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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2204
U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

W I L L I AM P. M AR

R , also known as B I L L M AR

R , J R ., Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 11 CR 24 — Rubén Cas til lo , Chief Judg e.
A RGU E D F E B R

UAR Y 19, 2014

— D E C I D E D J ULY 29, 2014

Before B AU E R

, F L AUM , and H AMI L TO N

, Circ uit Judges. B AU E R , Cir cui t Judge. A jury found Wi lli am P

. Mar r , also known as Bi ll Mar r

, Jr

. (“Marr ”), g uil t y of si x counts of wi re fraud. Mar r appeals hi s convic tion, arg uing t hat he di d not
r e ceiv e a fai r tr i al becau se the government relied upon improper propensi ty evidenc e to convic t hi m, and that three jury instructi ons incorre ctly explain ed the la w
. He also contends2 No. 13-2204
that the di stric t court lacked the authority to or der restituti on. For the re asons that follow , w e affi rm. I. BACKGRO UND In July 20 0 0 , Wi lli am C. Mar r , the defendant’s father , founded Equi pment So urce USA , LLC (“Equi pment So urce”), whi ch sold used fork li fts. The d e fendant Mar r managed fork li ft sales a nd dai ly oper ations for the fami ly bus iness

. Mar r adv ert i sed for klifts for sale onlin e and sold them o nline or ov er t he phone. In April 2001, the defendant’s fat her opened a chec kin g accoun t for Equi pment So urce at P alos Bank and T rust (“P alos 1 Bank”) and named Mar r as a si gnato ry

. In Ja nu a r y 2002, the defendant’s father opened a second accoun t at P alos Bank, a
m e rch a n t a c c oun t, whi ch a l l owe d Equi pment So urce to process credi t card tr ansac tions

. Mar r w as a si gnato ry on the merchant
accoun t as w ell. Checks wi thdrawn from these accoun ts are at the heartof Mar r’s pro pensi ty ar gument. Fr om 2001 to 2003, Mar r used Equipm ent So urce to sell fork li fts tha t he ne v er actually owned or possess ed. Mar r’s modus o p e randi w as to adv ert i se fork li fts for sale onli ne, collect credi t card payments from out-of-state customers, and then purpor t to deli v er the product wi th o ut ev er doin g so. W he n cus tomer s di d not receiv e the fork li fts they or dered, they w o ul d co ntact Mar r
. T ypic ally , a cus tomer w ould com-

Palo s Bank a nd Trust Co mpany cl osed o n August 13 , 2 01 0, when it was 1 acqu i red b y Fir st Mi dwest Bank. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Failed Bank List, http: // www.fdi c.go v/bank/indi v i dual/ fail ed/ b ankl i st.html (Last

v i site d J uly 18 , 2 01 4)

.No. 13-2204 3 plain that he receiv ed an inv oic e and a notic e of shi pment, and t ha t Equi pment So urce charged hi s credi t card, but that he
nev er actually received the fo r k l i ft he or dered. Whi le Mar r gav e v ary ing explanations to hi s unhapp y cus tomer s, he rar ely refunded their mo ney or deli v ered the fork li fts. Instead, hi s cus tomer s w ere forced to contact their credi t card compani es to di spute the charges. A cus tomer ’s credi t card company
w ould then send notic e of the di spute to P alos Bank, where the
cus tomer ’s payment w as sent. Nex t, P alos Bank w ould notif y Equi pment So urce that a cu st omer di sputed a charge and

w ould request a response. Sandra Leci k handled all of the credi t card di sputes at P alos Bank, and she dealt exclusi v ely wi th Mar r when there w ere i ssu es rais ed by Equi pment So urce cus tomer s. If Mar r di d not respond or the inqui ry w as resolv ed in the cus tomer ’s fav or

, P alos Bank refunded the amount of the
or i gin al charge back to t he cus tomer ’s credi t card account by debi tin g Equi pment So urce’s merchant accoun t. When thi s occurred, it w as cal led a “chargeback.” In 2002, Thomas Hull ing er , Senior Vi ce Presi dent at P alos Bank, notic ed a hi gh inci de nc e of chargebacks on Equi pment So urce’s merchant account. Hullinger esti mated that fort y percent of Equi pment So urce’s credi t card tr ansac tions in 2002 resulted in chargebacks. The other 300-350 merchant accoun ts at P alos Bank had chargeback rat es of less than tw o percent the same y ear

