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ORDER – 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

STUDENT DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MERCER ISLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT

NO. 400, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. C06-395JLR

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on cross motions for summary judgment

(Dkt. ## 17, 51). The court has considered the papers filed in connection with the

motions and has heard oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion and DENIES Plaintiff Student Doe’s motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

The facts in this case are not in dispute. On Tuesday, February 21, 2006, while

home on midwinter break from school, Doe argued with his two older sisters about use of

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ORDER – 2

the family’s home computer. The dispute escalated, and Doe, a thirteen year-old boy,

became violent. He threatened his sisters with scissors and a ten-inch butcher knife, and

upset them by shaking the cage of the family’s pet rabbit. At one point, Doe hurled the

scissors at one of his sisters. The girls barricaded themselves behind a bedroom door and

called their father, who was not at home. Upon receiving the call on his cell-phone,

Doe’s father dialed 911. Doe’s father told the 911 operator that his son was “out of

control.” Blakney Decl., Redacted Ex. A at 4-5 (Dkt. # 19). Shortly thereafter, two

Mercer Island Police officers arrived at the family residence, arrested Doe for assault, and

transported him to the juvenile detention facility. Doe confessed to the assault and the

police department released him from custody the following morning. Fortunately, neither

sister suffered an injury as a result of Doe’s conduct.

Doe returned to Islander Middle School (“IMS”) on Monday, February 27, 2006. 

That afternoon, Mercer Island Police Officer Art Munoz relayed information regarding

Doe’s assault to IMS administrators as well as Defendant Dr. Cynthia Simms, the

Superintendent of Defendant Mercer Island School District No. 400 (“the District”). 

Officer Munoz contacted Dr. Simms in his capacity as the liaison between Mercer

Island’s police department and the District. Officer Munoz heard of Doe’s assault over

his police radio immediately after it occurred. He also interviewed Doe at the police

station and reviewed the responding officers’ police report. 

On the morning of February 28, 2006, Principal Sharon Gillaspie called Doe’s

parents to schedule an appointment to discuss a “situation” involving their son. Compl.

¶ 39. Doe’s mother had already planned on driving Doe to school that morning because

he had an appointment with his psychotherapist that would make him late for class. She

agreed to stop by the administration office. Upon arrival, Principal Gillaspie informed

Doe’s mother that Doe could not remain at school that day. She expressed the school

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1

The SAV policy includes, among other things, a directive that students “shall” receive a

“violence risk assessment” if they exhibit “violent behavior on or off school grounds,” and the

steps school administrators and staff must follow for reporting a student’s threatening conduct. 

Lobsenz Decl., Ex. A (Simms Dep. Ex. 6.). 

ORDER – 3

administration’s concern over Doe’s presence at IMS given his prior assault, and

explained to Doe’s mother the school’s student-at-risk-of-violence (“SAV”) policy.1

Principal Gillaspie gave Doe’s mother a copy of the policy. According to Principal

Gillaspie, she offered to give Doe some homework to do during the expulsion period but

Doe’s mother declined because the family was going on a vacation. Blakney Supp. Decl.,

Ex. B. (Gillaspie Dep. at 98). 

Doe and his parents returned to school that evening to meet with Superintendent

Dr. Simms. Dr. Simms invited Doe to explain what had happened in the family home

prior to the arrest, but Doe’s parents told Dr. Simms that his public defender for the

criminal matter advised Doe not to discuss the incident. In any event, Dr. Simms told

Doe and his parents that she was familiar with what happened based on her conversation

with Officer Munoz. She stated she was expelling Doe on an emergency basis and that as

a condition for reentry, he would need to see a District-approved mental health

professional for a “violence risk assessment.” Based on the evaluator’s report as to

whether Doe posed a danger to himself or other students, Dr. Simms would make a

decision regarding his return to school. 

The meeting lasted for over an hour, the bulk of which Dr. Simms and Doe’s

parents occupied expressing their disagreement about the qualifications for performing

violence risk assessments. In addition, Doe’s parents – both employed in the mental

health profession – protested the idea of having a District evaluator see their son, in part

out of concern over the confidential nature of the patient-psychotherapist relationship. 

John Doe Decl. ¶ 13; Jane Doe Decl. ¶ 17. They urged Dr. Simms to allow Dr. Justin

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ORDER – 4

Mohatt, Doe’s regular therapist, to perform the evaluation. Dr. Simms, however, did not

believe that Dr. Mohatt had the proper forensic training. 

Before the meeting ended, Dr. Simms gave the Does copies of the District’s

policies on expulsion and due process procedures. Specifically, Dr. Simms testifies (and

Doe does not directly contest) that she gave the Does a copy of District Board Policy

5114, District Regulations 5114.1-.5, and the SAV policy. See Blakney Supp. Decl., Ex.

B. (Simms Dep. at 204-205). District Regulation 5114.4 directs the District to send

written confirmation of an emergency expulsion within 24 hours of the decision and

provides that an expelled student has 10 days within which to request a hearing. Simms

Dep. Ex. 6. Other than give the Does a copy of the policy, Defendants admit that they

did not send separate written confirmation of the expulsion decision within 24 hours. Dr.

Simms did compose a letter memorializing the February 28, 2006 meeting, but the Does

did not receive it until March 7, 2006. Jane Doe Decl., Ex. A. 

The Does called Dr. Mohatt after the meeting and asked him to telephone Dr.

Simms to explain his qualifications for performing a violence risk assessment. 

Apparently, Dr. Simms reiterated her position to Dr. Mohatt that the Does must hire one

of the District-approved evaluators. According to Doe’s mother, she attempted to contact

some of District-approved therapists that she and her husband believed had the necessary

qualifications to perform the assessment. She attests that many were unavailable, some

were geographically distant, and others did not return her phone calls. Believing that

their son posed no danger to anyone in the first place, Doe’s parents grew frustrated with

the process. John Doe Decl. ¶ 22; Jane Doe Decl. ¶ 27. 

Sometime on or about March 7, 2006, the Does hired an attorney. Shortly

thereafter, the District acquiesced to having Dr. Mohatt perform the violence risk

assessment. Dr. Mohatt evaluated Doe and submitted his report to the District. On

March 13, 2006, Doe’s parents, their attorney, and Dr. Simms met to discuss Dr.

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ORDER – 5

Mohatt’s report in which he concluded that Doe was not a danger to himself or others. 

Dr. Simms agreed that Doe could return to school the next day. In total, Doe missed 10

days of school. 

A month after his expulsion, Doe, through his parents, filed suit against the

District and Dr. Simms. In his complaint he alleges that Defendants violated his

procedural and substantive due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doe also

alleges that Defendants denied him his right to a public education under state law. Doe

originally requested monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. He has since voluntarily

dismissed his “damages claims,” such as “pain, mental anguish and emotional distress”

(Dkt. # 62). Counsel insisted at oral argument that Doe did not intend to drop all requests

for monetary relief and that he was still praying for damages, if any, arising from the fact

that he missed ten days of school. Doe also asks this court to enjoin Defendants from

maintaining information regarding the expulsion in his school record. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. Doe cross-moves for

summary judgment on his procedural due process claim. 

III. DISCUSSION

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all inferences

from the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Addisu

v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is

appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears

the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party meets its burden, the

opposing party must show that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Matsushita Elect.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must

present significant and probative evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v.

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ORDER – 6

Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). For purely legal

questions, summary judgment is appropriate without deference to the non-moving party.

A. Procedural Due Process

Doe alleges a violation of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment based largely on Defendants’ failure to follow the expulsion procedures

outlined in the Washington Administrative Code (“WAC”), as well as the District’s own

policies. Specifically, Doe attacks Defendants’ failure to provide written notice within 24

hours of the expulsion in contravention of WAC 392-400-300. Defendants concede that

they failed to provide written notice, but argue that providing oral notice to Doe satisfied

the constitutional minimum. 

In his cross-motion, Doe also contends that Defendants lacked sufficient reason to

expel him. Cross Mot. at 14. The propriety of Defendants’ decision is a separate

question from whether Defendants afforded Doe adequate process in rendering that

decision. Doe’s challenge to the decision itself more closely resembles a substantive due

process claim, which the court addresses in Part III.B., infra. 

To come within the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Doe must demonstrate that, (1) his exclusion from IMS deprived him of a

liberty or property interest, and (2) Defendants failed to provide sufficient due process

with respect to that deprivation. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz,

435 U.S. 78, 83-85 (1978). As to the first element, the court concludes that Doe has a

state-created property interest in attending public school, a point which Defendants do

not contest. That is, although the Washington State Supreme Court has not directly

addressed the question, Washington courts have implicitly recognized that state law vests

students with a property interest in public education. See Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585

P.2d 71, 91-93 (Wash. 1978) (construing WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 1 as imposing a duty on

the State to provide and finance public education and a corollary “right” of students to

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ORDER – 7

such schooling); cf. Nieshe v. Concrete Sch. Dist., 127 P.3d 713, 719-721 (Wash. Ct.

