www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 1 1 

The public debate that surrounded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–led operation in Libya gave an impression of an Alliance in trouble. There is, however, a good story to tell. The United 

States, as the host of the May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, may wish to 

present the case for a new type of operation and call for a strategy review on 

Libya in order to develop a balanced approach to Allies’ possible contributions 

to stability in North Africa and the Gulf region.

NATO Inherited Libya

In the spring of 2011, dramatic events unfolded in the southern rim of 

the Mediterranean. Countries from Egypt to Libya were swept by significant 

popular uprising and political change. The events led to regional upheaval and 

ultimately armed conflict, resulting in a NATO-led operation in Libya. Following serious unrest, which began in Benghazi on February 17, the United Nations 

Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1970, which instituted an arms 

embargo, froze the personal assets of Libya’s leaders, and imposed a travel ban 

on senior figures. NATO stepped up its surveillance operations in the Central 

Mediterranean. NATO Defence Ministers met on March 10 and supported 

the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to have Alliance ships 

move to the same area in order to boost the monitoring efforts.

On March 17, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing member 

states and regional organizations to inter alia take “all necessary measures” to 

protect civilians in Libya. NATO members immediately followed the UN call 

by launching a NATO-led operation to enforce the arms embargo against 

Libya on March 23. In addition, on March 24, NATO decided to enforce the 

UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya given the UNSC resolution call for a 

ban on all flights except those for humanitarian and aid purposes to avoid air 

attacks from Libyan authorities perpetrated on civilians inside the country. Finally, on March 27, following intense internal debates, NATO agreed to accept 

NATO and the Arab Spring

by Isabelle François

Transatlantic Current

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Isabelle François is a 

Distinguished Visiting Research 

Fellow in the Center for Transatlantic 

Security Studies, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ The North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Operation 

Unified Protector could become 

the symbol of American success 

in convincing its Allies that 

Europeans must take a greater 

share of the burden and assume 

greater responsibility for security 

in Europe and its periphery.

◆ NATO should prepare for a 

strategy review on Libya in the 

context of the 2012 Chicago 

Summit. The summit could be 

an opportunity to highlight 

allied capabilities with necessary 

partners’ contributions to conduct 

limited interventions—short-term 

6-month “bridging missions” 

mandated by the United 

Nations—from open crisis to 

stabilization that paves the way 

for reconstruction efforts.

October 2011

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies
2 Transatlantic Current No. 1 www.ndu.edu/inss

the whole military operation in Libya under UNSC 

Resolution 1973, taking over from a coalition led by the 

United States, France, and the United Kingdom, which 

had intervened militarily in the early days of the Libyan 

crisis with the first airstrikes on March 19, 2011.1

The purpose of the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector has been to protect civilians and civilianpopulated areas. NATO took action as part of a broad 

international effort, and immediately indicated its desire 

to work with its partners in the region. The NATO-led 

operation had the necessary legal basis through UNSC 

Resolution 1973 to intervene militarily. Moreover, the 

support from the Arab League provided the necessary 

political legitimacy for the intervention.

In this context, NATO was able to consult with and 

get some concrete support from countries in the region. 

The Allies were able to make best use of partnership 

frameworks, notably the Mediterranean Dialogue with 

Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and 

Tunisia, as well as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 

with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Allies reached out to all their partners, including 

in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, to share information, ensure transparency, and give an opportunity 

to willing contributing nations to provide assets to the 

operation. Three partners have contributed militarily to 

date, notably with aircraft from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar from the Gulf region, as well as Sweden 

among the Partnership for Peace partners. In addition, 

some staff support was provided by Jordan, while Malta 

assisted the Alliance in its operations both at sea and 

in the air. Others have given their political support, enhancing the legitimacy of the operation. The partnership 

with Gulf countries developed significantly within a few 

months, and should be built upon to institutionalize the 

level of cooperation reached between NATO and some 

Gulf countries.

