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S. HRG. 110–835 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY 

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 11, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, January 11, 2007 

Statement of: 

Rockefeller, Hon. John D., IV, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West 

Virginia .......................................................................................................... 1 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri 4 

Negroponte, Hon. John D., Director of National Intelligence ....................... 6 

Hayden, General Michael V., Director, Central Intelligence Agency ........... 13 

Fort, Hon. Randall M., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 

Research ........................................................................................................ 17 

Mueller, Hon. Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation ..... 19 

Maples, Lieutenant General Michael D., Director, Defense Intelligence 

Agency ............................................................................................................ 23 

Supplemental Materials: 

Statement for the Record of the Director of National Intelligence John 

D. Negroponte ............................................................................................... 58 

Statement for the Record of Michael V. Hayden, Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency ....................................................................................... 72 

Statement for the Record of Randall M. Fort, Assistant Secretary of 

State ............................................................................................................... 77 

Statement for the Record of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation ................................................................................ 82 

Statement for the Record of Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency ............................................... 91 

Letter dated March 30, 2007 to Director Michael V. Hayden, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice 

Chairman Christopher S. Bond ................................................................... 121 

Letter dated March 30, 2007 to Director J. M. McConnell, Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence, from Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond .................................... 127 

Letter dated September 12, 2007 to Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV 

and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond from Kathleen Turner, Director of Legislative Affairs ............................................................................... 138 

Letter dated March 30, 2007 to Director Robert S. Mueller III, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, from Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and 

Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond ........................................................... 146 

Letter dated February 4, 2008 to Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and 

Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond to Brian A. Benczkowski, U.S. 

Department of Justice .................................................................................. 147 

Letter dated March 30, 2007 to Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, from Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond .................................... 156 

Letter dated March 30, 2007 to Randall Fort, Department of State, from 

Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. 

Bond ............................................................................................................... 176 

Letter dated May 2, 2007 to Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV from 

Jeffrey T. Bergner, Department of State .................................................... 177 

(1) 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL 

SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The hearing convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay Rockefeller (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Rockefeller, Feinstein, Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, 

Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, Bond, Warner, Hagel, 

Chambliss, Hatch, Snowe, and Burr. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, IV, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. This hearing will come to order. I welcome all of our witnesses in what is I think one of the most important public meetings of the year. This one will be open, and then 

we’ll have a closed one, and I think between the two we can get 

a lot accomplished. 

Today the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence embarks on 

an ambitious agenda of hearings and Committee reviews that will 

restore meaningful congressional oversight of the activities of the 

U.S. intelligence community. 

I think it’s fitting that the Committee’s first hearing of 2007 is 

on the worldwide threat. It’s important not only that the Congress, 

but the American people understand that threats facing our country both inside our borders and abroad are significant. This is why 

the Committee is conducting this session openly. 

I am extremely concerned—and I’ll just be frank about it from 

this Senator’s point of view—that the misguided policies of the Administration have increased the threat facing our Nation and hampered our ability to isolate and defeat al-Qa’ida and other terrorists 

that seek to strike against the United States. I believe our actions 

in Iraq have placed our Nation more at risk to terrorist attack than 

before the invasion. 

Based on the findings of the Committee’s Iraq investigation, I 

have concluded that the Administration promoted nonexistent links 

between Iraq and al-Qa’ida in an effort to, so to speak, sell the war 

that was fundamentally, in fact, about regime change, not about an 

imminent threat to America. 

The sobering consequences of our actions are well known. Over 

3,000 Americans have died in Iraq, many thousands more are 

gravely wounded. Our military and intelligence efforts in fighting 

2 

and capturing the Taliban and al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan were diverted at a very critical juncture to support the invasion of Iraq. 

Now these agents of extremism and violence have reestablished 

themselves in a safe haven that threatens not only America but 

also the governments in Kabul and Islamabad. Al-Qa’ida and foreign jihadists have used our occupation as an opportunity to strike 

against Americans and as a propaganda tool to spread its influence 

in Iraq and throughout the region—throughout the world. 

I also believe that this portrayal of our actions in Iraq has fueled 

the spread of the terrorist message and increased the number of 

self-radicalized terrorist cells in other parts of the world such as 

Asia and Europe. 

The ongoing war in Iraq has demanded enormous funding and 

personnel resources, which have strained our efforts in the global 

war on terrorism. And I have seen nothing in my service on the 

Intelligence Committee or any in other forum that suggests that 

sending an additional 21,500 American troops to Iraq will bring 

about greater security on the ground or lead to a more successful 

outcome. 

The overwhelming advice from our senior military commanders 

suggests that there’s little reason to believe that the diplomatic, political and economic objectives will be any more successful with 

153,000 troops than with the current 132,000 troops. And that’s 

really the crux, to me, of the President’s new strategy—more 

troops. 

It is an approach that tinkers at the margins of a grave and deteriorating situation. It is not grounded in the realities that we face 

in Iraq and in the region, and it is an unacceptable gamble with 

additional soldiers’ lives. The President must understand that even 

as the Congress continues to support and fund the brave work of 

our servicemen and servicewomen who are now serving in Iraq, we 

will push back on an ill-conceived plan to put more soldiers in 

harm’s way. 

I also am troubled by what I see as an Administration counterterrorism policy, which in certain respects may be complicating, if 

not worsening our ability to win the war on terrorism. 

To be specific, I have serious misgivings about the soundness and 

effectiveness of the CIA’s secret detention program, the NSA’s 

warrantless surveillance program, both publicly acknowledged by 

the President of the United States. I’m concerned that the very existence of a separate CIA prison program established to interrogate 

high-value detainees under a different set of rules than those outlined in the Army Field Manual and repudiated, in fact, by the 

FBI, has undermined our moral standing in the eyes of the world. 

How many millions of moderate Arabs and Muslims around the 

world having seen the photos of Abu Ghraib, having heard stories 

about abuses at Guantanamo and who are now aware that the CIA 

operates a secret prison, believe that America tortures detainees? 

How does this perception help foster extremism around the 

world, and how do we weigh this fact, combined with lasting damage done to America’s image, against the putative intelligence benefits of operating a separate CIA program in lieu of a single Pentagon program that is subject to greater scrutiny? 

3 

With respect to the NSA surveillance program, I believe the Administration’s policy has unnecessarily alienated an essential ally 

in combating the terrorist threat—the U.S. Congress. In the aftermath of 9/11, our Nation stood unified to defeat the terrorists; that 

was the hallmark. The Administration decision to go it alone and 

work outside the legal parameters of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was, in my judgment, a serious miscalculation and 

undercut the strength of our unity of purpose. 

This approach also created serious doubts in the minds of Americans, whose support is essential in any kind of effort of this sort, 

as to how far the Administration would go, in fact, in unilaterally 

carrying out secret programs seeking to identify potential terrorists 

inside our borders, inside America. 

The Administration has still not convincingly demonstrated to 

me that the ends justifies the means, in other words, that the NSA 

program has produced the sort of unique, timely and actionable intelligence to justify the surveillance of American phone calls and email messages without a court warrant. 

As we hear from our witnesses today, I hope they can address 

these concerns about the effectiveness of our counterterrorism programs and whether the situation in Iraq has worsened the threats 

facing America’s security. 

In the coming weeks and months, this Committee will receive 

testimony from intelligence officials and outside witnesses on critical questions at the heart of our national security policies. 

For your information, next week the Committee will hold a 

closed hearing on Iraq’s regional neighbors and their influence on 

the war, including—in the light of the Iraq Study Group recommendations—the intelligence community’s assessment on the receptivity of Syria, Iran and other nations to a regional diplomatic 

initiative and the consequences of changes in the U.S. military 

presence in Iraq. 

The Committee will then turn its attention to an examination of 

current, emerging and future terrorist safe havens. Our focus will 

not only be on current operations, such as in Somalia, to deny terrorist sanctuary where they can plot and carry out attacks, but also 

on the soundness and foresight of our counterterrorism policy to 

identify those places where the terrorists’ virulent messages of violence may take root and preemptively try to stop it. 

In 2 weeks the Committee will hold a pair of open hearings on 

the state of the intelligence community reform 2 years after the 

passage of landmark legislation establishing an empowered Director of National Intelligence to manage and coordinate our intelligence programs. 

The focus of our next open hearing will be on the intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department 

of Homeland Security. We will be interested in evaluating the pace 

of transformation at the FBI and the effectiveness of the newly created Joint Terrorist Task Forces and state and local fusion centers 

in carrying out counterterrorism investigations that do not run 

afoul of privacy rights and civil liberties. 

The Committee’s workload will continue to be heavy beyond January. In addition to a number of closed hearings on developments 

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, the Committee 

4 

will hold monthly hearings on the situation in Iraq, including a 

hearing on the intelligence community’s new Iraq National Intelligence Estimate once it is completed. 

Our first act of Committee business will be to re-pass the fiscal 

year 2007 intelligence authorization bill. The Committee unanimously reported this bill out last May, but it was never received 

with approval by the Senate. 

We must also complete the Committee’s 21⁄2-year investigation of 

prewar intelligence on Iraq in a prompt, but thorough and objective 

manner. We should have and we could have completed this years 

ago. 

There is other unfinished business before the Committee in the 

area of counterterrorism. For 4 years the Administration kept the 

very existence of the National Security Agency’s warrantless surveillance program and the Central Intelligence Agency’s detention, 

interrogation and rendition program from the full membership of 

this Committee. Through the over-restriction of Member and Committee staff access to the NSA and CIA programs and the denial 

of requested documents, the White House has prevented this Committee from completely understanding these programs and thoroughly evaluating their legal soundness and their operational effectiveness. 

The Senate will rightfully expect our Committee to have informed judgment on both the NSA and CIA programs and to be 

prepared, if this Committee so decides, to propose legislative language on each by the time we report out our fiscal 2008 authorization bill this spring. 

The Administration can no longer stonewall the Committee’s legitimate requests with respect to those two programs. It needs to 

understand the fundamental precept that congressional oversight is 

a constructive and necessary part of governance. 

Our Committee stands ready to work with the Administration, 

and we do, but we also want to be treated equally. We want to 

know what is our right under the National Security Act of 1947, 

to have the intelligence which gives the basis for policymaking, or 

perhaps which does not. But we cannot responsibly do our work so 

long as we are deprived of critical information that we do need, in 

fact, to do our job.. 

Before introducing the witnesses, I now turn to Vice Chairman 

Bond for his opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chaiman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

welcome to our witnesses. It’s a great honor for me to serve as Vice 

Chairman, and I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, 

and the Members of the Committee. 

I’m very pleased that we worked on the agenda for the Committee this year. It is an aggressive one because there’s much work 

that has to be done, work that we postponed as we continue to look 

backward over the last 4 years. But we are going to pass the 2007 

authorization bill, find out about the intelligence that is supporting 

our troops in Iraq—a very important thing to me and others. 

5 

We want to take a look at how we’re doing in the battle of ideology, because an insurgency, an ideological war, is 20 percent kinetic and 80 percent ideological. And I would look forward to your 

views and members of the panel on how we’re doing in that area. 

We also need to take a look at the other areas where radical 

Islamists pose a threat to responsible democratic governments, to 

Americans, and even to the United States. I believe that we must 

look at the intel reform bill because I believe we gave the Director 

of National Intelligence lots of responsibility, but not enough authority to get the job done. And that’s a legislative problem. 

Also, I think we ought to consider whether we can work with the 

agencies to develop a legislative framework for counterterrorism. 

There will be a change in the Administration in January 2009 and 

I think that we ought to have an established legislative framework 

for that extremely important work. 

And finally, I hope we can do a better job working with the community to get a handle on finances, get Intelligence Committee 

input into the appropriations process, and take a look at some of 

the very costly activities in the intelligence community. 

We have much work to do in the 110th Congress. This was supposed to be a hearing on the worldwide threat. As everybody knows 

with the President’s announcement, most people are going to be focusing on Iraq, and I will as well. And I believe the Chair and I 

have been invited to serve on a consultation group with the President and other Committee heads to continue to oversee and comment on this program. 

But I have a slightly different view. I believe that there is something different between what we have been doing with the forces 

that were there. Adding more forces to the existing scenario would 

not have been of any help. But I believe now that Prime Minister 

al-Maliki has agreed to take ownership and put the Iraqis out 

front, that—he’s asked us for additional support to support his 

troops as they take over security in Iraq—is probably the only 

available option for concluding our efforts in Iraq successfully, and 

I’m going to ask questions about that. 

But I believe that participation and full ownership by the elected 

government of Iraq is the critical ingredient. It’s time for Iraqis to 

step up to the plate or we will obviously consider other options. 

America has sacrificed greatly to give the Iraqis this historic opportunity. They must seize day. Our commitment to Iraq is firm, 

but not in perpetuity. And Prime Minister al-Maliki can either be 

the father to a modern Iraq, as George Washington was to the 

United States, if you will, or a forgotten footnote in the history of 

whatever remains of the territory that formerly was called Iraq. 

There are steps that the President has taken to recognize the 

burdens on our military, our National Guard, our reservists; I 

think those are important. 

But as I said, Iraq’s not our only concern. North Korea continues 

the development of both nuclear weapons and advanced delivery 

systems. Iran apparently has rejected international sanctions and 

forges ahead with nuclear developments. Radical Islamists are festering the potential for terrorist attacks in areas of Southeast Asia, 

Pakistan, parts of Iraq, potentially endangering the United States 

as well. 

6 

We also too often neglect some of the concerns in South America 

as well as other areas that could become terrorist safe havens. 

The preeminent conflict of the last generation was with a monolithic superpower, the Soviet Union. Today we face a myriad of enemies united by a militant ideology infested with hatred for America and the freedoms, hopes and opportunities we represent. We 

have a different battle. 

And I would say parenthetically, with respect to the access by 

this Committee to information, the leaders of this Committee and 

the leaders on both sides in the Senate and the House were briefed 

on the President’s terrorist surveillance program. I was not. I really think I should have been. But I can say that, now that I have 

been read into the program and studied it carefully and the underlying law, I believe not only is it within the guidelines of the law 

and strongly and carefully enforced to make sure it stays there, but 

I believe it’s been very effective, and I’m sure that there are witnesses here who can comment on the effectiveness of the programs. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and look forward to 

hearing the witnesses. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Vice Chairman Bond, for 

what was an excellent statement. 

And obviously we welcome you very genuinely. This is kind of 

the beginning of a new era, I think. We are serious; the Vice Chairman and myself, and Members of this Committee are serious about 

getting intelligence, of working with you together. If there’s ever 

any time that we need to do that, it certainly is now. Disagreements on policy do not mean something is political; it means that 

there can be honest differences that can only be worked out if people are willing to talk to each other in open fashion. All of you have 

that nature. 

And so let me just say, in order to allow maximum time for Senators to ask questions of our witnesses, I ask that their full written 

statements be made a part of the record, without objection. And 

I’ve asked that each of our witnesses briefly summarize their statements. 

Now, obviously, as the head of the intelligence community, Director John Negroponte will begin, and we have asked the Director to 

try to keep his remarks to 20 minutes. And then after that, we 

would hope that the other equally important witnesses would try 

to keep within 10 minutes. 

And for the Members of the Intelligence Committee, we will be 

restricted to 5-minute questions in as many rounds as we can do. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DIRECTOR OF 

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Director NEGROPONTE. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the invitation to offer the intelligence community’s 

assessment of threats to our Nation. 

I’m privileged to be accompanied by General Michael Hayden, Director of the CIA; General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency; Mr. Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI; and 

Mr. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 

Research. 

7 

Judgments I will offer the Committee are based on the efforts of 

thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals, many of whom 

serve in harm’s way. 

The U.S. intelligence community is the best in the world, and I’m 

pleased to report that it is even better than it was last year as a 

result of reforms mandated by the President and the Congress. 

These reforms promote better information sharing, the highest 

standards of analytic rigor, the most innovative techniques of acquiring information, and a stronger sense of community across our 

16 agencies. 

The Nation requires more from our intelligence community than 

ever before because America confronts a greater diversity of threats 

and challenges than ever before. 

This afternoon, in the interest of brevity, I will address only a 

few of these threats and challenges, providing more comprehensive 

assessments in my unclassified and classified statements for the 

record. 

My comments will focus on: Our efforts to defeat international 

terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida, which is seeking to 

strengthen its global network of relationships with other violent extremists; the challenges Iraq and Afghanistan confront in forging 

national institutions in the face of inter-sectarian insurgent and 

terrorist violence; the two states most determined to develop weapons of mass destruction, Iran and North Korea; the shadow that 

Iran has begun to cast over the Middle East; turmoil in Africa; democratization in Latin America; China’s economic and military 

modernization; and energy security and the foreign policy benefits 

which high prices offer states that are hostile to U.S. interests. 

