23-506

Bramble v. Moody’s Corp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A 

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 21st day of February, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT:

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

MYRNA PÉREZ,

MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

FELICIA BRAMBLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 23-506

MOODY’S CORPORATION, SCOTT KENNEY, 

in his capacity as Senior Vice 

President Chief Audit Executive, 

ADAM BERKOWITZ, in his capacity as 

Senior Vice President of Accounting,

Defendants-Appellees.

∗

____________________________________________

∗ The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
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For Plaintiff-Appellant: Jason M. Wolf, Rutkin & Wolf PLLC, 

White Plains, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees: Amy J. Traub, Baker & Hostetler LLP, 

New York, NY; Paul M. Knettel, Baker & 

Hostetler LLP, Houston, TX.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Nelson S. Román, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the March 2, 2023 judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED.

Felicia Bramble, a former payroll manager at Moody’s Corporation

(“Moody’s”), appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 

of Moody’s and two senior Moody’s employees (collectively, “Defendants”) on 

Bramble’s claims of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law (the 

“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”).1 On 

1 Although the district court’s decision did not explicitly set forth the basis for its jurisdiction over 

Bramble’s state-law claims, neither party challenges the district court’s exercise of supplemental 

jurisdiction over these claims, and we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in doing so. See Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 723 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding 

that the district court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over NYSHRL 

discrimination claim because that claim arose “out of approximately the same set of events as 

[plaintiff’s] federal retaliation claim”). To the extent Bramble’s brief implies that she is asserting 
3

appeal, Bramble argues that the district court erred in concluding that she failed 

to make a prima facie case of discrimination. “We review a district court’s grant 

of summary judgment de novo,” Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 157 (2d Cir. 

2021), and will affirm when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, 

and issues on appeal.

In considering Bramble’s Title VII and NYSHRL discrimination claims, we 

employ the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 

2015); see also Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). To 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Bramble must demonstrate that 

(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; 

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) “the adverse employment 

action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory 

intent.” Tolbert, 790 F.3d at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted). If Bramble

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, we decline to consider her arguments as they were not raised 

in the district court and are therefore forfeited. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 

787 F.3d 638, 662 (2d Cir. 2015).
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makes out this prima facie case, the burden then shifts to Defendants to “proffer 

some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.” Spiegel v. 

Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2010). If Defendants carry this burden, 

Bramble must then present sufficient admissible evidence “to permit a rational 

finder of fact to infer that [Defendants’] employment decision was more likely than 

not based in whole or in part on discrimination.” Walsh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 828 

F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vivenzio, 611 

F.3d at 106 (explaining that, at step three, the “plaintiff is given an opportunity to 

adduce admissible evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of 

fact to infer that the employer’s proffered reason is pretext for an impermissible 

motivation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

NYCHRL claims must be analyzed “separately and independently from any 

federal and state law claims,” and the NYCHRL’s provisions must be construed 

“broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs to the extent that such a construction 

is reasonably possible.” Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if 

no reasonable jury could conclude either that [Defendants’] reasons were 

pretextual” or that Defendants’ conduct “was based at least in part on 
5

discrimination.” Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mihalik v. 

Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013).

The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on Bramble’s 

Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL claims, concluding that she failed to proffer 

sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

discrimination played any role in Defendants’ decision to terminate her, and that 

she therefore failed to establish a prima facie case as to any of her claims (including 

under the NYCHRL). On this record, we need not decide whether Bramble 

established a prima facie case because Defendants clearly identified a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for Bramble’s termination, and Bramble failed to 

present evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that 

Defendants’ reason was pretextual or that their actions were based – even in part 

– on discrimination. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants.

Here, there can be no doubt that Defendants identified a “legitimate[,]

nondiscriminatory reason” for Bramble’s termination. Spiegel, 604 F.3d at 80. It 

is undisputed that Bramble failed to follow the company’s internal procedures for 

changing an employee’s direct deposit information, and directed her subordinate 
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to do the same, when she received a phishing email requesting that a senior 

manager’s account information be changed. It is likewise undisputed that –

although this procedure was not codified into a formal, written policy at the time

– Bramble was aware of the payroll department’s processes for verifying and 

implementing changes to an employee’s direct deposit information. Indeed, the 

record confirms that, while Bramble understood the relevant policy, she made a 

“mistake” and “forgot” to request a voided check or a bank letter before directing 

her subordinate to change the senior manager’s account information as requested 

in the email. J. App’x at 488. Bramble’s admitted policy violation plainly 

constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination.

Moreover, given the undisputed facts concerning Bramble’s policy 

violation, no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Defendants’ decision to 

terminate her was motivated by racial animus. Bramble admitted that “if a 

violation of [Moody’s] protocol is evident[,] termination is appropriate,” and if a 

“policy violation is severe enough, Moody’s can and will terminate for a first 

offense.” Id. at 494. Bramble does not deny – nor could she – that she instructed 

her direct report to circumvent payroll’s established process in the course of

changing the senior manager’s direct deposit information. And while Bramble 
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may disagree that termination was warranted in this circumstance, her

disagreement as to the severity of her violation is insufficient to show 

discrimination or pretext. See Bentley v. AutoZoners, LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 

2019) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim of discrimination 

“simply by questioning whether her misconduct was sufficiently severe to warrant 

termination”); see also Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that 

the court’s “role is to prevent unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a 

superpersonnel department that second guesses employers’ business judgments,” 

and therefore courts are not to consider “personnel decisions that lack a linkage or 

correlation to the claimed ground of discrimination” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Bramble’s various arguments that the circumstances of her termination 

demonstrate discriminatory animus or pretext are unavailing. For example, her 

contention that Moody’s failed to consider a penalty short of termination – such as 

suspension or additional training on how to recognize spam or phishing emails –

is of no moment given that the company’s code of conduct makes clear (and 

Bramble herself recognizes) that Moody’s was not obligated to undertake any form 

of progressive discipline or retraining in advance of a termination decision. See
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Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 2000). Nor has Bramble

advanced competent evidence that any similarly situated Moody’s employee was 

provided additional training, subjected to progressive discipline, awarded a lesser 

sanction, or given more favorable treatment in the wake of a comparably serious 

violation. See Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 494 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating

that a showing of disparate treatment requires that comparator co-employees “be 

similarly situated to the plaintiff in all material respects,” including having 

“engaged in comparable conduct” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Without 

proper comparators, Bramble’s assertions that she was terminated despite having

received “excellent evaluations,” having “no prior disciplinary history,” and not 

“cost[ing] the company a dime” as a result of this incident, Bramble Br. at 12, are 

insufficient to demonstrate that this employment decision had anything to do with 

her race. See Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 495; see also Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 82 (2d Cir. 

2023) (explaining that the “sine qua non of a . . . race-based discrimination suit is 

that the discrimination must be because of the plaintiff’s protected characteristic” 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

Bramble’s conclusory assertion that two other Moody’s employees made 

complaints against the same second-level supervisor who fired Bramble does not 
9

alter this conclusion. As to one of these employees, Bramble’s only evidence that 

the employee ever complained about racial discrimination was Bramble’s own 

unsubstantiated belief, which is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material 

fact. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir. 

2008). As to the other employee, the record reflects that she did not complain 

until nearly two years after Bramble was fired, that her complaint concerned the 

supervisor’s failure to put her up for promotions (as opposed to wrongful 

termination or discipline), and that she failed to assert any nonspeculative facts in 

support of her belief that she was denied promotions because of her race. As a 

result, these complaints fail to raise a genuine dispute as to whether Bramble’s 

termination was racially motivated.

To the extent Bramble relies on certain of her experiences at Moody’s prior 

to her violation to suggest that her termination was in some way motivated by her 

race, her examples fail to demonstrate that discrimination played any role in 

Defendants’ decision to terminate her. Specifically, Bramble claims that her 

second-level supervisor shut off her phone access while allowing two “Caucasian 

employees . . . to keep their company phones,” Bramble Br. at 14; that she was 

seated behind a partition in her office “where no one could see her,” unlike other 
10

employees who were more visible, id. at 11; that the promotions of “Caucasian 

employees . . . were announced in finance meetings but [hers] never were,” id.; 

and that the human resources department revoked her access to “salary banding” 

information after she allegedly saw that she made less “than similarly situated

Caucasian employees,” id. But as the district court correctly noted with respect 

to each of these examples, Bramble failed to explain how she was similarly situated 

to any of the employees to whom she sought to compare herself – all of whom held 

different titles, performed different job duties, worked in different departments, 

or had different levels of seniority than Bramble.

The only example advanced by Bramble that even arguably supports an 

inference of racial animus was an instance nearly a year before Bramble’s

termination where her second-level supervisor allegedly asked her if she believed 

he had ever discriminated against her. As the district court appropriately found, 

however, this question was unconnected to any purported adverse employment 

decision and is therefore insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent. See 

Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 307 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[S]tray 

remarks, without more, do not constitute sufficient evidence to make out a case of 

employment discrimination.” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
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Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 111 (explaining that defendants can avoid liability under the 

NYCHRL if the “conduct complained of consists of nothing more than . . . petty 

slights and trivial inconveniences” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 

Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that, in 

determining whether a statement is probative of discrimination, a district court 

may consider “the context in which the remark was made (i.e., whether it was 

related to the decision[]making process)”). In fact, Bramble herself perceived this 

interaction merely as “weird,” J. App’x at 496, rather than as indicative of any 

racial animus or hostility. The district court was therefore justified in granting 

summary judgment to Defendants on Bramble’s discrimination claims.

We have considered Bramble’s remaining arguments and find them to be 

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court