59–006 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 114–283 

AIRPORT ACCESS CONTROL SECURITY IMPROVEMENT 

ACT OF 2015 

OCTOBER 6, 2015.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. MCCAUL, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 3102] 

The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred the 

bill (H.R. 3102) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to reform programs of the Transportation Security Administration, 

streamline transportation security regulations, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with 

an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 4 

Background and Need for Legislation .................................................................... 4 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 6 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 7 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 7 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 8 

New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures ............. 8 

Congressional Budget Office Estimate ................................................................... 8 

Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives .................................... 8 

Duplicative Federal Programs ................................................................................ 9 

Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits ... 9 

Federal Mandates Statement ................................................................................. 9 

Preemption Clarification ......................................................................................... 9 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 9 

Advisory Committee Statement .............................................................................. 9 

Applicability to Legislative Branch ........................................................................ 9 

Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation ...................................................... 9 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 11 

Additional Views ...................................................................................................... 16 


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The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act 

of 2015’’. 

SEC. 2. AVIATION SECURITY. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle A of title XVI of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

is amended by adding at the end the following new section: 

‘‘SEC. 1602. RISK-BASED SCREENING OF EMPLOYEES AT AIRPORTS. 

‘‘(a) SCREENING MODEL.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

of this section, the Administrator shall establish a risk-based, intelligence-driven model for the screening of employees at airports based on level of access and 

employment positions at domestic airports. Such screening model shall— 

‘‘(A) ensure that only those individuals authorized to have access to the 

secure areas of a domestic airport are permitted such access; 

‘‘(B) ensure that an individual is immediately denied entry to a secure 

area when such individual’s access authorization for such secure area is 

withdrawn; and 

‘‘(C) provide a means to differentiate between individuals authorized to 

have access to an entire secure area and individuals authorized access to 

only a particular portion of a secure area. 

‘‘(2) FACTORS.—The Administrator shall consider the following factors when 

establishing the screening model described in paragraph (1): 

‘‘(A) Whether and how often employees at airports require employmentrelated access to Secure Identification Display Areas, Airport Operations 

Areas, or secure areas. 

‘‘(B) The ability of each airport operator to reduce employee entry and 

exit points to a mutually agreed upon minimum number of such entry and 

exit points necessary to maintain airport operations. 

‘‘(C) In consultation with airport operators, the ability of the Administration to create a randomization plan for screening at the defined operational 

minimum entry and exit points at airports which maximizes the deterrent 

effect of screening efforts. 

‘‘(b) DISQUALIFYING OFFENSES.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

of this section, the Administrator, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, labor organizations representing aviation, ground, 

and cabin crew workers, and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, shall 

conduct an aviation security risk-based review of the disqualifying criminal offenses codified in sections 1542.209 and 1544.229 of title 49, Code of Federal 

Regulations, to determine the appropriateness of such offenses as a basis for denying to an employee a credential that allows unescorted access to Secure Identification Display Areas of airports. Such review shall consider the following: 

‘‘(A) The adequacy of codified disqualifying offenses to address the current 

aviation security threat environment, particularly the terrorism insider 

threat. 

‘‘(B) If such codified disqualifying offenses should be tailored to address 

the current aviation security threat environment, particularly the terrorism 

insider threat, by excluding or including other offenses. 

‘‘(C) The potential security benefits, drawbacks, and challenges associated 

with identifying patterns of misdemeanors or of other non-disqualifying offenses that could jeopardize aviation security. 

‘‘(D) The feasibility of integrating similar departmental eligibility requirements for access to Secure Identification Display Areas of airports. 

‘‘(E) If the ten year look-back period for disqualifying offenses is appropriate, in light of the current aviation security threat environment, particularly the terrorism insider threat. 

‘‘(2) WAIVER.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

section, the Administrator shall provide an adequate redress process for an employee who is subject to an adverse employment decision, including removal or 

suspension of such employee, due to a disqualifying offense referred to in paragraph (1), that is consistent with the appeals and waiver process established for 

applicants for commercial motor vehicle hazardous materials endorsements and 

transportation workers at ports under section 70105(c) of title 46, United States 

Code. 


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‘‘(3) NOTICE.—Any changes to the Secure Identification Display area badge 

program, such as changes considered pursuant to subparagraphs (B), (C), (D), 

and (E) of paragraph (1) shall be subject to notice of proposed rulemaking. 

‘‘(4) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of the aviation security riskbased review required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall brief the 

Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the results of such review. 

‘‘(c) CREDENTIALING.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 

this section, the Administrator, in consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee, shall review the auditing procedures for all airport-issued identification 

media. Such review shall determine the following: 

‘‘(1) The efficacy of the auditing program requirements at domestic airports 

to ensure the integrity, accountability, and control of airport-issued identification media. 

‘‘(2) The feasibility of including biometrics standards for all airport-issued 

identification media used for identity verification and badge verification. 

‘‘(3) The feasibility of integrating other departmental programs’ eligibility requirements for access to secure areas of airports. 

‘‘(d) VETTING.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

of this section, the Administrator shall— 

‘‘(A) establish a program to allow airport badging offices to utilize the employment eligibility confirmation system established under section 404 of 

the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 

(8 U.S.C. 1324a note; commonly referred to as ‘E-Verify’) to determine the 

eligibility to work in the United States of all applicants seeking access to 

secure areas of airports; 

‘‘(B) establish a process to transmit applicants’ biometric fingerprint data 

to the Office of Biometric Identity Management’s (OBIM’s) Automated Biometrics Identification System (IDENT) for vetting; and 

‘‘(C) conduct a data quality assessment to ensure that credential application data elements received by the Administration are complete and match 

the data submitted by the airport operators. 

‘‘(2) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of the responsibilities specified 

in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall brief the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation of the Senate on the results of such completion. 

‘‘(e) REPORTING OF VIOLATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall establish a nationwide program for 

the anonymous reporting of violations of airport security. 

‘‘(f) CENTRALIZED DATABASE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Administrator, in consultation with the Aviation Security 

Advisory Committee, shall— 

‘‘(1) establish a national database of employees who have had either their airport or aircraft operator-issued badge revoked for failure to comply with aviation security requirements; 

‘‘(2) determine the appropriate reporting mechanisms for airports and airlines 

to submit data regarding employees described in paragraph (1) and to access 

the database established pursuant to such paragraph; and 

‘‘(3) establish a process that allows individuals whose names were mistakenly 

entered into such database to have their names removed and have their 

credentialing restored. 

‘‘(g) UPDATED REVIEW.—Not later than April 8, 2016, the Administrator, in consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, shall conduct an updated 

and thorough review of airport access controls. 

‘‘(h) EMPLOYEE SCREENING STUDY.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

of this section, the Administrator, in consultation with the Aviation Security 

Advisory Committee, shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of 

the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the Comptroller General of the United States a cost 

and feasibility study of a statistically significant number of Category I, II, and 

X airports, that ensures that all employee entry and exit points that lead to secure areas of such airports are comprised of the following: 

‘‘(A) A secure door utilizing card and pin entry or biometric technology. 


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1 Carey, Susan. ‘‘Closing an Airport Security Gap: Employee Screening.’’ The Wall Street Journal. 27 January 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/closing-an-airport-security-gap-employeescreening-1422396346. 

‘‘(B) Surveillance video recording, capable of storing video data for at 

least 30 days. 

‘‘(C) Advanced screening technologies, including at least one of the following: 

‘‘(i) Magnetometer (walk-through or hand-held). 

‘‘(ii) Explosives detection canines. 

‘‘(iii) Explosives trace detection swabbing. 

‘‘(iv) Advanced imaging technology. 

‘‘(v) X-ray bag screening technology. 

‘‘(2) CONTENTS.—The study required under paragraph (1) shall include information related to the employee screening costs of those airports which have already implemented practices of screening one-hundred percent of employees entering secure areas of airports, including the following: 

‘‘(A) Costs associated with establishing an operational minimum number 

of employee entry and exit points. 