App. 2005) (holding that student did not have a property interest in attending graduation

ceremony, but referencing the generalized right to attend public school articulated in

Goss). Moreover, the fact that public school attendance is mandatory in Washington

under RCW § 28A.225.010 indicates that students have a property interest in continued

enrollment. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (construing Ohio law that

requires children to attend public school as creating a property interest in public

education). Once a state provides children the right to a public education, the Fourteenth

Amendment protects students against deprivation of that entitlement without due process

of law. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. The court therefore turns to the second question of

whether Defendants employed adequate procedures to protect Doe’s interest. 

The court begins by noting that, failure to follow state or local regulations or

policies does not ordinarily establish a violation of an individual’s right to procedural due

process. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985); cf

Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that teacher did not

have a property interest in the procedures themselves). Doe dedicates much of his

briefing to a discussion of the ways in which Dr. Simms and the District contravened

their own policies and procedures as well as those contained in the WAC. Doe’s analysis

misses the mark. It is true that, had Defendants followed their own procedural

safeguards, they would likely stand on firmer ground in this lawsuit. Still, the court does

not translate Defendants’ failure to comply with school policies or state regulations into a

federal procedural due process violation. Cf. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th

Cir. 1994) (holding that so long as defendant-prison complied with due process

requirements, failure to comply with its own more generous procedures was not a

constitutional violation). The court examines the process that Defendants actually

provided Doe in order to determine whether it meets the constitutional minimum. 

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The year following Goss, the Supreme Court announced in the seminal case of Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the balancing test for determining what process is due in a

given context. Although Goss predates Mathews, the Goss Court’s analysis considers the same

principles in setting the constitutional floor for due process in the school suspension context. 

Accordingly, this court applies Goss as the benchmark, rather than undertaking the Mathews

balancing test anew. See Shuman Ex Rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 149

(3rd Cir. 2005) (applying Goss to student’s procedural due process claim against school following

four-day suspension).

ORDER – 8

In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court considered the question of what process is

due in the context of short-term exclusions from school. 419 U.S. at 581. There, Ohio

school administrators had suspended several students for alleged misconduct without any

hearing. 419 U.S. at 568. The Court held that, in the context of temporary exclusions

from school of 10 days or less, the school must provide at least “rudimentary

precautions” to avoid mistaken or arbitrary suspensions. Id. at 581. At a minimum, the

student must have oral or written notice of the charges and, if the student denies them, an

explanation of the evidence and an opportunity to present his or her side of the story. Id.

Said another way, the student is entitled to “some kind of notice” and “some kind of

hearing.” Id. at 579. The formality required is minimal: “[i]n the great majority of cases

the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes

after it has occurred.” Id. at 582. Indeed, the Court expressly cautioned against imposing

on administrators inflexible, countrywide standards to fit the multitude of situations that

schools face. Id. at 578. 

Under the circumstances presented here, the court concludes that Defendants have

complied with the minimum due process requirements articulated in Goss.

2

 First,

contrary to Doe’s contention, Goss does not require written notice prior to short-term

exclusions from school. Indeed, not only did the Goss Court countenance either written

or oral notice, id. at 581, the Court recognized that, where a student’s presence at school

“poses a continuing danger to persons” the school need not provide any notice prior to the

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The Goss Court’s holding also incorporates the significance of a student’s admission or

denial of the conduct: “due process requires . . . that the student be given oral or written notice of

the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence . . . and an

opportunity to present his side of the story.” 419 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added). 

4

The court notes that Defendants were entitled to rely on Doe’s statements in the police

reports as conclusive evidence that the assaults occurred. Cf. Black Coal., 484 F.2d at 1045

(upholding school’s reliance on juvenile court’s findings to determine that student committed

assault).

ORDER – 9

suspension or expulsion. Id. at 582. Here, Principal Gillaspie gave Doe and his mother

immediate oral notice of his exclusion from school. Later that same day, Dr. Simms met

with Doe and his parents to explain the basis for an emergency expulsion. She informed

them of the condition for Doe’s reentry and gave Doe’s parents a copy of the District’s

SAV policy as well as a document that explained the procedures for appealing the

decision. This was all that was procedurally required to put Doe on notice. 

For reasons unclear to the court, the parties do not discuss in their briefs whether

the initial meeting on the evening of February 28 with Dr. Simms constituted a hearing. 

