Filed 6/24/21 Velis v. AT&T Services CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

WILLIAM VELIS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

AT&T SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B303011

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV10231)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Carolyn B. Kuhl, Judge. Affirmed.

Diversity Law Group, Larry W. Lee; Hyun Legal, Dennis S. 

Hyun; Polaris Law Group, William L. Marder; Law Offices of 

Choi & Associates, Edward W. Choi for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Paul Hastings, Raymond W. Bertrand, James P. DeHaan

for Defendant and Respondent.
2

Appellant William Velis filed a complaint alleging that his 

employer, respondent AT&T Services, Inc., violated Labor Code 

section 226, subdivision (a)(9)1 (section 226(a)(9)) by failing to 

identify all applicable hourly rates for overtime wages on its wage 

statements. Velis sought to represent a class of AT&T’s past and 

present employees who were paid overtime wages. He also 

sought penalties for the violation under the Labor Code Private 

Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (§ 2698 et. seq.).

AT&T demurred to Velis’s second amended complaint 

(SAC), arguing that its wage statements complied with section 

226(a)(9) as a matter of law. The trial court agreed and 

sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

Velis now argues that he properly pled a violation of section 

226(a)(9) by alleging that AT&T disaggregated overtime wages 

into “overtime base” and “overtime premium” components and 

listed different numbers of hours worked at each component rate. 

We disagree and affirm. Section 226(a)(9) requires employers to 

provide accurate itemized wage statements showing “all 

applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the 

corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the 

employee.” Disaggregating overtime rates and hours does not 

violate this statutory mandate. 

BACKGROUND

I. Second Amended Complaint

In the factually sparse SAC, Velis alleged that he was a 

non-exempt employee of AT&T, a corporation that does business 

in California. In the first cause of action, for violation of section 

226, subdivision (a), Velis alleged that the wage statements 

1All further statutory references are to the Labor Code 

unless otherwise indicated. 
3

AT&T provided to employees who earned overtime wages did not 

“identify all applicable hourly rates for overtime wages whenever 

overtime wages were paid. Specifically, whenever overtime 

wages were paid, the overtime rates were identified as the 

regular or ‘base’ rate of pay and separate line item [sic] showing 

various premium rates of pay. Moreover, the applicable hours for 

each overtime line item identified different hours. For example, 

Plaintiff’s January 25, 2019 wage statement contained an 

overtime base line item with a pay rate of $28.7875 per hour at 

11.75 hours, while the ‘overtime prem 0.5’ line item showed a pay 

rate of $14.3938 per hour at 3.75 hours. This causes significant 

confusion as it is unclear as to what rate of overtime pay Plaintiff 

is being paid and how many actual overtime hours for which 

Plaintiff is actually being paid.”

Velis sought to represent a class of past and present nonexempt AT&T employees “who were paid overtime [and] were 

issued similarly confusing and inaccurate wage statements” any 

time from March 26, 2018 through the present. He also 

incorporated his section 226, subdivision (a) allegations into a 

derivative second cause of action for violation of PAGA. Velis 

sought PAGA penalties on behalf of all “Aggrieved Employees 

from March 25, 2018, through the present, for Defendants’

violations of Labor Code § 226, arising from Defendants’ failure 

to provide accurate, itemized wage statements in violation of 

Labor Code § 226.”

2

II. Demurrer

AT&T demurred to the SAC for failure to allege facts 

sufficient to state a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 

2Velis used the plural “Defendants” because he included 50 

Doe defendants in the SAC. 
4

430.10, subd. (e).) It contended that the first cause of action for 

violation of section 226, subdivision (a) failed as a matter of law, 

and that the derivative PAGA cause of action therefore failed as 

well.

Citing the January 25, 2019 wage statement Velis 

referenced in the SAC, and concurrently requesting judicial 

notice thereof,3 AT&T asserted that the wage statement listed all 

applicable hourly rates and the hours Velis worked at those 

rates. Specifically, it contended the January 25, 2019 wage 

statement showed that Velis worked a total of 35.75 hours: 24.00 

“Regular” hours, at a rate of $28.7875 per hour; 11.75 “Overtime 

Base” hours, at a rate of $28.7875 per hour; and 3.75 “Overtime 

Prem 0.5” hours, at a rate of $14.3938 per hour. AT&T argued 

that the Ninth Circuit has interpreted section 226(a)(9) to permit 

this type of “splitting overtime into its component parts” of a base 

rate of pay and an overtime premium that is 0.5 times the base 

rate. (See Hernandez v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (9th Cir. 

2014) 554 Fed. Appx. 661 (Hernandez).) It further contended 

that the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), a 

state agency authorized to enforce California’s labor laws 

3In its ruling on the demurrer, the trial court acknowledged 

that it could consider the January 25, 2019 wage statement as a 

“material document[ ] referred to in the allegations of the 

complaint.” (City of Port Hueneme v. Oxnard Harbor District

(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 511, 513.) The court also noted that Velis 

included the January 25, 2019 wage statement in his opposition 

and did not object to the request for judicial notice. The court 

nevertheless concluded it was “not necessary” to consider the 

January 25, 2019 wage statement because “the demurrer can be 

sustained based on the allegations in the SAC, which include a 

detailed description of the January [25,] 2019 wage statement.”
5

(Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 

563), also endorsed the disaggregation of overtime wages by 

issuing an exemplar wage statement displaying the overtime 

wage rate as one-half of the regular wage rate. 

III. Opposition and Reply 

Velis filed a written opposition to the demurrer. He 

contended the wage statements inaccurately listed “both the 

hours and rates for overtime,” such that his “overtime rates and 

hours cannot be ascertained from the information on the four 

corners of Plaintiff’s wage statements.” Regarding the January 

25, 2019 wage statement in particular, the contents of which he 

did not dispute, he contended, “it is not clear whether Plaintiff 

worked 11.75 hours of overtime, or 3.75 hours of overtime, a 

combination of those hours, or some other hours.” Velis 

distinguished Hernandez, supra, 554 Fed. Appx. 661 on the basis 

that the wage statement at issue there listed the same number of 

hours worked at each component portion of the disaggregated 

overtime wage. He urged the court to instead follow McKenzie v. 

Federal Express Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 765 F. Supp. 2d 1222 

(McKenzie), which he contended was “directly on-point” and held 

that “listing the overtime rate of 1⁄2 of the regular rate violates 

Labor Code § 226(a)(9) as a matter of law.”

Velis did not address AT&T’s argument that the DLSE had 

approved the practice of “splitting overtime into its component 

parts” through its exemplar wage statement. He also did not 

seek leave to amend or suggest any possible amendments to the 

SAC. Instead, he suggested that if the court was “inclined” to 

sustain the demurrer, it “should hold its ruling in abeyance” and

“should permit Plaintiff to conduct discovery to confirm what the 

actual overtime hours and rates are and how employees are being 
6

paid. . . . Plaintiff must be permitted to conduct discovery to 

determine whether Defendant is paying its employees correctly.”

Velis did not cite any authority in support of this suggestion. 

In its written reply, AT&T reiterated its previous 

arguments in support of the demurrer and urged the court to 

follow Hernandez, supra, 554 Fed. Appx. 661. Additionally, it 

disputed Velis’s assertion that McKenzie, supra, 765 F.Supp.2d 

1222 was “directly on-point.” AT&T contended that McKenzie

was distinguishable because the wage statements in that case, 

unlike those at issue here, did not include a line item for total 

hours worked. AT&T also highlighted Velis’s failure to address 

its contention that the DLSE had approved “split[ting] the 

worker’s overtime rate into a half-time premium earned on top of 

a base rate.”

IV. Tentative Ruling 

The court issued a written tentative sustaining the

demurrer with leave to amend. In the tentative, the court 

concluded that Velis failed to plead a violation of section 

226(a)(9). It explained: “Taking Plaintiff’s allegations to be true, 

Defendant’s wage statements adequately show ‘all applicable 

hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the 

corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the 

employee.’ It is clear that the amount of overtime hours worked 

is 3.75, because that is the amount of hours for which an 

overtime premium was paid. The fact that 11.75 hours were paid 

at a base rate, while only 3.75 of those hours were paid at the 

premium rate does not, without more, lead to any confusion as to 

either the total amount of overtime hours or the proper hourly 

rates.”
7

The court further concluded that “[l]isting the overtime 

premium at 0.5 times—rather than 1.5 times—the regular rate of 

pay does not constitute a violation of the Labor Code.” It 

observed that Velis “could simply add $28.7875 to $14.3938 in 

order to determine that his overtime rate was $43.18.” The court 

noted that “the DLSE itself follows this practice in its own 

sample wage statement,” the exemplar wage statement for piecerate workers AT&T cited in the demurrer. The court also found 

AT&T’s primary cited authority, Hernandez, supra, 554 Fed. 

Appx. 661, analogous because “the plaintiff’s wage statements 

separated overtime base hours from overtime premium hours, 

paying the former at a normal rate, and paying the latter at a 

rate of 0.5.” The court found Velis’s primary cited authority, 

McKenzie, supra, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1222, “inapposite” because 

Hernandez “held that the animating factor behind the McKenzie

decision was the fact that the wage statements ‘did not provide a 

line item for total hours worked,’ and the SAC here did not allege 

that such a line item was absent.” It also rejected McKenzie as 

“simply not persuasive, as it offers an interpretation of Labor 

Code section 226 that does not accord with that of either the 

DLSE or the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals” in Hernandez. 

The court tentatively rejected Velis’s request for discovery. 

It tentatively allowed leave to amend, however, to the extent that 

Velis’s opposition suggested other possible violations of section 

226, subdivision (a). 

V. Hearing and Supplemental Briefing

At the hearing on the demurrer, AT&T submitted on the 

tentative. Velis argued that the demurrer should be overruled 

because “nothing on the four corners of the pay stub” clearly 

demonstrated the number of overtime hours he worked. He 
8

again distinguished the Hernandez wage statements on the 

ground that they listed the same number of hours on the 

disaggregated overtime base and overtime premium lines. Velis 

also argued that the DLSE had not approved the practice of 

disaggregating of overtime for hourly workers like himself. He 

contended the exemplar wage statement on which AT&T relied

was applicable only to piece-rate workers, and that the DLSE had 

issued an exemplar wage statement for hourly workers that 

“requires hourly pay stubs to list 1.5 the base rate of pay” for 

overtime. Velis additionally clarified that he had no intent to 

amend the SAC to assert further claims. 

In response to Velis’s belated argument about the DLSE

exemplar wage statements, AT&T contended that the law 

“merely requires that the pay stubs show the rates and hours 

worked,” and “there’s no single uniform way that a pay stub has 

to reflect this information.” AT&T also contended that any 

concern over the different number of hours on the “overtime base”

and “overtime prem” lines “should be addressed through Labor 

Code section 226, subsection b,” which “gives the employee the 

right . . . to request his or her payroll records so that they can 

look behind the pay stub to see if they were, in fact paid . . . 

correctly or if there’s any questions.”

4 Velis responded that the 

latter contention proved the wage statements failed to show the 

information required by section 226. 

4Section 226, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part that 

“[a]n employer that is required by this code or any regulation 

adopted pursuant to this code to keep the information required by 

subdivision (a) shall afford current and former employees the 

right to inspect or receive a copy of records pertaining to their 

employment, upon reasonable request to the employer.”
9

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court gave the parties 

leave to file supplemental briefs further addressing the DLSE 

exemplar wage statements. In Velis’s supplemental brief, he 

argued that the DLSE exemplar wage statement for hourly 

workers was controlling. He bolstered this argument by pointing 

to language on the DLSE website describing the exemplar for 

hourly workers as “required by Labor Code section 226(a).” He 

argued that the language mandated employers of hourly wage 

workers to emulate the exemplar wage statement for hourly wage 

workers, which listed the overtime pay rate as 1.5 times the 

regular rate rather than the disaggregated 0.5 premium shown in 

the piece-rate exemplar. Velis requested that the court take 

judicial notice of both DLSE exemplar wage statements, as well

as text from the DLSE website. 

