UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4724

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN MATHEW RHODES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00240-TDS-7)

Submitted: April 28, 2014 Decided: July 10, 2014

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dianne J. McVay, JONES MCVAY LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Graham Tod Green, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Justin Mathew Rhodes appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 

two consecutive terms of eleven months’ imprisonment. Counsel 

has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal 

but questioning whether the district court erred by: (1) finding 

by a preponderance of the evidence that Rhodes engaged in new 

criminal conduct; and (2) sentencing Rhodes to consecutive terms 

of imprisonment after revoking concurrent terms of supervised 

release. Rhodes was informed of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We affirm.

To revoke supervised release, a district court need 

only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); 

United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). 

This standard is met when the court “believe[s] that the 

existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” 

United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We review for clear error 

factual determinations underlying the conclusion that a 

violation occurred. United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 

1019 (8th Cir. 2003). There is clear error if, after reviewing 
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the record, we are “left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of 

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

We conclude that the district court did not clearly 

err by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Rhodes 

engaged in new criminal conduct. The district court based its 

finding that Rhodes participated in the theft of a television on 

testimony the court found credible, and Rhodes offers no 

argument that undermines the court’s credibility determination. 

See United States v. Cates, 613 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010) 

(holding that credibility determinations made by district court 

at revocation hearings are rarely reviewable on appeal). 

Because the district court found by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Rhodes engaged in new criminal conduct and Rhodes 

admitted to violating two additional terms of his supervised 

release, we conclude that the district court did not err by 

revoking Rhodes’ supervised release.

We also conclude that, pursuant to our longestablished precedent, the district court did not err by 

imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment upon revocation of 

concurrent terms of supervised release. United States v. 

Johnson, 138 F.3d 115, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Rhodes, in writing, of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Rhodes requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Rhodes. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED