### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03 - 22 - 00013 - CV

Michael L. Marin , Appellant

v. Jenifer L. Marin , Appellee

FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D - 1 - FM - 21 - 001848 , THE HONORABLE MADELEINE CONNOR , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Michael L. Marin appeals from the trial c ourt ’ s fina l decre e of divorce. In three issues, Mic hael challenges the trial cour t ’ s award of spousal main tenance to Jenifer L. Marin and its determination that the community estate was entit led to reimbursement of $137,641 for the

en hancement of the value of Michael ’ s separate property
. 1 We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Michael and Jen ifer were married i n August 2009. They have two children who

were min o rs when the div orc e decree was signed

. Additionally, Michael has two children from a previous marria ge who were minors when Michael and Jeni fer married

. In the decree, Jenifer

1 Because the parties share a surname, for clari ty we refer to them by th eir given names

. 2 Because th e parti es are fami liar with the facts of the case, its p rocedural history, and the evidence adduced at trial, we do not recite them in this o pinion e xcept as necessary to advise the parties of t he Cou rt ’ s decision and the ba sic reasons for it. See T ex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47. 4

.2

was named the conservator with the right to desi gnate the ir minor children ’ s r eside nce. Mich ael d oes not challenge any of the c hild

- custody or child

- support orders.

A t the time of the di vorce, Michael was a partner at a law firm in Austin

. Jenifer , who was also a lawyer though not licensed to pr actice in Texas , did not work out s ide the home at all during the marriage and was principally en g a ged with caring fo r t he four children

. 3 Michael, Jenifer, and the children l ived in a house Michael ha d purchased before he and Jenifer married

. The evidence at t rial showed that Michael con trolled the parties ’ finances during the marriage.

Michael initially f

iled a petition fo r di vorce in January 2021 but nonsuited it shortly thereafter. He filed a second p etition for divorce on April 1, 2021 . The trial judge held

a three

- day bench trial in Oc tober 2021. The court granted the divorce on the ground of insu pporta

bi l ity , found that Jenifer should receive a disproportionate division of the community estate, and orde red Michael to pay Jenifer sp ousal maintenance of $2,500 per mo nth for four
y ears. Michael perfected t his appeal challengin g the court ’ s award of sp ousal maintenance and its adjudication of Jenifer ’ s cl aim for reim bursement to the community estate against Mi cha e l ’ s

se parate estate.

DISCUSSION Spousal Maintenance Award

Michael c hallenges the trial court ’ s spousal

- maintenance a ward ordering him to pay Jenifer $2,500 per mo nth for four ye ars. He assert s that the trial cour t abused its discretion by ordering any spousal maintenance because there was “ no evidence of the statutory pr edicates for spousal maint enance. ” We revi e w a trial court ’ s award of spousal maintenance for an abuse

3 Mi chael and the mother of his tw o daughters divorced in 200 5. In 2009, Michael beca me the “ primary caregiver ” for h i s daught ers , an d they lived with Michael and Jeni fer.3

of discretion. Kelly v. Kelly , 634 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2021, no pet.)

. Thus, we will no t disturb an order awarding spousal maintenance unless the tri al court acts arb i trarily, unreasonably, w ithout regard to guiding rules and principles, or without supporting evidence. See Bocque t v. Herring , 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998) ; In re Fuentes , 506 S.W. 3d 586, 593 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. p roceeding ). When c onsidering whether the trial court abused its discretion, “ legal and fac tual sufficiency of the evidence are not ind ependent grounds for asserting error, but they are relevant fa ctors ” in our assessment. Dunn

v . Dunn , 177 S.W.3d 393 , 39 6 (Tex. App.

— Ho us t on [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied ); see also Zeifman v. Michels , 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2006, pet. denied)

. There is no abuse of discretion if some evidence of a substantive an d probative character exists to support the tri al court ’ s decisi o n. Stamper v. Kno x , 254 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.)

. B ecause of the overlap between the abuse

- of

- discretion and sufficiency

- of

t he

- evid en ce stand ards of review, c ourts apply a hybrid analysis , engaging in a two

- p ronged i n quir y to deter mine whether the trial court (1) had sufficie nt information on which to exercise its di scr etion an d (2) erred in its application of that discretion. Zeifman , 212 S.W.3d at 588

.

