1 UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) EUGENE MATHI SON, ) ) Plaintiff, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-2164 ( CKK) ) UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, ) ) Def endant. )

)
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION F or the re a so ns dis c us se d b e low , th e Court wi ll g ra nt d e fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s. I . BA CKGROUND A. A Motion to Vacate, Se t Aside or Correct Sentenc e Unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2255 A fe dera l prisoner “ claiming the rig ht to be rele ased upon the g round that the sente nce was imposed in violation of the Constitut ion or laws of the United States, or that the c ourt was without jurisdiction t o impose such sentenc e, or that the sentenc e wa s in ex cess of the maxim um authorized by

law, or is other

wise subject to collate ral attack, may move the cour

t which imposed the sentenc e to vac ate, se t aside or c orre ct the sente nce.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The re is “[a] 1-y ear period of limitation . . . to [ file] a motion under this section,” which “ shall run from the latest of . . . the date on which the impediment to makinga motion cre ated by g overnme ntal action in violation of the Constitut ion or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was preve nted from makinga motion by such g overnme ntal action [or] . . . t he date on which the2

fa c ts s up po rt ingthe c la im o r c la ims pr e se nte d c ou ld h ave be e n d isc ov e re d thro ug h th e e xer c ise of du e dil ig e nc e .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 5( f) (2 ), (4 ). Th e statut e fu rt he r p ro vid e s th a t: An application for a wr it of habea s corpus in behalf of a prisoner who i s authorized to apply

for r elief by

motion pursuant to this section, sh a ll n ot b e e nte rt a ine d if it a pp e ars that th e ap pli c ant h a s f a ile d to apply for r elief, by

motion, to the court which sente nced him, or that such cour t has denied him re lief, unless it al s o appea rs that the reme dy by motion is inadequate or inef fec tive to test the leg ality of his detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (e mphasis added)
. Gene rally , a cour

t does not “ente rtain an a

pplication for a

writ of habe as cor

pus to inquire into the detention of a pe rson pursuant to a judg ment of a c ourt of the United States if it appe ars that th e le g a lity

of su c h d e te nti on

ha s b e e n d e te rm ine d” a lr e a dy “ on a pr ior a pp lic a tio n f

or a wr it of ha be a s c or pu s, e xce pt a s p ro vid e d in [§] 22 55 .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 24 4( a ). On ly un de r c e rt a in circ umstances will a c ourt hea r a c laim presente d in a sec ond or succ essive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Be fore a prisoner may file a se cond or suc cessive motion under § 2255, he fi rs t mu st “ mov e in t

he a pp ro pr iate c ourt

of a pp e a ls f or an o rd e r a

uth or izin g the dis tr ic t c ourt to consider the application.” 28 U .S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A ). B. Plaintiff ’s Criminal Convictions and Efforts to Obtai n Post-Conviction Relief Two sepa rate criminal ca ses wer e brought ag ainst plaintiff in the United States District Court for the District of

South Dakota. See Mathison v. Morrison , N o . 0 6
- 3 4 9 6 , 2 0 0 7 WL 3224671, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2007)
. 1. Th e Ma il F ra

ud Ca se Plaintiff “was a lleg ed to have operated a small Ponzi scheme in the ear ly 1990s which inv olv e d a

n a lle g e d $ 1. 3 mi lli on

in l os se s. ” Com

pl. ¶ 9 . With r e sp e c t to the c ha rg e s b ro ug ht i n3

connec tion with the Ponz i scheme ( the “mail fr aud ca se”) , the United States Court of Appe als for the Tenth Circuit desc ribed plaintiff’ s convictions and ef forts to obtain post-conviction re lief as fo llo ws : [On S eptember 12, 1 9 9 7 ], [ plaintiff] was convicted in the United S t a t e s D i s tr i c t C o urt f

o r th e D i s tr i c to f

S o u thD ak o t a

o f c o n s p i r a c y, ma il fr a ud , wi re fr a

ud , and mon e y la

un de ri ng . H e wa s se nte nc e d to a total of 246 months followe d by three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. He a lso was orde red to pa y over $1.3 milli on in restitution. On direct a pp e a l, t he Un ite d St a te s Co ur t of Ap pe a ls f

