed, the convoy returned to Kismayo 

March, having made a statement about the capability and resolve of the 24th ME

(SOC). It also allowed the Marines to become familiar with the general area and 

experience operating in southern Somalia. A similar mechanized force—designa

Task Force HAMMER—marched to Jilib in the north on 6 and 7 April, accomplish

much the same result.196

Broderick’s energetic use of his MEU included helicopter raids on the villages of

Goobyen, Hoosingow, and Afmadow, primarily to search for unauthorized weap

and provide humanitarian assistance when possible. Afmadow, for example, was 

in the gunrunning routes in southern Somalia often used by warlords to move w

out of cantonment areas in violation of UNITAF policy.197 The Marines conducte

textbook operation at Afmadow and met no open resistance, but they found no w

ons and felt a certain silent hostility during their initial sweep of the village. (Bro

learned later that the Somalis had removed the weapons the night before and ret

them after the Marines departed.)198 A second raid at Afmadow later in the deplo

proved equally unproductive.199

In addition to executing rapid raids inland, the Marines of 24th MEU, accompan

SEAL teams, conducted riverine operations along the Jubba River. Although inte

to observe traffic on the river and interdict weapons movement, these patrols ma

direct contact. Yet the continuous presence of the Marines within the operationa

coupled with their establishment of strongpoints at key locations, helped contro

flow of illicit arms while monitoring the movement of Somali men of fighting ag

addition to the normal possibility of violent conflict with Somali factions, the M

and sailors on the Jubba River had crocodiles and hippopotamuses to deal with, t

not addressed in standard amphibious training.201 These operations helped suppr

activity by various troublemakers in the Kismayo sector.202 They also had the effe

separating the two warring forces (those of Omar Jess and Morgan), thereby redu

their ability to engage each other or disrupt the transition process.203

Like Colonel Newbold before him, Broderick believed it important to impress lo

warlords with the MEU’s speed, mobility, and operating tempo. Also like his

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the importance of maintaining a

positive image with the local Soma

lis and the outside world, to the

extent possible. He therefore balanced the display of military power

with gestures of goodwill. These

involved the MEU’s medical and

logistical capabilities as well as

civic-action projects undertaken by

individual Marines and sailors.204

Broderick’s engineers conducted numerous improvement projects, and his medical and

dental personnel frequently established clinics to assist local Somalis.205 Even during the

raid on Afmadow, Broderick ordered a team of doctors and corpsmen to accompany

the Marine force and offer medical care to the villagers. This took the edge off the raids

and searches and earned the goodwill of many Somalis.206 These humanitarian efforts

by 24th MEU (SOC) sought to improve the lives and circumstances of the Somali people and to encourage cooperation.207

By late April, the mission of 24th MEU (SOC) had ended (for the time being). Marines

sailors, and equipment from various parts of Somalia back-loaded onto Commodore

Pyle’s ships and departed for the Persian Gulf.208 They would return to Somalia in June

1993 and again during early 1994 in support of UNOSOM II, but their departure in

April signaled the termination of the American operations under UNITAF.209

Broderick and Pyle believed they had made a difference in Kismayo. In addition to stabilizing the situation through patrolling, manning checkpoints, conducting riverine

operations, and other actions, the 24th MEU (SOC) had worked very hard at helping

the Somali people. Through a variety of actions such as escorting food deliveries, operating health clinics, and dealing with Somalis directly, personally, and respectfully,

Broderick and Pyle felt they had won the hearts and minds of the people in Kismayo by

the time they departed.210

One experience that won the hearts and minds of the Marines and sailors on board

the Wasp ARG was a visit from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin

Powell. During his visit Wasp returned to Mogadishu, where Powell visited after a day

of meetings ashore. Like other ships of the fleet, Wasp had many VIP visitors, but the

Powell visit was a highlight, not the ordeal that most were. Like President Bush during

his earlier visit to Tripoli, Powell proved a motivational presence. He mingled with the

Marines and sailors, offered to have their pictures taken with him, and showed a

Somali woman saluting.

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learned, was Powell’s birthday, so he orchestrated a birthday party, including 

cake, on the ship’s flight deck. Powell’s visit was a special event, one that the

Marines and sailors would remember as one of the high points of the deploym

of the Wasp ARG.211

Operation RESTORE HOPE took place between 9 December 1992 and 4 May 1993

Observers and analysts generally acknowledge that it succeeded in breaking the f

by ensuring delivery of food and supplies to needy Somalis—its primary mission

Although estimates vary, there is little doubt that RESTORE HOPE, coupled with t

contribution of PROVIDE RELIEF, saved many thousand Somali lives.213 The fact th

occurred with only minor fighting should not suggest that it was easy. In additio

the incidents in Mogadishu and Kismayo between Somali fighters and UNITAF f

sporadic sniping occurred throughout the operation, causing casualties and seve

deaths. Numerous confrontations also resulted when UNITAF elements disarme

Somalis caught in violation of arms agreements or during weapon sweeps consid

necessary for mission security. Fortunately, most of these cases did not result in s

violence.214 The cooperation of major warlords in the cantonment of technicals a

heavy weapons helped remove these armaments from the streets and reduced the

potential for violence.215

Conditions would be very different for UNOSOM II during Operation CONTINU

HOPE, with its more ambitious missions. At the time of transition, UNOSOM II 

sisted of about seventeen thousand troops from twenty-one nations, making it m

combined, and less a joint, organization than UNITAF. At its peak strength in No

ber 1993, UNOSOM II would number just under thirty thousand soldiers from t

nine nations.216 CONTINUE HOPE never had the expeditionary flavor of RESTORE 

as it tended to operate out of fixed bases and built semipermanent structures for 

units. Regrettably, it also proved less successful. Many critics suggest that the inco

plete work of UNITAF preordained failure for UNOSOM II, whereas others have

blamed the second operation itself.217 In either case, CONTINUE HOPE would have 

very different outcome than RESTORE HOPE.

The expeditionary nature of RESTORE HOPE and the degree to which it relied on 

based forces in many ways exemplify the precepts of . . . From the Sea. The tenden

focus both the amphibious ready group and the carrier battle group on power pr

tion ashore illustrates the growing importance of the littoral mission, as opposed 

blue-water operations of the Cold War era.218 The skillful air-control measures of 

carrier battle group in the early stages of the operation, the medical support capa

of the amphibious ready group, and the joint nature of the mission further embo

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long Somali coastline, particularly between Mogadishu and Kismayo, demonstrates to a

considerable extent the “marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare based

on sea-borne maneuver, sea-based sustainability, and rapid execution,” as would be

codified several years later in the Marine Corps concept paper Operational Maneuver

from the Sea.219

Notes

1. Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, pp. 34–35;

Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, pp.

238–39.

2. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, pp.

243–44; Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 4.

3. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 55–56; Jane Perlez, “2 Somali Factional Leaders Pledge to End the

Fighting,” New York Times, 12 December

1992; Zvijac and McGrady, Operation Restore

Hope, p. 41.

4. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons

Learned (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1995), p. 73; Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 4; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle

Ready, pp. 246–47. (For a complete listing of

the Seven-Point Agreement, see appendix E.)

5. Oakley interview.

6. Hoar interview.

7. Ibid.; Oakley interview; Oakley, “Somalia,”

p. 4; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready,

p. 259.

8. Hancock interview.

9. Johnston interview.

10. Ibid.

11. Perkins first interview.

12. Vice Adm. James B. Perkins III, USN (Ret.),

interview by the author, Naval War College,

Newport, Rhode Island, 24 July 2008 [hereafter Perkins second interview].

13. Perkins first interview.

14. Johnston interview.

15. CJTF Somalia, message P 080217Z December

1992, “Initiating Directive for MPF Operation Restore Hope,” OOTW, Restore Hope,

box 1, folder 14, Marine Corps Archives;

Perkins first interview.

16. The ships from Maritime Prepositioned

Ships Squadron 2 that supported RESTORE

HOPE included MV 1st Lt. Alex Bonnyman

(T-AK 3003), MV Pvt. Franklin J. Phillips (T

AK 3004), and MV PFC James Anderson, Jr.

(T-AK 3002). See U.S. Army Dept., Resource

Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia, December

1992–May 1993, Operation Restore Hope

(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1994) [hereafter Resource Guide], pp.

109, 113–14, 118–19; Perkins second interview; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 17.

17. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 3; Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force, Preliminary Lessons Learned during Port Operations in

Mogadishu, Somalia 11 December 1992–08

January 1993, Folder: OOTW, Operation Re

store Hope, box 2, folder 26, Marine Corps

Archives.

18. See Military Sealift Command, www.msc

.navy.mil.

19. In addition to Lummus, Bonnyman, Phillips,

and Anderson, the MPF ships that supported

RESTORE HOPE were MV American Cormorant, MV Sheldmond, MV Eagle, MV Strong

Virginian, SS Sea Pearl, SS Gopher State, SS

Green Harbor, SS Green Valley, SS American

Osprey, USNS Pollux, USNS Algol, and USN

Capella. See Military Sealift Command,

www.msc.navy.mil.

20. CMPF Somalia, message O 111111Z Decem

ber 1992, “Operation Order for Maritime

Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operation Restore Hope,” OOTW, Restore Hope, box 1,

folder 14, Marine Corps Archives.

21. At the initial meeting of the Joint Committee on Security, the members agreed to discontinue using the term “nongovernmental

organization” and include NGOs within the

more general category of “humanitarian

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designation includes NGOs, UN humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International

Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies (IFRC). HRO became normal usage, as reflected in the literature of Operation RESTORE HOPE. See Zvijac and McGrady,

Operation Restore Hope, p. 41; Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore

Hope,” p. 99, 116 note.

22. The U.S. Army is supported by the MPF program through use of ships designated “Army

Prepositioned Stocks-3” (APS-3), large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off vessels. Yet at

the time of RESTORE HOPE, the Army still relied to a considerable extent on large

containerships contracted by MSC for its

sustainment packages. See Military Sealift

Command, www.msc.navy.mil; Johnston interview; Perkins first and second interviews;

Allard, Somalia Operations, pp. 45–49.

23. Oakley, “Somalia,” pp. 3–4; Perkins first interview; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 59; Brig. Gen.

Marvin T. Hopgood, Jr., interview by Capt.

David A. Dawson, American Embassy,

Mogadishu, Somalia, 27 January 1993,

Folder: Operations Other than War, Operation Restore Hope, box 4, folder 11, Marine

Corps Archives.

24. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

25. Hopgood-Dawson interview.

26. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology;

Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, pp. 18–19.

27. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 186–87.

28. MCNEWS 18-93.

29. Perkins first interview; Resource Guide, pp.

41, 127, 129.

30. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology,

sec. 3, p. 2.

31. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 59; Newbold-Dawson

interview.

32. Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold, USMC (Ret.),

correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 23 August

2008.

33. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, pp.

253–54; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 34;

Jane Perlez, “Mission to Somalia; Somali

Terror Inland,” New York Times, 11 D

ber 1992.

34. Peterson interview.

35. Zinni interview.

36. Peterson interview; Resource Guide, p

37. Johnston interview.

38. Ibid.; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, 

39. Lois M. Davis et al., Army Medical Su

for Peace Operations and Humanitari

sistance (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND

p. 55; Johnston interview.

40. The U.S. Navy has two large-capacity 

tal ships, operated by Military Sealift 

mand: USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) in

Baltimore and USNS Mercy (T-AH 1

San Diego. They remain in layup wit

mal crews until needed for an operat

When ordered to active service, the s

able to “staff up” and depart for thei

sion within five days. See Military Se

Command, www.msc.navy.mil.

41. Johnston interview; Rear Adm. Jame

Perkins III, USN, Memorandum for t

cord, Mogadishu, Somalia, 26 Decem

1992, Folder Past 1990: Command F

Somalia, NHC Operational Archives

42. Perkins second interview.

43. Resource Guide, pp. 107–109.

44. The “handysize” ships (generally, dry 

carriers able to enter small ports and 

without crane assistance) were unde

tract to MSC from the Crowley Corp

tions for just such exigencies. Perkin

interview; Resource Guide, p. 123.

45. Perkins second interview.

46. Johnston interview; Capt. John W. Pe

USN (Ret.), correspondence to Gary 

20 June 2008.

47. Davis et al., Army Medical Support, p. 7

son interview; MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Com

Chronology, pp. 46–47; Zinni intervie

48. Johnston interview; Johnston to Ohl

et al., Army Medical Support, p. 54; R

Guide, pp. 35, 110.

49. Johnston interview; Wilhelm-Curita

Dawson interview.

50. Central Command in Somalia, pp. 22

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pp. 24–25, 30; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 254.

52. Zinni interview.

53. Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military

and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” pp. 103–104; Clancy,

Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 254.

54. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 50–52; Newbold-Dawson

interview.

55. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention,

pp. 150–51; Zvijac and McGrady, Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 29–30.

56. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 51, 53–54.

57. Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military

and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” pp. 101–102.

58. Libutti interview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz,

Battle Ready, p. 247.

59. Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military

and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” pp. 100–101.

60. Disaster assistance response teams (DARTs)

are elements of the Office of Foreign Disaster

Assistance (OFDA), which operates under the

U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID—see its website, www.usaid.gov);

Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military

and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” p. 101.

61. Ibid., pp. 101–102.

62. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 67 note; Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian

Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,”

pp. 101–103.

63. Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military

and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” pp. 102–103.

64. Resource Guide, p. 117.

65. Sommer, Hope Restored? pp. 36–37.

66. Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military

and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” pp. 101–105, 114–16.

67. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 5; Anthony C. Zinni,

“Non-traditional Military Missions: Their

Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness

and Flexible Thinking,” in Joe Strange, Capital

War (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Univ.,

1998), pp. 248–50; Col. Robert B. McKittrick

interview by Capt. David A. Dawson, Somalia, 10 February 1993, Folder: Operations

Other than War, Operation Restore Hope,

box 5, folder 9, Marine Corps Archives.

68. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” pp. 70–71; Zinni in

terview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle

Ready, pp. 262–63; Mroczkowski, Restoring

Hope, pp. 58–62; Sommer, Hope Restored?

pp. 34–35; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and

Operation Restore Hope, pp. 87–92.

69. Hopgood-Dawson interview.

70. Resource Guide, pp. 108, 124.

71. The helicopters included two AH-1W Super

Cobras and one UH-1N Huey. The M113

APC used by the hostile Somalis was a U.S.

Army system provided earlier to the Siad

Barre government. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Com

mand Chronology, sec. 3, pp. 2–3; Baumann

and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan

against the World,” p. 48; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 39.

72. Central Command in Somalia, p. 30; Clancy,

Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 265.

73. Colonel Hagee filled a special role as

Johnston’s principal liaison officer with Am

bassador Oakley. He was billeted in the ambassador’s compound and attended all

meetings with the warlords and other key

Somali officials. In this role he reported to

Johnston but had direct contact with Zinni

in the commander’s absence. Johnston to

Ohls; Johnston interview; MFS/IMEF

(Fwd.), Command Chronology, sec. 2, p. 9.

74. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology,

sec. 3, pp. 11–12; Baumann and Yates, with

Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p

65; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, pp. 66–68

75. MCNEWS 18-93.

76. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 65; MFS/IMEF

(Fwd.), Command Chronology, pp. 9–10.

77. Facts on File, 21 January 1993.

78. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p.

255; Zinni interview.

79. JP 1-02, p. 110.

80. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” pp. 30–32.

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sec. 1, p. 1; sec. 2, pp. 1–5.

82. Resource Guide, p. 15.

83. Ibid., pp. 10–12.

84. Central Command in Somalia, app. 9, p. 10.

85. Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, p. 55; Jane

Perlez, “Bush Sees Victims of Somali Famine,” New York Times, 1 January 1993.

86. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 55.

87. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 101–102.

88. Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, p. 48; Perlez,

“Bush Sees Victims of Somali Famine.”

89. Alberto R. Coll, The Problems of Doing Good:

Somalia as a Case Study in Humanitarian Interventions, Case Study Series on Ethics and

International Affairs 18 (New York: Carnegie

Council, 1997), p. 9; Oakley interview;

Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, pp. 46–47.

90. Resource Guide, pp. 119–20.

91. Peterson interview.

92. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 268.

93. Peterson interview.

94. Martin R. Ganzglass, “The Restoration of the

Somali Justice System,” in Learning from Somalia, ed. Clarke and Herbst, pp. 22–23.

95. Zinni interview.

96. Hirsh and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, pp. 62, 72, 76–77.

97. Hoar interview.

98. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 14.

99. Central Command in Somalia, pp. 25–26;

Peterson interview.

100. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 52.

101. Resource Guide, pp. 113–14, 165–66.

102. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 11.

103. Central Command in Somalia, p. 26.

104. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 35–36;

“30,000-Strong UN Force Steps in to ‘Restore Hope,’” U.N. Chronicle (June 1993),

p. 17.

105. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology,

p. 4.

106. Ibid., pp. 4–5; Peterson interview.

108. Ibid.; Wilhelm-Curitan/Dawson inte

109. Clarke, “Failed Visions and Uncertai

dates in Somalia,” pp. 18, 26 note; Pa

Gilkes, “From Peace-Keeping to Peac

forcement: The Somalia Precedent,” 

East Report (November–December 1

pp. 22–23.

110. Central Command in Somalia, p. 26;

Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 94.

111. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, pp. 62, 72, 76; Mroczko

Restoring Hope, p. 44.

112. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chron

5; Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Join

Force in Operation Restore Hope (Ale

Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, Marc

p. 83.

113. Hancock interview; Hancock to Ohls

Chief of Information, message P 092

December 1992 (NAVNEWS 064-92

Somalia: Opn Restore Hope, Articles

November–December 1992, Marine 

History Division, Reference Branch,

Quantico, Virginia.

114. Newbold to Ohls, 23 August 2008.

115. Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

R 311954Z December 1992 (MCNEW

93), Somalia: Opn Restore Hope, Nov

December 1992, Marine Corps Histo

sion, Reference Branch, Quantico, Vi

MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chron

5; Resource Guide, p. 113.

116. Central Command in Somalia, p. 26.

117. Resource Guide, p. 114.

118. Baumann and Yates, with Washingto

Clan against the World,” p. 52.

119. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, pp. 76–77.

120. Resource Guide, pp. 135–37.

121. Baumann and Yates, with Washingto

Clan against the World,” p. 82.

122. Resource Guide, p. 137; Mroczkowski

ing Hope, p. 96.

123. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 8; Resource Gui

151.

124. MCNEWS 18-93; Oakley, “Somalia,” 

Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 96.

125. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 9.

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Clan against the World,” p. 82; Hirsch and

Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope,

pp. 70–71, 78–79; Sommer, Hope Restored?

pp. 37–38.

127. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” pp. 82–83; WilhelmCuritan/Dawson interview.

128. MCNEWS 18-93; Mroczkowski, Restoring

Hope, p. 97; Oakley, “Envoy’s Perspective,”

p. 51.

129. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 41–42;

Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” p.

539.

130. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 9.

131. John R. Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,”

Foreign Affairs (January/February 1994), p.

59.

132. Woods, “U.S. Government Decision Making

Process,” pp. 160–61.

133. Quoted in Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and

Operation Restore Hope, p. 103 note, and in

Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” p. 60.

134. Woods, “U.S. Government Decision Making

Process,” p. 161.

135. Hoar interview.

136. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 102–103.

137. Ibid., pp. 106–107.

138. Zinni interview.

139. Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” p. 63;

Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 38.

140. “Report of the Secretary-General,” 22 March

1993, in United Nations and Somalia, pp. 46,

246–47.

141. Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, USN (Ret.), interview by PBS Frontline, “Ambush in Mogadishu” series, 29 September 1998, available at

www.pbs.org.

142. “Report of the Secretary-General,” pp. 46,

246–47.

143. Drysdale, “Foreign Military Intervention in

Somalia,” p. 131; United Nations and Somalia, p. 43.

144. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 111.

145. Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March

1993, in United Nations and Somalia, pp.

261–63.

first session of the Conference on National

Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993, i

United Nations and Somalia, pp. 264–66.

147. Madeleine Albright, with Bill Woodward,

Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York:

Miramax Books, 2003), pp. 142–43; Bolton,

“Wrong Turn in Somalia,” pp. 62, 64–66.

148. Quoted in Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and

Operation Restore Hope, p. 111; and Bolton,

“Wrong Turn in Somalia,” p. 62.

149. United Nations and Somalia, p. 44; Hirsch

and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore

Hope, pp. 108–10.

150. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 108.

151. Accounts differ slightly on the actual day on

which these officers arrived in Somalia to

take up their assignments. The author chose

these dates as most credible. In any case, all

were in place by 20 March 1993; Howe PBS

Frontline interview.

152. Central Command in Somalia, p. 36.

153. Both Bir and Montgomery had made previous orientation visits to Somalia during Feb

ruary 1993. Resource Guide, pp. 151–52,

156–58.

154. Walter Clarke, interview by PBS Frontline,

“Ambush in Mogadishu” series, 29 September 1998, available at www.pbs.org; Coll,

Problems of Doing Good, pp. 9–10.

155. Hoar interview.

156. Howe interview.

157. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 110; Oakley, “Somalia,” pp.

13–14.

158. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 108.

159. General Montgomery commanded U.S.

Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM) under

Central Command’s commander in chief,

General Hoar, throughout the period of

CONTINUE HOPE. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia

After Action Report, p. 8; Albright, with

Woodward, Madam Secretary, pp. 143–46;

Howe PBS Frontline interview.

160. Zinni interview.

161. Howe PBS Frontline interview.

162. Howe interview.

163. Zinni interview.

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Clan against the World,” pp. 87–88; Coll,

Problems of Doing Good, p. 10; Howe

interview.

165. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 88; Hirsch and

Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope,

p. 111.

166. United Nations and Somalia, p. 41.

167. Ibid., pp. 39, 41–42.

168. Security Council Resolution 814.

169. United Nations and Somalia, p. 40.

170. Oakley interview.

171. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary,

pp. 142–43.

172. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 40–41.

173. Ibid., pp. 41–42.

174. Zinni interview.

175. Howe, “Relations between the United States

and United Nations in Dealing with Somalia,” p. 180; Zinni interview.

176. The exact number of U.S. troops committed

to UNOSOM II varies among accounts. The

author has used the numbers from the most

credible source: U.S. Army Dept., Somalia

After Action Report, pp. 9, 26, 35.

177. Col. Patrick C. Sweeney, USA (Ret.), interview by the author, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1 July 2008; Oakley,

“Somalia,” p. 14; Zinni interview; MCNEWS

18-93.

178. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary,

pp. 142–43.

179. Zinni interview.

180. The United States Army in Somalia, p. 15;

Hoar, “CINC’s Perspective,” p. 62.

181. Oakley interview; Zinni interview.

182. Zinni interview.

183. Johnston interview; Howe interview; Zinni

interview.

184. Wilhelm-Curitan/Dawson interview.

185. Howe, “Relations between the United States

and United Nations in Dealing with

Somalia,” p. 180.

186. These assignments included France occupying Oddur, Canada accepting Belet Uen, Italy

taking Gialalassi, Morocco working

Baledogle, Australia in Baidoa, Belgium at

in Mogadishu and Merca. See Centra

mand in Somalia, pp. 34, 36; Wilhelm

Curitan/Dawson interview.

187. Hempstone, “The Somalia Tarbaby.”

188. Walter S. Clarke and Robert Gosend

malia: Can a Collapsed State Reconst

self?” in State Failure and State Weak

Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg 

ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution P

2003), p. 144.

189. The ships constituting the Wasp ARG 

USS Wasp (LHD 1), USS Nashville (L

USS Barnstable County (LST 1197), a

El Paso (LKA 117). See Campaigning 

Southern Somalia: Actions of the 24th 

Expeditionary Unit from 17 March to 

1993: Campaign Analysis by Michael 

ards, Conference Group One, undated

Folder: OOTW, Opn Restore Hope, b

folder 32, Naval Historical Center, pp

David Bowne Wood, A Sense of Valu

American Marines in an Uncertain W

(Kansas City, Mo.: Andrews and McM

1994), pp. 18, 38; Capt. Kenneth Pyle

(Ret.), telephone interview by the au

August 2008.

190. Commanding Officer, 24th Marine E

tionary Unit (SOC), Command Chro

1 January to 30 June 1993, 17 Septem

1993 [hereafter 24th MEU (SOC), C

Chronology], p. 7; Commanding Offi

rine Medium Helicopter Squadron 2

(REIN), Command Chronology, 1 Jan

30 June 1993, 7 July 1993 [hereafter H

263, Command Chronology]; both Fo

Command Chronology, Marine Cor

Archives.

191. Brig. Gen. Matthew E. Broderick, US

(Ret.), telephone interview by the au

August 2008; Johnston interview; Py

interview.

192. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chrono

7; Wood, Sense of Values, pp. 162–83

193. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chrono

7; Resource Guide, pp. 158–61.

194. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chrono

7; Wood, Sense of Values, pp. 39–40, 4

195. HMM-263, Command Chronology;

Broderick interview.

196. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chrono

pp. 7–9; Campaigning in Southern So

pp. 8–9.

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198. Ibid., pp. 122–45.

199. HMM-263, Command Chronology.

200. Broderick interview.

201. Ibid.; Pyle interview.

202. Campaigning in Southern Somalia, p. 9.

203. MCNEWS 18-93; Mroczkowski, Restoring

Hope, pp. 97–98.

204. Newbold initiated Project HAND CLASP in

Baidoa during December 1992 and Operation RENAISSANCE in parts of Mogadishu during January 1993. This link between security

and civic action proved effective and stimulated a greater commitment to direct assistance in Somali needs by UNITAF forces. See

Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” pp. 75–76.

205. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology,

p. 9.

206. Broderick interview; Wood, Sense of Values,

pp. 124, 141–43.

207. Campaigning in Southern Somalia; Broderick

interview.

208. Pyle interview; Wood, Sense of Values, pp.

192–93.

209. Broderick interview; Wood, Sense of Values,

pp. 200–13, 256.

210. Broderick interview; Pyle interview.

212. U.S. Defense Dept., Joint Military Operation

Historical Collection, pp. V1-6 to V1-7;

Woods, “U.S. Government Decision Making

Process,” p. 166; Lt. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery, USA (Ret.), telephone interview by

the author, 27 July 2008.

213. Haass, Intervention, p. 44; Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” pp. 510, 534, 570;

Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 157;

Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” pp. 56 note 2, 88;

Coll, Problems of Doing Good, p. 15.

214. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology, p

10; Newbold-Dawson interview.

215. Allard, Somalia Operations, pp. 36–37, 64–

75; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action

Report, pp. 5–6.

216. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 26.

217. Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende, “The

Political Component: The Missing Vital Element in U.S. Intervention Planning,” Param

eters (Autumn 1996), pp. 35–51; Woods,

“U.S. Government Decision Making Process,” p. 160.

218. . . . From the Sea.

219. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from

the Sea.

