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U.S. POLICY AND THE OSCE: 

MAKING GOOD ON COMMITMENTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 28, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 112–1–9] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Chairman 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State 

MICHAEL C. CAMUN ̃ EZ, Department of Commerce 

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense 

[II] 
U.S. POLICY AND THE OSCE: 

MAKING GOOD ON COMMITMENTS 

JULY 28, 2011 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .......................................... 6 

WITNESSES 

Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European 

and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State .......................... 3 

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State ........ 6 

Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs, Department of Defense ....... 8 

Dr. Michael Haltzel, Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic 

Relations, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) ........................ 18 

Catherine Fitzpatrick, Consultant, Jacob Blaustein Institute 

for the Advancement of Human Rights ................................. 21 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 30 

Prepared statement of Philip H. Gordon ................................... 31 

Prepared statement of Michael H. Posner ................................ 35 

Prepared statement of Alexander Vershbow ............................ 40 

Prepared statement of Dr. Michael Haltzel .............................. 46 

[III] 

(1) 

U.S. POLICY AND THE OSCE: 

MAKING GOOD ON COMMITMENTS 

July 28, 2011 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 1:30 p.m. in room 210, Cannnon House 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. Smith, 

Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State 

for European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State; Michael 

H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor, Department of State; Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense; Dr. Michael Haltzel, Senior Fellow, Center for 

Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS); and 

Catherine Fitzpatrick, Consultant, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the 

Advancement of Human Rights. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will come to order, and good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for being here for this very important 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe hearing. I’d 

like to welcome our distinguished witnesses. It is not often that we 

have the honor of hearing from three assistant secretaries at the 

same time, including two who also serve as Helsinki Commissioners, so you really should be up here—[chuckles]—asking the 

questions. But thank you for being here and thank you for your 

work on behalf of human rights and all of the three baskets that 

make up the Helsinki Final Act. 

Today we’ll explore the U.S. policy towards the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe, a unique intergovernmental 

organization that incorporates human rights and economic development into its comprehensive concept of security. Unfortunately, 

over the past several years, OSCE countries with poor human 

rights records have been able to thwart some of the organization’s 

work on these issues. 
2 

Last December at the Astana Summit, the OSCE’s first summit 

since 1990, OSCE states failed to reach consensus on an action 

plan laying out priorities for the coming years. Yet, the OSCE 

needs to continue to focus on fundamental human rights issues. 

This is its heritage, the reason it was created in the 1970s. It must 

not allow itself to be sidetracked by Russia or other un- or semidemocratic states which argue that the organization should look 

only at positive examples of best practices or that distract the 

OSCE from its work by insisting on lengthy discussions of OSCE 

reform. 

Likewise, our own government must raise the priority given to 

human rights and humanitarian concerns, from supporting oppressed people of Belarus, turning back the trend to restrict Internet and media freedoms, supporting democracy in Kyrgyzstan and 

democratic activists throughout all of central Asia, making sure the 

OSCE partnership program is used to generally promote human 

rights for oppressed minorities; and as for the Copts in Egypt, helping OSCE countries to address the disturbing and potential tragic 

demographic trends found in almost all of the member states. All 

of these have been the subject of recent commission hearings and 

as we look forward to working with the executive branch on each 

and every one of these issues. 

One issue I’d like to particularly raise here is the international 

child abduction issue. I note parenthetically—and unfortunately 

due to scheduling I will have to be absent for most of this hearing—but at 2:00 I’ll be hearing, as chairman of the Global Health, 

Global Human Rights Africa Subcommittee from Susan Jacobs and 

others about the efforts to bring children home who have been abducted throughout the world. 

The Hague Treaty is now some 30 years old. And unfortunately, 

much of its implementing processes have been thwarted or mitigated by countries, especially government authorities that have refused to take seriously their obligations; and the hearing will focus 

on many of these countries, with a particular emphasis on Japan. 

So regrettably I will have to leave for that. Again, this hearing was 

actually put on after that hearing. 

I would also point out that at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 

in Belgrade earlier this month, there was a resolution that we had 

authored as a commission to take up the issue of international parental child abductions by promoting better implementation of the 

Hague convention. My hope is that at the OSCE Ministerial in 

Vilnius this year we can look at standards for OSCE states to fill 

the gaps in the convention’s implementation. Like I said, 30 years 

after its signing there are huge gaps that must be looked at. 

I’d like to also say that—and I mentioned this to Assistant Secretary Posner just a moment ago—but last week we held a very 

disturbing hearing here in this room and heard from three distinguished witnesses including Michelle Clark, who all of you will recall was the director of OSCE trafficking work. She did a landmark 

report on partner-country Egypt and focused on the issue of the abduction and the forced marriages of Coptic women, often starting 

as early as 14 and 15 years of age, who are then forced into Islam 

and then after that forced to take up a Muslim husband. If that 

isn’t a definition of trafficking, I don’t know what is. 
3 

This has been reported on, as I think all of you know, in the past 

in a cursory way, perhaps, by many human rights reports. But she 

said—and she said it with emphasis—that the idea that it’s a mere 

allegation must be stricken from the record, that this is now a common practice. And she estimated—and she did on-the-ground investigations and, frankly, she actually told us she would going back 

to do more on-the-ground human rights investigations—that thousands of Coptic girls, every year now, are being abducted and 

forced into Muslim marriages, obviously against their will, against 

the will of their families. And drugs and rape are very often a 

means to expedite that conversion and that marriage—an absolute 

horrific situation that has gotten scant coverage. 

I plan—or actually offered an amendment to the foreign relations 

bill when it was marked up last week in committee condemning 

this egregious practice. And many of the members wanted more information after the markup, which we are providing and have provided. And I do think it’s an issue we need to engage robustly. 

I’d like to introduce our first panel, beginning first with Dr. Philip Gordon who serves as Assistant Secretary of State for European 

and Eurasian affairs. Prior to assuming his position he was a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. He also served as Director 

for European Affairs at the National Security Council under President Clinton. 

Michael Posner serves as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. And prior to his current position 

he was executive director and then president of Human Rights 

First. And I would just say personally I’ve worked with him for 

decades and it’s great to have him before the Commission. Before 

joining Human Rights First, he practiced law in Chicago, and he 

also worked for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, which 

obviously became Human Rights First. 

Then we’ll hear from Ambassador Alexander Vershbow who 

serves as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs. A career foreign service officer, he has served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the Russian Federation and the Republic of 

Korea. He’s held numerous senior-level foreign policy positions 

principally focused on the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. 

And so I’d like to now ask our first panelist, Dr. Gordon, if he 

would proceed. 

PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 

EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Sec. GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’m honored 

to be here, and appreciate the opportunity to talk about our agenda 

for the OSCE. I am particularly pleased to be sitting here with my 

friends and close colleagues, Mike Posner and Sandy Vershbow. I’d 

like to focus my remarks today on the OSCE since the December 

2010 Astana Summit, which I attended along with Secretary Clinton. 

And I’d like to begin by looking at our core foreign policy goals 

for the organization, reviewing our achievements at Astana and 

looking forward to the OSCE’s Ministerial in Vilnius this December. I’ve submitted a long version for the record, and would like to 

just summarize here if I may. 
4 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection. Your full statement and that of 

our distinguished witnesses will be made a part of the record. 

Sec. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our approach to the OSCE rests firmly on the foundation of relations with Europe and Eurasia as a whole. Europe remains a key 

national priority for the United States for the simple reason that 

nowhere does the United States have better, more valuable partners than in Europe. The United States and Europe share common 

values, our economies are intertwined, and our militaries work together to address common security challenges. 

U.S. bilateral engagement with Europe is complemented by key 

multilateral institutions, including the OSCE. Through the OSCE 

we engage on such U.S. priorities as advancing human rights and 

fundamental freedoms, building democratic institutions throughout 

the OSCE area, and advancing good governance in the economic 

and environmental spheres, and military transparency. In this period of tight budgets, multilateral approaches often present an effective alternative to unilateral engagement. 

Today, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the principles and commitments embodied by the OSCE face some serious challenges both 

from the inside and outside of the organization. From within, there 

is an uneven application of the Helsinki principles. Regional crises 

and transnational threats are proliferating. Efforts to resolve the 

protracted conflicts, for example, in Georgia, Moldova and NagornoKarabakh continue to face very frustrating obstacles. 

To take another example, Russia’s determination to limit the role 

of the OSCE in Georgia has diminished possibilities for international engagement in this region where transparency and confidence building are sorely needed. Problems like these make headlines, but they offer only a partial picture of the OSCE, because the 

OSCE has also made tremendous contributions toward advancing 

democratic prosperity and stability throughout Europe and Eurasia. Although it is at times stymied by a lack of political will, the 

OSCE nonetheless remains uniquely positioned to build confidence 

through military transparency, promote good governance and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe and Eurasia. 

At the Astana Summit last December, which was the first OSCE 

summit in 11 years, the 56 participating states issued the Astana 

Commemorative Declaration, which was a stronger affirmation of 

the Helsinki principles and commitments of the entire OSCE akey 

(ph) including, for the very first time, an explicit statement that 

human rights situations in participating states are matters of, 

quote, ‘‘direct and legitimate concern to all.’’ Because of disagreements over the protracted conflicts, we were indeed unable to get 

consensus on an action plan at Astana. But the final document 

tasks future chairmanships to develop a plan to address a range 

of common challenges. 

Since the summit, we’ve been working with the Lithuanian 

chairmanship as new challenges present themselves. Among these 

has been Belarus. After a flawed presidential election, the Government of Belarus launched a brutal crackdown against the opposition and civil society following, and closed the OSCE office in 

Minsk. Through the invocation of the Moscow Mechanism and 
5 

other efforts, we are working to hold the Government of Belarus accountable for its failure to protect human rights and fundamental 

freedoms. 

In close consultation with Senator Cardin and others on this 

Committee, we have also taken concrete actions to address the 

tragic case of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who died in pre-trial detention in Russia. We’ve also worked with the chairmanship to support greater OSCE assistance for North Africa. For example, 

ODIHR, at the request of Egyptian activists, is already holding a 

workshop for Egyptian civil society on international standards of 

election observation in advance of Egypt’s November parliamentary 

elections. 

Looking forward to the December OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius, 

the United States is working with our partners to achieve results 

in all three dimensions. Very briefly—in political-military dimension, we want to agree on a substantial update of the OSCE central 

arms control agreement, the Vienna Document, which we hope will 

be reissued at Vilnius for the first time since 1999. In the economic-environmental dimension, we want to endorse greater economic transparency, good governance and anti-corruption measures, as well as work with the special representative on gender 

issues to empower women in the economic sphere. In the human 

dimension, we hope to take the Helsinki Final Act into the digital 

age with a decision that would explicitly acknowledge that human 

rights and fundamental freedoms can apply to online activity as 

they do to offline activity. We want to reaffirm and strengthen government’s commitment to the protection of journalists. 

We all know that a consensus-based organization with 56 participating states sometimes moves in frustratingly small steps. The 

issues the OSCE faces can seem intractable, but exchanging words 

is better than exchanging bullets, which unfortunately we have experienced in the OSCE space in the last three years. The OSCE 

has not yet lived up to its full potential, but the OSCE does good 

and vital work and remains essential for protecting human rights, 

promoting stability and spreading democracy throughout the region. 

The Helsinki Commission; you, Mr. Chairman; the Commissioners and the experts on your staff play a vital role ensuring that 

the participating states keep the promises made at Helsinki. With 

your support, the United States will continue to play a leading role 

in the OSCE to strengthen, build upon the progress participating 

states have made over the past 35 years, and bring us closer to a 

truly stable, secure and prosperous OSCE region. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Gordon, thank you very much for your testimony. To 

note, there are eight consecutive votes on the floor right now. I 

have 30 seconds to get to the floor. Co-Chairman Ben Cardin will 

be here momentarily, but until then we will stand in, momentarily, 

recess. Again, I apologize to our witnesses. 

[Recess.] 
6 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. The Commission will come back to order. I apologize; as I think Chairman Smith has indicated, the House has series of votes. The Senate’s waiting on the House. We may be waiting a long time from what I understand. So we’re sort of in that 

position. Obviously the timing of this hearing was—we didn’t anticipate that we would be in the midst of these negotiations concerning the budget. So we apologize to all of our witnesses. I understand that Secretary Gordon, you’ve already completed your opening statement, so we’ll go to Secretary Posner. 

MICHAEL H. POSNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Sec. POSNER. Thank you, Senator Cardin. I ask that my written 

testimony be submitted to the record. 

Mr. CARDIN. Without objection, all of your statements will be included in the record. 

Sec. POSNER. Great. First, I want to thank you for holding this 

important hearing at this time. And I want to focus my brief remarks on the human rights and human dimension aspect of the 

OSCE. 

First, for us, the OSCE is an important forum for raising human 

rights issues in individual countries in concern. And in the written 

testimony, I focus in particular on Belarus, Russia and Uzbekistan. 

As Assistant Secretary Gordon said with respect to Belarus, we see 

a refusal to extend the mandate of the OSCE office in Minsk, its 

hindering of the Moscow Mechanism by not allowing a special 

rapporteur into the country, and now their resistance to joining 

consensus on the agenda for the human dimension implementation 

meeting in Warsaw. But by its obstructionist behavior, Belarus 

only draws more attention to its poor human rights record. 

We also have been and will continue to press for human rights 

with respect to Russia. We’ve spoken out repeatedly at the OSCE 

Permanent Council and in other OSCE fora about the—about the 

many unresolved cases, like the murder of journalist Paul 

Klebnikov, human rights activist Natalya Estemirova, and the corruption and impunity as exemplified in the tragic case of Sergei 

Magnitsky—Senator Cardin, a case in which you’ve played such an 

important role in drawing international attention, and we thank 

you for that—also restrictions on free assembly for groups like 

Strategy-31. 

For us, the OSCE is particularly important, though, in the five 

Central Asian states, which don’t really have another regional 

forum. And so the comprehensive security we seek in the OSCE region, and in Central Asia particularly, will remain elusive until a 

range of serious human rights problems are addressed. There is a 

pattern, for example, of serious human rights violations in 

Uzbekistan. We’ve consistently raised our concerns in cases like 

that of Dilmurod Sayid, a journalist who was imprisoned for writing about corruption; Maxim Popov, who remains incarcerated for 

working on AIDS issues; and we continue to advocate for fair treatment and due process in these and similar cases. 
7 

We are committed to working with civil society in Uzbekistan 

and other Central Asian countries to advance democratic reforms 

at a moment where those issues are extremely difficult. But sometimes the engagement does yield results. And I want to point in a 

positive way to the actions by the Government of Kyrgyzstan, 

which has decriminalized libel, an issue in which the OSCE representative on freedom of the media has persistently focused. 

A second broad point I want to make is that the OSCE remains 

a pioneering process relevant in today’s world. It’s a comprehensive 

approach to security, to human values—which are at the core of 

the Helsinki process—and there is also a recognition of the vital 

role of civil society. The OSCE as an institution and the civil society activists associated with the Helsinki movement contribute expertise to our partnership with Mediterranean states now undergoing transformations. 

Third, and relating to that same point, the Helsinki process must 

continue to champion citizen activism. Secretary Clinton last summer gave an important speech in Krakow, Poland, talking about 

the environment in which NGOs—which civil society are now being 

restricted by governments who are unhappy with their actions—the 

OSCE, through its engagement of civil society, reinforces our strategy of supporting citizen activism. In mid-August, my bureau will 

be reviewing proposals for a new $500,000 program to create a 

demand-driven, virtual network of human rights and democracy activists in the OSCE region. We’re calling it Helsinki 2.0. This will 

help extend Helsinki’s human dimension and the legacy of citizen 

involvement. 

Last point is that I think it’s important for us to send a clear 

message from Vilnius on Internet freedom. I appreciate the Commission holding a hearing on that subject several weeks ago. We 

applaud Lithuania for making media freedom both via old and new 

technologies key themes of their chairmanship, and we’re grateful 

for the tireless effort of the OSCE permanent representative on 

freedom of the media, Dunja Mijatovic ́. 

