An International Survey 

of Maintenance Human 

Factors Programs

Carla Hackworth, Kali Holcomb, Melanie Dennis1

Scott Goldman2

Cristina Bates3

David Schroeder1

William Johnson4

1

Civil Aerospace Medical Institute

Federal Aviation Administration 

Oklahoma City, OK 73125

2

Oklahoma State Department of Health

Oklahoma City, OK 73117

3

University of Oklahoma Psychology Department

Norman, OK 73019

4

Federal Aviation Administration

Atlanta, GA 30319

September 2007

Final Report

DOT/FAA/AM-07/25

Office of Aerospace Medicine

Washington, DC 20591
NOTICE

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship 

of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest 

of information exchange. The United States Government 

assumes no liability for the contents thereof.

___________

This publication and all Office of Aerospace Medicine 

technical reports are available in full-text from the Civil 

Aerospace Medical Institute’s publications Web site: 

www.faa.gov/library/reports/medical/oamtechreports/index.cfm


Technical Report Documentation Page 

1. Report No. 

DOT/FAA/AM-07/25 

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 

5. Report Date 

September 2007 

4. Title and Subtitle 

An International Survey of Maintenance Human Factors Programs 

6. Performing Organization Code 

7. Author(s) 

Hackworth C,1 Holcomb K,1 Dennis M,1 Goldman S,2 Bates C,3

Schroeder D, 1

 and Johnson W4

8. Performing Organization Report No. 

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS) 1

FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 

P.O. Box 25082 

Oklahoma City, OK 73125 

2

Oklahoma State Department of Health 

Oklahoma City, OK 73117 

3

University of Oklahoma Psychology Department 

Norman, OK 73019 

4

Federal Aviation Administration 

Atlanta, GA 30319 

11. Contract or Grant No. 

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 13. Type of Report and Period Covered 

Office of Aerospace Medicine 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Ave., S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

14. Sponsoring Agency Code 

15. Supplementary Notes 

Work was accomplished under approved task AM-B-06-HRR-521. 

16. Abstract 

There are many international approaches to the regulation of human factors programs for aviation maintenance 

organizations. Transport Canada and the European Aviation Safety Agency have established specific regulations 

regarding maintenance human factors. The Federal Aviation Administration has not yet established regulations 

but, instead, has created guidance documents and developed voluntary reporting programs for maintenance 

organizations. The purpose of this study was to assess the status of human factors programs in airline 

maintenance organizations and independent maintenance and repair organizations. Questions focused on 

training, error management, fatigue management, and other human factors issues. An online link was sent via Email to 630 addresses. Of these, 414 respondents returned a valid questionnaire (i.e., defined as responding to at 

least one content item), which resulted in a response rate of 66%. A highly-experienced group (i.e., over 65% 

had 20 years in aviation maintenance) from more than 50 countries responded to the questionnaire. Results 

highlight the maintenance human factors strategies, methods, and programs that companies use to reduce 

human error.

17. Key Word 

Aviation Maintenance Human Factors, Human Error, 

Aviation Maintenance Practices 

18. Distribution Statement 

Document is available to the public through the Defense 

Technical Information Center, Ft. Belvior, VA 22060; 

and the National Technical Information Service, 

Springfield, VA 22161

19. Security Classif. (of this report) 

Unclassified 

20. Security Classif. (of this page) 

Unclassified 

21. No. of Pages 

28

22. Price 

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized

iii

Acknowledgments

The research team is grateful to all respondents and colleagues who participated 

in the design and completion of this study. 



Contents

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Questionnaire Content. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Sample Distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Sample Demographics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Data Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Motivation for Human Factors Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Regulator Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Proactive Human Factors Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Organizational Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Human Factors Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Error Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Fatigue Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Human Factors Metrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Support From the Regulator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Providing Human Factors Suggestions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Event Reporting – The Good News. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Industry Involvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Differences in Responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Training the Trainer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Getting the Information to Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Human Factors of Technical Documentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Using Error Data – The Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Human Factors Metrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Fatigue Management Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

In Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Appendix A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

International Survey of Human Factors Status in Maintenance Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

Appendix B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

List of Countries Responding to Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

An International Survey of Maintenance Human Factors Programs

Introduction

United States (U.S.) airlines invest more than $10 

billion annually to ensure the airworthiness of their 

fleets (Boeing, 2005). Boeing and the U.S. Air Transport Association (as cited in Rankin, Hibit, Allen, & 

Sargent, 2000) found that maintenance-related errors 

were associated with up to 15% of commercial aircraft 

hull loss accidents from 1982 through 1991. In the 2003 

International Air Transport Association (IATA) safety 

report following a review of 92 accidents, they found that 

a maintenance factor initiated the accident chain in 26% 

of the accidents. Maintenance errors are responsible for 

an estimated 20 to 30% of engine in-flight shutdowns, 

costing approximately $500,000 per shutdown (W. 

Rankin, personal communication, August 11, 2005). 

This would argue that the airlines and Maintenance and 

Repair Organizations (MROs) must continue to invest 

in human factors (HF) programs within maintenance 

organizations and also on the flight deck.

While not the primary cause of aviation accidents in 

Australia, maintenance-related errors contribute to 4.5% 

of the overall aircraft accidents. In 1998, an Australian 

project surveyed licensed aircraft maintenance engineers. 

The study focused on the events and conditions that pose 

a risk to the safety of the aircraft or maintenance workers. 

The most common occurrence reported in the survey 

involved situations where aircraft systems were operated 

in an unsafe manner during maintenance. Incomplete 

component installation was the second leading occurrence. More than 95% of these occurrences involved 

human error. The most common errors involved memory 

lapses and procedural shortcuts. Time pressures, equipment deficiencies, inadequate training, coordination 

difficulties, and fatigue are examples of factors believed 

to precipitate these events. The Australian Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) recommended several areas 

that needed to be addressed to mitigate the identified 

concerns. They included: programs addressing fatigue, 

improved recurrent training, crew resource management, 

and eliminating a blame culture (ATSB, 2001).

