RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3729-22

A.S.,

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

S.A., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________________ 

Submitted September 12, 2024 – Decided September 30, 2024 

Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jacobs. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. 

FV-04-3168-23.

S.A., appellant pro se. 

Respondent has not filed a brief. 

PER CURIAM 

Defendant, S.A., appeals from a June 20, 2023 final restraining order 

(FRO) entered under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on predicate acts of harassment, N.J.S.A. 

2C:33-4, and stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.

 1

 For reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I.

The parties to this action are daughter and mother. On April 19, 2023, 

plaintiff, A.S., contacted the Cherry Hill Police Department, complaining that 

defendant, her mother, had falsely reported her as a missing person and called 

the police at other times to instigate groundless "wellness checks." Plaintiff also 

related that her mother followed her on a trip to Tampa, Florida, appeared 

uninvited at her hotel, surreptitiously accessed her financial accounts, and 

attempted to enter her Manhattan apartment without permission. Based on these 

recollected incidents, a municipal court judge authorized issuance of a 

temporary restraining order (TRO) listing harassment as a predicate offense. 

On April 26, 2023, in application to obtain an amended TRO, plaintiff 

expanded on the history of domestic violence. Specifically, plaintiff described 

how defendant accessed her bank and credit card accounts to learn of her travel 

plans. After discovering plaintiff planned a trip to Australia in late December 

2022 with a long-term boyfriend who her mother disfavored, defendant 

1

 We refer to the individual involved in this appeal by initials to protect her 

privacy. See R. 1:38-3(c)(9). 
3 A-3729-22

contacted the New York City Police Department, reporting that her daughter 

was at risk of self-harm. Acting on that report, the NYPD detained and 

transported plaintiff to a psychiatric unit at Mount Sinai Hospital, where she 

remained for over six hours before being cleared for release. Because of the 

delay occasioned by involuntary hospitalization, plaintiff cancelled her travel 

plans. On the heels of that cancellation, she then planned a trip to Portugal in 

early January 2023, again in the company of her boyfriend, D.S. Through 

surreptitious means, defendant learned of plaintiff's itinerary. When plaintiff 

arrived in Lisbon, she was met by Portuguese authorities, who had been told by 

her mother that she was "being forced to travel against [her] will by [her] 

partner." Besides these incidents, plaintiff listed six separate occasions when 

defendant parked outside of her Manhattan apartment building and monitored 

her, even donning a wig on one occasion to avoid detection. On another 

occasion, defendant prompted police to conduct a "welfare check" at 7:30 a.m. 

Based on the foregoing, a Superior Court judge authorized issuance of an 

amended TRO to include stalking, in addition to harassment, as a predicate 

offense. 
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As proceedings began on June 20, 2023, defendant's counsel of record told 

the court that his client had terminated his services. Defendant confirmed this 

representation: 

THE COURT: You want to represent yourself in this 

matter? 

DEFENDANT: Yes, yes[.] I sent a termination letter 

of his services. I strongly feel I could represent myself 

better. He's not familiar with my case[.] He's very busy 

with other cases. So please allow myself to represent 

myself today. 

After further questioning and assurances from defendant that she was 

indeed ready to proceed, the court commenced trial. First to testify was Sergeant 

James Shields of the Cherry Hill Police Department. Sergeant Shields recounted 

that defendant called on December 26, 2022, reporting that "her daughter was in 

danger." She called on multiple other occasions with the same concern. In 

response, the police contacted plaintiff to check on her welfare. On the third 

occasion, plaintiff asked that the police "cease contacting her" for that purpose. 

 Sergeant Shields' next contact with the parties came on April 19, 2023, 

when plaintiff completed forms necessary to request a TRO. Once the TRO was 

granted, Shields served it on defendant at her listed Cherry Hill address. On 

cross-examination, defendant did not challenge the substance of Shields' 
5 A-3729-22

testimony, except to elicit that he did not "have a problem with any of the calls 

[defendant] was making." 

Plaintiff's testimony followed. She recounted the predicate acts and 

history in reverse chronological order. Plaintiff detailed how her trip to Tampa 

in April 2023 was disrupted when her mother unexpectedly appeared at the hotel 

where she was staying and tried to persuade her to leave D.S. She perceived her 

mother's surprise appearance and actions as an escalation of her prior acts of 

domestic violence. Fearing for her personal safety, plaintiff reported the 

encounter to the Tampa Police Department. Upon her return to New Jersey, she 

contacted the Cherry Hill Police Department, which provided guidance to obtain 

a TRO. 