We con du c t a tr ad i tional sufficiency review to answer the fir s t question, apply ing the familiar standard s for determining the l e gal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

. Jenifer bore the bur den of pro of on her spousal

- maintenance claim. See, e.g. , Pec k v. Peck , No. 03

- 14

- 00440

- CV, 2016 WL 3917 131, at *3 n. 16 ( T ex. A pp.

— Austin July 15, 2016, no pe t.) (mem. op.) (cit ing Cooper v. Co oper , 176 S.W.3d 62, 65 ( Tex. App.

— Ho uston [1 st Dis.] 2004, no pet.) ). C onsequently, in attack ing the legal sufficiency of the eviden ce supp o rting the trial court ’ s dete rmination of Jeni f

er ’ s spousal

- maintenance claim, Michael must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to sup port the adverse fi ndings. See Zeifman , 212 S.W.3d at 588 (citing4

Croucher v. Croucher , 660 S.W.2d 55 , 58 (Te x . 1983) ). We analyz e whet he r the evidenc e would enable reasonable pe ople to reach the judgment being reviewed, crediting evidence favo rable to the findings if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding contrary e vidence unless a rea sonable factfinder could not. Id. (cit ing City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Te x. 2005) ). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the findin gs and indu lge every reasonable infer ence that would s upport them. City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 822

.

Under the l egal suff

icien cy s ta ndard, w e defer to the reasonable credibility determinations made by the factfinder

—here, the trial court

— and do not merely substitute ou r judgment fo r that of the factfinder. See id. at 816

- 17, 819

- 20, 822 . Th e factfi nd er “ is the sole judge of the credibi lity of wi tnesses and the w eight to be given to the ir testimony. ” Golden Ea gle Archery , Inc. v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003)

. If we conclude in answer to the first question that the trial court had suffic ient inf o rmation on which to exercise its discretion, then to an swer the second question we det ermine whether the trial court made a reasonable decision based on the e vide nce, “ that is, that the court ’ s decision was neither ar bitrary nor unreasonabl e. ” Zeif

ma n , 212 S.W.3d at 588

. Family Code Chapter 8 governs the award o f spousal main tenance in a divorce decree. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 8.001

– .359; Dalton v. Dalton , 551 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. 2018) ( “ In 1995, th e Texas Legislature first authorized co urts to a wa r d a f o rm of involuntary post

divorce alimon y referred to as ‘ spousal main t enance. ’ ” ). The Fam ily Code defines “ mai ntenan ce ”

as “ an awar d in a suit for disso lution of a marriage of periodic payments f rom the future income of one s pouse for the support o f t he ot h er spouse. ” Tex. Fam. Code § 8.001(1)

. “ The legislative purpose in enacting pro visions for spousal ma intenance was to prov ide temporary and

re habilitative sup p ort for a spouse whose ability for self

- support is lacking or has det eriorate d5

over ti me while engage d in homema king activities and whose capital assets are insufficient to provide support. ” O ’ Carolan v. Hopper , 71 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2002, no pet .)

.

The Family Cod e authorize s trial courts to a ward spousal maintena nce “ only

u n der ‘ very narrow ’ and ‘ v ery limi t ed circumstances ’ ” and only if the parties meet certain eligi bil ity requirements. Dalton , 551 S.W.3d at 130 (quoting McCollough v. McCollou gh , 212 S.W.3d 638 , 645 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2006, no pet.) ); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051 . In this case, J enifer so ught mai n tenance under Section 8.05 1(2) (B) , which prov ides in relevant part: [T]he court may order maintenance for either spouse only if the spouse seeking maintenance will lack suffic ient property, including the spouse ’ s separ a te property, on dis solution of the m a rriage to provide for the spouse ’ s minimum reasonable needs and :

... . (2) the sp ouse see king ma int enance:

... . ( B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks the ability to ear n sufficien t income to provide for the spouse ’ s minimum r easonable needs. . . .

. Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051(2)(B) ( eligibility fo r spousal maintenance). T he par ties do not dispute that Michael and Jenifer were married for 10 years or longer . There was legally and factu ally suffici ent evidence a t trial to s u p port a finding that Jenifer lacked the ability to earn sufficient income to provid e for her mi nimum reasonable needs , and Michael do es not challenge th at determination on appeal.

In h is fi rst issue, Mic hael asserts that the trial court abus ed i ts discr e tion in awarding J e nifer spousal main tenanc e becau se she “did not prove the statutory predicates for an award of spousal support. ” Mi chael maint ains that to be eligible for an award of spousal6

maintenance, Jenifer wa s re quired to re but a pres umpt ion that spousal maintena nce is not warranted and, relatedly, that the on ly way Jenifer could re but the presumption was to offer le gally sufficient evidence that she had exercised diligence in e arning sufficient income to
prov ide for her minimum reason ab le nee ds o r that she had ex ercised d iligence in developing the necessary skills to provide for her minimum reasonable needs durin g the period of separation and during the t ime the suit for dissolution of the marriage was pending

.

The Fa m ily Code provides t hat u nless t h e spouse seeking maintenance pursuant to

se cti on 8.051( 2)( B) has “exercised diligence in (1) earning sufficient income to provide for th e spouse ’s minimum rea sonab le needs; or (2) d eveloping the necessary skills t o pr ovide for the
spouse ’s min imum reason a b le needs during a period of separation an d during the time the suit for dissolution of the marriage is pending , ” there is a rebuttable presumption that maintenance is not warranted. Id. § 8.053 (a) . Thus, even wh en a spouse meets the eligibil ity require me nts for

an aw ard of sp ousal maintenance under section 8.051(2)(B) , i f the spouse fail s to demonstrate that she exercised dilig ence in one of the two ways provided for in sect ion 8.053 (a) , she must rebut a presumpt ion that maintenance is not wa rra nted. S ee Peck , 2016 WL 3917131, at *1 n.7 ( “ With respect to [ Family Code section 8.051 (2) ] P aragraph ( B), there is a rebuttable
pre sumption that maintenanc e is not war ranted unless t he spouse s ee king main tenance has

‘ exer cised diligence ’ in either ‘ ear ning sufficient income to provide for the spouse ’s minimum reasonable needs ’ or ‘ developing the necessary ski lls to provide for the spo use ’s minimum reasonable needs during a period of s epa ration a n d during the time the suit for dissolution of the marriage is pending. ’ ”). We first consid er whether the re was legally sufficient evidence
pres ented at trial to support a finding that J enifer exercised diligence in e arning sufficient income
to pr ovide fo r her minimum reasonable nee ds. See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053(a)(1) . The diligence7

inquiry under this section of the Family Code is no t limited to the period of separation and the time the suit f

or dissolution of the ma rriage is pending. See Deb roc k v. Deb ro ck , No. 03

- 21

- 0030 8

- CV, 20 22 WL 17970214, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Austin Dec. 28, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing D ay v. Day , 452 S.W.3d 430, 434 (T ex. App.

— Ho uston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied ) (comparing Family Code section 8.053(a)(1) with section 8.05 3( a )(2) ) ).

At trial, Jenif

er te stified that in Oc tober 2020 she took a nd passed a course required to obtain a license to sell real estate in Nor th Carolin a. 4 After finishing the first course, Jenifer took th e first o f three additional courses and had re gis ter ed f o r the second and third courses. She was s cheduled to c omplete the second and third courses in December 2021

. Obtaining a North Carolina real

- estate licen se would reduce the number of courses she would b e

r equired to take to obtain a license to se ll real es tate in Texas if she c hose to remain in the state

. Jenifer testified that taking these cou rses would set h e r up for taki ng the Texas real estate exam in January 2022. Jenifer t estif ied that sh e had react ivated her license to practice law in the District of Columbia , whic h had requ ired tha t she take an e thics course. Jenifer met with a

car eer counsel or , was working on her r esume, and had explored educational opportunities for alter na tive career s. This ev idence is legally sufficient to suppor t a finding that Jenifer exerc ised dilig ence in e arning sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. See Slic ker v. Slicker , 464 S.W.3d 850, 863 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2015, no pet.) (reasonable diligence demonstrated by spouse who con ducted job searc h, took on e computer c lass and pla n ned t o take another, had sent resume to one potential employer , and had worked fo r a short period of time)

.

