J-A19029-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AMANDA BLAIR 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 287 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered December 6, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0000794-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AMANDA BLAIR 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 288 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered December 6, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0003559-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2020

Amanda Blair appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following 

the revocation of her probation. She argues the court abused its discretion by 

imposing an excessive sentence. We affirm.

In July 2018, Blair pled guilty, at one trial court docket, to Endangering 

Welfare of Children (“EWOC”) and Possession of a Controlled Substance, and 

at a second docket, to two counts of Disorderly Conduct. The trial court 
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sentenced her at the first docket to one year of probation on each count, to 

be served consecutively, and at the second docket, she received 180 days of 

probation. The court subsequently found Blair in violation of probation (“VOP”) 

due to her failure to comply with drug treatment conditions and it revoked her 

probation. The court reinstated her probationary sentences and Blair began

Chester County’s Swift Alternative Violation Enforcement program (“SAVE”). 

However, Blair did not complete the SAVE program because she was 

removed in November 2019 due to her continued drug use, including multiple 

overdosing incidents, and her failure to report for random drug testing. As a 

result, on December 6, 2019, the VOP court revoked Blair’s probation again. 

This time, the court sentenced her to two and a half to five years’ incarceration 

on her EWOC conviction and no further penalty on her remaining convictions.

The VOP court gave Blair credit for time served. At Blair’s Gagnon II1 hearing, 

the court provided the following reasoning for its sentence, citing the need to 

vindicate the authority of the court and Blair’s failure at rehabilitation despite 

multiple attempts to treat her addiction:

THE COURT: . . . But what this boils down to, really, is the 

vindication of the authority of the Court. That’s all it is. And all the 

other cases, the information regarding them are indicative that 

she’s never really complied with the authority of the Court. We 

just have to keep locking her up. And we give her breaks that she 

never takes advantage of. In other words, we try to provide as 

much support for her and her addiction and she doesn’t take 

advantage of it. So what happens is that she continues to possess 

and use drugs. And I don’t know the extent that she --I don’t know 

what terms are on the [EWOC]. Is she supposed to have any 

____________________________________________

1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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contact with this child? I mean, if she does it’s ludicrous. It’s just 

an indication that the system has no effectiveness. She shouldn’t 

be within a country mile of this kid.

[Commonwealth]: Your Honor, I don’t have the file in front of me. 

But I prosecuted this case, and I think to some extent our hands 

were tied, just because of the family dynamics. I don’t know who 

the father is, but as you’ve heard, her mother is an addict and is 

on the run. And her grandmother is an enabler. I know there’s 

been times the grandmother has handled custody of the child, but 

I think we just kind of had to defer to CYF and to their opinions. 

There really wasn’t much we could do. I couldn’t include no 

contact with your son as a condition of the EWOC plea, because 

where would he go? And yet, he was six at the time.

THE COURT: How old is he now?

[Blair]: He is eight. He will be nine in March.

THE COURT: Ms. Blair, you have personality disorders. But the 

issue for me always was, you’re smart enough if you want to; you 

just don’t want to. And this is where the criminal justice system 

gets put in a unique position. You don’t want to live, because you 

certainly don’t take the actions like anybody who does. And you 

perpetuate this drug lifestyle, supporting the industry of drug 

commerce. And you continue to do that around your child when 

you’re currently under supervision for endangering because of this

conduct in the past. This is a very sick dynamic, and your child is 

going to pay the price for it. But, the summary form showing your 

history of violation of probations and parole in past cases indicate

that you have not complied with the orders of the Court. And you 

certainly haven’t complied with the orders of the Court on 

information 3559 of 2017, and the charge of endangering the 

welfare of children. You’re continuing to do that. The person that 

you have endangered, are serving a sentence on, is continuously 

exposed to the same conduct that you were convicted of engaging 

in and placing in danger before. And the history of this familial 

relationship, as [the Commonwealth] discussed . . . [i]s a sick 

dynamic between you and your mother and your grandmother. 

And your son is caught in that sick dynamic. Very unhealthy. Right 

now your grandmother has the child because you’re in jail and 

your mother is on the run. Otherwise, that kid is in that sick 

dynamic with you and your mother. And you have been offered all 

of the treatment -- probably more treatment and opportunities 

than anyone I’ve ever given in the system in 20 years. And no one 
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has failed more miserably at it than you. And for me just to ignore

that, would make this system a farce; a complete and total farce.

Particularly when the nature of the charge I’m dealing with now is 

endangering the welfare of your own child, and you will not stop 

engaging in that conduct. And replete in all of the sentences was 

that you were to engage in drug and alcohol treatment and engage 

in the rules of supervision, and not engage in drug activity or 

activity that places you and your child at risk. And you refuse to 

abide by that. And as a consequence then, the resources of this

system -- how many times you have been saved by police or other 

health professionals? If there has ever been a case before me 

where the authority of the Court needed to be vindicated, it’s you.

Because not to do so would allow you to continue to run amuck in 

our society, continuously endangering the welfare of your child, 

yourself and everyone else that has to respond to you. So, I can 

most honestly say that I have tried every trick in the Judge’s book, 

every resource available to try and help you, and you have 

repudiated each and every one of them. And this last time I’d 

hoped that maybe in the SAVE program that Judge Royer could 

find a way, which she has not been able to do.

