Al-Qaim

U.S. Marines in Battle

SEPTEMBER 2005 - MARCH 2006
First Light, First Casualties: Ubaydi, November 14, 2005.

Painting by CWO-2 Michael D. Fay

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, Triangle, VA
The Battle for Al-Qaim

and the Campaign to Secure the Western

Euphrates River Valley

by Nicholas J. Schlosser

1

This study examines a counterinsurgency campaign

conducted during the Iraq War between the fall of

2005 and spring of 2006 in the district of al-Qaim

on the Syrian border. In many ways, the struggle to clear

and hold the district marked a turning point for the U.S.

Marines [ghting to bring security and stability to al-Anbar

Province. We tactics and procedures utilized by the

Marines of Regimental Combat Team 2 as well as its

numerous supporting units served as a model for future

operations in 2006 and 2007. In particular, the battle for alQaim marked one of the [rst times that the Coalition and

tribes in al-Anbar united against al-Qaeda in Iraq.

We Iraq War began in 2003 with a lightning quick assault

by Coalition forces that toppled Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist

regime within a matter of weeks. During the months

immediately following the overthrow of the old regime, a

lack of adequate security forces and indecision among

policy makersrapidly led to a collapse of order and stability.

By the summer a broad insurgency conducted by former

regime loyalists, criminals, and Islamic fundamentalist

[ghters had broken out against the U.S. occupation of the

country. We United States’ initial goal of creating an

independent, democratic government was superseded by

the more basic and pressing need to establish a secure and

stable Iraqi state. To confront this challenge, U.S. forces

implemented a wide range of tactics, including raids against

insurgent hideouts,surgical operations against“high-value”

targets, and stability operations akin to those used during

counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and parts of South

Vietnam in the 1960s.

We lack of a uni[ed approach to U.S. strategy in Iraq

meant that it o]en fell to the commanders of smaller units

(brigades, regiments, and battalions) to devise an eXective

means for defeating the insurgency in their particular areas

of responsibility. It was in this type of operating

environment that the commander of Regimental Combat

Team 2, Colonel Stephen W. Davis, and one of his battalion

commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford of 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines, undertook a concerted campaign

to clear and secure al-Qaim District in western Iraq.

Marine Corps Operations in Iraq

2004–2005

We Marine Corps began to withdraw and redeploy its

forces from Iraq almost immediately a]er the collapse of

Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime in April 2003. However,

as the already chaotic situation in Iraq rapidly declined

into an open insurgency against the U.S. occupation over

the summer of 2003, Marine Corps leaders began

preparations for a return to the country. What began as a

few battalions soon mushroomed into the majority of I

Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), which included the

1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Aircra] Wing, and 1st

Force Service Support Group.

1

Combined Joint Task Force 7, the overall Coalition

headquarters in Iraq, gave I MEF responsibility overIraq’s

vast western al-Anbar Province. We region was

strategically signi[cant for a number of reasons. First, it

occupied the critical expanse of territory connecting

central Iraq with its western neighbors. Second, several

major highways, railroads, and the Euphrates River run

across the province, linking Jordan, Syria, and Saudi

Arabia with the major population centers that occupied

the fertile plains of central Mesopotamia. At over 170,000

square kilometers, it was Iraq’s largest province and

accounted for nearly 30 percent of the country’stotal area.

For both these reasons, the province had long been a

center for trade and smuggling.

A third reason for the province’s importance was that it

was a stronghold for Iraq’s Sunni population. Once the

ascendant ethnic and religious group in Iraq,the Sunnis had

seen their powersigni[cantly cut by theAmerican invasion,

and manywere fearfulthattheywould suXer discrimination

in a Shi’a-dominated state.Consequently, al-Anbar Province

quickly became a center of the rapidly rising insurgency

againstthe U.S. presence and a hub of opposition to the new

political structures the U.S.-led transitional government,

On the Cover: Marines with 2d Platoon, 1st Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion, conduct house searches on 5 November 2005

during Operation Steel Curtain.

Photo by Cpl Ken Melton
2

BattleforAl-Qaim

CentralIntelligenceAgencymap
called the Coalition Provisional Authority, sought to put in

place to govern the new Iraqi state. We province was also

dominated by tribes that o]en supplanted and superseded

state authority, making it particularly diYcultfor authorities

in Baghdad to assert direct control over the region.

Consequently, cities such as al-Fallujah were frequently

hostile to central control, and even Saddam Hussein was

unable to eXectively assert his authority throughout the

region as much as he would have liked.

2

For all of these reasons, al-Anbar Province needed to be

secured and stabilized if the U.S.-led Coalition was to

defeat the Iraq insurgency. To achieve this aim, the

Marines of I MEF devised a strategy that focused on

dividing insurgents from the populace. Drawing on classic

doctrinal works on counterinsurgency such as the Marine

Corps’ Small Wars Manual, as well as modern techniques

utilized by police forces to combat gang violence, I MEF

hoped to refocus the Coalition’s eXorts in al-Anbar from

targeting insurgents to protecting the population.

3

Wis eXort struck a major obstacle on 31 March 2004

when insurgents in al-Fallujah ambushed and murdered

four Blackwater government contractors. Concerned that

allowing this aggression to go unanswered would severely

damage America’s ability to maintain authority in the

country, Combined Joint Task Force 7 commander

Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, USA, ordered I

MEF commander Lieutenant General James T. Conway

to conduct an oXensive operation against the city to

capture the insurgents responsible for the murders.

Despite protests from both General Conway and 1st

Marine Division commander Major General James N.

Mattis that such a large-scale operation would make the

tense situation even worse and would likely create outrage

among the Iraqi populace, the Marines of I MEF followed

Coalition orders and conducted Operation Vigilant

Resolve. Four infantry battalions attacked the city. We

Marines met stiX opposition, and on 7 April 2004 reports

emerged (which were later found to be false) that several

Iraqi civilians had been killed in an attack on a mosque.

In the face of protests from the Iraqi governing council,

Lieutenant General Sanchez ordered a suspension to the

assault. We Marines remained on the outskirts of the city,

which quickly turned into an insurgent stronghold.

4

We remainder of I MEF’s 2004 campaign would focus

on destroying the insurgency in al-Fallujah and defeating

the numerous uprisings triggered by the reaction to

Vigilant Resolve such as in al-Anbar’s capital ar-Ramadi

and in the southern city of an-Najaf. Marines also

confronted insurgents in al-Qaim District in the border

towns of Husaybah and Karabilah. In November, I MEF

launched Operation Al-Fajr against the insurgency in alFallujah. Four Marine ri\e battalions, two Army

mechanized task forces, and numerous supporting forces

methodically cleared the city of insurgent forces, securing

the city by the end of the month.

5

In March of 2005,I MEF returned to the United States and

wasrelieved by II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (II

MEF) under the command of Major General Stephen T.

Johnson. Over the course of the subsequent year, II MEF’s

primary mission in al-Anbar Provincewasto provide a secure

environment in which to hold two major national elections:

a referendum on the Iraqi constitution in October and general

elections for a new parliament to be held in December. To

achieve this, the new commanding general of the Coalition

forcesin Iraq, General George W. Casey Jr., USA,* planned a

range of operations throughout the Euphrates River valley

under the umbrella name Operation Sayaid. Casey’s overall

strategy focused on “Iraqization,” as he believed the best

means for combating the insurgency was to reduce the

presence of American forces and place the task of providing

security in the hands ofIraqisoldiers.Consequently,with two

fewerinfantry battalions, the Marine expeditionary force sent

to Iraq in 2005 was smaller than the one deployed the

previous year had been.

6

We ground combat element of II MEF was the 2d

Marine Division commanded by Major General Richard

A. Huck. Huck deployed the battalions of his division’s

two reinforced regiments throughout the major towns

along the Euphrates River, from the al-Qaim District at

the Syrian border to al-Fallujah in the east. We II MEF

area of operations was divided into four parts. Wree of

these were centered in the eastern urban centers of alAnbar Province: the capital ar-Ramadi (code name

Topeka), al-Fallujah (code name Raleigh), and Taqaddum

(code name Oshkosh). We bulk of II MEF’s forces were

deployed here. We headquarters of both the

expeditionary force and Regimental Combat Team 8 was

at al-Fallujah. We headquarters of the 2d Marine

Division was at ar-Ramadi. We largest area of operations,

larger than the other three combined, was Area of

Operations Denver. We area stretched roughly from arRamadi to the Syrian border and the region included the

towns of Hit, al-Asad, the Haditha triad, Rawah, Rutbah,

Anah, and the al-Qaim District towns of Ubaydi, Sadah,

Karabilah, and Husaybah. We forward deployed

elements of the 2d Marine Aircra] Wing, commanded by

Brigadier General Robert E. Milstead Jr., were stationed

September 2005 – March 2006 3

*The Combined Joint Task Force 7 was redesignated Multinational

Force-Iraq in May of 2004. In July of 2004, LtGen Ricardo S. Sanchez,

USA, was replaced by Gen George W. Casey Jr., USA, as the overall

Coalition commander.
at al-Asad, as well as the headquarters of Regimental

Combat Team 2 commanded by Colonel Stephen W.

Davis, which was responsible for the infantry battalions

operating across the area. Marines called this region, in

particular the area at the Syrian border known as the alQaim District, “the wild, wild west.”7

At about 48,000 square kilometers, Area of Operations

Denver was roughly equivalent in size to the state of

South Carolina. We mission of patrolling and securing

this entire area fell to Regimental Combat Team 2.

During his regiment’s deployment, Colonel Davis noted

that “this is a [regimental combat team] with a division

mission in a [Marine expeditionary force]-plus battle

space.”* Davis’ command included three battalions;

however, due to the size of the region, he was forced to

detach a company from each battalion for other

responsibilities such as base security operations.

Consequently, even though Davis was aware that a

constant Marine Corps presence in certain urban areas

was critical to achieving a lasting solution to the problems

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Initial deployment of II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) units in al-Anbar Province, March 2005.

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius

The commanding officer of Regimental Combat Team 2, Col Stephen

W. Davis (left), speaks to Gen George W. Casey, USA, commanding

general of Multinational Force-Iraq in early 2006. Col Davis’s

headquarters would hold overall command of the al-Qaim

counterinsurgency operations during the fall of 2005.

*A Marine regimental combat team in Iraq was roughly 3,000–5,000

Marines, sailors, and soldiers; a division roughly 15,000–20,000

Marines, sailors, and soldiers; and a Marine expeditionary force,

30,000–40,000 Marines, sailors, and soldiers.

4 Battle for Al-Qaim
in the region, his regiment simply did not have the

necessary forces. He recalled in May of 2005, “Because

my force structure’s so small, I don’t have the ability to

leave anybody in town who can make patrols . . . you’ve

got to have people that stay there to give people security.”8

We Coalition command’s plans to rely on the Iraqi

Army to provide security, an army that was still a work in

progress, meant that U.S. forces in Iraq such as Regimental

Combat Team 2 were o]en forced to rely on [repower and

mobility to make up for their lack in numbers. It also

made remaining in a single area for too long a period a]er

it had been cleared of insurgent forces diYcult, thus

allowing insurgents to return once American forces had

le]. In many ways, the operations conducted by the

Coalition during the [rst half of 2005 resembled the

“search and destroy” missions conducted by American

forces during the Vietnam War. Were were exceptions,

notably the operations of Colonel Herbert R. McMaster’s

U.S. Army 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar

during the summer. In general, however, the overall

struggle against the insurgency began to resemble what

some critics called a “whack-a-mole” strategy. Coalition

operations would successfully neutralize insurgent

activities in one city, only to [nd insurgents popping up in

another city. Forced to turn attention to the new area of

insurgent activity, the Coalition forces would o]en be

unable to prevent insurgent [ghters from returning to

areas they had earlier cleared. One Marine described these

eXorts as “squeegeeing out” insurgents. Although the

Coalition was able to clear areas, most insurgents would

escape and would simply return once the Coalition forces

had redeployed to conduct another clearing operation

somewhere else in their area of responsibility.

9

7e Al-Qaim District

We al-Qaim District stretches roughly 26 kilometers

along the southern bank of the Euphrates River, from the

western town of Husaybah at the Syrian borderto the twin

towns of Old and New Ubaydi to the east. We villages of

the district stand a few miles south of the river. Its

population in 2005 was about 200,000. Both Highway 12

and a railway line running parallel to the south frame the

southern border of the district. Directly on the Syrian

border is Husaybah and to that town’s east is Karabilah.