As Ambassador Gordon and I have both noted in our written testimonies, the U.S. Government is committed to fundamental freedoms in the digital age, and the Astana summit ended without 

adoption of a plan. We intend to renew our efforts in the Vilnius 

Ministerial. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that we are committed to a Europe that is whole, free and at peace, Europe and 

Eurasia coming together in an integrated way. And there can’t be 

lasting security in this region until human rights and fundamental 

freedoms can be fully exercised by all of the people within the 

OSCE region. 

Again, I want to thank you for holding these hearings and for 

your own personal commitment to these issues. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you for your testimony and thank for 

your participation on the Commission. Secretary Vershbow? 
8 

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Sec. VERSHBOW. Thank you, Senator Cardin. Thanks to you and 

to Chairman Smith for inviting me to testify about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and our goals in the 

runup to the Vilnius Ministerial meeting in December. And I’m 

very honored to associate myself with this Commission and its 

achievements over the decades. Like my colleagues, I have a longer 

statement that I’d like to submit for the record. 

Mr. CARDIN. And it will be. 

Sec. VERSHBOW. But I’ll just summarize some of the main points. 

The OSCE has three attributes that make it unique. It has a 

vast geographic scope; it has a three-basket approach to security, 

encompassing human rights, economic development, as well as 

military security that is still relevant today; and it has an extraordinary legacy, having played a critical role both in supporting and 

inspiring the forces of democracy and freedom behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War and then bringing order during Europe’s 

tumultuous political transitions of the early 1990s. 

Throughout its history, the OSCE has adapted to new challenges 

and changes in the security environment. And in keeping with this 

tradition, it must continue to adapt to face the challenges of the 

21st century. 

As we’ve heard, last December, the OSCE held its first summit 

in Astana—the first summit since 1999. At the summit, we learned 

that the achievements of the OSCE cannot be taken for granted. 

The effort to produce an action plan for 2011 foundered over fundamental disagreements on conventional arms control and the unresolved conflicts. 

Fortunately, due in no small part to the efforts of my friend Phil 

Gordon, the member states did succeed in producing the Astana 

Commemorative Declaration which recommitted all 56 participating states to the Helsinki principles and to revitalizing the 

political-military dimension of European security. 

And I’d like to focus on what the administration would like to accomplish in this area by the time of the Ministerial in December, 

with particular attention to the three most important parts of the 

conventional arms control regime: The 1999 Vienna Document, the 

Open Skies Treaty, and the CFE Treaty. 

OSCE is engaged in an intensive effort to update the Vienna 

Document for the first time since 1999. So far, the only changes 

that have been agreed are administrative in nature. 

One substantive proposal that we believe would be critical to 

making the update a success is to lower the force thresholds for notification of military maneuvers, a subject that’s central to the 

original intention of the Vienna document. So far, only 35 of the 

56 participating states have agreed to this proposal, but we think 

it would better reduce force sizes in Europe and it would send a 

clear signal that OSCE is serious about modernizing military 

transparency and security in Europe even though this is not the 

only updating that should be done, either before or beyond Vilnius. 

So we hope to have a deeper discussion with our OSCE partners 

on a range of measures that would be necessary to improve the se-
9 

curity of all participating states. With military budgets under pressure, we think that the Vienna Document must continue to evolve 

to keep pace with the transformations underway across Europe’s 

militaries. 

On Open Skies, the 34 states party to the treaty have flown more 

than 700 aerial observation flights since the treaty entered into 

force in 2002. The ability of any party to overfly any part of the 

territory of every other party is actually quite extraordinary. And, 

indeed, the United States and Russia both used Open Skies to 

verify the New START treaty. We’re seeking to recommit the 

United States to the treaty by increasing the number of flights in 

which we participate each year and by upgrading our sensors to 

digital. While many states are scaling back their participation due 

to budget cuts, we note that Russia has renewed its commitment 

by purchasing new Open Skies aircraft, so we look forward to the 

continued operation of this landmark treaty. 

The news on conventional armed forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty, is less encouraging. As you know, the CFE impasse began with 

Russia’s December 2007 suspension of its compliance with the treaty. Our efforts, led by Ambassador Victoria Nuland, to conclude a 

framework agreement as the starting point of negotiations to modernize the treaty have foundered on two main issues: the right of 

states to choose whether or not to allow foreign forces to be stationed on their sovereign territory, and providing transparency 

among all parties regarding their current military posture. 

Currently, the United States is consulting with the other parties 

to decide the way forward while continuing to encourage Moscow 

to reconsider its position. But as NATO said at the Lisbon summit 

last November, this situation in which 29 parties implement the 

treaty while one does not cannot continue indefinitely. 

While the future of CFE remains uncertain, we remain committed to conventional arms control and military transparency in 

Europe. And while the CFE treaty can’t be replaced, we’ll continue 

to work through the OSCE to advance these objectives by modernizing the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty. 

We also seek to use the leverage of OSCE’s diverse membership 

in trying to address the unresolved conflicts. And we hope through 

cooperative efforts to resolve them. 

Sadly, we’ve seen little sign of progress on resolving the conflict 

between Georgia and Russia. Talks do continue in Vienna and in 

Geneva on the possibility of an OSCE team that could have access 

to all of the territory of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, but Russia has yet to agree. 

Our position remains unchanged. The United States continues to 

support Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its 

internationally recognized borders, and we will maintain our support for international efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia needs to abide by 

its ceasefire arrangements and take steps that promote stability in 

the region. 

The OSCE continues to play an important role in supporting a 

peaceful resolution of the dispute over Transdniestria through the 

‘‘five plus two’’ talks, and the United States remains closely engaged with our OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, Russia and France, 
10 

in supporting efforts to promote a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

Unfortunately, an attempt last month to reach a breakthrough 

failed and tensions along the line of contact are increasing. But 

with the parties’ inability to finalize the Madrid basic principles to 

resolve the conflict, we remain at a dangerous stalemate, and prospects for progress remain uncertain. 

Now, the OSCE is also a forerunner among regional organizations in addressing emerging threats, such as preventing nuclear 

proliferation to nonstate actors, the control of small arms and light 

weapons, the promotion of cybersecurity, and enhancing border security in Central Asia. 

On nonproliferation, OSCE continues to work towards full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. OSCE is setting norms for its members on nuclear nonproliferation by hosting 

specialized workshops and specialized tools for implementation. 

OSCE is a vital forum for cooperation on reducing the threat 

posed by small arms and light weapons. It’s facilitated cooperation 

among participating states in reducing trafficking, securing existing stocks, and eliminating excess small arms and light weapons 

and related materials since 1999. In March and July of this year, 

DOD participated in OSCE-led visits to Kyrgyzstan, and we’re now 

working to ensure that that country’s man-portable air-defense systems, or MANPADS—and we’re also coordinating OSCE efforts to 

secure and destroy large stockpiles of hazardous conventional ammunition. 

On cybersecurity, OSCE hosted an important conference to explore potential roles for the organization, which included not only 

participating states, partners, and international organizations but 

the European Commission, Japan, and NATO. In the run-up to the 

Vilnius ministerial, the Pentagon will continue to support State 

Department-led discussions on developing cyber confidence-building 

mechanisms in the OSCE to protect our vital interests. 

We also have been working through OSCE to promote a stable, 

secure, and prosperous Central Asia by improving border security 

and working to combat illegal drug trafficking and other forms of 

proliferation across the region. We believe OSCE can do more in 

Afghanistan. The secretariat has proposed 16 projects to enhance 

Afghan border security with an emphasis on building Afghan capacity. These are supportive of the Afghanistan government’s national development strategy. So far, only a few have been implemented and we would like to see more progress between now and 

Vilnius on these very important projects. 

So, to conclude, Senator, in 1970, it was unlikely that NATO and 

the Warsaw Pact would hand each other their order of battle, publish advance warning of and invite observers to their large military 

exercises, conduct thousands of intrusive inspections, and fly hundreds of uncontested reconnaissance sorties over each other’s territories. But now, we take these measures for granted. 

The OSCE, aided by this Commission, remains an important tool 

to prevent future conflicts, to resolve the remaining conflicts in 

Eurasia, to address new threats as they emerge. We hope to be a 

bit further along by this year in projecting the peace and security 
11 

of OSCE to other areas of instability, but clearly much more work 

remains to be done. 

I hope that by the time of the Vilnius meeting in December, the 

Astana summit will, ultimately, be seen as a turning point in reinvigorating OSCE’s security dimension and moving it boldly into the 

21st century. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you for that comprehensive presentation. I thank all three of you. 

It’s clear to me that if the Vilnius Ministerial is going to be successful, it’s going to require a great deal of preparation work by the 

United States. We saw a year ago with the Astana preparations— 

were not up to what we wanted it to be, and I agree with the observations; Secretary Gordon, but for your work and the U.S. work, I 

think that would’ve been a difficult time. I think we pulled out at 

the end some important work that was done in Astana. And I really do applaud the U.S. for your leadership there. 

We can’t chance that again. I think we need better preparation 

moving in to the Ministerial. Of course, this is not a summit, so 

the expectations are nowhere near as high, but it still, I think, requires us—it’s a once-a-year opportunity. And I listen to your testimony, and I think you do have the framework for some very important progress being made following up on Astana and Vilnius. And 

I just encourage you to work with our Commission here so that we 

can try to reinforce what you’re doing with the work of our Commission. 

I want to just follow up, if I might—Secretary Vershbow, that 

you pointed out: the strength of the OSCE, its geographical scope, 

the fact that it has the three baskets that are interwoven together, 

and its legacy. And we can all point with pride a lot of what has 

been done as a result of the OSCE. 

On the geographical side, since its inception, of course, the 

United States and Russia were equal partners in an organization 

in Europe which gave it a unique opportunity for the relationship 

between the United States and Russia. The breakup of the Soviet 

Union, of course, now gives us opportunities in Central Asia that 

we did not have before, and that’s still unclear as to how we’re 

going to be using that opportunity to advance Central Asia. 

And now, there is an interest in expanding the OSCE in the 

Mediterranean beyond just our partner states, in using the framework—it was Max Kampelman who originally suggested that we 

create a separate OSCE for the Mediterranean. Later, he said, 

well, it would take too long to do that; why don’t we just try to expand the Middle East into OSCE? And we’ve been doing that. 

We’ve been doing that through the partnership status. There is 

some talk within the Parliamentary Assembly to try to give the 

Mediterranean partners higher standing. I would be interested in 

the U.S. pursuing additional partner states in the Middle East as 

well as increased participation in the OSCE for the partner states. 

So I guess if you could—and I would like to hear all three of 

you—first, how you see us using the OSCE as it relates to Russia, 

which I think is a real challenge. We have some of the real experts 

here on Russia, so what should we be looking to as far as the fu-
12 

ture of the OSCE as it relates to Russia? Central Asia, sort of— 

[inaudible] 

Sec. GORDON. Senator, I’d be happy to begin and pick up on a 

couple of those. I’m sure my colleagues will follow up. 

First, if I might—and thank you for your kind words about our 

work on the road to Astana—I would note that your comments 

about the difficulty of Astana actually go hand in hand with your 

comments about the strength of OSCE, the strength of the OSCE 

being that it works in all three dimensions, that there are 56 participating states, its geography covers a broad swath of issues; that 

gives it certain advantages, everybody’s involved and it’s comprehensive. 

At the same time, it creates challenges in advancing the agenda 

that we saw in Astana, and we have no illusions about—on the 

road to Vilnius and beyond. It is just something that we have to 

live with. With a strong chairmanship in Lithuania and our own 

work and the support of the Commission, we hope to—despite 

these sort of structural challenges—make real progress in Vilnius. 

On the work in other areas, let me just start with the Mediterranean. We do believe that there is a role for the OSCE and the Mediterranean, one that it is indeed already playing. Even short of an 

OSCE for the Mediterranean, which, as you suggest, may be a 

bridge too far in the short term, the OSCE is already working with 

neighboring states in the Mediterranean. I think I mentioned in 

my testimony the workshop on elections in Egypt that just took 

place in the past couple of weeks. A number of OSCE members 

from Central Europe have had workshops on democratic transitions, which is something also the OSCE can help with. With years 

or even decades of experience of trying to support rule of law, democracy, free market economies in the OSCE space, it can be useful to those Mediterranean countries that are seeking that transition as well. 

And I guess I would say a similar thing about Central Asia, 

where the OSCE is already hard at work trying to do that—again, 

facing many challenges but trying to bring the lessons of what it 

has learned in decades of democratic support in Europe and Eurasia to Central Asia as well, and that will be another theme in 

Vilnius. 

Finally, on Russia: Once again, it’s a consensus organization. As 

Ambassador Vershbow said, we have had significant differences 

with Russia on some of the key issues we face, including in the 

area of arms control. But we can’t move forward without Russia. 

And we are committed to working with the Russians as we need 

to in trying to strengthen the organization and take advantage of 

one of its most important voices in the full range of issues. 

Sec. POSNER. If I can just add a couple thoughts to that: I think, 

to share Phil’s observation, clearly, in places like Tunisia, Egypt, 

hopefully in Libya, there is a desire to engage with European partners and European countries that have gone through political 

transformations moving towards democracy. If the OSCE can be a 

forum for making that happen in an easier way, then we should 

be encouraging that. 

And I think we’re going to see in the—I spend a lot of my time 

now trying to deal with that region, and there is—these are coun-
13 

tries that have had, in many instances, 30 or 40 years without any 

functioning political systems. And so it’s in our interest to facilitate 

that kind of exchange and engagement, not so much to impose our 

thoughts of what’s important, but try to have a real discussion 

among states that have been through a similar transformation. 

I think the Central Asian piece, from a human rights perspective, is in some respects the most important. Those five Central 

Asian states don’t have a Council of Europe or certainly not a European Union. And they’re tough states. On human rights terms, 

we have a range of challenges. But I think the OSCE, however 

fragile the architecture and however difficult, I think is a platform. 

And it’s an especially important platform for the civil society in 

those states who feel so marginalized by their own political systems. So I think even though we continue to struggle over how to 

keep this as part of the mix, it’s critically important in whatever 

we do that this be a piece of what we regard as a priority. 

And finally, again, to share Phil’s reflections on Russia, we have 

our own challenges in dealing with the Russians on a bilateral 

basis for human rights. But it’s part of the reset, it’s part of our 

policy. We’ll continue to engage. We understand that these are 

issues in which we often don’t agree, but that doesn’t mean we 

don’t have the conversation. And it spills over to the OSCE, where 

often the Russians are at loggerheads with us about how far the 

OSCE should go. It’s critical we keep ODIHR as a functioning, 

strong entity. It’s critical that we keep doing the election monitoring. It’s critical that the human dimension piece be strong and 

we keep that agenda where it needs to be. 

So we’ve got our work cut out for us. But I think we’re pretty 

clear about what we need to do. 

Sec. VERSHBOW. I thank you, Senator, for posing some very 

good—interesting questions, challenging ones because, it’s ironic, in 

the case of Russia that OSCE itself was something that evolved 

from a Russian or Soviet initiate—Brezhnev’s European Security 

Conference proposals. Yet now Russia seems less enthusiastic 

about the full three-basket structure and process that is at the 

heart of the OSCE. 

Clearly there’s a lot to be done on some of the issues I discussed 

in my statement in the area of conventional arms control. And I 

think the Russians still are keenly interested in that, even if we 

are having serious difficulties in the case of the CFE Agreement 

and finding a framework that respects the key principles of host 

nation consent and transparency that I mentioned. But hopefully 

the Russians will ultimately see that a world without any CFE 

Agreement, without the predictability and transparency that comes 

with negotiated arms control, will be a much more unreliable basis 

on which to build European security in the future. 