‘‘(B) A comparison of costs associated with implementing the requirements specified in paragraph (1), based on whether such implementation 

was carried out by the Administration or airports. 

‘‘(3) COMPTROLLER GENERAL ASSESSMENT.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Upon completion of the study required under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General of the United States shall review such 

study to assess the quality and reliability of such study. 

‘‘(B) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 60 days after the receipt of the study 

required under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General of the United States 

shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of 

the Senate on the results of the review required under subparagraph (A).’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1601 the following 

new item: 

‘‘Sec. 1602. Risk-based screening of employees at airports.’’. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of H.R. 3102 is to amend the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 to reform programs of the Transportation Security Administration, streamline transportation security regulations, and for 

other purposes. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

This legislation is the culmination of multiple Subcommittee 

hearings and briefings on the issue of airport access controls, as 

well as a review of the recommendations issued by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC). The Subcommittee’s oversight, 

as well as the ASAC’s review, was an outgrowth of the number of 

recent arrests of airport workers. An estimated 950,000 employees 

of airlines, airports, vendors, and officials have access to sterile 

areas of airports nationwide, at approximately 18,000 access 

points.1 Recent incidents such as a gun smuggling case at the Atlanta airport; a Federal Aviation Administrator (FAA) inspector 

who flew with a gun in his carry-on bag; an airline employee misusing his badge to avoid screening before boarding a flight, and 

drug smuggling cases at the Dallas and Oakland airports highlight 

security weaknesses that could be further exploited in the future 

if left unchecked. 

Between May and December 2014, a Delta Air Lines employee 

allegedly smuggled 153 firearms, including AK–47 assault weapVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:01 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR283.XXX HR283

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2 Sharkey, Joe. ‘‘Gun Smuggling on Plane Reveals Security Oversight.’’ The New York Times. 29 December 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/business/gun-smuggling-on-plane-reveals-security-oversight.html?lr=0. 3 Schabner, Dean. ‘‘Federal Safety Inspector Arrested After Allegedly Flying with Fun in 

Bag.’’ ABC News. 17 January 2015. http://abcnews.go.com/US/federal-agent-arrested-allegedlyflying-gun-bag/story?id=28295458. 

ons, on 17 Delta flights between Atlanta and New York. Authorities say that the Delta employee would go through standard security screening and then receive the guns from a Delta baggage handler, who was not subjected to standard security screening, on the 

sterile side the airport, before boarding flights to New York’s John 

F. Kennedy International Airport. The investigation was a monthslong collaborative effort between authorities in New York and Atlanta, as well the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Delta Air Lines.2 In 

the wake of the gun smuggling case, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson visited Atlanta to review airport security. While 

there, he announced enhanced security measures by TSA at airports across the country, including stepped up countermeasures to 

mitigate the insider threat from those with access to sterile areas 

of airports. These countermeasures include increased screening of 

airport and airline personnel at employee access points and an immediate review of existing security protocols and potential security 

solutions by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. 

The ASAC airport access control working group—consisting of a 

broad cross-section of industry experts and government entities— 

was asked to analyze the adequacy of existing security measures 

and providing recommendations to address security loopholes. TSA 

has already implemented five short-term initiatives to address 

some of the problems that were identified in the ASAC report. 

Overall, the final report included 28 separate recommendations in 

the following five main areas: 

• Security Screening and Inspection; 

• Vetting of Employees and Security Threat Assessment; 

• Internal Controls and Auditing of Airport-Issued Credentials; 

• Risk-Based Security for Higher Risk Populations and Intelligence; and 

• Security Awareness and Vigilance. 

This bill codifies many of those recommendations such as reviewing the list of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge 

disqualifying criminal offenses and extending the look-back period, 

and creating and maintaining a national database of airport employees with revoked credentials. 