In response, AT&T disputed Velis’s assertion that the 

language on the DLSE website mandated a specific format for 

hourly wage statements. It argued that both DLSE exemplar 

wage statements “are just that—examples.” For that reason, it

asserted, the disaggregated overtime wage shown on the 

exemplar wage statement for piece-rate workers could also be 

used on wage statements for hourly workers. AT&T also pointed 

out that wage statements found to comply with section 226, 

subdivision (a) have included lines for total hours worked even 

though the exemplar wage statement for hourly workers “does 

not have a line item for ‘total hours worked.’”

VI. Ruling

After receiving and reviewing the supplemental briefs, the 

court issued a written ruling sustaining the demurrer without 

leave to amend. The ruling largely tracked the court’s tentative 

ruling summarized above.
10

As in the tentative, the court concluded that the SAC failed 

to state a claim under section 226(a)(9). The court again found it 

was “clear that the amount of overtime hours worked is 3.75, 

because that is the amount of hours for which an overtime 

premium was paid. The fact that 11.75 hours were paid at a base 

rate, while only 3.75 of those hours were paid at the premium 

rate, does not, without more, lead to any confusion as to either 

the total amount of overtime hours or the proper hourly rates.”

The court also again concluded that Hernandez was more 

analogous and persuasive than McKenzie. 

The court took judicial notice of both DLSE exemplar wage 

statements. It concluded that the DLSE’s disaggregation of the 

overtime wage rate on the piece-rate exemplar indicated its 

approval of disaggregating overtime wages on wage statements 

for hourly workers. The court observed that section 226(a)(9) 

“makes no distinction between piece-rate workers and hourlypaid workers,” and the DLSE lacks the power to expand the scope 

or requirements of the statute. The court also noted that Velis 

“has identified no statutory authority to support the conclusion 

that listing a 0.5 premium rate violates section 226(a)(9) for 

hourly-paid workers but is permitted with respect to piece-rate 

workers.”

Because it concluded that the SAC did not state a claim 

under section 226(a)(9), the court also sustained the demurrer as 

to the derivative PAGA claim. The court determined that the 

SAC could not be amended to state a claim, and rejected Velis’s 

request to hold the ruling in abeyance and grant him additional 

discovery. 

Velis timely appealed. 
11

DISCUSSION 

Velis contends that he adequately pled a violation of section 

226(a)(9), and the trial court erred in concluding that his claim 

was foreclosed under Hernandez and the DLSE’s exemplar wage 

statement for piece-rate workers. We disagree.

I. Governing Legal Standards

We apply a de novo standard in an appeal following the 

sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. (Soto v. Motel 

6 Operating, L.P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 385, 389 (Soto).) “[W]e 

accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the 

operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or 

conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject 

to judicial notice.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.

(2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) “[I]t is error for a trial court to 

sustain a demurrer [if] the plaintiff has stated a cause of action 

under any possible legal theory.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital 

District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) However, we must affirm the 

judgment if any one of the grounds of the demurrer is well taken. 

(Ibid.) Even under the de novo standard of review, the appellant 

bears the burden of demonstrating error. (Denny v. Arntz (2020) 

55 Cal.App.5th 914, 920.)

To determine whether Velis stated a cause of action for 

violation of section 226(a)(9), we must determine what section 

226(a)(9) requires of employers. “The proper interpretation of a 

statute, and its application to undisputed facts, presents a 

question of law that is also subject to de novo review.” (Morgan v. 

United Retail, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142 (Morgan).) 

“The rules governing statutory interpretation are well-settled. 

We begin with the fundamental principle that ‘[t]he objective of 

statutory construction is to determine the intent of the enacting 
12

body so that the law may receive the interpretation that best 

effectuates that intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We look 

first to the words of the statute, giving them their ordinary 

meanings. We give effect to every word and clause, avoiding 

constructions that render portions meaningless or inoperative. 