Plaintiff also recounted a trip to Portugal in January 2023, where she was 

contacted by embassy officials at her mother's behest. This was followed by 

defendant's numerous appearances at plaintiff's apartment. Plaintiff's attorney 

sent defendant a cease-and-desist letter and a supplemental letter revoking a 

power of attorney she had previously conferred to defendant. Plaintiff also 

testified how her intended trip to Australia was derailed in December 2022. She 

recalled that her mother even contacted members of D.S.'s family in effort to 

sabotage their romantic relationship. 
6 A-3729-22

Defendant learned of yet another trip to Bangkok in September 2022. In 

that instance, defendant contacted the United States embassy, reporting her 

daughter "was going to be shot or killed or worse." Thai embassy officials 

contacted plaintiff, asking her to sign a waiver to release information about her 

whereabouts to defendant. 

At the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, her attorney asked: 

COUNSEL: [W]hat are you asking the Court to do today? 

PLAINTIFF: I would like the FRO entered. I also am 

asking the Court to order a mental health evaluation 

because I do believe there is a deep history and you 

know, very critical, untreated, mental health issues 

here[,] and for her to be required to comply with the 

recommendations. 

On cross-examination, defendant impressed upon her daughter that in the 

event she obtained an FRO, contact with her father would also be adversely 

affected. Through leading questions, defendant attempted to minimize the 

nature of her conduct, stressing that plaintiff's apartment building was "a high 

rise with 5,000 people in it," suggesting an innocuous basis for her presence. 

Defendant asked her daughter to concede that on only one occasion did she 

actually enter plaintiff's apartment, for the purpose of bringing Christmas gifts. 

Plaintiff sidestepped this invited concession, instead maintaining her allegations 

that defendant parked outside the building, that her presence had been video 
7 A-3729-22

recorded by the building's doorman, and that plaintiff herself had witnessed 

defendant and her father "with my own eyes, many times outside my building." 

 In her direct testimony, defendant pointed to her age (sixty-eight), "longstanding tenure[d] faculty member" at a university, love for her only child, and 

genuine belief that her daughter "has been manipulated" by D.S. Defendant 

denied having any intent to harass her daughter, "[n]o matter what actions [she] 

took in the past." Citing the subject statute, she argued, "even assuming that all 

of the allegations contained in the temporary restraining order and amended 

restraining order are true, . . . they fail to establish prima facie act of . . . 

harassment, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 . . . ." She also challenged the court's 

jurisdiction, claiming not to have been at her Cherry Hill residence when the 

TRO was served, but was instead in Florida on the date in question and did not 

return until "late at night, late in the afternoon." 

Defendant presented pictures to buttress her contention that her 

relationship with her daughter was "loving, healthy[,] and respectful," 

deteriorating only after her daughter moved in with her boyfriend during the 

Covid pandemic. The boyfriend's religion, she stated, "doesn't allow him to live 

with a non-Jewish woman like my daughter." She testified to becoming 

"interested in Judaism. I (indiscernible) almost a rabbi, myself, okay? We 
8 A-3729-22

support our daughter to date or marry anyone she likes in her life[,] but we have 

concerns. We don't want our daughter to get involved in violating other people's 

religious law." She continued, "[w]e want to support [D.S.] to move forward, 

move on with his own Orthodox Jewish life and marriage without worrying 

about our daughter, as long as he could allow my daughter to be free." 

Defendant conceded she and her husband travelled to Tampa, not to 

intercept her daughter, but instead to "see whether in the future we can buy a 

house . . . or a second home." She acknowledged contacting authorities in 

Portugal, explaining that she was motivated by concern for her daughter's safety 

in the company of D.S. She also acknowledged wearing a wig on one occasion 

when she travelled to her daughter's apartment in Manhattan. Because elderly 

East Asian people were being attacked in New York early in the pandemic, "our 

friend suggested wear wigs, okay, for safety and also [to] look younger." 

In making its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court said: 

I find this [c]ourt has jurisdiction over this matter. It's 

clear the parties have a family relationship[,] being 

daughter and mother[,] and this [c]ourt has jurisdiction. 

One of the ways this [c]ourt can obtain jurisdiction is 

the residence of either the [p]laintiff or the [d]efendant. 

It's clear, as you testified to ma'am, that you live in 

Cherry Hill, New Jersey, which is in Camden County.
9 A-3729-22

 Having found legal jurisdiction, the court continued, speaking to 

defendant: 

[Y]ou've just admitted to every single act of harassment 

that was alleged in the temporary restraining order. 

 Finding plaintiff's testimony credible, the court recited the elements of 

harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4) and found: 

These are not typical activities of an adult. [Plaintiff] 

has the right to have some freedoms in her life. It's 

clear that this is harassment. The amount of times that 

you admitted yourself to doing this is disconcerting to

this Court . . . there was also stalking. 

