Filed 2/8/24; certified for publication 3/5/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re F.V., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B329192

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04342)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RENE S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders

of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tamara E. Hall, 

Judge. Reversed. 

Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

Rene S. (father) appeals from the jurisdictional and 

dispositional orders removing his daughter F.V. from father and 

mother Fa.V. (mother). 

Father and F.V. traveled to the United States from 

Honduras when F.V. was nine years old. When they were unable 

to cross the border together, F.V. entered the United States 

alone. Immigration authorities placed F.V. with E.V., a maternal 

uncle then living in California (maternal uncle) after obtaining 

mother’s consent to that placement. The juvenile court sustained 

jurisdictional allegations that maternal uncle then sexually 

abused F.V. Although the juvenile court found mother and father 

had no reason to know maternal uncle would sexually abuse F.V., 

the court asserted jurisdiction based on parents allowing F.V. to 

enter the United States unaccompanied with no plan in place for 

her care. 

As for disposition, the juvenile court indicated it was 

inclined to return F.V. to mother in Honduras, which could not 

happen immediately because, inter alia, F.V. had no passport. 

The court declined to place F.V. with father, finding his housing 

situation was “not stable” and F.V. did not want to relocate to 

Texas, where father now lived. Consequently, F.V. remained in 

foster care.

We hold there was insufficient evidence of future risk to 

F.V. to support jurisdiction. At the time of the jurisdiction 

hearing, F.V. was no longer in maternal uncle’s custody, and 
3

there was no indication mother and father would allow maternal 

uncle access to her. Assuming arguendo F.V.’s entering the 

United States alone demonstrated a failure to supervise and 

protect her, that circumstance was unlikely to recur given father 

was now in the United States and able to care for her, and 

mother wanted her back in Honduras. To the extent mother and 

father disagree as to who should care for F.V., that is not a basis 

for the juvenile court’s involvement.

Accordingly, we reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders. 

BACKGROUND

1. Referral and initial investigation

On November 1, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral 

alleging maternal uncle, with whom F.V. resided, had sexually 

abused F.V. F.V. was 10 years old at the time. DCFS removed 

F.V. and maternal uncle’s daughter, M.V., and placed them in 

foster care.1 

DCFS’s investigation revealed the following. F.V. had 

traveled to the United States from Honduras with father

approximately 11 months earlier. F.V.’s family lived in poverty, 

and “had heard younger children were being allowed into the 

United States.” Their first attempt to cross the border was 

unsuccessful. F.V. then crossed without father and was detained 

1 At various times in these proceedings, F.V. and M.V.

gave detailed accounts of the sexual abuse they suffered. Those 

details are not relevant to our resolution of this appeal, and we 

do not summarize them.
4

by immigration authorities. Mother, still in Honduras, consented 

to the immigration authorities placing F.V. with maternal uncle.

Father arrived in the United States later and was living in Texas. 

F.V. told mother during a videochat that maternal uncle 

had sexually abused her. Mother called another relative in 

California, D.R., and asked her to call the police, which D.R. did, 

thus leading to the referral. When a social worker spoke with 

D.R., D.R. reported that she knew maternal uncle because they 

were from the same town in Honduras. She said when she was 

14 years old, maternal uncle “would try to touch her body and she 

would get rocks to defend herself from him.” 

Maternal uncle had prior child welfare history. DCFS 

found “Inconclusive” a March 1, 2022 referral stating maternal 

uncle hit his daughter, M.V., with a belt on numerous occasions.

DCFS also found inconclusive a December 18, 2021 referral 

alleging maternal uncle, then living in a shelter with M.V. and an 

unidentified second child, had left the children unsupervised. On 

October 5, 2021, M.V. reported that years earlier, one of maternal 

uncle’s friends had raped her, although she had never told her 

father. DCFS found “no allegation reported or concerns of risk.” 

F.V. told DCFS she wished to return to mother in 

Honduras. Mother’s preference was for F.V. to live with father

and hoped DCFS could help father get custody; otherwise, mother 

wanted F.V. to return to Honduras. Mother stated she was 

“residing in . . . poverty.” 