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Al-Qaim in 2005, showing major Marine Corps outposts.

September 2005 – March 2006 5
Bisecting Karabilah, perpendicular to the Euphrates, is a

dry riverbed called the Emerald Wadi. We wadi is deep

enough that it requires a bridge to allow vehicle traYc to

cross. Next to Karabiliah is the town of Sadah. Past Sadah,

the Euphrates makes a dramatic course change, moving

northwest, then south. We sudden turns create an area

that looks like the end of a dog’s bone. Nestled within this

area are the towns of Old Ubaydi and New Ubaydi. Across

the Euphrates from New Ubaydi is the town of Ramah.

10

Due to its location on the Syrian border and along

major transit routes, al-Qaim had become an important

logistical center for the insurgency as fighters moved

toward the urban areas of central Iraq. As the

insurgency became more international in character, alQaim also became an important point of entry for

foreign fighters entering from Syria. Consequently, the

Coalition established several bases around the district.

The largest was Camp Al-Qaim, positioned about 10

kilometers south of the Euphrates, near a railway

station. A large and substantial facility, the camp was the

central command post for operations throughout the

district. Its distance from the urban areas of al-Qaim

also meant that it was difficult for insurgent forces to

attack. In contrast, a second base, originally called

Camp Husaybah, sat at the western edge of the town of

Husaybah (Marines would rename it Camp Gannon in

2004).* Roughly the size of a square city block and

composed of about eight to ten buildings, the camp had

originally been an old customs post along the SyrianIraqi border. The outpost granted Marines an important

position from which to observe and interdict activity

along the border and in the northern sections of the

town. In the spring of 2005, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines

had also constructed a battle position on a hill north of

the town, further enhancing the Marines’ ability to

observe activity in the region and the city’s key avenues.

We locations of both the battle position and Camp

Gannon made them frequent targets for insurgent hitand-run attacks, and the Marines in both locations faced

[re from insurgent forces on a daily basis. Captain

Richard H. Pitchford, whose Company L, 3d Battalion,

6th Marines, would be positioned at Camp Gannon for

much of the fall of 2005, recalled later that the company

faced, “nearly constant daily engagement from some

enemy popping up somewhere, using much of the urban

terrain to mask their movement, and then engaging us

from diXerent areas. I would say we were in the defense

but in a very aggressive posture in our defense.”11

Photo by SSgt Jason D. Becksted

The al-Qaim cityscape is shaped by low buildings, narrow streets, and stone walls, with mosques dominating the skyline. These characteristics

are apparent in this image of Karabilah, taken during Operation Spear in June of 2005.

*After Maj Richard J. Gannon II (1972–2004), commander of

Company L, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, who was killed in a battle

with insurgents on 17 April 2004.

6 Battle for Al-Qaim
As with much of the al-Anbar Province, tribalism

dominated the social and cultural makeup of the al-Qaim

District. In the words of Major Edwin O. Rueda, an

intelligence oYcer working with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines

in 2005, “We region is arguably the most intricate tribal

area in Al Anbar, where the tribal elements maintain a

signi[cant amount of in\uence and power.” We area was

dominated by four tribes: the Albu Mahal, al-Salmoni,

Karbuli, and Ubaidi. Alongside these four were a number

of smaller groups such as the al-Jurghafe tribe.

12

For decades the ruling powers over Mesopotamia had

used the tribes as a means of asserting control, with the

Ottomans, British, Hashemites, and Ba’athists all relying

on the tribes’ in\uence and authority to help govern Iraq

as a whole. For much of the twentieth century, tribal

authority and in\uence was on the decline as the

modernizing and centralizing forces of the Iraqi state and

market economics began to weaken more traditional

modes of authority and commerce. We drive to curtail

tribal power became particularly aggressive following the

1958 coup abolishing the Hashemite monarchy as Iraqi

leaders sought to supplant traditionalsources of authority.

We privileged status tribes enjoyed as well as any oYcial

connections between the tribes and the government were

quickly severed and abolished. We government replaced

tribal law with civil and criminal law, curtailed the

practice of granting privileges to diXerent tribes, and used

educational and information initiatives to propagate the

idea that tribes were a vestige of Iraq’s past and did not

belong in a modern, pan-Arab state.

13

We blow delivered to the Iraqi state by the Persian Gulf

War led to a resurgence of tribal dominance. We defeat of

the Iraqi military by the Coalition and the subsequent

uprisings in the north and south had badly shaken the

foundations of Saddam Hussein’s authority. Although his

regime would successfully put down the uprising in the

south, the rebellions nevertheless demonstrated the

dictator’stenuous hold on the Iraqi people. He subsequently

enlisted the aid of tribal leaders, particularly powerful ones

in the country’s west, where nomadic attitudes and

traditions remained a dominant part of the region’s social

makeup even during times when tribal activity and power

were at a low point. Soon, tribes throughout Iraq began to

supplant and adopt roles and functions formerly reserved

for the state. Tribal authorities established alternative

means with which to settle disputes, collect money, and

maintain law and order. By the time the Saddam regime fell

in 2003, the tribes had become a predominant in\uence on

everyday life in al-Anbar. Sheikhs were expected to ensure

the economic well-being of their tribe by providing their

members with jobs, engaging in extortion, and acquiring

support from the government. Wey also worked to acquire

contracts and licenses from the central government.

14

Exploiting divisions among the tribes, Saddam also

played diXerent tribes oX against one another and

undertook to divide and conquer the al-Anbar region.

We chief bene[ciary of Ba’athist patronage in al-Qaim

was the al-Salmani tribe, which gained increasingly

greater in\uence over the region at the expense of the

other tribal groups. We fall of the Ba’ath regime in 2003

led to an unraveling of this state of aXairs. We Albu

Mahal tribe, the region’s largest, began to assert

themselves now that their chief rivals, the al-Salmani, had

lost their Ba’athist patronage and protection. In response,

the al-Salmanis and Karbulis began to align themselves

with al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups that

had been organized to [ght the Americans.

15

We Iraqi insurgency had a signi[cant impact on this

resurgence in tribal authority. By the middle of 2005, the

insurgency against the United States had gone through a

dramatic metamorphosis. Initially, it had been a diXuse

resistance movement led by individuals who, for a variety

of reasons, shared the common goal of ending the

American occupation. Beyond this, there was little central

authority or direction, and its decentralized character gave

the insurgency the impression that it was everywhere and

nowhere at the same time. Wis movement, described as

“netwar,” was characterized by a seeming lack of

coordination, centralized planning, and overall guiding

ideology and purpose. We insurgency brought together a

wide variety of groups and participants including former

Ba’athists, Iraqi secular nationalists, religious nationalists,

and religious fundamentalists from both Iraq and abroad.

16

Beginning in 2004, charismatic and energetic leaders

began to emerge to give the insurgency greater direction

and focus. In Iraq’s southern regions, the radical cleric

Muqtada al-Sadr quickly became the face of radical Shi’a

opposition to the Coalition. In al-Anbar Province,

Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi emerged as one of the

strongest leaders of the Sunni insurgency. His organization,

Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad carried out a campaign of

terror and intimidation throughout al-Anbar Province

from its base in al-Fallujah. In the fall of 2004 he requested

and received recognition as leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq from

al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Following the Second

Battle of al-Fallujah, al-Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda in Iraq

organization shi]ed operations west, and soon established

al-Qaim as an important insurgent base.

17

Although at [rst many of al-Anbar’s tribes had aligned

themselves with the insurgency, their frequently

parochial outlook and traditional concerns clashed with

September 2005 – March 2006 7
the internationalist, Islamist vision of al-Zarqawi’s

organization. According to a letter written by al-Zarqawi

in April 2004 and recovered and translated by the U.S.

government, the “shaykhs” were “mostly Su[s doomed to

perdition.” In the insurgent leader’s estimation, they

lacked the requisite fervor and drive to wage jihad and

religious warfare. “With all the horrors and bad

circumstances, not one of them everspeaks about jihad or

calls for sacri[ce or self-sacri[ce. For these, three is too

much, not to say four. Wey are not suited to this.”18

As his insurgent organization increased its in\uence in

the region, it began to displace the power of al-Anbar’s

dominant tribes. We two forces competed for in\uence

and also for economic gain, with al-Qaeda in Iraq

funding itself through the black market smuggling

activities that had previously been the domain of the

tribes. Traditionally, sheikhs were expected to provide the

members of their tribe with patronage and work.

However, the violence wrought by the insurgency had

crippled al-Anbar’s economy, discouraging economic

investment. Al-Qaeda in Iraq also interfered with the

traditional social norms and customs of the region. Wey

violated the sanctity of funerals, o]en using such

gatherings as moments of opportunity to kill large

numbers of prominent sheikhs. Wey also sought to

curtail the role of local laws and traditions, local religious

practices, and institute sharia law in the regions of alAnbar that they controlled. Rather than win allegiance

and loyalty from the local tribes and Iraqis in the region,

al-Qaeda in Iraq’s aggressive campaign to reorder the

economic makeup and social fabric of al-Anbar’s society

alienated and angered many of the province’s

inhabitants.

19 We foreign [ghters also helped exacerbate

pre-existing tensions between al-Qaim’s tribal groups,

and Marines suspected that groups such as the Salmoni

tribe were at the very least giving their tacit approval to

the insurgents in their struggle against the Albu Mahal.

To defend its interests, the Albu Mahals formed their own

militia, the Katab al-Hamsa.

20

Marine Corps Operations in al-Qaim:

March 2004–August 2005

As these social upheavals threatened to reshape the alQaim District, Marines conducted a number of

operations in and around the region to disrupt insurgent

activity and establish a modicum of stability. Beginning in

March 2004, when I MEF took command of operations in

al-Anbar, Marines confronted persistent and aggressive

insurgent activity in the district. Beginning in March

2004, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, took responsibility

for stability and security in al-Qaim. Within weeks of

their arrival, the situation in al-Fallujah sparked uprisings

against the Coalition in ar-Ramadi and an-Najaf. We

Marines of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, faced a similar

surge in violence beginning in mid-April. On 14 April

2004, around 30 insurgents ambushed the Headquarters

Company of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, while it was

convoying from Karabilah to Husaybah. We attack

damaged several vehicles in the convoy and wounded the

battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew A.

Lopez, and four others. Despite wounds to his back from

enemy [re, Colonel Lopez responded, oversaw the aerial

evacuation of a wounded Marine, and directed the

Marine counterattack.

21

At the same time as the ambush, a squad from 4th

Platoon, Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was

conducting a reconnaissance patrol of the water

treatment plant in Karabilah. Hearing the sounds of the

rocket propelled grenades and small arms [re from the

ambush, the squad immediately deployed to provide

assistance. As it came to eastern Husaybah, insurgents

attacked the squad. We squad dismounted and returned

[re. Subsequently, traYc along the roads moving east

from Husaybah began to build up and the squad’s

Marines started to inspect and search the vehicles. Upon

inspecting one vehicle, three men \ed from the car and

moved west. We squad leader, Corporal Jason L.

Dunham, and two Marines pursued and tackled one of

the men. While attempting to secure him, the man

dropped a live grenade. Dunham immediately threw his

helmet on the grenade, which then detonated. While

Dunham’s act saved his fellow Marines, the explosion le]

him mortally wounded and Corporal Dunham would die

eight days later at the National Naval Medical Center in

Bethesda, Maryland. For his actions on 14 April,

Corporal Dunham became the [rst Marine recipient of

the Medal of Honor since the Vietnam War. We medal

was presented to Dunham’s family by President George

W. Bush in a ceremony held on 11 January 2007.

22

Fighting continued in Karabilah and Husaybah for

several weeks. On 17 April the insurgent attacks

intensi[ed in what 3d Battalion, 7th Marines’ operations

oYcer, Major George C. SchreZerIII, called the “Battle of

Husaybah.” At 8:00 a.m. an explosion rocked the old

Ba’ath party headquarters. Following this the Marines

from the battalion came under heavy mortar and small

arms [re from insurgent forces. We [ghting was [erce

and saw numerous house-to-house [ghts as the Marines

of the battalion methodically cleared buildings one a]er

the other. In the a]ernoon, the Marines of 3d Battalion,

7th Marines, set up a cordon around Husaybah and

8 Battle for Al-Qaim
continued to engage the insurgents in the buildings and

streets of the town, selectively using heavy weapons and

airstrikes in an attempt to prevent civilian casualties. In

the course of the two-day battle, [ve Marines were killed.

One of them, the commander of the battalion’s Company

L, Captain Richard J. Gannon II, was awarded the Silver

Star. We others killed, all from Captain Gannon’s

command, were Corporal Christopher A. Gibson, Lance

Corporal Michael J. Smith Jr., Lance Corporal Ruben

Valdez Jr., and Lance Corporal Gary F. Van Leuven.

23

While Marines continued operations in al-Qaim for the

remainder of 2004, the operation to take al-Fallujah

scheduled for the fall of 2004 meant that most of I Marine

Expeditionary Force’s resources needed to be diverted

toward operations in the eastern Euphrates Valley. We

situation in al-Qaim did not improve, and continued to

deteriorate throughout the fall of 2004 and into the winter

and spring of the following year. In October 2004, the New

York Times reported that American forces in the district

were [ghting insurgents every day, writing, “Villagers in

this tiny hamlet on the Syrian-Iraqi border no longer wait

Photo courtesy of the Dunham family

During the insurgent assault on 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in

Husaybah and Karabilah in April 2004, Cpl Jason L. Dunham was

mortally wounded as he used his helmet to shield fellow Marines from

a grenade blast. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor,

the first Marine to receive the medal during the Iraq War.

Medal of Honor Citation for

Corporal Jason L. Dunham

We President of the United States in the name of the

Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL

JASON L. DUNHAM

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his

life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Ri\e

Squad Leader, 4th Platoon, Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines (Reinforced), Regimental Combat Team 7, 1st

Marine Division (Reinforced), on 14 April 2004. Corporal

Dunham's squad was conducting a reconnaissance mission

in the town of Karabilah, Iraq, when they heard rocketpropelled grenade and small arms [re erupt approximately

two kilometers to the west. Corporal Dunham led his

Combined Anti-Armor Team toward the engagement to

provide [re support to their Battalion Commander's convoy,

which had been ambushed as it was traveling to Camp

Husaybah. As Corporal Dunham and his Marines

advanced, they quickly began to receive enemy [re.

Corporal Dunham ordered his squad to dismount their

vehicles and led one of his [re teams on foot several blocks

south of the ambushed convoy. Discovering seven Iraqi

vehicles in a column attempting to depart, Corporal

Dunham and his team stopped the vehicles to search them

for weapons. As they approached the vehicles, an insurgent

leaped out and attacked Corporal Dunham. Corporal

Dunham wrestled the insurgent to the ground and in the

ensuing struggle saw the insurgent release a grenade.

Corporal Dunham immediately alerted his fellow Marines

to the threat. Aware of the imminent danger and without

hesitation, Corporal Dunham covered the grenade with his

helmet and body, bearing the brunt of the explosion and

shielding his Marines from the blast. In an ultimate and

sel\ess act of bravery in which he was mortally wounded,

he saved the lives of at least two fellow Marines. By his

undaunted courage, intrepid [ghting spirit, and unwavering

devotion to duty, Corporal Dunham gallantly gave his life

for his country, thereby re\ecting great credit upon himself

and upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps

and the United States Naval Service.

September 2005 – March 2006 9
for the call to prayer to mark the end of the daily fast for

Ramadan. Instead, sundown arrives in tandem with an

eruption of mortar rounds and gun[re between Iraqi

insurgents and the American forces stationed next door.”24

On 15 October 2004, a car bombing killed a Marine, two

soldiers, and their translator while on patrol in the

district.

25 On 11 April 2005, suicide bombers attacked a

U.S. installation in the region.

26

We violence was not only directed at the Americans.

Iraqi police, Iraqi soldiers, and tribal leaders were also

targeted by insurgents. In March 2005, 20 Iraqi bodies were

uncovered, one of which was carrying a police identity

card. We others were believed to have been national

guardsmen.

27 Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam EXan Fahran alShurji al-Aziz, a principal sheikh of the Albu Mahal tribe,

described the situation in al-Qaim under al-Qaeda in Iraq

as harsh and brutal. He described one incident:

Four members of one family in the al-Qaim

District—not from my tribe, from the Salman

tribe—they were former soldiers. [We

insurgents] brought them out and killed them in

the middle of the street. Wey cut oX their heads,

and they put each head on the back of the body.

Wis was in August of 2004. We family came to

pick them up, to take them and bury them. AlQaeda stopped them. I contacted the director

general for the phosphate factory to bring a

shovel so he can just bury the bodies. It was

starting to smell. Wey stopped them. A]er a

week or 10 days, if a car wanted to pass through

this area, he had to put a mask on his face from

the smell. What they did, they came and put

TNT on each body, and they called the family to

come pick them up. When the family came at

dawn, they exploded them. With these four

people, they killed another eight, and they

injured many others.

28

We sheikh’s assertions revealed that a divide had begun

to emerge between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the local tribal

groups, in particular the Albu Mahal tribe. “We started

to understand their mission was to destroy our tribe.”29

We Albu Mahal tribe requested Coalition assistance

against al-Zarqawi’s group in the spring of 2005. Wat

May, II MEF’s Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted

Operation Matador. A lack of adequate forces

immediately became a challenge for the Marines

planning the operation. Colonel Davis’regiment had only

three battalions to maintain security throughout its entire

area of operations. Shortly a]er the operation, Davis

noted that “we have underresourced this [ght out here.”

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius

An M1A2 Abrams main battle tank from Task Force 3/2 patrols Ubaydi during Operation Matador in May 2005.

10 Battle for Al-Qaim
Nevertheless, Davis planned to compensate for the

limited number of forces by emphasizing speed and

mobility, and attached Boeing Vertol CH-46E Sea Knight

medium helicopters and Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion

heavy li] helicopters to the Matador task force. We force

would also include AAV-7A1 Assault Amphibian

Vehicles, M1A1 Main Battle Tanks, and LAV-25 Light

Armored Vehicles. We goal of Operation Matador was

to clear the region of insurgent activity, with a focus on

the area north of the Euphrates around Ubaydi and

Ramana. We force for the operation was designated Task

Force 3/2 and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Timothy S. Mundy. We task force included Company I

and Company K from Colonel Mundy’s 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines; Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines;

Company B, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion; Combat Logistics Battalion 2; and the U.S.

Army 814th Bridge Company.

30

We initial objective of the operation entailed securing

a suitable crossing point between New Ubaydi and the

town of Ramana across the Euphrates, and then

constructing a bridge in order to establish a line of

communications north of thatriver. Fighting was [erce as

the U.S. Army bridge company constructed a ribbon

bridge across the river beginning on 8 May. Meanwhile,

the Marines of Task Force 3/2 fought to clear New

Ubaydi. We following day, Marines crossed the river

using assault amphibian vehicles and battled insurgents as

they cleared Ramana. By the end of the day, the ribbon

bridge was complete and Marines continued to clear

Ramana. We assault force then moved to the town of arRabit, rooting out the network of caves lining the

riverbank. We operation came to a close on 14 May, with

the bulk of the Marine task force returning to Camp Al

Qaim. We operation ended with an estimated 144

insurgents killed and 40 taken prisoner. Coalition losses

were nine killed and 39 wounded. We Marines killed in

action were Corporal Dustin A. Derga, Lance Corporal

Lawrence R. Philippon, StaX Sergeant Anthony L.

Goodwin, Lance Corporal Wesley G. Davids, Private First

Class Christopher R. Dixon, Lance Corporal Nicholas B.

Erdy, Lance Corporal Jonathan W. Grant, Lance Corporal

Jourdan L. Grez, and StaX Sergeant Kendall H. Ivy II.

31

Although the operation had initially been organized at

the behest of the Albu Mahal tribe, it had been conducted

without coordination with local tribal leaders. At the

time, the Coalition had little sense that a diXerence

existed between organizations such as al-Qaeda in Iraq

and the local militias like Katab al-Hamsa.

32 We gains of

Operation Matador were also largely undercut by the

perennial problem of troop de[ciencies. To maintain

security throughout his area of operations, Colonel Davis

had been forced to send one of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines’

ri\e companies to guard Al Asad Air Base. We task force

also lacked Iraqi security forces to reinforce its strength.

During the months following Operation Matador, Katab

al-Hamsa suXered a critical defeat against al-Qaeda in

Iraq, and the Albu Mahal’s authority in the region was

quickly supplanted by the terrorist organization. During

Operation Matador insurgents kidnapped the governor

of al-Anbar Province, Raja Nawaf, and demanded an end

to U.S. operations in the region in exchange for his

release. On 31 May, his body was found a]er a [re[ght

between Marines and insurgents.

33 In mid-June, residents

of Husaybah reported that insurgents aYliated with alQaeda in Iraq had seized control of the town.

Concurrently, Iraqi soldiers uncovered 17 bodies, two of

which were decapitated. According to residents in the

district, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the killings,

and declared that the dead had been American spies.

34

By September, al-Qaeda in Iraq openly declared that alQaim was under its control. Signs throughout the district

proclaimed the region the “Islamic Kingdom of Qaim.”

Al-Qaeda in Iraq [ghters burned down beauty parlors,

music stores, and movie theaters. On 5 September, a

woman’s corpse was found in a street carrying a sign that

read “A prostitute who was punished.” Wat same day,

Sheik Dhyad Ahmed of the Albu Mahal was killed, along

with his son, by a car bomb set up in front of his home.

We al-Qaim tribes remained open to an alliance with the

Coalition, but were wary of whether or not the Marines

would remain to secure the area once the insurgents had

been cleared out of the district.

35

We opportunity for a new alliance arose in the fall of

2005, as the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines was relieved by the

incoming 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford. We battalion’s

operations over the course of the next six months would

have a signi[cant and lasting impact on the district and on

al-Qaeda in Iraq’s ability to operate along the Syrian border.

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in Afghanistan

and Its Preparations for Iraq

We [rst units of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, began to

arrive in the al-Qaim region in late August of 2005,

marking the unit’s second overseas deployment in two

years. During the summer and fall of 2004 the battalion

served in eastern Afghanistan. We experience in that

country would prove to be a signi[cant in\uence on the

battalion’s operations in Iraq.

September 2005 – March 2006 11
As with all Marine battalions, the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, prepared for its deployment to Afghanistan by

participating in a combined arms exercise at the Marine

Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms,

California. During the exercise, the battalion trained for

the speci[c environment to which it would be deployed,

the mountainous regions of eastern Afghanistan. It

trained in the ridges at Twentynine Palms and even

practiced operations with supply mules imported from

the Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport,

California. Following the exercise, while the majority of

the battalion returned to its home at Marine Corps Base

Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, 100 Marines attended

the Mountain Warfare Training Center in California.

Wese Marines eventually served as a cadre of mountain

warfare specialists who were able to impart what they had

learned at Bridgeport to the rest of the battalion.

36

We 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, deployed to Afghanistan

in May of 2004. Its companies were deployed throughout

Khowst and Ghazni Provinces east of Kabul and Bagram

Air Base, along the Afghan-Pakistani border. We

battalion’s companies were dispersed across a wide

geographical area and were tasked with a variety of

missions and responsibilities. “Each company had a

diXerent experience and each company was in a vastly

diXerent terrain,” Lieutenant Colonel Alford recalled.

Indeed, the battalion rarely operated as a single unit

throughout its time in Afghanistan, with its ri\e

companies (usually reinforced by elements of the

battalion’s weapons company) functioning independently

as autonomous units, or under the operational command

of another unit. For the [rst three months of 3d Battalion,

6th Marines’ deployment, the platoons of its Company L

served as a security force for Bagram Air[eld and a quick

reaction force for Combined Joint Task Force 76, the

overall Coalition headquarters in the country. Company

K deployed its ri\e platoons to man three forward

operating bases at Nagalam, Asadabad, and Naray.

Reinforced with elements from Weapons Company, each

base was manned by roughly 80 Marines. Company I

manned Forward Operating Base Surobi and conducted

70 local patrols throughout the Wuzbin Valley before

redeploying to Jalabad. From there, the company

conducted missions in Gelan, Moqur, and Sanya Masha.

37

Beginning in July, the ri\e platoons from Company K

reunited to conduct Operation Chainsaw with a U.S.

Army Special Forces company in the Korangal Valley. In

August, Company L, which had been performing guard

duty and conducting operations as a quick reaction force,

began to once again operate as a light infantry company.

Using 20 attached vehicles, the company’s Marines

conducted patrols throughout the Khowst-Gardez Pass,

familiarized themselves with locals, and gathered

intelligence. Wey also provided security for a U.S. Army

artillery battalion. Wat same month Company K began

constructing a base at Gardez, from where it conducted

security and stability operations at Carkh and Chimkani.