or the Ei g hth

Cir c uit aff irmed. See U

nited States v. Mathison , 157 F. 3 d 5 4 1 (8t h Cir. 1998), cert. de nied , 525 U.S. 1089, 119 S.C t. 841, 142 L .Ed.2d 696 (1999). In 2000, [pl aintiff] filed his fir s t 2 8 U.S.C. § 2255 mot ion in the district court for

the Dis t ri ct of South Dakota, which was de nied as barr ed b y t h e o ne-year

statute of limitations. On appeal, the Eight Circuit denied a c ertificate of a ppeala bil i ty and dismissed. See Mathison v. United States , No. 01-1078 (8th Ci r. June 6, 2001) (unpublished). In 2001, h e filed a second § 2255 motion in the Di str ic t of

South Da ko ta , wh ic h the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d. On a pp e a l, the Eig hth Circuit remande d the ca se with direc tions t o d ismiss the se c on d § 22 55 mot ion , f

or la c k o f s ubje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n, a s a unauthorized second or succ essive motion. See Mathison v. United States , No. 02-3926 (8th Cir. Ma y 6, 2003) (unpublished). In 2003, he f il e d a th ir d § 2 2 5 5 mo ti o n , wh ic hth e d is tr ic t c o urt d is mi s s ed be c a us e [pla int if

f] f a ile d to ob ta in a

n o rd e r f ro m th e Ei g hth

Cir c uit a uth or izin g the dis tr ic t c ourt to c on sid e r t his thi rd mot ion . O n a

pp e a l, the Eig hth Circuit denied a cer tificate of appea lability

and dismissed. See M athison v. United States , No. 03-3202 (8th Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) (unp u b li s h e d )
. T h e n , in

2 0 0 6 , [p la inti f

f ] f il e d a mo ti o nfor authorization to file second or succe ssive § 2255 motions, which the Eig hth Circuit denied. See M athi s o n v. United States , No. 06-1134 (8th Cir. Mar. 23, 2006) ( unpublished). Mathison v. W

iley , 281 Fe d. Appx. 845, 847 (10th C ir.) (pe r cur iam), cert. dismissed , __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct . 317 (2008); se e als o Mathison v. Morrison , 2007 WL3224671, at *1.4 2. Th e Tax Eva sio n Ca se Plaintiff was “c harg ed with tax evasion . . . after he wa s indicted for the [m ail fra ud]
case ,” an indictment a lleg edly prompted by

plaintiff’s re fusal “to lie a nd plead guilty

and implicate four me n whom he knew wer e 100% innoc ent.” Compl. ¶ 9. On June 10, 1997, the court “ sentenc ed [him] to 21 months i n prison, and thre e y ear s of supervise d rele ase,” and the “sente nce in the ma il fraud c ase [was to] run concur rently with his sentence in the tax evasion
case .” Mathison v. Morrison , 2007 WL3224671, at *1. His convictions wer e af firmed on appea l. United States v. Mathison , 162 F.3d 1165 ( 8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Plaintiff filed a § 2255 motion in t he tax evasion ca se “timely within one y ear

of the fina lity

of his conviction,” a

nd it “was doc keted a s 99-4208 (D.S.D. 1999).” Compl. ¶ 10. C. Plainti ff’s Clai ms Two of plaintiff’ s claims perta in to the one-y ear period within which a

person must file a motion to vacate, se t aside or c orre ct the sente nce, see28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), and the third pertains to the meaningof the ter

ms “authorized,” “ inadequate” a nd “inef fec tive” as use d in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)
. 1. I mpediment Caused by Gover nmental Action I mmediately

afte r completingthe § 2255 motion in the tax evasion c ase, pla intiff beg an work on his § 2255 motion in the mail fraud ca se. Compl. ¶ 12. At that time, there we re “ about two months remaining until his one-year limit ation under § 2255( f)( 1) wa s over.” Id. On Dec ember

