U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

43–667 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–54] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON UNMANNED 

AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) AND 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND 

RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) CAPABILITIES 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 19, 2007 


Congress.#13
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

DOUG ROACH, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

BEN KOHR, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2007 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 19, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities ....................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 19, 2007 ........................................................................................ 43 

THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 2007 

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) AND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) CAPABILITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Alles, Brig. Gen. Randolph D., Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Warfighting Lab, U.S. Marine Corps ................................................................. 27 

Clingan, Rear Adm. Bruce W., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy 

Director, Air Warfare, U.S. Navy ....................................................................... 26 

D’Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office; Sharon L. Pickup, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues, Government Accountability Office; and 

Michael J. Sullivan, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Issues, Government Accountability Office ......................................................... 4 

Davis, Brig. Gen. Walt, Commander, Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence, U.S. Army ............................................................................... 24 

Deptula, Lt. Gen. David A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force ........................................................ 24 

Landon, John R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Information Technology Acquisition (C3ISR & IT Acquisition), Office of the 

Secretary of Defense ............................................................................................ 23 

Sorenson, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A., Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, U.S. Army .......................................................................... 25 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Alles, Brig. Gen. Randolph D. ......................................................................... 135 

Page

IV 

PREPARED STATEMENTS—Continued 

Clingan, Rear Adm. Bruce W. ......................................................................... 125 

D’Agostino, Davi M., joint with Sharon L. Pickup and Michael J. Sullivan ............................................................................................................... 47 

Davis, Brig. Gen. Walt ..................................................................................... 83 

Deptula, Lt. Gen. David A. .............................................................................. 90 

Landon, John R. ............................................................................................... 74 

Sorenson, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. ........................................................................ 108 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 145 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON UNMANNED AERIAL 

VEHICLES (UAV) AND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, 

AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) CAPABILITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 19, 2007. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Aloha. Good morning, everyone. Thanks for 

being here today. 

We have some pretty extensive testimony. Two panels, so we will 

get right to it. 

I would like to make an opening statement and then defer to my 

good friend and compatriot here on the subcommittee, Mr. Saxton, 

Jim Saxton, from New Jersey. 

The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive 

testimony from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 

the Department of Defense (DOD) witnesses regarding intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance programs and policies, ISR, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs. 

They include the spectrum of manned and unmanned vehicles, 

from very small unmanned vehicles that weigh less than a pound, 

to a variety of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and manned aircraft programs, to multi-billion-dollar, highly classified, satellites. 

Some ISR programs, like the satellite programs and the U–2 aircraft, fall within the jurisdiction of other subcommittees. 

ISR program systems incorporate various sensor payloads, including electro-optical, radar, electronic and infrared, as well as 

ground stations, data links and users that include the immediate 

needs of the warfighter to intelligence analysts. 

Let me say parenthetically, it is not that I believe that the panel 

members don’t know most of these things, but this is a public meeting for the record and I want to make sure that everyone, including 

the panelists, at least have the same basic foundation for a start 

and also, of course, to inform the public. 

Please don’t think I am patronizing you in any way by this opening statement. I don’t know about Mr. Saxton, but that is not my 

intent. 

2 

Further, ISR policies and acquisition programs involve major involvement by a variety of organizations, including all the military 

services, the combatant commands and the intelligence agencies, 

all 5 million of them, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA), and more recently, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). 

There is concern as to whether an organization exists within the 

Department of Defense with sufficient information across the spectrum of ISR programs with the authority to properly direct resources and avoid wasteful, uncoordinated expenditure of resources. That is probably a key element in all of this. 

Parenthetically here, we have been going over all of the various 

programs just dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), for 

example. I think we stopped at 130, one hundred and thirty, last 

night. Programs, approaches, suggestions, methodologies and so on. 

And that is just within one particular bailiwick of the 5 million intelligence agencies. 

So it is not so much that it gets complicated. It is overwhelming 

and detailed to the point that you lose the perspective about where 

you are going and why. And most clearly, at least to me, is the 

question of who is in charge, where is the authority, who can make 

decisions in an expeditious way, that we can manifest in our deliberations here in the Congress. 

A U.S. Strategic Command senior study group tasked to review 

ISR programs recently concluded that there is no authoritative ISR 

baseline to determine requirements. The GAO indicates that the 

Department of Defense’s ISR roadmap, required by Congress in 

2004 and published in 2005 and again in early 2007, does not identify future requirements, does not identify funding priorities and 

lacks a means of measuring progress in meeting requirements. 

Again, parenthetically, as you know, if that happens, then the 

Congress is going to step in, and you know how insightful that is 

going to be. 

While DOD has made some progress in coordinating the acquisition of some ISR systems, significant progress needs to be made as 

ISR programs continue to proliferate. 

As examples: the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization alone includes a budget request of $4.5 billion for 130 ISR 

projects that I just mentioned; the Army has 18 UAV ISR science 

and technology projects, including 3 projects investigating flappingwing UAVs; the Army and Navy, less than 2 years ago canceled a 

$900 million development program for joint Aerial Common Sensor 

(ACS) aircraft and sensors because of an estimated doubling of cost 

and an estimated 2-year slip. That program has now been slipped 

five years, and the Navy and Army intend to each acquire their 

own system. 

The Air Force believes that there is an unnecessary duplication 

of UAV program acquisition offices, training operations, logistics 

and maintenance operations and intelligence support facilities. 

Even though Central Command and all of the other combatant 

commands have their own joint intelligence center, the Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat Organization has created its own with 

600 people and 200 contractor personnel. The Subcommittee’s challenge is to attempt to understand this vast variety of programs and 

3 

projects across the spectrum of the Department and to deal with 

it. And I assure you, we will deal with it in this Congress from this 

subcommittee. Recommendations will be forthcoming. 

So we look forward to hearing from all our witnesses on these 

and other important issues. 

With that, I will conclude my statement. And as I said at the beginning, defer to my good friend and colleague and I might say my 

mentor on this subcommittee, the Honorable Jim Saxton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to associate myself with the words of your opening 

statement. And let me just say very, very briefly, we have had the 

opportunity to view ISR capability that has emerged as a result of 

the new threats that exist today. As we move from the Cold War 

era and the threat that we faced there into the new era of asymmetric threat, it was necessary for us to develop some new capabilities. And without being specific about those new capabilities in this 

setting, we have done that. 

The question today is whether our new capabilities are organized 

in a way that give us the best bang for the buck. Or is there a way 

that they should be organized that does enhance our capabilities in 

two ways. One, to use the assets that exist today and, second, to 

be sure that we are in a position to best develop capabilities for the 

future. 

So that is what to me this hearing is about today and I look forward to hearing from both panels. 

And, Mr. Chairman, with that I will yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Jim. 

Let us go forward then with the GAO panel, panel number one. 

I am going to read in order, and if you could speak in the order 

that I read it, I think it would be most useful for us. 

Ms. Davi D’Agostino, who is the Director of Defense Capabilities 

and Management issues; Ms. Sharon Pickup, Director of Defense 

Capabilities and Management issues; Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management issues. 

Without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared testimony will be 

included in the hearing record. If you could summarize—I know 

you have heard this before, but if you could, it would be useful so 

that we can get into the meat of the hearing. We do have the testimony. We have gone over the testimony, and I think you will find 

questions and observations from the members will reflect that they 

are familiar with the material. 

Ms. D’Agostino, please. 

4 

STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D’AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; SHARON L. PICKUP, DIRECTOR, 

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D’AGOSTINO 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you. We do have one combined statement to provide orally for the record. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we are pleased 

to be here before you this morning to discuss GAO’s work for this 

subcommittee on the Department of Defense’s management and acquisition of ISR assets, including unmanned aircraft systems. 

As you know, the demand for all types of ISR assets, including 

manned and unmanned, airborne and space capabilities, has increased significantly as battlefield commanders at all levels have 

found them an important tool in conducting many types of military 

operations. 

In a fiscally constrained environment, DOD plans substantial investments in ISR assets in the future to enable it to better meet 

requirements for expanded or new capabilities which makes it imperative that DOD have a sound approach. 

We testified before this subcommittee last year on one component 

of DOD’s ISR enterprise, unmanned aircraft systems. Both before 

and since then, DOD has taken some steps intended to enable it 

to take a more integrated approach to assessing future ISR requirements and established a new organization to help integrate and 

better allocate existing assets to improve support to combat operations. 

We are currently doing work for the subcommittee on a number 

of issues related to DOD’s plans for assessing ISR requirements for 

future systems, managing the ISR assets it already has and acquiring ISR systems, and we plan to issue reports to you later on this 

year. 

Because our work is not complete at this time, today we will offer 

our preliminary observations on these matters to you. 

Specifically, we will discuss our work to date on, one, the status 

of DOD initiatives aimed at improving the management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges the department faces 

in implementing the initiative; two, DOD’s approach to managing 

existing ISR assets to support ongoing military operations; and, 

three, the status of selected ISR programs and development and 

the potential for synergies between them. 

First, in reviewing DOD’s efforts to look at its ISR assets across 

the enterprise, we noted that DOD has taken some actions intended to improve the assessment of ISR requirements for future 

systems across the department. These efforts, if implemented properly, could enable DOD to meet more of the growing demand for 

ISR capabilities more efficiently. 

5 

For example, in response to the statutory requirement, as you 

mentioned, Mr. Chairman, DOD has developed and is updating an 

ISR integration roadmap. The roadmap is noteworthy in that it 

sets out some strategic goals and objectives for DOD’s ISR enterprise and it does catalog all systems in development. 

Also, as you noted in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, our 

preliminary work shows that the roadmap does not yet identify future requirements, identify funding priorities or have ways to 

measure progress toward strategic goals for the ISR enterprise. 

Also, importantly, the roadmap does not yet define requirements 

for global persistent surveillance, clarify what ISR requirements 

are already filled or possibly saturated or specific gaps or otherwise 

represent an architecture of what the ISR enterprise is to be. 

In another recent initiative, DOD designated ISR as a test case 

for its joint capability portfolio management concept. The test case 

is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across 

DOD versus on a service or individual system basis will enable 

interoperability of future systems and reduce redundancies and 

gaps. The concept is only about one year old, so it is too early to 

tell how successfully it will be implemented. 

Currently, the portfolio managers are in an advisory role and can 

comment on the military services ISR plans but cannot direct 

changes. The Department has not yet assessed the test cases and 

come to a position on whether the managers need more authority 

to direct service plans. 

Turning to our review of DOD’s approach of managing its existing ISR assets, including unmanned aircraft systems, our ongoing 

work indicates DOD lacks adequate visibility to optimize the use 

of those assets and metrics to evaluate their performance. Specifically, greater visibility is needed in both allocating existing assets 

to combatant commanders and tasking these assets during ongoing 

operations. 

With regard to allocation, the U.S. Strategic Command is 

charged with recommending to the Secretary of Defense how best 

to allocate on an annual basis DOD ISR assets to combatant commanders. However, our work suggests that Strategic Command 

does not have all the information it needs to insure it is leveraging 

all available ISR capability in making its allocation decisions. 

While it has visibility into about 80 or 90 percent of DOD’s assets, 

it does not have complete information on national-level and allied 

assets. As a result, its allocation decisions consider only a portion 

of the available capabilities. 

To its credit, Strategic Command is working to take steps to gain 

greater visibility. 

With regard to tasking or assigning ISR assets to specific missions during ongoing operations, DOD’s current approach again 

does not provide sufficient information and, therefore, visibility on 

how ISR assets at all levels are being used. Specifically, while the 

commander responsible for planning, coordinating and monitoring 

joint air operations has information on how the ISR assets supporting theater-level requirements are being used, the commander 

does not currently have information on how tactical ISR assets or 

those embedded in individual units are being used, nor do indiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
6 

vidual units have information on how theater-level assets and tactical assets in other units are being used. 

As a result, DOD is limited in its ability to fully leverage and optimize the capabilities of all available ISR assets in a way that 

assures operational needs are addressed in the most efficient and 

effective manner. 

Our work also indicates DOD lacks metrics and feedback for systematically tracking the effectiveness of its ISR missions. DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics, 

such as the number of targets plans versus the number collected, 

but it has made only limited progress in developing qualitative 

metrics that would help the department better understand the intelligence collected and how it helps accomplish the mission. Also, 

it does not have a fully developed mechanism for getting feedback 

directly from the supported units. 

Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD cannot evaluate the true demand for ISR assets, determine whether it 

is allocating and tasking them in the most effective manner or insure that it is acquiring new systems that best support the 

warfighting needs. 

Finally, turning to our review of 13 ISR systems currently in development, we assessed the potential for synergies between them 

and identified some programs where program managers and services are working together to gain efficiencies. We also identified 

cases where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly and 

redundant stovepipe solutions. For example, we found additional 

opportunities for synergies in cases such as Global Hawk and 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance. 

Also, of the 13 airborne ISR programs we reviewed, most have 

encountered either cost growth or schedule delays. These problems 

are typically the result of not following a knowledge-based approach as called for in Defense policy. In some cases, the resultant 

delay in delivering new capability to the warfighter has led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant and operational until the new capability is finally delivered. 

DOD recognized in its quadrennial defense review it needs to develop a more flexible and responsive set of ISR capabilities to support the joint warfight across the department. Steps taken thus far 

to integrate requirements are positive developments, but they are 

new and there are some limitations. In the future, we hope that 

DOD will continue to focus on developing a more comprehensive, 

integrated approach to identifying future requirements and managing currently available assets as well as taking advantage of 

synergies to be gained in developing new or expanded systems. 

This concludes our oral statement. And we are happy to answer 

any questions you may have. 

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. D’Agostino, Ms. Pickup and 

Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. That was really an excellent summary. Not a word wasted in it. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sullivan, you don’t lack for work, do you? I see you all the 

time in here. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Support role today, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, very good. Do you ever get to go home? 

7 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sometimes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Good for you. We appreciate it. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will go to Mr. Saxton for questions. I will 

defer mine and go to Mr. Saxton as ranking member, and then we 

will take it in order, alternating by seniority today. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. D’Agostino, the majority, I would say, of experience that we 

have had with UAVs has obviously been in Iraq. And I am told 

that you have been there to view for yourself—yes?—to view for 

yourself—— 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Ms. Pickup’s team has been there. 

Mr. SAXTON. Okay. 

So I guess my question is this: What have we learned from our 

experience in Iraq about the use of UAVs? How successfully have 

we been able to gather information using UAVs? And in your opinion, have the changes that have been made in how we are organized to use them been helpful? 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, sir, appreciate your question. 

We haven’t actually been to Iraq, but my team has more importantly been to the combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, which, 

you know, from which the commander responsible for planning and 

coordinating the air operations resides. 

And so, you know, we were actually able to talk to the knowledgeable folks and actually witness the planning, management and 

execution of ISR support to the ground. And while they were there, 

they were also able to talk to some operational commanders in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

And as you mentioned, I don’t think anyone can dispute the operational success of the unmanned systems. And, you know, there is 

anecdote after anecdote in terms of how well they are being used, 

and I think that is also evidenced in the increasing demand by our 

respective combatant commands. And you see that in the funding 

requests that the chairman mentioned. 

In terms of our view on management, we do think some improvements are needed and as Ms. D’Agostino mentioned in the oral 

summary, it is all about the visibility and how much information 

the air component commander has in terms of the actual ISR capabilities that reside in theater. 

And while the air component commander has very good information at theater level for assets such as the Predator, in terms of 

where they are, how they are operating, what they have been 

tasked against and what the specific mission that they have been 

assigned to perform is, the commander doesn’t have the same level 

of fidelity for assets that are embedded into individual units, for 

example the Army’s Hunter. 

That is not to say from an airspace integration and air traffic 

control perspective that the air component commander doesn’t 

know where the assets are or the zones in which they are operating, but it is more in terms of the missions that they have been 

assigned to and how well they are performing and, you know, while 

some level of duplication is necessary, we have heard some anecVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
8 

dotes of some inefficiencies where perhaps, you know, a unit was 

in contact. 

They were able to procure a Hunter to come on the scene to help 

them collect intelligence. At the same time, they were trying to secure the use of Predator, and when the Predator arrived on the 

scene, the Hunter was there. So it just raised questions about efficiencies and employment of the capabilities. 

Mr. SAXTON. My limited experience—well, first of all, we have 

seen all the briefings here, or many briefings here relative to capability the various platforms provide, but my one experience, of 

course, in Iraq led to a change in the way our capabilities were organized. 

Whenever any of us go overseas and talk to military folks who 

are in an operational theater, one of the questions we say is, ‘‘What 

can we do to help you?’’ 

And on one occasion, as we were associated with some special operations command people, commanders in a certain location in 

Iraq, we asked that question. And the commander said, ‘‘We need 

to have control of Predator. It is not working well for us to have 

to coordinate and depend on the current system,’’ which as I understood it at the time was what I called the big Air Force controlling 

Predator, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) needed to control 

their own Predators. 

Today that change has been made and I understand that 

SOCOM does control their own Predators and at a briefing as recent as about an hour and a half ago, they told us, that is SOCOM 

told us, that it is now working much better. 

So I am wondering what that experience tells us in terms of how 

we should proceed to go forward. 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, I think in terms of the actual management 

piece, you are exactly right. I mean, the special operations command is probably a special case in terms of the types of missions 

they perform and their own funding line and in the case of what 

I just spoke to, the air component commander doesn’t always have 

full visibility on what the special operations command assets are 

doing, because of the nature of their mission. But from an airspace 

integration standpoint, they have a general sense of where the assets are operating. 

In terms of the issue of operational control, you know, I think 

that regardless of whether they are controlled by a special operations unit, they are controlled by the air component commander 

or they are controlled by an individual army unit per se, what we 

think is important is that the DOD has a mechanism whereby everybody is aware of what capabilities exist so that if you do want 

to do some dynamic tasking in a realtime situation, that you can 

do that. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. 

Let me just ask you one other quick question, because I don’t 

want to overextend my welcome here in terms of the chairman’s 

latitude with time. 

Going forward, I understand there are some issues that had to 

do with bandwidth problems in the employment of UAV assets, 

particularly in Iraq. Would you speak to that, just briefly? 

9 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, I think this is not, obviously, a new problem. 

It has been the case for a long time. And I think that the growing 

numbers of assets in theater is adding to the congestion. 

I mean, I think one of the things that we have noticed in our 

work is the criticality of advances coordination. And one of the 

things that we have found is that while Central Command 

(CENTCOM) has some procedures for advanced coordination, that 

there is some, you know limited awareness on the part of the services. So we have seen some cases where assets might get into theater and then you have to deal with where do we base them or, 

you know, the frequency congestion issue. 

So our thought is there needs to probably be some more done in 

the way of guidance and communication strategy. That is not to 

say that things—that the instances we have seen showed up sight 

unseen, but there could have been some more advanced coordination. 

Mr. SAXTON. Have we reached a saturation point in theater, 

where this has become a real problem? 

Ms. PICKUP. I can’t definitively say that we have reached a saturation point, but I would say that from the anecdotes that we have 

heard, that we are getting pretty close. And that, you know, from 

the standpoint of, you know, it is really important to maximize the 

capabilities that you have and to make sure that you have good information and you are getting a good return on investment in the 

way that you employ them, but I can’t specifically say that we have 

reached the saturation point. But I think that there needs to be a 

hard look at how the capabilities are being used. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the—whatever. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Before I go to Mr. Reyes, I inadvertently neglected in my opening 

statement to pay tribute and give thanks, my personal thanks, to 

my predecessor as chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Weldon, 

Curt Weldon. 

I personally would not even remotely have the background and 

such information irrespective as I do had it not been for the efforts 

of Mr. Weldon when he was chairman to pursue this, all of the 

issues associated with the hearing today, and to recognize, I think, 

almost before anybody else, what the possibilities were for unmanned aerial vehicles were, both in terms of variety, of mission 

capability and what would be involved logistically in accomplishing 

it and, more importantly for us, legislatively. And I think he did 

form a foundation for the committee, the legacy of which is going 

to be well-served, I hope, by the decisions this subcommittee 

makes. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here this morning. 

I was curious in following up Congressman Saxton’s line of questioning. In the context of, when you mention metrics and the ability to be able to have a good accounting of the effectiveness of ISR, 

what is the difficulty in doing that? What has DOD said about 

their ability to provide that kind of information? Or is that kind 

of, I guess, accountability? 

10 

Ms. PICKUP. I think this is probably true in the case of any type 

of, you know, metric that you are trying to develop. It is always 

easier to develop the quantitative metrics, you know, the number 

of missions flown, number of targets, those kinds of things. With 

unmanned systems and from an intel perspective, you know, what 

is really important is the more qualitative type of metrics that actually tells you how well the mission performed by the ISR assets 

achieved the commander’s objective, so to speak. And how the intelligence collected helped accomplish the mission. 

And while I think the department is further ahead on the quantitative piece, it is the qualitative piece that the strategic commands and the services and the combatant commanders are wrestling with right now. But it is exactly how to measure the impact 

on unmanned systems and other ISR assets. 

Mr. REYES. Are you in a position, or did you offer any recommendations or solutions as to how we could do that or how they 

could do that? 

Ms. PICKUP. As Ms. D’Agostino mentioned, we are in the process 

of, you know, compiling our preliminary observations and we are, 

you know, very much continuing to evaluate what progress has 

been made to date. 

Mr. REYES. So your answer—— 

Ms. PICKUP. In terms of us recommending specific metrics, no, 

we have not recommended specific metrics. 

Mr. REYES. Will you? You know, it is well and good to point out 

that there is a problem, but I think all of us on the committee 

would appreciate having the benefit of the research that you have 

done and the study that you have completed, what some potential 

recommendations might be. Will you be making those recommendations? 

Ms. PICKUP. I think we could be in a position to describe, you 

know, some examples of the types of qualitative information you 

might need. 

Mr. REYES. Is it that this issue, because of its complexity or 

maybe the technicality of benefit to utilization or whatever the formula is that you have looked at, is it one that is difficult to do or 

impossible to do? Where does it fit in that range? 

Ms. PICKUP. I would say it is difficult. It is difficult to do because 

you don’t always know the specific impact of a particular asset. 

And that you have a lot of capabilities brought to bear in terms of, 

you know, specific missions. So isolating the exact contribution of 

an individual asset can be difficult because you can’t look at it in 

a vacuum. 

Mr. REYES. I have had the opportunity to be in Iraq 7 times and 

Afghanistan 15 or so times. In fact, a couple of weeks ago I was 

in Afghanistan and actually got to see one of the operations by the 

Predator and carried out by special operations people. So I think 

a number of us have seen that and know and understand just how 

effective it is. That is why I find it difficult to understand why we 

can’t provide a way of measuring the effectiveness. 

Ms. PICKUP. Right. I mean, I think that what we have seen in 

our travels, so to speak, is a lot of anecdotes and, you know, some 

very specific examples of how the units felt that the Predator, for 

example, helped. But in terms of, you know, getting a broader 

11 

trend analysis and those kinds of things, I just don’t think that the 

department is there yet in terms of compiling on a more comprehensive basis some of that anecdotal information. 

Mr. REYES. The only other question I was going to ask, because 

we are concerned with the numbers, is does the Air Force have sufficient Predators based on what you have seen to date. 

Ms. PICKUP. We have not evaluated the specific, you know, basis 

for the Air Force’s request. What I will say, and I will bring it back 

to the chairman’s opening statement, is that we feel that there 

needs to be some more transparency in terms of all the services’ 

funding requests in terms of how it relates to an investment strategy and strategic plan. 

And in terms of the supply-demand issue, which I think is what 

you are alluding to, is that we have seen information that suggests 

that the combatant commanders would like more assets, including 

Predator, to meet their needs, but I think we feel until they have 

a good mechanism for evaluating the performance, they can also 

show how all these different programs interrelate and, you know, 

including how they derive the numbers and, as I am sure Mr. Sullivan could talk about, how they have tried to get some synergy in 

their acquisition strategies. I think it is difficult to know exactly 

what the needs are. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Ms. Pickup, before I go to Mr. Turner, I want to follow up a little 

bit on this. I appreciate what you are saying, and I appreciate your 

rectitude and I would say your usefully conservative attitude on 

this, particularly given the number of programs and all of the contingencies, if you will, associated with it. 

But we have to make decisions, and my request to you would 

be—this committee will be working—by the end of the month we 

have to make decisions, this subcommittee. The full committee will 

be making decisions the first full week in May. I would appreciate 

it if you will—I am not expecting you to do our thinking for us. 

That is not the issue. But if you could maybe put some midnight 

oil together, not that you don’t probably already, but I am talking 

in terms of a request. 

Because, as you know, I and I think most members, if not all the 

members, of our committee, have great respect for your organization institutionally and great respect for the individuals that work 

in it. 

I think in response to my reaction to Mr. Reyes’ questions, we 

need to have such recommendations as you think you can usefully 

make, because otherwise I guarantee you I am going to make recommendations, and I understand the difference legislatively speaking between arbitrary and capricious. We will not make capricious 

recommendations, but we will make arbitrary ones. That is to say, 

we will make decisions based on what we think somebody can show 

us or a benchmark we think needs to be met, and if it gets met— 

that is what supplementary budgets are for. 

If people can show that they can do something, then we can always add something in later, but we are going to make decisions 

here. The first lesson I learned as a legislator was people have 

wants and they have needs. I know what people want, but we are 

going to have to make decisions on what we think they need, and 

12 

that is what is going to come out of this subcommittee, what we 

think people need. 

So if you could help us with that, I am not saying we are going 

to slavishly follow what you put forward, but if you can help give 

us a perspective as we move toward these arbitrary but necessary 

dates for ourselves, legislative dates that need to be met, we would 

be grateful. 

Mr. Turner, I took in your time, so I am going to be generous 

with it. I appreciate it. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding 

this hearing and your interest and sincerity on this topic. Clearly 

there is a tremendous amount of work that can be done. 

I want to thank the panel for the insight that they bring. 

In reading the GAO report, it is a great 101 lesson on dividing 

up the issues that we face here. You do a great job in describing 

the use, data, the gap, how are these things working. We need to 

get beyond just anecdotal evidence and that can be used not only 

for determining how they are deployed and how they are managed, 

but for developing legacy systems or even additional systems. Do 

we really know that what we have is doing what we believe it is 

and where are the gaps. 

Second, the topic that certainly Mr. Saxton spoke of, which is the 

management of these assets. Well, what happens—you know, who 

is in charge of them. 

And the third is the one that really interests me, is the issue of 

development of these assets. And I read on Page 17, as part of your 

report, which is a fascinating description of the development of the 

Warrior with the Predator being a legacy system. And I have a few 

questions that are not stated in this report and maybe the answers 

aren’t as clear, so if you can’t assist me in answers, I understand. 

But starting on Page 17, basically it states that the Air Force has 

the legacy system of the Predator, which has been operational since 

1995; that the Army, in 2001, began to develop the Warrior system. 

And it states right here, ‘‘The Army did not explore potential 

synergies and efficiencies with the Air Force program,’’ which had 

been in existence before. 

The Army declared it an urgent need of the battlefield and they 

awarded a separate contract to the same contractor producing the 

Predator. 

Now, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) indicates that we 

should consider all working together. And obviously this is a huge 

illustration or where we missed an opportunity to leverage our 

knowledge if we have people who are not working together, communicating together. 

And this footnote that you have here, ‘‘The Army asserted that 

its need was urgent and it could not get sufficient report from 

Predator because of the systems limited assets.’’ 

And, jeez, it just seems odd to have a system, to declare that it 

has limited assets, then there be an urgent need, and for the answer be let us start from square one instead of start from square 

Predator, working with those who have knowledge and expertise in 

it. 

So I want to know, if you know, because it is not in the report, 

how did this come about? How is it that one branch of the military 

13 

can just declare something as an urgent need and undertake its 

own program? Because I would liken it to, if we were sitting here 

in this hearing and we were looking at, you know, tanks or armed 

vehicles, and the Air Force declares that the Army’s vehicles are 

not suitable for protecting its planes on the ramp and therefore 

they immediately undertook the development of their own tank 

system or armed vehicle system separate from any of the systems 

that the Air Force has. 

Can you explain to me, organizationally, how does that work? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

In this situation, where we have—actually the Air Force has the 

Predator and then they have something else, kind of a variation on 

the Predator, called the Reaper as well, which is a bigger, stronger 

kind of a Predator. 

The Army identified needs, I think some needs that fit well with 

what the Predator could do, but they had obviously some unique 

needs to the Army, and began just as you stated and as we have 

in our statement, they began a separate program. 

Now I think currently that is still being arbitrated and eventually the Department of Defense and the acquisition technology and 

the logistics and Joint Staff and a bunch of other people have to 

weigh in on this. 

Right now, there is pressure on both the Air Force and the Army 

to look for synergies and combine that program to the extent that 

they can, and they are working on that. The progress with that has 

not been very good. 

Mr. TURNER. Let me get back to the—is it because UAVs are relatively new that there is not a clear statement of who has responsibility and how these are to be managed? 

Because I would think that if we were sitting here talking about 

a tank, for example, and the Air Force suddenly decided to develop 

its own tank, we would have all expected the issue to be a little 

more clear. 

Is that the issue? Or is this something that each of the branches, 

regardless of the system, if they can justify, can move forward? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would say that this is a longstanding problem 

in the acquisition process that we have. It is not unique at all to 

UAVs. 

In fact, if there is a need for a tank, there might be another division within the Army that would say armor could do it or helicopters could do it, or that need or that threat could be met by 

many different things and those programs often times start up separately, all defeating the same threat. So I don’t think it is unique 

to UAVs at all. It is the stovepipe nature of our services, I think. 

The parochialism, if you will. 

They all have their own tactics and doctrine for fighting wars 

and their own material needs. That is why a lot of the things—we 

touch on it in this written statement, but we have said it elsewhere. And in fact, the Department of Defense, in fact, in a report 

that they have recently issued, in February, I think, in response to 

Section 804 of last year’s Authorization Act, they have a lot of initiatives going on right now to try to pull these types of problems 

that you just stated, where there are two different programs basically meeting the same need, up out of the stovepipes, if you will, 

14 

look at it in a more functional, capability-based way, you know, 

that is what the requirements process is now supposed to do. 

That has been defined on paper, anyway, as joint capabilities, 

functional capability boards, looking at these things as opposed to 

the services. And then making decisions on what they call the big 

A, you know, big acquisition decisions, where you develop a portfolio of programs that are going to be the proper mix, so you are 

not building redundant programs. 

That should be done, I believe, by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology getting together with the 

Joint Chiefs and the Comptroller, for that matter, so you can constrain it with resources as well, at a corporate level, if you will, so 

that the warfighters are not making these kind of parochial decisions. 

They are tying to do that right now with, you know, the WarriorPredator situation is in flux. There is a lot of friction there now to 

try to get that to be more of a joint program, to try to get the 

synergies that, as you state, they should be able to get from something like that. But there is resistance. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, and them, because on Page 17 that distribution really does show how we have 

lost opportunities and lost hours. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, I agree with you. 

Mr. TURNER. So thank you for the manner in which you presented that. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

Representative Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. 

I just wanted to ask a question about the comment you made 

about stovepiping and how this is not unique. I mean, I think the 

services have wonderful ways they grow their officers in not a parochial way but a service-oriented way, or else you wouldn’t get a 

great officer like Dave Deptula coming up through the services. 

On the other hand, I have been quite taken by the need to define 

requirements, understand what the right funding priorities are, 

and then to have the mechanism by which you can expect what you 

inspect, so to speak, and follow up. 

The challenge, it seems to me, is that we have moved into a word 

of jointness and the Joint Staff has set up a requirements mechanism. They do it in J8. 

But is it time we took it to the next step, the funding, which is 

the power in the joint world, for a truly a joint warfare area, global 

persistent surveillance—more the networks that permit that picture to be viewed by everyone? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. In fact, we recently did a study looking 

at the commercial world to see how big enterprises, vast enterprises, far flung assets and resources, do their strategic planning, 

meet their needs, and what points and how well they constrain 

their needs by funding. 

And what we found is at the very beginning, way sooner than 

what we see in the Department of Defense, the funding and the requirement-setting processes, if you will, are integrated, and they 

are integrated at a very high level. There is usually a point of auVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
15 

thority above the product lines or whatever eventually is going to 

execute the plan. 

We call that a best practice. We went to a number of companies 

and saw that. 

I would repeat that the Department of Defense understands that 

as well and is working on that. They have many initiatives. There 

really has been no results of this, but it is obvious that the department understands that in order to defeat the problems that they 

have had with the unhealthy competition that they get in programs 

that are under way, you know, because requirements—a program 

has to have environments better than the next one. The cost estimates are usually not very well-informed. 

Mr. SESTAK. So, would you disagree that almost a GoldwaterNichols II is needed in the acquisitions, in the budget world, in certain programs? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think, in fact there is a report that the department has looked at closely in order to help in its transformation 

called beyond Goldwater-Nichols that was done by the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), I think, which has a lot 

of the ideas. 

Something that would take a look at those kinds of ideas and 

maybe go forward with them in terms of organizing our requirements and funding processes better, yes, sir. 

Mr. SESTAK. My only question is, I think we have heard of this 

issue for years. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. SESTAK. And it seems to me that the only thing that eventually resolves it is changing the process and the control of the dollars. So do you have any comments, either of you? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I think, following up on what Mr. Sullivan said, 

in terms of the ISR capability portfolio management test case that 

DOD has under way right now, this relatively new undertaking 

that they are doing that just began in September, they actually do 

have some experience with the fiscal year 2008 budget, where they 

did look across services et cetera and the portfolio managers in this 

case was the ISR Integration Council led by Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, that basically they did recommend some rebalancing in the portfolio. 

And, again, while they weren’t facing cuts and having to make 

very, very difficult recommendations, still we noted they had to elevate the disagreements with the services to the deputy secretary 

level because they do not have the authority to direct changes in 

the service plans, as I mentioned in the statement earlier. 

But it does show a step in the right direction and DOD still 

hasn’t assessed, you know, where they stand on the test cases yet, 

and they may consider giving more authority to the portfolio managers down the road. But this is an example of them trying to get 

a handle on this, and I think they are seriously trying to do so. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Ms. Miller. 

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you for calling this hearing today. I just find the 

whole concept of the UAVs and everything such a fascinating thing 

and I think as technology is progressing, our ability to integrate it 

16 

into weaponry will make our military much stronger and lethal and 

I think it will keep our troops much safer. 

In fact, my husband was a fighter pilot in another life, and I 

have had this conversation with him, telling him that the glory 

days of the fighter jocks are over with all of this new technology. 

In fact, one of the aircraft that he flew in Iceland is now on display at the Dayton Air Museum, not to date him. But that is what 

is going to happen with some of these different aircrafts. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Was his argument back to you that at least 

in those days he knew who was in charge? [Laughter.] 

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Like the astronauts, right? [Laughter.] 

At any rate, I think as we utilize the UAVs in theater, it is unfortunate that we are missing an opportunity not to have the proper measurements of some of the different things that are happening. I think your report is very, very interesting, sort of pointing out some of the disconnect, I suppose, of the different services 

and not sharing information perhaps as they could. 

But let me ask this question, and perhaps it is more appropriate 

for the next panel, but let me ask anyway. I think that UAVs have 

a huge role to play as off-the-shelf hardware, so to speak, in the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for border security, both 

northern border security and southern border security. I mean, 

there has been a lot of talk in this Congress and some votes about 

putting a fence up in different places, and obviously we are not 

going to do that all around our country, nor do we want to. 

But having the UAVs integrated into the Department of Homeland Security as well is something I think is coming. And I am just 

wondering whether or not the GAO has done any studies about 

perhaps you be a conduit to make sure there is not a disconnect 

as the DHS begins to utilize those and integrate them into most 

probably the National Guard around the two borders. 

Do you have any comment on that? 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, we do have some work looking at national airspace integration issues in terms of unmanned systems and, you 

know, obviously what you are alluding to, in a Katrina-like situation, there was a lot of discussion about whether we could use unmanned systems in the initial stages to get a good sense as to 

what, you know, what the situation was and the extent of the damage. 

And I can get you some specific information on the ongoing efforts that we have. But clearly it is—— 

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Well, I guess I just raised that point. 

We don’t want the Department of Homeland Security to determine 

that they are going to go off on their own with something. We already, as I say, have off-the-shelf hardware that can be utilized for 

that. 

I mean, you can go across Death Valley and know that you have 

got to have a UAV if you are really going to patrol that as optimally as we would like to. Or you can go along the northern border, or even where I am, up in Michigan with a very long, liquid 

border, et cetera. 

17 

I just think that the technology has huge applications for us from 

the Department of Homeland Security standpoint and maybe it is 

the next future add-on mission. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think in terms of acquisitions, I know that the 

Department of Homeland Security, specifically the Coast Guard, is 

tapped in pretty well to what the Department of Defense programs 

have to offer now and, you know, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater 

project, for example, I think borrows as much as possible in terms 

of commercial items and off-the-shelf-type things. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. One of the issues that comes up in the use of 

UAVs domestically is air-worthiness issues. And the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has, you know, raised some concerns, as 

well as I think there are a lot of seams that are still to be worked 

out in the airspace and air domain from a homeland perspective. 

And there is an air domain strategy being worked, I think, by the 

administration, to try to hammer out. There is a huge Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD), that directs an air domain 

strategy, among other things. 

And I think that some of these problems and issues are being 

hashed out in that process. 

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Castor is next. Then she will be followed by Mr. Wilson, Mr. 

Marshall and then Mr. Bishop. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the panel very much. 

In your report, you detail the trouble that the DOD has had with 

identifying future capabilities. They seem to be so focused on what 

is happening now and the technological development, that it has 

been difficult for them to focus on where to go from here. 

Tell me, would you summarize what is happening, however, with 

identifying future capabilities? And where is that expressed? Is 

that an expressed authorization that has ever come from the Congress? Is it something that has been identified at the Joint Chiefs? 

Is there something in writing that makes that direction? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We talk a little bit about the ISR integration 

roadmap, where I think the Congress was trying to get to a common picture for the end-state envisioned for the ISR enterprise on 

the part of DOD. 

And I think the folks in DOD that we have met with are aware 

that that would be the desirable thing to have, so that when new 

requirements or new proposals come in for new systems, there is 

something to assess them against, to see to what extent they fit in, 

are they filling a gap or are they proposing a system in a capabilities area that we already have plenty of coverage in. 

And I think right now, without having that vision of end-state 

and with some technological parameters tied to it, DOD doesn’t 

have a very good strong basis to see how new proposals are going 

to fit into the vision of the future. 

I don’t know if that helps you. 

Ms. CASTOR. Where did that express direction to develop the ISR 

roadmap originate? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. It was the Congress in the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 2004. 

18 

Ms. CASTOR. 2004. And no updating since that time? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. They have updated the roadmap in January 

2007, and it was updated more to reflect the latest in the Quadrennial Defense Review and some additional updates. I would not say 

it takes a major leap from the previous version. 

Ms. CASTOR. And for updating of that roadmap, how do they seek 

the input of the combatant commands and the different services? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. This roadmap actually catalogs all the systems 

in development and it is probably the only single place where you 

will find a handle, I would say a good handle, on all of the ISR capabilities, both existing and in development, as well as consideration toward the backend processing needs, which I think was expressed in some conference language in that same year by the committee’s report. 

Ms. CASTOR. And, for example, you detail some of the input Central Command and ISR—could you explain to me how, for example, 

the Central Command has input into the ISR roadmap? 

Ms. PICKUP. Into the roadmap? I mean, in terms of the allocation 

of existing assets, all the combatant commands, on a yearly basis 

put in what they think their needs are for the existing assets. 

In terms of the roadmap, it is done through the Joint Staff. It 

is also similar to, there is an unmanned systems roadmap and, you 

know, like a lot of things over at the department, it is a collective 

effort, so there are mechanisms set up to get the combatant commanders input, the services, the defense agencies, et cetera. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I might add that under JSIDS, the requirements 

generation process, if you will, I think the combatant commanders, 

they have what they call the Integrated Priority List, that I believe 

is kind of an ongoing list of priorities that combatant commanders 

are seeing to counter threats that they encounter in the field. And 

that gets cranked into the requirement setting process, these functional capability boards. 

For example, battle space awareness as a functional capability 

board would be looking at those priorities coming in, sorting 

through them and trying to make a sensible, planned investment 

strategy for delivering those back to the combatant commanders. 

That is all done by the Joint Chiefs. 

Ms. CASTOR. Your comment is that they are so focused on the 

current capabilities and sorting out what is happening in the global 

environment today, it has been difficult for them to look ahead and 

make those kinds of strategic recommendations. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The combatant commanders are focused—I may 

be speaking a little bit more than I know, however they are concerned with more the immediate threats. But the services have— 

Air Combat Command, for example, is a service component that 

can look at more future things and kind of step back and take a 

look at those global things. So they do have components that do 

that as well. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MARSHALL [presiding]. Thank you. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

19 

And, actually, in lieu of a question, I just want to thank you for 

promoting UAVs and GAO, in working with the colleagues behind 

you, too. 

I have the perspective of being the parent of a son who served 

in Iraq. And I previously, thanks to Congressman Abercrombie and 

Congressman Curt Weldon, have been introduced to the capabilities of UAVs, and I had seen them in actual usage. And I know 

for my wife and I, we just felt like—because I told her all about 

it—that it was reassuring to know that overhead there was the extraordinary capabilities of reconnaissance and surveillance to protect our troops who are in harm’s way. 

And I think it is particularly significant that in the overview we 

were provided—and I would like for the enemy to know this—the 

DOD indicates that the 3,400 small and 500 tactical and theaterlevel UAVs accumulated over 160,000 flying hours in 2006 in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. This is up from 60,000 hours in 2004. I want 

them to know that we have got very capable people who are monitoring their activities. 

Again, I just see this as protecting American troops, coalition 

troops, and I share the enthusiasm of Congresswoman Miller, that 

whatever we can do, and I indeed take seriously the comments by 

Chairman Abercrombie, that we want your input on what can be 

best done to promote UAV systems to protect American troops and 

additionally, obviously, for Homeland Security too. 

But, again, thank you for what you are doing. And that is the 

perspective of a very, very grateful parent. Thank you. 

I yield back to the chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to move away from the Goldwater-Nichols II level of 

examining this issue and ask some questions more down in the 

weeds at the moment, sort of recognizing the realities of the circumstance that we seem to have facing us at the moment, though 

we would wish that we weren’t where we are as far as jointness 

is concerned. 

There is a difference of opinion, between Air Force and Army, 

principally, concerning who ought to control what assets. And what 

I understand is that the language is also different. Army will talk 

about strategic versus tactical, tactical should be with individual 

divisions, those sorts of things, those capabilities. They should be 

inherent within the division, they should move with the division. 

The tactical capabilities should be with the division, when it is in 

the states, when it is getting ready to be deployed, when it is actually deployed. 

Air Force says that at the strategic level, Army doesn’t necessarily have to have the asset imbedded within particular divisions. 

Air Force talks in terms of different altitudes. Below a certain altitude, 3,500 rings a bell with me, Army should go ahead and have 

its individual assets. At above 3,500, the medium- to high-altitude 

assets should all be in a joint command, probably Air Force. And 

what Air Force says is that this, the terms tactical and strategic 

really aren’t very helpful, that these assets have capabilities and 

20 

we ought to be focusing on what capabilities those assets can provide. And to say that one asset is a tactical asset versus a strategic 

asset just doesn’t tell you anything. 

Could you help me with that difference of opinion between the 

Air Force and the Army and then offer your own individual opinions concerning whether we should, in a setting like Iraq, have a 

joint command or division-specific command of these aerial assets? 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, I am not sure that I can help you sort out the 

different perspective of the services in terms of operational control, 

because I think you hit, you know, one of the things that is under 

discussion right now. 

From our perspective, sir, I think that regardless of who controls 

it, it is important that the air component commander has total visibility into the capabilities that are in theater, because under the 

auspices of the Joint Forces Commander, the air component commander, the ensign responsible for running the air operations, does 

in fact have the ability and the authority to kind of reach out and 

tap into those capabilities, regardless of whether they are embedded. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Ms. Pickup, earlier in your testimony you made 

reference to a division needing a particular asset and getting a 

Hunter or a Warrior on-sight, calling for a Predator and the Predator shows up. The air command commander doesn’t really know 

how these assets are being used, and so there is duplication that 

is unnecessary and, consequently, perhaps a loss for us as far as 

efficiency is concerned. 

Let us assume that Army didn’t have—let us assume that Air 

Force’s vision of this is what is imposed and that Army has UAV 

assets that it employs below 3,500 feet that are specifically embedded in divisions, brigades, what have you. And Air Force, or some 

other joint command, is providing the other assets. How does the 

Army get hurt by that? 

The Army would say it won’t work because they just won’t listen 

to us about where we need things when we need them or what capabilities these things must have in order to meet our needs or 

there would be an interoperability problem? 

Ms. PICKUP. There is a process by which it is determined how the 

Predator, for example, will be tasked during an ongoing operation, 

and an asset like that, that has kind of a theater-level capability, 

its allocation, tasking, is based on the CENTCOM combatant command’s priorities, for example, and those priorities, you know, in 

the case of a theater-level, might be a high-value target, high-value 

individual, where a unit may have, you know, troops in contact, 

clearing a building, may have a different priority. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So if I understand you correctly, the question 

here is whether or not the division commander should have the 

asset and be in charge of the asset with regard to an immediate 

tactical need or CENTCOM should be in a position to say no, sorry, 

we are going to continue to use this asset for a high-value target 

over here, and we understand that you want to have an asset, this 

need, but we are in charge and we are just going to have to use 

it for this other purpose. 

Is that really the dispute here? 

21 

Ms. PICKUP. I think it is. I think that demands, you know, often 

exceed supplies and there is a prioritization process that occurs, 

and it is not so much kind of Air Force versus Army but it is the 

broader issue of what the Joint Force commander on the ground 

and the theater commander from a combatant commander perspective thinks the priorities are. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you. 

My time has expired. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You still have some time. Do you want to follow up? I think you are doing an excellent job. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Actually, I find this very helpful for me. I didn’t 

have the benefit of Curt Weldon’s tutelage over all these years. I 

did, actually, in full committee listen to Curt time and again on different subjects, but not this particular subject. So it is helpful to 

me to hear your sense of this. And your sense of this is it is a who 

is in charge, and it is understandable. 

Shoot, if I were the division commander or brigade commander 

or what have you, I am going to want to have me in control of all 

the assets I think are useful to me in the event this happens or 

that happens, whereas CENTCOM might, say, understand that, 

hear that, but there are limited assets available and somebody else 

needs to be prioritizing how these assets are used than the guy 

who’s stuck, in the weeds with a particular tactical problem. There 

needs to be a bigger vision here. 

And you see that as being the principal difference of opinion? 

Ms. PICKUP. Right. And I think it also brings up the issue of 

what are the full range of capabilities, you know, what is the right 

asset to put on the problem, so to speak, and how do you optimize, 

you know, what exists over there, and how is that integrated, because—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Do you see any reason why Army can’t work with 

Air Force or whoever else to come up with a requirements-based 

process of acquisition and just have one acquisition, one 

sustainment, one support, all the efficiencies associated with just 

doing this through one agency as opposed to having two different 

agencies stovepiped, as we tend to be. Is there some reason why 

that cannot occur? 

And, consequently, Army is not going to get what it really needs 

if that is the process that is ultimately settled on. 

Mr. Sullivan? Ms. Pickup is looking at you. Help me out here. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Sullivan, your answer will be the last answer for this panel. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Okay. I think we have examples of where we— 

this is like the executive agent idea, I think, that the Air Force has 

floated that very idea and now with UAV. And it is something— 

I don’t think we are ready to take a position on whether that is 

a good way to do it. 

You know, the work that we have done, and I think what the Department of Defense sees as a better way to do that, is to manage 

from requirements through to acquisition, you know, disciplining 

the process a little bit more. To be able to do that in a joint manner 

and to do it above the product lines, if you will, you know, do it 

for the warfighter. The services should execute a balanced portfolio 

of products that are decided upon by someone higher. 

22 

That is kind of where—but I wouldn’t—the proposals that are 

out right now on executive agents, I just don’t know enough about. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, can I just make a quick short— 

just to help Mr. Sullivan continue his response. 

What you just described, you know, getting at least at the joint 

level, whether it is this executive agent idea that I don’t really 

know much about is the way to go or at a joint level, it is intended 

to accomplish the same objective here. Did it work where Warrior 

is concerned? Where immediate needs, little dispute I guess between Air Force and Army whether or not those needs can be met. 

And then as Mr. Turner was suggesting, Army just went off and 

got—what Air Force would view as comparable to Air Force going 

off and getting a tank, what is your view of that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, it doesn’t work very well right now. It is a 

very sloppy process and there is a lot of underlying causes for that 

that would probably take a long time to kind of go through. 

They have it on paper, they understand it, but there is a lot of 

reasons why it is not working well now, though. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thanks, Mr. Marshall. That was really excellent. 

And I want to thank you folks. And, again, if it is possible for 

you to come up with some recommendations in this other context, 

that would be very, very helpful. 

The policy issue here is a separate one, and I take your word, 

Mr. Sullivan, in this last remark, as being a summary of the position of the other two as well. Is that correct? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Very good. 

And I thank you very, very much. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We will go right to our next panel. And while 

that panel is coming up—Mr. Landon, General Davis, General 

Deptula, General Sorenson, Admiral Clingan and General Alles— 

obviously that is six people. It is unwieldy, but we had to do it this 

way rather than split it on half. 

So how about you zero in on—it would take a half hour, if we 

stuck strictly to five minutes, just to get through opening statements, and I don’t think that is useful to anybody. 

Some of the issues involved here are well-known to everybody on 

the panel, and I think you can see by the questions and the observations coming from the members it is well-known to them. 

So why don’t we just take two minutes each and if you will zero 

in on your principal points. You don’t need to explicate them. But 

if you think of the audience, if you will, that doesn’t have a clue 

as to all the inside baseball involved here, all the antecedents. 

And I realize you are all involved in the military and are therefore unused to politics, I realize there are no politics in each of 

these services. But take my admonition as an old-time politician, 

when you are explaining, you are losing. People have to understand 

what it is you are talking about. They don’t have to know all the 

details, they don’t have to have a deep background in it, but they 

23 

have to understand what it is you are talking about, what you are 

trying to get at. 

So can I ask each of you to summarize in two minutes? Speak 

not to me. Speak to the average American out there who wants to 

know, okay, what is it that you are talking about, why is it important, what do you propose to do. 

Fair enough? 

Mr. LANDON. It is a great start, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I want to start with you, Mr. Landon. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. LANDON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION 

(C3ISR & IT ACQUISITION), OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Mr. LANDON. Thank you, sir. 

Good morning, Chairman Abercrombie and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I really want to thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

to address the Department of Defense’s ISR programs and investments, particularly on unmanned vehicles. 

I have provided a written statement, and I have addressed the 

questions we received earlier. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All of the statements have been observed and 

are being analyzed and will be accepted for the record. 

Mr. LANDON. Thank you, sir. 

My name is John Landon. I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Information Technology. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Your time is almost up already. [Laughter.] 

Mr. LANDON. It is a long title. 

I wanted you to know I am here today representing Mr. Ken 

Krieg, who is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

In my position, I provide acquisition oversight for the Office of 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) for major defense acquisition programs 

and major automated information system programs. I also support 

the undersecretary of defense for intelligence regarding the acquisition of ISR programs. 

You have already recognized the other witnesses today, so I will 

dispense with that. 

If I might briefly add, ISR systems are playing a major combat 

and support role in both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These systems perform an ever-increasing role in a wide range of DOD—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, Mr. Landon. I know that. Let’s 

summarize what it is that you want me to know. 

Mr. LANDON. Sir, let me make one point, and that is that these 

unmanned systems have essentially proven their value in combat, 

and they have effectively moved from what were largely concept 

and demonstration programs into an integral part of the department’s force structure. 

24 

We are making that transition as we go, and so that is really a 

key point as we move forward. 

And with that, sir, I am happy to take any of your questions and 

address anything you need. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will give you another 20 seconds to 

tell us, do you have your command and control hierarchy established or not? 

Mr. LANDON. Sir, I do believe so. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Thanks. 

Mr. LANDON. We do, and we are working to improve it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Landon can be found in the Appendix on page 74.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Davis. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. WALT DAVIS, COMMANDER, JOINT 

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE, 

U.S. ARMY 

General DAVIS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to 

be here to represent the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

all those members. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General DAVIS. And I appreciate the opportunity. 

I am the commander of the Joint Unmanned Aircraft Center of 

Excellence at Creech Air Force Base, which is an organization that 

was formed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council direction 

in the summer of 2005. Along with the rechartering of an integrated process team, which became a material review board 

chaired by Brigadier General Steve Mundt, we work operational 

issues on behalf of the Joint Force and the joint staff. They review 

material issues on behalf of the Joint Force. 

Since that time, in the past 18 months we have grown our capacity, and you must know, I think I can best speak from an information-related to the most recent piece on executive agency will be 

the training aid for the joint staff and the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council as we bring that issue forward for discussion for 

the joint staff, Joint Requirements Oversight Council and potentially the service chiefs in the tank. 

Again, sir, it is a privilege to be here. 

[The prepared statement of General Davis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 83.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. I appreciate the way you are 

doing that, because we may also get hit with votes coming sooner 

than I thought, so we will want to move along as quickly as we 

can. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DAVID A. DEPTULA, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General DEPTULA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

committee, it really is an honor to be here as the Air Force’s first 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. 

25 

The Air Force is acutely aware of the significance of ISR to 

America’s sons and daughters in the battle space as the Air Force 

has been engaged in combat and ISR combat support continuously 

for more than 16 years in Southwest Asia. At the same time, during that time, fighting and winning in Bosnia and Kosovo. 

Since September 11, 2001, we have been conducting ISR operations at an unprecedented pace. We have doubled your Air Force 

fleet of medium-altitude Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from 

a planned program of record of 6 patrols in 2001 to 12 combat patrols simultaneously today, and we will increase this capacity to 21 

by 2010. That is a 350 percent increase in capability. 

Your Air Force high-altitude ISR aircraft, consisting of the 

manned U2 and the unmanned Global Hawk, are currently flying 

more than 90 missions a month in CENTCOM alone. 

For our RC135 rivet-joint aircraft, we continue investments in a 

proven baseline modernization strategy that provides recurring upgrades to stay ahead of advances in adversary communications. 

Now, the Air Force has continued its investment in network-centric technologies that multiply these capabilities. A real success 

story is our distributed common grounds system, perhaps more descriptively called ISR exploitation centers. They are used to exploit 

data collected by our airborne sensors at locations in Hawaii, California, Virginia, Korea and Germany. Such reachback allows us to 

keep the bulk of our footprint at home while delivering effects and 

capabilities to anywhere on the globe. In other words, this system 

allows us to project capability without projecting vulnerability. 

As your expert in providing dominance of airspace and cyberspace, the Air Force is deeply committed to delivering premier air 

and space ISR capabilities in accordance with the priorities of the 

Joint Force Commanders. In that regard, the intent of the Air 

Force Chief of Staff’s recent memo to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on medium- and high-altitude UAVs falls in three major categories. 

First, to seek to deliver the greatest possible UAV ISR to our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines by optimizing medium- and 

high-altitude UAV use. 

Second, it aims to achieve efficiencies by unifying acquisition of 

these vehicles through an executive agent. 

And, third, it champions interoperability by synchronizing architectures, data links and radios for all UAVs operating above the coordinating altitude. 

[The prepared statement of General Deptula can be found in the 

Appendix on page 90.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JEFFREY A. SORENSON, DEPUTY 

FOR ACQUISITION AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF 

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. ARMY 

General SORENSON. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Abercrombie, Congressman Saxton and distinguished members of the 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee. 

26 

The United States Army, with nearly 280,000 soldiers on active 

duty in 80 countries is meeting the demands of the global war on 

terror, fulfilling other worldwide commitments and transforming to 

meet the challenges of an uncertain future. 

Army unmanned aerial systems are multimission systems whose 

primary purpose is to integrate, respond and support the tactical 

warfight at the division, brigade and battalion levels of employment. Currently, our unmanned airborne systems are Raven, Shadow and the extended-range multipurpose aircraft system. 

Unmanned aircraft system air tempo and op tempo has increased 

dramatically since 2001. In fact, we experienced a 10-fold increase 

in usage and we have accelerated the fielding of the unmanned aerial systems to every brigade combat team who has now an organic 

Shadow platoon and we continue to rotate our Hunter systems 

while Warrior Alpha integrates with manned assets to provide lethal effects against IED placement and other particular targets. 

The hundreds of thousands of hours flown by these systems alleviate the demand for more expensive high-value platforms used 

at the theater and strategic levels. 

Our current manned airborne ISR systems include the Guardrail 

Common Sensor and Airborne Reconnaissance Low. This aging 

fleet is doing a superb job, however there are limitations that come 

with age and Air Low Common Sensor will replace these two workhorses beginning with the intelligence transformation of the 21stcentury battle space. 

The Air Force recently requested executive agency for mediumand high-altitude aircraft unmanned systems. The Army, however, 

recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense uphold the 

2005 JROC decision to use the Joint Unmanned Aircraft System 

Material Review Board and the Joint Unmanned Aerial Systems 

Center of Excellence in lieu of a single-service executive agent. 

Our airborne ISR goals remain unchanged, to provide our 

warfighters with the right sensor at the right place and the right 

time so they can conduct decisive operations on terms not the enemy’s. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General SORENSON. And again, I want to thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Sorenson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 108.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Those last two were excellent summaries. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. BRUCE W. CLINGAN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AIR 

WARFARE, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral CLINGAN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Saxton, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here 

to testify with my colleagues. 

The Navy’s unmanned aerial system initiatives are in four categories: small tactical, tactical, broad area and low observable penetrating systems that fill maritime capability gaps. 

27 

I will forego any further comments to leave time for questions in 

this regard. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Clingan can be found in the 

Appendix on page 125.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. RANDOLPH D. ALLES, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LAB, 

U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General ALLES. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Abercrombie, Representative Saxton and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, on behalf of our Marines forward 

deployed around the globe, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

here and discuss the Marine Corps intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance enterprise. 

I would just like to emphasize, our ability to prevail in an often 

chaotic and unpredictable battlefield requires an increasing reliance on ISR capabilities. The ability of commanders to paint an accurate picture of the enemy is of the utmost importance. It drives 

battlefield decisions tempered by experience and training on how 

and when to employ marines, fires logistics and information. 

If leaders can orient themselves faster than the enemy, their decisions can be enacted in an offensive versus defensive manner, 

driving the campaign versus being driven. And our vision is to provide this kind of information down to the tactical level. 

I will just briefly mention, we organize our UAVs in a threetiered system. Our Tier 1 systems are basically man-packable, used 

at the company and sometimes battalion level. We are currently 

using the Dragon Eye unmanned system, transitioning to the 

Raven B, which is in use by the Army. 

Tier 2 systems is a coming program for us, used at divisions, 

regiments and battalion levels. And then Tier 3s are used at our 

force level. We are currently using the Pioneer UAV, transitioning 

to the Army’s Shadow system in fiscal year 2007. 

I think it is important to emphasize that for commanders to prevail, particularly in a counterinsurgency environment, he needs 

ISR and unmanned vehicle assets he can task and employ down to 

the squad level. Because of the need for this decentralized execution, the Marine Corps opposes the idea that any one service 

should control the procurement or employment of these valuable 

assets. 

That concludes my remarks, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Alles can be found in the Appendix on page 135.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. General Deptula and General Sorenson, I would 

like to move right to the heart of the matter and just ask you, we 

understand that there are some differences of opinion as to how we 

should move forward organizationally, and I thank you both for 

coming to my office in the last couple of days to discuss those matters, as I am sure you have with other members, including the 

chairman. 

28 

But this morning, what I would like to ask you to do, would you 

both explain your position with regard to differences as to how you 

think we should move forward? And in conjunction with that, what 

do you see as the best path for us to take—not us, necessarily, here 

on this committee, but for our government to make a decision 

about how to best organize ourselves? 

General Deptula, would you like to begin? 

General DEPTULA. Yes, sir. First, thanks very much for the opportunity to address this issue. 

I think it would be instructive for all involved in the process to 

briefly review the American way of warfare, which summarized 

briefly, essentially boils down to this. Each of the individual services do not fight our wars. We have our combatant commands, 

headed up by a Joint Force commander, who takes the capabilities 

that each one of the services are responsible for developing and 

then uses them in an appropriate mix and fashion to accomplish 

his or her objectives, given a particular contingency. 

So each one of the services are unique and have expertise in 

their core competencies. That is the subject of roles and missions. 

And it works very well when the Joint Force commander can reach 

out and combine those capabilities to achieve a particular outcome. 

On this particular subject, with respect to medium- and high-altitude UAVs, there are a couple of pieces. There is the efficiency 

piece that involves combining, as was mentioned earlier by one of 

the members, the numerous efforts that go on to procure and develop a system and address how we can achieve efficiencies by combining that multiple duplication of effort. 

The issue of operational employment is one that I believe can 

best be described not by using terms associating aircraft as tactical, 

operational or strategic, but looking at how they are used. Operational, strategic and tactical are terms that I believe describe effect. An airplane is an airplane, an aircraft is an aircraft. 

In the case of medium- and high-altitude UAVs, those are assets 

that can move around the theater, and what we would like to do 

is see them employed to their best extent possible to maximize that 

ISR delivery of information to users on the ground by putting them 

wherever they are needed most in accordance with the Joint Force 

commander’s priorities, and not tying them to a local position associated with a particular unit. 

We believe that UAVs that have a local effect and can operate 

and provide information to units on the ground within tens of miles 

and operate below coordination altitude in the theater should be 

the purview of individual units and organically operated. 

So there are two principle elements here, an efficiencies argument with respect to procurement of these vehicles and an operations and employment argument, where we are seeking to maximize their utility. There are no Air Force targets in combatant 

command. They are Joint Force targets. And what we want to do 

is optimize the ability of the Joint Force commander to use the capability of these resources, and in the medium-to-high-altitude environment, they are low-density assets, so we need to prioritize 

them. 

I think in closing our description, it is useful to consider an analogy. Consider a city block, a city consisting of 50 blocks. The mayor 

29 

owns five fire trucks. The difference in perspective here is one 

where those who believe in organic assignment, would assign each 

of those five fire trucks to a city block. The perspective in using the 

assets in accordance with the Joint Force commander’s priorities 

across the entire theater would allocate those five fire trucks to the 

mayor, and the mayor would distribute them to whatever block 

needed them the most. 

Thanks very much, sir. 

Mr. SAXTON. General Sorenson. 

General SORENSON. Yes, Congressman Saxton. 

I guess in some cases I would agree with my counterpart, General Deptula, here, with respect to it is the Joint Force that is essentially—we are supporting the Joint Force in providing these assets. 

However, at the tactical level this becomes a matter of risk, time 

and consequence for those that are currently in harm’s way. I think 

in many cases the issue becomes, and I think we have videos to 

kind of come back and express this in more detail, it is an issue 

with respect to being able to respond quickly and decisively at the 

tactical level to in many cases support the tactical commander. 

Now, the tactical commander, in many cases, has the command 

and control and is responsible for integrating these assets as well 

as to do the teaming of the man and unmanned systems in order 

to essentially respond on quick high-value targets that, quite frankly, just manifest themselves in moments of time. 

I think in many cases as we talk to how we do this, as I mentioned in my oral statement, I do believe we ought to go back to 

have the JROC essentially evaluate this. This is the only position. 

Quite frankly, we do find that the Material Review Board as well 

as the Center of Excellence is doing a good job with responding to 

what types of assets meet those requirements and what should be 

those acquisition strategies. 

I would also point out that even in today’s environment, at the 

brigade level, we are right now flying about 530 hours provided to 

a brigade combat team on a daily basis. At the division level, we 

have got about another 64 hours provided by our Shadow and 

ERMP. And then you get to the Predator level, we get about 10 or 

20 hours. 

So for that commander on the division level, he is essentially getting the majority of his ISR requirements filled by tactical assets 

that are available to him when he needs it to supply the required 

capability. 

And, last, I would also like to say with respect to efficiencies, 

though it was discussed earlier, when we basically awarded the 

Warrior ERMP capability in fiscal year 2005, it was a competitive 

award based upon a joint requirement. And in making that competitive award, we were able to bring down from the standpoint of 

the Predator the price by about 10 percent and increase performance by about 40 percent because it had about 20 percent more endurance and 50 percent more increased capability in terms of payload. 

So the competitive forces are being used and I think we are trying to work again with the Air Force to do this more efficiently. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. 

