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91–811 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–126] 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY 

FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ 

AND THE LEVANT 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, September 18, 2014, The Administration’s Strategy for the Islamic 

State in Iraq and the Levant .............................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, September 18, 2014 ............................................................................... 49 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE IN 

IRAQ AND THE LEVANT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, accompanied by LTG William Mayville, USA, Director for Operations, J–3, Joint 

Staff ....................................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck ........................................................................................... 53 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Carson ........................................................................................................ 66 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 64 

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 63 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 63 

(1) 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR THE ISLAMIC 

STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 18, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:19 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning, 

ladies and gentlemen. Before we begin, I will state up front that 

we intend to conduct this hearing in an orderly and efficient manner to ensure all members have an opportunity to ask questions 

and our witnesses have an opportunity to be heard. To that end, 

please be advised I will not tolerate disturbances of these proceedings, including verbal disruptions, photography, standing or 

holding signs. Thank you all for your cooperation. If there are disturbances, we will stop and have those who are disturbing leave 

the room. 

The committee meets to receive testimony on the administration’s strategy for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL. 

I would like to welcome Secretary Hagel, Lieutenant General 

Mayville, Director of Operations at the Joint Staff. General 

Dempsey is on a long-planned trip, meeting with his defense 

counterparts in Europe. Given the many crises in the world right 

now and the immense demands that they are placing on our military, General Dempsey is exactly where he should be. 

I received a call from Secretary Hagel I think it was about a 

week ago. He said I am in, I think Tbilisi or whatever, Georgia, 

and I said, is that near Atlanta? He said, No, a different Georgia. 

And he was there, and then he was going to Turkey, and then he 

was coming back here, and then he just—it is really great to have 

you here today, Mr. Secretary, and I understand how busy you are 

and how much you are traveling. Really appreciate your time, what 

you, General Dempsey, what all of the men and women in uniform 

are doing to keep us safe and from harm. 

Just yesterday the House, on a bipartisan basis and in large 

numbers, passed my amendment to the continuing resolution at 

the President’s request which authorizes the Secretary of Defense 

to train and equip appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition. We strengthened the proposal through congressional over-
2 

sight, including detailed reporting and reprogramming requirements. 

Although not everyone supported the authority, there was widespread agreement that ISIL is a threat to our allies and to the 

United States, apparently that ISIL—agreement that ISIL must be 

defeated, agreement that the landscape is incredibly complex and 

that any option will carry risk and agreement that the Syria trainand-equip authority is but one part of what should be a broader regional strategy to defeat ISIL. 

I listened to the President’s speech last week, and I talked with 

military experts, including those who know Iraq best. I traveled to 

the region earlier this month and got blunt answers from our allies 

and partners on what needs to be done. I do not believe the 

minimalist counterinsurgency strategy that the President has proposed is sufficient to achieve his objective to degrade and destroy 

ISIL. 

I gave a speech at the American Enterprise Institute last week. 

I called for swift action, not the current ‘‘go slow’’ approach. For 

every week we wait, ISIL grows. We need to conduct military operations in both Iraq and Syria to deny ISIL any safe haven. 

While the Kurds and Iraqi security forces are willing to fight and 

have some capability, they still need our trainers, our advisors, our 

command and control, our intelligence, our close air support, our 

special forces, the capabilities that only the United States can provide. None of us should minimize the risks. We cannot succeed 

from the safety of some headquarters building. Engaging those divergent groups and advising indigenous forces will put our military 

in harm’s way. 

This is a dangerous business. The most irresponsible thing that 

the President can do is give the military a mission but not give it 

the tools it needs to do the job. By taking options off the table, I 

fear the President is setting the mission and our military up for 

failure rather than success. I know when Eisenhower was planning 

the invasion of Normandy, one of his subordinates questioned some 

of the planning, and he said, ‘‘We are planning for success; failure 

is not an option.’’ We are in that same situation today. 

Today’s hearing is important for us to understand the administration’s strategy for ISIL. The President has identified his objective to degrade and ultimately destroy. We need to hear from our 

defense and uniformed leaders on what you believe will be required 

of the military to achieve that objective. We need to understand the 

campaign, the role our partners will play, the risks, the capabilities 

our military will need, and the consequences of inaction. 

Mr. Secretary, General Mayville, again, thank you for being here 

during this consequential moment for our country. I look forward 

to your question and gaining answers to our questions. 

I would like to point out that we have a staff member who is 

leaving us, Debra Wada. Is Debra in here? 

Mr. SMITH. We can thank her anyway. 

The CHAIRMAN. She already left? You already got her, huh? She 

is a professional staff member for the Subcommittee on Military 

Personnel for the House Armed Services Committee, a position that 

she has held since 1999. Ms. Wada served as the lead staff member 

for the subcommittee from 2007 to 2010 and briefly served as dep-
3 

uty staff director for the committee in 2011. In 1999, Ms. Wada 

served as legislative affairs specialist for the National Parks Service. She served as legislative assistant for U.S. Senator Daniel K. 

Akaka, acting as the Senator’s principal aide on national defense, 

veterans affairs, maritime issues, educational, social security, and 

welfare from 1987 to 1999. She received a B.A. [Bachelor of Arts] 

from Drake University. 

This sounds like an obituary. It is not. She is leaving to become 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense, so we just got her ready to move 

down there for another very important job. She is still in the fight. 

So we want to point that out and thank her for what she is doing 

and wish her well down there for you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess it is not so much 

an obituary as we can just say she has been sentenced to a stint 

over at the Pentagon. So we wish her well and we will visit her 

from time to time. 

Well, I thank you very much for being here, Mr. Secretary, General Mayville, and this is a very difficult moment for our country, 

because I think the best way to sum it up is our country simply 

wants this problem gone. You know, ever since 9/11 [September, 

11, 2001], ever since we learned about this terrorist threat that is 

out there, the two wars that we fought, all the decisions that have 

been made, and believe me it wouldn’t be hard for anyone to go 

back over those decisions and criticize them step by step from just 

about any point on the political spectrum and say, Why did we do 

this? Why did we do this? If only we hadn’t done that, everything 

would be fine. But the bottom line is, this problem is not going 

away. I cannot personally imagine any set of decisions that we 

could have made in the last 13 years that would have made it just 

go away now. 

I can certainly, you know, imagine ones that would have been 

better, and we can look back and learn about what was perhaps 

not a good decision, but the threat that we face, and ISIL is but 

one piece of it, is the ideological threat that we first came to understand with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. It is an incredibly violent extremist ideology, attempting to hijack one of the world’s 

great religions, and their ideology is very straightforward. They 

want to destroy us. The only thing that, you know, stops them from 

doing it is our efforts, the efforts of men like you and others and 

just the lack of capability. This threat exists, and we have to confront it, and every time a decision comes up, I really think a lot 

of the opposition is we just don’t want to have to deal with it. But 

it is there, and we have to deal with it. The threat is real. It is 

not being made up, and ISIL is the latest manifestation of that 

threat. We have seen how just absolutely brutal and vulgar they 

are. 

They have committed, you know, small-scale genocides every 

place they have gone. Anyone who doesn’t believe what they believe 
4 

they kill and usually in the most brutal fashion imaginable. And 

they threaten us. Certainly they threaten the region first. There 

has been considerable debate about whether or not ISIL is a direct 

threat to us right now, and in a truly technical sense, they aren’t, 

in the sense that they haven’t been able to yet set up a system for 

plotting and planning attacks overseas, but I vividly remember, 

and this was a mistake I made along the way, when we were focused on Al Qaeda and we were focused in Pakistan, and for the 

longest time I said, Look, you know, Pakistan, Afghanistan, that is 

where it is at because any attack against western targets has always been plotted and planned out of that region. 

And that was true until Abdul Mutallab showed up on that airplane in Detroit, and that one was plotted and planned out of 

Yemen, which showed that the threat can spread, and we have responded to that. We were responding to it at the time by working 

with the Yemeni Government and trying to confront the threat 

there. And make no mistake about it, if ISIL were to settle down 

and get secure territory in Syria or Iraq, I have no doubt that they 

would try to train fighters and send them back to attack targets 

in the West. Now anyone who wants to, you know, say that that 

wouldn’t happen, I wish you were right, but you are not. Their ideology is clearly a threat. 

So the question comes, how do we confront that threat? The one 

thing we can do even if we can’t wish the problem away is we can 

learn from our past mistakes, and I think one of those mistakes 

and one of the areas that we need to change and move forward is 

the assumption that U.S. military might will fix this problem, and 

I understand that trap as well. You see a problem, you say by gum, 

we are not going to go at this at a halfway fashion, we are going 

to go get them because it is the American way; you win. You got 

a problem? You know what? We are going to go fix it. As the cliche ́

goes, to a hammer every problem is a nail. 

But the problem here is this ideology gains strength from overWestern aggression, militarization in the region. The strongest argument that Al Qaeda and ISIL have to present to the people they 

want to join them is that they are protecting Islam against Western aggression. That is how they present themselves. 

Now, we understand that that is a—sorry, I was going to say 

something that isn’t appropriate in a public hearing. That is not 

true, let’s just put it that way, but that is their message. So when 

we show up with 150,000 troops in Iraq or 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, it is effective up to a point, but it also reinforces that 

message. And that is why I think the vote we took in the House 

[of Representatives] yesterday and the train-and-equip mission is 

so critical. 

To win this fight, we have got to find partners, Muslim partners—in the case of ISIL, preferably Sunni partners—to work with 

to fight them. We have got to convince the people of the region that 

they need to fight this evil for their own sake. We were incredibly 

successful in the Anbar Awakening precisely because that is what 

we did. Yes, we had troops there, but we went in and we worked 

with the Sunni tribes in the Anbar region to convince them that 

Al Qaeda was evil, and then they took the fight. 
5 

That made a huge difference, and that is what we have to do 

here. That is why I think the train-and-equip mission makes so 

much sense, and it was a bit frustrating yesterday to listen to people who are concerned about it, didn’t want to do the train-andequip because they were concerned about, you know, U.S. military 

getting too engaged. They were in favor of the bombing, but they 

didn’t want to do the train-and-equip, and I understand how those 

issues can become conflated, but train-and-equip is how we get us 

out of the fight. It is how we develop a capable force, and we have 

seen this succeed against ISIL in Iraq. We have seen the Kurds, 

who were a broken force until we showed up, provided some arms 

and trained them, and they have now turned the tide and are actually starting to take back territory from ISIL because we helped 

them. 

Similarly, the Iraqi Government, a totally, totally broken force. 

Now, I have an argument, people say, well, gosh, here we go again 

with train-and-equip. We trained and equipped the Iraqi military, 

and how did that work out? The primary reason that didn’t work 

out is because the Sunnis in the Iraqi military chose not to fight 

for [Iraqi Prime Minister] Maliki. I don’t know whether they were 

a capable force or not, because they didn’t even fight because the 

Maliki government became sectarian and corrupt and didn’t support the Sunnis, so we insisted on a change in that government. 

Now we have a new Iraqi Government that is at least trying, initially, a power-sharing arrangement that can bring some of the 

Sunnis in. 

So we have Sunni partners now who are going to lead that fight. 

So when we go after ISIL, the one big point, it has got to be locally 

driven, we have got to find local Sunnis who are willing to do that. 

So we could go rushing in and bombing and dropping a whole 

bunch of U.S. troops in there, and we would simply exacerbate the 

problem. We have got to be smart about how we build local support 

to confront ISIL, but make no mistake about it, they are a threat. 

One of those I wish we didn’t have to think about it, I truly do. 

It involves money, it involves putting lives at risk, it involves difficult military decisions. I wish that there wasn’t a threat from 

ISIL and this ideology, but we have learned in the last 20 years 

that there clearly is. We have to come up with a plan for confronting it, and I look forward to hearing from the Secretary and 

the General today about how we are going to keep working on that 

plan, implement it, and move forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY 

LTG WILLIAM MAYVILLE, USA, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, 

J–3, JOINT STAFF 

Secretary HAGEL. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

members of the committee, I very much appreciate the opportunity 

this morning to discuss the President’s strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. 

Mr. Chairman, on a personal note, I want to thank you for your 

leadership on yesterday’s vote. I believe, the President believes, 

that that vote was a very important and defining vote, and we are 
6 

not unmindful of the work that you and others on this committee 

invested in that vote and getting the turnout that you did. So 

thank you. 

Yesterday I joined President Obama at MacDill Air Force Base 

in Tampa where he received a briefing from the commander of U.S. 

Central Command [CENTCOM], General Austin, on operational 

plans to implement our ISIL strategy and met with representatives 

while I was there, as did the President, from more than 40 partner 

nations. 

I am joined here today, as you have noted, Mr. Chairman, by the 

Joint Staff’s Director for Operations, Lieutenant General Bill 

Mayville. He is our J–3 [Joint Staff, Operations], and General 

Mayville helps oversee, among many of his responsibilities, our 

military operations in Iraq, the Middle East, and in CENTCOM, 

and works closely with General Austin and CENTCOM to develop 

all of our military plans. So I appreciate very much General 

Mayville being here. 

And as you noted, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Dempsey is with our 

partners internationally over the next few days, and as you noted, 

he should be. Much of that discussion will be about the Middle 

East, specifically Iraq and Syria. He consults with our allies in this 

fight against ISIL and tomorrow will attend a special NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization] Chiefs of Defense conference in Lithuania where they will be focused on the ISIL challenge. 

The Defense Department civilian and military leaders, Mr. 

Chairman, are in complete agreement with every component of the 

President’s strategy, and we strongly believe it offers the best opportunity to degrade and destroy ISIL. The President, Chairman 

Dempsey, General Austin, and I are in full alignment on all of our 

objectives and our tactics and our strategy, that military strategy 

necessary to achieve the President’s objective. However, as President Obama has repeatedly made clear, American military power 

alone cannot eradicate the threats posed by ISIL to the United 

States, our allies, and our friends and partners in the region. Iraq’s 

continued political progress toward a more inclusive and representative government will be critical to achieving our objective. 

We believe that Iraq’s new Prime Minister is committed to bringing all Iraqis together against ISIL. To support him and the Iraqi 

people in their fight against ISIL, against terrorists, the special coalition that we are assembling will need to use all of its instruments of power—military, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, 

and intelligence—in coordination with the countries in the region. 

To succeed, this strategy will also require a strong partnership 

between the executive branch and Congress. The President has 

made it a priority to consult with congressional leadership on the 

ISIL challenge, as have Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and 

many senior members of the administration. 

I appreciate the opportunities I have had to discuss our strategy 

with members of this committee, including you, Mr. Chairman, and 

other members of the Senate and the House over the last couple 

of weeks, and we will continue with these consultations. 

ISIL poses a real threat to all countries in the Middle East, our 

European allies, and to America, as you have noted, Mr. Chairman, 

as has Congressman Smith. 
7 

In the last few months the world has seen ISIL’s barbarity up 

close as its fighters advanced across western and northern Iraq and 

slaughtered thousands of innocent civilians including Sunni and 

Shi’a Muslims and Kurdish Iraqis and all religious minorities who 

stood in their way. ISIL’s murder of two U.S. journalists outraged 

the American people and exposed the depravity of ISIL’s ideology 

and tactics, exposed those tactics and that brutal ideology to the 

world. 

Over the weekend we saw ISIL’s murder of a British citizen. 

ISIL now controls a vast swath of eastern Syria and western and 

northern Iraq, including towns and cities in these areas. ISIL has 

gained strength by exploiting the civil war in Syria and sectarian 

strife in Iraq. As it has seized territory across both countries and 

acquired significant resources and advanced weapons, ISIL has employed a violent combination of terrorist, insurgent, and conventional military tactics. 

ISIL has also been very adept at deploying technology and social 

media, employing this to increase its global profile and attract tens 

of thousands of fighters. Its goal is to become the new vanguard of 

the global extremist movement and establish an extremist Islamic 

caliphate across the Middle East. It considers itself the rightful inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s legacy. 

While ISIL clearly poses an immediate threat to American citizens in Iraq and our interests in the Middle East, we also know 

that thousands of foreign fighters, including Europeans and more 

than 100 Americans, have traveled to Syria with passports that 

give them relative freedom of movement. These fighters can exploit 

ISIL’s safe haven to plan, coordinate, and carry out attacks in 

United States and Europe. Although the Intelligence Community 

has not yet detected specific plotting against the U.S. homeland, 

ISIL has global aspirations, clearly has global aspirations, and they 

have so stated. 

And as President Obama has made clear, ISIL’s leaders have 

threatened America and our allies. If left unchecked, ISIL will directly threaten our homeland and our allies. In his address to the 

Nation last week, President Obama announced that the United 

States will lead a broad multinational coalition to roll back ISIL’s 

threat and defeat ISIL. More than 40 nations have already expressed their willingness to participate in this effort and more than 

30 nations have indicated their readiness to offer military support. 

President Obama and Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and 

I and others are working to unite and expand this coalition. 

At the NATO summit in Wales, Secretary Kerry and I convened 

a meeting of key partners in this coalition. I then went to Georgia 

and Turkey, as you noted, Mr. Chairman. The Georgians made 

clear they will help. Turkey, by virtue of its geography and its common interest in destroying ISIL, and I might note an indispensable 

member of NATO from the beginning of NATO. We know that Turkey is now in the grips of ISIL holding nearly 50 of its diplomats. 

[Disruption in hearing room.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The chair notes that there is a disturbance of the 

committee’s proceedings. The committee will be in order. The committee will stand in recess until the Capitol Police can restore 

order. 
8 

The gentleman will proceed. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. As I was noting, ISIL is currently 

holding nearly 50 Turkish diplomats hostage, and this obviously is 

a high and first priority of the Turkish Government to get those 

hostages back, and in my conversations with President Erdogan 

and other leaders in Turkey, we talked specifically about that, but 

also the important role Turkey will play in our overall efforts in 

this coalition. 

Secretary Kerry convened a meeting in Jeddah [Saudi Arabia] 

last week with foreign ministers from the six Gulf Cooperation 

Council states, also Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, and all 22 

nations of the Arab League adopted a resolution at their summit 

in Cairo calling for comprehensive measures to combat ISIL. 

Earlier this week in Paris, President Hollande of France, who 

traveled to Iraq last weekend, hosted a conference attended by the 

U.N. [United Nations] Security Council permanent members, European and Arab leaders, and representatives of the EU [European 

Union], Arab League, and United Nations. They all pledged—they 

all pledged to help Iraq in the fight against ISIL, including through 

military assistance. Other key allies such as Australia, Canada, 

France, and the United Kingdom are already contributing military 

support, and other partners have begun to make specific offers. 

At next week’s U.N. General Assembly, we expect that additional 

nations will be making commitments across the spectrum of capabilities, building on the strong Chapter 7 U.N. Security Council 

Resolution adopted last month calling on all member states to take 

measures to counter ISIL and to suppress the flow of foreign fighters to ISIL. Also next week, President Obama will chair a meeting 

with the U.N. Security Council to further mobilize the international community. 

As you all know, former International Security Assistance Force 

[ISAF] commander and acting CENTCOM commander, General 

John Allen, has been designated to serve as special Presidential 

envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL. General Allen will 

work in a civilian diplomatic capacity to coordinate, build, and sustain the coalition, drawing on his extensive experience in the Middle East. He will work closely with General Austin of CENTCOM 

to ensure that coalition efforts are aligned across all elements of 

our strategy. 

In his address to the Nation, the President outlined the four elements of this strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. Let 

me now describe how we are implementing this whole-of-government approach. First, in close coordination with the new Iraqi Government, we are broadening our air campaign against ISIL targets 

to protect Americans threatened by ISIL and advances that ISIL 

is making and also to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. 

military has already conducted more than 170 successful air 

strikes. These strikes have disrupted ISIL tactically and helped 

buy time for the Iraqi Government to form an inclusive and broadbased governing coalition led by the new prime minister. That was 

one of President Obama’s essential preconditions for taking further 

action against ISIL because the Iraqi people, the Iraqi people must 

be united in their opposition to ISIL in order to defeat them. This 

is ultimately their fight. 
9 

The new broader air campaign against ISIL targets will enable 

Iraqi security forces, including Kurdish forces, to continue to stay 

on the offensive and recapture territory from ISIL and hold it. The 

President of the United States has the constitutional and the statutory authority to use military force against ISIL in Syria as well 

as Iraq. Because ISIL operates freely across the Iraqi-Syrian border 

and maintains a safe haven in Syria, our actions will not be restrained by a border that exists in name only. 

CENTCOM’s plan includes targeted actions against ISIL safe havens in Syria, including its command and control, logistics capabilities, and infrastructure. General Dempsey and I have both approved and spent considerable time reviewing and adapting the 

CENTCOM plan which General Austin, as I noted, briefed to the 

President in Tampa yesterday. 

The second element of the strategy is to increase our support for 

forces fighting ISIL on the ground, not American forces, but forces, 

Iraqi forces fighting on the ground. To support Iraqi and Kurdish 

forces, the President announced last week that we would deploy an 

additional 475 American troops to Iraq. Part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors and support personnel to supplement forces already in Iraq conducting assessments to the Iraqi 

security forces. This assessment mission is now transitioning to an 

advise-and-assist mission with more than 15 teams embedding 

with Iraqi security forces at the headquarters level to provide strategic and operational advice and assistance. 

By the time all these forces arrive, there will be approximately 

1,600 U.S. personnel in Iraq responding to the ISIL threat. But as 

the President reaffirmed yesterday in Tampa, American forces will 

not have a combat mission on the ground. Instead, these advisors 

will continue to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces, including the 

government’s plans to stand up Iraqi National Guard units. These 

units are to help Sunni communities defeat ISIL in their area. The 

best counterweights to ISIL are local forces and local citizens, the 

people. 

As you know, in June, the President asked Congress for the necessary authority for DOD [Department of Defense] to train and 

equip moderate Syrian opposition forces and $500 million to fund 

this program. And again, we appreciate yesterday’s House vote to 

amend the continuing resolution with language authorizing this 

train-and-equip program. Saudi Arabia will host the training program for this mission, and the Saudis have offered funding and additional assistance with recruiting and vetting. The $500 million 

request the President made in June for this train-and-equip program reflects CENTCOM’s estimate of the cost to train, equip, and 

resupply more than 5,000 opposition forces over one year. 

This is the beginning of a multiyear, scalable effort designed to 

eventually produce an even larger opposition force. The package of 

assistance that we initially provide would consist of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment like communications, as well as tactical and more advanced training. As these forces prove their effectiveness on the battlefield, we would be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to the most trusted 

commanders and capable forces. 
10 

The goal is not to achieve numerical parity with ISIL, but to ensure that moderate Syrian forces are superior fighters trained by 

units. Our goal is to undercut ISIL’s recruitment and to enable the 

Syrian opposition to add to the pressure ISIL is already facing from 

the Iraqi security forces and the security forces of Kurdistan. 

We want to force ISIL into a three-front battle against more capable local forces. A rigorous vetting process will be critical to the 

success of this program. DOD will work closely with the State Department, the Intelligence Community, and all of our international 

partners and in the region to screen and vet the forces we train 

and equip. We will monitor them closely to ensure that weapons do 

not fall into the hands of radical elements of the opposition, ISIL, 

the Syrian regime, or other extremist groups. 

There will always be risks, Mr. Chairman. There are risks in everything. There are risks in action and there are risks in inaction, 

but we believe the risk is justified, given the real threat ISIL poses 

to this country and to the region and to our allies and the necessity 

of having capable partners on the ground in Syria. 

As we pursue this program, the United States will continue to 

press for a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Assad has lost 

all legitimacy to govern. He has created the conditions that allowed 

ISIL and other terrorist groups to gain ground and terrorize and 

slaughter the Syrian population. The United States will not coordinate or cooperate with the Assad regime. 

The third element of the President’s strategy is an all-inclusive 

approach to preventing attacks from ISIL against the homeland of 

the United States and our allies. In concert with our international 

partners, the United States will draw on intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic tools to cut off ISIL’s funding, improve our intelligence, strengthen homeland defense, and stem the 

flow of foreign fighters. 

The United States and our allies have been stepping up efforts 

to identify and counter threats emanating from Syria against our 

homelands. This includes increased intelligence sharing, working 

with DOD’s partners at the National Counterterrorism Center, the 

Department of Homeland Security, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and across the Intelligence Community. 

Our terrorist screening and analytical databases now have special threat cases linking together known actors and potential foreign fighters, making it easier and faster to update them regularly 

with new information. Department of Homeland Security Secretary 

Jeh Johnson has directed enhanced screening at 25 overseas airports with direct flights to the United States, a step that the 

United Kingdom and other countries have already taken. 

The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have 

launched an initiative to partner with local communities to counter 

extremist recruiting, and the Department of Treasury’s Office of 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is working closely with coalition partners to disrupt ISIL’s financing and expose their financing 

activities. 

The final element of the President’s strategy is to continue providing humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians displaced or 

threatened by ISIL. Alongside the Government of Iraq, the United 

Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, U.S. troops have already de-
11 

livered life-saving [aid to] thousands of threatened Iraqi civilians 

on Mount Sinjar and the Iraqi town of Amerli. 

Our total humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis is now more than $186 million for fiscal year 2014. The United States is 

also the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance for the 

millions of Syrians affected by the civil war. Since the start of the 

Syrian conflict, the United States has committed almost $3 billion 

in humanitarian assistance to those affected by this war. 

All four elements of this strategy require a significant commitment of resources on the part of the United States and our coalition partners. This effort will not be easy. This effort will not be 

brief. This effort will not be simple. We are at war with ISIL, just 

as we are at war with Al Qaeda, but destroying ISIL will require 

more than military efforts alone. It will require political progress 

in the region and effective partners on the ground in Iraq and in 

Syria, and as President Obama said yesterday in Tampa, we cannot do for the Iraqis what they must do for themselves. We can’t 

do for them, but this is an effort that calls on America’s unique, 

our unique capabilities and abilities and responsibilities to lead. As 

the Congress and the administration work together, we know this 

effort will take time. The President has outlined a clear, a comprehensive, and a workable strategy to achieve our goals and protect our interests. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank you. Thank 

you for your continued support, your partnership, and what you do 

for our men and women in uniform who protect this country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel can be found in the 

Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Will the General have an opening 

statement? 

General MAYVILLE. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You outlined a lot of things. I think 

the President’s stated objective to degrade and ultimately destroy 

ISIL is a very worthy goal, and I think you have outlined a lot of 

things that he plans to do in that area, yet the only thing he has 

asked Congress for—I presume he will be coming for other things, 

but so far all he has asked is for the train-and-equip. We acted on 

that yesterday. The Senate, I understand, will act on that today. 

So I think that is a good message that we are trying to work together. We are all Americans and we have one common enemy, and 

that should unite us and unite us strongly. 

I was glad to hear you say that you are all united, your team, 

all the military leaders. It was reported that General Austin’s military advice was to send a modest contingent of American troops to 

advise and assist in Iraq, more than the President I think has decided to do. Is that an accurate report? 

Secretary HAGEL. What I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, is, as 

you know, and I think the President has been very clear, and certainly General Dempsey made this clear 2 days ago in our hearing 

before the Senate Armed Services Committee. First, the President 

expects from his military leaders an honest, direct evaluation of 

what they think and what is required to implement strategies that 
12 

will protect this country. There were a number of recommendations 

on a number of things based on the questions the President asked 

of our military leaders. I will tell you this: General Austin, as I 

have said, is in full agreement with the President’s decisions on the 

resources the President has decided to use to implement that strategy, and General Austin made that very clear again yesterday with 

the President when the President was in Tampa to get—spent the 

day there with General Austin and his commanders to get a thorough briefing of the plan. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. There is one thing that I am going to give you, 

give the President some advice through you. I think it is very important that he does follow the advice and counsel that he receives, 

the professional advice of the military. They are the ones best suited to do that. I realize he is Commander in Chief, he has the final 

say and the final obligation and responsibility. I would also request 

that he not take options off the table. It seems to me every speech 

he gives, the first thing he says is no boots on the ground, and then 

makes an announcement of sending more boots. 

I think that that is confusing to the American people, and I think 

it builds distrust rather than understanding of what he is really 

saying. I think no boots on the ground, I think people are thinking 

divisions and full-bore thing that we originally did in Iraq, shock 

and awe. I understand that is not the strategy, but I think the 

American people get confused, and if we explain to them, look, 

boots on the ground means no combat forces, or boots on the 

ground means we are not going to do shock and awe or whatever, 

but we are going to have our people there, and there are certain 

things that they have to do, and without them, we can’t be successful in this battle, and I think they can accept that, and they can— 

they are smart enough to figure it out, and if they think they are 

not hearing the truth, the whole truth, then I think they get, they 

kind of get their backs up. 

I think it is also very important that the President give lots of 

updates. I think, you know, over the last several years the war in 

Afghanistan, there have been a lot of accomplishments that we 

have achieved over there, and I don’t think the American people 

know, and I think only the President can tell them that, and I 

think they would like to know, as we move forward, how we are 

doing in Iraq, how we are doing in Syria, and I would strongly suggest that he go before the people—he is the only one that can do 

it—and keep them informed as to what is going on, because I think 

they are going to have to be in this, and this is not going to be— 

this is going to be for the entire duration of his Presidency and 

probably the next President’s. So if we don’t let people know what 

is going on and make them a part of it, we are not going to have 

the political support we need to go forward. 

I am concerned about the strategy of counterterrorism. I don’t 

think it has been overly effective in Yemen or other places that he 

pointed out that had actually been successful. I think we are going 

to have to be more aggressive than that. 

I see what we are doing in Iraq is building up, pushing ISIL, I 

think the plan is to push them out of all their occupied territory, 

regain that, take it back, and free up Iraq, and then as you are 

pointing out, we don’t want to have a safe haven where they can 
13 

just slip over into Syria. So my understanding of what the President is saying, he is not going to give them any safe haven. So 

while we don’t know yet what more he will do, he has said he will 

make—take air strikes there if possible. 

So I just, more than questions, I think I just want to relay a few 

of those things, my thoughts and feelings. I am not going to be in 

a position to do that much longer, so I want to take advantage of 

it while I have the opportunity. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to a couple of 

the points you made because each is particularly important, and 

not only are your points right, I think, and I think the President 

agrees with what you have said, but most of the points are centerpieces and pillars of his strategy. 

On the particular question on boots on the ground, what he has 

said is that there is no ground combat role for Americans. Yes, a 

combat role on the ground is going to be required. Obviously, it is 

going on in Iraq today. It will be required in Syria. And what he 

has said is the Iraqi security forces, the Peshmerga, the Kurdish 

forces that are the ground forces in Iraq, and we will continue to 

support them through air strikes and other capabilities we have. 

Syria, as you know, the whole point of train and equip is to help 

develop that ground force, a capable unit-by-unit ground force in 

Syria, but he is fully aware of and agrees that this isn’t going to 

be done without ground forces, but what he has made clear to the 

American people, and I know there are differences of opinion, as 

he does, that he is not going to order American combat ground 

forces into those areas, but I thought that was a point that you 

made that you gave me an opportunity of maybe hopefully clear 

that up. 

Your point about informing and updating the American people, 

you are right. I think any of us in this business understand how 

critical that is the American people understand what is going on. 

They are represented obviously in this body and the body across 

the way, as it should be, but to have the American people understand it and be part of it, and especially the Congress, as I have 

noted in my testimony, the President thinks it is a critical component of going forward. So thank you for allowing me to maybe clear 

that up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah, on the boots on the ground point, I think the 

problem is that the President and many people have the instinct 

that the country, as we witness from the protesters, you know, we 

just don’t want to go back into another war, and everyone is very 

concerned about that, and the President is seeking to reassure 

those folks, but I agree with the Chairman, I think it would be better to sort of explain, you know, what, it is not a boots-on-theground issue, and also it is not even a matter of, you know, we are 

war weary, so we are not going to send in troops just because we 

know it will upset people. 

It is because we don’t think it will work, and I think that is the 

thing to make clear is that there is too much of an excessive reliance on U.S. military force, then oddly, we push more people into 

the arms of ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria], and I think, you 

know, too often the President does sound more like he is in the 
14 

former camp of we don’t want to do this because we know it is hard 

and we know you don’t like it. It would be better if he would make 

it clear that we are not going to do this because it is not going to 

work, it is not the most effective way to confront those forces. 

So both Buck and I will task you with going to the President and 

working on his messaging, but it is important and it is important 

how it is presented to the American people and how we build support for this program. 

On the issue of finding, you know, Sunni partners because I still 

contend that is the key, if we find enough Sunnis in Iraq and Syria 

who are willing to fight against ISIS, that is when we will start 

to be successful. What are our efforts in terms of outreach to some 

of those tribes, focusing on Iraq for the moment, from the Anbar 

Awakening? They are still there. I suspect many of them are fighting with ISIS. How are we doing working with the Iraqi Government and the locals there to try to turn some of those tribesmen 

the same way we did during the Awakening? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, as you have just pointed out, 

and as I noted in my testimony, the reaching out to the Sunni 

tribes through an inclusive representative functioning government 

in Iraq is a start. General Allen’s relationships will help, General 

Austin’s relationships, relationships of other coalition partners in 

the area, especially Arab Sunni countries that are part of the coalition will be critically important to this. This cannot be seen as a 

U.S.-Western effort against any component of the Muslim world or 

Islam, Sunni versus Shi’a. 

So it is all of those working together as we go forward in this 

coalition to get once again the Sunni tribe leadership and buy-in, 

and as I noted in my testimony that what we are doing, one of the 

most fundamental parts of that is the evolution and development 

of government in Iraq that the Sunnis trust and have some confidence in that begins to unite that country, and as you defined it 

in your opening statements, much of the Maliki government did everything but that the last 5 years and brought a lot of this on. So 

that can be done. It is a critical component of this. We know that, 

and we are working hard to do it. 

Mr. SMITH. And just a little pie in the sky for the moment. The 

whole area there would benefit from the Sunnis and the Shi’a finding some way to coexist. Massive understatement, I understand. 

But our partners Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], 

Qatar, is there any way to have conversations with them and say, 

look, we know you guys hate Iran and understand that. A big part 

about what motivated Saudi Arabians and these other countries in 

the early stages of Syria’s civil war to just say, hey, if you are 

against Assad, we are going to throw money at you, we are going 

to throw guns at you, which is what really empowered some of 

these violent extremists was the Saudis, they didn’t care, they were 

like, we—we hate Iran, Assad is a partner, so whatever, whatever 

we have to do to get Assad is in our interests. 

Do you think it is sort of dawning on them at this point that they 

are caught between two things here and if they don’t find some 

way to peacefully—I mean, Iran’s not going anywhere, okay? Now, 

we do wish that they would stop messing in external affairs as well 

as they do, but has there been any effort at saying how do we sort 
15 

of take the edge off that because that is what, you know, groups 

like ISIS feed on. 

Secretary HAGEL. You have just identified a big part of the complications. Yes, we are much aware of that. We are working with 

that. As I noted, Secretary Kerry was in Jeddah last week and convened a meeting of the foreign ministers from the six GCC [Gulf 

Cooperation Council] countries as well as four other Middle Eastern countries. 

As I noted in my testimony and my comments, this is a complicated dynamic on a good day, and there are many factions and 

factors that are flowing through this, and we have to be mindful 

of that as we proceed and try to calibrate achieving an objective 

here that the President has laid out that is clearly in our interests, 

and clearly in the interests of those Sunni countries, Arab countries, all the countries of the Middle East, and to find that common 

ground and common interest and seize upon that where we can 

find that cooperation, and we are doing that, and that is coming 

together, as these countries are stepping forward on committing to 

what they are going to be doing, and they are going to be doing 

more of it as we coordinate that. So what you have identified, Congressman, is a core piece of this effort. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield my time to 

the gentlelady from Indiana, Ms. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding his time. Thank you, Secretary Hagel and General for being here, for your service, we appreciate it. And I am 

thinking that I remember on September 11th, a reporter was asking a question to White House press secretary and said how are 

you defining victory, and the White House press secretary said, I 

don’t have my Webster’s dictionary with me up here. And what is 

on the minds of the American people, I know, it is on my mind as 

well, that we have talked about degrading and destroying, and now 

those seem to be the two coins that we are understanding, we are 

degrading, which my understanding is we are slowing down this 

process, we are disrupting ISIL’s maneuvers and operations, and 

then we are ultimately destroying, and I think it is a fair question 

to ask on behalf of all Americans that if this plan is successful, and 

there is so many doubts about this plan being successful, the big 

‘‘if.’’ What is the end game? What does it look like with a destroyed 

ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, destroying ISIL, which is clearly, as you 

have noted and we have said clearly, is not an easy or simple or 

quick task, and we have been very honest about that. We will continue to be honest about it. But your question, what is the end 

state, it is a region and it is a reality and a threat that is eliminated from threats against the United States and against our allies. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. So—— 

Secretary HAGEL. That threat of beheadings, of terrorist, sophisticated terrorist attacks of slaughtering people, of a barbaric approach to everything they do, an ideology that has nothing to do 

with religion, any religion. The capacity that ISIL now possesses 
16 

through their funding mechanisms, through their sophistication, 

through their organization, through their strategy is a threat to 

everybody, so what does an end game look like is a world without 

that threat. Now, is the world always going to be dangerous? I suspect in our lifetimes it will be, but that is something that we are 

aware of, but we are dealing with the threat right now. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Right, I understand that, and I understand the 

enormity of it and the complexity of it, and I think the American 

people do as well, but I think it is a fair question to say, is, you 

know, is success that we stop seeing beheadings? You mentioned 

that. Of course that would be a measure of success. Is success that 

Iraq gets its territory back? That would be successful; I would 

imagine you would agree. That Syria—— 

Secretary HAGEL. Stability in the Middle East. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Stability in the Middle East. 

Secretary HAGEL. Partners. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. What about the caliphate in general, is success 

also going to be measured in the fact that we no longer have a 

group of people that literally are going to insist on world dominance in a caliphate or are we ever going to be able to deal with 

that, because it seems to me that if we don’t continue to have some 

kind of a bold and aggressive approach, that there is some kind of 

democracy and freedom in that region with the very limited partners that we have that there will never be an end game, and my 

fear, and I think the fear of the American people is we have all 

heard this before. We have all lived through this already. 

Secretary HAGEL. So what’s the alternative, do nothing? 

Mrs. WALORSKI. What does it look like? If this plan doesn’t work, 

what is the alternative? What does it look like in the Middle East 

then? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, we always have Plan Bs and Cs, that is 

what the military does as well as anybody in the world, but we believe this plan will work, and we believe the way it is laid out with 

our partners, the structuring of it, the reality of it, the timeframes 

of it, the partnerships, commitments to this will work. But back to 

your more fundamental question, and I understand your question. 

As I said, I don’t know if we will ever see a world without threats, 

particularly your question about won’t there always be threats out 

there with some extremist group wanting to build an extremist caliphate in the Middle East? I suppose. But I have got to worry 

about what I have right in front of me right now, and this is an 

immediate threat. Yes, we have to think long term, we do. We are 

trying to think through that as to what will work, what will be effective, how do we bring the civilized world together to stop 

this—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Right. 

Secretary HAGEL [continuing]. Because the other way to ask that 

question, Congresswoman, is what if we don’t. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Correct. And just quickly, what else can we do 

as a Congress to make sure we get those passports away from the 

foreign fighters that are coming from America? 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you, and I am glad you mentioned that 

because it is something I noted in my testimony. It is a critical 

piece to this. It is a dangerous and real threat with those kind of 
17 

individuals floating around out there, possessing those passports 

with easy access, as I said, we are coordinating with using every 

interagency force we have, coordinating with our partners all over 

the world and databases, everything that we can do right now to 

address this, to identify those threats out there, to stop those 

threats. 

Some countries are further ahead, like the U.K. [United Kingdom], probably further ahead than almost anyone, but I just was 

in a National Security Council meeting late yesterday afternoon 

when we came back from Tampa, the President chaired, and the 

Attorney General was there, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

there. We were all there. This was a big part of the topic. In fact, 

it was the central part of the topic, foreign fighters, and the President wanted updates, and he gets them every week on what are 

we doing, how much are we doing, how much can we still do and 

what do we have to do, so it is a big part of what we are doing 

here. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield 

back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

So yesterday we took a vote. The vote was on whether to arm the 

Syrian rebels. We, I think, all acknowledge that ISIS is a problem 

and something that we need to take care of. I find it pretty disturbing that we are having this hearing after we have taken a vote 

because I don’t think that the plan that I have seen was detailed 

enough to make me believe that your plan will work. 

I am going to ask you some questions, most of which will probably have to go on the record or you will have to come in and brief 

me, and I hope the other members of this committee believe that 

it is important enough for us to understand exactly what this plan 

is because I am not so sure of it and I haven’t heard the details 

as I would like to hear them. 

I want to begin by saying that I have a Syrian-American community, and they are all over the place on this. I go and I talk to 

them, et cetera. Syrian moderates, most of my people say that 

those Syrian moderates have gone over to ISIS. And most of them 

have told me that they don’t think that the Syrian moderates we 

arm, whoever those may be, are actually going to fight against the 

ISIS moderates who used to hang out with the Syrian moderates. 

Equip and train, because we did such a great job in Iraq, $35 billion later—and Mr. Chairman, I was the one every single time 

Rumsfeld and others were in front of us asking about equip and 

train. But some have said, as my good friend and colleague here, 

that it wasn’t a problem of equip and train; it was a lack of leadership; it was bad people commanding; it was the commander in chief 

Maliki who was wrong and didn’t help us on this or didn’t make 

this thing work. 

Can you tell me who the commander in chief of the Syrian moderates, who are all over the place—don’t even talk to each other 

sometimes—how we are going to see that leadership go through? 

These are just for the record, okay. What type of arms? Exactly 

what type of arms are we going to hand over to these people? Be-
18 

cause the last time I checked, we handed over arms to Maliki and 

they ended up in ISIS and the very same arms are going after us. 

Coalition. Coalition of 40, the President says. Who? What will 

they really do? How many troops? I have been through this, you 

guys. I saw the coalition in Iraq, and we used to sort of like chuckle 

at each other in seeing some of these countries with one person. I 

don’t know, training dogs, maybe a bomb expert, but coalition of 

40? Who? What? How much? Which are the combat troops? How 

are they going to get there? I would like to know those things. 

And I have a problem, when you go out in front of the American 

people and start talking about why certain countries might not 

want to suggest that they are with us—this is why I want all this 

information somehow. I don’t need to put it out in the public. But 

you know what I am told by my Turkish Americans? That Turkish 

Army arms are in ISIS hands, and the Government of Turkey has 

winked to let those go into those hands. I have a problem. It is a 

very complicated issue you are getting America into and an even 

more complicated situation. 

More importantly—and, Secretary, this isn’t and shouldn’t be 

under your sort of purview, but it is under the administration’s— 

so let’s say—and I hope your plan works, because, you know, ISIS, 

ISIL, they are not good. I hope I am wrong. I hoped the same thing 

when I voted against the Iraq war, that I was wrong, but I don’t 

believe that I was wrong on that. So I want to see the plan; in particular, I want to ask the administration for this, the neighborhood 

players, let’s say we eliminate ISIS and ISIL, what fills that gap? 

What has to fill that gap for this to work are people putting up 

homes, people putting up schools, people putting up jobs, people 

getting these people the type of lives that they see on television 

and all these TV shows we export but aren’t living. And that is one 

of the reasons this has been created. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Gentlelady yields back. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Secretary, in November 2005, as a Senator, you 

penned an article in Foreign Affairs magazine asserting that Vietnam was a national tragedy, partly because Members of Congress 

failed their country, remained silent, and lacked the courage to 

challenge the administration in power until it was too late. You 

wrote, and I quote, ‘‘To question your government is not unpatriotic; to not question your government is unpatriotic. America owes 

its men and women in uniform a policy worthy to their sacrifice.’’ 

These are your words, Mr. Secretary. 

In the past, you informed America that many in the Middle East 

see us as an obstacle of peace and an aggressor, an occupier. You 

wrote that our policies are a source of significant friction in the region, and that we are, at the same time, both a stabilizing and destabilizing force in the Middle East. Also, you described a fear of 

the uncontrollable, the unpredictable consequences of military action. You stated, ‘‘How many of us really know and understand 

Iraq, the country, the history, the people and the role of the Arab 

world?’’ You asserted that the American people must be told of that 

long-term commitment, risk, and cost of the undertaking. 
19 

Mr. Secretary, you and I have a friendship that was based on my 

coming out against the Iraq war. I did not know you prior to that, 

and I was very grateful that you extended a hand to me because 

I was getting beat up pretty bad down in my district and by some 

of my Republican colleagues. In fact, the chairman at the time told 

me that he would not appoint me to be a subcommittee chairman 

because I would vote with the Democrats to pull our troops out of 

Iraq, which he was right in that assessment—not necessarily not 

naming me as a subcommittee chairman but my position. 

The reason I bring this up in when you said back in 2005 is that 

in the year 2000, when Bill Clinton left the Presidency, President 

Clinton left this country as President, we were $5.6 trillion in debt. 

Today, Mr. Secretary, the debt of this Nation is over $17.6 trillion. 

I have heard you testify—and you will in 2015—that cuts are coming to the military. You are concerned about it, and we are concerned about it. You also have said that sequestration, if it is not 

repealed, is going to complicate the cuts that are coming without— 

normally. 

I want to ask you today, do you think that Congress should pay 

for whatever we decide to do and the administration decides to do 

as it relates to Syria and to Iraq? Do you think we need to pay for 

it today or put it on the back of our grandchildren? Because we will 

not be able to continue to police the world, and by using what we 

have is known as borrowing money from the Chinese, the Japanese, and all these other countries, because we cannot pay our bills 

today, would you agree that we need to pay for whatever we do in 

Syria and in Iraq, we need to pay for it today and not tomorrow? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you. And I recognize any 

time any of us ever write anything or say anything, it is always 

at some peril. But let me address my own words for a moment and 

say that I, obviously, agreed with what I wrote then and I still 

agree with it. 

Now, there is a big difference between what we are talking about 

today versus where we were in 2005. The President’s strategy in 

where and how and why it was to go forward—— 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Secretary, one moment. I apologize to you for 

that. But please answer my question about do we pay for it today 

or do we pay for it tomorrow, because my time is going to expire. 

Secretary HAGEL. The responsibility of elected officials is always 

to be honest about anything they get this country into, any action 

they take, including paying for it. And I can assure you, this Secretary of Defense will be very clear in this administration on what 

we believe it is going to cost, how we are going to pay for it. And 

there will not be any ambiguity about that. But, yes, every Congress, every elected official has that responsibility, that financial 

responsibility and fiduciary responsibility. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I think, generally, history would show that the 

West won the Cold War. It would also show winning the Cold War 

didn’t either end communism or get rid of communists. So the point 

I want to make is, is it fair to say that we might be able to beat 
20 

ISIL as a group, but that is not going to end extreme Islamic militants or going to end the desire for those folks to try to create a 

caliphate sometime in the future? 

Secretary HAGEL. I can’t, nor would I, and I don’t believe the 

President would, ever say that what we are doing now and attempting to do with our strategy and our focus on ISIL will end 

forever any terrorist group or any group of people who want to do 

harm to our country or establish Islamic caliphate. Of course, not. 

I can’t guarantee that. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is great. That is what I want to hear, because 

I think we need to have the right expectation here. When people 

ask you what the definition of winning is, it is a great question. 

We just need to have the right expectation about what that is. 

Secretary HAGEL. But I think also, Congressman, the reality of 

the threat, as it is today, is very real and—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. 

Secretary HAGEL [continuing]. I will never come before this committee overstate a threat or understate a threat. And we have a 

threat. 

Mr. LARSEN. Second, in your testimony on page 3, you say, 

‘‘CENTCOM’s plan includes targeted actions against ISIL’s safe havens in Syria. General Dempsey and I’’—meaning you—‘‘have both 

approved the CENTCOM plan.’’ 

So you have approved a CENTCOM plan already that includes 

air strikes inside Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. That plan was provided to the President in full 

explanation yesterday with all the options, all the plans. And I laid 

it out, generally, in my testimony, and the President asked that, 

as to what our options are. 

Mr. LARSEN. In your testimony, you say you have approved that 

plan. It was briefed to the President. Has the President approved 

that plan or taken any action to operationalize that plan? 

Secretary HAGEL. The President has not yet approved its finality, 

but he will do that when he feels that he is—— 

Mr. LARSEN. I am sure he is putting a lot of thought into it. I 

am not saying he is not. I just want to be sure at what step the 

White House is with that. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. 

The third question, mainly for the general—I don’t want you to 

feel left out—on the train-and-equip mission, I think Mr. Smith 

made a good point, it is how we get out of the fight. We want to 

train and equip moderate Syrian opposition. Obviously, after 13 

years in Afghanistan and Iran, we should have learned some lessons about the vetting. And I think a big concern is how do we 

know people are moderate; people are Syrian, that is, are committed to a free Syria; and third, that they are in the opposition, 

they are not going to turn on us? 

General MAYVILLE. Yes, Congressman. You raise a good point. I 

think we have got to be very upfront that the vetting process is absolutely essential if we want to get this right. We have a tremendous amount of experience over the last decade in vetting and 

standing up these types of forces. We have an eye on the pool right 

now of folks that we can draw from, but we need to be very delib-
21 

erate. Despite our best efforts, this will not be perfect, but we are 

looking for individuals that can come together that want to defend 

their community, can work as a team. 

They have to be able and willing. They have to be appropriate 

for the task. Many of them will be former military. Some will come 

from the large Syrian diaspora that’s already been displaced, but 

many of them are fighting right now against the Assad government. We will have to put in place mechanisms to assure ourselves 

of their reliability and make sure that we have a system of accountability, and then we will build from there. We will build a 

chain of command. We will take small groups and create clusters 

and build formations. It will be something that is a multiyear requirement that we will have to look at. 

Mr. LARSEN. I think that we will, as it was laid out in the 

amendment we had yesterday, we will have plenty of time to talk 

to you all later on how that is going and what you are running 

into. 

Finally, I don’t have a lot of time so I will just make a note on 

this, I was surprised to hear the President use the 2001 AUMF 

[Authorization for Use of Military Force] as a justification for this, 

because the last time Pentagon, as I recall, was in front of us to 

discuss this issue at all, there was at that time I wouldn’t say 100 

percent opposition but a lot of reluctance in using the 2001 AUMF 

because there was no connection. So, at some point in the future, 

I would like to find out what changed. But time is up, and I do 

want to have that explored at some point. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for giving us your time today 

to help walk through this strategy. I would like to get your 

thoughts on two areas. You know, strategy has a lot of components, 

as you mentioned. When you look at a lot of these terrorist groups, 

the oxygen that tends to feed them is twofold: One is hatred, which 

we can’t always do a lot about, but the second one is their financing and their money. 

When I look at ISIL, at least the figures that I have, that we expect them to get about $1 billion this year through kidnapping for 

ransom, selling oil in the black market, stealing money from banks 

and funding from state sympathizers from the Gulf. Could you give 

us your thoughts on the strategy we are going to use to cut that 

off, one? And secondly, could you give me your thoughts—you 

know, General Dempsey about a year ago told us that Syria had 

five times more air defenses, some of which are high-end systems 

that is to say higher altitude, longer range—could you give us your 

concerns, if any, about the impact those air defense systems could 

have on some of our air strikes and our capability of that? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you. On the ISIL financing, and you stated it correctly, we must cut off that funding and 

those sources, and it is as high a priority in this effort as any one 

priority. 

As I mentioned in my testimony just generally, the Treasury Department, through a couple of their offices set up to deal with for-
22 

eign financing and these general kinds of threats, have set up a 

special office on this particular issue working with our international partners. You hit some of the main ones, the black market 

avenue that they use to sell oil. They have, as you I know are 

aware, ISIL has taken control of certain small oil fields in Syria, 

and we have some estimates of 100,000 barrels of oil that those 

fields are producing, and they get them out in different ways, so 

to cut off that main source. 

You mentioned other sources. They, obviously, have taken over 

cities and towns and resources and banks. But there are day-to-day 

illegal activities that they are involved in, businesses that we are 

trying to find, will find, but that has to be working with our partners on it. So there is no higher priority than getting that— to cut 

that off. 

On your question on Syrian air defenses, I would feel a lot more 

comfortable, Congressman, and we can do this in a private—in a 

closed setting, and we would be very happy to come in and give you 

a thorough briefing on this. 

Mr. FORBES. And Mr. Secretary, thank you. And the other thing 

I would just ask, at some point in time if you could do for us, I 

know we have a priority of cutting off that funding, but I think, 

on the committee, we would love to just hear what our strategy is 

for actually doing, you know, doing that. Because—— 

Secretary HAGEL. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. We would like to know, if they are getting $1 billion a year, do we want to get them down to $200 million? I mean, what have we laid out as our strategy, and what exactly is our plan to get our hands around that and do that? So if 

at some point in time you could maybe share that with us in whatever venue or setting you think is appropriate, we would appreciate 

that. 

Secretary HAGEL. We can do that whenever you want to do that, 

and we could do that—I think it’d be more effective in a closed 

briefing on exactly how we are doing it and take you down into 

some depth on this. And we can coordinate with your staff on this. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, thank you so much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you brought that up. I think that is 

one thing that really separates ISIL from all the other terrorist 

groups is they are so well funded and they have good leadership 

and know how to use that money. So it would be very good to attack that. 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, we can do it through your committee however way you want to do it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we just found out there is no votes tomorrow, so probably people will be heading to the airport pretty quick, 

so we will get back to you. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel, your predecessor one-time removed, Secretary 

Gates, as he was leaving, gave a speech at West Point where he 

said, ‘‘In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the 

President to again send a big American land Army into Asia or into 
23 

the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined, as General McArthur so delicately put it.’’ 

Yesterday, during the debate on the chairman’s amendment, I 

mean, obviously, there was, you know, high anxiety that, you 

know, this amendment was really sort of a prelude to the scenario 

that Secretary Gates warned against. One of the reasons why I 

voted for the amendment was that I think a close examination of 

the text showed that, in fact, we were talking about using a program, title 10, which is not about sending in large ground forces 

from the U.S. but, in fact, almost doing the opposite, which is to 

sort of stand up indigenous forces to take the fight, you know, to 

our enemy. 

And I guess I just want to ask you, as long as I’ve got you here, 

is just, you know, if you could just sort of reiterate whether or not 

that is the correct interpretation of the McKeon Amendment, or do 

you need to have your head examined? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, having my head examined, that question 

is open for many reasons, not just this issue, I suspect. 

But I completely agree with Secretary Gates. And I would not 

make that recommendation unless it would be such a catastrophic 

situation that—but I don’t think that is the case today. I know it 

is not the case today. 

Now, that said, I think the issue overall, though, is always one 

of, first, identifying the threat, is it real? And then, what do you 

do about it? And your question about the interpretation of the 

amendment is, for example, I mention in my testimony, when we 

put all of the additional soldiers in place that the President has ordered, that will be approximately around 1,600 Americans in Iraq. 

The interpretation, as I have read the amendment in the CR [continuing resolution], is—I think your interpretation is correct. 

I said this has to be a partnership—the President has said that— 

between the Congress and the administration. I was once on your 

side of the dais. I understand Article I pretty well, the responsibilities of Congress, starting with the fact you have the money and 

the authorities and all that goes with your side of the equation. So 

there are specific issues that we will work through on how we implement that amendment and those authorities. 

There is always a question of, I think, if we could rewrite it, we 

would probably rewrite it in certain areas. But, overall, I think 

what you have laid out your understanding of what you voted for 

is pretty clear, in my understanding. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And in fact, I think one of the benefits of the amendment is that 

it really does engage the Congress with the administration as opposed to just kind of abdicating our role, which, you know, some 

of the comments on the floor were just, well, let the AUMF from 

2001 and 2002 kind of control or authorize whatever actions the 

administration needs to take, which, again, I really think is not the 

way that our checks and balances should operate. 

Secretary HAGEL. No. Well, I agree. But the difference, AUMF, 

2001 or 2002, on this particular issue, the train and equip moderate opposition for Syria is, this is equipping and training a nongovernmental group that we have—I am not sure recently or when 
24 

historically we have done that—I suppose we have, but legally, I 

mean, above board. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. 

Secretary HAGEL. And that was different in Iraq. That was different in some of these other situations. So—but the authority the 

President has statutorily—and I know there are differences of opinion on this, using that AUMF from 2001, 2002—really it comes 

down to the connection ISIL has had with Al Qaeda and still has 

in terrorist groups. But the training and equipping mission with 

nongovernmental groups is a little different. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. And, again, I think that is our role now. 

I mean, it is by statute that we will get those reports from your 

Department and we are going to have a timeline where we are 

going to be reengaged almost immediately after the election. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being here today. 

Over the weekend, the President promised that, as we defeat 

ISIL, there will be no more mistakes. I look forward to working 

with you to avoid his mistakes. 

The Obama mistake of underestimating ISIL as junior varsity, 

JV. We know that 16 months ago, as the President was underestimating the terrorist threat and saying it was diminished, that that 

was not true. Dr. Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute 

released a map showing in warning of the growing terrorist threat 

across North Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia, and this was 

ignored by this administration. 

The Obama mistake of failing to secure a basic security agreement with Iraq, undermining the achievements of the American 

and allied service members who promoted freedom in Iraq—and I 

particularly appreciate that I had two sons serve in Iraq and working with the people of Iraq to preserve their freedom. 

The Obama mistake of defense sequestration, downsizing our 

military as jihadists expand their safe havens across the world to 

attack the American families. 

The Obama mistake of failing to support the students of Iran’s 

Green Revolution. We should remember the Iranian revolution supporters in Tehran carried signs in English declaring clearly their 

goals: Death to Israel; death to America. 

The Obama mistake of declaring a red line in Syria on chemical 

weapons and then blaming others. Clearly, the red line was stated 

by him in a speech on August 20, 2012, and a year later he denied 

it, which is not correct. 

The Obama mistake of releasing five murderous Taliban while 

negotiating with the terrorists. One of the terrorists was praised by 

the Taliban murderers as the equivalent of 10,000 warriors to destroy America. It is more important than ever that the detention 

facility at Guantanamo Bay be retained to protect American families. 

The Obama mistake of announcing an Afghan withdrawal date, 

disregarding conditions, putting Afghanistan and Pakistan at risk. 
25 

The Obama mistake of equating Hamas rocket attacks with 

Israel’s self-defense. We should recognize the Hamas creed, quote, 

‘‘We value death more than you value life,’’ end of quote. 

The Obama mistake of the Benghazi assassinations cover-up. 

The Obama mistake of the Fort Hood massacre dismissed as 

workplace violence and the Little Rock murder as drive-by shooting. 

The President obviously needs to change course and adopt peace 

through strength. We know weakness endangers American families 

worldwide. I believe the President should take action remembering 

September 11 and the global war on terrorism. And a way to 

change course is backing up the Kurdish regional government, our 

courageous allies. 

And I would like to know, what are the plans for weaponry for 

Erbil? I understand there is a problem in delivering the weapons. 

We need to be there to back up people who have been so bravely 

associated with United States. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, on your question regarding 

backing up Erbil, the Peshmerga, there is no country that we have 

accelerated our deliveries to quicker than Iraq, specifically the 

Peshmerga. We have had allied countries flying missions in there 

directly to Erbil to reinforce them with ammunition, with equipment coming from many nations. It has been as high a priority 

over many months as we have had. So it has been ongoing, and it 

is as high priority as we have with our partners. 

Mr. WILSON. And as the co-chairman of the Kurdish Regional 

Caucus, I appreciate that. And I have been to the Kurdish region. 

For decades, they have resisted oppression and identified with freedom of the United States. 

A final question from me, Mr. Secretary, is just yes or no, is 

America at war? 

Secretary HAGEL. I said America was at war against ISIL, just 

like we are Al Qaeda. I said it in my testimony. 

Mr. WILSON. And we are at war on a global war on terrorism? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. Terrorists who try to kill us. The President is taking action and has laid that action out very clearly and 

has asked for the Congress’ partnership. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. And actions are so important. Thank 

you very much. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Secretary Hagel and General Mayville. 

Like all Americans, and I think, as you have heard in our discussion today, obviously everyone on this committee and if you could 

have been on the floor throughout the past several days, I am 

greatly concerned with the recent events in Iraq and Syria. We 

know that ISIL is a lethal terrorist organization, and we must confront the difficult questions that our President has raised about the 

serious threat that it poses. 

But this is a complex and long-term challenge, and as such, I am 

wary of commitments that the President has admitted will spill 

into future administrations, creating enduring costs while raising 
26 

substantial and unpredictable risks without a more robust, clearheaded debate. And I, like Congresswoman Sanchez, would have 

appreciated the opportunity to have this hearing with you before 

we took the vote. 

And I appreciate the President’s continued commitment not to 

send U.S. ground forces into combat, but his experience has shown 

any expansion of U.S. involvement in this region raises serious concerns over this slippery slope we may find ourselves on. Chairman 

Dempsey’s recent testimony that he could foresee a scenario in 

which he could recommend U.S. ground troops in the future 

crystalizes the alarming uncertainties around this effort. 

Many questions remain. You have heard some of them addressed 

today, including the cost, the timetable, the nature of the participation from the region’s Arab states, to name just a few. Yesterday’s 

train-and-equip vote, endorsing just one piece of the strategy, focused on expanding our effort in Syria, masked the multifaceted 

challenges ahead, and I could not endorse it. 

But I appreciate the opportunity today to begin to ask some of 

these questions. In his September 16 testimony before the Senate, 

Chairman Dempsey noted that the United States and its allies 

would work to develop a military chain of command in Syria that 

is linked to a political structure. I would like to know more about 

the political structure that Chairman Dempsey is envisioning. 

Secretary Hagel, do you think that the Syrian opposition has a 

solid and widely supported political structure on which to base a 

military command? And, if not, who do you think it will be linked 

to? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, on the issue of a political agreement and 

a political resolution, I mentioned that in my testimony, the President has been very clear on that point when he has said, on many 

occasions, and I have just noted, that there is not a military solution to this in Syria or in Iraq or the Middle East. So a political 

resolution must be achieved. Now—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. Reclaiming my time. But that is not the question. 

We are now embarking upon an effort to train and equip the Syrian forces—the moderate Syrian forces that we think we can work 

with. And for it to be effective—and I believe he is correct—that 

it has to be tied to a political structure. So to start down this path 

in which we are focusing on training, equipping a force that is not 

aligned with any Syrian-oriented political structure, really in some 

ways puts the cart before the horse. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, not exactly. If, in fact, there is no alternative that is allowed to develop in Syria because of the brutality 

of ISIL and other terrorist groups that are slaughtering the people 

in Syria, and you have a regime that has no legitimacy to govern, 

which started all this, you have got to start somewhere. And we 

recognize this is difficult. We recognize there is no good option 

here. 

But if we don’t help where we can help develop some infrastructure—and this is why we would train in units, not individuals—to 

allow a political opposition to come together based on security—because security is required in this, as well. It isn’t either-or. That 

is how we envision and that is how we would want to go forward. 
27 

That is partly why this is a long-term effort. This is why we have 

been very clear it is complicated. It is serious. 

But if there is no opening, no opportunity for a political opposition group to develop because they are all out of the country—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. But you would agree it, obviously, doesn’t exist 

today. 