Human error is documented as a causal factor within 

maintenance-related accidents (Boquet, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, Shappell, & Weigmann, unpublished 

manuscript; Johnson & Watson, 2001). Wells (2001) 

reported that HF issues are believed to be a factor in 50% 

of maintenance-related accidents. Maintenance errors 

can generally be divided into two major classes: failing to 

detect a problem or the introduction of an error during 

maintenance (Marx & Graeber, 1994). Patankar, Lattanzio, & Kanki (2004) examined maintenance Aviation 

Safety Reporting System (ASRS) procedural error reports. 

Within their analysis, several error themes emerged under 

the category of user error. Examples of these user errors 

included mechanics not reading or following the maintenance manual, mechanics overlooking required inspection 

items, and mechanics making logbook errors.

Companies are faced with implementing corrective 

actions in response to these errors and must realize how to 

prevent such errors. This requires organizations to move 

from blaming an individual worker to implementing a 

systemic approach to handle maintenance errors. Johnson 

(2001) suggested that HF programs can improve safety 

and reduce vulnerability to error—while maintaining 

efficiency. Therefore, remedial actions must improve 

performance, ensure that safety policies and practices 

are consistent, and, in doing so, reduce costs. Recently, 

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released the

Operator’s Manual for Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance (FAA, 2006a). The manual includes chapters 

highlighting the impact of event investigation systems, 

proper use of technical documentation, HF training, shift 

and task turnover procedures, and fatigue. 

Effective HF programs, however, require commitment. 

Komarniski (2006) recently highlighted the requirements 

of a successful maintenance human factors (MHF) program. Buy-in from management, as well as the maintenance staff, is integral. With full support, attention to 

HF becomes a part of the culture, day-to-day operations, 

and an important, protected line in the budget.

There are a variety of international approaches to the 

regulation of HF programs for maintenance organizations. Transport Canada (TC) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have established specific, yet 

differing, regulations regarding MHF. These pertain 

to such items as initial and continuation training and 

formal error-reporting systems. The FAA has not yet 

established regulations but, instead, has created guidance 

documents and developed voluntary reporting programs 

for maintenance organizations. For now, the FAA has 

chosen to adopt a voluntary rather than a regulatory 

approach to MHF.

Objective one of the FAA’s 2006-2010 Strategic Plan 

(FAA, 2006b) Increased Safety Goal intends “to reduce 

the commercial airline fatal accident rate.” Another Flight 

Plan goal targets the provision of international technical 
leadership. In support of these objectives, the FAA conducted this international survey of maintenance-related 

companies to examine employee perceptions of how 

companies are implementing MHF initiatives. 

This project assessed the effect of voluntary versus 

regulatory approaches to MHF programs. How are organizations applying HF principles in their day-to-day 

operations? What is the effect of a MHF program on 

the organization and on aviation maintenance personnel? Additionally, is there a significant difference in the 

implementation of MHF programs across the international spectrum? 

This paper describes a variety of safety practices and 

opinions prevalent among HF managers, quality control 

managers/executives, HF trainers, and labor organization 

representatives that work in the international airline 

maintenance industry. Because we were unable to systematically sample respondents, our conclusions are limited 

to a descriptive nature and do not necessarily reflect the 

opinions or practices of the entire aviation maintenance 

population. However, based on our sample, as described 

later in the paper, we are reasonably certain that we have 

respondents who represent the “best case” representation 

of international MHF programs.

Method

Potential respondents were identified in coordination 

with the Joint Aviation Authority Human Factors Working 

Group (primarily comprised of EASA member states), 

several airlines, and FAA representatives. Publications, 

including newsletters and notices, were sent to encourage 

international participation. Invited respondents worked 

in maintenance organizations as engineers, quality assurance specialists, maintenance directors, and mechanics. 

Respondents volunteered to participate in advance of 

receiving the questionnaire.

Questionnaire Content

The questionnaire contained 66 items with 12 potential 

follow-up items. Follow-up items were presented based 

upon pre-specified responses to specific items. Items 

were organized into eight categories: (1) demographics, 

(2) error management, (3) HF training, (4) fatigue management, (5) proactive HF support, (6) motivation for 

an HF program, (7) HF metrics, and (8) organizational 

policies. The questionnaire asked respondents for additional information about their company’s maintenance 

program and any general comments about the survey. See 

Appendix A for the complete questionnaire. 

Individual/organizational demographics. Respondents 

were asked to provide basic organizational and general 

individual demographic information. These items included specifying the type of maintenance operation in 

which the respondent was currently employed, country 

of employment, primary regulatory authority, job title, 

number of employees in their organization, and years of 

experience in aviation maintenance. 

Error management. Respondents were asked to comment on their organization’s approach to human error 

investigations, including how they used the data. There 

was one open-ended comment item for additional remarks 

about error management.

Human factors training. Respondents were asked about 

their organization’s approach to HF training. The items 

focused on how much and what type of HF training was 

provided for employees of the organization, the type of 

employees who received the training, and the credentials 

of the maintainers (e.g., licensed or unlicensed). One 

additional item allowed respondents to provide remarks 

regarding HF training.

Fatigue management. Respondents were asked if their 

organization currently had a fatigue management system, 

provided training on fatigue management, and if the 

organization recognized fatigue as a safety issue. 

Proactive human factors support. This section assessed 

whether the respondent’s organization valued their MHF 

program. Included were items inquiring if management 

supported the MHF program in words and action.

Motivation for human factors program. Respondents 

were asked to rate the importance of various factors to 

their organization when they implemented a MHF program (regulatory compliance, safety, or cost). 

Human factors metrics. This section focused on the 

metrics utilized by the respondent’s organization to assess 

their HF program. Additionally, respondents were asked 

whether the organization utilized cost-benefit and returnon-investment calculations to assess their HF program. 

Organization’s policies. Respondents answered questions 

on the formal or informal policies in place regarding HF 

issues. For example, respondents were asked about their 

company’s shift handover policy and safety policy.

Respondent comments. Two items directly asked respondents for general feedback regarding their organization’s 

maintenance program and for any additional comments 

about the survey. 

Sample Distribution

An E-mail invitation was sent to 647 potential respondents. The E-mail included an explanation of the purpose 

of the questionnaire, as well as a link to the survey, includ-

ing username/password information. All questionnaires 

were conducted online using the SurveySage © system. 

Three reminder E-mails were sent over a one-month 

period following the initial invitation. The reminder 

prompted the potential respondent of the existence and 
purpose of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was open 

to respondents for one month from the initial invitation, 

after which the questionnaire was taken offline. Of the 630 

valid E-mail invitations, 414 returned a valid questionnaire (i.e., defined as responding to at least one content 

item), which resulted in a response rate of 65.7%. 

Sample Demographics

Respondents represented several occupations within 

the maintenance workforce, including: management, 

quality control, training, and labor (see Table 1). The 

respondents were employed in more than 50 countries. 

Not surprisingly, given the origin of the survey, many 

respondents (39.8%) worked within the United States. 

However, respondents from many other countries participated, including: Canada (8.7%), United Kingdom 

(7.2%), Australia (3.2%), Norway (3.0%), and Singapore 

(3.0%). A listing of all participating countries is included 

in Appendix B.

A majority of the respondents had a long history 

within aviation maintenance, with 64.9% indicating 

more than 20 years of experience. Respondents worked in 

maintenance departments where the median number of 

employees at their company or engineering maintenance 

department was 300 with a range from a minimum of 1 

to a maximum of 50,000.

The survey sample covered the entire aircraft maintenance industry, with more than one-third from an airline 

maintenance department, 27.3% from repair stations, 

8.9% general aviation/business operations, and 5.6% 

from a training facility or maintenance school (Fig. 1).

For those who reported that they worked for an airline 

maintenance department or repair station, nearly twothirds were from a major carrier, slightly over 20% were 

at a regional carrier, and the remaining worked in air taxi

and corporate operations.

When asked for the primary regulatory authority that 

their company’s maintenance operations were designed to 

comply with, the majority of respondents indicated the 

FAA (45.0%). However, as an indication of the diversity 

of responses, other authorities were identified as well. See 

Table 2 for a summary.

Table 1. Job Title of Respondents. 

Job Role Title 

% of

Respondents

Supervisor/Manager/

Coordinator 37.1

Quality Assurance/Quality 

Control/Airworthiness 28.4

Training 11.9 

Engineering 6.2 

Technician/Mechanic 4.4 

Consultant/Professor 3.9 

Inspector/Investigator 3.4 

Labor Representative 3.1 

Safety Analyst 1.8 

Table 2. Primary Regulatory Authority to Which 

Maintenance Operations Were Designed to 

Comply. 

Regulatory Authority Model N % 

Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) 182 45.0

European Aviation Safety 

Agency (EASA) 95 23.5

Local National Aviation 

Authority (O-NAA) 72 17.8

Transport Canada (TC) 36 8.9 

Civil Aviation Safety 

Authority (CASA)(Australia) 19 4.7 

Airline Maint

35.0%

Repair Stn

27.3%

Manu 4.8%

GA/Biz 8.9%

Mil/Gov't

8.2%

School/Trng 5.6%

Other

10.1%

Figure 1. Employment Facility of Respondents. 
Data Analysis

Frequencies and proportions were calculated for each 

response option across items. Percent positive was calculated by summing the top two response categories on the 

agreement (i.e., agree and strongly agree) and the importance (i.e., considerable and great importance) scales.

For several items, results are split by regulatory author-

ity model (i.e., CASA, EASA, FAA, TC, and O-NAA). 

Keep in mind that this was the regulatory body that 

their company designed their maintenance programs to 

be in compliance with and, therefore, possibly not their 

country’s regulatory agency. We make this point because 

some companies across the world may follow FAA or 

EASA regulations even though they are not regulated by 

either of those agencies.

Results

Motivation for Human Factors Program 

Though there are many advantages to instituting an 

HF program within a maintenance operation, when asked 

to rate independently the importance of several factors 

when their organization implemented an HF program, 

85.7% reported that flight safety was of considerable to 

great importance. Worker safety was also a high priority, 

at 80.9%. Further, over three-fourths (79.9%) indicated 

that regulatory compliance was also a strong motivator. 

Overall, cost was least important, at 59.7%. 

When we examined responses by regulatory model, we 

found that flight safety was of the highest importance for 

CASA, FAA, and O-NAA. For EASA and TC, regulatory 

compliance was of a high degree of importance. See Figure 

2 for all responses.

Regulator Support 

Slightly over 40% reported receiving support from their 

regulator for the implementation of their HF program, 

and 33.9% worked closely with their regulator to monitor 

their HF program. When support and working closely were 

broken out by regulatory model, respondents complying 

with TC reported the highest level of support (57.1%), 

while those under O-NAA indicated the closest working 

relationship (44.4%). See Table 3 for all responses.

Proactive Human Factors Support

Respondents indicated encouragement from their 

manager/director of maintenance, with 64.8% report-

ing that senior management demonstrated support in 

words and action for MHF. Fifty-nine percent indicated 

(agree or strongly agree) that they had a formal means for 

supervisors and workers to provide suggestions on HF 

issues. When split by regulatory model, EASA respondents, by far, expressed the highest agreement, at 71.4%. 

This is in contrast to the second-highest group, O-NAA 

respondents, at 60.9% (Table 4).

Keeping the lines of communication open between 

HF personnel and senior management is essential for 

a successful HF program. Thirty-nine percent reported 

that their company employed a formal method for their 

HF specialist(s) to provide regular briefings to senior 

maintenance management.

Close to 80% recognized the value of proactive HF 

programs. However, only 11.5% indicated HF was an 

explicit line item in their company’s budget.

Of the 127 respondents who indicated the U.S. was 

their country of employment and their regulatory model 

was the FAA, 48.8% indicated that they participated 

in the FAA’s Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Regulatory

Compliance

Flight Safety Worker Safety Cost

CASA EASA FAA TC O-NAA

% Importance

Figure 2. Motivating Factors for Human Factors 

Program.

Table 3. Level of Support by Regulatory Model. 

Regulatory

Model

Support

% Agreement 

Work Closely 

% Agreement 

TC 57.1 35.7 

CASA 46.2 28.6 

O-NAA 39.3 44.4 

EASA 39.1 28.6 

FAA 38.3 31.9 

Table 4. Formal Means for Supervisors 

and Workers to Provide Suggestions. 