38

In October, all of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ companies

provided security for the national elections, with

Company I providing security in Kogiani and Pachir Wa;

Company K providing security at Sayeed, Karam,

Chimkani, and Gardez; and Company L guarding the

transportation of ballots from Khowst to Gardez. During

this period, Company K was placed underthe operational

control of the U.S. Army’s 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry.

In November, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ deployment

came to an end and its elements began the process of

returning to the United States.

39

We deployment to Afghanistan would prove to be an

instructive experience for the Marines of 3d Battalion,

6th Marines. Over the course of six months, the battalion

had participated in the full range of operations described

in the concept of the “three block war.” It conducted

stability operations, provided humanitarian assistance,

and battled militia forces opposed to the Coalition and

Afghan government.

40 Among the lessons learned by the

battalion during its deployment was the critical role the

populace could play in both supporting and defeating an

insurgency. We 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, realized the

signi[cant in\uence that local elders and tribal groups

held over the social and cultural makeup of the region.

While 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, worked alongside

Afghan security forces, it nevertheless did not focus its

eXorts on living with and operating among the Afghan

people, focusing instead on operating out of forward

operating bases. When deployed to Iraq in the fall of

2005, the battalion leadership resolved to take a diXerent

approach and live with Iraqis.

41

A few months a]er its return to the United States, 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines, began preparing once again for an

overseas deployment, this time to Iraq. We unit trained at

both March Air Force Base and the Marine Air-Ground

Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, both in California.

At that time, Twentynine Palms was in a state of transition,

with the combined arms exercise rapidly undergoing

revision. Beginning in 2004, the Marine Corps Combat

Development Command and its subordinate commands

(Twentynine Palms included) had begun revising Marine

Corps training to better prepare Marines for

counterinsurgency operations. By the end of the decade,

the annual combined arms exercises conducted by Marine

12 Battle for Al-Qaim
battalions at Twentynine Palms became Exercise Mojave

Viper, an immersive live-[re training exercise focused on

preparing Marines to operate in densely populated urban

settings in a desert country. In 2005, battalions preparing

for deployment went through a revised combined arms

exercise that featured role players and a focus on patrols

and convoy escorts. During this period the battalion also

deployed to March Air Force Base where it trained with

role players in a mock-up of an Iraqi town designated

Matilda Village. We predeployment training also included

some cultural brie[ngs designed to help Marines

understand the customs and religion of the Iraqi people.

Nevertheless, the training eXort was not focused

speci[cally on counterinsurgency operations. To [ll in the

We United States Marine Corps and Small Wars

As a seaborne force, the Marine Corps has a long history of [ghting small wars during the numerous

interventions conducted in foreign nations by the United States. We most well-known were those

fought in Central America in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua during the [rst three

decades of the twentieth century (o]en called the “Banana Wars”). In most of these cases, Marines initially

landed to protect Americans and American interests as these nations were wracked by upheavals and civil

wars. In some cases, such as in Haiti in 1915, Marines and Navy personnel served as administrators. In most

cases, Marines also trained and served alongside local security forces, notably the Haitian Gendarmerie and

the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional. In all of these countries, Marines fought anti-government guerrilla forces

such as the Cacos in Haiti and the Sandanistas in Nicaragua.

During these interventions, Marines learned and honed the tactics for [ghting small wars. Wey utilized

small, lightly equipped, and highly mobile foot patrols. Wey interacted with the populace, organized and

observed elections, and tried to avoid harsh and excessively punitive measures against the population.

Between 1935 and 1940, the Marine Corps produced a doctrinal publication that gathered together the most

important lessons it had learned from the interventions in Central America and the Caribbean. Wis work

would become the Small Wars Manual, published in 1940.

While many Marines during the 1930s anticipated the Corps would have to participate in future

interventions, the rising threat from Japan and the outbreak of World WarII forced them to focus on building

the Fleet Marine Force and on the mission of seizing advanced bases. For the next two and a half decades,

Marines focused on large-scale forced entries and combined arms operations.

Beginning with the United States’s involvement in South Vietnam in the late 1950s however, Marines

served as advisors to local security forces and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. In 1965, large-scale

Marine formations landed in South Vietnam and Marines once again found themselves [ghting guerrillas

in a jungle environment. To weaken the Viet Cong’s ability to operate among the South Vietnamese villages,

the Marines developed the combined action program (CAP). We CAP utilized integrated platoons of

Marines and South Vietnamese soldiers to build trust with the villagers, gather intelligence, and weaken the

Viet Cong’s in\uence over the population.

Following the Vietnam War, many Marines once again sought to shi] the Corps’ focus back to amphibious

landings and conventional operations. Marines nevertheless served as advisors in counterinsurgencies during

the 1980s, most notably in El Salvador. We Iraq War led to a renewed interest and focus on insurgencies, and

before the second deployment in 2004, Major General James N. Mattis instructed his Marines of the 1st

Marine Division to read the Small Wars Manual. He also reintroduced a version of the combined action

program to help train Iraqi forces. His comments on returning to Iraq aimed to remind Marines that small

wars and insurgencies have been a part of the Corps’ history as much as the large-scale amphibious landings

in the Paci[c during World War II: “Wis is the right place for Marines in this [ght, where we can carry on

the legacy of Chesty Puller in the Banana Wars in the same sort of complex environment that he knew in his

early years.”

September 2005 – March 2006 13
gaps, battalion company commanders scoured the internet

for articles and material on counterinsurgency to better

prepare themselves and their Marines for the new

deployment.

42

As the battalion prepared to deploy to Iraq in 2005,

Lieutenant Colonel Alford resolved to take a new course

with regards to the Iraqi populace, drawing on lessons

from his Afghanistan deployment. He recognized that the

main objective needed to be retaking the al-Qaim

District. “I didn’t know exactly how, but I knew we were

going to do it.” Upon conducting a predeployment site

survey in July of 2005, Lieutenant Colonel Alford noticed

intelligence reporting that the militant groups in the

district were [ghting one another. “When we’re there on

our [pre-deployment site survey] in July of ’05, there was

a lot of [ghting going on up in the city and [3d Battalion,

2d Marines] was like, yeah that’s red on red.* Just right

there, I was like, well that’s got to mean something, if

they’re [ghting each other. I didn’t know what it meant,

but I wanted to [nd out what it meant.”43

To uncover “what it meant,” Alford and 3d Battalion,

6th Marines’ staX concluded they would need to live and

operate among the populace of the district, and not from

outside the towns in Camp Al-Qaim. Drawing on their

experience in Afghanistan, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

concluded that the center of gravity in the insurgency was

the people, not the enemy. It was an observation famously

made by David Galula, a veteran of France’s colonial war

in Algeria.

44 A battalion brie[ng made the point more

succinctly: “It’s the people, stupid.”45

Commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1988, Lieutenant

Colonel Julian “Dale” Alford was a veteran of Operation

Just Cause and Operation Desert Storm. During both

operations he had served as a platoon commander with his

future command, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Lieutenant

Colonel Alford was also a veteran of Operation Iraqi

Freedom, serving as the executive oYcer of 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, during the march up to Baghdad in 2003. A

self-taught student of counterinsurgency, Alford had

digested important texts on the subject at a time when the

topic was still of little interest to most of the U.S. military

establishment. Wese included an expanded edition of

David Galula’s PaciLcation in Algeria published by the

RAND Corporation, Francis J.“Bing” West’s seminal study

of the Marine combined action program in Vietnam, Ke

Village, and the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual from

1940.

46

While Lieutenant Colonel Alford’s chief goal was to

secure the al-Qaim District, there was uncertainty with

regard to how he would achieve this particular aim. We

2d Marine Division’s headquarters ordered the battalion

to maintain the “status quo.” Consequently, the al-Qaim

campaign would largely unfold as a consequence of

decisions and innovations made in the [eld by Alford and

endorsed and expanded upon by his regimental

commander, Colonel Davis. Much of the battalion’s future

success would also depend on the ability of its company

and platoon commanders to devise and carry out operations in accordance with the overarching campaign goals.

We continuity in personnel between the battalion’s

deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq would be crucial in

this regard. Of the roughly 950 Marines who deployed

with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, to Afghanistan in 2004,

about 700 would deploy to Iraq in 2005. Among those

returning were several company commanders. Alford’s

executive oYcer, Major Toby D. Patterson, had been the

commander of the battalion’s Weapons Company in

Afghanistan. We Headquarters and Service Company

commander, Captain Justin J. Ansel Jr., had served as

commanding oYcer of Company I in 2004. Company I’s

new commander, Captain Conlon D. Carabine, had led

the Headquarters and Service Company. Alford’s new

Marine Corps History Division

LtCol Julian D. Alford was commanding officer of 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, from 2004–2006. Col Alford’s personal interest in

counterinsurgency warfare and effective leadership would play a

critical role in the overall success achieved by the Marines in al-Qaim

in the fall of 2005.

*“Red on red”: enemy forces against enemy forces. Enemy forces are

usually designated in red on U.S. and NATO battle maps, whereas

friendly forces are designated in blue.

14 Battle for Al-Qaim
operations oYcer, Major Christopher P. O’Connor, had

led Company K. O’Connor’sreplacement as commanding

oYcer of Company K was Captain Brendan G.

Heatherman, who had served as one of the battalion’s

assistant operations oYcers. Company L’s commander,

Captain Richard H. Pitchford, had also served as an

assistant operations oYcer. As Alford would state later,

this continuity in personnel meant that,“when I said ‘le],’

they knew exactly what ‘le]’ meant.”47

3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ Arrival in Iraq

and Operation Iron Fist

During its deployment to al-Qaim, 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, ultimately concentrated on [ve major areas of

concern. First, and perhaps most important, was

strengthening the partnership between U.S. forces and the

Iraqi Army. Wis entailed training, recruiting, and

providing the Iraqi forces with operational and logistical

support in order to “put an Iraqi face out front,” in the

counterinsurgency operations. Second, Alford planned to

implement a variation of the combined action platoons

utilized during the Vietnam War and pair Iraqi and Marine

Corps elements together. We units would eat, work, and

live together, thus strengthening cooperation between the

two forces and providing better sharing of intelligence.

Wird, the battalion strengthened the Iraqi police force.

Ultimately, this would be achieved by building cooperative

relationships with the local sheikhs and tribal leaders.

Fourth, the battalion interacted with local leaders and lived

among the people of al-Qaim District. Fi]h, the battalion

focused on civil aXairs and reconstruction operations to

provide electricity, water, sewage, schools, and hospitals to

the region. Finally, the battalion would maintain a focus on

engaging enemy forces.

48

We campaign to secure al-Qaim can be divided

roughly into [ve phases. It began with 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines’ arrival in Iraq at the end of August 2005. We

[rst month of the deployment was de[ned largely by

small arms battles with insurgents inhabiting the major

urban centers of the district. While the Marines of the

battalion were aware that engaging the population would

be critical, it would be impossible to do so unless the

district’s towns were eXectively cleared of insurgent

forces. Wus, the battalion’s companies also spent

September preparing for a large-scale sweep of the

district. Wis began on 1 October with Operation Iron

Fist, the second phase of the campaign. During this

battalion-sized operation, Marines methodically moved

through the towns of Sadah and eastern Karabilah,

stopping at the Emerald Wadi that divided Karabilah in

two. We period following the end of Operation Iron Fist

on 5 October and the beginning of November constituted

a third phase, during which the Marines of 3d Battalion,

6th Marines, established battle positions inside the cities

of Sadah and eastern Karabilah and lived with the

population. During this period they began to acquire a

clearer picture of the [ghting between the al-Qaim tribes

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in the fall of 2005.

September 2005 – March 2006 15
and al-Qaeda in Iraq and also how the tribal relationships

had an impact on the region. For the remainder of

October the Marines of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, also

engaged in small arms [ghts and sniper duels with

insurgents in western Karabilah and Husaybah across the

Emerald Wadi.

We fourth part of the campaign was Operation Steel

Curtain, a large regimental-sized assault to clear

Husaybah, Karabilah, and the towns of New and Old

Ubaydi. We [nal phase began in mid-November as

Marines moved into battle positions built in the center of

the major urban areas of the district. From here, Marines

and Iraqi security forces conducted patrols, continued to

acquire intelligence, and built a close working relationship

with the [ve major tribes of the al-Qaim District.

We [rst units of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, arrived in

Iraq at the end of August. To maximize operational range,

the battalion was once again broken down into its

component units and spread across the area of operations.