Secretary HAGEL. There is very little organizational opposition in 

Syria today, that is right. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

Secretary HAGEL. And that is part of the problem. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. My time is up. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

This morning I saw a brief news story that said that decisions 

for approving targets for air strikes in Syria would be made by the 

President and only by the President. Is that true? 

Secretary HAGEL. No, it is not true. That story in the Wall Street 

Journal was not true. 

Mr. KLINE. I can’t tell you how relieved I am to hear that. That 

is a terrible mistake if we are going to start making daily tactical 

decisions in the White House. So I am very relieved to hear that. 

But that leaves—— 

Secretary HAGEL. I might just say, I was sitting next to the 

President yesterday when this entire issue was being discussed, 

and he was very clear with General Austin, once he makes decisions, he gives General Austin and our military leaders the authority to carry out those policies. 

Mr. KLINE. Outstanding. As I said, I am very, very relieved to 

hear that. 

That does lead me to the larger question, though. You know, I 

have got 3 or 4 minutes here, but could one of you sort of outline 

what the command structure, what the command and control structure is going to be? What is the role of General Austin and 

CENTCOM? What is the role of Iraqi commanders, of Peshmerga? 

Who is going to make the decisions? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, because the general is just a pretty face 

here and hasn’t had to answer a question, really, except one. 

Mr. KLINE. Actually, I was so hoping he would answer. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, you have never been indirect before, Congressman. 

So, with your permission, I will ask General Mayville. 

Mr. KLINE. Very good. 

General MAYVILLE. The command-and-control structure begins 

with the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces. Our role 

there is to supplement that with what they need so that they can 

make informed decisions. We are doing that right now. Now we are 

going to switch out some of the initial assessment teams and replace them with more—with Army advisers that can better help at 

the general officer level, as well as reach into the ministries and 

assist, as well. But the chain of command is an Iraqi chain of command, enabled by partners in the region. 
28 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Pretty face or not, let me try it this way: I 

started my questioning by asking about targets for air strikes in 

Syria. So if it is not the President of the United States, who is it? 

General MAYVILLE. Now, for targeting, targeting will be planned 

jointly and enabled by U.S. Central Command through its CAOC 

[Combined Air Operations Center], which is in the region. The 

mechanisms to command and control those, they are already in 

place. We did that, you saw that unfurl when we retook Mosul 

Dam. You saw that when we assisted in the operations around 

Haditha and Amerli. So we are not going to change that. The 

CAOC, which is an Air Force command and control structure component underneath Central Command, will orchestrate all of this. 

The coordination and the planning, it will be done forward in concert with Iraqi forces and Iraqi leaders. 

Mr. KLINE. Air strikes in Syria, I am talking about. 

General MAYVILLE. We haven’t received authorization. That is 

part of what the Secretary was talking about. We have yet to receive authorization for those missions. But—— 

Mr. KLINE. So it is not the President of the United States, but 

we are not really quite sure who it is to make those decisions? 

General MAYVILLE. If I could, sir, whether we strike in—where 

we strike ISIL, regardless of its geography, the command-and-control structure that I just laid out is the command-and-control structure that we will use wherever the President allows us to strike. 

Mr. KLINE. All right. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and General, for being here. I think 

part of the problem, and you heard it with the questionings that 

we are having today, is that because the amendment that we voted 

on involved Syria and the potential to train and to arm the Syrian, 

quote, whatever that moderate force will be that is going to be vetted 15 days from now or when the Senate passes it, and the fact 

that the 170 air strikes are really in Iraq, and we are talking about 

our 1,600, as far as I know, are in Iraq, that the public, I think, 

are getting confused, as we probably are, as to what exactly is 

being done in Iraq versus what we are authorizing. 

You also know that part of the continuing resolution was to fund 

OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] at the 2014 level, which 

technically is about $30-some-odd billion dollars more than what 

was requested in 2015. And whether or how you determine what 

that money is and how it plays out for the remainder of the continuing resolution is something else, but we also know that it was 

the request early on that the OCO funding include the $500 million, which is to arm and train 5,000 Syrians. 

So having said that—whoever can answer this question, take it— 

my question is really, when we divide the two, not Syria part but 

the Iraq part, which we are clearly engaged in, one, where is the 

funding coming from? Is it OCO funding? Two, how much is that 

costing us per day? And, though we feel that we don’t have the 

same kind of legislation as we have in the amendment, which 

clearly defined who would be appropriate vetted people in Syria, 
29 

now who are the people that we are vetting, if we are vetting them 

at all, in Iraq? 

Because right now, air strikes are in Iraq, and we need the 

ground forces, as I understand the philosophy, to be in Iraq. So 

who are we vetting? Because General Dempsey, I think, made a 

statement yesterday that there are 50 brigades or so in Iraq of 

which 26 or 24, 1 of those 2 numbers, are not appropriate because 

it is not of the right composition. 

So who is making these vetting decisions, and what are we in for 

in the Iraq portion of this? Though we have sort of been kind of 

thrown off the path, because we are talking about Syria. But our 

people, 1,600 of them are in Iraq. I think my constituents want to 

know, what does this mean for Iraq? Iraq is the concern right now 

because that is where we are. 

So whoever wants to take it. 

Secretary HAGEL. I will give you an answer, and then the general 

may want to go deeper on this. But your question about who are 

we vetting, we would be vetting the Syrian opposition forces that 

we would begin to train and assist. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But I am talking about Iraq. 

Secretary HAGEL. But you asked the question about who are vetting? That is who we are vetting. It is not Iraq. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So we are not vetting anyone in Iraq? Is that—— 

Secretary HAGEL. The Iraqi security forces under the government, the sovereign Government of Iraq and the Peshmerga, who, 

as you know, are part of the overall structure, are in place. They 

are institutionalized. They are functioning armies. Now, that is different from what we are doing. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Mr. Secretary, not to interrupt you, but General 

Dempsey said, of the 50 brigades, only 24—— 

Secretary HAGEL. Those are in Iraq. 

Ms. HANABUSA. No, that is what I am talking about. I am talking 

about Iraq. I said, we have sort of meshed this whole thing together, but I am looking at Iraq. So are we vetting the Iraqi forces 

that are supposed to be the ground troops—— 

Secretary HAGEL. No. 

Ms. HANABUSA [continuing]. Or is it only Iraq that is going to 

provide—the general is nodding and you are saying no. So I would 

like—— 

General MAYVILLE. I am nodding because I understand the question. I can understand the confusion. 

Secretary HAGEL. We are not vetting Iraqi forces and troops. 

What General Dempsey was talking about is the most capable Iraqi 

security forces, Iraqi security forces. Vetting in that part of it is 

part of the Syrian—train and equip moderate Syrian opposition. 

General, do you want to add anything to that? 

General MAYVILLE. Yes, Congresswoman, I understand the question. I can see how it can be confusing. 

What we are doing today in Iraq is we are, first and foremost, 

securing U.S. Government facilities and U.S. Government personnel, American citizens in Iraq. We have two operating centers, 

one in Erbil and one in Baghdad, designed to facilitate the Iraqi 

security forces operations. We advise them. We make them aware 

of what they need to do next, and we help them track issues. And, 
30 

as was mentioned earlier, when they go on an operation and it 

needs to be enabled by air support, these operation centers do that 

as well. 

Most recently, the assessment team that went into the Baghdad 

area, the area that General Dempsey spoke to and identified 50 

brigades and gave an assessment, that assessment is over. And we 

are changing those forces out, and they will be advise-and-assist 

forces to work with selected brigades and divisions in Iraq. I hope 

that helps. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS [presiding]. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

And, Secretary Hagel, I first want to thank you for yesterday’s 

Medal of Honor ceremony for Bennie Adkins. That was very special. I appreciate you doing that for a great American. 

I understand that the administration was prepared to acknowledge publicly that the Russians were in violation of the INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty over a year ago but didn’t for 

policy reasons. Do you know what thought went into why we didn’t 

publicly acknowledge INF violations earlier? 

Secretary HAGEL. I know that we were carefully examining the 

evidence that we had and that we were looking at to see if, in fact, 

they were in violation. But, as to your specific question, no, I don’t 

know. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Yesterday—or recently, Russia’s President 

announced at Yalta in mid-August that he had authorized the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons into Ukrainian territory. Do you know how the U.S. would respond and what the implications are for us if he, in fact, does move those weapons into 

Ukrainian territory? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, again, I think, rather than talking about 

this in an open hearing, we probably ought to do this in a closed 

hearing to take you through a number of steps there on this. And 

I think I would feel more comfortable to talk about it that way. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand. 

And do you know why the United States is considering continuing to approve Russia’s proposals to fly under the Open Skies 

Treaty enhanced sensors and aircraft over the United States while 

it is in material breach of the INF? I am really concerned about 

us going forward with that Open Skies access when we know that 

they are cheating on chemical weapons conventions, biological 

weapons conventions, and now we know they are cheating on the 

INF. 

What are your thoughts on whether we should go forward with 

the Open Skies practice? 

Secretary HAGEL. We, as you know, just had a team in Moscow 

last week on this specific issue. We were represented by a senior 

member, Defense Department, State Department led it, and others, 

and these were all issues that were discussed. We, the Russians 

and us, have many mutual interests on different things, and what 

they have done in Ukraine and their actions the last 6 months 

have not only complicated but put in jeopardy all of those interests 

that we have. So we are working our way through the very set of 

questions that you have just asked right now. 
31 

Mr. ROGERS. So, in fact, this may be one of the consequences 

they may suffer or experience as a result of the INF violations—— 

Secretary HAGEL. Well—— 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. Denied access under the Open Skies 

program? 

Secretary HAGEL. No decision has been made on this, but we are 

looking at a lot of different options, and we are talking to the Russians. 

Mr. ROGERS. Good. 

My last question is, recently or yesterday, the committee received the second of two reprogramming requests to the total of $1 billion 

out of the Army O&M [operations and maintenance] to pay for the 

military’s efforts to respond to the Ebola outbreak. We already 

have a serious readiness problem. What are your thoughts about 

what this $1 billion would do to that? I ask this to either one of 

you. Doesn’t matter. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. Two pieces to that. One is the 

money. And second is probably the bigger implication of your question, how does that affect, as you say, our readiness and our capability to respond to other challenges. And we have got a lot of 

them, as you know. 

On the money, that can be done, okay, by using OCO that would 

not affect our readiness in any other area. But the other question 

that you ask is a legitimate question. Right now, General Dempsey 

and our commanders have agreed that what we will be providing 

the military in assisting in Africa with the specific areas that the 

President announced on using our unique capabilities would not affect our readiness anywhere in the world, because these are capabilities that we have that we wouldn’t take away from any of the 

other areas that we are now dealing with that are significant 

threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. So am I hearing that you said that OCO is really 

the proper source for the money? Would it be accurate to say that 

we can expect you to come to the conferees and ask us to adjust 

the OCO levels to reflect this added amount of money before we 

can finish up the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I have to talk to the comptroller about 

this and OMB [Office of Management and Budget] on the bookkeeping on how that works. But, as you know, Congressman, and 

there are a lot of different opinions on whether there should be an 

overseas account or not and whether it is a slush fund or not, but 

in this case, I think—and it is an imperfect process—probably OCO 

is an appropriate account for this kind of thing, these things that 

develop, these contingencies, overseas contingencies situations. I 

don’t think anybody would have forecast this, we didn’t a year ago, 

the seriousness of this. So we are working it right now with comptrollers and the appropriations people here on the Hill. 

Mr. ROGERS. Based on the way the world is looking, OCO may 

have to get a lot bigger to accommodate all of the contingencies 

that are popping up around the globe. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, it may. I hope not. But, as you know, we 

have been bringing that OCO account down every year, so that is 

the good news. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. Thank you for your service. 
32 

Who is next? 

Mr. Barber from Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes for any 

questions he may have. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Mayville, for your service, 

both in uniform, Mr. Secretary, and in public life as Senator and 

now as our Secretary of Defense. 

You know, I was—took the vote yesterday after a lot of consideration about what we were doing when we were giving authorization 

to a limited authority to train and equip the vetted and moderate 

forces in Syria. I was proud to stand with my colleagues to give 

that to you and the President, because absolutely, we must stop the 

savagery that we know has been already committed at the hands 

of ISIL and, also, because I want to make sure that we do everything we can to prevent them from having a safe haven to send 

harm our way in the homeland. We must do everything we can to 

prevent another situation in which terrorists can attack this country from safe havens overseas. 

So I have two questions, Mr. Secretary, one related to that and 

the other to the larger issue of how we really contain and hopefully 

eliminate and destroy ISIL. First, could you speak to the question 

about how you see ISIL’s current capabilities for carrying out 

transnational terrorism? And, secondly, could you speak to how 

arming the Syrian opposition will roll back ISIL’s territory and 

their ability to launch an attack? And how long would you estimate 

it will take for the opposition to really engage ISIL in order to degrade its capabilities? 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you, Congressman. The first question 

on transnational criminal activities as a source of ISIL funding, it 

is part of—and a significant part of—that funding, and I think in 

a couple of the questions that were asked here earlier, specifically 

the black marketing of oil—— 

Mr. BARBER. Secretary, I was really addressing what is your 

view about how we can prevent their capabilities for exporting terrorism into our country and to other countries. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, you have to cut off the capability and cut 

off the funding. And that is what I was talking about earlier in answers to some other questions, as well. And that is a huge priority 

of what we are overall in our overall strategy how you defeat ISIL, 

how you degrade them, you disconnect them and you defeat them. 

Taking that funding away is a big part of that, and we are operationally doing that right now with our partners through the 

Treasury Department, our law enforcement all over the world. And 

it is a key part of degrading any capacity they have in the future. 

As to your longer-term question, how long, I think the President 

has been pretty clear on this. When General Dempsey and I were 

before the Senate committee 2 days ago, we talked about this. I 

can’t give you an exact number of years how long, but we know it 

is going to take some time. We know it is going to take some years. 

Maybe we can do it sooner. 

But this is, as you know so well and has been reflected this 

morning in many of the comments, this is a group that has capacity that we have never seen before outside of a nation state. And 

you mix in with that the religious dynamic, ethnic dynamic, all the 
33 

other factors that complicate this situation. It is going to take some 

time, and we know that. 

Mr. BARBER. In your view, is ISIL capable today of sending 

radicalized Americans back to this country to do harm to the 

United States? 

Secretary HAGEL. Oh, I think they are capable of doing that 

today. 

Mr. BARBER. Given that, I want to expand the question of their 

threat in the Middle East to Israel, to Jordan, to Lebanon. Can you 

speak to us about what you see is already happening and further 

threats that might exist for those countries? 

Secretary HAGEL. It is very clear to me, and I think most people 

who have looked at this, and certainly it is to the President and 

his administration, that with the instability that currently resides 

all across the Middle East, that you go right through each of the 

countries, starting on the west with Lebanon and you move east, 

every one of those countries is in some form of instability and 

under threat from ISIL, from other terrorists organizations. 

If we see further destabilization of these countries, that will create a global problem that will ripple out everywhere. Oil, if you 

would destabilize the major oil-producing countries in the Middle 

East, that in itself would affect world economy. It would affect everything. Israel, I mean, you look at where we are today in that 

part of the world; it is probably as unstable as it has been in our 

lifetime. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Dr. WENSTRUP [presiding]. Gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I did support the amendment yesterday of the 

chairman. However, that is only good through December 11 at the 

latest, so we will be revisiting this issue again soon. So, because 

we know ISIL is so dangerous, look what the news is out of Australia just today, going against the public, against Australians. So 

this is a bloodthirsty group, and the beheading of two Americans 

is a horrible situation and was one of the real reasons why I supported the President’s plan. 

However, I would like to have you elaborate on some of the details of the President’s plan. Other questions have done this previously, but particularly, are we contemplating—will we be using 

UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] and drones, armed Predators and 

Reapers to take out ISIL leadership like we have done in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, like we are doing now currently in Somalia and 

Yemen? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, the way I would answer your question is, 

and I think the President noted this in his statement to the American people a week ago, that we are looking at every option, every 

target using our capabilities and our partners to degrade and destroy ISIL. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So that is something that is on the table? 
34 

Secretary HAGEL. Everything is being closely examined. Everything. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Because I would certainly hope the President 

would not take that off the table. 