Regulatory

Model % Agreement 

EASA 71.4 

O-NAA 60.9 

FAA 55.5 

TC 53.3 

CASA 46.7 
and 9.4% reported that their company was initiating 

actions to participate. This high ASAP participation by 

our respondents reinforces the fact that our data include 

many of the “best case” examples of operators in the U.S. 

However, ASAP participation across all repair stations 

and U.S. carriers is much smaller. 

Nearly 36% of respondents indicated that they were 

active participants in industry or HF working groups. 

When examined by regulatory model, figures ranged 

from 31.3% to 44.8%, with TC leading the way. 

Organizational Policies

The majority of respondents (72.3%), reported that 

they had a formal quality assurance (QA) process such 

as ISO9000. When asked if their QA program addressed 

HF, 46.3% said “yes” and 10.2% said “don’t know.” Most 

(88.6%) reported that their company had a formal safety 

policy, and an additional 7.8% reported an informal safety 

policy. These figures were fairly consistent regardless of 

regulatory model. See Tables 5 and 6 for all responses.

Over 60% reported a formal shift handover policy, 

and an additional 22% reported an informal policy. See 

Figure 3 for a breakout of shift handover policy across 

regulatory model. Results were fairly similar; however, 

respondents that reported their HF practices were in line 

with EASA were most likely to have a shift handover 

policy (92.9%).

Interestingly, less than half (42.7%) reported their 

company had a formal policy to apply HF principles in 

writing or amending technical documentation. However, 

an additional 28% indicated an informal policy. 

Human Factors Training 

The issue of HF is introduced as part of training for 

new maintenance personnel by 66.6% of the represented 

companies. Further, 79.6% (agree and strongly agree) 

recognized the return on investment of initial HF train-

ing, and 76.1% recognized the return on investment of 

recurrent HF training. 

Given differences in HF requirements across regulatory 

agencies, we suspected that there could be differences 

in the maturity of training programs. Indeed, this is 

what we found in that TC (77.4%) and EASA (71.6%) 

respondents reported having an existing course that met 

requirements. Respondents regulated by the FAA had 

the lowest percentage (43.4%) regarding an existing HF 

course. See Figure 4 for all responses.

However, as is clear from the figure, it was not as if 

others were absent of training. In fact, their companies 

were in the process of developing a course, sending 

Table 5. Quality Assurance Processes by 

Regulatory Model. 

% QA 

Process

% QA Process 

Addresses 

HF

Overall 72.3 46.3 

O-NAA 75.0 55.6 

FAA 74.0 37.5 

EASA 69.9 55.6 

CASA 66.7 40.0 

TC 66.7 50.0 

Table 6. Formal and Informal Safety Policy by 

Regulatory Model. 

Safety Policy 

% Formal % Informal 

Overall 88.6 7.8 

CASA 100.0 0.0 

EASA 93.1 4.2 

FAA 88.7 7.3 

TC 90.0 10.0 

O-NAA 80.0 13.8 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Overall CASA EASA FAA TC O-NAA

% Formal & Informal Policy

Figure 3. Shift Handover Policy by Regulatory 

Authority Model. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Existing Course Developing a

Course

Send Employees No Course

Overall CASA EASA FAA TC O-NAA

% Endorsement

Figure 4. Current Position Regarding 

HF Training. 
their employees to an existing course, or they had hired 

a consultant for training. One area in need of improvement was found for those that designed their program in 

compliance with the FAA. Over 17% of these respondents 

reported no course. 

For respondents that reported having an HF course or 

were in the process of developing a course, the topic areas 

of the course were in line with best practices. For example, 

many reported that communication, human error, and 

factors related to fatigue were covered (Table 7).

When asked about the breadth of their company’s HF 

trainers, the majority of respondents (68.5%) reported 

that their trainers had maintenance/engineering work 

experience. Many trainers were said to have attended a 

2-5 day HF course (61.7%) and/or a 2-5 day instructors’ 

skills course (46.8%). Only a few (12.9%) reported that 

their HF trainers had no formal HF training. When we 

examined the results by regulatory model, CASA, EASA, 

and TC clearly had instructors with a well-trained and 

experienced background (Fig. 5). By comparison, for 

those companies that modeled their program after the 

FAA, a higher percentage (23.4%) of their trainers were 

said to have no formal training.

Error Management

One of the key factors for a successful MHF program 

is the availability of a program to track maintenance error 

events. Over half (55%) of the respondents reported that 

their error data were stored in a database. Differences were 

observed across regulatory model. Companies modeling 

EASA requirements reported the highest storage of error 

data (65.1%), while those modeling the FAA were the 

lowest at 49.1%. See Table 8 for all responses.

Overall, organizations reported employing either a 

formal (64.8%) or informal (19.1%) program for their 

human error investigations. Of these organizations, 

32.2% reported using the Maintenance Error Decision 

Aid (MEDA), 10.5% the Human Factors Analysis and 

Classification System (HFACS), 36.6% some modification of MEDA, and 35.1% indicated they used another 

program not listed.

Moving beyond storage of data and investigating single 

incidents, we wanted to know if companies had systemic 

programs in place to review and use their error data to 

prevent future occurrences. Tracking trends and the progress of interventions support the sustainment of an HF 

program. We found less positive results within this area. 

For example, less than half (46.5%) of our respondents 

indicated that their company reviewed their database in 

a proactive manner (Table 9).

Moreover, most respondents (70.5%) indicated that 

their company generated recommendations from indi-

vidual incidents but did not evaluate the effectiveness 

of interventions.

Fatigue Management

Over half (51.3%) of the respondents indicated that 

managing fatigue was an important element of their safety 

management system. The impact of fatigue on safety was 

recognized by 82.1%. However, only 24.9% indicated 

that their organization had a fatigue management system. 

This figure was fairly consistent across regulatory models. 

The inconsistency between belief and action was further 

Table 7. Topic Areas of Human Factors Course. 

Topic Area % 

Introduction to HF 96.4 

Factors that contribute to human 

error

96.0

Communications 92.4 

Effect of shift work and fatigue 

on performance 

89.8

Event Investigation 74.7 

Shift turnover 78.2 

Other topics 32.9 

Table 8. Percentage Storing Error Data in a 

Database by Regulatory Authority. 

Regulator % in Database 

Overall 55.0 

EASA 65.1 

O-NAA 57.4 

TC 56.3 

CASA 53.8 

FAA 49.1 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2-5 day HF

course

2-5 day

Instructors

course

MX/Eng Work

Experience

No Formal

Overall CASA EASA FAA TC O-NAA

% Yes

Figure 5. Training of HF Trainers. 
evident in that only 35.9% reported that their organization provided training on fatigue management. However, 

regulatory adherence was found to have an impact with 

TC (45.2%) and EASA (40.8%) reporting higher figures 

than the other regulatory models (Fig. 6).

Human Factors Metrics

Nearly one-third (30.8%) of the organizations conduct 

formal HF audits but less than one-quarter (22.6%) have 

an audit planned for 2006-2007. Over half (54.4%) measure the economic and other effects of errors/incidents. At 

present, less than 10% performed a cost-benefit to justify 

their HF interventions. However, 51% recognized that 

their company must improve their return on investment 

data regarding HF.

For some respondents, realization of the benefits from 

this investment has begun, with 27.2% reporting costbenefit success stories as a result of their HF interventions. 

When asked for examples of success stories, respondents 

shared that their companies experienced a reduction in 

errors, improved on-time performance, improved workplace design, and reduced on-the-job injuries.

Discussion

The high response rate (66%; N=414) from experienced personnel (65% had 20+ years) from more than 50 

countries is indicative of the high level of international 

interest in maintenance HF. The respondent sample 

likely represents the world’s best-case examples due to the 

voluntary nature of the available addresses. The largest 

number of respondents was somewhat evenly divided 

between airlines and repair stations, with representatives 

from training organizations and general aviation (GA) 

maintenance facilities also participating. The general-

izations here are most reflective of larger maintenance 

organizations. That is appropriate, since they were the 

primary target audience of the study. Forty percent 

of the respondents were from the U.S., which is also 

consistent with the current distribution of international 

aviation maintenance activity. (K. Michaels, personal 

communication, February 11, 2007). In summary, we 

can attribute reasonably accurate conclusions due to our 

diverse international participation.

During the design of this study, we expected to find 

extensive differences among countries because of national regulations regarding HF. The charts presented 

throughout this report have shown rankings, level of 

interest, and the nature of HF programs based mostly 

on regulatory model. There were more similarities than 

differences in the data.

Maintenance organizations institute HF initiatives 

because such programs help ensure flight safety and 

worker safety. Most respondents rated those factors as 

highly important. Of course, regulatory compliance is very 

important for companies modeling regulations from TC

and EASA, as shown in the data. Nearly 1,200 U.S. repair 

stations comply with EASA regulations; therefore, they 

are also motivated by requirements beyond the FAA.

Respondents rated cost issues as the fourth most important reason for having an HF program. It is admirable 

that safety and compliance are rated highly. 

Support From the Regulator

TC was reported as providing the most support as 

a regulator. The FAA, EASA, and other local national 

authorities received about the same rating for their support. In response to these findings, the FAA, through the 

Flight Standards Service organization and, hopefully, other 

authorities, will identify the best ways to empower the 

Table 9. Use of Human Error Data. 

Recommendations are made 

from individual incidents 

investigated.

70.5% 

We review our error database 

periodically to identify concerns 

and plan interventions. 

46.5% 

Senior management uses the 

information as part of a formal 

quality management process. 

43.1% 

Within the past year, processes 

and procedures were changed as 

a result of the analysis of the 

error database. 

33.7% 

Interventions are evaluated to 

assess their effectiveness. 26.9% 

We do not use our human error 

data. 10.8% 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

System Training

Overall CASA EASA FAA TC O-NAA

% Yes

Figure 6. Fatigue Management System and 

Training by Regulatory Authority Model. 
Aviation Safety Inspector workforce to provide additional 

HF support to the industry. One example of recent FAA 

MHF support to the industry is the Operator’s Manual for 

Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance (FAA, 2006a). 

The manual was written to assist companies with developing a quality MHF program. The FAA is also revising 

the MHF Web site (www.hf.faa.gov) and is developing a 

new edition of the Web-based Human Factors Guide for 

Maintenance and Inspection. The FAA Flight Standards 

Service is also taking proactive measures to enhance and 

clarify additional guidance material for industry and for 

FAA personnel. Additionally, Flight Standards extended a 

previous Aviation Safety Inspector two-day maintenance 

resource management course to three days with additional 

coverage of HF topics. 

Providing Human Factors Suggestions

Over half of respondents reported that there were means 

for workers to provide HF suggestions to the company. 

EASA-modeled companies were well above the average. 

This is a very positive finding that is likely related to the 

European requirements for significant HF initial and 

continuation training for everyone, including managers. The result is that HF issues and language became a 

shared value among all segments of the workforce. That 

appears to be happening in Europe, and the rest of the 

world is evolving in a similar fashion.

Event Reporting – The Good News

We were extremely encouraged to see the level of agreement regarding formal application of event investigations. 

Most had a formal or informal system. Over two-thirds 

of respondents said they were using Boeing’s MEDA 

or some modification. This extensive use of the same 

reporting format could foster data-sharing sometime in 

the future. Event reporting systems are the fundamental 

foundation for excellent HF programs and also for safety 

management systems.

Industry Involvement

Another similarity among the respondents was their 

company’s and their personal involvement in industry 

and government committee work related to HF in 

maintenance. Over a third of the respondents participated in such activities. This figure reinforces the earlier 

statement that our respondents represent the industry’s 

best companies. Of course, this could also be an area of 

improvement.

With respect to formalized business processes and 

safety policies, there were similar responses from most 

respondents. That means that a transition to Safety 

Management System will not be a difficult concept for 

many maintenance organizations.

Differences in Responses

Over half of respondents indicated that their company 

had an existing HF course. Respondents who modeled the 

FAA had the lowest figure regarding having an existing 

HF training course. In response to the same question, 

respondents modeling TC and EASA reported over 75% 

percent. Because HF courses are not a regulatory requirement in the U.S., it was not surprising to find the largest 

percentage where no course existed was from companies 

that modeled the FAA. Obviously, this suggests that 

regulations are a reliable means of ensuring the presence 

of an HF training program.

Training the Trainer

As mentioned above, it is reasonable to expect that 

companies that model their program in accordance with 

FAA regulations would have less training than companies 

that were required to have training. The question related 

to background training of HF trainers clearly indicated 

that HF trainers of companies which designed their 

programs in compliance with FAA regulations had less 

formal training in comparison to the rest of the world. 

Companies modeling FAA regulations were at the bottom 

of the ratings with respect not only to HF training but 

also for train-the-trainer instruction for HF trainers. For 

respondents that modeled FAA regulations, 23% indicated 

that their HF trainers had no formal training. 

Many HF instructors build their company-specific 

course from the general materials they obtain by participating, as students, in other courses. A multitude of 

such courses can be found with a simple Internet search. 

The importance of such training, for the trainers, cannot 

be discounted. Of course, trainers can also gain a lot of 

knowledge by their participation on industry committees, attending conferences, and relying on self-study 

materials. 

Getting the Information to Management

Training and safety personnel who are involved in 

HF programs are frequently in a position to hear stories 

about events that often are not significant enough to 

warrant formal reporting. However, these small events 

lead to larger ones. Thus, attention to small events will 

prevent larger ones. About 40% of the respondents said 

that HF personnel have formal means to communicate 

human factors issues to senior management. While that 

is a respectable number, there is significant opportunity 

to expand such communication. Scheduled meetings, 

bi-weekly or monthly, dedicated to the discussion of human error and events in the maintenance environment 

is a very easy way to formalize this reporting.
The Human Factors of Technical Documentation

Proper use of technical documentation remains a high 

priority for the industry. Failure to follow procedures is 

the number-one cause of most negative events. Often 

the failure to use the documentation is associated with 

an HF-related issue. Many respondents’ companies had 

a formal or informal policy to apply HF considerations 

to the development or modification of documentation. 

Effective use of error-reporting systems is an excellent 

way to raise human factors-related attention to technical documentation and procedures. Event investigations 

must drill down to the reason(s) that people did not 

use the documents. HF issues are often a root cause of 

documentation-related events.

Using Error Data – The Challenges

We have already commented on the excellent efforts to 

investigate, report, and record event data. A majority of 

respondents said that event investigations lead to recommendations. However, fewer respondents reported that 

processes and procedures were changed in the last year as 

a result of the event database. We found that slightly over 

a quarter of companies have evaluated the effectiveness of 

their interventions. These numbers strongly suggest that 

the error data are not being used to its full potential.

Human Factors Metrics

Thirty-one percent reported that their organization 

conducted some type of HF audit. Fewer respondents 

were planning such an audit for 2006-2007. These questions did not define what was meant by HF audit; thus, 

it is difficult to draw reasonable conclusions about audits. 

However, the numbers are low; thus, this appears to be 

a fertile opportunity for improvement.

Over half of the respondents reported that their 

company measured the cost of events. Few respondents’ 

companies tried to cost-justify HF interventions, while 

over half of the respondents recognized the importance 

of demonstrating the return-on-investment in human 

factors programs. The FAA Operator’s Manual for Human 

Factors in Aviation Maintenance offers a method to calculate return on investment. However, to do this properly, 

companies must track errors, estimate the cost of errors, 

and the cost of the interventions to calculate savings. As 

previously noted, few companies are tracking errors and 

interventions over time, which makes calculating savings 

over time impossible.

Fatigue Management Systems

One of the strongest findings of this survey is related 

to fatigue in aviation maintenance. The majority of 

respondents acknowledged the impact of fatigue on 

maintenance work. However, only a quarter of them had 

a fatigue management system and slightly over a third 

delivered training related to fatigue management. These 

numbers strongly suggest that the aviation maintenance 

industry and the regulators must monitor this situation 

and implement programs to ensure that worker fatigue 

management systems provide continuing safety.

In Summary

This study reinforces the belief that maintenance human factors (MHF) programs are valuable and important, 

and there are a variety of such programs throughout the 

world. For organizations that model agencies with regulatory requirements, the HF programs are more widely 

adopted, and the HF instructors are given more training 

to prepare them for their responsibilities. Regardless of 

the variety of international regulations on MHF, the 

industry reports that flight safety and worker safety are 

the primary reasons to have such programs.

HF programs reduce cost and foster continuing safety 

and control of human error in maintenance. This survey 

found that the best targets of opportunity for improvement are use of event-data reporting, creation of a fatigue 

management program, and increased use of data as a 

means of tracking errors over time to justify the cost of 

HF programs. 

References

Australian Transportation Safety Board (2001). ATSB 

Survey of licensed aircraft maintenance engineers in 

Australia. Department of Transport and Regional 

Services, Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

Boeing (2005). Statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents. Worldwide operations, 1959 – 2004. 

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. Seattle, WA. 

Retrieved August 29, 2005, from www.boeing.

com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf.

Boquet, A., Detwiler, C., Holcomb, K., Hackworth, 

C., Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (unpublished 

manuscript). General aviation maintenance accidents: An analysis using HFACS.

Federal Aviation Administration (2006a). Operator’s 

manual for human factors in aviation maintenance. 

Retrieved January 30, 2007, from www2.hf.faa.

gov/opsManual/assets/pdfs/HFOM_Maint_Org.

pdf.

Federal Aviation Administration (2006b). Federal Aviation Administration flight plan 2006-2010. Retrieved August 17th, 2006, from www.faa.gov/about/

plans_reports/media/flight_plan_2006.pdf.
10

International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2004, 

April). IATA safety report 2003 No. 9049-04, 

Montreal.

Johnson, W.B. (2001). Human factors programs: Fact or 

fantasy? The 15th Symposium on Human Factors in 

Maintenance and Inspection, London, UK.

Johnson, W.B., & Watson, J. (2001). Reducing installation error in airline maintenance. Washington, DC: 

Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved January 

10th, 2007, from http://hfskyway.faa.gov.

Komarniski, R. (April, 2006). Today’s training requirements, Aircraft Maintenance Technology. Retrieved 

January 10th, 2007, from www.amtonline.com/

publication/article.jsp?pubId=1&id=2242.

Marx, D.A., & Graeber, R.C. (1994). Human error in aircraft maintenance. In N. Johnston, N. McDonald, 

& R. Fuller (eds.), Aviation Psychology in Practice. 

Aldershot, UK: Avebury (pp. 87-104).

Patankar, K., Lattanzio, D., & Kanki, B. (2004) A content 

analysis of representative procedural errors in ASRS 

maintenance reports. Proceedings of the Safety 

Across High-Consequence Industries Conference, 

167-72.

Rankin, W., Hibit, R., Allen, J., & Sargent, R. (2000). 

Development and evaluation of the maintenance 

error decision aid (MEDA) process. International 

Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 26, 261-76.

Wells, A. (2001). Commercial aviation safety. (3rd ed.) 

New York: McGraw-Hill.
A-1

Appendix A

International Survey of Human Factors Status in 

Maintenance Organizations

Welcome to the International Survey of Maintenance Organizations. This survey is designed to assess the 

present state of human factors in the international aviation maintenance industry. The survey items target key 

human factors issues such as training, error investigation and company safety policies. We are interested 

in what human factors elements your organizations are implementing and if those initiatives are designed to 

meet the requirements of the FAA, EASA or other regulatory bodies. We will distribute a final report describing 

the results of the survey when completed. 

The Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) adheres to World Medical Association ethical standards, public 

law, and federal policies for safeguarding the information submitted by participants in this survey. This information will be protected to the extent available under applicable laws and regulations and no individually 

identifiable information will be included in the published report. Additionally, identifying information will not be 

retained once the data collection is done. Participation in the survey is completely voluntary. Please feel free 

to make any comments that you have regarding the survey in the comment section at the end of the survey. 

This survey has been approved by the OMB (#2120-0713). 

Please skip any item on the survey that you feel does not apply to you or your organization, as well as those 

that you do not feel qualified to answer. 

If you feel that the majority of the questions do not apply to you or your organization, you may exit the survey 

at anytime by clicking the ‘Cancel Survey’ button on Page 5. Exiting the survey early will not exclude you from 

receiving the final report.

1. Do you work for a... (Please select one response.) 

•	 Airline Maintenance Department

•	 Repair Station (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul-- Entire A/C)

•	 Repair Station (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul-- Components only)

•	 Manufacturer

•	 General Aviation/ Business Aircraft Operations 

•	 Military/Government Fixed Base Operator

•	 Other Military/Government

•	 Maintenance School/Training Facility

•	 Other

(Display when response for item 1 is “Repair Station (Components only)” or “Airline Maintenance 

Department or Repair Station (Entire A/C.)”)

What type of airline maintenance operation do you work for?

•	 Major Carrier

•	 Regional Carrier

•	 Air Taxi/Charter Operator

•	 Corporate

2. In which country are you currently employed? (Please type answer below.)
A-2

3. Which is the primary regulatory authority your maintenance operations are designed to be in 

compliance with?

•	 Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)

•	 European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)

•	 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

•	 Transport Canada

•	 Other National Aviation Authority

(Display when response for item 3 is “Other NAA.”)

Please specify your primary maintenance human factors regulatory requirements: (Text box provided)

4. How many employees work for your Maintenance and Engineering Department or company? 

(Please enter number.) 

5. What is your job title? 

•	 Human Factors Manager

•	 Quality VP/Director

•	 Quality Manager

•	 Maintenance VP/Director

•	 Maintenance Manager

•	 Human Factors Trainer

•	 Labor Organization Representative

•	 Other

(Display when response for item 5 is “Other.”)

Please specify your job title: (Text box provided)

6. How many years of aviation maintenance experience do you have? 

•	 Less than 1 year

•	 1-5 years

•	 6-10 years

•	 11-15 years

•	 16-20 years

•	 More than 20 years

7. What is your organization’s approach to human error investigations? 

•	 A formal process or program

•	 An informal process or program

•	 No process or program, however one is being planned for implementation

•	 No process or program and no immediate plans

(Display when response to Item 7 is “A formal process or program” or “An informal process or program”)
A-3

Which of the following approaches does your operation use to investigate human error? (Please 

select all that apply.)

•	 Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA)

•	 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

•	 Our own modification of MEDA

•	 Other

If you selected “Other” please specify the approach used to investigate human error in your 

maintenance operations: (Text box provided)

8. How are your human error data being used? (Please select all that apply.) 

•	 We review our error database periodically to identify concerns and plan interventions.

•	 Within the past year, processes and procedures were changed as a result of the analysis of the error 

database.

•	 Within the past year, we bought new tooling or enhanced the workplace because of human factors 

issues identified in the error database.

•	 We review our error database to assess the effectiveness of interventions.

•	 Senior management uses the information as part of a formal quality management process.

•	 Recommendations are made from individual incidents investigated.

•	 Recommendations are monitored to see if they are implemented.

•	 Interventions are evaluated to assess their effectiveness.

•	 We do not use our human error data. 

9. Does your company participate in the FAA’s Aviation Safety Action Program for voluntary error 

reporting?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Initiating actions to participate

10. Are your human error investigation data in a database? 

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

11. Does your company track corrective actions as a part of your formal process to manage human 

error events?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

12. Does your company have a written discipline policy regarding error reporting? 

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know
A-4

13. Does your company conduct a formal human factors audit in your maintenance organization?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

14. Does your company have a maintenance human factors audit planned for 2006-2007?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

15. How many formal human error event investigations has your company conducted in the past 12 

months? (Please enter number.) 

16. Additional Comments on human error management (Text box provided)

17. Does your company have maintenance human factors personnel with an academic degree in a 

human factors-related discipline?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

18. Does your company have maintenance human factors personnel with work experience in human factors? 

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

19. Does your human factors specialist prepare the curriculum and teach your maintenance human 

factors course?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

20. Does your company introduce human factors as part of your new employee training for maintenance personnel?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

21. Does your company offer human factors continuation training to maintenance personnel?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know
A-5

(Display when response for Item 21 is “Yes.”)

How many hours of human factors continuation training for each licensed aircraft maintenance 

engineer/mechanic are offered per 2-year period? (Please enter a numeric response.) (Text box 

provided)

22. Does your company offer human factors continuation training to all staff?

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

23. About what percentage of your managers has received at least 4 hours of human factors training? (Please enter a percentage between 0 and 100.)