As to stalking (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10), the court found: 

On two separate occasions, you testified that - - perhaps 

three separate occasions. That first, you sat in a car out 

front of her building in New York. This was your 

testimony[,] and you did that because you wanted to be 

able to see her. That fits the definition of stalking. 

So it's clear that there are at least two predicate acts that 

have been found in this matter. 

 The court added: 

Incidentally, your daughter is 27 years old. She's not a 

child. She is – not only is she an adult[,] but she is also 

a Wharton [g]raduate . . . I'm also sure that she feels it 

is necessary to do this so she can live a life free of being 

harassed and being – every time she goes anywhere, 

there is a wellness check or she is getting stopped at the 

airport[,] or her boyfriend is being detained at the 

airport. 
10 A-3729-22

Having found defendant committed predicate acts of harassment and 

stalking, the court then determined that entry of an FRO was necessary "for the 

safety of the [p]laintiff" and prohibited defendant from having any further 

contact with her daughter or D.S. 

 Concerning a psychiatric evaluation, the court ruled: 

You have – not only have tried to track them down and 

have wellness checks[,] but also have them detained at 

the airport. This is not what a rational person typically 

does. So I do have concern[,] as has also been asserted 

by the [p]laintiff[,] that there is a need for a psychiatric 

evaluation. So I'm entering that provision in there as 

well . . . I do think it is important that a psychiatric 

evaluation be conducted in this matter. 

II. 

On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments: 

Point 1: The TRO was wrongly issued on April 19, 

2023 because the Cherry Hill Municipal Court and the 

Camden Superior Court had no jurisdiction over the 

allegations listed in the TRO[,] even though there was 

no single element of domestic violence in the 

allegations. Also, the Court had no jurisdiction over 

the two parties because the plaintiff daughter has lived 

in NYC since 2019[,] while I, the defendant mother[,] 

no longer lived in New Jersey at the time of the TRO 

issued but has [sic] lived in Pennsylvania, 120 miles 

away from my daughter. (Raised below) 

Point 2: There was no factual legal basis for the Court 

to enter the TRO on April 19, 2023 because the 
11 A-3729-22

allegations presented no immediate danger or any 

danger from the loving mother to the plaintiff, my only 

child but my love and care for her life safety and her 

health and her well[-]being due to the dangerous 

situation she has involved with her previous partner 

without her realizing it. (Raised below) 

Point 3: The Camden Superior Court of New Jersey 

violated my legal right to due process of law by 

depriving my legal right to appeal the wrongly issued 

TRO[,] by making up a false reason that the previous 

TRO appeal application was denied [. . . .] (Raised 

below)[]

Point 4: The trial court violated my right to due process 

of law at the FRO hearing. (Raised below) 

Point 5: The trial court abused the discretion and erred 

in granting the final restraining order with psychiatric 

evaluation without reviewing and considering any 

evidence and testimonies from me, the mother of the

deceived plaintiff daughter [A.S] and my witness, [], 

the father of [A.S.]. (Raised below) 

Point 6: The trial court erred in entering the FRO with 

psychiatric evaluation without applying the law 

correctly. The NJ harassment statue N.J.S.A. 2C: 33-4 

requires that the act is "with purpose to harass ..." which 

is just the contrary to our intent ([plaintiff]’s mother 

and father) was to protect and save the life and health 

of our deceived, missing and isolated daughter, not

harass same. (Raised below) 

Point 7: The trial court Judge got the facts wrong that 

were not what the parties testified to during the hearing. 

He made mistakes in his findings and got the law wrong 

which resulted in his biased and unjustified decisions 

which has made our mentally sick and deceived 
12 A-3729-22

daughter homeless[,] endangering her life. (Raised

below) 

Our standard of review in domestic violence matters is circumscribed. We 

defer to the trial judge's factual findings unless they are shown to be not 

reasonably supported by the record and thus "'clearly mistaken'" or so "'wide of 

the mark'" as to result in a denial of justice. C.M.F. v. R.G.F., 418 N.J. Super. 

396, 401-02 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). We must accord considerable weight to the trial 

judge's findings of credibility. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). We 

owe special deference to the expertise of the Family Part in making often 

difficult judgments about the lives of families and children. See E.P., 196 N.J. 

at 104; Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413. 

Jurisdiction 

For provisions of the PDVA to apply, the court must first have subject 

matter and personal jurisdiction. Here, the trial court properly found both forms 

of jurisdiction. It had subject matter jurisdiction based on the familial 

relationship between the parties and persistent calls by defendant to the Cherry 

Hill Police Department to conduct welfare checks of plaintiff, among other 

predicate acts. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19d. It had personal jurisdiction based on 

defendant's residence in Camden County. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28a. This latter 
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finding was supported by testimony from Sergeant Shields and plaintiff, both of 

whom testified that defendant maintained a residence in Cherry Hill during the 

time of the subject predicate acts. There is nothing in the record to support 

defendant's newly raised contention that she lived in Pennsylvania rather than 

Cherry Hill at the time of the incidents or on the date of service. Accordingly, 

we reject defendant's jurisdictional arguments contained in points one and two. 