But we do face a bigger challenge in getting all three baskets 

back into the category of areas where the Russians are actively cooperating with us in the OSCE framework, and indeed, in other 

areas as well. Mike’s addressed the human rights issues; I think 

in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management we’ve 

been trying for the last few years to strengthen OSCE’s ability to 

act proactively and at the early stages of conflict. 
14 

But there too we’ve encountered Russian resistance to giving 

more authority to the chairman in office to take the initiative to 

send a fact-finding mission to an emerging area of conflict. But this 

ultimately should be in Russia’s interest. We all will save a lot in 

terms of potential for bloodshed and expenditure of our treasure if 

we can nip conflicts in the bud through political means. And that’s 

where OSCE has great strengths that should be built upon. 

I see tremendous potential in Central Asia to focus on some of 

the transnational issues as well as the human rights issues, since 

those countries do indeed not have as many other institutional 

frameworks to which they can turn. And I think there too with— 

whether you’re looking at drug trafficking, terrorism, organized 

crime—regional approaches that could be facilitated by OSCE 

would be tremendous contributors to Russia’s security and to everyone else’s. 

On the Mediterranean countries, I agree with my colleagues that 

the experience of the transition of the post-Cold War period is certainly something that OSCE could help in sharing with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. There may be mechanisms that could be transposed from the European framework to 

the Mediterranean framework and in the security area as well, 

helping countries in transition develop civilian control of the military—civil-military relations. And hereto there may be an increased role for NATO which has had a Mediterranean dialogue, 

which has largely been a consultative forum, but may now have 

some operational role in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace— 

what the Partnership for Peace did in Central and Eastern Europe 

and in the Balkans in the post-Cold War period. 

So it’s an organization with tremendous potential and we hope 

we can begin to realize more of that at Vilnius and beyond. And 

I agree with you on your points about closer preparation, and we 

will certainly want to coordinate closely with the commission as we 

go forward. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, I appreciate that. 

Secretary Posner, as you were talking about Russia and progress 

made in human rights and that we can deal with that and deal 

with other issues at the same time it reminded me of my first involvement with the Helsinki Commission dealing with Soviet Jews 

many years ago. And at that time, the logic of naming names was 

being challenged internationally. And naming names, I think, was 

perhaps the most effective way that the Commission was able to 

advance basic rights by putting a face on the issue. 

And I think most recently—and you mentioned the Sergei 

Magnitsky case, I think that also galvanized international attention. And although Russia may not like the fact that we have 

brought this on a personal level, it does bring it home that they 

have failed to live up to commitments under the OSCE. So I would 

just encourage us to continue to do that. I know there’s a lot of 

pressure not to embarrass countries because of individual cases, 

but to me that’s the most effective way that we’re going to be able 

to make progress towards compliance with the principles of OSCE. 

One last question I have, which—it’s a process question, and that 

is: The CSCE is 36 years old. When it was first developed, there 

was the Soviet Union, we didn’t have a Parliamentary Assembly, 
15 

Vienna was not what it is today. We’re seeing things that are happening; the consensus process is being challenged, transparency is 

clearly a problem within OSCE, there’s mixed signals we’re getting 

from many capitals around the OSCE region as to how much support they’re giving in Vienna. How does the United States interject 

itself into reforms within the OSCE? 

We have direct interest in the Parliamentary Assembly. It’s 

played a critical role in election monitoring, one of the principle 

services provided by the OSCE. There’s been friction between 

ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly. We had the secretary 

general of the Parliamentary Assembly—who happens to be with 

us today, Spencer Oliver—who was here in Congress when the 

original Helsinki Act was passed and has a lot of institutional 

knowledge of what needs to be done. 

I guess, as I saw the results in Astana, I realized that but for 

the United States we would not have been able to achieve what we 

did. It seems to me that reform within OSCE will not take place 

unless the United States is in the leadership. And how do we develop that? How does the United States put these issues up? I say 

that fully supportive of the importance of the OSCE today with all 

of its problems. But it could be much more effective, I think we all 

agree. How do we go about exercising that leadership in the United 

States? 

Sec. GORDON. And, again, I’m happy to start. And I’ll start by 

saying we share your premise, especially those of us who try to 

work with the organization on a regular basis. It is clear that it 

is suffering from the consensus principle and a lack of political will 

among countries to allow it to function as efficiently as it needs to. 

So how do we deal with that and how have we been trying to do 

it? 

First of all, as you say, through our own U.S. leadership and vigorous action. Secretary Clinton herself is personally invested in 

this. That’s why she went to Astana; that’s why she has focused on 

this whole set of issues. The organization has a new secretary general and we will give him our full support—a very competent 

Italian, an experienced Italian diplomat. You mentioned the Parliamentary Assembly which we will also support. This Commission, 

and through our own efforts, we have tried to find ways to make 

the organization more efficient by allowing it to act, in some cases, 

when there isn’t a consensus. 

And I think we mentioned using what’s called the Moscow Mechanism in Belarus. Obviously, when we wanted to follow up on the 

very flawed elections and the use of violence by the regime that followed those elections last December, if the OSCE had to wait for 

every member to agree—that is to say including Belarus—it 

couldn’t have played a role. So we invoked and supported the use 

of this Moscow Mechanism where a smaller number of OSCE countries can send an observer-investigator into a member state. And 

naturally, there was resistance to that in some quarters. But we 

actually managed to do it, and I might add including—with Russian support. 

So there are ways to use the organization. It’s not easy, but those 

types of mechanisms can make it more efficient. We tried to suggest a similar reform when it comes to crisis response. At present, 
16 

because of the consensus rule, the OSCE is just too slow. If violence breaks out in a participating state and most of us think it 

would be useful to have the OSCE send someone, it is necessary 

to get support of all of them, and lo and behold it’s not surprising 

that maybe the state that is using force doesn’t want it to happen. 

And we have tried to suggest that it would be more effective to 

have a crisis response mechanism that didn’t rely on consensus, 

whether it’s minus one or minus two or minus three. But that is 

one of the issues we have not reached consensus on, including from 

Russia which is reluctant to allow for that capacity. We still support it; we still think it would be a good idea to prevent a single 

country from blocking the organization as a whole to have a crisis 

response action. So that’s unfortunate, and we will continue to try 

to lobby for that change. 

And then lastly I would just say that—to remind us all that even 

when the organization at 56 in Vienna is stymied by a lack of consensus, we shouldn’t overlook the importance of the sub-organizations of the OSCE, including ODHIR, including the High Representative for Freedom of the Media, including the High Commissioner for National Minorities. These organizations are effective, 

sometimes quietly. So, you know, I just remind us all that even as 

we get frustrated sometimes maybe by an inability to get the entire 

organization to work, that doesn’t take anything away from the effectiveness of some of these subgroups. 

Sec. VERSHBOW. Thank you, Senator. And thanks, Phil. Phil has 

covered some points that I would have made. I think the bottom 

line is you’re right, that the American leadership is going to be critical to not only keeping the organization effective in what it’s doing 

now, but getting it to engage in new areas where I think it can fill 

a void in the overall security architecture of Europe and Eurasia. 

So we have to very persistent in our diplomacy, patient but not too 

patient. I think we have to recognize that if the institution doesn’t 

overcome what is, I think fair to call, a crisis of confidence on the 

part of some of its members in the institution itself, then it will be 

relegated to a second-tier status. 

So I think that we have to continue to work very hard to persuade the countries that have become more skeptical about OSCE 

that it really is an asset that they could use to deal with their own 

security problems and help them in dealing with threats on their 

doorstep, preventing conflicts from emerging; that it’s not a burden, 

it’s a relatively affordable institution in terms of what we spend on 

it, but it can deliver significant results. But clearly some countries 

still see OSCE as a threat. And we have to overcome that attitude. 

We certainly, from the DOD point of view, try to talk up OSCE 

in our defense dialogues with the countries in Europe and Eurasia. 

We certainly took a proactive role in the effort to revitalize the 

CFE Treaty. And while it has not yet borne fruit, we’re still committed to try to shape an approach that can respect the principles 

that are important to all the member states but get that negotiating process back on track and bring the agreement up to date in 

light of new geopolitical realities. 

So, again, persistence in our diplomacy will be key, but clearly 

we have an uphill climb ahead of us. 
17 

Sec. POSNER. Just a couple words to add what both have said. 

Having attended both the human dimension meeting in Warsaw 

and the summit in Astana last year, it is clear to me how much 

the United States’ leadership is vital. And I think it’s incumbent 

on us also to be redoubling our efforts to engage at every level the 

Western European allies that should be standing with us on all of 

these issues. They’re there, but they wait sometimes for us to lead. 

And for this organization to succeed, we have to have a critical 

mass of countries that are all working at full speed in the way that 

we do as a delegation. I’m very proud to be part of this Government 

because I see how much time and energy we put into these issues. 

Second thing, I think it is important that we change the dynamic 

in a different way, which is that we’ve got to move to create allies, 

for example, in the Central Asian area. It’s one of the reasons I 

mentioned Kyrgyzstan twice—I’m going to mention in now a third 

time. It represents a potential change in the atmosphere and the 

environment of this organization if we can reinforce the best instincts of an emerging democracy in Central Asia, which 

Kyrgyzstan could be—we’re not there yet—but it would suggest 

that we have an ally in a different place where we could begin to 

build, I think, some new dynamic changes. 

The third thing, just following on what Phil said, I’m very high 

on the work on the high representative on the media. I think she’s 

done an outstanding job. I also think the three tolerance representatives—Andy Baker in particular, who’s focused on antiSemitism—below the radar in some ways, but taking on very tough 

issues, doing real factual fact gathering, and building a kind of momentum on very tough issues that are particularly important now 

in Europe. And so that agenda, the tolerance agenda, to me is a 

critically important one. We’ve got to, again, pay attention and 

make sure that the resources and the political support is behind 

that. 

Last point, Senator, in relation to your comment on Magnitsky, 

I think it’s really important for us also to be taking on the tough 

cases, to make that part of the routine. Sometimes we do it privately, and when we can succeed that’s the best. But as you’ve 

done in the Magnitsky case, you’ve raised the profile, you’ve caused 

us to, you know, redouble our efforts. We were very engaged, but 

we’re now engaged some more. And we’ve certainly seen the reaction on the Russian side is that you’ve gotten their attention. And 

I think that’s a good thing. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, I thank you all for your observations there. I 

was going to make an observation that the parliamentarians can 

really help you bring about the kind of consensus you need, but I 

didn’t think this was good day for me to mention that, considering 

where we are in Congress. But I do think that the political involvement of the Parliamentary Assembly can help. 

As you mentioned, and I think rightly so, that the institutions 

within OSCE had a great deal of strength. Even though we need 

consensus for overall action, we have the institutions that are now 

well established. I might point out that in almost every one of 

those cases it was the leadership of the United States that either 

initiated or funded their operations. There was a lot of extra budgetary support that the United States was behind to support the 
18 

human rights capacity of OSCE. And of course the tolerance was 

the U.S. initiative. 

So I guess what I would encourage us all to do—as we look towards the future, how do we transform OSCE to continue to be relevant to meet the current needs? And that’s why I look at expanding its geographical side. I look at some of the steps that we could 

take to integrate a better relationship between the Parliamentary 

Assembly and the Permanent Council and what happens in Vienna. Those issues, I think, are election monitoring, which is one 

of our signature issues, and to make sure that we continue to have 

the type of support to be able to carry out those important functions. I think all that would be important for us to continue. 

Just one positive note before we call the second panel. Our annual meeting was in Belgrade, and we look in the Balkans today, 

and I think—although there’s still many challenges, Kosovo and 

Bosnia are still very much at risk—but clearly the progress that’s 

been made in the Balkans reflect not just the work of the OSCE 

but the leadership of the United States. And I couldn’t tell you how 

proud we were to see the progress that was made in Serbia. 

I mean, Serbia was one of my principle countries of interest just 

a few years ago for its failure to meet OSCE commitments. And 

now it’s clearly on the path for moving towards EU. And that’s, I 

think, a credit to the support of the United States and the support 

of the OSCE through the process. So I think there’s been a lot of 

successes that we can point to, but we still have challenges that 

we have to meet. 

And with that thank you all very much. And we’ll move to the 

second panel. And, again, I apologize for the delay. Just for the 

record, tell our first panel there may be questions that we’ll be submitting for the record. We would ask if you would get them back 

to us in a timely way. 

The second panel will consist of Dr. Mike Haltzel, senior fellow 

at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a senior adviser 

at the international consulting firm of McLarty Associates. We also 

have Cathy Fitzpatrick, a consultant to the human rights organization, a frequent contributor to online publications at Eurasia and 

about the OSCE, and also a Russian translator. She has testified 

for our Commission several times, and has served as a public member of the U.S. delegation to OSCE Human Dimensions in 1991, 

2004 and 2010. 

And I appreciate the patience of both of you—obviously we’re a 

little bit delayed. And we will try to move this on. We will keep 

the record open for questions from members of the Commission. We 

would ask our witnesses if questions are asked to try to respond 

to them as promptly as possible. 

Dr. Haltzel, I’d be glad to start with you. 

DR. MICHAEL HALTZEL, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR 

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

(SAIS) 

Mr. HALTZEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask, first of all, 

that the full text of my written remarks be entered into the record. 
19 

Mr. CARDIN. That’s be true for both witnesses, your full testimony will be included in the record, and you may proceed as you 

wish. 

Mr. HALTZEL. Thank you. It’s an honor and a pleasure to participate in today’s hearing. I’d like to take this opportunity to commend you and Congressman Smith for your energetic leadership of 

the Helsinki Commission. In a policy world where coping with daily 

crisis makes it easy not to see the forest for the trees, the Helsinki 

Commission stands out for its ability to examine both current problems and their deeper causes. 

I would also mention the, quote-unquote, ‘‘foot soldiers’’ of our 

OSCE policy. During the past two years I’ve had the honor of being 

the head of three U.S. delegations to OSCE conferences. The 2009 

H-Dem [ph] in Warsaw, 2010 Copenhagen 20th Anniversary Conference, and the 2010 Vienna Review Conference. I can honestly 

say, Senator, I’ve never encountered a more expert, hard-working 

and effective group of public servants than the members of those 

three delegations and the officials backing them up here in Washington, D.C. Several of them are here in the room today. I think 

American people are being extraordinarily well served by, and 

should be proud of, these U.S. Federal employees. 

Mr. Chairman, a lot of the territory was covered eloquently by 

the three assistant secretaries on the first panel. I will attempt to 

give a somewhat more general summary of an outsider who on occasion has been part of the OSCE process. When one views the 

Helsinki process over the nearly four decades of its existence one 

must, I believe, judge it to have been a resounding success. The old 

CSCE played a significant role in hastening the demise of communism in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia; and the territory of the OSCE today is unquestionably in much better shape 

than it was when the founders began their deliberations in the 

Finnish capital in the early 1970s. 

That’s the relatively good news. The bad news—and I think 

we’ve heard it, again, in the first panel and from you also, Senator, 

is that since arguably its high point in 1990 at the Copenhagen 

Conference on the Human Dimension, where actually I was a public member, the organization has, in many respects, been a disappointment. To be sure, it faces formidable challenges. We’ve 

talked about Uzbekistan, in Andijan the massacre in 2005; 

Kyrgyzstan, which as a new democratic government and there is 

some hope, nonetheless had a violent, repressive leader who fled 

last year. We know about the insurgency spreading in Russia’s 

largely Muslim North Caucasus where Moscow has farmed out control of Chechnya to a brutal warlord. 

These and other abuses, again, were outlined by the first panel 

and by Chairman Smith. Russia’s military continues illegally to occupy parts of Georgia and Moldova, talks on the protracted conflicts seems stalled. 

What has the OSCE been able to do to remedy these problems? 

Unfortunately, I don’t think enough. Last December’s first-in-adecade OSCE summit undoubtedly accomplished a formal reaffirmation of the organization’s lofty principles. We deserve credit for 

leadership there, Phil Gordon especially. 
20 

In a healthy organization, however, I submit that this reaffirmation would have been considered unnecessary. And we, as you 

know, did plan for an action plan. My final statement at Vienna, 

we outlined nine areas where the United States felt progress had 

to be made or we could not agree to an action plan. I’m glad we 

stuck to our principles because it would have been incomplete otherwise. 

