**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 4554** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. NICHOLAS R. CHAPMAN , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Souther n District of West Virginia , at Huntington

. Robert C. Chambers , District Judge. ( 3:08

- cr - 00164

- 1 )

Submitted : October 4, 2010 Decided: October 21 , 2010

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opi nion

. Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assist ant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Nicholas R. Chapman appeals his thirty

- six month sentence imposed on revocation of his probation. We aff irm. Chapman, who requested a variance in this case, makes a single contention on appeal: the district court imposed a plainly unreasonable sentence because the court allegedly failed to offer an individualized explanation for the sentence. We do
not agree. We “review probation revocation sentences, like supervised release revocation sentences, to determine if they are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden , 478 F.3d 652, 656 ( 4th Cir. 2007). The first step in this analysis is a determina tion of whether t he sentence was unreasonable. Un ited States v. Crudup , 461 F.3d 433, 438 ( 4th Cir. 2006). In determining reasonableness, we generally follow the procedural and substantive considerations employed in reviewing original
sentences. Id. Ho wever, “[t]his initial inquiry takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” Moulden , 478 F.3d at 656 (quoting Crudup , 461 F.3d at 438). Alth ough the district court must consider the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Chapter 7 policy statements and the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006),3 “the sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a defendant’s probatio n and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Moulden , 478 F.3d at 657 (citing Crudup , 461 F.3d at 439). In Chapman’s case, the statutory maximum revocation sentence was ten years. “The court must provide a statement of reasons fo r the sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but this statement ‘need not be as specific as has been required’ for departing from a traditional guidelines range.” See United States v. Thompson , 595 F.3d 544 ( 4th Cir. 2010) (citing
Mou lden , 478 F.3d at 657). If a sentence imposed after a revocation is not unreasonable, we will not proceed to t he second prong of the analysis

-- whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable. Crudup , 461 F.3d at 438

- 39. A sentence is procedurally unreaso nable only when the district court commits a “significant procedural error” in imposing the sentence. United States v. Curry , 523 F.3d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 2008). A district court commits a significant procedural error by: “failing to calculate (or improp erly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence

-- including an explanation f or any deviation from the Guidelines.” Gall v. United States ,4 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Carter , 564 F.3d 325, 330 ( 4th Cir. 2009) (holding that, while an “individualized assessment need n ot be elaborate or lengthy,

. . . it must pr ovide a rationale tailored to the particular case . . . and [be] adequate to permit meaningful appellate review”) . In this case, Chapman contends that the district court committed procedural error by failing to include an adequate statement of reasons jus tifying the sentence it imposed. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not impose an unreasonable sentence, let alone one that is plainly so. The court discussed Chapman’s initial sentencing (where he was placed on probat ion), his attempts to receive substance abuse treatment, and the faith shown in him by the court and by the Probation Office. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Chapman’s probation violations (which included possession with intent to deliver marijuana ) were significantly serious as to justify the term of imprisonment imposed. T his explanation was not inadequate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adeq uately presented in the materials5 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED