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THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY

TO CONFRONT ISIS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 26, 2015

Serial No. 114–52

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

General John Allen, USMC, Retired, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. Department of State .................................. 5

Brigadier General Michael Fantini, USAF, Middle East Principal Director, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ...................................................................... 13

Brigadier General Gregg Olson, USMC, Deputy Director for Middle East, 

Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .............. 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

General John Allen, USMC, Retired: Prepared statement .................................. 9

Brigadier General Michael Fantini, USAF: Prepared statement ........................ 15

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 55

Written responses to questions submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .............. 56

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida ........................................................................................................... 61

(1)

THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY TO 

CONFRONT ISIS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. This morning, 

the committee continues its examination of the threat that is posed 

to the Middle East and to the United States by ISIS. And one of 

the things we are trying to do here is to look at the administration’s strategy to destroy this brutal terrorist organization and assess the proposed authorization of military force to be used. They 

have sent an authorization to us. 

The goal of ISIS, I think, are pretty clear. It is to wreck everything and every person in its path to establish a caliphate and then 

fight to expand that caliphate. ISIS affiliates are growing in power 

and presence throughout the region. In the last few weeks, we have 

seen attacks in Yemen. We have seen attacks in Tunisia and Libya. 

What is less clear is the administration’s approach and its determination to tackle this threat. 

Many of you know that for some time some of us on this committee have been pushing the idea of hitting ISIS from the air. We 

went through many months of ISIS going town by town in Syria, 

and many in Iraq, without the use of U.S. air power against ISIS. 

As a consequence, ISIS ended up taking many major cities across 

the region and ended up taking the Central Bank of Mosul. If we 

count the number of sorties against ISIS to date, there are 2,959 

that have been flown. If you compare that to the 116,000 air 

strikes during the First Gulf War when Iraq moved 40-some divisions into Kuwait, you get an idea of the difference in magnitude 

between the way this has been conducted versus the very real deterrence that we utilized in the past. 

We also have the fact that at least among the Canadian forces, 

their spotters are forward deployed so they can hit their targets 

when they call those targets in. With the U.S. forces, our forces are 

not forward deployed, so when you call in an air strike, you are not 

forward deployed to do it. There is some question about how effective that is going to be. 

Most Americans would be puzzled to learn about a lot of this and 

I think the piecemeal attacks that the Obama administration has 

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been systematically using here has been squandering our air power 

advantage. At least one observer tells us that is the case. Adding 

to the problem, the regional forces on the ground these air strikes 

are supposed to be supporting are badly under supplied. After 7 

months of fighting, this committee is still receiving troubling reports from the Kurdish Peshmerga and visits from the Kurdish 

representatives about how outgunned their men and women are on 

the front line. Now 30 percent of their battalions are female and 

those women are fighting against ISIS. They are fighting with 

small arms and they have yet to receive the artillery, the longrange mortars, and the anti-tank weaponry that they have repeatedly asked for. 

This morning, Ranking Member Engel and I are reintroducing 

legislation to allow U.S. arms to be sent directly to the Kurds. They 

are strung out on a 500 plus mile front against ISIS. These brave 

fighters, these women and these men and these battalions, need 

better equipment to defeat ISIS and we can’t allow Iran, through 

its influence over Baghdad, to continue to prevent that type of 

weaponry from coming from the center. So we should provide or we 

should sell it to them directly. 

And the Sunni tribal fighters who would be central to this fight 

are yet to trust Baghdad, as you know. Strong local police and provisional national guard forces are desperately needed to protect 

Sunnis in Anbar Province and elsewhere. Into the void on the 

ground in Iraq have stepped Iranian-backed Shi’ite fighters, the 

leading force behind the recent Tikrit offensive. 

Senior U.S. officials have put this development in positive terms. 

The reports indicate that U.S. intelligence and air power will now 

support this Iranian-backed mission. The Washington Post wisely 

cautioned in an editorial this week, ‘‘the growing power of the militias with their brutal tactics, sectarian ideology, and allegiance to 

Iran’s most militant faction has become as large an impediment to 

the goal of stabilizing Iraq’’ as ISIS. Shi’ite militias taking on ISIS 

may serve the immediate interest of killing jihadis, but it is hard 

to see how empowering Iran’s proxies is in the short, medium, or 

long-term interest of an inclusive Iraq or stable Middle East. 

The fear that many of us have is that Sunni Iraqis who have 

been tortured by ISIS, will get the same brutal treatment by their 

Shi’ite militia ‘‘liberators’’ and that would fuel endless conflict. 

To see how this is viewed in the region with respect to Iran being 

on the march, the other day the Iranians boasted that they had 

taken four Arab capitals. Well, in taking Yemen, you have set off 

a situation now where the Saudis and others are reacting, a 10-nation coalition is reacting and the Saudis are making preparations 

to hit that Iranian proxy on the ground. We know that Quds Forces 

and other Iranian agents have helped organize and toppled that 

government and now that the Iranian regime is crowing about it, 

other countries in the region are taking action and this is complicating the circumstances here. In other words, Iran is very much 

complicating the ability of the region to get some stability. 

Political reconciliation in Baghdad must be central to U.S. policy. 

The committee will be interested to learn what the administration 

is doing to press Prime Minister Abadi to ensure he doesn’t become 

former Prime Minister Maliki, a disastrous sectarian. 

3

And we will hear today, our U.S. strategy is focused on Iraq first. 

That is what we will be told. But until the meltdown of Syria, 

where General Petraeus termed a ‘‘geopolitical Chernobyl’’ is 

capped, until that meltdown is capped, ‘‘it is going to continue to 

spew radioactive instability in extremist ideology over the entire 

region.’’

Last fall, Congress voted to authorize training and equipping the 

Syria opposition forces, but to our great frustration, that is still not 

up and running and when pressed on the path forward in Syria, 

most administration officials seem to suggest we can figure it out 

later. Our slow action is creating a crisis of confidence among our 

allies. 

Our witnesses are here to explain the President’s strategy and 

when the committee returns in April, we plan to hear more from 

the Secretary of State and Defense about the President’s AUMF request. 

I will now turn to the ranking member for his opening statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important 

hearing. General Allen, General Fantini, General Olson, welcome. 

We are delighted that we have such a distinguished array of generals to really speak with us this morning. Thank you for appearing here today and thank you for your tireless service to our country. 

The main purpose of this hearing is to get an update on the 

progress of the anti-ISIS coalition and the significant challenges 

that remain. But we must also address the elephant in the room, 

in my opinion, the need for a new authorization for the use of military force or AUMF. 

As I have said again and again, this committee and this Congress have an important role to play in our foreign policy. I believe 

that is the case with our negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program 

and the same must hold true when it comes to our effort against 

ISIS. Congress needs to play its part. And I will resist any attempt 

to marginalize Congress fulfilling its constitution role. 

By passing the new AUMF, our service members, the brave men 

and women in uniform risking their lives against this enemy would 

feel the full support of Congress. Our coalition partners would see 

that the American Government is united in our commitment to degrade and destroy this enemy. Congress would reassert the important role we are empowered to play by the Constitution. And we, 

as lawmakers, would show that Congress doesn’t shrink away from 

the tough decisions because if we do, we are sending a message 

that Congress may put itself on the sideline the next time a crisis 

arose and the time after that and the time after that. That is simply unacceptable. 

The language sent to us by the President with the AUMF isn’t 

perfect, but I believe it is a good start. So let us work together to 

craft a bipartisan AUMF. Let us tailor it to the needs of our troops 

and this mission because everything we are dealing with today is 

taking place under the shadow of this vital unfinished business. 

I know that we are talking a lot about Iran these past days as 

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ground. But I really believe that that is something that cannot fade 

in the background. It is something that we have to tackle and this 

is the committee to do so. And we will do so. 

Generals, we look to you for leadership in clearly explaining our 

strategy to degrade and defeat ISIS to this committee and to the 

American people. In my view, the international coalition has made 

some real progress, conducting military operations and advising 

our partners on the ground, working to alleviate the humanitarian 

crisis, cutting off funding sources for ISIS, taking steps to stem the 

flow of foreign fighters and pushing back against the toxic message 

of ISIS propaganda. This strategy is making a real difference. ISIS 

is losing ground. Much of its top leadership has been taken out. 

Obviously, we still have much more to do. 

Thanks to our training, Iraqi security forces are improving so 

that they can better deal with the ISIS threat. Regional partners 

are playing a bigger and bigger role and the coalition is holding 

steady. But we are still facing a lot of challenges and I would like 

to touch on some of those today. 

First of all, I am concerned about Iran’s growing foothold in Iraq. 

The Iran-guided operation in Tikrit has faltered, but Shia militants, including some fighters trained by Iran’s Quds Force are 

playing a more influential role in Iraq. What are their intentions? 

And how do our own plans take these elements into account? 

Secondly, I am struggling to see the path forward in Syria. I 

think you know that I view our efforts to aid the opposition is too 

little, too late, and far too slow. Two and three years ago, I was 

yelling that we should be aiding and abetting and providing weapons to the Free Syria Army. What has happened now 3 years later 

is these forces are barely hanging on. They have been focused in 

fighting the Assad regime and that would be hard enough, especially with inadequate weapons and training. But they also have to 

face off against ISIS and other battle-hardened groups like the 

Nusra front. They need more training and equipment as quickly as 

we can get it to them. 

And lastly, what more can we do, what more can we do to support the Syrian people? More than 200,000 Syrians have already 

perished in this war. Nearly 10 million have been driven from their 

homes. This crisis has spilled over borders into Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. This is a humanitarian catastrophe. Assad has 

blood on his hands and the Syrian people desperately need relief. 

So gentlemen, I look forward to covering these issues with you. 

I thank you again for your courageous service and I say again that 

it is past time for Congress to give you the support you need for 

this vital mission. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. This morning, we are 

pleased to be joined by senior representatives from the Department 

of State and Defense. General John Allen is the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. He was appointed on September 16, 2014 by President Obama. General Allen 

is a retired U.S. Marine four star general, former commander of coalition and U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013. During 

his combat tour in Iraq, he played a critical role in the awakening 

movement in Al Anbar Province. 

5

Brigadier General Michael Fantini is the Middle East Principal 

Director for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs. Previously, he served as commander 

of Kandahar Air Field. 

Brigadier General Olson is with us. He is the Deputy Director for 

Middle East Joint Staff’s Strategic Plans and Policy at the Department of Defense and previously he served as the deputy commander for Marine Forces Central Command. Brigadier General 

Olson, as I understand, you will not be giving oral testimony, but 

will be available to answer any members’ questions. So we thank 

you for that, sir. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full, prepared statements will 

be made part of the record and members will have 5 calendar days 

to submit any statements or questions of you or any extraneous 

materials. So we would ask that you would summarize your remarks and we will begin with General Allen. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN ALLEN, USMC, RETIRED, SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY FOR THE GLOBAL COALITION 

TO COUNTER ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

General ALLEN. Esteemed members of the committee, thank you 

for providing me this opportunity to update you on the progress of 

the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. More broadly, let me thank 

you sincerely, the members of this committee, for the tremendous 

support that that you have been giving our men and women in uniform and also our diplomats in the Foreign Service at far-flung 

posts and stations around the world who have served our country 

so well. We are deeply grateful for the support of this committee 

in that regard. 

I returned to Washington this past week after a 10-day visit to 

coalition capitals, where I met with partners in Rome and Ankara, 

Baghdad and Berlin, and finally in Brussels, where I briefed the 

members of the European Union and North Atlantic Council. My 

engagements in each of these stops reinforced my confidence in the 

coalition strategy to counter ISIL across the informational, physical, and financial spheres in which it operates. In the territory 

ISIL has lost, in the increasing financial strain on the organization, 

and in the diminished morale and increased desertions of its fighters, we are clearly degrading its capabilities. The allure of the socalled caliphate is under direct assault. 

To date, the coalition has conducted nearly 3,000 air strikes, I 

believe, in fact, went over that number last night, against ISIL territories; more than 1,600 in Iraq and nearly 1,300 in Syria. We 

have taken out ISIL’s fighters, many of its commanders, as well as 

the infrastructure, support to its terror infrastructure and facilities, including 20 training camps and over 200 oil and gas facilities. 

Since the coalition campaign began, ISIL has lost more than a 

quarter of the populated territories it held in Iraq. 

Because we lack the same kind of partners on the ground in 

Syria, the situation there is more challenging and complex. Still, 

we are working closely with regional partners to establish sites for 

training and equipping vetted, moderate Syrian opposition elements, in order to train approximately 5,000 troops per year for the 

next 3 years. 

6

Syrian opposition groups to counter-ISIL continue to make strategic gains, expanding west and east from Kobani in retaking territory from ISIL. Coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syrian territories continue to degrade ISIL’s sanctuary and limit its freedom 

of movement and military capabilities, as well as its capacity to resupply its efforts in Iraq. 

In Iraq, coalition air power has supported many Iraqi Security 

Force-led operations, and we are actively supporting training of 

Iraqi forces at four camps where nine Iraqi Army and three 

peshmerga brigades are being trained and equipped. 

The coalition is planning to build on this initial success, as well 

as prepare to meet a set of critical challenges in the months ahead. 

As ISIL is defeated in population centers and the military forces 

must move on to other objectives, there will be an immediate need 

for policing and public security efforts to set the conditions for essential service delivery. 