Company L was stationed at Camp Gannon and at Battle

Position Harmon, just outside Husaybah on the Syrian

border. We remainder of the battalion deployed to Camp

Al Qaim to the south. From the moment elements of the

battalion came to Iraq, it was engaged in near constant

combat with insurgents. On 8 September, Company K

conducted cordon and search operations southwest of the

district. We next day, the same company accompanied 2d

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion to ar-Rutbah,

roughly 200 kilometers to the south, to conduct a sweep of

that area. Upon returning, Company K squads set up

operations out of two battle positions: Battle Position Khe

Sanh in Sadah and Battle Position Belleau Wood south of

Ubaydi to the east.

49

Wroughout their deployment to al-Qaim, the Marines

of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, were sustained by Combat

Logistics Battalion 2, the unit tasked with providing

support to the entire Area of Operations Denver.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce E. Nickle, the

battalion’s logistics convoys were the lifeblood for the

Marines stationed in the region, and provided food,

water, ordnance, and equipment for building

forti[cations. From its base at al Asad, the logistics

battalion also conducted emergency refueling missions,

mine-sweeping, and maintenance support. Following

Operation Iron Fist, the battalion would also provision

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, with the equipment and

engineers needed to construct battle positions inside alIllustration by Vincent J. Martinez

This map shows the initial disposition of Task Force 3/6 in the Al-Qaim District. The battalion headquarters was to the south of the urban area

at Camp Al-Qaim. Elements from Company I of Task Force 3/6 manned Battle Position Khe Sahn at Sadah. Meanwhile, to the west on the

Syrian border, Company L manned Camp Gannon and watched over the critical border area.

16 Battle for Al-Qaim
Qaim’s towns. Roughly a third of the battalion’s combat

logistics patrols were tasked with provisioning the bases

at Camp Al Qaim and Camp Gannon. Due to the dangers

of roadside bombs set by insurgents along major supply

routes, Bell UH-1 Huey and AH-1 Cobra helicopters

from 2d Marine Aircra] Wing (Forward) provided escort

and reconnaissance for the convoys. Further

compounding the danger was the limited number of

supply routes Marines could take to conduct resupply

missions, especially during the period when al-Qaim’s

towns were under insurgent control. For example, to

supply Camp Gannon, convoys needed to move across

the desert just inside the Iraqi Border. Convoys o]en took

seven to nine hours crossing areas o]en littered with

pressure plate-activated mines.

50

In order to implement a plan that emphasized living

and working among the people, the leaders of 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines, recognized that it would need to

conduct an aggressive operation to clear the region of

insurgents. By the end of September, the battalion began

preparations for Operation Iron Fist. We operation’s

primary objective was to clear the towns of Sadah and the

eastern part of Karabilah up to the Emerald Wadi in order

to establish battle positions inside those two towns. On

26 September, Company L redeployed from Camp

Gannon, leaving 137 Marines behind to secure

Husaybah. We remainder moved to Camp Al Qaim. Four

days later, the reinforced battalion, designated Task Force

3/6, launched the assault. Along with the battalion’s three

ri\e companies, the force also included an AAV-7A1

assault amphibian platoon, an M1A1 tank platoon from

Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, and a forward command

element, along with 81mm mortars.

51

We task force’s Marines utilized the full arsenal at their

disposal: small arms; squad automatic weapons; AT-4

shoulder mounted rocket launchers; and M240G 7.62

mm, M2 .50-caliber, and MK19 40mm machine guns,

augmented by 60 mm/81 mm mortars. We Marines also

relied on the 120mm main guns of supporting M1A1

Abrams tanks, as well as the guided bombs, rockets, guns,

and missiles from supporting Bell UH-1N Huey and Bell

AH-1W Cobra helicopters, Boeing FA-18 Hornet [ghterbombers, and unmanned General Atomics MQ-1

Predator drones. Over the course of Operation Iron Fist,

[xed- and rotary-wing air assets would drop over 18,000

pounds of ordnance during 80 strike missions.

52

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

In Operation Iron Fist, Task Force 3/6’s three rifle companies moved methodically from east to west, stopping at the wadi dividing the town of

Karabilah into western and eastern sections.

September 2005 – March 2006 17
We assault lasted four days. Movement through the

two towns was slow and methodical, as the Marines from

Task Force 3/6 cleared and secured each and every

structure. We battalion’s three ri\e companies moved

deliberately westward through the towns, with Company

L in the center, Company K to the south, and Company I

on the north. Elements from the battalion’s Weapons

Company occupied blocking positions on either side of

the westward advance. From there, they interdicted

approaching cars and other vehicles and prevented them

from entering the battle zone.

53

Sergeant Jeremy R. Riddle of the battalion’s Weapons

Company recalled the deliberate process necessary for

clearing the buildings of the two towns: “It was slow. I

realized how slow it was for these battalions to move

meticulously through these towns because there are big

houses, lots of rooms, sometimes you have people,

occupants in the house so it makes it hard to get through

each one with the interpreter.” We northern element,

Company I, immediately came under sniper and small

arms [re, with insurgents utilizing a mosque in Sadah to

direct [re. On the second day, 2d Platoon of Company L

encountered stiX resistance at the water plant supplying

Sadah and eastern Karabilah, and brought in tanks to

provide [re support. We next day, Company L’s third

platoon uncovered an improvised explosive device

factory. While Company L and Company I encountered

resistance, Company K’s advance was relatively rapid. As

a result, Captain Heatherman maneuvered his company

northward to \ank the insurgent forces. In the course of

the advance, a suicide bomber who had rigged his car

with explosives attacked the company, driving directly

into the middle of a platoon through a false wall. “When

that thing came out of the wall, I thought the whole

platoon was dead,” Heatherman recalled. Although the

explosion was massive, no one in the company was killed

or even injured as a result of the attack.

54

On 3 October the battalion suXered its [rst Marine

killed in action. Since September, a mobile assault platoon

from 3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ Weapons Company had

occupied a prominent position overlooking Sadah,

Karabilah, and the Emerald Wadi. Designated Hill 214,

it was also an area that 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, had

avoided during their own deployment. Consequently, the

leaders of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, believed that

occupying it would send a clearsignal to the insurgents in

Sadah and Karabilah that they did not plan on spending

their deployment in the security of Camp Al Qaim to the

south. Marines from the battalion’s Weapons Company

occupied the position on 9 September. Wey immediately

received mortar [re from the towns below. We hill

nevertheless provided the Marines of Task Force 3/6 with

a strong blocking position during Operation Iron Fist.

Likely due to its tactical position, the hill and the area

around it was littered with buried improvised explosive

devises. On 3 October, one of the sniper team’s high

mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (Humvee) struck

an explosive device while on a routine patrol. We blast

tore the Humvee apart, sending debris \ying 150 yards,

and killing one of the Humvee’s occupants, the assistant

leader of Sniper Team 6, Corporal John R. Stalvey, who

was riding in the passenger’s seat.

55

We insurgents’ preferred means of attack were small

arms [re: machine guns, sniper ri\es, mortars, rocket

propelled grenades, and improvised mines and other

types of explosive devices that could wreak havoc upon

Coalition convoys. In general, insurgent forces remained

hidden and many Marine veterans of the al-Qaim

operations recall never actually seeing the faces of their

enemies. “You can’t even see them, but you see where

everything is coming from,” Corporal Fabricio D.

Drummond noted a few weeks a]er the battle for Sadah.

“I’d see a muzzle \ash . . . pretty much just a muzzle \ash.

I’ve never seen anything other than that.” A section leader

of Task Force 3/6’s Mobile Assault Platoon 1, Sergeant

James N. Sawyer, noted a few days a]er the end of

Operation Steel Curtain,“I have not seen the face or even

the [gure of an Iraqi or an Afghani [ring at me. All I have

seen is a muzzle peeking around a building and have

shots impact on the ground in front of me, or to see an

RPG detonate in front of my vehicle. Wey will not [ght

you face-to-face.”56

Ironically, recovered documents from al-Zarqawi

himself indicate that the al-Qaeda in Iraq leader

denigrated such tactics, feeling that his [ghters were not

taking the necessary risks to achieve victory:

Jihad here [Iraq] unfortunately [takes the form

of] mines planted,rockets launched, and mortars

shelling from afar. We Iraqi brothers still prefer

safety and returning to the arms of their wives,

where nothing frightens them. . . . We have told

them in our many sessions with them that safety

and victory are incompatible, that the tree of

triumph and empowerment cannot grow tall and

lo]y without blood and de[ance of death, that

the [Islamic] nation cannot live without the

aroma of martyrdom and the perfume of

fragrant blood spilled on behalf of God, and that

people cannot awaken from their stupor unless

talk of martyrdom and martyrs [lls their days

and nights.

18 Battle for Al-Qaim
We tactics described by al-Zarqawi were precisely the

ones utilized by the insurgents at al-Qaim. Interestingly,

many Marines found that they were not only [ghting

Iraqis, but Islamist [ghters from countries such as Syria,

Jordan, and Libya as well.

57

We operation to clear Karabilah and Sadah came to a

close on 5 October, with the battalion’s three ri\e

companies stopping their advance at the Emerald Wadi.

In the course of the oXensive, 51 insurgent [ghters were

killed in action. Following the end of the operation,

Alford’s Marines began constructing two new battle

positions. Company K’s 3d platoon occupied Battle

Position Chosin in eastern Karabilah. We 1st and 2d

platoons of Company K moved to Battle Position Iwo

Jima in Sadah. However, although Operation Iron Fist

was completed, the struggle and danger to secure the

townsremained. Positioned inside the towns, the Marines

of Task Force 3/6 were now more open to attack from

insurgent snipers and small arms, as well as to the

perennial threat of mines and other improvised

explosives. We companies of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

confronted almost daily [re[ghts and relied on their full

arsenal and frequent use of close air support. Elements

from the battalion also participated in numerous other

operations throughout the western Euphrates Valley

alongside other Marine Corps and Army units.

58

7e Figure-Out Stage: October 2005

Operation Iron Fist successfully cleared two major

urban centers of al-Qaim District. Rather than press into

the more heavily defended western areas of Karabilah and

Husaybah however, the battalion focused on

consolidating its gains in eastern Karabilah and Sadah. In

many ways, the weeks of October 2005 following the

conclusion of Operation Iron Fist would prove to be the

most critical for the eventual outcome of the deployment.

Company K commander Captain Heatherman described

these weeks as the “[gure-out” stage, a period during

which Marines quickly began to comprehend how the

local conditions and intertribal relationships played a role

in the con\ict in al-Qaim. From their battle positions

directly within the towns, Marines became “nosy

neighbors” as they conducted patrols and built

relationships with the district’s inhabitants.

59

We Marines of Task Force 3/6 began patrols of east

Karabilah on 6 October. We battalion’s Weapons

Company deployed a double-sized sniper platoon of 38

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Following Operation Iron Fist, Task Force 3/6 strengthened its presence in Sadah by deploying most of Company I to Battle Position Khe Sanh.

Meanwhile, Company K manned two battle positions (Chosin and Iwo Jima) in western Karabilah. Company L remained at Camp Gannon in

Husaybah while elements of Company I manned Battle Position Belleau Wood south of Ubaydi.

September 2005 – March 2006 19
Marines stationed along the Emerald Wadi. From here

they were in a position to pick oX insurgents who

continued to attack Marines with small arms and mortars

from the western part of the city. With the insurgents in

western Karabilah and Husaybah pinned down in those

towns, Task Force 3/6 began a concerted eXort to build

trust and cooperation with the Iraqis of Sadah and

Karabilah. We decision to construct the battle positions

inside the towns was a signi[cant step toward achieving

this goal. As Colonel Alford commented a month a]er

Iron Fist,“the people have got to know that you’re staying.”

Alford’s executive oYcer Major Toby D. Patterson,

summed up the approach, stating,“We’re here for the long

haul. . . . I think one of [the Iraqis’] biggest fears was that

we were going to come in, get rid of the insurgents, leave,

and then the insurgents were just going to roll back in.”

By establishing the battle positions, the Marines were able

to demonstrate that this would not be the case.