First, terrorism. Terrorism remains the preeminent threat to the 

homeland, to our national security interests, and to our allies. In 

the last year, we have developed a deeper understanding of the 

enemy we face. Al-Qa’ida is the terrorist organization that poses 

the greatest threat. We have captured or killed numerous senior alQa’ida operatives, but al-Qa’ida’s core elements are resilient. They 

continue to plot attacks against our homeland and other targets, 

with the objective of inflicting mass casualties. And they are cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. 

Use of conventional explosives continues to be the most probable 

al-Qa’ida attack scenario. Nevertheless, we receive reports indicating that al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups are attempting to 

acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or 

materials. Their objective, as I have said, is to inflict mass casualties. They will employ any means at their disposal to achieve that 

objective. 

In addition to al-Qa’ida—its networks and affiliates—I would 

highlight the terrorist threat from Hizballah, backed by Iran and 

Syria. As a result of last summer’s hostilities, Hizballah’s self-confidence and hostility toward the United States as a supporter of 

Israel could cause the group to increase its contingency planning 

against U.S. interests. 

We know from experience since 9/11 that countering terrorism 

depends on effective international cooperation. Our successes so far 

8 

against al-Qa’ida and other jihadists and our ability to prevent attacks abroad and at home have been aided considerably by the cooperation of foreign governments, among them Iraq, the United 

Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and many 

others. 

It is important to note our shared successes, not to take credit 

but to demonstrate results. The longer we fight this war, the better 

we get at inflicting serious setbacks to our adversaries. 

For example, in Iraq we eliminated al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s murderous 

leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Also in Iraq, we have severely damaged Ansar al-Sunna’s leadership and operational capacity. 

In the United Kingdom, a plot to perpetrate the worst terrorist 

slaughter of innocent civilians since 9/11 was detected and disrupted. 

And in Pakistan, last April, Abdel al-Rahman al-Muhajir and 

Abu Bakr al-Suri, two of al-Qa’ida’s top bomb-makers, were killed. 

Again, I emphasize that we do not and could not accomplish our 

counterterrorism mission unilaterally. Our role varies from situation to situation. But what does not vary is our requirement for 

good intelligence and committed partners, which we have in all 

parts of the world. 

Now turning to Iran and Afghanistan—the two countries where 

the U.S. military is engaged in combat—Iraq and Afghanistan face 

challenges that are exacerbated by terrorism, but not exclusively 

attributable to it. 

In Iraq, sectarian divisions are widening, but the multiparty government of Nouri al-Maliki continues to seek ways to bridge the divisions and restore commitment to a unified country. The effort to 

create a so-called moderate front of major parties from the country’s three major ethno-sectarian groups to back the Prime Minister has underscored moderates’ interest in bridging the gaps between Iraq’s communities. 

Iraqi security forces have become more numerous and capable 

since my last threat briefing. Six division headquarters, 30 brigades and more than 90 battalions have taken the lead in their 

operational areas, have battled insurgents on their own and have 

stood up to the militias in some cases. 

Nonetheless, Iraq is at a precarious juncture. The various parties 

have not yet shown the ability to compromise effectively on the 

thorny issues of de-Ba’athification, constitutional reforms, federalism, and central versus regional control over hydrocarbon revenues. Provision of essential public services is inadequate. Oil output remains below prewar levels. Hours of electric power available 

have declined and remain far below demand, and inflationary pressures have grown since last year. 

Increasingly, the Iraqis resort to violence. Their conflict over national identity and the distribution of power has eclipsed attacks 

against the coalition forces as the greatest impediment to Iraq’s future as a peaceful, democratic and unified state. 

Prospects for increasing stability in Iraq over the next year will 

depend on several factors—among them, the extent to which the 

Iraqi government and political leaders can establish effective national institutions that transcend sectarian or ethnic interests, and 

within this context the willingness of Iraqi security forces to pursue 

9 

extremist elements of all kinds; the extent to which extremists, 

most notably al-Qa’ida in Iraq, can be defeated in their attempt to 

foment inter-sectarian struggle between Shi’a and Sunnis; and last, 

the extent to which Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran and Syria, can 

be persuaded to stop the flow of militants and munitions across 

their borders. 

As in Iraq, 2007 will be a pivotal year for Afghanistan. The ability of the Karzai government, NATO and the United States to arrest the resurgence of the Taliban will determine the country’s future. At present the insurgency probably does not directly threaten 

the government, but it is deterring economic development and undermining popular support for President Karzai. 

Afghan leaders must build central and provincial government capacity and confront pervasive drug cultivation and trafficking. Neither task will be easy. The country faces a chronic shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated government officials. The 

drug trade contributes to endemic corruption at all levels of government and undercuts public confidence. And a dangerous nexus exists between drugs and the insurgents and warlords who derive 

funds from cultivation and trafficking. 

Turning now to states of concern with regard to proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction, after terrorism, the efforts of nationstates and non-state actors, including terrorists, to develop and/or 

acquire dangerous weapons and delivery systems constitute the 

second major threat to the safety of our Nation, to our deployed 

troops, and to our friends and interests abroad. 

Dual-use technologies circulate easily in our global economy; so 

do the scientific personnel who design and use them. That makes 

it more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire these widely available components and production technologies and to adapt them to 

nefarious purposes. 

Iran and North Korea are the states of most concern to us today 

because their regimes are pursuing nuclear programs in defiance of 

United Nations Security Council restrictions. 

Our assessment is that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear 

weapons. It is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment and has 

shown more interest in protracting negotiations than in reaching 

an acceptable diplomatic solution. 

Iranian nuclear weapons could prompt dangerous and destabilizing counter-moves by other states in a volatile region that is 

critical to the global economy. 

By pressing forward with its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea also threatens to destabilize a volatile and 

vital region, a region that has known several great-power conflicts 

over the last century and now comprises some of the world’s largest 

economies. 

As you know, North Korea flight tested missiles in July and tested a nuclear device in October. Pyongyang has threatened to test 

its nuclear weapons and missiles again. Indeed, it already has sold 

ballistic missiles to several Middle Eastern countries. 

Turning now to regional conflicts, instability, reconfigurations of 

power and influence, first, the Middle East, an emboldened Iran. 

In the Middle East, Iran’s influence is rising in ways that go beyond the menace of its nuclear program. The fall of the Taliban 

10 

and Saddam, increased oil revenues, Hamas’s electoral victory, and 

Hizballah’s perceived recent successes in fighting against Israel all 

extend Iran’s shadow in the region. This disturbs our Arab allies 

who are concerned about worsening tensions between Shi’a and 

Sunni Islam, and face heightened domestic criticism for maintaining their partnerships with Washington. 

Iran’s growing influence has coincided with a generational 

change in Tehran’s leadership. Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 

administration, staffed in large part by second-generation 

hardliners imbued with revolutionary ideology and deeply distrustful of the United States, has stepped up the use of more assertive 

and offensive tactics to achieve Iran’s long-standing goals. 

Under the Ahmadinejad government, Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily with ballistic missiles 

and naval power, with the goal of dominating the Gulf region and 

deterring potential adversaries. 

Iran seeks a capacity to disrupt the operations and reinforcement 

of U.S. forces based in the region, thereby raising the political, financial and human costs of our presence to the United States and 

our allies. Tehran views its growing inventory of ballistic missiles 

as an integral part of its strategy to deter and, if necessary, retaliate against forces in the region, including U.S. forces. 

Another key element of Iran’s national security strategy is its 

ability to conduct terrorist operations abroad. It believes this capability helps safeguard the regime by deterring United States or 

Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening Israel, enhancing Iran’s 

regional influence through intimidation, and helping to drive the 

United States from the region. 

Lebanese Hizballah lies at the center of Iran’s terrorism strategy. 

Hizballah is focused on its agenda in Lebanon and supporting antiIsraeli Palestinian terrorists. But as I indicated earlier, it could decide to conduct attacks against U.S. interests in the event it feels 

its survival or that of Iran is threatened. 

Why would it serve Iran in this way? Because Lebanese 

Hizballah sees itself as Tehran’s partner, sharing Tehran’s world 

view and relying on Tehran for a substantial part of its annual 

budget, military equipment and specialized training. 

Syria has also strengthened ties with Iran while growing more 

confident about its regional policies. This is due primarily to what 

it sees as vindication of its support to Hizballah and Hamas and 

its perceptions of success in overcoming international attempts to 

isolate the regime. 

Damascus has failed to cutoff militant infiltration into Iraq and 

continues to meddle in Lebanon. As a result, Lebanon remains in 

a politically dangerous situation, while Damascus, Hizballah and 

other pro-Syrian groups attempt to topple the government of Prime 

Minister Siniora. 

In the Palestinian territories, inter-factional violence has intensified in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank since the establishment 

of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government in March. Absent success in forming a national unity government, this violence 

threatens to escalate further. 

Talks have stalled over disputes about the political platform and 

control of key Cabinet positions. Hamas rejects Quartet and Israeli 

11 

demands for explicit recognition of Israel, renunciation of armed resistance to Israeli occupation, and acceptance of previous PLO and 

international agreements. 

Turmoil in Africa. The Darfur conflict is the world’s fastest growing humanitarian crisis, with more than 200,000 people killed, 2 

million internally displaced, and another 234,000 refugees in neighboring Chad. 

Rebel groups continue to fight against the government because 

the existing peace agreement fails to satisfy their security concerns 

and their demands for power sharing and compensation. The Sudanese military has been unable to force the rebels to sign the peace 

accord, and with assistance form local militias, it is attacking civilian villages suspected of harboring the rebels. 

In addition, Chadian and Central African Republic rebel groups 

have become entangled in the Darfur crisis. The spillover of violence in the past 10 months threatens to destabilize already weak 

regimes in both countries. 

The rapid collapse of the Council of Islamic Courts and the arrival of the transitional Federal Government, the TFG, in 

Mogadishu has altered the political dynamics of southern Somalia. 

The TFG faces many of the same obstacles that have kept any single group from establishing a viable government in Somalia since 

the country collapsed in 1991. 

Somali society is divided into numerous clans and sub-clans that 

resist seeing one group rise above the others. To win the confidence 

and support of the population and to have any chance of restoring 

order, the TFG will need to be more inclusive and demonstrate effective governance. 

More turmoil could enable extremists to regain their footing, absent mechanisms to replace the temporary Ethiopian presence with 

an internationally supported Somali solution. Al-Qa’ida remains determined to exploit turmoil in Somalia. 

Democracy in Latin America. Gradual consolidation of democracy 

has remained the prevailing tendency in Latin America, although 

some commentators have spoken of a lurch to the left in the region. 

This year’s numerous elections point to no dominant ideological 

trend. Moderate leftists who promote macroeconomic stability, poverty alleviation, and the building of democratic institutions fared 

well, as did able, right-of-center leaders. At the same time, individuals who are critical of free-market economics won the presidency 

in two of Latin America’s poorest countries, Ecuador and Nicaragua. 

In Venezuela, Chavez reacted to his sweeping victory on December 3 by promising to deepen his self-described Bolivarian Revolution and to intensify the struggle against U.S. imperialism. 

He is among the most stridently anti-American leaders anywhere 

in the world and will continue to try to undercut U.S. influence in 

Venezuela, in the rest of Latin America, and elsewhere internationally. As he does so, he must confront the fact that in Cuba—his 

close ally—the transition to a post-Castro regime has now begun. 

In Mexico, President Felipe Calderon of the ruling National 

Party was inaugurated on December 1 after a razor-thin majority 

margin of victory over his close opponent, leftist populist Andres 

Manuel Lopez Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution. 

12 

The July election illustrated the country’s polarization along 

socio-economic lines. The new government has initiated steps to address problems in northern Mexico that affect both Mexican and 

U.S. security concerns, including drug smuggling, human trafficking, and associated violence. 

The rise of China. In 2006 Chinese leaders moved to align Beijing’s foreign policy with the needs of domestic development, identifying opportunities to strengthen economic growth, gain access to 

new sources of energy, and mitigate what they see as potential external threats to social stability. 

At the same time, China places a priority on positive relations 

with the United States while strengthening ties to the other major 

powers, especially the European Union and Russia. 

PRC leaders continue to emphasize development of friendly relations with the states on China’s periphery to assure peaceful borders and to avoid perceived containment by other powers. In the 

past year, China achieved notable success in improving relations 

with Japan under newly elected Prime Minister Abe, and prospects 

for cross-strait conflict with Taiwan diminished. In addition—— 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I need to point out with full respect 

that your time is up. 

Director NEGROPONTE. I have 2 more minutes, sir—2 or 3. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You’re close to 25, but you’re welcome 

to them. So if you can complete in that time, that’s excellent. And 

I thank you. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Thank you very much. 

Beijing continues its rapid rate of military modernization initiated in 1999. We assess that China’s aspirations for great-power 

status and its security strategy would drive this modernization effort even if the Taiwan problem were resolved. 

The Chinese are developing more capable long-range conventional strike systems and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads able to attack 

U.S. carriers and airbases. 

We have entered a new era in which energy security will become 

an increasing priority for the United States, the West and fast-developing major energy consumers like China and India. Oil prices 

have fallen by more than 25 percent since their peak last July and 

spare production capacity has grown to more than 2 million barrels 

per day. 

But escalating demand for oil and gas has resulted in windfall 

profits for some producer nations that are openly hostile to our interests. Iran and Venezuela fall into this category. Russia now sees 

itself as an energy superpower, a status with broad ramifications 

that include strong-arm tactics in its relations with neighboring 

states. 

Conclusion. Each of the national security challenges I have addressed today is affected by the accelerating technological change 

and transnational interplay that are the hallmarks of 21st century 

globalization. Globalization is not a threat in and of itself; it has 

more positive characteristics than negative. But globalization does 

facilitate terrorist operations, raises the dangers of WMD proliferation, stimulates regional reconfigurations of power and influence, 

13 

especially through competition for energy, and exposes the United 

States to mounting counterintelligence challenges. 

In this maelstrom of change, many nation-states are unable to 

provide good governance and sustain the rule of law within their 

borders. This enables non-state actors and hostile states to assault 

these fundamental building blocks of the international order, creating failed states, hijacked states and ungoverned regions that endanger the international community and its citizens. 

More to the point, it also threatens our own national security 

and support for freedom and democracy, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan where our troops and those of our allies are helping defend freely elected governments and sovereign peoples. 

In the 21st century, the fact is that events anywhere can and 

often do affect us. This does not mean that all threats and challenges are equally important. At any given point in time, we must 

pay greater attention to those that are most dangerous. 

In our national intelligence enterprise, the military, foreign, 

counterintelligence and domestic dimensions must be seamlessly 

integrated to provide our policymakers, warfighters, and first responders with the time and insight they need to make decisions 

that will keep Americans safe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte is on p. 58.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Director Negroponte, I thank you very 

much. I didn’t mean to interrupt, but we have to sort of keep on 

schedule. 

I’m very proud to present once again to the Intelligence Committee General Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. We look forward to your comments, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, DIRECTOR, 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman 

Bond, and Members of the Committee. 

The CIA is at the forefront of our national response to the challenges that Ambassador Negroponte has just presented to the Committee. The men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency are 

indeed central to our Nation’s ability to detect, analyze, and warn 

of the risks and opportunities we face in this kind of global environment. 

What I’d like to share with you today in open session, and frankly more comprehensively in the classified statement for the record, 

are some of the steps that CIA has taken to build on our unique 

strengths and to help ensure that the United States is able to meet 

the challenges that the DNI has just described. 

The Strategic Intent—an intent I’ve discussed with the CIA 

workforce in recent weeks and which the Committee has copies 

of—is our road map to building a more effective organization in fulfilling our paramount mission, and that’s simply protecting the 

American people. 

The central theme of our Strategic Intent is integration, operating as a team within our agency, and as a team within the larger 

intelligence community. 

14 

We’re made up of many parts. CIA has to have world-class analysts who are experts in their fields and who employ rigorous analytic tradecraft in the assessments they provide policymakers, including the Members of this Committee. 

We have to have core collectors who are conversant in the languages and cultures of the countries in which they work and who 

can collect decisive intelligence against tough targets from a variety of collection platforms. 

Our support specialists—and I know many of you have traveled 

to our bases and stations around the world and have witnessed this 

firsthand—our support specialists have to have the agility and proficiency to facilitate our work anywhere in the world, and frequently they have to do it on very short notice. Our S&T officers— 

science and technology—must always give our operators a decisive 

edge that our adversaries can’t match. 

Let me talk for a few minutes about collection. 

As the national human intelligence, HUMINT, manager, CIA is 

working to build an integrated national HUMINT service and 

working to enhance the entire community’s relationships with liaison foreign intelligence services. Our focus remains on collecting information that will tell us the plans, the intentions and the capabilities of our adversaries and that provide the basis for decision 

and action. It’s crucial we develop and deploy innovative ways to 

penetrate tough targets. 

From the perspective of CIA ’s collection, globalization is—as 

Ambassador Negroponte has just stated—the defining characteristic of our age. It requires us to find new ways to collect key 

intelligence on targets, whether they be terrorists, weapons of mass 

destruction proliferators, or simply daily business in volatile regions of the world. 

We’re waging a global, high-stakes war against al-Qa’ida and 

other terrorists that threaten the United States, and that’s a fundamental part of our mission. We work on our own; we work with 

other U.S. Government agencies; and we work with foreign liaison 

partners to target terrorist leaders, terrorist cells, disrupt their 

plots, sever their financial and logistic links, and roil their safe havens. 

Our war on terror is conducted from our Counterterrorism Center, or CTC, and is carried out, for the most part, from our stations 

and bases overseas. CTC has both an operational and an analytic 

component, and the fusion of those two—ops and analysis—is critical to its success. Moreover, CTC works very closely with NCTC, 

Ambassador Negroponte’s National Counterterrorism Center, to assure protection of the homeland. 

CIA’s collection on terrorist targets—particularly collecting 

through human source—has been steadily improving in both quantity and quality since 9/11. Penetrating secretive terrorist organizations is our greatest challenge. We have made significant strides in 

this regard, although I am extremely concerned by the damage 

done to our efforts by rampant leaks in recent years. Leaks can 

and have led to grave consequences for our efforts. 

I think the Committee knows very well that terrorist plots and 

groups aren’t broken up by a single report or a single eureka moment or a single source. No detainee, for example, knows everyVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
15 

thing there is to know about the compartment activities, even of 

their own group. We do this via painstaking, all-source analysis, 

and that drives and supports our operations. 

The work of CTC has been crucial to identify and target those 

who would do us harm. 

With regard to WMD, CIA also dedicates significant resources to 

countering the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and 

associated delivery systems. As the Ambassador pointed out, we 

focus on North Korea and Iran, two states with WMD programs 

that threaten regional balances, threaten U.S. interests, and 

threaten nonproliferation regimes. 

We also focus on the WMD and missile programs of Russia and 

China, programs that are large enough to threaten U.S. survival if 

the political leaderships of those countries decided to reverse themselves and assume a hostile stance. 

We watch also for other states or non-state actors, early signs 

that they may be taking steps toward acquiring nuclear, biological 

or chemical weapons. 

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, we work to gather critical information on terrorism, insurgency, stabilization, nation building, security, foreign relations, infrastructure, and we do all that on both 

the strategic and tactical level. 

A priority in our efforts in both those locations is the collection 

of force protection intelligence to support warfighting and counterterrorism activities of U.S. and allied forces. 

In Iraq, the insurgency, sectarian violence, and the role of external actors acting against coalition goals and coalition forces remain 

key features of the unstable situation there and a major focus of 

our collection. 

In Afghanistan we are working to counter al-Qa’ida, Taliban, and 

anti-coalition militants who threaten the stability of the Afghan 

state. 

In all these operations we maintain a very close relationship 

with the U.S. military on many levels. We provide liaison officers 

dedicated to senior U.S. commanders, as well as operating in several working-level fusion cells with our military partners. 

Let me spend a minute talking about a relatively new discipline 

that’s showing both great promise and great production, and that’s 

open source intelligence. To meet the challenge of global coverage 

that Ambassador Negroponte has outlined, we’re playing a leading 

role in exploiting readily available information—open source information. 

We are the executive agent for the DNI’s Open Source Center, 

and we’ve elevated both the organizational status of the center and 

the visibility of the open source discipline inside CIA and inside our 

community. We recognize its unique and growing contributions to 

integrated collection and analysis. 

Let me spend a few minutes talking about analysis, which of 

course, is a very challenging activity for us. 

The ongoing successes of this collection activity and other efforts 

by the men and women of CIA are the foundation for that equally 

important analytic mission. Producing timely analysis that gives 

insight, warning and opportunity—not analysis for its own sake, 

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tunity—to the President, to other decisionmakers, to yourselves is 

the foundation of our analytic effort. 

As the DNI has made clear, we operate in a very unstable and 

dangerous world. Our adversaries in the long war on terrorism are 

dispersed across the planet. They’re resilient, they’re ruthless, 

they’re patient, and they’re committed to the mass murder of our 

countrymen. 

The possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

threatens both international stability and our homeland. The rise 

of China and India and the emergence of new economic centers are 

transforming the economic and geopolitical landscape. As I already 

pointed out, weak governments, lagging economies, and competition for energy will create crises in many regions that we have to 

foreshadow and predict for decisionmakers. 

The complexity and interdependence of these issues demands the 

very best analysis. To achieve this we are continuing to enhance 

our tradecraft, our ability to analyze and expanding our analytic 

outreach. 

Let me talk for a minute about this: We’re making major investments in analytic training. We’ve got a 16-week course for all incoming analysts with a dozen modules in it built around things like 

the analytic thinking process. It includes sessions on assumptions, 

sessions on framing questions, analytic tools, alternative analysis, 

and how to weigh information. 

The Sherman Kent School has 22 courses of advanced analysis 

and it’s designed to meet the tradecraft needs of experienced analyst—required courses on critical thinking, writing, briefing, and 

collection. 

These tradecraft efforts, as well as our Red Cell, continue to 

produce alternative analytic papers designed to challenge conventional wisdom, lay out plausible alternative scenarios, and re-examine working assumptions. 

We’re also routinely engaging academics and outside experts to 

critique and strengthen our analysis. 

In November, we launched an innovative online presentation of 

our core, our flagship daily intelligence publication; it’s called the 

World Intelligence Review, or the WIRe. The WIRe online leverages 

the best of modern Web technology. 

Mr. Chairman and other Members of the Committee, in closing, 

let me affirm that we’re pursuing our strategic goals and positioning ourselves to meet the threats outlined here today, but will 

do so in a way that is true to our core values of service, integrity 

and excellence. They are the constants that reflect the best of our 

agency’s unique history and the best of our previous accomplishments. They are the values that have served us well and will continue to guide us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Hayden is on p. 72.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much, General Hayden. 

I might just point out to everybody that I think there’s a vote, 

a single vote at 4:15. Vice Chairman Bond and I will just switch 

off, moving swiftly in order to keep this going. 

17 

So, according to the protocol, the Assistant Secretary of State for 

Intelligence and Research, Randall Fort, we very much welcome 

you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL M. FORT, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 

Mr. FORT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity today 

to present the views of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the current and projected threats to the 

United States. 

As Ambassador Negroponte has noted, the intelligence community is acutely aware of, and there is broad intelligence community 

consensus about, the dynamic nature of threats to U.S. interests. 

And INR generally shares the judgments presented by the DNI and 

to be presented by my colleagues. 

Therefore, rather than revisit the assessments already stated, I 

would like to explain how INR, as the State Department’s in-house 

intelligence unit, supports the Secretary of State and department 

principals by acting as what I would call an intelligence ‘‘force multiplier,’’ identifying, assessing, and explaining the significance and 

the relevance of threats that could jeopardize U.S. diplomatic and 

foreign policy interests. 

As the DNI stated, it is essential that the community have indepth, comprehensive global coverage to identify and understand 

the threats we face. At the same time, the difficulties inherent in 

anticipating rapid and unexpected changes within global financial 

markets and the technology sector, for example, pose potential 

challenges to our defense and foreign policy establishments. 

In recognition of the urgency of these new challenges, Secretary 

of State Rice has established ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ as one 

of the fundamental engines of our foreign policy. The aim of this 

new approach is to re-fashion traditional diplomatic institutions 

and practices to serve new diplomatic purposes. Changing the 

world, not merely reporting on it, is the operative essence of Transformational Diplomacy. 

The Secretary’s new initiative underscores the pivotal role diplomacy plays in anticipating, understanding, and countering real and 

potential threats to vital U.S. interests. INR’s mandate is to provide the timely, accurate and actionable intelligence analysis necessary to enable U.S. diplomacy to confront and address those 

threats and challenges, and we are uniquely placed to do so. 

It is critical that our diplomats receive intelligence and analytic 

support that both informs current operations and looks beyond the 

horizon at broader strategic dynamics, such as the effects of our democratization efforts—a key element in Transformational Diplomacy—on regional political stability. INR seeks to identify threats, 

challenges and opportunities at an early stage to provide policymakers time to take appropriate action. I think an ounce of diplomacy is worth a pound of kinetic solution. 

In sum, the complexities of the world in which we live have 

blurred traditionally discrete lines among security interests, development efforts, economic objectives, and other traditional areas of 

diplomatic and analytic endeavor. Consequently, INR and the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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partment of State are repositioning resources to focus on and support Transformational Diplomacy. 

For example, the Department aims both to increase U.S. diplomatic presence in more remote locations and prepare to react to a 

wide variety of humanitarian crises, including refugee flows, 

pandemics and natural disasters. Naturally, INR must be ready to 

respond at a moment’s notice and provide the intelligence support 

necessary to address those challenges. 

Yet in an era of almost instant global awareness, the impact of 

our actions in one area can now be felt, or at least perceived, almost immediately elsewhere. Thus, analytical intelligence support 

is critical to an accurate understanding of the environment in 

which diplomatic initiatives are undertaken. INR is working within 

the Department and with our embassies and other posts abroad to 

help policymakers both anticipate emergent crises and understand 

their long-term repercussions. 

INR’s Humanitarian Information Unit, or HIU, for example, 

shares broadly unclassified information via a Web-based platform 

to facilitate coordination between U.S. Government civilian and 

military resources and private sector humanitarian response 

groups and NGOs. The HIU is an excellent example of an open 

source intelligence force multiplier. 

An informed understanding of the perceptions of U.S. policies 

and actions on the part of foreign publics and governments is prerequisite both to deciphering and comprehending the nature of the 

global environment, including potential and actual threats. Such 

knowledge is also critical to anticipating potential reactions to our 

policy initiatives and receptivity to offers of assistance generally 

and in crisis situations. 

To that end, INR conducts public opinion polling and focus group 

surveys throughout the world in order to gauge how U.S. policies 

are perceived, as well as how individuals in key countries perceive 

the role and behavior of their own governments. The sharper our 

understanding of the forces that drive those perceptions, the better 

prepared we will be to anticipate emergent threats. 

The crosscutting nature of the threats and challenges we face— 

especially from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction—requires a fresh emphasis on understanding the intentions and managing the behavior of a variety of groups and transnational actors. 

Regional cooperation is a key element of our counterterrorism 

strategy. Yet there are times when economic, political, and cultural 

barriers complicate or impede the cooperation we seek. 

Comprehensive, accurate intelligence analysis is needed to support policymakers in this regard, not only by identifying the 

threats but also by ensuring a full understanding of the strengths, 

weaknesses and perceptions of partners or potential partners so 

that policy is devised with the best information available. 

Even as we seek to understand the terrorist threats faced by our 

allies, we must also remain vigilant to emerging trends, not only 

to identify threats, but to assist in identifying new potential partners as well as their strengths and weaknesses. The threats posed 

by failed states points to the critical intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security. 

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namics, economic and financial developments, and shifts in military operations, doctrine and training. Deep analytic expertise is 

required to confidently tease apart and make sense of seemingly 

unrelated trends and anomalies in these areas, even if our policy 

colleagues might not wish to hear about them. 

To focus our perspectives and encourage analysts to look beyond 

immediately recognizable trends, INR publishes a quarterly report 

on global hot spots designed to alert the Secretary of State and 

other interested policymakers to potentially troublesome trends 

that we have detected. 

Our focus is on areas that may have received only limited policy 

attention but where significant threats may emerge in the future. 

The aim is to identify areas where diplomatic action could make a 

difference, either by shifting the direction of a trend to forestall a 

threat from manifesting, or by enabling actions that could mitigate 

the impact of a crisis. 

In our first report, published in early November last year, the 

issues raised ranged from repercussions of electoral fallout in Mexico to concerns about political violence in Bangladesh and friction 

between Russia and Georgia. Policymakers were very pleased with 

the product. 

In conclusion, I believe INR’s abiding challenge will be not only 

to maintain our vigilant watch over those threats that we know 

present a clear danger to U.S. interests; going forward, we must 

also strive to think, analyze, and write strategically in order to 

identify the challenges and opportunities arising from the complex 

and dynamic global environment. 

Thank you all very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fort is on p. 77.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Fort. 

And now, I guess our veteran is the Director of the FBI, whom 

we as a Committee very greatly welcome—Bob Mueller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Bond, Members of the Committee. 

As you’ve heard from my colleagues, successes in the war on terrorism in the past 12 months and the arrest of many key al-Qa’ida 

leaders and operatives have diminished the ability of that group to 

attack the U.S. homeland. But at the same time, the growing 

Sunni extremist movement that al-Qa’ida spearheaded has evolved 

from being directly led by al-Qa’ida to being a global movement 

that is able to conduct attacks independently. 

And as a result, the United States faces two very different 

threats from international terrorism—first, the attack planning 

that continues to emanate from core al-Qa’ida overseas, and second, the threat posed by homegrown, self-radicalizing groups and 

individuals inspired, but not led by al-Qa’ida who are already living 

in the United States. And while they share a similar ideology, 

these two groups pose very different threats due to the differences 

in intent and their attack capability. 

20 

First, al-Qa’ida. Al-Qa’ida’s strategy for conducting an attack inside the United States continues to include proven tactics and 

tradecraft with adaptations designed to address its losses and our 

enhanced security measures. For example, we believe that alQa’ida is still seeking to infiltrate operatives into the United States 

from overseas, those who have no known nexus to terrorism and 

using both legal and possibly illegal methods of entry. 

We also believe, if it can, al-Qa’ida will obtain and use some form 

of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material, if it can 

get it. 

Al-Qa’ida’s choice of targets and attack methods will most likely 

continue to focus on economic targets such as aviation, the energy 

and mass transit sectors, soft targets such as large public gatherings, and symbolic targets such as monuments and government 

buildings. 

Second, the homegrown threat. In contrast to the threat from alQa’ida, it is critical to be aware of the differences in intent and capability in order to understand and counter the so-called homegrown threat. We have disrupted several unsophisticated, smallscale attack plans recently that reflect the broader problem homegrown extremists pose. 

Just over a year ago, we disrupted a homegrown Sunni Islamic 

extremist group in California known as the JIS, or Assembly of Authentic Islam. This group was primarily operating in State prisons 

without apparent connections or direction from outside the United 

States and with no identifiable foreign nexus. Members of this 

group committed armed robberies in Los Angeles with the goal of 

financing terrorist attacks against the enemies of Islam, including 

the U.S. Government and supporters of Israel. 

Last year, the FBI along with other Federal agencies and our foreign partners, dismantled a global network of extremists operating 

primarily in Canada and on the Internet and independently of any 

known terrorist organization. The associates of this group who 

were in Atlanta, Georgia had long-term goals of creating a network 

of extremists in preparation for conducting attacks, possibly inside 

the United States. 

The diversity of homegrown extremists and the direct knowledge 

they have of the United States makes the threat they pose potentially very serious. As well, the radicalization of some U.S. Muslim 

converts is of particular concern to us as we look at this threat. 

The threat from other terrorist groups inside the United States. 

While al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and independent Islamic jihadist 

groups remain the primary threat to the U.S. homeland, other 

groups such as Iranian-supported Lebanese Hizballah warrant attention due to their ongoing fundraising, recruitment, procurement 

and capability to launch terrorist attacks inside the United States. 

As seen in the summer 2006 conflict with Israel, Hizballah has 

a well-trained guerilla force that is proficient in military tactics 

and weaponry and capable of striking U.S. interests. To date, 

Hizballah has not conducted an attack within the U.S. homeland. 

Instead, Hizballah associates and sympathizers primarily engage in 

a wide range of fundraising avenues to include criminal activities 

such as money laundering, credit card, immigration, food stamp 

21 

and bank fraud, as well as narcotics trafficking in order to provide 

support to Hizballah. 

Our efforts to stem the flow of material and monetary support 

to Hizballah over the past few years has led to numerous Federal 

indictments resulting in the arrests of suspected Hizballah supporters and approximately $5 million in property seizure and court 

ordered restitution. 

I would say also that Iran continues to present a particular concern due to its continued role as a state sponsor of terrorism, its 

development of its nuclear program, and commitment—its commitment to promoting an Iranian-inspired extreme version of Shi’a 

Islam within the United States. 

Iran is known to support terrorist groups such as Hizballah, 

Iraqi Shi’a insurgency groups, and non-Shi’a Palestinian terrorist 

organizations. 

Additionally, the ongoing factional in-fighting between Hamas 

and Fatah elements in the Palestinian territories has for now—for 

now—consumed the attention of most of the Palestinian organizations. But the primary focus of U.S.-based Palestinian groups remains fundraising and proselytizing. 