Post-operation Libya

NATO’s engagement in Libya, despite its sound legal and political basis, has faced significant challenges in 

terms of internal cohesion, as well as external pressure 

on the Alliance in light of the summer stalemate. The 

mandate for operation was renewed by NATO Defence 

Ministers on June 8 for another 3 months until the end 

of September.2 Despite various bilateral efforts and attempts between the forces of Muammar Qadhafi and the 

rebels from the Transitional National Council (TNC), 

a negotiated settlement was impossible. Taking over 

Tripoli in mid-August, the TNC will have to prepare for 

transition in Libya in order to ensure inclusive political 

representation in future government institutions and the 

electoral process, as well as to guarantee territorial integrity. This will no doubt take months and NATO will 

remain engaged, abiding by its commitments until the 

TNC decides on—and international community supports—the requirements after the operation ends.

Since the situation in Libya will remain volatile, 

NATO should prepare for a strategy review on Libya in 

the context of the 2012 Chicago Summit. The Alliance 

may no longer be in the lead when it comes to the Libyan 

transition by May 2012, but it will still have lessons to 

learn and to share. Moreover, NATO will have a role to 

play in support of stability and reconstruction in Libya 

and the region. It would also be useful for the Alliance 

to continue to engage with the regional partners and develop closer cooperation, notably in the framework of the 

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Lessons Learned

Following the widely reported speech by outgoing 

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in June 2011, 

the partnership with Gulf countries 

developed significantly within a 

few months, and should be built 

upon to institutionalize the level of 

cooperation reached between NATO 

and some Gulf countries
www.ndu.edu/inss 3 Transatlantic current No. 1

many interpreted the remarks as evidence of a decaying Alliance in the face of a new challenge in Libya.3

(Others, however, heard the speech as a wake-up call.) 

Operation Unified Protector was used as a prime example of NATO’s inability—“11 weeks into an operation 

against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated 

country”—to keep up with the requirements of modern 

warfare. Criticisms were also leveled because only a small 

number of Allies (eight) contributed to the strike operation. Key European members such as Germany fundamentally disagreed with the mission and rendered the 

European Union (EU) unable to contribute much more 

than humanitarian aid and sanctions against the Qadhafi 

regime. Despite what can be interpreted at the end of 

August 2011 as a qualified success for the Alliance in 

Libya, NATO continues to suffer from a public image 

deficit in many quarters, and member nations may have 

to consider how much transformation is likely to be sufficient for the Alliance to be able to “rebrand” its image.

The Libyan operation has faced the usual challenge of 

maintaining consensus within the Alliance as time went 

by without a political settlement in place. From the early 

days of consultation within NATO, differences of approach and diverging political interests on the part of various Allies (notably France, Germany, and Turkey) did not 

escape media attention. In June, consensus was challenged 

following the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers: On 

June 22, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini called 

for a suspension of the campaign in the face of civilian 

casualties in the wake of NATO air strikes, saying it was 

necessary for humanitarian aid to reach people—a reversal 

of the position confirmed a couple of days later by Prime 

Minister Silvio Berlusconi. At an EU summit on June 24, 

Berlusconi pushed for a final solution to the Libyan crisis. That said, for as long as public opinion was supportive 

of the Allies’ military engagement against Qadhafi forces, 

consensus within NATO was likely to be maintained.

It should be clear, however, that in the absence of a 

major threat to the Alliance, various interests on the part 

of member states will make “difficult consensus” the norm 

rather than the exception. Moreover, in most cases, as we 

have seen in the Balkans and now in Libya, NATO-led 

operations can count on only a limited number of member nations to contribute forces that will assume combat or 

strike roles in any given operation. As NATO transitions to 

“out of area” operations, there is no requirement for all Allies 

to contribute to a NATO-led operation, and it should not 

come as a surprise when a number of them opt out. Such 

decisions, provided that they do not affect consensus and 

do not get in the way of the mission, are not undermining 

the Alliance; they may actually provide added flexibility for 

NATO to act and may prove to be the process by which 

most operations will be approved in the future. This should 

not be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of 

the Alliance. NATO’s strength lies in its ability to manage 

the consensual basis for its military action irrespective of 

obvious differences often made public for internal purposes.