60

Built primarily out of Hesco* barriers by Marine

engineers from Combat Logistics Battalion 2, the

positions were small, rapidly constructed forti[cations

designed to provide about a platoon of Marines with both

protection and the ability to live and operate among the

Iraqis in al-Qaim, o]en no further than 100 meters from

an Iraqi home. Wus, townspeople going about their dayto-day aXairs would see Marines on the streets providing

security. According to Alford, “You walk out the front of

a battle position and you’re in the street, you’re in the

villages, houses. We plopped ‘em down right in the

middle of the towns.” Major Patterson added that

building the positions and maintaining a visible Marine

presence inside the towns were,“de[nitely helping us win

the [information operations] campaign, at least in this

[area of operations].” Eventually, the platoons also

partnered with Iraqi platoons, thus creating an ad hoc

version of the combined action program platoons.

61

We presence of Iraqi Army forces was an important

contribution to the Coalition’s success in the al-Qaim

region. We history of the Iraqi Army had been a

tumultuous one since the Coalition Provisional Authority

ordered the dissolution of the old army in May of 2003.

Wat decision helped to in\ame the nascent insurgency.

Veterans lacking a means of subsistence and already

suXering humiliation following the army’s defeat against

U.S. forces joined the insurgency. Within months of the

old army’s dissolution, the Coalition Provisional Authority

ordered the creation of a new army of 40,000 individuals

to serve as an internal security force. We performance of

the army was mixed. It was dominated by Shi’a Iraqis, thus

leading many Iraqis in the Sunni-dominated al-Anbar

Province to fear and distrust the new force. Its

eXectiveness under [re was also a problem. During the

First Battle of al-Fallujah in April 2004, several units

serving alongside the 1st Marine Division mutinied and

refused to [ght. Units from the army did perform better

several months later however, during the Coalition’s

November 2004 oXensive to retake al-Fallujah.

62

While the general performance of the Iraqi Army was

mixed, it is important to remember the obstacles it faced

from the outset. In the eyes of many Iraqis it was a puppet

of the United States similar to the mandate army created

by the British in the 1920s. Furthermore, Iraq’s military

had traditionally focused on large-scale conventional

wars, such as those against Iran in the 1980s and against

U.S.-led coalitions in 1991 and 2003. Consequently, it

faced the same challengesthat the U.S. military wasfacing

at the time: adapting a conventional force to [ght urban

warfare and counterinsurgency. We challenges of

creating a brand new security force compounded the

challenges of [ghting a protean and unpredictable

insurgency. We army’s oYcer corps was inexperienced

and found itself relying heavily on attached American

oYcers for leadership and guidance.

63

Whatever the limits of the Iraqi Army however, the

Coalition leadership believed that it was critical that Iraqi

units participate in large-scale Coalition counterinsurgency operations. First, planners hoped that Iraqi

participation would [ght the impression that the United

States was occupying the country, rather than [ghting a

counterinsurgency in support of the Iraqi government

Photo courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette

The battle positions arrayed across the al-Qaim District were small

and usually manned by platoon-sized formations of Marines and Iraqi

soldiers. Their close proximity to the district’s urban areas and, most

importantly, the district’s inhabitants, increased access to intelligence

and strengthened Coalition security efforts in the region.

*A collapsible, flexible wire mesh filled with dirt, sand, or stones that

can be set up with relative speed and ease.

20 Battle for Al-Qaim
and people. Second, the inclusion of Iraqi forces solved

the more practical problem of having enough boots on

the ground to hold and secure territory cleared of

insurgent forces. Conscious of both these factors, Colonel

Davis and Lieutenant Colonel Alford requested and

received reinforcements in the form of Iraqi battalions.

To maximize cooperation, Alford manned his battle

positions with a Marine platoon and an Iraqi platoon

throughout the al-Qaim campaign. Wis forced

partnerships to form between Marines and Iraqis,

strengthening the overall counterinsurgency campaign.

64

Company I commanding oYcer Captain Conlon D.

Carabine recalled an example of when the close working

relationship between Marines and Iraqis proved bene[cial.

As he and an Iraqi lieutenant watched as a number of

young Iraqi males went through a Marine checkpoint

during a clearing operation, the Iraqi lieutenant spotted one

of the men and, just by looking at the man’s attire, told

Captain Carabine that the man was “a terrorist.” Initially

dubious, Carabine followed the lieutenant to question the

suspect, who had already been searched and cleared by the

Marines. Within thirty seconds of questioning him, the

lieutenant walked the man back into the building he had

come from. As Carabine recounted,

Inside that building, right inside the doorway,

was his AK-47, two cell phones, a little book with

contacts. Were’s no question: the guy turned out to

be Syrian, he had phone numbers to Damascus,

there is no question, he was straight up just a

terrorist. Now if it wasn’t for that, those Iraqi

soldiers (and there were plenty of other instances

where they were huge force multipliers, but I use

that speci[c example), that guy would have been

home free. Were’s no question about it.

Wus, by working alongside Iraqi forces, the Marines of

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, were assisted by individuals

who knew local customs and cultures well enough to be

able to spot individuals who did not belong.

Consequently, cooperating with Iraqi forces provided a

signi[cant advantage in terms of intelligence. As a result,

Colonel Alford stressed the necessity of close cooperation

and partnership. As Alford put it on several occasions,“If

you’re not sleeping with them, eating with them, and

crapping in the same bucket, you’re not partnered.”65

In many ways, the three weeks between Operation Iron

Fist and Operation Steel Curtain were as dangerous and

as taxing as those two operations. Sergeant Jeremy R.

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius

Iraqi soldiers played a critical role in the battle for al-Qaim, serving as translators, providing intelligence, and providing extra strength for

security operations. Here an Iraqi takes aim in Husaybah on 5 November 2005 during Operation Steel Curtain.

September 2005 – March 2006 21
22 Battle for Al-Qaim

Riddle, a sniper from Weapons Company, recalled that

insurgents [red on his position on the Emerald Wadi

every single day during these weeks. Sergeant Riddle

stated, “Once that op [Iron Fist] was over, pretty much

started our real combat experience here in Iraq.”66

Improvised explosives remained a danger, as did vehicleborn improvised explosive devices (cars rigged to

explode, driven by suicide bombers). On 19 October one

such vehicle struck Company K. As a squad-sized patrol

moved north, a vehicle came out of a blind alley, turned

and sped toward the Marines. We patrol’s point man,

Corporal Norman W. Anderson III, opened [re. We

driver ducked down, and the car immediately exploded,

killing Corporal Anderson. We remaining six Marines in

the patrol sustained injuries. Following the attack,

Company K formed at the site and then swept the entire

area of north Sadah. During the sweep of about 50

houses, the Marines uncovered the house where the

explosive had been built and detained nine insurgents.

“We talked about that kid for days,” recalled a physician’s

assistant from Combat Logistics Battalion 2, Lieutenant

James L. Anderson, USN,“because in our minds what he

did, he saved all his buddies.” We battalion sergeant

major, Scott L. Weakston, concurred, “His heroics

probably saved the whole squad.” Lance Corporal

Anderson posthumously received the Bronze Star with

Combat “V” for his actions.

67

We patrols conducted during October revealed to

Marines the layout of the major families and leaders of

the region. On 15 October, Iraqis went to the polls to vote

on a new constitution. We battalion leadership worked

closely with local Iraqi leaders in Sadah and east

Karabilah to set up voting sites and maintain security at

the various polling locations. Turnout in the western

cities of Iraq was larger than it had been for the

constituent assembly election of the previous January, but

was still small. In particular, the polling sites in Company

K’s area of responsibility saw only 19 people show up to

vote at the Sadah School, most of whom were in the Iraqi

Army. We low turnout attested to the Marines’ initial

ignorance of the cultural and tribal dynamics of the

region. Unknown to the Marines, they had placed the

polling site deep within an area controlled by the Albu

Mahal tribe. Consequently, no members of the rival

Karbuli tribe came out to vote. Many Iraqis also did not

want to be seen voting as long as insurgents were still

operating in the region. At one point, a tribal leader

frankly said that the only way he and his tribe would vote

is if the Marines forced them to do so at gunpoint. We

Marines did not oblige his request.

68

Nevertheless, while the turnout was light, the Marines

and Iraqi soldiers provided security throughout the

region, and intermittent insurgent attacks did not disrupt

polling. On the a]ernoon of the election date, insurgents

attacked the Iraqi National Guard complex outside

Husaybah. Company L and Iraqi forces responded, killing

four insurgents and wounding another. On the same day,

Company K confronted mortar [re and the detonation of

an improvised bomb, though no Marines were injured.

69

October was a period of trial and error as the Marines

of Task Force 3/6 attempted to learn more about al-Qaim,

its people, and the insurgency. Sometimes this led to

mishaps and mistakes, as seen in the placement of polling

sites. Company K’s experience in Sadah and Karabilah is

a case in point. Early on the company came to believe that

the local village elders, or mukhtars, were roughly

equivalent to a mayor. We fact that there was only one in

Sadah reinforced this perception. In Karabilah, however,

the Marines empowered one of them, Mohammed

Ahmed Salah, as mayor, not realizing there were several

mukhtars in the town. By doing so, the Marinesreordered

the power structure in Karabilah without realizing it.“We

empowered Mohammed Ahmed Salah, mistakenly, at the

beginning, during [October] before we realized, ‘Oh my

God, did we just do that? Did we just dictate the power

structure in this town?’” Captain Heatherman recalled.

We Marines of Task Force 3/6 struggled for the rest of

their deployment to rectify these early mistakes.

70

In another incident, Marines from Company K noticed

\ickering lights from a house near Battle Position Iwo

Jima. Believing this to be an insurgent signaling to

operatives to launch an attack, Marines stormed the

home, smashing through the front door and damaging a

wall and the house’s foundation. As it turned out, the

home’s owner was simply rewiring his house. We

Marines of Company K subsequently provided [nancial

restitution and helped the man rebuild his door a]er the

mishap. In another incident, about 10 Marines of

Company K, including Captain Heatherman, became

involved in an actual [st[ght with about six or seven

insurgents. “We go in, and there are [ve or six insurgents

sitting at a table and their AK-47s were leaning against

the wall, and we went in there. I guess we could have shot

them all, but they all ran right at us. Some of them tried

to run away, some of them tried to [ght, and it turned

into a big brawl in there . . . it was like a John Wayne

movie, you don’t see that anymore.”71

Along with serving together manning battle positions,

the Marines of Task Force 3/6 and the 2d Battalion, 1st

Brigade of the Iraqi 1st Division participated in a number
September 2005 – March 2006 23

of joint operations throughout the area. We [rst of these

was a sweep of a small village conducted by the

Headquarters and Service Company and an Iraqi Army

unit. On 16 October, Company I and the 1st Company of

the 2d Battalion swept the town of Barwannah, to the east

of al-Qaim on the Euphrates, during Operation Zamboni.

On 19 October, Headquarters and Service Company and

a company of Iraqi soldiers conducted Operation River

Sweep.

72

By operating closely with both Iraqi troops and

civilians, the Marines of Task Force 3/6 were able to

obtain critical intelligence as well. On 23 October, dozens

of women and children were given medical treatment by

members of a medical civil assistance program situated

near Battle Position Khe Sahn in Sadah. An Iraqi

approached members of Company K at the clinic,

providing the Marines with information on a car bomb

that had detonated near the battle position the previous

day. We lead proved valuable, and led Company K to

another car bomb and a house being used by insurgents

as a base. Taking small arms [re, the Marines engaged in

a [re[ght that led to one insurgent wounded and two

others captured. A search of the home found materials

for building improvised explosives and anti-Coalition

program material.

73

On 2 November, another informant came to Marines

in Sadah and told them of a house being used as an

insurgent base north of Battle Position Iwo Jima. Marines

from Company K subsequently moved north to

investigate. As they entered the house, insurgents began

dropping grenades down a \ight of stairs. We blasts

wounded four Marines and a sailor. We Marines

withdrew from the house and called in an air strike,

which leveled the building. Describing the subsequent

events, the battalion command chronology stated,“Wree

of the insurgents were still alive in the rubble but could

not move. Upon conversation with the insurgent, we

learned the six were from Libya and the one we were

talking to wore a suicide vest with explosives.” In danger

of being killed by the explosion, the Marines quickly

backed away and were forced to kill the insurgent before

he could detonate the vest himself.

74

To further increase cooperation with Iraqis, Lieutenant

Colonel Alford began to seek aid from tribal leaders. As

noted, the sheikhs of the local tribes, particularly those

of the Albu Mahal, had already begun to turn against the

insurgents and align themselves with the U.S. forces.

However, Operation Matador’s failure to provide a

permanent solution to the security situation in al-Qaim

had led many to doubt whether the Marines would be

able to eXectively defeat the insurgent [ghters. With

Operation Iron Fist however, it was clear that the Marines

of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, would not be withdrawing

back to Camp Al Qaim. Wanks to the operation, civil

aXairs Marines were able to carry out their mission in

both Sadah and eastern Karabilah. Following the clearing

operations against the insurgency in Sadah, Team 3 of the

6th Civil AXairs Group set up operations in the city.

