```

[House Report 107-17]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                             Rept. 107-17
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 1

======================================================================

 
              ANTITRUST TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 2001

                                _______
                                

  March 12, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House and 
                         ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 809]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 809) to make technical corrections to various antitrust 
laws and to references to such laws, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend 
that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     1
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     4
Committee Consideration..........................................     4
Vote of the Committee............................................     4
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     4
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     4
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     4
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     5
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     5
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................     6
Agency Views.....................................................     6
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............     9

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 809, the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 
2001,'' makes six miscellaneous changes to the antitrust laws. 
Three of these changes repeal outdated provisions; one 
clarifies a longstanding ambiguity regarding the application of 
the antitrust laws in the District of Columbia and the 
territories; and two correct typographical errors in recently 
passed laws.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

       A. Repeal of the Act of March 3, 1913 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 30)

    The Act of March 3, 1913 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 30) requires that 
all depositions taken in Sherman Act equity cases brought by 
the government be conducted in public. In the early days of the 
Sherman Act, the courts conducted such cases by deposition 
without any formal trial proceeding. See generally United 
States v. Microsoft Corporation, 165 F.3d 952, 957-58 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). In 1912, a district court held that such 
depositions must be closed under the Equity Rules in effect at 
the time. United States v. United States Shoe Machinery Co., 
198 F. 870 (D. Mass. 1912). In response, Congress passed this 
statute requiring that the depositions be open. The rationale 
was that because these depositions essentially constituted the 
trial, they should be open as a trial would be. For a fuller 
description of these events, see Microsoft, 165 F.3d at 957-58, 
and the authorities cited therein.
    Under the modern practice of broad discovery, depositions 
are generally taken in private and then made public if they are 
used at trial. Under the modern system, Sec. 30 causes three 
problems: (1) it sets up a special rule for a narrow class of 
cases when the justification for that rule has disappeared; (2) 
it makes it hard for a court to protect proprietary information 
that may be at issue in an antitrust case; and (3) it can 
create a circus atmosphere in the deposition of a high profile 
figure. In the Microsoft case cited above, the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of the District of 
Columbia invited Congress to repeal this law. Microsoft, 165 
F.3d at 958.

B. Repeal of the Antitrust Provision in the Panama Canal Act (15 U.S.C. 
                                Sec. 31)

    Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act provides that no vessel 
owned by someone who is violating the antitrust laws may pass 
through the Panama Canal. The Committee has not been able to 
determine why this provision was added to the act or whether it 
has ever been used. However, with the return of the Canal to 
Panamanian sovereignty at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to 
repeal this outdated provision. The House Committee on Armed 
Services, which has jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Act, 
waived jurisdiction over this provision in the last Congress. 
The Committee has consulted informally with the Armed Service 
Committee, and, to date, it has not indicated that it has any 
objection to this repeal.

C. Clarification that Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act Applies to the District 
                 and the Territories (15 U.S.C. Sec. 3)

    Two of the primary provisions of antitrust law are Sec. 1 
and Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1, 2. 
Section 1 prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade, and 
Sec. 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and 
conspiracies to monopolize. Section 3 of the Sherman Act was 
intended to apply these provisions to conduct occurring in the 
District of Columbia and the various territories of the United 
States. Unfortunately, however, ambiguous drafting in Sec. 3 
leaves it unclear whether Sec. 2 applies to conduct occurring 
in those areas.
    The Committee believes that Congress intended Sec. 3 to 
apply both sections to the territories, and that by passing 
this amendment, it is only clarifying the matter by making 
explicit that which is already implicit in Sec. 3.
    The Committee is aware of at least one instance in which 
the Department of Justice declined to bring an otherwise 
meritorious Sec. 2 claim in a Virgin Islands case because of 
this ambiguity. United States v. Topa Equities (V.I.), Ltd., 
Civil No. 1994-179 (D.V.I. 1994). In that case, the Department 
was able to bring other claims under Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act 
which led to a settlement. All five of the congressional 
representatives of the District and the Territories are 
cosponsors of the bill.

D. Repeal of Redundant Antitrust Jurisdictional Provision in Sec. 77 of 
                         the Wilson Tariff Act

    In 1955, Congress modernized the jurisdictional and venue 
provisions relating to antitrust suits by amending Sec. 4 of 
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15). 69 Stat. 282. At that 
time, it repealed what was then Sec. 7 of the Sherman Act, a 
jurisdiction and venue provision that was redundant of the one 
in Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act. However, it did not repeal the 
similarly redundant jurisdiction and venue provision contained 
in Sec. 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. Id. It appears that this 
was an oversight because Sec. 77 was never codified and has 
rarely been used.
    Repealing Sec. 77 will not diminish any jurisdictional or 
venue rights because Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act provides any 
potential plaintiff with broader rights of jurisdiction and 
venue than does Sec. 77. Rather, the repeal simply rids the law 
of a confusing, redundant, and little used provision.

                 E. Correction of Typographical Errors

    The bill corrects an erroneous section number designation 
in the Curt Flood Act passed in 1998, and it inserts an 
inadvertently omitted period in the Year 2000 Information and 
Readiness Disclosure Act. Neither of these corrections makes 
any substantive change.

             F. Application of Amendments to Pending Cases

    The changes made by the bill become effective on the date 
of enactment. In addition, the bill includes language that 
clarifies the application of the various amendments to pending 
cases.
    With respect to Sec. 2(a) (public depositions), the change 
does not affect any substantive rights of the litigants, and 
for that reason, the bill applies the change to pending cases.
    With respect to Sec. 2(b) (Panama Canal), the Committee 
believes that this provision has never been used and that there 
are no pending cases that will be affected. In the unlikely 
event that there is such a case, the bill does not apply the 
amendment because it would affect substantive rights.
    With respect to Sec. 2(c) (application of Sherman Act 
Sec. 2 to the District of Columbia and the territories), the 
Committee believes that there could be pending cases that would 
be affected. In our judgment, the amendment only makes explicit 
that which is already implicit in Sec. 3. However, a court 
might interpret the existing Sec. 3 differently. To avoid 
changing the rules in the middle of litigation, the Committee 
intends that any litigant in a pending case filed before 
enactment of this amendment ought to be treated as if this 
amendment had not passed. In such a case, a court should 
interpret Sec. 3 as it would have in the absence of this 
amendment.
    With respect to Sec. 2(d) (Sec. 77 of the Wilson Tariff 
Act), the Committee believes that there could be pending cases 
that would be affected. The Committee understands that Sec. 77 
has rarely, if ever, been used. However, if there is a pending 
case in which a litigant has relied on it, he or she should not 
have the rules changed in the middle of the case. For that 
reason, the bill does not apply Sec. 2(d) to pending cases.
    Finally, with respect to the typographical errors corrected 
in Sec. Sec. 2(e) and 2(f), they make no substantive change, 
and it was not necessary to direct how they apply to pending 
cases.

                                Hearings

    Because H.R. 809 contains only noncontroversial technical 
corrections to the antitrust laws, the Committee held no 
hearings on it.

                        Committee Consideration

    After its referral to the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. 
809 was held at the full Committee. Thus, it received no 
subcommittee consideration. On March 8, 2001, the full 
Committee on the Judiciary met in open session and ordered 
favorably reported the bill H.R. 809 unamended, by a voice 
vote, a quorum being present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    During its consideration of H.R. 809, the Committee took no 
rollcall votes.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report. See Agency Views Section, 
below.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    H.R. 809 authorizes no funding for any program. However, by 
eliminating the need for public depositions and clarifying that 
Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act applies to the District of Columbia 
and the territories, it should improve the efficiency of the 
Department of Justice in enforcing the antitrust laws.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 809, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                    Washington, DC, March 12, 2001.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 809, the Antitrust 
Technical Corrections Act of 2001.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Lanette J. 
Walker.
            Sincerely,
                                  Dan L. Crippen, Director.

Enclosure.

H.R. 809--Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 2001

    CBO estimates that implementing this bill would have no 
significant impact on the federal budget. Because H.R. 809 
could affect direct spending and receipts, pay-as-you-go 
procedures would apply. CBO estimates, however, that any impact 
on direct spending and receipts would not be significant. H.R. 
809 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no 
costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    H.R. 809 would make several technical changes to current 
antitrust law and would eliminate a redundant law that 
establishes jurisdiction in cases involving violations of 
antitrust law. It also would clarify that certain provisions of 
antitrust laws apply to territories of the United States and 
the District of Columbia. As a consequence of that 
clarification, additional convictions for antitrust violations 
might result, and the federal government might collect 
additional fines. Collections of such fines are recorded in the 
budget as governmental receipts (revenues), which are deposited 
in the Crime Victims Fund and spent in subsequent years. 