The consensus rule we’ve talked about has become an increasing 

burden. Nondemocratic members, Russia above all, continually stymie organizational progress. We’ve talked about American crisis response proposals that have been blocked: preventive action in 

North Caucasus, aid in Afghanistan. 

The lack of an enforcement mechanism is also a fundamental 

weakness of the OSCE. At the Copenhagen conference last June, 

where several other people on the staff were also present as members of the delegation, we had a remarkably free and open discussion in the last session. And all of the countries basically said that 

the lack of an enforcement mechanism is a serious flaw. 

The public naming and shaming of human rights violators at the 

HDIM drives nondemocratic participating states up the wall. 

That’s fine, and occasionally, it does improve the conditions of imprisoned civil rights advocates. It rarely alters general governmental behavior. It doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue trying; we 

should. 

As several people have said, in the face of constant stonewalling, 

some segments of the OSCE do manage to carry out their mandates with distinction. I would cite especially Dunja Mijatovic, the 

representative on freedom of the media; ODIHR, of course; Knut 

Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; 

the Parliamentary Assembly; and last but not least, the valuable 

field missions and training programs of the organization. 

I won’t repeat what Secretary Vershbow had to say about the 

arms control mandate. It’s abundantly clear that Moscow’s refusal 

to accept the host nation consent principle and transparency is a 

real disappointment. I certainly hope that the update of the Vienna 

Document at the December Vilnius ministerial will succeed. 

So finally, we have an organization whose effectiveness varies 

widely. As a norm setter, the OSCE has few, if any equals. Its specialized agencies and field mission remain valuable international 

players. But in enforcing its democratic and human rights principles and its arms control efforts, the OSCE has proved to be a 

disappointment. So what should we do? 

Mr. Chairman, frustrating though it may be to some, I would 

argue for more, not less commitment to the organization. U.S. leadership, as we’ve all heard, is absolutely essential. We should redouble our commitment both in personnel and in behavior. We have 

excellent people at our permanent mission in Vienna and a firstrate staff. 

We should continue to introduce constructive initiatives such as 

more effective crisis response mechanisms, which had been vetoed 

until now; updating the Vienna document, as I said; Internet freedom; greater economic transparency; more gender equality. Many 

of these may be vetoed, but nonetheless I think demonstrating that 
21 

the U.S. is a good international citizen and a leader at the OSCE 

has intrinsic value that should not be underestimated. 

At the HDIM, in that same vein, we should always be candid 

about our own national shortcomings. We should publicly own up 

to our deficiencies, as we have done, but then we should explain 

the measures that we’re taking to try to rectify them. This increases our credibility within the organization, especially among 

the European participating states. 

I think the United States should always be the foremost champion of NGOs and their right to participate in OSCE conferences, 

and, whenever possible, even in Permanent Council meetings. 

In the negotiations over all manner of OSCE documents, from 

routine announcements to treaties, we should be second to none as 

paragraph experts, even if people consider us nitpickers. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we should never ‘‘go along to get along.’’ 

On the vast majority of issues confronting the OSCE, we are in 

agreement with our European friends and allies. Occasionally, however, if they are willing, allegedly, quote, unquote, for the good of 

the organization, to acquiesce in resolutions or draft agreements 

that we feel would jeopardize our national interest or compromise 

the principles of the OSCE, we must resist group pressure to provide consensus. No matter how much eye-rolling it may occasion, 

our being a minority of one in such rare cases is not only ethically 

sound, but also organizationally the most supportive position for 

the OSCE. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I thank you again 

for the opportunity to offer my views. I look forward to attempting 

to answer any of your questions. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you again for your testimony. Ms. 

Fitzpatrick? 

CATHERINE FITZPATRICK, CONSULTANT, JACOB BLAUSTEIN 

INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

Ms. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Senator, especially for treating the 

OSCE as the indispensable organization. 

What I would like to do today in my testimony is to focus on the 

excellent recommendations that have already been made by the 

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in the Belgrade Declaration. But it 

needs some focus, as it’s a very long document. 

OSCE should concentrate on developing a more effective capacity 

to react diplomatically to crisis with particular attention to 

strengthening human rights investigation capacity and high-level 

public statements on crises. 

There is a very frayed political consensus now, and the OSCE 

faces not only its longstanding set of frozen, and, in some places, 

thawing conflicts, but new challenges as we’ve seen this last year: 

the pogroms in Kyrgyrstan, the brutal crackdown in Belarus, the 

regression on press freedom by Kazakhstan even as it was chairing 

the organization, and, of course, the appalling terrorist attacks in 

Russia, Belarus and now, tragically, Norway. 

We never expected these kind of tragedies when we saw the Berlin Wall fall when the Soviet Union dismantled. And it seems as 

if our Helsinki ideals have not come to pass. The organization has 
22 

not been able to predict or respond to these kinds of incidents effectively. 

So to that end, we must increase the complementarity, integration, and effectiveness of the various offices. We should work at the 

ministerial level on a consensus-minus-one basis to have a standby 

rapid reaction diplomatic mission. We should strengthen the ability 

of ODIHR, the High Commissioner for Nationalities, the various 

special representatives and the Parliamentary Assembly to mount 

fact-finding missions as an integral part of their function. We 

should also enable the OSCE’s secretary general and other OSCE 

leaders to speak out more in condemnation of human rights violations, and not just leave it to the rapporteurs. 

All the deployed missions should have a human rights component, and they should report more publicly than they do. All the 

various institutions of OSCE should report to the Permanent Council more, and that body should become more transparent. I would 

advocate creating an OSCE mandate for freedom of association 

with particular focus on human rights defenders; this was done 

successfully by the U.S. at the U.N. Human Rights Council, and 

that could be replicated. And we should ensure that groups that incite hatred or violence or that call for the destruction of any state 

or for the destruction of anyone’s rights do not receive government 

support. 

So the fact finding, which used to be at the heart of Helsinki experience with the citizens’ movements, it seems to everywhere have 

been substituted with technical assistance and training seminars. 

And that’s a strategy that evolved to cope with the refusal of some 

states to admit observers and accept criticism of their record. 

Through extraordinary efforts, the Finnish politician Kimmo 

Kiljunen was able to mount a prestigious fact-finding panel in 

Kyrgyzstan, as you know. Its findings represent an important validation of the fact that while 75 percent of the victims were ethnic 

Uzbeks, nearly a hundred percent of those tried for the violence are 

also ethnic Uzbeks. And this disparity represents a grave injustice. 

Although he was invited to investigate the June pogroms by President Roza Otunbayeva, Kiljunen was subsequently denounced by 

the Kyrgyz parliament and declared persona non grata. So the 

OSCE PA has followed up with this. There’s been hearings with 

NGOs and so on, but more is required. The Lithuanian chair-inoffice should immediately appoint a special envoy on Central Asia 

to continue to press for implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. And there is a precedent for such an envoy. 

As good as it was, this Commission exposed significant weaknesses in OSCE: the lack of a well-functioning permanent institution staffed with regional experts and lawyers to perform factfinding missions in rapid and thorough fashion. 

Throughout OSCE’s history, the function of fact finding has been 

performed by different offices in different ways at different times: 

Sometimes it’s ODIHR with a very good report on Kosovo and 

Chechnya in the past and on Andijan; sometimes it’s the High 

Commissioner for Nationalities; sometimes it’s the Parliamentary 

Assembly. So this is where this needs to be coordinated and institutionalized better. 
23 

This process of fact finding should be shielded from political processes. And to that end, the various bodies, such as ODIHR and 

Parliamentary Assembly, should coordinate better and institutionalize their fact finding and interact with the Vienna Conflict 

Prevention Centre and the Permanent Council. 

The right to know and act upon one’s rights, which was the inspiration for the founding of the Helsinki citizens’ movement, is 

still not a reality, even 35 years later. 

Regrettably, work on behalf of NGO legalization has devolved 

into a very tedious and expensive exercise in technical assistance 

to two states for drafting laws and civic association parties. But for 

some governments, that turns into an opportunity to exhibit their 

duplicity and procrastination. So I would rather see—instead of 

this focus on drafting laws, I would like the OSCE to have a special 

mandate to focus on the civic organizations that already exist and 

their actual problems and to intervene with states on their behalf, 

particularly for human rights monitors. 

And even as we want to promote civil society, we also have to 

be mindful of groups that incite imminent violence, and that 

speaks to the role of the tolerance mandates and so on to report 

more effectively. 

The Permanent Council could indeed become more open and 

transparent. While some officials do brief these meetings, the head 

of ODIHR, the tolerance rapporteurs, the mission heads—they’re 

an invaluable resource—they should all be coming to the Permanent Council and reporting more. 

As for the call for public meetings at the Permanent Council— 

well, we have seen at the U.N. Security Council that, regrettably, 

when you have open meetings, than can lead to more public posturing and canned speeches, and it drives the real work then even 

further behind the scenes. So what I feel is more operative is that, 

even if the sausage-making of diplomacy is hidden from us, we 

should see the product of it more often. So that means more consensus text from the chair, more negotiated resolutions, more reporting. The U.S., of course, has set a good example already by 

publishing their speeches to the Permanent Council; few others, if 

any, do. 

As for briefing by NGOs, there was a call in the Belgrade Declaration to make this as often as once a week. I fear that would 

only lead to some special interests posturing again and also only 

those wealthy organizations that can afford to stay in Vienna 

would be able to report. So I would like to see other ways of just 

incorporating the NGO information better and also arranging briefings occasionally. 

Work on the charter status for OSCE should be delayed. An organization that has had two missions expelled or suspended—in 

Belarus and Georgia—and has had grave situations where OSCE 

monitors or police advisers could not be deployed in a timely fashion or were expelled, as we saw in Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan— 

that’s not an organization that should be drafting a charter until 

a basic consensus on both the nature and the remedies for these 

situations is reached. We all lament the absence of [teeth ?] for the 

many good findings and recommendations of OSCE. 
24 

A debate on membership or expulsion criteria will likely be futile. We could try to agree that no state seriously violating Helsinki 

principles should be allowed to chair the organization, and yet that 

is also a process we find we’re not able to start—to question. 

But what we can do is create benchmarks that are very clear for 

what we expect of the chair; for example, Ukraine coming in and 

articulate those forcefully well in advance, and to protect those 

groups inside the country that continue to expose the violations by 

the state that is serving as chair. 

So there’s little that we can do sometimes, but when all else fails, 

we can refuse to validate a state’s behavior. And that’s when— 

when we look at some of the challenges coming up—for example, 

the Russian elections—I think it’s very important not to reopen the 

process of evaluating criteria for monitoring; we should leave that 

as is and hopefully make the same kind of credible statement about 

these elections that ODIHR and others have made in the past. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank both of you for your testimony. You’ve 

given us a lot of really good ideas on the type of reform. I put at 

the top of the list consensus minus one, particularly as it relates 

to administrative decisions. We can move faster in that. Transparency, to me, is a huge issue within OSCE. The development of 

the structure in Vienna, which seems to be, in many cases, independent of the member state capitals, and how we get greater response in Vienna—quicker response and be able to work more effectively to deal with current issues—I think all of that’s important. 

I want to ask one question, and we may have some additional 

questions for the record. And this is one that I don’t think has been 

given a lot of thought as to whether this is the best way to move 

forward within OSCE. And that is the chair-in-office. 

I mean, some of your proposals are to give more authority to the 

secretary general or to allow the different institutions to be able to 

move forward or to have greater accountability within the institutions directly to the secretary general. But it seems to me that so 

much depends upon the chair-in-office within OSCE. And I must 

tell you, I’m not sure there’s a clear path as to how the future 

chairmanships are going to be determined within OSCE. There’s 

certainly a geographical discussion going on now. And I don’t know 

what the answer is, but I am concerned about so much dependent 

upon which country is the chair within OSCE and whether there 

isn’t a better way to provide a direction than a yearly rotation of 

the chair from one of the member states. 

Ms. FITZPATRICK. Well, Senator, I would keep the chair-in-office 

because it’s—as with other multilateral organizations, you have the 

EU changes every six months, you have the U.N. Security Council 

changes its presidency every month. So changing once a year isn’t 

so terrible. And in any multilateral organization, you’re in a dialogue with some states that are not like-minded; sooner or later, if 

they’re members, they’re going to rotate into the chair. 

I think what—a lot of time was spent during Kazakhstan’s chair 

in trying to explain precedents to them and bolstering precedents 

from good practices by chairs, so that’s important. 
25 

Mr. CARDIN. I don’t disagree with that. I’m really raising this, 

not so much to suggest that there be a different—but how do you 

deal with that? With Kazakhstan coming in as chair-in-office, it 

was so much attention on the chair that it really, in some respect, 

detracted from the organization. 

Ms. FITZPATRICK. I agree that it did detract, and I think that’s 

where we have to work at bolstering ODIHR and the capacity of 

other bodies to do fact finding, because the chair—during the 

Kazakh chair, there was very poor response on fact finding in crises. 

But on the other hand, things like appointing—I mentioned appointing the special envoy. That is within the power of the chair. 

There’s not a lot you can undo, but they do have this discretionary 

power to appoint people, and then—and how they shape the human 

dimension seminars, what the topics are. So there is some scope 

there for making the chair effective. 

Mr. HALTZEL. I agree with you, Senator, it’s a real problem. Don’t 

forget we were one of the last countries to agree to Kazakhstan’s 

chairmanship-in-office. You know all about that. I believe the U.K. 

and the Czech Republic were the other two. There were meetings 

in Madrid. They promised some things, several of which they never 

delivered on. 

I’m not enamored of the idea. And yes, the EU has a rotating 

presidency, but they’ve whittled that way, way down as a result of 

their newest—I mean, basically, the presidency of the EU means 

a whole lot less than it did before the Lisbon Treaty. So I’m not 

sure that that’s much of a model. 

Look, I think what we can do is, first of all, be very careful about 

who gets into the chairmanship. And then we can bolster them. As 

you well know, we have been helping the Lithuanians. I think 

that’s extremely good. Todd Becker, one of our experienced diplomats, I’m told, has been seconded there for the year. And some 

of the smaller countries need that sort of help. And in fact, I remember when Slovenia was chairman-in-office several years ago; 

they sent people over here to talk to us to try to help them. But 

beyond that, I don’t know. I have the same sort of doubts that you 

do. 

If I could backtrack on just one thing very briefly—and that has 

to do with the suspension idea—I had that in my written statement—but I feel that yes, the Moscow Mechanism is being used 

against Belarus right now, but we heard from an earlier testimony 

that the Belarusians are managing to stonewall even within the 

Moscow mechanism. It is not unheard of to suspend a country from 

the OSCE; it was done in 1992 against Yugoslavia, then Serbia and 

Montenegro because of the wars there. I think if one is talking 

about leverage, I think the United States should carefully consider 

bringing up a resolution of suspension unless Belarus cooperates 

fully with the Moscow Mechanism and changes some of its behavior. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, our delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly 

a couple of years ago challenged Belarus, and we didn’t get very 

far. So it’s a tough thing to actually accomplish. But your point is 

very well taken. 
26 

Let me ask you one final question as it relates to Russia. What 

do you think—we know what Russia’s intentions were when the 

CSCE was formed: They wanted legitimacy in the international 

community, and they thought that they could withstand the scrutiny. And now we’re not exactly sure what their intentions are. 

Would you want to share with us what you think our best strategy 

should be with Russia as it relates to the OSCE? 

Mr. HALTZEL. Senator, I think they have, to some extent, contradictory strategies. Don’t forget, in 2008, President Medvedev 

gave a speech in Berlin outlining his idea for a new European security architecture, which was brought up within the OSCE and, I’m 

happy to say, has more or less died a peaceful death. It would have 

clearly undermined NATO and it should’ve been, and I think really 

was, a nonstarter. I testified before the Permanent Council on this 

in 2009. 

My own feeling is that Russia would like HDIM to vanish from 

the face of the earth. They would like to concentrate on the arms 

control areas to their own advantage. And they don’t really care 

very much about the economic and environmental. I don’t think 

they want to see the whole organization die. I think they’d be 

happy to see it just sort of dangle in the wind. 

