RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0133-17T2

 

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF 

CHILD PROTECTION AND 

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.C.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

M.C. and J.A.C.,

Defendants.

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF M.I.C.,

G.M.C., J.E.C. and E.C.,

Minors.

___________________________

Submitted October 3, 2018 - Decided 

Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 26, 2018
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A-0133-17T2

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FN-09-0126-16.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Joan T. Buckley, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney for minor M.I.C. (M. Alexis Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney for minors G.M.C., J.E.C. and E.C. (Karen 

Ann Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the statement 

in lieu of brief). 

PER CURIAM

Defendant J.C.1appeals from a June 8, 2016 fact-finding determination,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that he sexually abused his stepdaughter, 

Mary, over the course of at least seven years from when she was less than six 

until she was thirteen years old. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(3). Defendant argues 

that the trial court erred in relying on inadmissible hearsay and ignoring relevant 

 

1

 We use initials and pseudonyms to identify the parties to preserve the 

confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
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exculpating evidence. We disagree and affirm substantially for the reasons

expressed in Judge Bernadette N. DeCastro's comprehensive written opinion.

Mary did not testify, although she gave detailed statements to the Hudson 

County Prosecutor's Office detective and the evaluators at the regional child 

abuse diagnostic center, Audrey Hepburn Children's House (AHCH). Both the 

female detective and Dr. Anthony D'Urso, the supervising psychologist at 

AHCH, testified at the fact-finding hearing. Dr. D'Urso explained the evaluation 

procedure and results in great detail, finding that Mary's allegations, expressed 

in "age-inappropriate detail," were supported by his clinical findings. Mary had 

reported the sexual abuse when she was eight years old, but had recanted at that 

time. She reported to AHCH a progressive pattern of abuse as she got older.

Mary experiences flashbacks and was diagnosed as suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. 

Our Supreme Court has made clear that

previous statements made by the child relating to any 

allegations of abuse or neglect are admissible in 

evidence; provided, however, that no such statement, if 

uncorroborated, shall be sufficient to make a fact 

finding of abuse or neglect. Thus, a child's hearsay 

statement may be admitted into evidence, but may not 

be the sole basis for a finding of abuse or neglect.

[N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 

17, 32-33 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).]
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"[T]he corroboration requirement must reasonably be held to include 

indirect evidence of abuse. Such evidence has included a child victim's 

precocious knowledge of sexual activity, a semen stain on a child's blanket, a 

child's nightmares and psychological evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting State v. 

Swan, 790 P.2d 610, 615-16 (Wash. 1990).

Our review of the trial judge's decision after a fact-finding hearing, as 

defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.44, is limited. "We ordinarily defer to the factual 

findings of the trial court because it has the opportunity to make first-hand 

credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a 'feel 

of the case' that can never be realized by a review of the cold record." N. J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). We defer to Judge

DeCastro's expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 

(1998), and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported 

by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 

189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial 

judge's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those 

facts, her legal conclusions are unassailable.
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Defendant's arguments regarding the admissibility of certain evidence and 

the judge's purported failure to consider inconsistencies in Mary's prior 

statements and other gaps in the evidence are without sufficient merit to require 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). "[R]ulings to admit or 

exclude evidence are generally subject to a wide degree of discretion." Jacobs 

v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 452 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div. 2017). 

The judge's evidentiary "ruling is not disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of 

discretion." Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84, 92 (App. Div. 

1991). Sufficient credible evidence supported the finding of abuse by a 

preponderance of the evidence.

Affirmed.