History of Domestic Violence and Predicate Acts 

In defendant's third and seventh points, she challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence that resulted in the temporary and final restraining orders based on 

allegations of harassment and stalking. "Domestic violence" means an 

occurrence of one or more of the fourteen specific criminal acts inflicted upon 

a person protected by the Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Among those fourteen 

specified criminal acts is harassment and stalking. A person commits an act of 

harassment when, "with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person," 

the actor "makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications . . . at 

extremely inconvenient hours . . . or any other manner likely to cause annoyance 

or alarm." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), (c). "A finding of a purpose to harass may be 

inferred from the evidence presented." State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 

(1997). 
14 A-3729-22

Instigating baseless repeated welfare checks constitutes harassment, as the 

trial court found. A party's purported loving, well-intended motivation for 

initiating such action is not a legal justification for what amounts to an unhealthy 

need to control and dominate the life of another. As the Supreme Court has 

observed, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence . 

. . . At its core, the [PDVA] effectuates the notion that the victim of domestic 

violence is entitled to be left alone. To be left alone is, in essence, the basic 

protection the law seeks to assure these victims." Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 584 

(citations omitted). More than once, plaintiff made clear her wish to be left 

alone; yet defendant regularly and consciously disregarded that wish. In finding 

defendant engaged in conduct constituting harassment, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion. 

A person is guilty of stalking when they "purposefully or knowingly 

engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 

reasonable person to fear for his safety or the safety of a third person or suffer 

other emotional distress." A "course of conduct" under the statute includes: 

repeatedly [on two or more occasions] maintaining a

visual or physical proximity to a person; directly,

indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, 

method, device, or means, following, monitoring, 

observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating 

to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's 
15 A-3729-22

property; repeatedly committing harassment against a 

person . . . . 

Here, as the trial court found, all the elements of the offense were met, 

extending also to reasonable fear for the safety of D.S., a romantically-linked 

third party. A review of the record confirms that defendant personally surveilled 

plaintiff at her apartment or caused third parties (police and diplomatic officials) 

to monitor her daughter. While defendant at times tried to portray her conduct 

as innocuous – being in Tampa by happenstance or wearing a wig out of fear for 

her safety – defendant acknowledged engaging in the predicate conduct. 

 In her fourth point, defendant claims a due process violation without an 

attendant referent. We see nothing in the record that would pertain to a due 

process concern, including defendant's independent, if improvident, decision to 

proceed without counsel. Due process mandates that litigants have "a 

meaningful opportunity to defend against a complaint in domestic violence 

matters, which would include the opportunity to seek legal representation, if 

requested." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 606 (App. Div. 

2013) (citing Franklin v. Sloskey, 385 N.J. Super. 534, 540-41 (App. Div. 

2006)), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 587 (2014). The protection of a defendant's due 

process rights in the domestic violence context requires a fact-sensitive 
16 A-3729-22

analysis. Ibid. Here, the record shows defendant had retained counsel who 

appeared and asked to be relieved based upon defendant's wish that he not 

represent her. Further, the record evidences that defendant's decision to proceed 

without her retained counsel was knowing and voluntary. There was no feature 

of this case that would implicate a due process violation. 

In sum, the trial court relied on substantial reliable evidence to make its 

factual findings and legal conclusions in entry of an FRO. Defendant's 

justification, while nominally motivated by concern for a loved one, was 

correctly found by the trial court to be misguided and "irrational."

Psychiatric Evaluation 

Upon entering an FRO, the trial court stated, "I do have concern[,] as has 

been also asserted by the [p]laintiff, that there is a need for a psychiatric 

evaluation. So[,] I'm entering that provision in there as well." The irrational 

nature of defendant's purported defense and testimony congruently gave rise to 

the court's decision to order a psychiatric evaluation by a court-selected mental 

health professional. The PDVA provides, "the court may require the defendant 

to receive professional counsel from either a private source or a source 

appointed by the court, and if the court so orders, the court shall require the 

defendant to provide documentation of attendance at the professional 
17 A-3729-22

counseling." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-27(a). Based on defendant's alarming behavior in 

the record before us, the court acted reasonably and within its authority to 

require defendant be evaluated by a professional psychiatrist. 

Defendant's remaining arguments do not merit discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.