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Operation CONTINUE HOPE

Operations and Conflict

Operation CONTINUE HOPE officially began on 4 May 1993, when Lieutenant Ge

Cevik Bir took command of UNOSOM II military operations in Somalia. Major 

eral Thomas M. Montgomery served as Bir’s deputy as well as Commander, U.S. 

in Somalia (USFORSOM).1

During the transition process, UNITAF leaders had c

ered UNOSOM II slow to assume command of the Somalia mission.2

But from t

spective of Generals Bir and Montgomery, the handoff had been hasty and had n

their needs or adequately prepared them.3

At the time of the change of command

UNOSOM II had an immature communications capability, insufficient infrastru

to operate its headquarters, and less than 30 percent of its staff in place.4

This res

in part, from the slowness of the United Nations in passing Security Council Res

tion 814, delaying funding and formal authority for assigning the headquarters s

When the resolution passed on 26 March 1993, it officially established UNOSOM 

through 31 October 1993, with an annualized budget of $1.5 billion.6

It officially 

lished the 4 May transition date and authorized Bir and Montgomery to allocate 

and prepare for the transition.7

The changeover occurred on schedule but not in 

“seamless” manner that leaders of UNITAF and UNOSOM II intended. The polit

and military controversy between the United States and UN regarding prerequisi

ditions for transferring control created friction that affected personnel from both 

they came together in Mogadishu.8

At the beginning of UNOSOM II, Bir commanded about seventeen thousand sol

from twenty-one nations, including just over four thousand U.S. troops. His deg

authority varied widely.9

With regard to American forces, the Logistics Support C

mand—now under command of Brigadier General Norman Williams—would b

of the UNOSOM II organization, but the QRF remained outside that structure, r

ing through Montgomery, in his capacity as USFORSOM commander, to Genera

at Central Command.10 In U.S. military terminology, operational control of the Q

remained with Central Command (General Hoar), whereas tactical control came 

CHAPTER SIX

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QRF on his own authority for emergencies, but for operations in support of the

UNOSOM II mission he needed consent from General Hoar.12 In addition to the Amer

ican troops stationed within Somalia, Central Command maintained in the Indian

Ocean a naval expeditionary force (an amphibious ready group with an embarked

Marine expeditionary unit), which would be available to Montgomery should the need

arise.13 Of course, the ARG would also be available for other missions and might not

always be on Somalia station when required.14 The UNOSOM II command relations—

like those within USFORSOM—were also somewhat complicated, and they became

even more so in late August 1993 with the arrival of Task Force RANGER, under Major

General William F. Garrison, U.S. Army.15

Command and control over the coalition forces—which would eventually grow to

nearly thirty thousand troops from twenty-nine nations—proved problematic

throughout Operation CONTINUE HOPE.

16 Not all forces arrived on schedule, and those

that did often came without weapons or equipment, useless until their shipments

arrived, sometimes substantially later.17 Additionally, many coalition commanders

operated under limitations imposed by their national governments or required home

approval before executing UNOSOM II orders. When confronted with conflicts

between UN missions and national agendas, field commanders would always follow

directions from their home governments, creating disruption in planning and danger

during combat.18 These infringements upon unity of command made many of the

troops essentially unusable, reducing the ability of UNOSOM II leaders to prevent or

respond to provocations. This situation was very worrisome, because Generals Bir and

Montgomery felt certain that Aideed would challenge the UN and its commitment to

the UNOSOM II operation.19

In the weeks immediately after taking control in Somalia, UNOSOM II forces continued to support humanitarian relief missions while conducting shows of force within

Mogadishu and elsewhere. This consisted of increased patrolling and expanded checkpoint activity intended to maintain a visible presence and give the appearance of a

seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II.20 Additionally, UNOSOM II

leaders planned to continue the inspection of weapons cantonment sites (also called

“authorized weapons storage sites,” or AWSSs) using the inventories created and provided by UNITAF. Of course, Mogadishu remained the greatest area of concern,

because Aideed and his militia controlled a large portion of the city. In contrast, Ali

Mahdi and his USC faction (which controlled the northern part of Mogadishu) contin

ued to cooperate with UN efforts within Somalia.21

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the center of gravity for the entire Somalia mission. He believed that actions ther

would determine the success or failure of Operation CONTINUE HOPE, whatever 

ress was achieved in other parts of Somalia.22 Predictably, the first severe crisis fo

UNOSOM II occurred in Mogadishu, on 5 June 1993, with a murderous ambush 

to the inspection of weapons storage sites. It was a shocking and distressing incid

but there had been forewarnings of greater confrontation with Aideed’s Somali

National Alliance (SNA) throughout the month since UNITAF’s departure.23

On 6 May, only days after UNOSOM II assumed the mission in Somalia, Kismay

again erupted, when Omar Jess attempted to recapture the city. Belgian forces ha

thwarted his effort, and Montgomery dispatched a portion of the QRF to help st

the area.24 Meanwhile, Aideed began broadcasting virulent attacks against the Un

Nations over Radio Mogadishu (also known as Radio Somalia, or Radio Aideed)

he had taken over after the fall of the Somali government in 1991.25

“Radio wars” had been going on in Mogadishu since the arrival of UNITAF in De

ber 1992. Aideed claimed that Radio Mogadishu constituted the official, state bro

casting system, but he had often used it for blatant propaganda purposes, promo

his own claim to national leadership and supporting the interests of his political 

tion. Much of his cant had consisted of highly inflammatory rhetoric against the 

and its activities. For their part, UNITAF leaders had created a Somali-language n

paper and radio station in Mogadishu, both named Rajo (sometimes spelled Raja

meaning “hope” in Somali), as parts of its public-information and psychological 

ations activity.26 In response to provocative transmissions, UNITAF would broad

rebuttals, matching their intensity to that of the invective coming from Radio

Mogadishu. This gave Generals Johnston and Zinni bargaining power with Aidee

causing him to keep his messages more moderate. That approach had proved som

what effective during the period of Operation RESTORE HOPE.

27

But now, after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, Generals Bir and Mo

gomery had a much smaller psychological operations element, with virtually no 

broadcast capacity.28 Having no way to moderate Radio Mogadishu, they and Ad

Howe considered the possibility of closing it down.29 Doing so would create prob

including concerns over free speech and protection of the radio’s archives, both o

which Montgomery considered important to the Somali people. Many people qu

tioned the wisdom of closing down a radio station while trying to promote demo

and freedom in Somalia. UNOSOM II leaders would have preferred that Radio

Mogadishu moderate its broadcasts but did not believe Aideed would do so.30 In 

May, eleven leaders from factions not allied with Aideed urged UNOSOM II offic

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political groups.31 Aideed had made this difficult by declaring the premises of Radio

Mogadishu part of one of his weapons cantonment areas, collocated with the station,

known as AWSS-5. Many UNOSOM II officials and Somali leaders suspected that

Aideed did this simply to ensure his exclusive use of the facility.32 When Aideed and

other SNA leaders learned that UNOSOM II was considering shutting down the station, they had reasoned that a takeover would likely occur in conjunction with an

inspection of AWSS-5.33

In late May, UNOSOM II commanders began planning for inspections of the AWSSs

within Mogadishu, in accordance with prior agreements between the UN and Somali

warlords.34 According to UNITAF records, Ali Mahdi had two storage sites within

Mogadishu, and Aideed operated five.35 Montgomery intended to conduct a simultaneous inspection of them all, to preserve the impression of evenhandedness.36 In addition to the fact that Resolution 814 specified disarmament as an objective for

UNOSOM II, Bir and Montgomery wanted to ensure that heavy weapons remained in

storage and did not show up on the street.37 This was of particular concern because evi

dence suggested that the factions had begun removing heavy weapons from their cantonment sites.38 UN leaders also wanted to establish a baseline accounting of weapons

within the city, validate the accuracy of their inventory lists, and be certain that the

warlords used these sites for the cantonment of weapons only.39

The Italian contingent of UNOSOM II had responsibility for the section of Mogadishu

under the control of Ali Mahdi, the Pakistani element for the area under Aideed.40 Dur

ing the final stages of planning for the AWSS inspection, leaders of the Italian brigade

notified General Montgomery that they had disestablished the two Ali Mahdi cantonments back in March. The Italian commanders had made this decision on their own

and failed to notify either UNITAF or UNOSOM II leaders.41 Despite this complication

Generals Bir and Montgomery decided to go ahead with the inspections at the five

Aideed cantonment sites. When UNOSOM II officials delivered the notification of

inspection on 4 June, the evening before the scheduled inspections, the SNA minister

of internal affairs became irritated and declared, “This will start the war tomorrow.”42

Based on subsequent events, this seems a significant warning, but SNA officials—

including Aideed himself and the minister of internal affairs—often made extreme

statements that they did not act upon.43 In Ambassador Oakley’s view, this reaction

resulted from lack of dialogue between UNOSOM II and the Somali factions. During

RESTORE HOPE, Oakley or another high-level leader would make an appointment with

Aideed personally and well in advance, with the result that the inspection process during UNITAF occurred without problems.44

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0700 in company strength and conducted the inspections as planned. Contrary t

accounts, the Pakistani leadership had prepared very well for this operation. Pho

imagery received from overflights of the cantonment sites the afternoon of 4 Jun

showed newly installed weapons covering avenues into some of the facilities. The 

stani commanders had received this information, along with copies of the photo

and had planned accordingly.45 Additionally, Montgomery had ensured that all the 

of the Pakistani brigade had M113 armored personnel carriers, for use in this an

operations.46 The Pakistani teams came prepared to conduct the inspections by fo

necessary, but they experienced no resistance from the militia guarding the cantonm

Only one incident occurred during the inspection process. A crowd of protesters 

fronted the soldiers at the Radio Mogadishu site (AWSS-5), resulting in some wa

shots from the Pakistanis and rock throwing by the Somalis. According to the UN

inquiry published a year later, a Pakistani soldier also shot a Somali man who

attempted to snatch his rifle during the demonstration.48 The disturbance at AWS

constituted the first occasion during the UNOSOM II deployment where Somali 

tors mingled with women and children, using them as human shields to screen th

selves.49 The fact that a U.S. technical team accompanied the Pakistani componen

have created suspicion among Aideed’s followers regarding the real purpose of th

inspection. (The team was intended to evaluate the problem of taking the radio s

off the air, but not to actually do so on this occasion.) In the minds of SNA lea

this inspection was nothing more than a cover for intelligence gathering about t

broadcasting station and its equipment, information that could be helpful in a fu

effort to silence Radio Mogadishu. Some may even have expected an attempt to s

and deactivate the station during the inspection.50

By about 1030 that morning, the Pakistanis had completed inspections of all five 

and had begun returning to their base and headquarters, at a soccer stadium. Th

confiscated no weapons, and Radio Mogadishu remained open and functioning. 

paring for the inspection, the Pakistani brigade had organized itself into four tea

Before the movement back to their base camp, two teams joined at one of the site

(AWSS-3, where a radio retransmission site was also located), thereby creating th

separate processions marching back to the stadium, from different directions. So 

only the demonstration at AWSS-5 had marred the morning action. But that per

relative accord would draw to a quick and violent end.51

On the return march from the cantonment sites, the Pakistani element formed o

inspection teams joined together tripped an ambush of automatic-weapons fire a

rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). This occurred on 21 October Road near a fac

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opened against a Pakistani detachment providing security at a south Mogadishu feeding station, armed Somali fighters again mingling with women and children.52 This

mixed crowd of women, children, and armed men overwhelmed the Pakistani soldiers

and in some cases “literally took them apart by hand.”53

Somali fighters also struck at several Pakistani checkpoints and ambushed reinforcements dispatched to the embattled units.54 The attacks had all the earmarks of a wellplanned and coordinated operation designed to inflict maximum casualties and so

challenge UN operations in Somalia.55 In addition, demonstrations and shootings

erupted throughout Mogadishu.56 Montgomery dispatched helicopters and elements of

the QRF to relieve the Pakistani troops where possible. But by the end of the day,

UNOSOM II had suffered twenty-four Pakistani soldiers killed and another fifty-six

wounded. Six Pakistani soldiers had been captured, one of whom died in captivity,

while five were returned to UNOSOM II two days after the battle. Additionally, three

American soldiers and one Italian soldier received wounds on that day.57

Bir and Montgomery had expected Aideed and his followers to challenge UNOSOM II

at some point, but this attack was a stunning event.58 It not only crossed a major

threshold of violence against UNOSOM II but threatened to undercut the efficacy of

UN peace operations throughout the world. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and UN

officials in New York feared the broader implication of this action. They believed that

failure to respond adequately would be a signal to miscreants in other conflict areas—

where some ninety thousand peacekeepers were at risk—that they could attack UN

forces with impunity.59 It was also a challenge to the new policies of “assertive multilateralism” and “engagement and enlargement” of the Clinton administration. This

early Clinton strategy envisioned a post–Cold War expansion in democracy, market econ

omies, and multilateral cooperation.60 Administration officials believed that Somalia,

though not strategically important to the United States, offered a test of this concept.61

Whether planned, instigated, or spontaneous, the Somali actions of 5 June in

Mogadishu were very cunning in that they occurred after—not before or during—the

inspections. The Pakistani and UNOSOM II planners had prepared for possible resistance at the cantonment sites but had not considered the possibility of an attack after

the fact. Neither had they expected attacks at separate and unrelated locations, such as

the feeding centers, UN strongpoints, or routes of reinforcement. In short, they did

not consider themselves involved in a war. Among the most shocking incidents of these

assaults was the mutilation of Pakistani soldiers overwhelmed by mob action.62 In the

words of General Montgomery, “That was a real initiation into the kind of brutality

we faced.”63

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leaving little doubt as to SNA complicity.64 Aideed and his leaders had either orch

trated the events or at the very least created the conditions that spawned them.65 

in the CONTINUE HOPE incursion, the extent of Aideed’s personal involvement in

ordering these attacks became a matter of some debate. In fact, the entire questio

whether the violence had been spontaneous or planned and orchestrated became 

subject of considerable disagreement.66 Nevertheless, few of the American and U

sonnel in Mogadishu at the time had any doubt regarding Aideed’s culpability.67 T

inventories taken during the inspection of the cantonment sites revealed that Aid

faction had removed numerous heavy weapons, including all technicals, from the

AWSSs. This further demonstrated to the satisfaction of UNOSOM II leaders in

Mogadishu and UN officials in New York that the SNA no longer intended to coo

with Resolution 814 or the Addis Ababa accords.68

The 5 June 1993 attacks on the Pakistani soldiers in Mogadishu caused internatio

revulsion, particularly among nations providing troops to UNOSOM II. They we

after all, in Somalia for humanitarian purposes, to help the Somali people and na

in a time of difficulty. The UN Security Council, prompted by the delegate from 

stan and strongly supported by the United States, responded the next day by pass

Resolution 837.69 Among other things, it condemned the attack and called on the Sec

General “to take all measures necessary against all those responsible for the arme

attacks . . . including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks.”

Although early drafts of Resolution 837 named both Aideed and his faction as be

responsible for the 5 June attacks, the final version mentioned only the SNA.71 No

theless, broadcasts over Radio Mogadishu praising the assaults of 5 June, coupled 

the reappearance in south Mogadishu of heavy weapons, some of which Somalis 

used in the attacks of 5 June, convinced UN officials that they needed to take acti

against both Aideed and his SNA faction.72 The UN resolution was pushed throu

Security Council over the weekend, with virtually no input from U.S. military lea

or State Department specialists.73

Critics of the UNOSOM II operation often argue that Resolution 837 amounted 

declaration of war on Aideed and the SNA.74 They say the resolution and the acti

spawned amounted to taking sides in the internal Somali conflict and unnecessar

making an enemy of Aideed. They also suggest that in trying to pick the winners 

losers in Somalia, UN leaders forced Aideed’s hand.75 Some critics go so far as to 

gest that the 5 June inspection of the AWSSs did in fact amount, as Somalis had s

pected, to a cover for confiscating Aideed’s weapons and closing down his radio

station.76 The clear implication of this line of criticism is that UNOSOM II leade

and not the intransigence of Aideed caused the violence of 5 June 1993, the subse

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We shall explore these ideas, along with contrary viewpoints, later in this study, but on

thing is certain: Resolution 837 called for action against the perpetrators of the 5 June

attacks, and UNOSOM II leaders in Somalia felt compelled to act accordingly.77 What

followed amounted to “a virtual war situation between UNOSOM II and the SNA, as the

two sides attacked each other over a period of four months.”78 This is a clear example of a

tactical incident having strategic implications. This one essentially ended all efforts at

nation building in Somalia and greatly reduced support for humanitarian operations.79

In addition to condemning the 5 June attacks and directing UNOSOM II to arrest the

responsible individuals, Resolution 837 called on UN forces to disarm factions in

Mogadishu and neutralize Radio Mogadishu.80 During 12–14 June 1993, UNOSOM II

leaders initiated action under the mandate of Resolutions 814 and 837—both of which

called for disarmament of Somali factions—by attacking weapons and munitions storage areas within Mogadishu. This included both authorized AWSSs and clandestine

weapons sites, garages for the maintenance and storage of technicals, the cigarette factory, and Radio Mogadishu and its retransmission site.81 These attacks involved AC-130

Spectre aircraft (temporarily assigned to USFORSOM on 9 June) in conjunction with

Montgomery’s QRF and other UNOSOM II forces.82 On 17 June, UNOSOM II again

took the initiative, attacking Aideed’s Mogadishu enclave with AC-130 gunships and

following up with a cordon-and-search operation. The QRF played a lead role, supported by French, Italian, Moroccan, and Pakistani elements of the UNOSOM II

force.83 Also on 17 June, Admiral Howe “called for the arrest and detention of General

Mohamed Aideed.”84 Howe was supported in his action by the American envoy in

Somalia, Robert Gosende, who had become a strong advocate of removing Aideed after

the 5 June attacks on the Pakistani troops.85

The decision to declare Aideed a wanted man came after careful consideration of the

issues and the possible impact on the situation in Mogadishu.86 The most critical factor

in Howe’s thinking was the finding of a panel of UN jurists who had reviewed the evidence of the 5 June attacks and found “powerful circumstantial evidence . . . buttressed

by the testimony of a credible witness,” that the attacks had been well planned, well exe

cuted, and well coordinated.87 The panel also confirmed the complicity of Aideed and

determined that adequate grounds existed for his arrest and prosecution.88 Howe further discussed the matter with Kofi Annan (at the time Assistant Secretary-General for

Peacekeeping), Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and other Somalia specialists at the

UN before deciding to arrest Aideed.89

The final element influencing Howe’s decision was a 13 June demonstration at the

Kilometer Four strongpoint in south Mogadishu. During this protest, Pakistani troops

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nearby buildings. Between eight and twenty Somalis suffered wounds in an excha

gunfire during that incident, depending on the source.90 Based on intelligence tha

Howe considered solid, it appeared that Aideed’s followers had fired into their ow

protesters to inflate casualties and create the impression of UNOSOM II brutalit

Howe believed that “if this man would kill his own people in order to accomplish 

goals, he really ought to come off the streets, he ought to be detained. He needed 

through the legal process.”92 Several weeks later, UN officials authorized a $25,00

reward for information leading to Aideed’s arrest. According to feedback Howe

received from military leaders, UNOSOM II’s warrant for Aideed’s arrest had no 

bility on the street without a reward; offering rewards for information on terrori

become normal throughout the world even at this early date.93 There followed va

reports that Aideed had in turn placed a reward on Howe for a million dollars, an

other UNOSOM II leaders for as much as $250,000.94 When told that the SNA ha

a million-dollar price on his head in response to the $25,000 reward for Aideed, 

quipped, “Well, all I can tell you is that we can pay the $25,000.”95

Over the next several weeks, UNOSOM II executed a series of attacks against SNA 

ities and weapons sites. The QRF led most of these actions, with the participation 

some coalition units. Concurrently, Aideed’s forces conducted mortar and RPG a

against UNOSOM II positions at the port, airport, embassy, and other facilities, a

as ambushes and sniper fire at targets of opportunity.96 On 12 July, the QRF laun

controversial attack on a major SNA command-and-control center and meeting 

known as “Abdi House.”97 Officers of the QRF had planned and scheduled the rai

based on information that important militia leaders would confer there that day. 

attacking with helicopters firing TOW antitank missiles and 20 mm guns, a U.S. 

assault company swept the facility. After a firefight within the compound, it clear

objective area and departed the scene.98 U.S. forces suffered no casualties, but afte

irate Somalis attacked and killed four international news reporters who came to 

the site.99

Although highly successful as a tactical operation and damaging to Aideed’s oper

the unilateral nature of the attack on Abdi House created problems within the

UNOSOM II alliance. Most of the previous attacks had been combined operation

they had been preceded by warnings, permitting civilians and noncombatants 

batants as well, for that matter) to flee the scene. The attack on Abdi House had

included no such warning, causing some coalition members to consider it und

provocative.100 Additionally, some observers contended that the supposed meetin

militia leaders had been in fact a convocation of various clan and faction leaders 

gathered to discuss “a less belligerent approach to United Nations and the possib

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news reporter has suggested that there were actually two separate meetings—the

Aideed military conference and a meeting of Somali elders—in near proximity; U.S.

intelligence had known only about the militia planning session, and the attack had

inadvertently encompassed both groups.102 All these complications (the consternation

of UNOSOM II partners over the attack and the murder of the reporters), coupled

with the unifying effect this attack may have had within Somali factions, tended to nullify any tactical advantages gained from this operation.103

On 23 June, the USS Wasp ARG and 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somali waters to

shore up U.S. military capability and support UNOSOM II operations. A normal rotation of command had occurred in the Persian Gulf, with Captain Charles Vian replacing Kenneth Pyle as commodore of the Wasp ARG.104 Upon arrival of Wasp off

Mogadishu, Colonel Broderick conferred with General Montgomery to discuss future

operations. During the meeting, fresh intelligence arrived on the location of Aideed,

and the two leaders agreed to prepare a direct-action mission by 24th MEU (SOC) to

capture the SNA leader. Broderick quickly tailored his maritime special-purpose force,

consisting of elements from the MEU (SOC) and naval special warfare forces, and

launched the mission from the deck of Wasp.105 The raid was based on current intelligence regarding Aideed’s whereabouts, and it was flawlessly executed, but Aideed was

not at the target site.106

After this operation, Broderick again mixed military action with humanitarian activity

sending his medical team ashore at Merca (near Mogadishu) and other locations to set

up medical and dental clinics. Throughout the day, as Marines fanned out to clear the

surrounding areas and provide secure environments, Navy doctors and corpsmen

treated Somali patients, often as many as thirty per hour.107 Broderick’s 24th MEU

(SOC) also escorted grain convoys, conducted riot-control training for coalition forces

and augmented the aviation and explosive-ordnance-disposal elements of the QRF.108

It even undertook helpful civic-action projects in faraway Bossasso before departing

Somali waters—one of the few operations undertaken in northern Somalia during the

various incursions of the 1990s.109

After the 12 July attack on Abdi House, the conflict between UNOSOM II and Aideed

continued at varying levels of intensity through the end of August. Four American

military policemen died on 9 August when their vehicle was destroyed by a commanddetonated mine.110 This followed an attack on an American contractor (Brown & Root)

vehicle that had wounded two Americans. Largely, these attacks resulted from attempts

of SNA forces to regain the initiative they had lost when the QRF began offensive operations following the 5 June ambush.111 It became clear that Aideed and his leadership

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ing their attacks to U.S. personnel).112 Fully schooled on the U.S. defeat in Vietna

the retreat from Lebanon after the October 1983 Beirut bombing, they had corre

identified the center of gravity for UNOSOM II as being the American media an

political leadership.113 Inflict enough U.S. casualties, SNA leaders reasoned, and th

media will create pressure on American politicians for withdrawal.114 Once Amer

involvement was ended, Aideed’s forces could marginalize the UN mission to Som

and eventually compel it to depart.115 In Ambassador Oakley’s words, “The Unite

States became public enemy number one for all the Somalis who supported Aide

During July and August, Montgomery organized and trained the QRF for “snatch 

ations,” to capture Aideed and his most important lieutenants.117 That effort, alon

attacks against SNA operation centers and facilities, had the effect of driving him

deeper into hiding in the backstreets and underground of Mogadishu.118 Montgo

had a very high regard for his QRF, but it was essentially light infantry of the 10t

Mountain Division, not trained or equipped for this type of operation. He believ

that UNOSOM II needed special-operations troops with the configuration, train

and capability designed for such missions. Additionally, Montgomery believed h

needed to augment UNOSOM II with heavy forces to protect his troops and bett

port humanitarian operations as the conflict with Aideed intensified. Accordingl

Montgomery requested a mechanized task force and an air cavalry troop.119 As w

see, the issue of sending heavy forces onto Somalia would have a long and tortur

Montgomery did not need to request special operations units, because Admiral H

was already making repeated appeals for them through his contacts in Washingto

had been since as early as 8 June.120 Montgomery now supported these requests, o

course, thereby giving them more weight with American decision makers.121 How

neither General Powell in Washington or General Hoar in Tampa had any enthus

for sending those forces into Somalia.122 Hoar was particularly skeptical about th

lihood of capturing Aideed, considering the prospect for success no better than o

four.123 Both Hoar and Powell ultimately acquiesced to the request for special ope

tions forces, because the commanders on the scene considered them necessary to

accomplish the mission.124 But even more to the point, President Clinton and his

national security adviser, Tony Lake, decided on 22 August, after an attack that

wounded six Americans, that it was time to bring Aideed to justice and ordered t

deployment.125 This led to the arrival of Task Force RANGER late in August 1993.1

Task Force RANGER consisted of a specially structured (task organized) team of v

special operations units amounting to some 450 soldiers. Commanded by Major 

eral William F. Garrison, USA (who also commanded the Joint Special Operation

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that UNOSOM II leaders believed would ensure the capture of Aideed. Despite the task

force’s name, U.S. Army Rangers made up only about a third of the unit, essentially one

company. The other major elements included a squadron from Delta Force and a

detachment of the U.S. Army’s special operations aviation unit from Task Force 160.127

“The unit’s mission was to capture Aideed and six of his top aides” and bring to justice

those considered responsible for the 5 June ambush of the Pakistani soldiers.128

As mentioned earlier, the arrival of these special operation units further complicated

the already complex command relationships between UNOSOM II forces. Although

Task Force RANGER operated within Somalia in support of CONTINUE HOPE’s objectives, General Garrison served under the operational and tactical control of Central

Command.129 In short, Task Force RANGER remained a strategic asset, under the

authority of General Hoar. Despite this anomalous situation, General Hoar made it

clear that he expected Garrison to coordinate his actions with Montgomery and keep

Montgomery well informed of plans.130 In fact, Garrison established an excellent relationship with Montgomery, and the two commanders worked very well together.131 Yet

this did not constitute unity of command, and that fact would prove problematic when

a well planned and well executed operation turned bad.

In mid-September, Montgomery again requested heavy reinforcements for

USFORSOM, including an armor platoon of four M-1 tanks, a mechanized company

with fourteen M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and an artillery battery of six 105

mm howitzers.132 As commander of U.S. forces and deputy commander of UNOSOM I

operations, Montgomery believed he needed these units to enhance force protection,

given the increased incidents of mine warfare, sniping, mortar attacks, and ambushes

continuously experienced since 5 June. Admiral Howe agreed, believing these forces

were needed to permit movement within Mogadishu and for continued support of

humanitarian operations.133 Generals Hoar and Powell endorsed Montgomery’s request

(minus the artillery), but Secretary of Defense Les Aspin rejected it, out of concern

over congressional and public criticism.134 This decision, like the unity-of-command

issue, would come back to haunt military and civilian leaders within the Department o

Defense.

