NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BALJIT SINGH MALHI,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 23-17

Agency No.

A205-585-946

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted December 6, 2023

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, BRESS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Dissent by BRESS, Circuit Judge.

Baljit Singh Malhi, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an order 

from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) (collectively, the “Agency”) denying his 

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

DEC 19 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-17

Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We 

grant the petition and remand to the BIA to remand to the IJ for additional factfinding as to Malhi’s credibility under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 

1231(b)(3)(c), 1229a(c)(4)(C). 

Where, as here, the BIA cites Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 

(B.I.A. 1994) and “provides its own review of the evidence and law, we review 

both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 

2011). We review credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Barseghyan 

v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2022)). However, the Agency commits 

“legal error[]” when it “fail[s] to give specific, cogent reasons for rejecting . . . 

plausible explanations.” Munyuh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 750, 764 (9th Cir. 2021).

1. The REAL ID Act requires credibility determinations to be made 

“[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.” 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1229a(c)(4)(C). If the Agency relies on inconsistencies in 

making its adverse credibility determination, they must be “something more than 

‘[t]rivial inconsistencies that under the total circumstances have no bearing on a 

petitioner’s veracity.’” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010)). Further, the 

Agency must provide (1) “the noncitizen with an opportunity to explain each 

inconsistency, although this opportunity can occur through direct or cross-
3 23-17

examination”; and (2) “a ‘specific and cogent reason for rejecting’ [reasonable and 

plausible] explanation[s].” Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1143 (quoting Rizk v. Holder, 

629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled in part on other grounds by Alam 

v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc)). We require these steps “[i]n 

order to . . . make [substantial evidence] review possible.” Ren, 648 F.3d at 1085; 

see also Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1042 (“[T]he REAL ID Act does not give a blank 

check to the IJ enabling him or her to insulate an adverse credibility determination 

from our review of the reasonableness of that determination.”). If the Agency fails 

to do either, the inconsistency may not serve “as substantial evidence to support 

the [Agency’s] adverse credibility finding.” Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 

1091 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Malhi is Sikh and a member of the Mann Party. The Agency considered four 

instances when Malhi relayed why he came to the United States. Malhi 

consistently stated he had been attacked and threatened because of his membership 

in the Mann Party. In particular, Malhi detailed an attack in June 2012 which led to 

him being hospitalized for several days. Malhi also provided a letter from

Jalandhar Civil Hospital stating he was treated there in June 2012. Malhi further 

stated he had been threatened by the Congress Party once through a letter and 

several times through phone calls. Although the Government sought and received 

an adverse credibility finding, it did not contradict any of these statements of fact 
4 23-17

before the IJ.

Overall, we note that Malhi’s testimony was “overwhelmingly consistent 

with . . . his prior statements” and the documentary evidence he provided. Ren, 648 

F.3d at 1089. Indeed, the IJ appeared to credit Malhi’s statements that he was 

attacked, finding only that it was “unclear” who attacked him. As we have 

consistently held, the Agency’s adverse credibility finding must be made based on 

“the totality of the circumstances” and the Agency may “not cherry pick solely 

facts favoring an adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that 

undermine that result.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040. The Agency relied on three 

potential inconsistencies between Malhi’s four statements in making its adverse 

credibility determination. We consider each one below.

First, as to the number of attacks, in Malhi’s statement to border patrol, he 

answered affirmatively to two questions about whether his persecutors threatened 

his life and attacked him by caning, concluding “I have been attacked twice.” In 

his credible fear interview and testimony, Malhi stated he had been attacked once

and had also received a threatening letter. 

On cross-examination, the Government asked about this potential 

inconsistency. Malhi explained that because he had been nervous, he incorrectly 

stated that there had been two attacks rather than distinguishing between the two 

primary events (the attack and the threat) that caused him to flee to the United 
5 23-17

States. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044–45 (“[T]he analysis on review . . . should 

recognize that the normal limits of human understanding and memory may make 

some inconsistencies or lack of recall present in any witness’s case.”). Malhi’s 

statements were not clearly inconsistent because the series of questions may have 

caused him to count both the January 2013 threatening letter (in response to the 

threat question) and the June 2012 attack (in response to the caning question). See 

Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1143.

Nevertheless, the IJ stated only that Malhi “was not able to clarify” the 

potential inconsistency. Even assuming the statements were inconsistent, this alone

is not a specific and cogent reason for rejecting Malhi’s explanation, and thus the 

IJ erred in relying on this potential inconsistency. Id. at 1145; Lai v. Holder, 773 

F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Second, as to the identity of Malhi’s attackers, in his credible fear interview, 

Malhi stated he was attacked by the Congress Party.1In his declaration and 

testimony, he stated he was attacked by the Badal Party and Bharatiya Janata Party 

(“BJP”). His declaration addressed that discrepancy, explaining that he had been 

nervous, terrified, and not feeling well at his credible fear interview, that he had 

1

In his border patrol statement, Malhi stated he was “in danger from the Congress 

party.” He did not specifically state who attacked him, so we do not treat his later 

statements as inconsistent with his border patrol statement. See Barseghyan, 39 

F.4th at 1143.
6 23-17

memory issues associated with what occurred in India, and that recalling those 

events caused him to become stressed and confused. On cross-examination, Malhi 

further explained that he originally named the Congress Party because they had 

threatened him after the attack and continued to threaten his family in India, 

neither of which were disputed. The IJ relied on this inconsistency, stating only

that it was “unclear” who attacked Malhi in June 2012, that he was “unable to 

reasonably explain” the inconsistency, and that his explanation was 

“unpersuasive.”

The IJ erred in considering Malhi’s explanations for this inconsistency. The 

IJ failed to consider the explanations Malhi provided in his declaration regarding 

the inconsistencies. See Soto-Olarte, 555 F.3d at 1091. Further, in his testimony, 

Malhi provided a reasonable explanation for failing to mention the Badal Party and 

BJP at his initial interviews, i.e., that he was nervous and more afraid of the 

Congress Party given the multiple threats they had sent him and his family. The IJ 

provided only summary reasons for rejecting these explanations, and we have

rejected such reasons as failing to meet the specific and cogent standard. 

Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1145; Lai, 773 F.3d at 973.

Third, as to how Malhi identified his attackers, in his credible fear interview, 

Malhi stated his uncle saw his attackers’ car and identified it as belonging to the 

Congress Party. In his testimony and declaration, he stated he saw the car and 
7 23-17

identified it as belonging to the Badal Party and BJP. Malhi was never given an 

opportunity to explain this potential inconsistency, but the IJ nonetheless relied on 

it. That was legal error. Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1143.

Because the Agency failed to consider the overall consistency of Malhi’s 

statements and committed legal error in its consideration of each of the three 

potential inconsistencies it relied on, substantial evidence does not support the 

Agency’s adverse credibility finding. See Soto-Olarte, 555 F.3d at 1091. We 

therefore remand to the BIA to remand to the IJ for additional fact-finding as to the 

adverse credibility determination and Malhi’s relief applications as necessary. 

2. Because we grant the petition as to the adverse credibility finding, we

also find that the BIA erred in deeming Malhi’s CAT claims waived to the extent 

the IJ rejected those claims based on an erroneous adverse credibility 

determination. Cf. Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

IJ’s reasoning on this point was ambiguous. In considering Malhi’s CAT claims, 

the IJ found the harm Malhi suffered did not rise to the level of torture. It is not 

clear whether the IJ considered his testimony in making this finding as the IJ 

initially stated his testimony would be given “no weight.” On remand, Malhi’s 

CAT claims should be reconsidered to the extent the IJ based the denial of them on 

the adverse credibility determination.

PETITION GRANTED.
1

Malhi v. Garland, No. 23-17

BRESS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the decision to grant the petition for review. The 

majority’s assertions that the BIA and IJ committed legal error are unfounded.

1. Substantial evidence easily supports the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination. The IJ relied on two core inconsistencies in Malhi’s account as the 

basis for finding Malhi not credible. First, Malhi stated in his sworn border 

statement that he had been “attacked twice” in India, but he stated in his credible 

fear interview, hearing testimony, and written declaration that he had been attacked 

once and had also received a threatening letter. Second, Malhi stated in his credible 

fear interview that he was attacked by members of the Congress Party, but in his 

merits hearing and written declaration he said that he was attacked by members of 

the BJP and Badal parties. Malhi also changed his story as to how he recognized his 

assailants. Malhi initially asserted that his uncle had seen his attackers’ car and 

noted that it belonged to the Congress Party, but Malhi later asserted that he had 

personally seen Badal and BJP logos on his attackers’ car. 

These were not trivial inconsistencies. Instead, they went to the very 

foundation of the persecution claim: who attacked Malhi, how many times, and how 

he was able to recognize the perpetrators. These points formed “the crux of his 

application for relief.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010); see 

FILED

DEC 19 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

also id. at 1046–47 (“Although inconsistencies no longer need to go to the heart of 

the petitioner’s claim, when an inconsistency is at the heart of the claim it doubtless 

is of great weight.”). Here, “[i]n light of the total circumstances, [Malhi’s] inability 

to consistently describe the underlying events that gave rise to his fear was an 

important factor that could be relied upon by the IJ in making an adverse credibility 

determination.” Id. at 1047. The majority’s assertion that Malhi’s testimony was 

“overwhelmingly consistent” with his prior statements is simply inaccurate.

