1

The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-3000

___________

Geneva Proctor, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

UNUM Life Insurance Company of *

America, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: January 4, 2002

 Filed: January 29, 2002 

___________

Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Geneva Proctor appeals the District Court’s1

 adverse grant of summary

judgment in her action under the Employment Retirement Security Income Act of

1974 (ERISA). Proctor sued UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM),

the administrator of her former employer’s long-term disability benefit plan (Plan),

alleging wrongful denial of benefits. Having conducted a de novo review of the

record, and of the District Court’s application of the deferential abuse-of-discretion
-2-

standard of review, see Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 897-98 (8th Cir. 1996),

we affirm.

Specifically, we agree with the District Court that UNUM did not abuse its

discretion in denying benefits. See Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan

v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834, 841 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a plan administrator’s

decision to deny benefits must stand if it is reasonable, i.e., supported by relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the decision).

After conducting similar tests with differing results, examining physicians Joseph

Matthews and Deanna Ruddell reached opposite conclusions as to whether Proctor

has a disabling allergy to latex. Thus, it was reasonable for UNUM to credit Dr.

Matthews’s opinion, which was based on two types of skin tests, an independentlyanalyzed blood test, and a lung-function study. See id. at 843 (ruling that a plan

administrator does not abuse its discretion in finding employee not disabled where

record reflects conflicting medical opinions). It also was reasonable for UNUM to

decline to find Proctor disabled based on the January 2000 letter from her treating

physician, Dr. Barger, who failed to specify which of the conditions he listed was

disabling, or to explain how they prevented her from working as a radiologic

technologist. Further, contrary to Proctor’s assertion, the Plan specifically requires

that she be under the regular care of a physician for her allegedly disabling condition.

Proctor’s reliance on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579

(1993), is misplaced. The key issue in an ERISA denial-of-benefits action is whether

the plan administrator’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, although that

determination is made in part by considering the quality of the evidence. See

Fletcher-Merrit v. NorAm Energy Corp., 250 F.3d 1174, 1179 (8th Cir. 2001). Even

if Daubert applies, Proctor did not present her test-reliability argument to the Plan,

so the District Court was precluded from considering the argument and the medical

literature upon which it was based. See Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1251
-3-

(8th Cir. 1998) ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court should

consider only evidence that was before the plan administrator when the claim was

denied."). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring separately.

I concur but write separately to observe that Proctor's employer determined that

it was unsafe for her to return to work. Although a June 2000 letter from UNUM

indicates that, in October 1999, Proctor's employer offered her a job (unspecified)

which she turned down (Appellant's App. at 94), from June 22 to October 1999 her

employer would not allow her to return to work. As to this period, Proctor might

have a viable action against her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA). See Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2001) (to be

regarded as disabled under ADA, employee must show that employer mistakenly

believed she had physical impairment that substantially limited one or more major life

activity).

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.