Populations that have fled the fighting will need shelter, assistance, and security until they can return home. In many cases, facilities have been destroyed or made insecure by improvised explosive devices. Providers will need to rapidly assess and respond with 

basic medical care, water, electricity, and other municipal services. 

As a successful stabilization effort begins with fair treatment 

during military operations, we applaud Iraqi leaders, including 

Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, who publicly called for the 

protection of civilians and warned against acts of revenge and recrimination, or abuse. I might digress by saying it is worth reading 

his 20 point Code of Conduct that he issued last month with regard 

to the fighters in the field to liberate Iraq. It also means protecting 

the schools, hospitals, and water treatment facilities and securing 

antiquities and libraries. These measures begin the process of reunifying Iraq and building trust between liberated communities 

and the Government of Iraq. 

These critical stabilization efforts were at the center of my consultations last week in Baghdad. On the first day of meetings, we 

heard from the Iraqis about the need to plan for IDP returns, support IED removal, and provide services and expertise to assist with 

stabilization efforts. On the second day, a team of experts and coalition members met with their Iraqi counterparts and discussed 

Iraqi plans in greater detail. Throughout my meetings, I emphasized that Iraq’s stabilization efforts will be the most important signal of the intentions of the Abadi government to fulfill its goal of 

rebuilding an Iraq for all Iraqis. 

We know from experience that these essential services are delivered more efficiently and effectively when they are sequenced and 

planned early on with military and civilian cooperation. We also 

know this: Stabilization operations require significant resources. 

We, as a coalition, will work together to assist and support Iraq 

as we are able to, but we do not have the resources to support all 

of Iraq’s needs. Nor can money alone, whether from the Iraqi budget, from a trust fund, or from any number of partners, achieve full 

effectiveness without appropriate prioritization, planning, and sequencing. 

From Baghdad, we traveled to Berlin for the first meeting of the 

coalition’s Stabilization Working Group. There, under the leaderVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
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ship of German and Emerati Governments, we convened more than 

a dozen coalition partners to identify specific areas where the coalition can support the Iraqis and establish a shared understanding 

of what we hope to achieve. 

The Working Group on Stabilization is just one of five coalition 

working groups coordinating coalition activities on specific lines of 

effort, including military support, counter-finance, counter-messaging, and efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters. 

Among coalition members, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters 

is an urgent concern and rightly so. Partners are working together 

to make it more difficult for their citizens to fight in Syria and Iraq 

through criminal justice reform, enhanced border control, and better intelligence sharing. Eighteen coalition partners have passed 

new Foreign Terrorist Fighter legislation over the last 6 months in 

order to stem the flow of fighters traveling to the region. More action is being contemplated. In fact, just this week, the Italian Government broke up a ring of smugglers of foreign fighters operating 

between Italy and Albania. The CT operation flowed from the use 

of information as a result of our coalition actions, and prosecution 

of those individuals will flow from legislation as a result of our Coalition actions. 

We must continue to improve how we harmonize border and customs processes, track potential and actual fighters en route to the 

battle, and share intelligence with partners. This kind of information sharing and creative thinking between partners is also vital in 

meeting a related and similarly urgent challenge: Constraining 

ISIL’s access to financial support. 

Here, the coalition has made gains in synchronizing practices to 

block ISIL’s access to banks, both in the region and globally. This 

includes stemming the flow of private donations and limiting ISIL’s 

financial options by restricting its ability to generate oil revenues. 

We are now expanding these efforts to counter ISIL’s access to local 

and informal financial networks. 

There is also broad consensus among partners in the Coalition’s 

Counter Finance Working Group, which met for the first time in 

Rome last week, that we must closely examine any financial ties 

between core ISIL and terrorists linked to ISIL throughout the region. 

We are also beginning to better prepare ourselves to counter 

ISIL’s violent messaging. Last month, the President announced the 

creation of a new Joint Online Operations Center with the UAE, 

where we will collaborate with regional partners to take on ISIL 

in the online information space. Efforts like these, to counter violent messaging, or to take on ISIL’s recruitment capabilities and efforts to generate revenues, will endure long after we defeat ISIL, 

and will support long term U.S. counterterrorism goals. 

The United States and coalition partners are also supporting the 

United Nations’ efforts to provide food aid and supply critical assistance to protect vulnerable women, children, and men and attempt to limit the suffering caused by ISIL’s excessives and advances. 

Ultimately, the best way to protect vulnerable communities from 

ISIL’s barbaric campaign of death and terror is to degrade and deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
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feat the organization, militarily and ideologically, over the course 

of several years. 

The President has outlined a framework for the authorities he 

believes will be necessary to pursue this campaign with his formal 

request of the Congress for the authorization of the use of military 

force against ISIL. The AUMF request foresees using our unique 

capabilities in support of partners on the ground instead of through 

the long-term, large-scale deployment of U.S. ground forces. At the 

same time, the President has asked for the flexibility to fight an 

adaptable enemy, one that hopes to expand its reach and capabilities well beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria. 

As the President has said, the world needs to know we are 

united in the effort against ISIL. We are strongest as a nation 

when the administration and Congress work together on issues as 

serious as the use of military force. A new AUMF will prove that 

we stand united against this threat. A powerful message of support 

for our leadership with our allies and our coalition and a powerful 

message of defeat for ISIL. 

Taking the fight to ISIL also requires our close coordination with 

this committee and with the Congress, so that we can constantly 

evaluate our tactics and strategy, and that we are resourcing them 

appropriately. 

This hearing presents an opportunity to continue that very important dialogue with the Congress and coordination and consultation. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Engel for calling this hearing and permitting us to appear before 

you today. I look forward to taking your questions. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of General Allen follows:]

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Mr. SMITH [presiding]. General Allen, thank you very much for 

your testimony. We now go to General Fantini 

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL FANTINI, 

USAF, MIDDLE EAST PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General FANTINI. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee, thank you for having me here today. I will 

briefly describe our efforts that we are undertaking to counter ISIS 

in Iraq and Syria. 

As General Allen mentioned, the U.S. strategy to counter ISIL is 

a whole of government effort, supported by a broad international 

coalition. It includes multiple lines of effort across the government 

to counter this threat. The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for denying ISIL safe haven and building partnership capacity. This means conducting strikes against critical ISIL assets 

and supporting our partners on the ground, principally the Iraqi 

security forces and vetted Syrian opposition. 

Under the denying safe haven line, to deny ISIL safe haven, the 

coalition has conducted approximately 3,000 air strikes including 

more than 1,600 in Iraq since August 8, 2014. Additionally, over 

1,200 strikes have occurred in Syria since December 23, 2014. We 

have taken out ISIL’s fighters and commanders, more than 1,000 

vehicles and tanks, over 200 oil and gas facilities, the infrastructure that funds this terror, as well as over 20 training camps, and 

more than 2,000 fighting positions, checkpoints, buildings, and barracks in both Iraq and Syria. As a result of this effort, the coalition 

has arrested ISIL’s momentum, degraded its ability to mass and 

maneuver forces, and pressured or eliminated its leadership cells, 

and disrupted its command and control and supply lines. Overall, 

we have put ISIL on the defensive in Iraq. 

Under building partnership capacity, countering ISIL will not be 

possible without our local partners in the lead. To build partnership capacity in Iraq, the U.S. and coalition partners are supporting the Government of Iraq in its efforts to strengthen and reconstitute the Iraqi security forces by assisting with training, 

equipping, and advising the Iraqi security forces. This includes 

Kurdish fighters as well as Sunni tribes. Last summer, we stood 

up our ‘‘advise and assist’’ team to partner with local forces, and 

earlier this year, we began training Iraqi security and Kurdish 

forces at four sites across Iraq. I was able to visit Taji site recently 

and see firsthand the partnership that we have undertaken with 

the Iraqi forces. With the help of Congress, the Iraq Train and 

Equip Fund will enable us to train and equip the 12 brigades, to 

include three peshmerga brigades and 9 Iraqi brigades that was 

mentioned by General Allen as well as tribal and Sunni forces. 

Under the Syria train and equip, in addition to our efforts in 

Iraq, we are working with our coalition partners to build the capabilities of the moderate Syrian opposition, with training of the first 

class set to begin later next month in April. The goal is to train 

vetted Syrian recruits to defend the Syrian people; stabilize areas 

under opposition control; empower trainees to go on the offensive 

against ISIL; and promote the conditions for a negotiated settleVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
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ment to the end of the conflict in Syria. Our partners in the region, 

including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and others have offered 

strong support to host and quickly stand up the program. U.S. 

forces in the region strengthen our partners’ abilities to fight terrorism locally, but it will be Iraqi forces and Syrian fighters who 

will secure the gains against 

ISIL and inflict a lasting defeat. 

We look forward to working closely with you and we will continue to keep you and your colleagues informed. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Fantini follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Let me begin first of all, General Allen. From a purely military point of view, is the current 

military strategy to defeat ISIL deficient in any way? 

General ALLEN. Well, obviously, as the strategy unfolds, we know 

it is a long-term strategy. We will keep a very close eye on the 

progress. We will evaluate the resources against our expectations, 

again, as the strategy unfolds. As I watched the pieces of this come 

together with respect to the training, with respect to our enabling, 

with respect to our fire power and fire support provided to the Iraqi 

security forces, it seems to be unfolding in a manner which I think 

will be successful in Iraq. So we will keep a close eye on this and 

obviously, we will remain in close consultation with the Congress 

on the issue of resources. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you if I could, 2 days ago, I chaired a 

hearing on the increase of anti-Semitism in Europe and Ambassador Ronald Lauder, who was obviously a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO policy testified. He is 

also the President of the World Jewish Congress. And he said there 

were ‘‘thousands of young European Muslims that have left to fight 

with Islamic radicals in Iraq and Syria. And there is a real fear 

that they could return bringing the bloodshed with them. Some 

have already returned and we have seen the consequences.’’ He referred to increased attacks on Jews throughout Europe especially 

where radical Muslim elements appear. 

To what extent is the administration examining the threat of returning Muslim extremists from the United States, a threat not 

just to Europe, but also to the United States? I noticed in your testimony, General, you talk about how the coalition members are trying to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters. You made a very cursory 

reference to some of the things. I know you can expand upon it. 

You mentioned 18 coalition partners have passed new foreign terrorist fighter legislation and so on. But this is a rear guard, the 

likes of which I think we have never seen before. Your thoughts on 

that and what can we do to mitigate the threat here in the U.S.? 

General ALLEN. You have put your finger on one of the greatest 

threats ultimately of ISIL as it exists today. It is a threat to Iraq. 

It is a threat in Syria. It is a threat in the region. But the return 

of foreign fighters is a direct threat to our homeland. Not just our 

homeland, but the homelands of our partners as we have seen tragically in such places as Ottawa and in Sydney and in Paris, Copenhagen, and Brussels and other places. So you are correct. This is 

a real issue for us. That is why there is, in fact, not just a working 

group, but an entire line of effort within the U.S. strategy as well 

to stem the flow of foreign fighters. And it begins by dealing with 

issues at home where we have encouraged, through best practices 

and consultation and the exchange of information, nations to work 

with at-risk populations at home, with clerics and teachers, with 

family members, with tribal leaders in our coalition partners’ 

homes. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there recognition, if I could interrupt, among our 

partners that Jews are at heightened risk? 

General ALLEN. Absolutely. This is, of course, an issue. The antiSemitism that has arisen from this, this is an issue. The Jewish 

population is at risk. But more broadly than just the Jewish popuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
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lation, it is the security of these countries, so they are fixated on 

this, gentlemen. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could, many of us have noted with a great deal 

of dismay the President’s earlier dismissal of ISIS as a JV team or 

the equivalent of, and we have seen this happen on a number of 

fronts. I held a whole series of hearings on Boko Haram and tried 

desperately to get the administration to declare Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Went twice to Nigeria. Went to Jos 

where a fire bombing was occurring in churches. It was as clear as 

the nose on my face that Boko Haram had more of a regional terrorist mindset. And we seem to have not adequately assessed the 

scope, tenacity, and lethality of the threat. And as part of this coalition of the 60, is Nigeria a part of that? 

Again, to my dismay and shock and many others, all of a sudden 

we walked away, last December, from helping the Nigerian Government combat the very real threat that they are facing with training, with vetted, Leahy vetted individuals. It all can be done as a 

matter of political will, if you might speak to that. 

And finally, very quickly, because I am almost out of time, General Dempsey had pointed out that the security of the Iraqi forces 

and the Iranian support, I should say, is a positive thing in military terms. He then said that we have got to think what happens 

when the drums of ISIL stop beating and what about this idea that 

we need an inclusive government in Iraq? That seems to me to a 

very far-away dream, not likely to happen. But if you could speak 

to the Boko Haram especially. 

General ALLEN. Boko Haram is obviously a great concern. It has 

put its hand in the air to be what they call distant province of the 

caliphate and they have ultimately established a relationship. So 

I certainly commend your having held hearings on this issue because it is a very serious issue. Nigeria is not a member of the coalition, but I am traveling to nations around the world and trying 

to explain the nature of ISIL and the nature of this threat of local 

franchises expanding. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could look to include them as well as other 

countries in Africa with al-Shabaab and all the other threats that 

are being faced, we would deeply appreciate it. I yield to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Smith. I want to talk a little bit at 

the beginning about Iran. We are negotiating a deal with them. 