30 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Ms. Giffords hasn’t had a chance to ask a question yet, so I am 

going to go to her next. And then we will go back on schedule. Is 

that okay with everybody? 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is for Secretary Landon. 

We have already heard the discussion that the Air Force is proposing to take control as executive agent for all DOD UAVs above 

3,500 feet. The Air Force asserts this would generate cost savings. 

At the same time, the Army believes that there is tactical risk associated with severing the direct connection between the ground 

commander and tactical ISR assets at altitudes above 3,500 feet. 

Has there been an independent analysis demonstrating there 

would be a cost savings or evaluating whether savings, if any, 

would justify the additional tactical risks to deploying Army forces 

that would result? 

Mr. LANDON. Let me see if I can take that on. There are a couple 

of questions there. 

One is the issue of the analysis that will go on. The Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force essentially made this proposal to the Deputy Secretary. The Deputy received that. Subsequently, the Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs has responded to the Deputy Secretary, on the 

4th of April as a matter of fact, and said he would like to take this 

issue to the JROC, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, 

to address the issue and to flesh it out. 

As you know, we reviewed this same issue and proposal in 2005. 

A decision was made and that resulted in, frankly, the Joint Unmanned Center of Excellence. That was stood up and is now led by 

General Davis. 

This is a significant issue and I think in order to get to the analysis that we need in order to make an informed decision, we are 

going to take a little time here to go through that. And so I can 

tell you this: the Deputy Secretary is aware of this issue. The 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is aware of this issue, if you have 

seen his comment in the paper this morning. And so this issue is 

going to be brought forward rapidly and debated. But we need to 

ensure that we have all of those. 

Now, as far as the risk—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. For clarity’s sake, 

because the question is a good one, aren’t you reinventing the 

wheel again? General Davis is sitting right next to you. Isn’t his 

organization the result of—you have already considered this, the 

JROC. Do you mean you are going to do it all over again? 

You know, this didn’t come up April 4th. 

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I mean, General Davis, do I have that right? 

I mean, organizationally, you are the result of what this previous 

round of consideration was. Now we are going to do it all over 

again? 

General DAVIS. Sir, if I could, again, you are right. I think the 

one difference, though, now is that quite frankly, in the spring of 

2005, when the issue was raised for single-service executive agency, a joint team was put together composed of all of the services 

and other elements of the joint staff. 

31 

I don’t suspect, at least from my view, coming in in August of 

2005, to have to go back to the Vice Chairman to recommend an 

initial operational capability date and organizational structure, 

that kind of thing, how much money we needed, I don’t think as 

much analysis was put into actually determining what executive 

agency really meant. 

And so as I stated in my brief opening comments, sir, that is our 

job now, as a joint staff entity. I work for the Joint Staff J8, Vice 

Admiral Stanley. Our organization is equipped to lay out this issue 

with respect to really defining per the Air Force’s—what their intent is on executive agency, teeing that up for discussion and making sure that we do it deliberately and we have the input of the 

combatant commanders and the services so the discussion can take 

place at different levels in the system. 

So while, yes, we were created as well as a rechartering of a material-focused board, again, that will be our job in this case. 

General DEPTULA. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment on 

that? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, then we will go back to Ms. Giffords. I 

hope you don’t mind me interrupting, but I didn’t want you to get 

misled that this is something that is just getting started now. It 

has already been ongoing. 

If you would direct to Ms. Giffords, and then we will go back to 

her. 

General DEPTULA. Just with respect to the Joint UAS Center of 

Excellence and the Joint UAS Material Review Board, it might be 

instructive to hear what the GAO has to say about those two organizations in their recent report on unmanned aircraft systems, 

when it stated, ‘‘None of the entities are chartered with the authority to direct military services to adopt any of their suggestions.’’ 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. It has been a year and a 

half now, and this has got to get done. 

General DEPTULA. Yes, sir. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, just a follow-up question for Secretary Landon. 

Is the DOD prepared to make the Air Force the executive agency 

for UAVs flying above 3,500 feet in the absence of really having the 

analysis both from the cost standpoint and the tactical standpoint? 

Mr. LANDON. Yes, ma’am. I don’t think the department is ready 

to make a recommendation at this time, until we understand what 

the pertinent facts are that are brought forward by all of the services and the combatant commanders. 

And I think that is absolutely critical to this discussion. We need 

to understand the dynamics, the items that have changed since the 

previous decision, and all of the consequences that will result as 

part of this decision. It is a very large decision. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is that okay? All right, good. 

Mr. Turner, thank you for your patience. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We are trying to run this as a co-op here. 

Mr. TURNER. With the last questions that were asked, I just 

want to make sure that there is not any confusion, with Ms. Giffords’ statements. 

32 

The GAO and the information that we have from the first panel 

made an excellent delineation of the different categories we are 

talking about. You know, the management of these as an asset in 

theater versus the issue of development, research and development, 

and also looking at this from their perspective of how that is divided, it is very different than trying to mesh it altogether and say 

who is—if you look at research and development and give us someone that you are losing control on the combat level, those are completely different concepts, and it is very clear in the GAO report. 

On Page 17 of the GAO report, and I said this when we had the 

first panel, it is very disturbing when you read it, because it clearly 

says that the Air Force has the Predator, they are working with 

other branches, and then the Army comes along and decides that 

they want to have Warrior. They don’t work with the Air Force, 

they undertake development of it. They don’t look to the potential 

synergies and efficiencies in the Air Force program, even though 

the Warrior is a legacy system to the Predator. They don’t leverage 

the knowledge that is inherent in our DOD. And then they turn 

and award a contract, which is a separate development contract, to 

the same contractor producing the Predator. And now, January 

2006, we are having a recommendation to consider the Army and 

the Air Force work together. 

During the first panel, obviously, my suggestion was, gee, how 

would the Army feel if the Air Force undertook development of a 

tank, because we are not talking about that you guys woke up one 

day and said I think it would be good for us to have something 

completely different than what is currently there. You started with 

the Predator. And according to the GAO report, you didn’t talk to 

the Air Force. Apparently, you currently still aren’t talking to the 

Air Force in any meaningful way. 

What do we lose? Do we lose a parochial battle between the Air 

Force and the Army? No. We lose technology. We lost efficiency. 

And we lose effectiveness at DOD that we are all paying for and 

we are all working for. 

And Page 17 of the GAO report clearly sets it out that that is 

how we get in this situation that we are in, of people perhaps not 

playing well together. 

And I have got to ask you, in looking at this plan, my first 

thoughts are, General Sorenson, when General Moseley was here, 

he testified that approximately 7,500 airmen are currently performing Army missions. These airmen are very willing to assist the 

Army and are proud to serve alongside their fellow servicemen. 

They are airmen that are performing Army jobs. 

Can you tell me how many people and assets the Army currently 

has in development of UAVs? 

General SORENSON. How many people we have in development? 

Or how many systems we have in our inventory? 

Mr. TURNER. How many people do you have in development of 

UAVs? 

General SORENSON. I am not sure I can tell you exactly how 

many people we have working in the development. I can tell you 

right now the Army has about 300 Ravens, we have 19 different 

Shadow systems and 5, at this point in time, Warriors fielded. 

With respect to the people that are working on—— 

33 

Mr. TURNER. General, excuse me. My interest in my question 

was on development, correlating it to the fact that we currently 

have the Air Force being drawn upon to fill Army positions that 

the Army is not able to fill. And we have the issue of UAV development and a GAO report that clearly says the Army undertook development of the UAV when the Air Force had a current and legacy 

system and is not, according to the GAO report—it is not my conclusion, but theirs, having reviewed the situation, that the Army 

is not working with the Air Force on this. 

General SORENSON. Okay. I can summarize this in about 20 seconds. 

First of all, the Predator was an ACTD. It was awarded. It was 

awarded some years ago. The Army went back and looked at the 

requirements that it needed in terms of combat operations. It went 

through the JROC process. The JROC approved the requirement in 

2005. The Army then did a competitive award, as I mentioned before. The competitive award is now awarded a capability that is 10 

percent cost—costs 10 percent less than the Predator and is 40 percent more capable. 

It provides additional 20 percent endurance and 50 percent more 

in payload. So I think the competitive process works and, quite 

frankly, Army got a better deal. 

Mr. TURNER. General, is there anything that the Air Force knows 

about UAVs that the Army doesn’t that would have been helpful 

or would be helpful in the future as the Army looks to its UAVs? 

General SORENSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, I think the GAO report clearly says that what 

needs to happen, and I appreciate the chairman’s focus on this, 

what we now know is we are not having the type of collaboration 

and cooperation that is needed. Would you agree to that? 

General SORENSON. Not necessarily, no. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, so you disagree with the GAO report that 

says—and I must say it is hard to read this report and not conclude that it is the Army that is not working with everyone else. 

So you would disagree with this report’s conclusion that there is 

not the type of cooperation that is needed in order to maximize our 

assets and resources? 

General SORENSON. I would say there is cooperation and I would 

say I would disagree with that report. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I think that is very interesting. 

I am glad, General, that you concluded that for us. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you satisfied, not necessarily with the answer, but satisfied that you have pursued it in the direction you 

wanted to go? Because I am happy with the way this is going. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, then, if you would provide me with just some 

additional time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will. 

I am going to go to Mr. Marshall—Ms. Castor passes, so we will 

go to Mr. Marshall and how about Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bishop? 

Would you like to go back to Mr. Turner, then? 

Mr. Bishop? 

Okay. We will go to Mr. Marshall and then come back to Mr. 

Turner. 

34 

Mr. MARSHALL. I am going to pick up where Mr. Turner left off 

and continue with the same line of questioning. 

Again, I am going to sort of stay in the weeds so that I can better 

understand where this dispute actually lies. 

But on the substantive level as opposed to just the parochial we 

want to be in charge kind of stuff, and I have already heard the 

Army and Marines say that they oppose this executive agency concept. Is Navy against it? 

Admiral CLINGAN. We are strongly opposed to the executive 

agency. 

Mr. MARSHALL. And I take it that the reason you are opposed to 

the executive agency concept is that Air Force as proposed now 

would be the executive agent and you are worried that somehow 

substantively you are not going to get what you need. So real 

quickly, what is it under that concept that substantively you won’t 

get that you need because of—and quickly, what reason, why is it 

that you won’t get what you need? And if all three of you could go 

ahead and just tell us that. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Quickly and to your very specific point, Congressman. 

The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles into combat operations today underpins the effectiveness of the maneuver units and 

the risk associated with accomplishing their assigned effects. 

To the point, it would be like a ship requesting, ‘‘May I have a 

radar system tomorrow to accomplish my mission? May I have a 

set of binoculars tomorrow to accomplish my mission?’’ And hoping 

that it was allocated to you. 

Mr. MARSHALL. If Air Force were the executive agent and agreed 

that that substantive—well, let us say DOD generally agrees that 

substantive problem exists, if these assets just need to be delivered 

with regard to the need of a particular ship. And Air Force couldn’t 

provide Navy with that day-to-day capability? Like, okay, it is on 

the ship and you have got it, it is yours. 

Admiral CLINGAN. It is so integral to mission accomplishment, 

that it would be habitually associated. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So, when you have got those kinds of things that 

you need to have habitually associated with the particular asset, 

what you are suggesting is that that should just be—the Navy 

should just figure that out, right? And then as part of that asset, 

you acquire that capability and it stays with that asset. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Not exactly, sir. 

In the acquisition process that we use, the Joint Requirement 

Oversights Council and its associated processes, when a service 

comes forward with a required capability, it is vetted thoroughly to 

make sure that it isn’t available in another service. When there is 

an identified capability gap, the service goes forward to acquire it. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. 

General Deptula, you are familiar with all of these arguments, 

as I am not. You have just heard the Navy, and I assume that 

Army and Marines, you guys agree that that is one principle problem associated with the executive agent concept. 

So, General Deptula, how do you respond, for our benefit? 

General DEPTULA. Yes, sir. 

35 

I believe my good colleague is confusing the economic efficiencies 

that would accrue to the standup of an executive agent to assure 

that we unify acquisition of systems and the execution of operational capability, which is resident in our joint way of warfare. 

So what the Air Force is suggesting the Department of Defense 

do is stand up an EA to achieve efficiencies in terms of consolidating different acquisition authorities and everything that goes 

along with procuring systems. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I don’t mean to interrupt. Navy says it needs this 

requirement met with regard to this particular asset. You are suggesting that Navy should go to Air Force, or to this executive 

agent, which would be the Air Force, and say this is ISR kind of 

stuff, UAV stuff, and what we need is this. Will you get it for us 

and give it to us? 

General DEPTULA. No, sir. 

If the Navy elects, for example, the decision has not been made, 

but if they elect to procure or select Global Hawk to satisfy their 

requirement, the Air Force is already procuring Global Hawks, and 

instead of the Navy going out and acquiring those systems and the 

Air Force going out and acquiring those systems is that we do it 

in a unified fashion. Now, clearly there are going to be different requirements. And the Joint UAV Center of Excellence, the Joint Material Board, would be those boards to—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. General Deptula’s vision, Admiral, won’t work for 

what reason? 

Admiral CLINGAN. In specific, he brings up a great example. 

Through the JROC process, we have the capability gap that wasn’t 

met by Global Hawk. We embarked on a competitive program. Interestingly, Global Hawk, Predator and Gulf Stream 550, for example, are among the likely competitors for this. 

As we look to achieve initial operating capability in 2014 for that 

system, we wanted to make sure that as soon as those UAVs arrived, that they would be immediately effective. So we have a maritime demonstration program, a Global Hawk maritime demonstration program, to develop concepts of operations, tactics, techniques 

and procedures and the integration and taking process we will use. 

And in employing the Global Hawk in that role, we identified that 

it in fact did not meet our requirements. 

So we took the Global Hawk solution, it is being used as a risk 

reduction, but we have identified clearly that it does not meet our 

requirements. As an example—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, if you would let me continue just 

for a second, or do you want to—and all I want to do is go back 

to General Deptula. 

You have heard the response from Navy. It would help me if you 

are in a position to say, wait a minute, in fact Air Force could have 

solved this issue for Navy. With Air Force acting as executive 

agents, would there be some seamless result here, that it would be 

as if the Air Force were a part of the Navy trying to figure out this 

problem in an appropriate way. 

General DEPTULA. Yes, sir. That is the intent. 

Now, I would tell you that we want to work together with the 

other services to define how these efficiencies would be gained in 

36 

determining just what the roles and responsibilities of the executive agent would be. 

There is a lot of consternation with the use of the term. You can 

call it cheese as far as I am concerned. The issue is trying to get 

to savings by avoiding duplication of program offices, duplication in 

independent training ops, duplication of logistics and maintenance 

ops, duplication of independent intelligence support facilities and 

multiple procurement offices. That is the intent. 

Mr. MARSHALL. What I hear is the other branches saying that all 

sounds fine, and it is desirable, but the effect substantively for us 

will be we won’t get what we need when we need it. 

General DEPTULA. That, sir, is a issue—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. That is the way the system works. We won’t get 

from the Air Force what we need when we need it. 

General DEPTULA. But, sir, that is not an Air Force issue. That 

is an issue of the Joint Force Commander determining the priorities of the theater assets that are assigned to that command. 

General SORENSON. Mr. Marshall, if I could, just as one response. 

You know, we talk about this, but quite frankly the systems that 

we have currently operating, the Raven, the Shadow, these already 

are joint systems that are used by my counterparts over here right 

now. So we do have consolidation. We are looking at this in a joint 

manner. 

And I would say as well, where the Army has gone—it is interesting to have the air platform flying around. It is more important 

to have a common ground station. Right now, the common ground 

station works with the Shadow, works with the Hunter, works with 

all these other systems, so I don’t have a duplicative, if you will, 

delivery of terminals at the bottom end in terms of where the 

warfighters are, such that I would have to have constant streams. 

These guys sit in one terminal and it is just like watching NFL 

football. I can get that screen, that screen and that screen. That 

is what they want, a common terminal at the end, not all these 

systems flying around with independent satellite video responses 

that they have to look at. So, quite frankly, that is what we are 

hearing from the unified commanders and the battle commanders 

out in the field. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Turner? We have a 15-minute in 5, so we 

have probably 10 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. I will be quick. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is all right. 

Mr. TURNER. I don’t want to end with Mr. Marshall’s statement, 

no matter how much I admire Mr. Marshall. 

The conclusion that he stated is not exactly the conclusion that 

I think is inevitable from what we have heard from the Army and 

the Navy. It is not, oh, you just can’t get it from the Air Force or 

you can’t get it fast enough. 

