NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 20-1824

____________ HOLLIE ADAMS; JODY WEABER; KAREN UNGER; CHRIS FELKER, Appellants

v. TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL 429; COUNTY OF LEBANON; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLV ANIA; JAMES M. DARBY, Chairman, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board; ALBERT MEZZAROBA, Member, Pennsylvania Labor Relations

Board; ROBERT H. SHOOP, JR., Member, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, in their official capacities

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-00336) District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

Argued on June 23, 2021 Before: CHAGARES, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 20, 2022)

Charles O. Beckley, II Beckley & Madden 212 North Third Street Suite 301 Harrisburg, PA 171082 Jeffrey M. Schwab (ARGUED) Daniel R. Suhr Liberty Justice Center 141 West Jackson Boulevard Suite 1065 Chicago, IL 60604 Counsel for Appellants

John R. Bielski (ARGUED) Willig, Williams & Davidson 1845 Walnut Street 24 th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellees Peggy M. Morcom (ARGUED) Morcom Law 226 West Chocolate Avenue Hershey, PA 17033 Counsel for Appell ee County of Lebanon Ryan B. Smith Claudia M. Tesoro Nancy A. Walker (ARGUED) Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General 1600 Arch Street Suite 300 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellees Atto rney General Pennsylvania; James M. Darby; Albert Mezz aroba and Robert H. Shoop, Jr.3 OPINION*

ROTH , Circuit Judge: When the appellant-employees (employees) we re hired, they faced a choice: join a union and pay dues or decline to join and pay “fair share” fees. 1 At the time, it was lawful for unions to charge fair share fees to nonmembers. The employees, all of whom work for Lebanon County, chos e to join Teamsters Union Local 429 (the Union). In 2018, however, the Supr eme Court held in Janus v. AFSCME 2 that state laws authorizing unions to charge fair share fees viol ate the First Amendment. So after Janus , the employees faced a different choice: pay union dues or pay no fees. The employees chose to resign from the Uni on. The Union stopped charging them

dues. It also refunded to th em the dues that had automatica lly been deduct ed after they resigned. Nevertheless, the employees sued. 3 They sought a refund of the dues they had paid before they resigned from the Union. In their view, th ey should have had the choice

* This disposition is not an opin ion of the full Court and, unde r I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. 1 A fair share fee is a payment that nonmembe rs are required to make to the union, which typically is a percentage of union dues. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018). A “f air share” fee is the same as an “agency” fee. 2 Id. 3 Nevertheless, the Union continued to wi thhold money from Adams and Weaber through March 2019—after they filed this lawsuit.4 to pay dues or pay noth ing at all—even before Janus . Because they did not have that choice, they contend that their payment of union dues violated the First Amendment. The employees also assert that Pennsyl vania’s exclusive-representation law, making a union the exclusive bargaining agent for employees, violates the First

Amendment. The employees filed their complaint in Fe bruary 2019. The complaint names as defendants the Union, the Coun ty of Lebanon, the Pennsylv ania Attorney General, and members of Pennsylvania’s Labor Relations Bo ard. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge issued two Reports and Recommendations, recommending that the District Court grant summary judgment for the defendants. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations and dismissed the claims. The employees appealed.

I. Jurisdiction The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Standard of Review

Our review of an order granting a mo tion for summary judgment is plenary. 4 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the mova nt shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact a nd the movant is entitled to ju dgment as a matter of law.” 5 In

4 Bletz v. Corrie , 974 F.3d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 2020). 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).5 considering the motions, we “review the re cord as a whole, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and must not ‘weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.’” 6

III. Discussion

On the issue of refund of dues , we have recently held in LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council , 7 that a former union member has “no standing to seek a refund of any portion of the union dues she made prior to Janus because she cannot tie the payment of those dues to the Union’s unconstitutional deduction of fair-share fees

from nonmembers.” 8 LaSpina involved a similar situation to the one we have here: an employee, in an exclusive representation em ployment situation, who joined the union rather than paying a fair sh are fee and who then, after Janus , resigned from the union and sued to get a refund of union dues. We dismissed the claim for refund in LaSpina and following LaSpina , we do the same here. The employ ees lack standing to seek a refund of union dues paid before they resigned the union. 9 The employees’ claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief are moot because they have not shown their employers or the union will continue to assess union dues. 10 To the extent Adams and Weaber still seek damage s for union dues paid after they resigned the union, their claims