The court considers the informal meeting as constituting “some kind of hearing” for

purposes of due process. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. Notably, when a student admits to the

conduct in question, courts have recognized that the need for a hearing is significantly

diminished because the risk of an administrator making an erroneous decision vanishes. 

See Black Coal. v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973)

(holding that the school did not have to provide a hearing on the question of expunging

blemished record where student had “admitted all of the essential facts which it is the

purpose of a due process hearing to establish”); see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch.

Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 624 (5th Cir. 2004).3 

In this instance, Doe’s frank admission in the police reports to the conduct in

question absolved the Defendants from holding anything more formal than the initial

meeting with Doe’s parents.4

 Whatever Doe’s qualm with the decision itself, there is no

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ORDER – 10

dispute that Defendants possessed accurate information regarding Doe’s assault. The

operative facts were simply not in question, and thus, it is doubtful that due process

required Defendants to provide any hearing. Accordingly, the court grants Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Doe’s procedural due process claim.

Before proceeding to Doe’s remaining claims, the court expresses its dismay over

Defendants’ practice of imposing expulsions for an indefinite number of days. By a

stroke of luck (or perhaps pressure from Doe’s attorney), Doe’s expulsion lasted just ten

days, bringing the due process requirements within the Goss fold. Had Doe’s expulsion

continued while, for example, Doe’s parents and Dr. Simms continued to argue about the

qualifications of various therapists, the court’s analysis may very well have ended

differently. Fortunately for Defendants, the fact remains that Doe’s expulsion was

relatively short, and thus, the rudimentary notice and hearing met the constitutional

minimum. 

B. Substantive Due Process 

Procedures aside, at the heart of this case is Doe’s challenge to the substance of

Defendants’ decision. Doe adamantly argues that Defendants lacked sufficient reason to

believe that he was a threat to himself or other students and that his inter-family, out-ofschool conduct did not warrant an emergency expulsion. Doe alleges that the expulsion

decision was arbitrary because: (1) the SAV policy on its face does not actually protect

students from violence, (2) Defendants did not adequately investigate risk factors

associated with school violence or Doe’s history of violence, (3) there was an insufficient

“nexus” between his off-campus behavior and the school’s interest in keeping the student

body safe, (4) the school board had not yet adopted the SAV policy, and (5) Doe did not

violate any school rules. 

To make out a substantive due process claim on any of the above theories, Doe

must show conduct that either “shocks the conscience” or results in an arbitrary

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ORDER – 11

deprivation of a “fundamental right.” See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir.

2006). The United States Supreme Court describes fundamental rights as “those personal

activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history

and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that

they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.

702, 727 (1997). Not surprisingly, the list of fundamental rights is short, and the Court

has cautioned against expanding the reach of the substantive arm of the Due Process

Clause. Id. at 721. 

Doe contends that Defendants deprived him of his fundamental right to have his

parents direct his upbringing. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15-16 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205, 232 (1972)). Although it is not altogether clear how this right is implicated, it

appears that Doe takes issue with the fact that Defendants’ decision to expel him centered

on events that occurred within the confines of the family home. Doe also contends that

the SAV policy, because it reaches off-campus violence, “impermissibly intruded upon

his family’s substantive due process rights to privacy and to parental control.” Pl.’s

Opp’n at 16. 

The court disagrees that the right of Doe’s parents to control his upbringing is

implicated in this case. First, Doe does not provide any authority for the proposition that

he has standing to assert this right. The right to direct a “child’s care, custody, and

control” is uniformly stated as belonging to the parents. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530

U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).

Regardless, even if the court assumes that Doe has standing to assert this

fundamental right, the court holds that, in this instance, the right “does not extend beyond

the threshold of the school door.” Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1207

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that parents had no due process or privacy right under Meyer or

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Although no party raised it, the court is struck by the fact that Doe’s sisters also attend

schools within the District. See Jane Doe Decl. ¶ 3.

6

The court reaches its decision regarding the limitations on parental rights in the context of

public schools mindful that, under common law, those same schools are faced with the enhanced,

nondelegable duty to protect students from harmful actions of others students. E.g., Carabba v.

Anacortes Sch. Dist., 435 P.2d 936, 958 (Wash. 1968); J.N. v. Bellingham Sch. Dist., 871 P.2d

1106, 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).

7

Other circuits apply the rational basis test where a parent asserts the right to control a

child’s upbringing as a basis for challenging state action in public schools. See Herndon v. Chapel

Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Ed., 89 F.3d 174, 178-179 (4th Cir. 1996); Immediato v. Rye Neck

Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461-462 (2d Cir. 1996).