4, 1999, plaintiff was tra nsfer red f rom one F eder al B urea

u of Prisons fac ility to another so that he could appe ar on c harg es in another criminal ca se: the g overnme nt “had indicte d him as a coc onspirator with” a n individual ag ainst whom prosec utors wanted5

plaintiff to testify
. Id. The c harg es we re dr opped about one y ear later. Id. Howeve r, plaintiff “wa s held for the rema inder of his one -y ear limit ation to filing [a § 2255 motion in the mail fraud
case ] on 24-hour lockdown, without any adequate law libra

ries or a dequate assistance from persons tra ined in the law.” Id. (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s a nd c itatio n o mitte d) . A c c or din g to plaintiff, “[d]ue to the impediment to fil ing [ca used] by g overnme ntal action in violation of the Constit ution, . . . [ he] was unable to c omplete his motion unt il March 31, 2000, se vera l weeks past the one- y ear

limit ation under [28 U.S.C. § 2255] (f) (1).” Id. The Court construe s plaintiff’s asse rtions as an a rgument for the tolling of the one -y ear pe ri od of lim itatio n f

or fi lin g a § 2 25 5 mo tio n in

the ma il f

ra ud c a se : an a lle g e dly unconstitutional gove rnmental a ction, an indictment on cha rg es eve ntually

dropped, c reated an impediment to the timely filing of his § 2255 moti on, such that the one -y ear period of limitation should run from the date on which the impediment wa s removed. 2. Ne wl y Di sc ov e re d F a c ts Wit h the § 2255 motion in the mail fraud ca se, plaintiff a lleg edly “pre sented a

n abundanc e of ne wly

discovere d evidenc e . . . , includingsworn af fidavits from g overnme nt witnesses who re cante d their testimony . . ., sworn dec larations from people unavailable be fore trial who had f

inally ag ree d to tell the court fa cts which prove d perjury on the par

t of g overnme nt-ag ent witnesses[,] [and] [d] ocumentar y evidenc e provingthe prosec utors suborned perjury from witnesses.” Compl. ¶ 14. Accor ding to plaintiff, “ none of this could have been obtained bef

ore tria l or befor e the § 2255 motion was filed.” Id. Rather, plaintiff a lleg ed that “[t] he ea rliest discovery

which supported a

claim that the matter

should never ha

ve g one to trial was obtaine d quite acc idently on about Dec ember

15, 1999.” Id. On this basis, plaintiff asserte d6

that “the one -y ear

limit ation under § 2255( f)( 4) should have r un until mi d-De cembe r 2000.” Id. The Court construe s plaintiff’s asse rtions as an a rgument the one- y ear

limit ation period sh ou ld r un fr om D e c e mbe r 1 99 9, the a pp ro ximate date “ on

wh ic h th e fa c ts s up po rt ingthe c la im or cla ims presented c ould have be en discove red through the exercise of due dilige nce.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4)
. 3. Va g ue ne ss Plaintiff alleg es that “28 [U.S.C.] § 2255(e) is unconstituti onally vague” be cause “neither Congr ess nor the c ourts have pr ovided suffic ient g uidance as to the mea ning of the phra ses and words used.” Compl. at 1. P laintiff is ref err ing to the te rms “author ized,” “inade quate,” and “inef fec tive,” with re spect to all of whic h “the c ourts have e x presse d uncer tainty as to what Congr ess had in mind when it used this languag e in the statute.” Id . ¶ 4. I f plaintiff c annot see k relief under 28 U .S.C. § 2255, he asserts that, in the alter native, he must be a llowed to file a petition for a wr it of habea s corpus unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Se e id . ¶ 6. As state d p re vio us ly , p la int if f w a s tr ie d, c onvic te d, and se nte nc e d in

tw o s e pa ra te criminal proc eeding s befor e the United States D istrict Court for the District of South Dakota , and he fi le d a § 2 25 5 mo tio n in

bo th t he ta x ev a sio n c a se (N o. 99 -4 20 8) and in t he ma il f ra ud c a se (No. 00-4055)
. SeeCompl. ¶ 13. Accor ding to plaintiff, the Mag istrate Judge be fore whom the mot ion in t he ma il f ra ud c a se wa s p e nd ing“ ne ve r r e a d a sin g le thi ngPla int if

f s a id i n h is pleading s,” and r ecommende d that the motion “be denie d as time barr ed [based] solely on the AUSA’s re sponse” to the motion filed in the tax evasion case
. Id .; see id. , E x. A at 1- 2; se e als o Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. “When [p] laintiff filed his objections[,] ” he a sserted “ that the cour t couldn’t
a do pt f ind ing s o n th e wr on g c a se .” Com pl. ¶ 1 3. Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e a do pte d th e Ma g istra te7