6 Bletz , 974 F.3d at 308 (quoting Parkell v. Danberg , 833 F.3d 313, 32 3 (3d Cir. 2016)). 7 985 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2021). 8 Id. at 281, 287. 9 See id. at 286–87. 10 Id. at 289–91.6 are now moot because they have been reimbursed and, in a ny event, they fail to state a

claim under the First Amendment. 11, 12 Turning to the claim th at the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), Pennsylvania’s exclusive representation law, violates the First Amendment, we hold that, consistent with every Court of Appeals to consider a post- Janus challenge to an exclusive-representation law, the law does not violate the First Amendment. 13 The Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to an exclusiverepresentation law in 1984. In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight , a group of teachers challenged a Minnesota law that permitted the designation of an exclusive union representative for school employees. 14 The Court explained that the law

did not violate the teachers’ free doms of speech or association. 15 The state did not “restrain[] appellees’ freedom to sp eak on any education-related issue.” 16 Nor did the

11 See id. at 287–88. 12 One the employees wo rked for the co unty for two years while not a member of the Union. App. 92–93. At the start of her employment, rather than join the union, she “opt[ed] instead to pay a fair share fee as a non-member.” App. 130. But she does not raise any separate refund clai m based on her payment of agency fees. So any separate claim for a refund of ag ency fees is forfeited. 13 Reisman v. Associated Facs. of Univ. of Me. , 939 F.3d 409, 41 4 (1st Cir. 2019), cert. denied , 141 S. Ct. 445 (2020); Akers v. Maryland State Educ. Ass’n , 990 F.3d 375, 382 n.3 (4th Cir. 2021); Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass’n , 972 F.3d 809, 813–14 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied , No. 20-1019, 2021 WL 2301972 (U.S. June 7, 2021); Bennett v. Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of St ate, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO , 991 F.3d 724, 735 (7th Cir. 2021); Bierman v. Dayton , 900 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. , Bierman v. Walz , 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019); Mentele v. Inslee , 916 F.3d 783, 786–91 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. , Miller v. Inslee , 140 S. Ct. 114 (2019); Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18 , 992 F.3d 950, 969 (10th Cir. 2021). 14 465 U.S. 271, 273–75 (1984). 15 Id. at 288. 16 Id.7 law impermissibly infringe on “their freedom to associate or not to associate with whom they please.” 17 And the teachers were “free to fo rm whatever advoca cy groups they

like.” 18 Recognizing that Knight presents a large obstacle, the employees try to tack around it. They argue that Knight was only about whether the employees could demand a forum with their employe r. This case is different, they posit, because they object to the Union speaking on their behalf at all. Th e employees’ complaint is that the Union can allegedly “speak in their name.” 19 Thus, they argue, Knight does not bar their

constitutional claim. This reading of Knight , however, is simply at odds with what it says. It is true that

in Knight the teachers argued that the law violat ed the First Amendment because it made the union their exclusive representative. Bu t the Court also considered whether the law

violated the teachers’ First Amen dment freedoms of speech or a ssociation. It held that it

did not. Knight forecloses the First Amendmen t challenge. Like the law in Knight , PERA allows for the designation of an exclus ive representative. Like the law in Knight , it requires the public employer to negotiate with the exclusive representative on employment issues. The employe es here, like the teachers in Knight , are free to express whatever ideas they wish, incl uding through groups they create and including about the

17 Id. 18 Id. at 289. 19 Employees’ Op. Br. 55.8 Union. Indeed, PERA protects their right to present certain grievances to their employer. 20 Also like the teachers, the employees are free to associat e—or not—with the Union. Given these similarities, this la w does not violate the First Amendment. The employees’ final argument is that Janus undercut Knight

. Janus provides, however, that “[s]tates can keep their labo r-relations systems exactly as they are.” 21 Nothing in Janus undermines Knight or exclusive-representation laws.

IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affi rm the District Court’s orders granting summary judgment to the defendants.

20 43 Pa. Stat. § 1101.606. 21 Id. at 2485 n.27.