Let me turn for a moment, if I might, Mr. Chairman, to the 

threat posed by domestic terrorist groups. While much of the national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed by international terrorists, we must also contend with an ongoing threat 

posed by domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within the 

United States. 

Domestic terrorists, motivated by a number of political or social 

issues, continue to use violence and criminal activity to further 

their agendas. Despite the fragmentation of white supremacist 

groups resulting from the deaths or the arrests of prominent leaders, violence from this element remains an ongoing threat to government targets, to Jewish individuals and establishments, and to 

non-white ethnic groups. 

The militia movement similarly continues to present a threat to 

law enforcement and the judiciary. Members of these movements 

will continue to intimidate and sometimes threaten judges, prosecutors, and other officers of the court. 

Lastly here, animal rights extremism and eco-terrorism continue 

to pose a threat. Extremists within these movements generally operate in small, autonomous cells and employ strict operational security tactics making detection and infiltration difficult. And these 

extremists utilize a variety of tactics, including arson, vandalism, 

and the use of explosive devices. They continue to remain a threat. 

Let me turn for a second, if I might, to a subject discussed by 

my colleagues, and that’s the WMD acquisition by terrorist groups. 

It continues—particularly the acquisition by terrorist groups—to be 

a growing concern. Transnational and domestic terrorists and state 

sponsors of terrorism continue to demonstrate an interest in acquiring and using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

weapons commonly called CBRN. And these weapons are advantageous to them because the use of one causes mass casualties, 

mass panic, and economic disruption. 

And while one could say that terrorist groups may not now— 

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logical and chemical agents needed for a mass-casualty attack, 

their capability will improve as they pursue enhancing their scientific knowledge base, including recruiting scientists to assist 

them. Currently, terrorist groups have access to relatively—and I’d 

say relatively—simple chemical and biological agent recipes 

through the Internet and through publications such as ‘‘The Anarchist Cookbook.’’ 

In addition to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by 

terrorists—which is a concern I just described—we are also concerned about WMD proliferation. 

The U.S. Government has identified 21 countries of which Iran, 

North Korea, and China are of great concern—identified them as 

having the capability either to develop WMD systems or acquire 

export-controlled WMD and dual-use items and sensitive technologies. 

From an operational perspective, the Bureau and our counterparts at DHS and the Department of Commerce have had success 

in conducting joint investigations leading to the arrests of individuals for violations of U.S. export laws, and we have also together 

produced intelligence in support of national intelligence collection 

requirements in this arena. And this resulting information has enabled the community together to better understand the threat to 

national security from foreign government exploitation of international commerce. 

While preventing another terrorist act on U.S. soil is the FBI’s 

primary mission, protecting the United States from espionage and 

foreign intelligence operations is also of vital importance. 

Recent investigative successes highlight the fact that foreign governments continue to target the United States for sensitive and 

classified information and technology. In 2006, the Bureau arrested 

20 individuals on espionage-related charges, and also disrupted foreign intelligence operations. 

The recent arrests of a U.S. defense contractor and his co-conspirators for passing sensitive weapons technology to the People’s 

Republic of China confirms that foreign states are using nontraditional actors and methods to collect classified, sensitive, and commercially valuable proprietary information and technology. 

Other FBI investigations revealed trusted insiders compromising 

classified or sensitive information to a wide range of U.S. allies. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman—I am getting to the end—finally, Mr. 

Chairman, the Bureau is concerned by cybersecurity threats which 

may come from a vast array of groups and individuals with different skills, motives, and targets. The Nation’s security, economy, 

and emergency services rely on the uninterrupted use of the Internet and telecommunications to ensure the continuity of military operations, financial services, transportation and the energy infrastructure. 

Terrorists increasingly use the Internet to communicate, conduct 

operational planning, proselytize, recruit, train, and to obtain 

logistical and financial support. That is a growing and increasing 

concern for us, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me close by saying that we’re working closely with our partners in the intelligence, military, diplomatic, law enforcement communities, and our primary responsibility remains the neutralizaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
23 

tion of terrorist cells and operatives here in the United States and 

the dismantlement of terrorist networks worldwide. And while this 

is our first priority, we remain committed to the defense of America 

against foreign intelligence threats, as well as to the enforcement 

of Federal criminal laws, all while respecting and defending the 

Constitution. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present these 

remarks today, and I’d be happy to answer any questions you 

might have. 

[The prepared statement of Director Mueller is on p. 82.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Director, very much. 

Let me just explain that a vote just went off, and it’s going to 

be our first real test of bipartisanship here because Majority Leader Reid has now reduced votes to 15 minutes, so we’ll see how 

things are going. If Kit Bond gets back in 8 minutes, you’ll know 

that I’m done. [Laughter.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Director, thank you very much, 

and I want to proceed now to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples. We welcome 

your testimony, sir. And I apologize for the ways of the Senate. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL D. MAPLES, 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General MAPLES. Chairman, I understand. 

Chairman Rockefeller, I do appreciate this opportunity to appear 

before the Committee to testify and to thank you for your continued support to the dedicated men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

My testimony—which I have submitted for the record—outlines 

our assessment of the states of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current threat from global terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also addresses defense-related developments in states and regions of concern and other 

transnational issues. As you requested, I will summarize a few of 

these issues. 

In Iraq, we have seen some recent developments that give hope 

for progress. These include the continued development and increased capability of the Iraq security forces, efforts to address 

problems associated with de-Ba’athification, and increased cooperation between Sunni Arab tribes and the government in al-Anbar 

province. 

Additionally, Prime Minister Maliki has made gestures to the 

Sunni minority such as offers to reinstall some Saddam-era military leaders and the issuance of arrest warrants for Ministry of Interior personnel accused of abuses. Some rogue elements from 

Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement have also been expelled from his organization. 

Despite these developments, significant challenges to U.S. and 

coalition forces remain. Violence in Iraq, as measured over the past 

year, continued to increase in scope, complexity, and lethality with 

the Sunni Arab-based insurgency gaining strength and capacity. 

The conflict remains a sectarian struggle for power and the right 

to define Iraq’s future identity. 

24 

We have noted a change in the character and the dynamics of 

the conflict. The perception of unchecked violence is creating an atmosphere of fear, hardening sectarianism, empowering militias and 

vigilante groups, and undermining confidence in government and 

security forces. 

Conflict in Iraq is in a self-sustaining cycle in which violent acts 

increasingly generate retaliation. Insecurity rationalizes and justifies militias, in particular Shi’a militias which increase fears in the 

Sunni Arab community. The result is additional support, or at least 

acquiescence, to insurgents and terrorists such as al-Qa’ida in Iraq. 

Shi’a militants, most notably Jaish al-Mahdi, are also responsible 

for increases in violence. 

Attacks by terrorist groups account for only a fraction of insurgent violence, yet the high-profile nature of their operations and 

the tactics they employ have a disproportionate impact. Al-Qa’ida 

in Iraq is the largest and the most active of the Iraq-based terrorist 

groups. 

DIA judges that continued coalition presence is the primary 

counter to a breakdown in central authority. Such a breakdown 

would have grave consequences for the people of Iraq, stability in 

the region, and U.S. strategic interests. 

No major political figure in Iraq has endorsed the notion of civil 

war or partition, and most political and religious leaders continue 

to restrain their communities. Moreover, DIA judges that Iraqi 

Arabs retain a strong sense of national identity and most Iraqis recall a past in which sectarian identity did not have the significance 

that it does today. 

Intelligence support to our forces engaged in combat in Iraq is 

our highest priority. We have more than 300 analysts dedicated to 

the complexities of Iraq, including a cadre of 49 analysts who are 

focused exclusively on the insurgency. Many of our human intelligence collectors in Iraq have made multiple deployments and are 

experienced in contingency operations. 

As the complexity of the situation is increasing—and it is changing—we are likewise increasing the resources devoted to our support. 

In Afghanistan, the Taliban-led insurgency is a capable and resilient threat to stability, particularly in the Pashtun south and east. 

Despite absorbing heavy combat losses in 2006, the insurgency has 

strengthened its military capabilities and influence with its core 

base of rural Pashtuns. Overall, attacks doubled in 2006 from the 

previous year. And suicide attacks quadrupled from 2005 levels, 

and large-scale operations increased significantly as well. DIA assesses the Taliban-led insurgency will remain a threat in 2007, and 

its attacks will increase this spring. 

Al-Qa’ida remains the most dominant terrorist organization and 

the most significant threat to U.S. interests worldwide. Al-Qa’ida’s 

increasing cooperation with like-minded groups has improved its 

ability to facilitate, support, and direct its objectives. 

Al-Qa’ida in Iraq is the largest and most deadly of the Iraq-based 

terrorist groups. It conducts the most provocative anti-Shi’a attacks 

in Iraq, a hallmark of its strategy since 2003. It has instigated cycles of sectarian violence by characterizing its operations as defending Sunni interests. 

25 

Al-Qa’ida, in Iraq, poses a regional threat and aspires to become 

a global threat. 

Pakistan’s direct assistance has led to the eradication or capture 

of numerous al-Qa’ida terrorists. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s border 

region with Afghanistan remains a haven for al-Qa’ida’s leadership 

and other extremists. 

After global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the most significant threat to our homeland, deployed forces, allies and interests. Increased availability of information together with technical advances have the potential to allow 

additional countries to develop nuclear, biological and chemical 

weapons. This is an area of increasing concern. 

North Korea’s October 2006 detonation of a nuclear device 

marked its first nuclear test and an attempt to win international 

recognition as a nuclear state after a decades-long program to develop these weapons. 

Iran also continues to develop its WMD capabilities. Although 

Iran claims its program is focused on producing commercial capabilities, DIA assesses with high confidence that Iran remains determined to develop nuclear weapons. 

DIA expects China’s nuclear weapons stockpile to grow over the 

next 10 years. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. General. 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I ask you to rescue me from a delicate 

situation. 

The votes last for 15 minutes; there are only 51⁄2 minutes left in 

this one. So people will be back immediately. We then go into questions. And we want to be able to do that, and I apologize for the 

inconvenience; I truly do. 

So we’re in recess for the moment. 

[The prepared statement of General Maples is on p. 91.] 

[A brief recess was taken.] 

Vice Chaiman BOND [presiding]. My apologies to the General for 

missing his testimony. I will look forward to reading it in full. The 

Chairman has graciously suggested that since we have a long afternoon and he has now had to go over to vote that I will begin my 

questions and see if I can get 5 minutes on the timing machine. 

Let me ask a quick question for a short answer. We have in the 

past been myopic in view of the threats prior to 9/11. We look at 

other terrorist-affiliated organizations beyond al-Qa’ida. You’ve 

talked about Hizballah, Sunni insurgents in Iraq, about Jemaah 

Islamiyah from Southeast Asia. 

What are your assessments of the threat that the groups pose to 

the U.S. homeland? And what do you feel you’re able to do to build 

on that and to have your analysts challenge the assumptions that 

you’re making—exploring the possibilities to change tactics against 

strikes on the U.S. soil? 

Director Mueller has talked about what they’re doing. What are 

the others of you doing to feed into that process? 

General HAYDEN. Senator, I’ll start. As you know, our CTC—as 

I described in my remarks—is a large center. I’ve been very impressed in my time at the agency with their deep expertise. Many 

of the leaders of that center have been involved in this now well 

26 

before 9/11. They do try—and I don’t want to overstate this, but I 

think they do try to be very imaginative in terms of are we looking 

at the right things. Are there other things out there we’re not 

aware of? 

Vice Chaiman BOND. You’re fully integrating that with the FBI’s 

information? Is that fully integrated? 

General HAYDEN. That’s right, Senator. When I meet with those 

folks, we have FBI people in the room because they are permanently on the staff. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. And Homeland Security? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. And NCTC, as well. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. All right. 

You have an excellent operation, and we appreciate having knowing what you’re doing there. 

Let me ask a broader question. I have heard a lot of comments 

about—and there will be legitimate questions raised about the policy that the President has announced in going forward with the 

commitment by the Prime Minister, al-Maliki to take control of 

Iraq. And I think we will want to hear your assessments of that— 

of the intelligence assessments of the success of that. 

At the same time, what concerns me is what are the options? The 

one option that I have heard most frequently and strongly supported is to withdraw—to withdraw now essentially, or very shortly, regardless of the security situation in Iraq. 

What in your judgment would happen? I’ll start with you, Director Negroponte. What would happen if we pulled out now from 

Iraq? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, we’ve looked at that question, and 

we’ve tried to assess it, Senator. And I think the view pretty much 

across the community is that a precipitous withdrawal could lead 

to a collapse of the government of that country and a collapse of 

their security forces because we simply don’t think that they are 

ready to take over, to assume full control of their security responsibilities. 

We think that that is a goal that can be achieved on a gradual 

basis and on a well-planned basis, but to simply withdraw now, I 

think could have catastrophic effects. And I think that’s a quite 

widely held view inside of Iraq itself. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. I want to know what the impact of that is. 

Does that affect just the Middle East? Does it affect us? And I’d 

like to hear from General Maples and General Hayden on that as 

well. 

Director NEGROPONTE. If I could just add one point before ceding 

to them, I think in terms of al-Qa’ida’s own planning, if you look 

at the letter that Zawahiri wrote to Zarqawi last year about establishing in Iraq sort of a beachhead for the expansion of al-Qa’ida’s 

ideology throughout the Islamic world, establishing the caliphate, 

it would be the very sanctuary for international terrorism that we 

are seeking to avoid. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. General Maples. 

General MAPLES. Sir, I’d follow up on that statement by the Ambassador because I truly believe that a failure in Iraq would empower the jihadist movement. It would give that base of operations 

from which the jihadist movement would expand. And it’s conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
27 

sistent with the goals of al-Qa’ida in Iraq to establish that Islamic 

state and then to expand it into the caliphate. 

I also think that there, of course, will be very significant regional 

impacts, both in terms of stability and to other countries in the region; there will be economic impacts with respect to, in particular, 

hydrocarbons and the effect that that could have, particularly if 

those resources were in the hands of jihadists. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. In other words, they could get the profit off 

of the high price of oil. 

General MAPLES. Absolutely. And then I would follow with one 

last—and that is the empowerment, further empowerment of Iran 

within the region. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, Senator. When I went before the Iraq 

Study Group, I prefaced my remarks by saying: I think I’m going 

to be giving a rather somber assessment of the situation in Iraq, 

but before I do that, I said, let me tell you, if we leave under the 

current circumstances, everything gets worse. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. You have a masterful way of understating 

it. 

General HAYDEN. Three very quick areas: More Iraqis die from 

the disorder inside Iraq; Iraq becomes a safe haven, perhaps more 

dangerous than the one al-Qa’ida had in Afghanistan; and finally, 

the conflict in Iraq bleeds over into the neighborhood and threatens 

serious regional instability. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. Any threat, do you see—what threat to the 

U.S. homeland? 

General HAYDEN. The immediate threat comes from providing alQa’ida that which they are attempting to seek in several locations 

right now, be it Somalia, the tribal area of Pakistan, or Anbar 

province—a safe haven to rival that which they had in Afghanistan. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. All right. My time is up, and now turn to 

the Senator from Oregon. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The President said last night, Director Negroponte, that a major 

part of his plan for Iraq involves relying on Iraqi national police 

brigades. Can you tell us how many of these Iraqi national police 

units are capable of functioning independently today? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I can’t give you those exact numbers. Perhaps General Maples has them. But what I would say as a general 

proposition is that the army of Iraq is better equipped to deal with 

these situations than the police, although there are some police 

units that have acquitted themselves well. And I think that’s going 

to take time to develop. 

But that’s one of the reasons that at the same time the President 

talked about strengthening our advisory effort and strengthening 

the effort to embed American units within Iraqi security units. 

So it’s a package, if you will Senator, so as to deal with some of 

the training and experience shortcomings that these units have. 

But I think over time, I think that the plan has a reasonable 

chance of succeeding. 

Senator WYDEN. When we go to closed session, either tonight or 

in the future, I’m going to ask you some more about that. But put 

28 

me down as saying I think you have, once again, confirmed the 

rosy-scenario analysis with respect to that last comment. 

Now this morning, Secretary Rice outlined a plan to increase the 

number of provincial reconstruction teams that operate in Iraq. 

Now, Senator Snowe and I visited one of these teams last year, and 

as far as I could tell, it was made up of very dedicated, intelligent 

people who so far haven’t been able to accomplish a whole lot. Have 

we seen, based on your analysis, any reduction in attacks in areas 

where these provincial teams are in operation? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I don’t know the answer to that question, 

Senator. But what I would say is that it is important in terms of 

restoring and holding areas that have been cleared, where forces 

have gone that there be something other than just the security element as well. 

So what the PRT concept is designed to address is the need for 

follow-up once a situation has been stabilized from a security point 

of view. So I think it’s a very sound concept. 