NATO’s dependence on the international community to move from a military operation to broader stabilization and reconstruction efforts is yet another key 

challenge and its comprehensive approach to crisis management. Operation Unified Protector has shown progress 

in terms of NATO partnerships with other international 

and regional organizations, and has reached out quickly 

and decisively to various partners in the region. However, 

Alliance strategic success has depended on the ability of 

the international community to deliver a political settlement, relying notably on the Libyan Contact Group 

set up in London in April 2011. Moreover, NATO will 

likely face a difficult transition from military operation 

to civilian efforts at reconstruction once the UN and the 

key European members such as 

Germany fundamentally disagreed 

with the mission and rendered 

the European Union unable to 

contribute much more than 

humanitarian aid and sanctions 

against the Qadhafi regime
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 1 4

international community have taken the lead on the basis 

of a still elusive final outcome in Libya.

A Good Story to Tell

For all the challenges facing a transforming Alliance, Operation Unified Protector is not a bad story to tell. 

It could actually be the tell tale sign of a winning transatlantic partnership for the Allies’ publics—if the United 

States chooses to make the operation a deliverable at the 

Chicago Summit.

One of the key themes of the summit will be “smart 

defense”—that is, identifying capability areas where Allies need to keep investing and working multinationally 

to mitigate the decline in defense spending and to address some of the concerns raised by Secretary Gates 

last June. The Libya operation is not irrelevant to that 

debate as it outlined where NATO should focus in addition to its frontline capabilities.4

 Although the operation 

has exposed military weaknesses on the part of Europe 

(nothing that was not already known), it has shown that 

Europeans can project fighting power in complex operations and find the political will to take the lead.

Moreover, Operation Unified Protector tells the story 

of an Alliance yet unmatched in terms of its command 

and control capability and its flexibility and ability to 

conduct a complex operation. Perhaps even more importantly, NATO was the only organization with the political will to take over from the American, French, and 

British coalition in Libya, despite differences of views 

within the Alliance. Finally, Alliance capacity in terms 

of command and control was trusted by partners in the 

region to be able to run the operation, thereby gaining 

their political support.

In fact, the Libyan operation can be seen as the 

symbol of America’s success in convincing its Allies that 

Europeans have to take a greater share of the burden and 

assume greater responsibility for security in Europe and 

its periphery.5

 The operation was the first in which the 

United States agreed to play a pivotal but supporting role 

while Europeans took the lead. It is a prime example of 

American forces and assets being made available to Europeans through NATO as Allies lacked the necessary 

weapons and munitions to carry out the mission. The 

United States was indispensable to the operation, but the 

supporting role came after America provided the initial 

heavy strikes and the Europeans finally agreed to do the 

heavy lifting. That is transatlantic partnership at its best.

The Libya operation has managed to identify what 

a limited model of intervention can be with a supporting 

yet indispensable role for the United States. It also outlines the type of support that European Allies are likely 

to need in today’s operations. This seems to indicate a 

clearer division of labor rather than an inability to act on 

the part of the Europeans or disengagement on the part 

of the United States. It also corresponds to the burdensharing requirements imposed by today’s fiscal constraints, 

stopping short of giving in to the isolationist forces within 

member parliaments. It is hardly a sign of despair for the 

Alliance, although the lack of European capabilities identified should not be met with complacency.

