J-A23037-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

JEREMY PAUL LEFEVER 

 Appellant No. 1488 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 6, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0001314-2012 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 2, 2015 

 Appellant, Jeremy Paul Lefever, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

jury trial convictions of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”) and 

fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and his bench trial convictions 

of reckless driving, driving while operating privilege is suspended or 

revoked—driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance 

(“DUI”), and failure to stop at a red signal.1 We affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On July 11, 2012, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Lieutenant James Hollobaugh 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3733(a), 3736(a), 1543(b)(1) (3802 

related), and 3112(a)(3)(i), respectively. 
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of the City of Butler Police Department saw a lone driver operating a small, 

dark, hatchback-type vehicle run a steady red light in Butler. Lieutenant 

Hollobaugh activated his police cruiser’s lights and attempted to initiate a 

traffic stop of the vehicle. The vehicle failed to stop, accelerated, and fled 

from Lieutenant Hollobaugh, who pursued the vehicle in his police cruiser 

and called for backup. The pursuit continued for several blocks when 

Lieutenant Hollobaugh activated his police cruiser’s siren. The pursued 

vehicle then proceeded to turn onto a one-way street in the wrong direction 

and nearly struck an oncoming vehicle. Lieutenant Hollobaugh lost sight of 

the vehicle for approximately fifteen (15) seconds. He then saw a tall, white 

man wearing a dark tank top running from the pursued vehicle, which was 

parked in a private driveway about two blocks from where Lieutenant 

Hollobaugh lost sight of the vehicle. Lieutenant Hollobaugh parked behind 

the vehicle and discovered it was registered to Ms. Alicia Kniess. Lieutenant 

Hollobaugh knew from prior incidents that Appellant lived at the same 

address as Ms. Kniess. 

 Meanwhile, Patrolman David Villotti of the Butler Police Department 

responded to Lieutenant Hollobaugh’s call for backup. Patrolman Villotti 

observed a tall, white man in a dark tank top walking approximately one 

block from where Lieutenant Hollobaugh located the parked vehicle. 

Patrolman Villotti stopped the man and identified him as Appellant. Keys 

matching the pursued vehicle were found on Appellant’s person. 
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 Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion on October 10, 2012, to 

suppress the keys found on his person. The court conducted a hearing and 

denied Appellant’s motion on February 14, 2013. Thereafter, on January 29, 

2014, a jury convicted Appellant of REAP and fleeing or attempting to elude 

a police officer, and the court convicted Appellant of the summary offenses 

of reckless driving, driving while operating privilege is suspended or 

revoked—DUI, and failure to stop at a red signal. Appellant filed a motion 

for judgment of acquittal on February 10, 2014, which the court denied on 

February 12, 2014. The court sentenced Appellant on March 6, 2014, to 

sixty (60) days’ to twelve (12) months’ imprisonment for fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer, plus a consecutive ninety (90) days’ 

imprisonment for driving while operating privilege is suspended, followed by 

twelve (12) months’ probation for REAP. 

 Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on Monday, March 17, 

2014, which was denied by operation of law on August 15, 2014. Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal on September 12, 2014. The court ordered 

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied. 

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 

INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY AND TRIAL 

COURT’S FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS THE ACCUSED, 

THE DRIVER OF THE PURSUED VEHICLE. 

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
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INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY AND TRIAL 

COURT’S FINDING THAT THE UNNAMED VICTIM WAS 

PLACED [IN] ACTUAL DANGER OF DEATH OR SERIOUS 

BODILY INJURY. 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE VERDICTS WERE NOT 

AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 

TRIAL. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

 In issues one and two combined, Appellant argues there was 

insufficient evidence to sustain his bench and jury trial convictions. 

Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Appellant was the driver of the pursued vehicle and that Ms. 

Kniess’ vehicle was the pursued vehicle. Appellant alleges the fact finders’ 

assumptions that the parked car was the pursued vehicle, that Appellant was 

the man seen running from the parked car, and that Appellant had been 

driving the parked car during the pursuit were all based solely on 

circumstantial evidence. Appellant claims Lieutenant Hollobaugh was unable 

to provide any details which would have positively identified the vehicle he 

pursued, such as the license plate information or the make, model or color of 

the pursued vehicle. Appellant also contends Lieutenant Hollobaugh’s 

description of the man the Lieutenant saw running from the parked car was 

insufficient because he saw the individual for only a brief second, at night, 

from a block away. 

 Appellant also argues the Commonwealth failed to prove REAP beyond 
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a reasonable doubt because the alleged victim was not in actual danger of 

death or serious bodily injury from the pursued vehicle. Appellant claims 

Lieutenant Hollobaugh’s testimony that Appellant nearly struck an oncoming 

vehicle on a one-way street was the only evidence that Appellant allegedly 

placed another individual in danger of death or serious bodily injury. 

Appellant alleges the surrounding circumstances were not so inherently 

dangerous to prove actual danger or to suggest that a risk was created when 

Appellant allegedly drove recklessly down a one-way street. Appellant 

maintains the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to bear the burden 

of proving every element of the charges against him beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Appellant concludes this Court should reverse the judgment of 

sentence. We disagree. 

 Initially, we observe: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted...in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 
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received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)). 

 Section 2705 of the Crimes Code provides: 

§ 2705. Recklessly endangering another person 

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if 

he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may 

place another person in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. 

Thus, [this] crime requires (1) a mens rea of recklessness, 

(2) an actus reus some “conduct,” (3) causation “which 

places,” and (4) the achievement of a particular result 

“danger,” to another person, of death or serious bodily 

injury. 

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2003) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 395 A.2d 1337, 1340 (Pa.Super. 

1978)). See Commonwealth v. Klein, 795 A.2d 424 (Pa.Super. 2002) 

(indicating mens rea for REAP is conscious disregard of known risk of death 

or great bodily harm to another person, and serious bodily injury is bodily 

injury which creates substantial risk of death or causes serious, permanent 

disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily 

member or organ). Significantly, REAP “is a crime of assault which requires 
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the creation of danger” so “there must be an actual present ability to inflict 

harm.” Reynolds, supra at 727-28 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rivera, 

503 A.2d 11, 12 (Pa.Super. 1985) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 Instantly, the trial court concluded: 

On January 29, 2014, [Appellant] was convicted by a jury 

of [REAP], 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, and fleeing/attempting to 

elude police, 75 Pa.C.S.A § 3733(a). On the same date, 

[the] [c]ourt found [Appellant] guilty of the summary 

charges of reckless driving, driving under suspension, DUI 

related, and failure to stop at a red signal. [Appellant] 

contends that at trial, the Commonwealth’s witnesses 

never identified the driver of vehicle being pursued as 

[Appellant] and that the affiant, Lt. James Hollobaugh of 

the Butler City Police Department, could not confirm the 

color, make, model and license plate of the vehicle. 

Lt. Hollobaugh testified at trial that on July 11, 2012, just 

before 1:00 a.m., he was following a “smaller, 

darker/black hatchback-type vehicle” occupied by the 

driver only when he observed the vehicle proceed through 

a steady red signal northbound on Main Street at the 

intersection with Jefferson Street in the city of Butler. This 

traffic violation led to a chase within an area comprised of 

a few blocks. 

Lt. Hollobaugh further testified that he turned on his 

vehicle’s overhead lights and attempted to initiate a traffic 

stop. The operator of the vehicle accelerated quickly 

whereupon the Lt. activated his vehicle’s siren. The 

operator turned south onto McKean Street, which is a oneway northbound street, one block east of Main Street. The 

operator of the small dark vehicle nearly collided with a 

northbound vehicle on McKean Street. Lt. Hollobaugh lost 

sight of the vehicle briefly when he saw a tall, white man 

wearing a dark tank top running and observed the vehicle 

[the Lieutenant] was following parked in a private 

driveway nearby. Lt. Hollobaugh parked his vehicle behind 

the pursued vehicle and ran the plate through PennDOT. 
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The tall, white man was detained by Patrolman Villotti less 

than one block from the parked vehicle. Lt. Hollobaugh 

testified that the person he observed running was the 

same individual detained by Patrolman Villotti. 