They continue to be a bad actor all over the Middle East and 

Yemen. 

It appears that the Iraqi security force is with the help of outside 

militias including Shia militias. We are making gains in Tikrit. 

What has been Iran’s role in this operation and what is the United 

States’ current role in this operation? 

General ALLEN. I don’t think we have a full and complete picture 

on Iran’s role. There seems to have been some organizational support to the Shia elements in the Popular Mobilization Force, potentially some direct fire support as well. How much command and 

control they were exerting as opposed to how much the Shia militia 

elements, the PMF, were exerting, I think remains ultimately to be 

determined. 

The U.S. role with regard to Tikrit has to be considered in the 

larger U.S. role across all of Iraq. But your question is an imporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
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tant one. As we watch the operation unfold in Tikrit, we continued 

our close relationship with the Combined Joint Operations Center. 

Our conversation with the Iraqi military leaders and political leaders continued. As the operation unfolded, Prime Minister Abadi 

and members of the Iraqi security forces requested U.S. and coalition support for the final phase of the operation ultimately to liberate the city of Tikrit. I don’t want to get into a lot of the operational details, to the benefit of the enemy, who is listening to what 

we are saying, it began by the provision of information and key intelligence. But as I think Mr. Engel, you saw last night, a large 

number of well-targeted and precise air strikes went in and are beginning to support the Iraqi security force operations that are unfolding right now. That is, I think, where we would leave the level 

of operational detail. 

The United States is deeply involved in this operation now. And 

we are deeply involved because it is consistent with our relationship with Iraq, overall inside Iraq, but it is also specifically as a 

result of the request of the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi security 

forces to assist them in Tikrit. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, is it in the United States’ interest to save what 

I would call a failing Iranian strategy? I worry about Iran’s role in 

Iraqi military operations because what does that portend for the 

political future of Iraq? 

General ALLEN. I don’t believe at all that we are in our efforts 

at this moment saving or attempting to salvage a failed Iranian 

strategy. The intent, of course, is to support the Abadi government 

and to support the Iraqi security forces and the liberation of a not 

insignificant urban center and population center with the idea ultimately of driving Daesh out of the province of Salah ad Din. 

I recently met with senior leaders from that province and last 

week across Iraq met with senior Iraqi leaders, and they are very 

keen on our role, our role across Iraq, our role in the restoration 

of Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. They are also very 

keen on our role now to support the Iraqi security forces in the 

final assault on Tikrit and the liberation of that population center 

and that aspect of Salah ad Din province. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me turn to the AUMF because I think that is 

very important. The administration sent an AUMF. I was one of 

the few people who thought it was a good AUMF. I didn’t look at 

it as a finished product. I looked at it as a jumping off point and 

I thought it provided some very important things. 

Now some in Congress have called for a broad AUMF that would 

allow for U.S. ground troops. Let me ask you about that. How 

would the introduction of U.S. ground troops be perceived in the 

countries in the Middle East and by our other coalition partners? 

Would a large deployment help or hinder our ability to achieve our 

goal of degrading and defeating ISIS? 

General ALLEN. That is an important question. As I try to respond to questions like that, I always try to start by saying the 

operational environment will clearly dictate the recommended or 

the decision making with respect to what the force will look like. 

If it is a major emergency, one that requires some significant number of troops, then that operational environment, I think will be 

one that is clearly discussed with the Capitol Hill and our congresVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
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sional partners, obviously to ensure that we are all of one mind on 

this issue. 

Absent a specific emergency or absent an operational environment that would seem to require a large infusion of American 

troops, I think we have learned now over many years in the region 

that the presence of foreign troops from outside that region often 

ultimately creates a reaction within that region that is focused on 

those foreign troops, that may have, in fact, a destabilizing effect. 

We also are actually quite good at training indigenous forces and 

employing very precise special operations forces, either in support 

of indigenous forces or if necessary, in terms of direct action. So 

there are many options for the Commander in Chief, whoever that 

will be. There are many options that can be discussed and consulted with the Congress. But I think we now know after many 

years of experience in the region, that the presence of large numbers of ground forces can sometimes have the reverse effect of our 

intention, which is to stabilize. It can sometimes destabilize the social fabric. So we need to be very conscious of that. That is why 

I think the AUMF is important in that it gives us the ability to 

empower and enable and support indigenous, national forces, to 

achieve the goals which otherwise foreign ground forces might have 

to undertake. And it is a very important question. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

General ALLEN. Yes, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. SMITH. Chairman Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much and I would like to 

thank our witnesses. Thank you all very much for being with us 

today. 

General Allen, your last point about large deployments sometimes actually destabilize rather than stabilize the situation was 

very well taken. And I hope that my colleagues understand the significance of that point. And to the degree that you have outlined 

a strategy that does not require a large deployment of American 

troops on the ground is something that I think we should all take 

very seriously, take a look and see, make sure—see how it works. 

Because this is a strategy that does work in the long run. 

Let me ask you about letting the—mobilizing the local forces 

which is what you are outlining for us today. You were involved 

with the Anbar province and the efforts there. 

General ALLEN. Deeply involved, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So are the Sunni tribal forces that enabled 

you to succeed there, are they currently involved in the struggle 

against ISIL? 

General ALLEN. Of course, Anbar remains, as you know, sir, a 

very contested area at this particular moment. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. 

General ALLEN. And I have met with many of the sheikhs of Al 

Anbar. Some of them have their tribal sons in the fight right now. 

Without exception, however, the sheikhs that I have met from Al 

Anbar have said that when the opportunity presents itself, they 

will, in fact, join the Iraqi Government to oppose ISIL. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. General, weren’t these forces that you were 

talking about the most effective forces that we had when we actually had a large deployment there? Weren’t they actually the best 

21

forces? And what you are telling me now is those forces are not at 

play. Isn’t that correct? 

General ALLEN. Well, I like to think that the Marines were the 

best forces that we had, but I take your point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I second that. 

General ALLEN. The environment was really dramatically different at the time. It was a contested area where once the tribes 

were properly supported by us, they were able to turn on the 

enemy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me, General, pardon me, my time is limited here for questions. 

General ALLEN. Of course. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. However, let me just note for the record that 

looking from a distance, it seems to me the reason why these tribal 

forces that were so important to your success with an earlier strategy are not at play now is because the administration is insisting 

on a strategy that is based on keeping Iraq together rather than 

working and deploying the forces within that region into the fight 

against ISIL. 

General ALLEN. If I may comment? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. 

General ALLEN. I have been to Al Asad Airbase just recently 

where I saw U.S. and coalition special operators training the tribal 

forces. It is the full intent of the Iraqi Government to leverage and 

they now have about 7,500 or so tribal fighters on the payroll to 

leverage the tribal fighters ultimately to do much of the same thing 

that we were successful in doing in ’07. It is an intent of the Iraqi 

Government. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I understand it is their intent, but the fact 

is that these tribal leaders don’t trust the intent of the Iraqi Government and because of this—and by the way, I wouldn’t either, if 

I was in their spot. 

What about the Kurds? You mentioned that there are Kurdish 

fighters that you were very high on, level on. Then you mentioned, 

of course, the Sunni tribal leaders that we are talking about. 

Where are the Shi’ites? Isn’t this really the problem is that when 

we come down to it, the Shi’ites are not doing their part in this? 

General ALLEN. That is a really important question, and it is a 

bit complex. I am going to take a stab at it, recognizing the time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. 

General ALLEN. Last year, when Daesh entered Iraq, ISIL entered Iraq, and we began to see the route and ultimately what 

looked like the potential loss of Baghdad and points south, the 

Grand Ayatollah Sistanti called for the rallying of all Iraqis to the 

flag. Not Shia, but all Iraqis to the flag, ultimately to help to defend the country. At the time, for obvious reasons, many of those 

individuals who were able to get to the flag frankly were the Shia 

elements. And they were organized in something called the Popular 

Mobilization Committee of which we see in the field today, Popular 

Mobilization Forces. 

They are not Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. They are not Kata’ib Hezbollah 

with close ties to Iran. I think we need to be very nuanced in how 

we look at them because these are organizations that were filled 

last year with young men that came from the tribes in the south. 

22

They were teachers one day, and they were fighters the next day. 

They were bakers one day. They were infantrymen the next day. 

They came to defend their country. The fact that they were organized in Shia organizations and there are about 80,000 of them or 

so, the fact that they were organized in Shia organizations has 

been ultimately to stabilize the situation and then participate conceivably in the counter offensive. 

It is not an intention, sir, that these groups remain permanently 

established and it is the intention, ultimately, of the Iraqi Government that elements would be subsumed under the national guard 

concept or they would be disbanded and go home. They have already ceased paying about 20,000 of them to go home. So the Shia 

are, in fact, involved here as an irregular force in a military organization that has played a role. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Has played a role, but again, underscoring 

the basic point that we just went through, these are not the ultimate fighters that we have to rely on, are really the Kurds and the 

Sunni tribal people. I believe in the strategy that you have set out. 

I believe it will work, but only if we are not hampered by the idea 

that we are going to keep Iraq which was an artificial entity created by the British a long time ago, make that our number one 

goal rather than defeating ISIL which is what supposedly our goal 

is. 

Thank you, General, very much and I thank all of you very 

much. 

Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to continue 

this line of questions about the Shia and Iran and Sistani’s Popular 

Mobilization Forces. And I want to actually start with the news 

about our strikes in Tikrit. The coverage in The New York Times 

today included a paragraph that said, ‘‘if the Americans did not engage, they feared becoming marginalized by Tehran in a country 

where they had spilled much blood in the last decade, the official 

said speaking on the condition of anonymity.’’

If you could speak to the strikes in Tikrit, the air support that 

the United States is providing. Is it different than the support we 

have provided in the past? And is it being offered in part because 

there were concerns about being marginalized by the Iranians and 

in answering that question that gets to the broader point of the 

again, same article, the preponderance of the 30,000 fighters on the 

Iraqi side are the members of the militias fighting alongside the 

Iraqi soldiers and policemen. Of those 30,000, how do we, General 

Allen, following your last response, how do we view it in a nuanced 

way to distinguish between the Iranian-backed militias and 

Sistani’s Popular Mobilization Forces? 

General FANTINI. Congressman, I think the answer to your question is no. We work by, with, and through the Iraqi Government, 

and so through the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi security forces. 

The Iraqis came back and asked for support and we adjudicated 

that decision to the highest levels and decided to engage there. It 

is within the Iraqi interest and the coalition’s interest to be successful in Tikrit because we don’t want to have another success for 

Daesh or ISIL. 

23

And we anticipate that the support that we are providing the 

Iraqi security forces with the minister of defense, with the Ministry 

of Defense in charge of the command and control of that operation 

that we are in a position that we can provide that support to be 

successful. 

General ALLEN. With regard to the command and control, there 

is a difference between the role of the traditional Shia elements 

that are aligned directly with Iran and supported directly by Iran, 

and those elements of the PMF that have provided a larger force 

posture and a larger force generation capability. They are not—

they don’t intend to be or are not intended to be a permanent part 

of the Iraqi security force entity. They are viewed as a temporary 

organization that has played the role ultimately of blunting and 

halting the forward progress of Daesh. As we continue to build out 

the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces across the board, we can 

provide you, I think, significant detail about the forces that are engaged right now in Tikrit. It is actually quite encouraging. 

To give you a sense of when the PMF elements are going to be 

in play and when they won’t be in play and as we continue to force 

generate the regular forces, they will play an increasing role ultimately in the counter offensive, ultimately to liberate the populations. 

Mr. DEUTCH. General Allen, are you confident that the Iraqi people view this action in Tikrit as one taking place against ISIS by 

the United States through air strikes and Iraqi security forces, or 

is it viewed as one that is a combination of U.S. air strikes and Iranian Shia-backed militias? 

General ALLEN. That is a good question. During my time on the 

ground just last week there, I made an effort to meet with the provincial leadership in Salah ad Din Province, in which Tikrit is the 

largest population center. 

At the time, the leadership in Salah ad Din and even recently, 

have talked about focusing on the liberation of Tikrit and have applauded the role of American forces in supporting the central government and the Iraqi security forces and liberating Tikrit from 

Daesh. My sense is that on the ground in Salah ad Din their view 

is that the United States, as we have done in multiple other places 

in Iraq, is providing the kinds of information and support to command and control and ultimately fire power that will facilitate the 

Iraqi Government and Iraqi security forces in accomplishing the 

mission of defeating Daesh and liberating this population center. 

So my sense that at least the Sunni leadership, key Sunni leadership, the Speaker, the Vice President and others, but also the 

Sunni leadership of Salah ad Din have been clear that they support 

the role of the United States in this particular fight, sir. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, I just hope that translates then 

down to the Iraqi people as well. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mo Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. I pass. 

Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes David Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much 

for being here, General. You said, General Allen, in response to a 

question, you said I think we will be successful and you said in 

24

Iraq sort of emphatically. And it caused me to wonder whether you 

had a different assessment with respect to the region or outside of 

Iraq. 

General ALLEN. The pieces as we have assembled them in Iraq, 

I foresee those pieces achieving the strategy that we have laid out 

for ourselves which is ultimately to facilitate the Iraqi Government’s restoration of the territorial integrity of Iraq and the sovereignty of the country. 

With respect to Syria, obviously, that situation is going to take 

longer. The training and equipping program, with the great support of the Congress, is just beginning to receive trainees and begin 

the process formally of training elements of the new Syrian army. 

And as those elements are introduced into the battle space, as we 

continue the work of working closely with the Syrian moderate opposition. I just met the president of the Syrian Opposition Coalition 

last week. There is not the clear partner in Syria that there is Iraq. 

There is not the governmental entity in Syria that there is in Iraq. 

And so it is going to take more time, obviously, and we are going 

to have to evaluate that strategy as time goes on. 

Mr. CICILLINE. General, according to a recent human rights report, a Shia militia destroyed a Sunni village they had retaken 

from ISIS which was methodical and driven by revenge, according 

to the record. It indicated that dozens of other villages were similarly targeted. And considering the increasing efforts to combat 

ISIS by Iranian backed Shia militia sort of building on Congressman Deutch’s question, how can we monitor Iranian retaliatory actions and will the Shia militias’ punitive actions cause Iraq’s 

disenfranchised Sunnis to view ISIS as really their only protectors 

and what are we doing to mitigate that and also what are the implications for fostering reconciliation between Shia, Sunni, and 

Kurdish communities in Iraq because of Iran’s involvement? 

General ALLEN. It is an extraordinarily important question, both 

yours and Congressman Deutch’s. There have been excesses. They 

have been horrible. We saw very quickly that the Iraqi Government 

condemned those excesses, and the Iraqi Government has initiated 

investigations into those excesses, ultimately to hold those who perpetrated them to be accountable. 

That is an important first point. Those excesses have been condemned by the Iraqi Government. Those excesses have actually 

been condemned by the Grand Ayatollah Sistani and it was part 

of—because of that, it was part of the reason for his issuance of the 

20 Point Code of Ethics, Code of Conduct which would be recognizable to all of us in uniform as something that would be admirable 

to be followed by anyone who is involved in combat operations. 

That is what I would say is the first part. 

The tribes, the Sunni tribes that I still remain in close contact 

with, I just had a conversation with one just this morning, a 

sheikh, have made it clear that they are willing to give this government in Iraq a chance. Prime Minister Abadi has reached out to 

the sheikhs. He has reached out to the tribes. Unlike his counterpart who, in fact, victimized the Sunni tribes and victimized the 

Sons of Iraq, he has also established in an unprecedented way, relations with the Sunni governments in the region. He has been to 

visit the King in Jordan. He has developed a close relationship 

25

with the Turks. He is going to be invited ultimately to visit the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia very shortly. He and his government 

have had close relations. 

There is a regional relationship with the Sunni governments. 

There is an outreach through his own government, through his national security advisor and through his own personal actions, to the 

Sunni tribes in an effort not just to recruit them into the fight 

against Daesh, but also to establish the mechanisms and the environment in which reconciliation can occur. 

I speak frequently with the sheikhs of these tribes and there isn’t 

one of them who sees ISIL as, in some form or another, an alternative to the central government in Baghdad. There just isn’t any. 

That may have been an issue last year. It may have been an issue 

in and around the invasion by Daesh in June 2014. But among the 

tribes with whom I have long relations and the sheikhs with whom 

I maintain contact, there isn’t a one of them that sees the presence 

of Daesh in Iraq as preferable to the central government. In fact, 

they have told me that they believe that Prime Minister Abadi and 

this government in Iraq is something that they can give a chance 

to. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, General. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, 

Randy Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Allen, how many 

of those tribes and sheikhs are there? 

General ALLEN. I will take the question, sir. There are many. In 

Anbar, I think we tracked in ’08 there were as many as 60 tribes 

and subtribes. There are multiple tribal confederations, the 

Shammar Confederation, the Dulaimi Confederation, the Zobai. 

There are multiple tribal confederations. 

Mr. WEBER. How many of them do you stay in contact with? You 

said you have talked to a number of them? 

General ALLEN. I have talked to 10 or 12. 

Mr. WEBER. 10 or 12, okay. 

General ALLEN. And they have significant populations. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, and earlier you said that Grand Ayatollah 

Sistanti had a Code of Conduct, I believe that had 20 items on it? 

General ALLEN. Twenty points, yes, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Twenty points. Where do you——

General ALLEN. I will leave one with the committee. 

Mr. WEBER. Perfect. Do you view—what do you think the 

chances are that when this is all said and done, however long that 

takes that Iran winds up with the spoils of the country of Iraq and 

that actually, they will be in charge? 

General ALLEN. I don’t think that that is going to be the case. 

Mr. WEBER. You do not? 

General ALLEN. I do not think that is going to be the case. In 

the end, Iraq is an Arab country. And while a large element of the 

Iraqi population shares a confession within the faith of Islam with 

the large population in Iran, they are a different people. 

Mr. WEBER. What percentage of the fighters would you guesstimate is Iranian Guard or Iranian and then let us go to Shia and 

Sunni and even the Kurds? Can you divide that up for us? 

26

General ALLEN. No, I can’t. We will take the question. The preponderance, the majority of Shia militias now in the battle space 

are of the Popular Mobilization Force I described before. Some 

smaller number of them are the direct Iranian-allied Asa’ib Ahl alHaq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and that type of group. But we can provide 

you, I think, some pretty good fidelity on that. And then of course, 

our focus is the Iraqi security forces, their counterterrorism service, 

and the training of the tribes as well. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you guesstimate that that is the total force 

of 100,000 or 200,000 or what would you guess the fighting number? 

General ALLEN. I will ask my military colleagues to get you the 

number. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. General Olson? 

General OLSON. Congressman, there is about 90,000 fighters in 

the ministry of peshmerga. There have been as many as 80,000 mobilized in Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s call to arms for Shia militia, 

some of whom have been enrolled as Popular Mobilization Forces, 

some of whom have not. And for Iraqis under arms, there is a significant Shia population in the Iraqi armed forces, both the counterterrorism services, and the regular armed forces. About 80 percent of the Iraqis in uniform are Shia. 

Mr. WEBER. And what number would you put on that? 

General OLSON. I will have to get back to you with an exact 

number of the Iraqis under arms. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you guess 10,000 to 80,000? 

General OLSON. It is upward to that, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. It is upward to that. 

General OLSON. I can get a number for you. 

Mr. WEBER. And what is our current guesstimate on ISIL forces 

in Iraq? 

General OLSON. The numbers vary, sir. I would defer to Intelligence Committee colleagues about their best guess estimate of the 

current figures. I have seen figures as high as a couple dozen thousand. I have seen figures much lower than that. I think that is a 

better question that we can back to you with a detailed classified 

answer. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And are you guys watching the budget negotiations up here? It is okay to admit that you are watching them. 

General OLSON. My portfolio on the Joint Staff does not include 

being mindful of budgetary restrictions. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you feel like you have enough to—well, first of 

all, how many—we don’t call them boots on the ground. I think we 

call them advisors. But how many advisors do we have in Iraq? 

General OLSON. The total force in Iraq is a little bit upwards of 

3,000 uniformed Americans. They are divided between the efforts 

of building partner capacity, advising and assisting the Iraqi counterparts and then providing the basic security and life support that 

come with that. 

Mr. WEBER. Are you confident that we have enough money in the 

budget to prosecute this war now and the next 2 to 3 years? 

General OLSON. Currently, the operations are being funded 

through a level that is appropriate for our current level of effort. 

27

Mr. WEBER. Okay, and if you could come to us with an AUMF, 

would you want it for 3 years or longer? 

General OLSON. Chairman Dempsey has testified that the current AUMF is sufficient to support the strategy as designed. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Weber. The Chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from Florida, Lois Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, 

for your service to our country. 

I have a couple of questions. First relates to the underlying conditions that led to the rise of ISIL. Would you agree that ISIL is 

not the cause of the turmoil in the region, but a symptom of much 

deeper problems. I would like to get your opinion. Is it unstable 

governments, poverty, desperation, radical religion? I would like to 

get your take on that. 

And secondly, I think the American public somehow thinks that 

you can simply get rid of ISIL by bombs or dropping drones and 

could you just explain the difficulty of their assimilation, let us say, 

into population and so for the terrain? 

General ALLEN. One of the, I think, real benefits of the counter 

ISIL Coalition which numbers at 62 entitles now, countries and entities, is the recognition that Daesh is, in fact, not the disease, it 

is the symptom of something bigger. And that broad recognition includes the base societal factors that have given rise to the 

attractiveness of an organization like this. And they are societal 

issues. There are political issues, inclusiveness, participation, social 

issues associated with economic opportunity, the ability ultimately 

to have the opportunity to put food on the table for families. And 

often the result of the absence of all of those or some of those in 

these countries and among these populations have created the conditions of despair and desperation which has made those populations susceptible to radicalization and then recruitment. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Excuse me, General, I assume there are efforts 

being done to try to respond to those conditions. 

General ALLEN. I think so. We just had this week, in fact, we ate 

dinner together the other night with the President of Afghanistan, 

Ashraf Ghani, where I personally saw because we are beginning to 

see the emergence of the potential for ISIL and we have the presence of the Taliban which is its own entity, where we have seen, 

I believe, some real progress with regard to the underlying issues 

that gave rise to some of these organizations: The rights of women 

and the opportunity of women to have a far more prominent role 

in society, the dedication to institutions of democracy, and to build 

capacity within those institutions, all of which, of course, has 

stemmed from the security efforts that we have put into the building of that force which is holding now. So that country is a good 

example as are other countries in the region. It is a good example 

of how they are attempting to address and embrace an absence of 

capacity, whether it is social or economic or human rights or democratic institutions or governmental institutions. An absence of capacity, as I said before, the combination of which has given rise to 

despair and radicalism and extremism and then violence. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Which sounds to me why Syria is so difficult because there really is no government there to work with at all. 

28

General ALLEN. Syria is very challenging, ma’am. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And could someone just respond to the question 

about how ISIL has integrated into the society? They are not 

standing in a corner waiting to be bombed, so if you could just 

maybe explain the difficulty of rooting them out. 

General FANTINI. Yes, ma’am. ISIL is an ideological entity that 

through the use of terror is able to co-op to the society. And that 

is why when we look at the number of strikes that we have done 

to halt ISIL and put them on the defensive, it is very precise and 

we have done it with forethought with the understanding that this 

conflict is not a major force on another major force, more traditional if you will. 

From a counterterrorism perspective, we are in a counterterror 

fight and when we engage a target, we want to ensure we engage 

the enemy and don’t create more enemies by hitting the wrong target if you will. And so that is why it will take time and the fact 

that we have conducted over 3,000 strikes in the 6 months has positioned us to continue to push for success as we move forward, but 

it is a very challenging environment and a distributed enemy. Our 

coalition tactics engender the support of the society and the government and that is how we will continue to pursue. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman ROYCE. [presiding.] We will go now to Mr. Salmon. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I just ask for any of your thoughts on 

Clapper not designating Hamas and Iran now has threats to our 

national security. I was kind of shocked that in his most recent report that they are not included in the threats to our national security and I am curious about your thoughts. 

Also, when it comes to dealing with the fight against ISIL, we 

are also seeing Iran and its allies continue to invade other countries and become more of a threat to our national security. So this 

muddled mess, one day the Shi’ites are our allies and the next the 

Sunnis are our allies. Depending on what country, if you are dealing in Yemen, the Iran-backed forces are our enemy and they are 

a problem, but yet when we are fighting against ISIS, they are our 

allies. It is a very confusing mess. And for us in Congress to end 

up developing an AUMF, it becomes very, very complicated and I 

am just curious of your thoughts on that. 

General ALLEN. Confusing mess is actually a good term for the 

environment that we find today in the region. It is a very difficult 

environment. It is one that is characterized by long term social difficulties as we explained to Congresswoman Frankel. It is one 

where there have been long-term insurgencies and destructions of 

the social fabric that have been leveraged by political entities within the region. Iran has been prominent in that. It is a state sponsor 

of terror. It has been a disruptive influence for a very long time 

and I think that we haven’t in any respect changed our view that 

Iran is one of the central destabilizing influences throughout the 

entire region. Not just in the context of its destabilizing of our partners and allies in the region, but certainly as a direct threat to our 

ally Israel as well. 

So Iran remains a state sponsor of terror. We still perceive it to 

be. I don’t think that there has been any back peddling by the administration in that regard. 

Mr. SALMON. Why did Clapper then leave them off of the list? 

29

General ALLEN. I don’t know. I don’t know that he did, sir. We 

will do some research on his comments to ensure that we provide 

the clarity that you desire on this issue. I am not going to speculate 

here. I didn’t see his comments. So you deserve an answer and we 

will get you one. But Hamas and Hezbollah remain FTOs, foreign 

terrorist organizations, and have been duly designated by the U.S. 

Government and remain on that list, sir. Nothing has changed in 

that regard. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. The other question I would have is why has 

the administration not designated additional Shia militias or their 

leaders under Executive Order 13438 blocking property or persons 

who threaten stabilization efforts in Iraq since the onset of operations against ISIS? 

General ALLEN. I can’t answer that. We will get an answer for 

you, sir. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay, that would be really helpful. I will yield back 

the balance of my time. 

General ALLEN. Thank you for the questions. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the congressman for yielding and we 

will go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Alan Grayson. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Olson, trying 

to piece together information from public sources, it appears to me 

that we are spending roughly $1 million for every ISIS fighting 

that U.S. forces kill. Does that sound right to you? 

