J~u~ 111111

Th~ smith Y~ir~
Part III: The Smith Years

The documents in Part III cover the period from Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smiths

August 1950 appointment as DCI to President Trumans farewell visit to CIA in

late 1952.

General Smith swept into office in October 1950 with a mandate and an inclina

tion to bring about major change in CIA. As the fourth Director of Central Intel

ligence, he inherited an Agency that lacked clear direction even as it braced

itself for the outbreak of a third world war. Smith began by implementing most

of the program that the NSC had recommended to DCI Hillenkoetter in 1949.

Moving swiftly, he reorganized CIAs analytical and support functions, exercised

tighter control of clandestine activities, and insisted on high-level political

approval for covert operations. The war in Korea and the threat of its spread

dominated Smiths tenure as DCI. Covert operations in East Asia soon con

sumed an enormous proportion of CIAs growing but still limited resources. The

wartime emphasis on the clandestine services steadily enhanced the profile and

influence of Smiths new deputyand ultimately his successorAllen Dulles.

339
63. Houston to Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, 29 August 1950

(Typed transcript; attachments not included)

transcrib~d for A3D by ed 3/20/53 X

29 August 1950

I

1~EMcRANDtThi ~OR Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith

1. In accordance with our conversation of 23

August, I am forwarding a memorandum outlining the

basic current problems facing CIA.

2. In the interest of brevity, the problems are

broadly stated. Therefore, I have attached in tabs

certain documents which go into considerable illustra

tive detail. This forwarding memorandum is classified

TOP SECRET in accordance with the classification of

TabS F and G. The rest of the papers are classified

in accordance with their content.

L2~ F.f-&1 ~ ~o~4L

~i~

HS/HC- ~ 1

~1~3 -

~ L LJ~JJJ~ -~e~

/s/ LAWBENCE R. HOUSTON

Lawrence R. Houston

wproved ~or :~

the HISTORICAL REVL1~I ~of

the Central Inte1ligeni~e Agency.

Dat.~ S JAN 1991

~RP ?~

I -, ~T&~.1 ~ ~&f /~1t1L~

oOO18~

341
63. (Continued)

29 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR T1~ RECORD

Set forth below is a brief statement of some of the more

pressing problems presently facing the Central Intelligence Agency.

These are the sub~ject of extensive studies within the Agency

and are voluminously documented in Agency files.

Appended hereto are certain documents which most

clearly illustrate the issues involved and which indicate measures

which would be basic steps in the solution thereof. These docu.

ments are identified in a list of tabs at the end of this paper.

1. Coordination of Activities

Difficulties in coordinating the intelligence activities

of the Government, and of performing other functions imposed

upon CIA by law, result from existing National Security Council

directives which impose upon CIA the board of directors

mechanism of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in

the following manner:

342
63. (Continued)

2

a. They require that recommendations and advice of

the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the National Security

Council (NSC) must contain the concurrence or non-concurrence

of the IAC;

b. They enable the IAC to assert the position that

they are not merely advisory to the DCI, but are actually a

board of directors, of which the DCI is but the executive secre

tary, i.e. one among equals;

c. Therefore the recommendations which go forward

to the NSC are not CIA recommendations as contemplated by the

law, but actually are watered-down compromises, replete with

loop holes, in an attempt to secure complete IAC support.

2. Intelligence Support for Production of E stiinates

Difficulties are encountered by CIA in producing adequate

intelligence estimates, due to the refusal of the MC agencies to

honor CIA requests for necessary intelligence information, depart

mental intelligence, or collection action:

a. Information has been withheld from CIA by MC

agencies on the basis that it is operational rather than

intelligence information and therefore not available to CIA;

that it is eyes only information or on a highly limited dissemi

nation basis; or that it is handled under special security provisions

which by-pass CIA;

b. CIA is not empowered to enforce its collection re

quests on L&C agencies, or establish priorities;

c. There is a failure of spontaneous dissemination of

certain material to CIA;

d. MC agencies continue, to cite the socalled Third

Agency Rule as a basis for refusing the give intelligenŁe to CIA.

3. Production arid Dissemination of Estimates

The furnishing of adequate national intelligence estimates

343
63. (Continued)

3

to the President, the NSC, and other appropriate recipients is

hampered by the lack of complete material, (as set forth in para

graph 3, above), and by present procedures which require concur

rence or substantial dissent to each estimate from the IAC agencies,

but make no provision for setting time limits thereon:

a. Departmental agencies of the IAC cannot concur in

intelligence estimates which conflict with agency substantive policy;

nor can they free themselves from departmental bias or budgetary

interests;

b Coordination of CIA estimates often takes months,

with the result a compromise position;

c. Departmental dissents to CIA estimates are frequently

unsubstantial, quibbling or reflective of departmental policy.

I~. Special Problems

a. The IAC agencies resist the grant of authority to

CIA to issue directives affecting the intelligence field in general

and their activities or priorities in particular on the ground that

it would violate the concept d~ command channels;

b. The status of CIA in relation to the President and

the NSC must be redefined and clarified;

c. The relationships between CIA on the one hand, and

the Departunnt of Justice - particularly the FBI, on the other,

especially in connection with the defector problem, must be improved

and clarified.

d. Difficulties imposed by NSC directives in the field

of unconventional warfare must be eliminated, particularly the policy control over CIA granted to the Departments of State and Defense.

The separation of clandestine operations into two offices within CIA

creates serious problems of efficiency, efficacy and, above aD.,

security;

e There is a failure of coordination of overt intelli

gence collection in the field, due in part to competition among the

departments in the field, but also to lack of positive planning and

344
63. (Continued)

action by CIA. This results in unnecessary duplication and over

laps, and the initial withholding of choice material. It is becom

jug necessary for CIA to take a strong position in the field of

overt collection abroad.

~. Nuclear Energy and Other Special Intelliceuce Subjects

Each has its own but related problems.

6. Relationship between JCS and CIA in the Event d~ War

This is an unresolved problem which has been the

subject of considerable discussion, one aspect of which is

covered by Tabs F and 0 attached. It may of course require

urgent consideration at any time.

7. Conclusion

Solution of the above problems lies in a grant of

adeuate authority to the DCI and CIA, and use of that authority to achieve the necessary coordination by direction rather than

placing reliance in a spirit of cooperation and good will.

345
63. (Continued)

INDEX OF TABS

~Tab A CIA proposed revision of NSCID #1. This

directive is believed by CIA to be necessary

to give the Director the authority needed for

exercise of his responsibilities. It has been

forwarded to State for discussion, but no

further action has been taken on it.

Tab B -

Proposed Memorandum to the National Security

Council, which elaborates paragraphs 1 - 3 set

forth in the memorandum above. This was pre

pared several months ago as an introduction to

CIAs proposed revision of NSCD) #1, included

herewith under Tab A.

Tab C - National Security Council Intelligence Directive

(NSCID) #1, under which CIA presently operates.

Tab D - Memorandum entitled Legal Responsibilities of

the Central Intelligence Agency11, which emphasizes

particularly Congressional intent in regard to the

national intelligence mission.

Tab E Current State/Defense proposals for reorganization

~

of intelligence production within CIA. A c anpro

~ St~ u~er discuss ~n.

Tab El]. -

Compromise now urged by State/Defense thru Gen. Magruder.

Tab F - Joint Intelligence Camnittee report on war time

status and responsibilities of CIA and its field

agencies (JIc 14~5/i, 12 July 1950). This indicates

an intention on the part of the JIC to have J(S

take over control of all covert activities in the

event of war.

Tab G - Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Jo~ni Magruder, dated

16 August 1950, setting forth CIAs position on its

war time relations to the Joint Chiefs. This memo

randum was originally drafted for dispatch to the

Secretary of Defense and was actually dis~tched

to General Magruder.

346
64. Wisner, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence,

Interpretation of NSC 10/2 and Related Matters,

12 October 1950 (Photocopy)

~r~)

October 19~O

r~:~T~ii1 T~

ME1~!ORANDUM FOR: DTh~TOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SIJBJECT~ Interpretation of NSC 10/2 and Related Matters

1. Pursuant to your oral instructions to me, I have duly notified the

appropriate representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff of your interpretation of NSC 10/2 and of your view

that the Memorandun of Interpretation dated 12 August 19IL6 and entitled

Implementation of NSC 10/2 is no longer applicable or effective in the

light of altered circumstances.

2. The notification and advice above referred to was accomplished at

a meeting held in s~y office at 3:30 p.m., 1]. October l9~O, which meeting was

attended by the authorized representatives of the Secretaries of State and

Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I explained to these individuals

at considerable length your reasoning and conclusions as regards the lack

of insuediate necessity for a –evision of NSC 10/2 in order to accomplish

the full integration of the Office of Policy Coordination as an element of

the Central Intelligence Agency fully responsive to your authority and

connnand as Director of the Agency. I further pointed out that you acknow

ledged the propriety and desirability of the continuing receipt by OPC

of advice and policy guidance from the Departments of State and Defense and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but that this was not to be regarded in any

sense as placing State, Defense and JCS in the position of giving instruc

tions or orders to OPC. Finally, I explained that you saw no reason for

changing the e~.sting pattern of advice and guidance including the manner

in which policy guidance flows to OPC as well as the organizations and

individuals in State, Defense and CIA heretofore functioning in this

capacity. I said that in theory and in fact the policy guidance would be

coming to the CIA as an organization and not merely to GPO, and that it

would be ny responsibility to keep you fully informed on all matters worthy

of your, attention.

3. The foregoing statements on icy part appeared to have been well

received by the representatives of State, Defense and the JCS, all of

whom expressed themselves as being personally in agreement with your views.

They undertook to convey the information given to them to their respective

superiors and to inform us in due course of the reaction and response of

their su~eriors. -

FRANK G. WISNER

Assistant Director for

Policy Coordination

.5 Pt

f~j6-77I

~~

347
65. Smith, Memorandum for the President, 12 October 1950

(Carbon copy with attachments)

32~i5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 Octobor 1950

~MG~Æ3~M P(E T~ PE~ID~T

In accordance with your instructions, I cubait hereuith eati

estee regarding five oritical situations in the Par Last. The

intelligence organizations of the Departeenta of Stat., the Ariq, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of

these estimates and concur in thee.

The estimates folio, in the folloving orders

Enc1oa~e A - Threat of Full Chinese C~~~~t Intervention

in Korea

B - Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea

C Threat of Chinese C~~4-~t Invasion of Formosa

D - Threat of Chinese Ciii~~~i,j4gt Invasion of

Indochina

B - Cc~,mmi ~t Capabilities and Threat in the

Philippines F - General Soviet and Chinese Con~ist Intentions

and Capabilities in the Far East

Inasonch as the conclusions reached with respect to these per

ticular situations depend in pert on the possibility of a Soviet

d~eision to resort to global war, the latest agreed estimate on

that subject is also attached as Enclosure G.

IALT~ B. SMITH

Director

Et~76~C

. SKCRKT

349
65. (Continued)

m ~~ y~

~-~.-~ 1.1 ~ ~ £~ L~

32615A

30

ERRATA for Central Intelligence Agenty Top Secret

Memorandum of 12 October 1950 #32615

A phrase has been omitted from Enclosure E, Communist

Capabilities and Threat in the Philippines. The phrase

a number of the ~

belongs in paragraph ~ thus mpking

the first sentence of 3.~. rend: Since the Communists have

achieved power in China, it is believed that ~ number ~

approximately half a million Phulpplnó Chinese have already

aligned themselves with the Peiping regime.

~-F- S E C RET

350
65. (Continued)

32E15

-

- -.

30

CENTRAL INIELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 October 1950

A. THREAT OF FULL CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

IN KOREA

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To esthnate the threat of full-scale Chinese Communist

intervention in Korea.

fl. CAPABILITIES

2. The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking

requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effec

tively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict.

III. FACTO1~ BEARING ON D~TENT

3. Indications of Intentions Despite statements by Chou En-lai,

troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities

and border vl~lations, there are no convincing Indications of an actual

Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in

Korea.

4. Factors FavorizE Chinese Communist Intervention

~ Intervention, if resulting in defeat of UN forces, would:

(1) constItute a major gain In prestige for communist China, con

firmingit as the premier Asiatic power~ (2) constItute a major

gain for Woi~ldCommunism with concomitant increase in Communist

Chinas stature in the Sino-Soviet axIs; (3) result in the elimination

1

351
65. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

of the possibility of a common frontier with a Western-type

democracy; and (4) permit the retention of sources of Man~

churian electric power along the Yalu River.

~ Intervention, even if not resulting In a decisive defeat

of UN forces, would: (1) enable the Chinese Communists to uffliZe

foreign war as an explanation for failure to carry out previously

announced economic reforms; (2) be consistent with and furnish

strong impetus to anti-Western trends in Asia; and (3) justify a

claim for maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to

China.

~ Interventinn, with or without assurance of final victOry,

might serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the

cause of the Soviet Union, In that it would Involve the Western

bloc In a costly and possibly inconclusive war In the Far East

~. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet

bloc particularly face the prospectof a major set-back In the

struggle with the non-Communist world If UN forces are per

mifted to achieve complete victory In Korea.

5. Factors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention

~,. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the con

sequences of war with the US. Their domestic problems are of

such magnitude that the regimes entire domestic program and

economy would be jeopardized by the strains and the material

damage which Would be sustained In war with the US. AntiCommunist forces would be encouraged and the regimes very

existence would be endangered.

.~. Intervention would minimize the possibility of Chimse

membership In the UN and of a seat on the Security CounciL

-2

~-OP SECRET

352
65. (Continued)

a S - a aa £

~, Open intervention would be extremely costly unless

protected by powerful Soviet afr cover and naval support Such

Soviet aid might not be forthcoming because it would constitute

SOviet Intervention.

d. Acceptance of major Soviet aid would make Peiping more dependent on Soviet help and Increase Soviet control in~

Manchuria to a point probably unwelcome to the Chinese Corn

munlste.

~. If unsuccessful, Chinese Intervention would lay Peiping open to Chinese resentment on the grounds that China would be

acting as a Soviet catspaw.

From a military standpoint the most favorable time for

Intervention In Korea has passed.

Continued covert aid would offer most of the advantages

of overt lntervention~ while avoiding its ris~ and d1sadv~inb~ges.

Covert aid would enable the Chinese CommuniSts to:

(1) Avoid further antagonizing of the UN and reduce

risk of war with the US;

(2) Promote the China-led Asiatic peoples revolu

tionary struggle, while ostensibly supporting

peace; -

(3) MaintaIn freedom of action for later choice between

abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as

might be appropriate to Chinese Communist needs In

Korea;

3

S-E

353
65. (Continued)

(4) SatIsfy the aid Korea demand In Communist

circles In China and Asia generally, without

risking war with the US.

W. PROBABILITY OF CHD~ESE COMMUNiST ACTION

6. WhIle full-scale Chinese Communist Intervention In

Korea must be regarded as a conthiuisg possibility, a consid

eration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring

a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in

1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined

to continued covert ass]~e te thi North K~eans.

-4-

m a n en fl~fl~

354
65. (Continued)

CENTRAL INTELLiGENCE AGENCY

12 October 1950

B. THREAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KOREA

L STATEMENT OF TEE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the threat of direct Soviet military Inter

vention In Korea during 1950.

U. CAPABILITIES

2. SovIet armed forces now in the Far East are capable of

intervening overwhelmingly In Korea virtually without warnlng~

UI. FACTORS BEARING ON iNTENT

3. Indications of Intentions The Soviet Union to date has

given no indication, that it intends to Intervene directly In Korea.

Since the beg1nnh~g of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought

in its official statements and In its propaganda to give the un

pression that it is not Involved ln.the Korean situation. More

over, the USSR has taken no political or military actions that

constitute direct armed intervention in Korea. However, the

Soviet Governmentfor some months has been Increasingly

improving its military capabilities In the Far East as well as

in other sirategic areas.

4. Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention The defeat of

North Korea would constitute a major set..back for the USSR.

It would Involve:

~. The loss of a Satellite, and the esthbH~hmez~t of a

Western-oriented state on the frontiers of Communist China

and the U~R.

1

355
65. (Continued)

F Li La La S

b. Giving the Western Powers a potential strategic

bridgehead which the Kremlin would always regard as a threat

to the industrial, communication, and military centers of

Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.

c. Weakening the S~viet military and political position

vis~a-vls Japan.

d. A loss to Soviet political prestige in that it would

demonstrate that the Kremlin is not willing to support its fol

Lowers effectively In a Soviet-Instigated action.

e.. A loss to Soviet military prestige in that it would lead

to a tendency, whether or not Justified, to re-evaluate the eec

tlveness ci Soviet military equipment and tactics.

f. A reduction In. the prospects of the Soviet Union for

expanding its political control by means short of war in that

it would dez~onsfrate the determination and capability of the

non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-Inspired aggression.

5. Factors Oouosin~ Soviet Intervention

a. In wetgbng potential gains and risks of Intervention, the Soviet leaders must calculate, as an overwhe1inh~g consider

ation, that thefr open Intervention would lead to direct hostili

ties with US and other UN forces over an.issue on which the

Western world has achieved a new degree of unity. Soviet

leaders would have no assurance thatcombat betwee Soviet

and US forces would be limited by the US to Korea or to the

Far Eastern theater. Consequently, a decision to Intervene

openly In Korea, In the uffinipte analysis, involves a decision

to risk immediate and probably global war with the US.

-2-

iu~ on~RE

356
65. (Continued)

~&bA~ £

~.. The Soviet leaders may estimate that it will be

possible, without assuming this aI1~crfflcal risk, to salvage

some of the losses suffered from the Korean situation. US

military activities could be obsfructed by extensive guerrilla

action, which mi~t involve thç US In an extended and Łostly

occupation and Which could confribuite to Soviet efforts to

developin Asia a racial enmity toward the US and the Western

Powers.

LV. PROBABILITIES OF SOVIET ACTION

6. It is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider

that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military

intervention and a consequent rave risk of war. They will.

Intervene In the Korean hostilities only if they have decided,

not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis

c~ over -all c~nsidØrations, that j~ Is to their Interest to pre

cipith.~e a global war at this time.

-3-

~ a a a

357
65. (Continued)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 October 1950

C. THREAT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST I VASION OF FORMOSA

I. STATEME1~ OF THE PROBLE~4

1. To estininte the tlfrØat of Chinese Communist invasion

of Formosa during 195~).

II. cAPABILrr~s

2. Despite certain definite Chinese Communist deficiencies

in naval and air forces and probably in amphibious fr~in~ng and

docfrmne, the Communists are now capable of launching an in

vasion against Formosa with about 200,000 froops and moderate

air cover. The USSR could at a minimum furnish tactical advice

andtechnical and logistic support.

3. Although Chinese Nationalist forces are sufficient In

number and materiel to defend Formosa, lack of staying power,

poor comm2nd sfructure, lack of Inter-service coordination,

questionable morale and shortages of some types of ammunition

make their defense capabilities questionable.

4. Without direct Soviet participation and given sfrong naval

and air assistance by the US armed forCes~ the Chinese Nation

alist defense forces are capable of holding Formosa ng~fnst a

determined. ChlnØsØ Communist Invasion.

W. FACTORS BEARING ON IWTENT

5,~ Indications of Intentions Frequent official statements of

the Chinese Communists h~vØ clearly lndioated their intention

to seize confrol of Pormosa, Rowever, available intelligence does

TOP 6ECR~E~!r

358
65. (Continued)

grAD ~

not indicate their intention to do so in the Immediate future.

An unknown factor bearing upon the intent to invade Is the

degree of control the USSR is capable of exercising over the

Chinese Communists, and the Soviet intent with respect to

Formosa.

6. Factors Favoring Invasion of Formosa

a. The occupation of Formosa would remove the

symbol of Nationalist !estetanCe; eliminate a potential

source of coordinated opposition to the Chinese Communist

regime; and would seriously dbninlgh continued anti-Corn

inunlst resistance In China and throughout Southeast Asia.

b. Abmdonment or continued postponement of an

attack on Formosa would result In a loss of ~face to the

Chinese Communists.

c. Formosa would provide the Chin~sŁ Communists

with a small but significant source of foreign exch~ge, and

a potential source of rice, thereby contributing somewhat to

Chinese Communist capabilities for economic reconstruction.

7. Factors Opposing an Invasion of Formosa

~. Success would be Improbable.

~. An attack involves the risk of war with the US as

long as Ua-forces are interposed between Formosa and the

maiTthLnd The Chinese Communist leadership would be re

luctant to jeopardize its popular support, domestic achievements,

and internal program by an attack on Formosa that coUld lead

to retaliatory air attacks on Chinese cities, to a strict block

ade of the Chinese coast, to strong economic sanctions, and to

protracted warfare that could sap Chinese economic sir eugth.

-2-

TOP GECRET

359
65. (Continued)

TOP 6]3CUET

c. The Chinese Communists face serious domestic

problems, Including banditry, widespread unrest, guerrilla

opposition, economic st~gn~tlon, agrarian maladjustments,

and the problems involved In. consolidating the CommWiist.