The majority’s reasons for granting the petition, meanwhile, do not withstand 

scrutiny. First, the majority says that Malhi’s statement that he was attacked twice 

was not clearly inconsistent with his later statements that he was attacked once 

because the series of questions during his border interview could have caused Malhi 

to conflate the June 2012 attack and the January 2013 threatening letter. But Malhi 

has never argued either here or before the agency that he was confused by the nature 

or sequencing of the questioning at the border. Nor does the record support that 

conclusion, much less compel it. The border officer asked Malhi “Did they threaten 

your life?” to which Malhi replied “Yes, they tried to cane me.” The border officer 

then asked, “Did they succeed in caning you?” to which Malhi replied “Yes, I have 

been attacked twice.” The clear import of Malhi’s response is that he was attacked

on two occasions. The majority hypothesizes that the “series of questions may have 
3

caused” Malhi to confuse attacks with threats, but that speculation hardly justifies 

setting aside the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.

Second, the majority concludes that the IJ did not give sufficiently “specific 

and cogent” reasons for rejecting Malhi’s explanations about the inconsistencies in 

his account. But the IJ need only provide such reasoning if Malhi’s explanations 

were “reasonable and plausible.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1143 (9th 

Cir. 2022). It is doubtful Malhi’s explanations meet that standard. Malhi said he 

only mentioned the Congress Party in his credible fear interview because they 

“created more problem[s] for me.” But this makes little sense when Malhi testified 

that it was the BJP and Badal party members that physically attacked him. And 

while the majority focuses on how Malhi said the Congress Party threatened him, in 

fact Malhi said that the threats “were from all the three parties,” again undermining 

his assertion that the Congress Party created more problems for him. In addition, 

though Malhi’s nervousness could reasonably contribute to Malhi making some 

misstatements in his border statement and credible fear interview, Malhi has 

provided no plausible explanation as to how his nerves led him to make critical 

misstatements about the basic nature of his persecution: how many times he was 

attacked, who attacked him, and how he knew who his attackers were. 

But even assuming the IJ was required to provide “specific and cogent” 

reasons for rejecting Malhi’s explanations, the IJ did so. The IJ specifically noted 
4

that Malhi was “able to identify the symbols for each individual party, including the 

Congress [P]arty as an open palm, and distinguish this from the symbol for Badal 

and BJP.” Because Malhi could tell each party from the others, it was unclear why 

he would be inconsistent about who attacked him. The IJ also specifically 

acknowledged Malhi’s argument that he was nervous. But the IJ found Malhi’s 

explanations “unpersuasive” because Malhi “was not able to clarify” or “reasonably 

explain” the inconsistencies in his accounts. That is a more than fair reaction to 

Malhi’s scant testimony, and the record certainly does not compel the opposite 

conclusion. The IJ’s reasoning was more than sufficient. See Aguilar Fermin v. 

Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding adverse credibility determination 

where IJ found “unconvincing” petitioner’s explanation that she had misspoken 

about receiving personal threats because she was “nervous” and had “forgotten”).

Nor, as the majority suggests, did the IJ commit legal error by failing to 

consider Malhi’s statement in his written declaration that, when he thinks about 

events that happened in India, he starts “feeling very uncomfortable, scared, and 

tense, and [his] memory starts to blur.” To start, it is not clear that Malhi offered 

this statement as an explanation for either of the two main inconsistencies that the IJ 

relied upon in making her adverse credibility determination. Malhi stated in his 

declaration that he believed his fear and confusion rationalized “why [he] was not as 

complete in explaining the threats as [he] should have been during [the] interview, 
5

and only mentioned the one threatening letter.” Malhi did not indicate that these 

factors led him to misspeak regarding the number of times he was attacked or the 

identity of his attackers. But in any event, Malhi stated in his merits hearing that his

inconsistencies on those points were due to nervousness and depression, and those 

explanations were not meaningfully different from the ones he offered in his 

declaration. The IJ not referencing the written declaration is thus of no moment. 

See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (“No express, point-bypoint rejection of [petitioner’s] explanations was necessary.”).

Third, the majority claims that the IJ did not give Malhi the opportunity to 

explain the inconsistency in how he recognized his attackers. But Malhi’s 

vacillation as to how he knew who was attacking him was part and parcel of his 

broader inconsistency regarding his attackers’ identity, which Malhi had ample 

opportunity to clarify on cross-examination. The IJ was permitted to reference a 

particular aspect of that inconsistency when describing the totality of the 

circumstances motivating her adverse credibility determination.

In short, Malhi provided inconsistent testimony on bedrock aspects of his 

claim of persecution. We should let the adverse credibility determination stand.

2. As the BIA found, Malhi forfeited his CAT claim by failing to object 

to the IJ’s denial of CAT relief before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The IJ’s 

denial of CAT relief did not depend on her adverse credibility finding because the IJ 
6

also concluded that “the harm suffered by [Malhi] in his case does not arise to the 

level of torture as contemplated by the [INA] and the definition of torture.” Yet, 

Malhi’s brief to the BIA challenged only the adverse credibility finding and did not 

address the IJ’s separate determination that Malhi was otherwise ineligible for CAT 

relief. This alone is grounds for denying CAT relief here. But I would also do so 

because the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is amply supported.

In sum, I would deny the petition in full.