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The Attorney General of Texas 

March 19, 1981 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

Honorable Patricia A. Elliott 

Criminal District Attorney 

Taylor County Courthouse 

Abilene, Texas 79602 

Opinion No. k3+366 

Re: Collection of fees from city, 

school district, and water district 

for filing abstract of judgment 

Dear Ms. Elliott: 

When a plaintiff recovers a favorable judgment in a suit for the 

collection of~delinquent taxes, he may place a lien upon the property of the 

judgment debtor by securing an abstract of juclgment, see article 5447, 

V.T.C.S., and by filing it in the real property records in the office of the 

county clerk of the county in which the property is located. The property 

thereby becomes encumbered in favor of the judgment creditor. You have 

asked whether the city of Abilene, the Abilene Independent School District, 

and the West Central Texas Municipal Water District are liable for the 

payment of the $3.00 fee charged by the Taylor County clerk for recording 

abstracts of judgment The taxing authorities assert that this fee is included 

among the court costs mandated by article 39304 V.T.C.S., and, therefore, 

that article 7297, V.T.C.S., exempts them from having to pay it. 

Article 5447, V.T.C.S.;provides that: 

Each clerk of a court, when the person in whose 

favor a judgment was rendered, his agent, attorney or 

assignee, applies therefor, shall make out. . . and 

deliver to such applicant upon the payment of the fee 

allowed by law, an abstract of such judgment . . . 

Statutory authority for the. $3.00 fee charged by the county clerk for 

recording abstracts of judgment in the real property records of the county is 

conferred by article 3930(2)(a), V.T.C.S. 

Article 7297, V.T.C.S., provides that district or county attorneys shall: 

. . . institute suit in the name of the State for 

recovery of. . . taxes due and unpaid on unrendered 

personal property; and in all suits where juaments 

are obtained under this law, theperson owning the 

property on which there are taxes due. . . shall be 

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Honorable Patricia A. Elliott - Page Two 

liable for all costs. The State and county shall be exempt from 

liability for any costs growing out of such action. (Emphasis 

added). 

This exemption also applies to school districts and municipal corporations which 

are authorized to levy and collect their own taxes. V.T.C.S. article 1060a. 

Article 39304 V.T.C.S., sets forth various fees to be charged by county clerks 

and clerks of county courts for services rendered in causes of action on the docket of 

the county court 

It is well established that article 7297 exempts the aforementioned taxing 

authorities from liability for payment of court costs In suits for the collection of 

delinquent taxes. Nacogdoches Independent School District v. McKinney, 513 S.W. 2d 5 

(Tex. 1974); Electra Independent School District v. W.T. Wsggoner Estate, 168 S.W. 26 

645 (Tex. 1943); City of Houston v. McCarthy, 371 S.W. 2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. - 

Houston 1963, writ reM n.r.e.1; South Lake Independent School District v. Easterling 

142 S.W. 2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. -Beaumont 1940, writ rePdX The Texas Supremd 

Court has recently held that this exemption also applies to court costs arising in a bill 

of discovery suit initiated as an aid to the enforcement of a prior delinquent tax 

judgment State v. U.T.L. Aeronautics, Inc., 590 S.W. 2d 120 (Tex. 1979). In that case, 

the court observed that: 

It is our opinion that the State’s action grows out of and is 

grounded upon its judgment in the prior suit for taxes and 

relates solely to the enforcement of that judgment. But for the 

prior juement, there would be no basis for the State’s bill of 

discovery suit. 

590 S.W. 2d at 12L 

It is urged ln an accompanying brief that the need for filing sn abstract of 

judgment in the records of the county clerk also exists solely by virtue of the prior tax 

judgment In other words, but for the judgment In the delinquent tax suit, there would 

be no basis for securing and filing an abstract of juament in order to encumber the 

judgment debtor’s property. Accordingly, the recording fee - which, it is contended, 

is included among the costs to be taxed upon the initial flllng of the suit under article 

3930b - is a cost which ‘grows out of” the cause of action within the meaning of 

article 7297. The quoted passage from State v. U.T.L.~Aeronautlcs, Inc., s&ra, is 

relied upon as authority for this proposition. 

In our opinion, however, this argument is without merit. Article 3930b neither, 

explicitly nor, we think, implicitly provides that a fee charged by a county clerk for 

recording an abstract of judgment in the county records is to be included among the 

costs to be taxed upon the initial filing of a suit for the collection of delinquent taxes. 

See section 2(a). We do not think the legislature Intended for the article 7297 

exemption to spply to fees for services performed during the course of a taxing 

authority% efforts to implement the post-judgment enforcement option of placing a 

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Honorable Patricia A. Elliott - Page Three 

lien on a judgment debtor’s property through the filing of an abstract of judgment in 

the county records. See Attorney General Opinion WW-658 (1959). 

State v. U.T.L. Aeronautics, Inc., supra, does not compel a different conclusion. 

That case merely held that the costs arismg out of a bill of discovery suit brought by 

the state to determine whether a corporation had sufficient property to satisfy a prior 

delinquent tax judgment related solely to the enforcement of that judgment and 

therefore grew out of the judgment within the meaning of article 7297. It furnishes no 

authority for an agument regarding fees involved in exercising a post-judgment 

enforcement option which does not involve litigation. 

We therefore conclude that the fee charged by the Taylor County clerk for 

recording abstracts of judgment in the county records is not part of the “costs growing 

out of” the original delinquent tax suit within the meaning of article 7297, V.T.C.S., 

and, accordingly, that the three aforementioned taxing authorities are not exempt 

from liability for payment of it. 

SUMMARY 

Article 7297, V.T.C.S., does not exempt the city of Abilene, 

the Abilene Independent School District, and the West Central 

Texas Municipal Water District from liability for payment of 

the fee charged by the Taylor County clerk for recording 

abstracts of juc$gment in delinquent tax suits in the real 

property records of Taylor County. 

Very truly your% 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

RICHARD E.GRAY III 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Jon Bible 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Susan L. Garrison, Chairman 

James Allison 

Jon Bible 

Rick Gilpin 

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