Father also stated he would like DCFS’s assistance in 

obtaining custody of F.V. He said he was having trouble getting 

money because he had no fixed employment and was 

undocumented. He also was “not living in the best place and 
5

understands the USA requires for the child to be [in] a safe 

environment.” 

2. Detention

On November 3, 2022, DCFS filed a Welfare and 

Institutions Code2 section 300 petition seeking to detain F.V. 

The petition asserted identical allegations under section 300,

subdivisions (b)(1) and (d). The allegations stated that mother 

and father had “placed the child in a detrimental and 

endangering situation by allowing the child to come to the United 

States from Honduras unaccompanied resulting in the child 

residing with the maternal uncle . . . .” The allegations then set 

forth in some detail the sexual abuse suffered by F.V. 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found father to 

be F.V.’s presumed father. Father requested a prerelease 

investigation and return of F.V. to father or placement with 

father’s relatives. Mother requested the child be released to both 

parents and to stay with father in the United States. Minor’s 

counsel stated minor wished to be released to mother or father, 

but because of the impracticality of doing so at that time, minor’s 

counsel submitted, requesting a prerelease investigation of 

father, paternal relatives, and mother.

The juvenile court ordered F.V. removed and detained from 

parents. 

3. Proceedings leading to adjudication and disposition

In a prerelease investigation report filed less than a month 

after the detention hearing, mother stated she now believed it 

2 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
6

was in F.V.’s best interests to return to mother in Honduras. 

Mother stated she was not employed, and lived with her three 

other children, ages 19, 16, and 12. Father and mother’s adult 

son supported her financially. DCFS conducted a virtual 

assessment of mother’s two-bedroom home via WhatsApp and 

reported no concerns. 

Father stated he would like F.V. to be in his care. He was 

working in construction and lived by himself in a one-bedroom 

trailer with a sofa bed in the living room. DCFS conducted a 

virtual home assessment of the trailer and reported no concerns. 

Father informed DCFS of the school and medical and dental 

providers he had located for F.V. should she be placed with him. 

He also gave DCFS the name of someone he had found to look 

after F.V. while father was at work.

DCFS found no criminal history for mother or father. 

The juvenile court held a pretrial release hearing on 

December 1, 2022. Father asked F.V. be released to him. Mother 

asked that DCFS facilitate her fingerprinting, which DCFS had 

cited as a reason for not releasing F.V. to her. F.V.’s counsel 

stated F.V. “would like to be released to one of her parents,” but

submitted on the prerelease investigation because “there are 

logistical issues to work out in terms of the practicality of getting 

her, physically, either to Texas or Honduras.” F.V.’s counsel 

asked that at disposition DCFS consider release to parents, and 

“outline in the report the logistics of return or plans for that.”

DCFS objected to releasing F.V. to parents because DCFS 

would be unable to monitor the case if the child were in 

Honduras or Texas, father had said someone else would watch 

F.V. while he was at work, and father’s residence “may be 

temporary because of relocation services being offered through 
7

that state.” The court denied release to parents, citing the 

reasons stated by DCFS and F.V.’s counsel. 

In the jurisdiction and disposition report, mother stated she 

did not know maternal uncle was sexually abusing F.V. until F.V.

told her. Father stated he first heard of the sexual abuse 

allegations when a DCFS social worker informed him. 

Mother and father both reported that although they had 

been in a relationship with each other until recently, they no 

longer were on speaking terms. They did not provide further 

details. 

Mother continued to assert her belief that F.V. would be 

best off in her care. Father stated he wanted F.V. in his care but 

believed she would also be safe in mother’s care. F.V. stated she 

did not want to reside with father, and mother had told her “only 

[mother] will take care of her and keep her safe.” 

Both parents had telephonic visits with F.V. two to three 

times a week. At their request, DCFS allowed longer and more 

frequent visits. F.V.’s caregiver reported parents called at their

scheduled times and were always respectful. 

A last minute information filed December 30, 2022 stated a 

Texas social worker had visited father’s trailer to conduct a home 

assessment and reported no concerns. Father reported to the 

social worker that he earned $400 a week and paid $350 a month 

in rent.

