In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 18-3126

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JON GILES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 CR 00112-1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 28, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. After Jon Giles’s DNA was found at

the scene of the robbery of North Community Bank, FBI agents

interrogated him at the Pontiac Correctional Center where he

was serving a prison term for two other bank robberies. Giles

confessed to the robbery. Giles argues the district court erred
2 No. 18-3126

in denying his motion to suppress the confession, because his

prolonged solitary confinement prior to the interview rendered

him incapable of exercising a voluntary and knowing waiver

of his Fifth Amendment rights. Giles also argues that the

district court failed to properly address his mitigating arguments at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we reject these

arguments and affirm the orders of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2010, Jon Giles pleaded guilty to state robbery charges.

Giles spent the next two years in solitary confinement at

Tamms Correctional Center. When Tamms was shuttered,

Giles was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center. He spent

one month in general population before returning to isolation

from January 2013 until January 2014. 

On August 30, 2013, during this period of solitary confinement, FBI agents Timothy Bacha and Michael Lovernick

questioned Jon Giles. They were investigating a bank robbery

at North Community Bank that took place in 2009. DNA

recovered from a glove found near the crime scene matched

Giles’s DNA. The glove was found next to dye-stained money

stolen from the bank. 

At first, Giles refused to meet with the agents. Robin

Lopeman, a Pontiac correctional officer, approached Giles’s cell

with Bacha’s business card. Giles requested that she show the

card to Robert Hall, a fellow inmate and former gang associate,

following a “home-grown” prison custom of letting other

inmates know where you are going and who you are talking

to. Hall shouted his consent and Giles agreed to speak to the

agents.
No. 18-3126 3

Bacha and Lovernick read Giles his Miranda rights, and he

agreed in writing to be questioned without an attorney present.

Giles initially denied his involvement in the North Community

Bank robbery until he was shown the DNA report and photographs of the dyed money. Giles then confessed to the robbery

and agreed to a cheek swab after being advised of his right to

refuse. The swab matched the DNA found on the glove.

Giles was indicted on March 4, 2014, on one count of bank

robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 and one count of using a

firearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c). He moved to suppress the confession, arguing that

neither his Miranda waiver nor his confession were made

voluntarily. In support of this claim, Giles cited his long-term

confinement in a “small windowless cell” which provided little

opportunity for human interaction. Giles said his mental state

was “precarious” and that he had experienced symptoms of

“acute anxiety attacks, insomnia ... uncontrollable rage” and

“hallucinations.” 

At an evidentiary hearing, Giles called psychiatrist

Dr. Silberberg who testified that he conducted a forensic

psychiatric evaluation of Giles on November 4, 2014, and had

reviewed administrative and medical records. Dr. Silberberg

stated that prolonged isolation could result in impaired

memory, attention, and concentration. Isolation could also

affect the ability to make rational decisions, and cause mood

disorders. He testified that the effects could be temporary, and

that a person might be competent at one point in time but not

another. Dr. Silberberg recited Giles’s medical history, which

included treatment for psychological disorders and repeated

head trauma, and concluded that Giles would be particularly
4 No. 18-3126

vulnerable to the effects of isolation. He concluded that Giles

did not appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning and

that his confession was not voluntary.

 Lopeman described Giles’s initial refusal to speak with the

FBI agents; and how she showed Hall Bacha’s business card as

Giles requested. Hall testified that he knew Giles for 17 years,

that both were members of the Four Corner Hustlers gang, and

corroborated Lopeman’s testimony regarding Bacha’s business

card. He said he spoke to Giles regularly, and had no difficulty

communicating with him. 

Bacha corroborated the statements of Lopeman and Hall.

He testified that Giles read a form informing him of his

Miranda rights, recited the consent portion back to Bacha

without any difficulty, and then signed the form agreeing to be

interviewed without an attorney present. Giles denied involvement with the robbery until being shown the DNA evidence;

Giles then described the robbery, providing details such as the

gender of the teller he robbed and details about his getaway. 

When Bacha asked whether Giles had information about

any other criminal activity, Giles indicated that he could

provide information about money and drugs in exchange for

a lenient sentence. When asked whether he had information

about any murders, Giles stated that if the agents wanted to

“talk about bodies” that he would have to think about it. Giles

then signed a consent form and gave a sample of his DNA.

Bacha testified that Giles showed no signs of mental distress,

did not appear disoriented, and appeared to be rational.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding

Dr. Silberberg’s conclusions about Giles’s mental state on the
No. 18-3126 5

date of the interrogation and confession to be unsupported.