4 J e nifer was raised in North Carolina, her parents reside t here, and she wanted to return there after the div orce.8 Even when there i s legally insufficie nt ev idence t o support a fi nding of reason able diligence, however , th e lack of such evidence si mply give s rise to a reb uttable p resumpti on that
spous al main te nance i s not warra nted. See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053(a) (presumption that spousal maint enance is not war ranted arises when s po use seeking maintenance has failed to exerci se d ilige nce in either e arning suffic ient incom e or deve loping n ecessary skills to provide for minimum reasonable needs ). 5 This presumption is subj ect to the same rules gover ning presumptio ns generally. It s ef fect is to shift the bur den of prod uci ng evidence to the party agai ns t whom it o perates. S ee Genera l Motors Corp. v. Saenz , 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex. 1993)

. Once that burden is dis charged and evidence contradicting the presumption h a s been offered, the p resumption disappears and “ is not to b e weigh ed or treated as evidenc e. ” I d. (quoting Comb ined Am. Ins. Co . v. Blanton , 353 S.W.2d 8 47, 849 (Tex. 1962) )

. “ A presumption is nothing more than a rule for the guid ance of a trial judge in locating the burden of production at a particular time. ” Texas A & M Univ. v. Cham bers , 31 S.W. 3d 780, 784 (Te x. App.

— A ustin 20 00, pet. denied)

. Thus, the effect of a failure to present evidence supporti ng a finding of reasonable diligence is that the p arty seeking spousal main tenance has the burde n of producin g evidence that contradicts the presumption that such spousal maintenance i s not war ranted.

Our review of the evidence is informed by the legislative purpose in enacti ng provisions for spousal ma intenance , whi ch was to provide temporary and rehabilitativ e support for a spouse whose ab ility to support hers elf is lacking or has det eriorated over tim e wh ile the
spouse was engaged in homemaking acti vities and whose capi tal assets are insufficient to p rovide support

. See O ’ Carolan , 71 S.W.3d at 533

. At trial , Jenifer testified that while she and

5 Section 8.053 sets for th the conditions under which a rebuttable presumption aris e s. See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053

. I t does not, however , d efi ne or circumscribe what type of evidence is required to o vercome that presumption.9

Michael were married, she stayed at ho me and too k care o f their two children as well as his two chi ldren from a prior marriage. Ther e was evidence that Je nif er ’ s role as primary caretaker of the children facilitated Michael ’ s pursu it of his succes sful and lucrative legal career. At the ti me of the divorce, Jenifer was 4 7 years old an d had not worked in more than ten years. She testified that she currently la cked the qualific atio ns to practice law in Texas or to wor k as a real e state agent. Jenif

er testified that she cou ld not get a pre - approv al letter f rom any mortgage lender unless she received child support and spou sal maintenance. She also testified that she did no t independ entl y have sufficient capital to purc hase a house or pay rent for a s uitable place in Austin for her and the children . Jenifer ’ s finan cial planner testified that even assuming Jenifer obtained a job with a $60 ,000 year ly salary she wo uld likely deplete he r resour ces in fifteen
years. We c on clude that th e trial court could have determ ined that evidence of Jenifer ’ s lo ng absence fr om th e work force due to her homemaking activities, her inability to se cure employment that woul d cover her household expenses w ithou t additional education or

c ert ifications, and her inability to p rovide for her minimum reasonable needs would overcome

a p r esump tion against spousal maintenance. See Debrock , 20 22 WL 17970214, at * 6 (lack of education and employm ent experience com bin ed with diminished ability to provi de for minimum reasonable needs ov er came presumption against spousal maintenance ); Slicker , 464 S. W.3d at 863 (evidence of spouse ’ s long per iod of time n ot working outside home and lack of specific ed ucation or employment skills that would facilitate job s earch supp orted findin g that wife was eligible to rec eive spousal maintenance ). Accordingly, w e hold t hat the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Jenifer spousal maintenance. We ove rrule Mic hael ’ s fi r s t issue