For the most part, the problems that forced UNOSOM II into the role of a combatant

in Somali factional warfare had been limited to Mogadishu—specifically, the areas of

the city controlled by Aideed and his SNA faction. The rest of Somalia actually experienced improvement throughout the summer of 1993.135 The famine had been broken

by February, and in many areas calm and stability had begun to return. The resumption

of business activity and the reopening of schools demonstrated that progress was

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eral Montgomery had been correct to identify Mogadishu as the center of gravity 

CONTINUE HOPE. However improved the conditions in most of Somalia, the con

between Aideed and UNOSOM II and the consequent battle for control of the ca

city would decide the outcome of the UN mission in Somalia.137

With the arrival of Task Force RANGER at the end of August, the search for Aidee

became the focus of UN operations, attracting the attention of military leaders a

international press. After a short period of settling in and rehearsals, Task Force

RANGER launched a succession of operations intended to capture and detain Aid

and his top aides.138 The first major action involved an attack against the Lig Liga

House on 30 August. The Lig Ligato House had supposedly replaced the Abdi Ho

a command-and-control node and SNA meeting place. Unfortunately for Task F

RANGER and USFORSOM, this assault proved somewhat of an embarrassment, b

the U.S. team captured eight employees of the UN Development Program, whom 

immediately released. (Perhaps the UNDP employees should have been the ones

embarrassed, since they were in a location frequented by Aideed, and from which 

leadership had instructed them to depart. The presence of substantial amounts o

and contraband material also raised questions regarding their activities.)139

During September, there followed a series of textbook operations that captured a 

ber of SNA leaders. Notwithstanding the skill and professionalism demonstrated 

these raids, getting current intelligence on Aideed and his most important lieuten

proved very difficult.140 This shortcoming resulted in the occasional detention of 

cent people, causing criticism from various individuals—mostly in the media—w

understanding of the difficulty of such missions. Regrettably, they also drew caus

criticism from Secretary Aspin, who should have appreciated the problems.141 Bu

operation on 21 September that succeeded in arresting Aideed’s most important 

tenant, Osman Ato, somewhat offset that negative commentary. The apprehensio

occurred near the Digfer Hospital in downtown Mogadishu, and it also netted th

Osman Ato’s bodyguards.142 Osman Ato, of course, had been an important point 

contact for American leaders during PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, before 

fissure between UNOSOM II and the SNA developed during CONTINUE HOPE. H

sent into captivity on an island off Kismayo, but General Hoar would arrange for 

early release.143

Several other important considerations flowed from the 21 September action. Fir

Aideed—who already had gone into hiding—went even farther underground, m

it more difficult to obtain information on his whereabouts or movements.144 Add

ally, whenever the special operations helicopters, known as “Little Birds” (an arm

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that they were on a snatch mission. If Aideed happened to be in a vulnerable location,

he simply took a walk and submerged himself in the friendly masses of Mogadishu.145

By this point Aideed had become more important to Somalis as a symbol of resistance

than as the leader of his faction and subclan. The failed efforts to capture Aideed

tended to enhance his stature and to unify him and the SNA with all but his most

implacable enemies.146 This played into Aideed’s hands as he skillfully manipulated the

information front.147 Among other clever ploys, he cast the UN and United States in the

role of neocolonialists attempting to establish a new trusteeship in Somalia. In so

doing, he defined himself as defender of the nation.148

A second important point emerging from the 21 September raid was the considerable

firepower encountered by the helicopters of Task Force RANGER. For the first time a

high volume of RPG rounds was received from the SNA militia. It required the Rangers

and Delta Force soldiers to return fire, inflicting an unknown but substantial number

of casualties. Previous raids by Task Force RANGER had been so fast and efficient that

neither side received high casualties;149 the experience of 21 September suggested that

operations could become more dangerous. Aideed’s fighters had obviously adjusted to

American tactics, and this boded ill for the future.150 Four days later, on 25 September, a

Black Hawk helicopter belonging to Montgomery’s QRF became the victim of an RPG

round, killing three American crewmen.151

In the early afternoon of 3 October, leaders of Task Force RANGER learned from a Somali

informant of a meeting near the Olympic Hotel, in the heart of Aideed-controlled

Mogadishu. According to this intelligence, the gathering would include two of Aideed’s

top lieutenants, Abdi Hassan Awali and Omar Salad Elmi.152 The Delta team leaders

quickly developed a plan and dispatched a snatch team, which captured twenty-four

individuals, including the two Aideed advisers.153 The task force called for a prestaged

truck convoy to evacuate the detainees, which arrived on the scene at about 1600.

Twenty minutes later a Black Hawk helicopter piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Clifton

Wolcott, which provided fire support from onboard snipers, was struck by a rocketpropelled grenade and crashed into the Mogadishu street, killing two and injuring five

U.S. soldiers.154 This precipitated the best-known action of the Somalia incursions—the

“Black Hawk Down” incident, or the “Battle of Mogadishu.”155

As Rangers and Delta operators moved to protect their comrades in the downed helicopter, a second Black Hawk, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, also

took an RPG round and crash-landed some distance to the south. A rescue column

consisting of Task Force RANGER personnel, followed by a company of the QRF under

command of Lieutenant Colonel William C. David, attempted to break through to the

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just past th

meter Four 

circle the re

element tri

an ambush 

forced it ba

the airport

special ope

helicopter

inserted tw

Delta Force 

commissio

officers near the Durant crash site, where they attempted to hold off a growing th

of armed Somali fighters. After a heroic stand, the small party of defenders was o

run by the mob, killing all except Durant, who suffered serious injuries.157 When 

cue party finally broke through to the Durant crash site some hours after midnig

neither Durant nor the American bodies remained. Durant had become a prison

the SNA, and irate Somalis had desecrated the bodies of his five comrades.158

After the failure of the first relief effort to break through at the Kilometer Four c

Montgomery had organized a composite force of U.S. troops, Pakistani tanks, an

Malaysian armored personnel carriers; it took some time to organize and prepar

action. Clearly, if Montgomery had possessed the armored task force he had requ

a powerful reaction force could have been launched much sooner.159 Once Montg

put together his “pickup” rescue team, it fought its way to the two crash sites in t

early morning hours of 4 October.160 The soldiers of Task Force RANGER had been

fighting in downtown Mogadishu for over fourteen hours when the relief colum

arrived.161 During the day, they received small reinforcements by helicopter, along 

a resupply of ammunition. The nearly one hundred soldiers of Task Force RANGE

had formed around the Wolcott crash site fought off all attempts to overrun thei

tion. Unlike at the Durant crash site, the rescue team arrived in time to relieve th

Wolcott defenders, evacuate the wounded, and recover the dead.162

The fierce battle of 3–4 October 1993 constituted the bloodiest urban fighting fo

forces since the Vietnam War. The American and coalition forces suffered eightee

Americans killed and eighty-four wounded, two Malaysians killed and seven wou

and two Pakistanis wounded. Estimates of Somali casualties vary widely, but the 

Army after-action report puts the number at three to five hundred killed and ove

seven hundred wounded.163 The Somali figure would have been even greater (and

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unthinkingly removed the AC-130 Spectre gunships from Somalia in early August.164

Grotesque pictures of an angry mob dragging a dead American soldier through the

streets of Mogadishu appeared in the United States late on 4 October.165 It was a sudden

shock to the American people and their political leadership.166 The United States had

gone into Somalia to end the famine and save lives. How had that resulted in bloody

urban combat and the dragging of an American soldier through the streets of

Mogadishu? Additionally, a public exhibition of severely injured Chief Warrant Officer

Durant, the only survivor of the fighting at his crash site, also became a dominant new

item, further distressing and angering the American public.167

The Battle of Mogadishu and the earlier failures to capture Aideed had vindicated Gen

eral Hoar’s doubts about the efficacy of this approach, much to his distress. His regret,

of course, was the loss of U.S. troops, whom he characterized as “superb soldiers[;] . . .

nobody’s any better than these guys.”168 He also believed the decision process had been

weakened by the presence of people in high positions who did not understand the realities of combat operations. Additionally, he felt that options with greater promise than

the capture and trial of Aideed had existed during the summer and fall of 1993. The

most hopeful of them had been an offer by the president of Ethiopia to host a meeting

of all aggrieved parties to resolve outstanding issues and end the violence.169 Leaders in

the UN and United States, however, had found no attraction in that prospect at the

time. Hoar also finds fault in himself, for permitting the snatch operations to continue

after the first several failures. He never believed that the operation had much chance of

success in the first place, and he saw virtually none after the element of surprise had

been lost: “I feel that I was culpable by not ending that goddamn thing.”170 Of course,

that would have been difficult, since orders for the operation came from the White

House.171

Notes

1. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report,

p. 71.

2. Zinni interview.

3. Montgomery interview.

4. The army after-action report states that only

22 percent of the UNOSOM II staff was in

place during the transition, whereas General

Montgomery (and other sources) remembered the number at about 30 percent. Ibid.;

U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 75, 81.

5. Montgomery interview; U.S. Army Dept.,

Somalia After Action Report.

6. In a series of UNSC resolutions, the United

Nations extended the UNOSOM II mandate

through 31 March 1995. See UNSC Resolutions 878, 886, 946, and 954 in United Nations and Somalia, pp. 321–22, 337–38, 435–

37, 462–63.

7. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 43–44, 261–

63.

8. Montgomery interview.

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UNOSOM II at the time of transition varies

from sixteen thousand to eighteen thousand,

depending on the account (sometimes it varies within the same account). U.S. Army

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 26,

63, 75, 77, 80; United Nations and Somalia,

pp. 49–50.

10. Montgomery interview.

11. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 241.

12. Montgomery interview.

13. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 44–45.

14. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology.

15. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 10.

16. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 50, 62.

17. Howe interview.

18. Allard, Somalia Operations, pp. 34, 56; Hirsch

and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore

Hope, p. 119; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After

Action Report, pp. 26, 28.

19. Montgomery interview; Hirsch and Oakley,

Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 115.

20. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 84.

21. Howe interview.

22. Montgomery interview; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 92.

23. The United Somali Congress (USC) in

Mogadishu divided into two political factions after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. The

faction under Aideed and his Habr Gidr

subclan allied with the Somali National Alliance (SNA), which included the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of Omar Jess and

the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

located in Baidoa. Therefore, Aideed’s faction became known as the USC/SNA and

Omar Jess’s as the SPM/SNA. Eventually,

many observers and analysts dropped the

“USC” from the Aideed faction and the

“SPM” from the Omar Jess faction, referring

to them as simply “the SNA.” After the break,

Ali Mahdi’s Abgal-based faction became

known as the USC/SSA, and then simply the

SSA (Somali Salvation Alliance). In the interest of consistency, this study will refer hereafter to the Aideed and Omar Jess factions as

the SNA and Ali Mahdi’s faction as the SSA.

U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action

lia and Operation Restore Hope, pp. 1

Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Read

24. Baumann and Yates, with Washingto

Clan against the World,” p. 107; Mon

interview; United Nations and Somal

25. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Se

p. 143; United Nations and Somalia, p

Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 40.

26. The Rajo newspaper and radio statio

established and operated by the 8th P

Battalion of the U.S. Army’s 4th Psyc

cal Operations Group (Airborne), ou

Fort Bragg, North Carolina. U.S. Arm

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p

49; Resource Guide, p. 14; Hirsch and 

Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 

63.

27. Montgomery interview; Clancy, Zinn

Koltz, Battle Ready, pp. 267–68.

28. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 153 note 5.

29. Ibid., pp. 116–17; U.S. Army Dept., S

After Action Report, pp. 49, 65, 179–8

30. Montgomery interview.

31. United Nations and Somalia, p. 49; “R

of the Commission of Inquiry Establ

Pursuant to Resolution 885 (1993) to 

tigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM 

sonnel, 1 June 1994,” in United Natio

Somalia [hereafter UN Commission 

quiry Report], p. 375.

32. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Actio

port, pp. 86–88.

33. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 117; UN Commissio

quiry Report, p. 375.

34. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 117.

35. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Actio

port, p. 86.

36. Ibid., p. 87.

37. Security Council Resolution 814.

38. This evidence included information 

both human intelligence sources and 

overflights. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia 

Action Report, p. 86; Howe PBS Fron

interview.

39. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Actio

port, p. 86.

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41. Ibid., p. 87; Montgomery interview.

42. Neither Aideed nor any of his principal aides

were available to receive the inspection notification on 4 June. Osman Ato later claimed

that had UNOSOM II officials delivered the

notice to a member of the Cease-Fire Committee the violent incident of 5 June 1993

would not have happened. UN Commission

of Inquiry Report, p. 398; U.S. Army Dept.,

Somalia After Action Report, p. 88.

43. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 88.

44. Oakley interview.

45. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 89.

46. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 117–18, 117 note 5; Montgomery interview.

47. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 376.

48. Ibid.

49. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 89.

50. A subsequent UN inquiry determined that

the U.S. technical team had been included

for the purpose of surveying the radio facility and transmission equipment. That inquiry did not find any intent to close down

the radio during the inspection of 5 June,

and General Montgomery emphatically denies any intent to do so on that occasion. He

does acknowledge that UNOSOM II leaders

had the issue under consideration and may

later have felt forced to do so. Montgomery

interview; UN Commission of Inquiry

Report, p. 375.

51. Howe PBS Frontline interview; U.S. Army

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 89.

52. Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” p. 144.

53. Montgomery interview.

54. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 376;

U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 89–90.

55. Clarke PBS Frontline interview.

56. Howe PBS Frontline interview; Montgomery

interview.

57. United Nations and Somalia, p. 50; Montgomery interview; UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 376; U.S. Army Dept.,

Somalia After Action Report, p. 128.

59. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary

p. 143; United Nations and Somalia, p. 50;

Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” p. 144.

60. During September 1993, a series of speeches

by President Clinton, Secretary Christopher

Ambassador Albright, and National Security

Adviser Lake explained the new administration’s concept of engagement and enlargement for the post–Cold War era. See

President Bill Clinton, “Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 27

September 1993; Secretary of State Warren

Christopher, “Speech at Columbia University,” 20 September 1993; National Security

Adviser Anthony Lake, “Speech at Johns

Hopkins University,” 21 September 1993;

and Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright,

“Speech at the National Defense University,”

23 September 1993. Reprinted in Naval War

College, Newport, Rhode Island, handout

TFP-14, 1993.

61. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, interview by

PBS Frontline, “Ambush in Mogadishu,” 29

September 1998, available at www.pbs.org.

62. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary

p. 143; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 108;

Bryden, “Somalia,” p. 149; Hirsch and

Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope

p. 118; Donatella Lorch, “Somali Clan Chief

Poses Tough Problem for U.N.,” New York

Times, 17 June 1993.

63. Montgomery interview.

64. Professor Tom Farer (of American University, Washington, D.C.), executive summary

of report, 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia, 24 August 1993, in

United Nations and Somalia [hereafter Professor Tom Farer Report], pp. 296–300; UN

Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 381.

65. Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” pp.

541–42.

66. Oakley PBS Frontline interview.

67. Clarke PBS Frontline interview; Howe interview and PBS Frontline interview; Montgomery interview; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia

After Action Report, pp. 89–90.

68. At every AWSS, the actual weapons and munitions present differed from the inventory

lists. In most cases, inspectors could not find

heavy weapons listed on the inventories. In

other cases, inspectors discovered weapons

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of seriousness in complying with the disarmament agreement. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 90; “Report of the

Secretary General on the Implementation of

Security Council Resolution 837 (1993), 1

July 1993,” in United Nations and Somalia,

pp. 273–75.

69. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary,

p. 143; United Nations and Somalia, p. 50.

70. United Nations Security Council Resolution

837, 6 June 1993, in United Nations and Somalia, pp. 267–68; United Nations and Somalia, p. 50; Woods, “U.S. Government

Decision Making Process,” p. 162.

71. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 118 and note 7.

72. “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution

837,” pp. 274–75.

73. Oakley interview.

74. Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,”

p. 542.

75. Zinni interview.

76. Gérard Prunier, “The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope,” in

Learning from Somalia, ed. Clarke and

Herbst, pp. 143, 147 note 27.

77. Howe PBS Frontline interview; Montgomery

interview; UN Commission of Inquiry Report, pp. 378, 385.

78. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 377.

79. Oakley interview.

80. Security Council Resolution 837; Montgomery interview.

81. During the AC-130 gunship attack on Radio

Mogadishu, Montgomery was careful not to

destroy the archives. By this time he knew

where they were located, and he took precautions to protect them while disabling the station. Montgomery interview; “Report of the

Secretary General on the Implementation of

Security Council Resolution 837,” pp. 276–

77.

82. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” pp. 111–13; Daniel

P. Bolger, Savage Peace: Americans at War in

the 1990s (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995), p.

301; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action

Report, pp. 9, 129–30; UN Commission of

Inquiry Report, p. 399.

ties in this operation, five killed and 

nine wounded. Poole, Effort to Save S

p. 44; Montgomery interview; U.S. A

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p

31.

84. United Nations and Somalia, p. 52; U

Army Dept., Somalia After Action Rep

p. 9.

85. Patrick J. Sloyan, “Somalia Mission C

Clinton Called the Shots in Failed Po

Targeting Aideed,” Newsday, 5 Decem

1993.

86. John Drysdale, Whatever Happened t

lia? (London: HAAN, 1999, repr. 200

189–92; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia 

eration Restore Hope, p. 120; Howe P

Frontline interview.

87. Professor Tom Farer Report, pp. 296–

88. Montgomery interview; U.S. Army D

Somalia After Action Report, p. 9.

89. Poole, Effort to Save Somalia, p. 45; H

terview; Howe PBS Frontline intervie

90. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, 

399–400; Professor Tom Farer Repor

296–300.

91. Not all accounts of the 13 June incid

Kilometer Four agree that SNA gunm

fired into the crowd. John Drysdale, 

viser to Special Representative Jonath

Howe at the time of this incident, ar

emphatically against this claim in his 

ever Happened to Somalia? (see page 

UN Commission of Inquiry Report, 

399.

92. Howe PBS Frontline interview; Profe

Tom Farer Report, p. 297; UN Comm

of Inquiry Report, p. 378.

93. Howe PBS Frontline interview.

94. Lt. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery, U

(Ret.), interview by PBS Frontline, “A

in Mogadishu,” 29 September 1998, a

at www.pbs.org; Clarke and Gosende

malia,” p. 144.

95. Howe interview.

96. Montgomery interview; UN Commi

Inquiry Report, pp. 391–92.

97. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, 

404.

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Clan against the World,” pp. 118–19; UN

Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 379.

99. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 9; UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 404.

100. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 97–98.

101. Oakley, “Somalia,” p. 15.

102. Keith B. Richburg, “U.N. Helicopter Assault

in Somalia Targeted Aideed’s Top Commanders,” Washington Post, 16 July 1993;

Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?

pp. 203–205.

103. Accounts of the number of Somali casualties

reported from the attack on the Abdi House

vary widely. UNOSOM II estimated twenty

Somali dead, the ICRC suggests fifty-four

dead and 161 wounded, whereas SNA officials claim seventy-three killed. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 379; Sommers,

Hope Restored? p. 41.

104. Broderick interview; Pyle interview.

105. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology, pp.

12, 28.

106. Broderick interview; George P. Fenton, “Marine Expeditionary Units: On the Operational Level in MOOTW,” Marine Corps

Gazette (March 1996), pp. 63–64.

107. Wood, Sense of Values, pp. 210–12.

108. Broderick interview.

109. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology, pp.

12, 28; Fenton, “Marine Expeditionary

Units,” p. 64; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After

Action Report, p. 100.

110. United Nations and Somalia, p. 53.

111. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 98.

112. Keith B. Richburg, “In War on Aideed, U.N.

Battled Itself: Internal Conflict Stymied Decisions on Military Operations,” Washington

Post, 6 December 1993; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 134.

113. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 121–22, 121 note 19;

Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” p.

546.

114. Richburg, “In War on Aideed, U.N. Battled

Itself.”

544; Bolger, Savage Peace, p. 301; Drysdale,

Whatever Happened to Somalia? pp. 212–13.

116. Oakley interview.

117. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 136.

118. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

119. Ibid., p. 134; Montgomery PBS Frontline

interview.

120. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of

Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly,

1999), p. 91; Howe interview.

121. Lawrence E. Casper, Falcon Brigade: Combat

and Command in Somalia and Haiti (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 31;

Howe PBS Frontline interview.

122. Oakley interview.

123. Hoar interview; Patrick J. Sloyan, “A Look a

. . . the Somalia Endgame; How the Warlord

Outwitted Clinton’s Spooks,” Washington

Post, 3 April 1994; Oakley PBS Frontline

interview.

124. Howe PBS Frontline interview; Montgomery

interview.

125. Sloyan, “Somalia Mission Control.”

126. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 10, 100, 155.

127. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 32.

128. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 136.

129. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 32.

130. Hoar interview; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia

After Action Report, pp. 136–37.

131. Montgomery interview; Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 35.

132. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 134–35.

133. Howe PBS Frontline interview.

134. Poole, Effort to Save Somalia, pp. 55–56; R.

W. Apple, Jr., “Clinton Sending Reinforcements after Heavy Losses in Somalia,” New

York Times, 5 October 1993; Patrick J.

Sloyan, “Hunting Down Aideed; Why

Clinton Changed Mind,” Newsday, 6 Decem

ber 1993; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Ac

tion Report, p. 135.

135. Howe interview.

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Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp.

100–101.

137. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 102.

138. Bolger, Savage Peace, pp. 308–13.

139. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, p. 22; Casper,

Falcon Brigade, p. 37; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 137–38.

140. Sloyan, “Hunting Down Aideed.”

141. Ibid.

142. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 138.

143. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 37; Hoar interview.

144. Hoar interview; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia

After Action Report, p. 138.

145. Hoar interview.

146. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 123; Michael Maren, The

Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign

Aid and International Charity (New York:

Free Press, 1997), p. 228.

147. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 119–20.

148. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 375;

Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? p.

197; Howe interview.

149. Bolger, Savage Peace, p. 311; U.S. Army

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 138.

150. In a meeting with General Zinni some weeks

later, Aideed stated that he and his officers

had observed Task Force RANGER operating

out of the Mogadishu airfield and had realized that its helicopters were the key vulnerability. Therefore, when SNA leaders

conducted important meetings, Aideed

placed his fighters on the rooftops of surrounding buildings armed with machine

guns and RPG launchers. By concentrating a

high volume fire on the helicopters they

hoped to bring one down, with the expectation that the American assault force would

rally to protect its crew. This would allow his

militia and armed sympathizers to fix the

U.S. soldiers in place, swarm to the site, and

concentrate their firepower against the now

stationary defenders in the streets of

Mogadishu. Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, USMC,

interview by PBS Frontline, “Ambush in

Mogadishu” series, 29 September 1998, available at www.pbs.org. Clancy, Zinni, and

interview.

151. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 25–26, 62

Army Dept., Somalia After Action Rep

105, 156.

152. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, pp. 28–2

per, Falcon Brigade, p. 32.

153. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, p. 29.

154. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 38; U.S. Ar

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p

39.

155. The most thorough account of this a

Mark Bowden’s 1999 Black Hawk Do

Story of Modern War. A popular mov

the same name provided an exciting 

riveting) dramatization of the event. 

all “historical” movies produced by H

wood, it also played fast and loose w

facts. Lawrence Casper’s 2001 book F

Brigade: Combat and Command in So

and Haiti provides another excellent 

of this incident, including a broad pe

tive on the involvement of the QRF, 

stani troops, and Malaysian forces. B

Black Hawk Down; Casper, Falcon Br

pp. 31–110; Montgomery interview.

156. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 45–46; U

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p

12, 139.

157. The two soldiers who voluntarily we

rescue of Durant and his crew, Maste

Gary I. Gordon and Sgt. 1st Class Ra

Shugart, did so knowing they were li

ing to their deaths. Their spirited def

held off the Somali throng long enou

an SNA leader to control the situatio

thereby saving Durant’s life when the 

swarmed over the crash site. The mil

leader knew the value of holding an 

can prisoner, whereas the crowd was 

ily after blood. For their actions at th

Durant crash site, both Gordon and 

posthumously received Medals of Ho

Bolger, Savage Peace, pp. 323–24; Cas

Falcon Brigade, pp. 40–41; U.S. Army 

Somalia After Action Report, p. 11.

158. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 76–77, 92

note 1; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia Aft

tion Report, pp. 11, 139.

159. Hoar interview.

160. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 46–87; M

gomery PBS Frontline interview.

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162. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 138–39.

163. Ibid., pp. 13, 139.

164. Bolger, Savage Peace, p. 324.

165. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, pp. 292, 304.

166. Oakley interview.

167. Apple, “Clinton Sending Reinforcements after Heavy Losses in Somalia”; Hirsch and

p. 127.

168. Hoar interview.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 122; Sloyan, “Somalia Mission Control.”

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Operation CONTINUE HOPE

Reinforcement and Withdrawal

In some ways, the Battle of Mogadishu was a replay of the 1968 Vietnam Tet offe

in microcosm. American leaders had not prepared the public for this level of vio

and as a result the vivid press images created revulsion within the population and

among members of Congress.1

Just as Tet 1968 weakened American commitmen

Vietnam by shattering the will of irresolute political leaders, so too would the Ba

Mogadishu result in American withdrawal from Somalia.2

In both cases, elected o

cials had committed the armed forces of the United States to a role that America

not fully understand. When press coverage of an unexpected and violent battle re

the deception (intentional in the case of Vietnam, probably unintended in Soma

the revelation impaired the war effort.3

Ironically, the same media clout that had 

nally stimulated U.S. intervention in Somalia by exhibiting images of suffering n

undercut that effort with the images of the desecration of an American soldier.4

O

course, the Vietnam analogy goes only so far. The size, impact, and results of the 

failures are not comparable. Yet it is interesting to note that if both Tet 1968 and

Mogadishu 1993 constituted public-relations defeats, they also represented milit

victories. But they were victories that American leaders at the time chose not to e

It is understandable that Americans did not have a clear appreciation of their cou

role in Somalia at the time of the Battle of Mogadishu. Many thought American

involvement had ended with the return of U.S. troops at the conclusion of Opera

RESTORE HOPE. In a highly publicized event at the White House on 5 May 1993, 

dent Clinton greeted General Johnston and a representative group from the UNI

force with a laudatory speech declaring, among other things, “I say to you Gener

[Johnston], and to all whom you brought with you: Welcome home, and thank y

a job very, very well done.”5

This seemed like a “mission accomplished” ceremony

although people who followed the Somalia situation in detail knew that the Unit

States had a continuing commitment to the UN effort. But for most Americans—

do not follow foreign affairs closely—this welcome home on the White House la

CHAPTER SEVEN

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ments of RESTORE HOPE justified the recognition that President Clinton conferred. Yet

due in part to good press coverage of the White House event, there remained only a

vague awareness among most Americans that nearly four thousand U.S. soldiers continued to serve in Somalia, and there was even less clarity about their role.7

After the Battle

of Mogadishu, this ambiguity and the anger it engendered strengthened the hand of

political leaders who wanted the United States out of Somalia and free of the UN commitment. It also gave rise to a new term in the American lexicon—“mission creep.”8

“Mission creep” is a somewhat amorphous concept that is now widely used by politicians, military leaders, and pundits alike. It suggests the drifting of a military mission

into something of higher responsibility and of greater cost in terms of blood and treasure than originally intended. The initial incursions of PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE

HOPE had operated well within the mandate of Security Council Resolution 794 and

the intentions of American leaders. Any expansion of U.S. activity during UNITAF

operations—such as engineering support to local communities, reestablishment of a

police force, civic-action projects, and refugee resettlement assistance—had been

humanitarian in nature and did not cross a threshold that would lead to major combat

situations.9

Although some may consider even this a form of mission creep, it never

committed the United States to higher levels of responsibility in Somalia. Some critics

even suggest the UNITAF operation constituted “mission shrink,” by virtue of its failing to disarm all Somali factions in accordance with the Resolution 794 mandate and

the expectations of many leaders.10 This study has already addressed the debate on disarmament in some detail, but it is important to note that many observers believe the

failure of UNITAF to disarm the major warring factions in Somalia contributed to the

problems experienced later during UNOSOM II.11 Nevertheless, had UNITAF

attempted a complete disarmament as these critics suggest it should have, the accompa

nying violence would surely have constituted severe mission creep.

The transition from RESTORE HOPE to CONTINUE HOPE clearly signaled a greater

involvement in Somali affairs through the process of nation building, as expressed in Res

olution 814, substantially drafted by representatives of the United States.12 The foreign

policy initiatives of the new Clinton administration—“assertive multilateralism” and

“enlargement and engagement”—greatly influenced the language of Resolution 814.13

Unfortunately, the individuals who committed the United States to nation building in

Somalia did not coordinate with the established national security organizations, thereby

preventing leaders who questioned its wisdom from voicing their objections.14 The UN

decision to take the step toward violent conflict with Aideed’s SNA after the 5 June

attacks on the Pakistani forces found expression in Resolution 837, again supported by

representatives of the U.S. government.15 In fact, with passage of Resolution 837 the UN

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between UNOSOM II and Aideed’s SNA. This was a very deliberate decision, take

the UN Security Council and supported—even instigated—by representatives of th

government.16 In General Zinni’s view, declaring Aideed an outlaw and placing a

reward on his head moved the mission from peacekeeping or peacemaking to a f

counterinsurgency warfare.17 This change in the Somalia mission did not result f

mindless drift but from specific actions knowingly undertaken by high-level lead

New York and Washington, as well as in Mogadishu.18

On 7 October 1993, three days after the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton

addressed the nation on Somalia. In it he praised the success of RESTORE HOPE a

lamented the fact that “the people who caused so much of the problem in the be

ning started attacking American, Pakistani, and other troops who were there just 

keep the peace.”19 He also professed that the United States would finish the job in

Somalia, but he allowed less than six months for that purpose: “All American tro

will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred sup

personnel in noncombat roles.”20 Many leaders in the administration and Congre

wanted an immediate withdrawal, but a consensus of the National Security Coun

and other key leaders convinced President Clinton that such action would be unc

scionable.21 In the interim, the president stated, he would increase U.S. strength b

ordering more ground troops and armor into Somalia, along with an aircraft car

and two amphibious ready groups, carrying some 3,600 Marines. The basic purp

these forces included protecting American troops, continuing the humanitarian 

and creating conditions wherein the Somali people could solve their problems am

themselves. To facilitate this process and achieve its rather nebulous objective for 

Somali people, the president asked Ambassador Robert Oakley to return once ag

Somalia.22 To Aideed, hunkered down in the recesses of Mogadishu, all this must 

sounded a lot like victory.23

After President Clinton had made the decision to withdraw from Somalia, he had

tasked General Hoar and Ambassador Albright with informing Secretary-Genera

Boutros-Ghali prior to its public release. It was a message the Secretary-General 

not want to hear and did not take graciously.24 Ambassador Oakley returned to

Mogadishu on 9 October, two days after the president’s speech, accompanied by 

eral Zinni and a new U.S. policy for dealing with Aideed and the Somalia problem

Ironically, this new American policy provided sufficient military power to accom

the original goals of Operation CONTINUE HOPE yet restricted the ability of Gen

Bir and Montgomery to use that power.26 A departure date having been announc

America’s military posture in Somalia now became primarily defensive in nature

Oakley’s words, “Clinton personally ordered the acting chairman of the Joint Ch

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forces against Aideed, the SNA, or other Somalis except in self-defense.”27

President Clinton’s policy shift constituted the third major strategy for U.S. military

involvement in Somalia. The first—under President Bush, Ambassador Oakley, and

General Johnston—had focused on breaking the famine while minimizing conflict with

Somali warlords. Although this strategy involved cooperation with Aideed and other

faction leaders, it was backed up by hardball diplomacy and a powerful military force

under UNITAF, consisting primarily of U.S. Marines and soldiers of the 10th Mountain

Division.28 The second strategy—under President Clinton, Ambassador Albright,

Anthony Lake, General Montgomery, and UN officials Admiral Howe and General

Bir—consisted of nation building through auspices of the United Nations. It constituted a classic mismatch between strategy and resources, wherein the UN attempted to

accomplish larger and more intrusive objectives than under the earlier policy, with sub

stantially less military power and diplomatic support.29 During this phase, communica

tions between the UNOSOM II force and the Aideed faction broke down, allowing the

factor of surprise to enter into the equation within Mogadishu. That resulted in misun

derstandings between the SNA and UN, contributing to the subsequent conflict

between Aideed and UNOSOM II.30 The third strategy followed President Clinton’s

policy speech of 7 October and the consequent reduction in military activity. In this

phase, the United States essentially moved into an exit strategy designed to extract the

United States from UNOSOM II and Somalia after a decent interval. Although U.S.

military and diplomatic power temporarily returned to Somalia during October 1993,

it primarily became a force to protect American personnel until the withdrawal date of

31 March 1994.31 Only during the first phase of America’s involvement in Somalia—

RESTORE HOPE/UNITAF—was there an appropriate match between strategy and

resources. In the second and third phases substantial mismatches existed, although only

in the second phase did this create problems.

Aideed reacted to President Clinton’s speech of 7 October and the changing political

environment in Washington and Somalia by declaring a unilateral cease-fire in

Mogadishu.32 Officially, the UN and United States did not acknowledge Aideed’s ceasefire, but the change in American policy, coupled with the absence of offensive military

activity by UNOSOM II forces, served as an unofficial recognition and acceptance of

the gesture.33 For Aideed, this provided a needed respite. His militia and supporters

had suffered grievous losses in the Battle of Mogadishu. In General Zinni’s opinion,

“the battle that day really took its toll. . . . [A]t that stage in the game they were really

down and worried.”34 But Aideed no longer needed to fight against U.S. and UN forces.

He had only to wait until 31 March 1994, and the situation would turn decidedly in

his favor.35

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believed that the Battle of Mogadishu had severely damaged Aideed and the SNA

in his view, there was now an opportunity to destroy the power of Aideed, whom 

considered the major impediment to progress in Somalia.36 Howe considered the

Somalis good people, who had achieved a level of stability everywhere in their co

except where Aideed ruled.37 Even Omar Jess and General Morgan had made an a

modation in southern Somalia, and Kismayo was no longer the flash point for vi

that it had been in the past.38 With substantial U.S. ground and naval forces flowi

into the operational area, Howe believed UNOSOM II could now eliminate the p

of Aideed and place Somalia on the road to full recovery.39 Unfortunately for How

his concept of victory, President Clinton’s restrictions ensured that the powerful 

ican forces building up in Somalia would primarily operate in a defensive mode.

did conduct extensive planning and rehearsals, along with several complex opera

But these were more in the nature of exercises and shows of force. The days of ta

the fight to Aideed and the SNA had ended with the Battle of Mogadishu.42

Upon their arrival in Mogadishu, Oakley and Zinni (who returned to Somalia at

Oakley’s request) met with Howe, Bir, and Montgomery to gain an understandin

their position on the issues and explain the new American policy for Somalia.43 O

course, U.S. objectives would drive UN action in the future, just as they had in th

After discussions with UN and American leaders, Oakley and Zinni met with rep

tatives of the SNA and eventually with Aideed himself. (They also met with Ali M

representatives, although UNOSOM II had not been at war with his SSA faction.

first order of business involved release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. During 

ings with Aideed’s representatives, Oakley and Zinni persuaded them (and indire

Aideed himself) to release Durant, along with a Nigerian soldier, Umar Shantali, 

the SNA had captured in a bloody shoot-out some weeks earlier.44 Obtaining thes

releases had been problematic and very challenging. In Oakley’s words, “Aideed’

sion to release the prisoners without quid pro quo was exceedingly difficult. Th

sands of casualties in south Mogadishu in the summer and fall had been among 

followers and kinsmen, and feelings were running very high.”45

Oakley’s credibility and his skill at hardball diplomacy overcame opposition to

Durant’s release. Oakley did not actually negotiate for Durant’s release or promis

U.S. action in return. He simply demanded the release as a gesture of good will, w

suggesting dire consequences if refused.46 But when Oakley returned to the Unite

States, he contacted General Hoar and mentioned that Osman Ato was quite ill i

captivity (on, as noted, an island off Kismayo) and that he thought it might be a 

gesture to release him. Hoar accommodated, telling Oakley, “I’m going to release 

Bob, but please don’t tell anybody.”47 Certainly, Oakley did not offer Aideed any q

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gesture deserved another.

Although the release of Durant was important to Oakley’s mission, his broader purpose involved restarting the peace process in Somalia and returning conditions to polit

ical and diplomatic tracks.48 Whereas Howe hoped to finish off Aideed militarily,

Oakley intended to re-create the more conciliatory relations of RESTORE HOPE.

49 This

was consistent with President Clinton’s intent “to make it possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve

their problems and survive when we leave.”50 Oakley’s effort had a positive effect on

calming the situation in Somalia, and his credibility with Aideed and SNA leaders gave

him considerable influence. But Clinton’s lofty goals had no real hope for success once he

announced the withdrawal date of 31 March 1994. Zinni came to believe that the Clinton

administration had given up on accomplishing anything beneficial in Somalia and thereafter simply used Oakley to place the best possible face on the American withdrawal.51

On 16 November, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 885, which in effect

suspended arrest actions against Aideed and set the stage for release of SNA prisoners,

including Mohamed Awali and Omar Salad Elmi, “snatched” by the Delta Force in

October. Resolution 885 essentially nullified the provisions of Resolution 837. It also

authorized “the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry . . . to investigate armed

attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them.”52 The results o

that investigation, entitled Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to

Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel, was published 1 June 1994. Among other things, the investigation found, “the mandate given to

UNOSOM II, at least as it was interpreted, was too pretentious in relation to the instru

ments and to the will to implement it.”53 In other words, there existed a mismatch

between strategy and resources, and an insufficiency of will.

U.S. forces began flowing into Somalia almost immediately after President Clinton’s 7

October address to the nation. The first element included a battalion-sized reinforcement from the 10th Mountain Division, along with AC-130 Spectre gunships. General

Hoar had assigned AC-130s to support Montgomery after the 5 June attacks on the

Pakistani troops, but as noted, Special Operations Command had reassigned them to

other missions during August. As part of the force protection plan in the wake of the

Battle of Mogadishu, Hoar had the Spectres returned to the Horn of Africa.54 Based out

of Mombasa, Kenya, these AC-130s would patrol the skies over Mogadishu as “airborne

guardians” to the American and UNOSOM II forces below.55 Howe believed these

gunships represented an ideal weapon, if used in conjunction with other American

forces, for defeating Aideed’s militia and eliminating him as a force in Mogadishu. But

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purpose. At this point, American leaders intended the AC-130 Spectres, like the o

U.S. forces arriving on the scene, for troop protection and as a show of force.56

In addition to the infantry battalion from Fort Drum and the AC-130 aircraft, G

Montgomery received heavy ground forces to support and protect USFORSOM. 

included the immediate ready company of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechaniz

with a platoon of M1 Abrams tanks attached. That force moved to Mogadishu by 

tegic airlift (C-5 Galaxy aircraft) from Fort Stewart, Georgia, within days of Clin

speech.57 The immediate ready company constituted the lead element of a larger 

nization known as Task Force 1-64 (1st Battalion of the 64th Armor), which arriv

Mogadishu by strategic sealift during mid-November.58 Once fully established in 

lia, Task Force 1-64 consisted of five armored and mechanized company teams, a 

mm self-propelled artillery battery, an engineer battalion, and various support el

ments, totaling well over a thousand soldiers.59 Task Force 1-64 was a very power

detachment, far stronger than the mechanized and armor forces Montgomery ha

requested during August and September. Although intended as an instrument of 

protection and 

rence, the increa

American milita

power also enha

the bargaining p

tion of Oakley a

other American 

ers on various i

of particular int

to the United St

such as the relea

Chief Warrant O

Durant.60

To organize the 

arriving in Somalia and provide a vehicle for command and control of the growi

Army component, Central Command activated on 14 October 1993 a new headq

ters, named “Joint Task Force Somalia” (JTF Somalia), under Major General Carl 

Ernst, USA. The new JTF Somalia commander integrated the forces arriving from 

United States with the existing units of the 10th Mountain Division constituting 

QRF, essentially taking control of U.S. operational units within Somalia.61 Figure

4 illustrate the organizational structure of U.S. forces before and after the arrival 

Somalia. The primary mission of JTF Somalia involved “U.S. force protection an

Hunter Base.

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UNOSOM II/USFORSOM Command Structure prior to October 1993

U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 119; Bolger, Savage Peace, p. 309; Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 12.

FIGURE 4

USFORSOM–JTF Somalia Command Structure after October 1993

U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 203; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p.

102; Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 104.

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Central Command through General Montgomery as commander of all U.S. forc

Somalia, and on to General Ernst as commander of JTF Somalia. But Montgom

had only tactical control of JTF Somalia, whereas operational control of Ernst’s 

remained with General Hoar at Central Command, causing some confusion abo

command relations.63 This basic structure would remain in place until mid-Janua

1994, at which time General Hoar combined USFORSOM with JTF Somalia und

Montgomery’s command.64 Although Ernst departed Somalia at that point, his s

remained in place to serve Montgomery in his command of U.S. forces.65

In building a staff to support the new joint headquarters, General Ernst drew fro

variety of sources. About half of its members came from the headquarters of 10t

Mountain Division, the remainder consisting of individual augmentees from all 

vices.66 Among the more prominent officers were Brigadier General Peter Pace, w

served as deputy commander for JTF Somalia, and Colonel Emil R. “Buck” Beda

who became the J-3 (operations) officer. Assigning these key positions to Marine 

cers underscored the joint nature of the JTF Somalia staff.67 It also allowed Ernst 

draw upon the experience that Pace and Bedard had acquired while serving with

UNITAF during RESTORE HOPE.

68 Both officers would remain in Somalia under M

gomery after the departure of Ernst in January 1994. On 17 October, in the mids

this activity, Task Force RANGER quietly departed Somalia with all its equipment 

board U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy aircraft.69

Regrettably, with the establishment of JTF Somalia a certain amount of tension d

oped over command relations. Montgomery and Ernst had somewhat different v

of the U.S. tasking, and lines of authority were even less clear than they had been

Although both held the rank of major general (Ernst was actually a promotable b

dier general, “frocked” to the two-star level for this assignment), Montgomery

remained the senior American commander in Somalia. But both Ernst and JTF S

were under the operational command of Central Command.71 Additionally, Erns

tended to embrace the Oakley and Zinni criticism of UNOSOM II, thereby creat

resentment in Montgomery, who believed that the mission and circumstances ha

changed significantly since the days of RESTORE HOPE.

72 Having been in the midd

very difficult and bloody situation in Mogadishu for a several months, Montgom

did not appreciate criticism from individuals who had not been there during tha

time.73 Ernst felt he received a cold reception from Montgomery, who wanted mo

the JTF Somalia forces (especially engineers and infantry) placed under USFORS

for construction and security duty. Ernst refused to do so and insisted on keepin

his forces integral to JTF Somalia. Since JTF Somalia was under the operational c

of Central Command, only General Hoar could order Ernst to reassign his troop

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21 October Road.75 Named for a significant victory of the Somali civil war, the road had

been the site of numerous incidents between the SNA and UN during UNOSOM II,

and it held great symbolic value.76 Montgomery built a bypass road to avoid the strain

and conflict associated with that main corridor and to permit movement in support of

humanitarian and UNOSOM II operations.77 But Ernst believed he had direction to

open the old road and keep it clear of roadblocks and factional control. Additionally,

he considered the bypass road longer and more time consuming for moving supplies o

reinforcements into the hinterland or outlying posts.78 Montgomery viewed the bypass

as an appropriate solution to a sticky problem, one that was consistent with his guidance from Central Command.79 After Oakley and Zinni visited JTF Somalia during

their October trip to Mogadishu, Ernst developed a joint and combined plan to

retake the 21 October Road using Pakistani forces with an armored overwatch from

elements of the 64th Armor. The armor and other U.S. forces would be prepositioned

where they could take over the mission if the Pakistani force ran into trouble.80 Montgomery suspected that Oakley and Zinni’s visit to JTF Somalia reinforced Ernst’s intent

to reopen the 21 October Road by force if necessary.81 The fact that he did not know

about the operational plan until Ernst presented it to him did not please the

USFORSOM commander.82

Ernst and his staff worked diligently to put together a detailed and comprehensive plan

for clearing the 21 October Road and then rehearsed it extensively in live-fire and

maneuver exercises.83 But Montgomery did not intend to approve the plan, believing

that UNOSOM II no longer needed the 21 October Road and abhorring the idea of send

ing Pakistani troops back up that road after the casualties they had suffered on 5 June

1993. Additionally, UN opposition from Generals Bir and Montgomery (in his role as

deputy UN commander), coupled with verbal direction coming out of the White

House to avoid offensive actions and American casualties, eliminated any prospect of

this action, or any other risky operation, being carried out except in self-defense.84

Montgomery had originally been scheduled for rotation back to the United States during October 1993. Had that occurred, Ernst would have become the senior U.S. commander in Somalia. But when the president decided to withdraw the United States

from UNOSOM II, officials in Washington chose to keep Montgomery in place to rede

ploy American forces.85 This undoubtedly disappointed Ernst, as did the restrictions

placed on use of JTF Somalia.86 Ernst did conduct several major humanitarian operations during November and December, which also served to exercise his force, along

with the MEU(SOC)s from offshore ARGs, but he undertook no offensive military

actions.87 Additionally, JTF Somalia escorted convoys, conducted some patrols, and

secured the U.S. cantonment areas and other fixed sites.88 Ernst believed he and his staf

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amphibious withdrawal scheduled for 31 March 1994. They had created a four-p

campaign plan: phase I (Tactical Offense and Operational Defense), phase II (Ta

Defense and Operational Offense), phase III (Tactical and Operational Defense), 

phase IV (Withdrawal). In the event, JTF Somalia went to phase III much earlier 

expected due to the risk-adverse policy of the White House.89 The JTF staff had a

developed a complex execution matrix that addressed every contingency the JTF 

likely have to deal with while in Somalia. Although Ernst would like to have rema

in Somalia as JTF commander, even he agreed that it made sense to keep Montgo

in place, given his experience and relationship with the UN, which would becom

important as U.S. forces drew down.90 On 17 January 1994, General Hoar combin

two commands (USFORSOM and JTF Somalia) under Montgomery, at which tim

Ernst returned to the United States.91 Thereafter, Montgomery removed himself f

his role as the deputy commander of UNOSOM II under General Bir and focuse

exclusively on his duties as commander of U.S. forces.92 During February and Ma

elements of USFORSOM/JTF Somalia began the redeployment of its units to the

United States through strategic airlift in preparation for the tactical amphibious

withdrawal of its last remaining units.93

As part of the flow of ground troops into Somalia during October and Novembe

erful naval forces sailed into its coastal waters, arriving only days after the presid

October speech.94 The USS New Orleans ARG, with Captain Brian F. Boyce as com

dore, arrived on 10 October bearing 13th MEU (SOC), commanded by Colonel L

D. Outlaw.95 The New Orleans ARG and 13th MEU (SOC) remained in Somalia w

until mid-February conducting a variety of operations ashore under the directio

Ernst and Montgomery. About the same time, Rear Admiral Joseph J. Dantone, J

brought major elements of the USS Abraham Lincoln battle group to Somalia fro

Arabian Gulf, where they had been supporting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH by

enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq.96 The USS Guadalcanal ARG, unde

Commodore Guy E. Myslivy, with 22nd MEU (SOC), commanded by Colonel Ja

Huly, arrived on the scene about the same time as Abraham Lincoln and New Orl

Collectively, these naval forces constituted a formidable presence to support

USFORSOM and JTF Somalia ashore.98 Ernst and Dantone established a tone of 

eration very early in the deployment, developing a gentlemen’s agreement to wor

team and to keep each other well informed of their plans and issues.99 When the A

ica group relieved Abraham Lincoln, Rear Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski continue

relationship established by his predecessor. Both naval commanders viewed their 

in Somalia waters as providing support to Ernst and JTF Somalia.100

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form, Marine Corps leaders decided to assign a senior officer to oversee composite

operations, at least during the initial stages of the deployment.101 Brigadier General

Richard F. Vercauteren—who also commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade

in Hawaii—was a logical choice, because of his extensive experience on the African

continent and particularly in Somalia. In previous assignments, before the chaos of the

1990s had set in, he had traveled the length and breadth of the country. Vercauteren

collected an ad hoc staff from various sources and joined Admiral Dantone on board

Abraham Lincoln, from where he helped coordinate Marine activities ashore and

afloat.102 One of Vercauteren’s immediate problems involved the organization of the

Marine forces then assembling off the coast of Mogadishu. At that time, the Marine

Corps had decided to phase out Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) such as General Jenkins had commanded during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. For this reason, and because ARGs and MEUs would rotate in and out of Somalia station at

irregular times, Vercauteren decided not to restructure the two Marine expeditionary

units into a MEB configuration. They would continue to function as separate organiza

tions; Vercauteren would closely coordinate and integrate their activities under the

rubric “Marine Forces Somalia.”103

Rear Admiral James Perkins—who commanded Amphibious Group 3 in San Diego—

returned to Somalia in mid-October to coordinate the naval elements of the amphibious force, in a role similar to that Vercauteren played for the Marines.104 Perkins, of

course, had provided critical service during RESTORE HOPE, and he would contribute

in an equally important, if different, role during this phase of the incursion.105 Despite

the fact that the two ARG/MEUs—New Orleans with 13th MEU (SOC) and

Guadalcanal with 22nd MEU (SOC)—remained separate entities, Perkins performed

the function of commander, amphibious task force, while Vercauteren served as commander, landing force, although these roles were somewhat ad hoc in nature. Captain

John Peterson—who had been commodore of the Tripoli ARG during the initial insertion of Colonel Newbold’s special-purpose Marine air-ground task force in December

1992—accompanied Perkins as his chief of staff.106 Vercauteren would depart after

about six weeks, returning in March to assist during the final evacuation of U.S. forces

from Somalia.107 Perkins and Peterson remained on station and facilitated the final

evacuation of American forces during March 1994.108 During the closing months of

American involvement in Somalia, a close personal and professional relationship devel

oped between Montgomery and Perkins, contributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations.109

An interesting aspect of the naval expeditionary forces deployed off Somalia during

this period was the integration of the carrier battle group with the amphibious ready

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from the explorat

new concepts char

istic of America’s 

services of the 199

Admiral Dantone 

his Abraham Linco

battle group had t

with the New Orle

ARG and 13th ME

(SOC) during pre

deployment traini

the California coa

prior to departing for the Indian Ocean. Their innovative approach had combine

carrier battle group with an amphibious ready group as a means to enhance com

power and power projection.111 For example, at San Clemente Island, off the Cali

coast, Abraham Lincoln and the New Orleans ARG conducted a series of complex 

cises.112 Use of this concept of naval power in the Somalia situation clearly consti

an application of . . . From the Sea, in that it focused naval expeditionary forces, c

pled with naval aviation assets, toward the littorals while they acted in concert w

joint forces (Army and Air Force) ashore.113 It also anticipated the publication on

later of Forward . . . From the Sea, which emphasized tailoring naval expeditionar

forces around fleet operational forces, using a building-block approach.114

The USS America battle group under Rear Admiral Cebrowski had undertaken a 

lar integration effort with the USS Guadalcanal ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC) prio

their deployment into the Mediterranean.115 Essentially a form of adaptive force p

aging, this approach proposed to do more with smaller naval forces in the resour

scarce aftermath of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. But once the Guadalcan

ARG reported into the Sixth Fleet, the amphibious element tended to revert to a

traditional ARG/MEU configuration.116 America would participate in Somalia o

tions as a replacement for Abraham Lincoln, conducting a direct handoff later i

deployment.117 Its earlier training with the Guadalcanal ARG and 22nd MEU (SO

proved a valuable asset during subsequent operations on the littoral of Somalia,

because its officers had gained a keen understanding of the ARG/MEU capability

During their time on station, Colonel Huly and 22nd MEU (SOC) assumed the Q

mission for a period, sent security forces ashore, and flew helicopter missions ov

Mogadishu as part of the show of force then under way.118 After two weeks on sta

the Guadalcanal ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC) departed Somalia waters to particip

Helicopter operations off the coast of Somalia.

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Hoar and other American leaders believed that BRIGHT STAR played an important role

in maintaining American influence and cooperation in that part of the world. Egypt

had supported the United States during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and

American leaders believed that participation in BRIGHT STAR would help bond that

relationship and serve as an indicator of America’s good relations with Arab countries.120

Additionally, events had calmed down in Somalia to a point that one ARG/MEU off the

coast of Mogadishu, coupled with the other ground and naval forces arriving in Somalia,

could provide adequate security for American and UN personnel.121

Several weeks after

the departure of

the Guadalcanal

ARG/MEU,

Cebrowski brough

the America battle

group into Somali

waters to replace

Abraham Lincoln.

The two battle

group commanders and their staffs

conducted a faceto-face turnover, in

the interest of maintaining close and continuous support of JTF Somalia during this

critical time.122 Having worked with 22nd MEU (SOC) and conducted its own workups

similar to those of Abraham Lincoln and 13th MEU (SOC), the America group’s

assumption of responsibility proved seamless with respect to naval operations off the

shore of Somalia.123 The America battle group and New Orleans ARG with 13th MEU

(SOC) could function together very effectively in subsequent operations because all

elements had trained to perform that mission. In other words, Cebrowski and the

America battle group understood MEU operations and could work well with amphibious forces.124 Additionally, the two carrier battle groups represented a strong show of

force, using both their ships and aircraft. The ships could get very near to the shoreline

due to the steepness of the coast and the deep water close in, making them highly vis

ible ashore. Also, of course, they put numerous high-performance jets overhead at

fairly low altitudes, reminding all parties of the power available to support U.S. forces

and interests.125

Jet taking off from the USS America.

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MEU (SOC) provided the only amphibious force in the Somalia area of operatio

During that period, elements of 13th MEU (SOC) conducted various actions in 

port of JTF Somalia, as a quick-reaction force and as a reinforcing element for op

tions ashore.126 Additionally, 13th MEU (SOC) augmented the intelligence and

surveillance capability of Ernst, using its sophisticated collection equipment. Ou

also placed the aviation assets of the Marine expeditionary unit, primarily a varie

helicopters, in the service of the forces ashore.127 Snipers from both the MEU and 

units assisted in the protection of facilities and individuals ashore, keeping hostil

ments at a proper distance, while operating within the rules of engagement.

Like the previous ARG/MEUs that had visited Somalia littorals since American in

ment, 13th MEU (SOC) conducted frequent humanitarian assistance missions an

quently operated medical and dental clinics for needy Somalis ashore. Like Colon

Newbold’s SPMAGTF and Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC), Marines and Navy med

personnel of 13th MEU (SOC) provided extensive, desperately needed health car

vices during excursions ashore, often for several days at a time.128 In some cases, s

Operation SHOW CARE and Operation MORE CARE, they operated in conjunctio

Army and coalition elements.129 In other cases, they operated more independentl

although always under JTF Somalia command when ashore.

On 2 February 1994, 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somalia waters to relieve 13th 

(SOC). Colonel Broderick still commanded 24th MEU (SOC), which had now

deployed on board the USS Inchon amphibious ready group, with Captain Steven 

serving as commodore.130 When relieved by the Inchon ARG, the New Orleans gro

proceeded to Singapore, where it conducted a face-to-face turnover with the Pele

ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) and cross-decked some special equipment for use in 

lia by 11th MEU (SOC).131 Captain Warren Ide, Jr., was the commodore of the Pe

ARG, and Colonel William C. McMullen III commanded 11th MEU (SOC).132 Th

Peleliu ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) proceeded to Somalia, where they joined th

Inchon ARG and 24th MEU (SOC) for duty in the last critical weeks of Operatio

CONTINUE HOPE.