J udg e’s r ecommenda

tion and denied the motion. Id. Plaintiff’s eff orts to secure a ce rtificate of appea lability

wer e unsucc essful. Id. Undaunted, “ [a] fter pur suing e very possible remedy

in the courts to g et the issues [he] actua lly raised in his 00-4055 § 2255 a djudicated,” plaintiff filed a petition for a wr it of habea s corpus unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of Colora do, the dis tr ic t in

wh ic h h e wa s in c arc e rate d at th a t ti me . Co mpl . ¶ 15 . Pl a int if

f a rgue d th a t hi s
re me dy un de r § 22 55 wa s in a de qu a te and ine ff e c tiv e be c a

us e the se nte nc ingc ourt

re fu se d to consider his motion altog ether
. SeeCom pl. ¶¶ 13 , 1 5. In h is v ie w, “ it w ou ld b e lud ic ro us to believe that a dismissal based on a mag istrate’s r ecommendation, based in turn, upon the g overnme nt’s response to the WR ONG motion and a r efusa l to even look at the a ctual motion could be de emed ‘ inadequate’ a nd ‘ineff ective.’ ” Id. (empha sis in original). I n short, he believe d that “[a] § 2255 mot ion can’ t possible [ sic] be adequate or e ffe ctive if it’s not consider ed.” Id. Neither the District of Colorado nor the Tenth Circuit agree d with these ar g uments. Compl. ¶¶ 16 , 1 8; see M

athison v. W

iley , No. 08-1377, 2009 WL784257, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 2009) (a ff i rm i n g d i s tri ctco urt ’s d i s m i s s al o f p l ai n t i ff ’s § 2 2 4 1 p et i t i o nb ec au s e “ a c o l l at er al ch al l en ge to a fe dera l conviction or sentenc e g ener ally must be raised in a

motion to vacate f

iled in the sentenc ing c ourt under § 2255, a nd not in a habea s petition filed in the court of inca rce ration under § 2241,” and that plaintiff “ failed to e stablish that the remedie s available to him under § 22 55 are ina de qu a te or

ine ff e c tiv e ” ); Mathison v. W

iley , N o . 0 8
- c v - 0 0 0 9
- B N B , 2 0 0 8 WL 46 52 94 , at *2 (D . Co lo. F e b. 15 , 2 00 8) (d e nyingpla int if f’ s h a be a s c or pu s p e tit ion

be c a us e plaintiff “ha s an ade quate a nd eff ective r emedy

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota”) , recons. de nied , 2008 WL579949 (D. Colo.8

Mar. 3, 2008) , aff’d , 281 Fe d. Appx. at 847. Plaintiff deems his § 2255 reme dy inadequate and inef

fec tive due to the sente ncing court’s a lleg ed fa ilure to consider the merits of his motion, and he ar g ues that he should be allowed to file a

petition for a wr it of habea s corpus unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the alternative. Ho we ve r, be c a

us e of the c oll e c tiv e fa ilure of

Con g re ss a

nd the c ourt s to de fi ne the te rm s “inade quate” and “ine ffe ctive” f or purpose s of § 2255(e ), he is pre vented f rom pursuinga habe as
reme dy under both § 2255 a

nd § 2241. SeeCom

pl. ¶¶ 6- 7, 15 , 1 9; se e als o Pl.’s Opp’n at 7 (“ As worde d, absent a

ny definitive, explicit di rec tion for all the cour ts to follow, the (e) pa

ragraph of

§ 2255 must be held unconstitutional as it leaves Plaintiff depr ived of a fundame ntal privileg e the FoundingFathers and Cong ress provide d for testingthe leg ality of his sentenc e.”)
. D. De ma nd

for Re lie f Acc ordingto plaintiff, he “ha d an absolute r ight” to file a motion under [§] 2255 i n the mail fraud c ase, Compl., Ex . A at 3, and he was “ denied that r ight be cause the sentenc ing c ourt
re fu se d to c on sid e r [h is] § 22 55 [mot ion ] al tog e the r. ” Com pl. ¶ 1 9. He a sk s th is C ourt to “ ru le that subsection (e ) of 2255 is unconstitutionally vague; [and] t hat Plaintiff . . . have at least one unimpeded proc edura l shot at collatera l relief.” Id . at 9 (Relief Requested) . In the alter

native, plaintiff demands “ a dec laratory judgme nt orderingDef

endant to cla

rify what is meant by

the terms used in § 2255(e )[.] ” Id. I I . DI SCUS SI ON Def endant moves to dismiss the complaint on three grounds: (1) that the Court lac ks subject matter jur isdiction because plaintiff has no standingto bring his claims; (2) that the
c omp la int fa ils to s tate a

c la im u po n whic h r e lie f c an b e g ra nte d; a nd (3 ) t hat pl a int if

f’ s c la ims9

are barr ed by

res judicata or c ollatera l estoppel. SeeMe m. o f P . & A. in S up po rt of De f. ’s Mo t. to D ism iss the Com

pl. a t 4- 13 . B e c a

us e the Court

de te rm ine s th a t pl a int if

f l a c ks sta nd ingto br inghis c la ims , th e Court wi ll n ot a dd

re ss t he tw o a lte rn a tiv e ba se s f or dis mis sa l. “Ar ticle I I Iof the United States Constitution l imits the judicial power to deciding‘Cases and Controver sies.’” In re Navy Chaplaincy , 5 34 F .3 d 7 56 , 7 59 (D .C. Cir .) (q uo tin g U. S. C O N ST . art. I I I , § 2), cert. de nied , __ U.S. __, 129 S.C t. 1918 (2008). A pa rty has standingfor purp os e s o f Art ic le I I Iif

his c la ims “ sp ri ngfr om a n ‘ inj ur y in f a c t’ – a n inva sio n o f a

le g a lly protec ted intere st that is ‘concre te and pa rticularized,’ ‘ actua l or imminent’ and ‘fa irly trac eable ’ to the challeng ed ac t of the def endant, a nd likely to be re dresse d by

a fa vorable decision in the fede ral c ourt.” Navegar, Inc . v. United States , 103 F.3d 994, 998 ( D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Luj an v . D e

fe nd e rs o f W ild lif e , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)) . “The redr essability element of standing require s that it be ‘likely , as opposed to mer ely speculative, that the injury will be redr essed by

a fa vorable decision.’” Defende rs of W ildlif e v. G utierrez , 5 32 F .3 d 9 13 , 9 24 (D .C. C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Luj an v . D e fe nd e rs o f W ild lif e , 504 U.S. at 561). Pla int if f’ s p e rc e ive d in

jur y is h is i na bil ity to m ount a

c oll a te ra l c ha lle ng e to h is conviction and se ntence in the mail fraud c ase be cause of the ill-def ined terms in § 2255(e ), or, alternatively , beca

use of the one -y ear

limit ations period within which to file a § 2255 motion has run. I t appea

rs, then, the plaintiff’ s only injuries come a

bout beca use the fe dera l courts in which he ha s f ile d h is v ari ou s mo tio ns , p e tit ion s a nd a pp e a ls h ave a

pp lie d th e law i n a c c or da nc e wi th controlling prec edent. In defe ndant’s view, “ [p] laintiff’s quar rel . . . is not with the languag e of the statute, but with the fac t that courts have ruled a g ainst him.” Def.’ s Mot. at 11. Se c tio n 2 25 5 “ is the e xclu siv e re me dy fo r a fe de ra l pr iso ne r a

tta c kin g the le g a lity

of his10

detention.” Caravalho v. Pugh , 177 F.3d 1177, 1178 ( 10th Cir. 1999). Although “ [v] ary ing standards ha

ve bee n adopted by

the circ uits for deter

mining whe n § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffe ctive,’” In reSm ith , 285 F.3d 6, 8 ( D.C. Cir. 2002) (citingcase s), it is settled that § 2255 “is not inadequate or inef fec tive mere ly

beca use an individual is unable to obtain re lief under that provision.” In re J

ones , 2 26 F .3 d 3 28 , 3 33 (4 th C ir . 2 00 0) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Caravalho v. Pugh , 177 F.3d at 1178 ( “That [ plaintiff] may be bar red f rom filing a

second or

succe ssive mot ion purs ua nt t o § 22 55 in t

he se nte nc ingc ourt

do e s n ot e sta

bli shthat th e re me dy

pr ov ide d in § 2255 is inadequate or ineff ective.” ). As the Te nth Circuit has observe d in one of plaintiff’ s prior ca ses, “[t] he mer e fa ct that [plainti ff] was denie d relief under § 2255 doe s not establish that this statutory