Additionally, on January 16, 2015, an inspector for the FAA was 

arrested at New York’s LaGuardia Airport after a TSA screener detected a firearm in his carry-on luggage. This discovery was only 

after the inspector traveled to New York from Atlanta, where he 

used his SIDA badge to bypass security screening. The individual 

flew in the cockpit of the aircraft from Atlanta to New York. The 

FAA has since suspended its program allowing personnel to bypass 

airport security until it can implement mandatory retraining to 

prevent further such incidents.3 Lastly, TSA has informed the 

Committee that on Saturday, January 24th, an airline employee in 

Atlanta used his SIDA badge to gain entry to the sterile area of 


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the airport and bypass screening, before boarding a flight to Paris, 

France. 

HEARINGS

No legislative hearings were held on H.R. 3102, however the 

Committee held the following oversight hearings: 

On February 3, 2015, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security held a hearing entitled ‘‘A Review of Access Control Measures 

at Our Nation’s Airports.’’ The Subcommittee received testimony 

from Mr. Mark Hatfield, Acting Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Doug Perdue, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department 

of Justice; Ms. Sharon L. Pinkerton, Senior Vice President, Legislative and Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America; and Mr. Miguel 

Southwell, General Manager, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. 

The Subcommittee on Transportation Security continued its 

hearing on April 30, 2015, with a hearing entitled ‘‘A Review of Access Control Measures at Our Nation’s Airports, Part II.’’ The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Melvin J. Carraway, Acting 

Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Jeanne M. Olivier, A.A.E., Assistant Director, Aviation Security and Technology, Security Operations and Programs Department, The Port Authority of New York 

& New Jersey, testifying on behalf of The American Association of 

Airport Executives; and Mr. Steven Grossman, Chief Executive Officer/Executive Director, Jacksonville International Airport, Jacksonville Aviation Authority, testifying on behalf of The Airports Council International, North America. On June 16, 2015, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

held a hearing entitled ‘‘How TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker 

Vetting.’’ The Subcommittee received testimony from Hon. John 

Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 

Ms. Stacey Fitzmaurice, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Ms. Jennifer Grover, 

Director, Transportation Security and Coast Guard Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. 

112th Congress 

On May 16, 2012, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

held a hearing entitled ‘‘Access Control Point Breaches at Our Nation’s Airports: Anomalies or Systemic Failures?’’ The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. John P. Sammon, Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement, 

Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland 

Security; Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Mark Crosby, Chief of Public 

Safety & Security, Portland International Airport, testifying on behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives; Captain 

Sean P. Cassidy, First Vice President, Air Line Pilots Association, 

International; and Mr. William Swift, Chairman, Airport Minority 

Advisory Council. 


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COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Committee met on September 30, 2015, to consider 

H.R. 3102, and ordered the measure to be reported to the House 

with a favorable recommendation, amended, by voice vote. The 

Committee took the following actions: 

The following amendments were offered: 

An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. KATKO

(#1); was AGREED TO, as amended, by voice vote. 

A Substitute for the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. THOMPSON of Mississippi (#2); was WITHDRAWN by 

unanimous consent. 

An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 

to H.R. 3102 offered by MR. KATKO (#1A); was AGREED TO by 

voice vote. 

Page 3, strike ,line 7 though page 5, line 5, and insert a new subsection entitled 

‘‘(b) Disqualifying Offenses.’’ 

The Subcommittee on Transportation Security met on July 23, 

2015, to consider H.R. 3102 and reported the measure to the Full 

Committee with a favorable recommendation, as amended, by voice 

vote. 

The following amendment was offered: 

An Amendment by MR. KATKO (#1); was AGREED TO by voice 

vote. 

Page 3, line 15, strike ‘‘mutually agreed upon’’. 

Page 4, line 22, strike ‘‘(2)’’ and insert ‘‘(3)’’. 

Page 4, beginning line 22, insert the following: 

‘‘(2) ‘‘Waiver.-Not later than 180 days after 2 the date of the enactment of this 

section, the Administrator shall provide an adequate redress process for an employee who is subject to an adverse employment decision, including removal or 

suspension of such employee, due to a disqualifying offense referred to in paragraph (1), that is consistent with the appeals and waiver process established for 

applicants for commercial motor vehicle hazardous materials endorsements and 

transportation workers at ports under section 70105(c) of title 46, United States 

Code.’’. 