133

Ide and McMullen had known they would deploy to Somalia as they conducted t

MEU (SOC) workup training in California during the latter half of 1993. In add

the standard and special training objectives required for the deployment of a ME

(SOC), the two commanders concentrated much of their training on raids and lo

range noncombatant evacuation operations. Many American leaders feared that 

U.S. withdrawal from Somalia would precipitate another social and political coll

Should that occur, large numbers of American and third-nation citizens would b

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similar to what Moser and Doyle executed during EASTERN EXIT—the Peleliu ARG and

11th MEU (SOC) could save many lives if Somalia fell back into chaos.134 Upon arrivin

in Somalia waters, 11th MEU (SOC) assumed primary responsibility as an evacuation

force in readiness, as well as a reserve force to support Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC)

ashore.135 Broderick’s troops would provide security during the withdrawal of

USFORSOM/JTF Somalia units, while McMullen, primarily at sea, would support

those operations and maintain a ready-response capability for any emergencies ashore

during or after the withdrawal.136

Once 11th MEU (SOC) arrived on the scene in Somalia, McMullen and his staff needed

to develop a set of plans appropriate for the local circumstances. During this planning

process they identified some 2,300–2,600 people, primarily in central and southern

Somalia, who would require evacuation. They established four collection sites

(Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and Bardera), where the evacuees would assemble. In

addition to his organic assets, the Marine Corps provided McMullen with a detachment of four C-130 Hercules airplanes based in Mombasa to assist in evacuation operations. After developing operational plans, 11th MEU (SOC) conducted a series of

rehearsals that included flights to the assembly areas and reviews of extraction sites and

routes.137

On 14 March, Peleliu received orders to steam south and conduct search and rescue

operations in response to the loss of an AC-130 Spectre aircraft off the coast of

Malindi, Kenya, killing over half of the fourteen-man crew.138 McMullen sent a CH-53E

Super Stallion helicopter ahead with key personnel and equipment; it arrived shortly

after the crash. The aircraft had gone down in about fifteen feet of water in Malindi

Lagoon. McMullen’s divers removed all the ordnance and critical equipment prior to

the arrival of the Air Force recovery team. They also recovered all the bodies except

one, who had been last seen by his fellow crew members in a parachute over water.

Search and rescue efforts by a variety of organizations over a two-week period could

not find that missing airman.139

As things turned out in Somalia, McMullen did not need to conduct an emergency

evacuation in Somalia after the U.S. pullout. Although some firefights occurred among

the various factions, the situation in Somalia did not unravel as many expected it to.

But 11th MEU (SOC) remained a ready force offshore, “spring-loaded” and ready for

immediate launching. Moreover, the training and skills obtained in preparing for these

Somalia evacuations did not go to waste. They proved of great service to the United

States a few weeks later, when it became necessary to evacuate American citizens from

another chaotic situation, in Rwanda.140

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months.141 The buildup of JTF Somalia occurred primarily in October and Novem

and by January 1994 Central Command had consolidated the force under Montg

ery’s command. One of the major milestones of the withdrawal occurred in Janu

when logistical support to UNOSOM II was farmed out to a contractor (Brown &

Root), after having been under U.S. Army cognizance throughout the Somalia in

sions.142 In February, the gradual redeployment of units back to the United States 

begun.143 Most of Montgomery’s soldiers and much of their equipment actually f

out of Mogadishu airport on U.S. Air Force C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy aircr

on contracted 747s and DC-10 planes prior to the amphibious withdrawal that

occurred in late March 1994.144 But flying large airplanes out of Mogadishu airpo

loaded with American troops and equipment created considerable risks; for one 

shot down would have been a disaster.145

It is unlikely that SNA fighters using RPGs would have attacked American aircraf

flight; that weapon is inadequate for such a task beyond about eight hundred yar

and the security zone around the runways exceeded that distance. Besides, Aideed

wanted foreign forces out of his country and would certainly avoid interference w

their departure.146 But in Somalia it was always possible that some rogue element 

acquire shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles capable of bringing down a s

flying American plane at low altitude. To avoid this nightmare scenario, Montgom

assigned helicopter gunships and observers to control the areas around the airfie

to escort the U.S. aircraft as they made their approaches and departures from

Mogadishu.147 Montgomery’s efforts proved adequate since no real threat to fligh

ations developed during the redeployment period.

The final step in the U.S. withdrawal, including removal of most heavy combat p

occurred by means of a classical amphibious withdrawal named Operation QUIC

DRAW.

148 Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC) served as the primary instrument to accom

that mission, with substantial support from all amphibious forces afloat. The Inc

ARG with 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somalia on 2 February 1994. Broderick’

immediately went ashore and came under control of General Montgomery.149 On 

March, 24th MEU (SOC) conducted a relief in place with Montgomery’s Army s

forces, thereby permitting the subsequent redeployment of all U.S. Army forces.

Broderick’s force provided a secure perimeter for the loading of Army forces on t

contract ships for transportation to Mombasa, from where they would return to 

United States. The ships, provided by Military Sealift Command, included the Gr

motor vessel Mediterranean Sky and the SS Empire State, of U.S. registry.150 (Emp

State is the school training ship for the State University of New York Maritime C

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Reserve Force.)151

Essentially, 24th MEU (SOC) established a perimeter ashore that encompassed the por

area, the airfield, and other contiguous areas necessary to protect American and coalition forces. Montgomery placed his Army units (ground, air, armor, and logistical)

under Broderick’s command, so that he could use them as assets for defense, if necessary, and control their egress from land onto their ships.152 This also permitted Montgomery to relieve his brigade headquarters earlier so it could fly to its home station and

oversee the transition of their forces back into the United States.153 The 24th MEU (SOC)

supported by 11th MEU (SOC) and other naval forces afloat, maintained control over

the secured areas while the U.S. forces loaded on ships and departed Somalia.154 Despite

the presence of Admiral Perkins and General Vercauteren in the operational area,

amphibious forces off Somalia served under General Montgomery’s command once

ashore.155 The process of relieving Army units of their security responsibilities and preparing for their withdrawal occurred over several weeks, but the actual amphibious

withdrawal took only one day—25 March 1994.156

During the loading of Army units and equipment, Montgomery and Broderick loaded

their tanks and heavy weapons last, so they would remain available for use should the

need arise.157 Once the Army units were loaded on their ships and Montgomery had

departed for Peleliu, Broderick’s Marines boarded their amphibious assault vehicles and

returned to their ships.158 During the withdrawal of the Marines, a picket line of AH-1

Cobra gunships from 11th and 24th MEU(SOC)s hovered at the perimeter, facing outboard and ready to engage any element attempting to interfere. Once the last amphibious vehicle splashed into the water, Broderick got aboard Vercauteren’s UH-1 Huey

helicopter and the two men returned to their ships.159 The United States was once again

free from foreign entanglements. It had been a clean, smooth, and textbook-quality

amphibious withdrawal, but it would not be the last one the U.S. Navy and Marine

Corps would undertake from the shores of Somalia.

Notes

1. Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” p.

553; Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 42; Robert I.

Rotberg, “The Lessons of Somalia for the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Learning from

Somalia, ed. Clarke and Herbst, p. 232.

2. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 127, 158–59; Hughes, “U.S.

Intervention in Somalia,” p. 553.

3. Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” pp.

543–44.

4. Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The

United States after the Cold War (New York:

Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p. 37;

United Nations and Somalia, pp. 61, 86;

Hughes, “U.S. Intervention in Somalia,” p.

559.

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President to General Johnston and Staff

(Washington, D.C.: White House, 5 May

1993), available at clinton6.nara.gov/1993

-05-05.

6. Montgomery interview.

7. Ibid.

8. Hoar interview.

9. Oakley interview.

10. UNSC Resolution 794, under which UNITAF

operated, did not actually call for disarmament of the warring factions, but many leaders in the UN and United States interpreted

its reference to using “all necessary means”

to establish a secure environment as requiring such action. Resolution 814, which established UNOSOM II, did specifically call for

disarming the warring parties. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 32, 43; Security Council Resolution 794; Security Council

Resolution 814; Sommer, Hope Restored? pp.

34–35; Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” p. 143.

11. Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende mention

in an article in Parameters that “UNOSOM II

inherited a ticking time bomb” from the

UNITAF operation. Clarke and Gosende,

“The Political Component,” pp. 35–51;

Sommer, Hope Restored? p. 34.

12. Ganzglass, “The Restoration of the Somali

Justice System,” p. 23; Clarke and Herbst,

“Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian

Intervention,” p. 241.

13. Montgomery interview.

14. The U.S. representative to the UN, Madeleine

Albright, and the national security adviser,

Anthony Lake, provided the impetus that

moved the United States to support UN nation building during the early days of the

Clinton administration. Hoar interview;

Oakley interview.

15. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 118 and note 7.

16. Montgomery interview; Howe PBS Frontline

interview; Albright, with Woodward, Madam

Secretary, pp. 142–46.

17. Zinni PBS Frontline interview.

18. Montgomery interview; Oakley interview.

19. President William J. Clinton, Address to the

Nation on Somalia (Washington, D.C.: 7 October 1993), Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 11 October 1993, pp. 29,

_5288889.pdf, www.proquest.com.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.; Hoar interview; Oakley intervi

22. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on S

23. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, pp. 135–36.

24. Hoar interview.

25. Zinni had been a brigadier general at 

ginning of Operation RESTORE HOPE 

ceived promotion to major general p

returning to Somalia in October 199

would, of course, eventually obtain t

of full (four-star) general. Clancy, Zi

Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 270.

26. Montgomery interview.

27. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Ope

Restore Hope, p. 128.

28. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.

29. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Se

pp. 142–43; Oakley interview.

30. Hoar interview.

31. Oakley interview.

32. United Nations and Somalia, p. 61.

33. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 97–98.

34. Zinni PBS Frontline interview; Clanc

and Koltz, Battle Ready, pp. 282–83.

35. Bolger, Savage Peace, p. 327.

36. Generals Bir and Montgomery, along 

number of top military leaders in So

also believed that the 3 October 1993 

of Mogadishu created an unparallele

portunity to defeat Aideed. Not only 

suffered grievous losses, but the outc

had weakened his position within th

Gidr subclan and its SNA political fa

Baumann and Yates, with Washingto

Clan against the World,” pp. 168–69.

37. Howe interview.

38. On 6 August 1993, a collection of 15

ers representing over twenty clans an

subclans signed the Jubaland peace a

ment to end all hostilities in the Juba 

including Kismayo. United Nations a

malia, pp. 58, 284–85; Hirsch and Oa

Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 

39. Howe interview.

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interview.

41. Maj. Gen. Carl F. Ernst, USA (Ret.), telephone interviews by the author, 14 and 15

October 2008.

42. Oakley interview.

43. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 130; Montgomery interview.

44. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 273;

Zinni interview; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia

After Action Report, p. 103.

45. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 131–32.

46. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.

47. Hoar interview.

48. Oakley interview.

49. Howe interview; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia

and Operation Restore Hope, pp. 130–31.

50. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Somalia.”

51. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 285.

52. Security Council Resolution 885; Hirsch and

Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope,

pp. 133–34; UN Commission of Inquiry Report, pp. 368–416.

53. For the entire text of the investigation complete with annexes, see United Nations and

Somalia, document 88, pp. 368–416.

54. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 13.

55. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 99; Montgomery

interview.

56. Rear Adm. Joseph J. Dantone, USN (Ret.),

telephone interview by the author, 12 September 2008; Howe interview.

57. The companies of the 24th Infantry Division

(Mechanized) are equipped with M-2

Bradley fighting vehicles, which are a substantially improved and more capable version of the M113 armored personnel carrier.

Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 93; U.S. Army

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 142.

58. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 93; U.S. Army Dept.,

Somalia After Action Report, pp. 139, 142.

59. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 100; Ernst interviews; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action

Report, p. 142.

60. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 131.

62. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 140–41.

63. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 184; Hoar interview; Montgomery interview.

64. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 146.

65. Ernst interviews.

66. Montgomery interview; U.S. Army Dept.,

Somalia After Action Report, p. 142.

67. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 105.

68. Ernst interviews.

69. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 102.

70. Ibid., pp. 116–17; Hoar interview; U.S. Army

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 145.

71. Ernst interviews.

72. Montgomery interview.

73. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 183.

74. Ernst interviews.

75. The 21 October Road was not actually close

to all traffic, not even all military traffic, all

the time. But when UNOSOM II convoys,

some humanitarian convoys, and some traffic by factions opposed to the SNA attempted to transit, they were often denied

passage. The idea that all factions and all

UNOSOM II traffic should have unimpeded

use of this and other major corridors was

behind the persistent concern of many U.S.

and UN leaders. Ibid.

76. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 191.

77. Montgomery interview.

78. Ernst interviews.

79. Montgomery interview.

80. Ernst interviews; Montgomery interview.

81. Ernst interviews; Montgomery interview.

82. Montgomery interview.

83. Ernst interviews; Baumann and Yates, with

Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p

191.

84. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 191; Oakley

interview.

85. Hoar interview; Montgomery interview.

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(Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 26

August 2008.

87. Operation SHOW CARE occurred during November 1993, an insertion of 13th MEU

(SOC) and a linkup with U.S. Army and Moroccan forces in the city of Merca. MORE

CARE involved a complex linkup of U.S.

Army, Marine Corps, and Nigerian forces for

extensive humanitarian operations near Old

Port in Mogadishu. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 142–43; Baumann

and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan

against the World,” pp. 185, 191.

88. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” p. 191.

89. Ernst interviews; Oakley interview.

90. Ernst interviews.

91. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My

Clan against the World,” pp. 192–93; Casper,

Falcon Brigade, pp. 99–108, 123; Ernst interviews; Montgomery interview; U.S. Army

Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 13,

139–42, 146.

92. Montgomery interview.

93. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 46; Montgomery interview.

94. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 13, 139, 141.

95. The ships that made up the New Orleans

ARG were USS New Orleans (LPH 11), flagship; USS Denver (LPH 9); USS Comstock

(LSD 45); and USS Cayuga (LST 1186). Col.

Larry D. Outlaw, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 27 August 2008.

96. The Lincoln battle group consisted of USS

Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), USS Princeton

(CG 59), USS Ingraham (FFG 61), USS Fox

(CG 33), USS Willamette (AO 180), USS

Mount Hood (AE 29), USS White Plains (AFS

4), and USS Pasadena (SSN 752). Commanding Officer, USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72),

Command History for Calendar Year 1993

[hereafter Lincoln Command History, 1993],

Naval Warfare Division, Naval Historical

Center, Operational Archives Branch, Navy

Yard, Washington, D.C. [hereafter Naval

Warfare Division, NHC].

97. The Guadalcanal ARG included USS

Guadalcanal (LPH 7), USS Ashland (LSD

48), and USS Shreveport (LPD 12). Commanding Officer, USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7),

ter Guadalcanal Command History], 

Warfare Division, NHC; Lt. Gen. Jan 

USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by 

thor, 4 September 2008; Outlaw inter

98. Katz interview.

99. Ernst interviews.

100. Dantone interview; Ernst interviews

101. Discussions between the Commanda

the Marine Corps and Commander, 

Forces Pacific resulted in the decision 

choose Brig. Gen. Richard F. Vercaut

Brig. Gen. Richard F. Vercauteren, U

(Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Oh

September 2008.

102. Dantone interview; Vercauteren inte

103. Vercauteren interview.

104. Perkins first interview.

105. Outlaw interview.

106. Peterson interview.

107. Vercauteren to Ohls.

108. Peterson interview; Vercauteren inte

109. Montgomery interview; Perkins first

interview.

110. Outlaw interview.

111. Dantone interview.

112. Lincoln Command History, 1993; Out

interview.

113. . . . From the Sea, pp. 87–99.

114. Forward . . . From the Sea, pp. 2, 4, 6.

115. Guadalcanal Command History.

116. Huly interview.

117. Dantone interview.

118. Huly interview.

119. Guadalcanal Command History.

120. Huly interview.

121. Outlaw interview.

122. Capt. Leroy T. Bortmes, USN (Ret.), 

phone interview by the author, 19 Se

ber 2008; Dantone interview.

123. Guadalcanal Command History; Huly

interview.

124. Outlaw interview.

125. Dantone interview.

126. Outlaw interview.

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cluded four CH-53E Super Stallions, twelve

CH-46 Sea Knights, four AH-1 Cobra

gunships, and three UH-1 Huey aircraft. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ernst interviews; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia

After Action Report, pp. 142–43.

130. The Inchon ARG consisted of the USS Inchon

(LPH 12), USS Trenton (LPD 14), USS Portland (LSD 37), and USS Spartanburg County

(LST 1192). Commanding Officer, USS

Inchon (LPH 12), Ship’s History for Calendar

Year 1994, Naval Warfare Division, NHC.

131. Commanding Officer, USS Peleliu (LHA 5),

Command History for Calendar Year 1994

[hereafter Peleliu Command History, 1994],

Naval Warfare Division, NHC.

132. The ships constituting the Peleliu ARG were

Peleliu, USS Duluth (LPD 6), USS Anchorage

(LSD 36), and USS Frederick (LST 1184).

During the transit across the Pacific Ocean,

Captain Ide developed serious health problems and had to be medically evacuated to

the naval hospital at Bethesda, Maryland.

Admiral Perkins assigned an interim commodore, Capt. Mike Coumatos, who commanded the ARG until Ide returned to duty

in March 1994. Col. William C. McMullen

III, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by the

author, 29 August 2008.

133. Ibid.; Outlaw interview.

134. McMullen interview.

135. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 146.

136. Broderick interview; McMullen interview.

137. McMullen interview.

138. Peleliu Command History, 1994, p. 139.

139. McMullen interview.

140. On 9 April 1994, 11th MEU (SOC) initiated

Operation DISTANCE RUNNER, a long-range

NEO to Bujumbura, Burundi, where some

tionals had fled from the violence in neighboring Rwanda. Launching three CH-53E

helicopters from Peleliu, four C-130s from

Mombasa, with 330 heavily loaded Marines,

McMullen conducted a NEO that may have

been less dramatic than EASTERN EXIT but

was no less professionally challenging.

Peleliu Command History, 1994; McMullen

interview.

141. Montgomery interview.

142. United Nations and Somalia, p. 62; Casper,

Falcon Brigade, p. 130.

143. Montgomery interview.

144. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 130, 136.

145. Broderick interview; Montgomery interview

146. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 144.

147. Broderick interview; Casper, Falcon Brigade,

p. 113; Montgomery interview.

148. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 130, 136.

149. Broderick interview.

150. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 145, 218.

151. Perkins second interview; Casper, Falcon

Brigade, p. 130; Maritime Administration,

www.marad.dot.gov; American Merchant

Marine at War, www.usmm.org.

152. Broderick interview; Montgomery interview

153. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 136–37; Montgomery interview.

154. Broderick interview.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.; Montgomery interview.

157. Montgomery interview.

158. Broderick interview.

159. Ibid.

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Operation UNITED SHIELD

When the United States announced its intention to withdraw from Somalia in O

1993, a number of other nations also decided to pull out their forces as well. As a 

UNOSOM II lost some of its most capable and best-equipped contingents.1

The 

could not replace all the units lost and had to consider how to function under su

tially altered circumstances. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali continued to believ

the strategy laid out for UNOSOM II under Resolution 814 and its supporting d

ments was the correct approach to the problems of Somalia. This strategy embra

the options of coercive disarmament and military reprisals for attacks on UN for

clan-based factions.2

But he also realized that the approach was no longer possib

because it had become “evident that Member States were not prepared to commi

troops needed to replace those being withdrawn by the United States and several 

pean and other countries.”3

Boutros-Ghali reluctantly proposed a more limited mission for UNOSOM II, wh

the Security Council passed as Resolution 897 on 4 February 1994.4

This resoluti

reduced the size of the UN contingent and curtailed its powers of enforcement, r

ing UNOSOM II to a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI authority, as had 

the case during UNOSOM (I). In short, soldiers could now use their weapons on

self-defense, when directly threatened. There would be no more attacks against S

factions for preemption or reprisal purposes, and no more discussion of forcible 

mament. Additionally, all UN measures to assist the Somali people in rebuilding 

country and achieving reconciliation would depend strictly on cooperation.5

Numerous changes in UN leadership accompanied this transition. On 12 January 

Lieutenant General Aboo Samah Aboo Bakar of Malaysia succeeded Lieutenant G

eral Cevik Bir of Turkey as the UNOSOM II force commander. By all accounts, G

Bir had served the UN very well; he had been a highly competent and effective ge

officer, respected by his peers and associates. The U.S. commander, General Thom

Montgomery, had developed a close relationship with Bir, for whom he had been

CHAPTER EIGHT

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UN mission.6

Yet the Turkish contingent to UNOSOM II was only a company-sized unit,

and this somewhat undercut Bir’s effectiveness. When he wanted to carry out serious

combat operations, he often had trouble convincing coalition members to support

them, since many believed the small force from his own nation could not carry its fair

share of the burden.7

This factor, coupled with the independent-mindedness of the var

ious international partners, had made Bir’s job very challenging, despite strong suppor

and cooperation from the U.S. contingent.

On 8 March 1994, Admiral Jonathan Howe stepped down as the Secretary-General’s

special representative in Somalia. His deputy, Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, became the

acting special representative until 1 July, when James Victor Gbeho of Ghana assumed

the post.8

Howe’s service to UNOSOM II received high praise from Boutros-Ghali and

formal recognition in Security Council Resolution 897.9

Yet Howe had been subjected

to considerable criticism within the United States for the UN decision to pursue Aideed

after the 5 June ambush of Pakistani soldiers. In fact, Howe had become the person

most directly identified with the “get Aideed” strategy and the decision to go to war

against the SNA.10 These critics had conveniently forgotten the role that key members

of the Clinton administration played in creating and sustaining that strategy.11 In seeking to find fault, it is always easier to focus on one individual than a complex process o

a group of people with varying degrees of culpability. In any case, Admiral Howe—who

had had a highly successful career in the U.S. Navy, and as deputy national security

adviser—said of his year in Somalia, “I’ve never had a harder job.”12

No immediate descent into chaos occurred in Somalia after the U.S. withdrawal, but as

many feared, violence increased. There was fighting between clan-based factions (those

of Aideed and Ali Mahdi), and there were renewed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.1

From May through July 1994, five Nepalese, two Malaysian, and ten Indian soldiers

died in attacks and ambushes from various Somali groups. This deterioration in the

security situation had a negative impact on humanitarian activity. Once again convoys

came under attack, food started stacking up in the port of Mogadishu, and relief organizations began closing down operations.14 Nonetheless, Somali factions continued to

hold peace conferences and sign reconciliation agreements; there were meetings at

Addis Ababa, Cairo, Nairobi, Bardera, and even Dhoobley. Peace conferences between

Somali leaders were very common but unproductive in the 1990s, before, during, and

after the American incursions.15

Even Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suspected, referring to the participation of faction leaders in these reconciliation conferences, that “there remained grave misgivings

about the seriousness of their commitment.”16 Yet the Secretary-General found positive

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modation. Boutros-Ghali and Howe always tended to emphasize the political and 

nomic stability achieved outside Mogadishu when evaluating progress in Somali

believed that improved agricultural productivity, rebounding markets, and the re

ing of numerous schools indicated what dedicated efforts could achieve.17 This is 

point often overlooked by analysts, pundits, and historians, and it is absolutely co

The international commitment and the efforts of local Somalis had accomplishe

much. Only in areas where Aideed had control or exercised strong influence did 

nized violence and strife consistently prevail.18

One development that Boutros-Ghali and others viewed as hopeful was an effort 

imam of Hirab to bring about reconciliation within the important Hawiye clan. 

Aideed’s Habr Gidr element and Ali Mahdi’s Abgal group were subclans within it

effort promised to go a long way toward restoring stability to Somalia.19 But the i

initiative ultimately proved ineffective, and its failure exposed the illusoriness of 

conviction—held by many American and UN officials—that religious and clan e

possessed great authority within Somali society. That may have been true in certa

parts of Somalia, where traditional forms of leadership remained strong, but not 

areas controlled by the major warlords.20 The faction leaders and their armed mi

wielded the real power in those zones during the period of American involvemen

fact, this seemingly positive move by the imam of Hirab had an effect opposite to 

UN leaders expected: some clans and subclans feared that any agreement resultin

from it would lead to a new UN-supported coalition, which would operate to t

detriment.21

Still believing that hope existed for peace in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali recommended 

August report to the Security Council that the UN continue its efforts there a litt

ger.22 But when by October there had been no progress and the political stalemat

showed no signs of abating, even Boutros-Ghali began to question the efficacy of 

UNOSOM II mission, recognizing that “a viable and acceptable peace could only 

from the Somalis themselves.”23 Beginning to perceive the UN mission as futile

Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council a final extension of the

UNOSOM II mandate, to expire no later than 31 March 1995. In the interim he p

posed a gradual and sequential reduction of UN presence, culminating in a final 

cal withdrawal, supported by member states capable of ensuring security and suc

On 4 November 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 954, which embod

Boutros-Ghali’s recommendation and extended the UNOSOM II mandate for a 

time. It also requested member states to provide military assistance in conductin

evacuation.25

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February 1995. Most troops departed on contract flights, typically on 747 and L1011

jumbo jets.26 In some ways, the evacuation process mirrored the American departure of

a year earlier. The important difference, of course, was that it involved the tactical

extraction of the final UN forces; this time there would be no friendly UN troops

remaining behind. Since Somali leaders could not control all factions and gangs, the

final phase of the evolution posed a much higher risk than the Americans had faced. By

the end of February only a rear guard of about 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers, with their weapons and equipment (much of it on loan from the United States),

remained of the UNOSOM II force.27 On 28 February a combined task force—named

CTF UNITED SHIELD, and under U.S. leadership—conducted an amphibious landing at

Mogadishu and established a protected enclave for the removal of remaining UN

forces.28 Once CTF UNITED SHIELD had established its secure perimeter, the Pakistani

and Bangladeshi troops passed through its lines, entered the protected area, and loaded

on ships for departure. By 3 March, Operation UNITED SHIELD had completed all its

objectives and the last American Marines had returned to their ships.29 The evacuation

force consisted of elements from seven nations, but like much of the UN involvement

in Somalia, it had been primarily an American show.30 The operation proved efficient,

effective, and professional, but it nonetheless represented a failure by the UN to create

peace and stability within Somalia.

Yet despite shortcomings and failures, the various incursions of the 1990s were not

the abject disasters that many have portrayed—in fact, quite the contrary. The famin

had been broken, and many thousands of people (hundreds of thousands, by some

estimates) survived who would otherwise have perished.31 Additionally, the ineffectiveness of military action (particularly during CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II)

resulted more from confusion about the mission and tenuous commitments by polit

ical leaders than from military incompetence.32 It did not help, of course, that

CONTINUE HOPE occurred during the transition between the Bush and Clinton

administrations.33

As top leaders within the UN and United States began considering the withdrawal of

UN personnel from Somalia during the summer of 1994, several points became obvious. First, a military force could not accomplish this evacuation operation exclusively

with aviation or a combination of air and commercial shipping. There would be no

way to protect the last departing echelons from surface-to-air missiles, in the case of

aircraft, or from RPGs, mortars, artillery, or even small-arms fire, in the case of commercial ships.34 Even if the major warlords agreed not to interfere, there remained

numerous, well-armed elements outside their control willing (even pleased) to strike a

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the sea, using a classical amphibious withdrawal. Any other option left open the 

bility of disaster during the final extraction.36

Another point of concern involved the ambivalent attitude of many American le

There existed no enthusiasm for returning to Somalia, particularly since the miss

might involve a withdrawal under fire.37 More American casualties were the last t

political and military leaders wanted, especially in a failed state having no strateg

value to the United States.38 Yet in the final analysis, the Clinton administration f

responsible for the safety of the international forces remaining in Somalia and re

nized that only the United States could ensure a successful extraction.39 In the op

of Rear Admiral Lee F. Gunn, who attended a number of meetings with key advis

the Clinton administration, pressure from General Zinni helped sway opinion in 

of the operation.40

The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), headquartered at Camp Pendleton, C

nia, was a logical choice to conduct the evacuation of Somalia.41 In addition to th

sons that had made I MEF the appropriate force to lead Operation RESTORE HOP

in 1992–93, several other factors now contributed to that decision. For one thing

sistent reports of surface-to-air missiles within Somalia virtually dictated an amp

ous withdrawal. An amphibious power-projection capability makes it possible to

establish a secure area to protect all extractions (air and sea). After all elements h

departed, the landing force systematically collapses its defenses and, if necessary, 

its way off the beach in amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), with the support of 

cal airpower and naval gunfire. AAVs can even continue fighting after entering th

water.42 Another advantage in using I MEF to lead Operation UNITED SHIELD wa

many of its officers and Marines had served in Somalia and understood the situa

on the ground. Not the least of these individuals was the newly assigned I MEF c

mander, Anthony C. Zinni, now wearing the three stars of a lieutenant general.43 

only was I MEF the correct organization to execute Operation UNITED SHIELD, b

Zinni was the ideal general officer to command it.