Concrete Summit Deliverables

A strategy review in Chicago could offer three types 

of deliverables. First, there is the NATO circle for discussion among the 28 member states. One of the lessons learned by Allies from the Balkan operations is that 

without the deployment of ground troops, it is difficult to 

win from the air. We will have to see whether there will 

be a need for ground troops to assist in the monitoring 

and transition phase following air operations, and which 

organization will have to take the lead (if any) given that 

no Ally seems inclined to deploy ground troops. There 

although the operation has exposed 

military weaknesses on the part of 

Europe, it has shown that Europeans 

can project fighting power in 

complex operations and find the 

political will to take the lead
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 1 5 

may be no request from the Libyan operation for any 

assistance in this regard, but the capability should exist.

Operation Unified Protector may be a turning point 

for NATO recognizing the flexibility to conduct different types of operations—from the demanding conditions 

of Afghanistan to the shorter UN-mandated “bridging 

missions,” which are less demanding in human and financial terms. NATO is the only organization with the 

flexibility to operate at both ends of the spectrum, and 

this flexibility has proven critical in the face of uncertainties in contemporary operations. Moreover, smaller 

scale missions may be more likely because of budgetary 

constraints. These bridging missions could also make 

best use of NATO’s decision at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to improve the ability to deliver stabilization and 

reconstruction effects by agreeing to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with others and conduct appropriate planning 

in crisis management.6

 These missions, aimed at roughly 

a 6-month period toward stabilization, would pave the 

way for another organization to take the lead in reconstruction efforts, while buying time for the international 

community to assist “home grown” political settlements 

necessary for stabilization prior to reconstruction.7 In 

any case, this type of operation should foster cooperation 

with other international organizations and refrain from 

any competing calls between organizations.

The Allies will be called upon in Chicago to consider 

their core capabilities for future operations on the basis 

of the guidance provided by the 2010 Strategic Concept, 

while taking full account of today’s fiscal constraint. It 

may prove useful to consider reviewing the case of Libya 

and draw some key conclusions when it comes to defining NATO’s core capabilities for limited operations.8

 This 

should not detract from the major allied focus or from 

U.S.-led efforts in operations, such as the International 

Security Assistance Force. Afghanistan will undoubtedly 

remain the central theme of the Chicago Summit.

Second, the Libyan crisis can offer some lessons 

in terms of NATO partnerships. Inviting partners to a 

NATO strategy review of Operation Unified Protector

in Chicago would recognize the contribution of NATO 

partnerships both militarily and politically in terms of 

the support provided by partners both in the region, 

such as Qatar, and beyond, such as Sweden. This would 

militate in favor of a “big tent meeting” at the Chicago 

Summit where the Libyan operation, and possibly the 

post-operation strategy, could be reviewed. While the 

tendency at NATO would likely be to organize a meeting with troop-contributing nations, it may be that the 

Allies would gain from reaching out more broadly to 

countries in the region in order to develop a balanced 

political dialogue.9

A partnership meeting on the post-Libyan operation, open to other international organizations, might 

also give focus to ongoing discussions regarding whether and how NATO could assist countries south of the 

Mediterranean in developing the necessary security reforms in the face of popular uprisings experienced in the 

wake of the Arab Spring. Partnering with the EU in this 

context may offer some valuable prospects for enhancing NATO–EU cooperation.10 Cooperation with other 

regional organizations, such as the Arab League, Gulf 

Cooperation Council, and African Union, also hold significant potential in developing capacities in the region.

Finally, the interest of emerging powers in the Middle East and North Africa was demonstrated in the various diplomatic efforts toward a negotiated settlement in 

Libya on the part of Russia, South Africa, and others, 

and should be recognized by NATO. Moreover, dialoguing with countries that hold a seat on the UN Security 

Council and that supported UNSC Resolution 1973 is

bridging missions would pave the 

way for another organization to 

take the lead in reconstruction 

efforts, while buying time for the 

international community to assist 

“home grown” political settlements
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 1 6 

a long-term requirement for UN-mandated NATO 

bridging missions. This could also be handled as a side 

event as a summit conference. A strategy review on the 

Libyan crisis would be an opportunity to engage a broad 

political dialogue beyond NATO partnerships, reaching 

out to significant security interlocutors at a time when 

the U.S. public and Congress seem to focus increasingly 

beyond Europe. There will likely be a growing interest 

internationally in ensuring security and stability prior to 

investing in the resumption of oil production in Libya. 