Information from the Department of Justice indicates that it 
would be unlikely to prosecute additional criminal cases under 
H.R. 809. Therefore, CBO expects that any additional receipts 
or direct spending would be negligible.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Lanette J. 
Walker. This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 provides that the short 
title of the bill is the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act 
of 2001.''
    Sec. 2. Amendments. Subsection 2(a) repeals the Act of 
March 3, 1913, requiring that depositions in Sherman Act equity 
cases brought by the government be held in public, as described 
above.
    Subsection 2(b) repeals the paragraph in Section 11 of 
Panama Canal Act, prohibiting ships owned by persons who are 
violating the antitrust laws from passing through the Canal, as 
described above.
    Subsection 2(c) adds a new Sec. 3(b) to Sec. 3 of the 
Sherman Act to clarify that Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act applies 
to the District of Columbia and the territories. This new 
Sec. 3(b) in Sec. 3 closely tracks the language of Sec. 2 of 
the Sherman Act with language applying it to the District and 
the territories.
    Subsection 2(d) repeals Sec. 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act 
and also eliminates several cross-references to Sec. 77 in five 
other statutes (the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, and the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act). These 
cross-references occur in definitions of the term ``antitrust 
laws'' in the other statutes and do not change the substance of 
those statutes.
    Subsection 2(e) corrects an erroneous section number 
designation in the Curt Flood Act passed in 1998. It makes no 
substantive change.
    Subsection 2(f) inserts an inadvertently omitted period in 
the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act. It 
makes no substantive change.
    Sec. 3. Effective Date; Application of Amendments. 
Subsection 3(a) provides that the changes shall take effect on 
the date of enactment.
    Subsection 3(b) provides that the change made in subsection 
2(a) (i.e. taking depositions in public) shall apply to cases 
pending on the date of enactment, but that the other changes 
shall not apply to pending cases.

                              Agency Views

    The Committee has not received any formal agency views on 
H.R. 809. However, the Committee has consulted informally with 
both of the antitrust agencies, the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the 
Federal Trade Commission. Both agencies have indicated 
informally that they have no objection to the passage of the 
bill.
    In addition, the impetus for the provisions of subsections 
2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) came from answers to questions to the 
Antitrust Division after the Committee's general oversight 
hearing on both of the agencies on November 5, 1997. The 
Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: The Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the 
Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 105th Congress 250 (1997). The relevant text is 
set forth below:

                     Congress of the United States,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                 Washington, DC, December 16, 1997.
Hon. Joel Klein,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
    Dear Assistant Attorney General Klein: I appreciate your 
appearing before the Committee on the Judiciary to testify at 
the oversight hearing on ``The Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and The 
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission'' on 
Wednesday, November 5, 1997.
    Members of the Committee have asked that you answer 
additional written questions for the record. I have attached a 
copy of the questions. I would appreciate your answering the 
questions in writing and returning your answers to the 
Committee for inclusion in the hearing record at your earliest 
convenience.
    If the Committee can provide you with any additional 
information, please do not hesitate to have your staff contact 
Joseph Gibson by Phone at (202) 225-3951 or by fax at (202) 
225-7682. I appreciate your participation in our hearing.
            Sincerely,
                                   Henry J. Hyde, Chairman.

             QUESTIONS FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL KLEIN

Questions From Chairman Hyde

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    6. Does the Antitrust Division currently seek any changes 
to the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms available to 
it, or to any of its organizational statutes? If so, please 
enumerate these changes and provide a brief explanation.
    7. Does the Antitrust Division believe that there are any 
provisions of the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms 
available to it, or to any of its organizational statutes that 
are anachronistic or that should otherwise be eliminated from 
the statute books? If so, please enumerate these changes and 
provide a brief explanation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                        U.S. Department of Justice,
                             Office of Legislative Affairs,
                                    Washington, DC, March 17, 1998.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for giving Assistant Attorney 
General Joel Klein the opportunity to testify at the oversight 
hearing on ``The Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade 
Commission'' on November 5, 1997.
    Enclosed are the responses to the written questions for the 
record that you sent to Mr. Klein on behalf of the Committee 
after the hearing.
    If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to 
contact me.
            Sincerely,
                                               Andrew Fois,
                                        Assistant Attorney General.

Enclosure.