What I hear is an organization, the Air Force, that has ingenuity 

and has inventiveness and has delivered a product, and I see two 

other military branches that, upon looking at that, said, well, you 

know, it is something that there should be a legacy to, that we can 

grow upon, and then instead of working with the inventor and the 

people, because we are not just talking about an organization itself, 

37 

we are talking about people also who have the knowledge, the inventiveness, the ingenuity, said, ‘‘Well, you know what, I think I 

want something different, maybe more, maybe less, maybe something different than what I have got. And instead of going to the 

people who brought me the first, I am going to go start my own’’ 

and use, as an example, the fact that it is old. 

It is like me going to a car dealer and saying, ‘‘Okay, I bought 

a car from you five years ago, but now this car doesn’t have all the 

bells and whistles that I want. Instead of talking to you about what 

else you might have and what you think might be an improvement 

on this car, I will go develop my own.’’ 

And if we encourage that type of development, the Air Force is 

going to have tanks. This is not the type of cooperation that we 

need. 

And the thing that bothers me the most about it, because on the 

issue of research and development and technology, what bothers 

me the most is that you miss the opportunity for those who have 

worked on these systems before to develop the next generation of 

what is important and what they have seen. 

We know that almost every weapons system that is delivered, 

you could probably ask the person on the day it was delivered, who 

was shepherding it through, what do you know that this doesn’t do 

and what would be the next thing that you would have this do? 

Well, if you don’t involve those people, you miss that. And if you 

start all over again, we have a missed opportunity and over-investment. 

And General Sorenson, I ask you, and I would like you to provide 

to me since you don’t know right now, the total number of the individuals that the Army has and, Admiral, I would like it from you 

also, on the Navy, on development and research on UAVs, because 

I am going to get back to the fact that I know that when the Army 

was falling short on being able to man its own missions, it turned 

to the Air Force. And the Air Force, as General Moseley said, delivered 7,500 people. 

Meanwhile, we are missing the opportunity for cost savings. 

Now, here is the next question that I have for you, gentlemen, 

and I would like all three of you to answer. And I am going to start 

with General Deptula. 

If we did look to the efficiencies—I do believe we have duplication of effort. Is it possible that the duplication of effort that is occurring could be utilized for us to be able to acquire more of these 

resources? Every one of you say that we need more of these resources, and it sounds like the resources that we are spending 

more on is development and research. 

General Deptula, is it possible that we could actually acquire 

more of these if we got rid of—had some efficiencies? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General, before you answer, the question is 

asked to the three of you, and I would like also General Alles to 

answer as well, I would like you to put it in writing. You can give 

a verbal answer now, a couple of sentences, but I would like the 

question on duplication of effort to put in writing, addressed to me 

and I will distribute it. Is that all right? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 145.] 

38 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I greatly appreciate it. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General, your view on duplication of effort. 

You can summarize it now, but I would like your full answer in 

writing to the committee. 

General DEPTULA. Yes, sir. Rapid answer is yes. We believe that 

there are significant efficiencies that can be gained by the consolidation and reducing the duplication of effort that goes into multiple 

services acquiring medium- and high-altitude UAVs. 

What is done with that savings is above my pay grade. I mean, 

that would be determined by the department. But savings could accrue, and one of the options would be the procurement of additional 

UAV systems. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General SORENSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman and Congressman, I 

would go back to what I said before. We did look at the Predator 

when the Army came back with its needs. However, the needs 

which we the Army had could not be met by—— 

Mr. TURNER. General, you know that is not the question. The 

question is—— 

General SORENSON. I am getting to the duplication. I am getting 

to the duplication. 

We did look at it. It could not meet the requirements. As a result, we went on a competitive procurement. That competitive procurement resulted in something that was—— 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. General, I understand what you followed. What you didn’t do is get up and go ask the Air Force. 

What I asked you was, is the duplication—are there duplications 

between the three of you that could result, if they were eliminated, 

in efficiencies that could deliver more product for DOD? 

General SORENSON. There could be, yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Congressman, the collaboration and sharing 

that actually occurs beyond the Center of Excellence and the Acquisition Board or Material Board process extends the technology maturation and a variety of other efforts so that duplication is perhaps 

not as substantial as might have been conveyed to this point. 

There is always room for efficiencies. I might build on the example previous, where if in fact the material solution, the contract is 

awarded to Global Hawk, or if the selection is Global Hawk, it is 

likely, as we have done in helicopters and other systems, that we 

would use the Air Force contract as an example of reduced duplication. 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral, are you saying that you don’t believe there 

are efficiencies that could be achieved that could result in purchasing more product? You either agree or disagree with that statement, that if we looked between the three of you and found efficiencies, of which I believe there is duplication—I mean, if you 

don’t believe there is duplication, say there is not duplication. But 

my question is, do you believe there is duplication that, once eliminated, could result in delivering more product? 

Admiral CLINGAN. There is undoubtedly duplication to a limited 

extent. And, therefore, more product could be bought of some type. 

39 

But whether it is unhealthy or extraordinary is an issue that 

ought to be quantified. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your answer. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General, you are going to have the final word, 

I am sorry, because we are going to bring the hearing to a conclusion with our thanks. 

General ALLES. Thank you, sir. 

My reply would be this, sir, the Marine Corps routinely buys the 

other services systems. So from the standpoint of duplication, I 

don’t see that as a huge issue for our service. I mean, you have 

seen that with both our Tier 1 and our Tier 3 UAVs by the Army 

or the joint solution. 

But I would just mention that efficiency does not imply effectiveness, and I think that is what you ask the military forces to do, 

is to be effective. If we are not effective, then all of the money 

spent on us is a waste. So I think we have to look at it in those 

terms and whether in fact we are achieving the effectiveness we 

want, given that we attain some efficiency. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield for 

just a second? I am sorry. 

Or Mr. Turner, I am not familiar with all this yielding stuff, 

would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. TURNER. Sure, Mr. Marshall. Absolutely. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, I think it would be very helpful to me, and I think 

the panel, and if you would like to do it as an addendum to what 

the chairman has asked you put in writing, your responses, a 

lengthier response on this; it is my sense that Army, Marines, 

Navy are convinced that if this executive agency thing is put in 

place with Air Force in charge, that somehow you substantively 

won’t get what you want. In other words, you will be less effective. 

It is exactly what you just said, General Alles. 

Could you, in your response, detail how that would necessarily 

occur? It is going to have to be something along the lines of Air 

Force just isn’t going to pay attention to what you want as your 

people, under your control, paid by you, subject to your orders, 

would pay attention to what you want. It is going to have to be 

something along those lines, I assume. 

But we need to see that, because there are clearly efficiencies 

that can be obtained here. This is a joint world. Goldwater-Nichols 

II, Mr. Sestak made reference to that, it may be that we simply 

have to order more integration here because for some reason DOD 

can’t get it done and the services won’t get it done, or it may be 

that we should back off and acknowledge that if we try to do that, 

we are going to make ourselves less effective and be a penny wise, 

pound foolish. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That will get addressed in the—thank you. 

That will get addressed in the response. 

And Mr. Bishop—I know, General, I know how important it is, 

but Mr. Bishop has not had an opportunity yet and wants to conclude. 

Mr. BISHOP. General, I will let you actually answer this question 

anyway, and because we are running to a vote, I am not going to 

40 

be cute and ask questions. Let me just run through what I want 

to say. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. 

Mr. BISHOP. Chairman Abercrombie, I appreciate you holding 

this hearing. It is extremely important. It is also very troubling. 

The things we have heard today from all of you reminds me as 

if I am reading a textbook history about 60 years ago when we 

were deciding whether to have an Air Force in the first place. It 

is basically the same argument, more compound sentences being 

produced and different technology, but it is the same basic arguments that are going through there. 

I want to take it one step further, as I assume we are probably 

going to not come back after the vote, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. We will conclude now, but the subcommittee will meet. I will call a meeting of the members. 

Mr. BISHOP. I am sure you will. We always get those meetings. 

But let me just take it one step further. And I am assuming, 

General Deptula, that as we envision the future of the Air Force, 

fighter commands or fighter squadrons will consist of manned missions, manned fighters, in conjunction with unmanned aircraft at 

the same time. And I would just say this for my colleagues on the 

staff, if we do not produce the F35 in sufficient quantities, we do 

not have the technology to combine those in the future, and 15 

years from now we are going to be in a less secure situation if we 

don’t have that technology going with this technology. 

I am going to put that pitch in for the 35 and the 22 as essential 

aircraft to combine with the unmanned aircraft that we have 

that—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And to think I was inches from a clean getaway. 

Mr. BISHOP. I am clean. I am done. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Go ahead, General. You get the last word. 

General DEPTULA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I want to take that anxious look off your face. 

General DEPTULA. I just wanted to reflect on Congressman Marshall’s remarks in articulating that the objective of the Air Force 

here is to get medium- and high-altitude UAV ISR distribution to 

be as transparent and joint as the GPS signal is to all the services. 

GPS is 100 percent owned and operated by the Air Force, yet its 

effect has become so ubiquitous, it is depended upon by all the 

services without any concern. We can do that with medium- and 

high-attitude UAVs. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General DEPTULA. And I would request to have my complete oral 

statement be entered into the record. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, of course. Of course you can. 

And again, all of you, take the opportunity of Mr. Turner’s question to write your definitive statement on this and we will take it 

from there. I am very—— 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, can I ask for one more thing? When 

they are doing that written statement, I would really like for each 

of them to also comment on whether or not they disagree with the 

GAO report, as General Sorenson said that he did. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Sure. 

41 

Mr. TURNER. Because saying that we won’t get what we want 

and the GAO report saying, well, you know you haven’t asked, is 

probably a pretty good conclusion. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We will do that. 

We are very grateful to you, very, very much indeed. And we will 

try to bring this to a quick resolution. 

Hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 19, 2007 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 19, 2007 

(47) 


43667.001
48 


43667.002
49 


43667.003
50 


43667.004
51 


43667.005
52 


43667.006
53 


43667.007
54 


43667.008
55 


43667.009
56 


43667.010
57 


43667.011
58 


43667.012
59 


43667.013
60 


43667.014
61 


43667.015
62 


43667.016
63 


43667.017
64 


43667.018
65 


43667.019
66 


43667.020
67 


43667.021
68 


43667.022
69 


43667.023
70 


43667.024
71 


43667.025
72 


43667.026
73 


43667.027
74 


43667.028
75 


43667.029
76 


43667.030
77 


43667.031
78 


43667.032
79 


43667.033
80 


43667.034
81 


43667.035
82 


43667.036
83 


43667.037
84 


43667.038
85 


43667.039
86 


43667.040
87 


43667.041
88 


43667.042
89 


43667.043
90 


43667.044
91 


43667.045
92 


43667.046
93 


43667.047
94 


43667.048
95 


43667.049
96 


43667.050
97 


43667.051
98 


43667.052
99 


43667.053
100 


43667.054
101 


43667.055
102 


43667.056
103 


43667.057
104 


43667.058
105 


43667.059
106 


43667.060
107 


43667.061
108 


43667.062
109 


43667.063
110 


43667.064
111 


43667.065
112 


43667.066
113 


43667.067
114 


43667.068
115 


43667.069
116 


43667.070
117 


43667.071
118 


43667.072
119 


43667.073
120 


43667.074
121 


43667.075
122 


43667.076
123 


43667.077
124 


43667.078
125 


43667.079
126 


43667.080
127 


43667.081
128 


43667.082
129 


43667.083
130 


43667.084
131 


43667.085
132 


43667.086
133 


43667.087
134 


43667.088
135 


43667.089
136 


43667.090
137 


43667.091
138 


43667.092
139 


43667.093
140 


43667.094
141 


43667.095
142 


43667.096
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE 

RECORD 

APRIL 19, 2007 

(145) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Regarding UAVs, could we acquire more equipment if we got 

rid of duplication of research and development? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The Navy does not believe there is duplication of effort in its 

UAS programs. The Navy and Marine Corps continually review opportunities for 

achieving both warfighter and acquisition efficiencies in their UAS and all other 

programs. A key element of the strategy is to leverage and apply the successes of 

the other Services. UAS-specific examples include: 

• Army and Navy collaborate extensively on the Fire Scout Program. Army 

buys the aircraft off of the Navy contract. Fire Scout aircraft and avionics are 

currently over 90 percent common. The GAO report highlighted this efficiency 

as a positive example of inter-service cooperation. 

• The Navy/Marine Corps are retiring the Pioneer system and are buying Shadow 200 systems—including aircraft and ground control systems—directly from 

the Army. 

• The Navy/Marine Corps have curtailed further development and production 

of the Dragon Eye system in favor of buying the Raven B system directly from 

the Army. 

• The Navy leveraged an existing Air Force contract to procure the Global 

Hawk Maritime Demonstration System (GHMD) system. Development has 

been limited to modifications to the payload, which in turn have been provided to the Air Force and are planned to become part of the Global Hawk 

Block 10 baseline. Additionally, Navy GHMD test data will be used to help 

the Air Force mitigate Global Hawk Block 10 schedule risk. 

• The Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS Program is being 

acquired competitively. Planned system developmental efforts are limited to 

those attributes uniquely related to the maritime environment including sensors, architecture, and tactical integration. The Navy is leveraging all the Air 

Force as well as other DOD UAS accomplishments. 

• Last, in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort or redundancies, 

the Navy fully supports the Joint UAS Center of Excellence and Joint UAS 

Material Review Board. These organizations, which are jointly manned and 

report to the Joint Staff, will improve the Department’s ability to efficiently 

provide interoperable and effective capabilities to the warfighter. These organizations are already positively informing our programs of record. 

In summary, the Navy has an excellent relationship with the Air Force, Army and 

Marine Corps that allows information to flow freely between program managers, requirements officers and leadership. In this way, we can focus on developing the 

unique aspects that our missions and roles require, while taking full advantage of 

efforts that have gone before. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Regarding UAVs, could we acquire more equipment if we got 

rid of duplication of research and development? 

General SORENSON. Efficiencies are obtained by a collaboration of efforts between 

the Services in respect to Research & Development, whether the product is an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), or other materiel solution. If there are two or more 

simultaneous System Development & Demonstration (SDD) programs to meet a 

similar set of technical thresholds and Key Performance Parameters (KPP), that 

would be an example of a duplicate effort expending funding that could be used for 

other obligations/missions. In respect to the Medium-Altitude UAS, the U.S. Army, 

through the competitive process, included features on the Extended Range/MultiPurpose UAS (Warrior) such as Automated Take-off and Landing System, a Heavy 

Fuel Engine, a Tactical Common Data Link to the One System Ground Control Station (already in use by the U.S. Army, USMC, and SOCOM), to achieve a capability 

that has greater endurance, 50 percent greater payload, and more than double the 

onboard power of the Predator, at less cost. The U.S. Army openly offered these advanced features to the USAF as part of the competitively awarded contract. The 

USAF accepted (January 2007) the Army ER/MP Air Vehicle as the potential system 

146 

for their Block ‘‘X’’ Predator product improvement for the future and is procuring 

aircraft now. Additionally, the Army is providing the Air Force documentation of the 

ER/MP, such as the Test & Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), and other information 

is being shared through Technical Interchange Meetings (TIM) between product 

management personnel. With a complete collaboration of efforts, the DOD saves valuable resources since the expenditure of funds for the System Development is not 

duplicated and both the Army and Air Force reap the benefits of commonality of 

the same basic aircraft which includes a redesigned fuselage/wing and improved engine. Historically, at the time of the Joint Requirements review for the ER/MP and 

the source selection competition, the Predator was still an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The benefits of the competition are evident in the 

selection of an aircraft within a full system design that is 10 percent lower in cost 

and 50 percent more capable than the Predator. The U.S. Army’s systems architecture deliberately reused the previous investments in training, installations, personnel, contracts management, and logistics to achieve the greatest commonality 

within the DOD. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Regarding UAVs, could we acquire more equipment if we got 

rid of duplication of research and development? 

General ALLES. The Marine Corps is not duplicating effort in its UAS programs. 

The Marine Corps continually reviews opportunities for achieving both warfighter 

and acquisition efficiencies in its UAS programs. A key element of the strategy is 

to leverage and apply the successes of the other Services. UAS-specific examples include: 

• The Navy/Marine Corps are retiring the Pioneer system and are buying Shadow 200 systems—including aircraft and ground control systems—directly from 

the Army. Fielding of the Army One Ground Control Systems by the Marine 

Corps with the Shadow 200 will significantly increase interoperability 

amongst the services. 