Page 7, line 13, strike ‘‘for cause’’ and insert ‘‘for failure to comply with aviation 

security requirements’’. 

Page 7, line 13, strike ‘‘and’’. 

Page 7, line 18, strike the period and insert ‘‘; and’’. 

Page 7, beginning line 19, insert the following: 

‘‘(3) establish a process that allows individuals whose names were mistakenly entered into such database to have their names removed and have their 

credentialing restored.’’. 

Page 7, line 20, insert ‘‘the Administrator, in consultation with the’’ before ‘‘the 

Aviation Security’’. 

Page 7, line 20, after ‘‘Committee’’ insert a comma. 

COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. 

No recorded votes were requested during consideration of 

H.R. 3102. 


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COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight hearings and 

made findings that are reflected in this report. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX

EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R. 3102, the 

Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act of 2015, would 

result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, a cost estimate provided by the Congressional 

Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget 

Act of 1974 was not made available to the Committee in time for 

the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall 

cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon 

its receipt by the Committee. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 3102 contains the following general performance goals and objectives, including outcome related goals and 

objectives authorized. 

H.R. 3102 requires the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to provide a briefing to the relevant Congressional committees on the results of an aviation security risk-based 

review of the disqualifying criminal offenses that are a basis for denying a credential to access Secure Identification Display Areas of 

airports. The Administrator is also required to brief relevant Congressional committees on the establishment of a program that allows airport badging offices to utilize the E-Verify system, the establishment of a process to transmit applicants’ biometric fingerprint data to the Office of Biometric Identity Management for vetting, and the results of a data quality assessment to ensure that 

credential application data elements received by the Administration are complete and match data submitted by airport operators. 

This legislation also requires the Administrator to submit a cost 

and feasibility report of a statistically significant number of airports ensuring that all employee entry and exit points that lead to 

secure areas of airports meet certain requirements specified in the 

legislation to the relevant Congressional committees and the Comptroller General of the United States. Furthermore, the Comptroller 

General of the United States must assess the quality and reliability 

of the Administrator’s aforementioned study and report the results 

of the assessment to the relevant Congressional committees within 

60 days of receipt of the study. 


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DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds that 

H.R. 3102 does not contain any provision that establishes or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another Federal program. 

CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED

TARIFF BENEFITS

In compliance with rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in 

clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the rule XXI. 

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

An estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the 

Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the 

Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. 

PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

In compliance with section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act 

of 1974, requiring the report of any Committee on a bill or joint 

resolution to include a statement on the extent to which the bill or 

joint resolution is intended to preempt State, local, or Tribal law, 

the Committee finds that H.R. 3102 does not preempt any State, 

local, or Tribal law. 

DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULE MAKINGS

The Committee estimates that H.R. 3102 would require no directed rule makings. However the bill does allow the Administrator 

to engage in the rule making process if determined to be necessary 

upon completion of the review required under section 2. 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. 

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides that bill may be cited as the ‘‘Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act of 2015’’. 


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Section 2. Aviation security 

This section requires the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to, within 180 days, create a risk-based 

model for the screening of employees that will ensure that only authorized individuals have access to the secure area, ensure that an 

individual is denied entry to a secured area when a person’s access 

authority is withdrawn and provide a means to differentiate between individuals authorized to have access to an entire secured 

area and individuals with authorized access to only a particular 

portion of a secure area. This section also requires the Administrator to consider the following factors when establishing this riskbased screening model: whether and how often an employee requires access to specific areas, the ability of an airport to reduce 

access points to a mutually agreed upon operational minimum, and 

the ability to create a randomization plan. 

This section also requires the Administrator, in consultation with 

the Director of the FBI, labor organizations representing aviation, 

ground and cabin crew workers, and the Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee, to conduct a review of the disqualifying offenses to determine the appropriateness of such offenses as a basis for denying 

employee credentials within 180 days of enactment. Such review 

shall consider the following: The adequacy of codified disqualifying 

offenses to address the current aviation security threat environment; if such codified disqualifying offenses should be tailored to 

address the current aviation security threat environment by including or excluding other offenses, potential security benefits, drawbacks and challenges associated with identifying patterns of misdemeanors or of other non-disqualifying offenses that could jeopardize aviation security; the feasibility of integrating similar departmental eligibility requirements for access to secure areas; and 

a determination as to whether the look-back period for disqualifying offenses should be extended or modified. 