             QUESTIONS FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL KLEIN

Questions from Chairman Hyde

    6. Does the Antitrust Division currently seek any changes 
to the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms available to 
it, or to any of its organizational statutes? If so, please 
enumerate these changes and provide a brief explanation.
    Yes.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    A second area that this Committee may wish to take a look 
at is the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to the 
District of Columbia and the territories. There does not appear 
to be any reason other than historical anomaly for the laws 
against monopolization to apply in the 50 States but not the 
District of Columbia or the territories, but that appears to be 
the current state of the law. I would be happy to work with the 
Committee on developing such legislation
    7. Does the Antitrust Division believe that there are any 
provisions of the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms 
available to it, or to any of its organization statutes that 
are anachronistic or that should otherwise be eliminated from 
the statute books? If so, please enumerate these changes and 
provide a brief explanation.
    Yes. The Antitrust Division believes that both 15 U.S.C. 
section 30 and 15 U.S.C. section 31 should be eliminated from 
the statute books. The first statute requires that in antitrust 
cases, as opposed to any other types of civil cases, 
depositions of witnesses be open to the public. We do not 
believe that different procedures should apply regarding the 
openness of depositions in antitrust cases from any other civil 
cases. Indeed, such a requirement could raise unnecessary 
complications in certain instances. For example, in a high 
profile civil litigation, it is possible that a large number of 
people may desire to be present at a given deposition. If the 
deposition has been scheduled for a normal size conference 
room, and large numbers of people show up, the question would 
arise whether any of those individuals could be turned away 
consistent with the statute. Must the deposition be postponed 
until a larger room can be found or could the deposition go 
forward and people be excluded? In any event, the Division sees 
no need for this type of provision. If the matter goes to 
trial, the trial will be public.
    The second statute that could be eliminated is entitled 
``Panama Canal closed to violators of the antitrust laws,'' 15 
U.S.C. section 31. In the 84 years since this statute has been 
part of the law, we are aware of no enforcement of the statute. 
Moreover, without expressing any Department of Justice legal 
opinion on the issue, it may be the case that the Treaty 
Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama 
Canal (Sept. 7, 1977) impliedly repealed this statute. In any 
event, we believe this statute is anachronistic and should be 
removed from the statute books.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    In addition, although they do not constitute formal agency 
views, the Committee would like to recognize two other 
contributions to this bill. The Committee appreciates the 
contribution of the D.C. Circuit in calling to our attention 
the need for the repeal contained in subsection 2(a). 
Microsoft, 165 F.3d at 958. We also appreciate the contribution 
of the office of the House Legislative Counsel, in calling to 
our attention the need for the repeal contained in subsection 
2(d).

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

                          ACT OF MARCH 3, 1913

CHAP. 114.--AN ACT Providing for publicity in taking evidence under Act 
              of July second, eighteen hundred and ninety.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, [That in 
the taking of depositions of witnesses for use in any suit in 
equity brought by the United States under the Act entitled ``An 
Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints 
and monopolies,'' approved July second, eighteen hundred and 
ninety, and in the hearings before any examiner or special 
master appointed to take testimony therein, the proceedings 
shall be open to the public as freely as are trials in open 
court; and no order excluding the public from attendance on any 
such proceedings shall be valid or enforceable.]
                              ----------                              

                   SECTION 11 OF THE PANAMA CANAL ACT

    Sec. 11.  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [No vessel permitted to engage in the coastwise or foreign 
trade of the United States shall be permitted to enter or pass 
through said canal if such ship is owned, chartered, operated, 
or controlled by any person or company which is doing business 
in violation of the provisions of the Act of Congress approved 
July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled ``An Act to 
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies,'' or the provisions of sections seventy-three to 
seventy-seven, both inclusive, of an Act approved August 
twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled ``An 
Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, 
and for other purposes,'' or the provisions of any other Act of 
Congress amending or supplementing the said Act of July second, 
eighteen hundred and ninety, commonly known as the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, and amendments thereto, or said sections of the 
Act of August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four. 
The question of fact may be determined by the judgment of any 
court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in any 
cause pending before it to which the owners or operators of 
such ship are parties. Suit may be brought by any shipper or by 
the Attorney General of the United States.]
                              ----------                              

                     SECTION 3 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 3. (a) Every contract, combination in form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in 
any Territory of the United States or of the District of 
Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such 
Territory and another, or between any such Territory or 
Territories and any State or States or the District of 
Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of 
Columbia, and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby 
declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract 
or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court.