What should we do about this? I think what we should do about 

it is what we should do about the whole organization: redouble our 

commitment. Put them on the spot. I mean, they had a perm rep 

in Vienna who was the—[laughs]—I have to laugh—the most aggressive but skillful man imaginable. I mean, and he would just 

bull straight ahead. There’s only one way to deal with that; it’s just 

have more staying power than they do, be completely open about 

the arguments they’re making being specious, be the last delegation to leave a negotiation and show our European friends that 

we’re leaders and that we’re good international citizens and that 

we want to be the leaders of the OSCE. 

Mr. CARDIN. Good point. 

Ms. FITZPATRICK. Well, I think on the challenge of Russia, that 

it was actually a very explicit plan of Russia to undermine OSCE’s 

human rights components. From their letter some years ago, signed 

also by Kazakhstan and others, I think they’ve worked very methodically at destroying budgets, undermining the principles. So I 

think they have to be called on that. 

And I think the elections present profound opportunity, but also 

a challenge, because ODIHR and others will be under enormous 

pressure to call that as being valid. And we can already see with 

the crackdown on Live Journal, with many problems in Russia, 

their real conditions don’t obtain for free and fair elections. So I 

think focusing on the election is very important. And I also think 

that the Moscow Mechanism has to mechanize in Moscow on 

Belarus. We have to explicitly negotiate with Russia on Belarus. 

There’s one school of thought that says, never raise Belarus with 

Russia, because that puts it into their sphere of influence. But 

they’re the ones who bail out Lukashenko. Their television is also 

very important. So I think any component—you know, programming that we do should focus on Russian television. It’s no AlJazeera for this region by any stretch, but it’s all we have as far 
27 

as reaching the whole region by satellite, so we should work more 

on getting on Russian television to make known our views. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, let me thank both of you. I think your testimonies have been very helpful to us as we try to chart the future 

leading up to the ministerial in Vilnius, but more importantly, 

leading to the future of the OSCE. With that, our hearing will 

stand adjourned. Thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(29) 

A P P E N D I X 
30 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Good afternoon and welcome to our witnesses and everyone joining us today. It 

is not often that we have the honor of hearing from three assistant secretaries at 

the same time, including two also serving as Helsinki Commissioners. As Chairman 

of the Helsinki Commission, I appreciate the close and cooperative relationship the 

commission has long had with the executive branch. 

Today we will explore U.S. policy towards the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—a unique intergovernmental organization that incorporates 

human rights and economic development into its comprehensive concept of security. 

Unfortunately, over the past several years, OSCE countries with poor human 

rights records have been able to thwart some of the Organization’s work on these 

issues. 

Last December, at the Astana summit, the OSCE’s first summit since 1999, OSCE 

states failed to reach consensus on an action plan laying out priorities for the coming years. Yet the OSCE needs to continue to focus on fundamental human rights 

issues. This is its heritage—the reason it was created in the 1970s. It must not 

allow itself to be sidetracked by Russia or other un- or semi-democratic states which 

argue that the Organization should look only at positive examples of ‘‘best practices,’’ or that distract the OSCE from its work by insisting on lengthy discussions 

of OSCE ‘‘reform.’’ 

Likewise our own Government must raise the priority given to human rights and 

humanitarian concerns, from supporting oppressed people of Belarus, turning back 

the trend to restrict Internet and media freedom, supporting democracy in 

Kyrgyzstan, democratic activists throughout all of central Asia, making sure the 

OSCE Partnership program is used to genuinely promote human rights for oppressed minorities, as for the Copts in Egypt, helping OSCE countries to address 

the disturbing and potentially tragic demographic trends found in almost all member states. All of these have been the subject of recent Commission hearings, and 

we look forward to working with the executive branch on these issues. 

One issue I’d particularly like to raise here is international child abduction. I authored a resolution that was adopted at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual 

Session in Belgrade earlier this month urging the OSCE to take up the issue of 

international parental child abductions by promoting better implementation of the 

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. I believe 

the OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius this year could set new standards for OSCE states 

to fill gaps in the convention’s implementation, and hope to be able to work together 

with the Department of State toward this goal. 
31 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEC. PHILIP H. GORDON

Introduction 

Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Cardin, Members of the Commission: Thank you 

very much for inviting me here today to discuss our agenda for the OSCE. Let me 

also take this opportunity to thank the excellent Helsinki Commission staff members who have worked long, hard, and in cooperation with their State colleagues to 

safeguard the principles and commitments of the OSCE, and to hold participating 

States to account. 

I will focus my remarks today on the OSCE in the aftermath of the December, 

2010 Astana Summit. I will begin by looking at our core foreign policy goals for the 

OSCE, reviewing the achievements of Astana and looking forward to the OSCE’s 

Ministerial meeting in Vilnius this December. 

OSCE: Shared Values, Inconsistent Implementation 

Nowhere does the United States have better or more valuable partners than in 

Europe. The U.S. and Europe share common values, our economies are intertwined, 

and our militaries work together to address common security challenges. U.S. bilateral engagement with our European partners is complemented by our work together 

in key multilateral regional institutions. Our engagement with NATO Allies—including operational military cooperation—on the full gamut of security issues has 

no equivalent anywhere else in the world. Through the OSCE we are able to engage 

on such U.S. priorities as advancing human rights and fundamental freedoms, 

building democratic institutions in the Western Balkans, combating trafficking in 

persons, as well as North Africa and Afghanistan, to name just a few. In this age 

of a tight budget and many demands, multilateral approaches often present a more 

effective alternative to unilateral engagement. 

The OSCE was founded on the principle of comprehensive security, that is, the 

conviction that true security has an economic and environmental dimension and a 

human dimension, in addition to the political-military dimension. As the 

world’slargest regional security organization with membership that stretches from 

Vancouver to Vladivostok, with partners in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, 

the OSCE has unmatched scope to advance this concept and strengthen security 

across all three dimensions and increasingly beyond the OSCE region itself. 

Today the principles and commitments enshrined in the founding document of the 

OSCE—the Helsinki Final Act—are facing serious challenges from both inside and 

outside the organization. From within, there is uneven application of the Helsinki 

principles, and I regret to say that there are OSCE participating States where journalists can find it too dangerous to report the news, where political activists are 

beaten and incarcerated, where religious and minority groups, such as the Roma, 

continue to face persecution, and where economic growth is stifled by endemic corruption. Regional crises and transnational threats are proliferating. Efforts to resolve the protracted conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh continue 

to face frustrating obstacles. The OSCE’s inability to reach consensus on ways to 

address these issues is increasingly identified by critics as evidence of the organization’s ineffectiveness. 

This Commission—and your able staff—know well the reasons why OSCE decision-making is complicated and how easy it is for one nation to use the organization’s consensus rule to prevent timely and effective action in a situation of crisis. 

Russia’s determination to limit the role of OSCE in Georgia, for example, has diminished possibilities for international engagement in this region where transparency 

and confidence-building are sorely needed. 

Problems like these make headlines, but they offer only a partial picture of the 

role OSCE plays in Europe today. The OSCE has deepened and strengthened European and Eurasian security through initiatives to enhance rule of law, provide for 

free and fair elections, develop an independent media, respect the rights of minority 

groups, and improve the ability of citizens to exercise their fundamental freedoms. 

The OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the 

OSCE’s field missions have been at the forefront in assisting OSCE participating 

States to strengthen their democracy and thereby their security. 

In concert with those bodies, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the High Commissioner for National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and 

the Chairmanship’s Special Representatives on Tolerance and Gender Issues make 

for a powerful set of instruments to help participating States live up to their commitments and thus bring security to the region.The OSCE has made tremendous 

strides toward building a zone of prosperity and stability that stretches from western Canada to the Russian Far East. Although it is at times stymied by a lack of 
32 

sustained political will and attempts by some participating States to constrain its 

flexibility, the OSCE nonetheless remains uniquely positioned to build confidence, 

promote good governance, and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in 

Europe and Eurasia. 

Moving Forward from Astana 

At the Astana Summit last December—the first OSCE Summit in eleven years— 

the 56 participating States issued the Astana Commemorative Declaration—a 

strong reaffirmation of the Helsinki principles and commitments and the entire 

OSCE acquis. This included the first-ever explicit affirmation by the former Soviet 

states of the declaration originally made in the OSCE’s 1991 Moscow Document that 

makes human rights conditions in individual OSCE participating States matters of 

‘‘direct and legitimate concern’’ to all of them. The final document also tasked future 

OSCE Chairmanships to build on efforts last year to develop an action plan to address a range of common challenges that notably include the protracted conflicts, 

conflict prevention and crisis response, counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, issues 

facing media freedom, anti-Semitism, treatment of minorities such as the Roma and 

Sinti, and trafficking in persons to name a few. 

The Astana Summit also underscored the vital role that civil society plays in the 

OSCE region, as numerous human rights activists from some of the OSCE region’s 

most embattled corners engaged constructively with government delegations and 

provided input to the work of the Summit. With strong U.S. support, NGOs and civil 

society representatives participated in the final three days of the Human Dimension 

portion of the Review Conference preceding the Summit, as well as in a civil society 

forum and an independently organized parallel NGO conference. Secretary Clinton 

also held a vibrant, standing-room only town hall event at Eurasian University with 

NGO and civil society representatives. 

The Astana Summit opened a new chapter for the OSCE. It provided renewed impetus for action to make the OSCE space—including the Central Asian space—even 

more democratic, prosperous, and secure for our citizens. The Administration has 

remained deeply engaged in the work of the OSCE across all three dimensions. We 

are seeking ways to sustain the momentum that was generated—in both government and civil society networks—by the Astana Summit. 

Lithuania’s Chairmanship 

In 2010 and 2011, crises in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the ongoing 

need for the OSCE to hold its membership to the highest standards of human rights 

performance and comprehensive security. The tragic case in Russia of Sergey 

Magnitsky, a lawyer who died in pre-trial detention, is most illustrative of the problems facing the judiciaries of too many member states, and a problem that we are 

seeking to address in close consultation with Senator Cardin and others on this 

committee. 

We will continue to press for greater implementation of OSCE commitments in 

Europe. The Arab Spring has shown us vividly the link between democracy and security, and we will look for opportunities to offer OSCE expertise in democratic 

transition and institution building to the countries of North Africa and to the 

OSCE’s other partners, such as Afghanistan. 

Soon after the Astana Summit, Belarus presented the first challenge for the 

OSCE as its government launched a sustained, brutal crackdown against opposition 

politicians and activists, civil society, and independent media after a flawed presidential election. Since then, we have worked closely with the Lithuanian Chairmanin-Office, the EU, and like-minded OSCE participating States to manage and address these issues. Despite rhetoric that it was willing to cooperate with the OSCE, 

Belarus refused to extend the mandate of the OSCE Office in Minsk, claiming that 

the Office’s mandate had been completed. At the government’s insistence, the OSCE 

office in Minsk officially closed in March. In stark contrast to the stunning events 

unfolding during the Arab Spring in Northern Africa, Belarus seems to have entered 

a prolonged winter of backpedaling on human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

In response, we joined with 13 other participating States to invoke the Moscow 

Mechanism, a tool established in the 1991 Moscow Document that allows for special 

rapporteur missions to address concerns about the implementation of human rights 

commitments. Together we appointed a rapporteur to investigate the crackdown by 

the Government of Belarus against opposition candidates, civil society representatives and journalists, and the mass arrests that followed the December 19 presidential election. Though Belarus refused to cooperate, the rapporteur was able to 

conduct his fact-finding mission and reported back with a number of constructive 

recommendations that holds the Government of Belarus accountable for its failure 
33 

to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms,including freedom of expression, 

prohibiting torture, and upholding the rule of law. We continue to work to ensure 

that the OSCE and the international community focus on the concerns raised in the 

report. 

Dramatic developments in OSCE’s partner states have captured headlines. Working closely with the Lithuanian Chair, we have supported engagement with Tunisia 

and Egypt in order to offer OSCE expertise to nascent democracies emerging in 

North Africa. We are taking a realistic, pragmatic approach offering advice and 

guidance on issues such as democratic elections and human rights monitoring. Assistance could come through sharing of materials such as handbooks and guidelines, 

visits by subject matter experts, and participation in OSCE meetings, conferences, 

seminars, as well as specific projects—either in the OSCE region or in the Partner 

State. At the request of Egyptian activists, ODIHR is already organizing a workshop 

for Egyptian civil society on international standards and tools of election observation, in advance of Egypt’s November parliamentary elections. 

Goals for Vilnius 

In December, the OSCE will meet in Vilnius, Lithuania at the level of foreign 

ministers to review results achieved since Astana and take decisions for future 

work. The United States is working with like-minded partners to achieve specific 

results in all three dimensions: 

• In the political-military dimension, we want to agree on a substantial update 

of the Vienna Document, which will be reissued at Vilnius for the first time 

since 1999. Building on the existing measures, we are re-examining how data 

exchange, notification, observation, and possibly other measures can offer greater security and transparency in light of today’s smaller post-Cold War military 

establishments. Our effort to update the Vienna Document is part of our broader commitment to improve military transparency in Europe and ensure arms 

control and the confidence and security building measures regime are relevant 

to the challenges of the 21st century. U.S. efforts to find a way forward on the 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty are separate from this work on 

Vienna Document, but they are motivated by some of the same goals and concerns: we want to achieve greater military transparency and cooperation on conventional forces in Europe as a route to increased confidence and trust. 

• In the economic-environmental dimension, we want to endorse greater economic 

transparency, good governance and anti-corruption measures, as well as identify 

ways to better empower women in the economic sphere. Citizens must be able 

to trust their governments to develop economic and environmental resources in 

a responsible and equitable manner. We hope that at Vilnius all OSCE members will endorse the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative endorsed by 

the G-8 in Deauville, and agree on goals and best practices to promote the economic empowerment of women. 

• In the human dimension, we hope to take the Helsinki Final Act into the digital 

age. We are seeking consensus on a declaration that would explicitly acknowledge that human rights and fundamental freedoms can apply to online activity 

as they do to offline activity. This includes, in particular the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association. Even more urgent is the need to reaffirm and 

strengthen governments’ commitment to the protection of journalists. Both of 

these goals address priority issues for both the OSCE Representative on the 

Freedom of Media and the Lithuanian Chairmanship. 

We also want to see the OSCE give greater attention to Central Asia, including 

addressing longstanding challenges to democracy and human rights in that region. 

The OSCE can and should assist Kyrgyzstan’s fledgling parliamentary democracy 

and play a greater role in helping stabilize and secure Afghanistan, particularly in 

the area of border management. 

Of course, we envision that the Vilnius Ministerial will be an opportunity for 

OSCE Ministers to declare formally our support for Mediterranean Partners, such 

as Egypt and Tunisia, and offer to assist them in democratic institution building 

and electoral reform. 

Finally, the OSCE must continue to play a direct role in resolving the protracted 

conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh. As the 2008 war in Georgia 

showed, these conflicts hold the devastating potential to destabilize security in the 

OSCE region, and their resolution must remain a high priority for the OSCE and 

all its member states. We intend to use the meeting in Vilnius to highlight progress 

made on each of these conflicts this year and the challenges that remain to be addressed. This is difficult and frustrating work. But OSCE is one of a handful of 

international institutions that has the political standing to engage on the protracted 
34 

conflicts, and it has the ability to shine a light on the human and security situation 

in these regions. Impartial, comprehensive, accurate reporting is not something to 

be feared or avoided, and that is what OSCE is ideally suited to deliver, if it can 

get unhindered, status-neutral access to regions of conflict. If the OSCE’s role is undermined, the international community is diminished; the United States will stand 

firmly against that. We will continue to push hard to improve theOSCE’s ability to 

respond to crises in a fast and effective manner, including preventing the development of new conflicts in the OSCE area. 

OSCE Moving Forward 

We all know that a consensus-based organization with 56 participating States 

sometimes moves in baby steps when we want to see larger and faster strides. We 

can take comfort that whether the OSCE is working to eliminate rocket fuel in 

Ukraine, advocating for journalists and bloggers in Azerbaijan, or developing a 

multi-ethnic police force in Serbia and Kyrgyzstan, those small steps can result in 

impressive progress over time, and thus deserve our sustained attention. 