Senator WYDEN. Director, tell me if you would, how can there be 

confidence, as Members of this Committee look at this, when you 

can’t give me information about how it’s worked in the past? And 

Senator Snowe and I go on a visit, we’re impressed by the people’s 

intelligence and dedication, but it doesn’t look like they’re accomplishing much. 

Director NEGROPONTE. To be honest with you, I’d have to defer 

to the Department of State and those responsible for directing the 

PRTs. We worry about the threat situation, the terrorism, alQa’ida, Ansar al-Sunna and so forth. So we haven’t done that particular assessment that you mentioned. 

Senator WYDEN. I think I have time for one other area. I’m very 

troubled about the Iranian links with Iraq. And I’ve recently been 

getting some very troubling reports from active duty military personnel who believe that Iran is supplying Iraqis with explosive devices that are now killing our courageous troops. They’re of course 

known as these EFPs, the explosively formed projectiles. And the 

concern from the soldiers is that the sophisticated nature of the devices, as well as the fact that they are mainly used in Shi’a areas 

of Iraq, suggests that they’re coming in from Iran. 

Do you and perhaps General Hayden have any views with respect to this? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I think that what you have just said is 

generally true, Senator. 

General HAYDEN. That’s very consistent, Senator, with our analysis. We believe that to be true. The EFPs are coming from Iran. 

They are being used against our forces. They are capable of defeating some of our heaviest armor, and incident-for-incident, cause 

significantly more casualties than any other improvised explosive 

devices do. They are provided to Shi’a militia. That’s all correct. 

Senator WYDEN. I’m going to see if I can get one other question 

in, Director Negroponte. 

In your view, Director, does the Iranian government want to see 

a full-blown civil war in Iraq? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Sir, I think this is a question where I 

don’t think we really fully understand. The judgment of the community in the past has been that Iran wants an Iraq that is not 

29 

a threat to it; they want to support a Shi’a-dominated Iraq, and 

that they want a stable Iraq. They don’t want it to fall apart. They 

don’t want a country that’s on its borders just to fall apart into various parts. That’s been the view. 

But one has to wonder why it is that they have increased their 

supply of these kinds of lethal weapons to extremist Shi’a groups 

in Iraq, provoking violence, attacks on coalition forces, and others. 

And one wonders if their policy toward Iraq may not have shifted 

to a more aggressive posture than it has been in the past. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. 

I’d like to ask four questions of each of you, and I would hope 

that your answers would be short, because I think they’re the kinds 

of questions that should elicit that. And they’re very direct. 

Starting with you, Director Negroponte, is the presence of alQa’ida and affiliated terrorists greater in Iraq today than prior to 

the war? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Prior to the war? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Prior to the war. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Yes. I would say that would be the case. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. 

Randy. 

Mr. FORT. Yes. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. OK. Is it your assessment that alQa’ida and other extremist groups have used our invasion and continued military presence in Iraq as an effective recruiting tool to 

grow their ranks? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I don’t know whether that is as much of 

a recruiting tool for al-Qa’ida, as maybe some of the insurgent 

forces inside of Iraq; in other words, I don’t think that—— 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I’m asking about al-Qa’ida. 

Director NEGROPONTE. I’m not certain. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. General. 

General HAYDEN. Our NIE, Senator, talked about Iraq being a 

cause celebre for global jihadism. They certainly use and misuse 

the images from Iraq. I would add, though, that as the war goes 

on, even al-Qa’ida in Iraq is taking on an increasingly Iraqi identity. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Fort. 

Mr. FORT. I would associate myself with General Hayden’s comments. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

General MAPLES. I would say an increase in jihadists and extremists; it has grown. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The third question is, is it your assessment that our actions in 

Iraq have contributed to the spread of Islamic extremism and the 

growth of self-radicalized terrorist groups and cells? 

Director NEGROPONTE. You mean outside of Iraq? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. In or out. 

Director NEGROPONTE. I think, as the General said, it’s become 

a cause celebre. But I’m not sure that if you look at other parts of 

30 

the world, I don’t see a dramatic growth in al-Qa’ida’s capabilities. 

I think they’ve managed to dig in. I think they’ve managed to sustain themselves. But I wouldn’t say that there’s been a widespread 

growth of Islamic extremism beyond Iraq; I really wouldn’t. 

I think the threat’s still there. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. If one were to go beyond al-Qa’ida to 

affiliated types of groups, not strictly al-Qa’ida—— 

Director NEGROPONTE. Yeah. It’s not clear to me that Iraq is 

what necessarily motivates it. For example, the London—the July 

7 incident of about a year ago, July of 2005—I’m not sure that Iraq 

had particular influence on those homegrown extremists who’d 

gone back to Pakistan and then come back to England to carry out 

terrorist activity. 

I think that there’s a diversity, a complexity of motives. It’s a rejection of globalization; it’s anger and frustration with the West. 

It’s a whole number of things—the lack of responsiveness of Middle 

Eastern and Islamic governments to the aspirations and needs of 

their peoples. It’s not exclusively Iraq-based, in my opinion. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Director. Careful answer. 

General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Sir, I think I’m in the same place as the Ambassador. It is used. Clearly it’s used. If you go to jihadist 

Websites, you can see the themes. But there are a variety of 

themes that they use, whether it’s the Palestinian territories, 

whether it’s Hizballah and the Israelis in Lebanon, whether it’s the 

nature of Arab states. So it all contributes to their recruitment effort. It’s hard to connect the dots as to what contributes to specific 

radicalization. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. OK. I’m surprised. 

Mr. Fort. 

Mr. FORT. Echoing some of the comments, I think it’s a key 

thread in the tapestry, but it is a tapestry of all of the factors that 

my colleagues have mentioned, plus Afghanistan, plus perceived 

U.S. hegemony in any number of areas. 

I think you have to look at individual groups and grievances. The 

Salafists in Algeria, are they really being driven by what’s going 

in Iraq? Is the CIC in Somalia really being driven by what’s going 

on in Iraq? There are any number of local conditions and regional 

conditions that may drive individual groups, but clearly it is having 

a factor. 

But you know, just to say off the top of my head, it would be very 

difficult to ascribe solely to that one particular factor—that being, 

you know, the exacerbent of choice. I think we’d have to really sort 

of try to disaggregate the groups and their particular issues to 

come up with a really thoughtful answer to that question. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Hamburg would be included in your response? 

Mr. FORT. In what sense, Senator? I’m sorry. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Well, that they were not in some way 

influenced by what was going on in Iraq. 

Mr. FORT. When you say Hamburg, I’m not sure what you’re referring to. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Forget it. 

31 

Mr. Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. I like the tapestry analogy. I think this is a 

more difficult question in terms of contributions. And certainly alQa’ida makes use of the fact that we are in Iraq, but it does not 

escape us that we were neither in Afghanistan, nor in Iraq at the 

time of 1993 attempted bombings—the Cole bombings, the East African bombings, the September 11 bombings. 

And so yes, while it is used as a recruitment tool now, we can’t 

forget that this philosophy, this ideology pre-dated our going into 

either Afghanistan or Iraq. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, sir. 

General Maples. 

General MAPLES. Sir, I believe that the jihadist movement is 

growing both in numbers and in dispersion around the world. 

There are a variety of factors that lend to that—governance, societal, cultural, youth in Islam, opportunity, certainly presence in 

Iraq, Afghanistan; U.S. actions probably contribute in some way to 

that. But I think there are a wide number of factors that are affecting the jihadist movement. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. All right. 

I don’t actually have the time to do my second questions, so that 

would be, then, Senator Bond. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the things I have been a firm believer in is the value of 

HUMINT. And I think that when we gutted our HUMINT capability in the mid-1990s we reaped a whirlwind. We did not have 

good HUMINT when we went into Iraq, and it takes a long time 

to catch up to employ, field, train, and utilize collectors. 

I’d like to know from, I guess, the Director and the General primarily, how do you judge the state of our HUMINT collection in 

Iraq and against the hard targets like Iran and North Korea? What 

are you doing to improve on it? Are you making an effort to bring 

into the agencies greater numbers of ethnically diverse officers 

from areas to which we seek access who could speak the language 

and relate to the people in those areas? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Just to tee it up for General Hayden, sir, 

first of all—and limited by what we can say in an unclassified setting—— 

Vice Chaiman BOND. Yes, yes. I don’t ask the names and addresses, you know. 

Director NEGROPONTE. The President gave us an order in 2004 

to increase our HUMINT capabilities by 50 percent, and we’re, I 

think, well on our way to achieving that. So that would be the first 

point. 

Secondly, I think that in addition to building capabilities in the 

Central Intelligence Agency, as part of our intelligence reform, I 

designated General Hayden to be the HUMINT manager for the 

entire intelligence community so that we’re now starting to build 

common analytic and tradecraft and recruitment and other standards, source evaluation standards and so forth, not only for the 

CIA, but for the other HUMINT players in the community—the Defense HUMINT service, the FBI, and so forth. 

So I think we’re really making a lot of progress in this area. But 

if I could turn it over to General Hayden—— 

32 

General HAYDEN. Senator, I look forward in some future closed 

session to talking about some of the initiatives, and I think you’ll 

be heartened by what’s going on. I’m certain you’ll be heartened by 

the trajectory, by the direction in which we’re heading and things 

that are being improved. 

You’ll probably be a bit impatient, like all of us are at the table, 

with some of the velocity. But even there I think we’re gaining 

speed. That’s in terms of diversity and penetration of very hard 

targets, and again, I look forward to briefing the Committee on 

that. 

On the other matter the Ambassador brought up, I think it’s very 

important that we have this national HUMINT manager role. I fulfill that for the Ambassador. 

Just one quick example. In our tradecraft courses that have traditionally been only for CIA case officers, General Maples will have 

more than a couple of dozen folks inside each one of those courses. 

Director Mueller will have some number of folks inside each one 

of those courses, as well. I think that just sets the groundwork for 

future improvements. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. We’ll follow up later on that. I also note, 

Mr. Ambassador, that when you talked about worldwide threats, it 

seemed that an area I’ve spent some time in—Southeast Asia— 

with its Jemaah Islamiyah, ASG, MILF, and the training areas in 

the southern Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand are no 

longer a threat. So I was just a little concerned that that dropped 

out. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, as I mentioned in my comments, I 

just didn’t have time to hit all of my points in 20 minutes. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. I understand. But it would be helpful to 

have a written report on such, if you think it is still a threat, which 

I believe it is. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Yes, and we do do that. We believe it. 

Vice Chaiman BOND. I want to give General Maples an opportunity. The Iraq Study Group made several surprising, shocking 

comments, and it said that fewer than 10 analysts at DIA have 

more than 2 years experience; the IC is under-reporting violence in 

Iraq. The study group even suggested you may be cooking the 

books; it says good policy is difficult to make when information is 

systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy 

with policy goals. 

I’d like to ask you if you would clarify that, and maybe General 

Hayden would have a thought on it, because I think that one warrants a response on the record. 

General MAPLES. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that opportunity. 

In my comments I did remark that right now the Defense Intelligence Agency has well over 300 analysts who are focused on Iraq, 

to include 49 who are dedicated to the insurgency itself. So the 

number was wrong, and I know how it came about in terms of the 

reporting. 

But the number is not the issue for me—it is an issue—but the 

real issue is, what kind of capability and capacity do we really need 

to have in the community in order to do what needs to be done 

with respect to our analysis and our support in Iraq? 

33 

And I think we need to increase that capability. We need to increase that capacity, and particularly with the changes that are 

going on right now, the complexities that we have in Iraq, and a 

change in direction in terms of counterinsurgency, we need to increase intelligence capabilities, and we’re working that right now 

with both Multinational Forces Iraq, CENTCOM, and the intelligence community. We’ve all gathered together to try to focus our 

analytic effort on the changed conditions. 

So the answer to the question is that the specific number was 

wrong, but the conclusion about increasing the capacity and our 

focus on the complexities in Iraq I do believe we need to do. 

General HAYDEN. Senator, like any commander, you have to decide what your main effort is and where you have economy of force. 

It’s the same in intelligence collection, and of course it applies to 

Iraq as well. 

I can give you a real brief summary of how it has evolved. The 

first effort was against al-Qa’ida and the Sunni rejectionists and 

the insurgency. I think we have actually done very well in that and 

understand it very well. The success of our forces in Anbar is a reflection of that. 

And then we had to shift our weight to better understand what’s 

happened in the past 15 months, which is this growth of factional 

fighting, not Sunni rejectionists but Sunni, Shi’a and sometimes intramural between Sunnis and between Shi’a. 

And then finally, Senator Wyden, we clearly have to shift our 

weight to the issue that you raised earlier—what are the Iranians 

doing, how are they doing it, and what is it we can do to stop it? 

So that’s been kind of the sequence for us in terms of how we 

dealt with Iraq as a target, Senator. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Feingold, you have a question, 

sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our military involvement in this war in Iraq will end. It will end 

because it is preventing us from confronting urgent threats around 

the world, including places like Afghanistan and Somalia and the 

global expansion of terrorist organizations. It will end because our 

continued occupation of Iraq is making conditions worse. It will end 

because our military cannot sustain this commitment. And it will 

end because in a democracy like ours a war cannot go on indefinitely without the support of the people. So I think we need to discuss how to end our involvement in this war. 

Now this is not in the spirit of a precipitous withdrawal, and I 

know Mr. Negroponte referred to the problems that would be attendant to a precipitous withdrawal. But my questions are in the 

spirit of how do we avoid a precipitous withdrawal. How do we in 

the near term successfully do a redeployment? That’s what I would 

like to hear from you about. 

What would our strategy be as we re-deploy our forces? What are 

the most—I’d like each of you to answer—what are our most pressing priorities in terms of U.S. national security interests? Is it 

counterterrorism? Is it the stability of our allies and partners in 

the region, refugee flows? 

Give me some sense with your expertise of what our strategy 

would be for dealing with these challenges. And how do we use all 

34 

the tools available to us—intelligence, diplomatic, economic, and in 

a much more limited sense, military—to confront these challenges 

in a post-occupation environment? 

I would add, you know, obviously I want this to happen in the 

near term, but we’re going to have to face this in any event, these 

kinds of questions. So I’m looking genuinely for some guidance. 

Mr. Negroponte. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Senator, I’m not trying to cop out here, 

but I think you’re asking me very much of a policy question. But 

maybe I can come at it this way. 

In my remarks earlier I said that the prospects for increasing 

stability in Iraq over the next year will depend on several factors, 

and then I mentioned the degree to which Iraqi government and 

political leaders can establish effective national institutions that 

transcend sectarian or ethnic interests. That was one of my points. 

The other was the extent to which extremists, most notably alQa’ida, can be defeated in their attempts to foment inter-sectarian 

struggle between Sunni and Shi’a; and last, the extent to which 

Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran and Syria, can be persuaded to 

stop the flow, stop the flow of militants and munitions across their 

borders. 

So these are the kinds of factors that I think could contribute to 

an improvement in the trends, in the adverse trends that we describe for you in what I think is a fairly somber assessment of the 

situation in Iraq. 

But if I had to—wearing my hat now as the ex-U.S. Ambassador 

to Iraq—if I had to characterize the approach that’s been outlined 

by the President in his speech yesterday, it’s to make available now 

some additional resources to assist the Iraqis so that we can hasten 

the day that they will be able to assume responsibility for security 

and for the affairs of their country in their entirety, sooner rather 

than later. 

So this is a proposal designed—and I know I’m straying into the 

policy lane here, but you asked a policy question. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. And I understand that answer. 

What I’m really getting at is assuming a policy decision is made 

to re-deploy these troops—let me turn to General Hayden for this 

part—what are some of the practical challenges that you would 

think of first that we should be thinking about of how we would 

do this? 

General HAYDEN. Again Senator, using your premise—assuming 

the policy decision is made, and I want to share Ambassador 

Negroponte’s remarks—I actually think what the President discussed last night is creating the pre-conditions for what you describe. 

Assuming a policy decision is made before that takes place or 

other circumstances, two or three things must happen. Number 

one, this can’t be a safe haven for al-Qa’ida. Number two, Iraq has 

to be a barrier to Iranian expansionism, not a bridge for Iranian 

expansionism. And number three, it cannot be allowed on a geopolitical, on a regional, or a human basis to descend into the 

human carnage of inter-sectarian violence. 

35 

Senator FEINGOLD. Those are the goals. What do we practically 

do? What are our priorities as we’re re-deploying to achieve those 

goals? 

General HAYDEN. Senator, again, no disrespect intended, those 

were the very thought processes in the small group meetings over 

the past several months that we were considering. What the President talked about last night was what we believed to be the best 

choices available to us to achieve the kinds of things I just described—no safe haven, no bridge for expansionism, and again, finally, the inter-sectarian question inside Iraq. 