. In June 2002, Mr

. Hullinger met wi t h M a r r to di scu ss the excessi v e chargebacks on t he Equi pment So urce merchant
accoun t. The tw o men di scu ssed P alos Bank’s requirement that Equi pmen t So urce shi p i ts products prior to chargin g i ts
cus tomer s’ credi t cards. Mar r sai d he w ould comply wi th P alos4 No. 13-2204
Bank’s requ ir ement, but the hi gh rat e of chargebacks conti nued. Fr om July thro ugh October 2002 , the chargebacks on E qui pment So urce’s merchant accoun t total e d a l m os t $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0

. At the end of October

, Mr

. Hullinger called a second meetin g, thi s tim e wi th both Mar r and hi s father

. He informed them that they mus t maintai n a reserve of ov er $90,000 in their merchant
accoun t to cov er any ov erdr afts and mus t prov i de proo f of deli v ery befor e P a l os Bank w ould release fund s from the credi t card sales into t hei r account. Equi pment So urce fai led to maintai n the required reserve, so P alos Bank froze the compan y ’ s accoun ts a few days after the second mee t ing

. Nev ert heless, chargebacks from cus tomers conti nued to be debi ted fro m the merchant acc ount. In Nov ember

, tw enty-eight chargebacks occurred, tot aling $153,930. P alos Bank appli ed the appr o x i mately $40,000 remain ing in t he merchant account to the ba l a nc e

. In Decem

ber , another tw enty-eigh t chargebacks occurred, tot aling $172,69 7 ; P alos Bank appli ed the approx i mately $13,000 remain ing in Equi pment So urce’s chec kin g accoun t t o t he negativ e balanc e. The final balanc e of Equi pment So ur ce’s chec k ing accoun t w as zero and the final negativ e balanc e of E qui pment So urce’s merchant accoun t w as $328,881.89—a l os s t ha t P alos Bank pai d to Equi pment So urce cus tomer s. P alo s Bank mai led Mar r a lette r requestin g payment for the loss, but no payment w as remi tte d. Although t he recor d does not fully describe how , the government w as informed of the sus pi ci ous acti vity at Equi pment So urce. In January 2003, the FBI executed a search

w a r rant at Equi pment So urce’s o ffi ces and sei zed documentsNo. 13-2204 5
and offi ce equi pment. Equi pment So urce ceased doin g bus i

ness shortly there after

. Ei ght y ears later

, the government fi led a n infor mati on chargin g Mar r wi th si x counts o f wi re fraud relat ed to hi s fraudulent forklift sal es. A. The T

rial Proceedin gs At tr i a l, the government presented testim ony fro m fou rte e n Equi pment So urce cus tomer s who pai d for fork li fts but nev er receiv ed them. One of the defraude d cu st omers testifi ed that he w ent to Equi pment So urce’s offi ce to get hi s money back and met wi th Mar r
. Mar r told hi m that he w ould refund the money , but needed to t alk to hi s law y er fi rst. Mar r nev er sent
a refund. The cus tomer i denti fi ed Mar r in the courtr oom as the p e rson he talked wi th duri ng the vis i t. The government then called Ms. Leci k and Mr

. Hullinger , th e t w o e mploy ees from P alos Bank, who explain e d the chargebacks on the merchant
accoun t and i denti fi ed Mar r as havin g a si gni fi cant ro le in the management of Equi pment So urce’s bank accoun ts. As i ts final wi tness, the government called i ts financi al exper t witness, Bruce K i lli an, who analyzed the Equi pment Sour ce mer chant
accoun t and confi rmed the $328,881.89 loss to P alos Bank. The government intro duced no evidenc e that Mar r wrot e chec ks from the Equi pment So urce accoun ts to “cash ” or to the “Four Seasons Curre ncy Exchange.” Mar r then presented hi s case and called Lee Wi lli ams, a former IRS agent, to testif y as an exper t wi tness. He stated that he had r e viewed Equi pment So urce’s financi al recor ds and calculated that Mar r and hi s wi fe had loaned Equi pment So urce ov er $1.1 mi lli on, but had been reimb ursed less t han6 No. 13-2204 $900,000. Wi lli ams explain ed that the personal fund s in t he company accoun ts mainly came fr o m Mar r and hi s wi fe’s home equi ty line of credi t a cc o un t and their personal money market accoun t. Wi lli ams conclu ded that Mar r deposi ted ov er $200,000 more into the Equi pment So urce accoun ts th a n he wi thdrew

. Wi lliam s also described chec ks wri tte n from the Equi pment So urce accoun t to cash o r a currency exchange in October 2002. For example , W illiams sai d one chec k w as writ t e n to “cash ” in the amount of $266 for “offi ce supp li es,” another w as wri tte n to a “currency exchange” for “li cens e and permi ts,” and another w as wri tte n to “cas h” in the am ount of $2,450, thi s ti me for “cost of g oods sold.” On c ro s s - e xa m in a ti on

, the go v e rnm e nt qu e s ti one d Wi l l i a m s abo u t chec ks that had been wri tte n from the Equi pment So urce chec kin g accoun t to cash or to the currency exchange. Wi lli ams stated that the memo line of th e chec ks often noted that the wi thdraw al w as for the “cost of goo ds sold,” but admi tte d that he di d not consi der the se chec ks in hi s calculati ons at all becau se he w as only hi red to analyze the net amount Mar r and hi s wi fe loaned the b usiness from thei r per sonal acc ounts. He also co nc eded that wri tin g chec ks to cash w as an unus ual bus iness practic e becau se the IRS wi ll deny a bus iness expense i f i t cannot be v erifi ed by an inv oic e or r e ce i pt of some sort

. When the prosecutor asked, “ So the problem wi th all these chec ks to cash i s y ou don’t know where thatmoney went, do y ou ?” Wi lli ams responded, “No one does.” Mar r’s lawy er objecte d twi ce duri ng th e cross-examinati on. First, to scope, whi ch the judge ov err uled and then to facts not in evidenc e, whi ch the judge sus tain ed. Mar r’s lawyer nev er objecte d on Rule 404(b) gr ounds.No. 13-2204 7
The government recalled i ts financi al expert wi tness Kill i an to rebut Wi lli ams’ testim ony

. Sinc e Wi lli ams’ testim ony intro duced information about chec ks being conv ert ed to cash , Kill i an addressed thi s i ssu e. The gove r nm e nt intro duced an exhib i t that sum mari zed the chec ks wri tte n to cash or to the currency exchange as compared to cash deposi ts. The chart documented t he Equi pment So urce chec kin g accoun t from January 7, 2002, thro ugh October 30, 2002. Kill i an no t ed that the cas h wit hdr aw als tot aled ov er $1.3 mi lli on and the cash deposi ts tot aled only about $ 7 0 0 , 000, leaving the net cash

w i th d ra wa l s a ro u n d $ 6 00,000. The governm e n t a l s o in tr od u c e d
an exhib i t sum mar iz ing the amount of chargebacks for all tw elv e months of 2002, whi ch tot aled about $600,000; approx i mately fi fty percent of Equi pment So urce’s credi t card sales. Again, Mar r’s lawye r nev er objecte d on Rule 404(b) gr ounds. Mar r’s lawy er cross-examine d K illi an. On redirect, the prosecutor asked onl y o ne questi on, i t w as about what w as wri tte n on the memo line of tw o chec ks dated October 29, 2002: Mr

. Kill i an, in y our exper i ence as a rev e nu e agent,
w ould that entry in the memo line, cost of goo ds sold,

w ould that be the kin d of suffi ci ent documentati on that

w ould hav e allow ed t ho se chec ks to be accepted as bus iness deducti ons in an audi t? Kill i an responded, “No.” Mar r’s lawy er then obje cted “about anythin g to do wi th taxe s” and asked for a si debar