    (b) Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce in any 
Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, 
or between any such Territory and another, or between any such 
Territory or Territories and any State or States or the 
District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the 
District of Columbia, and any State or States or foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if 
a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
                              ----------                              

                          WILSON TARIFF ACT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Sec. 77. That any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by any other person or corporation by 
reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this 
Act may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States 
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, 
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee.]
    Sec. [78.] 77. Sections 73, 74, 75, [76, and 77] and 76 of 
this Act may be cited as the ``Wilson Tariff Act''.
                              ----------                              

                              CLAYTON ACT

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) 
``antitrust laws,'' as used herein, includes the Act entitled 
``An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful 
restraints and monopolies,'' approved July second, eighteen 
hundred and ninety; sections seventy-three to [seventy-seven] 
seventy-six, inclusive, of an Act entitled ``An Act to reduce 
taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other 
purposes,'' of August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and 
ninety-four; an Act entitled ``An Act to amend sections 
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-
seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled `An Act to 
reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for 
other purposes,' '' approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred 
and thirteen; and also this Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. [27.] 28. If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part 
of this Act shall, for any reason, be adjudged by any court of 
competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not 
affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof, but shall 
be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, 
paragraph, or part thereof directly involved in the controversy 
in which such judgment shall have been rendered.
                              ----------                              

              SECTION 4 OF THE FEDEAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

    Sec. 4. The words defined in this section shall have the 
following meaning when found in this Act, to wit:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    ``Antitrust Acts'' means the Act entitled ``An Act to 
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies,'' approved July 2, 1890; also sections 73 to [77] 
76, inclusive, of an Act entitled ``An Act to reduce taxation, 
to provide revenue for the Government, and for other 
purposes,'' approved August 27, 1894; also the Act entitled 
``An Act to amend sections 73 and 76 of the Act of August 27, 
1894, entitled `An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue 
for the Government, and for other purposes,''' approved 
February 12, 1913; and also the Act entitled ``An Act to 
supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies, and for other purposes,'' approved October 15, 
1914.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

          SECTION 405 OF THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT, 1921

    Sec. 405. Nothing contained in this Act, except as 
otherwise provided herein, shall be construed--
    (a) To prevent or interfere with the enforcement of, or the 
procedure under, the provisions of the Act entitled ``An Act to 
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies,'' approved July 2, 1890, the Act entitled ``An Act 
to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies, and for other purposes,'' approved October 15, 
1914, the Interstate Commerce Act as amended, the Act entitled 
``An Act to promote export trade, and for other purposes,'' 
approved April 10, 1918, or sections 73 to [77] 76, inclusive, 
of the Act of August 27, 1894, entitled ``An Act to reduce 
taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other 
purposes,'' as amended by the Act entitled ``An Act to amend 
sections seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August 
twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled `An 
Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, 
and for other purposes' '' approved February 12, 1913, or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

                  SECTION 105 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

    Sec. 105. Antitrust Provisions.--
    a. Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any person 
from the operation of the following Acts, as amended, ``An Act 
to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies'' approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety; 
sections seventy-three to [seventy-seven] seventy-six, 
inclusive, of an Act entitled ``An Act to reduce taxation, 
mission, to define its powers and duties, and for other 
purposes'' approved August twenty-seven, eighteen hundred and 
ninety-four; ``An Act to supplement existing laws against 
unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes'' 
approved October fifteen, nineteen hundred and fourteen; and 
``An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its 
powers and duties, and for other purposes'' approved September 
twenty-six, nineteen hundred and fourteen. In the event a 
licensee is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, either 
in an original action in that court or in a proceeding to 
enforce or review the findings or orders of any Government 
agency having jurisdiction under the laws in the conduct of the 
licensed activity, the Commission may suspend, revoke, or take 
such other action as it may deem necessary with respect to any 
license issued by the Commission under the provisions of this 
Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

       SECTION 103 OF THE DEEP SEABED HARD MINERAL RESOURCES ACT

SEC. 103. LICENSE AND PERMIT APPLICATIONS, REVIEW, AND CERTIFICATION.