Secretary HAGEL. Everything is on the table. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Good. And regardless of whether it is Syria, 

Iraq or any other neighboring country, this leadership needs to 

be—and the American people would support eliminating the leadership. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, as you also recall from the President’s 

speech, he said wherever they are. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Second issue is the use of our Tier One special forces, our elite special forces to mount assaults on the ground 

to capture and apprehend ISIL leadership wherever they are found. 

This is what I meant when I said we were doing this in Somalia 

and Yemen. Is that something that will be contemplated and is on 

the table? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I think to really get into any of the specific tactics, Congressman, we want to probably have a closed briefing on that. We can do that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Certainly, then, let’s follow up on that at 

the appropriate time. 

Secretary HAGEL. We can do that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And, also, along the same lines, using boots on the 

ground, for lack of a better word, to guide and direct close air support, that is something that I think is critical also. And, once again, 

is that something that we can talk about in this forum? I want to 

see as many tools in the tool box as necessary so that this plan can 

be successful, and I think taking things off the table militates 

against that. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, again, within the confines of an open 

hearing, I would again say that we are looking at everything, nothing off the table, but I would also point to the success here recently 

regarding the Haditha Dam, Mosul Dam, and some of these 

strikes, where it has been Iraqi security forces on the ground with 

their special forces and our air strikes and we didn’t have our people embedded with them and they were very successful. So the 

Iraqi security forces have capability. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, I am glad to hear your answers, Mr. 

Secretary. My concern is, I am just going to echo what the chairman said earlier, sometimes the President takes things off the 

table right off the bat, and that that is troubling to me. I want to 

see as many options on the table as possible. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, if I might, and I think you have got a little time, so I won’t indulge anyone else here, I know how that 

works. I don’t think it was a matter, and I know it is not a matter 

of the President taking options off the table of the American public. 

I think what he wants to always make sure that the American public is certain and clear of what his intent is and what he as the 

President of this country is willing to do, but he wants the American people to understand what is it that he is getting them into, 

what is he asking the American people for, and I think that is the 

clarity you see. Tactically in these issues, no, he won’t take things 

off the table. 
35 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you for that reassurance, and I will continue to be supportive. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. At this time we are going to go to 4 minutes so 

that we can try to get everybody’s questions in before we have to 

go to votes. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Had to start with me, didn’t you, Mr. Chairman? Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being patient and staying here until 

we freshmen get to ask questions. I very much appreciate that. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congresswoman, I was a freshman once, I understand. You ask the best questions. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. Well, thank you very much. So, you 

know, I voted no yesterday, and it was a tough no vote for me because I simply have a lot of questions. If—the vote yesterday was 

on this reauthorization for the $500 million that expires in just 7— 

I am sorry, 12 weeks. Why would we not start by asking for that 

amount of money to arm the Peshmerga and putting more forces 

and more resources behind the troops in Iraq first before we go to 

what is a short-term funding for arming these rebel groups in 

Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. Two answers, Congresswoman. One is we have 

got to do both, and we are presently supporting the Peshmerga as 

well as the Iraqi security forces with literally expanded accelerated 

help, equipment, armaments, and we are doing that and have been 

doing that, and I noted that in an earlier answer. So it is not an 

either-or. We believe we need to do both, and we need to get the 

training and equip part of the moderate Syrian opposition piece 

started as quickly as possible, because they both fit into the overall 

strategy as how you defeat ISIL, and you help stabilize those countries, particularly Iraq, and so it is not a matter of not doing one 

versus the other. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I am concerned that we are starting with the 

rebels. 

General, I had a couple questions for you. If we turn, if we actually train and equip these moderate rebel groups and we send them 

back in, my understanding is that they don’t have much of a command-and-control structure, they are fairly self-identifying, there 

are a whole bunch of groups, there is no military-like structure like 

the ISIS and ISIL has, and their first mission is to basically defend 

and deny territory to ISIS. How are they able to logistically support themselves once we train them and give them this weaponry? 

How are they going to be able to conduct these operations? Who is 

going to provide them with the 556 [5.56 millimeter rifle ammunition], the 40 mike-mike [40 millimeter grenade launcher ammunition], the 7.62 [7.62 millimeter machine gun ammunition]? Where 

is that coming from and are we looking now at relying on contractors or secret ops or covert ops to do that? 

General MAYVILLE. Congresswoman, we are looking at all options 

of how you sustain this effort once we begin, but you do raise an 

important issue in developing the leadership and finding those 

within these initial formations that have the aptitude for additional skills. So we are going to have to find who has the aptitude 
36 

to be a logistician, who has the aptitude to be a communications 

expert, and we will build that capability as we build this basic 

force. The first phase is identify and vet them, create a relationship, give them the basic training, and let them go back and protect their communities. The next thing we will do is we will build 

off of that with skills, and we will stay connected to them. There 

will have to be an oversight, there will have to be accountability, 

and we will have to create a method for doing that with the leadership that we identified within the training. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Just in the last 20 seconds I have, so you are 

not ruling out the fact that we may be actually turning to a Blackwater or whatever their subsidiary is, Xe International Development Solutions, Academy, whatever they are calling themselves to 

provide the logistical support in the initial stages? Is that what we 

are opening ourselves up to? 

General MAYVILLE. There has been—we are still in the very 

early planning of this, but to date, there has been no discussions 

of anything other than how would we as a military would do this. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and Mr. Secretary, I think 

I heard you clearly and concisely say, we are at war and everything 

is on the table. Is that accurate? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. I think one of the things that is confusing to me and 

I think confusing the majority of Americans is that that is not consistent with what the President says when he, as one of my colleagues pointed out, takes other actions or potential operations off 

the table, and my granddad is no longer here, but he was a World 

War II POW [prisoner of war] and a B–17 pilot, and he would tell 

you that the first, the first decision is the decision to win and make 

sure that we are willing to do whatever it takes to win. 

Desert Storm was in 1990. We have been in that country, in 

those countries on and off for 24 years, over half of my life. We 

have spent trillions of dollars, we have had hundreds of thousands 

of Americans in there, hundreds of thousands of other people that 

we have trained, and, General, these 5,000 moderate Syrians ought 

to be pretty easy to find. I assume they are 10 foot tall and bulletproof. My question is, how can 5,000 moderate Syrians do what the 

United States and all of our coalitions could not do in 24 years? 

General MAYVILLE. Well, 5,000 moderate opposition groups with 

basic training to secure their villages will have some effect, but it 

won’t have the decisive effect that you speak to, but it is only one 

part of a larger effort. That larger effort includes training, continuing to assist in the Iraqi security forces counter ISIL. We will 

have the use of our airpower to assist where it is necessary, and 

we are also looking to employ the support, the direct support of 

partners in the region. So we are going to squeeze on this through 

multiple venues. 

Mr. SCOTT. Then, with due respect, the President should outline 

that. There should be a separate vote, not a vote on a continuing 

resolution. I blame this on my leadership as much as I do the 

President. This is much more serious than an amendment to a con-
37 

tinuing resolution. I would also suggest, you know, the Sunnis and 

Shi’as have been fighting since the 7th century. We don’t understand that war, certainly not all of them participate in it, but when 

we talk about beheadings, you know, Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the Saudis beheaded eight people in the month of 

August, and they practice one of the strictest forms of Sharia law 

and do some things over there that by any stretch of the imagination I think any American would consider barbaric. And so how do 

we pick our friends? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I think the first way I would answer your 

question is America, I think any country, always responds in its 

own self-interest. What is our interest here? I think you asked the 

question when American citizens are publicly killed, murdered, is 

that in the interest of this country? Well, I think it is. Is it a threat 

to who we are? I think it is. So you can take that out as far as 

you want. So that is partly, I think, the answer. 

But your bigger question, which is exactly the right question, the 

history of that area, we can’t interject ourselves or impose ourselves on any country or traditions or history, and what we are 

doing differently is bringing in partners from the region. This, as 

the President has said, what I said, has to be settled by the countries themselves, and that means the Arab countries, the Muslim 

countries. We can help, but we can’t alone dictate or determine the 

outcome of that. But it is in our interests. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Maffei. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Lieutenant General Mayville, thank you for your 

service to our country. Can you describe to us what—there is talk 

about coalition. What are the members of the coalition that actually are going to have people on the ground either as military advisors or troops along with us? 

Secretary HAGEL. As I said in my opening testimony, we are 

close to 50 coalition nations who are—— 

Mr. MAFFEI. Mr. Secretary, I don’t mean to interrupt you, but 

specifically have committed to having people there arm in arm with 

us, not just supplies, not just—but actual human beings on the 

ground helping us with that mission. 

Secretary HAGEL. Each country will provide assistance based on 

their capacities too. Some will be airpower, some will be people. We 

have had a number of military offers. We are coordinating that now 

I noted in my testimony. General Allen has the essential responsibility of bringing that together, coordinating each of these pieces. 

So we are in the process of doing that. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Okay, thank you. I am a little bit still confused 

about the nature of this. The President promises no combat mission, and I know you have been questioned by other folks about 

sort of what that means, but I am concerned that whether our people are over there on a combat mission, a training mission, advisory mission, they will become targets. Can you just clarify, if we 

have people that are shot at, they will have, the rules of engagement will say they should defend themselves, correct, sir? 

Secretary HAGEL. Oh, absolutely. 
38 

Mr. MAFFEI. I appreciate that and I am glad. But won’t that then 

lead to combat missions, maybe not offensive combat missions, but 

if our people are in harm’s way, won’t they be in combat? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, anybody in a war zone who has ever been 

in a war zone, and some of you have, know that if you are in a war 

zone, you are in combat. What the President has said that there 

would be no specific American ground combat role. I think that is 

pretty clear. Yes, if you have advisors in a war, they are in a combat zone, yes. But the role of Americans in that war, as the President has laid out, I think is pretty clear, what he said we will do 

and what we won’t do. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Can you or Lieutenant General give us any sense 

of how many Americans will be put in harm’s—how many Americans additionally will be put in harm’s way either in the theater 

or near the theater? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, what I said in regard to the President’s 

announcement last week on what he has ordered now additional 

American forces into Iraq, by the time they all get there, there will 

be around 1,600 American forces in Iraq. 

Mr. MAFFEI. And they would be in Iraq? 

Secretary HAGEL. In Iraq. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Not Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. Not Syria. In Iraq. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Okay. Just finally, I guess trying to figure out again 

who exactly we are helping. You speak of sort of the ‘‘we’’ in this, 

and I know you have been asked similar questions, but I am still 

fuzzy on how exactly you are going to identify the forces that we 

can train, we can enhance, and I guess it goes back to my allies 

question, and are they going to be alone, is this just going to be 

a few Syrian fighters, 5,000 each? Because it seems to me that if 

we are training them, yes, we will eventually build up a force 

there, but in the meantime, won’t our enemy build up their force 

far more than we can catch up? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, a couple answers to your question. It is 

a beginning. We might be able to do more than 5,000 a year. As 

I said in my statement, it depends on more training sites, more 

vetting, more people. We are going to train them in units, equip 

them in units, not just rebels here and there, so that they are prepared to take on more and more responsibility. With our partners. 

That is another piece of this. This is an undertaking that is pretty 

dramatic and sophisticated. It is a beginning, but at the same time, 

all of the other dynamics of this strategy, what is going on, as General Mayville just noted here a minute ago, are in play at the same 

time. We are not just relying on that train and equip moderate Syrians. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Hagel and General Mayville, I really want to thank you 

for your service across the board, and it has been varied for Secretary Hagel in a number of ways, going back to Vietnam. We really do appreciate that. 

You made a comment about combat, so I want to make sure that 

our troops, the 1,600 that are in Iraq, are going to be compensated 
39 

as they should be reference to combat pay, because they are going 

to be exposed to that at some point in time or could be. Are they 

going to be? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, they are now, but let me have General 

Mayville explain how that is—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay, so those currently in country are receiving 

combat pay? 

General MAYVILLE. Let me not get in front of that important decision that will come to the Secretary, but typically you are talking 

about hostile duty pay? 

Mr. NUGENT. Yes. 

General MAYVILLE. And there are a set of procedures clearly outlined and under what conditions one is entitled to that. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

General MAYVILLE. And we will apply that standard here, and it 

will go to the Secretary. 

Mr. NUGENT. So the answer is the Secretary will make that decision whether or not? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, and they will be compensated. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you very much, I appreciate that. You know, 

I voted no. I will tell you it was difficult, but at the same time, because of all of the briefings I have heard, and you have touched on 

it, you know, the Syrian force that we are talking about training 

and equipping, and the reason I voted no was, you know, they have 

very little organization, there is no—and you mentioned this, there 

is no political structure in place to support them. I would support 

an Iraqi issue because there is a political force to at least start 

talking about how to fix things. Command and control. 

We know that at this point in time there is no command and control for the Syrian free forces or whatever you want to call them, 

and there is for the Iraqis because we helped build that. And training or retraining the Iraqi force is a whole lot easier than trying 

to train up, by the President’s own, you know, description of, you 

know, guys that are, you know, the regular folks. They may have 

some combat experience now because they had to fight for their 

lives, but they are certainly not a trained combat, just as Iraq is 

because we trained them, even though they have had some issues, 

but we still have at least a base to start from, and I guess that is 

why I disagreed with us getting involved in the train-and-equip 

portion in Syria when we have the ability to do that I think and 

win in Iraq. I think we have, and I think we have shown that we 

can work with them. 

So it gets a lot, it is a whole lot of hoping and wishing in the 

fact that—and I know it depends upon the training facilities that 

we have available, but the testimony has been, you know, 3 training facilities, 5,000 troops. I don’t know how—how do we overcome 

those other things, the command and control, political system, and 

the actual trained forces, because the fact remains static, obviously, 

in Syria as we move forward, if you could. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, here, the way I would explain it, and it 

is my opinion and the opinion of the President that if you are going 

to defeat ISIL, and that is the objective, as the President has laid 

out, you are not going to defeat ISIL just in Iraq. Matter of fact, 
40 

most of the ISIL threat is in Syria, safe havens, training camps, 

resources. 

Mr. NUGENT. I get that. 

Secretary HAGEL. So you are going to have to deal with them in 

Syria. 

Mr. NUGENT. But I would think a step by step, at least an approach where you can drive them out of Iraq while we have the opportunity to, and as we are doing it, focus then back on Syria. I 

yield back, I apologize. 

Secretary HAGEL. We have to do both at the same time. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Kilmer. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us. I am of the opinion that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force needs to be rescinded and that 

a more specific authorization needs to be drafted to combat the 

ISIL threat. 

What cautions, what advice and requests would you have for us 

if we were to consider that effort of drafting a new Authorization 

for the Use of Military Force? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, as you know, we believe the President 

has the authority under the AUMF of 2001 to do what he believes 

that is important to do for the security of this country. He also has 

said he welcomes the Congress’ involvement, support. If the Congress believes that they want to get involved in writing a new authorization of force, that is the prerogative of the Congress. But to 

go beyond that as to advise you, I am not a lawyer, so I would 

leave that up to the lawyers and specifically what the White House 

thinks they would need if that is something that they think they 

should want to do or need to do. 

Mr. KILMER. Is there anything specific that you would want or 

not want in such an authorization? I understand that you believe 

you currently have that authorization. I guess the question I have, 

in one of the briefings we had, it was said we would welcome if 

Congress wanted to provide a more specific authorization. Any constraints or things that you would want to see in that regard? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I think anytime—and I am going to be 

general in this because that is not my area. That is really the 

President have to make those kinds of decisions. But for us, Department of Defense, who we are always the ones required to implement, we would want to have the Commander in Chief have as 

much flexibility within the bounds of accountability, which in a coequal branch of government we have to have, we recognize that, 

but for us, we have to have that flexibility and I think the Commander in Chief does as well in order to carry out his duties. 