The Administrator is also required to provide an adequate redress process for an employee who is subject to an adverse employment decision, including termination or suspension, due to a disqualifying offense as defined above within 180 days of enactment. 

The process must be consistent with the appeals and waiver process established for applicants for commercial motor vehicle hazardous materials endorsements and transportation workers at 

ports. 

A notice of proposed rulemaking for any changes made to the Secure Identification Display area badge program as a result of the 

review is required pursuant to this section. This section also requires the Administrator to brief the relevant Congressional committees on the results of this review. 

This section requires the Administrator, in consultation with the 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee, to review the auditing procedures for all airport-issued identification media within 120 days 

of enactment. The review shall determine the efficacy of the auditing program requirements, the feasibility of including biometric 

standards for airport issued identification media, and the feasibility of integrating other DHS eligibility requirements for access. 

Section 2 would require the Administrator within 180 days of enactment to establish a program to allow airport badging offices to 

utilize E-Verify to determine the eligibility to work in the U.S., to 


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establish a process to transmit applicants biometric fingerprint 

data into the Office of Biometric Identity Management’s Automated 

Biometric Identification System (IDENT) for vetting and to conduct 

a data quality assessment to ensure that credential application 

data elements are complete and match data that was submitted by 

airport operators. Upon completion of these responsibilities, the Administrator is required to brief the relevant Congressional committees on the results. 

This section requires the Administrator within 180 days of enactment to establish a Nationwide program for the anonymous reporting of violations of airport security protocols. 

It also requires the Administrator within 180 days of enactment, 

in consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, to 

establish a national database of employees who have had either 

their airport or aircraft operator-issued badge revoked for failure to 

comply with aviation security requirements and to determine the 

appropriate reporting mechanisms for airports and airlines to submit data and to access the database. Additionally, this section requires the establishment of a process that allows individuals whose 

names were mistakenly entered into such a database to be removed 

and have their credentialing restored. 

This section also requires the Administrator in consultation with 

the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to conduct an updated 

and thorough review of airport access controls by April 2016. In addition, this section would require the Administrator within 180 

days of enactment, in consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to conduct a cost and feasibility study of a statistically significant number of Category X, I and II airports, that ensures that all airport employee access points that lead to secure 

areas of those airports are comprised of a secure door utilizing card 

and pin entry or biometric technology, surveillance video recording 

capable of storing video for at least thirty days, advanced screening 

technologies, including, but not limited to, a magnetometer (walkthru or hand-held), explosive detection canines, explosive trace detection swabbing, advanced imaging technology or x–ray bag 

screening technology. 

Finally, section 2 also requires that the study shall include information related to the employee screening costs of those airports 

which have already implemented practices of screening one-hundred percent of employees entering secure areas of airports, and 

costs associated with establishing an operational minimum number 

of employee access points, and a comparison of costs associated 

with implementing the requirements outlined earlier, based on 

whether the implementation was carried out by TSA or the airports. 

Upon completion of the study, this section requires the Comptroller General of the United States to review and evaluate its 

quality and reliability and report to the relevant Congressional 

committees within 60 days. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic 


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and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Homeland Security Act of 2002’’. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as 

follows: 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE XVI—TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

Subtitle A—General Provisions 

* * * * * * * 

Sec. 1602. Risk-based screening of employees at airports. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE XVI—TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

Subtitle A—General Provisions 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 1602. RISK-BASED SCREENING OF EMPLOYEES AT AIRPORTS. 

(a) SCREENING MODEL.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 

the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall establish 

a risk-based, intelligence-driven model for the screening of employees at airports based on level of access and employment positions at domestic airports. Such screening model shall— 

(A) ensure that only those individuals authorized to have 

access to the secure areas of a domestic airport are permitted such access; 

(B) ensure that an individual is immediately denied 

entry to a secure area when such individual’s access authorization for such secure area is withdrawn; and 

(C) provide a means to differentiate between individuals 

authorized to have access to an entire secure area and individuals authorized access to only a particular portion of a 

secure area. 