Partys political control. For these reasons the danger ~sts

that, if attacks should fail or prove unduly costly, the present

apparent solidarity of the Communist regime would be subjected

to a severe strain.

~, In view of current UN Interest In Formosa, the

~hlnese Communists have some reason to hope for a favorable

political solution.

I. PROBABILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION

8. It is believed that barring a Soviet decision to precipi

tate global war, an Invasion of Formosa by the Chinese Corn

rnuxüats will not be attempted during the remainder of 1950.

3

360
65. (Continued)

- SEC RE-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

V

12 October 1950

D. THREAT OF A CHINESE COMMUNiST INVASION OF

V Th~OCHINA

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the threat of a Chinese Communist invasion

of Indochina in 1950.

TI. CAPABILITIES

2. From forces presently deployed near the Indochina

border, the Chinese Communists could commit 100,000 troops

for an invasion of Indochina without appreciable forewarning.

Approximately 150,000 additional Chinese Communist troops

could arrive at the border in support of an Invasion within ten

days. Reinforcements and supplies might be moved by sea to

rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. It Is also within

Chinese Communist capabilities to furnish air support for an

Invasion.

3. These capabilities could be exercised without jeopardy to other possible Chinese Communist military operations In the

Far East, except to the already inadequate air support for a

simultaneous North Korean or Formosan intervention.

4. If the Chinese Communists should invade Indochina, it

Is almost certain that the defending forces under the French

would soon lose all of Vietnam, except Cochin China.

1

~ SECRET

361
65. (Continued)

~ .C Li Li ..# £t Si S

III. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT

5. Indications of Intentions

~. The construction and improvement of roads, railroads,

and air facilities; the provision of tecbnical and training assistance

and advisory personnel; present logistic support from the border

provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunn~n--ail these might be

construed as positive indicators of an impending invasion. These

activities, however, might also be indicators of an increase in

the flow of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Mlnh Communists, rather than of Chinese invasion.

_b. Although Chinese Communists have given propaganda

support to the Viet Mlnh, there has been no public Chinese Com

munist statement which could reasonably be construed as a com

mitment to invade or as justification for invasion.

6. Factors Favorii~ Intervention

a. A Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina would be

the most rapid means of establishing a Communist Indochina.

b. The fall of Vietnam to the Communists would facilitate

establis~.ment of Communist control over Burma and Thailand.

c. An early Communist victory in Indochina would in

part ofifet the loss of International Communist prestige occa

sioned by Communist reverses in Korea.

d. The Chinese Communists, operating on behafl of

International Communism, might Invade Indochina with the hope

that, even if UN intervention should deprive then of complete

victory, Western bloc forces wo~i,ld be involved in inconclusive

warfare In the Far East.

2-

TOP SECRET

362
65. (Continued)

7. Factors Opposing Intervention

a. A Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina would

greatly increase the risk of Chinese Communist involvement

In war against the Western Powers or the~ UN, as well as the

risk of global war.

b. Recent Viet Minh military successes have increased

the probability that Communist control of Indochina can be ulti

mately secured without resort to Chinese Communist invasion,

providing there is no major increase of presently planned ex

ternal assistance to the French and their supporters.

c. Viet Mink capabilities can be substantially increased

without resort to open intervention.

d. Invasion of Indochina by Chinese Communist troops

would arouse local anti-Chinese sentiment and could be a

serious source of command conflict between Peiping and Viet

Minh leadership.

e. A Chinese Communist invasion would tend to antag

onize the presently neutral states of Asin, particularly India.

~. Communist Chinas prospects for membership in the

UN and UN-sponsored organizations would be jeopardized and the

opportunity for the establishment of diplomatic relations with

powers outside the Soviet orbit would be curtailed.

~. Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina might provide

the US with an impelling reason for retaining in the vicinity of

Formosa--a major objective of the Chinese Communist government--

the US Seventh Fleet.

3

TOP SECRET

363
65. (Continued)

TOP CECfl~T

IV. PROBABILIT~S OF CHINESE COMMUNiST INVASION

It Is estimated that an openChiæese Commuyngt Invasion--

while possible and capable of being launched with little or no

preliminary warning--is improbable in 1950. It Is highly prob

able, however, that the Chinese Communists wifi Increase the

substantial military assistance already being given to the Viet

Mthh forces.

-4-

11,-P 0.ECRET

364
65. (Continued)

~. h J~ ~ Lb ~à

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 October 1950

E. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND THREAT IN THE

PHILIPPINES

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the Commumst capabilities and threat in

the Philippines.

II. CAPABILITIES

2. The Huks The Huks (MÆpagpalaya N~ Bayan

are today the army of Philippine Communism, led by avowed

Communists who follow the policies and seek to further the

objectives of World Communism. Their armed strength Is

estimated at no more than about 10,000. The Huks are essen

tinily a guerrilla organization, utilizing hit and run tactics;

making maximum use of the elements of surprise, choice of

terrain, and mobility; and avoiding frontal engagement with

government forces. The Huks, who are limited almost exclu

sively to infantry weapons, have the capability of mounting

several comparatively large-scale (300-500 men) coordinated

attacks simultaneously against widely separated targets. During.

1949-50, they have expanded their areas of operation throughout Luzon and to other islands of the Philippines. In recent months

they have carried out better coordinated and more widespread

attacks. The Ruks have terrorized local communities and Inter

fered with travel. They can extend and intenSIfy their operations,

particularly in we~kly defended provincial areas, and may well

stage another series of coordinated attacks before the end of

1950.

1

365
65. (Continued)

TOP ~ECRE-T

3. Supporting Elements

!. Support of the lIuk movement, apart from that derived,

from unorganized lawless elements, is bound among large numbers

of peasants, who willingly or by force and intimidation contribute

to the Euk movement. Another source of support is found in the

Philippine labor movement, where low real wages and poor conditions

of work permit exploitation of the union movements by Communist

organizers,

b. Since the Communists have achieved power in China

it is believed that approximately half a million Philippine Chinese

have already aligned themselves with the Peiping regime. Such

Chinese are probably facilitating Communist communications,

providing financial support, and otherwise rendering aid to the

Huks.

C. Available intelligence does not indicate that the Huks

have received, or are likely to receive, sufficient assistance from

external Communist sources to alter their military capabilities

significantly during 1950.

4. Government Countermeasures Government efforts to

deal with the Huk problem have been Ineffective thus far. Govern

ment forces have been and are able to maintain over-all intexnal

security but are unable to control local areas where dissident

groups are strongest. Recently reorganized armed forces may

be able to deal more effectively with Huk activities, but little

improvement is anticipated during 1950. Disillusionment with

the governments ineffectiveness has caused many persons who

are not active Huk supporters to become indifferent and unco

operative toward government efforts to stamp out the dissident

forces. The government, moreover, has shown little disposition

to adopt and implement basic agrarian and social reforms which

2-

-

~.. 1 La %... .1.. La

366
65. (Continued)

~trrfl5~

might reduce considerably the number of peasants who sup

port the Huks. Such a reduction would lessen measurably

Ruk capabilities and the intensity of their operations, but

would not elinlnntethe hard core of the Huk movement which

would continue to pose a burdensome security problem.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

5. While the Huks are capable of conducting widespread,

coordinated raids particularly In central Luzon, and creating

some disturbances in the Manila area, it Is esthnated that they

cannot overthrow the Philippine Government in 1950.

-3-

~OP SECRET

367
65. (Continued)

TOP CECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 October 1950

F. GENERAL SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

AND CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate general Soviet andChthese Communist inten

tions and capabilities in the Far East In 1950.

II. OBJECTIVES

2~ The Soviet UniDi and Communist China share the common

objective of establishing Communist control throughout the Far

East. Logically, both would prefer to secure this objective with

out resort to general war. The Soviet Union includes In Its objec

tive. Kremlin control of a communized Asia, Including China. While

Chinese Communists may well object to such Kremlin control, they

have given no overt Indication that they do not accept the primacy

of Moscow In International Communism.

HI. CAPABILITIES

3. Short of Direct Employment of Armed Forces The Soviet

Union and Commuiiist China have the capacity, through a contlnua~

tion of measures short of war, further to develop the strength of

Communism In all areas in the FarEast except those occupied by

US or UN forces. It is estimated, however, that in no area of the

Far East, exØØpt Tibet and possibly Indochina unless presentlyplanned external assistance is Increased, do they have the capa

bility of establishing complete Communist control dUring 1950

through such measures.

1

~ OECRET

368
65. (Continued)

TAD F~FCfl1~~

4. With Full-Scale Employment of Armed Forces In

the event of war beginning in 1950:

~ The Soviet Union acting alox~ has the capability

of rapidly occupying Korea, Hokaido and Olcinawa; of launching a substantial amphibious-airborne Invasion of Honshu; and of

conducting harassing attacks on the KWutians, Ky~*shu, 7ormpsa,, the Philippines, and other is1z~ndc in the adjacent waters, and

lines of communication.

b. Communist China acting alone poasesses the capability to overrun Tibet and substantial portions of the mainland of

Southeast Asia, and to make a strong attack on Korea.

~ lit combination, the Soviet Union and Communist China

have the capability of overrunning practically all the Asiatic main

land and possibly of occupying all Japan and Formosa.

IV. ITENrloNs

5. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have clearly

indicated that they Intend to pursue without pause their goal f

extending Communist control over every vulnerable area In the,

Far East by every means open to them short of direct use of

their armed forces. Neither has given concrete Indication of,

an Intention to employ during 1950 its awn armed forces outside

itS own boundaries.

6~ It Is estimated in particular that, barring .a Soviet deci

sion to precipitate a global war, the Soviet Union Will not du~rIng

Ii~d~vrveuedIrectiywith its armed forces In Korean hoetil

itles, and the Chinese Communists probably will not In 1950

attempt to invade Korea, Formosa, or Indochina.

With respect to a possible Soviet decision to ~,recipitate

global war, the latest agreed conclusions are set fOrth In

Enclosure G.

2-

T-Oi ~~RET

369
65. (Continued)

~rri-n nT~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 October 1950

G. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING A POSSIBLE SOVIET DECISION

TO PEE CIPIrATE GLOBAL WAR

1. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously motivated by Marxist

Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations aifectirig the posl

tion of the Snvtet Union. as a world power. They have made clear

that their long-term object Is to establish-World Comnmnt~m under

the domthatlim of the Kremlin. Their immedtate cdncerns, however,

are:

a. To maintain the control of the Kremllh over the peoples

of the Soviet Union.

b. To strengthen the economic and military position and

defend the territory of the Soviet Union.

c. To consolidate control over the European and Asian

Satellites (including Communist China).

d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet

Unipn, and to prevent the establishment, in. Europeand Asia, a!

forces capable of threatening the Sovietposltlon.

e. To eliminate Anglo..American influence in Europe and

Asia.

f. To establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.

~. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally.

1

GE CUE

370
65. (Continued)

The Soviet Union will try to pursue these ob~ectlves

simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another

of these objectives, however, It may be expected that the

Soviet rulers will attach greater importance to the: first

four listed; and in:that order.

2. On the basis that the long-term object of the Soviet

rulers is immutable and dynamic, and that the Western Powers

are not prepared to succumb to Soviet domination without a

fight, there is, andwill continue to be, grave danger of war

between the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the Western Powers and their allies on the other.

3. The Soviet Union will continue relentlessly Its aggres

sive pressures on the power ppsition of the Western nations.

4. The Soviet rulers could achieve, and are In a fair way

towards achieving, the first three parts of their object (see g,

c above) without risk of lnvo(vement in direct armed conflict

with the Western Powers.

5. Parts g,Q,~and ~ of their object are improbable of achieve

ment without the employment of armed force, though there are

still factors in the existing situation which might welL lead Soviet

rulers to consider that, in certain circumstances, andln the

absence of effective armed opposition by the Western Powers, they

might uufimâtely attain these Parts of their object without th~e overt

involvement of Soviet armed forces.

if. In pressing to achieve parts ~and~g~ of their object,

the Soviet rulers will, at certain stages, inevitably impinge upon

the vital interests Of the Western Powers aid so incur the risk

of involvement in a general war precipitated through the necessary

reactions of the Western Powers.

-2

~ ~

371
65. (Continued)

TOP OECT~rT

7. In the belief that their object cannot be fully attained

without involvement in a general war against the Western

Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberately to pro

voke such a war at a moment when, in their opinion, the

strength of the Soviet Union vis-h-vis the Western Powers

is at its maximum. It is estimated that such a period exists

now and will extend from the present through 1954 (Note 1)

with its peak at about halfway, i.e., 1952 (Note 2).

8. From the point of view of military forces and economic

potential, the Soviet Union Is In a position to conduct a general

war of limited duration now if Soviet rulers thought it desirable

or expedient.

9. While intelligence is lacking to permit a valid prediction

as to whether or when the Soviet Unipn may actually exercise

its Initiative and capability to launch a general war, in view of

the foregoing it must be recognized that the risk of a general

war exists now and hereafter at anytime when the Soviet rulers

may elect to take action which threatens, wholly or in part, the

vital Interests of the Western Powers.

NOTE 1: 1954 being the date by which it ~s assumed that North

Atlantic Treaty Organlzatipn forces in Europe will be

built up to such a strength that they can withstand the

initial shock of surprise attack; and when the gap between

the relative strength of the Western Union forces and those

of the Soviet Union will have begun to contract.

NOTE 2: i.e., when the Soviet Union has made good some essential

deficiencies In atomic bomb stock pile, and in certain

types of afrcraft and before the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization economy is fully geared to the war effort.

TOP ~iit.l~E~T

372
66. National Intelligence Estimate 12, Consequences of the Early

Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,

27 December 1950

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIN.ATES

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

210

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF

CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA

NlE-12

Published .27 December 1950

CENTRAL I N I E I L I G E N C E

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0

1 DECLASSI~~ ~ ~ CLASS. CHANGED ~o T

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AIim: HR 70-2

DATE: ~/.L&L REVIEWER: ~

AGENCY

-

E~1T~M

Z E C f~ E T

7 ~ COPY NO~

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

FOR

373
66. (Continued)

~

WARNING

inforni~n affex.l~r1he na

tional defense United Sta In the meaning

of the Esptonage Act. 31 and 32, as amended.

Its ~transmlss e reveiatio ts Contents in any

law.

374
66. (Continued)

3ECRET

DISS~Th4fl~ATION NOTICE

1. ThIs copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of the recipient

designated on the front cover and of Individuals under the Jurisdiction of the recipients

office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further

dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa

tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart

ment of State

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, for the Department of the Army

c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

4. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

e. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commicsion

f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other

Department or Agency

2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with

applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar

rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DISTRIBUTION (NIB Series):

Office of the President

National Security Council

National Security Resources Board

Department of State

Office of Secretary of Defense

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Atomic Energy Commission

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Research and Development Board

Munitions Board

CEO ThE

375
66. (Continued)

3EORfiT

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT

OF CHINESE NATION.M.TST F~QR~ES IN KOREA

NIE-T2

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of, State,

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the

preparation of this estimate, and State, Army, and Navy

concur In it. A dissent by the Intelligence organization

of the Department of the Air Force is appended as an annex.

This paper is based on in.forzn~ tion available on 23 December.

-

376
66. (Continued)

OEOI1ET

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT

OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES

IN KOREA

.ASSUNPTION: That hostilities have not spread beyond the borders of Korek at the time of

a decision to employ Chinese Nationalist forces in Kore&

1. The Chinese Nationalists have offered a

task-force of 33,000 troops for service in Korea

and possibly could provide a greater number

without jeopardizing the secithty of Taiwan.

Nationalist troops have undergone extensive

and prolonged training, but due to inept lead

ership and poor living conditions there Is some

question of their morale. The majority of

Nationalist troops on Taiwan have come from

the more temperate zones of China, and a con

tingent for Korea probably would require

training and some re-equipment before being

committed to combat In cold-weather opera

tions. In other respects, the Initial Nation

alist contingent for Korea would be wellequipped and could be transported to Korea

In fourteen days. The Nationalist troops are

experienced and familiar with Chinese Com

munist tactics. Nationalist units should per

form comparatively efficiently under good

leadership and adequate supervision, but

might be susceptible to Communist prop

aganda and suffer a substantial number of

defections if permitted to operate independ

ently in areas beyond the Immediate tactical

control of UN commanders.

2. The presence or the absence of Chinese Na

tionalist troops in Korea in the limited num

bers estimated to be available within the Im

mediate future would not be a major factor

affecting the ability of UN fOrces tO establish

Note: This estimate considers only the conse

quences of the Immediate employment of Chinese

Nationalist troops in Korea in the present situation

and does not deal with the consequences of eventual

employment of Chinese Nationalist troops either

In Korea, in later and changed circumstances, or

on the Chinese mainland as part of a larger under

taking. An estimate (NIElO) Is In preparation on

the more general question.

and hold a defensive line across the peninsula

against numerically vastly superior Chinese

Communist forces.

3. If a protracted defense of a beachhead is

undertaken, the presence of Chinese Nation

alist forces could make a substantial contribu

tion, provided they were operating under good

leadership and adequate supervision.

4. Whatever the military outcome In Korea,

the employment of Chinese Nationalists there

would, in the eyes of other nations, further

Identify the US with the Chinese Nationalists

and would constitute a moral commitment for

continuing US support of the Chinese Na

tionalist regime. In addition, the employ

ment of Chinese Nationalist forces In Korea

would Immediately raise difficult problems

Involving the feasibility of continuing the US

policy of neutralization of Taiwan, particu

larly with respect to the employment of Na

tionalist naval and air forces other than in

Korea and in Korean waters.

5. A majority of tiN nations would probably

reject a US proposal to use Chinese Nation

alist troops in Korea. There Is a general

apprehension that the employment of Chinese

Nationalist troops in Korea would give im

petus or at least provide the pretext for In

creased militancy on the part of Communist

China. This militancy would increase the

danger of a general war with Communist

China, which In turn might develop into a

global war. In addition, the Western Euro

pean nations would feel strongly that the US

was jeopardizing the first-priority task of

defense of the European continent by becom

ing involved in protracted hostilities in Asia.

The employment of the Chinese Nationalists

would alienate other Asiatic countries, which

QECflET 1

377
66. (Continued)

consider the Chinese Nationalists to be re

actionary, politically Incompetent, and al

ready repudiated by their own people. Uni

lateral US action in using Chinese Natinn~1ist

troops would intensify these feelings.

6. The use of Chinese Nationalist troops in

Korea would remove whatever chance might

remain of a political solution of the Korean

conflict. Although it Is evident that Com

munist China strongly supports general

Soviet strategic objectives, this support might

2

become even stronger as a result of the use

of Chinese Nationalist forces In Korea.

7. The USSR would probably welcome a uni

lateral US decision to use Chinese Nationalist

troops in Korea as: (a) further embroiling

the US in hostfflties with Communist China

without engaging the USSR; (b) dividing the

US from its allies; and (c) providing plaus

ibility for International Communist propa

ganda concerning alleged US military aggres

sions and support of reactionary regimes.

SECI1~T

OECflET

378
66. (Continued)

-

ANNEX

1. The Director of Intelligence, U.S.A.F., dis

sents in NTh~12.

2. In general, this estimate has emphasized

the military and political disadvantages of the

employment of Chinese Nationalist forces in

Korea, and has failed to point out adequately

the advantages which would accrue to the

U.S.-U.N. campaign in Korea by the use of

such forces. Specific points are as follows:

a. The discussions in this paper appear to

have been governed by the acceptance of ap

proximately 33,000 Nationalist troops as being

essentially the total number available for

employment in Korea. This office estimates

this number to be far less than the total

available.

b. The estimate does not give sufficient con

sideration to the fact that Chinese Nation

alist Forces offer the only readily available

force for major augmentation of U.N. forces

in Korea. In fact, such insufficient consid

eration fails to give planners grounds for

looking upon the availability of these forces

as a factor influencing the determination as

to whether or not a beachhead should be held

at all.

c. Introduction of a large number of Chi

nese Nationalist troops could make a sub

stantial contribution by providing muchneeded Infantry to the U.S.-U.N. campaign in

Korea, if a beachhead were retained.

d. This office does not believe that the re

actions of all the various Asiatic nations to

the employment of Nationalist troops in

Korea can be assessed with sufficient accuracy

to warrant the conclusion that these Asiatic

nations will be irrevocably opposed to the

utilization of these anti-communist forces.

In this respect, more deference is paid in this

paper to the attitudes of the governments, or

majorities in the respective countries, than to

the elements which fully recognize the Com

munist menace and would be encouraged by

this new opposition to Communisms advance.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that

even in Europe, public opinion might learn to

applaud firm opposition, whether It be in

Europe or in Asia, and in fact might prefer

the fight to be made in Asia.

e. The estimate indicates that the use of

Chinese Nationalist troops In Korea would

eliminate any remaining chance of an imme

diate political solution of the Korean con

ifict. This dissent in no way is intended to

contradict this conclusion. However, It ap

pears to this office that the law of diminish

ing returns has set in with respect to the prob

ability of a satisfactory immediate political

conclusion. The discussion in the paper does

not warrant a sound conclusion as to whether

or not utilization of Nationalist troops would

prejudice or aid an eventual political solution.

3. The estimate implies that the employment

of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would

give impetus to, or provide the pretext for,

increased militancy on the part of Commu

nist China. it is reasonable that any increase in militancy, if such is possible (other

than against Hong Kong), would be gov

erned more by Chinese military capabilities

and their own timetable than by any provo

cation which might result from the employ

ment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea.

4. There appears to be insufficient data to

justify the conclusion In paragraph 7 of this

estimate that the USSR would probably wel

come a unilateral U.S. decision to use Chinese

Nationalist troops in Korea.

5. This office would revise NIE-.12 as indicated

below:

a. Reference p. 1, par. 2. Revise as follows:

There is no immediate crisis in. Korea re

quiring Chinese Nationalist troops to prevent

a disaster, but this opportunity to begin the

dynamic exploitation of any anti-Communist

forces whose commitment could have a favorS-BORE T 3

379
66. (Continued)

4 3ECEET

able effect on the Korean and possibly the

entire Far Eastern situation should be given

careful consideration. The Chinese National

ist forces on Formosa provide the only visible

means for such e~cploitation. The presence or

absence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea

in-the limitcd nurnbcrs cvtinmtod to be avail

able within the immcdiatc near future and

later would ~be an important a major fac

tor affecting the ability of UN forces to estab

lish and hold a defensive line across the

peninsula against numerically vastly superior

Chinese Communist forces, unless the US-UN

introduced reinforcements drrectly.

b. Reference p. 1, par. 3. Add at end of

paragraph as follows: An important require

ment in Korea is for additional infantry. By

using Nationalist infantry as a screening

force, present UN forces in Korea could be

used more effectively as a striking force. The

defense of a beachhead requires a mobile re

serve which can counterattack quickly at the

points of greatest enemy pressure.

c. Reference par. 4. Amend first sentence

and add a new sentence as foilowe: Whatever

the military outcome in Korea, the employ

ment of Chinese Nationalists there would, in

the eyes Of certain other nations at the present

time, further identify the US with the Chinese

Nationalists and would constitute a degree of

moral commitment for continuing US support

of the Chinese Nationalist regime. At the

same time this act would identify U.S. inten

tions to utilize anti-Communist forces within

its capabilities, and as such might have a posi

tive psychological effect of potentially great

value upon anti-Communist forces.

d. Reference par. 5. Eemse as follows:At

the present time a majOrity of UN nations

would probably reject a US proposal to use

Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. there

is a general apprehension that the employ ment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea

would give impetus, or at least provide the

pretext, for increased militancy on the part Of

Communist China. Despite the repeated as

surance of the US-UN to respeCt the Man

churian borders and the maintenance of the

embargo against Chinese Nationalist opera

tions on the mainland, Chinese Communist

militancy has already reached a high level in

committing the Fourth Field Army, which

represents the best available Chinese Com

munist military force. It is difficult to see any

new form which this militancy could take

(other than in Hong Kong). Thic militancy would increase Therefore, there probably would be little increase in the danger of a gen

eral war with Communist China, which danger

in turn might develop into a global war al

ready exists. This, too, probably will have

little direct effect upon the development of a

global war. At least in the beginning, the

Western European nations would might feel

strongly that the US was jeopardizing the

first-priority task of defense of the European continent by becoming involved a continued

involvement in protracted hostilities in Asia.

Later however, they might come to appreciate the determination of the US to take construc

tive action in an area of vital importance in

the struggle against Soviet directed Commu

nist aggression. The employment of the

Chinese Nationalists wo~d might alienate

those element in certain other Asiatic couri

tries, which who consider the Chinese Nation

alists to be reactionary, politically incompe

tent, and already repudiated by their own peo

ple. On the other hand, the employment of the Chinese anti-Communist forces could

hearten the anti-Communist elements of all

Asiatic countries and increase their will to re

sist Communist aggression. Unilateral US

in using Chinese Nationalist troops would intensify these feelings In addition if the other nations should determine that it is

necessary to make a stand in Korea, they will

be more amenable when they recognize this

as a method of relieving theni of the necessity

of providing more forCes themselves.

e. Reference par. 6. Amend as foflows: At

a time of delicate negotiations the use of Chi

nese Nationalist troops in Korea would removc

~hat.~ver change might remain-of might have

prejudiced an immediate political solution of

the Korean conflict deriving from those nego

tiations. Although it is evident that Commu

ni~t China strongly supports general Soviet

-

strategic objec~*s, this support might bestronger as a result of the use -of

Chinese Nationalist -forcee in Korea This

ODCRET

380
66. (Continued)

would not necessarily have precluded, how

ever, a later political settleiflent. It was,

therefore, important that a decision to use

Nationalist troops be deferred until the prob

abilities of obtaining an acceptable linmedi

ate politicaL solution were gone. However,

Chinese Communist intervention on a massive

5

scale is already a fact, and an immediate

political solution deriving from present nego

tiations now appears to have reached a point

of diminishing returns.

f. Reference par. 7. Delete entire para

graph: UOOU would probably welcome a

unilateral . . . reactionary rcgimc.

~EOflflT

SECRET

381
67. Milton W. Buffington to CSP Lewis S. Thompson], United

States National Student Association, 17 February 1951

(Carbon copy)

17 ~sbsul17 1951

s~~si~ ~

SUBJECT, Uoitsd States ~t3coa1 Stadout Asoeciation

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Sts4sut Aasociatiou~

2 The 1at4~ha1 Sirodout As.ociatiou is finuseed p$.ncipslly.

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:is a rhi .b.ts~ it. ~~., j~3~i~ g~

sMito.vias.ps.,,4~4& £Lsbsrl. of i tsrustlous]~ .ff.ir., Ii. .

~a~ee& i~go 4~ ~t b, foe ~to ths.i~~ of the

383
67. (Continued)

orgiinI~ation as a shale at th. present tine. lb. Lewsnatein favors

a forthaight stand on th, pert of the orgn4~tioa concerning Ccc

_____

as a political and ni3.jtuy -to cer .sciwity. This via

onnifsated in a epe.ch onde by lb. Lowenatein at the Stockholm con

ference sailed in late Dsc~er by the Siedisb. nat4~1 ~dnt

unjnn to discuss methods of inter ati~n~~l studont cooperation cutsid

of the C~unist-doninu.ted Internatia~l Union of 3tud~s. Br. Kissa

berg, on the other band, favors shot perporta to be a ~e idd~alietic

isa. militant stand on the subject in dsfernca to th, principle of

the Bational Student isecciatian shiob r.nir.a it to edth..s itself

to matters of student interest mud g~al welfare lather than to

questions of internat4~ein,il politics. C~ent1y, lb. L~stsin is

faced vith being draft.d into the AX~, in vi of ~fact we haTs

undertaken, covertly and t1wou~i the p&~r ~to get his

deterred, althongh he is caspistely of this fact. Xe con..

eider this undertaking t. be in order An ~t of the fact that vs

han considerable evidenc, that. the ~t4i~1 ~cutive C~itteŁ of

the National Student lasociation support. Br, Lowanst.siu.

6. Spesld.ng specifically to the question relied ~ Dr. ~liott

ma to acbaF4~1ng the Ilitional Stadsut Association a. snub, I do not

feel that mach subsidy is f...4hI~ practicable, or desirable, in view

of the facto hereinabove ~reusd. Lw.Iiuir am iciivtduml projects

aria, which require the use of the aovj of the kt(~1 Student

Aaao~iatfrr, and share conlit4 a are such that t~ use of this aegis

c.nbec .ths - --

aw. med.intoth.

-

~as sill not offend or arena. the suspicion of the Uat~oza1 __

Student iesociution that the go...~.-Int is at all interested. An

illuatriticn of this type at activity La fo~ in the project cw~rently

being prepared joint3~- by this office and the Tar ~at DIvision to

convene a regional students s.~in~ In Son4ih.est Ails dzwing this

coning eer.

6. As matters stand, it is my rsco~..n~4tion that we sontinca

to operate as hereinabove expressed.

3LIL~LON ~1. Btfl~FIX~TON

cc:

sF/Ic (2)

II/E1~ (2) 2

SP/L~.1B/db

384
68. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Deputy Director

of Central Intelligence William H. Jackson], Problems of

OSO, 8 June 1951 (Carbon copy; attachment not included)

8Junsl951

)Mr~J.N~K F~s D.pu%y Dir.otor of Csn~sl IntsUl.gsne.

SUBJECT Probisms of 0/30

1. 0/so more than any other part of the agsncy still is

plagued with peroonsel probloms. I b.lt.v. that their promotion.

policy soy still be arcbais~ that they ~y to hire people at much

too low salarissj and as very slow in moving good people up fast.

2. The ~~làjnt of 4,sp cover hal been ca~ nsgl.ct.d

in 0/so. It would .som: absolutely S e.sntial that scow isportant

staff ~t concentrate prinarily on this flobiow.

3. It would appear from ontisde observsre that 0/so

often forget. it. mission in favor of borsauoratic controls.

I have motd a far greater tendency on the part of 0/80 operators

to be worried about somebody discovering one of their sources

and to giv. very littis consideration to trying to build up a

worldwide .epionsgs ostoork.

is. T)I reel heart of 0/SO, as is the case in any operating

office, is the operating Division. Unfortusatsl.y there has bean a

tsndeaoy to .vbordisot. the operating divietons to the at~ff tad to

aU~ the staffs to bsc~ big and ~i.ld1y.

5. . probliom of oporatiormi research, with pirtioular

ref.rsnos to ~zzterrmtiorml C~1aniow,is a serious ous. leer

auggS.tion to pat an opsrsttosel reesareb staff under the ~pis~r

DireCtor for Plans to v~t with .11 covert offices usy be the

ausmor to this.

6, The problams which have be.n 3.opsrdiling the

relations of 0/so and 0/SI ar. bolt outlised in tb. attached

..uiorsndse from Clark.

This ~5l!tI~ ~ ~5 Is~!~~Sd L!MAI S. ImPl~ICI

~ ~suU.vs Assistant to

~ISTO~ICAL DOC~~ £ttl~~nt Destroy orLi:- rith consent

~SECRE1 _________

Date: UA1~,1g~

385
69. J. S. Earman, Memorandum for Rear Admiral Robert L.

Dennison, King Abdullahs Assassination, 20 July 1951

(Carbon copy)

2oJ.~1~51

~gP4N~I P~I. RZAB £T~IPkL ~

IIVAL_LIZ TO T~ ~U~T

sm~Ts Zj~1~~ti~

Att~h. ~.t. ja t~ c~* c~.,t c~ t~.

I~b.3.et s.~4~t1on.

J. S.

L..iata*t to tb. Director

~1.eor. 1

O/DCIsJS~arn1d

Diatribntion;

Orig & 1 - Addreasee ii

2 Signer v ~U~WNThO / P~cNm~Hcu~a

o cECLA$$~ED

łL~s. cH~ED TOe 1$ $ C f)AJJ

~

W1~ P~7O4,

lploa%

FILE: WHITE H~J5E

387
69. (Continued)

-

20 July 1951

C~ut en ~Abdc]1~bs Aamutnatien

~ 20 July King Ab~n11.h of Jorden ~ ieaa..jaat.d vbiis

entering the ii Aqas Mo~ts in the Old City of Jernasisa. The

seasesin, rspert.dly a t.rrInist ~ bed contacts lith the

f.raer Orsod ~Zti of Jsruaale., ~. killed an tb. .pct. £ .t&tS

of ~has bun declared in Jerden and Prinas hit, second

eon at the King, has been assed t~ry Regent.

Sixty.c~ ~sar old King Ab&~~i1.l .~4 been the ruler at

Jerden alone th. stats eni created b~ ths British toUantcg

World War I. I. baa bean considered the t consiatently and

r.li*hly pro.hritiih ruler in the hear last. £b~~1~1j * eldest

son T~fla1, the hair aWa,unt, I. cvrrwtly indergoing treeteant

in a mtal ~aetitstion in ~tser1and. Under the tsran of the

constitation Tal1.ls ntal condition precladse his b*~iig

~arsh, and his fitteen ~ser cad son Hussein aocerdiugl.y 1 the

legal anessasor.

£b~11*h~. a~ipsysn~ e4i~t4I~gu~s to try to achieve ~ treaty

vith I~.1 and his epo~sdic atts~ta, in son3uonti~ vith his

5S1~ulW the Regent of Iraq, to establish a Orcatu Syria, consist

ing of Iraq, Jordan sad Syria, de his u~ emsaiss in the

~boeiag Arab states a. ~sll as within Jordea. The foreer

mend Wafti annsotly in lebanon, in strongly auti-~ ti b and

an ostepoken .us~ of King Abdella The ~fti att~tpd to set

an t11peadent Arab Oovsti~1.t in P.3astion after the creation

of Zarsel. Arab Palestine was aubseqeastly ise.rporstsd into

Jorda.. Rind 1-SoIb, the .z..Prine I~niatsr of lebanon T ass

aseheslaitod in ~an 16 July, ass $ sontrihetor to the

~ftis fands.

The death of Abdulleb ~ a r.eolet. auti_CI~_:_~.4at, p~

W.stara ruler. The and of Abdullah a intluanen viii nest iłatly and ~re.tly effect the Hritisb, who rely on the ~ith-tawisM,

ffisved, and fin.on.d Arab legion (the ar~ of Jerdsn) the only

s~stant and dup~dae Arab ar~ in the lear last. The contUsion

and pseetbie dia~Jara which ~ result can only benefit the anti

W.st.ra s3~te in the hear Z..t.

CONFIDENTiAL

388
69. (Continued)

~ONIIDEt14AIL~ 2L. Jnl,y 195].

O~nt on ~Abdulish a Assassination

On 20 July King Abdull.h of Jordan was assassinated while entering th.

al Msa Mosqul in the Old City of Jsruaalsm. Tb. assassin, reportedly a

t.rrorist who had contacts with the foruer Grand Hufti of J.ruaslam, was

~.Ued on the spot. A stat. of .asrgsucy has been dsclarsd in Jordan; and

Prfno. Naif, second son of the King, baa been nened tonporary Regent.

Sixty-nine year old King ~bad been th. ruler of Jordan sine, the

itat. was created by the British following World War I. Ho has been consid

ered the anst eonsiat.ntly and reliably pro-British ruler in th. Near East.

Abdullab. .ldÆt son ~the heir apparent, is currently wid.rgoing

trea~t in £ ntal institution in Svits.rland. Und.r the tern of the

constitution Tallals i~ntal condition pr.clud.s his b.coning nonareh, and

his fifteen year old son Hussein accordin~1y is the legal successor,

Abdullah s apparent willingness to try to achieve a treaty with Israel

and his sporedic att.spt in conjnnction with his nephew the Rgent of Iraq,

to establish a Greater S*ria, consisting of Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, ned. him

ny ~nmwiss in the neighboring Arab states as well as within Jordan, Tb.

Loreer Grand Multi, currently in Lebanon, is strongly anti-British and an

outspoken ane~ of King Abdullah. Tb. Mu.fti atteapt.d to set up an independ

ent Arab governuent in Palestine after the creation of Israel. Arab Palestine

was subsequently incorporated into Jordan. Rind alSolh, the .zPrine Minis

ter of Lban~n who was assassinated in ~an 16 July, was a centribeter

to the forner Multis funds.

The death of Abth~1~1~1~ rewvss a raselut. anti..C~r(.t, pro-Western

ruler. The end of Ab~~a influenc, will nest idiat.ly end dirootly

affect the British, who rely on the Britishtrained, oftlcer.d, and financed

Arab Legion (the aria- of Jordan) as the only cenp.t.nt and dependable Arab

ar~ in the Near East. Tb. confusion and possible disorders which aq- result

can only benefit the anti-Western sl~t in the Near East.

Prepared by OCI 1300

389

70. Special Estimate 9, Probable Immediate Developments in the

Far East Following a Failure in the Cease-Fire Negotiations in

Korea, 6 August 1951

SPECIAL

COPY NO. 69

ASSISTANT

ESTIMATED1RECTOR,O~E~,~

PROBABLE IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENTS IN

THE FAR EAST FOLLOWING A FAILURE IN

THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS IN KOREA

e0CUMENTNO _______________

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I

XDECLASSIFIED

tL1SS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE: _______________

DATE/~~4(REVIEWER0061!~..

SE -9

Published 6 August 1951

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-~1~

391
g

pI
70. (Continued)

T~JuvuL~F

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

PROBABLE iMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENTS ~N THE FAR EAST

~OLLOW1NG A FAILURE IN THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS

IN KOREA

Number 9

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,

the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par

ticipated In the preparation of this estimate. AU members

of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this

estimate on 3 August.

393
70. (Continued)

T~JJJi~

ANNEX A

The following tables show a break-down of aggregate air strength

available to the Chinese Communists by aircraft types, subordination and

disposition:

Table I

Chinese Communist Aircraft Strength by Type and Subordination

Undetermined

CCAF NK.AF Subordination Total

let Fighters 400 400

Piston Fighters 120 80 - 200

Ground Attack 100 20 50 170

Light Bombers 80 50 130

Transports 100 - -

400 100 500 1,000

Table2

Chinese Communist Aircraft Strength by Type and Disposition

let Piston Ground Light Trans

Fighters Fighters Attack Bombers ports Total

Manchuria 325 40 130 90 15 600

China Proper 75 80 20 40 85 300

NKAF in Manchuria - 80 20 - - 100

400 200 170 130 100 1,000

1

~~r .

394
70. (Continued)

__________

L~ .1

ANNEX B

CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE NAflONALIST FORCES

1. The Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces have very limited capabilities

at the present time. Weaknesses in leadership, organization and logistical

support curtail their defensive capabilities and seriously limit their

offensive capabilities.

2. Present training, strength, and equipment are probably sufficient to

permit a successful defense of Taiwan against a limited attack, but

shortages of modern aircraft, POL, spare parts, ammunition, transport,

artillery, and supplies of all classes, and lack of replacement personnel,

make it impossible for the Chinese Nationalist forces alone to defend

successfully against a prolonged and determined all-out assault by Chinese

Communist forces equipped for amphibious warfare.

3. The completion of present organization plans and the receipt of

American aid should greatly increase the combat effectiveness and defensive

capabilities of the Nationalists. It is estimated that the Nationalist forces

could possibly become combat effective in a minimum of 6 to 8 months

after full implementation of the United States aid program. However,

the Nationalists could not even then mount a successful invasion of the

mainland and exploit a possible initial beachhead without continued

United States air, naval, and logistical support. The Nationalists do not

have the necessary additional manpower to exploit successfully a break

through from the beachhead, but it might be obtained from guerrillas and

potential defectors from the Chinese Communist Forces.

11

395
70. (Continued)

PROBABLE IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FAR EAST

FOLLOWING A FAILURE IN THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS

iN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To assess present Communist capabilities in the Far East and

probable immediate Communist courses of action in this area in the

event of a breakdown of cease-fire negotiations in Korea.

ESTIMATE

PROBABLE COMMUNIST MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION IN THE

FAR EAST

1. If cease-fire negotiations should break down, we believe that Com

munist forces in Korea will continue large-scale military operations

in the area and may undertake offensive actions against UN troops at

an early date. The Chinese Communists have improved their over-all

capabilities since the termination of the April-May offensive. The

Communists probably would be able to employ at least as many troops

as they employed in that offensive. These troops would have the ad

vantage of a considerable logistic build-up and, according to recent

indications, they are likely to have more artillery and tank support

than they had for recent offensives. Communist combat air capabili

ties have been significantly increased during the past month, and now

constitute an increasingly serious threat to UN forces in Korea.*

* ~~ is the view of DI/USAF, that the following consideration. is ap

plicable at this point:

However, it does not necessarily follow that the build-up of forces

in North Korea is for the purpose of launching an offensive in the

event that the cease-fire negotiations fail. The build-up could be

for the purpose of strengthening Communist bargaining power during

cease-fire negotiations or even to conduct a limited objective of

fensive during the negotiations so as to move the battle line south

of the 38th Parallel and settle in fact one of the issues of the

negotiations.

396
70. (Continued)

Although Communist ground offensive operations against UN forces, at

least in the early stages of renewed hostilities, are likely to be of sub

stantlä.lly the same scale and nature as they were last spring, defensive

air operations could ~: materially expanded and offensive operations on

a sizeable scale could be initiated.

2. We do not believe that operations of the scale and nature described

above could destroy UN forces or drive them from Korea. Furthermore,

we do not believe that if the Chinese Communists should employ their

current maximuzzi air capability in support of a ground offensive, they

would be able to sustain these air operations long enough to gain air

superiority over Korea and to enable Communist ground forces to de

stroy or expel UN troops. fiowever, this air offensive would subject

UN forces to greater personnel and materiel losses than heretofore

inflicted in the Korean war.*

3. We believe, therefore, that in the event of a breakdown of cease-fire

discussions and the continuance of large scale military operations in

Korea, the Communists will have to choose between two possible major

courses of action: (a) to accept the continuation of a conflict of sub

stantially the scale and nature that preceded the cease-fire negotiations; Or (b) to take more drastic measures to destroy or expel UN forces.

There is a third less likely course of action in that the Communists

could effect a defensive action with reduced strength. Whichever

course of action is undertaken, the Communists will maintain mili

tary pressure in Korea, while probably trying to keep the door open

for political negotlatio~s at any time when the global interests of the

USSR would make .a diplomatic settlement of the Korean conflict advan.

tageous.

4. If UN/US forces are to be defeated, the Communist forces in Korea

must have strong air support and must be provided by the USSR with

heavy ground equipmen.tto overcome their current deficiencies.

* It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, InteUigence, that

the last sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted.

-2-

397
70. (Continued)

. __

There have been numerous reports that Communist forces in Manchuria

have been supplied and trained with Soviet equipment. If thes,e forces

exist they could be utilized in Korea. In any event, personnel for the

operation of Soviet equipment could be obtained by training Communist

forces presently in Korea, by introducing volunteers from SovietSatellite sources, or by introducing organized Soviet units. Unless

the USSR has, in fact, trained and equipped large Communist forces in

Manchuria, we do not believe that the Chinese Communists can defeat

the UN/US forces in Korea in the immediate future merely with the

additional support of advisory, logistical and technical assistance and

rear area participation from the USSR. If Soviet ground and air person

nel were to be employed in sufficient strength to add decisively to

Chinese Communist capabilities, such personnel would almost certain

ly come in direct contact with US forces, thereby creating a state of

de facto war between the US and the USSR in Korea. We do not believe

the Soviet Union is willing to accept the risk of such a~ facto war,

which might expand into general war, merely to insure an early defeat

or expulsion of UN/US forces.

5. It is more likely that the Kremlin will attempt to prevent an ex

tension of the area of conflict and, in recognition of internal strains in

Communist China, will endeavor to provide enough logistical and tech

nical assistance to insure maintenance of Chinese Communist will and

ability to continue military operations in Korea. The Kremlin may

estimate that thereby it could oblige the UN/US to maintain very sub

stantial forces in Korea indefinitely, at great cost and with continuing

strain on the political and military relations of the participating UN

nations.*

* The DI/USAF would add the following consideration at this point:

However, it is possible that the Chinese Communists would reject

such a plan and demand decisive help from the USSR or decline to

maintain more than a holding force in Korea. Such a course of

action would give them a greater freedom for operations elsewhere.

-3-

TE~j~

398
70. (Continued)

6. If, however, the Communist forces in Korea were threatened with

decisive defeat, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This

aid might weU include the introduction of volunteer forces. It

might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent

that a de facto local war between the US/UN and the USSR would

exist.

7. If UN/US forces took the initiative in expanding the area of the con

flict, Communist reaction would depend on the scale and nature of

UN/US military operations:

(a) Pursuit

If UN/US aircraft in hot pursuit of Communist aircraft

crossed the Manchurian border, we believe that the Communist

reaction -- aside from the local opposition by enemy inter

ceptor aircraft and AA -- would be restricted to diplomatic

protests and to intensified propaganda in the UN and elsewhere

claiming that the US was engaging in action designed to expand

the war.

(b) Bombing Attacks on Military Installations in Manchuria

If UN/US forces engaged in air operations against military

installations and lines of communication in Manchuria, other

than in furtherance of the hot pursuit principle, we believe

that the USSR would commit air force and antiaircraft units

in the defense of Manchuria despite the realization that such

commitment would increase the risk of general war. The

Kremlin probably would attempt to cloak these units as

Chinese and/or volunteer forces.

(c) Naval Blockade

If the UN/US imposed a naval blockade on Communist China to

enforce a UN Imposed economic blockade, the USSR probably

would attempt to step up the overland flow of supplies and

attempt to reduce the effects of the blockade by water shipment

through Port Arthur and Dairen. We do not believe that the

USSR would openly attempt to break the blockade by force,

-4-

399
70. (Continued)

~,~r

but would probably escort its own ships to Dairen and Port

Arthur, and might well resort to covert use of submaiines and

mines against blockading ships.

(d) Use of Nationalist Forces

Effective Chinese Nationalist forces are not currently available

in significant numbers for employment outside present

Nationalist-held territory, and it is estimated that it will be

from six months to one year before such forces could be

available. While Chinese Nationalist raiding forces could

attack the Chinese mainland, the Chinese Communists can

contain such attacks with the military forces presently de

ployed in east China. Since the Chinese Nationalists could

not threaten the stability of the Chinese Communist regime

(See Annex B), there would be no need for the USSR to lnter~L

vene.

(e) Bombing Communist China

If the UN/US were to launch a systematic strategic air and

naval bombardment of Communist China, Peiping would call

on the USSR for increased assistance. So long as this born

bardment did not jeopardize Communist control over Manchuria

and North China, the Kremlin would probably restrict its

assistance to the provision of air defense units.

8. If UN/US courses of action described above should endanger Com

munist control over North China and Manchuria, the Kremlin would

probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction

of volunteer forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet

forces to such an extent that a de facto local war between the US/UN

and the USSR would exist.

9. Unless the Kremlin decided to precipitate general hostilities; an

Intensification of military operations in Korea subsequent to a break

down of cease-fire negotiations probably would reduce the prospect

of any additional large-scale Communist military operations in the

Far East.

-5-

--~-~=-~T

400
70. (Continued)

~

INDICATIONS OF CURRENT COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

10. There have been many indications of Communist preparations for a

new offensive, including troop movements, logistic build-up and rein

forcements. Efforts to build and maintain airfields in North Korea con

tinue, and the gradual southward extension of enemy air activities In

dicates an enemy intention to extend air defense progressively over all

Communist-controlled Korea. There are no reliable Indications, how

ever, of enemy intent to commit. the entire air force available to the

Chinese Communists. Soviet assistance in the form of technical ad

visors, antiaircraft crews, and logistic support to Communist forces in

Korea and Manchuria probably is increasing,, but there is no reliable

evidence that this assistance will be on such a scale. as to increase sub

stantially Commur~ist capabilities in Korea in the near future. However,

there are indications that tanks and artillery are moving into Korea.

Furthermore, reports of Soviet assistance in the organization of a

modern Chinese Communist army in Manchuria continue. These reports

may be authentic, and,~ in fact, considerable progress may. have been

made in the development of such forces. There have also been uncon

firmed reports of Soviet troop concentrations In Manchuria, Including

locations along the Korean border, but there are no reliable indications

of Soviet preparation to move troops into Korea in the near f~iture.

Despite many reports concerning an 9nternational Volunteer Army,~

there is no firm evidence that such a force actually exists.

11. There are no reliable indications of early Chinese Communist

military action in other areas of the Far East beyond the scope of

present efforts, although numerous reports state variously that In

vasions of Iapan, Taiwan, and Indochina are planned within the next

few months. There has been unusual agreement among, otherwise un

confirmed reports from Indochina, Southeast China, Peiping, 7apan, and

Korea in alleging that communist units, facilities, or personnel in these

areas have been ordered to be in a state of readiness by late summer.

The content and emphasis of Communist propaganda during the cease-fire

talks indicate an intention to maintain and reinforce the psychological

preparation of the Chinese and North Korean peoples for a possible

resumption of hostiliti~s. This theme, plus frequent reference to the

remaining necessity of iiberating Taiwan and of preventing the

-6-

401
70. (Continued)

remilitarization of Japan through.a separate peace treaty, might

indicate an intention to prepare these peoples for expanded military

operations either in the Korean area or elsewhere in the Far East.

Communist propaganda gives no indication of the formation or commit

ment of an International..Volunteer Army in Korea, nor does Commu

nist propaganda indicate any Soviet intention to participate in the Korean

fighting on a large scale or in military operations elsewhere in the Far

East.

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN KOREA

12. Chinese Communist and North KoreanStrength The Communists

have recouped their military capabilities in Korea since the costly

abortive offensive in late May. They have brought up troop replacements,

additional supplies, and equipment including tanks and artillery, and they

are now capable of launching a limited ground offensive at any time with

little or no advance warning. Such a ground operation might be sup

ported by offensive air attacks against UN air, ground, and naval forces

If the Communists committed the air units presently available in the

Manchuria-Korea area.

13. The current estimate of Communist troop strength in Korea,

492,000, represents only a slight increase over the estimate of late

June, but reports suggest that a. maximum of 300,000 additional Chinese

Communist troops may be en route to or are now in North Korea. If

these additional troops have entered or were to enter the Korean area,

total Communist strength in the area would be somewhat greater than

the previous peak strength at the beginning of the Communist April of

fensive. On the other hand, reports indicate that Chinese Communist

combat effectiveness 1~as been reduced by the practice of bringing

battle -torn units up to strength by individual replacements rather than

by introducing fresh experienced regular units. The North Korean Army

has made a significant recovery in strength, fire power, and battle

efficiency since last March, but it still is hampered by food and equip

ment shortages, disease, and the declining quality of the remaining

North Korean manpower pool. The generally lower quality of Communist

troops in Korea may be more than offset, however, by the reported

movement in recent weeks of considerable numbers of tanks and ar

tillery pieces towards the front.

-7-

402
70. (Continued)

14.~ Although the estimate of Chinese Communist air strength has not

changed since 1 Iune 1951, intensified training, conibat experience in

both day and night Operations, airfield development, and improved air

craft performance have contributed toa general increase in Communist

air capabilities. The Chinese Communists have available approximately

1,000 aircraft, including about 100 aircraft of the North Korean Air

Force (NKAF) and approximately 500 aircraft (400 of which are jet

fighters) of undetermined subordination. (See Mmex A.) These jet

aircraft constitute the most significant element of Communist air power,

and they are appearing in increased numbers near the battle area.

They are principally of the MIG-15 type~ The MIG.- 15 has performance

characteristics at least comparable to the F -86, the best jet fighter

available to the UN forces. Some of these MIGrI5S have recently

appeared in Korea with large-size wing tanks which increases their

estimated radius of action to approximately 400 nautical miles, suf

ficient to permit these aircraft to reach from Manchurian bases over a

large part of Korea and adjacent waters.

15. Limited airfield development has continued in North Korea despite

intense and sustained UN aerial bombardment. The majority of North

Korean airfields are suitable only for piston-engined planes, but some

of them could possibly be used for limited jet operations. Logistic

support of North Korean airfields is seriously hampered by the UN

air interdiction of enemy lines of communications, and as long as UN

air superiority is maintained, enemy offensive and defensive operations from these fields wilibe severely restricted. Bowever, there are

sufficient airfields In Manchuria from which the Communists could

attempt to launch air attacks on UN forces.

16. The Chinese Communists are estimated to have the following air

capabilities:

(a) Continuance of attempted air defense of the Yalu River line.

(b) Expansion of defensive air operations to cover all of

Communist-controlled Korea. Exercise of this capability

-8-

403
70. (Continued)

would divert Increasing numbers of UN aircraft from missions

of close support and interdiction to the mission of maintaining

air superiority.

(c) Initiation of offensive air operations against UN air, ground, and

naval forces on the Korean peninsu]a and adjacent waters. Ex

ploitation of this capability might

(i) Disrupt UN air operations and logistic support of UN

ground forces by airborne attacks on UN air bases, lines

of communications, and sunoly bases.

(ii) Divert UN air effort from direct support of ground action

and interdiction of lines of communications.

(iii) Hamper the treedom of movement of UN ground forces.

(iv) Hinder UN airlift operalions~

(v) Harass UN naval operations and the present freedom of

UN sea communications.

17. Soviet Assistance Soviet assistance to Communist forces in Korea

to date has consisted of advisory, technical, and logistical support and

limited participation of antiaircraft personnel and possibly other

specialized Soviet combat troops. Virtually all heavy combat equip

ment for the North Korean Army has been furnished by the USSR. In

addition, most of the electronic and antiaircraft equipment for both

North Koreans and Chinese Communists, POL supplies, and some

vehicles and ammunition, have been supplied by the USSR. The USSR

has the capability to increase considerably the level of Its present type

of assistance to the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces. UN

attacks on lines of communications will continue to hamper the delivery

of supplies to the front, however, and Chinese Communist forces thus

far engaged in Korea appear to have lacked the skilled personnel re -

quired to operate modern heavy arms and equipment. The Soviets have

supplied all the jet aircraft and most of the piston-engined aircraft in

the Chinese Coinmunist and North Korean air forces. They have also

9 -

404
70. (Continued)

_ ----.5-

provided logistic support for these air forces. In addition, they are pro

viding technical assistance and advisory personnel and are reported to

be training large numbers of Chinese pilots in the USSR and Manchuria.

(a) Volunteer Forces

While unconfirmed reports continue to be received concerning

the existence~ of formation of International Volunteer Forces,

the existence of such forces, though possible, is not accepted.

(b) Communist Forces in Manchuria

Large numbers of Chinese Communist and North Korean troops

are stationed in Manchuria. While persistent reports have been

received that the Soviets were equipping these forces with

Soviet equipment and training them in Soviet techniques, there

is no reliable basis for estimating the size or status of such

forces.

(c) Soviet Ground Forces

The strength of the Soviet Army in ihe Far East Is estimated to

be 35 divisions. Of this total, a force of 13 to 15 divisions

probably could be made available and committed to combat in

Korea within 30 to 60 days alter a decision had been made to

employ it. The commitment of such a force with presently

available air support would give the combined Communist

forces the capability of forcing a UN withdrawal from Korea.

(d) Soviet Air Forces

(i) Strength The Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces have an

estimated Table of Organization and Equipment strength

of 5,300 combat aircraft, primarily of World War II

types. The actual strength is estimated to be about

85 percent of the TO and E strength but it is believed

that these units could be brought up to full strength im

mediately alter M-Day. Over and above those jet

fighters estimated to be available to Communist China,

there is but little evidence of additional jet fighters in

the Far East. However, jets may have been introduced

without detection by intelligence. In any event, the

- 10 -

405
70. (Continued)

Soviets have the capability of deploying jet units to the

Far East In a relatively short time.

(ii) Airfields There are 131 airfields in the Sino-Soviet

Far East within 500 miles of the 38th Parallel In

Korea or the Japanese Islands of Honshu and Kyushu.

The Soviets could probably deploy their entire Far

Eastern air strength on these 131 fields.

(iii) Logistic Support The Soviets probably have been stock

piling POL products, including jet fuel, in substantial

quantities In the Far East. Providing no effective UN

action were taken to disrupt Communist supply lines

outside Korea, it is believed that Communist China

and the USSR could support logistically a major air ef

fort In the Korean theater. If the Soviet Far Eastern

air forces were deployed to bases adjacent to Korea,

night bombing attacks could be carried out anywhere

In Korea or against Japan, and saturation-type day

bomber operations could be launched throughout most

of Korea. If Soviet medium bombers (TU-4s) were

employed, they would considerably increase enemy air

capabilities and expose UN military installations in

South Korea and Japan to the danger of atomic attack.

No TU-4s are currently known to be based in the Far

East.

(e) Soviet Naval Forces Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces consist

of the Fifth Fleet with headquarters at Vladivostok and the

Seventh Fleet with headquarters at Sovetskaya Gavan. The

surface forces of these fleets consist of two heavy cruisers,

nineteen destroyers, fifteen coastal destroyers, and 345

miscellaneous vessels including mine sweepers, subchasers,

mine layers, landing craft, and motor torpedo boats. The

submarine fleet has a strength of 85 submarines including

18 ocean patrol types, 39 medium-range types and 28 coastal

types.

11

406
70. (Continued)

COMMUNIST CAPABILiTIES IN TEE FAR EAST EJ.SEWHERE THAN

IN KOREA

18. The Chinese Ccmmunists have the capability of undertaking mili

tary operations In the Far East elsewhere than in Korea and could

initiate such operations as an alternative or, in some areas, as an

addition to a renewed offensive In Korea.

(a) Taiwan The Communists have been tuilding up their

capabilities for an assault on Taiwan. Thus far, however,

the heavy Communist military commitment In Korea,

together with the assignment of the US Seventh Fleet

to assist in maintaining the security of Taiwan, probably have been decisive factors in the Chinese Communist

decision to postpone any attempt to invade the island.

(b) Hong Kong Regardless of the outcome of the cease-fire

negotiations, the Chinese Communists will continue to have

the capability of launching an attack on Hong Kong without

further preparations and little, if any, advance warning.

(c) Southeast Asia The Chinese Communists probably could

make available approximately .50,000 men for extended

operations In Burma (NIE-36). In Indochina, the Chinese

Communists probably could support approximately

100,000 men (NIE-35) for a series of limited offensives

of short duration. However, so long as they are com

mitted in Korea, the Chinese Communists probably would

not be able to support logisticaliy both such operations

concurrently.

(d) Japan Dfrect and large-scale Soviet participation would

be necessary for Communist attacks, against Japan.

- 12 -

407
( I
71. Special Estimate 13, Probable Developments in the World Sit

uation Through Mid-1953, 24 September 1951

- 158

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

DOEUSçENT oc. I

NO OHAOCE IN CUSS. 0

O DECLASSIFIED .

CLASS. C~1.~liGEC TO: TS 8 (;.~ ,~

NEXT EEYIEW DATE: _______________

AUTH: lift iC4

DATE:~#ThN ri IEYIEWEELQ18557

j~t~ ( ~

CENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-ONIIDENTIAL

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD

SITUATION THROUGH MID-1953

SE - 13

Published 24 September 1951

409
71. (Continued)

WARNING

CV3~ENT cONTAmS EqPORJ~!ATION

NAflON SE OP THE UNTIED S , wrr~ TEE

?AEANNIG or 3 ~ND 794 or

~ S. CODE, AS . RS~SSION OR REV

ELATION OF NT~1TS TO OR BY AN tINA PERSON IS PRO~ BY LA

410
71. (Continued)

~

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TEE

WORLD SITUATION THROUGH MID-1953

SE-13

Published 24 September 1951

This estimate was prepared at the request of the Senior

Staff of the National Security Council as Appendix A to

Parts I and.II of United States Programs for National

Security.

The estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence

Agency in consultation with the intelligence organizations

of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air

Force, and the Joint Staff. The Intelligence Advisory

Committee concured in this estimate on 20 September

1951.

Tt1..1~.hT

411
71. (Continued)

-

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

WORLD SITUATION THROUGH MID-1953

L PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES

AND INTENTIONS !f

A. Probable Growth in Soviet and Satellite Capabilities

1. The Soviet sphere will probably continue to increase its

military, economic, and political strength over the next two

years. Its absolute strength will be considerably greater in

over-all terms by mid-1953 than at present.

2. General Military Capabilities The military strength-inbeing of the Soviet orbit should further increase over the

next few years. Of greatest significance are a probable im

provement in Soviet capabilities for atomic attack and for

defense against such attack, the further development of Chinese

Communist military strength, and continued growth of

European Satellite military power.

a. Substantial modernization programs are continuing

in all three Soviet services and Soviet forces should

remain at a high state of war readiness. No sizable

increase is expected in the Soviet army, which now

totals some 2,500,000 men, including 175 line

divisions, and can probably mobilize an additional

145 divisions by M + 30 days. While the over-all

numerical strength of the Soviet air force is expected

to remain substantially the same, Soviet air power

will become increasingly effective through continued

conversion to jet fighters and bombers, improved

1/ Except in general terms, the position of Communist China is

discussed in Section III.

~ONA~EN~E

412
71. (Continued)

CO~EN~L

1~fr

training standards, operational use of heavy bombers,

and acquisition of additional electronic equipment. More

over, the USSR is increasing Its strength in Eastern

Europe and the Far East to maintain its relative advan

tage over Western strength.

b. Atomic Capabilities 1/ While Soviet atomic capa

bilities will remain inferior to those of the US, the USSR

may have as.many as 100 bombs by mid-1952, and as

many as 200 by mid-1953. Some of these bombs might

have an energy yield as high as 100 kilotons. At present

the Soviet air force has an estimated Tb and E strength

of about 600 to 700 TU-4 medium bombers capable of

one-way missions, carrying atomic bombs, to practically

all important targets in the US. Although there is no

1/ Special attention is called to the fact that estimates of the

Soviet atomic stockpile are tentative and uncertain because:

(a) The number and/or size of the production facilities

postulated as a basis for this estimate may be incorrect.

The minimum program, which is not inconsistent with

the information available, would provide a stockpile of

about one-half the number of weapons indicated. On the

other hand, from the information available at the present

time, the possibility that additional or expanded produc

tion facilities will be constructed during the period under

consideration cannot be precluded.