The OSCE enables its participating States to address issues of concern in a forum 

which allows for a full and open debate. The issues can seem intractable but exchanging words beats the alternative of exchanging bullets. We have had bullets exchanged in the OSCE space in the last three years and that is something the OSCE 

participating States need to eliminate in the future. The potential of the OSCE has 

not yet been fulfilled - and therein lies its promise for the future. 

The Helsinki Commission—you, the Commissioners, and the experts on your 

staff—play a vital role in ensuring that the participating States keep the promises 

they made at Helsinki. With your support, the United States will continue to play 

a leading role at the OSCE, to strengthen and build upon the progress the participating States have made over the past 35 years, and bring us closer to a truly stable, secure, and prosperous OSCE region. 

I am happy to take your questions at this time. 
35 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEC. MICHAEL H. POSNER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Distinguished Members of the Commission: I appreciate your calling this timely hearing on the work of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as we plan for the December Ministerial Meeting in Vilnius and beyond. I have the privilege of working for a former Helsinki 

Commissioner, Secretary Clinton, and it is my honor to serve as the Helsinki Commissioner for the Department of State. The Commission’s efforts help strengthen my 

hand and that of my State Department colleagues as we work with other governments, civil society advocates, and the private sector to defend and advance human 

rights and democratic government across the OSCE region. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask the Commission to consider my testimony today in 

conjunction with that of Assistant Secretaries Gordon and Vershbow. If I may, I will 

direct my comments today in particular to the OSCE’s Human Dimension—the principles that animate it, the challenges that confront it, and what all of us can and 

must do to defend and advance it. As the only regional forum with a membership 

that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the OSCE constitutes a vital platform 

for raising concerns about human rights and democratic governance in key countries 

of concern, such as Belarus, Russia and Uzbekistan. 

A Pioneering Process, Then and Now 

The Helsinki process was launched 36 years ago next week, in the midst of a Cold 

War and in a different century. The past twenty years since the end of Soviet Communism have seen profound changes in the OSCE region and the world. With them 

came an opportunity for the participating States to increase in number, establish 

and develop the OSCE as an organization, and, most significantly, agree to ground 

breaking commitments in the areas of human rights and democratic governance. 

These commitments remain a global high water mark. The OSCE has not been 

merely a reflection of the great post-Soviet geopolitical changes. The OSCE’s comprehensive concept of linking security among states to respect for human rights 

within states, and the citizens monitoring movements that the Helsinki process inspired, helped create and shape the new reality in Europe and Eurasia. 

And I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to 

security, the human and democratic values at the core of the Helsinki process, and 

its recognition of the vital role and contributions of civil society—remain inspiring 

and innovative concepts in this new century, not just to men and women within the 

OSCE region, but to people around the world. 

Time and again, most recently in North Africa and the Middle East, we see that 

governments’ respect for human rights and their responsiveness to the aspirations 

of their citizens are essential to security, stability and peace. The OSCE, and the 

civil society groups associated with the Helsinki process, can make useful contributions of experience and expertise to our partner Mediterranean States undergoing 

transformations. Even as we speak, OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights (ODIHR) is holding its first workshop for Egyptian civil society representatives interested in election monitoring in support of the Arab Spring. 

The Enduring Importance of Implementation 

As Assistant Secretary Gordon noted, the participating States at the Astana Summit last December, including those that joined the OSCE in the post-Soviet period, 

reaffirmed in the Summit’s Commemorative Declaration the principles of Helsinki 

and all the commitments made to date. They also reaffirmed that human rights are 

not solely a domestic issue, but also a matter of ‘‘direct and legitimate’’ interest to 

other States. Secretary Clinton, Assistant Secretary Gordon, Ambassador Kelly and 

his outstanding delegation, and I worked intensively with like-minded counterparts 

to ensure that the Commemorative Declaration was strong and unequivocal. I believe that we succeeded. 

But we all agree that reaffirmation is not enough. We must continue to address 

serious problems of implementation within OSCE participating States, through our 

bilateral diplomacy and through the OSCE and other multilateral organizations.All 

countries, including our own, have room for improvement in living up to our OSCE 

commitments and all have a responsibility to do so. That said, the work and resources of the OSCE should focus most on the areas where implementation remains 

weakest and where humarn rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and 

democratic principles of government face the greatest challenges. This is not a reflection of political bias or double standards. It is not a matter of ‘‘East of Vienna 

versus West of Vienna’’—as some participating States assert. The divide that concerns the OSCE is not between East and West; OSCE must address the gap between commitments and practice. Human rights are universal, but they are not uni-
36 

versally respected in the OSCE region. That is the truth, and the OSCE must address it. 

Advocates of human rights, democracy, and labor who seek to help their fellow 

citizens know and act upon their rights are targeted for persecution, even murder, 

in some participating States. Laws are wielded like political weapons against those 

who expose abuses or express disagreement with official policies and practices. Judicial independence and the rule of law have yet to be established or fully respected 

in practice. NGOs are subjected to increasing legal restrictions and burdensome administrative measures that impede their peaceful work, reflecting a disturbing global phenomenon. There are human rights and humanitarian aspects of protracted 

conflicts that must be addressed as essential elements of settlement and reconciliation processes. 

Media—particularly independent media—are under pressure to be silent or to 

self-censor. For practicing their profession, journalists are victims of brutal, sometimes deadly, attacks, often carried out with complete impunity. Countries in the 

OSCE region are also part of a growing global trend by governments to restrict 

Internet Freedom, and thus the exercise of freedoms of expression, association and 

assembly via new media. Too many people in the OSCE region are denied the opportunity to access a range of sources of information. The Representative on Freedom 

of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic, who testified before you a few weeks ago, deserves 

special mention for raising awareness and pushing to protect journalists and an 

independent media throughout the OSCE space. 

Democratic development is uneven across the OSCE region. Not all elections meet 

OSCE’s standards. Not all officials and government institutions operate in an accountable and transparent manner. The next few years will see national elections 

in a number of OSCE States, including my own country. The United States continues to welcome ODIHR observers and we hope our fellow participating States will 

do likewise. We are pleased that Russia recently has invited ODIHR to conduct a 

needs assessment for an elections observer mission in the lead-up to December’s 

parliamentary elections, and we urge Russia to extend a formal, unrestricted invitation for this observation mission once the assessment is completed. We also look to 

Russia to invite ODIHR to do the same for the presidential elections in 2012. Similarly, we hope that ODIHR will be invited to observe the upcoming parliamentary 

elections in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine, and the 

presidential elections in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey 

and Turkmenistan. 

Not surprisingly, participating states with serious implementation problems do 

not like to have their records in the spotlight, as we see so clearly demonstrated 

by Belarus’s refusal to extend the mandate of the OSCE Office in Minsk, its refusal 

to cooperate with the Moscow Mechanism Rapporteur, and now its resistance to 

joining consensus on the detailed agenda for the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw. The Representative on Freedom of the Media has 

not been allowed to visit Belarus since the crackdown last December. Belarus rejected a fact-finding mission by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Working Group 

on Belarus and the Working Group’s Chair was denied a visa to observe trials of 

political prisoners. Such obstructionist behavior only draws more attention to 

Belarus’ lamentable human rights record. 

The report of the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism Rapporteur on Belarus contains a 

wealth of constructive recommendations, which we urge Belarus to accept so that 

it can increase its integration into the OSCE community, instead of deepening its 

isolation.With respect to Russia, we have spoken out in the OSCE Permanent Council and other OSCE fora about the continued assaults on fundamental freedoms of 

the press and assembly, and the rule of law. We repeatedly have expressed our concerns about: the many unsolved cases of murdered journalists like Paul Klebnikov 

and human rights activists like Natalia Estemirova; corruption and impunity as exemplified by the tragic case of Sergei Magnitsky; and restrictions on freedom of assembly for members of groups like Strategy 31, the Khimki Forest Defenders, and 

for members of various Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender groups. We have 

raised our concerns about Russia’s disappointing decision to deny the opposition 

group PARNAS registration so that it can compete in the upcoming parliamentary 

elections and we urge Russian authorities to reconsider that decision. 

We continue to monitor and speak out about the treatment of minorities in Russia, including the application of the so-called ‘‘law on extremism’’ to peaceful religious groups. We also are concerned about inter-ethnic tensions and incidents of violence between ethnic Russians and minority groups, as well as by reports of serious 

human rights violations in the North Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya. These reports include disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and retribution against 

those who report abuses. 
37 

Mr. Chairman, as we set our sights on the Ministerial in Vilnius, I want to emphasize that our interest in human rights and democratic development in Central 

Asia did not begin or end with the Astana Summit. The United States remains committed to working bilaterally and within the OSCE with the participating States of 

Central Asia and with civil society in that region to advance domestic democratic 

reforms, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. 

We also will continue to work with Central Asian states to reinforce border security 

to counter transnational threats such as narcotics and terrorism, and to bolster security in Afghanistan, an OSCE partner. We have stressed that Kazakhstan’s legacy 

as the 2010 Chair of the OSCE will be determined by the continued efforts it makes, 

now that the spotlight has left Astana, to deliver on the pledges made there to reinvigorate comprehensive security and protect the human rights of citizens. We 

strongly encourage OSCE representatives, as well as high public officials from the 

participating States, including the Members of this Commission and Members of the 

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to seek opportunities to engage with the governments and citizens of Central Asian states to advance Human Dimension issues. 

We have seen that such engagement can yield results. Most recently, the Government of Kyrgyzstan decriminalized libel, an issue on which the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media had persistently focused. We applaud Kyrgyzstan’s 

becoming the first Central Asian country and the 13th OSCE participating State to 

decriminalize defamation. This measure will strengthen freedom of expression in 

Kyrgyzstan and set an example for the rest of the OSCE community. Kyrgyzstan 

also deserves recognition for its support of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, which 

operates according to a Memorandum of Understanding between the Kyrgyz government and the OSCE. The United States joined the Academy’s Board of Trustees in 

March 2011 and since its foundation in 2005 we have been strong supporters of the 

excellent work the Academy is doing to provide graduate studies to Central Asian 

and Afghan students. Coupled with the steps Kyrgyzstan has taken to ensure inquiry into the abuses committed during the June 2010 conflict, we think that the 

positive trajectory for Kyrgyzstan’s democratization can continue. The OSCE remains well-poised to assist. 

Mr. Chairman, the comprehensive security we seek in the OSCE region, and in 

Central Asia particularly, will remain elusive until serious human rights problems 

are addressed. We will continue to press for the implementation by the Central 

Asian states of OSCE commitments in all three dimensions, and to offer our assistance toward that end. 

For example, Uzbekistan continues to exhibit a poor record on media freedom, 

freedom of religion, and a wide range of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

We regretted the Uzbekistan Supreme Court decision in June to close the Human 

Rights Watch office in Tashkent. We have raised in the OSCE and elsewhere the 

cases of Dilmurod Sayid, a journalist imprisoned for writing about corruption, and 

Maxim Popov, who remains incarcerated for working to decrease the incidence of 

AIDS in the country, and we will continue to advocate for fair treatment and due 

process in those, and similar, cases. 

We also remain deeply concerned over the arrests of religious adherents, including 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, Protestants and members of some Islamic groups in 

Uzbekistan. Reported raids on the homes of members of non-majority religious 

groups, coupled with bans on the import of some religious publications and the confiscation or destruction of religious literature, further chill the climate for religious 

expression. 

We will continue to use the OSCE as a platform for pressing these and other 

human rights challenges in Uzbekistan, including ongoing reports of torture in detention and the use of child labor in the annual cotton harvest. 

Mr. Chairman, looking across the OSCE, community, we see intolerance and hate 

crimes against religious and ethnic minorities, including Roma and Sinti. I wish to 

commend the essential work of OSCE’s three tolerance representatives: Rabbi Andrew Baker, on Combating Anti-Semitism, Dr. Massimo Introvigne, on Combating 

Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions, and Ambassador Adil 

Akhmetiv, on combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims. I also salute the efforts of the OSCE’s Contact Point on Roman and Sinti Issues. Violence 

against women and assaults on individuals because of their sexual orientation or 

gender identity are widespread problems. People with disabilities experience discrimination and tend to be relegated to the margins of society. The OSCE region 

is both a source and a destination for human trafficking. Men, women and children 

are forced into servitude within its borders. 

To meet all of these challenges of implementation, participating States must 

strengthen their political will to honor their commitments. We and other like-mind-
38 

ed governments must work vigilantly to ensure that the capacity and integrity of 

ODIHR, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and other OSCE institutions are strengthened, not weakened, and that full use is made of the OSCE’s good 

offices, mechanisms, and field missions. Today, for example, the High Commissioner 

is working to prevent ethnic tensions from boiling over again in Central Asia and 

to ensure that children can receive an adequate education in their language in Slovakia, Serbia, and other parts of Europe. And the field missions are standing up 

freedom of information and human rights ombudsmen who can defend citizens’ 

rights. 

Let me now say a few words about the state of consensus in the OSCE and its 

prospects for meeting today’s human, economic, and military security challenges. It 

is evident that some participating States lack the political will to meet the commitments they have already made. They are often reluctant or unwilling to give their 

consent so that the OSCE can take timely and effective action in key areas of concern, including the persistent implementation problems. 

Mr. Chairman, we have encountered such dilemmas before in OSCE’s history. 

During the Cold War, Human Dimension commitments made by the Soviet Union 

and Warsaw Pact countries were honored more in the breach than in practice. Despite this challenge, the Helsinki process managed to advance, thanks to the moral 

force of Helsinki monitoring groups as well as the West’s principled, sustained diplomacy. This tenacity ultimately paid off with the emergence of the democracies of 

Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. And the need for sustained, principled 

efforts by governments and their citizens is equally compelling now. 

Today, we must be steadfast in the face of threats from some participating States 

to withhold consensus or attempt to water down commitments or weaken OSCE institutions. We will creatively use the full array of existing OSCE authorities, institutions, principles, and precedents to support the efforts of today’s activists on the 

ground who are pressing for human rights and democratic reforms. Consensus to 

act on issues of human rights and democracy may be hard to reach at the Stateto-State level, but there is a growing grassroots consensus among citizens of the 

OSCE region and regions across the globe that governments must respect human 

rights and give their people a meaningful role in shaping the future of their countries. 

The Helsinki Process and Support for Citizen Activism 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have made support and defense of civil 

society a global foreign policy priority, and we see our work in OSCE as integral 

to that effort. 

OSCE was the first regional organization to recognize the importance of civil society and provide for NGO participation in its proceedings. Secretary Clinton made 

a special point of holding a Town Hall with civil society groups in Astana during 

the OSCE Summit, and we will continue to encourage and defend NGO involvement 

at the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings and other expert meetings of 

the OSCE. 

Mr. Chairman, the Commission has long championed the vital role that non-governmental organizations play in the OSCE process. I am pleased to report that my 

own Bureau and Ambassador Kelly have collaborated on a new effort aimed at helping connect civil society activists across the OSCE region through new technologies. 

In mid-August, my bureau will be reviewing proposals for a new $500,000 program to create a demand-driven virtual network of human rights and democracy activists in the OSCE region, which we intend to launch in September. We call it Helsinki 2.0. The network would serve as a sustainable coordination platform for reinvigorating human rights advocacy in Europe and Eurasia. A virtual interface will 

be created to enable activists to have regular engagement with governments beyond 

the traditional appearances at annual OSCE meetings. We hope that this Helsinki 

2.0 platform will enhance activists’ ability to network with one another and with 

the OSCE. This effort should help extend Helsinki’s Human Dimension and its legacy of citizen advocacy into the Digital Age. 

Enduring Freedoms, New Apps 

Mr. Chairman, the Commission has greatly helped to elevate the issue of Internet 

freedom. I very much appreciate your holding a hearing on the subject a few weeks 

ago, at which my Deputy, Dan Baer, testified. It is vitally important that the OSCE 

take a principled and pioneering stand on Internet freedom. 