Senator FEINGOLD. General Maples. 

General MAPLES. Sir, I would also understand this question as 

based on the premise of a policy decision. Our number one priority 

would still remain the threat of terrorism to our nation and to 

counter that terrorism wherever it may be in the world. 

I think regionally we would continue to look at the effect this 

would have on Iran and Iranian influence throughout the region 

and the impact that that would have on other nations and countries in the region, which would be significant to us as well. 

And then I would probably add a third one there, and that is the 

rising conventional and asymmetric capabilities of other nations in 

the world—particularly in the area of ballistic missiles—that continue to pose a threat to us. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me follow on and say that if the decision 

were made, over a period of time, as was done with Somalia in the 

1990s, to say that at a certain point the funding for the mission 

would no longer be there, what provisions would you ask us to put 

in such legislation in order to protect the troops? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Sir, I just think that that’s really taking 

us very far afield from our responsibilities. 

First of all, it’s a hypothetical, I mean it’s a very hypothetical 

question, I believe, in terms of the policy framework in which we’re 

operating right now. I’d be most reluctant to attempt an answer to 

that question at this time. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I understand your feeling of constraint, 

but I think it’s the reality that may well be faced sooner rather 

than later. And I would suggest that since we did not have a plan, 

in my view, when we went into Iraq, we better darn well have a 

plan for how to disengage from Iraq that looks like it looked ahead 

to some of these questions, because the American people have had 

it with this. We are going to have to re-deploy these troops, I think 

sooner rather than later. And I think it’s incumbent on all of us 

to actually think about this as something other than a hypothetical. I think it’s a reality that’s coming. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you. 

Senator Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Chairman and the panelists, first of all, 

I know as we’ve listened to your testimony and interacted with 

most of you at the table, I think we have to say that something 

really has been working, and something has been really working 

right over the fact that since 9/11 there has been no attack on the 

American homeland. So I think you should be thanked for that, 

and I think you should be congratulated for that. 

36 

I visited the agencies—like NSA and NGA and Office of Naval 

Intelligence. 

Ambassador Negroponte, I know you helped set up the National 

Counterterrorism Center. And I’d note that Admiral Redd is there. 

We were there; saw the brilliant and wonderful way it’s working. 

So we do believe that many things are working well. And of 

course, as the appropriator for the FBI, I have the honor of interacting with Director Mueller many times. So we believe that there 

are many things working. 

But I think where we find ourselves today at this hearing, rather 

than going through some of the other threats that you raised or 

how we can discuss the need for resources, how to sharpen what 

the reforms were, et cetera, I think we are focused on the issue of 

Iraq. And there is indeed a credibility problem. 

We’re very far from the ‘‘slam dunk’’ that your predecessor’s— 

predecessor, General Hayden, promised the President. We’re very 

far from the ‘‘mission accomplished’’ that the President promised 

us. And now we wonder where are we going, and what is the best 

way to go? Essentially, what are the plans? What are the intentions? And what are the capabilities? 

So that’s where I’d like to focus my questions, and then in the 

second round come back to the FBI. 

I’d like my first question to go to General Maples. I’m so sorry 

I missed your testimony, General. But perhaps either you or someone else at the table could talk to me about the military plans that 

the President outlined yesterday in terms of going into the neighborhoods of Baghdad. 

Could you tell me, number one, in terms of achievability and sustainability, what would those troops do? Who is the enemy? In 

other words, who is the enemy our great military’s going after? 

And if we’re talking about disarming, who’s going to disarm the 

militias or the insurgents, and how are we going to keep them disarmed? And who is going to keep them disarmed? Is it going to be 

the U.S. military? Is it going to be this Iraqi force that’s been in 

training for now almost 4 years? We’ve been training for 4 years, 

longer than we were in World War II. 

Can you answer that? And I don’t mean it in a pugnacious way. 

If these guys are going to be in neighborhoods going door to door, 

who’s the enemy? And how are we going to deal with that? 

General MAPLES. Ma’am, I can’t answer your question as it has 

been expressed, because those are operational decisions that will be 

made by the commanders on the ground and the chain of command. 

Senator MIKULSKI. So you mean when they go into Baghdad, and 

we say, ‘‘Guys, you’re into these nine neighborhoods’’ that we heard 

about; you’re going door to door. They won’t know who the enemy 

is? 

General MAPLES. I think that our intelligence assessments and 

what we have provided and what we continue to work with, the 

forces in Iraq will provide them the intelligence to conduct the operations. 

Senator MIKULSKI. But what is the intelligence? In other words, 

what is it that you’re going to say to the commanders? This is what 

you’re going to be facing. This is who we think the enemy’s going 

37 

to be. This is what your job is. We’re not talking about the dayto-day tactical. What is it? 

General MAPLES. I believe what has been expressed is that the 

primary focus of the forces, both the Iraqi and the U.S. forces 

there, will be to provide security to the population. 

Senator MIKULSKI. But provide security means that there’s going 

to be somebody there facing you with a gun or a bomb. And what 

are we going to do? Are we going to say well, no, we only do Shi 

’ites? Or no, we only do Sunnis? What are we going to do? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I think, Senator, one of the thoughts—and 

it certainly came up, as the General mentioned, that we had a 

number of discussions in the run-up to all of this interagency discussion under the leadership of the NSC—is that presence matters, 

effective security presence. And I think there was a feeling that it 

was not sufficient in Baghdad and it was going to have to be increased. 

And I think another point I’d make here is that I would emphasize the idea is for the Iraqis to take the lead as much as possible 

and for us to be in a supporting role. And the plan is for—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. What does that mean? What is the supporting 

role? 

Director NEGROPONTE. What it does mean is that in each of the 

nine districts of Baghdad there are going to be two Iraqi brigades; 

that’s the plan—a total, I think, of 18 brigades, mixed police and 

army. 

Senator MIKULSKI. But what are we going to do, stand behind 

and say, ‘‘This is a gun; shoot it?’’ 

Director NEGROPONTE. We are going embed forces within those 

Iraqi units that will play a support and training and advisory role. 

That is going to be one of the main things we do. 

Senator MIKULSKI. I’m not going to—Mr. Ambassador, I so respect you. I’m not going to keep on this line of questions. But try 

to envision this. 

So what does ‘‘embed’’ mean? OK, here goes the Iraqi military; 

then what we going to do, have like three Iraqis, one Marine, three 

Iraqis, one Marine, three Iraqis, one Marine? We’re going to knock 

on doors? We’re going to look for people with guns? 

But even if you disarm them, who’s going to keep them disarmed, 

this Iraqi force? Is that what we’re looking for? Who’s going to be 

the sustainable factor in this? 

Director NEGROPONTE. The sustainable factors must be the 

Iraqis, and I think that’s the idea, is to try to beef up their presence so that they can really have a more decisive and a greater impact on the kind of disorderly situation that they’ve been confronting up until now by expanding and increasing their presence. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, let’s go then to your conditions, because 

I just can’t envision this. And I make no bones about the fact I’ve 

never faced warfare the way the men and women in the military 

have, but I really don’t get this. I don’t get the feasibility; I don’t 

get the achievability, and I don’t get the sustainability. 

Well, let’s then go to the so-called benchmarks. Now, what have 

you been able to advise the President about the capabilities of the 

Maliki government to be able to achieve any of the items that you 

talk about on page four? 

38 

Let’s go to something simple like oil—not even power-sharing 

with sectarian violence. 

What’s your view on the corruption in Iraq? Do you feel that 

they’re ready to deal with the corruption in Iraq and then really 

get the oil flowing? And why hasn’t the oil flowed so far? Four 

years, no oil, and they don’t seem to have the will. Am I wrong or 

harsh in this? What about the corruption? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I’ll let the General follow up. 

Corruption is a problem. I cite it right in my remarks. But I 

would point out that they are producing a certain amount of oil, 

11⁄2, there are a couple million barrels a day; they’re exporting 1.5 

million, and they’ve actually got some fairly respectable reserves 

developed as a result. 

But these are the kinds of issues that we are encouraging them 

to make progress on, and we think that the fact that this kind of 

package approach is what’s going to encourage them to move their 

performance in the right direction. 

But maybe I’ll defer to the General here. You wanted to add 

something? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, ma’am. In both questions you raise—let 

me start with the hydrocarbon law. As the Ambassador points out, 

they are producing oil. It’s somewhat below prewar numbers. But 

they are producing; they are selling. In fact, they have a budget 

surplus in terms of monies available because of the export—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. Then why are we giving them a billion bucks? 

General HAYDEN. Well, one of the reasons, ma’am, is that we 

want to use it in a targeted way with our forces so that when we’re 

operating at the local level, we can have an impact. But the President talked about the Iraqi—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. Talk to me about corruption. Talk to me 

about corruption, and talk to me about a government that will have 

to establish security services and be something that the Iraqi people can have confidence in. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Mikulski, I regret to say, 

you’re at 9 minutes. And we have four Senators waiting to ask 

their first round of questions. I’ll obviously come back to you. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Could we finish the corruption point? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You could do it in—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. I’m not the one answering it. 

General HAYDEN. All I was going to say, Senator, is that in the 

President’s remarks last night he pointed out the condition, the requirement for the Iraqis to spend $10 billion in the reconstruction 

effort. 

And just to quickly revisit the question with regard to the forces, 

you’re going to have nine sectors, nine army brigades and then, 

added on that, national police brigades, an American battalion embedded in each. 

It has been our experience that when there are embedded American units with Iraqi units, the even-handed behavior of that unit 

increases and the professional performance of that unit increases. 

So the presence of the American battalion there—we have a clear 

track record—should improve the performance of the Iraqi brigade. 

In addition, the Iraqi army is largely a strictly infantry force 

now. With the American battalion there, all the supporting eleVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
39 

ments—logistics, indirect fires, air support, communication—are 

more readily available to the Iraqi brigade. 

You asked about the commitment of the Iraqi government, and 

that, ma’am, is quite clearly the critical point and why I think the 

President spent so much time on it yesterday. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I’m going to ask you this in the classified hearing. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator, thank you. 

I’m going to call now in order on Senator Warner, Senator Burr, 

then Senator Whitehouse and Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Warner, we welcome you, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I wish to comment on my colleague from Maryland’s inquiry, because I share concerns—and I’ve expressed this in 

our meetings with the President and others—about the American 

GI facing the conflict between the Sunni and the Shi’a—conflicts 

and antagonisms and killing that goes back over a thousand years. 

And I somehow feel that that’s not the job of the U.S. GI or the 

coalition GI to solve. That must be borne by the Iraqis. 

I just had the privilege of spending about 20 minutes with General Petraeus—that’s why I was absent for a few moments here— 

and I pressed that question on him, as I did on the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs the other night, or the other afternoon when we 

were together. 

We’ve got to make it clear that the primary responsibility of that 

sectarian violence and the resolving of it, has got to fall upon the 

Iraqi component of this jointness that we have and to take the 

point and to take the responsibility. They are far better qualified 

by virtue of language and culture and everything else to understand what drives two people, the Sunni and Shi’a, to the point of 

trying to take one another’s life over, you know, a religious dispute 

that originated, I think, in 650 A.D. as to who was going to succeed 

Muhammad. 

I respect their religion and respect the divisions, but when it 

comes to warfare and the security of our people, that’s very important, that we call upon the Iraqis to take the point. 

First, I’d like to say, Ambassador Negroponte, again, you’ve fulfilled another distinguished chapter in your career. You’ve laid a 

wonderful foundation for your successor. And I happen to have 

been privileged to know your successor . We worked together some 

30–plus years ago in the Pentagon—a very able individual. 

But my first question to you is, in the course of the deliberations 

in the Armed Services Committee, working up to the bill that was 

passed this year for the annual authorization, we put in a request 

to the Administration to perform a National Intelligence Estimate 

on Iraq, an NIE. And that is now under way. 

First, Mr. Ambassador, could you give us an estimate of when 

that might be released? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Yes, Senator. Probably by the end of this 

month, which has been pretty much the target that we had all 

along. As you know, these estimates take several months to prepare. 

Senator WARNER. Oh, yes. 

40 

Director NEGROPONTE. And it’s just been circulated now for sort 

of final coordination between the intel agencies and then we will 

have several meetings on them, and so I expect by the end of the 

month. 

But in the meanwhile, I would like to point out that this hasn’t 

impeded us from contributing to all the deliberations within the 

Administration about this new policy initiative that was announced 

by the President yesterday. So that proposal has had the benefit 

of the latest intelligence from Iraq, just as we have been periodically briefing the Congress on what’s going on in Iraq. 

So the fact that the NIE has not yet been produced does not 

mean that we have been holding back useful information for policymakers with respect to that country. 

Senator WARNER. Well, early on in October when I came back 

from Iraq, I expressed my grave concern that the situation was 

drifting sideways, and the rest is history. And some others joined 

in my concern at that time. And I commend the Administration for 

the manner in which they really have come together, worked very 

conscientiously, listened to a lot of different perspectives, and that 

has culminated in what the President presented to the Nation and 

the Congress last night. And I think it was a credible job and it’s 

worthy of the most intense study by the Congress. 

And that’s the process this Senator is in now, is not only a study 

of the President’s release last night, but the manner in which it 

was put together. And that’s why I asked the NIE question because, I say to my colleagues most respectfully, that NIE will, I 

think, bring into sharp focus some issues which bear upon some of 

the conclusions and the objectives that the President stated in his 

document last night. 

And I for one, am going to withhold final judgment on exactly 

where and how I’m going to hopefully join in a bipartisan way to 

come up with some revised strategy that we can all agree on. But 

I think it’s important that Members examine that. 

And Mr. Chairman, my understanding, when I was Vice Chairman of this Committee many years ago, is that the Committee 

makes that NIE available to all U.S. Senators in our spaces for examination. Would that be correct? And therefore, once released, I 

urge my colleagues to look at that all-important document. 

I also commend you, Ambassador Negroponte, on the very forthright presentation in your statement today. And I urge that colleagues have the opportunity—all Senators—to read that, because 

it brings into a clarity of focus the very key issues that are before 

us now, as we try and work with our President on the new strategy. 

And I want to once again return to your phrases, which were 

quite clear. Iraq is in a precarious juncture. And you recite the 

problems. You have prospects for increasing stability over the next 

year will depend on a number of issues, and you very clearly set 

forth; there are seven of these issues in here. Indeed the friends 

in our region are concerned about the consequence of the growing 

instability in Iraq. 

Now, given that, I think, clear and factual and accurate portrayal 

of the situation, we’ve got to get a better understanding of what it 

is that the President feels we can accomplish in this mission. And 

41 

so much of it is dependent upon Prime Minister Maliki and his government in delivering. 

The President mentioned benchmarks. 

Now, but my specific question to you, can you give us any further 

definition here in open session—we’ll continue to pursue it in 

closed—of your estimate as to how solid the Maliki administration 

is in place, how likely that it will continue? It’s got to continue, it 

seems to me, for at least—Maliki in that office—for another year. 

And we have these somewhat disturbing statements about how he 

didn’t really want the job and one thing and another. 

But I put that aside and I want to rest on your evaluation of 

Maliki as an individual, his strength of will, his strength of purpose to live up to the commitments that apparently he has made 

to the President of the United States, who in turn, as President, 

has now formulated a plan which presumably tracks some of 

Maliki’s requests to our President to go forward and really put in 

harm’s way another 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, 25,000 of our forces. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, he certainly made a strong speech 

the other day, Saturday night, on the occasion of the anniversary 

of the Iraqi armed forces about his willingness and the government’s readiness to go after unlawful elements of any type and extremists on both sides. 

I think it’s important that they’re prepared to commit resources, their own resources, these $10 billion that the General was referring to, as a way of following up these clear-and-hold operations. 

I think he’s got a tough row to hoe, Senator, in the sense that 

his government was put together—it was sort of a negotiated proposition with the elements from across the political spectrum. 

Senator WARNER. I’m fully aware of that, but I’m just talking 

about the man himself; the gravitas that he has or doesn’t have. 

Director NEGROPONTE. I think he’s been making a very noble effort under very, very challenging circumstances. 

But are these conditions going to be met? Are the benchmarks 

going to be met? I think we’ve got to wait and see. But I certainly 

feel that he ought to be encouraged by this affirmation of American 

commitment and desire to work with him to reach a satisfactory 

outcome. And I would have thought that that would give impetus 

to his efforts and be helpful. 

Senator WARNER. All right. Now, I don’t want to get into detail 

on the exact military—— 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Warner, could you make this 

the last part, sir? 

Senator WARNER. I will, Mr. Chairman; I’d be glad to do that. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You’re approaching 10 minutes. 

Senator WARNER. I will not get into the military planning, which 

I have some knowledge about it, but basically, it’s going to take 

time to marshal the additional forces of the United States and sequence them into that area of operation—namely Iraq—to stage 

and then move into place in the nine different parts of Baghdad. 