(Ibid.) If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the 

plain meaning of the statute governs. (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole

Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.)

If the statutory language is ambiguous or susceptible to 

more than one reasonable interpretation, we may turn to 

extrinsic aids to assist in our interpretation. (Murphy v. Kenneth 

Cole Productions, Inc., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1103.) Such aids 

may include opinion letters and other materials issued by the 

DLSE, which, while not binding on the court, are entitled to 

consideration and respect. (Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 

Cal.5th 829, 841; Morgan, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147.) 

We also consider analyses and interpretations of the statute by 

other courts. We keep in mind that “‘in light of the remedial 

nature of the legislative enactments authorizing the regulation of 

wages, hours, and working conditions for the protection and 

benefit of employees, the statutory provisions are to be liberally 

construed with an eye to promoting such protection.’ [Citation.]”

(Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 

1004, 1026-1027.) 

II. Analysis

Section 226(a)(9) requires an employer to “furnish to his or 

her employee . . . an accurate itemized wage statement in writing 

showing . . . all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay 

period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each 

hourly rate by the employee.” (§ 226(a)(9).) Employees generally 
13

are entitled to earn an overtime rate of pay “of no less than one 

and one-half times the regular rate of pay” for “[a]ny work in 

excess of eight hours in one workday and any work in excess of 40 

hours in any one workweek and the first eight hours worked on 

the seventh day of work in any one workweek.” (§ 510, subd. (a).) 

The plain language of section 226(a)(9) requires wage 

statements to “show,” or “make evident or apparent,” each hourly 

rate and the number of hours the employee worked at each rate, 

including overtime hours. (Morgan, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1146.)

“The purpose of the wage statement requirement is to 

provide transparency as to the calculation of wages.” (Morgan, 

supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149, citing DLSE Opn. Letter No. 

2006.07.06.) ”A complying wage statement accurately reports 

most of the information necessary for an employee to verify if he 

or she is being properly paid in accordance with the law and that 

deductions from wages are proper.” (DLSE Opn. Letter 

No. 2006.07.06; see also Soto, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 393 

[“The purpose of requiring greater wage stub information is to 

insure that employees are adequately informed of compensation 

received and are not shortchanged by their employers.” 

(emphases omitted)].)

A wage statement need not perform every single calculation 

necessary for the employee’s verification of his or her pay to 

comply with section 226, subdivision (a). For instance, 

in Morgan, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136, the court held that 

a wage statement complied with the section 226, subdivision 

(a)(2) requirement to show “total hours worked by the employee”

by listing the total number of regular hours worked and the total 

number of overtime hours worked; the wage statement did not 
14

also need to include a line adding those two figures. Morgan

emphasized that the employee “could determine the sum of all 

hours worked without referring to time records or other 

documents,” and held that requiring the employee to “simply add 

together the total regular hours figure and the total overtime 

figure” did not constitute a violation of section 226, subdivision 

(a)(2). (Ibid.) 

We find Morgan persuasive.5 The Ninth Circuit did as 

well. Hernandez, supra, 554 Fed. Appx. at p. 662 cited Morgan, 

supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 1136, for the proposition that “[w]age 

statements comply with § 226(a) when a plaintiff employee can 

ascertain the required information by performing simple math, 

using figures on the face of the wage statement.” It then held 

that the wage statement at issue met that standard, because 

“Hernandez need only subtract his regular hours from total hours 

to determine overtime hours worked during the pay period. 

5Our colleagues in the Division One of the Fourth Appellate 

District also agreed with Morgan in an opinion filed after this 

case was submitted. (See General Atomics v. Superior Court of 

San Diego County (2021) ___Cal.App.5th___, ___ , 2021 Cal.App. 