Along with the group’s mission of providing essential

services to Iraqis and building cooperation between

Marines and the populace, the team, commanded by

Major Sean M. Hurley, also sought to locate local and

potential leaders within the local communities. We group

brought in medical supplies, provided medical assistance

and care, and made reparations payments for damage.

75

We battalion staX also hoped to exploit the divisions

between the tribes and al-Qaeda in Iraq. Major Edwin O.

Rueda, a regional area oYcer assigned from regimental

headquarters at Alford’s request, proved instrumental in

helping the battalion leadership navigate the local

customs and cultural attitudes of the al-Qaim District.

Rueda’s knowledge of the region’s culture and Iraqi

history helped 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, and Regimental

Combat Team 2 to devise a campaign plan that would

incorporate an alliance with tribal groups.

76

Operation Steel Curtain, Part I: Clearing

Husaybah and Western Karabilah

By the end of October 2005 the Marines of Task Force

3/6 prepared to complete the general sweep of the alQaim District. While eastern Karabilah and Sadah had

been cleared and secured, Ubaydi to the east and

Husaybah and the rest of Karabilah to the west remained

underinsurgent control. Consequently, insurgents proved

a persistent and tenacious threat to the Marines and Iraqis

operating along the Emerald Wadi in the western part of

Karabilah.

We success of Operation Iron Fist had convinced

Colonel Davis that a greater and more focused eXort in

the district could spur a signi[cant shi] in the situation

in western al-Anbar. Consequently, Operation Steel

Curtain entailed a far larger force than used in Iron Fist

and constituted the largest Marine Corps operation in

Iraq since the Second Battle of al-Fallujah.

Wroughout the Iraq War, U.S. Central Command

relied on Marine expeditionary units as its operational

reserve. In 2004, the 11th, 24th, and 31st Marine

Expeditionary Units had served in this capacity, helping

to reinforce Multinational Force-Iraq when necessary. In
2005, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) served

as the Central Command reserve. To reinforce his assault

force for Operation Steel Curtain, Colonel Davis received

operational control of Lieutenant Colonel Robert G.

Oltman’s Battalion Landing Team 2/1, the ground combat

element of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

77

We 13th MEU, commanded by Colonel James K.

LaVine, had been a\oat aboard the USS Tarawa (LHA 1)

amphibiousready group since July 2005. During its cruise

it had participated in humanitarian operations in the

Philippines in August and then proceeded to Egypt where

it conducted Exercise Bright Star with Egyptian forces.

As with the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit’s predeployment training focused on

a mix of both conventional operations and counterinsurgency. When he could, Colonel LaVine integrated

counterinsurgency with his command’s standard training

package. Nevertheless, he also wanted to ensure that his

air-ground task force remained versatile, \exible, and

prepared for numerous challenges beyond counterinsurgency. Wus, the Marine expeditionary unit’s

training to obtain its special operations-capable

certi[cation did not overwhelmingly stress counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, Battalion Landing Team 2/1

participated in the revised combined arms exercise at

Twentynine Palms and had also trained to conduct urban

clearing operations. During Exercise Bright Star, the 13th

MEU also conducted live [re and convoy training.

78

Upon arriving in Iraq at the end of October, the 13th

Marine Expeditionary Unit conducted convoy protection

operations and disruption operations along the main

supply route to al-Qaim. Beginning on 2 November,

Battalion Landing Team 2/1 began its deployment to alQaim in preparation for Operation Steel Curtain. At

Lieutenant Colonel Oltman’s insistence, the entire

battalion landing team was placed under the operational

control of Regimental Combat Team 2. We force would

serve, in Colonel Oltman’s words, as a “swing force” for

Operation Steel Curtain, providing Regimental Combat

Team 2 with a powerful formation capable of punching

through al-Qaim as 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, established

battle positions behind the line of advance. As a battalion

landing team, Colonel Oltman’s force consisted of not just

a Marine infantry battalion (2d Battalion, 1st Marines),

but also an artillery battery, an assault amphibian platoon,

a light armored reconnaissance platoon, a combat

Photo by PFC David A. Irvin

LtCol Robert G. Oltman (far left) commanded Battalion Landing Team 2/1 in the fall of 2005. The battalion was the second major formation

tasked with conducting Operation Steel Curtain (the other being the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines).

24 Battle for Al-Qaim
engineer platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, and a

platoon of tanks.

79

We Steel Curtain assault force also included elements

of the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d

Force Reconnaissance Company, and two U.S. Army

units: the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, and the 3d

Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Also

coupled to the force were the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions

of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division of the Iraqi Army. We

force was supported by Combat Logistics Battalion 2,

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369, Marine

All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 332, Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (Reinforced), and

other aviation assets from the 2d Marine Aircra] Wing.

80

Operation Iron Fist had involved a westward advance

through Sadah and eastern Karabilah. To confuse the

insurgents, who were expecting the Marines to continue

the assault across the Emerald Wadi into western Karabilah

and Husaybah, Task Force 3/6 redeployed to positions west

of Husaybah, at the Syrian Border. On 1 November, the

elements of Task Force 3/6 based at Camp Al Qaim

convoyed northwest to Camp Gannon, where they joined

Captain Pitchford’s Company L. So that all of Captain

Pitchford’s ri\e company could be used in the assault on

Husaybah, Combat Logistics Battalion 2 created a

provisional ri\e platoon for security operations at Camp

Gannon. As with the Second Battle for al-Fallujah, the

Marines utilized loudspeakers to warn Iraqi civilians to

leave the towns before the impending assault.

81

On 4 November, Companies I, K, and L from Task

Force 3/6 moved into their battle positions west of

Husaybah, with the three ri\e companies of Battalion

Landing Team 2/1 moving into positions south of Task

Force 3/6. Task Force 3/6 was given responsibility for the

northern districts, with Company L moving across the

northern boundary, Company K advancing in the center,

and Company I anchoring the task force’s southern \ank.

Below Company K was Company F of Battalion Landing

Team 2/1. We landing team’s Company G occupied the

assault force’s southernmost \ank, while Company E

occupied the battalion landing team’s center. Meanwhile,

the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and

the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion served

as screens north and south of Husaybah, respectively.

82

We assault force began its attack on 5 November. As

Steel Curtain’s planners had hoped, the insurgents were

caught by surprise, having assumed that the assault would

come from the east. Consequently, most of the insurgent

forces and improvised explosives were concentrated in

the eastern areas of unoccupied Karabilah, with remote

detonators consistently found to the west of the bombs

laid out to slow the Marines’ attack. We advance was

deliberate, and just as in Sadah and eastern Karabilah the

Marine ri\e companies focused their eXorts on clearing

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Battalion Landing Team 2/1. This chart illustrates the reinforced combat power of the team, with an additional artillery company and a platoon

each of light armored reconnaissance Marines, assault amphibian Marines, tanks, combat engineers, and reconnaissance Marines.

September 2005 – March 2006 25
each and every structure of insurgent forces. Due to the

fact that Marines posted in Camp Gannon were able to

observe most activity in northern Husaybah over the

preceding months, the advance in that area was relatively

rapid. In comparison, the advances through the southern

city blocks, most notably the areas given to Battalion

Landing Team 2/1, proved more diYcult and slower.

Insurgents continued to rely on rockets and small arms

[re as well as mines and other explosive devices to stall

the Marines. Every block seemed to be rigged with an

explosive of some sort. We Marines also faced a threat

that had been in place from decades ago in the form of an

old World War II-era mine[eld south of the city.

Nevertheless, the Marines were able to push forward and

by the end of the [rst day, a quarter of the town of

Husaybah had been cleared.

83

By the close of 6 November, half of Husaybah had been

eXectively cleared of insurgent forces. Fighting remained

[erce as the Marines maintained their deliberate advance

westward. In the course of their assault, Company K

uncovered a weapons cache that included two antiaircra]

guns, a gun mount for a pickup truck, electronics used to

detonate explosive devices, camou\age utilities, AK-47

assault ri\es, ammunition, handcuXs, ski masks, and a

122mm rocket. Marines also found on the body of one

insurgent killed in action, three diXerent identi[cation

cards, a thumb drive, an improvised explosive device

manual, weapons, ammunition, and 500 American

dollars. On the same day, Task Force 3/6 suXered its third

Marine killed in action in Iraq when insurgent small arms

[re killed Private First Class Ryan J. Sorensen of

Company I.

84

We two battalions [nished clearing Husaybah on 7

November. Over the course of the next two days the

Marine ri\e companies undertook operations to clear the

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

The first phase of Operation Steel Curtain (5–7 November 2005) entailed a eastward advance through Husaybah by two reinforced Marine battalions.

Task Force 3/6 cleared the northern sections of the town while Battalion Landing Team 2/1 cleared the southern areas.

Photo by SSgt Jason D. Becksted

Marines ready High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

(HMMWVs) and AAV-7A1 Assault Amphibian Vehicles as they

prepare to launch Operation Steel Curtain.

26 Battle for Al-Qaim
corridor connecting Husaybah and western Karabilah.

Fighting remained intense, if sporadic, and improvised

explosives remained a critical threat, as seen when an

assault amphibious vehicle struck a mine, wounding three

Marines. On 10 November, another mine killed Private

First Class Daniel F. Swaim and wounded two others

from Company L.

85

We two battalions altered their deployments to clear

Karabilah. Battalion Landing Team 2/1 set up blocking

positions to the south. Meanwhile, Task Force 3/6 moved

north of the town and on 10 November its three

companies plunged south into the urban area. Company

I advanced on the right, Company K in the center, and

Company L on the le], through the area known as the

“shark [n,” a grassy, fertile section of the district

bordering the Emerald Wadi that looked like a dorsal [n.

As the Marines advanced, they encountered several

insurgents masquerading as farmers. About 30 insurgents

were rounded up and detained during the southward

advance. By 12 November, both the towns of Husaybah

and Karabilah had been cleared of insurgents, and

elements of Task Force 3/6 walked along the Emerald

Wadi bridge connecting western and eastern Karabilah.

86

Like a slow-moving glacier leaving sediment in its

wake, Task Force 3/6 established new battle positions

throughout the two towns of Husaybah and Karabilah as

it advanced eastward, leaving behind a platoon-sized

formation to man each one. As 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

advanced eastward, it built battle positions and le]

behind a platoon to man each one. As Alford recalled,

"We attacked until we ran out of platoons." In Husaybah

the battalion built Battle Position Beirut and Battle

Position Hue City, manned by elements of Company L.

In Karabilah the Marines built Battle Position Tarawa and

Battle Position Guadalcanal, both manned by units from

Company I. Company K returned to its positions in Battle

Position Chosin and Battle Position Iwo Jima in eastern

Karabilah and Sadah.

87

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 continued to provide

critical support for the Marines in al-Qaim throughout

the operation. A platoon sergeant from the battalion’s

Transportation Support Company, Sergeant B. J. Cody

Bookwalter, recalled the continuous convoy missions to

the Marines in al-Qaim:

Loads on the trucks were mostly chow and

water for the [rst few convoys and then it got to

be Hesco, Texas, and Jersey barriers for

protective walls. At [rst . . . we’d get up at 4:30 in

the morning to leave, get back at 1300, 1:00. Go

ahead and load again, go back out, get back

around 2300, 11:00 at night, go to sleep,

somebody else would load our trucks for us, we’d

have extra Marines staying back, they’d load our

trucks, get up at 4:30 and do the same

repeativeness (sic) everyday. Mostly the drivers

and the gunners did get a little bit down that they

didn’t have no time but like four or [ve hours to

themselves, couldn’t really go hygiene as properly

as you wanted to, couldn’t have a little bit of laydown time because as soon as you got back, you

laid down, you go to sleep, you get up, you got to

put your weapon back up, remount the vehicle,

and get ready to go out.

Combat Logistics Battalion 2’s Marines rushed in the

equipment necessary to build defensible battle positions

from which Marines would be able to provide security

throughout al-Qaim once it had been cleared of insurgent

[ghters. Over the course of the operation, Transportation

Support Company moved in 164 Jersey Barriers, 174

Texas Barriers, 46 intermodal containers, and 199 pallets

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius

A Marine from 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, mans a position on a

rooftop in Karabilah on 11 November 2005 during Operation Steel

Curtain. To his left are two Iraqi soldiers.