24. About what percentage of your licensed aircraft maintenance engineers/licensed mechanics 

has received at least 4 hours of human factors training? (Please enter a percentage between 0 and 

100.)

25. About what percentage of your unlicensed aircraft maintenance engineers/mechanics has received at least 4 hours of human factors training? (Please enter a percentage between 0 and 100.)

26. About what percentage of your maintenance support staff has received at least 4 hours of human factors training? (Please enter a percentage between 0 and 100.)

 (For questions 27 to 31: Our/We refers to your maintenance organization.)

27. Our organization’s current position regarding human factors training is:

•	 We have an existing course that meets the requirements.

•	 We are in the process of developing a course to meet the requirements.

•	 We send our employees to existing courses or hire a consultant to do this training.

•	 We do not have any plans for development of such a course.

(Display when response for Item 27 is “We have an existing course that meets the requirements” or “We are 

in the process of developing a course to meet the requirements.”)

The human factors course covers the following areas: (Please check all that apply.) 

•	 Introduction to human factors

•	 Effect of shift work and fatigue on performance

•	 Communications (e.g., Inter-team, Crew Resource Management)

•	 Factors that contribute to human error

•	 Event investigation

•	 Shift turnover

•	 Other

If you selected “Other” please specify the areas your human factors course covers: (Text box provided)
A-6

The course(s) is designed for: (Please check all that apply.) 

•	 Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineers/Mechanics

•	 Non-licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineers/Mechanics

•	 Trainers

•	 Supervisors/Managers

•	 Quality Auditors

•	 Planners

•	 Degreed Engineers

•	 Other

If you selected “Other” please specify who your human factors course was designed for: (Text box 

provided)

28. We recognize the return on investment value of initial human factors training.

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

29. We recognize the return on investment value of recurrent human factors training.

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

30. We recognize the value of proactive human factors programs.

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

31. We measure the economic and other effects of errors/incidents.

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

(Our/We refers to your maintenance organization.)
A-7

32. What training do your human factors trainers have: (Select all that apply)

•	 Academic degree in human factors or related field

•	 Have a University/College diploma

•	 Attended a short (2-5 days) human factors trainers course

•	 Attended a short (2-5 days) instructor skills course

•	 Have maintenance/engineering work experience

•	 Are licensed mechanic/engineers

•	 Have no formal training 

33. Our human factors trainer(s): (Select all that apply) 

•	 Develop the training content and materials

•	 Use materials the company purchased

•	 Use freely available materials

•	 Need more training materials

34. Human factors is introduced as part of our new employee training for maintenance personnel:

•	 One day course

•	 Two day course

•	 Computer-based course

•	 Other

35. Additional Comments on human factors training. (Text box provided)

36. We have a fatigue management system.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

(Our/We refers to your maintenance organization.)

37. We provide training on fatigue management.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

38. We recognize that fatigue is a safety issue.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know
A-8

39. Our manager/director of maintenance actively supports maintenance human factors in words 

and in actions.

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

40. We have a formal means for supervisors and workers to provide suggestions on human factors 

issues.

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

41. We have a formal method for our human factors specialist(s) to provide regular briefings to senior maintenance management. 

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

42. We receive support from our regulator (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration, European Aviation 

Safety Agency, Joint Aviation Authorities, or National Aviation Authority) in the design and implementation of our human factors program. 

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

43. We work very closely with our regulator (e.g., FAA, EASA, JAA, or NAA) to monitor our human 

factors program. 

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree

44. We are active participants in industry or government human factors working group(s).

•	 Strongly Disagree

•	 Disagree

•	 Neither Disagree nor Agree

•	 Agree

•	 Strongly Agree
A-9

Please rate the relative importance of each factor in the decision of your organization to implement 

a human factors program.

45. Regulatory Compliance

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

46. Flight Safety

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

47. Worker Safety

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

48. Cost

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

49. Does your company have a safety policy?

•	 Formal Policy

•	 Informal Policy

•	 No Policy

50. Does your company have a policy to apply human factors principles in writing or amending 

procedures?

•	 Formal Policy

•	 Informal Policy

•	 No Policy

51. Does your company have a shift handover policy?

•	 Formal Policy

•	 Informal Policy

•	 No Policy
A-10

52. Does your company have a policy for considering human performance limitations in production 

planning?

•	 Formal Policy

•	 Informal Policy

•	 No Policy

Please rate the importance of these factors on your company’s safety management system. 

53. Formal human factors program

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

54. Human factors training

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

55. Fatigue management

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

56. Error reporting system

•	 Not At All

•	 Limited Importance

•	 Moderate Importance

•	 Considerable Importance

•	 Great Importance

(Our/We refers to your maintenance organization.)

57. We have a formal quality assurance program like ISO9000 or a continuous improvement program.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know
A-11

58. Our quality assurance program explicitly addresses human factors.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

59. We ensure that our service providers and suppliers have a quality assurance program. 

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

60. We have an explicit line item in the budget for human factors interventions. 

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

61. Additional comments on proactive actions taken to support a human factors program at your 

company. (Text box provided)

62. We perform a cost-benefit or return on investment calculation to justify our human factors interventions.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

63. Our management demands return on investment calculations in our proposed program plans.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

64. We have success stories and positive examples of the cost-benefit of our human factors interventions.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

(Display when response for item 64 is “Yes”.)

Please share your success stories of the cost-benefit associated with your human factors interventions. 

 (Text box provided)

(Our/We refers to your maintenance organization.)

65. We must improve our return on investment data regarding human factors programs.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know
A-12

66. Our return on investment efforts have demonstrated the value of safety-related human factors 

interventions.

•	 Yes

•	 No

•	 Do Not Know

67. Additional comments on your company’s maintenance program. (Text box provided)

68. Please enter your comments and suggestions about this survey. (Text box provided)
B-1

Appendix B

List of Countries Responding to Survey

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Bahrain

Belgium

Bolivia

Brazil

Canada

Chile

China

Colombia

Cyprus

Denmark

Ecuador

El Salvador

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Greenland

Guatemala

Hong Kong

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Korea

Kuwait

Luxembourg

Malaysia

Malta

Mexico

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Panama

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Singapore

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Taiwan

Thailand

Turkey

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States of America

Venezuela