ORDER – 12

Pierce to override a public school’s determination regarding health education materials to

which children would be exposed). Rather, when Doe’s parents chose to enroll Doe in

public school, they surrendered their exclusive right to make decisions regarding when

his behavior poses a risk to himself or others.5

 See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206. Defendants

determined that the off-campus assault was relevant to their duty to maintain safe school

grounds; they did not unconstitutionally interfere with the Doe family’s decision to

contact the police about Doe’s behavior in the first instance.6

Because the court concludes that Defendants have not infringed a fundamental

right, the court applies rational basis review. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208.7

 In the

context of school expulsions, “a substantive due process claim will succeed only in the

‘rare case’ when there is no rational relationship between punishment and the offense.” 

Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch.

Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Seal standard). On this topic, the

Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland stated:

It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school

administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or

compassion . . . . The system of public education that has evolved in this

Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school

administrators and school board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be

a vehicle for federal-court corrections of errors in the exercise of that

discretion which do not rise to the level of specific constitutional guarantees.

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Although the court recognizes that the decisions in this discussion primarily deal with

expulsions for disciplinary purposes, the court cannot conceive of any reason to apply lesser

deference to a school decision based on safety concerns. 

9

Indeed, when asked at oral argument whether such evidence existed, Doe’s counsel

simply maintained that the conscience-shocking inquiry did not apply because Doe had asserted a

fundamental right. 

ORDER – 13

420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975).8 

Indeed, even where a fundamental right is implicated, the court reviews “with

deference, schools’ decision in connection with safety of their students.” LaVine v.

Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding school officials’ decision

to expel student based on a violent poem, even though student’s freedom of expression

right implicated). Under this deferential standard, lower courts have upheld school

administrators’ efforts to regulate off-campus conduct based on safety concerns. See,

e.g., Cohn v. New Paltz Central Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp.2d 421, 434 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)

(denying substantive due process challenge to school’s expulsion based on student’s 

possession of a handgun off school property). 

Here, the court concludes that Defendants have shown a rational relationship

between their decision to expel Doe in order to ascertain his potential for violence, and

Doe’s prior assaults. There is no question that Defendants’ sole concern in deciding to

expel Doe centered on his safety and the safety of the other school children. The court

does not substitute its own judgment for that of Defendants in determining how to make

schools safe in an era of increasing school violence. Further, the court declines to

second-guess Defendants’ decision where Doe does not cite any evidence that

Defendants’ conduct “shocks the conscience.”9

 See Brittain, 451 F.3d at 991. 

Finally, Doe contends that Defendants have arbitrarily maintained reference to the

expulsion in his school records. As such, Doe seeks injunctive relief to require

Defendants to expunge his records. In response, Defendants cite the need to maintain

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10The court advises the parties that, if Defendants fail to act in accordance with their

representation, Doe may request relief from the court.

ORDER – 14

such records in order to preserve institutional memory of incidents that may inform future

decisions regarding school safety. 

The court denies Doe’s request for permanent injunctive relief. Doe has not

prevailed on either of his constitutional claims and the court is not aware of any separate

constitutional right to an unblemished school record. As such, the court denies his

requested relief. The court recognizes that the Ninth Circuit in LaVine ordered the

defendant-school to expunge a high school student’s record of negative documentation

once the perceived threat had subsided. 257 F.3d at 992. In doing so, the court noted

that a “permanent blemish” would “harm [the student’s] ability to secure future

employment.” Id. By contrast, Doe has made no showing whatsoever that the

information in his school record poses any risk of harm to his future educational or

professional opportunities. Defendants, on the other hand, represent to the court that the

files are internal, confidential, and shredded “upon [Doe’s] graduation.”10 Defs.’ Opp’n

at 19. Without more, the court denies Doe’s request for relief. 

C. State Law Claims

Doe appears to have abandoned any claims arising under state law. Defendants

assert that Doe did not comply with the notice-of-claim provisions under state law. Doe

does not contest this fact and simply reiterates that his federal claims do not require such

notice. Without any evidence or argument to the contrary, the court grants Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Doe’s state law claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion (Dkt. # 17)

and DENIES Doe’s motion (Dkt. # 51). The court directs the clerk to enter judgment

consistent with this order. No claims remain and the case is hereby closed.

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ORDER – 15

Dated this 26th day of January, 2007.

A JAMES L. ROBART

United States District Judge

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