This study has already addressed Zinni’s experience in humanitarian operation

particularly in Somalia and Kurdistan. But Zinni also had broad experience beyo

operations other than war, including two combat tours in Vietnam.44 An addition

area of Zinni’s interest and expertise (and more directly relevant to the mission a

hand) involved the Marine Corps stock in trade, amphibious operations. Throug

his career Zinni had served in numerous deployments at sea with Fleet Marine F

units. In the process he had become fascinated with the complexity and challeng

amphibious warfare. Additionally, he had taught amphibious warfare at the Com

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operations.45 For UNITED SHIELD, the alignment of commander, organization, and mis

sion could not have been better.

As Zinni and his staff began to analyze the UNITED SHIELD mission and the forces

available for its execution, one thing became immediately apparent—that this operation fit Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine exactly.46 Zinni had always been

the antithesis of a doctrine-driven officer.47 Yet he was willing to use any appropriate

means to get the job done, and he believed that I MEF should “run this [operation]

right by the book.”48 The circumstances not only fit the time-tested amphibious doctrine developed over several hundred years but lent themselves to the new operational

and strategic concepts expressed in . . . From the Sea and other papers and studies of

the 1990s. Zinni also leveraged the strong relationship that existed between the Navy

and Marine Corps organizations within U.S. Pacific Command (which provided the

forces used in Central Command operations), by making the commander of Amphibious Group 3, Rear Admiral Gunn, his deputy task force commander as well as the nava

component commander.49 By so combining their staffs Zinni and Gunn gained synergism while solving the problem of finding adequate working space for command and

control of the operation.50 Under the leadership of Zinni and Gunn, the focus of seabased naval expeditionary forces on littoral power projection was as complete as it

could have been.

Another positive aspect of Operation UNITED SHIELD involved that rarest of luxuries in

expeditionary warfare and amphibious operations—adequate time for planning. The

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued the UNITED SHIELD warning order

in August 1994, for execution prior to the end of March 1995.51 This provided roughly

six months to plan, rehearse, critique, and execute. Yet having so much preparation

time did not keep the operation from being difficult, especially since it involved coalition forces and an uncertain situation ashore.52 UNITED SHIELD would be the largest

amphibious withdrawal under hostile conditions since the 1st Marine Division and

several ancillary U.S. and coalition forces withdrew from North Korea at Hungnam in

December 1950.53 During August and September the Joint Staff and Central Command

considered various high-level options for the Somalia evacuation; on 25 September

1994 the secretary of defense approved a general course of action.54 Central Command

eventually assigned UNITED SHIELD, in a preliminary planning order, a basic mission

“to deploy to the area of operation, provide planning support and conduct military

operation in support of the UNOSOM II withdrawal and retrograde of U.S. Government equipment.”55 Finally, CJCS issued an alert order directing execution planning.

The I MEF staff ’s work intensified.56

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Phase II (Deployment), Phase III (Support to UNOSOM), Phase IV (Execution), 

Phase V (Redeployment).57 The key officers associated with the UNITED SHIELD pla

process were Army colonel John C. Latimer of Central Command and the I MEF/C

Marine staff officers Colonel John W. Moffett (chief of staff), Colonel Harry W.

“Bucky” Peterson III (director of operations), and Lieutenant Colonel William R

Norton III (director of plans). Admiral Gunn also played an important role in th

preparation for UNITED SHIELD, but he and other key leaders experienced a signi

distraction shortly after they began planning.58

During early October 1994, Saddam Hussein again moved Iraqi forces toward Ku

with the lead elements reaching to within fifteen miles from the border. This mo

tion and deployment, coupled with other defense preparations and bellicose rhet

captured the attention of commanders and planners at Central Command and I 

Under the name of Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, Central Command dispatche

numerous forces of all services, including the forward-deployed Tripoli ARG and 

ments of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) from Diego Garcia to Saudi A

Gunn and other naval and Marine officers flew to Oman, where they joined the M

squadron and then moved on to Saudi Arabia to begin an off-load in preparation 

the fly-in combat elements. In many ways, VIGILANT WARRIOR constituted a qui

and more efficient replay of the DESERT SHIELD deployment of 1990. The impres

American response caused the Iraqis to back off, allowing the focus to return to

UNITED SHIELD.

59

As planning intensified at I MEF, Zinni feared that his staff could become excessi

attached to its plan, after the hard work and creativity put into it. He therefore

requested that a team from Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Qua

Virginia, review the detailed plan, including its “branches and sequels.”60 Among 

things, the team conducted war games on the plan to ensure its efficacy and offer

recommendations that contributed to the success of the operation.61 From the fin

detailed plan, the I MEF/CTF staff created a “playbook,” a simplified version of a

contingencies. Copies of this playbook remained with key staff officers as a quick

source of information and insight as the operation played out.62 The UN also cre

military planning cell—which included officers from both Central Command an

MEF—to conduct parallel planning during the months leading up to the operati

This cell provided a critical function—to “translate the UN political and diplom

goals into language understandable by military forces.”63

One of the key decisions made by General James Henry Binford Peay III—who

replaced General Hoar as commander in chief of Central Command in August 1

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commander would report directly to the commander in chief of Central Command.

But Peay believed he could provide better support if the CTF commander reported to

the Central Command naval component (NAVCENT) commander, Vice Admiral John

Scott Redd.64 Peay’s rationale was that his headquarters in Tampa would be five thousand miles from the scene of action; NAVCENT headquarters, located in Bahrain,

would be much closer and more responsive.65 Additionally, UNITED SHIELD had a distinctly maritime flavor, utilizing as it did a preponderance of naval expeditionary

forces. Placing it under naval oversight was a logical decision, one that tailored the

command structure to fit the mission.66 This decision caused some controversy because

of its unusual nature and because both Redd and Zinni held three-star rank, leading

some to wonder who would actually run the combined task force, Redd or Zinni.67 Nev

ertheless, Zinni considered it a good idea and had no objections to operating under

Redd and NAVCENT headquarters. In fact, he considered it an advantage to have both

Redd and Lee Gunn, his deputy CTF commander, available to look after Navy and seaoriented issues, allowing him to focus more on actions ashore. In the final analysis, the

arrangement worked effectively, because both commanders understood their roles and

focused on accomplishing the mission.68

Another unique element of the UNITED SHIELD operation was the use of nonlethal

weapons.69 American leaders were keenly aware that Somali fighters often mingled with

unarmed women and children. The SNA had frequently used this technique during

CONTINUE HOPE. In the 5 June 1993 attack on UN troops it had led to the brutal

deaths of several Pakistani soldiers; reluctant to shoot into the mixed mob at a Mogadi

shu feeding center, the Pakistanis allowed hostile individuals to get close enough to

assail them. American troops going ashore during UNITED SHIELD had no desire to use

deadly force against unarmed civilians if avoidable. A nonlethal option—in addition to

conventional combat capability—offered flexibility. The ability to handle mobs without immediately crossing the threshold to deadly force was not only more humane but

also broadened the range of tactical situations in which the Marines could engage. This

clearly enhanced the ability of the landing force to maintain the initiative and control

events on the ground.70

The program to arm an element of the Marine landing force with nonlethal weapons

came into focus during December 1994, when General Zinni requested the assistance of

Colonel Gary W. Anderson of the Marine Corps Combat Development Center in developing such a capability for UNITED SHIELD. Anderson and a team from the I MEF staff

undertook an intensive effort to identify appropriate weapons, equipment, and training

options. Anderson also led the effort to get fast-track approval from the office of the

Judge Advocate General of the Navy Department for use of these new and exotic systems

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with officials of the 

Angeles Sheriff’s D

ment, authorities a

national laboratori

representatives of s

commercial vendo

nonlethal systems.

Law enforcement

departments and 

guards throughou

United States had 

developing and u

nonlethal weapons for many years, but the U.S. military had never before used 

in foreign lands.72 Yet within a matter of weeks, the I MEF staff built such a cap

procured the necessary weapons and equipment, and deployed a mobile training 

to the Indian Ocean to work with components of 13th MEU (SOC), which woul

this technology in the upcoming operation. The MEU commander designated on

infantry company to serve as the operation’s primary nonlethal-reaction force.73 

special unit proved effective while ashore, primarily as a deterrent against mob a

by clans, factions, and freelancing thugs. The Marines did not actually fire any of 

nonlethal weapons during operations ashore, but they did use a substance known 

“sticky foam,” along with four-pronged caltrops for purposes of area denial.74

Once the press learned of it, I MEF’s intent to take nonlethal weapons into Somalia

became a media event of the first order. It also became somewhat controversial, som

observers supporting the concept and others expressing alarm. The primary object

seemed to be that the United States would be placing Marines in harm’s way while 

same time disarming them.75 The idea that nonlethal weapons simply provided an 

tional capability on the force continuum did not register with many analysts. But t

Marines involved in the operation had no problem understanding the concept and 

value.76 Beyond the controversy, media coverage had the effect of informing hostile 

ments within Somalia of the new weapons and tactics they might confront.77 Yet 

proved more of an advantage than disadvantage, since it demonstrated to Somali 

lords that some of their favorite tactics—unleashing mobs and mixing armed fig

with unarmed women and children—might no longer be available to them. Additi

media images of Marines in black bullet-resistant vests, plastic face masks, riot shie

and riot batons, carrying exotic weapons and conducting precision maneuvers, ma

them appear like some latter-day Spartan phalanx, ready and eager to meet any thr

Marines training with nonlethal weapons.

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were no mob incident

during the UNITED

SHIELD incursion

demonstrates the

deterrent value of this

concept, and the publicity actually helped

achieve that goal.78

The psychological

operations team that

supported UNITED

SHIELD specifically

exploited the publicity

about nonlethal weapons, in an attempt to influence the actions of Somalis.79 Of

course, assessments of the success of nonlethal weapons in UNITED SHIELD should take

into account also the facts that Somali leaders did not have time to develop countermeasures before the landing, and that the Marines always had a lethal option available

should nonlethal tactics fail.80

UNITED SHIELD was predominantly an American operation, but it also involved forces

from six other nations. Figure 5 demonstrates how UNITED SHIELD integrated the

coalition forces and lays out the organizational structure for the operation. Next to the

United States, Italy provided the largest contingent, a five-ship task force and the San

Marco Battalion of Marines. The San Marco Battalion accounted for about 350 troops

of the 2,675 total in the Italian contingent.81 Rear Admiral Elio Bolongaro was the

senior Italian officer with UNITED SHIELD and acted as Zinni’s Deputy Commander for

Coalition Forces.82 The operation plan for UNITED SHIELD integrated the San Marco

Battalion into the landing force, which would establish the secure enclave for the

amphibious withdrawal.83 This proved very effective, due to the combined amphibious

training of U.S. Marines with the San Marco Battalion and amphibious shipping of

both countries over a number of years.84 In addition to the Italian force, France supplied three ships to the operation, Pakistan three, Malaysia two, and the United Kingdom one.85 The total number of vessels participating in UNITED SHIELD would

ultimately reach twenty-three, once all logistical and fire-support ships arrived on sta

tion.86 The Pakistani and Bangladeshi forces that had remained in Somalia as the rear

guard for UNOSOM II constituted the final elements of the CTF UNITED SHIELD coali

tion. These two units performed their duty in Mogadishu to the very last, having provided courageous service throughout their time in Somalia. This is particularly true of

General Zinni addresses Marines and sailors during Operation UNITED SHIELD.

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the Pakistani troops, who were the first to go into Somalia during UNOSOM (I

were among the last to leave under UNOSOM II, and had suffered the greatest 

ber of casualties.87

Regrettably, the ships that the UN contracted to evacuate the Bangladeshi and 

stani troops from Mogadishu proved poorly maintained, inadequately supplied

generally unworthy of these fine troops. When the final ship (MV Vergina) arri

transport the last Pakistani element, the ship’s master damaged his vessel while

approaching the pier.88 There was a strong suspicion that he had been drunk. Adm

Gunn feared Vergina was no longer seaworthy, and to make matters worse, it had 

capability to repair the damage. Gunn dispatched a U.S. Navy hull technician tea

from Essex, which rapidly repaired the damage and permitted the vessel to get un

way. Generally disgusted with the lack of professionalism on board Vergina, Gun

assigned the vessel a command-qualified Navy commander and several officers, w

orders to take charge if necessary, regardless of what its owners might think.89

Source: CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

UNITED SHIELD Organization Chart and Command Relations

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(SOC), which had deployed to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean area during October

1994.90 Captain Gary W. Stubbs served as commodore of the ARG, and Colonel John C

Garrett commanded 13th MEU (SOC).91 Before departing California, Garrett had realized that his MEU would likely have a mission in Somalia sometime during its deployment. He had a good turnover with his predecessor as 13th MEU (SOC) commander,

Colonel Larry Outlaw, including a general orientation to the Somalia situation. He also

had an intelligence officer who had served in Somalia under General Johnston during

RESTORE HOPE. Additionally, when Garrett had a question about Somalia his staff

could not answer, he contacted Colonel Broderick and tapped into his wealth of experi

ence. As helpful as this all was, Garrett’s mission would be different from those of the

past and many of his problems unique.92

Garrett’s 13th MEU (SOC) would be augmented by an SPMAGTF organized around an

infantry company and heavily reinforced by a platoon of thirteen AAVs and a section

of six Light Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles (LAVs).93 The SPMAGTF came from elements of III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa and deployed on USS

Belleau Wood (LHA 3), based in Sasebo, Japan. Belleau Wood also served as flagship for

the CTF UNITED SHIELD command element, which flew from California to Singapore

to board the ship.94 Colonel Carl C. Herdering commanded the SPMAGTF, and Captain John W. Townes III was commanding officer of Belleau Wood.95 Most of the elements that constituted UNITED SHIELD—both American and coalition—assembled

during February off the coast of Kenya, where they conducted a series of exercises and

rehearsals addressing interoperability issues, integration of forces, and synchronization

of air support.96

The aviation support for UNITED SHIELD was substantial, with assets stationed on

board amphibious ships and at joint support bases in Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya.97

In addition to a normal complement of helicopters, 13th MEU (SOC) had six AV-8B

Harriers based on Essex to support the mission.98 Before the landing, the Harriers

cross-decked to Belleau Wood, from where they conducted flight operations during

UNITED SHIELD. This allowed more space on Essex for helicopter operations, thereby

increasing the responsiveness of the aerial quick-reaction force and facilitating other

helicopter-borne activity.99 The SPMAGTF included a composite air squadron of four

AH-1W Cobra gunships, four UH-1U Hueys, and four CH-53E Super Stallions, all on

Belleau Wood. The support base in Mombasa supported four Marine Corps KC-130

aircraft, additional CH-53E helicopters, and P-3 Reef Point reconnaissance aircraft pro

vided by the Navy, along with Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunships. The base in Nairobi

supported Air Force KC-135 tankers and additional Reef Point airplanes.100

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conducted a series of meetings to ensure its success. In addition to final planning 

sions at Central Command in Tampa and with NAVCENT in Bahrain, Zinni visit

Kenya and Pakistan to coordinate with top defense officials and ensure their full 

eration. He also wanted to reach an understanding with each coalition governme

regarding the tasking of its forces while under his command.101 Most important o

trips involved several visits to Mogadishu, where Zinni and key State Departmen

resentatives met with the Secretary-General’s special representative, Ambassador 

Victor Gbeho, and the new UNOSOM II commander, General Aboo. They also m

with Aideed, who agreed not to interfere with the operation. Somewhat ominous

however, Aideed pointed out that he did not control all the militias or gangs ope

near the airfield and indicated that some would likely fight the landing force.102 Z

and his team also talked with other major leaders in Mogadishu, including memb

Ali Mahdi’s SSA, to ensure they understood UNITED SHIELD’s mission and to elic

support.103 In Admiral Gunn’s words, Zinni “was very frank and direct with them

only General Zinni can be.”104

During the final weeks before the amphibious withdrawal, two incidents occurred 

Somalia that could have distracted attention. The first was the “kidnapping” of a p

Italian journalist, Carmen La Sorella, and the murder of her cameraman, Mirko

Hrovatin. As is often the case, the journalists had ventured outside of protected are

their Range Rover had come under attack.105 Essentially, the vehicle was caught up 

firefight between two Somali factions. La Sorella ran from the car to a place of relat

safety, but Hrovatin died in the exchange of gunfire. Before leaving her car, howeve

Sorella phoned her station in Italy, which prompted the Italian government to take 

to rescue her. Inevitably, Admiral Bolongaro received a call from Rome directing hi

“go get her.”106 This situation introduced a conflict between national interests and t

force mission, because leaders of UNITED SHIELD wanted to avoid overt aggressive 

that might suggest a return to the tactics of UNOSOM II.107 Such conflict between

national interests and task force missions had been a serious problem in previous S

lia operations but had been refreshingly absent during UNITED SHIELD.

108 Fortunat

operatives ashore confirmed that La Sorella was in a safe location and not in imme

danger. Meanwhile, the CTF operations officer, Colonel Bucky Peterson, and other 

ican and Italian officers of UNITED SHIELD worked out an arrangement (a sort of t

cover) that gave the appearance of action that satisfied the Italian government in R

without seeming unduly aggressive to militia leaders in Mogadishu. The next day a 

bined special operations team went ashore and effected the “rescue.”109

The second incident involved the prospect of a noncombatant evacuation oper

in Burundi—in the middle of Africa, between Tanzania and the Congo—where

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planning for UNITED SHIELD, Zinni’s staff had developed a sequel for just such a contingency.110 When this possibility arose, between 16 and 24 February, the CTF staff prepared a detailed plan relatively quickly and with minimal impact on their main activity

Colonel Peterson later believed that the Burundi tasking distracted the CTF staff for

twenty-four to thirty-six hours.111 Had it been necessary to execute the noncombatant

evacuation in Burundi, however, the impact on UNITED SHIELD could have been very

great, particularly if it had conflicted with the planned landing dates in Somalia. The

timing for UNITED SHIELD resulted from conditions of the moon and tides, the weathe

forecasts, and the hydrographic situation, such as the strength and direction of ocean

currents. Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi and the location of the prospective evacuation, is over six hundred miles inland, and the demands of such an operation on

UNITED SHIELD assets would have been substantial.112 Additionally, this NEO would

have occurred within the geographical purview (as then aligned) of European Command, not Central Command. Such operations at the seam of responsibility can be

particularly difficult, due to conflicting priorities and perspectives of the respective

commanders in chief, as Colonel McMullen and his 11th MEU (SOC) had learned one

year earlier.113 Certainly, the UNITED SHIELD team believed that it could carry out both

missions if the situation demanded.114 Yet the diversion of forces, equipment, and leadership attention would likely have degraded the Somalia operation and perhaps

encouraged greater resistance ashore. In the event, the evacuation from Bujumbura did

not occur, but had conditions in Burundi so dictated, only the forces of CTF UNITED

SHIELD would have been available for its execution.115

The execution phase of UNITED SHIELD began at 1000 on 26 February 1995, with the

establishment of a small command element ashore, collocated with the UNOSOM II

headquarters. This forward command element

actually “fell in” on a

liaison team under Colo

nel Latimer, which had

provided critical coordination with UNOSOM I

elements ashore.116 The

following day, Zinni

came ashore and

assumed command of

the UNOSOM II force

(that is, the Pakistani

General Zinni assuming command of UNOSOM II forces; Colonel Moffett is standing

on the extreme right.

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morning hours of 28 February, the UNITED SHIELD landing force—consisting of 

ion Landing Team 3/1, the SPMAGTF, and the San Marco Battalion—conducted a 

ing under leadership of the 13th MEU (SOC) commander, Colonel Garrett.118 By e

light, the entire landing force had got ashore and had established a continuous p

ter running from GREEN Beach (the key location for beach operations), in the so

and on the left flank of the landing force, to New Port, farther north on the right

Engineers had previously prepared berms to enhance the defensive positions the 

ing force would occupy. Additionally, Zinni had already inserted Army psycholog

warfare units and special operations teams.120

The landing force immediately e

oped the Bangladeshi battalion in 

positions at New Port, permittin

begin evacuation. But “retrograd

the Pakistani brigade would be so

what more difficult, since it was 

the lines of the landing force, in 

positions at the airport.121 The ce

gravity during the early stages of 

operation was the port area, sinc

UNOSOM II troops and some of 

UNITED SHIELD landing force wo

depart from that point. After all 

ments had departed the port area

center of gravity would shift to G

Beach, where the last element of 

landing force would conduct a ta

withdrawal.122

At about 0830 on 28 February, G

Aboo and his staff departed

Mogadishu, and the Bangladeshi battalion began loading on contract ships. At ab

midnight, the Pakistani brigade began a sequential withdrawal from the airport a

passage of lines through the landing force. This movement put it within the secu

enclave, where it could prepare for departure from New Port.123 Night movement

sages of lines, and interoperability among multinational forces generally, are diff

enough when done singly under normal conditions. To do all three in combinati

requires great skill and professionalism, which the forces of UNITED SHIELD

Marines come ashore for Operation UNITED SHIELD.

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ment of tanks and armored personnel carriers, which added a certain element of danger and complexity during hours of darkness.124 By about 0630 on 1 March, the passage

of lines was complete and the Pakistani troops had begun preparing their equipment

for loading and departure. Simultaneously, the San Marco Battalion prepared for withdrawal across GREEN Beach later that night.125

During the early hours of darkness on 2 March, the landing force initiated a systematic

contraction of its defensive line and a tactical amphibious withdrawal from GREEN

Beach. Throughout the evolution Marines exchanged gunfire with various Somali

gangs that chose to contest the activity. On several occasions it became intense, but the

vastly superior firepower of the Marines discouraged any determined effort against

their positions.126 Additionally, Zinni had Cobra gunships, Harriers, and AC-130 Spectre aircraft overhead, ready to engage targets should the situation require. Sniper teams

also proved effective in controlling the actions of rogue militias and often discouraged

threatening moves before they got started.127 The final amphibious vehicles departed

GREEN Beach at about 0100 on 3 March, and among their passengers were the CTF

commander, General Zinni, and his chief of staff, Colonel John Moffett. By 0505 the

amphibious ships had recovered all forces and vehicles. In the words of the 13th MEU

(SOC) commander, John Garrett, “I think it was probably the closest to a perfect operation that I’ve ever been on.”128 Admiral Gunn stated, “I rate the UNITED SHIELD piece

as one hundred percent effective.”129 Many others had similar comments, but the best

news after the reembarkation of all UNITED SHIELD forces was the report that no

American, coalition, or UNOSOM II lives had been lost during this complex and difficult operation.130

The story of UNITED SHIELD had not yet played out, however, when the final vehicle

departed GREEN Beach in the darkness of 3 March. During the trip back to Belleau

Wood, the amphibious tractor carrying Zinni and Moffett lost power when its engine

overheated. This undoubtedly resulted from the vehicle’s heavy load and the strong

current off the Somalia coast that it was fighting.131 The bilge pumps were still working

and a companion tractor passed a towrope, so everything seemed under control. Now,

however, the towing vehicle, under an incredibly heavy load, “flamed out” too. Both

amphibious tractors had now lost communications with the ships and other landing

craft, and the tide and strong current were pushing the tractors back toward the beach.

Moffett—observing the Belleau Wood getting smaller and technicals, lined up on the

beach with their headlights on, getting bigger—realized the seriousness of the situation. Several times before drifting too far from Belleau Wood he heard a voice call out

from the ship, “Who’s got the Godfather?” He shouted back, “I’ve got the Godfather!”

but no one could hear his reply.132

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mander, Corporal Deskins, brief him on the situation. After a long litany of all th

gone wrong (the tractor had lost power and was drifting toward the beach, the to

vehicle was in the same situation, they were unable to raise anyone on the radio, 

was no response to their flares, and hostile Somalis waited on the beach), the cor

assured his CTF commander that everything was under control: “Our machine g

work better on the beach.”133 At last, they spotted a safety boat—a utility landing

craft—and Moffett fired the tractor’s last flare, which attracted the attention of t

LCU’s crew. Eventually two boats arrived, came alongside each of the AAVs, and 

the power of their engines to arrest their drift toward the shore while taking off t

crewmen and passengers. Upon arriving within the well deck of Belleau Wood an

climbing out of the tractor into knee-deep water, Zinni observed waiting officers 

journalists looking down from the deck above. Zinni looked to Moffett and said,

“You’re going to make me wade up to those cameras, aren’t you?” Moffett smiled 

replied, “Just like MacArthur.”134

The landing force had been in Somalia only about seventy-two hours, and durin

time it had operated strictly from sea bases, with no buildup ashore. The UNITED

SHIELD force had come from the sea, been sustained from the sea, and returned t

sea.135 Colonel Peterson had departed Somalia from New Port for USS Dubuque a

then cross-decked back to Belleau Wood on an air-cushion landing craft. During 

final leg, he had one final look at Mogadishu from the sea. In the rush to withdra

team had forgotten to turn off the generator that powered an operational site it h

used while ashore, and a light was still burning. It was the only thing visible in an

ancient city of a million people. That sight saddened Peterson. He reflected, “We 

them with nothing except for that one light bulb in the old UN compound.”136

Notes

1. The governments of Belgium, France, and

Sweden also announced their intention to

withdraw from Somalia in October 1993. Italy, Germany, Turkey, and Norway subsequently announced the withdrawal of their

forces by the end of March 1994. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 61–62, 333, 350.

2. Ibid., pp. 64, 352.

3. Ibid., p. 65.

4. “Further Report of the Secretary General

Submitted in Pursuance of Resolution 886

(1993) Reviewing the Option for the Future

Mandate of UNOSOM II,” in United 

and Somalia [hereafter “Further Rep

the Secretary General”], pp. 345–53.

5. Security Council Resolution 897 (19

United Nations and Somalia, pp. 353–

6. Montgomery interview.

7. Hoar interview.

8. United Nations and Somalia, p. 68.

9. “Further Report of the Secretary Gen

p. 353; Security Council Resolution 8

10. Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” p. 14

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Restore Hope, pp. 124–26, 124 note 25, 125

note 27, 154, 154 note 6; Poole, Effort to Save

Somalia, p. 70.

12. Howe interview.

13. Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, pp. 273–

74.

14. United Nations and Somalia, p. 68; Hirsch

and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore

Hope, pp. 145, 148.

15. Ken Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding

and the Dynamics of Local and National

Reconciliation in Somalia,” in Learning from

Somalia, ed. Clarke and Herbst, pp. 57–60;

Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, pp.

274–75.

16. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 69–71.

17. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, pp. 134–35, 134 note 43; Howe

interview; Robert M. Press, “Retreat from

Somalia,” Christian Science Monitor, 27

February 1995; Donatella Lorch, “Last U.S.

Marines Quit Somalia as Escorts for the

U.N.,” New York Times, 3 March 1995.

18. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 148; Howe interview; Montgomery PBS Frontline interview.

19. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 142.

20. Gilkes, “From Peace-Keeping to Peace Enforcement,” p. 23.

21. Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding and

the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia,” pp. 52, 62 note 17.

22. “Report of the Secretary General on the

Prospects for National Reconciliation in Somalia and the Feasibility of Beginning a Reduction in the UNOSOM II Force,” in United

Nations and Somalia, pp. 426–29.

23. United Nations and Somalia, p. 73.

24. “Report of the Secretary General Concerning

National Reconciliation, Humanitarian Activities and Parameters for the Reduction

and Withdrawal of UNOSOM II,” in United

Nations and Somalia, pp. 442–46.

25. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 462–63.

26. Commander, Combined Task Force United

Shield, Report to Commander, U.S. Naval

Central Command on Combined Task Force

United Shield, UNOSOM II Withdrawal from

Somalia, 23 August 1994 to 17 March 1995,

Report on Somalia Withdrawal]. Copy in

possession of the author.