.10

Reimbursement C

laim In h is second issue, Mich ael cha llenge s the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the tri al court ’ s finding that the community estate ha d a right of reimbursement in the
amount o f $137,641 for impr ovements made to the Austin home in which he and Jenifer lived , which was Mic hael ’ s separa te pr operty
. Michael assert s that the trial court abused its discret ion in its award of Jenifer ’ s reimbursement claim because there was no evidence of the value of t h e improvements made to h is separate property

. Secti on 3.402 of the Family Code authorize s reimbursement claims between marital estates for capit al improveme nts to prop ert y and directs courts to resolve a c laim for reim bursement using equitable principles

. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.402 (a) (8), (b)

. We review a tr ia l court ’ s award of reimbursemen t under an abuse o f discretion standard. In re Estate of Baker , 627 S.W.3d 5 23 , 526

– 27 (Tex. App.

— W aco 2 021, no pet.)

. If some evidence support s the trial court ’ s d ecision, there is no abu se of discretion. A yala v. Ayala , 387 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dis t .] 2011 , no pet.) . Great latitu de

mu st be given to th e trial court in applyin g equitable principles to a claim for reimbursement. Penic k v. Penick , 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Te x. 1988) . An equita ble claim for reimbursement is
not merely a bal anc ing of the ledgers between t he marital estates. Id. The discretio n to be

exer cised in eva luating a claim for reimbursement is equally as broad as th at discretion sub sequently exercised by the trial court in making a “ just and right ” division of the co mmun ity property. Id. H owever, a trial court abuses its discretion i f it acts in an arbitrar y o r unre asonable

manner. Downer v. A quamar ine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 24 1

– 42 (Tex. 1 985) . The legal suf fici ency of the evidence is a re levant factor i n assessing whether the trial co urt abused its discretion. In re Marr ia ge of McCoy , 488 S.W.3 d 430, 433 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dis t .] 2016, no pet. ).11 The rule of r eimbursement is purel y an equitabl e one. Vallone v. Vallone , 644 S. W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1982) . A right of reimbursement arises when funds of one estate , here the community estate, ar e used to benefit another estate, here Mic hael ’ s s e parate estate, witho ut itself rec eiving so m e benefit. Id. at 4 59

. “ The right of reimbursement is not an inte rest in property or an e n forceab le debt, per se, but an equitable right which arises upon disso lution of the marriage through death, div orce, or annulment. ” Id. at 458

– 59

. The spouse seek ing reimbursement mu st esta blish the f ollowing: (1) that a contri bution was made by one marital estate to another, (2) that the contribut ion was reimbursable, and (3) the value of the contribution. Id. On appeal, Michael challeng e s only the third elemen t

— the value of the

c o ntribution. A claim for rei mbursement for fu nds exp ended by an estate for improv ements to another estate is to be me asured by the en hancement in value to the benefitted estate by reason of
t he impro vements. An derson v. Gilli land , 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Te x. 1985)

. Evidence showing the value of the p roperty without improvements and t he value of the pro perty with improvem ents is suff icient to sustain a finding as to the amount of the enhancemen t value. See In re Marriage of M cCoy , 488 S .W.3d at 435

. The e nhancement value is determined by presenting e vidence that sh ows an d compares the fair market value of the property in its improved condi tion, at the time of the dissolution , with what the fai r market value of th e property would have be en on the date of th e dissolution if the improvements had not been made : The enhanced value from the improvements made is calculated under the following formula. First, the fair market value of the property in its improved conditio n is determined as of th e date of the dissol ution of the marital relationship. Then, a de termination is made as to what the fair market value of the property would have been at the date of the dissolution had the improvements not been present on the prope rty. The difference bet ween these two value calculations is the amount of the reimburseme nt claim.12

Id. ( quot ing 38 Aloysius A. Leopold, Texas Practice Series: Marital Property and Homesteads § 14.6 (1993) )

. At trial, the court heard evidence about the v alue of the residence from Michael Benagli o. Benaglio s tated that he had assess ed the en hanced value of property for purp oses of reimbursemen t claim s 1 20 to 140 ti mes and always used the same methodology

. Benaglio
t es tified that improvements to Michael and Je nifer ’ s residen ce made in 2012 adde d 218 square feet of living space

. The impr ove me nt was the enclosure of a screened por ch to create additional living space. B enaglio review ed two third

- party apprais als done by licensed rea l estate appraisers that valued the proper ty at $980 ,000 and $2,4 00 ,000 respectively. Benagl io also review ed a 20 21 appraisal done by Keller Williams that valued the property at $1,150,000. Us ing these appraisa ls, Benaglio testified t hat the enhancement v alue of the enclosed sc reen porch ranged fro m $59, 450 to $150,70 0. Benaglio testified that h e arrived at this ran ge by divi ding the lowest appraisal and the high est appraisal by the total square foot age of the resid ence to arrive at a per - square - foot valu e and then multiplied that value by the squa re foot age added to the house by the enclosed screen porc h. Benaglio agreed with Michael ’ s counsel that in the “ real estate world ” peop le typically do not delineate the value of the improved structure

v ersus the value of the lot it is on but, rather, v alu e the entire improve d p roperty as a whole. Benaglio te stified tha t the apprais als he reviewed di d not value the land and the structure separately. The trial court found th at the community had enhanced the value of Mi chael ’ s

s eparate property by $137, 641, an amount with in th e range of values to which Benaglio testif ied

. The e vidence presente d by Benaglio is sufficient to sustain the t rial court ’ s fin ding as to the
amount of the enhancement value.13 On appeal, Mic hael argues that the evidence is legally in suffi cient to suppor t the trial court ’ s finding because ther e was no evi den ce of the value of the p roper ty in 2012, immedi ately before the improvem ent at issue was m ade. Michael argues that Benaglio ’ s testimony h as no proba tive value because he did not pr ovi de the trial co urt wit h a value of the property “ before the por ch was enclosed in 2012. ” As previously noted, however, the proper measure of the enhan cement value i s the difference between the property with an d without the impr ovement at the time of th e d issolution of the marriage. See In re Marriage of McCo y , 488 S.W.3d at 435

. Using fair market values assigned to the property by third

- party appraisers in 2021 , Be n aglio provided his opinion of how much less the house would be wor th if it was 218
squa re feet smaller, i .e. , without

— or before

— the 2012 improvements. Michael also argues that the methodology Benaglio used was incorrect, and that he should have valued th e land and the structure separ ately when maki ng his calculations. Although that could b e a n alternative

m ethodology for calculating the enhancement value, Mic h ael poin ts to no authority mandating that it be u s ed. Courts consistently requi re only that cou rt ’ s finding be supported by evidence of the f air market value of the property with and wit hout the improv ements. Moreover, Mic h a el did
not present any evidenc e of wha t the enhancement value would b e using the alt ernative methodology he advocated

. Benaglio testified that he had done more than 100 v aluations for reimbursement clai ms using h i s methodolo gy and that it is the me thod appraisers typically use when va luing rea l property. We conclud e that t he trial court ’ s finding in valuing Jen ifer ’ s reimbu rsement claim was a proper exercise of its broad discretio n and f ell within the great latitu de given to apply equitable principles

. See In re Marriage of Wells , No . 12

- 21

- 00152

- CV,14

2022 WL 3724724, at * 2 (T ex. App.

— Tyler Aug. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule Michael ’ s second issue. 6

CONCLUSI ON

Having over ruled Michael ’ s issues, we af firm the d ivorce decree.

__________________________________________ J

. Woodfin Jones, Justice Before Justices B aker, Smith, and Jones* Aff irmed Fil ed: April 5 , 2023 *Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justi ce (Retired), Thi rd Court of Appeals, sitting by assign ment. See T ex. Gov ’ t Cod e § 7 4.003(b)

.

6 Because of our disposition of Michael ’ s second issue, we need not address his third issue in which he asserts t h a t the trial court ’ s abuse of discretion in gr anting Je nif er ’ s reimbursement claim had more than a de minimus effec t on th e trial court ’ s divi sion of the community estate such that remand was warranted. See Tex. R. App. P. 4 7.1

.