General OLSON. The figure that we understand for the oper- ational costs per day is about $8.5 million. 

Mr. GRAYSON. But am I right to think that we are spending ap- proximately $1 million for every single ISIS fighting that U.S. 

forces kill? 

General OLSON. I haven’t done the math, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. All right, let us assume for the sake of the argument that that is correct. Does it make sense, does it make sense 

for us to be deploying the most powerful military force that the 

world has ever seen and spend $1 million to kill some man standing in the desert 6,000 miles from the closest American shore holding a 40-year-old weapon? Does that make sense? 

General OLSON. The military strategy as designed provides U.S. 

support to a coalition that will degrade, dismantle, and ultimately 

defeat ISIL. 

Mr. GRAYSON. What about you, General Fantini? Can you think 

of ways that we can spend less than $1 million and still keep 

America safe for every gentleman standing in the desert 6,000 

miles away when we kill? 

General FANTINI. Congressman, I can’t address the math that 

you are presenting. I don’t know if that is accurate or not. From 

the perspective of continuing with the strategy of developing local 

forces, to enable those local forces with coalition support, to degrade and defeat ISIL, I would submit that that is a worthy expenditure of resources. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Well, let us talk about that. You, of course, are all 

very, very familiar with what General Powell said about what 

makes for a good, effective war and what doesn’t. General Powell 

said that we need a vital national security interest that is pursued 

30

by a clear strategy. We need overwhelming force and we need an 

exit strategy. 

So let us start with you on that, General Allen. What is our exit 

strategy? 

General ALLEN. The exit strategy is an Iraq that ultimately is 

territorial secure, sovereign, an ISIL that has been denied safe 

haven, and ultimately has been disrupted to the point where it has 

no capacity to threaten at an existential level the Government of 

Iraq and the nation of the Iraqi people. And it ultimately ends up 

in a state that does not permit it to threaten the United States or 

our homeland. 

Mr. GRAYSON. General Allen, that doesn’t sound like a strategy 

to me. That sounds like a wish list. You certainly understand the 

difference between a strategy and a wish list. 

General ALLEN. And I do and the strategy, in fact, has a whole 

series of lines of effort that converge on Daesh to prevent it from 

doing the very things that I just mentioned. 

Mr. GRAYSON. But what is our strategy? 

General ALLEN. Strategy is to pursue a series of lines of effort 

from defense of the homeland to the stabilization of the Iraqi Government to the countering of the Daesh message to the disruption 

of its finances to the impediment of the foreign fighters to the empowerment of our allies to the leadership of a coalition ultimately 

aimed to the defeat of Daesh. That is a strategy. 

Mr. GRAYSON. But none of those are exit strategies, right? 

General ALLEN. There is no exit strategy for this. This is about 

dealing with Daesh. This is about defeating Daesh. The success of 

the strategy is not about exit. The success of the strategy is about 

empowering our partners so that they can ultimately restore the 

territorial integrity and the sovereignty of a country and deny 

Daesh the ability ultimately to do that. 

If you are looking for an exit strategy with respect to our presence in Iraq, when we have successfully concluded that aspect of 

the strategy, we have said from the beginning that our forces will 

redeploy. The Coalition has said from the beginning that our forces 

will redeploy. So if that is the term that you are seeking in terms 

of an exit strategy, then I would say that is the mechanism by 

which we redeploy our forces from Iraq. 

But the strategy is oriented on an effect that we hope to achieve 

with respect to Daesh. 

Mr. GRAYSON. General Olson, you will agree that we are not 

using what Colin Powell would have considered to be overwhelming 

force, correct? 

General ALLEN. We are using an appropriate level of force——

Mr. GRAYSON. Which isn’t overwhelming force, right? Not as 

Colin Powell would see it, right? 

General ALLEN. I don’t want to speak for General Powell. I believe that the resources that we are applying to the strategy to 

achieve our ends through matching ways and means are appropriate for the strategy as designed. 

Mr. GRAYSON. General Fantini, yes or no, are we using what you 

would consider to be overwhelming military force? 

General FANTINI. Congressman, I would submit that American 

air power against an AK–47 could be construed as overwhelming. 

31

I agree with General Olson that the use of the resources and the 

force applied to support our coalition partners to enable these 

ground operations are appropriate for the strategy and for success 

in this fight that will take a clear eyed and long-term commitment. 

And we have stated at least 3 years. 

Mr. GRAYSON. My time is up. Thank you all very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Grayson. There is just one 

vote on the floor, so we will keep this hearing moving. Some of the 

members have left to cast that ballot and they will be back. And 

those members waiting to ask questions, if some of you want to 

vote and then come back, we will work right through. 

Empowering our partners is sort of the theme, General Allen, 

that you have used successfully in the past with the Anbar awakening. One of the real questions here though is which partners end 

up stepping up to the plate and will they do more harm than good? 

And I am speaking right now of the militias, the Iranian led or encouraged militias here because that is my concern in all of this. 

Many of our partners in that theater are already frustrated 

about our Syria policy. We hear from these Ambassadors in the 

Gulf states and through the region. And I wonder how much longer 

the Sunni states will stick with the coalition once these Shia militias go on the rampage. And that is the part I am concerned about. 

In some areas, these Shia have burned and bulldozed thousands 

of homes in Sunni villages. You see the reports in the front pages 

of the papers about some of the atrocities committed. And this is 

our concern about the Iranian trained and equipped fighters stepping into Iraq. I will just give you what I recently heard about the 

breakdown. This is how General Dempsey described the Tikrit operation. A thousand Sunni tribal folks, a brigade of the Iraqi security forces, that would be about 3,000, well, that is what we want 

to see happening. But then approximately 20,000 of the Popular 

Mobilization Force which in this count seems that they are Shia 

militia. And so given that some of those militia are the same militia that in the past attacked U.S. forces during the height of the 

Iraq War and some are known to have targeted these Sunni Iraqi 

citizens during the same period. 

Given Iran’s involvement in this, how do we reconcile their role, 

then and now? And to what extent are Iranian forces on the ground 

taking part directing these militias? I see some of it in the interviews and certainly coming from the region. The Iranians are trumpeting this. 

General ALLEN. Prime Minister Abadi has been pretty clear, very 

clear actually, that it is not his intention that there be developed 

in a parallel security structures in Iraq. To that extent, the Popular 

Mobilization Forces have generally been organized in a manner 

that ultimately they will either be disbanded or will be subsumed 

under the national guard organizations once the national guard 

legislation is passed and they become a reality. 

I think your question and your concern is very well placed. We 

are attempting to ensure that we understand what it is that the 

Iranians have done and what they have not done with respect to 

the militias in general and with regard to Tikrit in particular. And 

you are also correct that there are elements of these militias which 

are the ones that we have seen before that we saw during our peVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
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riod of time in Iraq in large numbers, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl 

al-Haq and others that have the potential of creating a long-term 

security problem for the central government in Iraq. 

So we are watching this closely. We are working closely ultimately with the central government on the assimilation of those 

Popular Mobilization Forces, those Shia elements that came forward in the aftermath of the attack on Iraq last June to try to preserve the integrity of Iraq. And ultimately, it is the intention of 

Prime Minister Abadi that those forces either be disbanded or go 

home. 

The longer term issue, your question I think implies we are going 

to have to deal with Kata’ib Hezbollah and those elements that are 

directly supported by the Iranians over time. And I think that is 

a security issue that the Iraqis are going to have to address. And 

I think that their time will come as this campaign continues to unfold. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. I think some of this talk about Iran being 

a very successful regional power, long term, if it does this nuclear 

deal, the choice of words here by the administration, I think is concerning to others on the ground who have noticed the Iranians 

were bragging the other day about four Arab capitals now being 

under their control and talking about maybe taking a fifth, you 

know? And this kind of rhetoric coming commensurate—of course, 

I am bothered by 3 days ago the ‘‘Death to America’’ quote from 

the Ayatollah. And in the middle of all of this, pushing the envelope and saying we control four Arab capitals now and we are on 

our way to controlling a fifth and we are talking about Saudi Arabia. And they are trying to support a low-level insurgency among 

the Shia there. 

I think the Sunni tribes will be central to this fight in terms of 

turning back ISIS. And they have been squeezed between the terror of ISIS on one hand and the brutality of the Shia militia on the 

other. And because of your experiences on the ground in Anbar 

during the awakening and the fact is that helped turn the tide, I 

just look at the resources and the capabilities that were deployed 

then versus what we are doing to work with them now. And we 

have got to do more, I think, to fully engage the Sunni tribes in 

this struggle against ISIS as an alternative to having Iran bringing 

in as they are doing, you know, today in Syria and in Lebanon and 

Yemen and frankly trying to do in Saudi Arabia and trying to do 

in Bahrain as we know to the extent that you can succeed at this, 

I think it is going to be essential. 

General ALLEN. I agree with that 100 percent, Chairman. The 

unfolding of the counter offensive in Iraq needs to liberate large 

numbers of the Sunni population, numbers that have really very 

few options with respect——

Chairman ROYCE. My time has expired. I need to go to Mr. 

Meeks, but he has enough time to make that vote. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Generals, I want to 

thank you. What I appreciate is I think is what I am hearing is 

some honesty in the sense that I hope we are playing, even if it 

is short term or having short-term pain for long-term gain. You 

know, when we were in Iraq we thought that after the shock and 

awe just a few days later that it was all over and we then were 

33

in Iraq another 10 years. And from what I am hearing from you, 

we know that it is going to be a long-term fight. This is complicated. And we are going to have at least, I think you are saying 

at least 3 years. And I hope that then means that a lot of these 

regional entanglements that we try to figure it out because unfortunately have to run out, but I am told that yes, some of our troops 

on the ground, if you have troops on the ground that is not going 

to help. It could exacerbate the situation. In larger numbers, right, 

in large numbers. We have our special forces in training and doing 

what we have to do in that regard and bringing them together. Because in my estimation it is going to take everybody in the region 

working together and not just the United States by ourselves. And 

it has got to take the cooperation of a number of individuals in the 

region. 

So with that in mind, my questions would be, I have two-fold. 

One is with reference with Qatar and them and are they cooperating with us? There have been some differences in their approach 

to Syria which complicates things and whether or not they are 

able, have the ability or the desire to cut off the financing to the 

terrorists and what their authority is. 

And the second question then would be in reference to Turkey 

and whether or not they are cooperating with us in the region and 

how they add in because it is very important, I think, that we have 

those two countries intricately involved with us if we are going to 

really win this thing. So those are my two questions. 

General ALLEN. Mr. Meeks, you are 100 percent correct in your 

observations on both of those. They are both critical to the outcome. 

In the case of Qatar, the Emir has recently visited here. He has 

reinforced something that we have heard in the last couple of years 

which is that Qatar has taken measures to begin to stem the flow 

of donations that come from Qatar and obviously the enormous 

wealth that many of the individuals have there. Not the government, but individuals to stem the flow of that money ultimately to 

organizations like Daesh or other organizations. The Emir has been 

clear on that issue. We have seen, in fact, that that money has diminished, whether it still flows in any form or not, I can’t answer 

today. But Qatar has been very clear that it does not intend to tolerate the funding of those kinds of organizations. That is a positive 

trend with regard to Qatar and it is also a very positive public 

statement by the Emir. 

It is also important to understand that Qatar has flown air operations with us as on the wing of U.S. Air Force aircraft in Syria. 

Qatar also hosts Al Udeid which is one of our largest air bases in 

the entire region. The forward headquarters with CENTCOM, the 

combined air operations center for the region, and the headquarters, forward headquarters of our Special Operations Command in the region. So Qatar is a very important partner, not just 

in dealing with Daesh, but also dealing and helping us to continue 

as a platform for preserving regional stability. 

With respect to Turkey, Turkey is an old friend of the United 

States and we are an ally through our relationship with NATO. I 

have been to Ankara now four times in the last 4 months where 

we have had a number of conversations with the Turkish leadership, one of which specifically late one evening with the Prime MinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
34

ister resulted in the Turks, my direct conversation with the Turkish leadership resulted in the Turkish decision to permit the 

peshmerga to reinforce the defenders of Kobani by moving through 

Turkey to do that. 

Turkey has made a series of additional decisions ultimately to 

expand its support to our coalition efforts. We continue to have productive conversations with Turkey. We have more to cover, more 

ground to cover in terms of how Turkey might participate, but it 

is not just in the military context. Turkey is now co-leading the Coalition Working Group on stemming the flow of foreign fighters. It 

is in Turkey’s interest to do that and they have embraced that as 

a responsibility within the coalition. 

So we will continue to work very closely with both of those countries and as your question implies, they are critical to the outcome. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, General. 

General ALLEN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. ZELDIN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. I now recognize 

myself for 5 minutes. I wanted to start off by thanking all of the 

generals who are here for your service to our country, dedicating 

your entire life to protecting our freedoms and liberties, being responsible for making critical decisions that not only impact the welfare of the men and women under your commands, but also their 

families back home. So thank you for a lifetime of service to our 

country. 

I was in Iraq in 2006 with the 82nd Airborne Division and toward the end of that year, General Petraeus was taking over part 

of this surge strategy, was taking over all of the surge strategy and 

I remember a counter insurgency model coming out at the time 

where a lot of his vision for what we need to do in Iraq was articulated really in written form. You can find on the internet. 