LEXIS 452 (General Atomics).) General Atomics held that a wage 

statement that displayed an hourly worker’s earnings in two 

categories, a regular rate and an overtime rate of 0.5 times the 

regular rate, did not violate section 226(a)(9). It emphasized 

Morgan’s holding “that a wage statement does not violate section 

226 even if it requires the employee to perform simple math to 

obtain the required information,” and concluded that the plaintiff 

employee could “readily use the information in the wage 

statement” — including a line listing total hours worked — “to 

arrive at the item [the plaintiff] claims is missing, i.e., the 

statutory 1.5x overtime rate.” (General Atomics, supra, 2021 

Cal.App. LEXIS at pp. *14-*15.) 
15

Similarly, he can add the two component overtime rates to 

determine his overall overtime rate.” (Ibid.) The court observed 

that the wage statement’s inclusion of a line item showing the 

total number of hours worked “allow[ed] Hernandez to do the 

math to determine the § 226(a)-required information.” (Ibid.)

The wage statement in Hernandez was described in the 

underlying district court case Hernandez affirmed, Hernandez v. 

BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012, No. CV 11-

9484 SVW (SSx)) 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55301 [nonpub. opn.]. 

The wage statement divided Hernandez’s pay into three separate 

lines: an “Hourly Pay” line, showing 40.00 hours worked at a rate 

of $21.9300 per hour; an “OT Base 100%” line, showing 0.50 

hours worked at a rate of $21.9300 per hour; and an “OT Prem 

50%” line, showing 0.50 hours worked at a rate of $10.9650 per 

hour. (Hernandez v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55301, at p. *3.) At the bottom of the 

statement, a line labeled “TOT WKD HRS\WAGES” indicated 

that Hernandez worked a total of 40.50 hours and earned a total 

of $893.65 during the pay period. (Ibid.)

The federal district court rejected Hernandez’s argument 

that the statement violated section 226(a)(9) by disaggregating 

the overtime rate into two components, “OT Base 100%” and “OT 

Prem 50%,” that must be added together to calculate the 

overtime wage. (Hernandez v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra, 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55301, at pp. *8-*9.) It held that Morgan, 

supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 1136 controlled, and that listing the 

overtime wage as two component parts was “sufficient to ‘show’—

i.e., ‘to make evident or apparent’—that the employee’s effective 

overtime rate is equal to 21.93 + 10.965 = 32.895.” (Id. at p. *9.) 

The federal district court also rejected Hernandez’s contention 
16

that the wage statement was inaccurate because it “display[ed] 

the number of overtime hours worked by an employee twice.” (Id.

at p. *10.) It held that “any potential confusion created by 

displaying the number of overtime hours twice is mitigated (if not 

eliminated) by the inclusion of the total number of hours worked 

on the statement.” (Ibid. at p. *13.) As previously indicated, the 

Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in Hernandez, supra, 

554 Fed. Appx. 661. 

Velis contends the wage statement in Hernandez—and 

therefore the holding in Hernandez—is distinguishable. He 

asserts, “Unlike the wage statements in Hernandez wherein the 

OT rate was clearly identified on two separate line items 

containing the same number of overtime hours, here, the wage 

statements provided to employees listed two completely 

different number [sic] of overtime hours, 11.75 for Overtime 

Base and 3.75 for Overtime Prem 0.5. An employee would not 

know which item is for overtime and which is for regular pay.”

AT&T responds that the number of hours worked at the 

disaggregated overtime wage rates “was immaterial to 

Hernandez’s holding,” and Hernandez “never said paystubs must 

also list the same number of base and premium hours.” 

AT&T has the better argument. Section 226(a)(9) requires 

only that wage statements report “all applicable hourly rates in 

effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of 

hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.” The wage 

statements in Hernandez and this case meet that standard. Both 

disaggregate the overtime wage rate of 1.5 times the regular rate 

into component parts: an “overtime base” rate that is the regular 

rate, and an “overtime premium” rate that is one-half the regular 

rate. As in Hernandez, Velis can see all the applicable rates at 
17

which he worked, and “add the two component overtime rates to 

determine his overall overtime rate.” (Hernandez, supra, 554 

Fed. Appx. at p. 662.) He can also determine the number of 

hours for which he earned the full overtime rate by looking at the 

number of hours paid at the “overtime premium” rate, and can

use other lines on the wage statement, such as the total number 

of hours worked and total compensation, to confirm he was paid 

appropriately. 