Mr. KILMER. The other question I had for you was has the Department begun to consider the second- and third-order effects of 

providing air support and training and supplies as prescribed by 

this mission? I am particularly concerned with the wear and tear 

on our military airplanes and seagoing vessels that may have a 

higher utilization rate, and as a consequence, require more maintenance than was originally presumed in the President’s fiscal year 

2015 budget submission. As the presumed $500 million OCO dollars to train and equip our allies won’t cover that initial mainte-
41 

nance, where will the additional money come from, OCO or O&M 

accounts or through a supplemental request? 

Secretary HAGEL. We are looking at all that right now, and you 

are right, as we pick up the pace on this mission and do the things 

that we need to do, we are going to most likely have to change 

some of those numbers, but that is not new. I mean, the world is 

dangerous and it is fluid and it is dynamic. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Chairman, I yield back. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. At this time I will take my 4 minutes 

here, and I appreciate you both being here. You know, as we look 

back on things, I remember Vice President Biden saying the victory 

in Iraq will be one of the greatest successes of the Obama administration, and as I look out and I see those of you with your combat 

patches, I would say the success goes to those that were in the 

field. But that being said, we did succeed and we succeeded with 

combat troops and using all of our assets, and it was a gift to Iraq 

that unfortunately has fallen apart. 

My concern is when we start talking about counterterrorism operations as opposed to full combat, I have some concerns there. 

ISIL, to me, is somewhat of a state, not a recognized state, but they 

actually have territory, they have wealth, and they have an army, 

and they are different than the typical terrorist effort, and I understand our desire to want to use the Kurds and the Iraqi Army and 

the Syrian forces that we are talking about. 

My concerns stem from the questions you got earlier about who 

has got the central command here, I mean, who is really calling the 

shots when you are putting these pieces together, and I have the 

concern with that, but also in another hearing I had asked is the 

Iraqi army or the Peshmerga willing and authorized to move into 

Syria if that is what it takes to destroy this enemy ultimately, especially if our effort with the Syrians is not successful? And the answer I got was no. And to me that is like saying in World War II, 

well, we will go to Germany, but we won’t go in and defeat them. 

And so what is our contingency here? What are we going to do if 

this effort in Syria is not successful, knowing that our strongest assets on the ground are not willing to go into Syria where they have 

safe haven at this point? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, I think we recognize that Iraq is a sovereign country, so we don’t order Iraq to do anything. We can’t. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Understood. 

Secretary HAGEL. So if Iraq makes a decision for whatever reason, that is their decision. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. But see that to me is their objective is to liberate 

Iraq from this enemy, from ISIL, but our objective is to destroy 

ISIL. So I am concerned about the strength of what we have in 

Syria. We may run them into Syria, and then what if we are not 

succeeding there? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, that is exactly right, that we are looking 

at this from a borderless dynamic, that ISIL is a threat to all the 

nations of the Middle East. Right now they are principally focused 

in—their safe haven is in Syria, which is ungovernable, as you 

know, in the eastern part of Syria, so with the strategy that we 
42 

have laid out and we are implementing with partners, partners 

again essential, strong, united, inclusive Iraqi government essential, we have got the—must-have Muslim Arab partners essential 

as well as other partners in order to destroy ISIL, and you are exactly right, it isn’t by borders. We are not dealing with that. Each 

will play roles where they can. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. My time is running out, but I would hope maybe 

in another setting, a classified setting, perhaps, we can find out 

what some of those contingencies might be because I know the good 

general has already anticipated some of these things as a strategist, and it is not necessarily something we want to expose to everyone. So. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I appreciate that, and I yield back my time. At 

this time they have called votes, and so we are going to break and 

I have been told we are going to return after the votes. And I, 

again, appreciate both of you for your time today. And I do encourage members to come back, even some of those that have left and 

get them back. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BYRNE [presiding]. The committee will come back to order 

and the chair recognizes Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for holding this meeting. 

Secretary Hagel and Lieutenant General Mayville, thank you for 

appearing this morning and this afternoon before this committee, 

and I thank you for your steadfast leadership and dedication to 

service, and I applaud, I want to go on record as saying that I applaud the President for his four-point strategy to defeat ISIL. 

Now, the first question I have is, as you can imagine, talk of 

these actions against ISIL have stoked some concern in the AsiaPacific region that the rebalance strategy will be abandoned or not 

fulfilled. I don’t necessarily share these concerns, but I was hoping 

that you might be able to touch on how we balance our efforts to 

degrade and destroy ISIL and meanwhile keep to our commitments 

in the rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific area. Secretary Hagel. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congresswoman, thank you, and I think your 

question is an important one because, as we all know, the world 

is faced with many threats, America is faced with many threats, 

and we always have to keep in mind all of our interests around the 

world, and certainly the rebalance to Asia-Pacific is one very clear 

commitment and interest we have. 

Our efforts against ISIL will not affect our commitment to AsiaPacific, as the President has made very clear. That commitment, 

that rebalancing will continue, and I think we have, over the last 

couple of years in particular, have made great progress as we have 

enhanced our relationships and partnerships in your part of the 

world, and very much appreciate Guam’s role in all of this because 

you are a key, key area, and the people that you represent I want 

to also thank for their hospitality to all of our men and women who 

serve there. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and I 

thank you for your very direct answer to my question. 
43 

The other one is I noted on Tuesday that Chairman Dempsey 

talked about how this is a generation problem, and this battle 

against ISIL will be protracted, a protracted war, and with that in 

mind, what is the exit strategy for U.S. service members? If we are 

doing our job right over there, at some point our training teams 

should work themselves out of a job as the countries in the Middle 

East take on these roles. So what is the plan for the exit? 

Secretary HAGEL. You are correct that our role and our work 

with our partners is with an exit in mind, but let’s start with what 

we are doing and how we are doing it. First, the responsibility for 

bringing Iraq back into a strong position to defend itself is a responsibility of the Iraqis, the Iraqi security forces, Peshmerga, the 

government, the new government of Prime Minister Abadi, and 

bringing all the various segments of that country together. 

So it is not our responsibility. We are going to help them do that, 

we are going to support them in their efforts to do that. We will 

keep, obviously, some contingency of force there, but this is a different situation than we have had before. It is their responsibility 

and their fight, but we will help them. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I really appreciate your answers to my questions, and Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

Mr. BYRNE. The gentlelady yields back. The chair recognizes 

himself for 4 minutes. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being patient with us. We had a series of votes, and there were some of us that didn’t have a chance 

to ask you some questions. We appreciate your sticking around for 

this. I voted for the McKeon Amendment yesterday, but I recognized in doing so that it was one element, and it has a limited duration, and we will be back, at the very least, to consider what we 

are going to do about that one element, but obviously it is one element of what is going to be a much bigger strategy, and the President has some key decisions to make there, and we heard you talk 

about some of those today. 

My first question is, is it the President’s intent, your intent to 

come back to us with a bigger strategy, the full strategy so we can 

understand how that element and other elements fit together and 

operate together? And, if so, will you bring that back with a new 

AUMF because there are a lot of us that believe there needs to be 

a new AUMF, and we can get into the legal arguments about it, 

but as a matter of good policy, would you think that in addition to 

just giving us a strategy, there should be an AUMF that accompanies it? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you. On the AUMF, as 

you heard me say this morning and what the President has said, 

we believe, he believes he has the authority to do what he needs 

to do to keep this country safe and to degrade and defeat ISIL 

within the statutory authority that now exists. He has also said, 

as I have said, that he would welcome the President—or the Congress’ involvement, would welcome a rewrite of any of those authorizations. That is up to the Congress. But in the meantime, he feels 

strongly that he needs to take action on these threats now. 

As to strategy, the strategy that the President generally laid out 

to the American people last week as I am up here testifying on 
44 

today—Secretary Kerry is as well, has been—I was in the Senate 

a couple of days ago as you know. Other cabinet members have 

been up, we have been up briefing over the last 2 weeks, as you 

know, in closed-door sessions, and I am sure you have been part 

of those briefings, all in an effort to further define and bring some 

clarity to the strategy, how are we implementing it, what resources 

we are going to continue to need, what are the dynamics to each 

of these. 

So I don’t think the strategy changes. Obviously as we comply 

with the continuing resolution limits, having to come back in December with more information, and I suspect in the next 3 months 

we will have more fidelity and clarity on a number of things. As 

you know, these are fluid and dynamic challenges. We have to be 

prepared for that, be ready for that. So the basic strategy I don’t 

think is going to change or shift, but as we evolve in our requirements and how we are implementing that strategy, will, I suspect 

by necessity, be redefined and changed and shifted just the tactics 

of how we are implementing it. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, let me offer this observation; not advice, just 

an observation. In listening to my colleagues in the House as we 

were debating the amendment, as we were talking among ourselves, I think it would be very helpful to you in getting successful 

votes in the future if there was a clearly articulated strategy, complete, comprehensive strategy. And I think it would equally help if 

it was accompanied with a new AUMF. There are some of us that 

took the vote yesterday knowing that it was of a limited time duration, that we were only talking about one element, and I think it 

would strengthen our ability to support you and support the President, and perhaps gain some more votes if we had it all laid out 

for us, it was all put together in a package. 

I am not trying to get into a legal argument with you or the 

President about legal authority. I am talking about good policy. So 

I just offer that observation to you and hope that you will take that 

back to the President. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you, I will. I understand 

what you are saying. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you very much, sir. The chair recognizes Mr. 

Gallego for 4 minutes. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary, 

thank you for hanging out and staying. I know that, you know, 

many times when this row gets to ask questions, the witness has 

to leave, so I appreciate the courtesy. 

Very quickly, when we are talking about strategy, I mean, one 

of the things that I hear is that, you know, we are very capable 

of winning battles, but in the long run, we lose the war. That is 

certainly the impression that so many of the Iraq war, the second 

Iraq war veterans have in the district that I represent. And, as you 

know, it is a district that, it is bigger than 29 states, I mean, it 

is about 24 percent or so of the land area of Texas, it is a huge 

swath, disparate opinions, but there seems to be a good consensus 

that, you know, the strategy that we had outlined is a strategy for 

a specific purpose, a limited purpose as opposed to a more big picture long term, you know. And the perception is we have seen this 

movie before. What makes us think that the ending on this par-
45 

ticular case is going to be any different than the endings that we 

have seen before? What makes this different from other times? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, first, I think that the strategy that the 

President laid out corresponds very directly and clearly with the 

threat, and that threat has been identified and defined, I think, 

pretty clearly by the President and a number of us. This threat 

that ISIL presents to the United States, to our interests, to our allies, certainly to the region, we believe is very clear. 

Now, that said, the strategy that the President has announced 

that we are in the process of finalizing and in the process of implementing is different in many ways. Number one, it includes the, 

not just the strategic but the tactical buy-in of many partners, including partners in that region, including Muslim Arab countries. 

Second, it defines our role in a very clear way. As the President 

said, there will not be American combat responsibilities on the 

ground. We will have support missions where we can help, where 

we have unique capabilities, along with our partners. Another essential part of this is a new Iraqi government that must bring an 

inclusiveness and a representation to not just the government but 

the governing, where the new Prime Minister brings all the people 

in. 

I think the clear threat that ISIL presents to all of those countries is so clear now and the common interests are so clear that 

that is different from anything I can recall in how we have, certainly in the recent, in our recent history how we have gone about 

anything. 

Mr. GALLEGO. One of the important things that I would ask you 

to keep in mind as you move forward is, as you talk about getting 

investments from others, is that we need to make sure that the 

American people are invested in this as well. I mean, you know 

more than most even in this room about what happens when an 

American public is not supportive of U.S. military action, and it is 

very important that the public be kept engaged and that they be 

supportive of the President’s action and, frankly, America’s actions 

overseas. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you, I get that and I 

think, again—in fact, I know one of the reasons the President 

wanted to make that address to the American public last week was 

for that very reason, and we will continue to make that point. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. 

Mr. BYRNE. The chair recognizes Mrs. Davis for 4 minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for staying. I appreciate it. 

You know, we know that this is just fraught with complications, 

but my belief is that the consequences of doing nothing is also 

fraught with great risks, and I appreciate the fact of moving forward when we don’t have all the answers clearly. You can tell from 

the questions here and the questions throughout the last few weeks 

and the way, frankly, that the vote came up, good bipartisan yes 

and no, and so that means that we all have a lot of work to do, 

I think, and I know you appreciate that. 

The President requested that authority in order to provide direct 

military training for our moderate Syrian rebels so that they have 
46 

an alternative to ISIS, but the concern is partly the lack of unity 

among the disparate parts of those who have not chosen to join and 

are engaged in other areas. But I wonder if you could talk about 

that difficulty that we are going to face with whether it is dual alliances, the desire to defeat or to certainly weaken the Assad regime 

versus pushing back against ISIL. 

Have we ever trained and worked with a new group of troops 

who have that kind of dual goal, and perhaps it is not even dual? 

How do you see that coming together? I think the other concern is 

we obviously are looking for intel on the ground, and yet when it 

comes to air support and the intel on the ground, which is why we 

are training the Syrian forces first in local communities and then 

hopefully to be more helpful in the broader goals, we are going to 

need to have more, whether it is partner support on the ground or 

U.S. support on the ground as well. And, again, in terms of how 

we describe that strategy, I think that is very important to people, 

and that is another area that we really haven’t heard much about. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congresswoman, thank you. You ask a very 

important question, and you led with that, with the reality that it 

is complicated. I suspect Members of Congress hear that maybe all 

too often on all issues, but this one is complicated, and your question does reflect that complication. 

Let me answer it this way: The moderate opposition forces that 

we will be vetting, and that process I think we talked at some 

length about this morning, how we would do that and so on, are 

people in Syria, people who have lived in Syria, who are citizens 

of Syria, whose families have lived there for a long time, they are 

being and have been squeezed right now—are being squeezed—by 

both the Assad regime and by ISIL and other terrorist groups. 

Right now there is nothing that they have in any coordinated organized way to give anyone in Syria who wants their country back 

and some kind of a future of peace and stability for their families 

and themselves any hope or any possibilities to build on. So the 

moderate opposition understands it is not a choice between necessarily ISIL and Assad. Yes, ISIL is who we are focused on, and 

that is our primary mission and objective here is to destroy ISIL, 

but the reality is that people that we will train have to deal with 

that, both of those realities, and they need a new political base that 

will, we believe, will come from this possibility of organization and 

hope that we can help with a new moderate opposition. 

Mr. BYRNE. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The chair recognizes Mr. Langevin for 4 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. 

Is this on? Okay, there we are. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Secretary, I was one of those individuals who voted in favor 

of the resolution supporting the President’s plan last night. I did 

it with mixed emotions, and I know it is not a perfect plan, but I 

think we need to start somewhere, and I believe ISIL does pose a 

threat to the homeland and to our allies around the world based 

on the knowledgeable testimony I have heard from this committee 

and my work on the Intelligence Committee. 

My concern is, though, that there are going to be boots on the 

ground that are going to be required, but we don’t want them to 
47 

be U.S. boots, and I support the President’s position there, and I 

know you probably have talked about this already, but for my 

knowledge, I need to know the commitment that we have from our 

neighbors in the region in terms of what they are going to be able 

to do to put boots on the ground, because my constituents are really adamant that they don’t want a big U.S. footprint involved in 

this with forces on the ground, but, you know, and I know, I am 

concerned, we hear that it is going to take up to a year potentially 

to train the forces that we are training in Syria, and that is obviously too long a timeframe. 

If we had nations in the region who were willing to put boots on 

the ground now, at least to start with, it would be something to 

hold us over until those forces are trained and are going to go in 

and actually battle ISIL on the ground. So would you comment on 

that? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you, I will comment on it. 

First on your question on coalition partners and what are they 

committed to do and when will they start doing it, and all of the 

follow-up questions that go with it, just as an example. I understand this morning, I have not seen the report, but I knew it was 

forthcoming that President Hollande announced that France would 

be involved in military operations with us to destroy ISIL over 

Iraq, the next piece of this, Syria, and so on, as far as I know they 

have not made a decision, but that is just but one, since it just happened this morning, an example of how we are having more and 

more of these coalition partners come forward. 