Patrolman Villotti testified at trial that he was responding 

to Lt. Hollobaugh’s call for backup just after 1:00 a.m. and 

as [Patrolman Villotti] was turning onto the 200 block of 

East Brady Street, he observed a male walking towards 

him. At that moment, Lt. Hollobaugh radioed to stop the 

male walking down East Brady Street. Patrolman Villotti 

detained the tall, white man wearing a dark tank top who 

was identified as [Appellant]. The car keys found on 

[Appellant’s] person belonged to the small, dark hatchback 

parked in the private driveway. The patrolman testified 

that there were no other people in that area at that time. 

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the dashboard

camera video recording of the pursuit in question from Lt. 

Hollobaugh’s patrol vehicle, Commonwealth’s Exhibit “3”. 

It was admitted without objection and viewed by the jury. 

The Commonwealth also introduced Commonwealth’s 

Exhibit “4” and “5”. Exhibit “4” is a map of downtown 

Butler and Exhibit “5” is the same map with arrow 

markings to show the route of the pursuit. Both were 

admitted without objection. The maps clearly point out the 

short distance traveled during the pursuit as well as 

[Appellant’s] proximity to the parked car pursued during 

the chase. Additionally, the events of this incident 

occurred within a very short period of time. From the 

moment Lt. Hollobaugh first observed the small dark

hatchback vehicle on Main Street to the time at which 

[Appellant] was detained was a matter of minutes. 

[The] [c]ourt concurs with the jury verdicts that each 

material element of the crimes charged and the 

commission thereof by [Appellant] was proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The direct evidence provided by the 

officers’ eyewitness accounts, as well as the circumstantial 

evidence of the exhibits links [Appellant] to the crime[s] 

beyond a reasonable doubt. [The] [c]ourt believes that 

the jury could determine the presence of that quantum of 

evidence necessary to establish the elements of the

crimes. Further, the trial court may not change a verdict 
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based upon a redetermination of credibility or a 

reevaluation of the evidence. [The] [c]ourt also found that 

the evidence presented at trial, as it relates to the 

summary offenses, proved those offenses beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed December 3, 2014, at 3-4) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). The record supports the trial court’s conclusions. 

Moreover, Appellant’s conduct placed another individual in actual danger of 

death or serious bodily injury when Appellant recklessly turned onto a oneway street in the wrong direction, causing him almost to hit another vehicle 

headed in the opposite direction. See Reynolds, supra. Thus, there was 

sufficient evidence to support the finding that Appellant was the driver of the 

pursued vehicle and that he put another in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury when Appellant drove the wrong way on a one-way street and almost 

hit the oncoming vehicle. See Hansley, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

sufficiency of the evidence issues merit no relief. 

 In his final issue, Appellant argues his verdicts were against the weight 

of the evidence. Appellant claims his presumption of innocence was 

discarded in favor of Lieutenant Hollobaugh’s insufficiently corroborated 

testimony. Appellant contends Lieutenant Hollobaugh’s testimony lacked the 

adequate indicia of reliability to be considered as more than mere conclusory 

testimony. Appellant maintains there was no direct evidence or reliable 

testimony that proved he was driving the pursued vehicle. Appellant 

concludes this Court should reverse the judgment of sentence. We disagree. 
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 The following principles apply to our review of a weight of the evidence 

claim: 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the 

finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence and to determine the credibility of

the witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute 

its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we 

may only reverse the...verdict if it is so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d 

666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has 

ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role 

is not to consider the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, 

appellate review is limited to whether the trial court 

palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight 

claim. 

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004) 

(most internal citations omitted). 

 Instantly, the court relied on its sufficiency analysis and determined: 

[T]he fact finders’ guilty verdicts are not against the 

weight of the evidence as the verdicts are not “so contrary 

to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” It is 

clear from the verdicts rendered that the fact finders found 

the direct and circumstantial evidence presented at trial to 

be credible and established the elements of the offenses 

charged. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 4). We accept the court’s conclusions. Therefore, 

Appellant’s weight of the evidence issue merits no relief. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/2/2015