The conclusion that disaggregated overtime wages and 

hours are permitted by section 226(a)(9) is bolstered by the 

DLSE’s use of a disaggregated overtime wage rate in its exemplar 

wage statement for piece-rate workers . Section 226(a)(9) does not 

establish different wage statement standards for hourly and 

piece-rate workers,

6 and the DLSE “cannot alter or amend the 

statute which it is interpreting, or enlarge or impair its scope.”

(Adamek & Dessert, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations 

Board (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 970, 978.) By using a 0.5 overtime 

premium in the exemplar wage statement for piece-rate workers, 

the DLSE has indicated its approval of the disaggregation of 

overtime pay rates for piece-rate and hourly workers alike. (See 

General Atomics, supra, 2021 Cal.App. LEXIS 452, at p. *22.) The 

DLSE’s use of the phrase “required by Labor Code section 226(a)”

in describing the exemplar does not convince us otherwise. If, as 

6Only one of the nine subdivisions of section 226, 

subdivision (a) mentions piece-rate workers. Section 226, 

subdivision (a)(3) requires a wage statement to show “the number 

of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the 

employee is paid on a piece-rate basis.” This explicit mention of 

piece-rate workers shows that the Legislature knew how to 

distinguish between types of workers if it wished to do so in other 

subdivisions of the statute. 
18

Velis suggests, the phrase means employers must issue wage 

statements in exact conformance with the exemplar, then any 

employer who included a line showing the total hours worked by 

an hourly employee would be in violation of section 226(a)(9), 

because that information is not included on the exemplar for 

hourly workers. Such a result is absurd, particularly where 

courts have found that a line item detailing total hours worked is 

important in “allowing [employees] to do the math to determine 

the § 226(a)-required information.” (Hernandez, supra, 554 Fed. 

Appx. at p. 662.) 

Velis contends McKenzie, supra, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1222,

compels the opposite conclusion. We disagree. The wage 

statement at issue in McKenzie disaggregated overtime the same 

way Velis alleges here—”Reg. Earn.,” “Overtime,” and 

“OvrTimePrm.” It did not, however, include any indication of the 

total number of hours an employee worked. (See 

McKenzie, supra, 765 F.Supp.2d at p. 1226.) Thus, an employee 

confronted with lines showing 40.00 hours of “Reg. Earn.,” 9.12 

hours of “Overtime,” and 9.12 hours of “OvrTimePrm” on his or 

her wage statement would be unable to ascertain whether his or 

her pay should be for 49.12 hours or 58.24 hours without 

consulting additional documents. (McKenzie, supra, 765 F. Supp. 

2d at pp. 1226, 1229.) Here, the parties agree the wage 

statement contains a line listing the total hours worked. We 

agree with Hernandez, supra, 554 Fed. Appx. at p. 662, that this 

line enables Velis “to do the math to determine the § 226(a)-

required information” from the other information on the wage 

statement. (See also General Atomics, supra, 2021 Cal.App. 

LEXIS 452, at p. *17.)
19

Velis also looks for support in Wright v. Renzenberger

(C.D. Cal. March 8, 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234702 

[nonpub. opn.] (Wright). We agree with AT&T that Wright is 

distinguishable. In Wright, the wage statements “showed the 

overtime rate at one-half of the regular rate instead of one and 

one-half the regular rate and . . . included overtime hours in the 

regular earnings line.” (Wright, supra, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

234702 at p. *29.) Thus, “unlike Hernandez, the wage statements 

[in Wright did] not provide for the full overtime rate in two 

component parts which are set side from the regular rate and 

which can easily, and sensibly, be added together to show the 

correct overtime rate.” (Id. at p. *32.) “Instead, the (partial) 

overtime rate on [the] pay stubs must be added to the regular 

rate for the employee to calculate the correct overtime rate.”

(Ibid.) That is not the case here, where the overtime wage rate is 

disaggregated into two clearly identified component parts that 

are entirely separate from the line showing “regular” pay. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. AT&T is awarded its costs on 

appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J. CURREY, J.