• The Navy/Marine Corps have curtailed further development and production 

of the Dragon Eye system in favor of buying the Raven B system directly from 

the Army. 

• The Marine Corps lead ICD and CDD development for Tier II/Small Tactical 

UAS (STUAS) is a joint collaboration between the Navy, Air Force, SOCOM 

and Marine Corps. 

• Last, in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort or redundancies, 

the Marine Corps fully supports the Joint UAS Center of Excellence and Joint 

UAS Material Review Board. These organizations, which are jointly manned 

and report to the Joint Staff, will improve the Department’s ability to efficiently provide interoperable and effective capabilities to the warfighter. 

These organizations are already positively informing our programs of record. 

In summary, the Marine Corps has an excellent relationship with the Army, Navy 

and Air Force, which facilitates the flow of information between program managers, 

requirements officers and leadership. This allows the Marine Corps to focus on developing the unique aspects which its missions and roles require, while taking full 

advantage of previous developmental and operational efforts. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Regarding UAVs, could we acquire more equipment if we got 

rid of duplication of research and development? 

General DEPTULA. Yes, the Air Force believes there is duplication of effort with 

regard to medium- and high-altitude UAV acquisitions. 

For example, with the exception of its weapons payload capacity, the Predator 

(MQ–1) meets all threshold Key Performance Parameters (KPP) approved by the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for the Army’s Warrior UAV. The 

larger MQ–9 air vehicle is capable of meeting all Warrior threshold KPPs. Despite 

these considerations, the Army invested $190M in research and development for the 

Warrior system. While the Army investment did yield improvements to the MQ–1 

family of air vehicles that the AF plans to take advantage of, the MQ–1 was in production at the time the Army began their development efforts for Warrior, and could 

have delivered operational capability much sooner than the current Extended Range 

Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) program of record. It is our understanding that the Army 

ER/MP will not be deployed with initial operating capability until 3QFY09. Air 

Force MQ–1 has been deployed since 1995, and is currently maintaining 12 combat 

air patrols for CENTCOM, providing 24/7/365 UAV orbit capability. Full rate production for the Warrior program is not scheduled to begin until 4QFY09. At that 

time, the Air Force will have 19 combat air patrols available for the Combatant 

Commanders. It is reasonable to believe that significant savings could be realized 

by combining MQ–1 and ER/MP program acquisition, contracting, research and deVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
147 

velopment, depot maintenance, logistics and training activities into a single effort. 

New capabilities needed to meet additional Warrior requirements could have been 

spiraled into the existing MQ–1 program, as the Air Force has done throughout the 

history of the Predator. Although the Army asserts that there is a 10% reduction 

in Warrior program costs when compared to those of the Predator program, their 

analysis compares an existing, fielded capability to a program that has not yet finalized its production contract. The Army assertion is premature. 

The Navy BAMS program is another case where there is potential to realize significant savings by eliminating duplicative efforts. Although the Air Force and Navy 

have collaborated extensively on the Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration effort, 

the Navy’s Request For Proposal for BAMS could result in initiation of a completely 

new, high-cost acquisition program. A derivative of the existing MQ–9 or RQ–4 can 

satisfy mission requirements of the BAMS platform. Savings could be realized by 

using an existing platform for BAMS, even though new or modified sensors may be 

required for maritime use. 

The Air Force believes that consolidating development, procurement, contracting 

activities, depot maintenance, logistics, and training for medium- to high-altitude 

UAVs could offer at least a 10% savings compared to the cost of separate efforts. 

However, detailed analysis is needed to accurately quantify the potential savings. 

Certainly, if acquisition efforts were combined and DOD was able to use existing 

contract vehicles and production capacity, initial research and development activities and costs could be reduced. DOD would decide how best to apply those savings. 

Acquiring more UAV systems, fielding UAV combat capability sooner, and reducing 

UAV unit costs would be among their options. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the process and what office is responsible for providing oversight of service, combatant command, OSD, and defense agency, to include JEIDDO, ISR acquisition programs and operational implementation to ensure 

a coordinated, effective program. Does this office have the authority to modify service and agency budgets? 

Mr. LANDON. The Department employs Portfolio Management to provide authority 

for oversight of Service, combatant command, OSD, and defense agency ISR programs. The portfolio management structure ensures unity of effort from strategy to 

execution and also provides a forum to bring together the three key DOD processes: 

Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution Process (PPBE), Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and Defense Acquisition System 

(DAS) into an end-to-end fashion. The Battlespace Awareness (BA) Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM) integrates enterprise level investments from a Joint operational viewpoint of ISR performance and capabilities. 

Portfolio governance is provided through the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration Council. The BA CPM uses the Council to resolve issues and 

to develop trade space and identify new alternatives. 

Portfolio adjustments are made through the PPBE process. The Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM) enables resource decisions based on trade-offs within the portfolio after reviewing operational capabilities across the enterprise and prioritizing 

the warfighter’s needs. The CPM recommends to the leadership of the Department 

needed adjustments within the portfolio which would allow effective use of resources. The CPM does not currently have the authority to modify Service or Agency 

budgets, but provides the overall recommendations for ISR budget allocations to the 

Secretary of Defense in building the Department’s Budget. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you familiar with all of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization TSR acquisition projects and are you otherwise satisfied 

that there is no unnecessary overlap among the JIEDDO projects, services and defense agencies among ISR programs? 

Mr. LANDON. I am familiar with JIEDDO and their ISR work. JIEDDO seeks to 

expedite and rapidly deploy the national technical base to provide better weapons, 

training, intelligence fusion, and defensive capability to the warfighters. Unlike 

most ISR acquisition programs, the key to JIEDDO’s mission is rapid acquisition 

of predominantly, non-developmental items. Consequently, although there may be 

some overlap among JIEDDO’s projects, we view this overlap as a by-product of 

seeking to explore and field different approaches to solve urgent problems rapidly. 

JIEDDO’s focus is on Department of Defense actions in support of Combatant 

Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat Improvised 

Explosive Devices as weapons of strategic influence. To accomplish this mission 

JIEDDO seeks near-term, non-developmental items and capabilities that can be rapidly adapted, demonstrated and fielded within 6–18 months after contract award. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What OSD office is responsible to ensure that the services aerial common sensor acquisition programs are effectively coordinated to ensure maxVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
148 

imum use of common mission equipment, training, infrastructure and interoperability? Does this office have the authority to modify service and agency budgets? 

Mr. LANDON. In September 2006 the Deputy Secretary of Defense selected 

Battlespace Awareness as one of the four areas for capability portfolio management. 

The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Resources and 

Technology is the Battlespace Awareness (BA) Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM). 

The BA CPM is responsible for facilitating strategic choices and making capability 

tradeoffs. Coordinating Aerial Common Sensor program issues among the Services 

is part of the BA CPM’s responsibility. 

The Department’s four CPMs do not currently have the authority to modify Service or Agency budgets, however, the CPMs provide overall recommendations for 

budget allocations within their capability areas to the Secretary of Defense in building the Department’s Budget. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is there any plan to provide joint capability portfolio managers 

the authority to direct or redirect service budgets when it is determined that specific 

ISR programs could be improved by so doing? 

Mr. LANDON. The Department’s portfolio management model emphasizes resource 

decisions based on trade-offs within a given portfolio. The Battlespace Awareness 

(BA) Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM) exercises authority provided by and with 

the approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ‘‘direct’’ the ISSR POM and 

budget. The CPM has an open and direct line to the Milestone Decision Authority 

and to the Program Managers (PMs) for programs within the portfolio. The CPM 

develops and issues POM guidance for ISR programs; controls and approves budget 

execution, and advocates resource needs. The BA CPM will recommend resource allocations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the ISR Council and the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Recapitalization of DOD ISR programs and achieving global 

persistent surveillance are listed as two of DOD’s strategic objectives. Has the cost 

of achieving these two objectives been established? If so, please provide. 

Mr. LANDON. Recapitalization of DOD ISR programs and global persistent surveillance are incremental capabilities that evolve over time and will incorporate elements of space, air, land, and maritime domains. The cost of achieving these objectives is included in the FY2008 President’s Budget and is spread across multiple 

funding lines (programs) and multiple years within the budget. These two objectives 

were not separately costed as specific initiatives but achievement of these goals is 

important to the Department. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The GAO indicates the Strategic Command is charged with 

making recommendations on the allocation of ISR assets to meet worldwide requirements, but does not have the visibility of all ISR assets in executing its responsibilities. Do you agree with this observation? If so, are steps being taken to correct this 

shortcoming? 

Mr. LANDON. I agree with the observation but capabilities are being developed 

and fielded now that will provide needed insight and visibility into ISR assets. To 

make sound ISR allocation recommendations, global visibility of ISR assets is essential. An efficient ISR enterprise must leverage all available resources, integrating 

DOD, national and allied partner ISR capabilities. Visibility includes the awareness 

of and access to all available ISR capabilities, combined with the ability to capture 

collection requirements, tasking, and asset allocation in real time. Capability gaps 

currently exist in applications and tools supporting Intelligence Collection and ISR 

Operations Management, particularly in the consolidated planning and management 

of National and Theater ISR assets. These include a lack of ISR global force management applications, databases and connectivity to plan, coordinate and execute 

ISR collection requirements. These capability gaps have been identified through 

Combatant Command Integrated Priority Lists as well as the Joint Staff’s recent 

Winter 2007 Capability Assessment. USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component 

Command-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) in coordination with the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center as DOD’s Collection 

Manager, is evaluating and developing integrated capabilities for ISR management 

to help address these capability gaps. The initial versions of these software tools are 

currently fielded and are beginning to provide visibility into the Global ISR picture 

from the national to tactical arenas. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the status of coordination with the FAA and what are 

future plans for the operation of specific UAVs in U.S. airspace for homeland security and disaster response purposes? 

Mr. LANDON. DOD coordinates with FAA through the DOD Policy Board on Federal Aviation (PBFA) for policy issues related to the Department’s operations in the 

National Airspace System (NAS). Issues such as airworthiness standards, operational requirements, safety oversight activities, and airspace modernization are exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00152 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
149 

amples of such policy issues. To better coordinate DOD and FAA efforts on a daily 

basis, each military service and the PBFA has liaison representatives assigned to 

FAA headquarters. DOD participates in bi-weekly phone conferences with the FAA 

and representatives from Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other government organizations to discuss issues, activities and developments related to operating Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the NAS. The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed PBFA to work with FAA on a DOD/FAA Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA) to allow ready access to the National Airspace System (NAS) for DOD UAS 

domestic operations and training. This MOA sets forth provisions allowing, in accordance with applicable law, increased access for DOD UAS into the elements of 

the NAS outside of DOD-managed Restricted Areas or Warning Areas. 

Regarding future plans for homeland security and disaster relief purposes, DOD 

is working to achieve more timely responses with our family of UAS in support of 

Civil Authorities during disaster relief situations. Operating UAS within the NAS 

(outside Restricted and/or Warning Areas) requires an FAA Certificate of Authorization (COA). The COA approval process can take up to 90 days. To facilitate the 

timely use of UAS, DOD is working with the FAA for contingently approved COAs 

for the Predator UAS and Reaper UAS. These contingent agreements provide much 

of the authority for a UAS to operate in response to a disaster. Final FAA approval 

of the contingent COAs is required prior to initiating UAS operations based on additional information related to the specific disaster. The pre-coordinated COAs cover 

disaster relief support only and is issued to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander directing the assigned UAS during such operations. The Army is submitting 

a similar COA request for the Shadow UAS. 

With the exception of the pre-coordinated COAs for disaster relief operations, 

DOD UAS support to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is on a case-by-case 

basis initiated by a DHS request, and subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for UAS, released by the Joint 

UAS Center of Excellence in March 2007, provides an overarching CONOPS for 

UAS, including support for Homeland Defense and Civil Authorities. NORTHCOM 

also plans to release a UAS CONOPS later this year addressing Homeland Defense 

and civil support missions. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are all theater-capable ISR assets in Iraq allocated to the theater commander to be tasked on a daily basis to meet theater requirements? If not, 

why not. Please list ISR theater-wide assets. 

General DAVIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the status of coordination with the FAA and what are 

future plans for the operation of specific UAVs in U.S. airspace for homeland security and disaster response purposes? 

General DAVIS. The lines of communication and coordination between the FAA 

and the Services are open and functioning well. The FAA has formed a UAS Group 

that works to maintain and promote UAS-specific knowledge and to address operational and safety issues in a prompt manner. Additionally, the FAA has developed 

and employed an automated Web-based system as a means for DOD (and others) 

to request authorization to operate unmanned aircraft in non-segregated portions of 

the national airspace system. The FAA has demonstrated the ability to approve requests from DOD within 60 days and in some cases much more promptly. In preparation for future disaster relief operations, a standing FAA Authorization for US 

Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM’s) Joint Force Air Component Commander to 

operate pre-coordinated UAS assets was established in May 2006. 

USNORTHCOM and DHS provide defense and security for the homeland. 

USNORTHCOM provides defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) when directed 

to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Future homeland security 

plans requiring UAS operations will employ these DOD assets via DSCA with the 

appropriate FAA coordination. DHS is developing their own UAS capability to meet 

their mission sets—Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement. DHS coordinates directly with the FAA on their UAS operations. Additionally, DHS has a number of law enforcement functions not shared 

with USNORTHCOM. Therefore, DOD’s use of UASs for homeland security missions 

is controlled at the Secretary of Defense level to monitor compliance with the Posse 

Comitatus Act. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Pace has been quoted as saying he favors integrating 

certain classes of unmanned aircraft into mainstream operations in Iraq, is this accurate? If this is his view, is this consistent with current practice being followed by 

the in Iraq? 

General DAVIS. General Pace’s view is consistent with current practices being followed in Iraq. All aircraft flying above 3,500 feet in Iraq today are part of the air 

150 

tasking order (ATO), including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). In this sense (airspace deconfliction), unmanned aircraft are integrated into mainstream operations 

in Iraq now. It is important to note, however, that listing aircraft on the ATO by 

design does not give the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) ‘‘realtime’’ visibility of the specific mission tasking of the aircraft due to decentralized 

execution by local commanders. In actual practice, a UAS listed on the ATO does 

not provide JFACC with the authority to task it. However, it does provide the 

JFACC with awareness of an unmanned aircraft’s presence, who is operating the 

vehicle, and the information necessary to contact the controlling agency, if required. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Pace is also quoted as saying, ‘‘It makes absolute 

sense to me that things flying above 3,500 feet should be part of the ATO, air 

tasking order, so that there is deconfliction of the airspace and the Joint Force Air 

Component Commander—normally Air Force but not necessarily—is the right person to ensure that the airspace is deconflicted.’’ Is this General Pace’s view? Is this 

the practice? 

General DAVIS. General Pace’s statement echoes the procedures currently in place 

per Joint Publication 3–52, ‘‘Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat 

Zone,’’ dated 30 August 2004, and Joint Publication 3–30, ‘‘Command and Control 

for Air Operations,’’ dated 5 June 2003. The Joint Force Commander appoints an 

airspace control authority (ACA) to assume overall responsibility for the airspace 

control system. Normally, a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is also 

designated and assumes the role of the ACA. Acting as the ACA, the JFACC staff 

issues the airspace control order (ACO) and the air tasking order to task joint force 

components and provide additional information about the missions during the 

tasking period. The coordinating altitude, a procedural airspace control method to 

separate fixed and rotary wing aircraft through altitude deconfliction, is used as the 

lower altitude limit for ACA/ACO authority and planning. 

In the IRAQ area of responsibility, Army unmanned aircraft operating above the 

coordinating altitude (actual altitude classified) are integrated into the ACO and 

their missions published as part of the daily ATO. Army unmanned aircraft directsupport missions currently integrated into the ATO include SHADOW, HUNTER, 

and I-GNAT/WARRIOR-ALPHA. The Marine Corps operates separately from the 

ACA/JFACC and establishes a direct air support center responsible for the direction 

of air operations directly supporting ground forces, including their unmanned aircraft such as PIONEER, SHADOW, and SCAN EAGLE. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are any of the Army UAVs of the I–GNAT, Hunter, or Warrior 

A class, the large medium altitude UAVs, made available to the Joint or Combined 

Forces Air Component Commander on a regular basis for the tasking of high priority theater requirements? 