But the bigger question that you asked specifically about partners in the region, coalition partners in the region, how are they 

going to play a role as we take time to build these moderate Syrian 

forces in our train-and-equip program. 

Again, I would emphasize the importance of the entire dimension 

of the strategy. The train-and-equip portion of the moderate Syrian 

opposition is part of that, but so is a new Iraqi inclusive government to bring in the Sunnis and Shi’as so we can start to get the 

Sunni tribes in western Iraq back off of that support of ISIL and 

back with the government. Coalition partners, their involvement 

through military action, our air strikes will continue to help Iraqi 

security forces continue to work the offensive, take back territory, 

hold territory that they had lost to ISIL, stabilize Iraq. 

All these different dimensions are in play at the same time. Yes, 

it is going to take some time to start training these people, the 

right people, the vetted people in groups where we are not just 

training one or two terrorists, or antiterrorists, or fighters, but 

groups have discipline, strategy, tactics, weapons, that they can 

offer then a base of a beginning in Syria, not just a military option, 

but also political opposition to build around that. So it is going to 

take some time, but it is all these other elements of the strategy 

working at the same time toward the same end. 

Mr. BYRNE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming today, thank 

you for your patience and your candor. This is a great threat facing 

the people of our country. You are very concerned about it, and we 
48 

share your concern. We know that this needs to be a partnership 

between you and the President and the Congress, and we want to 

continue to work with you, and we appreciate the further communications we know we are going to be receiving from you. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you very much, and I 

very much appreciate the questions, the attention, and the support. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, sir, and this committee is adjourned. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

(53) 
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55 
56 
57 
58 
59 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

(63) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE 

Mr. KLINE. Secretary Hagel, you testified that reports of President Obama personally selecting each target in Syria or President Obama individually authorizing each 

target nominated for strike in Syria were erroneous. If the reports are wrong and 

the President is not personally selecting targets, please answer the following: To 

whom has the President delegated this selection authority and who will be nominating and giving final approval for prosecution of targets in Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. General Austin, the Commander, U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) has been delegated the authority to select and engage targets in Syria. 

General Austin has further delegated the authority to engage targets in Syria to the 

Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and the Commander, Task 

Force 94–7 (TF 94–7). Targets for deliberate engagement are vetted through the Intelligence Community at the request of CENTCOM’s Intelligence Directorate. This 

vetting ensures the accuracy of the supporting intelligence. Once vetted, each target 

is validated at CENTCOM to ensure it falls within the Law of War and supports 

the CENTCOM Commander’s intent and objectives. These vetted and validated targets are then approved for strike by General Austin upon nomination by the 

CFACC, TF 94–7, or the CENTCOM Intelligence Directorate. Dynamic targets, also 

known as targets of opportunity, are approved for engagement through the appropriate target engagement authority. 

Mr. KLINE. Please provide the committee a ‘‘wire diagram’’ of the command relationships and responsibilities that have been created for the ongoing operations 

against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), include all partner (coalition) nations and their responsibilities and authorities and annotate any national 

caveats coalition partners have placed on their use in the on-going campaign against 

ISIL. 

Secretary HAGEL and General MAYVILLE. [No answer was available at the time 

of printing.] 

Mr. KLINE. Under what rules of engagement (ROE) will our forces be operating? 

Please provide legal and layman definitions and examples of the ROE that we are 

currently operating under and plan to utilize in future operations. 

Secretary HAGEL and General MAYVILLE. U.S. forces will be operating under the 

Standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) that apply to operations conducted overseas. 

In addition, the Executive Orders for operations in Iraq and Syria have provided 

mission specific ROE. All the ROE are classified. 

The mission specific ROE authorize the use of force against two specifically designated groups, which means that these declared hostile forces may be targeted 

based on status. Forces that have been declared hostile for operations in Iraq and 

Syria include both the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Khorasan Group. 

U.S. forces use multiple forms of intelligence to determine whether or not the individual or equipment being targeted is a member of the declared hostile forces. 

U.S. forces always retain the inherent right of self-defense. Additionally, I authorized the use of force to defend other military and civilian personnel as well as critical infrastructure. In addition to the individuals designated by me, the Commander, 

U.S. Central Command has authority to designate additional military forces, civilian 

personnel, and critical infrastructure for protection under collective self-defense. 

General Austin has designated all partner nation coalition forces as eligible for protection under collective self-defense. U.S. forces have used this collective self-defense 

in operations that defend American citizens, internally displace people in vicinity of 

Sinjar and Kobani, and Iraqi Security Forces. 

The ROE also authorize entry in the land, internal waters, territorial seas, and 

air space of specifically designated nations. The entry authorization supports operations in Iraq and Syria and also allows for entry for the specific purpose of personnel recovery operations in surrounding nations, if necessary. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Forbes magazine recently wrote an article on DOD’s decision to reduce our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities by 50% 
64 

given the proposed retirement of the U–2 aircraft. The committee understands the 

U–2 currently provides 75 percent of our actionable intelligence. Several combatant 

commanders are on record supporting the capabilities of the U–2 over the Global 

Hawk. Public law in the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and 

again in the FY2012 NDAA preclude the retirement of the U–2 until ISR gaps 

caused by the retirement of the U–2 are mitigated. The law further stipulates that 

‘‘until the capability to be fielded at the same time or before the U–2 aircraft retirement would result in equal or greater capability available to the commanders of the 

combatant commands.’’ Can you provide details on the transition plan that allows 

a thoughtful transition strategy from the U–2 to the Global Hawk without creating 

an ISR gaps? 

Secretary HAGEL. The plan to upgrade the capabilities of the Global Hawk sensor 

and transition ISR missions from the U–2 to the Global Hawk is detailed in the office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation’s (CAPE) classified report to Congress. This report was prepared in response to section 143(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 and was briefed to members 

of the House Armed Services Committee on September 5, 2014. The Department of 

Defense Special Access Program Central Office (SAPCO) is coordinating with your 

office to arrange a discussion in which CAPE can review with you the classified details of the plan. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Several combatant commanders have expressed their concerns 

about our ISR capabilities and capacity? What investments are being made to maintain the necessary multispectral capabilities in order to preclude a gap in ISR capacity and capability as the U–2 is retired? 

General MAYVILLE. The retirement of the U–2 will create a multi-spectral gap 

until the required equipment for the RQ–4 is developed. The Air Force is assessing 

options for the transition of U–2 like capabilities to the RQ–4. In accordance with 

a $10M FY14 NDAA Congressional Mark, the Air Force is conducting a study to 

assess the cost and feasibility to transition U–2 sensor capabilities to the RQ–4. The 

results of this study are pending and distribution to the Congressional committees 

will occur by the spring of 2015. 

The FY15 PB provides investments to transition unique U–2 sensors to the RQ– 

4, mitigating some gaps in collection capabilities with the U–2 retirement. USAF 

estimates U–2 sensor transition costs at less than $500M over the next 10 years. 

The sensor transition will be deferred if BCA funding levels are realized. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Dr. FLEMING. President Obama has stated: ‘‘Our objective is clear and that is to 

degrade and destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) so it is no 

longer a threat.’’ While the President has repeatedly promised no combat boots on 

the ground, earlier this week General Dempsey testified in a Senate hearing that: 

‘‘To be clear, if we reach the point where I believe our advisers should accompany 

Iraqi troops on attacks against specific ISIL targets, I will recommend that to the 

President.’’ 

Could you please clarify: Will the President accept the recommendations of his top 

military leaders in order to destroy ISIL so that it is no longer a threat as the President has stated is his goal, or will this administration allow ISIS to continue its 

operations and conduct terrorist attacks in Iraq should the planned air campaign 

fail to destroy ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. The President has been clear: he is in regular discussions with 

his national security team on countering ISIL. The Chairman is a member of that 

team and his role is to provide military advice to the President. As events on the 

ground evolve, the President will continue to consider advice from his entire team. 

Dr. FLEMING. I am concerned about the safety of our airmen as they conduct the 

campaign this administration is proposing. The President has stated that there will 

be no combat troops on the ground, and yet as we know from the experience of Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and as has been explained by senior Air Force leaders, special operations forces are needed on the ground in Syria in order for air strikes to be successful. General Dempsey testified in a Senate hearing earlier this week that U.S. 

forces will be prepared to provide search and rescue missions if pilots are shot down 

and to make the mission successful. 

Could you please clarify as to how this administration plans to ensure the protection of U.S. airmen and the success of the airstrike mission that he is proposing 

without special operations forces serving in some kind of combat role? 

Secretary HAGEL and General MAYVILLE. All airstrikes are coordinated through 

the Combined Air Operations Center. Through various intelligence collection assets, 
65 

a threat overlay is developed displaying the threats from surface to air missiles. 

These threats are incorporated in mission planning to mitigate to the greatest extent possible risks to the force; mitigations are attained primarily through avoidance 

of these areas and the use of standoff munitions to limit exposure to these anti-air 

threats. The tactics used by pilots are also designed to minimize their vulnerability 

to surface to air missiles and anti-air threats. For targets that are inside the threat 

rings of surface to air missiles or located in other high threat areas, detailed 

weaponeering is conducted to minimize the threat to aircraft. The use of standoff 

weapons systems such as Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-Off Missiles, Joint Stand-Off 

Weapons, sea-launched Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, and employment of stealth aircraft minimize the threat to personnel. 

Dr. FLEMING. Since President Obama has taken office, our military has been cut by over $1 trillion and is set be cut by billions more before his term is complete. 

How does this administration intend to ensure that our soldiers have the training, 

resources, and equipment they need to be successful in meeting the President’s stated objective of destroying ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Military Services will always ensure the forces that are deploying to engage in combat operations or train and assist operations are trained 

and equipped to meet the mission tasking. Specifically for the current operations to 

defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Military Services, for 

the most part, have relied on forces already assigned to the U.S. Central Command 

(USCENTCOM). The Department is relying on Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO) funding that is available under the Continuing Resolution to cover the costs 

of current operations. The Department, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, will evaluate the need to request additional OCO funding in fiscal 

year 2015 as requirements are better defined. 

Dr. FLEMING. As part of his plan to destroy ISIL, the President has requested that 

Congress authorize the training and equipping of what this administration has 

called the ‘‘vetted, moderate Syrian opposition.’’ Yet recent media reports have indicated that the founder of the Free Syrian Army has stated that it will not join the 

U.S.-led coalition to defeat ISIL because overthrowing Assad is its top priority. 

What evidence can the administration provide that the opposition forces that the 

President intends to equip and train will focus its efforts on ISIL, rather than on 

Assad’s forces? How does the possibility of the rebel opposition focusing on Assad 

square with this administration’s stated goal of destroying ISIL? What is this administration’s plan for eliminating ISIL if rebel forces focus on Assad rather than 

ISIL and other radical jihadist groups? 

Secretary HAGEL. The program to train and equip Syrian moderate opposition 

forces is a multi-purpose effort designed to build a force capable of defending the 

Syrian population against extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS), as well as regime attacks; to stabilize areas under opposition control; 

and prepare trained forces to go on the offensive against ISIS. The initial priority 

is to fight ISIS, to the extent possible we will recruit from communities that are 

directly threated by ISIS, or where forces will have the capacity and will to fight 

ISIS. More broadly, our goal is to ensure that the moderate opposition is in a 

positon to hold territory from which ISIS is removed and, by strengthening opposition forces, to advance the conditions that will lead to a negotiated end to the Syrian 

conflict. 

Dr. FLEMING. A major concern Congress and the American people have with arming and training this ‘‘vetted, moderate, Syrian opposition’’ is its relationship to 

other groups on the ground. Could you please describe the nature and level of political, diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation, integration or affiliation between the identified rebel forces and the following groups: ISIL, Al-Nusra, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Khorasan Group, and other Al Qaeda affiliates and radical 

jihadist groups. 

Secretary HAGEL. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Dr. FLEMING. The constitutions and politicians we supported in Iraq and Afghanistan were not supportive of religious freedom. Are we going to change course on this 

matter? For example, are we going to include Christian militia groups and leaders, 

and perhaps other groups, or only Islamic militias? For example, one of the most 

prominent Christian militia groups is the Syriac Military Council. They control an 

area of free Syria. Will they be included in any approved weapons support and 

training support from us? 

Secretary HAGEL. We have not yet identified the specific armed groups we will 

work with for the train-and-equip program. However, should Christian groups demonstrate interest in working with us, and be deemed appropriate recipients of U.S. 

support after being properly vetted, we could consider including them in the program. 
66 

Dr. FLEMING. Please give a detailed account of the coalition against ISIL that the 

administration has formed thus far, including the type and level of support from 

each country part of the coalition. 

Secretary HAGEL. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON 

Mr. CARSON. We know that major terrorist groups like ISIL and Al Qaeda actively 

pursue an international profile—both to boost recruiting and to spread their extremist ideology. But I’m interested in understanding whether the split between ISIL 

and Al Qaeda has driven them into direct competition. Do you believe that the level 

of attention given to ISIL is encouraging Al Qaeda and others to branch out, as Al 

Qaeda recently did on the Indian subcontinent, or to act more violently to keep up? 

Are there any notable changes in Al Qaeda and other terrorist group activities that 

correspond with the rise of ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CARSON. President Obama made clear that ISIL is not a state. But are they 

taking any steps in pursuit of their statehood aspirations, like attempting to set up 

a government structure or provide public services? And if so, are we taking any 

steps to distinguish between ISIL fighters and those conscripted into these types of 

service positions in cities taken over by ISIL? 

Secretary HAGEL. ISIL aspires to establish local governments and provide basic 

services to the populace in each city or district of Iraq and Syria it controls. ISIL 

seeks to form its governance based on strict Sharia law. ISIL’s leadership structure 

in areas they control remains in-line with the group’s overall structure; however, the 

group has given some responsibility to local citizens loyal to ISIL and empowered 

supportive tribal leaders to address grievances. Local government offices and medical services are operated and managed ISIL members and loyalists. 

At this time we are unable to accurately distinguish between ISIL cadre and local 

citizens working under ISIL control. This is largely due to the lack of detailed information on the people in ISIL controlled cities. 

Mr. CARSON. What is the status of foreign military sales to Iraq? Are they on hold, 

proceeding normally, or being expedited to shore up the ISF? And after watching 

some of our equipment fall into ISIL’s hands, what steps can be taken to ensure 

that any future equipment provided is not lost in the same way? 

Secretary HAGEL. Since January, Iraq has requested additional equipment and 

services to aid in its campaign against ISIL. The USG has expedited delivery of 

more than 1,100 Hellfire missiles, 20,000 2.75-inch rockets, thousands of rounds of 

tank ammunition, thousands of machine guns, grenades, flares, small arms, and 

other equipment. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases are currently in development 

to provide additional Hellfire missiles, rockets, and other munitions as an immediate and effective tool against the threat. The formation of the new Iraq government, the strengthening and regeneration/reorganization of the ISF, and the increased U.S. advisory role will help ensure better security and employment of these 

critical capabilities. 

Mr. CARSON. I would like some clarity on the role of special operations forces in 

this conflict with ISIL. Obviously, special operations encompasses a wide array of 

missions. But does the ‘‘no boots on the ground’’ assertion apply to short-term special operations missions, like the pursuit of a high value target? If so, what types 

of special operations may occur while still sticking to the ‘‘no boots on the ground’’ 

pledge? 

Secretary HAGEL and General MAYVILLE. Special Operations play a central role 

in the conflict against ISIL. Counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, security 

forces assistance, counterinsurgency, and hostage rescue remain core activities for 

our Special Operations Forces. Nonetheless, the ‘‘no boots on the ground’’ policy applies to all operations, including Special Operations in Syria. However, our forces 

are capable of creating effects in Syria while not physically located there. U.S. Special Operations Forces conduct the core activities using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and in unique conditions and to different standards, but in 

a manner that complements conventional capabilities. Special Operations Forces can 

tailor their capabilities in combinations with foreign forces that provide options for 

creating effects to achieve a broad range of strategic objectives. If the situation necessitates, the President and Secretary of Defense retain the authority to make an 

exception to this policy. 

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