At a January 5, 2023 hearing, DCFS again opposed release 

to parents, stating there had been no recent contact with mother, 

and although father had been assessed and “[e]verything looks 

fine,” F.V. did not want to relocate to Texas. F.V.’s counsel stated 

F.V. wished to return to mother and counsel was working with 

immigration authorities to resolve the logistical issues in 
8

returning F.V. to Honduras. Father contended F.V. should be 

released to him because he was employed and had proper 

housing. The juvenile court again denied release to either 

parent.

In a last minute information filed January 26, 2023, father 

reported he was unemployed and could not provide financial 

support for his children in Honduras. An attorney provided 

notarized confirmation that mother had no criminal history in

Honduras. 

At a February 1, 2023 hearing, F.V.’s counsel requested 

that DCFS assist in obtaining a passport for F.V. to travel to 

Honduras and arrange for her to attend immigration hearings. 

DCFS did not object to the request and the juvenile court granted 

it. Father reasserted he wanted F.V. placed with him. 

In a last minute information filed February 24, 2023, father 

stated he was still residing in the same place and did not intend 

to relocate. The last minute information further indicated the 

DCFS social worker had communicated with DCFS’s immigration 

unit about options for securing F.V. legal status in the United 

States, and also what would be required to obtain an emergency 

travel passport from the Honduran consulate. The immigration 

unit stated it could contact the consulate about the passport if the 

juvenile court issued an order to assess mother’s home for 

placement. 

4. Adjudication and disposition

The adjudication and disposition hearing took place on 

March 6, 2023. DCFS argued the juvenile court should sustain 

the petition in full because parents knew or should have known 

maternal uncle was a sexual abuser yet placed F.V. in his care. 

As evidence of parents’ knowledge, DCFS pointed to maternal 
9

relative D.R.’s statement that maternal uncle had tried to 

sexually abuse her when she was 14. 

Mother argued she did not know or have reason to know 

maternal uncle was a sexual abuser, and when she found out, she 

acted appropriately by calling D.R. and asking her to intervene. 

Mother argued F.V. no longer was in danger so none of the 

allegations in the petition should be sustained. Mother wanted 

F.V. returned to her but acknowledged she needed DCFS’s 

involvement for that to happen. 

Father similarly argued he had no reason to know 

maternal uncle was a sexual abuser. He disputed the assertion 

that parents had allowed F.V. to come to the U.S. alone, noting 

he had accompanied her, but they were separated at the border. 

F.V.’s counsel asked the juvenile court to sustain the 

petition under section 300, subdivision (b), but to dismiss the 

allegation under subdivision (d), which would require parents to 

have known or reasonably known F.V. was in danger of sexual 

abuse. F.V.’s counsel argued sending F.V. to live in a foreign 

country alone at the age of nine placed her in an inherently 

dangerous situation. F.V.’s counsel contended, however, there 

was no evidence parents should have anticipated the sexual 

abuse, and both reacted appropriately when they found out.

The juvenile court dismissed the subdivision (d) count, 

finding no evidence D.R. told either parent that maternal uncle 

had tried to sexually abuse her, and therefore no evidence

parents knew F.V. would be sexually abused. The court 

sustained the subdivision (b) count, because maternal uncle did 

sexually abuse F.V., as alleged, and parents “did place their child 

in a detrimental environment . . . by sending a nine-year-old to 

this country by herself to reside with family members.” 
10

As for disposition, DCFS asked F.V. not be placed with 

either parent. DCFS argued it had no “information at this time 

that mother would be appropriate today if the child were 

returned to her care. She had reason to send the child to the 

United States. There’s no information that those reasons have 

abated or have changed.” DCFS contended father was living in a 

shelter in Texas, and there was no evidence F.V. would be 

adequately supervised if placed with him. Also, DCFS noted F.V.

had stated she did not want to relocate to Texas. 

Mother requested placement with her with the 

understanding there were immigration issues preventing F.V.’s 

return to Mother. Mother argued there was no clear and 

convincing evidence that F.V. would be at risk if placed with her.