. The judge deni ed the si de ba r becau se i t w as the government’s last questi on on redirect and he ov err uled the objec t io n. After

w ards, the go v ernment r ested.8 No. 13-2204
The next day

, Mar r’s lawy er renew ed her objection abo ut the intro ducti on of evidenc e relat ing to taxe s and mov ed for a mi str ial. She arg ued that Kill i an’s “line of questi oning [had] injected into a wi re fraud case the possi bi li ty that there could hav e been tax fraud.” The judge denied the moti on. In closing arg ument, the prosecutor relied on the E q ui pment So urce chec ks that ha d be en wri tte n to cash or to the currency exchange and stated that the chec k ing wi thdraw als di d not reflect a “legiti mate bus iness ” practic e. And in rebuttal arg ument, the prose cu t o r questi oned Mar r’s honesty and called Equi pment So urce a “sneaky , di rt y bus iness .” Mar r’s lawy er made no o bjection. At the j ur y instructi on conference, Mar r objecte d to Jury Instructions Nos. 25, 31, and 32. The judge ov err uled M a r r ’ s objections to all three instructi ons and t e nd ered the instructions to t he jury

. The jury found M arr gui lty on all six counts of wi re fraud in violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The di stric t court sent e nced Mar r to a ter m below the advis or y gui deline range of 57 to 71 months. Mar r receiv ed 3 y ea r s’ impri sonment, follow ed by 2 y ears of supervis ed r e l e a se, and w as or dered to pay $328,881.89 in restituti on to P alos Bank.

II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Mar r rais es three i ssu es. He contends that (1) the government i mproper ly intro duced and re l i ed on evidenc e i mplying that he had a propensi ty to commi t i llegiti mate tax practic es; (2) the jury instructi ons giv en at tr i a l w ere legallyNo. 13-2204 9

err oneous; and (3) the di stric t court err oneously or dered hi m to pay restituti on to P alos Bank. W e address each i ssu e in turn. A. Propensity Evidence Ma rr a rgu e s th a t the go v e rnm e nt’s refer ences to Equi pme n t So urce chec ks that w ere written to “cash ” or to t he “currency
ex ch ange” violated Rule 404(b)

. He contends that on three occasi ons t he go ver nment r eferr ed to these chec ks to suggest that he had a propensi ty to commit ill egiti mate tax practic es: (1) when the government cross-examined Wi lli ams; (2) when the g o v ernment questi oned Kill i an on redirect; and (3) when the go v e rnment relied on the evidenc e in i ts closing arg uments

. W e r e v i ew the di stric t court’s evidenti ary ruli ng for an abus e of di screti on. United States v
. Collin s , 715 F .3d 1032, 1037 (7th Ci r
. 2013). T

o p r eserv e an i ssu e for appeal, couns el mus t “make a tim ely objection or motion to strike ; a nd state[] the speci fi c gr ound, unles s i t w as apparent from the context .” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). A ter se motion in li mine i s not speci fi c enough to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Evid 103(a). United States
v
. Gulley, 722 F .3d 901, 906 (7th Ci r
. 2013). W e rev i ew i ssu es not proper ly rais ed before the di stric t court fo r plain err or

. Id

. A plain err or seri ously affec ts the “fai rness, integr i ty , or publi c reputat i on of judi cia l proceedings” becau se i t depriv es the defendant of a fai r tr i al, to the poin t that “the defendant w ould hav e been acqui tte d other wi se,” and the err or “w as so obvious and so prej udi ci al that a di stric t judge should hav e intervened wi th o ut being prompte d by an objection from defense counsel.” United S tates v. Haldar , 751 F .3d 450, 456 (7th Ci r . 2014). Mar r contends t hat w e should re view all t hree of hi s Rule 404(b) arg ument s using an abus e of di screti on standard,10 No. 13-2204
clai ming that hi s pre-tr i al motion in li mine objection preserved the is sue f or appeal. W e di sagree. Mar r’s motion relat ed to prospectiv e testim on y fr o m a wi tness who nev er actually testifi ed at tr i al; not Wi lli ams. Mar r di d object twi ce duri ng Wi lli ams’ testim ony , bu t ne v er on propensi ty g r o unds

. Therefore , Mar r’s objections di d not preserve the i ssu e and so w e rev i ew the ch e ck s evidenc e intro duced during the cross-examinati on of Wi lli ams for plain err or