Just my judgment: It’s probably going to be the March-April 

timeframe before the real center of gravity of this movement will 

begin to move forward. 

So my last question to you: What are some of the benchmarks 

that he can achieve, Maliki as Prime Minister, between now and 

42 

when the full momentum of this buildup; should it go forward, take 

place to show to the American people it is truly a partnership and 

that this time the Iraqis are going to perform, unlike they did in 

a previous iteration of last summer when we staged that operation 

in Baghdad to try and straighten it out? And they failed to show 

up, the Iraqi troops. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, for example, naming this commander for the entire jurisdiction of Baghdad, I think is an important step; starting to mobilize and get these forces ready for their 

move into Baghdad; and of course, starting to identify those funds, 

out of those $10 billion and start getting ready to deploy them to 

affect the situation. Those, for example would be some of the 

things. 

In the parliament, I think it would be trying to move some of the 

legislation that has been pending for a long time, such as the oildistribution legislation which hasn’t yet been passed. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Could the other two witnesses, General Hayden and General 

Maples, add to that question, if they so desire? 

General HAYDEN. Sure, Senator. I think an early indicator will 

be the degree of independence of the Iraqi commander for Baghdad—that he’s free of political considerations and has the ability, 

the freedom, to restore order in the capital. That means going after 

everyone who is outside the law, regardless of religious affiliation, 

and going into whatever neighborhoods he needs to go into operationally to effect that result. I think that would be an early and 

a very good indicator. 

Senator WARNER. General Maples. 

General MAPLES. Sir, the only other thing I would add is the 

Prime Minister’s ability to influence Sadr at this point, which I 

think will be very significant also. 

Senator WARNER. All right. I thank the Chair. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for your commitment. Thank 

you for your patience. Thank you for your knowledge you bring to 

this hearing. 

Ambassador, have the objectives of al-Qa’ida 2001—and when I 

say objectives, economic impact—changed? And that goes to the 

heart of a comment you had in your testimony about mass casualty. My curiosity—I remember the talk of the attack, post-9/11 

and the economic impact of the significance of the twin towers. 

Are we now at a point—Director Mueller talked about aircraft, 

and I was trying to separate in my mind, is this a delivery system 

or are we now—destruction of one aircraft which is mass casualty. 

Have we seen that transition? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I personally believe, but I’d be interested 

in what the others feel, that they pretty much have the same kinds 

of objectives as they did then—i.e., both mass casualties and harming economic infrastructure and symbols of capitalist society. 

To give an example, last August, the plot against the airliners 

that were going to go from the United Kingdom to the United 

States; it wasn’t just one airliner; it was nine airliners that they 

wanted to see simultaneously blown up. So that would have caused 

43 

thousands of casualties. So it would have been on a par, or something similar to 9/11. 

Senator BURR. And one would believe that that was to achieve 

maximum loss of life versus economic disruption and the impact 

that it caused in airline travel? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, probably both. But I’d be interested 

in what—— 

Senator BURR. Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. I think, clearly, there are a number of objectives. One, mass casualties; just the killing of Americans is number 

one. Second would be the adverse impact on the economy of the 

Unites States by taking down an aircraft. Third, the publicity. All 

of those are objectives that I think al-Qa’ida tries to attain as it 

develops these continuing plots. 

Senator BURR. Ambassador, you also said in your testimony, and 

I quote, ‘‘We must understand the enemy, his intentions and his 

capabilities.’’ Now, I’m going to ask you a very simple question: 

How much have we learned? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, I think certainly, as in any kind of 

war, as time goes on you learn more about your adversary, your 

enemy. And I think that’s been true in this situation vis-a-vis alQa’ida, and I think it’s demonstrated by some of the successes 

we’ve had in putting some of their operatives out of commission, 

like Mr. Zarqawi or some of the people who are close to bin Laden 

in the third tier of their leadership. We’ve pretty much eliminated, 

as you know, almost everybody who was in the third tier of the 

original team, if you will, of Usama bin Ladin. I’m sure there is 

more to be learned, but we’re in a much better position than we 

were before. 

And the other point I would make in that regard is, we are devoting an enormously greater amount of both collection and analytic effort to this challenge than we were 6 years ago. 

Senator BURR. General Hayden, would you like to comment at all 

about this, how much we’ve learned? 

General HAYDEN. Sure, Senator. 

First of all, stating very clearly, you’re never good enough and 

you always have to get better. I think it would be a very instructive 

pair of case studies to look at what happened and didn’t happen 

in July and August of 2001 and what did and didn’t happen in July 

and August of 2006 with the two plots, the 9/11 plot and the airline 

plot. There is a remarkable difference in the performance of our 

community between those two events. 

Senator BURR. Several of you, I think, alluded to energy in your 

statement. I think in the United States domestically we control 

about 6 percent of the reserves in the world. That’s either here or 

through U.S. companies. The majority of the reserves in the world 

are held by Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. 

My question is, how concerned are we about energy security? Are 

we doing enough? And Ambassador, for you, who is the lead agency 

for our national security as it relates to energy? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, from the point of view of analysis, 

I mean, the intelligence community pays a great deal of attention 

to the energy situation, energy politics, energy reserves. General 

44 

Hayden’s agency does an awful lot of work on that subject, has 

some very fine capabilities. 

As far as the policy work is concerned, I would say that is really 

something that comes under the National Security Council, with 

inputs from the Department of State and the Energy Department, 

would be the two that I would mention. 

Senator BURR. Well, my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I would like 

to make the point that I’m sure I don’t need to make, that if our 

eye is not closely on this one, just with the players that control the 

lion’s share, we could find ourselves in a mess in a very short 

order. And I know this is something that DOD is greatly concerned 

about and tremendous effort is being put on. 

My hope is that we can make an even stronger effort to understand where it is we need to position in the future and what we 

need to do here to position differently than we are today. 

Again, I thank each one of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Burr. 

Our order now is Senator Whitehouse, Senator Chambliss, and 

then Senator Nelson. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon, Ambassador, nice to see you. 

The President indicated last night an intention to disrupt networks in Iran and Syria that were delivering arms into Iraq and 

fueling the conflict. I presume that he did not intend that statement to express any intention to engage militarily on Iranian or 

Syrian soil in pursuit of that objective. But if that were the case, 

and if we were found to have engaged militarily on Iranian or Syrian soil in pursuit of that or other objectives, what would you estimate the political, diplomatic and other consequences would be of 

that on our efforts to bring peace, tranquility and security to Iraq? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Senator, let me say this, first of all. From 

an analytic point of view, the behavior, as I said in my statement— 

my prepared statement—both the behavior of Syria and Iran with 

respect to Iraq is of great concern. We estimate that something on 

the order of 40 to 70, maybe even more, foreign fighters come in 

across the Syrian border into Iraq every month and many, if not 

most, of those are suicide bombers. 

And then earlier in our session here we had a discussion about 

what the Iranians are doing in terms of supporting Shi’a extremist 

elements with explosively formed devices and other types of lethal 

assistance. So I think those kinds of behaviors are very troublesome. 

In terms of disruption and interdiction, I really do think it would 

be better to discuss that in closed rather than in open session. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Including the hypothetical question, if 

that were to happen and if we were to be found to have done an 

incursion into Syrian or Iranian sovereign territory, what would be 

the political and diplomatic consequences vis-a-vis our efforts to 

bring peace to the region? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I just think the question of how to go 

about disrupting these activities is just generally something that 

might be better discussed in closed session. 

45 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. You are responsible for the execution of 

these things, and I will defer to your judgment on that. 

Let me ask a slightly more complex question, and it’s one that 

I think, at least from my point of view, is the beginning of a discussion. I’m new here, as you know. But clearly, I think we all understand that the success of the President’s new strategy to escalate 

the conflict with additional troops is not at this point guaranteed. 

This leaves open the prospect that it is not successful, which raises 

the question, then what? 

And particularly if the commitment, as the President said last 

night, is not open ended, then obviously at some point it will end. 

My question is whether it is not in our national interest, in 

terms of the reactions of the multiple players engaged in this conflict and surrounding this conflict, but at the point when we decide 

when it’s not in our national interest to pursue the present strategy, does it not make sense to make a clear statement of our intention to deploy our troops elsewhere and take advantage aggressively and diplomatically of the window I would suggest that that 

might create to engage more aggressively with the Iraqi government factions, with the neighboring Arab countries and with the 

larger world community, all of whom, to one degree or another, 

have a disincentive from engaging helpfully in this conflict as a result of our presence? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I just don’t know whether, at this point, 

when we’re talking about plan A, whether it’s the time to be talking about plan B. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. It is the intelligence function, is it not, to 

prepare for plan B? 

Director NEGROPONTE. It’s a policy function. I think our function 

in this particular exercise has been, first of all, to lay out for the 

policy community the situation in Iraq as we see it, and then we 

participated also in the dialog that took place as they developed the 

specific steps that have been put forth. 

And as the General said earlier, and I agree with him, I think 

that if the different elements that I had mentioned earlier are carried out and come to pass—the question of the Iraqi government 

and political leaders establishing effective national institutions, the 

extremists being defeated, and so forth—we think this initiative 

has a chance to succeed. I think I’d be reluctant to go into the 

what-if’s. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes. Well, it’s clearly a very broad question, and as I said, it’s sort of introductory; I’ll continue to pursue 

it with you. 

Director NEGROPONTE. I think the other point, too, that one has 

to think about is the impact on the neighboring countries. I think 

there’s a lot of concern in the region about what is happening in 

Iraq and a lot of concern that the situation be stabilized. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Concern can be motivating. 

A specific example of the point might be the reaction that press 

reports have indicated the Iraqi population has to our presence, in 

which polls have apparently said that a majority of Iraqis not only 

don’t want us there but believe that it’s OK to kill coalition forces, 

presumably because we’re viewed as an army of occupation. Would 

a stronger indication that our position there is not open-ended, and 

46 

indeed that redeployment is in the future, would that not quell 

some of that sentiment? First of all, do you think that information 

is accurate, and would that not quell some of that sentiment? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I think there is some truth to it, and I 

also think that the fact that, for example, as the President announced yesterday, the Iraqis will be assuming the lead for security throughout the country by the end of the year I think is a nod 

toward that concern. 

The point is, how do we get from here to there in such a way 

that the Iraqis will have adequate capabilities, capacity to acquit 

their responsibilities? And the way forward that we’ve described is 

the way, the best way we can think of to getting there. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I’ll follow up further in the classified session. I appreciate your testimony, and it’s good to see you again. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Thank you. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator. 

Our order now is Senator Chambliss and then Senator Nelson, 

then Senator Snowe. 

Senator Chambliss you go ahead. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, what is the Chair’s intention 

relative to a closed session? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I’m sorry? 

Senator CHAMBLISS. What is the Chair’s intention relative to a 

closed session with these gentlemen? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The Chair’s intention is to be responsive to the membership of the Committee, and the Vice Chairman’s 

view is that. We discussed that. And it is late; there are questions 

that still have to be answered, but this was laid out as both an 

open and then a closed session. 

If the Senator has a question which he only feels he wants to ask 

in closed session, then there will be a closed session. Senator 

Wyden, I think shares that view somewhat and others may. So be 

assured that that will be available to you if you wish it to be. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I just have one question. 

General Maples, there are fresh reports today relative to the 

military entering an Iranian facility in Irbil. And it looks like we 

detained six individuals who are believed to be IRGC associates. 

What can you tell us about that situation, both relative to the individuals detained and what type of individuals they may be? And 

what about other assets that might have been picked up or information picked up? 

General MAPLES. Sir, the information we have about that operation is very limited, and you have the basics of that, although 

there was material that was taken as a part of the operation that 

can be exploited. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. OK. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fort, let me ask you. Here is a track of all of the suspect 

tracks of narcotics from Central America and South America in the 

year 2003. This is what it is in 2006. And as you can see, just simply by the amount of red lines, a lot of it is originating in VenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
47 

ezuela and it’s going to Haiti or the Dominican Republic, and then 

of course, it’s coming on up through the Caribbean. 

I’m going to Haiti tomorrow, and I’d like to know what, in your 

opinion, does this increase of traffic mean for stability in the region? 

Mr. FORT. Well, Senator, I must confess, I’ve not seen those 

charts, and my own expertise in terms of flows of narcotics coming 

up from Latin America is very limited. And if we wanted to have 

an in-depth conversation, I’d need a little bit more preparation. 

In a general response to your question, though, the implications 

are simply not very good. I mean, as we know from many years— 

from decades actually—of narcotics trafficking flows from Latin 

America and elsewhere, there are a variety of impacts on the local 

economies of the countries of production, on the law enforcement, 

on the social fabric, and so on and so forth. 

Senator NELSON. Let’s visit privately about it so we can get into 

specifics. 

Mr. FORT. Certainly. 

Senator NELSON. And this is under the umbrella that DOD was 

trying to take away helicopters from the region, specifically in the 

Bahamas, that were trying to interdict some of this traffic. And I 

think we’ve got that turned around now. But I will look forward 

to visiting with you on that. 

Mr. FORT. Certainly, Senator. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Let me ask General Hayden—and thank you all 

for your public service—there’s a widely circulating opinion poll 

that indicates that 61 percent of Iraqis believe attacks against 

American forces are justified. Do you think that’s accurate, and 

how would you characterize the Iraqi views toward U.S. forces in 

Iraq? 

General HAYDEN. Senator, I don’t know the details of the poll 

that you’re quoting, but I think, as the Ambassador said a few minutes ago, there is probably some element of truth in there in terms 

of betraying kind of intuitive Iraqi reactions to foreign occupation. 

I think that’s understandable, particularly since this has been 

some period since the beginning of our move into Iraq 3 years ago, 

and, I’d also suggest, the failure of ourselves and our coalition allies and the Iraqi government to provide security. I think those are 

two important factors in the results of the poll. Again, I don’t know 

how scientific it is, but there are elements of truth to that. That, 

I think, we’re confident about. 

Again, as the Ambassador suggested a bit earlier, that’s why success in Iraq will—must—have an Iraqi face on it. And that’s why 

in terms of what the President announced last night, the fact that 

we’re using Iraqi brigades on point in Baghdad is very important. 

Senator NELSON. I have, as you know, talked to your officers in 

almost all of those countries. And I’d like your opinion on—do you 

think that the Sunnis and the Shi’ites can come together on a compromise government? 

General HAYDEN. Senator, that’s obviously the $64 question and 

will largely determine how successful we can be in creating a pluralistic, even democratic government in Iraq. This is a very complex question. I don’t mean to dodge it, but if you could just give 

me maybe 1⁄2 minute or 45 seconds. 

48 

Because of the events, most of them generated by merciless, almost satanic al-Qa’ida attacks on the Shi’a population, which remained very quiet for about 2 years until about the Samarra 

mosque bombing, the dividing lines in Iraq right now are between 

Sunni and Shi’a. The objective of our strategy is to make the dividing lines in Iraq between radicals and moderates. The definition 

there are those who are or are not willing to kill their neighbors. 

That’s the objective we have laid out for ourselves. 

I think we can only get to that kind of dialog by providing some 

minimal level of security for the population that doesn’t exist right 

now. Without that minimal level of security, I’d offer the view, Senator, that even good people will be doing bad things, just simply 

out of raw fear. 

Senator NELSON. Ambassador Negroponte, there are a lot of people that are quite expectant what might happen in Havana. What 

do you expect to happen on the island after Castro’s death? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Senator, obviously we don’t know for sure. 

I think clearly the transition has already begun. Fidel Castro’s 

days seem to be—or months—seem to be numbered. But what is 

not known is whether people are holding back and maybe we’re not 

seeing the kind of the ferment yet that one might expect to see 

once Mr. Castro has definitively departed the scene. So there is 

that question of whether his actual passing might trigger some 

kind of a new political situation. 

Clearly, what Castro and his brother have in mind is to try to 

create some kind of a soft landing for the regime, whereby they 

transition from Castro to his brother in some kind of very smooth 

way. That is clearly their plan, but I think from the point of the 

U.S. policy, we don’t want to see that happen. We want to see the 

prospects for freedom in that country enhanced as a result of the 

transition post-Fidel Castro. 

Senator NELSON. So we really don’t know at this point what to 

expect. 

Director NEGROPONTE. We don’t know in large measure because 

it is a repressive society. They’ve repressed their opposition so severely over all these years, so people aren’t exactly speaking up 

yet. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Nelson, I’m going to have to intervene here. We’re at 71⁄2 minutes with you. Everybody’s meant to 

be at five. That’s primarily my fault. But Senator Snowe has a 

question that she wants to ask. 

Senator NELSON. All right. I have just one further question at 

your pleasure. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. All right. And then Senator Wyden, 

and then Senator Rockefeller actually has a question. 