Father requested placement with him, arguing he lived in a 

trailer, not a shelter, and there was no evidence of risk of harm. 

He noted that Texas has its own child welfare agency. If the 

court would not place F.V. with him, father “would be in 

agreement with returning the minor to mother.” 

F.V.’s counsel stated F.V. wished to return to Honduras. 

F.V.’s counsel contended father had been “transient” in Texas, 

and although he may be settled for the moment, at bottom F.V.

did not want to live with him. Because of passport and 

immigration issues, F.V.’s counsel requested suitable placement 

with the court revisiting the issue of release to mother later. 

F.V.’s counsel stated the Honduran consulate would require both 

parents to participate before F.V. could receive a passport, so 

counsel requested the court order the parents to cooperate in 

accomplishing that. F.V.’s counsel further stated F.V. had an 

immigration hearing scheduled on May 30, “at which time her 
11

attorneys will be asking the court to authorize [F.V.’s] voluntary 

departure to Honduras.” 

The juvenile court found, “The best place for this child, so 

that she can heal mentally, emotionally, psychologically is with 

her mother.” The court cited evidence that F.V. had tried to tell 

her mother about the abuse but maternal uncle had prevented it, 

and noted that mother had taken immediate action when she 

finally learned of the abuse.

The court denied placement with father, finding “[f]ather’s 

housing is not stable for this child. It is not in the child’s best 

interest to be bounced yet to another environment, in another

jurisdiction where the father’s housing is not stable only for this 

child to be subjected to more instability.” 

The court ordered “suitable placement with the 

understanding that there’s a possibility that will change to homeof-parent to mother after the immigration hearing because the 

child does need a passport to travel back to Honduras.” The court 

ordered parents to facilitate the passport process. The court 

further ordered both parents to complete parenting and sexual 

abuse awareness courses and engage in individual counseling. 

Father timely appealed from the jurisdictional and 

dispositional orders.

DISCUSSION

Father argues the evidence was insufficient for the juvenile 

court to assert jurisdiction over F.V. We agree. 

“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . , we look to 

see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we 

draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the 

findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record 
12

in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we 

note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.’ [Citations.]” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) 

The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), which permits a court to take jurisdiction if, 

inter alia, “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk 

that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a 

result of any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of 

the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect 

the child. [¶] (B) The willful or negligent failure of the child’s 

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child 

from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been 

left.” 

The juvenile court expressly found no evidence that mother 

or father had reason to know maternal uncle would sexually 

abuse F.V. Accordingly, maternal uncle’s sexually abusive acts 

could not, by themselves, justify assertion of jurisdiction. The 

juvenile court instead asserted jurisdiction based on parents’ 

sending F.V. into the United States alone without a plan for her 

care. 

Father disputes that the circumstances of F.V.’s entry into 

the United States demonstrated a failure to adequately supervise 

or protect F.V. Father argues, “The record does not address how 

F.V. specifically crossed the border, at what point [father] 

separated from her, and, prior to her entry, whether the parents 

made arrangements with [maternal uncle] to provide for F.V.’s 

care once in the United States.” 

We need not decide whether parents failed adequately to 

supervise or protect F.V. at the time she crossed the border. 

Even if they did fail in this regard, “ ‘previous acts of neglect, 
13

standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm; there 

must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will 

reoccur. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 

131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394 (Savannah M.), italics omitted, 

abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at 

p. 628.) 

Here, there was no evidence that the harm F.V. suffered 

following her entering alone into the United States would recur. 

At the time of the jurisdiction hearing, F.V. was no longer in 

maternal uncle’s custody. There was no indication mother or 

father would allow maternal uncle access to F.V.—as the juvenile 

court found, neither had a reason to know maternal uncle was a 

sexual abuser, and mother took appropriate action to protect F.V. 

once she found out. Thus, there was no evidence at the time of 

the jurisdiction hearing that maternal uncle remained a danger 

to F.V. 

Nor was there reason to think that the circumstances 

leading to parents’ allegedly negligent decision to send F.V. into 

the United States alone would recur. Father took F.V. to the 

United States because the family lived in poverty and had heard 

the United States was allowing younger children to enter. F.V. 

crossed the border by herself because father could not cross with 

her, and mother was still in Honduras with their other children. 