27. Like many statistics regarding troop count

during the Somalia incursion, the actual

number of Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers requiring evacuation by UNITED SHIELD

varies among accounts. The UN estimates

the number at 2,500, whereas other sources

suggest as high as 4,500. The former appear

the most consistent and authoritative figure

See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal; Vice Adm. Lee F. Gunn, USN

(Ret.), interview by the author, Alexandria,

Virginia, 11 October 2007; United Nations

and Somalia, p. 76; Donatella Lorch, “Marines Cover U.N.’s Pullout from Somalia,”

New York Times, 28 February 1995.

28. The designation of Combined Task Force

UNITED SHIELD (CTF UNITED SHIELD) occurred on 23 January 1995. Prior to that

time, the organization was designated Joint

Task Force UNITED SHIELD (JTF UNITED

SHIELD). This change reflected the participation of non-U.S. forces in the operations.

See Commander, CTF United Shield, message P 230210Z Jan 1993, Redesignation of

United Shield Joint Task Force (JTF) to Combined Task Force (CTF) United Shield, Command File Unified, 1995 Past 1990, Folder:

Central Command, U.S. United Shield Operation (Withdrawal from Somalia), NHC

Operational Archives.

29. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 76–77; CTF

United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

30. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope, p. 148.

31. Lorch, “Last U.S. Marines Quit Somalia as

Escorts for the U.N.”

32. Chester A. Crocker, “The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign

Affairs (May 1995), p. 5; Gunn interview;

Howe interview; Woods, “U.S. Government

Decision Making Process,” pp. 164–71.

33. Howe interview.

34. Zinni interview.

35. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p.

293.

36. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia With

drawal; Gunn interview; Zinni interview.

37. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.

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39. Gunn interview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz,

Battle Ready, p. 289.

40. Gunn interview.

41. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

42. Zinni interview.

43. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 289.

44. Ibid., pp. 23–111.

45. Ibid., pp. 129–30.

46. Zinni interview.

47. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 213.

48. Just as Zinni was ready to conduct UNITED

SHIELD by using existing doctrine at the

macro level, so was he willing to avoid slavish adherence to it at the detailed level when

it did not fit the requirements. It often occurs during joint and combined operations

that service-specific doctrine is found too restrictive and therefore becomes nonfunctional. Zinni accordingly instructed his

subordinates of all services to “leave their

rice bowls at home.” Peterson interview;

Zinni interview.

49. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.

50. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.

51. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Zinni interview.

52. Because of the unpredictability of various

warlords, coupled with the fact that they did

not control all violent elements within Somalia, planners for UNITED SHIELD needed to

consider the worst-case scenario: an amphibious withdrawal under fire. This decision

proved not only wise but also prescient. See

CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

53. After the massive Chinese attack at the

Chosin Reservoir in late November 1950, the

1st Marine Division fought its way through

the vastly superior enemy force in one of the

most famous and dramatic breakout operations in the history of warfare. After fighting

their way to Hungnam and the sea, U.S.

forces conducted an equally famous and

highly efficient amphibious withdrawal in

the face of their enemy. Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 493–95; Gunn interview; Zinni

interview.

Withdrawal.

55. Ibid.

56. Col. John C. Latimer of the Central C

mand J-5 planning directorate had c

three courses of action for the UN w

drawal from Somalia. This prompted 

ners and commanders at all levels (O

the Secretary of Defense, Central Co

and I MEF) to begin thinking about 

sue and led to concurrent planning a

cision making. Peterson interview; C

United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

57. CTF United Shield Report on Somal

Withdrawal.

58. Col. John W. Moffett, USMC (Ret.), 

view by the author, SAIC, San Diego

fornia, 14 March 2008; Peterson inte

59. Gunn interview; J. H. Binford Peay II

Five Pillars of Peace in the Central R

Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1995)

60. During the planning for UNITED SHIE

Zinni and his staff developed “branc

(changes to the existing plan) and “s

(new plans) in order to be able to res

immediately and appropriately to an

possible event. Representatives from 

rine Corps War College critiqued an

gamed these branches and sequels, a

with the basic plan, which I MEF the

cluded in a UNITED SHIELD “playbook

cially created for the operation. CTF 

Shield Report on Somalia Withdraw

interview.

61. Zinni interview.

62. Peterson interview.

63. CTF United Shield Report on Somal

Withdrawal.

64. The role of naval expeditionary force

Central Command had become so la

important that the United States crea

Fifth Fleet under NAVCENT on 1 Jul

Although this occurred four months 

UNITED SHIELD, it had been in the wo

several years. The first fleet created b

United States since World War II, it w

tually a reestablishment of the World 

fleet commanded by Adm. Raymond

Spruance. Further emphasizing the i

tance of naval forces in the Central C

mand area of responsibility, the NAV

commander billet had been elevated 

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predecessor, Vice Adm. Douglas J. Katz. Katz

interview; Vice Adm. John Scott Redd, USN

(Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 24

September 2008.

65. Redd interview; Zinni interview.

66. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

67. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 291.

68. Redd interview; Zinni interview.

69. During this time, the terms “nonlethal,” “less

than lethal,” and “less lethal” were used

somewhat interchangeably in the military

context. Several self-proclaimed experts in

the Pentagon insisted that “nonlethal” weapons could conceivably cause death even

though not designed or intended for that

purpose; therefore, a certain constituency

developed around “less lethal” and “less than

lethal” for such weapons used in combat.

Not all military personnel, especially those

operating in the field, accepted this terminology. In the literature of this period, especially that relating to UNITED SHIELD, all three

terms are used. Commanding General, I

Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, United

Shield: Less Lethal Report, 2 June 1995 [hereafter CG I MEF Less Lethal Report] (copy in

possession of the author).

70. Anthony C. Zinni and Gary J. Ohls, “No Premium on Killing,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1996), pp. 26–28;

Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 290.

71. Frederick M. Lorenz, “Less-Lethal Force in

Operation United Shield,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 1995), p. 73.

72. CG I MEF Less Lethal Report.

73. Col. John C. Garrett, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 3 September

2008.

74. The forward-deployed 13th MEU (SOC) on

board the Essex ARG constituted the main

landing force of UNITED SHIELD. The nonlethal systems acquired and deployed for the

operation included: 40 mm systems using

five types of rounds, 12-gauge systems with

three types of rounds, oleoresin capsicum

(pepper spray) devices, caltrops, stinger grenades, “flash bangs,” sticky foam, and aqueous foam. Other items—such as lasers that

temporarily blind, and sonic crowd-control

devices—had been considered but not selected for use due to lack of test results. See

view; Eric Schmitt, “Now, to the Shores of

Somalia with Beanbag Guns and Goo,” New

York Times, 15 February 1995.

75. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Take Foam Out of Marines’ Arsenal,” San Diego Union-Tribune, 5

March 1995.

76. Gunn interview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz,

Battle Ready, p. 290; Rick Atkinson, “Lean,

Not-So-Mean Marines Set for Somalia,”

Washington Post, 25 February 1995; Zinni

and Ohls, “No Premium on Killing.”

77. Lorenz, “Less-Lethal Force in Operation

United Shield,” p. 73.

78. The 13th MEU (SOC) commander had to

warn Somali mobs several times not to advance on his positions, but they always

stopped after being warned off. Garrett interview; Moffett interview.

79. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

80. Zinni and Ohls, “No Premium on Killing.”

81. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia With

drawal; Chief of Staff, I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, Information for Secretarial

Correspondence Related to Operation United

Shield, 7 April 1995 (copy in possession of

the author).

82. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

83. Garrett interview.

84. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.

85. The Italian ships were Garibaldi, Libeccio,

San Marco, San Giorgio, and Stromoli; the

French ships were Commandant Bory,

D’Estienne D’Orves, and Champlain; the Pakistani ships were Tughril, Shamsher, and

Nasr; the Malaysian ships were Sri Indera

Sakti and Mahawangsa; and the United

Kingdom sent Exeter. The number of troops

provided (including naval personnel) totale

902 from Bangladesh, 323 from France,

2,675 from Italy, 413 from Malaysia, 3,321

from Pakistan, 282 from the United Kingdom, and 8,569 from the United States. Of

the 8,569 American personnel, 7,597 served

within the naval forces component of the

CTF, the various ships and the entire landin

force. See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

86. In addition to the amphibious ships of the

Essex ARG (see note 90), the coalition ships,

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Lake Erie (CG 70), the fleet oiler USNS

Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193), the fleet replenishment oiler USNS John Ericsson (T-AO

194), the ammunition ship USNS Kiska (TAE 35), and the combat stores ship USNS

Spica (T-AFS 59). See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Gunn interview; Zinni interview; “Last Call: Marines

Close Out Final Chapter in Somalia,” Marine

Corps Gazette (April 1995), p. 7.

87. The Pakistani force suffered thirty-three

deaths out of a total of 135 killed in the UN

operations of the 1990s. Press, “Retreat from

Somalia.”

88. Apparently Vergina collided with an oceangoing tug while approaching the pier. In addition to damage from the collision, the ship

berthed wrong side to, complicating the

loading of the Pakistanis and their equipment. Gunn interview; Moffett interview;

Peterson interview.

89. Gunn interview; Zinni interview; Rick

Atkinson, “Marines Dig In to Guard U.N.’s

Somalia Pullout,” Washington Post, 1 March

1995; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready,

p. 298; CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

90. The Essex ARG consisted of the USS Essex

(LHD 2), USS Fort Fisher (LSD 40), and USS

Ogden (LPD 5). See Commander, Amphibious Group 3, Command History, 06 May

1995, Amphibious Group 3, CH 1994, Folder:

Past 1990, Command Files, Type Amphibious, NHC Operational Archives; Commander, Amphibious Squadron 5, 1995

Command History, 12 Mar 96, Folder: Past

1990, Command Files, Type Amphibious,

NHC Operational Archives; Garrett

interview.

91. Commanding Officer, USS Essex (LHD 2),

Command History for 1995, 11 March 1996,

Naval Warfare Division, NHC; Garrett

interview.

92. Garrett interview.

93. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

94. Ibid.; Gunn interview; Peterson interview.

95. Col. William J. Hartig, USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, Newport, Rhode Island,

14 September 2007; Commanding Officer,

USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3), Command

uary 1996, Naval Warfare Division, N

96. Although extensive and complex, the 

hearsals off Kenya did not include th

landing of troops ashore, due to the 

suitable beaches. Despite turn-away l

exercises, UNITED SHIELD leaders con

the operation plan fully tested and re

hearsed. Peterson interview.

97. CTF United Shield Report on Somal

Withdrawal.

98. The aviation assets of a deployed ME

(SOC) typically include transport he

ters (four CH-53Es and twelve CH-4

utility helicopters (four UH-1Ns), an

helicopters (four AH-1Ws), along w

detachment of vertical/short-takeoff

landing (V/STOL) fixed-wing attack 

(six AV-8Bs). MCDP 3.

99. Commanding Officer, 13th Marine E

tionary Unit, FMF, Command Chron

the Period 1 January through 30 June 

August 1995, Folder: Command Chr

ogy, Marine Corps Archives [hereafte

MEU, Command Chronology]; Garre

interview.

100. CTF United Shield Report on Somal

Withdrawal.

101. John H. Cushman, “Out of Somalia: 

Shield,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedi

(May 1995), p. 130; Moffett interview

102. The State Department representative

accompanied Zinni on his last visit t

Mogadishu included the head of the 

bureau, Ambassador David Shinn, an

U.S. special envoy to Somalia, Amba

David H. Simpson. According to Zin

Simpson took a provocative line with

Aideed, creating some anxiety as to h

might influence Aideed’s behavior. In 

end, the incident does not appear to 

affected the operation. Admiral Redd 

attended several of the meetings in M

shu, often playing the role of “tough 

though not in a provocative manner

interview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, B

Ready, pp. 291–93.

103. CTF United Shield Report on Somal

Withdrawal.

104. Gunn interview.

105. Rear Adm. Pio Bracco, Italian Navy (

correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 4 De

2008; Gunn interview; Moffett interv

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107. Ibid.

108. Gunn interview.

109. Bracco to Ohls; Gunn interview; Moffett interview; Peterson interview.

110. One of the sequels envisioned the possibility

of another major regional contingency taking precedence over the evacuation of Mogadishu. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal; Zinni interview; Donatella

Lorch, “Ethnic Hate Tears Pupils in Burundi,” New York Times, 13 February 1995.

111. Peterson interview.

112. Gunn interview; Peterson interview.

113. Gunn interview; McMullen interview.

114. Gunn interview.

115. Peterson interview.

116. Cushman, “Out of Somalia,” pp. 129–30.

117. Peterson interview.

118. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; 13th MEU, Command Chronology.

119. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

120. Although UNITED SHIELD was conducted primarily by naval expeditionary forces, the U.S.

Army and Air Force also provided invaluable

support, mostly through Special Operations

Command. The Army provided psychological operations and special operations teams;

the Air Force contingent operated the JSBs in

Kenya and provided special-operations control teams in Somalia in support of both

UNOSOM II forces (Pakistani and Bangladeshi) and the UNITED SHIELD landing force.

CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

pp. 129–30; Peterson interview.

121. Garrett interview.

122. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

123. Hartig interview.

124. Peterson interview.

125. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

126. Hartig interview; Moffett interview; Peterson interview.

127. Moffett interview.

128. Garrett interview; CTF United Shield Repor

on Somalia Withdrawal.

129. Gunn interview.

130. In addition to the UNOSOM II evacuees,

several hundred people—including U.S. nationals, members of the international press,

some NGO personnel, and bona fide refugees—also required evacuation. Ibid.;

Moffett interview; Peterson interview; CTF

United Shield Report on Somalia

Withdrawal.

131. Gunn interview.

132. Marines and sailors often referred affectionately to Zinni as “the Godfather,” though

usually when out of earshot. Moffett

interview.

133. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, pp.

300–301; Moffett interview.

134. Gunn interview; Moffett interview; Clancy,

Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, pp. 300–301.

135. Garrett interview; Zinni interview.

136. Peterson interview.

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Operational and Strategic Observations

What can we hope to learn from the American experience in Somalia during the 

Is Colonel Peterson’s dour assessment correct, that “we left them with nothing ex

for that one light bulb in the old UN compound”? Many individuals involved in

UNITED SHIELD and the earlier operations would undoubtedly agree. It has becom

commonplace to refer to our Somalia involvement as a failure; some even call it a 

ter. But not all agree, and even in 1995 many leaders saw value in the incursions a

held hope for improvement in Somalia.1

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gha

tried to remain optimistic about the future, assuring the world that the UN woul

abandon Somalia.2

But despite the Secretary-General’s earnest intention, it is diff

to square his assertions with the amphibious withdrawal of March 1995. In the fi

assessment, the UN goal of establishing a peaceful society, a stable economy, and 

mate elected government failed. The UN departed with little more than the hope 

Somalis would solve their problems on their own. Yet the incursions into Somali

saved many lives, and the famine had been broken. Additionally, the large-scale c

war had ended, although clan-based fighting continued, on a reduced level.3

Regrettably, the Somali people thereafter did no better at nation building or peac

ing than had the UN and its coalition. Although the country did not immediately

return to chaos, neither did it achieve stability. In the absence of progress, condit

trended downward toward more violence and despair. Nearly fourteen years afte

UNITED SHIELD, conditions in Somalia have returned to anarchy: rampant fighti

widespread criminal activity, and another famine looming on the horizon.4

Altho

conditions now resemble those of 1992, the political and military landscape with

Somalia has changed, notably with the death of Aideed during factional fighting 

1996 and diminished power of Ali Mahdi.5

From the perspective of Western nati

the situation has actually become much worse. The rise of a movement known a

Islamic Courts—a Taliban-like group with links to al Qaeda—has gained conside

following in southern and central Somalia.6

CHAPTER NINE

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1990s, they did not figure prominently in U.S. operations. But the issue took on an

entirely different significance after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington.7

The

Islamic Courts came close to taking control of the entire country in 2006, and they

actually controlled Mogadishu and much of south and central Somalia for nearly six

months. Only the intervention of U.S.-backed Ethiopian forces prevented them from

defeating the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which the UN and United State

recognized as the legitimate government of the country.8

After suffering a series of military defeats, the Islamic Courts reverted to guerrilla warfare, achieving some success,

including the capture of Kismayo in August 2008.9

If the Islamic Courts should gain

control of Somalia, they will likely take it into the orbit of the international Islamic ter

rorist network. Somalia—which had little or no strategic value to the United States

during the incursions of the 1990s—would then become a strategic problem comparable to that posed by Afghanistan in 2001.10

Predictably, the United States is widely blamed, both locally and internationally, for

most of the problems of Somalia, including failure of the UN mission of the 1990s, the

current calamity within the country, and the rise of the Islamic Courts.11 The logic goes

something like this. The UN mission to Somalia failed because of a lack of sufficient

American support, especially during UNOSOM II. The current calamity exists due to

lack of American attention and support after the withdrawal of UN forces. The rise of

Islamic terrorist groups resulted from the ineffectiveness of the American intervention

of the 1990s. The Islamic Courts movement remains popular in Somalia primarily

because of American support for the Ethiopian invasion and occupation of parts of the

country.12

Whatever truth there may be in these assertions, they hardly explain the chaos that has

visited Somalia over the past two decades. However inadequate the UN and American

efforts of the 1990s (and there is a wide range of opinions), ultimate responsibility for

the anarchy in Somalia must rest with its own leaders. The dictatorial rule of Siad Barr

created the conditions for civil war and the subsequent instability of his nation. The

self-interest of the clan-based faction leaders—who brought about Siad Barre’s

demise—encouraged and sustained the chaos, from which they expected to benefit.

The most powerful leaders within Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre put their quests

for power and wealth ahead of any genuine concern for the Somali nation and people.

Even so, the problems of Somalia continue to reach out to the United States, and they

are likely to do so into the future.

What further should we say for the U.S. involvement in Somalia? Simply stated, the

United States went into Somalia in 1992 to break the famine and save Somali lives.

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from the UN and American internationalists to take on a broader mission, ambig

ously known as nation building, resulted in a confused U.S. policy. Very few Ame

cans—and none with real power—wanted an extended commitment to Somalia 

the dying days of the George H. W. Bush administration. But that changed with t

arrival of a new presidential administration in January 1993.13 Initially, President 

concept of a “New World Order” meshed nicely with Secretary-General BoutrosGhali’s “Agenda for Peace” in addressing the crisis in Somalia. But the Bush admi

tion did not see either as committing the United States to a complex nation-build

mission using American troops. Ironically, the price of getting out of Somalia (en

Operation RESTORE HOPE and returning General Johnston’s large force to the Un

States) was an agreement to remain in Somalia, albeit with fewer U.S. troops. Th

applicability of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine for committing troops—with its 

lary of using overwhelming force—was completely lost sight of in the transition.

resulted in an operational overreach, whereby UNOSOM II received a broad man

without adequate means for its execution. Additionally, UNOSOM II (unlike UN

did not have a finite set of objectives to undertake or a specific time frame in wh

achieve them.15 After the departure of UNITAF, the mission to Somalia became c

fused in part because the presidential transition in Washington coincided with th

sion transition in Mogadishu.16

With the arrival of the administration of President Clinton, the doctrines of “a

tive multilateralism” and “engagement and enlargement”—primarily sponsored 

Madeleine Albright and Anthony Lake—seemed to fit exactly the situation withi

Somalia.17 This occurred as the UN was pressing the United States to remain invo

a major player within the UNOSOM II coalition. The facts that the UN leader fo

UNOSOM II (Admiral Jonathan Howe) was actually an American and that the A

can military commander (Major General Thomas Montgomery) was also the dep

UN commander further confused the situation. It is true, as many have pointed o

that only American officers commanded U.S. troops during the Somalia incursio

Nevertheless, the operations they executed were part of a UN strategy, driven fro

both New York and Mogadishu and with enthusiastic support from the new adm

tration in Washington. The crosscurrents resulting from the UN and American r

tionship allowed conditions in Somalia to slide from one crisis to another, drawi

U.S. forces through a process described, somewhat derisively, as mission creep.

Concerned with the drift toward conflict during the middle of 1993, certain mem

of the Clinton administration—including the president himself—began to recon

the situation and ponder a change of policy.18 Many key military leaders had alre

come to doubt the efficacy of the mission, and some had opposed it from the

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soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu, the American people became shocked and

enraged. This event—like Tet 1968 in Vietnam—became a defining moment; it resulted

in a curtailment of the U.S. commitment to Somalia and its people.19 In short, it

revealed the lack of American will for this mission and brought to light the confused

manner in which leaders had created and executed the policy.20 As Chester Crocker has

declared, “The Somalia ‘failure’ was less a failure of either humanitarian intervention

or muscular peacekeeping than a failure to apply them steadily and wisely. The failure

was of another order: strategic confusion followed by collapse of political will when th

confusion led to combat casualties.”21 There had been enough political will for RESTORE

HOPE/UNITAF, because that operation had been well coordinated, remained “on mission,” and proved successful. But support for CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II lacked

these prerequisites and quickly dissolved once the casualties began to mount.22

President Clinton further confused the issue by announcing that the United States

would not abandon the mission to Somalia but also that it would pull out all forces

within six months. The president represented this declaration as an effort to see the

mission through, but Somali and UN leaders recognized it for what it was—a face-saving

way to withdraw from what was by then perceived as a failed policy. In fairness to the

decision makers, they believed this six-month deadline would provide time for

UNOSOM II to build up strength from other UN members.23 They were also under

pressure from several congressional leaders for an immediate withdrawal. The sixmonth commitment was probably the best that could have been achieved under the cir

cumstances, and only if casualties remained low. In the meantime, the U.S. military

would build up large and powerful forces in Somalia for defensive purposes and as a

show of force. This new and more capable American force—known as JTF Somalia—

would not undertake offensive action, as the smaller and less powerful American element had done from June through October 1993.24 But its presence in Somalia provided a diplomatic tool, one that was skillfully utilized by Ambassador Oakley and

others during the final months of the American incursion.25 It proved effective in part

because Aideed—the UN’s number-one villain in Somalia—did not want or need any

more shoot-outs with U.S. forces.

At that point in Somalia, the higher-level policy to reconstruct the nation had not yet

failed. The tactical effort to capture Aideed had failed, and Americans had been

shocked to lose eighteen soldiers in a Mogadishu firefight. But even the results of the

Battle of Mogadishu were somewhat murky. In a strict military sense, one could consider it a tactical victory for U.S. forces—the American task force captured the SNA

lieutenants it had set out to get, and it had certainly inflicted far greater casualties than

it received. But it became a political and public relations defeat for the United States,

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successful than not at this point, despite the disastrous “get Aideed” operation an

shock of the Battle of Mogadishu. Many leaders remained hopeful that progress w

still possible. Certainly Generals Montgomery and Ernst believed that the condit

existed, and that they had the capability, to make an impact as JTF Somalia began 

build up. Admiral Howe too believed the time was ripe for real progress. But mu

that optimism evaporated with the decision of the Clinton administration to sus

offensive operations, avoid additional casualties, and withdraw from UNOSOM 

The United States certainly made a mistake in Somalia by supporting the so-calle

on Aideed and his SNA, as many have pointed out. That caused the UN and the U

States to lose any claim to neutrality and to be marked as participants in the inte

conflict.28 To some extent, this situation resulted from a lack of communications

between UNOSOM II and the Somali factional leaders, particularly Aideed.29 But 

more fundamental mistake involved expanding the initial UN mandate without p

ing the military means to ensure its success.30 This failure substantially resulted fr

lack of a thorough and open debate within the United States over the mandate, m

sion, force levels, and budget for the Somalia effort.31 Had such deliberation occu

American leaders would have either scaled back the mission or provided adequat

resources.32 But in its absence, top American leaders simply acquiesced to the UN’s 

concept of nation building and hoped for the best. In the opinion of Chester Cro

“Support for an initially popular undertaking collapsed amid confusion about A

can purposes. Was this a humanitarian mission, a manhunt for a wily warlord, o

nation-building program?”33

In the opinion of Walter Clarke, the Somalia incursion was a failure but not a mi

failure. He has stated, “In my view Somalia was not a military failure, it was a we

military operation, but which had no political focus. It was a failed political milit

operation.”34 Clarke’s point is very Clausewitzian and one with which few people 

argue. If nothing else, the Somalia incursions demonstrate that the primacy of po

should apply to humanitarian and peace operations as much as to regular warfar

But it is not enough that political leaders provide policy and strategic direction; t

must also ensure that the direction is sufficient to the task. Equally important, th

political objectives must be in harmony with the operational level of action as m

with the strategic.36 Otherwise, no degree of military competence can ensure succe

we learned to our regret in Vietnam. Operational excellence is rarely sufficient to m

up for inadequate strategy or policy. As Alberto Coll has argued, “In the Somalia in

vention, good intentions were mixed with miscalculation in roughly equal proport

produce an outcome that was as full of ambiguities and failures as it was of undeni

achievement.”37

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keep an appropriate balance and relationship among policy, strategy, operations, and

tactics. It is through the application of operational art and the definition of clear objec

tives that these elements are properly harmonized. But that is possible only if there is

clear and consistent direction from the policy and strategic levels. The lack of such

guidance, coupled with a failure to clearly define objectives during CONTINUE HOPE/

UNOSOM II, resulted in that operational drift that typified military actions during the

May–October 1993 period.38 This contrasted with the focused effort of Aideed and the

SNA, who attacked America’s center of gravity—that is, its unwillingness to suffer high

casualties where no vital national interests existed.39

The Somalia experience caused the Clinton administration to recognize the need for a

more orderly process for making decisions and commitments to peace operations. On

3 May 1994, the White House issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which

purported to ensure a more collaborative approach and “to impose discipline on both

the UN and the United States to make peace operations a more effective instrument of

collective security.”40 PDD 25 also signaled a change from the initial Clinton policy of

assertive multilateralism to a much more cautious approach for committing U.S. forces

to humanitarian and peace operations.41 The provisions of PDD 25, against the background of the Somalia experience, inhibited American involvement in humanitarian

operations for some time, as exhibited by the reluctance of President Clinton to intervene in the Rwanda genocide.42 Interestingly, the crisis in Rwanda and Burundi

occurred at the very time the Clinton administration was developing and issuing

PDD 25.43 Many observers contend that the “ghosts of Somalia” (as described by

Walter Clarke) also influenced the manner in which the United States involved itself

in the Balkans and in Haiti during the latter half of the 1990s.44 When the United States

did eventually intervene in those areas, the preparation and subsequent operations

clearly benefited from the experience in Somalia.45

The U.S. military in Somalia generally receives better marks than does the political side

Of course, it is difficult to separate political decision from military execution. What is

the point of a well executed military operation if accomplished as part of a flawed policy? For example, the 12 July 1993 attack on Abdi House was clearly a well executed

operation, but it ended any prospect of a peaceful accommodation with Aideed and th

SNA.46 It also had a negative impact on many U.S. allies and weakened the UN coalition

in Somalia.47 Tactical and operational excellence are necessary but not sufficient for

success, and they produce effectiveness only when complementary elements of a sound

strategic plan. The fact that tactical or operational events often influence strategic thinking further underscores the need to synchronize all levels of political and military activity.48 The attack on Abdi House is an example of failure to do so, and the 3–4 October

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port that existed for the larger policy and its strategic mission. Americans had re

lutely committed themselves to the humanitarian objectives in Somalia, but supp

combat action was very thin and consequently susceptible to shock, such as occu

during the Battle of Mogadishu.49

As previously mentioned, the experience in Somalia made the United States shy o

humanitarian and peace operations for some time. Yet in a broader sense, suppo

remained for international involvement among most Americans, so long as they

perceived a need, had a clear understanding of what the mission would entail, a

felt adequately informed of the strategy for success.50 As Walter Clarke stated in 1

“If the U.S. role is properly articulated by national leaders, the public is willing to 

the price of global leadership. The U.S. Public intuitively appreciated that the abi

project power for humanitarian purposes over long distances is the singular mar

world power.”51

American leaders had the issue of world leadership in mind before, during, and a

the Somalia incursions. As the Cold War morphed into the new world order, leav

the United States as the world’s only superpower, most observers expected Amer

assume greater responsibility in international affairs. The U.S. sea services, which

played a leading role in the Somalia incursions, had ensured their place in the ne

global environment through the energetic production of operational and strateg

cept papers, along with new doctrine where appropriate. The number of docume

issued during the decade of the 1990s, including . . . From the Sea and Operationa

Maneuver from the Sea, certainly illustrates that point. Such concept papers—com

with service and joint doctrine, and adjusted to fit new conditions—proved very

important in providing military professionals frameworks for thinking about, di

ing, and adjusting to changed environments. This framework played an importan

in the effectiveness of naval expeditionary forces during the Somalia incursions.5

also helped to minimize the effects of policy mistakes and strategic discontinuiti

at the more fundamental level, it was the esprit de corps of the Navy and Marine 

team (developed between the two services over two centuries, and not always hap

that underlay its success during the Somalia involvement, despite a lack of cogen

strategic guidance.