. 1. The Government’s Cross-Examinat ion of Will iams E vi d e n c e i s n ot a d m i s s i

b l e for p ro p e n s i ty purposes—a prior cri me, wrong, or bad act that i s intro duced to show that a person repeat ed hi s or her bad character on t his p a rt i cular occasi on. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (1). The evidenc e i s admi ssi ble for other purposes, how ev er , i f the prosecutor : (1) offered it for a purpose other than propensi ty , (2) it w as si mi lar and close enough in t i me to be r elev ant to the matter at i ssu e, (3) it w as supp or ted by suffi ci ent prelim inary evidenc e for a jury to find that the defendant commi tte d the prior act, and (4) i t ha d a probat i v e v alue that w as not subs tantially outw ei ghed by the d anger of unfai r prej udi ce, as required by Fed. R. Ev id. 4 0 3

. Gulley, 722 F .3d at 906 (ci tin g United States v
. H i c ks , 635 F .3d 1063, 1069 (7th Ci r . 2011)). Applyin g thi s test to Wi lli ams’ testim ony re l atin g to the chec ks wri tte n to cash or to the currency exchange, w e find that Wi lliams ’ testim ony w as permi ssi ble under Rule 404(b)

. First, the evidenc e w as used for a purpose other than propensi ty; the government cross-examined Wi lli ams to call into questi on the accu r a cy of hi s analysi s. Wi lli ams admi tte d thatNo. 13-2204 11
hi s analysis di d not inclu de the net $600,000 of wi thdraw als from the Equi pment So urce chec kin g ac count. He also admi tted that wri tin g che ck s to cash or a currency exchange w as an unus ual bus iness practic e

. The government questi oned Wi lli ams to prove Mar r’s intent to commi t wi re fraud, not to show that Mar r commi tte d tax fraud in the past and had done so againon thisoccasi on. Second, W ill iams’ te sti mony about the Equi pment So urce checks being conv ert ed to cash w as ext remely relev ant. The government alleged t ha t Mar r used the Equi pment So urce bank accoun ts at P alos Bank t o ev ade $328,881.89 in chargebacks and that the sch eme too k place from Nov ember 2001 to May 2003. Wi lli ams testifi ed about the same Equi p m e n t So urce bank accoun ts and described tr ansac tions that occurred at the same ti me as Marr’ s wi re fraud. Mar r makes a decent arg ument that the evidenc e does not
su p p o r t a finding that he w as the one who conv ert ed the Equi pmen t S o ur ce chec ks to cash , since he di d not si gn t he E qui pment So urce chec ks conv ert ed to cash (hi s father , Wi lli am C. Mar r d id) a nd t here i s no evidenc e that he ei ther cash ed any of the chec ks or rec e ived any of the money

. How ev er

, the amount of evidenc e needed to link a defendan t to a prior bad act, i s li ght ; an y evidenc e of the defendant’s partic ipa t ion in the prior act bey ond hi s mere presence i s suffi ci ent. United States v
. Coleman , 179 F .3d 1056, 1 0 6 1 (7th Ci r
. 1999). Her e, the government show ed that Mar r managed dai ly oper ations for Equi pment So urce, he w as a si gnato ry on the merchant accoun t, and he deposi ted sub stanti al amounts of money from hi s a nd hi s wi fe’s home equi ty line of credi t
accoun t and their personal money market accoun t into the12 No. 13-2204 Equi pment So urce accoun ts. Therefore , the jury could reasonably conclu de that Mar r partici pated in the sch eme to conv ert Equi pment Sour ce ch ecks to cash. Fin al l y , though Mar r asserts that the evidenc e of the $1.3 mi lli on in chec kin g wi thdraw als conv ert ed to cash prej udi ced hi m becau se t he jury could hav e harbor ed a bi as again st hi m due to hi s wealth, he has poin ted to no evidenc e in supp or t of thi s asserti on. The evidenc e of the Equi pment So urce chec ks
conv ert ed to cash i s hi ghly probat i v e of Mar r’s intent to commi t wi re fraud, and sub stanti ally outw eig he d any ris k that the j ur y w o uld convic t Mar r for uncharged tax fraud offenses instead of wi re fraud charges. For the reasons di scu ssed abov e, Wi lli ams’ te s tim ony about the chec ks being conv ert ed to cash w as permi ssi ble under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)