General SORENSON. Depending on the missions within the Corps (Multi National 

Corp–Iraq) and divisions, the Hunter, IGNAT, and Warrior Alpha Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) could be assigned missions above the tactical level to support 

strategic or theater level missions. These Army UAS are best suited to directly support the tactical commander. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If the medium altitude UAVs were made available for allocation to the highest priority UAV ISR targets, how many tactical UAVs would be 

available to support Army-organic tasking? 

General SORENSON. The Army has integrated manned and unmanned systems of 

manned aviation and unmanned aviation. Diverting the division Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems (UAS) such as the Warrior Alpha and the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose 

(ER/MP) UAS out of the tactical (division) battlespace is a conscious decision the 

next higher commander has to assess in terms of risk, time, and consequence. Priority and allocation depends on the time horizon of the command. Should the Joint 

Force or Combined Force Commander Force Commander take these systems it 

would create a void at the tactical level. 

For the CFACC assets, the CAOC approves the UAS target deck and has the final 

say on how assets are employed. CFACC asset allocation requires lengthy requirements planning and submissions 72-hours in advance which complicates target servicing due to the fluid tactical battlespace. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Army has purchased eight Fire Scout UAVs for the Future 

Combat Systems program which is not planned for an initial combat capability until 

2015. What is the status of those UAVs? How many missions and flight hours have 

they logged, by month/vehicle, since January 2006? What is the planned use rate 

and for what purpose for fiscal year 2008? Do they have the planned mission equipment installed and integrated? Is there any plan to deploy them to Iraq? 

General SORENSON. The eight Class IV UAVs (Fire Scout) you reference are preproduction air frames only. Only five airframes have been delivered and none have 

completed integration or flight testing. The purpose of these air vehicles is to perVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
151 

form integration of FCS specific avionics and computer systems, and testing of flight 

software to meet the FCS requirements. The Preliminary Design Review is scheduled for September 2008, the Critical Design Review is scheduled for July 2009, and 

First Flight is anticipated in November 2010. These dates are synchronized with the 

overall FCS integrated schedule. The Army continues to assess the technical performance in order to accelerate this capability. 

To date, no Army Fire Scout air vehicle has been fully configured. Of the five 

Army air vehicles that have been delivered, Army number one is 90% configured, 

less communication equipment and sensors. Army number two is approximately 

40% integrated; no work has begun on the remainder of the air vehicles. No flights 

have occurred, only ground engine runs have been conducted. 

However, The Army and PM FCS have been working with Northrop Grumman, 

the developer of the Fire Scout, to explore earlier flight opportunities. The Program 

Manager of Unmanned Aerial Systems (PM UAS), Training and Doctrine Command 

System Manager (TSM) UAS and Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) 

briefed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) on the potential of providing Fire 

Scouts into theater next fiscal year (FY), after the air vehicles are integrated (with 

non-FCS communications equipment and sensors) and tested. The Army has not 

made a decision to deploy the Fire Scout UAVs. Previous initiatives included a proposal to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). FCS 

agreed to provide two Fire Scout airframes and two Airborne Standoff Minefield Detection System (ASTAMIDS) payloads to be used in the JIEDDO proposal, that proposal was not funded by JIEDDO. In addition, we are discussing bailment of aircraft 

to Northrop Grumman and are supporting the Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) fact finding efforts into Fire Scout. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the planned evolution of the class I FCS UAV? How 

many have been procured? How many are to be procured, in what time frame? What 

is the planned acquisition budget for the program and note any changes the program planned in FY07 for the FYDP. How are the ones that are currently fielded 

to be used through the FY07–08 period? 

General SORENSON. The Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration (ACTD) program has transitioned into the Future Combat Systems 

(FCS) Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program. Honeywell is under contract to the FCS Lead System Integrator (LSI) to complete the development of the 

Class I UAV. Currently, no Class I UAVs have been procured/fielded (the MAVs residuals delivered under the ACTD program, remain with the Army’s 25th Infantry 

Division). The MAVs delivered under the ACTD are currently being used in the development of Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Technology Transfer Programs 

(TTPs) on how to best employ Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) UAVs. The 

25th Infantry Division has submitted an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) to the 

US Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) to deploy the MAVs to Iraq. To date, no 

decision has been made on whether the MAVs will be deployed to Iraq. The MAVs 

will continue to be used by the FCS program for experimentation and to reduce the 

risk to the Class I UAV. 

The planned acquisition budget for the Class I program through FY13 is as follows: 

FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 

RDT&E $20.2M $13.1M $4.3M $0.9M $1.7M $0.4M 

Procurement $0.9M $4.9M 

The Procurement budget in FY13 supports acquisition of the first Class I UAV 

production (the FY12 Procurement budget supports acquisition of long lead materials). The total production quantity of Class I UAVs in FY13 is 62 (35 for the core 

FCS program and 27 for Spin Out 3). Current Army funding supports acquisition 

of 2,239 Class I UAVs, although the final quantity will be dependent upon future 

Army decisions. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Please provide the Army’s definitions for UAVs. What is a 

‘‘tactical’’ UAV and what current UAVs fall in each of the Army’s various definitions 

for UAVs? 

General SORENSON. The Army’s definitions for UAVs are defined in the Joint 

Field Manual 3–04.15, ‘‘UAS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems’’, dated August 3, 2006. 

This document describes three classes of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Manportable, Tactical, and Theater. 

152 

• Man-portable UAS are small, self-contained, and portable. Their use supports 

the small ground combat teams/elements in the field. The Army’s Raven UAS 

falls into this category. It is hand-launched, soldier transported, and fielded 

to battalions and smaller organizations. The Army’s Future Combat System 

(FCS) Brigade Combat Team (BCT) will have its own man-portable UAS, the 

Micro Air Vehicle (MAV). The MAV will feature both ‘‘hover and stare’’ and 

‘‘perch and stare’’ capabilities made possible by its lift-augmented ducted fan 

propulsion system. This capability will allow operation virtually anywhere, 

even in confined spaces. 

• Tactical UAS are larger systems that support maneuver commanders at various tactical levels of command and can support the small combat teams 

when so employed and are locally controlled and operated by a specialized 

UAS unit. The Army’s Shadow, IGNAT, Hunter, Warrior A, and Extended 

Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) Warrior all fall into this category. The FCS 

BCT will have its own tactical rotary-wing UAS, the Firescout. 

• Theater. The Army does not have any UAS that fall into this category. 

In addition to these definitions, the Joint UAS Center of Excellence (JUAS COE) 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS), as endorsed by the Army during FY07, defines 

three ‘‘Tactical’’ UAS. The Raven is considered a ‘‘Tactical 1’’ system by the JUAS 

COE CONOPS since it is hand-launched, soldier transported, and fielded to Battalions and smaller organizations. The Shadow is defined as a ‘‘Tactical 2’’ system per 

the JUAS COE CONOPS since it is mobile-launched, vehicle transported, locally 

controlled and operated by a specialized UAS platoon within the Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT). The IGNAT, Hunter, Warrior A, and Extended Range/Multi-Purpose 

(ER/MP) Warrior are classed ‘‘Tactical 3’’ systems within the JUAS COE CONOPS 

since they are organic to the Division, conventionally launched (rolling take-off) and 

primarily operated out of airfields. The FCS MAV is a Tactical 1 and the Firescout 

is a Tactical 2, in accordance with the JUAS COE CONOPS. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Please provide any available information on fielded UAS accident and loss rates. 

General DEPTULA. MQ–1 Predator aircraft loss rates per flying hour have decreased from a rate of approximately 40/100,000 hours in 2001 to an all-time low 

in 2006 of 15.3/100,000 hours. This trend is comparable to early historical rates of 

the F–16—a true success story. Since September 2001, workload of the Predator 

force has dramatically increased, while the loss-rate continues to decline. 

There have not been any accidents or losses of fielded RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 

10 aircraft. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Please provide any available information on fielded UAS accident and loss rates. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Information on fielded UAS accident and loss rates for Fiscal 

Years (FYs) 2004 to date in FY 2007 is as follows: 

FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 

Pioneer: 1 0.83 0.83 0.25 Crash rate per 1000 flight hours 

Scan Eagle: N/A 5.5 3.1 2.0 Crash rate per 1000 flight hours 

The overall UAS loss rate (beyond repair) for Pioneer during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) is 0.045 per 1,000 flight hours, and the loss rate for Scan Eagle is 

1.6 per 1,000 flight hours. The very low loss rate on Pioneer is in part due to the 

inability to produce new Pioneers, which drives us to repair most crashed air vehicles. Scan Eagle is a low cost air vehicle (about $130K), and economic considerations 

result in only about 40 percent of the crashed air vehicles being repaired. Small, 

hand-launched UAS such as Dragon Eye and Raven B are classified as expendable 

items, and as such, accident/loss rate data is not tracked. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Please provide any available information on fielded UAS accident and loss rates. 

General ALLES. [See the information below.] 

153 

Marine Corps 

UAS Loss Rates and Accidents 

FY06 USMC UAS Accident & Loss Rates 

UAS Type Flight Hours Accidents Losses 

Dragon Eye Not reported Not reported 14 

Pioneer 7,152.3 7 0 

FY07 USMC UAS Accident & Loss Rates (thru July 07) 

UAS Type Flight Hours Accidents Losses 

Dragon Eye Not reported Not reported 2 

Pioneer 5603.2 1 0 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Please provide any available information on fielded UAS accident and loss rates. 

General SORENSON. [See the information below.] 

FY06 Army UAS Accident and Loss Rates 

UAS Type Flight Hours Accidents Losses 

Raven 19,853 61 59 

Shadow 69,332 63 15 

Hunter 6,987 5 2 

IGNAT & Warrior A 11,681 1 1 

FY07 Army UAS Accident and Loss Rates (thru May 07) 

UAS Type Flight Hours Accidents Losses 

Raven 10,714 45 32 

Shadow 65,963 23 9 

Hunter 6,316 4 3 

IGNAT & Warrior A 10,740 1 1 

Note: Losses are those Air Vehicle accidents resulting in an uneconomically reparable condition (usually 75 percent damage or more to vehicle), completely destroyed, or unrecoverable. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What aspects of the DOD organizational structure preclude effective management of the requirements-through-acquisition process? In your testimony you referred to a ‘‘sloppy process.’’ Can you provide more specific information 

as to how the requirements establishment and acquisition process needs to be modified and/or disciplined? 

154 

Mr. SULLIVAN. There are multiple aspects of DOD’s structure that contribute to 

problems with its requirements-setting and acquisition processes. They have led to 

poor acquisition outcomes—cost overruns and delays in delivering new systems to 

the warfighter. First, the department’s requirements-setting process (JCIDS) is platform-oriented and hampered by stove-pipes across the services. Second, the department’s planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process (PPBES) is not effectively integrated with the JCIDS and, therefore, does not constrain requirements 

early enough by matching needs with available resources. The result is that there 

are no clear priorities from which to choose programs and, at a strategic level, there 

are too many programs chasing too few dollars. This unhealthy competition for 

funding combined with unconstrained, stovepiped requirements creates poor business cases for acquisition programs. Third, as a result of this lack of clear priorities 

at the strategic level, the services’ acquisition organizations begin individual programs with inadequate cost and schedule estimates. These programs are hampered 

from the start and further hampered during execution by a lack of controls (or rules) 

concerning program management tenure or that provide knowledge concerning technological, design, and manufacturing maturity prior to making the next incremental 

investment in a weapon system’s development. Fourth, the department does not effectively include the voice of the S&T community in decisions about requirements, 

resources, and program execution at the appropriate times. Most programs begin 

with requirements for capabilities that are not yet invented, significantly complicating the execution of an acquisition program. GAO has issued numerous reports 

regarding these problems and potential solutions. 

Our written statement for the testimony provides some examples of these problems. There are many more. Two of these examples are the Global Hawk and the 

Predator/Warrior. 

• The Global Hawk program exemplifies a requirements process driven by the 

Air Force to include requirements for capabilities that were not achievable. 

These requirements were not constrained by the PPBES process since it is 

not integrated with requirements-setting. As a result, the program’s original 

cost and schedule was significantly underestimated and additional funds have 

had to be set aside for the program, impacting other programs given available 

funding. Since then, the program has encountered technology, design, and 

manufacturing problems that have significantly increased its cost and delayed 

deliveries. 

• The Predator/Warrior debate exemplifies the difficulty that the requirementssetting process has breaking through stovepiped services. To date, the Army 

and the Air Force have made some progress in acquiring these capabilities 

together; however, the process has been very difficult and there has been considerable resistance to a joint acquisition within each service. This can lead 

to unnecessarily redundant and inefficient acquisitions. 

Our recent best practices work (GAO–07–388) identified the lack of integration 

between the key decision support processes and the absence of a single point of accountability for acquisition investment decisions as two key structural contributors 

to the ‘‘sloppy’’ (perhaps better characterized as ‘‘undisciplined’’) nature of DOD’s 

management of the requirements-through-acquisition process. We reported that 

DOD’s acquisition decision-making structure is built on three separate processes 

that are headed by separate organizational entities. In addition, weapon system investment decisions continue to be heavily influenced by the military services. Within 

this structure the responsibility and authority for making decisions about what to 

buy, how to buy it, and how to pay for it is divided among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the 

OSD Comptroller/PA&E respectively. This fragmented structure lacks effective accountability and has led DOD to commit to more acquisition programs than its resources can support. 

In contrast, we found that successful commercial companies take a portfolio management approach to making investment decisions to help ensure they pursue the 

right mix of programs to meet the needs of their customers within resource constraints. Successful portfolio management requires strong governance with committed leadership that empowers portfolio managers to make decisions about the 

best way to invest resources and holds those managers accountable for the outcomes 

they achieve. This type of an approach requires knowledge about the customer’s requirements and available corporate resources—existing products, money, and technology—to be assessed in an integrated fashion early and often to ensure that investment decisions are adequately informed. 

While DOD implemented a new requirements process a few years ago, positive results have not been forthcoming and need and solution determinations are still overVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:47 Jun 02, 2009 Jkt 043667 PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-54\109250.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
155 

ly stovepiped. These problems are deep seated and of a cultural nature. They generally are not solved until leadership (the Secretary as well as the Congress) exhibits the will change. There are many obstacles to creating the right environment for 

this cultural transformation. Below I list some of the actions that would help 

achieve better results in the requirements and acquisition processes. 

1) An enterprise level (above the military services—OSD/ATL) investment 

strategy to determine needs jointly within a resource constrained environment. (Do not start more programs than you can afford.) 

2) A sound business case at the start of an acquisition program (milestone B) 

that ensures requirements and resources are matched—requirements are 

balanced to match the real warfighter need, mature technology, design 

knowledge, short cycle-times, and available funding. 

3) An evolutionary approach that develops new capabilities in increments rather than a single quantum leap. 

4) A knowledge-based acquisition process that defines specific criteria or knowledge that must be captured at key decision junctures before investing further 

in the development program. 

5) Program managers that are held accountable for the outcome of their decisions and remain on programs until the product is delivered. 

6) Senior leadership committed to the application and enforcement of a joint enterprise level investment strategy and knowledge-based acquisition process. 

7) Transparency in the acquisition decision making process. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is GAO in a position to offer recommendations on what qualitative metrics DOD might use to measure the success of its ISR missions? 

Ms. PICKUP. At the subcommittee’s April 2007 hearing, we testified that DOD 

lacks sufficient metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of its ISR missions. For example, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics 

such as the number of targets planned versus the number collected and more work 

needs to be done to develop qualitative as well as quantitative metrics. DOD officials acknowledge more needs to be done and there is an ongoing effort within DOD 

to develop qualitative as well as further quantitative metrics. Such qualitative 

metrics would address how the warfighter is benefiting from information gathered 

during ISR missions. Below are some examples of qualitative metrics, consistent 

with those being considered by the department. 

— Whether the essential elements of information requested by the warfighter 

were satisfied or not and what effect the captured intelligence had (e.g., Improvised Explosive Device hot spots were identified). 

— The impact the intelligence had on an operation (e.g., partner security forces 

were able to maintain border integrity and enforce border security). 

In addition to metrics that assess the success of individual ISR missions and assets, DOD should have metrics for tracking trends over time to assess whether ISR 

assets are meeting warfighter needs. These metrics would help inform DOD’s decision making regarding ISR acquisition. 

Æ