N.T. 12/6/19, at 13-16.

Blair filed the instant timely appeal. The VOP court and Blair each 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, noted

Blair’s lengthy history of criminal convictions and drug treatment, including a 

multitude of treatment programs over more than eight years. VOP Ct. Rule 

1925(a) Op., 2/21/20, at 8, 10-11. The court noted the statutory maximum 

for EWOC, a misdemeanor of the first degree, is five years’ incarceration. N.T., 

12/6/19, at 4-5. Ultimately, the [c]ourt concluded:

Here, the facts established at the VOP hearing clearly show that 

[Blair] failed to comply with the basic, technical, requirements of 

her probation. The Court gave due consideration to factors which 

might mitigate the imposition of a sentence of total confinement, 

however, the Court concluded that [Blair] is simply unwilling to

accept responsibility for her underlying conduct and to comply 

with the terms of her probation. After presiding over these VOP 
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proceedings, the Court determined that [Blair] is a high risk 

individual who is likely to commit another crime if she was not 

imprisoned. Moreover, the Court concluded that total confinement 

was essential to prevent future overdoses and to vindicate the 

authority of the Court under 42 Pa[.]C.S.[A.] § 9771(c)(3).

VOP Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., at 10.

Blair raises a single issue for appellate review: “Did the trial court abuse 

its discretion when it imposed a sentence of two and one half (2 1⁄2) to five (5) 

years total confinement after a violation of probation hearing?” Blair’s Br. at 

5. 

Blair challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence. “The right to 

appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, 

and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth 

v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 206 A.3d 

1029 (Pa. 2019). Before reviewing the merits of Blair’s claim, we must 

determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved 

his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon 

for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether 

the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth 

v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019). 

Here, Blair has complied with the first three requirements: her appeal is 

timely, she preserved the issue in a post-sentence motion, and her brief 

includes a statement of the reasons for allowance of appeal. We now turn to 

whether Blair has raised a substantial question. A substantial question exists 
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when the appellant makes a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

In this case, Blair asserts in her Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement that her 

VOP sentence of two and one-half to five years of incarceration was manifestly 

excessive because her probation violations were technical and the court failed 

to consider her rehabilitative needs and other mitigating factors. Such a claim 

raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 

735, 740 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding claim that “court imposed a sentence

unreasonably disproportionate to her crimes and unduly excessive” raised 

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (“Appellant’s claim that the trial court sentenced him to a term 

of total confinement based solely on a technical violation raises a substantial 

question for our review”). Therefore, we now proceed to a review of the merits 

of Blair’s claim. 

Blair argues that the VOP court abused its discretion by sentencing her

in the maximum range for EWOC when her violations were “technical” 

violations of the conditions of her probation and did not involve a new criminal 

conviction or the endangerment of a child. Rather, she maintains, her 

violations only concerned her continuing drug addiction and near overdosing

incidents, and her child was not present when police arrived following these 
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incidents. Further, Blair contends that the VOP court erred by failing to 

adequately consider her need for drug treatment in her sentence.

We review a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing for an 

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1123 

(Pa.Super. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs where “the sentencing court 

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.”

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 

2003)). 

When the court revokes probation, “the sentencing alternatives 

available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial 

sentencing.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b). The VOP court may impose a sentence 

of total confinement if it finds that “(1) the defendant has been convicted of 

another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely 

that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or (3) such a 

sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9771(c). 

A VOP court properly takes into account its experience with the 

probationer when fashioning a sentence after revoking probation:

[A] trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in imposing 

a seemingly harsher post-revocation sentence where the 

defendant received a lenient sentence and then failed to adhere 

to the conditions imposed on him. In point of fact, where the 

revocation sentence was adequately considered and sufficiently 

explained on the record by the revocation judge, in light of the 

judge’s experience with the defendant and awareness of the 
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circumstances of the probation violation, under the appropriate 

deferential standard of review, the sentence, if within the 

statutory bounds, is peculiarly within the judge’s discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 28-29 (Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted).

Blair’s conviction for EWOC constituted a misdemeanor of the first 

degree with a maximum allowable sentence of five years’ imprisonment under 

Pa.C.S.A. §106(b)(6). See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(b). Accordingly, the VOP court 

lawfully sentenced Blair to a maximum of five years’ incarceration. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b). Further, contrary to Blair’s assertions, the court did 

consider the “technical” nature of Blair’s violations by noting that her 

continued drug abuse, including two near overdoses, had placed both Blair

and her child at risk. Moreover, the court aptly noted that Blair had been given 

a plethora of drug treatment opportunities over the course of more than eight 

years and had sadly been unsuccessful in those efforts. Therefore, the court

properly determined that a sentence of incarceration, in this particular case, 

was necessary to vindicate the authority of the court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9771(c)(3); Pasture, 107 A.3d at 27-29. We discern no abuse of discretion 

and thus affirm Blair’s judgment of sentence. See Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1123.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/20