In the past, the Helsinki process was a major international platform for defending 

citizens who expressed dissenting views via samizdat and for protesting the jamming of radio broadcasts. Two decades ago, in response to efforts by the Ceausescu 

regime to restrict citizens’ access to Xerox machines, an explicit commitment was 
39 

included in the OSCE’s Copenhagen document pledging that ‘‘no limitation will be 

imposed on access to, and use of, means of reproducing documents of any kind.’’ 

Today, email, social networking, and text messaging are new forms of samizdat and 

tools of human rights advocacy as well as indispensible tools of commerce, education, and global communications. 

We applaud Lithuania for making media freedom via old and new technologies 

and the safety of journalists key themes of its Chairmanship. I want to emphasize 

that cyber issues are relevant to all three dimensions of the OSCE. As we partner 

with other governments, civil society, and the business sector on ways we can safeguard against very real cyber security threats, we will do so ever mindful that the 

measures we take must be consistent with our human dimension commitments to 

respect the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Mr. Chairman, as Assistant Secretary Gordon noted, the United States advanced 

language for inclusion in the Astana Summit Action Plan on the exercise of ‘‘Fundamental Freedoms in the Digital Age.’’ Since, as you know, the Astana Summit ended 

without the adoption of such a plan, we intend to renew our efforts to get this 

breakthrough language adopted at the OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius in December. 

OSCE’s adoption of such language would, I believe, mark the first time that any 

regional organization formally recognizes that respect for the full range of human 

rights, and fundamental freedoms must extend to the use of new technologies. 

The United States looks forward to working with the Lithuanian Chair, the EU, 

other participating States and civil society to ensure that the OSCE sends a strong 

and clear message from Vilnius on Internet Freedom. If I were to distill that message into a tweet to the world, it would be: ‘‘Enduring Freedoms, New Apps.’’ 

Promises Made, Promises to be Kept 

Mr. Chairman, when he signed the Helsinki Final Act 36 years ago, President 

Ford famously said, ‘‘History will judge this Conference not by what we say here 

today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the 

promises we keep.’’ He was right then, and his statement is even more true today. 

Europe cannot be completely whole, free and at peace— 

Europe and Eurasia cannot become truly integrated— 

There can be no lasting security extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok— 

until human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully exercised by all people 

who live within the OSCE community of nations. 

On behalf of President Obama and the American people, I thank the Commission 

for its decades of principled work to ensure that the promises made in Helsinki are 

kept. Now I would be happy to answer your questions. 
40 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEC. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

Introduction 

I want to thank Chairman Smith and Co-Chairman Cardin for having me back 

to testify about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

and our goals in the run-up to the Vilnius Ministerial in December. I am particularly proud that you have made me a Commissioner, along with my esteemed colleagues here today. I am honored to associate myself with this Commission and its 

myriad achievements over the decades. 

The OSCE 

The OSCE has three attributes that make it unique. First, it has a vast geographic scope, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This scope allows it to address a diverse set of security challenges with a 

variety of approaches, drawing on its extraordinary 56-nation membership. 

Second, the OSCE has a three-basket approach to security—comprised of the 

human dimension, the economic and environmental dimension, and of course the 

political-military dimension. This comprehensive approach, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, was revolutionary at the time—by including dialogue on 

human rights, democracy, and economic development along with military transparency—and is still relevant today. 

Third, the OSCE has an extraordinary and storied history. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the predecessor to the OSCE—played a critical 

role in providing support and hope to persecuted groups behind the Iron Curtain 

during the Cold War, and helped to bring order during Europe’s tumultuous political transitions of the early 1990s. 

Throughout its history, the OSCE has adapted to new challenges and changes in 

the security environment. In keeping with this tradition, we must continue to adapt 

the OSCE’s political-military security toolbox to face the challenges of the 21st century. 

Astana Summit 

In December of last year, the OSCE held its first Summit since 1999 in Astana, 

Kazakhstan. At the Summit, we learned that the achievements of the OSCE cannot 

be taken for granted. The effort to produce an action plan for 2011 foundered over 

fundamental disagreements on the security challenges facing the OSCE—especially 

on conventional arms control and the unresolved conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and 

Nagomo-Karabakh. The United States insisted on an action plan that reflected our 

longstanding principles on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and host nation consent 

as it relates to the unresolved conflicts. Russia was unwilling to support this, and 

the resulting impasse threatened the Summit outcome. 

Without hope of consensus on an action plan, the U.S. delegation, led by my good 

friend Assistant Secretary of State Phil Gordon, worked assiduously to produce the 

Astana Commemorative Declaration instead. The Declaration recommits all 56 participating States of the OSCE ‘‘to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver 

to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common 

goals.’’ 

Importantly, the Astana Declaration reaffirmed the right of countries to choose 

their own security arrangements and reasserted that no country can create a sphere 

of influence or seek to strengthen its security at the expense of others. The Declaration reiterated the importance of arms control and confidence- and security-building 

measures, highlighting their role in ensuring military stability, predictability and 

transparency. It also committed all of us to revitalize, modernize, and update the 

three most important parts of the conventional arms control regime—the Vienna 

Document 1999, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. 

I will leave it to my colleagues from State to address the human and economicenvironmental dimension, and focus instead on what the Administration would like 

to accomplish before the OSCE Ministerial in December in the political-military dimension of security. 

Conventional Arms Control 

I will address each part of the conventional arms control regime in turn, and note 

that the United States is fully engaged in the process of modernizing them, in both 

Vienna and Washington. Last month, Assistant Secretary of State Rose 

Gottemoeller, assisted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Russell and my Deputy 

Assistant Secretary, Celeste Wallander, attended OSCE’s Annual Security Review 
41 

Conference. DASD Wallander represented me in discussions on the Vienna Document 1999, and it is to that instrument that I turn now. 

Vienna Document 1999 

The OSCE can trace its role in arms control to four pages in the 1975 Helsinki 

Final Act, which established a confidence-building mechanism to reduce the chance 

of conflicts arising from large military maneuvers in Europe. The subsequent talks 

on military transparency, which eventually resulted in the Vienna Document 1999, 

formed one of three pillars of the effort to secure peace in Europe during the Cold 

War. The second pillar was the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, focusing on 

balancing NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional armaments, which evolved into the 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, or CFE. The third pillar was the ongoing bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic arms limitation talks, which eventually led to 

the START Treaty. 

The Vienna Document has grown to 60 pages, and comprises a series of 

confidence- and security-building measures designed to increase the transparency of 

military affairs on the territory of all participating European and Central Asian 

States. It includes a conflict-prevention mechanism, visits to military air bases, annual exchanges of military information, on-site inspections and visits to evaluate the 

information exchanges, and a series of military-to-military contacts. The Vienna 

Document 1999 applies to all military forces in the OSCE zone of application. 

The OSCE is engaged in an intensive effort to update the Vienna Document for 

the first time since 1999. With the direction provided by our Heads of State in 

Astana, we are approaching the milestone of issuing a new Vienna Document in December in Vilnius. Delegations have been working in the OSCE’s Forum for Security 

Cooperation for the past year to review the Vienna Document comprehensively and 

update it to meet today’s demands. Several proposals already have been adopted, 

and dozens more are under consideration. However, the proposals adopted to date 

have been administrative in nature, and more needs to be done if this effort is to 

be judged a success. One proposal to increase military transparency that I would 

like to highlight would lower the thresholds for notification of military 

manoeuvres—a subject central to the intent of the original document. Adopting this 

proposal made by the French delegation would send a clear signal that the OSCE 

is serious about modernizing its approach to military transparency and security. 

The dedication all delegations are demonstrating in this effort is encouraging; 

however, much more needs to be done. I believe the United States needs to have 

a deeper discussion with other delegations on the future of military transparency 

and what measures are needed to improve the security of all participating States. 

Our military budgets are all under pressure, and many participating States are undergoing rapid and radical military transformations. The Vienna Document must 

continue to evolve to keep pace—and the quality of military advice in Vienna must 

be equal to the challenge. 

Open Skies 

The Treaty on Open Skies started with an idea by President Eisenhower—to reduce the need for destabilizing espionage and transform the security environment. 

The idea was revived in the 1980s, and then, in 2002, the Treaty entered into force. 

To date, the 34 States Parties have flown more than 700 aerial observation flights, 

providing unprecedented levels of military transparency. The ability of any party to 

overfly every part of the territory of every other party from Honolulu to Vladivostok 

is extraordinary. Indeed, the United States and Russia both use the Open Skies 

Treaty as part of the verification of the New START, highlighting the linkages and 

reinforcing effects among these agreements. 

In June 2010, the parties met for their second Review Conference in Vienna. 

There, they recommitted themselves to addressing the challenges and guiding the 

way toward improved transparency. These challenges include implementation problems, such as increasing instances of interference with the full exercise of Treaty 

rights; economic issues, such as determining the future of aging airframes; and technological issues, including adapting to digital technology and fully implementing 

Treaty-allowed sensors. Addressing these challenges will require political will and 

could put strains on increasingly scarce defense budgets. 

We are seeking to recommit the United States to the Treaty, both by increasing 

the number of flights we fly and participate in each year, and by taking advantage 

of the ability to upgrade our sensors from film to digital capability. According to recent media reports, Russia has begun flight-testing a new TU-214 airframe with a 

full suite of digital sensors for use under the Treaty—the same airframe as the 

forthcoming replacement for their equivalent to Air Force One. No other partici-
42 

pating State has been able to commit to updating its aircraft. In fact, some, notably 

the United Kingdom, have eliminated their aircraft due to budgetary pressures. 

CFE 

The news on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty is less encouraging. However, it is worth noting the Treaty’s achievements—including the elimination of more than 72,000 battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, 

combat aircraft, and attack helicopters; the successful completion of thousands of 

on-site inspections; and the orderly, verifiable, and peaceful withdrawal of the 

massed armored forces that typified the Cold War standoff for decades. The CFE 

Treaty succeeded in eliminating the possibility of large-scale, surprise attack in Central Europe; it has been at an impasse with Russia’s ‘‘suspension’’ of implementation 

of CFE in December 2007, which was further complicated by Russia’s 2008 invasion 

of Georgia. 

The State Department named Ambassador Victoria Nuland as Special Envoy to 

engage in modernizing CFE in February 2010. She consulted closely with our NATO 

Allies to launch an effort to reach agreement among the 30 CFE Parties, joined by 

the six NATO members that are not signatories of the CFE Treaty (Estonia, Latvia, 

Lithuania, Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia), on a framework agreement based on 

three of President Obama’s five principles of European security: 1) reciprocal transparency of conventional armed forces; 2) reciprocal restraints on concentrations of 

heavy forces and permanent basing in sensitive regions; and 3) a renewed insistence 

on host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces on sovereign territory. 

Since June 2010, the United States and our Allies have been engaged in an intensive effort to reach agreement on a framework for negotiations to strengthen and 

modernize conventional arms control in Europe. However, after ten rounds of consultations in Vienna, Russia remains inflexible on two key issues: host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign troops on sovereign territory, and providing appropriate transparency among all parties regarding their current military posture for 

the period of any negotiation. Currently, the United States is consulting with Allies 

to decide the way forward, while continuing to encourage Moscow to reconsider its 

position. If Russia will not reconsider, we must look carefully at our options regarding the current unequal situation, whereby 29 Parties implement the Treaty and 

one does not. As the NATO communique issued at the Lisbon Summit warned, this 

situation cannot continue indefinitely. 

While the future of CFE remains uncertain and the Treaty cannot be replaced by 

the Vienna Document, we remain committed to conventional arms control and military transparency in Europe. We will continue to work through the OSCE to advance these objectives through modernizing the Vienna Document and the Open 

Skies Treaty. 

Outside of the OSCE, we are working both bilaterally with Russia and through 

the NATO-Russia Council to address concerns about missile defense and strategic 

stability. At the same time, through the Forum for Security Cooperation, we are 

seeking to address modern threats, such as transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, Central Asian instability, and unsecured, unsafe stocks of small arms and light 

weapons. Finally, we are using every opportunity possible, including the OSCE, to 

address the unresolved conflicts that have contributed to the stalemate on modernizing of the CFE. 

The Unresolved Conflicts 

The OSCE continues to play a critical role as a central forum for addressing the 

unresolved conflicts which emerged at the end of the Cold War in Georgia, Moldova, 

and Nagorno-Karabakh. As the 2008 war in Georgia showed, these conflicts hold the 

devastating potential to destabilize security in the OSCE region, and their resolution must remain a high priority for the OSCE and all its member states. The 

United States seeks to use the leverage of the OSCE’s diverse membership to address these unresolved conflicts, and, through cooperative efforts, resolve them. 

While each of the conflict resolution processes has faced myriad difficulties this 

year, I still hold out hope that with the help of our Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office, 

we can show progress by Vilnius. 

Georgia 

We have seen few signs toward progress on resolving the conflict between Georgia 

and Russia. First and foremost, the OSCE has not been able to resume its presence 

on both sides of the administrative boundaries in Georgia. Talks continue in Vienna 

and Geneva on the possibility that an OSCE team, based in Vienna, will be given 

access to all of the territory of Georgia within its internationally-recognized borders. 

This would be a significant step forward, but Russia and Georgia have yet to agree 

on the conditions for bringing such a team into existence. 
43 

As the Co-Chairs of this Committee noted after the 2008 hostilities, Russia’s invasion of Georgia represented ‘‘a clear violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity and 

Principle Four of the Helsinki Final Act.’’ The expiration of the OSCE mandate in 

Georgia at the end of 2009 was regrettable. Our position remains unchanged: the 

U.S. continues to advocate for allowing humanitarian assistance, as well as a return 

to pre-conflict positions, as Russia committed to doing as part of the August 8, 2008 

ceasefire agreement. The U.S. continues to support Georgia’s territorial integrity 

and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders, and we will maintain 

our support for international efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute over 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia needs to abide by its ceasefire arrangements 

and take steps that promote stability in the region. We reaffirm this message regularly to our Russian counterparts. 

Moldova 

The OSCE (then the CSCE) became involved in peacekeeping in Moldova in 1993, 

and continues to play an important role in supporting a peaceful resolution of the 

dispute over Transnistria through the 5+2 talks. These talks comprise Moldova, 

Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, plus the U.S. and the EU as observers. The United States continues to press for a resumption of formal 5+2 negotiations to make progress toward a settlement that will end this conflict based on 

Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Informal 5+2 talks in February discussed freedom of movement between the sides, the negotiating process, and a work 

plan for 2011—but showed limited results. President Medvedev hosted another informal 5+2 meeting in June in Moscow, but was unable to reach agreement on holding a formal meeting in September. Even without formal 5+2 negotiations, we encourage the parties to continue to pursue confidence-building measures, such as 

those to facilitate commerce within the existing customs process and to otherwise 

work to improve the daily lives of citizens on both sides of the Dniester River. 

In addition, the OSCE stands ready to support the completion of the removal of 

the estimated 20,000 tons of ex-Soviet arms and ammunition left on Moldovan territory, in Cobnasa, as well as any remaining equipment. The OSCE began assisting 

Russia and Moldova in removal and destruction of equipment, arms, and ammunition in 1999, but Russia stopped this effort in March 2004. The OSCE has allocated 

both money and manpower ready to facilitate the completion of Russia’s obligation 

to complete this effort. 

Nagorno-Karabakh 

The United States remains closely engaged with our OSCE Minsk Group cochairs—Russia and France—in supporting efforts to bring a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict. Presidents 

Obama, Medvedev, and Sarkozy in a joint statement at the G-8 Summit in Deauville in May noted ‘‘the time has arrived’’ to move beyond the ‘‘unacceptable status 

quo’’ and called for a ‘‘decisive step toward a peaceful settlement.’’ Specifically, the 

three presidents urged the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to finalize the 

Basic Principles, which will provide the formula for a future comprehensive settlement. If we reach agreement on the Basic Principles, the United States will work 

diligently with its partners, including the EU and the OSCE, to take the next steps 

toward implementing an eventual peaceful settlement to this terrible conflict. 