reme dy is inadequate or ineff

ective,” and “the fac t that he is prec luded from f iling another § 2255 motion in t he District of South Dakota does not establish that this statutory
reme dy is inadequate or ineff

ective.” Mathison v. W

iley , 281 Fe d. Appx. at 847. Nor is the § 2255 reme dy

inadequate or inef

fec tive “mer ely

beca use the one -y ear

statute of limitations for a petition under that sec tion has expi red.” Tor taro v . M arbe rry , 305 Fe d. Appx. 9 (3d Ci r. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Mo re ov e r, e qu ita

ble tol lin g of

the lim itatio ns pe ri od

is w arr ante d in

on ly the mos t extraordinary

of circ umstances. See U nited States v . Ci c e ro , 214 F.3d 199, 203 ( D.C. Cir. 2000) (c i t i n g Cal

de ro n v . U

nite d S tates D ist ric t Co ur t , 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 ( 9th Cir. 1997), c e rt. denied, 5 22 U. S. 1 09 9 ( 19 98 )) . Ade fe nd ant who is w ith out le g a l r e pr e se ntatio n, or sit s o n h is rig hts, or is ignora

nt of the law, doe s not present e x traordina ry circ umstances. Id. ; se e als o Un ite d S tates v . S ar o , 252 F.3d 449, 453- 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (a ffirmingdistrict court’s conclusion that a § 2255 motion was time-ba rre d beca use of malf

easa nce by a prisoner ’s attorne y11

do e s n ot c on sti tut e e xtra or din ary c ir c ums tanc e s b ri ng ingthe do c tr ine of e qu ita ble tol lin g int o play ), cert. de nied , 534 U.S. 1149 (2002). Ne ither plaintiff’s tra nsfer from one pr ison to another
no r h is p la c e me nt i n a

ho us ingun it w ith out le g a l mate ri a ls i s a n e xtra or din ary

c ir c ums tanc e to
war rant tolling of

the limitations period. Un ite d S tates v . B rit tai n , 4 1 F e d. Ap px. 2 46 , 2 49 (1 0th Cir.) (findingthat a prisoner ’s “tra nsfer s to and from va

rious prisons were not exceptional
c ir c ums tanc e s and , w hil e inc onve nie nt, did no t r ise to s uc h a

le ve l th a t th e y

pr e ve nte d [hi m] from timely

filing” his § 2255 moti on, and that his “a lleg ations reg ardingthe inadequa cies of the available leg al mater ials for inmates with visual impairments we re likew ise insufficient” ), c e rt. denied, 5 37 U. S. 9 13 (2 00 2) ; Un ite d S tates v . H ill , No. 00-425-07 H HK/DAR, 2008 WL172077, at *8 (D.D .C. J an. 18, 2006) ( Mag istrate Report a nd Recommendation that a petitioner who ha d been in tra

nsit and later in administrative se g reg ation in a spec ial housing unit with limit ed
acc ess to leg al mater ials did not present circ umstances to wa rra nt the equitable tolling ofthe oney ear limit ations period for

filing a § 2255 motion). Ev e n if thi s Co ur t w e re to r

ule in p la int if

f’ s f avo r o n a ny of the se c la ims , it

is b e y on d th is court’s a uthority to enterta in a § 2255 motion, to direct the sentenc ing c ourt to enterta in a § 2255 motion, or to entertain a pe tition for a writ of ha beas c orpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. Only

the appropr iate cour

t of appe als may

issue an orde r authorizing the sentenc ing c ourt to enterta in a second or succe ssive motion under § 2255, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)( A), 2255(h) , and only the district court havingjurisdiction over plaintiff’s c urre nt warde n may enter tain a habe as petition under 28 U .S.C. § 2241, see Stokes v . United States Parole Comm’n , 3 74 F .3 d 1 23 5, 12 39 (D .C. Cir.) (“[A] dist rict cour

t may not enterta in a habe as petition involving pre sent phy sical custody unless the re spondent custodian is within its t err itorial jurisdiction.”), cert. de nied , 543 U.S. 97512

(2004). I I I . CONCL USI ON Be cause plaintiff lacks standingto bring his claims, the Court will gra nt defe ndant’s motion to di smiss. An Order a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion.

/ s / C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: August 29, 2009