The district court gave great weight to the testimony of

Lopeman, Hall, and Bacha, all of whom were present on

August 30, 2013. The court concluded that Giles’s “conduct

and statements [reflected] a clear, intelligent, and knowledgeable thought process for anyone in the defendant's difficult

situation” and that his statements and actions were “contrary

to those of a person who is unable to appreciate either his

rights or the effect of waiving his rights” or who lacked free

will. United States v. Giles, No. 14 CR 112, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

137232, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2015).

Giles was found guilty of the robbery. At sentencing, he

argued that the mental health effects of prolonged isolation

warranted a reduced sentence. Other arguments in favor of

mitigation included Giles’s age upon release and the effect of

continued imprisonment on his mental health. 

The district court sentenced Giles to a total term of 30 years’

imprisonment. Because Giles was given credit for time served,

and imprisonment was ordered to be served concurrently with

the sentence for his other two robberies, Giles’s sentence was

effectively an additional 18 years of imprisonment for the

robbery.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Confession and Conviction

This court considers whether a Miranda waiver was made

knowing and voluntarily de novo, but reviews the district

court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations under

the clear error standard. United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815,
6 No. 18-3126

819–820 (7th. Cir 2009). “The evaluation of whether a confession is coerced involves consideration of the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether the suspect confessed

voluntarily, of his own free will, or whether the police overrode his volition.” Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 265 (7th Cir.

2018).

The district court received extensive briefing and held an

evidentiary hearing prior to denying Giles’s motion to suppress. Giles presented Dr. Silberberg’s testimony that Giles did

not appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning given to

him before the confession. The district court found Dr. Silberberg’s testimony was unsupported, and credited multiple fact

witnesses who were actually present the day of the confession. 

Bacha testified about the interview itself, stating that he

noticed no signs of mental distress or anything else that would

cause him concern about the defendant's mental health. The

court concluded that “the totality of the evidence establishes

that at the time in question, the defendant was a rational

person who was in touch with reality, able to consider his

options, and make intelligent, rational choices” and that his

confession was the “product of a free and voluntary mind.”

Ultimately, Giles failed to present evidence that the government obtained his confession through coercion.

Furthermore, Giles was identified as the major contributor

of DNA on a glove found outside the bank, and a DNA expert

testified that the odds of the DNA coming from someone else

was one in six trillion. Giles took the stand and offered an

implausible explanation for the presence of his DNA—that his

gang took gloves from a shared box and his DNA may have
No. 18-3126 7

gotten on it while he grabbed a different pair of gloves. In

addition to the compelling DNA evidence, two eyewitnesses

described the bank robber as matching the general description

of Giles. There was sufficient evidence to convict Giles, even in

the absence of the confession.

B. Sentencing

This court reviews claims of procedural error at sentencing

de novo. United States v. Banks, 828 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2016).

The district court must “consider a defendant's principal,

nonfrivolous arguments for lenience.” United States v. Martin,

718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In considering

such arguments, the district court must demonstrate it

“considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis

for exercising [its] own legal decision making authority.” Rita

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

Giles asked the court to consider reducing his sentence

based on the effects of his solitary confinement. As he did in

his motion to suppress, Giles relied on general literature about

the effects of solitary confinement and Dr. Silberberg’s opinion

which the court already found to be unsupported. 

Giles argues that the district court did not address his

argument that a longer prison sentence would fail as a deterrent because he would be 45 at the end of his sentence for the

two other robberies. The filings only contained a general

discussion of “aging out” and did not make any argument

personal to Giles. Nevertheless, the district court did address

and reject this argument, stating that the court would “like to

give a great deal of credit to his statement that he has reached

an age of maturity where he can look back at what he has done
8 No. 18-3126

and realize the many mistakes he has made” but found very

little likelihood of rehabilitation based on Giles’s extensive

criminal background and continued misconduct in prison.

Giles also argues that the district court failed to discuss the

negative consequences of continued incarceration on his

mental health. The district court did address this argument by

granting Giles’s request that he be placed at a facility with a

mental health treatment program.

Lastly, Giles argues the district court failed to ask whether

he was satisfied that the court had addressed his main arguments in mitigation. While we have encouraged such a specific

inquiry in the past, we have not required it. United States v.

Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We encourage

sentencing courts to inquire of defense counsel whether they

are satisfied that the court has addressed their main arguments

in mitigation.”) (emphasis added). While it didn’t use the

specific format we articulated in Garcia-Segura, the district

court invited comments from the parties four separate times

during the sentencing hearing. Giles raised no objections at

that time as to the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation

for its sentencing decision.

The district court set forth a well-reasoned explanation for

Giles’s sentence, and considered all of Giles’s non-frivolous

arguments. The objections he raises now do not show otherwise.

III. CONCLUSION

Giles failed to show that his solitary confinement rendered

him incapable of voluntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment
No. 18-3126 9

rights. He also failed to show any error in the court’s sentencing. The district court’s orders are hereby affirmed.