Unfortunately, there has been a step backward in this effort. I am sad to report 

that the attempt to reach a breakthrough in Kazan, Russia on June 24 failed, while 

tensions along the Line of Contact are increasing. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain 

unable to fmalize the Basic Principles, and we remain at an unhelpful and dangerous stalemate. President Medvedev has put forward another proposal to break 

the stalemate, but the prospects for progress are uncertain. 

New and Emerging Threats 

Part of the rich history of the OSCE, and a source of its strength, has been the 

adaptability of the institution to face new and emerging threats. No one in 1975 

could have imagined that cybersecurity would be a topic of discussion among states. 

In addition, the specter of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors, the control of 

small arms and light weapons, and border security in Central Asia all have become 

issues that concern all participating States. Fortunately, the OSCE provides ample 

flexibility to address new threats as they arise. 

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted in April 2004 to facilitate an 

effective global response to WMD proliferation threats by committing states to improve their domestic controls and prevent non-state actors from acquiring or developing WMD and their means of delivery. As the world’s largest regional security or-
44 

ganization, the OSCE plays an important role in the full implementation of UNSCR 

1540 through effective norm-setting and providing leadership that other regional 

groupings with less developed structures are looking to follow. 

The United Nations Committee overseeing implementation has welcomed the 

OSCE’s efforts to implement UNSCR 1540, praising its ability to leverage and empower regional approaches and understandings. In January 2011, the OSCE hosted 

a workshop specifically to define the Organization’s role in facilitating UN Security 

Council Resolution 1540. It brought together policymakers and experts from around 

the world, reviewing progress in the implementation of UNSCR 1540, the facilitation role appropriate for regional organizations and the UN, best practices, lessons 

learned, and the utility of border controls and end-use monitoring. 

The OSCE 1540 workshop demonstrated the Organization’s critical role in bringing together national, international, and non-governmental organizations to stop the 

spread of WMD, and the results are leading to further cooperation. The United 

States, with support from other delegations, is pressing for the development of such 

OSCE tools as a best-practices guide for UNSCR 1540 implementation for OSCE 

participating States, integration of the 1540 Adviser who started working in 2010 

at the Secretariat level, national action plans, and making use of OSCE institutions 

such as the Dushanbe Border Management College. 

Small Arms and Light Weapons 

The OSCE continues to provide a vital forum for Euro-Atlantic cooperation on the 

reduction of threats posed by the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons 

and their possession by subnational groups. Beginning with the adoption of the 

OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 1999, the OSCE has fostered 

cooperation among participating States in reducing trafficking, securing existing 

stocks, and eliminating excess small arms and light weapons and related materials. 

In March 2011, DoD participated in an OSCE-led assessment of ammunition storage, destruction, and related infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan. During this visit, DoD 

discovered poorly secured man-portable air defense systems MANP ADS and large 

stockpiles of obsolete and hazardous conventional ammunition. As a result the 

United States has offered funding for physical security upgrades and MANP ADS 

destruction there. DoD will participate in an OSCE follow-up visit in July to assess 

the possibility of an OSCE-funded storage and security improvement program at 

seven ammunition and small arms and light weapons depots. 

Cyber Security 

Next, I would like to address the role of the OSCE in cyber security. Information 

technologies are vital not only to the global economy but to our national security. 

There is no exaggerating DoD’s dependence on information networks and systems 

for the command and control of our forces, intelligence and logistics, and weapons 

technologies. As malicious cyber activities increase in their scope and sophistication, 

international concern has increased. 

In May, the OSCE hosted a conference on cyber security to explore potential roles 

for the organization. The conference was broadly attended, with participants from 

the participating States, partners, and international organizations, including Japan, 

the European Commission, and NATO. At the conference, the United States suggested that the OSCE promote confidence-building mechanisms within the politicalmilitary dimension of security to address cyber threats. In the run-up to the Vilnius 

Ministerial, DoD will continue to support State Department-led discussions on such 

mechanisms to protect our vital interests. 

Border Security in Central Asia 

The United States has been working to promote a stable, secure, and prosperous 

Central Asia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the OSCE Summit in 

Astana, all participants renewed their commitments across all three dimensions, as 

well as to continue their efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous, and 

democratic Afghanistan. We can achieve this by improving border security and 

working to combat drug trafficking and other forms of proliferation across Central 

Asia. 

One area where the United States certainly hopes the OSCE will do more is with 

Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan, an OSCE Partner Country made an 

urgent request for support in 2007. Responding to this request, the OSCE Secretariat proposed sixteen separate projects to enhance Afghan border security, including an emphasis on building Afghan capacity. These projects are designed to support 

the Afghanistan National Development Strategy in close coordination with the Government of Afghanistan. We would like to see more progress in these projects. 
45 

Conclusion 

In 1970, if you addressed a group of NATO or Warsaw Pact military planners and 

told them that they would, within their lifetimes, hand each other their order of battle, publish advance warning of large military exercises, invite the other side to observe the largest of these exercises, conduct thousands of intrusive inspections, and 

fly hundreds of uncontested reconnaissance sorties over each others’ territory, they 

would have responded with disbelief. Now, we take these measures for granted. 

The Helsinki Process, initiated in 1973, and aided by this Commission, remains 

an important tool to remind people that this effort is still underway, and still necessary to prevent future conflicts, resolve the remaining conflicts in Eurasia, and 

address new threats as they emerge. 

I had hoped that by 2011 we would be looking forward to projecting the peace 

and security of the OSCE area to other areas of instability that the OSCE area 

would be serving as a beacon and a guide to the rest of the world. Instead, we have 

much work to do to fulfill our original promise of a Europe whole, free and secure. 

As well as engaging in the hard work of creating the conditions necessary for advancement and growth in Central Asia. 

I hope that, in the future, the OSCE’s Astana Summit will be seen a turning 

point, where the participating States truly and fully recommitted themselves to reinvigorate the OSCE and move boldly into the 21st century. I think we see some 

positive signs as we advance toward our next milestone, the Vilnius Ministerial. 

Time will tell, and with your help, we will succeed. 
46 

1Dr. Michael Haltzel is Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns 

Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Senior Advisor at the 

consulting firm McLarty Associates. He was Head of the U.S. Delegations to recent OSCE conferences in Warsaw, Copenhagen, and Vienna. 2 ‘‘Punching above our weight to lead top regional security organisation,’’ The Irish Times, 

June 10, 2011. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL HALTZEL 1

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor and a pleasure to participate in today’s 

hearing. I would like to take this opportunity to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and 

Co-Chairman Senator Cardin, for your energetic leadership of the U.S. Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In a policy world where coping with daily 

crises makes it easy not to see the forest for the trees, the Helsinki Commission 

stands out for its ability to examine both current problems and their deeper causes. 

Having two prestigious figures at the helm of the Commission, greatly enhances its 

credibility and the impact of its findings. 

I would also mention the ‘‘foot soldiers’’ of our OSCE policy. During the past two 

years I have had the honor of being head of three U.S. delegations to OSCE conferences: the 2009 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, the 2010 

Copenhagen 20th Anniversary Conference, and the 2010 Vienna Review Conference. 

I have never encountered a more expert, hard-working, and effective group of public 

servants than the members of those three delegations and the officials backing them 

up in Washington, D.C. They included staff of the Helsinki Commission, career Foreign Service Officers, and State Department civil servants, plus a few public members with specialized professional backgrounds. Several of them are in this room 

today. The American people are being extraordinarily well served by, and should be 

proud of, these U.S. federal employees. 

Mr. Chairman, when one views the Helsinki Process over the nearly four decades 

of its existence, one must, I believe, judge it to have been a resounding success. The 

CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) played a significant role 

in hastening the demise of communism in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. 

Although Europe has not yet completely achieved the lofty goal of being ‘‘whole, 

free, and at peace,’’ the territory of the OSCE is unquestionably in much better 

shape than it was when the founders began their deliberations in the Finnish capital in the early 1970s. In Europe, only one dictator remains—Aleksandr 

Lukashenka in Belarus—while in Central Asia and the Caucasus a half-dozen other 

OSCE participating States have governments that are not democracies. Compared 

with the old Soviet Union and its communist satellites, though, the situation has 

markedly improved. 

That’s the relatively good news. The bad news is that since its high-point in 1990 

at the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension, which wrote what is still 

the most comprehensive document on human rights, the organization (as of January 

1, 1995 called the OSCE) has been in many respects a disappointment. For reasons 

that I will outline shortly, I would not call it a failure. But as I recently stated in 

an op-ed jointly written with former U.S. Ambassador William Courtney and former 

EU Ambassador Denis Corboy, 2 the OSCE, with 56 participating States the world’s 

largest regional security organization, is in crisis. 

To be sure, the OSCE faces a formidable array of challenges. Uzbekistan has 

never come to terms with the massacre of hundreds of protestors in Andijon in 2005. 

The new, democratic government in neighboring Kyrgyzstan is struggling with the 

aftermath of a violent, repressive leader who fled last year. Insurgencies are spreading in Russia’s largely Muslim north Caucasus, while Moscow has farmed out control of Chechnya to a brutal warlord. 

Meanwhile, Russia’s military continues illegally to occupy parts of Georgia and 

Moldova. Talks on ‘‘frozen’’ or ‘‘protracted’’ conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South 

Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are stalled, with only occasional, tantalizing indications of positive movement. 

What has the OSCE been able to do to remedy these problems? Unfortunately, 

other than offering rhetorical balm, not much. At last December’s first-in-a-decade 

OSCE summit in Astana, Kazakhstan the participating States, with strong leadership from Assistant Secretary Gordon, did formally reaffirm the organization’s lofty 

principles. In a healthy organization, however, I submit that this reaffirmation 

would have been considered unnecessary. 

Considerably more important was the fact that the participating States were unable to agree upon an Action Plan for the OSCE. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States gave fair warning that we would not accept a 

vague, toothless Action Plan. In my statement to the Closing Plenary Session of the 

Vienna Review Conference on October 26, 2010, I outlined nine specific goals and 
47 

3 http://photos.state.gov/libraries/adana/5/ViennaRevCon/ClosingPlenary—10-26-10.pdf 

implementation measures for the Astana Summit, which, if not accepted would 

make the United States hard pressed to accept an Action Plan. 3 I am gratified that 

at Astana the United States stuck to its principles, which are fully consonant with 

those of the OSCE. Not so with several other participating States. 

For example, take the paucity of concrete, remedial OSCE actions, which is cause 

for great concern. The OSCE’s consensus rule has become an increasing burden. 

Only once has a participating State been suspended, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992. Uzbekistan should have been suspended 

after the Andijon massacre six years ago. The government of Belarus violently suppressed peaceful protests against the rigged election of December 2010 and has imprisoned leading opposition figures. Since April of this year Minsk has been under 

investigation by a mission of independent experts under the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism, which does not require consensus to be activated but which itself can be compromised by the participating State under investigation. The Lukashenka regime 

surely deserves suspension, but I am doubtful that it will be so penalized. I hope 

I will be proved to be unduly pessimistic. 

Non-democratic members, Russia above all, continually stymie organizational 

progress. Moscow has vetoed carefully crafted U.S. crisis-response proposals, preventive action in the north Caucasus, and aid in Afghanistan, adjacent to OSCE territory in Central Asia. 

The lack of an enforcement mechanism is also a fundamental weakness of the 

OSCE. The public ‘‘naming and shaming’’ of human rights violators at the HDIM 

drives non-democratic participating States up the wall and occasionally improves 

the conditions of imprisoned civil rights advocates, but it rarely alters general governmental behavior. 

In the face of constant stonewalling, a few segments of the OSCE manage to carry 

out their mandates with distinction. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 

Media Dunja Mijatovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who testified before this Commission two weeks ago, is fearless in her speaking truth to power. The Office for 

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), based in Warsaw and headed 

by the Slovenian diplomat Janez Lenarcic, draws high marks for its work in election 

observation, democratic development, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and rule of law. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities former 

Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek commands universal respect for his efforts. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly plays an important role, although its relationship with the Permanent Council needs improvement. Last but not least, the 

OSCE runs valuable field missions and training programs in several troubled areas. 

The OSCE also has a key mandate in arms control. Assistant Secretary Vershbow 

undoubtedly will go into the details, so I will only touch on one important facet: the 

Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which was signed by 

30 states-parties at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit and has been ratified by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. NATO members have refused to ratify the 

accord until Russia complies with the commitments it made in Istanbul twelve years 

ago to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Last year the United States 

undertook an intensive, good-faith effort to negotiate a Framework Agreement on 

the Adapted CFE but has failed to date, largely because Moscow refuses to accept 

the principle of ′′host nation consent′′ and adequate transparency. 

So we have an organization whose effectiveness varies widely. As a norm-setter, 

the OSCE has few, if any, equals. Its specialized agencies and field missions remain 

valuable international players. But in enforcing its democratic and human rights 

principles and in arms control the OSCE has proved to be a huge disappointment. 

The organization remains important and is an integral tool of U.S. diplomacy, but 

even its strongest proponents—and I count myself in that group—must admit that 

it has been on a downward slide over the last decade. 

What, then, should U.S. policy toward the OSCE be? 

Mr. Chairman, frustrating though it may be to some, I would argue for ‘‘more, 

not less’’ commitment to the organization. Abandoning or reducing our participation 

in the OSCE is simply not an option. We should redouble our commitment, both in 

personnel and in behavior. The United States should be the most activist OSCE participating State. 

That means sending our best and our brightest, like our current Ambassador Ian 

Kelly and his new DCM Ambassador Gary Robbins, to represent the U.S. at the 

OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. It means backing up the Permanent Representative with an outstanding staff, both on site and at the Helsinki Commission 

and at the State Department in Washington. A prerequisite for these steps, of 

course, is adequate Congressional funding. 
48 

In terms of behavior within the OSCE, the United States should be second to 

none in its engagement, both positively and negatively. At the December 2011 

OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius, we should continue to push our constructive initiatives—such as more effective crisis-response mechanisms, updating the Vienna Document on arms control, formalizing internet freedom, codifying gender equality, and 

demanding more economic transparency—even if many or all of these initiatives will 

most likely be vetoed by Russia or others. Demonstrating that the U.S. is a good 

international citizen and a dedicated OSCE member has intrinsic value that should 

not be underestimated. 

At the HDIM, the United States should continue its leadership, including the 

‘‘naming and shaming’’ that is called for in an implementation meeting. In that vein, 

we should always be candid about our own national shortcomings. My experience 

at the Warsaw HDIM two years ago was that by publicly owning up to our deficiencies and then explaining the measures we are taking to rectify them we increase 

our credibility, especially among the European participating States. 

The United States should always be the foremost champion of non-governmental 

organizations and their right to participate in OSCE conferences. Whatever the occasional rhetorical excesses of some NGO representatives, these organizations infuse 

a breath of fresh air into OSCE proceedings and provide an essential link to the 

citizenries of participating States, especially non-democratic countries. 

In negotiations over all manner of OSCE documents—from routine announcements to treaties—the United States should be the quintessential ‘‘paragraph experts,’’ even at the risk of being labeled ‘‘nit-pickers.’’ I would prefer to describe it 

by the somewhat inelegant German term of possessing Sitzfleisch, meaning being 

assiduous. We should be diligent, careful to a fault, and tireless. Earning the reputation as the last delegation to leave a negotiation strengthens our hand in the 

future. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States should never ‘‘go along to get along.’’ 

On the vast majority of issues confronting the OSCE, we are in agreement with our 

European friends and allies. Occasionally, however, if they are willing—allegedly 

‘‘for the good of the organization’’—to acquiesce in resolutions or draft agreements 

that we feel would jeopardize our national interest or compromise the principles of 

the OSCE, we must resist group pressure to provide consensus. No matter how 

much eye-rolling it may occasion, our being a minority of one in such rare cases is 

not only ethically sound, but also organizationally the most supportive position. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I thank you, again, for the opportunity to offer my views, and I look forward to attempting to answer any questions 

Members may wish to pose. 

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