ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

ROBERT J. HARDY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Hardy Law Office Attorney General of Indiana

Auburn, Indiana

ANDREW R. FALK

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DANIEL NOLAN, )

)

Appellant, )

)

 vs. ) No. 17A03-1205-CR-215

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE DeKALB SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Monte Brown, Judge

Cause No. 17D02-1012-FC-46

September 26, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MATHIAS, Judge 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
2

Daniel Nolan (“Nolan”) appeals the eight-year sentence imposed after he pleaded 

guilty to Class C felony incest. He argues that the DeKalb Superior Court erred in failing 

to consider his guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance and that his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. We 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2006, Nolan’s eighteen-year-old biological daughter D.N. moved in with fiftyfive-year-old Nolan. Shortly thereafter, Nolan and D.N. became involved in a sexual 

relationship. D.N. claims that she did not consent to the vaginal, oral, and anal sexual 

acts, and that Nolan often gave her money the following morning to make her feel better.

Nolan also videotaped D.N. while they were having sexual intercourse.

D.N. eventually reported the sexual activity to the DeKalb County Sheriff’s 

Department. When deputies questioned Nolan, he explained that he and D.N. had a 

prostitution agreement, and that he had paid D.N. $12,000 in four months to engage in 

sexual activity with him. According to Nolan, every state should have legalized 

prostitution because he does not want to date women, he just wants to have sexual 

intercourse. When asked if he thought it was wrong to have sexual intercourse with his 

daughter, Nolan responded that he had “no morals about that.” Appellant’s App. p. 97. 

In December 2010, the State charged Nolan with Class C felony incest and with an

enhancement charge as a repeat sexual offender. In October 2011, Nolan pleaded guilty 

to incest in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the repeat sexual offender enhancement. 

At the sentencing hearing, Nolan claimed that D.N. was a “victim of her own greed.” Tr.
3

p. 40. Although unclear what prompted the exchange, Nolan turned to his daughter 

during the sentencing hearing and said, “Oh, screw you.” Tr. p. 40.

After the hearing, the trial court found the following aggravating factors: 1) 

Nolan’s past criminal activity described in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, which 

includes a prior conviction for molesting D.N.’s sister; 2) Nolan’s past criminal history 

has not rehabilitated him; 3) Nolan previously molested D.N. in 1992 and has now twice 

victimized one of his own daughters; 4) the incest was not an isolated incident but part of 

a series of acts that occurred between five and fifty times; and 5) Nolan’s statements,

conduct, and demeanor during the course of the sentencing hearing reflected a complete 

lack of remorse. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances and sentenced Nolan 

to eight years in the Department of Correction. Nolan appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

Nolan first argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider his guilty plea as a

mitigating circumstance. However, a guilty plea does not rise to the level of significant 

mitigation where the defendant has received a substantial benefit from the plea or where 

the evidence against him is such that the decision to plead guilty is merely a pragmatic 

one. Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Here, 

Nolan received a benefit in light of the State’s dismissal of the repeat sexual offender 

enhancement. There is also substantial evidence of Nolan’s guilt, including his own 

admission that he engaged in a sexual relationship with his daughter. In light of these 

circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Nolan’s decision to 
4

plead guilty was largely a pragmatic one. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

failing to consider Nolan’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor.

Nolan also argues that his eight-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Although a trial court may have 

acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of 

the Indiana Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision of a 

sentence imposed by the trial court. Alvies v. State, 905 N.E.2d 57, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007)). This appellate 

authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a 

court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial 

court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.

However, we defer to a trial court’s sentencing decision, both because Rule 7(B) 

requires us to give due consideration to that decision, and because we understand and 

recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Stewart 

v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The burden is on the defendant to 

persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 

2007). Finally, although we have the power to review and revise sentences, the principal 

role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some 

guiding principles for trial court and those charged with improvement of the sentencing 

statutes, but not to achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 

895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). 
5

Indiana Code section 35-5-0-2-6 provides that a person who commits a Class C 

felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with 

the advisory sentence being four (4) years. Here, Nolan pleaded guilty to one count of 

Class C felony incest and was ordered to serve eight (8) years in the Department of 

Correction.

Concerning the nature of the offense, fifty-five-year-old Nolan had sexual 

intercourse with his eighteen-year-old daughter. Nolan explained that he had a 

prostitution agreement with D.N., and that he had paid her $12,000 in four months. With 

regard to the character of the offender, Nolan previously molested D.N. and her sister 

when they were children, and that he had “no morals about” having a sexual relationship 

with his daughter. Appellant’s App. p. 97. Based upon the foregoing, we cannot 

conclude that Nolan’s eight-year executed sentence in the Department of Correction is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, J., and BARNES, J., concur.