(b) The ~pe~of weapon postulated for calculating the

stockpile figures may be incorrect. It is possible by

changing the weapon design to substantially increase or

decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile, given

a certain quantity of fissionable material. Such changes,

however, alter the kilotonnage of the individual weapons

accordingly.

-2

CONFIDENTIAL

413
71. (Continued)

evidence that the USSR has developed aerial refueling

techniques, with such techniques these aircraft may be

capable of two-way missions to most important US

targets. By mid-1952 the USSR may have approximately

1,000 TU-4s and by mid-1953 about 1,200. By mid1953 the USSR also may have approximately 100 longrange bombers capable of round trip missions against

nearly all vital targets in the US. It probably will

have by this time substantial numbers of twin-jet high

performance bombers capable of atomic attack on.

Western Europe and US overseas bases, and possibly

a jet bomber capable of attacking the US. By mid1953 the USSR should also have sufficient stockpiles

of nerve gas for sustained, extensive employment.

c. Soviet air defenses probably will be substantially

improved by mid-1953. A good all-weather interceptor

aircraft with adequate airborne intercept radar should

be available in limited to moderate quantities by that

time, and difficulties with ground control intercept

radars should be largely overcome. Moreover,

improved antiaircraft defenses with modern radar

equipment must be expected..

d. The USSR will probably considerably improve

its submarine warfare capabilitiesby mid-1953 in

view of the known Soviet modernization and construc

tion program. At present the USSR has an estimated

361 submarines. More than half are ocean.patrol

and medium-range submarines of considerable

endurance, and of these over 100 have the capability

of patrolling in US coastaL waters. Their operations

would include torpedo attacks against shipping and

mining of ports.

-3-

LON11 DENTIAE

414.
71. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRET

e. The Eastern European Satellite armies (including the East German) are expected to increase from a

present 65 divisions to 117 by the fall of 1953, when

Soviet re-equipment programs are expected to be

completed. By that time these forces, despite some

qualitative deficiencies, should be capable of inde

pendent operations with Soviet logistical backing or

joint offensive operations with the Red Army. The

East German Alert Police of 52,000 is capable of

rapid expansion, with Soviet help, to 24 SovIet type

rifle divisions. However, a force of only eight

divisions is apparently contemplated at present due

to the limitations imposed by the manpower demands

of the East German economy. Unless the Korean

war is prolonged, intensified, or broadened the

Chinese Communist forces should also be materially

strengthened with Soviet aid and technical support.

3. Capabilities for particular operations The Soviet bloc

will probably by mid-1953 still be able to carry out almost all

of the offensive operations of which they are presently con

sidered capable, except in the unlikely event that the effec

tiveness of new weapons developed, produced and actually

deployed by the West should offset the present preponderance

of Soviet military strength on the Eurasian continent.

a. The USSR should still be able to overrun Western

Europe and the Near East by mid-1953, although growing

NATO strength will increase Western defense capabilities

and lengthen correspondingly the time required for

Soviet operations.

b. The USSR is already capable of an atomic attack on

the continental US Although US air defenses will be

substantially improved by mid-1953, Soviet capabilities

for attack on the US may be even more significantly

increased, and the US will still be seriously vulnerable

to such an attack.

-4-

TOP CCCflET

415
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

4. Political and. Psychological Warfare Capabilities The

Communists will continue to have extensive propaganda, sub

versive, and obstructive capabilities, both overt and covert, in

Western Europe over the next two years. Moreover, Soviet and

Chinese Communist capabilities in the Far East will probably

considerably increase.

5. Economic Strength of the Soviet Bloc The over-all economic

strength of the Soviet orbit will remain far inferior to that of.

the Western Powers over the next few years, and little change

is likely by 1953 in relative productive capacities. For example,

US, Canadian, and Western European raw steel output should

continue to be four times as great as that of the Soviet bloc,

rising to roughly 175,000,000 tons in 1953 as compared to an

estimated 43,000,000 tons for the Soviet bloc. However, the

Western Powers will continue to be less able than the USSR

to bring their over-all resources to bear on maximizing economic

readiness for war. The Soviet economy is already at a high

state of war-readiness and its productive capacity is at such a

level and of such a character as to enable the USSR to maintain

a major war effort. Although the expansion of the NATO

mobilization base will substantially narrow the gap between

Western and Soviet economic war-readiness by mid-1953, the

USSRwi11 still maintain a substantial lead. Continued largescale arms production and stockpil.ing during the next two

years will further increase Soviet economic war-readiness

and extend the period over which the USSR could expect to

conduct large-scale offensive operations. Increased industriali

zation in the European Satellites and their further integration

into the Soviet economy will also contribute to Soviet war

potential.

6. However, certain sectors of the Soviet economy are highly

vulnerable to air attack and will probably remain so for the

period of this estimate despite Soviet efforts to improve their

air defenses, continued dispersion of facilities arid a more

complete system of reserve stocks. Moreover, certain economic

5

TOP OECflE~

416
71. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRET

weaknesses will still persist within the Soviet bloc, particularly

a shortage of merchant shipping and deficiencies in such items as

oil, crude rubber, certain machine tools and precision instruments,

some non-ferrousmetals and alloys, and some electrical equip

ment. Western trade controls already have some impact, and

to the extent that these controls are tightened such deficiencies

will become more important. However, apart from the effects of

US bombing, it is unlikely, in view of the Soviet stockpiling

program and the probable development of substitutes, that these

deficiencies will seriously affect Soviet capabilities for a long

war. Although inferior by US standards, the Soviet land transport

net is probably also adequate for a major war.

7. Internal Stability of the Soviet Sphere Despite continuing

tensions within the Soviet bloc, Communist control seems

assured for the period of this estimate. The only appreciable

likelihood of serious internal strains would be in Communist

China if it remained embroiled in hostilities in the Far East

(see Section III.) While chronic difficulties will persist in the~~

Sovietization of the European Satellites, they should be brought

under even firmer Soviet control. Domestic dissatisfaction with

the deprivations created by the forced pace of industrialization,

agrarian collectivization, and rearmament will be a constant in

the Soviet orbit, but no serious threat to the USSR.

B. Probable Soviet Policies through Mid-1953.

8. Soviet Objectives It can be assumed that over-all Soviet

objectives will remain the same as outlined In NSC 114. The

primary short-term aim of Soviet policy will continue to be the

obstruction of further growth in Western strength and unity.

The USSR must be increasingly concerned with the pace of Western

countermeasures, which it doubtless views as an ever more

serious threat not only to the early accomplishment of its over

all objectives but eventually to the security of the Soviet orbit

Itself. In particular, the USSR must fear growing US military

power and its projection into a series of overseas bases

-6-

TOP CECRET

417
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

encircling the Soviet bloc. It must also be seriously disturbed

over the approaching rearmament of Western Germany and

Japan, both with potential revisionist aims vis-a-vis the Soviet

bloc. The USSRs acute sensitivity to these developments Is

amply evident from recent Soviet cold war moves. While the

USSR may still see sufficient opportunities to justify a con

tinuation of its present aggressive cold war policies, mounting

Soviet concern as Western countermeasures develop further

may lead to a change in tactics by the USSR. With the rising

curve of Western strength, the possibility of such a change

will become progressively more acute.

9. Continued Aggressive Political Warfare For the time

being, however, it appears likely that the USSR will continue

its present aggressive policy of political and psychological

warfare. Despite the increased strength of anti-Communist

forces, the USSR and Communist China probably see various

revolutionary and subversive opportunities still open to them,

particularly in Asia. They may be expected to continue their

penetration of adjacent areas, promoting Communist coups

wherever the situation seems favorable. The Communist

forces wiil also attempt through local strikes, propaganda,

and other means to obstruct Western rearmament and under

mine the stability of free nations.

10. The USSR doubtless also sees possibilities of creating

rifts between the non-Soviet countries, given the present acute

stage of world tensions, and will make every effort to divide

th~ Western Powers. Further Soviet initiatives to forestall

the rearmament and pro-Western orientation of Germany and

Japan are almost certain. Against a background of continued

threats, the USSR will almost certainly intensify its propaganda

and diplomatic peace offensive to convince the world that

the aggressive course of the US and its allies is leading to

a new war, thus playing on Western fears and attempting to

weaken popular support of Western countermeasures.

-7-

TOP CECflET

418
71. (Continued)

-3ECRET

11. While continuing its efforts to undermine Western Europe,

the USSR will continue to devote much attention to Asia. The

USSR and Communist China undoubtedly consider that favorable

revolutionary and subversive opportunities exist in the Near

and Far East, where the decline of Western influence and

control has created serious instability. The Kremlin might

hope that through stimulating local strife and civil war in such

areas, it could either expand its own sphere of control and

deprive the West of important resources or dissipate Western

strength in costly and inconclusive military and economic

countermeasures.

12. Further Soviet or Chinese Communist local aggression

particularly in Asia, is also possible during the next two years.

Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina or Burma and Satellite

invasion of Yugoslavia are serious possibilities (see Section Ill).

To the extent that the Kremlin considers it necessary to

eradicate the Tito heresy before Tito or the West become too

strong, the USSR may feel compelled to act soon, if critical

situations arise in other areas, such as Iran, which offer

inviting opportunities, possible Communist intervention cannot

be discounted. However, a probable major factor in any decision

for or against any such overt expansion will be the Soviet and

Chinese Communist estimate of the resultant risks of general

war and their willingness to accept those risks. In view of the

US and UN reaction in Korea, the growing pace of Western

rearmament, and the ever sharper. delineation of the EastWest struggle, the USSR probably now considers that further

local aggression would entail serious risks of general war.

Before decidingon such local aggression the USSR would

certainly consider not Only Westeri~ capabilities in any particular

area but also over-all US capabilities against the USSR.

13. Although the USSR might under certain circumstances

deliberately precipitate general war (see paragraph 15), it

appears more likely that such a war, if it comes, would

result from Soviet misjudgment of US action in a given situation

8

TOP ~ECflET

419
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

or from the inability of either the USSR or the US to yield in

cases where they regarded their vital interests as involved. The

most immediate danger of such a development would be in event

of a prolongation, intensification, or broadening of the Korean

conflict. If under such conditions the Communist forces in

Korea were threatened with decisive defeat the Kremlin would

probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the

introduction of volunteer forces. It might even include the

employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto

local war between the US/UN and USSR would exist. In the

event of critical developments in other areas as well as in

Korea, the increasing tenseness of the international situation

and the growing strength of both sides, which might lead to

an increased determination to defend what each considered

to be its vital interests, will make the danger of general war

through accident or miscalculation considerably more acute.

14. Possibility of a Major Shift in Soviet Tactics While it

appears likely that the USSR will for a time continue its

aggressive cold war pressures, the further growth of Western

strength and counterpressures during the coming period may

produce a shift in Soviet tactics. Viewing the last three years

developments, the USSR may consider that its postwar revolu

tionary and expansionist opportunities, except perhaps in Asia,

are steadily narrowing and that continued cold war pressures

are unlikely to pay off. The Kremlin may consider that such

cold war pressures are only generating relatively greater

Western countermeasures, which might eventually, particularly

if they include German and Japanese rearmament, produce a

stituation dangerous to the vital interests of the USSR itself.

Therefore, if the USSR is to achieve its immediate primary

objective of forestalling a decisive increase in Western

strength, it may be increasingly faced with the necessity of a

shift from aggressive political warfare to some other approach.

-9-

TOP 3ECRET

420
71. (Continued)

-3ECRET

15. Deliberate Initiation of General War It is impossible to

predict whether orat what point the rising curve of Western

strength might lead the USSR to consider this trend so serious

a threat as to require a resort to force before the West reaches

a strength dangerous to the vital interests of the USSR. The

risk of such a development will become more acute as Western

defense programs progress, particularly in regard to German

and Japanese rearmament and the development of US overseas

bases. The USSR is increasing its already high state of warreadiness and continuing its systematic domestic propaganda

campaign to prepare the Soviet and Satellite peoples psycho

logically for possible war. Moreover, the USSR, with its

intense suspicion of Western motives, may consider present

Western defensive preparations as a prelude to eventual

action by the Western Powers to force a choice between war

and unacceptable concessions upon the USSR.

16. The USSR presumably recognizes that its Still inferior

over-all war potential, together with Western atomic superiority,

would make the outcome of a general war doubtful, despite

initial Soviet successes. Nevertheless, this consideration

cannot be accepted as necessarily controlling the USSRs

decision and the period through mid-1953 will be one of

acute danger of global war, if convinced that the circumstances

described above dictated a military showdown with the West

during this period, it is possible that the Soviet rulers would

themselves precipitate sUch a showdown at a time and under

circumstances that they considered most favorable. It is

alternatively possible, however, that they would for at least

a period concentrate their attention on moves designed to

maximize their immediate readiness for the impending con

flict. These moves would include further steps in the military

and economic mobilization of the Soviet Union and the Satellites.

At the same time, the Kremlin and its Satellites might undertake

local aggressions aimed at improving the immediate position

of the USSR. The USSR would have to weigh the prospective

- 10 -

TOP ~CCRET

421
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

gains in such local aggressions against the danger that such

aggression might touch off general war at a time and under

circumstances unfavorable to Soviet interests. But the Kremlin

would make its assessment in this regard against the background

of a belief that general hostilities were imminent in any event.

17. A Relaxation of Tensions As an alternative to deliberate

Soviet resort to early general war, if the Kremlin considered

that there were compelling reasons against this course of

action, the USSR might decide to make a. temporary shift, at

least in Europe, to new and less obviously aggressive tactics,

designed to lull the West into a false sense of security and

undermine growing Western strength. Considering that its

present aggressive postwar policies had reached the point of

diminishing returns and were engendering ever more threatenjug Western countermeasures, the USSR might see in this

alternative method of political warfare even better opportunities

of undermining the growing strength and cohesion of the West.

Such a tactical shift would not necessarily imply that the USSR

would suspend all its aggressive and subversive tactics; it

might adopt a softer policy in Europe, for example, while

continuing to expand in Asia. Moreover, a shift to such a course

would be only temporary, and it is impossible to say at what

point, if ever, the USSR might consider it necessary to adopt

it, or how far it might be willing to go. There are strong

grounds for believing that the USSR would in any case be

unwilling to make the major concessions which would appear

to be necessary to assure such a policys success.

11

TOP SECRET

422

1 (
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

II. PROBABLE GROWTH OF NATO STRENGTH AND WILL TO

FIGHT

18. Except in the event of a marked reduction in US aid, some

improvement in Western European strength and morale seems

likely by mid-1953, although less than that anticipated from US

and NATO programs. Further progress toward achieving MTDP

goals, continued expansion of Europes economy, a more unified

and efficient NATO and intra-European effort, and the probable

integration of West Germany into the Atlantic Community will

all contribute to this improved position. Nevertheless, certain

countries will still be deficient in political initiative and popular

will to sacrifice and Western Europe will remain subject to

dangerous economic and social stresses. It will still be vulner

able not only to Soviet occupation but to Soviet cold war pres

sures through mid-1953.

19. NAT Military Strength By mid-1953 the European NATO

forces should be considerably stronger than at present if there

is a continued high level of US aid. European defense budgets and military production will probably increase over the next

two years and although forces in being will fall short of phased

MTDP requirements, their morale, leadership and combat

readiness should be markedly higher than at present. However,

available European NATO forces will still be insufficient to do

more than delay a full-scale Soviet attack, except in the un

likely event that the effectiveness of new weapons developed,

produced, and actually deployed by the West should offset the

present preponderance of Soviet military strength on the

Eurasian continent.

20. Broadening of the NAT Coalition The formal or informal

association of Greece, Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Western

Germany with the NAT defensive coalition, which, despite vary

ing degrees of European reluctance, should be consummated in

the coming period, will be a major increment to NATO strength.

The developing integration of these countries either directly or

- 12 -

TOP 3ECrtET

423
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

indirectly into the NATO structure and the strengthening of their

forces should help to offset the increases in Soviet and Satellite

strength. The southern flank of SHAPE should be materially

strengthened, partly by a greater availability of Mediterranean

bases. However, numerous political and psychological obstacles

will continue to delay the optimum utilization of Yugoslav, West

German, and Spanish potential and to postpone the date at which

these nations can make a full contribution to European defense.

It seems unlikely, for example, given the continuing obstacles to

a West German contribution, that a sizable contingent of combatready German forces will become available before some time in

1953. Moreover, to the extent that the Western Powers do not

meet German demands for full equality, German cooperation may

be delayed.

21. Economic Burdens Despite the marked degree of economic

recovery during the ERP period, Western Europes economy is

being subjected to new strains by NAT rearmament needs. In

flationary pressures and raw materials shortages generated by

rearmament, persistent economic nationalism, and the contm

uing reluctance or inability of many governments to take the

necessary measures to cope with economic maladjustments will

all hamper both optimum defense output and continued economic

expansion. Nevertheless, the next two years should see a small

rise in European production and a small and uneven increase in

living standards, despite rearmament drains. Much will depend

upon how far national economic policies can minimize the econ

omic repercussions of rearmament while maximizing European

defense efforts. Finally, a great deal will depend upon the Øx

tent to which not only US economic aid but US materials alloca

tions and economic trends in the US itself permit a continued

expansion of European production. Because of a worsening

balance of payments situation in the UK, for example, increased

US aid may be required if a satisfactory rate of British defense

build-up is to be achieved.

13

TOP SECRET

424
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

22. Political and Psychological Factors The poor state of

European morale, still deficient popular will to sacrifice, and a

lack of vigorous governmental initiative, particularly in key con

tinental countries, will continue to hamper the achievement of

NATO objectives. Despite the marked degree of postwar Euro

pean recovery there still persists in many continental countries

a serious lack of governmental and popular confidence in Europes

ability to solve its economic and social problems, and to defend

itself against external attack. Popular morale and confidence

will be bolstered as NATO and other programs develop, but will

long remain an uncertain factor, particularly in event of war.

23. While no seriously adverse internal political developments

appear likely in any Western European countries, a marked un

provement in political stability seems at best problematical.

The chief areas of un~ertainty are France and Italy, in both of

which the position of existing governments will continue to be

precarious. This in turn prevents them from dealing vigor

ously with military, political, and economic problems. Never

theless, some form of coalition should be able to maintain its

present controlling position in France and Italy, unless a seri

ously worsening economic or international situation leads to

an acceleration of the trend toward polarization of the political

scene. The powerful French and Italian Communist parties will

probably maintain substantial strength, but their obstructive

role should be somewhat reduced unless rearmament creates

major economic stresses on which they can capitalize.

24. Progress of the Alliance Supranational institutions of

European unity - -

specifically the European Defense Force and

the Schuman plan administration - - should develop during the

next two years, but there is no indication that any European

state is yet prepared tO form a true federation with its neighbors.

Within NATO the problems of rearmament will probably dictate

a further unification of effort by mid-1953, though among the

treaty powers and those associated with them the problem of con

flicting national objectives will continue to hamper the develop

ment of maximum strength. The continuing debate over the sharing

- 14 -

TOP 3ECRET

425
71. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRE~

of rearmament burdens, the constant threat of rearmament to

social reform and welfare programs, the problem of trade with

the East, the struggle for markets within and outside Europe,

the part Germany is to play in the alliance - - all these will be

exasperating and sometimes frustrating problems with which

the West must deal. Added to all these will be the difficulties

always posed by an ambivalent Europe looking to the United

States for strength and power yet envious of American leader

ship and often doubtful.of the aims and methods of American

policy. Nonetheless, mid-1953 should find the alliance stronger

than at present and better organized than it is now.

25. On the other hand, if the USSR could remove some of the

fear of World War LU and Soviet invasion, European popular

willingness to shoulder the burdens of rearmament would al

most certainly lessen, and there would be strong pressure on

the governments to divert resources from the NATO effort to

meet pressing economic and social needs.

26. In any case the US will continue to face serious problems

arising from the failure of its European NATO partners to meet

present rearmament goals. Even if the Western Europeans were

willing arid able to assume a larger share of NAT defense bur

dens, adequate NATO rearmament would still be impossible with

out large-scale US military and economic assistance. In view of

the continuing uncertainties of the European situation, much will

depend therefore, during the period of this estimate, on US

leadership and support. A substantial reduction in US assistance

over the coming period would seriously jeopardize European

economic and political stability, as well as the creation of an

adequate NATO defense.

Ill. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEAR AND FAR

EAST

27. No decisive outcome of the East-West struggle in Asia

seems probable during the next two years. At present it appears

- 15 -

TOP CECRET

426
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

unlikely that the US and its allies will be able to do more than

maintain or perhaps slightly improve their present unsatisfactory

position in the Near and Far East, while on the other hand there

is acute danger of major deterioration. The East-West conflict

has become increasingly acute in the Far East, and will remain

acute so long as Communist China plays an expansionist role.

The threat of Communist expansion in the Near East and South

Asia is by no means as immediate, but in these areas as well

as in the Far East, the Western position is seriously threatened

by the anti-Western cast of the Asian nationalist revolution.

This anti-Westerniszn, combined with social tensions, poverty,

governmental and military weakness, and naivetØ or lack of con

cern about Communist objectives, makes most Asian states

vulnerable to Communist exploitation and complicates US efforts

to bolster them internally. In the Far East in particular, the

Communists have succeeded to a large extent in identifying them

selves with the Asian revolution, and in encouraging its antiWestern aspects. In those areas where Communism has gained

no firm foothold, Asian nationalism has expressed itself in acute

suspicion of US motives and a persisting trend toward neutral

ism. However, the continued economic and military dependence

of the free Asiatic countries upon the Western Powers provides

them an inducement to align themselves with the West.

28. The USSR and Communist China will present a serious

threat to US interests in the Far East through mid-1953. Un

less subjected to continuing economic and military stresses

from a prolonged, intensified, or broadened Korean war, the

Chinese Communist regime may be able to strengthen itself

over the coming period by modernizing and strengthening its

armed forces, by further consolidating its domestic control, and

by making some progress in solving its economic problems.

The Peiping regime will play an increasingly influential role in

Asian affairs by virtue of its growing prestige and through the

influence it exerts over Asian revolutionary movements. The

USSR will probably continue to provide substantial military and

technical help, although its economic aid will almost certainly

- 16 -

ATOP SECRE-T

427
71. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

fall far short of Chinese requirements. However, a

prolonged, intensified, or broadened struggle with the US and

its allies might critically weaken the Peiping regime unless the

USSR provided much greater military and economic aid.

29. While frictions may develop between the USSR and Commu

nist China and there remain long term possibilities of a major

clash of interests, it appears unlikely that any serious rifts will

develop in the next two years. Ideological affinity and mutual

antagonism toward the West, as well as common fear of Japanese

resurgence, probably dictate a continued close relationship, at

least over the short term.

30. It seems almost certain that Peiping intends to play an

aggressive, expansionist role in the Far East. While problems

of internal consolidation and development and a continued lack

of naval strength should prevent China through mid-1953 from

mounting a serious threat to the US-dominated offshore island

chain (except perhaps Taiwan), there will remain an ever pres

ent danger of Chinese Communist aggression against such ad

jacent mainland areas as Indochina, Burma, and South Korea.

While the Korean war has somewhat restricted Chinese Commu

nist capabilities for operations elsewhere, such capabilities

should increase in the event this conflict is ended. In any case

Communist China will almost certainly increase its covert sup

port of indigenous revolutionary movements. It may consider

that the prospects for eventual success by these methods, parti

cularly in Southeast Asia, are sufficient to make unnecessary

overt intervention with its risk of war with the West.

31. The probable emergence of a politically stable and pro-US

Japan will help to establish an East-West balance of power in

the Far East. However, the revival of Japans power potential

will inevitably be a long term development and Japan alone will

by no means be able to counterbalance Sino-Soviet strength in

Northeast Asia in the next two years. Moreover, anti-Western

sentiment may develop in post-treaty Japan, and if Japan fails

- 17 -

TOP CECRET

428
71. (Continued)

-CECflET

to find markets and raw materials in non-Communist areas,

there may develop an insistent demand for economic collaboration

with the Asian mainland. Under these circumstances, there will

be a continuing substantial requirement for US assistance, parti

cularly in the development of foreign trade. However, the con

tinuance of a conservative anti-Communist government should

tend to support US interests, and over the next two years at least

Japan should be a growing asset to the Western position in East

Asia.

32. The chief immediate danger of a critical development in the

Far East lies in a prolongation, intensification, or broadening of

the Korean war (see paragraph 13). Even If some compromise

solution were reached in Korea, the US would still be faced not

only with the constant threat of renewed aggression in Korea or

elsewhere in Asia and the consequent necessity of maintaining

large forces in the Far East, but alsowith major reconstruction

problems in South Korea. The reconstituted North Korean forces,

together with the Chinese Communists, will have a continued

capability for re-occupying South Korea in the event US and UN

forces are progressively withdrawn. The rebuilding of South

Korean security forces and the rehabilitation of the prostrate

South Korean economy will in any case constitute formidable

tasks.

33. Southeast Asia will continue to be extremely vulnerable to

Communist penetration. There is no prbspect for early develop

ment of strong anti-Communist governments in the area and a

real danger exists that, with increased Chinese Communist assist

ance or even overt intervention, indigenous Communist movements

may extend their control over more of Indochina and Burma within

the next two years. If these countries were to fall, Thailand would

doubtless prove unable for long to withstand Communist pressure,

and the situation would also deteriorate further in Malaya, Indo

nesia, and the Philippines. In any event, all Southeast Asian coun

tries will remain weak and unstable during the coming period, and

may require increasing amounts of outside assistance, including

- 18 -

TOP 3ECItET

429
71. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRET

military assistance, even to maintain themselves. In the absence

of major Communist successes in Indochina or Burma, the situ

ation in Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines should improve by

mid-1953, although long term problems of local insurgence, polit

ical instability, and economic development will still remain.

34. The Nationalist military position on Taiwan should gradually

improve with US aid. Enhanced Nationalist capabilities for harass

ing the mainland will require an increased allotment of Chinese

Communist strength for coastal defense. However, the security of Taiwan will continue to be hampered by the regimes economic

difficulties, general inefficiency and corruption, and will require

close US control if US military and economic aid is to be effec

tive.

B. Probable Developments in the Near East (and North

Africa

35. In the Near East the serious possibility of a deterioration

in the situation overshadows the limited possibilities of im

provement over the next two years. At present, except in Greece

and Turkey, the West is faced with a growing crisis in which the

chief motivating force is not Communist pressure but the antiWestern nationalism of Iran and the Arab world. The growing

strength of Greece and especially Turkey and the widening sys

tem of US Mediterranean bases should be positive favorable in

fluences in this area. However, these~factors will probably be

counterbalanced by continued Arab-Israeli animosity, further

deterioration of the British system of a1liances,~and nationalist

hostility toward the West. Active Soviet intervention in the Near

East seems unlikely, except possibly in Iran, More likely is a

further growth of neutralism, which might limit US-UK utili

zation of the areas strategic position and petroleum resources.

Improvement of the existing unsatisfactory US-UK position in

the Near East (except in Greece and Turkey) will depend largely

upon the successful solution of the areas economic problems

and upon the satisfaction of at least some nationalist aspirations.

- 19 -

TOP ~ECItET

430
71. (Continued)

-IDNTIAL

36. Developments in Iran will depend largely upon the outcome

of the current oil controversy, but in any event Iran will prob

ably remain internally unstable during the next two years. While

successful negotiations with the British might substantially in

crease Iranian revenues, it is doubtful whether effective use

would be made of these revenues. Failure of the negotiations may

well lead to economic chaos and increase the danger of a Commu

nist (Tudeh) coup. Overt Soviet intervention remains unlikely

unless the UK intervenes with armed force, in which case the

USSR might occupy Azerbaijan.

37. In the Arab states social and political instability, antiZionism, and extreme nationalism will hamper the achievement

of US objectives through mid-1953. There is little likelihood of

sufficient improvement in Israeli-Arab relations to permit their

joint association in Near East defense. Arab resentment over

US support of Israel,~ also creates problems for the US. Nation

alism will continue to undermine UK influence and seriously

jeopardize British retention of their important Egyptian bases.

However, despite the trend toward neutralism in the Arab coun

tries, there is some increased awareness of the Soviet threat

and, particularly if an increased Soviet threat developed, the

Arab states might more willingly cooperate with the West.

Their price would probably be a sharp Increase in the amount

of US aid.

38. Israels ultimate orientation is uncertain, despite Its econ

omic dependence on the US and its stated awareness of the Soviet

threat. Continued immigration and a paucity of resources pro

long economic instability and there is some danger that Israel

might seek an outlet through renewed expansion at the Arabs

expense.

39. While violent explosions in French North Africa may not

occur over the next two years, rising Arab nationalism, fanned

by extremists in the Arab states, will create increasing instabil

ity in this area and also in Libya, and may affect the security of

US bases.

- 20 -

431
71. (Continued)

~CONflbtNT1A~

C. Probable Developments in South Asia.

:40, Developments in SOuth Asia over the next t~o. years wlfldØ_

pend largely on the óutcóme of the Kashmir dispute. Reali

zationOfthe~effectthat war would hàve~onthedisputants might result in greater readiness to comprOmise, and some defÆctO

If not negotiated settlement may emerge. The resulting increased stability in the area would be favorable to US interests.

Pakistan maybe able to give morepositive expression to Its

pro-Western leanings and, if given US support, may prOvide ~

bases and troops for the defen~Ł of the Middle East. Although

India is far less likely to abandon its neutralist policy, at least

so long as Nehru remains prime minister, continued Chinese

CommuniSt penetration of Southeast Asia, especially Burma,

might lead India to adopt a more forceful anti-Communist policy.

On the other hand, If continued friction over Kashmir leads to

war, the resulting economic stresses and communal disorders

would leave both India and. Pakistan prostrate and vulnerable to

Communist penetration. In any event, the deep seated social

and economic ailments of the area, and particularly of India,

preclude the development in the short run of strong states

capable of adding significantly to the power of the Western

coalition.

IV. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

41. The situation In Latin America through mid-1953 should

continue to be favorable to US interests, despite certain internal

problems and a persistent isolationist attitude among large

segments of Latin American opinion. The areas trade position

has improved since the Korean war and is likely to improve

further. All but a few governments are pro-US, and only in

Argentina and Guatemala are there pronounced anti-US attitudes

in high official circles. The chief present problem in Latin

America Is the maintenance of political and economic stability,

both of which have been increasingly threatened In the last two

years.

- 21

T~ ~tl~T

432
71. (Continued)

~ONFENT1~E,

TO~=z~r~

42. Important obstacles to full Latin American support of US

policies are the persistence of isolationist sentiment and un

willingness to make sacrifices In the East-West cgnhllct, which

to many Latin Americans appears primarily as a struggle be

tween the US and USSR. The force of Isolationist and nationalist

opinion, particularly In countries ,wher~ importantcelections are

appx~oaching, has obstructed direct mllltar~. aid to the UN In

Korea, and has caused pro-US governments to act cautiously in

US negotiations to secure strategic mate~ials. Communist stra

tŁgy has been to play upon this isolationism by attacking Latin

American boils with the US. Soviet adoptl9n of a more con

duiatory policy would increase the susceptibility of isolationist

groups and complicate the task of governments desiring to co

operate with the US. Nevertheless, In the event of a. majorS

crisis, most Latin American governments would. act in the spirit

of the Rio Treaty.

-22-

433

72. Office of the DCI], Staff Conference, 22 October 1951

(Excerpt)

CEOIIET

SC-M29

22 October 195].

STAFF ~NFERQNCE

Minutes of Meeting held in Directors

Conference Room, Administration Building

Monday, 22 October 195]., at 1100 hours.

Genera]. Smith Presiding

?sent

Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director

Walter R. Wolf, Deputy -irector for Administration

Joseph Larocque,~ Jr., Executive Assistant to the Director Colonel Chester B. Hansen, Assistant to the Director

Captain Pflnk C. Acke.r, Deputy Director of Training Jarncs D. Andrews, advisor for Management James N. £i.rdrews, Asst. Director for Collection and Dissemination

George G. Carey, Assistant Director for. Operations H. Marshall Chadwell, Asst. Director for Scientific Intefligenoe Kin~nan Douglass, Asst. Director for Current Intefligen~o L. S. Hitchcock, acting D/aSst. Director for Research and Reports William L. Langer, Asst. Director for National Estimates

Franklin L.. Lindsay, Acting D/Asst. Dir. for Ftlicy Coordination

Naj. Gem. H. N. NcClefland, assistant Director for Communications James Q. Rc-ber, inst. Director for Intelligence Coordination Colonel Robert taylor, Office of Deputy Director for Plans

Naj. Gem. Willard Wyman, Assistant Diroctor for Special Operations

CECRET

SC-N29

o 22 October 195].

Otto

/0W.

435
72. (Continued)

The Director stated that the question of 0/PC operations,

paramilitary operations and the whole Magnitade situation may have

some effect on the form of the report. He feels that operations have

assumed such a very large size in comparison to our intelligence finiction th~ we have almost arrived at a stage where it is necessary to decide whether CI~ will retain an intelligence agency or becomes

a Uco]4 war departmeüt. We have never had trouble with the Bureau

of the Budgct in asld.ng for Lueds to conduct our intelligence work

but the very large proposed budget for 1953, most of it for operations, may cause the Bureau of the Budget to scrutinize our activjti.es very

carefufl,y.

22 October 195].

2

9

22 October 1951

436
73. National Security Council, NSC 10/5, 23 October 1951

(Photocopy)

TOP CECRET

NSC 10/5

October 23, 1951

NOTE BY THE EXECUTI YE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

SCOPE AND PACE OF COVERT OPERATI ONS

References: A.. Memo for~ NSC from Acting

Exeçu~ive SecrŁtary~, same

sàbject, dated June 27,

1951

B. Memo for NSC from Executive

Secretary, same subject,

dated August 22, 1951

C. Memo for NSC from Executive

Secretary, same subject,

dated October 9, 1951

As of October 23, 1951, the statutory members of

the National Security Council approved the recomiendations

contained in Referenàe A as amended by the Changes contained

in Reference C. The DIrect9r of Central Intelligence had

concurred therein.

Accordingly, the report as amended and approved is

enclosed herewith for informatiOn and appropiiate implementa

tion by all departments and agencies concerned, as indicated

therein.

It is requested that spocial security precautions

be taken in the handling of this report and that access be

limited strictly to individuals requiring the information

contained therein to carry. out their official duties

It is further requestE,d that all copies of the ref

erence memoranda be. withdrawn and returned to this office upon

receipt of thIs report. , .

.

.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

ExŁcütive Secretary

.1

NSC 1,0/5 .

,

~P 6EcRET

437
73. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

SCOPE AND PACE OF COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council approves in principle

as a national responsibility the immediate expansion of the

covert organization established in NSC 10/2, and the intens

ification of covert operations designed in general order of

emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure

of p~wer, including the relationships between the USSR,

its satellites, and Communist China; and when and where

appropriate in the light of U. S. and Soviet capabili

ties and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction

and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits

which no longer constitute a threat to U. S. security.

b. Streiigthen the orientation toward the United

Stat~s of the peoples and nations of the free world, and

increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domina

tion.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate co

vertand guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the

maximum practicable extent consistent with 1a above, and

ensure availability of these forces in the ev~nt of war

for utilization in accordance with principles established

by the National Security Council, including wherever prac

ticable provision of a base upon which the military may

expand these forces on a military basis in time of war

within active theaters of operations.

2. The National Security Council directs the Psycholog

icaL Strategy Board to assure that its strategic concept for

a national psychological program includes provision for covert

Operations designed to achieve the objectives stated in para

graph 1 above.

3. The National Securit~~ Council reaffirms the responsi

bility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations in accordance with NSC

10/2 and subject to the general policy guidance prescribed

therein, and further subject to the approval of the Psycholog

ical Strategy Board which shall be responsible for:

NSC 10/5 1 TOP CECHET

438
73. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRET

a. Determining the desirability and feasibility of

programs and of individual major projects for covert op

erations formulated by or proposed to the Director of

Central I ntel].igence.

b. Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of

covert operations and the allocation of priorities among

these operations.

c. Coordinating action to ensure the provision of

adequate personnel, funds, and logistical and other

support to the Director of Central Intelligence by the

Departments of, State and. Defense for carrying out any

approved program of covert operations.

4. The National Security Council requests the Secretary

of Defense to provide adequate means whereby the Director of

Central Intelligence may be assured of the continuing advice

and collaboration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formu

lation of plans for paramilitary operations during the period

of the cold war.

5. In view of the necessity for immediate decision pri

or to the coming into operation of the Psychological Strategy

Board, the National Security Counci1~ authorizes

as outlined in the

memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence enclosed

with the reference memorandum of June 27, 1951 (Reference A),

and pursuant to the appropriate provisions of NSC 48/5.

NSC 10/5 2 TOP CECUIT

439

74. Pforzheimer, Memorandum for the Record, CIA Appropria

tions, 25 October 1951 (Carbon copy)

-SE6hEF

25 October 1951

Memorandum Lox the Record:

Subject: CIA Appropriations.

1. Mr. George Harvey, Chief Clerk, House Apropristiona

Committee has raised with me several times the problem of pIneLug of the CIA budget, particularly since It has reached a magnitude

which makes camouflage difficult. At his request end with the

approval of Mr. Wolf. Mr. Saunders, Mr. Houaton and I met

with Mr. Harvey today to explore the question.

2. Mr. Harvey opened the discussion by pointing out that

since 1946 he was the only person on the House Appropriations

Committee or its staff who has knoWP each year the amount of

the CiA budget and it. location. This places a great responsi

bility on him and on the Chairman of the Coa~vr~1ttee, for In cer

tain years the minority methbers have not been informed. Mr.

Harvey further stated that sooner or later this situation might

lead to extremely embarras sing questions from other members,

which might endanger the security of the CIA budget if we con

tines to ~d1e the matter as sI present.

3. Mx. Harvey pointed out that there were two basic problems:

the ~rsi, bow to ~~le the 1953 budget which i. curren~ pre

paration; and the second, how to plan for the ultimate long-term

problem of CIA apprcpriatioas. He cited certain .~ples of

problems which have srisen in connection with the location of the

CIA budget. particularly fox the fiscal year 1952. (ii ehould be

recalled that in on. instance in the 1952 budget, the State Depart

ment added a $10, 000.000 item of its own to our appropria&Ina

which bad been contained In a. $10,000. 000 item br several year..

This ~âI4innal $10. 000.000 request had served to highlight the

item in which the CIA appvoprIa.~an was tarioded leading to com

pliceitcin of the security aspects. In addition, those items which

weSt bidden In the m1li~y budget were included 1* suck a way that

it would be apparent to Ce~~4tt.e members studying the question

that certain figures were being falsified, les.Iing to embarrassing

questions which would needlessly disclose to many Co~ttee

membere the fact that the CiA budget was included to these items.)

S~R~

441.
74. (Continued)

2-

As s result. Mr. Harvey wishes to discuss, prior to hi. depar

ture from Washington at the end of next seek, the location problem

with us and with Mr. Schaub of the Bureau of the Budget.

4. Mr. Harvey agreed that it would be preferable to place

the entire CIA appropriation in cue budget- -either State or Defense

- -to keep at a minimum the number of Committee members who

would have to be told something about the CIA budget. (This is

in line with the suggestion of Senator OM~b~ey of the Senate

Appropriation. Committee, who was rather hopeful that we could

eliminate the small sum which was in the State Department budget.)

It was agreed, however, that an immediate dropping of the full

State Department Item of several million dollars In which our

budget was contained would needlessly point up the fact that CIA

had had f~s there. Therefore, it was suggested that this sum be

reduced by one or two million dollar, every year. and that the

Bureau of the Budget write to the .A~propriation3I Committee Chair

man stating that for security reason, they would likc t~ have part

of this appropriation included each year, but that the sum w~uld be

impounded by the Bureau of the Budget until it was completely

eliminated, perhaps 1ivc years from now.

5. The next problem which was discussed was the question

of openly declaring a portion of the CIA budget, keeping the re

m~4~4er concealed. It was generally agreed that this would be

helpful at least as an Interim measure. It was pointed out to Mr.

Harvey that actually the major portion of the CIA budget was en

pended for cold war activities assigned to us by the National Security

Council in this emergency, as opposed to the smaller portion of

our budget which could be fully deslgnatàd for intelligence purposes.

It therefore canbe assumed that ultimately, although perhaps not

In the foreseeable future, the CIA budget will be considerably lea.

than its present size. However, this would not serve to solve any

of the Immediate problems. It was also agreed that from the

standpoint of security we could not separate the present budget

into purely intelligence functions en the one band sod the cold war

activities on the .,tbcr.

6. The question was then raised as to whether there was any

way In which we could receive funds from the Treasury without

gulag through the formal appropriations procedure. Mr. Harvey

felt that perhap. the beat solution to our problem would be to ob

tain per~ent legislation which in effect would state that such

442
74. (Continued)

3

fonda as might be approved ~taafly by the Appropriations Corn..

mittees of the Roast sad S~ate. or designated subcommittees

thereat, would be appropriated for CIA out of nay money in the

Treasury not otherwise appropriated by the Congress. In effect

this would mean that we make a presentation annn~lIy to the

Appropriations Committees or their designated subcommittees.

and that they In tarn certify to the Treasury the amoimts which

the Treasury could tern over to CIA. Thi. would sUminatc nay

*ecesstty for biding sums in the Federal budget for us aad would

also eliminate Floor debate. It was pointed oat that It i~ight be

difficult to secure such legislation, but it could be assumed that

If suggested it would have the complete approval of the r~king

members of the House Appropriations Committee in advance.