Senator Snowe. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to follow up on the question of national reconciliation 

because obviously this is the essence of the President’s proposal in 

terms of buttressing his proposal to provide for a surge in troops 

in Iraq. 

General Hayden, you mentioned the bombing of the golden 

mosque in Samarra, and Senator Wyden and I were in Iraq, you 

49 

know, days after that occurred, and that was obviously the event 

that unleashed the sectarian violence. 

It seems to me in your descriptions before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee last December—November—and General 

Maples, and now Director Negroponte with respect to the ability or 

the capacity of the Iraqi government to reconcile these differences 

and to bridge this political divide. 

And it seems to me—and in reading this description, Director 

Negroponte, when you’re saying that Prime Minister Maliki’s national reconciliation agenda is still at its initial stages, the various 

parties have not yet shown the ability to compromise effectively on 

the thorny issues of de-Ba’athification, the oil revenue, provincial 

elections, and so on, you’re describing something that very much 

was present when we were there back in early March. The Maliki 

government was assembled in May. It is now January. 

And General Hayden, back in November, you described the situation that the Shi’a now focus on assuring that Iraq’s new government reflects the will of the majority, that the Sunnis view the 

Shi’a as Iranian-controlled and the current government as predatory, and that the Kurds, for their part, want to keep and strengthen their substantial autonomy they’ve exercised since 1991, and 

that all reject the coalition presence and the constitutional regime. 

General Maples, you said last November in your testimony before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, that although a significant 

breakdown of central authority has not occurred, Iraq’s moved closer to this possibility primarily because of weak governance, increasing security challenges, and no agreement on a national compact. 

I mean, if you talk about this whole description in terms of the 

political will that obviously doesn’t exist within the government to 

take the risk for national reconciliation, I mean, is national reconciliation even possible? 

And how is that 20,000 troops going make a difference if the 

Iraqi government isn’t willing to take the risk for those political 

concessions and compromises, doing what they should be doing for 

themselves and what we would expect them to be doing? 

So Director Negroponte, I’d like to have you respond, as well as 

General Hayden and General Maples. 

Director NEGROPONTE. First of all, I agree with the thrust of your 

question in the sense that it’s a very difficult and grave situation. 

But I think, to your question of what difference would an increase in our troop presence and involvement make, I think it can 

only be viewed as a package in conjunction with additional effort 

on the part of the Iraqi government itself, both in the political area, 

the legislative area—trying to get those laws changed that we were 

talking about, the de-Ba’athification and the oil revenues, and the 

assistance effort, the question of getting more money into these 

areas that are cleared. 

The question is, the situation is difficult, but I don’t think it’s 

hopeless. And I think that through a combination of measures, it 

can be addressed, although time will only tell whether these measures are going to be successful or not. 

Senator SNOWE. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, ma’am. Again, to kind of review where 

we’ve been, the Iraqis have had a chance to effect these grand comVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
50 

promises since about the beginning of 2006. Prior to that, I think 

through a process that was quite heroic on both our part and 

theirs, we built up step by step to get a democratically elected Iraqi 

government in place. 

That was done in the face of what I mentioned earlier, this tremendous effort on the part of al-Qa’ida to inflict just raw human 

suffering on the Shi’a population. With as you suggest, the 

Samarra mosque bombing, all hell breaks loose from the Shi’a side. 

And every bit of evidence we had, that’s not a pre-planned move 

waiting for a provocation, it is a visceral response—the final provocation coming from al-Qa’ida. 

There are really deep-seated historical problems to overcome. 

And as you know—you visited—if you talk to the Sunnis, they 

think the current government is Iranian, if not Iranian-controlled. 

If you talk to the Shi’a, they think if Saddam’s not coming back 

still, the Ba’athists are coming back. So you’ve got these really 

deep-seated fears that have to be dealt with. 

A very important aspect of General Maples’ testimony and mine 

in November is that we described the sectarian violence there for 

the first time to be self-sustaining. It no longer needed external 

stimuli to cause these two communities to go after each other in 

the way they’ve been going after each other. 

During long deliberations in November and December—the Ambassador referred to these small-group meetings under NSC auspices. The fundamental question was: Can they make these political compromises in the current security environment? Our judgment was they could not and that we had to somehow intervene 

to bring the security to a certain level that then allowed—and this 

is very important, ma’am—the possibility that the Iraqis would 

make these compromises. I agree with you, this is an Iraqi responsibility to make these kinds of very hard decisions. 

Senator SNOWE. I just don’t see where the security question is 

going to overcome the fundamental problem and the root causes in 

Iraq. I just don’t see it because there hasn’t been any attempt to 

avert the initial stages; the political reconciliation stalled, there’s 

nothing to prevent them from doing that. There’s nothing. 

If they had the political resoluteness, and I—that’s my concern. 

I mean, if it’s taken this long—I mean, the oil revenues, for example, are at pre-Saddam levels in terms of revenues and exports currently. That’s what it was in March and obviously still is today. 

And when you talk about the fundamental divisions that exist 

within Iraq, I don’t see how the security question is going to affect 

that in the final analysis. 

Director NEGROPONTE. The reason we believe it should and it 

might, Senator, is that it’s the insecurity that precipitated a lot of 

this negative behavior in the first place. I mean, these divisions 

and these differences might have existed previously, but they have 

been now exacerbated and aggravated first by the al-Qa’ida and by 

the reactions that the General was describing, so that then you get 

this kind of a downward spiral where, as the General said earlier, 

even good people end up doing bad things. 

So I think by restoring security I think you can also help restore 

some civility to the political dialog. 

Senator SNOWE. I thank you. 

51 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Let me just announce for all the following. I’m going to ask a couple questions, then Senator Wyden, 

Senator Mikulski, Senator Nelson. I know it’s late, and I’m sorry, 

but that’s the way this usually works. And we have an obligation 

to Senators who want to ask questions in closed session, and I absolutely will honor that. 

That will require a 10-minute break, which could be useful for 

other purposes, to simply rewire; that’s all it takes. We’ll do it right 

here. We’ll go into closed session. So that’s what we’re going to do. 

I hope that you will all stay for that, regardless of the length of 

all of this. 

Remember, the great music—the greatest music ever written was 

the St. Matthew Passion; it took 31⁄2 hours—by Johann Sebastian 

Bach. So we have a ways to go still. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I don’t think this is going to rival that. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You don’t. OK. 

At the beginning of the war, Ambassador, I think the Shi’a objection to our being in Iraq in that posture was about 13 percent. And 

I think it’s now up to 71 percent. 

Could you just think out loud a moment for me, quickly, about 

the effect of that in relation to our ability to deal with the insurgency? 

Director NEGROPONTE. I think, first of all, you’ve got to address 

the question or you’ve got to ask yourself the question about how 

reliable these polls are, because if you talk to the—— 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Let’s say they’re partly reliable; they’re 

ballpark figures, and you understand that. 

Director NEGROPONTE. And then you have to sort of wonder what 

they actually mean. Does it mean that simply people are fed up 

with the absence of security? I would submit to you that a lot of 

this has to do with, well, we just haven’t had security, and well—— 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Ambassador, you can argue with my 

figures, but they are approximately correct and they have to do 

with the presence of American troops. So it’s that that I wish you 

to deal with with respect to its effect on tamping down the insurgency. 

Director NEGROPONTE. Well, I don’t believe that that necessarily 

has an adverse effect on the conduct of our counterinsurgency efforts. But maybe you can help me by elaborating on your question 

or maybe one of my colleagues can help me here. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Nobody has an answer to that. All 

right. 

Director Hayden, in my opening statement I expressed my concern about the existence of a separate CIA detention program 

that’s been publicly acknowledged by the President, as I indicated. 

To me, it’s a matter of some lasting damage in our standing with 

the moderate Islam community across the rest of the world. And 

it’s that which is my focus, this moderate population which is not 

yet involved in jihadism and the madrassa schools which don’t 

teach that kind of thing. 

In your estimation, what are we doing with respect to the feelings of the moderate community as they listen on Al-Jazeera and 

52 

others about the possibility of detention and, as might be interpreted, torture, and CIA? CIA is not watched as carefully as DOD. 

General HAYDEN. I’m sorry, Senator. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The CIA is not watched as carefully as 

DOD; that has to be part of the point. 

General HAYDEN. Actually, that’s not true, but I understand 

you’re not saying it’s true; you’re talking about the image that’s 

portrayed and how people might use or misuse the fact that there 

exists a separate CIA interrogation program. 

What it is we do is lawful. It’s lawful according to U.S. law; it’s 

lawful according to international law. In closed session I’ll elaborate a bit more as to why we’re very confident about that, about 

those judgments and how other people view it. 

It has a tremendous return on investment in terms of intelligence value. So even accepting the premise that it has some negative effect with regard to a public diplomacy campaign, that has to 

be balanced against the quality and quantity of the intelligence 

that it provides to protect the homeland. 

I think all those are very, very important factors, Senator. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. OK, we’ll do that in the next session. 

A final very quick question: At our opening hearing on the threat 

2 years ago I asked then-Director Porter Goss about unaccountedfor Russian fissile materials and whether he could assure us that 

the materials had not been stolen and found their way into the 

hands of terrorists. And of course, he said that he couldn’t assure 

us of that. Are we any farther along a chain of having more of a 

grasp on that? 

General HAYDEN. Senator, two reasons I prefer closed session— 

one is for details, but two, to make sure I get all the facts right. 

I would agree with Director Goss’s statement, though. We don’t 

have a total handle on it even still. But let me go ahead and do 

some homework to give you an answer to see what, if any, improvements have been made. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. OK. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. General Hayden, in Iraq, what proof is there 

that Prime Minister Maliki is prepared to confront al-Sadr and the 

Shi’a militias directly? And the reason I ask this is that my sense 

is that Prime Minister Maliki has given some speeches about this, 

has sort of paid lip service to the question of taking on these Shi’a 

militias, but is sort of hoping to suck us into this, which would 

open up a whole new front of our involvement. 

And what I’d like to know is what hard proof can you point to 

that would indicate that Prime Minister Maliki is prepared to confront al-Sadr directly? 

General HAYDEN. Senator, again, I can give a more elaborate answer in closed session. But in the current session, when we took 

both the policy the President announced last night and the speech 

he used to announce the policy to CIA analysts, and we sat down 

with a large room full of analysts on Tuesday to go through the 

speech, we have been using the analytical work of these people to 

shape our discussions, but I wanted them to see the speech, that 

was a critical concern. 

53 

Everyone understood that the success of this plan fundamentally, 

unarguably, unavoidably depended on the performance of the current government. 

I need to be careful here, too. Maliki clearly is a very important 

player as the Prime Minister. But success is going to be created by 

a larger group, and we have to include others we would at least 

give the opportunity to be moderates, like President Talabani and 

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and Tariq al-Hashimi, who represent various 

groups inside there. 

But the success or failure of the plan will depend on their being 

able to make the right decisions with regard to security. As I suggested earlier, that means going against anybody outside the law, 

going into any neighborhoods in Baghdad. 

Senator, I’ll be very candid with you because the President was 

very candid last night. The track record of the current government 

with regard to this isn’t something that would naturally give you 

great confidence. That’s why there’s that language in the President’s speech that makes the success of this very conditional on the 

performance of Prime Minister Maliki and his government. 

Senator WYDEN. I understand what the President is hoping for. 

I’m still looking for some hard proof—maybe you want to talk more 

about this in secret, in the closed session—that he is actually willing to do this, because that’s the ballgame. If you don’t take on the 

Shi’a militias directly, and somebody’s got to do it, then I don’t see 

how this can possibly come together. 

General HAYDEN. Absolutely correct, Senator. Taking on the 

Shi’a militia does things internally to Iraq in terms of creating the 

social contract with all parts of the population—in this case the 

Sunni population. It creates powerful and positive effects externally 

that this is a government of all Iraqis and not a Shi’ite faction in 

control, and that is a very beneficent effect in the larger neighborhood, which is largely Sunni. It’s very critical. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Bond wants to 

get to the ‘‘Closed Session Symphony.’’ 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Well, we have two more people, Senator Mikulski and Senator Nelson. 

So Senator Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Chairman, let me get right to the point 

of it. 

First, though, to Ambassador Negroponte, I meant what I said 

about things working right, and I think you are to be congratulated 

for implementing the intel reform legislation. You were given a 

very difficult job to stand up a whole new agency and a whole new 

framework, and quite frankly, many of us are disappointed that 

you are going over to State because I think you did not only try 

to follow the letter of what the law was on reform but the spirit 

of it. 

And I would say to my colleagues, a perfect example of this is 

to go visit the NCTC that Admiral Redd, who is here this evening, 

operates, because you then see that they both identify the dots and 

connect the dots, and I would really recommend that. 

But this past year—and this goes to a question both for you, Mr. 

Ambassador, and the Director of the FBI. It goes to FISA. And my 

54 

question very simply is this. Should FISA be reformed, based now 

on your whole experience standing up this? 

And Director Mueller, you know you’re the domestic person here 

that gets all the gathering around the world and have to deal with 

it in the United States. Do you think that FISA needs to be reformed? And No. 2, if so, does the Administration have a plan to 

submit a FISA reform package to the Congress? 

Director NEGROPONTE. Senator, I think the answer is in two 

parts. First of all, there are things about FISA that could be modernized that take into account changes in technology and communication and so forth. But whatever changes take place, if they do 

take place, we think as far as the terrorist surveillance program is 

concerned, have got to preserve the intelligence utility of that program—that is to say the agility of the program, the speed with 

which it can operate, and the protection of sources and methods. 

Director MUELLER. As to the second part of the question, Senator, on legislation, I know there are periodic discussions about 

changes to FISA, but I do not believe there is a particular package 

waiting to be presented to Congress. 

As to the first part—should it be reformed, given the advances 

of technology and the speed of the technology and the evolution of 

technology advancements—yes, I do think we ought to continuously 

look at ways that we can update FISA to take into account the new 

technologies that come on monthly, if not weekly, now. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I’m not 

going to go on with other questions. I’ll be talking to the Director 

of the FBI. 

But the other thing is, remember, after 9/11, we decided not to 

create our own domestic surveillance agency, and they’ve been 

doing two jobs—fighting crime as well as fighting the global war 

against terrorism, and maintaining a pretty significant ops tempo. 

And I think at another time, I’d like the Committee really to focus 

on the FBI. And also, I think we need to pick up on FISA. 

But I think enough said for tonight. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Mikulski, we’re going to have 

a hearing precisely on that. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I’ll be very brief. I just want to 

pick up where Senator Mikulski left off, Mr. Ambassador, and say 

that I too am disappointed that you’re going to State. You’ve had 

a long and distinguished career, and obviously there’s the tie-in 

with Iraq, you having been the Ambassador there. But there’s 

nothing more important than intelligence. And you stood up this 

organization and I would have expected at least another 2 years in 

your term, and I hate to see the disruption from the head leaving. 

Do you have any comments? 

Director NEGROPONTE. First of all, I regret leaving, Senator, for 

the reasons that you mentioned, and also because I believe I 

brought together a very good team of people, and I sincerely hope 

that as many as possible of them continue their service to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

On the other hand, I’m sure that you can also understand that 

for somebody who started his career as a junior Foreign Service OfVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:45 Jun 12, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48098.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
55 

ficer in the State Department in October 1960, to be asked to be 

Deputy Secretary of State is also a very important opportunity. 

Senator NELSON. Clearly, I understand from your personal 

standpoint. But what’s more important to the country? 

Director NEGROPONTE. But I was going to say, the third part of 

my remark, Senator, was going to be that while I indicated I was 

available to be the Deputy Secretary of State, if that was what the 

President wished me to do, that the decision was entirely up to 

him. I would serve in either capacity. I would do what the President wanted me to do, and this is what the President has asked 

me to do. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, just a final comment, back to 

what Senator Wyden said and the skepticism that he expressed, 

Senator Coleman and I were just blown away when we were talking to the national security adviser, Dr. Rubai, when he said—and 

this is a quote—this is not a sectarian war. And he went on to talk 

about well, it was the Ba’athists that want to retain power, and so 

forth and so on. 

Now, you know, if the top levels of the government, the national 

security adviser to the Prime Minister, is saying that, that indicates a certain mindset. And I don’t have any more optimism about 

this thing having reconciliation than the comments expressed by 

Senator Wyden, Senator Snowe and a whole host of Senators this 

morning in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee talking to Secretary Rice. 

That’s my comment. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. All right. Thank you. 

Now, what we will do is go into a 10-minute recess. And I hope 

those who are prepared to, No. 1, to clear the room in an appropriate fashion in accordance with classification, and second, to do 

whatever rewiring is necessary, will get at it. 

So we take a 10-minute recess. 

[Whereupon, at 6:14 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene 

immediately in closed session.] 

(57) 

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