(2) FACTORS.—The Administrator shall consider the following 

factors when establishing the screening model described in 

paragraph (1): 

(A) Whether and how often employees at airports require 

employment-related access to Secure Identification Display 

Areas, Airport Operations Areas, or secure areas. 

(B) The ability of each airport operator to reduce employee entry and exit points to a mutually agreed upon 

minimum number of such entry and exit points necessary 

to maintain airport operations. 


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(C) In consultation with airport operators, the ability of 

the Administration to create a randomization plan for 

screening at the defined operational minimum entry and 

exit points at airports which maximizes the deterrent effect 

of screening efforts. 

(b) DISQUALIFYING OFFENSES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 

the enactment of this section, the Administrator, in consultation 

with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, labor 

organizations representing aviation, ground, and cabin crew 

workers, and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, shall 

conduct an aviation security risk-based review of the disqualifying criminal offenses codified in sections 1542.209 and 

1544.229 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to determine 

the appropriateness of such offenses as a basis for denying to 

an employee a credential that allows unescorted access to Secure Identification Display Areas of airports. Such review shall 

consider the following: 

(A) The adequacy of codified disqualifying offenses to address the current aviation security threat environment, particularly the terrorism insider threat. 

(B) If such codified disqualifying offenses should be tailored to address the current aviation security threat environment, particularly the terrorism insider threat, by excluding or including other offenses. 

(C) The potential security benefits, drawbacks, and challenges associated with identifying patterns of misdemeanors or of other non-disqualifying offenses that could 

jeopardize aviation security. 

(D) The feasibility of integrating similar departmental 

eligibility requirements for access to Secure Identification 

Display Areas of airports. 

(E) If the ten year look-back period for disqualifying offenses is appropriate, in light of the current aviation security threat environment, particularly the terrorism insider 

threat. 

(2) WAIVER.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall provide an adequate redress process for an employee who is subject to an adverse employment decision, including removal or suspension of 

such employee, due to a disqualifying offense referred to in 

paragraph (1), that is consistent with the appeals and waiver 

process established for applicants for commercial motor vehicle 

hazardous materials endorsements and transportation workers 

at ports under section 70105(c) of title 46, United States Code. 

(3) NOTICE.—Any changes to the Secure Identification Display area badge program, such as changes considered pursuant 

to subparagraphs (B), (C), (D), and (E) of paragraph (1) shall 

be subject to notice of proposed rulemaking. 

(4) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of the aviation 

security risk-based review required under paragraph (1), the 

Administrator shall brief the Committee on Homeland Security 

of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on 


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Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the results of such review. 

(c) CREDENTIALING.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the 

enactment of this section, the Administrator, in consultation with 

the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, shall review the auditing 

procedures for all airport-issued identification media. Such review 

shall determine the following: 

(1) The efficacy of the auditing program requirements at domestic airports to ensure the integrity, accountability, and control of airport-issued identification media. 

(2) The feasibility of including biometrics standards for all 

airport-issued identification media used for identity verification 

and badge verification. 

(3) The feasibility of integrating other departmental programs’ eligibility requirements for access to secure areas of airports. 

(d) VETTING.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 

the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall— 

(A) establish a program to allow airport badging offices 

to utilize the employment eligibility confirmation system established under section 404 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 

1324a note; commonly referred to as ‘‘E-Verify’’) to determine the eligibility to work in the United States of all applicants seeking access to secure areas of airports; 

(B) establish a process to transmit applicants’ biometric 

fingerprint data to the Office of Biometric Identity Management’s (OBIM’s) Automated Biometrics Identification System (IDENT) for vetting; and 

(C) conduct a data quality assessment to ensure that credential application data elements received by the Administration are complete and match the data submitted by the 

airport operators. 

(2) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of the responsibilities specified in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall 

brief the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation of the Senate on the results of such completion. 