    (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) Antitrust Review.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (7) As used in the subsection, the term ``antitrust laws'' 
means the Act of July 2, 1890 (commonly known as the Sherman 
Act; 15 U.S.C. 1-7); sections 73 through [77] 76 of the Act of 
August 27, 1894 (commonly known as the Wilson Tariff Act; 15 
U.S.C. 8-11); the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.); the Act 
of June 19, 1936 (commonly known as the Robinson-Patman Price 
Discrimination Act; 15 U.S.C. 13-13b and 21a); and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

  SECTION 5 OF THE YEAR 2000 INFORMATION AND READINESS DISCLOSURE ACT

SEC. 5. TEMPORARY ANTITRUST EXEMPTION.

    (a) Exemption.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
antitrust laws shall not apply to conduct engaged in, including 
making and implementing an agreement, solely for the purpose of 
and limited to--
            (1) * * *
            (2) communicating or disclosing information to help 
        correct or avoid the effects of year 2000 processing 
        failure.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                            BUSINESS MEETING

                        THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2001

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Room 
2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James 
Sensenbrenner (chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The committee will be in order. 
Pursuant to notice, I now call up the Bill H.R. 809, a bill to 
make technical corrections to various antitrust laws and to 
references to such laws, for purposes of markup and move its 
favorable recommendation to the House.
    [H.R. 809 follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the bill will be 
considered as read and open for amendment at any point. Hearing 
none, so ordered. I yield myself 5 minutes.
    Today, the committee considers H.R. 809, the Antitrust 
Technical Corrections Act of 2001, which I have introduced with 
Ranking Member Conyers and Representative Hyde. This bill makes 
six separate technical corrections to our antitrust laws. Three 
of these corrections repeal outdated provisions of the law, one 
clarifies the long-existing ambiguity regarding application of 
the law to the District of Columbia and the territories and to 
correct two typographical errors in recently passed laws.
    This bill is identical to a bill we passed by voice vote in 
the committee and the full House last year, except we have 
added the two typographical corrections and some effective date 
language. The committee has informally consulted with the 
antitrust enforcement agencies, the Antitrust Division of DOJ 
and the Bureau of Competition of the FTC, and the agencies have 
indicated they do not object to any of these changes.
    In response to written questions following the committee's 
November 5, 1997, oversight hearing on the antitrust 
enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice recommended two 
of the repeals and a clarification contained in the bill.
    First, this bill repeals the act of March 3, 1913, which 
requires that all depositions taken in antitrust cases brought 
by the Government be conducted in public. In early days, the 
courts conducted such cases by deposition without any formal 
trial proceeding. Thus, Congress required the depositions to be 
open, as a trial would be. Under the modern practice of broad 
discovery, the depositions are taken in private and then made 
public if they are used at trial.
    Second, the bill repeals the antitrust provision in the 
Panama Canal Act, which provides that no vessel owned by 
someone who is violating the antitrust laws may pass through 
the Panama Canal.
    Third, the bill clarifies that section 2 of the Sherman Act 
applies to the District of Columbia and its territories.
    Finally, the bill repeals a number of redundant antitrust 
jurisdictional provisions in section 77 of the Wilson Tariff 
Act. The bill also corrects an erroneous section number 
designation in the Curt Flood Act passed in 1998.
    I believe that all of these provisions are noncontroversial 
and would help clean up some underbrush in the antitrust laws. 
I ask unanimous consent that my full statement be made a part 
of the record and yield to Mr. Conyers.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Sensenbrenner follows:]
       Prepared Statement of Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a 
 Representative in Congress From the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, 
                       Committee on the Judiciary
    Today the Committee considers H.R. 809, the ``Antitrust Technical 
Corrections Act of 2001,'' which I have introduced with Ranking Member 
Conyers and Representative Hyde. H.R. 809 makes six separate technical 
corrections to our antitrust laws. Three of these corrections repeal 
outdated provisions of the law; one clarifies a long existing ambiguity 
regarding the application of the law to the District of Columbia and 
the territories; and two correct typographical errors in recently 
passed laws.
    The bill is identical to a bill that we passed by voice vote in the 
Committee and the full House last year, except that we have added the 
two typographical corrections and some effective date language. The 
Committee has informally consulted with the antitrust enforcement 
agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the 
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, and the agencies 
have indicated that they do not object to any of these changes. In 
response to written questions following the Committee's November 5, 
1997 oversight hearing on the antitrust enforcement agencies, the 
Department of Justice recommended two of the repeals and the 
clarification contained in this bill.