He would say things like ‘‘Give flexibility to local commanders so 

they can adapt to changing circumstances.’’ Trying to tackle the 

conflict of Iraqi military and law enforcement in many cases not 

even showing up to work. How do we embed forces to ensure that 

they are going to be there in the morning? 

My first question is and I apologize if it was answered while I 

was away, who is in charge on our side on the ground in Iraq? 

General OLSON. United States Central Command is ultimately 

responsible for the campaign, in the campaign fund that has been 

written. There is a three star general who is the commander of the 

Joint Task Force, combined Joint Task Force for Operation Inherent Resolve. He is headquartered in the Central Command AOR. 

On the ground in Iraq is an American two star commander who 

commands the joint combined land forces effort there. 

Mr. ZELDIN. General Austin is the three star? 

General OLSON. General Austin is the four star Central Command. 

Mr. ZELDIN. The four star, right. Okay, so who is the two star? 

General OLSON. Major General Funk. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Major General Funk. Now so I remember——

General ALLEN. The 82nd is coming in behind by the Big Red 

One, by the way. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Good decision. As far as Major General Funk goes, 

or the three star that is over him, whose vision? One of the things 

35

in my analysis and the analysis of others is who is in charge and 

are they being given the flexibility and resources they need to accomplish their mission? 

When the President sent the authorization for the use of military 

force, the Congress accompanied with that was a five paragraph 

letter from the White House to Congress. And in one of those paragraphs it is indicating an understanding that the use of special operations, the use of ground operations would be important. The 

White House was careful not to word it where, you know, specifically saying it was going to be U.S. special forces or U.S. ground 

operations. But one of the things in my analysis of whether or not 

we are actually going to be able to defeat ISIS is that we are driving the recommendations from the ground up. 

When you have a very talented two star or three star or four star 

with multiple combat tours, a lot of combat experience, they understand the enemy. They understand the government, the culture. 

Without their hands being tied behind their back, they are able to 

say exactly what we need to do to defeat ISIS. Is that two star, 

does he have the flexibility he needs? In his mind, if he wants to 

send an Army Ranger Unit or Marines or Navy Seals or Delta 

Force or Green Berets to do a night mission in Syria or some part 

of Iraq, when they come under the cover of darkness. They take out 

a high-value target or they get very important actionable intelligence, does that two star have the ability to execute that kind of 

a mission? 

General OLSON. Being cautious about operational security, what 

I would say, Congressman, is that the chain of command has been 

empowered both by the chairman and by the Central Command 

commander to make the appropriate recommendations for what we 

need to do to carry out the strategy. 

Mr. ZELDIN. So when Secretary Kerry was here, one of my colleagues, Mr. Grayson, was trying to interpret whether or not the 

authorization included offensive operations. The Secretary’s initial 

response indicated that it did not authorize offensive operations. 

With my question, he had the opportunity to clarify it that it did 

not involve—he was not referring to kinetic air strikes. But the one 

thing that was left unanswered from that back and forth due to a 

lack of time, was whether or not the authorization for use of military force allows for the use of U.S. special operations forces to be 

able to conduct that kind of a mission. Does the authorization for 

use of military force the President gave to Congress, does that authorize that commander on the ground to execute that kind of a 

mission? 

General OLSON. The President’s transmittal letter included examples of things that are not enduring offensive ground combat operations such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel. The use of special operations forces to take military action 

against ISIL and their leadership, i.e., counterterrorism, or the use 

of U.S. forces in situations where ground combat operations are not 

expected or intended such as intelligence collection and sharing, 

missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational 

planning or other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces. 

Mr. ZELDIN. So just so I understand, General, and my time is expiring, just so I understand, would that commander on the ground 

36

be authorized—if Congress was to pass this authorization for use 

of military force, will that commander be authorized to conduct 

that special operations mission to take out a high-value target? 

General OLSON. Again, Congressman, within the bounds of 

OPSEC, the commander will be able to make the recommendation 

for the appropriate military operation to match the appropriate 

means to the appropriate outcome. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, General. At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. We are talking about the AUMF. 

Keep in mind the President has total power to deploy our forces 

outside combat areas for training. The President has under the 

War Powers Act the right to engage in a series of ground operations lasting 60 or 90 days per operation without any act of Congress. And then finally, unless we repeal the 2001 AUMF, the 

President has total power to do just about everything he wants 

against not only al-Qaeda, but organizations once affiliated with alQaeda which the President has concluded includes ISIS. 

Our focus is on ISIS because they have forced us to focus on 

them through not only their territorial acquisitions. After all, the 

Houthi have had some territorial acquisitions, but because of their 

gruesome YouTubes. They are the only group in the Middle East 

that has, in effect, asked us to bomb them. We have obliged. 

Another area where we—well, I think the Shi’ite alliance is more 

dangerous than ISIS. They have killed far more Americans including the Marines in the 1980s in Beirut. They have conducted operations on every continent, including Hezbollah, conducting operations in Buenos Aires and of course, they are trying to develop a 

nuclear weapon. 

So the total destruction of ISIS is probably not available to us, 

but even if it was, we would have to ask who is going to fill that 

ideological, that territorial and that cyber space. And I am not sure 

that we would see an improvement in the Middle East. 

I would like to focus just a second on Yemen. I will ask General 

Fantani, are we assisting the Saudis in the military actions they 

are taking by air over Yemen? 

General FANTINI. Congressman, yes, we are. We are providing 

enabling support to the GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And do we know whether former President Saleh 

is in the country of Yemen? Do we know whether current President 

Hadi is in the country of Yemen? 

General FANTINI. Sir, because of the classification of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Do we know in a way that you can disclose in this 

room? 

General FANTINI. No, I would not feel comfortable answering 

that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. General Allen, we have all seen the World War 

II movies. The French Government in exile didn’t exactly send 

checks and money to those living under Nazi occupation, but in 

Iraq we have got the government in Baghdad paying people in 

Mosul. The money then goes to ISIS to the extent ISIS wants the 

money. They can grab as much of it as they want. But my concern 

here is does the Iraqi Government generate from facilities that it 

37

controls such as Mosul Dam electricity which then goes into ISISoccupied areas? 

General ALLEN. I will take that question, sir. There has been 

some work on the Mosul Dam just recently and I want to make 

sure I get you the most——

Mr. SHERMAN. We saved the Mosul Dam. We, of course, got no 

credit from it in the Iraqi press or from the Iraqi people. At any 

time in the last few months has the Iraqi Government allowed electricity to go——

General ALLEN. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They have. 

General ALLEN. That is correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does ISIL pay for it or do they just charge the civilians for it? 

General ALLEN. No, they don’t pay for it, obviously. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So while we are bombing ISIS, we are giving them 

free electricity or rather Iraq is giving them free electricity, sending 

them money gratuitously, it is an unusual way to wage a war. One 

suggestion I made at the last hearing, I would like to run it by you, 

is should there be a change in the color and design of Iraqi currency so as to make invalid and worthless the currency that ISIS 

was able to seize? Now this will anger those who are corrupt, those 

who are evading taxes, pretty much those in control of the government in Baghdad. 

Is there serious discussion of making all that currency that ISIS 

seized worthless by doing a currency replacement? 

General ALLEN. Sir, you have posed these questions before. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

General ALLEN. They are, I think, very important questions, actually for how we would envision this counter offensive ultimately. 

What I would ask is you permit us to either come to you in a closed 

session or permit us to provide you a classified response. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I look forward to getting the classified response, 

but this isn’t sources and methods of intelligence. This is what 

color will the currency be? But you are right, we wouldn’t want to 

disclose those plans in advance. 

General ALLEN. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I look forward to getting an answer to these questions which as you note I have been posing for quite some time and 

I yield back. 

General ALLEN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. And General Allen, if we could plan 

on doing that after we return here in the House, how much time 

do you think it would be necessary for you to access that information so that we could have a briefing with the members of the committee? 

General ALLEN. When you return from your—we could do that 

pretty quickly, if you come back, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. That would be my request. 

General ALLEN. It would be helpful, I think, as well, to update 

you on how the Tikrit operation has unfolded. 

Chairman ROYCE. We have appreciated the prior briefings. 

General ALLEN. Yes, sir. Be glad to do that. 

38

Chairman ROYCE. I would follow up on that. We go to Mr. Darrell Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Olson, Marines are 

pretty straight forward and so I heard your answer to the earlier 

question when asked does a two star have the ability to perform 

X, Y, or Z combat mission, you answered the chain of command has 

the ability to beg for the opportunity through the chain of command. You answered, do I have the ability to ask? Is that correct 

that you have the authority to ask was your answer to do—you 

have the authority to do? 

General OLSON. The commander on the ground’s mandate in Iraq 

right now is to advise and assist and build partner capacity. 

Mr. ISSA. Right, so he has the ability to ask. 

General OLSON. Yes, sir. He does. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay, I just want to make sure that we got that sort 

of clear that they really don’t have combat command authority. 

What they have is the ability to go up the chain of command and 

ask, something similar to the way Vietnam was fought where you 

had to go practically back not just the Pentagon, but to the coffee 

table in the White House sometimes before you could get a go 

ahead. 

Do you think that is the way the war should be conducted? In 

other words, do we need to in short order provide our combat leaders, whether they are in an assisting role or quite frankly it is air 

strikes and targets of opportunity and so on, the normal ability 

within a combat arena to make decisions based on predetermined 

if then rather than almost always having to go up the chain which 

can cause a target or an opportunity to disappear? 

General OLSON. The way I would characterize the strategy is 

that we are executing by, through, and with our Iraqi partners. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay, we are executing by, with, and our Iraqi partners are Shia partners who are on the ground with Iranian 

operatives, correct? 

General OLSON. We are not directly advising or assisting any 

force that is not under the control of the Government of Iraq. 

Mr. ISSA. Right, but if Shia zone individuals under the control of 

Iraq with Iranian operatives next to them call for a strike or assistance, ultimately you are responding as an Iraqi response, correct? 

I don’t want to get too far in the weeds, but we will just take-you 

know what? I think I will give up on that because I think the Associated Press has made it clear you are doing it. 

So let me get back to this committee’s primary jurisdiction, the 

use of military force. Currently, the President is asking to retain 

one and get rid of one prior use of force. Additionally, he wants 

world-wide ability to go after ISIL, correct? ISIL, ISIS, Daesh, depending upon what name you want to use. That is essentially what 

it is. Just tell me if I am wrong? 

General FANTINI. That is accurate, Congressman, in terms of geographic limitations. 

Mr. ISSA. So that begs the real question. In Yemen today, the 

President is currently, and I think appropriately, assisting Gulf allies led by Saudi Arabia in trying to stabilize the situation which 

Iran-backed dissidents, not dissidents, Iran-backed opportunists, 

the Houthis, are in fact, trying to take that country by force, turn 

39

it into a Shia-controlled nation similar to Iran. That is not in the 

use of force request. It would not be covered. Is that correct? 

General FANTINI. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay, so as we speak we are, in fact, in a situation 

which we have combat operations support that is likely to need—

it certainly doesn’t fall under the normal global war on terrorism, 

as a matter of fact, unless I missed my prep for this. We just took 

Hezbollah and Iran effectively off the terrorist list, didn’t make 

them good guys, but took them off the list. And we now are in a 

situation in which we are using them in Iraq, maybe not as directly, we are using people in Iraq, we are using people in Syria 

that are formerly on a terrorist list. We are then fighting them in 

Yemen and the President has not clarified under what authority he 

plans to do that and for how long. Am I missing anything there? 

General FANTINI. Sir, I think first, we believe that Hezbollah still 

remains on the list. Number two, you highlight an excellent point. 

It is an extremely complicated environment. And we are pursuing 

this counterterrorism strategy with the precision strikes to halt 

ISIL and additionally as you highlight to support our Gulf partners 

as best we can because of the threats in the region. 

Mr. ISSA. My time is expiring, but based on the fact that we have 

essentially but two distinctly different groups, ISIS, Sunni extremists, and a myriad of Shia extremists in different areas, mostly if 

not all backed by Iran. We are now as a committee being asked to 

consider the authorization for use of military force only against 

half, well, in fact, we would have to rely on vague past authorizations for the future and we do not have a plan for situations like 

Yemen. 

So I will close with don’t you believe that any authorization use 

of military force has to envision the ability and a plan to deal with 

the fact that in some places we have two enemies, ISIS and Iranian-backed groups, and that we will be effectively on the ground 

fighting them in places such as Syria and that there currently is 

no new authorization for that. Shouldn’t there be an authorization 

for that or shouldn’t it be included in the authorization that we are 

being asked to render to the President? 

General FANTINI. I believe the intent of the AUMF was to afford 

the geographic flexibility, as well as the flexibility to respond 

across the globe to these types of threats. The issues that are associated with Yemen, I would estimate further need to be adjudicated 

in terms of exactly what the Houthis truly mean in terms of—or 

what they truly represent in terms of their affiliation and to ISIS, 

Daesh, and the Shia challenges within the region. 

Mr. ISSA. So General Clapper, former General Clapper’s list, 

worldwide threat assessment did not list Iran or Hezbollah where 

they were near the top at the last time. I just want to make sure 

the record is clear. We know they are still a terrorist, a nation 

backing terrorists. We know Hezbollah is still a terrorist organization. But they dropped from the list and I always assumed that 

there are too many good people double checking things for that to 

be a clerical error. 

So Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your indulgence. I 

yield back. 

40

Chairman ROYCE. Yes, and we are going to go to Mr. Grayson 

for questions and then we are going to go to Mr. Jeff Duncan. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Allen, how 

many countries have we asked to provide air support in the sense 

of offering to actually execute strikes against ISIS in either Iraq or 

in Syria? How many questions have we asked for that kind of support? 

General ALLEN. Well, when we talk to—I just have to—we would 

have to CENTCOM on that. 

Chairman ROYCE. You know what I am going to suggest here is 

a second round of questions, but first let us go to Mr. Jeff Duncan 

and then we can come back to our second round. That is probably 

the most efficient way to do it. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Certainly, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to reset the 

clock here, I hope. 

First off, General Olson, I was appalled when I heard about elements of the State Department asking the United States Marines 

to leave their weapons behind to be destroyed in Yemen. I told Secretary Kerry in this hearing a couple of weeks ago never to disarm 

the United States Marines ever again. And I apologize that that 

happened. And that is how I feel about it. I want to make sure that 

the men under your command have the weapons to defend their 

colleagues and defend this nation and our liberty. 

So thank you all for what you do. 

I visited Iraq in November 2012 on CODEL McCaul. And I will 

say that General Austin executed the withdrawal of U.S. forces 

from Iraq in a very professional manner. And I am a huge fan. His 

goal was to not lose another American life in our withdrawal. But 

while we were there, we were concerned about the premature withdrawal of U.S. forces. I say premature because there was a lot of 

uncertainty about the readiness of the Iraqi security forces, the 

readiness of their border security. There was concern that Iran 

would fill the void after U.S. troops left. ISIS wasn’t on the radar 

screen then but al-Qaeda was. And al-Qaeda was still in Iraq and 

I believe al-Qaeda was just waiting for the U.S. forces to leave to 

fill that void. 

So I disagree with letting the enemy know a time line of when 

American troops are going to withdraw from any theater. There is 

a 3-year deadline in the AUMF which I disagree with. I want to—

I personally want to make sure that we give commanders the ability, the commanders on the ground the ability to do their job, the 

ability to, with the rules of engagement, to defeat the enemy. 

But we still have a lot of threats in the region and we have seen 

what happened in Libya. We now see what is going on with terrorism in Tunisia, training elsewhere in North Africa, what is 

going on in Yemen, the Iranian-backed Shia militia there just opposing a legitimate regime in Yemen. We still have AQAP, Boko 

Haram, Hezbollah, Hamas, Abu Sayyaf and a lot of other terrorist 

organizations around the globe. I am concerned that they are all 

going to join forces. We are already seeing that with Boko Haram. 

Let me ask what are we doing with the Kurds? This question 

may have already been asked, General Allen, but how do the KurdVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
41

ish militia play into our overall goal? Because they are the only 

ones doing the heavy lifting in Iraq right now on the ground in my 

opinion with air support and I appreciate that, but how do they fit 

in to this dynamic? 

General ALLEN. Well, the Kurds play a very important role. They 

are a force for stability. They are an example of an area where the 

social factors and the relationships between and among the people 

within the Kurdish element of the Iraqi population have been able 

to achieve a level of stability and prosperity that are an example 

for the region. So the Kurds play a very important social role, I 

think, both for Iraq, but more broadly for the region. 

At a military level, peshmerga and Kurdish forces have been successful, as you correctly point out, through the use of coalition air 

power in recovering all of its previous holdings and then a bit 

more. In that respect, without getting into specific operational 

plans, with regard to the counter offensive, my very strong suspicions are that the peshmerga and the platform of Kurdistan or 

the KRG will play an important role ultimately as the counter offensive unfolds in the North and in the Northwest. So we would 

anticipate that they would play an important role in that. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I think they should. I have been impressed. Did 

any of the weapons from Libya make their way to Syria and then 

in the hands of ISIS, specifically MANPADS or any of that? 

General ALLEN. Let me take that question and come back to you 

with a classified answer, please. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Let me—my time is about up, so I will let 

you answer that question or we can answer it in a classified. 

General ALLEN. I prefer to answer that in a classified environment. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you about Yemen. How does Yemen 

play in this scope of combatting ISIS? Is ISIS part of the driving 

force in Yemen or is it a completely different group? Are they interconnected? And I will expand on that because I mentioned all the 

other terrorist organizations around the globe. How does that fit in 

to what we are trying to do here to defeat this enemy? 

General ALLEN. We have three principal forces at work. We have 

the Houthis which are a Shia element that is in some form or another supported by Iran. We have the regime which is failing and 

we have al-Qaeda which has been a problem for some period of 

time, AQAP it is often called, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Those three forces are in contention at this particular time, obviously, to restore the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the 

state. 

So to your point, at this juncture, al-Qaeda which is not ISIS, in 

fact, they are at odds with each other. Al-Qaeda is the principal 

Sunni element, extremist element that is on the ground in Yemen. 

The Houthis are the Shia element on the ground with regard to 

Yemen. And then we have the state which we still support. 

We are calling on all parties, obviously, to come to an agreement 

that supports the central government and it is a central government that the Saudi-led 10 nation coalition is now supporting with 

military operations. So those are really the three contending parties at work. 

42

Mr. DUNCAN. Wouldn’t you agree the Arab Spring combined a lot 

of those different Shia Sunni elements? 

General ALLEN. I think the Arab Spring was a catalytic effect 

that created instability in Yemen in particular. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. 

General ALLEN. One of the realities, I know, with respect to 

Yemen is that as the Houthis grew in prominence and capability, 

it drove Sunni elements into the arms of al-Qaeda. It is a very real 

issue. And al-Qaeda, of course, by virtue of its Sunni dent is by no 

means an ally of the Sunni states in that region that we support 

as well. So that is one of the reasons that Yemen is so important 

to us in terms of dealing with the dynamics there. And Yemen, of 

course, geostrategically is located at the southern end of the Babel-Mandeb which is the exit of the Red Sea which is a major shipping region. 

So Yemen is a very important area for us geopolitically, and of 

course, our long-term relationship with the central government is 

important to us. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, General Allen. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Chairman. I would ask for a classified 

hearing as well. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Duncan, we will do exactly that. As a matter of fact, we will incorporate those together. 

Mr. Duncan, do you think that makes sense to you? 

General ALLEN. Let me just say, Chairman, this is about ISIL. 

We will come ready to talk about ISIL, but tell us what you want 

and we will make sure we have got the right people in the room. 

Chairman ROYCE. I will work with Mr. Duncan and others to 

submit those questions in advance, General, in addition to what he 

has already raised today. 

General ALLEN. Great. 

Chairman ROYCE. Before the committee. 

General ALLEN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, our 

chairman emeritus. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And 

thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. Thank you 

very much. 

Brigadier General Fantini, you testified that the Syrian opposition train and equip program is set to begin later next month. In 

the past the administration has said that the purpose of this Syrian opposition train and equip was to have the forces fend off ISIL, 

not to go on the offensive. 

What will the mission be and will it include fighting Asad’s 

forces and will the Syrian opposition fighters be Leahy vetted? 

General FANTINI. Congresswoman, yes to Leahy vetting. The vetting process is very rigorous and essentially continuous. 

To your question of—I am sorry, can you repeat your first question? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, will it be to fend off ISIL? 

General FANTINI. Oh, pardon me. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Or will it be not go on the offensive or what 

exactly will the mission——

43

General FANTINI. The mission is to train and equip to defend 

their territory, provide security in their territory, counter and engage and go offensive toward ISIL. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It will be to go on the offensive against ISIL? 

General FANTINI. Eventually, right. But that won’t be until we 

can develop enough combat power that they see the conditions are 

right to move. But it is a counter-ISIL force, not a counter regime. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And one of the most important 

issues that this committee and the entire Congress can consider is 

the AUMF, the authorization for use of military force. But ISIL 

isn’t the only threat that we and the people of the region face. And 

if we are going to defeat ISIL, we need a comprehensive approach 

that addresses ISIL, al-Nusra, other terror groups that are fighting 

in Syria and Iraq, Assad and Assad’s allies which include Iran, the 

IRGC, and Hezbollah. 

Does the AUMF give the authority to use force against Assad’s 

regime, al-Nusra, Hezbollah, any other fighter, actor fighting in 

Syria and Iraq or is it just limited to ISIL and anyone fighting with 

or alongside that terror group? 

General FANTINI. I think it does not give the authority to use 

force against any regime. It is a complicated battle space in the 

Syrian area. But we believe that the AUMF, the combination of the 

2001 and this new AUMF would afford and provide the authority 

and the flexibility for our forces and friendly forces to the U.S. Government to be successful. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And General Allen, it was reported in the 

news earlier this week that Hezbollah is preparing a major offensive against ISIL while the Lebanese Armed Forces, the LAF, may 

not participate in Hezbollah’s offensive against ISIL. There is certainly going to be some level of coordination with Hezbollah and as 

a result, the patron of the terror group which is always Iran. 

What can you tell us about Hezbollah’s alleged planned defensive? Are there any known ties between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces? Can you confirm that any intelligence we 

share with the LAF will not be shared with Hezbollah? Can you 

confirm that Iranian generals and tanks are being used in the Iraqi 

campaign in Tikrit? And can you confirm if the United States is on 

any level directly or indirectly coordinating our efforts against ISIL 

with Iran? 

General ALLEN. Your last question I can confirm that we are not 

coordinating with Iran. And there is no intention to. To the other 

specifics of your question, you deserve a specific answer. Let me 

take that, please, and come back to you with the details that you 

have asked. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I look forward to that because we want to 

work with our allies, but if those allies are sharing information or 

they are in cahoots with terror organizations, we end up unknowingly doing more harm than good in getting valuable information 

and intelligence to our enemies. So I know that you will be handling that in a careful manner. 

General ALLEN. Yes, ma’am. That is a very important question. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much and thank you for 

your service again, gentlemen. 

44

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think that is a great 

idea having that classified briefing and I look forward to being 

there. 

Generals, General, General, and General, I appreciate you guys 

being here in the service to our great country. Without the service 

of you and the leadership of you guys and the military, our service 

men and women, we would not appreciate the liberties and freedoms we experience every day. And we don’t ever want to forget 

that. So thank you. 

You being the experts and I am glad to see the step up in the 

sorties because when this first started, there was only like single 

digits in the beginning a month, going on to degrade ISIS in the 

beginning. And I am glad to see you have stepped that up. And you 

being the experts, the recommendation as far as a tactic that we 

should pursue to reduce and zero out ISIS to where it is no longer 

a threat, and I look at Nazism where you had nation states and 

nation leaders, this is more of an ideology without a nation state. 

What is your recommendation? Can we pursue it with what we are 

doing and I am glad to see the Coalition that is building up and 

we had a classified briefing with you and you were telling me how 

you were doing some of the——

Chairman ROYCE. Remember, it was a classified briefing. 

Mr. YOHO. Right, and we shouldn’t talk about those things. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. So I won’t. That is why I look forward to the next one. 

Can it be done with what we are doing without U.S. assistance in 

your opinions? 

General ALLEN. Well, U.S. assistance is being applied, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. How much do we need of U.S. assistance? I know we 

need to have some in there. With that coalition, if we are directing 

it and kind of strategizing or as President Bush would say the 

strategery, how much can we rely on the coalition partners? 

General ALLEN. That is a really important question. The coalition partners in ways that I think we should all be very proud of, 

have stepped up to the plate in many areas that are obvious. Some 

of their airplanes are flying and dropping ordnance every day. 

Some of their trainers are training, some of the special operators 

are risking their lives just by being in the battle space. Those are 

obvious ways in which the coalition has stepped up. There are 

other ways that are less obvious, but really important as well in 

combining their capabilities with us to go after Daesh’s finances, to 

squeeze its ability to have operational flexibility. 

Mr. YOHO. And we have cooperation with all these other countries doing that same thing, correct? 

General ALLEN. We do and it is actually quite impressive. It is 

foreign fighters. It is counter finance. It is counter messaging. It is 

building stabilization capabilities. It is quite impressive. 

Mr. YOHO. I guess the question I have is how do you break that 

ideology? Why do people want to get into that? How do you break 

that? And I know we can do it militarily and you guys, nobody is 

better than what you guys do than you. But on the diplomacy side, 

thinking about that because what I see and this goes back to readVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:42 Jul 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\032615\93917 SHIRL
45

ing stories to my kids, The Cat in the Hat with the green spot that 

you couldn’t get rid of. You put it here, you could try to get rid of 

it. It pops up over here. And that is what I see ISIS doing with 

all the different countries it is going into because of that ideology 

that people are bringing into. From a diplomatic standpoint, is 

there anything that you would recommend we do differently? 

General ALLEN. You said countries that ISIS is going into. I 

think it is a very interesting point. What we are discovering is that 

it is less about countries that ISIS is going into than it is the movements locally are seeing an opportunity to leverage a relationship 

with ISIS to accomplish their own objectives. 

Mr. YOHO. And that is what I mean. 

General ALLEN. And that is a really important point. Because it 

gets to the larger issue here. This coalition has come together to 

deal with Daesh as a symptom of a bigger problem. But the coalition has also evidenced real interest in getting after the broader 

underlying factors that give rise to this. So it is about political capacity. It is about democratic process. It is about human rights. It 

is about the rule of law. It is about economic opportunity. It is 

about having a hope of being successful in your lives. And in many 

of these countries, many of these countries where we find organizations like Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula or Boko 

Haram or Abu Sayyaf in the jungles of the Philippines it is because 

they have no hope. People have no hope and they are easily susceptible to radicalization and ultimately recruitment for the purposes 

of extremism in these kinds of groups. 