Chicago could be an opportunity for all interested parties to look beyond the superficial level while ensuring 

that the transatlantic partnership continues to deliver its 

unique and flexible capabilities in terms of command and 

control of complex operations when the security environment calls for action.

Notes 1 See “Split in NATO over Libya mission,” March 22, 2011, 

available at <http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-dailyenglish-online/Politics/22-Mar-2011/Split-in-Nato-over-Libyamission>; David Brunnstrom, “NATO still split on taking over 

Libya operation,” Reuters, March 23, 2011, available at <http://

uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE72M4T72

0110323?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews>; Steven Lee 

Myers and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Allies are split on goal and exit 

strategy in Libya,” The New York Times, March 25, 2011, available 

at <www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/africa/25policy.html?_

r=1&scp=12&sq=25%20march%202011&st=cse>.

2 On June 8, 2011, NATO Defence Ministers “extended 

Operation Unified Protector for a further 90 days from 27 June.” See 

NATO, “Statement on Libya,” June 8, 2011, available at <www.nato.

int/cps/en/natolive/news_75177.htm>.

3 Robert M. Gates, “The Future of NATO,” June 10, 2010, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>.

4 For example, fighter bombers, warships, surveillance, aircraft 

refueling, and drones. See Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO after 

Libya,” June 29, 2011, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

opinions_75836.htm>.

5 Tomas Valasek, “What Libya says about the future of the 

transatlantic alliance,” Essays (London: Centre for European Reform, 

July 2011), available at <www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_libya_july11.pdf>.

6 At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, building on earlier efforts, 

NATO heads of state and government in their Declaration (para. 2) 

“decided to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management, as part of the international community’s 

effort and to improve NATO’s ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction effects.” To that end, they “agreed to form an appropriate 

but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other 

actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management.” See 

para. 9 in NATO, “Lisbon Summit Declaration,” November 20, 2010, 

available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_tests_688828.

htm?mode=pressrelease>.

7 Some analysts have made a strong case for the European 

Union to take over from NATO in Libya. See John E. Herbst and 

Leo G. Michel, “Why the EU should patrol Libya,” European Voice, 

July 14, 2011, 9.

8 For expediency, the NATO summit will focus on Afghanistan 

because it remains the most demanding allied operation. Also, there 

is an important public message to deliver in the context of transition. 

In addition, it would be difficult to gauge and prepare for a summit 

meeting on Libya without any certainty regarding what NATO’s role 

will be. However, smaller operations are central to Alliance efforts 

and transformation, and the political message of an operation with 

Europeans in the lead is one that demands attention.

9 The summit focus on Afghanistan could provide an opportunity for partners to attend based on their status as troop contributing nations to the International Security Assistance Force. It would 

be useful, however, to reach out beyond troop contributors to an 

operation. Allies and partners should consider future commitments 

for smaller operations such as Unified Protector, and should reach out 

more broadly to discuss the value-added internationally of United 

Nations–mandated bridging missions.

10 See Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and the Mediterranean: the changes ahead,” June 16, 2011, available at <www.nato.int/

cps/en/natolive/opinions_75547.htm>.

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies within the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies provides research 

and policy advice to senior Department of Defense and 

other U.S. Government leaders through studies, research 

projects, and outreach and education programs. CTSS 

draws on its unique interface with U.S. and international 

governments and research institutions to provide timely 

and relevant policy recommendations.

The Transatlantic Current series presents original research by members of the CTSS resident scholars as 

well as nonresident subject matter experts. The opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Department or 

any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU 

Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Ambassador Robert Hunter

Director

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS