Acting Officers

An officer designated by a departm ent head pursuant to a statute to perform the duties of a presidential 

appointee has the same authority as the officer for whom he acts, and may serve for an indefinite 

period notwithstanding the 30-day limitation of the Vacancy Act, though while acting he is entitled 

only to the salary of his regular position. There are, however, a num ber of practical and political 

reasons why the designation of acting officers should not be used as a substitute for appointm ent by 

and with the advice and consent of the Senate

Potential infirmities in the authonty of the acting officer in any particular situation will be cured by the 

de facto officer rule.

January 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE 

DEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

This responds to the request by the Office of Presidential Personnel for a 

discussion of certain issues relating to the designation of the Deputy Commissioner of Immigration (Deputy Commissioner) to perform the duties of and act as 

Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (Commissioner).

I.

The designation would be based on 28 U. S. C. §§ 5 0 9 ,510andon § 103ofthe 

Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) (8 U .S.C. § 1103). According to 28 

U .S.C . § 510 the Attorney General may authorize the performance by any 

officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the 

Attorney General. 28 U .S.C . § 509 vests in the Attorney General, with certain 

exceptions not here relevant, all functions of the Department of Justice, including 

those of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Attorney General thus 

has the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 510 to direct the Deputy Commissioner to 

perform the duties of and to act as the Commissioner. Similarly § 103(a) of the 

Act authorizes the Attorney General to delegate to any employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Service) or to any officer or employee of the 

Department of Justice any of the duties and powers imposed upon the Attorney 

General in the Act. He may require or authorize any employee of the Service or 

the Department of Justice to perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or 

duties conferred or imposed by the Act or any regulations issued thereunder upon

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any other employee of the Service. Section 103(b) of the Act charges the 

Commissioner with any and all responsibilities and authority in the administration of the Service of the Act which are conferred upon the Attorney General or 

which may be delegated to him or prescribed by the Attorney General. The 

Attorney General thus has the authority to delegate to the Deputy Commissioner, 

or require and authorize the Deputy Commissioner to perform or exercise, any or 

all the powers conferred or imposed upon the Commissioner.

The principal problems relating to the designation of acting officers, discussed 

below, are the legal authority of the acting officer, the duration of the designation, 

and the compensation to which the acting officer is entitled.

1. Authority c f Acting Officers. An acting officer is vested with the full 

authority of the officer for whom he acts. Keyser v. H itz, 133 U .S. 138, 145—46 

(1890). Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68, 81 (1890); United States v. Lucido,

373 F.Supp. 1142, 1145 (E.D. M ich. 1974); 20 Op. A tt’y Gen. 483 (1892); 23 

Op. A tt’y Gen. 473, 474-76 (1901).

2. Duration cf Designation (Relation to the Vacancy Act). The Vacancy Act, 5 

U .S.C . §§ 3345-3349, provides that where an officer of a bureau, who is not 

appointed by the department head, dies, resigns, or is sick or absent, his first 

assistant shall perform the duties of the office (5 U .S.C. § 3346), unless the 

President directs a department head or another officer of an executive department 

appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to 

perform the duties of the office. (5 U .S.C. § 3347.) Vacancies caused by death or 

resignation, however, may be filled under these provisions for not more than 30 

days. (5 U .S.C . § 3348.) It has been the position of the Department of Justice for 

many years that, if vacancies are filled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 510 (the same 

would be true of § 103 of the Act), they are not filled pursuant to the provisions of 

the Vacancy Act, and that the 30-day limitation of 5 U .S.C. § 3348 consequently 

is inapplicable. This position was upheld by the courts in the analogous situations 

where the Deputy Attorney General or Solicitor General became Acting Attorney 

General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 508. United States v. Lucido, 373 F.Supp. at 

1147-51; United States v. Halmo, 386 F.Supp. 593, 595 (E.D. Wis. 1974).

The Comptroller General takes the position that the 30-day limitation of 5 

U .S.C. § 3348 must be read into all statutes authorizing the temporary filling of 

vacancies, because otherwise the President could circumvent the power of the 

Senate to advise and consent to appointments. The Department of Justice has 

never agreed with the Comptroller General’s position in this regard. As explained 

below, however, the Department recognizes that the existence of this controversy 

makes temporary designations undesirable, especially where certain functions 

can be exercised only by specific officers.

3. Compensation of Acting Officers. Under 5 U .S.C . § 5535(b)(2) the Acting 

Commissioner could receive only the salary of the Deputy Commissioner.

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II.

An officer, designated by a department head under a statute such as 28 U.S.C. 

§ 510' to perform the duties of an officer appointed by the President by and with 

the advice and consent of the Senate, thus would have the same authority as the 

officer for whom he acts, and he could serve for an indefinite period, longer 

indeed than a recess appointee whose commission expires under Article II, § 2, 

clause 3 of the Constitution at the end of the next session of the Senate. The only 

direct drawback of the status of the acting officer is that while acting he is entitled 

only to the salary of his regular position and not to the compensation of the officer 

for whom he acts.

The question is occasionally raised why the President should be put to the 

inconvenience of having to go through the burdensome processes of selecting 

officers and securing the advice and consent of the Senate as to their appointment, 

if the same result could be obtained through an informal designation as acting 

officer by a department head. The answer is more practical and political than 

legal. Generally the Executive has recognized that the designation of acting 

officers should never be used as a substitute for appointment by and with the 

advice and consent of the Senate but only as an interim measure during the 

frequently difficult and time consuming processes of selecting a candidate and 

securing his confirmation by the Senate.

The following considerations underlie this recognition:

1. The President has the duty under the Constitution to appoint officers by and 

with the consent of the Senate. An attempt to circumvent the right of the Senate to 

participate in the appointment process is likely to result in political reprisals and 

repercussions. Hearings may be held on the status of the acting official which at 

best are time consuming and may require embarrassing explanations.

2. While, as indicated above, an acting officer has the same legal authority as a 

presidential appointee, his stature as a practical matter is often somewhat inferior. 

He is frequently considered merely a caretaker without a mandate to take farreaching measures.

3. In contrast to the position of the Department of Justice that an official whose 

acting status is derived from a statutory base other than the Vacancy Act is not 

subject to the 30-day limitation of 5 U .S.C. § 3348, the Comptroller General 

contends that 5 U.S.C. § 3348 controls the time for which all acting officers may 

serve, or that a provision such as 28 U .S.C . § 510 does not apply to officers 

whose appointment requires the advice and consent of the Senate. The Executive 

generally chooses to avoid, if possible, disputes with the Comptroller General in

view of his congressional backing.

4. The courts have never conclusively decided the question whether the 30-day 

limitation of 5 U .S.C. § 3348 must be read into a statute which generally

1 M ost if not all of the agencies have provisions authorizing a departm ent head to designate any officer in his 

departm ent to perform any function of the departm ent head. These provisions, w hich go back to the Hoover 

Com m ission R eport o f 1949, were first incorporated in the Reorganization Plans issued under the Reorganization 

Act of 1949, Pub L No 81-109, 63 Stat. 203 Since then many o f these provisions have becom e statutory

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authorizes a departm ent head to authorize any officer or employee of the departm ent to perform any function vested in the department head.2 Hence in the 

relatively few situations where legal actions may be undertaken only by a specific 

officer,3 the departm ent has tried to avoid the taking of such action by an acting 

official who served for more than 30 days.4 This legal uncertainty is a further 

reason indicating the importance of having the President make appointments by 

and with the advice and consent of the Senate and using acting designations only 

as an interim measure during the regular appointment process.

m.

In many instances the potential infirmities in the authority of the acting officers 

discussed in the preceding parts of this memorandum will be cured by the de facto

officer rule. Under that doctrine, a person who discharges the duties of an office 

under color of title is considered a de facto officer even if there are defects in that 

title. The public acts of a de facto officer are binding on the public; conversely, the 

public may safely assume that he is a rightful officer. McDowell v. United States,

159 U .S. 596, 601-02 (1895); Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 322-24 

(1902); United States \. Royer, 268 U.S. 394(1925); United States ex rel. D oss\.

Lindsley, 148 F.2d 22, 23 (7th Cir. 1945), cert, denied, 325 U.S. 858; Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 650 F.2d 14, 

17 (2d Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Joseph, 519 F.2d at 1071 n.4. As a 

rule, the authority of de facto officers can be challenged only in special proceedings in the nature of quo warranto brought directly for that purpose. United States

ex rel. D oss v. Lindsley, 148 F.2d 22; United States v. Nussbaum, 306 F. Supp. 

66, 68-69 (N.D. C al., 1969); F. Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, §§ 343, 

344 (1890).

As explained in the above-cited cases, the de facto officer rule rests on two 

basic considerations. First, when a person is openly in the occupation of a public 

office, the public should not be required to investigate his title; conversely, an 

individual should not be able to challenge the validity of official acts by alleging 

technical flaws in an official’s title to his office.5

A typical case of a de facto officer is one who has been properly appointed but 

who continues to serve after his term of office has expired. Waite v. Santa Cruz,

184 U .S. 302; United States v. Groupp, 333 F. Supp. 242, 245-46 (D. Maine

2 In United States v Joseph, 519 F2d 1068, 1070-71 (5th C ir 1975), cert, denied. 424 U .S. 909 (1976), 430 

U S 905 (1977), the Court o f Appeals seem s to have assum ed arguendo that 5 U S .C § 3348 limits the period 

during w hich an official designated pursuant to 28 U .S.C . § 510 may act The court, however, avoided the issue by 

holding the decision involved had been made by the Attorney G eneral him self rather than by the A cting Assistant 

A ttorney G eneral, w ho had m erely transm itted it, and that in any event the de facto officer doctrine, discussed in part 

III infra, applied.

3 in the D epartm ent o f Justice this involves especially certain orders and authorizations within the com petence of 

the C rim inal and Tax D ivisions

4 At tim es the D epartm ent o f Justice was ab le to obviate this difficulty by having the acting official sign the 

docum ent in his perm anent rather than in h is acting capacity, o r by having it signed by his superior.

5 A nother rationale for the de facto officer ru le is that a person should not be able to subm it his case to an officer 

and accept it if it is favorable to him, but challenge the officer's authority if the latter should rule against him 

Glidden Company v. Zdanok. 370 U S. 530, 535 (1962).

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1971), a jf d, 459 F.2d 178, 182 n.12 (1st Cir. 1972). This consideration is of 

particular importance if the status of the acting officer should be attacked on the 

ground that 5 U .S.C. § 3348 is applicable to designations of acting officers, so 

that their authority expires 30 days after their designation.

T h e o d o r e B . O l s o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office c f Legal Counsel

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