. The di stric t court di d not commi t plain err or by allowing W i lli ams to answer t he government’s qu esti ons. 2. Kill ian’s Rebut tal T esti mony Reg arding the Checks Converted to Cash Mar r contends that he tim ely objecte d on Rule 404(b) gr ounds duri ng Kill i an’s rebuttal testim ony , so our standard of rev i ew sh ould be for an abus e of di screti on. W e agr ee. Though Mar r di d not object unti l the cl o se o f Kill i an’s rebuttal testim ony

, an objection does not hav e to be “perfectly contemporaneo us wi th the challen ged testim ony” to preserve an iss ue fo r appeal. Jones v
. Lin coln Elec. Co. , 1 8 8 F .3d 709, 727 (7th Ci r
. 1999). An objection at t he “ cl ose of that wi tness’s testim ony or prior to the sta r t o f p r oceedi ngs the v ery next day” w ould suffi ce to allow the co urt to cure “any err or byNo. 13-2204 13
i ssu ing a li mi tin g or curati v e instructi on whi le the testim ony i s sti ll relat i v ely fresh in the mind of the juro rs.” Id

. Therefore , w e rev i ew the di stric t court’s evidenti ary ruli ng for an abus e of di screti on. Ess ential ly

, Mar r makes the same arg ument he di d about Wi lli ams’ testim ony; he contends that the government intro

duced i mproper tax fraud evidenc e at tr i al when i t questi oned Kill i an about the chec ks conv ert ed to cash. Kill i an testifi ed about the same evidenc e Wi lli ams di scu ssed duri ng hi s di rect and cross-examinati on. Mar r cannot now “complain on appeal [bec ause] the opposi ng party sub sequently intro d uc e[d] evidenc e on the same sub j e ct

. ” U nited States v
. T

ouloumis , 771 F .2d 235, 241 (7th Ci r . 1985). It w as Marr who fi rst introduced evidenc e of the chec ks co nverted to cash when hi s exper t wi tnes s, Wi lli ams, testifi ed about i t. The evidenc e of chec ks being conv ert ed t o cash w as permi ssi ble under Rule 404(b)

. The di stric t court di d not abus e i ts di screti on when i t ov err uled Mar r’s objection to Kill i an’s rebuttal testim ony or when i t deni ed Mar r’s motion for a mi strial after the close of evidenc e. 3. Prosecutor’s Stat ements Mar r arg ues that the government i mproper ly relied on the chec ks-to-cash evidenc e for propensi ty purposes in i ts closing and rebuttal arg uments as w ell. Sinc e Mar r di d not obj e ct to the government’s statements at t rial, our rev i ew i s for plain e r r or

. United States v

. Bell , 624 F .3d 803, 811 (7th Ci r
. 201 0 ). T o prev ai l, M a rr mus t establi sh that the government’s remark s
w ere i mproper and show that he w as deni ed a fai r tr i al becau se of them. Id

.14 No. 13-2204
Mar r contends that the prosecutor ’s remark s in hi s case
w ere comparable to the i mproper propensi ty comments made by the prosecutor in United States v
. Richards , 719 F .3d 746 (7th Ci r
. 2013). In Richards , the prosecutor repeat edly called the defendant a “drug-dealer” in hi s closing arg ument and sai d, “[c] learly the defen d a nt 's drug dealing i s not li mi ted to Cali fornia. It happens here too .” Id

. at 764. The court held that the comments were i mproper becau se the prosecutor made “the [propensi ty] arg ument ‘once a drug dealer , alw ays a drug dealer .’” Id. (ci tin g United Stat es v
. Jones , 389 F .3d 753, 757 (7th Ci r
. 2004 ))

. Here, the government made no such propensi ty arg ument. In closing arg ument, the prosecu tor refer red to the ch ecks that were conv ert ed to cash and asked, “what legitima te bus iness does that? What legiti mate bus iness wri t e s $1.3 mi lli on to cash and t o a cu rr ency exchange?” These remark s
w ere “reasonable inferences from the e videnc e adduc ed at tr i al.” See U n i te d States v
. Nun ez , 532 F .3d 645, 654 (7th Ci r
. 2008). W e find no i mpropr i ety in the government’s cl o sing arg ument. None of the prosecutor ’s remark s duri ng rebutta l closing
w ere i mproper ei ther

. The prosecutor remark ed t ha t Equi pment So urce w as a “sneaky , di rt y bus iness .” Pr o secutor s are allow ed to comment o n t he w eakness of the defense’s theor y

. Id

. at 654; see also Un ited States v . Glover , 479 F .3d 511, 520 (7th Ci r
. 2007 ). Th e prosecutor ’s remark s w ere in response to Mar r’s defense that he honestly tr i ed to rescue hi s fa iling bu siness. Therefore , w e find no i mpropr i ety in the government’s rebuttal ar gument ei ther

.No. 13-2204 15
B. Jury Instruct ions Mar r also challenges Ju ry InstructionsNos. 25, 31, and 32. He arg ues that the instr ucti ons w ere err oneous becau se they di d not require the government to prove that Mar r speci fi cally intended to defr aud a financi al insti tution, i .e., P alos Bank. W e rev i ew challen ges to jury instructi on s d e novo

. United States v
. DiSantis , 565 F .3d 354, 359 (7th Ci r
. 2009). “The di stric t court ‘i s afforded sub stanti al di screti on wi th respect to the preci se w or ding of instructi ons so long as the final result, read
as a whole, complete l y and corr ectly states the law .’” Id. (quoti ng Unit e d States v
. Gibson , 530 F .3d 606, 609 (7th Ci r
. 2008)). W

e rev erse only if t he ins tr ucti ons as a whole do not
corr ectly inform the j ur y of the appli cable law and the jury i s mi sled. Id

. I n t hi s case, the di stric t court tendere d the following instructi ons to t he jury ov er M arr ’s objections: Instruc tion 25 As used in these instructi ons, the phr a se “ intent to d e fr a ud” means that the acts charged w ere done knowi ngly wi th the inte nt t o decei v e cus tomer s of Equi pment So urce USA in or der t o caus e a gain of money or proper ty to the defendant or the potent i al loss of money o r pr oper ty t o anot her

. Instruc tion 31 A sch eme “affec ted” a financi al insti tution i f i t exposed the financi al insti tution t o a new or increased ris k of loss.16 No. 13-2204
Instruc tion 32 The government mus t show that the d e fe n d a nt engaged in a sch eme to defraud wi th a speci fi c intent to defraud and that the sch eme affec ted a financi al insti tution. The government i s not required to prove that the defendant intended to defr aud a financi al insti tution. “T o convic t a defendant of wi re fraud, the governm ent
mus t prove three elements: (1) the defendant partici pated in a sch eme to defraud; (2) the defendant intended to defraud; and (3) a use of an interstat e wi re in f urther ance o f t he fraudulent sch eme.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v
. T urn er, 551 F .3d 657, 664 (7th Ci r
. 2008). Mar r’s arg ument focus es solely on the second elemen t of the offense, the requi red mens rea

. T o convic t Mar r of wi re fraud, the g ov ernment w as not
re q uir e d to prove that Mar r speci fi cally intended to defraud P alos Bank. Whi le our ci rcui t has y et to speci fi cally address thi s i ssu e, the Thi rd Ci rcui t held that 18 U.S.C. § 1343 r e qui res a jury to find only that the defendant “had the intent to defraud” and need not find that the defendant intended to defraud a financi al insti tution becau se “the objec t o f the fraud i s not an element of the offense.” United States v
. Pelull o , 964 F .2d 193, 216 (3d Ci r
. 1992). In a recent wi re fraud ca se in the First Ci rcui t, the court “flatly rej ected the i dea that the government i s obli ged to prove that the defrauders intended to d e fr aud
a speci fi c vic tim .” United States v
. T um , 707 F .3d 68, 76 (1st Ci r
. 2013). W e jo in the reasonin g of our si ster ci rcui ts and hold that the wi re fraud stat ute only requires the government t o p ro v e that a defendant intended for hi s or her sch eme to d e fr audNo. 13-2204 17

someone, a financi al insti tution does not need to be the intended vic tim

. Here, the di stric t court modeled Instruction 2 5 after the P atte rn Criminal Jury Instruction for the Sev enth Ci rcui t that defines the “intent to defraud” for 18 U.S.C. § 1 343. W e presume th a t the P atte rn Criminal Jury Instructions for the Sev enth Ci rcui t corr ectly state the law , United States v
. Leahy, 464 F .3d 773, 796 (7th Ci r
. 2006), and Mar r does not arg ue that the formulation of the patter n instructi on w as in err or

. At tr i al, the government show ed that both Equi pment So urce cus tomers and P alos Bank fell vic tim to Mar r’s sch eme. Therefore , naming the Equi pment So urce cus tomer s as the int ended vic tim of Mar r’s sch eme in Instruction 25 corr ectly informed the j ury o n the appli cable law

. There i s not a P atte r n C r iminal Jury Instruction for the Sev enth Ci rcui t di rectly appli cable to Instruction 31. How ev er , there i s a Sev enth Ci rcui t ca se

. In United States v
. Serpic o , 320 F .3d 691, 694 (7th Ci r
. 2003), w e approved a jury instructi on in a wi re fraud case whi ch stated that “sch e me s affec ted the banks i f th e y ‘ e xposed the financi al insti tution[s ] to a new or increased ris k of loss.’” (ci tin g the jury instructi on). Whi le the preci se w or ding of Instruct io n 31 i s not the same as the instructi on in Serpic o , i t does completely and corr ectly state the law

. There i s not a P a t t e r n Criminal Jury Instruction for the Seventh Ci rcui t for when a wi re fraud sch eme affec ts a financi al insti tution ei ther

. How ev er , w e find that Instruction 32 corr ectly informed the jury of the appli cable law

. T o convict M a r r of wi re fraud, the government needed only to18 No. 13-2204 prove that Mar r’s schem e to defraud affec ted P alos Bank, not that Mar r intended to defraud P alos Bank. As w e cl a rifi ed abov e, in a wi re fr a ud case the “object of fraud i s not an element of offense.” Pelull o , 964 F .2d at 216. Therefore , w e hold that the di stric t court proper ly instructed the jury on the mens
rea required to supportMar r’s wi re fraud convicti on. C. Rest itut ion Order Mar r’s final arg ument i s that the di stric t court di d not hav e authority t o o rder restituti on to P alos Bank. He contends that P alos Bank does not quali fy as a vic tim under the Mandator y Vi cti ms Restituti on Act (“M VRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663. W e rev i ew de novo the di stric t court’s authority to or der restituti on
. United S tat es v. Hosking, 567 F .3d 329, 331 (7th Ci r . 2009). The MV R A r equi res the court to or der a “defendant [to] make res t it uti on to the vic tim of the offense” and defines a vic tim a s “ any person di rectly harmed by the defendant's cri minal conduc t in the course of the sch eme.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) -(2)

. The purpose of the MVRA i s to compens ate vic tim s for harm “caus ed by the s peci fi c conduc t that w as the basi s of the offense of convic tion.” See United States v

. Donaby, 349 F .3d 1046, 1052 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (c it ing Hughey v
. United States , 495 U.S. 411 (1990))

. Th e court deter mines who i s a vic tim by a preponder ance of the evidenc e duri ng sentencing. Id . at 1053. P alos Bank easi ly quali fi e s as a vic tim under the MVRA defini tion of a vic tim

. The recor d contains ample evidenc e showing that P alos Bank w as di rectly harmed by Mar r’s wi re fraud sch eme. Mar r charged Equi pment So urce cus tomer s for fork li fts he nei ther o wn e d nor deli v ered. The cus tomer sNo. 13-2204 19
receiv ed refunds pa id out of Equi pment So urce’s merchant
accoun t. Mar r d e p leted the fund s below the reserve r equi red to maintai n the merchant accoun t. Charge backs conti nued to
accrue after P alos Bank sus pe nd e d the Equi pment So urce accoun ts. After w a r d s, P alos Bank pai d the $328,881.89 defi ci t to Equi pment So urce cus tomer s and w as nev er reimb ursed by Mar r
. Therefore , the di stric t court had the a ut ho r i ty to or der restituti on pay able to P alos Bank.

III. CONCLUSION The di stric t court proper ly admi tte d e videnc e reg ardin g Equi pment So urce chec ks wri tte n t o cash or to the currency exchange, the t hree challenged jury instructi ons w ere proper , and the di stric t c ourt had the statuto ry authority nec essary to
o r der restituti on pay able to P alos Bank. The judgment o f t he di stric t courti s AFFI RMED.