(e) REPORTING OF VIOLATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the 

date of the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall establish a nationwide program for the anonymous reporting of violations of airport security. 

(f) CENTRALIZED DATABASE.—Not later than 180 days after the 

date of the enactment of this section, the Administrator, in consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, shall— 

(1) establish a national database of employees who have had 

either their airport or aircraft operator-issued badge revoked for 

failure to comply with aviation security requirements; 

(2) determine the appropriate reporting mechanisms for airports and airlines to submit data regarding employees described in paragraph (1) and to access the database established 

pursuant to such paragraph; and 


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(3) establish a process that allows individuals whose names 

were mistakenly entered into such database to have their names 

removed and have their credentialing restored. 

(g) UPDATED REVIEW.—Not later than April 8, 2016, the Administrator, in consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, shall conduct an updated and thorough review of airport access controls. 

(h) EMPLOYEE SCREENING STUDY.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 

the enactment of this section, the Administrator, in consultation 

with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, shall submit to 

the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the Comptroller General of the 

United States a cost and feasibility study of a statistically significant number of Category I, II, and X airports, that ensures 

that all employee entry and exit points that lead to secure areas 

of such airports are comprised of the following: 

(A) A secure door utilizing card and pin entry or biometric technology. 

(B) Surveillance video recording, capable of storing video 

data for at least 30 days. 

(C) Advanced screening technologies, including at least 

one of the following: 

(i) Magnetometer (walk-through or hand-held). 

(ii) Explosives detection canines. 

(iii) Explosives trace detection swabbing. 

(iv) Advanced imaging technology. 

(v) X-ray bag screening technology. 

(2) CONTENTS.—The study required under paragraph (1) 

shall include information related to the employee screening 

costs of those airports which have already implemented practices of screening one-hundred percent of employees entering secure areas of airports, including the following: 

(A) Costs associated with establishing an operational 

minimum number of employee entry and exit points. 

(B) A comparison of costs associated with implementing 

the requirements specified in paragraph (1), based on 

whether such implementation was carried out by the Administration or airports. 

(3) COMPTROLLER GENERAL ASSESSMENT.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Upon completion of the study required 

under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General of the United 

States shall review such study to assess the quality and reliability of such study. 

(B) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 60 days after the receipt of the study required under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General of the United States shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the results of 

the review required under subparagraph (A). 

* * * * * * * 


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ADDITIONAL VIEWS

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. 

THOMPSON 

I support enhancing access controls at our Nation’s airports. That 

was why I was pleased that then-TSA Acting Administrator Melvin 

Carraway, on January 8th, 2015, requested that the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), comprised of aviation security 

stakeholders in the private sector, assist TSA with efforts to evaluate airport employee screening and identify gaps in airport security 

associated with access control. As sponsor of legislation to authorize the ASAC (P.L. 113–238), I was pleased that the members of 

the ASAC’s working group on airport access control gave timely 

and thoughtful attention to this homeland security challenge. On 

April 8th, 2015, the ASAC issued its report entitled the ‘‘Final Report of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee’s Working Group 

on Airport Access Control’’ which recommended that TSA consider 

28 actions to enhance security. Since the issuance of that report, 

I understand that TSA has been making steady progress on addressing the recommendations. Given the multifaceted and complicated nature of the issue, implementation of reforms has broad 

implications on airport operations, including ground services and 

airport retail operations. While I do not embrace all the provisions 

in H.R. 3102, I do see the value in advancing it, insofar as it sends 

a message to TSA and stakeholders about Congress’ ongoing interest in raising the level of security at our Nation’s airports. 

Finally, I would note that in advance of consideration of H.R. 

3102 by the Full Committee, I developed a substitute amendment 

that made a number of changes to the bill. Ultimately, I chose to 

withdraw my amendment when the bill’s sponsor, Mr. Katko, 

agreed to incorporate key language I authored to ensure that the 

review of disqualifying offenses under the SIDA program are reviewed, as required under the bill, is carried out in a fair way and 

is focused on the aviation security threat picture. 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON. 

Æ 


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