However, it was further pointed out that the personality of the

Chairman of the Seaste Appropriations Conimittee might

ouch legislation extremely difficult at this time.

7. The final alternative discussed was the question of private

ft~aaag through the profit, of corporate cover, it was Mr.

Harvey. opinion that these profits should be reported each year

to the Appropriations Committees, and the annual budget be reduced

by such amounts rather than turning the funds over to the mis

cellaneous receipts of the Treasury.

Walter L. Plorabeimer

cc - DD/b.dinin.

Comptroller

$LC~ET

443
75. Office of the DCII, Staff Conference, 21 November 1951

50413].

2]. November 1951

STAFF O)N~R~2~CE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director s

Conference Roon, Administration BnIlrHng

Wednesday, 2]. Nov~nber 1951, at 1100 hours.

Genera]. &nith Presiding

Present

Allen W. Dufles, Deputy Director

1~Thnk 0. Wisner, Deputy Director for Plans

Walter R. Wolf, Deputy Director for Administration

Joseph Larocque, Jr., Executive Assistant to the Director

Colonel Chester B. Hansen, Assistant to the Director

James D. An&ews, Advisor for Manag~ent

Janice N. ~nthetrs, Asst. Director for Collection and Dissemination

Colonel Matthew Baird, Director of Training

H. Marshall Chadweil, Asst. Director for Scientific Intellig~nco

Brig. Gen. Trubee Davison, Director of Personnel

Lt. Co].. James B. Drum, A/Chief, Technical Services Staff, OJ~D/Plsns

Perry Johnson, E/Aset~. Director for Commi~icatioxiz

Col. Kilbourne Johnston, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination

Ijinan B. Kirkpatrick, D/Asst. Director for Special Operations

WI ~ ii~m L. Langer, lasistant Director for Natignal Esthnates

Max F. MilHlcan, Assistant Director for Research and Reports

James Q. Beber, assistant Director for Into].].igenee Coordination

Colonel Robert Taylor, Office of Deputy Director for Plans

Co].onc]..L. K. White, D/lasistant Director Lor Operations

Naj. Gen. ~i11ard bt~yuan, Asst. Director for Special Operations

SEcR.~r

SC-N31

21 November l9~l

445
75. (Continued)

SECIiLT

sC-14-31

2]. November l%1

1. Mr. Wisner made the following report on his recent trip with Mr. Mi].].er and Mr.He].ins:

Turkey

In consequence, no discussions were held

with I3nbassy officials and dealings were mostly with Turks on

the second echelon. Mr. Wiener felt that things in Turkey were

on a sound basis, the econon~- had taken strides forward and the

political situation appeared stable. Tunkey is so inportant

geographically that there is still a large job there.

Greece

!~i~sions were held with practically a].]. United States

and Greek anth.rities. Situation is not too satisfactory and the

United S~ates

.4..4._,....~ U

~ is the s_.._~.

in a genera~ i by States military

and diplomatic personnel. There is a feeling that the present

uneasy coalition may split and that Papagos might come into

power after the first o1f the year.

Mr. Wiener feels that th~ing thC trip they were able

to help Greek operatives in relation to their own government.

The heads of the Greek intelligence services are military personnel

and strong representations were mande to the Greek Government

that there should be continuity of service.

Major General Hart may become the new head of the

United States military mission. He was briefed by Mr. Wisner

in Stuttgart.

The internal Cozrginrnist situation seems to be fairly

well in check and they have gone underground. In this relation

the contrast between Greece and Italy- is very marked.

Italy

Unless present trends are reversed, the Italian situation

could be lost to the internal Cnitrnnini~t threat. ~ericans in

Italy, however, are aware of this, are begin-nirig to forgot their

differences and are showing more signs of working together.

The economic situation is poor, the tax collection

methods are bad and both are being exploited by the Conaunists.

SECB~T

SC-M-31

2]. November 1951

446
75. (Continued)

SC4I-31

2]. devenber 19S1

Conversations were held with Admiral Carney in regard to war planning in respect to Greece and !ugos].avia. Mr. Wisner

fc~els that the question of ~ingiug Greece and ~ugoslavia

directly together for war pimmi has been recently forgotten

by the United States and the British. Perhaps this is due to an

uncxpressed fear that if they get together they might decide to

partition Albania.

G3rma~

Mr. W~.sner fouad the German situation very ianpro~ive, with groat ecoeceic progress and booming manufacture. He es

pecially ncted the, recovery of the Deutsch Mark.

Gen. Truscot4

is closely f~Uowing the progress of the contractual agreemonts. Mr. Wiener foals that our negotiators may be uaable to get what

~ited States intelligence wants.

Ins position of Genera]. Truscott is interesting and vcry

greti1~p2ng. He is welcomed as the leader of the United States

intelligence activitjy. He is not, however, able to cover Berlin

as he has no man oem - - -

.....SJ_.~ J_ SI_,..J. _J

occupation to~rcea are dope~xicx.. and CIAs rcsDonsibiitt~ris great. Th~ 03 intel t~enco on the

Eastern Zonc and also parts of Poland is cxcullont. Troop sovaments are normally known within three days.

The defuctor operation was carefully studied and Mr. Wiener

feels it is going well. The ~ysical set-up is excellent althou~ heretofore the flow of defectors has ~oen smell. This is improving. Mr Wiener feels that press criticism of the defector

operation has become so wide spread (although mostly uajustified) that it is doing active hans and dote~ing defection.

France

Tho internal Ce~nmimi st situation is still strong but not

as bad as in Italy. The French argue constantly on a legalistic basis about COlrAnuaists and declare that the CQ1IE~nmi ~t Party is

still a.legal party. We will have tó kncp after this.

There wore nnnarous discussions with the French Intc].]1-

gcncc sc~rvices in an attempt to get thou to provide us i,ittLi more

intelligence. Some progress was made but we will probably have

to give thou something in exchange.

CE~ThET

SC -14-31

21. Novunbur 19~]. 2

447
75. (Continued)

Hollend ax4 Belgium

3EC~T

SCh31

21 Novombor 19S1

ice. s~tuatwn is Daci.y scrambled in Bolgium but

W. Wisnar saw the various chiefs ot the Intelligence services

at the same tine

Internal intelligence prob1~ in Belgiwa axe the

prinarily of a jurisdictional nature. Hr. Wisner arranged for copies of our National Security

Actofl91~7tobescmttothenforstudy.

Counterespionage service in Holland is having a bad

tine, Thcy have boon p~ibli~ CE amtters and have been criticized by the ncvspapers.

Eu

ax arrived just after election, too early to

observe ax~r change in the forei~ policy. He believes that soam

tine will elapse before there are a~r major policy chengcs.

General

In general, Hr. Wiener bad the impression that GIL was

gaining in maturity and stature. There is greater acceptance

Of CI& by american officials abroad and the Agency contribution

is recognized. This presents an increased responsibility to liv

up to this recognition. Hr. Wiener feels strongly that ~mco

ordinated trips through Europe and the )East must cease,

Such trios in the future must be coordinated through the Office

of DD/P

2. The Director endorsed ~. Wianurs c~onts on coordinated

travel. As a matter of procedure, when ar~one less than an Assistant

Director is traveling, coordination in the future idli be effected

through the Office of DD/P and the Senior Reprosentatives will always

C -

~8flCO5 5 - -

3. General Davison stated that although all Offices in CIA

wore lscrr~n-4ng xbr persondel ha had discovered that some 800 fileswere presently on -the desks of Division Chiefs and sane of than had been

there as long as two months. Be asked that the Assistant Directors get

those unving. The Director asked Qonerni Davison to look into the cause

of this delay and report to bin.

-3

448,

SCM33.

21 Novonber l9~l.
75. (Continued)

~cR~I

SC-N-)1

21Novenber 195]~

1~. The Diroctor mentioned a confidential mcmorand~n which

had boon circulated to the Assistant Directors and tho contents of

which ~h~td ovidontly ben ~~1eakŁdit ~ The Director is worriod about

our -sc~curity and fools that there is too nitich conversation on a].].

lcvcls. -

SC-14-31

2]. Novcwhcr 1951

14

449.
76. Earman, Memorandum for Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison,

Estimate of Situation in Guatemala, 14 January 1952

(Carbon copy)

~ecurInIy ~rma%IOlb

]i~ Jaz~a~y I9~2

!~T7.&M~J~! ~t. flZ&R A~1XRAL ~ERT 1. fl~I~ISc~

NLV~.L AID!~ TO 1~W~ P~U~Il?

Eeti~ta of 8i~aticn in Ooats~3*

8 of C~ntra1 IntsUig~oe bee z~q~stsd that

tbe ~ib3eot ~isr~ be ~im~ to the P~eai~t It I.e to

be not.d that the Inf~tjco oantainrd therein baa ~t bean

eo~dimtsd with the ~ei~e of the Intsliigsnea £4vie~y

~SIGNED

J.s.EAP.t~.I

Aaaistmit to tba Diveot~

~1oeei~

Piano dtd 11 J~ ~2 (fran Co].. King, OPC, to DDI~ ER 2.4~8U)

Diatributioni

Orig & 1 Addreeeee

2 Signer

1 - DD/P v/ac of ~o of 1]. Jan ~2 Y~~- j ~

~QI.M~ 4 0

D1MI. ~9TIO~ ~ 1 0

_____

__ /

451
76. (Continued)

~ th~i~

L~!-t

r~rkrufl

1]. January 1952

MEVORANDUM FOR DEPUT! DIRECTOR, PLANS

SUBJEcr, Eatiiiat. ~f Situation in Qatemala

~Activitisi

Th. ~continue to he vóry active in GU.atanala and aontirfli. to

receive Oover~nt support. Since the anti~Càwti.~1et rioting. in Ji~].y 1951

the Ccmuuniati have anftsnd ~ix overt c~aign for i~diat. action in

the political field, but they have forgsd ibsed in the labOr novoment,

.uocs.ding in forcing, nuder the guidano of Viconte LC~BARDO Toledano and

Louis SAILLAII!, $ csntral labor orgacisation oOepri.ing alaoat all the ~m4

In the country. The C~ui~im~( at nsvup~er Octohaó is published reguLarly and

cizoulatai frecly It has divoted ito co1~ anti-United States prop.~.

gand. and to trying to agpavat. the United Fruit Ccm~a~-s labor troubles.

The Guatomalan C~n~ts are small in number, but their infliasno. in both

government and labor i eubitantial.

Anti.-C~iat Lativitias

The AntiC~~mist Par~- of Ouatsmsla has bein foresd sine, tb. July

rioting and has received strong support fron the Gatbol.ic middle Class

from the Th~41 ~n. The uninrai~- students have furniah.d lasdership to

a eubetancial bloc in the Par~~r. They have requmstsd Prasid.nt Arbsna to

di~.a. the Co~iste belding positions in the Government, and to .~sll all foreign C~ii.~m4 ~t Tb. movement cOntinues to d,vslap in all sections

of the ooontry.

Political Situation

Presidect ARfi~Z baa shown no sign of oh*nglng the ~oliay est by AREVILO as regards C~~~ He has stated hi. appowitiOn to the anti

Comeuniat mev~t Ranfro ORDOREZ Pomiagma, littimb ~tni~t.r of C3oTSràisOt, baa recently reeiçasd and hem replaced by Riaa.rdo CH&VEZ~ H~r~ CHAVEZ

ii gsnerally regarded as an anti-Cosnmiat. Hoesvsr~ on b January 1952 hO

~oumo.d that the govsr~nt bad decided to ban all antiCo~iat ds~.

~

stratious. Coliw~.~ PAZ T,.j.oa, who bad .tudioueiy avoided attidin~ alt.

rauhls, bat who was foro.d to sttes4 the 3Ast cue as the Eepre

nntativ. of Pr.~4de~t Infi~Z has besn replaeod U Mixd.stsr of

tioni by Colonel Corlas 1LD*SA Sandoval, an Arbens supporter. PAZ IjadA baa been placed in charge of the construction Of the hlghwq to the Atlantic.

452
76. (Continued)

t1URITY %NFORMAT~ Eco~~.c Situation SW

A~NZ inherited a very black .oononic picture, and the labor trouble

and schasquent thrat to, uit~aw from Guatemala by the United Fruit Ccspm~ ha. made the ontloch even darker.

Activi~~ of Po].itical Exilsi

At least this. Guat~1~n exile groups is plotting againot the ARBENZ

regime. They ore, in probabl. order of itr.ngthi

a) a group b.ided by CO1~1 GASTfl~LO Areas, former Cosondante of

the Esou.1.a Jdiliter, sad now in Costa Rica, originally planned a January

19S2 uprising. it ha. bisn reported that CASTfl1W Arms. ha. been offered

aid by the 1~iited Fruit Ceepacy med a Peruvian group, pos.ibly the govern

nontj

b) a group in ~co headed by Cilonel Ar~. EAMIREZ who ha. been

in exile einos on att.uphed revolt in 19li8. This group may be finanoed in

part by American eli. prueet.r.;

c) supporters of General XDIOORAS Fuent.., meauccea.ful presidential candidate of the I$~O elections who is now in ~ Salvador.

The CASTIILO irmi. and RAMTW~Z groups have been in contact, but lo far

no agreement hi. been reached. If the teo groups ~e to unite, a encases

ful revelation might issult.

Conclusion.

C~~.m4 ~t lnfl.umeoI in the Gua$~.~1 ~n gover~nt continues to be serious.

~r. persist in Ouat~1 ~ that Prsuide~nt krbsns is ill ~th leukemia.

Effort. to verify the.. ~ors are being made. In the event that ARBENZ wore

forced to leave hi. office, Roberto ALV~1ADO Fcentes, president of the

Guat~1 a,i cingre.~ could conetititionauy aas~ presidency. Such on

evsntualit~r would further aggrmt. the situation in Guatemala bs~se

ALV~ADO Fuint.e is a ntrâng Cnl~t supporter having recently attended

& Co~nri4~t sponsored pre~p.sa. meeting in Visone.

J. CAL~t EINU

453

77. Wisner, Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Director for Policy

Coordination, Reported Crisis in the American Committee for

Cultural Freedom, 7 April 1952 (Carbon copy; attachments

not included)

S~~urjts, ~ 277L0

!cJ4~ANDw4 P~s D.puty Assistant Director for Policy Coordiaition

Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECTs R.pcrtd Crisis in the Aasrican Candttee for

Cu].tura3. Freedom.

1.. Attached hereto is a letter dated ~ April fran Arthur Schlesinger,

Jr., to myself, together with certain suclosurus eli ci ithich preaont a

rather slareing picture. I had not heard ~bc~t thesi d.veloascta prior

to my receipt of Schlesingers letter, and I am moot anxious to have an

OPC evaluation of this setter, vhiob very v.11 may not be a tanp..t in a

teapot.

2. ?~r offhand reaction to this ness is that th, position of

neither the pro-NcCarthytt.s or antt!~Carthyit.s is the correct cm.

tros our standpoint, and that it is soot unfortunat, that the setter

ever o up in such a way as to bring it to this kind of head. I can

understand ban an American coanitt.e for cultural treea~n, standing

.and being in fact a poup of American private citicens interest.d

in cultursi freed~, would feel that it would have t. take a position

an JicCarthyise. ~!owever, that is not the nature of the American Con

for Cultural Freedom ~ich, according to my r.coll.cttcn, v.a

inspired if not put together by this Agecay for the purpose of provid

ing cover and backatopping for the Luropeso effort, if such is to.

case, vs are stuck with the Ccanitt.s in that we hava an in.scapsbls

responsibility for its conduct, its actions and its public statements.

Under the cizeu~~stancee the ~rai,thg of- the issue of I4cC.rthyis., ith.ther

to cond it or to support, it, was a serious mistake in my epinian.

The xsa.oc is simply that this inj.cte ui into an extranei,y bet Azi

~ domestic political incus, and is s~e to get us into trouble and

to bring dean on our heads criticise for interference in a matter that

is nons of our concera *atsoever.

3. If you agree with the foregoing analysis and reaction, ma ~ou14

consider p.~ what Miould be done no,, that th. fat is in the firs.

If it wore possible to do so, it vould b. my thought that the entire

debet. em this subject, fran to. beginning, be eupongsd from to. record

and the setter thus laid to rest. I knar that this will nat satisfy

either faction, but it night hi possible far us to put caress t the

~ers if both fectiona that vs ar t*Th4.ig cheat gurap and the world

outside the United States, and that vs should stick to _~ lest end

that if pp~do sot do an the entire effort. i.tU be .and shot

~~~çImen bs~r~e oLour involvement in domestic Political issues. An upNO CHANGE n~pn.kta lmit7 and concord and the preservation of this valomble effort

DDECLA5SW~~ hej~.ssful. In a~- cas. it is the on1~r approach that I can

irrf -

-

~~________ ________

DD/P chronQ - 1

with ~

- -

27.

455

78. Smith, Memorandum for the National Secwity Council,

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence, 23 April 1952

(T~rped copy; one attachment not included)

lOP ~LCI~ET #63I~9

~uviiy horrn~t~uo~ IflCLUDED ~l

ThE PRE~rnEL~r~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~- ~ WASHINGTON 25. 0. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

23 April l9~2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MA~TIORAL S&XJRITY CO(YNCIL

~BJECT: Report by the Director of Central Intelligence

In July l91~9, the National Security Council directed

that certain changes be made in the organization of the

Central Intelligence Agency. The instructions contained

in this Directive NSC ~O have been carried out in

a].]. substantial respects.

There is attached, marked T.&B A, a chart of the organi

cation of the Central Intelligence Agency as of October l9~O

and an organization chart as of 31 December 19~l. A com

parison of these charts will indicate the general scope of

this reorganization.

Specificaij,y, there has been established an Office of

National Estii~tea to produce intelligence estimates of

national concern, both in aomte situation., and on a long- term basis. In its operations this Office utilizes the

resources of the total United States intelligence cn~init~y-.

The members of the Council are acquainted with the production of the Office of Nations]. Estimates, but, for rea~- reference, there is attached, marked T&B B, a list of the National

Intelligence Estimates which were prepared in l9~1.

To provide the National Security Council and ~pr.opriate

offices of the Government with all-source intelligence on a

current basis, there was also established during 19S1 an

Office of Current Intelligence. Council members are ac

quainted with the publications of this Office.

An Office of Research and Reports has been set up to

provide coordinated intelligence, primarily on economic

matters, as a service of c~uon cencern to interested

DOCID~ENT NO. ___________________

) NO C AIIGE tti CUU. 0

0 DECLaStIFI!D

~

SUN. c.(;~ItG~.D TO~ TS 9 c

NCXT LEYIEW D*TEI ________________

£UTN~ ~O4

Socurfty in.i~&~ ~ iavawui.. 064

457
78. (Continued)

TOP SECRET

Security Informeti~

Government agencies. Although accurate aPPraisal of ~

ene1~)r S econ~c potential. is a most isportant factor in

estimating his military capnMMtiss, this crucially

important task had previously been scattered anong twenty four separate agencies of the Government.

An Interdepertuental Econocic Intelligence Coninittee

has also been established, and the Agencys Assistant

Director for Research and Reports is its Chairman. His

Office is the clearing house for study and analysis of the

econou~ of the Soviet Orbit and for exploring and filling the gaps that had developed in the previously unrelated

system of collection and evaluation.

In cooperation with the Depar~nt of Defense, there

has been established the Interdepartmental Watch Ccanittee.

Its function is to provide constant and periodic review of

indications of possible ena~ action. The Central Intelli

gence Agency also maintains a twenty-four hour vatch on

behalf of the Agency.

Contineity of high caliber per sanmel, pOssessing

spe~l-~1ised training and experience, is essential for the

conduct of the Agencys activities. Accordingly, plans for

a career service within the Central Intelligence Agency are

being worked out and the first groups of prospective Jimior career officers are in. training.

After sufficient career personnel have been recruited

and trained in this service, it will be possible eventually

to select senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency fren aneng their mua~er. This davelopnent Viii. take time.

~heanwhil.e, ens of the Agencys cou+-4-~ning problems will be

the diffioulty of securing, adequately qualified personnel,

particularly for, senior positions. .

Four N~ papers approved ~ing the period under review

required the special aerviess Of the central Intelligence Agency:

1.

2.

2.--.

tt~ .c..

458
78. (Continued)

1~. The rmi~~lnl~~g paper NSC iDf~. redefines the

Central IÆtelligence Agency a responeibilitie~

~ a field.; which ~s probab]~ not envisaged at

the ~.me the National Seàurity iàt of L9b7, under which the Agency was established, was

framed. TI~–B is the field of cold war covert

activities, incleding geerrilla warfare. We have

accepted these responsibilities as agents for the

major Departments concerned and for projects which

are ap~a~oved by the Psychological Strate~ Board..

The Departments. of State sad Defense are charged with providing the Central Inteuigence Agency with the necessary support to accoaplish these

missions.. ~The present:I.y projected se~e of these

P TOP SECRET

security Iniermafion

3. The third NSC papor NSC 66/]. d~ieeted the

Central Intelligence Agency to provide intelli

gence support for the~ Voice of America with

respect to Soviet jn~~w4~~g This is being done, but the e~t~h1l~dimant of an additional nonitor

ing fad.ltt to - -

itiona,

I

459:
78. (Continued)

~OP-SE~

Security Informatj.,n

activities has, during the past three years,

produced a three-fold increase in the clandestine

operations of this Agency and i.iil]. require next

year a budget three times larger than that re

quired for our intelligence activities. These

cold war projects are worldwide in scope (with

the effort intensified in the Far East) and they

include psychological warfare as well as para

military operations; denial programs with respect

to strategic materials; stockpiling on a limited

scale in strategic areas to assist the military

in the event of war; the organization and p~nning

of sabotage teams to support. resistance operations;

and the pl Anfli ng and organization of escape and

evasion networks and staybehind movements for

use in the event of war.

Given the necessary support, it will be possible for the

Central Ixtelligence Agency to fulfill these requirements;

but since they have resulted in such a large expansion in the

Agency s budget and personnel strength, it should be noted

that:

1. They are not functions essential to the per

formance by Central Intelligence Agency of its

intelligence responsibilities.,

2 They were placed in this Agency because there

was no other Department or Agency of the

Government which could undertake them at that

time.

3. They will inevitably militate against the per

formance by Central Intelligence Agency of its

primary intelligence functions and are a con

tinning and increasing risk to its security.

Regrettably, (from ~cy personal viewpoint) it

seems impracticable, for reasons of coordinat~.on

and security, to divorce these from other covert

operations.

There renAl n a number of unsolved problems maj or and

minor. The following emamp].es will indicate their nature and

range.

1. Interrelationship Between Intelligence and Opera

tional Plmmi-ng It is not necessary for an

intelligence officer to Iciow very much about plans, either civilian or military, but if his product is

to be timely he must have adequate advance informa

tion at least of the general nature and objectives

Security InfCF.,

460
78. (Continued)

rop ~:c~: ~ Secur!ty ir.iorm~m~

of acy plans toi~ard which he can make an

intelligence contribution, as well as of such

national or international policies and agree

monte as precede them. The liaison arrangements of CIA and the Department of State on such matters

are reasonably satisfactory, although there xe

mains roem for betterment. Such arrangements with

the armed Services are still sameithat less than

satisfactory, although eons ieprovement is being made.

2. Security The uteost diligence hay been emorcised

to insure the security of the Central Intelligence

Agency, and I am now convinced that it is at

least as secure as ~ activity of the Government.

)~r ~i1 ng concern in this regard is largely based on the fact that the Agency is scattered

among twenty-eight buildings in the Washington area. Every effort idll be made to obtain funds

for the construction of a reasonably secure

building

3.

li. Scientific and Technical Intelligence The least

progress in coordinating iutelLtgence activities has been made in certain fields of scientific and

technical intelligence. An interagency committee

is presently studying this problem, with the view

of recending the proper steps for the improve-. mont of this aituation.

The Council is generally acquainted with the Central

Intelligence Agency s secret operations designed to produce raw intelligence. Although we are every effort to

develop these latter sumces, our e~erience so far has been

in general disappointing. They are costly by comparison with

other intelligence operations and they present in most cases

a gamblers s chance of obtaining really significant critical

strategic information, although they consistently produce a

- . - 5

461
78. (Continued)

TOP CRET

Security InEormation

significant quantity of useable information. We must and.

chal]. devote our best effort to their inprovement and to

the e~qloitation of every reasonable chance for penetration. On a few rare occasions there have been really brilliant

accomplishments.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, in view

of the efficiency of the Soviet security organization, it

is not believed that the present United States intelligence

system, or any instrumentality which the United States is

present].y capable of providing, including the available

intelligence assets of other friendly states, can produce

strategic intelligence on the Soviet with the degree of

accuracy and tiiaeliness which the National Security Council

would like to have and which I would like to provide. ore

over, despite the utmost vigilance, despite watch comuittees, and all of the other mechanics for the prompt evaluationand

transmission of intelligence, there is no real assurance that, in the event of sudden undeclared hostilities, certain advance

warning can be provided.

As far as our intelligence production is concerned, the

Central Intelligence Agency is basically an assembly plant for information produced by collaborating organizations of

the Government, and its final product is necessarily

dependent upon the quality of the contributions of these

collaborating organizations.

SIGNED

WAL~R B. SMtTB

Director

Enclosures -

TabA

Tab B

TQP SECRET

Security Inlormation

462
-1

00

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(Organization as of 1 October 1950)

SECRET I

(a

SECRET SECURITY INFORMA liON OR 1119 CIA, 12-51
OR 1120. CII, 2.51

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(Orga&zatlon as of 31 D.cmb.r 1951)

SECRET I

CENTRAL ~NTELUGENCE

~1

I- ~ ADVISORY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
79. Smith to CIA Deputy Directors, Organization of CIA Clandes

tine Services, 15 July 1952 (T~rped copy)

I

/ ~ SECRET

&ecurity lti~orinahOfl.

COP~

iS Ju3y l9~2

I~M(RA~lJU1~i FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director (Plans)

Deputy Director (Administration),

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Director of Training

Assistant Director for Communications

SUBJJ~T : Organization of CIA Clandestine Services

~. a. This paper describes the structure of the organization of CIA clan

destine services which will become effective on 1 August 1952.

b. It is designed to create a single overseas clandestine service,

while at the same time preserving the integrity of the longrange espionage

arid counterespionage mission of CIA from amalgamation into those clandes

tine activities which are subject to short term variations in the prosecu

tion of the cold war., The experiences of the British and the OSS during the

last war, as well as within CIA during the last three years, justify the

conclusion that the best organizational arrangement consists of a single

field organization with a single chain ci command and a single set of admin

istrative procedures, rather than two or three separate worldwide commands,

each with its own field network and with separate policy and administrative

procedures. There is no reason why the establishment of a single chain of

command and of uniform administrative procedures would have any effect of

submerging specialized 050 or OPC missions and techniques if intelligently

applied.

2. It is intended to establish the single chain of command from Washington

Headquarters to the chiefs of the merged field organizations by:

a. Designating the Deputy Director (Plans) as the Direàtors deputy

for all CIA clandestine activities. In this capacity DD/P is responsible

to the Director for the planning, execution and review of the missions en

trusted to the Director under NSCID-5, NSC 10/2, and NSC 10/5, and to him

is delegated the authority to carry out these functions.

b. Establishing in the immediate Office of the Deputy Director (Plans)

a Chief of Operations, as well as staff elements specializing in longrange

planning and prograiming and review and anaLysis. The Chief of Operations

will function as a Chief of Staff and Deputy to DD/P with responsibility

for the direction of operations, for coordinating the efforts of and elimi

nating duplication among all staff elements under DD/P, and for insuring ~

_________

~S,CSG 17 j cecuri~y

E ~c~q c~PI ~ 3/c ~ G- ~i;

465
79. (Continued)

bcc~iray znforrnation

prompt and effective compliance with operational directives, including

those which establish priorities for clandestine operations.

c. Eliminating the current AD/SO and AD/PC command structure and es

tablishing under DID/P staff çlements specializing in secret intelligence

and counterespionage, political and psychological warfare, paramilitary

operations, technical suorort, and administration. The chiefs of these

staff elements are comparable to Assistant Chiefs of Staff in a field

.4rny organization. They will be responsible for:

(1) Planning and supervising the proper performanoe of the

missions and operations of their respective services.

(2) Career planning for their respective specialized corps

of officers.

(3) Establishing standards for the recruitment, training,

and professional performance for their respeotive services.

(li) Supervision, guidance, and inspection in all matters per

taining to their respective services.

(5) Tinely and adequate recommendations within their respec

tive spheres of activity and for staff supervision and followup

to insure the effective execution of all orders and instructions

issued by con~etent authority.

(o) Such additional functions as may be delegated to them.

d. Establishing the official designations and general functions of

these staff officers as foilows:

(1) Chief of Foreign Intelligence (formerly AD/SO). Senior

officer for espionage and counterespionage. Represents the Di

rector in routine contacts with other agencies affecting the es

pionage and counterespionage mission. His inscediate office will

include personnel specializing in these and related activities.

(2) Chief of Political and Psychological Warfare (formerly

AD/PC). Senior officer for covert psychological and political war

f are, resistance, and economid warfare. His immediate office will

include personnel specializing in these and related activities.

(3) Chief of Paramilitary Operations. Senior officer for

covert paramilitary activities, including war planning and prepa

raticn~ sabotage and countersabotage, escape and evasion, and

guerrilla warfare. He will organize his activities along military

lines capable of close coordination with the military services in

time of war.

2

SECRLT

Securily InionnaJjoj1

466
79. (Continued)

Security ~for~aIic~l

COPI

(Li) Chief of Technical Support. Directs the Office of Tech

nica]. sevices in supoort of clandestine activities.

(S) Chief of Administration... Aqualified Asministrative Of

fice~ serving on the staff, of the Deputy.Director (Plans). Re

sponsible to DD/P for insuring adequate support in trained person

nel, equipment, funds, transportation, comimmica~ions, facilities

arid services for all clandestine activities.

e. Maintaining the A~ea Divisions as presently Cstablished and desig

nating the Area Division Chiefs, subject, to paragraphs 2. a. and b. above,

as the channels between Washington Headquarters and the various field in

staj.lations in their geographic areas of: responsibility. For exan~le, a].].

counications pertaining to activities in

originating with any Washington Headquarters office and addressed to any CIA activity in those areas will be coordina

ted with and sent physically through the ~. Division. In effect, .

the

Chiefs of the Area Divisions +~ill act as the. DirectorsexŁc~itive officers

for their respective geographic areas of responsibility.. .

.

f. .

Designating Senior Representatives in a].]. coun~ries . abroad where

there are CIA clandestine activities. . These Senior Representatives will

be responsible for the comeanci supervision of a].]. CIA ac~.vities in their

areas. To those Senior RepresentativØ~ wiul.be delegated the authority for routine administrative decisions in ~consonance- with óstablished admin

istrati~e orocedures

3. Procedures. The changed organizational structure recognizes only two corn

mend echelons: The Director and the Senior Representatives, ~with the Deputy Direc

tor (Plans) acting for the Director tbx~ough the medi~ of the Area Divisions on mat

ters pertaining to the conduct of clandestine activities. Orders to the Senior Re

presentatives will be tranmnitted is the name of the Director. Technical and pro

fessional correspondence wi].l be kept s informal as.possib].e and will be encour

aged between the Area Divisions, specialized staffs in Washington, and their coun

terpcrts in the field. Cable proced]re wiil be adopted irn~in general to the

current practices of other major Government agencies.. The Assistant Director fcr~

Communications will prepare for approval and prompt distribution a eable~ procedure manual in conforhity with the above, and will arrange for the establishment of a

message center, wider the direction of a cable secretary, to centrlize and stan

dardize the handling and distribution of coimications traffic. ~hen in operation, the message center will become the responsibility of the Executive Assistant to the

Director.

-

.

. . .

~

1~. All existing directives and regulations in conflict with this document are

rescinded effective 1 August 1952. .

.

. .

/s/ Walter B. Smith . ,1~

WALTER B.. SW~H

Director of Central intelligena~

\.~ r.

1 Att ~~: (~ j5.

Organization chart .

S~CV~ET

~

467
I SECUWY INF0~MAU0f

ORGANIZATION OF C I A CLANDESTINE SERVICES

: ~

IMIaS. ~ ~SIt

Co~ca~o

c~I

00

The Dupgy Dtrsct~y ( Adm~Int~r~~). Aa.t.~

Dtre~tor for Comm I~IU~I e~ fo. INisetor

~ TntolM ~U1 pror.to to the Os~y tIr.ctor

(PI~M) adiqu~s J~port e~ttopto elto Thr

raqotr.~..to ~ ~s A$~, to b~l peiJ~~.

IEcUIUS

aqulpmsol,

led, to ttoa

a~

~

aed,

SsoVg~

frWertoU~

(0? .~I

bitole

cti~

~

betwuSe

~

toss.

O~c.re led to. Cbtet et A~Iet~sU~ tar to.

Ds~st~ ~rwutor (Plies) wIll be wul~l.sd.

I As.est 1151
80. Office of the DCI], Staff Conference, 27 October 1952

4~2

27 0ctO~er 19S2

STA CONF~ENCE

Minutes of IleŁtirig Held in Dfrector~ s

Conference Rool, Adn~iniŁtratiän~BMh1~iing

Monday, 27 October L%2, at 11.00 Hours

Qeæoral Smith Presiding

F~ank G. Wiener, icting Deputy. Dire~t~

Richard Helms, Acting Deputy DirŁótor for Plans

Loftus E. Becker, Deputy, DireCtor Zo~ Intelligence

Walter Reid Wolf, Deputy DirØctór for Aæml i~1 ~tration

Jaans M. Andiews, Assistant DirectÆr ~or Collection Ød Disseadnation

Gg,rgeG. Carey, às8iitant Director for Operations

Ralph I Clark, Acting Director for SØientific Intel1i~eucØ

L. S. Hitchconk, ~cti .~zsistant Director for Research & Reports

Sherman Kent, Assistant Director for National Estimates

Major General Harold 14, l4cCJ.el.land, i~.seist8nt Director for Cozn~ications

Lt. General Willian H. H. Morris, Jr., Assistznt DircctOi for Perso~o2.

James Q. Reber, Assistant Director for Intelli.gence Coordination

H~tington D.ZhOldon, Assistaht Director for Current ~te1ligenee

Colonel Matthew Baird, Director of ~i n1

Brig. General. Jes.uorid C Balmer, Chief for Plans 8th Program Coordination

2~acy Barnes, Chief for POlitical and Psychological Warfare

Colonel Sheffield Ezh-arda, Chief, Inspection and Security

Willis Gibbons, Chief of TechnicOl Support Franklin lindsay, Deputy Chief, Political and ?s~chological Warfare

I~1e T. Shannon, (.hief of Ad~ni~stration, Office of DD/P

Brig. General Jonn Weckerling, Chief of Para~ilita~7 Staff

J. S. E~rman, ~ecutiv-e Assistant to the DirectOr

Robert W. Fuller, Assistant to the Director

Stan]cy J. Grogan, Assistant to the Director

Willard Gaibraith, Office of the Inzpector General

CLOfl~

SGMlil

27 October l9~2

469
80. (Continued)

1. Personnel

o~nrrr

SC}1ljJ.

27 October 1252

The Director, aEntioning.. that the kgency had reeent].y

experienced some difficulties in various parts of the world, remarked

that these difficulties steamed, by and large, from the use of improperly

trained or inferior personnel. He stated that until CIA could build a

reserve of well-trained people, it would have to hold its activities to

the limited number of operations, that it could & well rather than to

atteirt to cover a thoad, field with poor performance, lie reminded the

meeting that the Agencys primary mission wee intelligence and that he

would do nothing that militated ag~.nst aocomplishing this objective.

He also noted that the difficulties resulted in prt from poor security

pr~ctiqes, pointing up the need forgreatcrand continuing usphasis on

security,

2. Stoturients to the Pre55H;:t.~

The Director, citing the case of a correspondent who had

obtained a story concerning CIA, askedColonel Grogan if it were nct

possible to keep this story from being: pklblished -or, if published, to

have it so s~ritten that it would show no, connection with the !~genoy.

Colonel Gre gan replied that this could be.: done and added that, in general,

arrangements to step a story could be ande in individual eases.

Gcn~ral S.uith remarked thetç when nms correspondents request

information regar~ng saGe, story thfl they might have, involving CIA, thcy

should be told nothing. He-added that in rare cases, however, it might

be necessary to go to the top maæ.of a news organization in order to kill

a story..

Colonel Grbg~in t~arned against offtherecord remarks.

Regarding this, the Director stated that it- is safe to make remarks

off the record only when there is coraplet~ oensorship, which we do

not have in this country.

SC-M41

27 October 1952

470
81. Truman, Remarks of the President, 21 November 1952

(1~rped copy)

REI~ARKS OF. TRE PRESIDENT

TO TI FnIAL SESSION OF THi~ C.I.A. S

~IGHTh TR~INL~G ORLNT~TION COURSE FOR

~PRESEMT~TIVES OF VARIOUS GOVER1~I~NT

AGENCZ~.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRI~JLURE AUDITORIUN

W~SHINGWN, D. C.

NO17E~~ 21, 1952

12227p.m., e.s.t.

Thank you vary much. I am appreciative of the privilege that General

Smith haa offered me, to come over here and make a few remarks to this organization.

I am, naturally, very much interested in it.

When I became President -- if you dont mind me reminiscing a little

bit -- there was no concentration of information for the benefit of the President.

Each department and each organization had its own information service, and that

information service was walled off fran every other service in such a manner that

whenever it was necessary for the President to have information, he had to send

to two or three departments to get it, and then he would have to have memeb ody do a little digging to get it.

TIe affairs of the Presidential Office, so far as information was

concerned, were in such shape that it was necessary for me, when I took over the

.

Office, to read a stack of documents that high, and it. took me three months to

get caught up.

Only two people around the White House really knew what was going on

in the military affairs department, and they were Adznial Leaky and Admiral Brown.

I would talk to them every morning and try to get all the information I could.

And finally one morning I had a conversation with Admiral Leaky, and suggested to

him that tkmre should be a Central Intelligence Agency, for the benefit of the

whole government as well as for the benefit of the President, so he could be informed.

And the Admiral and I proceeded to try to work out a program. It has

worked very successfully. We have an intelligence information service now that I

think is not inferior to any in the world.

We have the Central Intelligence Agency, and al). the intelligence

information agencies in all the rest of the departments of the government,

coordinated by that Central Intelligence Agency. This agency puts the information

of vital importance to the President in his hands. He has to know what is going on

everywhere at home and abroad, so that he can inte].ligenctly make the decisions

that are necessary to keep the government running.

I dont think anyone realizes the immensity of the problems that face

~~~sident of the ~nited States.

It was my privilege a few days ago to brief the General who is going -

~ take aver the Office on the 20th day of January, and he was rather appalled at

a1~4a%t1~pxesident needs to know in order to reach decisions -- even danestic

~i8i~

____________

~ ~ ~

471
81. (Continued)

He must Imow exactly what is implied by what he does. The President

mikes a decision every day that can affect anywhere from 100 million to a billion

and a half people, It is a tremendous responsibility.

And I dont think many of you realize the position in which this great

country is, in this day and age.

We are at the top,.. and the leader of the free world - something that

we did not anticipate, something that we did not want, but something that has been

forced on us. It is a responsibility which we should have assumed in 1920. We did

not assume it then. We have to assume it now, because it has again been thrust on

us. It is out duty, under Heaven, to continue that lcadership in the manner that

will prevent a thir4 world war  which, would mean the end of civilization. The

weapons of destruction have becone so powerful arid so terrible that we cantt even

think of another all-out war. It would then bring into the war not only the

fighting mien -- the people who are tra mcd as fighters -- but the whole civilian

population of every country involved would be more thoroughly exposed to death

and destruction than would the men at the front.

That is w)atwe have to think about carefully. You are the organization, you are the inte]23~ence arm that kkeps the Executive informed so he can make

decisions that always will be in the public interest for his own country, hoping

always that it w*l save the free world from involvement with the totalitarian

countries in an all-out war - a terrible thing~to contemplate.

Those of you-who are deep in the Central Intefligemoe Agency Iciow

what goes on around the world -- bow what is necessary for the President to bow 7 every morning. I an briefed every day on all the world, on everything that takes ,

place from one end of the world to the other, all the way around.-- by both the

poles and the other way. It is necessary that you make that contribution for the

welfare and benefit of your government.

I came over here to tefl you how appreciative I am of the service

which I received as the Chief Executive of the greatest Nation in the history of

the world. You may not bow it, but the Presidential Office is the most powerful Office that has ever existed in the history of this great world of ours. Oenghis Khan,

Augustus Caesar, great Napoleon Bonaparte, or Louis Fourteenth --

or any other of the great leaders and executives of the world -- cant even

compare with what the PrØsident of the United States himself is responsible for, when he makes a decision. It is an Office that is without arallelinthŁ:~iistory of the world

That is the principal reason why I arri so amcious that it be a continuing

proposition, and that the, successor to me, and ti-n successor tO him, can carry on

as ifno election had ever taken place. -

That is the prospect that we are faced tth now, I am giving this

President. this new President -- more information than any other President ever

had when he went into Office.

472
81. (Continued)

Iou gentlemen -- and ladies are contributing to that ability of mine

to be able to do that. I an extremely thankful to you. I thinlç it is good that

some of you hive found out just exactly what.a tremendous organization Intelligence

has to be in this day and age. You cant run the government without it.

Keep up the good work. And when my successor takes over, I want you to

give him just the sane loyal service that you have given me, and then the country

will go forward as it should.

Thank you very much.

473