These circumstances had changed significantly by the time 

of the jurisdiction hearing. Father was now in the United States

himself and could care for F.V. There was nothing in the record 

to suggest he could not do so—he had a residence, was working in 

construction, and had found a school, medical and dental care, 

and a caregiver for F.V. while he was at work. Both DCFS and a 

Texas social worker had evaluated his home and identified no 
14

problems. Indeed, at the January 5, 2023 hearing DCFS stated,

“Everything looks fine,” and objected to placement with father 

only because F.V. stated she did not want to relocate to Texas. 

The juvenile court’s finding at the disposition hearing that 

father’s housing was “unstable” is not supported by the record—

there is no indication father was transient or that his housing 

situation was tenuous. Although father reported in the 

January 26, 2023 last minute information he was “currently 

unemployed,” we are aware of no authority that a parent’s 

unemployment by itself is a basis to assert dependency 

jurisdiction.

Mother made clear she no longer had interest in F.V. being 

in the United States, and wanted her back in Honduras. Any 

concern that mother might again send F.V. into the United 

States unaccompanied is not supported by the record. 

We acknowledge that mother and father during the 

jurisdiction hearing did not agree as to which of them should care 

for F.V., and reported they were no longer on speaking terms. 

Parental disagreement as to custody, however, is a family law 

matter, and not a reason for the juvenile court to get involved. 

In defense of the jurisdictional order, DCFS argues that 

during the 11 months F.V. lived with maternal uncle, father 

did not attempt to take custody of her. Also, when mother first 

spoke to a social worker, she stated she “d[id] not believe [F.V.] 

could be with father as he is not doing well financially.” Father 

explained early in the proceedings that at that time, he was 

having difficulty finding work and housing, which presumably is 

why he did not come for F.V. As noted, the record indicates that 

since that time, father has obtained housing and work.
15

DCFS argues that because father needs to arrange a 

caregiver for F.V. while he works, he is “plac[ing] her in yet 

another unstable situation where she would be under the 

supervision of a stranger.” Parents are free to arrange for 

babysitters, and that decision is not, in and of itself, evidence of 

risk supporting jurisdiction.

DCFS argues Savannah M. is distinguishable because in 

that case, the parents left their children with an inappropriate 

caregiver for a single night (Savannah M., supra, 

131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1390–1391), whereas mother and father 

sent F.V. into the United States alone, and were far from her for 

many months, “unable to assist her in any way after [F.V.] 

disclosed” the sexual abuse. 

The significance of Savannah M. for our purposes is the 

proposition that, whatever a parent’s past mistakes, jurisdiction 

is proper only upon a showing of substantial risk of future harm. 

(See Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394.) In 

reversing the jurisdictional order in Savannah M., the Court of 

Appeal reasoned there was insufficient evidence the parents 

reasonably should have foreseen that the caregiver, a family 

friend, would sexually abuse their daughter, and even if the 

parents were “somewhat negligent,” they had taken appropriate 

action once they learned of the sexual abuse. (Id. at pp. 1396–

1397.) Under those circumstances, the notion that they might in 

the future allow a sexual abuser “to manipulate them into caring 

for their daughters” was “mere speculation.” (Id. at p. 1397.) 

In the instant case, similarly, the juvenile court found 

mother and father had no reason to know maternal uncle was a 

sexual abuser, and mother took appropriate and immediate 

action when she found out. There is nothing in the record to 
16

suggest mother and father would make that mistake again. 

Further, discussed above, there was no evidence that the 

circumstances that led to F.V. being alone in the United States 

are likely to recur, now that father is in the United States and 

mother wants F.V. back in Honduras.

Our reversal of the jurisdictional order also necessitates

reversal of the dispositional order. (In re Roger S. (2018) 

31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583.) 

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are reversed.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.
Filed 3/5/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re F.V., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B329192

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04342)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RENE S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 CERTIFICATION AND

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed 

February 8, 2024, was not certified for publication in the 

Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion 

should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

There is no change in the judgment.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

____________________________________________________________

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.