    First, H.R. 809 repeals the Act of March 3, 1913 (15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 30). That act requires that all depositions taken in antitrust 
cases brought by the government be conducted in public. In the early 
days, the courts conducted such cases by deposition without any formal 
trial proceeding. Thus, Congress required that the depositions be open 
as a trial would be. Under the modern practice of broad discovery, 
depositions are generally taken in private and then made public if they 
are used at trial. Under our system, Sec. 30 causes three problems: (1) 
it sets up a special rule for a narrow class of cases when the 
justification for that rule has disappeared; (2) it makes it hard for a 
court to protect proprietary information that may be at issue in an 
antitrust case; and (3) it can create a circus atmosphere in the 
deposition of a high profile figure like Bill Gates. In an appeal in 
the Microsoft case, the D.C. Circuit invited Congress to repeal this 
law.
    Second, H.R. 809 repeals the antitrust provision in the Panama 
Canal Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31). Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act 
provides that no vessel owned by someone who is violating the antitrust 
laws may pass through the Panama Canal. The Committee has not been able 
to determine why this provision was added to the Act or whether it has 
ever been used. However, with the return of the Canal to Panamanian 
sovereignty at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to repeal this 
outdated provision. The House Committee on Armed Services, which has 
jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Act, waived jurisdiction over this 
bill last year. The Committee staff has consulted informally with the 
Armed Services staff, and to date, they have not indicated any 
objection to this repeal.
    Third, H.R. 809 clarifies that Section 2 of the Sherman Act applies 
to the District and the territories (15 U.S.C. Sec. 3). Two of the 
primary provisions of antitrust law are Section 1 and Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Section 1 prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
and Section 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and 
conspiracies to monopolize. Section 3 of the Sherman Act was intended 
to apply these provisions to the District of Columbia and the various 
territories of the United States. Unfortunately, however, ambiguous 
drafting in Section 3 leaves it unclear whether Section 2 applies to 
those areas. The Committee is aware of at least one instance in which 
the Department of Justice declined to bring an otherwise meritorious 
Section 2 claim in a Virgin Islands case because of this ambiguity. 
This bill clarifies that both Section 1 and Section 2 apply to the 
District and the Territories. All of the congressional representatives 
of the District and the Territories are cosponsors of the bill.
    Finally, H.R. 809 repeals a redundant antitrust jurisdictional 
provision in Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. In 1955, Congress 
modernized the jurisdictional and venue provisions relating to 
antitrust suits by amending Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 15). At that time, it repealed the redundant jurisdictional 
provision in Section 7 of the Sherman Act, but not the one contained in 
Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. It appears that this was an 
oversight because Section 77 was never codified and has rarely been 
used. Repealing Section 77 will not diminish any jurisdictional or 
venue rights because Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides any 
potential plaintiff with the same jurisdiction and venue rights that 
Section 77 does and it also provides broader rights. Rather, the repeal 
simply rids the law of a confusing, redundant, and little used 
provision.
    Finally, the bill corrects an erroneous section number designation 
in the Curt Flood Act passed in 1998, and it inserts an inadvertently 
omitted period in the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure 
Act. Neither of these corrections makes any substantive change.
    I believe that all of these provisions are non-controversial, and 
they will help to clean up some underbrush in the antitrust laws. I 
recommend that the Committee pass the bill without amendment.

    Mr. Conyers. I ask unanimous consent to submit my statement 
for the record.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Mr. Conyers. As a co-sponsor of the bill and a supporter of 
the corrections, I concur with your analysis and remind our 
colleagues that this has been arrived at in consultation with 
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and I urge all of the members to support the 
measure.
    I thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:]
   Prepared Statement of Hon. John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in 
                  Congress From the State of Michigan
    H.R. 809, the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act'' makes six 
non-controversial changes in our antitrust laws to repeal some out-
dated provisions of the law, to clarify that our antitrust laws apply 
to the District of Columbia and to the Territories, and to make some 
necessary organizational and grammatical changes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner and I have worked together on this bill, and 
we have consulted with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and 
the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition to ensure that these 
technical changes improve the efficiency of our antitrust laws. I urge 
you to support this bi-partisan bill.

    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there any amendments?
    If not, the question occurs on the motion to report the 
Bill H.R. 809 favorably. All of those in favor will signify by 
saying aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The ayes have it, and the motion is adopted.
    Without objection, the chairman is authorized to move to go 
to conference, pursuant to House rules. Without objection, the 
staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes, 
and all members will be given 2 days, as provided by House 
rules and wish to submit additional dissenting supplemental or 
minority views.

                                  

```