Traditional Navy–Marine Corps relationships developed primarily for use in con

tional warfare, but they translated well to the expeditionary environment of the p

Cold War era.53 The new challenges of the 1990s required only fine-tuning, as pro

in . . . From the Sea, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and other documents fro

that era. Of course, this had been true throughout American history. The ability 

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cies is the hallmark of American naval expeditionary forces. The manner in which Nav

and Marine Corps commanders exercised the operational art during the Somalia

involvement clearly demonstrated the efficacy of this system.

Making things work effectively was no easier for Esek Hopkins and Samuel Nicholas at

New Providence in the Bahamas during 1776 than it was for Anthony Zinni and Lee

Gunn in Somalia during 1995. But the logic of naval expeditionary forces, the competence and professionalism of leaders, and the commitment of sailors and Marines were

the essential ingredients that have ensured effectiveness in differing eras, under differing conditions, and in the face of differing requirements and expectations. Doctrine

written over many years from the hard experience of battle, and concept papers written

by creative minds that recognize new strategic and operational realities, is good and

necessary. But the expeditionary culture, coupled with strong traditions forged by the

Navy and Marine Corps team over many years and through many experiences, provided a capable force, able to operate in a variety of conditions, no matter how ineffectively political leaders utilized it. One of the high points of the Somalia incursions is

that those experiences tended to revalidate the efficacy of the Navy and Marine Corps

team and the related doctrine and concepts it had spawned.54 But however important

concept papers and doctrine may be, it is the expeditionary mind-set, combined with a

confident spirit of proficiency in uncertain circumstances, that undergirds martial

strength. These Somalia operations are vivid illustrations of Napoleon’s maxim that “in

war, the morale is to the physical as three to one.”55

Notes

1. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future

of Humanitarian Intervention,” pp. 84–85.

2. United Nations and Somalia, p. 78.

3. Oakley PBS Frontline interview; “Somalia:

Not a Total Failure,” New York Times, 2

March 1995.

4. David Axe, “Cries in the Dark,” U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings (April 2008); Jeffrey

Gettleman, “With Spotlight on Pirates, Somalis on Land Waste Away in the Shadows,”

New York Times, 11 October 2008; Oakley

interview.

5. Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” p. 129;

Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, p. 281.

6. The Islamic Courts grew out of local efforts

to establish order in parts of Somalia where

none had existed. The movement spawned a

militia initially known as the Union of Islamic Courts, and then the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). Its more radical

element hijacked the movement during 200

with the election of Hassan Dahir Aweys

(recognized as a terrorist by both the UN

and the United States) as chairman of the

CIC Consultative Council and with the increased influence from the radical al

Shabaab component. James Swan, Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Remarks to the Baltimore Council Relat

ing to Foreign Affairs in Somalia, 7 March

2007, available at www.proquest.com.

7. Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, pp.

304–305.

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Leader Surrenders in Kenya Capital,” New

York Times, 23 January 2007.

9. Associated Press, “Militants Patrol Captured

Somali City,” New York Times, 24 August 2008.

10. In December 2006, the UN Security Council

adopted Resolution 1725, authorizing a

peacekeeping force (mostly from the African

Union) to deploy to Somalia under the command of the Intergovernmental Authority

on Development (IGAD). Whether or not

these troops will be more successful than

previous efforts is uncertain. The length of

time Ethiopian forces will remain in Somalia

is also open to question, although most observers believe they will depart as soon as

possible. John R. Bolton, Surrender Is Not an

Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (New York: Threshold,

2007), p. 366.

11. Axe, “Cries in the Dark.”

12. Ibid.

13. Oakley interview.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia,” p. 6; Seybolt,

Humanitarian Military Intervention, pp. 154–

59.

17. Haass, Reluctant Sheriff, pp. 61, 90–91; Richard J. Norton, “Somalia II,” in Case Studies in

Policy Making & Process, ed. Shawn W.

Burns, 9th ed. (Newport, R.I.: National Security Decision Making Department, Naval

War College, 2005), p. 65; Lauren Ploch, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and

the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Report

for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 16 May 2007), p. 25.

18. Carla Ann Robbins, “Clinton Rethinks U.S.

Global Peacekeeping Role, Draws New Criteria for Joining U.N.-Led Missions,” Wall

Street Journal, 27 September 1993.

19. Coll, Problems of Doing Good, p. 12.

20. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.

21. Chester A. Crocker has served as Assistant

Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace, and Distinguished Research

Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University. Crocker,

“Lessons of Somalia,” p. 5.

Strategic Thought (London: Routledg

2001), p. 326.

23. Oakley interview.

24. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the 

of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 24

25. Hoar interview.

26. Coll, Problems of Doing Good, p. 12.

27. Oakley interview.

28. Press, “Retreat from Somalia”; Zinni

interview.

29. Hoar interview; Zinni interview.

30. Oakley interview.

31. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.

32. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia,” pp. 5–

33. Ibid., p. 7.

34. Walter Clarke served as Deputy Chie

Mission, U.S. Embassy, Somalia, dur

and as adjunct professor of peace op

at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping Inst

Clarke PBS Frontline interview.

35. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia,” p. 8; F

“Approaching Humanitarian Interve

Strategically,” pp. 147, 158.

36. Oakley interview; Milan Vego, Joint O

tional Warfare: Theory and Practice (

port, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 10

September 2007), p. I-44.

37. Coll, Problems of Doing Good, p. 15.

38. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, pp. 

to I-50.

39. Handel, Masters of War, p. 323; Vego

Operational Warfare, p. VII-16.

40. Clinton Administration Policy on Refo

Multilateral Peace Operations, Presid

Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (Washi

D.C.: White House, May 1994), avail

www.fas.org.

41. Farrell, “United States Marine Corps 

tions in Somalia,” p. 43; Weiss, “Reki

Hope in UN Humanitarian Interven

p. 223.

42. Max Boot, War Made New: Technolog

fare, and the Course of History, 1500 t

(New York: Gotham Books, 2006), p

Handel, Masters of War, p. 324.

43. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the 

of Humanitarian Intervention,” pp. 7

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45. Donald Hornbeck, “Operation Shining Hope

Owes Somalia,” U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings (December 1999), pp. 69–71;

Ismat Kittani and Ian Johnstone, “The Lessons from Somalia,” UN Chronicle, no. 3

(1996), pp. 80–81.

46. Oakley interview.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

50. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future

of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 252.

51. Clarke, “Failed Missions and Uncertain

Mandates in Somalia,” p. 17.

52. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, pp. XII-27

to XII-36.

53. Zinni interview.

54. Ibid.

55. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, p. III-33.

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Appendix A: The Weinberger Doctrine

Six tests governing the commitment of forces to combat:

1. Our vital interests must be at stake.

2. The issues involved are so important for the future of the United States and o

allies that we are prepared to commit enough forces to win.

3. We have clearly defined political and military objectives, which we must secur

4. We have sized our forces to achieve our objectives.

5. We have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people.

6. U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a last resort.

Note: This “doctrine” has been published numerous places, including Caspar W.

Weinberger’s book cited here.

Sources: Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pent

(New York: Warner Books, 1990); Earl E. K. Abonadi, Weinberger-Powell and Tra

mation: Perceptions of American Power from the Fall of Saigon to the Fall of Baghd

(Monterey, Calif.: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006).

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Appendix B: The Powell Doctrine

Questions to be answered affirmatively before applying military action:

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?

2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?

3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?

4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?

5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?

6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?

7. Is the action supported by the American people?

8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

Note: The Powell doctrine is based principally on the “Weinberger doctrine,” crea

former secretary of defense (1981–87) Caspar W. Weinberger. General Colin L. P

as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993, endorsed and advoca

Weinberger’s set of principles so strongly that many observers began calling it th

“Weinberger-Powell doctrine”; some even started referring to the general’s interp

tion as the “Powell doctrine.” Powell also emphasized the use of overwhelming fo

once American troops are committed to an action and that constitutes the essenc

his corollary to the “Weinberger doctrine.”

Source: Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995)

E. K. Abonadi, Weinberger-Powell and Transformation: Perceptions of American Po

from the Fall of Saigon to the Fall of Baghdad (Monterey, Calif.: U.S. Naval Postgra

School, June 2006).

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Appendix C: UNITAF Component Commanders

Air Force Component

• Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, 9 December 1992 to 29 Marc

• Colonel Wirthe, USAF, 29 March 1993 to 4 May 1993

Army Component

• Brigadier General William Magruder III, USA, 9–22 December 1992

• Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, 22 December 1992 to 16 March 1993

• Brigadier General Greg L. Gile, USA, 16 March 1993 to 4 May 1993

Marine Corps Component

• Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, 9 December 1992 to 23 March 199

• Colonel Jack W. Klimp, USMC, 23 March 1993 to 9 April 1993

• Colonel Emil R. Bedard, USMC, 9–23 April 1993

• Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, USMC, 23 April 1993 to 4 May 1993

Navy Component

• Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, 19–23 December 1992

• Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, USN, 19–28 December 1992

• Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III, USN, 28 December 1992 to 15 January 199

• Captain John W. Peterson, USN, 15 January 1993 to 1 February 1993

• Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, 1 February 1993 to 5 March 1993

• Captain Nathan H. Beason, USN, 5–23 March 1993

• Captain Kenneth Pyle, USN, 23 March 1993 to 4 May 1993

Sources: U.S. Army Dept., Resource Guide, Unified Task Force Somalia, December 1

May 1993, Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History

1994); Dennis P. Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task F

1992–1993 (Washington, D.C.: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2005).

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Appendix D: UN Security Council Resolutions

UNSC Resolution 733 (23 January 1992)

Calls for total arms embargo.

Calls for cease-fire and reconciliation.

Calls for increased humanitarian aid to Somalia.

Establishes special aid coordinator (David Bassiouni).

Worked from Nairobi and (in March) Mogadishu.

Success for resolution questionable due to looting, extortion, lack of support.

UNSC Resolution 746 (17 March 1992)

Deplores human suffering and failure to implement cease-fire.

Urges Somali factions to abide with cease-fire agreement.

Urges Somali factions to cooperate with humanitarian efforts.

Urgently dispatches team to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assis

Calls for a conference of reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

UNSC Resolution 751 (24 April 1992)

Establishes United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).

Dispatches fifty unarmed UN observers to monitor Aideed–Ali Mahdi cease-f

Allows future deployment of five hundred peacekeepers.

Boutros-Ghali assigns Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun to fact-finding

mission.

Authorizes appointment of special representative in Somalia (Mohamed Sahn

UNSC Resolution 767 (27 July 1992)

Endorses emergency airlift of food and medical supplies to “Triangle of Death

President Bush responds with emergency airlift called Operation PROVIDE RE

Establishes four UNOSOM operational zones in Somalia.

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UNSC alarmed by continued sporadic outbreaks of hostilities and loss of life.

UNSC deeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering.

UNSC gravely concerned at the deterioration of humanitarian situation.

Authorizes the increase in strength of UNOSOM to 3,500 (including 550

Pakistanis).

Allows for 750 U.S. soldiers in each UNOSOM operational zone.

UNSC Resolution 794 (3 December 1992)

Establishes UNITAF (Unified Task Force).

The United States establishes Operation RESTORE HOPE.

Calls for use of all means to create a secure environment for delivery of aid.

Authorizes Chapter VII (enforcement) operations to create secure environment.

UNSC Resolution 814 (26 March 1993)

Establishes expanded UNOSOM (i.e., UNOSOM II).

Directs a prompt, smooth, and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

Calls for effective program of disarming Somali parties, movements, and factions.

Calls for rehabilitation of political institutions and economy of Somalia.

Provides for establishment of impartial national police force.

Authorizes enforcement of Addis Ababa peace accords, including cease-fire.

Authorizes Chapter VII (enforcement) operations to create secure environment.

UNSC Resolution 837 (6 June 1993)

Issued in response to the killing of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers in ambush.

Directs UNOSOM to take all necessary steps to bring perpetrators to justice.

UNSC Resolution 885 (16 November 1993)

Authorizes establishment of Commission of Inquiry.

Investigates 5 June 1993 attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers.

Suspends arrest actions against implicated individuals.

Addresses individuals already detained under UNSC Resolution 837.

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Reduces size of UNOSOM II force.

Revises mandate without enforcement powers.

UNSC Resolution 946 (30 September 1994)

Extends UNOSOM II mandate to 31 October 1994.

Requests intensified preparations for possible withdrawal.

UNSC Resolution 954 (4 November 1994)

Extends UNOSOM II mandate for final period until 31 March 1995.

Requests member states to provide military assistance for withdrawal.

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Appendix E: Seven-Point Agreement (reached among principal leaders in Mog

on 11 December 1992)

1. Immediate and total cessation of hostilities and restoration of unity of the U.

2. Immediate and total cessation of all negative propaganda.

3. To break the artificial lines in the capital city of Mogadishu.

4. All the forces and their technicals should report to their respective designated

locations outside the city within the next 48 hours, and be controlled by the j

committee.

5. The already established reconciliation committee of the U.S.C. should conven

meetings within the next 24 hours.

6. We call upon all Somalis throughout the country to seriously engage on cessa

all hostilities and join with us for peace and unity of Somalia.

7. We express our deep appreciation to the international community for its effo

assist Somalia and appeal to it to extend and expand its assistance including n

only humanitarian relief aid but also reconstruction and rehabilitation as wel

national reconciliation conference.

Source: John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hop

Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States In

of Peace Press, 1995).

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Appendix F: Somali Clans and Political Factions

Clans are the equivalent of tribes in most other societies, with their own codes an

tures. Somalis typically divide each clan into five or more smaller clans, which ar

ther divided into subclans.

Principal Clans and Subclans Involved in the Somali Civil War

Hawiye clan

• Abgal subclan—Ali Mahdi Mohamed

• Habr Gidr subclan—Mohamed Farah Aideed

Darod clan

• Marehan subclan—Mohamed Siad Barre

• Majerteen subclan—Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan)

• Ogaden subclan—Ahmed Omar Jess

Isaaq clan

Dir clan—northwestern element

Dir clan—southern element

Rahanwein clan

Major Clan-Based Political and Military Organizations Active in the Somali Civil 

Somali Democratic Association (SDA)

Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Mohamed Farah Aideed’s branch of the USC)

Somali National Front (SNF)

Somali National Movement (SNM)

Somali Patriotic Front (SPF)

Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)

Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) (Ali Mahdi Mohamed’s branch of the USC)

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Somali Salvation Front (SSF)

Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)

United Somali Congress (USC)

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Appendix G: Participating Nations

EASTERN EXIT

Amphibious NEO from U.S. embassy in Mogadishu

United States only.

PROVIDE RELIEF

U.S. support operations during UNOSOM I

Primarily United States; small participation by Canada, France, and Germany.

RESTORE HOPE/UNITAF

About thirty-seven thousand personnel from twenty-two coalition nations

Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Italy, Kuw

Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey

United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe.

CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II

About thirty thousand personnel from twenty-nine coalition nations

Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Gre

India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nige

Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab

Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe.

UNITED SHIELD

About 16,500 personnel from seven coalition nations

Bangladesh, France, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United St

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May 1993, Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History,

1994); U.S. Army Dept., United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994 (Washington, D.C.: Cen

ter of Military History, 2003); The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996, with

Introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations, United

Nations Blue Book Series, vol. 8 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996);

Chief of Staff, I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, Information for Secretarial Correspondence Related to Operation United Shield, 7 April 1995 (copy in possession of the

author).

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Appendix H: General Zinni’s Considerations for Humanitarian and Peace Oper

One of the United States military’s most experienced leaders in the field of MOO

General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Retired), has developed the following considera

for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations:

• Each operation is unique. We must be careful what lessons we learn from a sin

experience.

• Each operation has two key aspects: (1) the degree of complexity of the opera

and (2) the degree of consent of the involved parties and the international

community for the operation.

• The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.

• Start planning as early as possible, including everyone in the planning process

• Make as thorough an assessment as possible before deployment.

• Conduct a thorough mission analysis, determining the centers of gravity, end 

commander’s intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated

duration of the operation.

• Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks with political objectives. A

mission creep and allow for mission shifts. A mission shift is a conscious deci

made by the political leadership in consultation with the military commander

responding to a changing situation.

• Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the operation. This allows

subordinate commanders to make appropriate adjustments to meet their indi

situation or rapidly changing conditions.

• Coordinate everything with everybody. Establish coordination mechanisms th

include political, military, nongovernmental organizations, international

organizations, and the interested parties.

• Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the decisionmakers are. 

must know how the involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural va

people with their own culture.

• Start or restore key institutions as early as possible.

• Don’t lose the initiative and momentum.

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or use words that might come back to haunt you.

• Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the fewest possible seams

between organizations and involved parties.

• Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each of the involved parties.

• Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.

• Personalities often are more important than processes. You need the right people in

the right places.

• Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about who you invite to participate

use as a go-between, or enter into contracts with since you are giving them influenc

in the process.

• Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused on it. Whatever the

image, humanitarian or as firm but well-intentioned agent of change, ensure your

troops are aware of it so they can conduct themselves accordingly.

• Centralize information management. Ensure that your public affairs and

psychological operations are coordinated, accurate, and consistent.

• Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and political compatibility and

military interoperability are crucial to success. The interests, cultures, capabilities,

and motivations of all the parties may not be uniform, but they cannot be allowed

to work against each other.

• Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training in

nontraditional roles. The troops need awareness and understanding of their roles.

The commander and the staff need to develop and apply new skills, such as

negotiating, supporting humanitarian organizations effectively and appropriately,

and building coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.

Source: U.S. Navy Dept., Marine Corps Operations, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication

[MCDP] 1-0 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 27 September

2001), app. E, p. 5. (Quoted verbatim.)

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Appendix I: Major Events Chronology

1960 Somalia gains independence from Italy and Great Britain; forms Somali Repub

1969 Military coup by Mohamed Siad Barre, who establishes Supreme Revolutionar

Council.

1988 Revolution begins in earnest against Siad Barre, brutally resisted. Army and ai

bombard Hargeisa and Burao, creating three hundred thousand refugees.

1989 Hawiye clan forms the United Somali Congress (USC).

1990 Manifesto Group in Mogadishu calls for Siad Barre’s resignation and national

reconciliation.

1991 Somalian civil war flares up; Mogadishu in chaos, social and political collapse. 

Navy and Marines evacuate U.S. embassy under fire, in Operation EASTERN EXI

Barre suffers defeat and flees from Mogadishu and then from Somalia. Clan-b

factions begin struggle for control of Somalia.

1992 (May) Last effort to recapture Mogadishu by Siad Barre’s militia is defeated. (A

President H. W. Bush orders airlift of supplies into Somalia, in Operation PROV

RELIEF. (December) Naval expeditionary force lands in Mogadishu (Operation R

HOPE). U.S. forces under UNITAF build up in Somalia to protect humanitarian 

operations.

1993 (May) Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II begins operations in relief of UNI

(June) Pakistani troops under UNOSOM II are ambushed, twenty-four killed. U

United States respond with operations to capture Aideed and minimize his SN

faction. (3–4 October) Battle of Mogadishu (“Black Hawk Down” incident) oc

President Clinton announces U.S. intent to evacuate Somalia no later than 31 

1994. U.S. builds up forces under JTF SOMALIA, primarily for defensive purpose

1994 U.S. forces under JTF SOMALIA complete buildup, then prepare to redeploy. La

elements depart Somalia, in a tactical amphibious withdrawal. U.S. naval

expeditionary forces conduct withdrawal (Operation QUICK DRAW).

1995 UN announces intention to withdraw all forces and personnel from Somalia. U

naval expeditionary forces conduct amphibious evacuation of UN troops and

personnel. (28 February–3 March 1995) Last of UNOSOM II forces conduct tac

withdrawal, under Operation UNITED SHIELD.

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Appendix J: Acronyms and Abbreviations

A AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle [now Expedition

Assault Vehicle]

AAV amphibious assault vehicle

AFB Air Force Base

AFOE assault follow-on echelon

AMC Air Mobility Command

APC armored personnel carrier

APS Army Prepositioned Stocks

ARG amphibious readiness group

ATF amphibious task force

ATU amphibious task unit

AWSS authorized weapons storage site [cantonment areas]

C CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.

CATF Commander, Amphibious Task Force

CEF Command Element Forward

CENTCOM [U.S.] Central Command

CIC Council of Islamic Courts

CINC Commander in Chief

CISE CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force; Combined Joint Task For

CLF Commander, Landing Force

CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center

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CMPF Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CRAF Civilian Reserve Air Fleet

CSSE Combat Service Support Element

CTF combined task force; Commander, Task Force

CVBG carrier battle group

D DART disaster assistance response team

E ECC evacuation control center

F FAST Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team [Marine Corps]

FIE fly-in echelon

FIST Fleet Imagery Support Terminal

FMF Fleet Marine Force

FSS fast sealift ship

FSSG Force Service Support Group

G GCA ground-controlled approach

GCE ground combat element

H HAST humanitarian assistance survey team

HOC Humanitarian Operations Center

HRO humanitarian relief organization

HRS Humanitarian Relief Sector

I ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies

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J JOC Joint Operations Center

JOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

JSB Joint Support Base

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF joint task force

L LAS League of Arab States

LASH lighter aboard ship

LAV Light Armored Vehicle

LCAC Landing Craft, Air Cushion

LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose, multipurpos

LHD amphibious assault ship (dock)

LKA attack cargo ship

LNO liaison officer

LPD amphibious transport dock

LPH amphibious assault ship (helicopter)

LSC Logistics Support Command

LSD landing ship dock

LST landing ship tank

M MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MARAD Maritime Administration

MARFOR Marine Corps forces

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication

MCM mine countermeasures

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MEF Marine expeditionary force

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MEU (SOC) Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)

MFA Marine Forces Afloat

MOOTW military operations other than war

MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force

MPS maritime prepositioning ship

MPSRon Maritime Prepositioned Ships squadron

MSC Military Sealift Command

MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

MV motor vessel

N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVCENT [U.S.] Naval Forces, Central Command

NCA National Command Authority

NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NGO nongovernmental organization

NSC National Security Council

O OAU Organization of African Unity

OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance [element of USAID]

OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference

OMFTS Operational Maneuver from the Sea

OPP offload preparation party

P PhibGru amphibious group

PhibRon amphibious squadron

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PSYOPS psychological operations

PVO private voluntary organization

Q QRF quick-reaction force

R RLT Regimental Landing Team

ROE rule(s) of engagement

ROWPU reverse osmosis water purification unit

RPG rocket-propelled grenade

RRF Ready Reserve Force

S SACB Somalia Aid Coordination Body

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

SDA Somali Democratic Alliance

SDM Somali Democratic Movement

SEAL Sea-Air-Land [Navy special operations]

SLRP Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party

SNA Somali National Alliance

SNDU Somali National Democratic Union

SNF Somali National Front

SNM Somali National Movement

SNU Somali National Union

SPF Somali Patriotic Front

SPM Somali Patriotic Movement

SPMAGTF special-purpose Marine air-ground task force

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General [United

Nations]

SSA Somali Salvation Alliance

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SSF Somali Salvation Front

SSNM Southern Somali National Movement

STOM Ship-to-Objective Maneuver

T T-AK cargo ship [MSC operated]

TALCE tanker airlift control element

TARPS Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Photo System

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TOW Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided [M-220 anti

tank missile]

TPFDD time-phased force deployment data

U UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNITAF Unified Task Force [UN authorized, US led]

UNLSC UN Logistics Support Command

UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA U.S. Army

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USC United Somali Congress

USF United Somali Front

USFORSOM U.S. Forces in Somalia

USLO U.S. Liaison Office

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

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V V/STOL vertical/short takeoff and landing

W WFP World Food Programme [UN Agency]

WHO World Health Organization [UN Agency]

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ARCHIVES, MANUSCRIPTS, AND

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December 2008.

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2008.

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July 2008.

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Pennsylvania, 20 October 2007.

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3 September 2008.

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9 September 2008.

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Newport, Rhode Island, 11 Septemb

and 24 July 2008.

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California, 17 March 2008.

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phone, 8 April 2008.

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Fairfax, Virginia, 11 February 2008.

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Rhode Island, 1 July 2008.

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Church, Virginia, 10 October 2007.

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Central Command on Combined Tas

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Not to Interfere.” Washington Post, 8 December 1992.

———. “U.S. Starts Relief Effort in Somalia.”

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About the Author

Gary J. Ohls currently serves as associate professor of Joint Maritime Operations 

Naval War College Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Califo

He received a PhD in history from Texas Christian University in Fort Worth, Tex

holds three master’s degrees, and is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval W

lege, in Newport, Rhode Island. Professor Ohls has previously taught at Texas Ch

University and served as associate professor of naval science and Marine officer

instructor with the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps unit at the University 

orado. Prior to his current position, Professor Ohls served as a member of the M

time History Department at the Naval War College in Newport. During this peri

also assisted the director of the Naval War College Museum in a variety of roles, 

ing the preparation of exhibits and the delivery of lectures. Colonel Ohls served t

five years in the U.S. Marine Corps, including duty as an enlisted man, regular of

reserve officer, and reserve officer on active duty. During this service, he perform

both command and staff positions at various locations worldwide and at sea. Ad

ally, he has worked in management positions with Northrop Grumman Corpora

and the Aerospace Corporation.

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The Newport Papers

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

Peter M. Swartz (no. 33, December 2008).

Major Naval Operations, by Milan Vego (no. 32, September 2008).

Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, edited by Paul D. Tay

(no. 31, August 2008).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

30, September 2007).

Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron (no. 29, September 2

Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, by 

A. Elleman (no. 28, February 2007).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

27, September 2006).

Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, edited b

Carnes Lord (no. 26, February 2006).

The Regulation of International Coercion: Legal Authorities and Political Constrain

James P. Terry (no. 25, October 2005).

Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century: A Naval War College Review Reader, edi

Peter Dombrowski (no. 24, July 2005).

The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, by William

Hopkinson (no. 23, May 2005).

China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew S.

Erickson (no. 22, April 2005).

Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and Sou

edited by Paul D. Taylor (no. 21, 2004).

Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988, by Robert Gile (no. 20, 2004).

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John Hattend

(no. 19, 2004).

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Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and

Andrew L. Ross (no. 18, 2003).

The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs

by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds (no. 17, 2003).

The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Sub

marines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. (no. 16, 2003).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen

(no. 15, December 2000).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (no. 14, August 1998).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, with David G. Freymann (no. 13,

March 1998).

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Nordquist (no. 12, August 1997).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strategy:

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (no. 11, April 1997).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James,

U.S. Air Force (no. 10, October 1996).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) (no. 9

December 1995).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenberg

(no. 8, December 1994).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States,

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (no. 7, June 1994).

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of

the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (no. 6, October 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, by

Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 5, August 1993).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (no. 4, June 1993).

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Robertson, Jr. (no. 3, October 1992).

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1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 2, April 1

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Christopher C. Harmon (no. 1, December 1991).

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press/newportpapers/newportpapers.aspx.

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