So the coalition is really seeking to understand what these underlying factors are so that as individual states and as a coalition, 

we can begin to move toward resolving some of those underlying 

factors that have given rise to organizations like Daesh or Boko 

Haram. 

Mr. YOHO. I have got one more question that I will submit and 

I am out of time. And I thank you for your service and your direction. You are our best hope. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. Mr. 

DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Good morning. General Allen, how many U.S. 

service members were killed when we were in Iraq by Iranianbacked forces and Shi’ite militia? 

General ALLEN. I will have to get that number for you. It is not 

insignificant. 

Mr. DESANTIS. At least hundreds at a minimum. 

General ALLEN. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I have seen estimates by one of your colleagues that said maybe up to 1500. 

General ALLEN. We will get the number for you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And Qasem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander, he was involved in directing a lot of those operations during that time period. Is that correct? 

General ALLEN. That is correct. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So we know that Qasem Soleimani is now directing some of these Shi’ite militia who are fighting ISIS. I know it 

has been discussed about our air strikes and how that may be 

46

working with the Shi’ite militias even though we are not doing it 

explicitly. 

My question is if we were conducting air operations would somebody like Qasem Suleimani be a target? 

General ALLEN. We don’t at this time intend to target it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And why is that? 

General ALLEN. We are in this to assist the Iraqi Government in 

dealing with Daesh. That is the reason that we are there, not to 

go to war with Iran. I think it is very important for us to keep that 

in mind. I will just leave it there. 

Mr. DESANTIS. When the Shia forces are clearing areas, how are 

they interacting with the Sunni population who is left behind? Are 

they oppressing them or are they trying to have a unified country? 

General ALLEN. That is a very important question. We have seen 

reports of massacres and atrocities. Those reports are under investigation. They have been condemned by us. They have been condemned by the Iraqi Government. They have been condemned by 

Grand Ayatollah Sistani. But I was just in Iraq last week and as 

Tikrit was kicking off and we did know that there were Shia elements that were part of the clearing force, I met with the Sunni 

leaders from Salah ad Din, the province in which this is undergoing, under way, and specifically asked the question, what do we 

know about the potential repetition of these kinds of atrocities, or 

these kinds of acts? 

At the time, they were satisfied that this was not happening. But 

they also recognized that in the end when you transition from a 

clearing operation to a holding operation so that the clearing force 

can keep on going, the holding force has to look like the population 

or derive from the organic of the population that ultimately is 

going to be held. To that extent, the Minister of Interior, Minister 

Ghabban, has asked for assistance in helping to recover the Sunni 

police of the three provinces, Salah ad Din, Ninawa, and Al-Anbar, 

ultimately to follow behind the clearing forces to become the hold 

force on top of the Sunni population so that we don’t end up with 

that dynamic of a Shia irregular clearing force sitting on top of and 

holding a Sunni population. The Iraqis are very conscious of that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. In fact, a Sunni Arab who sees the alternative to 

ISIS to be oppressed by the Shia, they are going to be more likely 

to want to side with Sunni backed terrorist groups if they don’t 

think there is a future for them apart from being oppressed by Shi 

’ites. Do you agree with that? 

General ALLEN. In the abstract, I would, but I think that there 

have been measures that this government has taken to Iraq that 

fundamentally give the Sunnis and the Shia an opportunity to coexist inside the government, inside Iraq, under the leadership of 

Prime Minister Abadi. 

That is why a Shia Minister of Interior, by the way, is very interested in reconstituting the Sunni police of the Sunni provinces. I 

think that is a very positive thing. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I do, too. Do you believe that Iran has provided 

arms to the Government of Iraq or any of its affiliates? 

General ALLEN. I will take the question. I don’t—we will take the 

question. I want to give you the answer you deserve on that. 

47

Mr. DESANTIS. And if they are, we do have authorities on the 

books, both at the U.N. and under U.S. law that I think would be 

implicated. So if you can let us know what the status of that is and 

then if we do think that Iran has been doing this, then what would 

the administration’s response be, I would definitely like to know 

that. 

General ALLEN. Thank you for the question. We will take it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, General. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. DeSantis. And we 

will recognize Mr. Smith for 3 minutes. We are sorry about that, 

but our witnesses have until 11 a.m. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for the second round, Madam Chair. 

General Allen, as you know, as all of you know, all of us now, 

President Obama touted Yemen as a significant success story, yet 

today it is imploding, rapidly imploding so much so that there has 

been an intelligence loss of U.S. information, according to several 

news outlets, including the LA Times. And I was wondering if you 

could tell us how serious that breach might be? Is it serious? The 

intelligence services of Yemen were just overrun and apparently 

the files were not destroyed fast enough. That could have an impact, certainly on our fight against ISIS, but also on all issues relevant to the war on terror. 

And also while I deeply appreciate and I am encouraged by your 

statement by the allure of the so-called caliphate has been shattered, it is hard to make predictions. I would hope that the word 

diminished might be used because every time we think we are 

making progress, some other moving part comes to bear. So I just 

offer that unsolicited as I hope it is shattered, but I am very concerned that it has not been. 

You also testified about disrupting the flow of foreign fighters as 

an urgent concern. I asked you about that earlier, but I wonder if 

you might elaborate very briefly on what new best practices are 

being contemplated so these killers, these terrorists, who become 

hardened in this battle don’t return to the United States and of 

course, to Europe, to kill Americans and to kill Europeans? 

General ALLEN. To your first point on the intelligence, potential 

intelligence lost, we will take the question. Obviously, the answer 

would be classified. So we will want to come back to you with that. 

It is a very good question. 

With regard to foreign fighters, the commitment by the coalition, 

I think, has been very impressive in that regard. We are not where 

we want to be because that momentum was developed before we 

began to build our own momentum against it. But it operates at 

several different levels. It is countries adopting their own legislative approaches, as I just described. The Italians will be prosecuting these traffickers of foreign fighters under legislation that is 

derived directly from Daesh and directly from our coalition activities. So we are beginning to see countries across the region, we are 

beginning see the activities of the EU helping to create a unity of 

purpose and vision on this issue. We have seen and will continue 

to see best practices being applied on border control measures, the 

sharing of information and intelligence, the sharing of personnel 

name, passenger name records. And that will improve over time. 

48

We all, of course, are nations, especially the Western European 

states and along the United States and Canada, are states where 

privacy is an extraordinarily important aspect of who we are as a 

nation and our population. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, General Allen. I know that since 

your time is limited, if you could finish that thought. 

General ALLEN. Well, we will continue the best practices associated with working with indigenous populations and at risk populations to reduce the attractiveness of Daesh and similar extremist 

organizations, legislative approaches, individually, and across the 

entire effort, the coalition, and also to strengthen the work of the 

Counter Foreign Fighter Working Group which is chaired by The 

Netherlands and Turkey. And we will be meeting next week in Ankara for the first time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Smith. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to 

build on a question that I asked before about the AUMF. Finding 

the right AUMF language is obviously difficult. Finding one that 

can pass Congress is difficult. Republicans and Democrats have 

each attacked what the White House sent up for different reasons, 

for polar reasons. 

How important is it for Congress to pass a new AUMF and what 

would be the consequences if we did not do so? And how would our 

troops and our coalition partners view such a development if we 

did not do so? 

General ALLEN. A very important question, Mr. Engel. There are, 

as you know, three major areas of discussion within the AUMF and 

we obviously welcome the robust conversation associated with 

those which is the size of the force that could be committed, the 

nature of the force, the duration that that force might be committed, and where that force might be committed. So those are all 

issues that deserve a very thorough conversation and coordination. 

But there is a fourth area that is really important about the 

AUMF and that is that whatever it looks like at the end, wherever 

the administration and the Congress have ultimately agreed that 

this should—whatever the measure should be fulfilled, a strong bipartisan support of the AUMF is an extraordinarily important outcome of this because it reinforces the reality and the appearance 

of American strategic leadership and it also sends a very clear message to Daesh that its days are numbered. That is why the AUMF 

is so important. We will deal with the issues about the size and the 

duration and the location and that is an appropriate platform for 

us to have the kind of conversation with the Congress that the 

American people deserve. 

But an approved, with a strong bipartisan vote of an improved 

AUMF preserves and strengthens America’s strategic leadership 

and also puts Daesh on notice that its end is in sight. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, General. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

I want one final question about Syria and about Assad. In an interview with ‘‘Foreign Affairs,’’ Syria President Assad asserted that 

any fighter not working with the Syrian military should and I am 

49

going to quote him, ‘‘be fought like any other illegal militia fighting 

against the Syrian Army.’’

So when the U.S. trained Syrian opposition fight is reintroduced 

back into the battlefield, will Assad target these fighters and obviously this isn’t a hypothetical, it is a real situation which Members 

of Congress need to have information on. Will the U.S. or other 

members of the coalition target Assad? 

General ALLEN. I would like to present that comment or the answer to that when we have the closed session if we may. It is very 

much on our minds, obviously. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We now to Mr. Rohrabacher who is recognized for 2 minutes and 

then 2 minutes for Mr. Sherman and then our witnesses will have 

to depart. 

Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have got 2 minutes, let me just note that 

I did some work in Vietnam in 1967. I was not in the military, but 

my father was a retired lieutenant colonel in the Marines. And 

when I got back I was dismayed and I remember talking to him 

about what a confusing mess that was in Vietnam and which to 

parrot your words we used earlier to describe the challenge that 

you face. 

And my father told me, he said, ‘‘Well, if you think that is a confusing mess, you should have seen what it was like when I landed 

the first DC–3 into the Pusan perimeter.’’ So we have faced these 

confusing messes before. It was important for us, as my father described, had we not been successful in Korea, Japan would have 

been neutralized. It would have changed the whole nature of the 

Cold War and the Soviets may have won. 

I think what we are doing right now to confront Daesh will either basically eliminate our deal with a challenge that is of that 

magnitude because if we don’t and if President al-Sisi does not win 

in Egypt, does not overwhelm those people who are trying to destroy him and replace him with a caliphate government and if you 

folks don’t succeed, we may have a world in which a huge chunk 

is controlled by radical Islamists who want to destroy Western civilization. So we wish you success. I believe that the strategy of 

using insurgencies as we did in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance works. Your success in Anbar Province reaffirms that. 

I would hope that our commitment to assist the Iraqi Government in this challenge does not get in the way of successfully implementing that strategy that we know that will work. So thank 

you all very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I know that we will get into it in 

closed session, but I will reiterate that I am confused that on the 

one hand we tout the failure of ISIS to provide governance, their 

inability to provide for the people under their control and then at 

the same time the Iraqi Government helps them provide governance with free electricity, sending salaries, etcetera. 

What I want to deal with in open session is whether the AUMF 

should include Assad or whether it should be limited to ISIS? Now 

in the absence of ISIS and before the beheadings, this country 

wanted to have as little military involvement in the Middle East 

50

as possible. Now Americans see this as a problem that we have to 

confront, but we have to confront it carefully. 

On the one hand, we have to go after ISIS for what they have 

done. On the other hand, there is this war between Shi’ites and 

Sunnis and it is not our role to be on one side of that or the other. 

The most evil element of the Shi’ite alliance is Assad. He hasn’t beheaded anybody on YouTube, but he has killed close to 200,000 innocent people. 

Should, and General, I realize there will be others at the State 

Department that will give us some input on this, but should the 

AUMF authorize the President, should he wish to, to go after not 

only ISIS, but also to go after Assad, perhaps not with the goal of 

destroying either, but at least confining mowing the grass of both 

of these evil elements? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. We have 10 seconds. 

General ALLEN. The answer is that this—at last if the State Department permits me to speak about this, the AUMF was submitted as a counter Daesh measure. It does not envisage provisions 

to deal with Bashar al-Assad, but that is an important and a separate conversation to be had, but in the context of the provided and 

draft legislation, that is about Daesh. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. ISSA. Madam Chair, I would ask unanimous to then have 

just 1 minute to plant a question so it could be dealt with later? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, Mr. Issa asked for unanimous consent 

to put something on the record and make a statement. 

Mr. ISSA. Very quickly, Generals, when we go into classified session in 2 or so weeks, the President has called for regime change 

in Syria. He also has refused to participate in a no-fly or a buffer 

zone even for humanitarian relief in Northern Syria. As a result, 

Turkey is very well known not cooperating with us in providing the 

normal air cover that would shorten our distances for attacks both 

in Syria and in Iraq. 

So during the classified session, I would ask that you be prepared to provide us with the information on what is going, what 

the impediments were, what the logistical changes would be if we 

were to come to an agreement with the Turks to provide that nofly zone and a buffer zone and the humanitarian relief in Syria 

rather than the millions that are in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and 

even a few scattered around Europe. So if I could ask and get an 

agreement that you would include that in the material brought to 

the classified briefing, that would be helpful to me. 

General ALLEN. I would be glad to. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Issa, and we certainly appreciate the time of our witnesses today. These are critical 

issues. We look forward to following up when we return, particularly in the area of the Tikrit mission and Iran’s role. And with 

that, Chairman Royce’s committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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