September 2005 – March 2006 27
of Hesco Barriers to the al-Qaim District. We company’s

Air Delivery Platoon also delivered 88 pallets of rations

and waterto the battle zone. In an important contribution

to morale, the battalion provided the Marines on the front

lines with a lobster dinner and cake for the Marine Corps

birthday on 10 November 2005. It also provided

Wanksgiving meals to the Marines posted in the battle

positions throughout al-Qaim a few weeks later.

88

Operation Steel Curtain

Part II: 7e Fight for New Ubaydi

With Task Force 3/6 stretched to its limits manning the

battle positions in Husaybah, Karabilah, and Sadah, the

task of clearing the twin towns of Old and New Ubaydi

fell to Battalion Landing Team 2/1 and the U.S. Army’s 3d

Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. On 13

November, Battalion Landing Team 2/1 conducted a

tactical road march to an assembly area south of New

Ubaydi. We leader of the battalion’s tank platoon, First

Lieutenant Matthew A. Dowden, recalled that the moon

turned a “blood red” as the dust kicked up by the moving

battalion [lled the night sky, a sign to insurgents that a

large military force was on the move. We army airborne

battalion was given the task of clearing Old Ubaydi to the

west. During staging operations for the push north, about

two hours before dawn on 14 November, Company E

commanding oYcer Major Ramon J. Mendoza Jr. was

killed by what was likely a pressure plate mine just to the

right of the battalion landing team’s lead tanks. “I looked

over, and I see this explosion next to me and just stuX

\ying around . . . ,” Dowden remembered. First Lieutenant

Nathan B. Chandler assumed command of the company.

89

Battalion Landing Team 2/1 commenced its attack on

New Ubaydi on 14 November 2005 as two platoons from

Company F launched an assault in the southeastern part

of the city. By this point in the battle, insurgents, aware

that [ghting the Marines in the streets was ineXective,

took to setting up ambushes in the major buildings. Wey

barricaded doors and then waited on the other side for

the Marines to break through, opening [re at waist level

to strike where the Marines’ body armor was weakest. We

insurgent [ghters also rigged buildings with booby traps

and other improvised explosives. At 8:30 a.m., an

automatic ri\eman from the 3d Squad of Company F’s

1st Platoon, Lance Corporal Christopher M. McCrackin,

entered a room as his squad cleared a building. Triggering

an explosive device, McCrackin suXered mortal shrapnel

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

With Husaybah cleared by November 7, Regimental Combat Team 2’s two battalion assault forces moved to their next objective, the western

section of Karabilah. Between 7 November and 10 November 2005 Task Force 3/6 moved north of the town. With Battalion Landing Team 2/1

anchoring the assault force’s western flank, Task Force 3/6 advanced south along the wadi dividing Karabilah, beginning with an assault through

the “shark fin” region on 10 November 2005.

28 Battle for Al-Qaim
wounds to his legs and wrist. Lance Corporal McCrackin

postumously earned the Navy and Marine Corps

Achievement Medal with Combat “V.”90

Later that day another Marine from Battalion Landing

Team 2/1 was killed in action when a [reteam from the

2d Squad of 1st Platoon, Company F, breached the front

room of a building. Corporal John M. Longoria and his

team were immediately attacked by [ve insurgents

waiting inside with PKM machine gun and AK-47 assault

ri\e [re. While the team was able to defeat the insurgent

ambush, Corporal Longoria was fatally wounded in the

action. He posthumously received the Navy and Marine

Corps Commendation Medal with Combat

Distinguishing Device. Lance Corporal Michael S.

Rodriguez, whose covering [re allowed the team to

recover Corporal Longoria, received the Bronze Star with

Combat Distinguishing Device.

91

We assault on New Ubaydi would last several days. At

6:40 on the morning of 16 November, Battalion Landing

Team 2/1 continued its operations on what would prove to

be the bloodiest day of Operation Steel Curtain for

Regimental Combat Team 2. We battalion’s Company F,

commanded by Captain Ross A. Parrish, was responsible

for clearing the eastern side of the city with two platoons.

We clearing operation of 33 buildings went without major

incident until 8:40 a.m. when 21 insurgents ambushed

Company F’s second platoon. We platoon received [re on

both its front and its right from four buildings, with the

enemy stronghold in a structure designated Building 6.

About 25 meters from this objective, 2d Platoon,

commanded by Second Lieutenant Donald R.

McGlothlin, established a position at Building 4. We [rst

[reteam from the 3d squad, led by Corporal Joshua J.

Ware, advanced to the building and tossed a \ash grenade

through an open door into the structure. Insurgents lying

in wait immediately responded with automatic [re and

grenades from recessed [ring ports, furniture in the

hallways, and “mouse” holes. All four members of the [re

team fell in the attack, including Corporal Ware, who was

fatally wounded in the ambush.

92

As this was occurring, communications between the

[re team and 3d squad were suddenly lost and Second

Lieutenant McGlothlin and his platoon sergeant, StaX

Sergeant Robert W. Homer, quickly took action. With

Marines pinned down inside the structure, 2d Platoon

was unable to call on supporting arms [re from tanks,

machine guns, and aircra] to destroy the insurgent

stronghold; the Marines of the [reteam would need to be

extracted from Building 6 [rst. StaX Sergeant Homer

immediately ran across the 25-meter kill zone to help and

direct the evacuation of the injured Marines at Building

6. Upon arriving at the site, he found two Marines injured

inside the building and two at the doorway. He quickly

grabbed one Marine who was still conscious despite a

wound to his head, and ran back through enemy [re to

the company casualty collection point, located in a

building designated Building 21. Meanwhile, McGlothlin

brought forward the tank section attached to his platoon

to provide cover and assembled a [reteam to relieve and

evacuate the embattled [reteam at Building 6.

93

We team, led by Corporal JeXry A. Rogers and

Lieutenant McGlothlin, ran across the deadly 25-meter

area between Buildings 4 and 6. Upon arriving at the

building, Corporal Rogers; the team’s grenadier, Lance

Corporal Joshua R. Mooi; and the team’s automatic

ri\eman, Lance Corporal John A. Lucente, entered the

building. As Lucente provided suppressing [re down

Building 6’s front hallway, Mooi grabbed a wounded

Photo by Cpl Michael R. McMaugh

One of the greatest hazards facing Marines during Operation Steel

Curtain was unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices.

In this image, a Marine from Combined Anti-Armor Team Blue for

Battalion Landing Team 2/1 inspects a house in Karabilah to ensure

that detonated ordnance has been destroyed.

September 2005 – March 2006 29
Marine by his \ak jacket and moved him outside the front

door. He and StaX Sergeant Homer, who had just

returned from Building 21, took the wounded Marine to

a new casualty collection point at Building 4.

94

Mooi returned to Building 6 with the machine gun

section leader, Lance Corporal Roger W. Deeds. Deeds

had turned his machine gun over to a fellow Marine so

that he could assist in the evacuation. We two moved into

the building to remove the remaining injured Marine

from the front room to outside Building 6’s door. Lance

Corporal Deeds provided [rst aid and then provided

covering [re for a corpsman as he tended to the injured

Marines, sending one of the evacuating Marines to his

machine gunner to ensure that he had enough

ammunition. Deeds continued to provide support until

he was mortally wounded.

95

Mooi entered the building a third time with Corporal

Rogers, where they linked up with Lance Corporal

Lucente. We [reteam then pursued insurgents into

another room (Room 3) in the building where they

received a heavy volley of [re from a “mouse” hole

connecting Room 3 with Room 5. While Corporal Rogers

[red on an insurgent attempting to attack from the rear

of the building, the volley of [re from Room 5 fatally

wounded Lucente. As he fell, Lucente handed Mooi one

of his grenades. Mooi threw the grenade through the

“mouse” hole, killed the insurgent gunman in the

adjacent room, grabbed Lance Corporal Lucente, and

brought him out of the building.

96

As Lance Corporal Mooi ran outside with Lance

Corporal Lucente, Second Lieutenant McGlothlin, who

had been directing the evacuation and providing covering

[re from Room 2 at Building 6’s entrance, was killed by

grenades and gun[re. As Mooi recalled,

[Second Lieutenant McGlothlin’s] asking us

what’s going on, and he’s shooting back down the

hallway and covering us while we’re making our

way out of the building. . . . We turn around, pass

him up, and the last I hear is a couple of gunshots

and a loud muZed explosion. . . . I’m pretty sure

he saved us from that grenade, so—I owe him a

lot.

Mooi then entered Building 6 a fourth time to recover

his platoon leader’s body, while Corporal Rogers provided

covering [re. As Mooi [red down the long hallway that

connected Building 6’s front and back doors, his [reteam

leader, Corporal Rogers, was mortally wounded by

insurgent gun[re.

97

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

The final objective of Operation Steel Curtain was the twin towns of Old Ubaydi and New Ubaydi. Beginning on 14 November 2005, the U.S.

Army 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, assaulted Old Ubaydi. Meanwhile, Battalion Landing Team 2/1 began clearing

operations in New Ubaydi.

30 Battle for Al-Qaim
Upon successfully recovering Lieutenant McGlothlin’s

body and securing it outside, Mooi came under [re from

an insurgent positioned at Building 6’s back door. Mooi

returned [re, killing the insurgent, and then went inside

a []h time, and at that moment was the only Marine in

the entire building. At the bottom of the stairwell, he

spotted and shot an insurgent who was throwing grenades

from Building 6’s roof. We lance corporal then le] the

building to support Marines [ghting outside, where the

battle had become more heated. He ensured a fellow

Marine remained to provide security over Building 6’s

central hallway and then carried Lieutenant McGlothlin to

the casualty collection point at Building 4.

98

Lance Corporal Mooi then led a hastily assembled

[reteam back into Building 6 to clear the remainder of the

structure (the sixth time hewould enterthe stronghold).We

team foughttheirway through the building and outthe back

door. Were, an insurgent engaged Mooi in a shootout. In

the course of the engagement, Mooi’s ri\e was hit three

times. One of the hits caused the ri\e to jam, leaving Mooi

defenseless before the enemy [ghter. Just before the

insurgent could [re hewasfelled by a nearby tank’s M2 .50-

caliber Browning machine gun. Mooi then vacated the

building to allow the supporting armor to [nish oX

insurgent resistance inside.

99

With Second Lieutenant McGlothlin mortally

wounded and communications with Company F

commanding oYcer Captain Parrish cut oX, StaX

Sergeant Homer had taken command of the evacuation

eXort. As noted, he designated Building 4 as the platoon’s

casualty collection point. He then immediately ran back

across the 25-meter ambush zone and directed and

coordinated machine gun and tank [re. To relieve the

embattled [reteams of 2d Platoon’s 3d Squad, StaX

Sergeant Homer ordered the platoon’s second squad, led

by Corporal Javier Alvarez, to assist the casualty recovery

eXorts from Building 6 and tasked the platoon’s [rst

squad with protecting the platoon’s \anks.

100

Corporal Alvarez immediately released his squad from

tank security and led a [reteam to help 2d Platoon’s besieged

3d Squad. As his team moved across 25 meters of open

terrain, the rate of enemy [re increased. In the course of the

assault, Corporal Alvarez was shot four times, twice in each

leg. He fell to the ground, immobilized. Nevertheless, he

continued to pour [re on the enemy positions, and ordered

the [reteam to continue its assault, all while he was being

treated for his wounds. He would change his ri\e magazine

three times as he provided covering [re and directed the

[reteam’s automatic ri\eman to suppressthe insurgents’ [re

coming from the building. As he treated Alvarez with a

Courtesy of Leatherneck

On the morning of 16 November 2005, insurgents ambushed 2d Platoon, Company F, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, as it advanced through the

outskirts of New Ubaydi. From positions in Buildings 6, 8, 11, and 19, insurgent fighters were able to deliver fire from a series of mutually

supporting positions. Using armor and air-delivered munitions, the Marines defeated the ambush, though five Marines were killed in the firefight.

September 2005 – March 2006 31
tourniquet, the [reteam leader was knocked down and

rendered unconscious by enemy [re. As the team leader

regained consciousness, he noticed an enemy grenade had

fallen next to Corporal Alvarez’s head, and immediately

warned hisfellow Marines ofthe threat.Alvarez grabbed the

grenade and attempted to throw it back at the insurgents. It

exploded before he could do so.We detonationwasso close

thatit knocked the corporal unconscious.Alvarez recalled,“I

don’t know if it went oX in my hand or within a foot of it. It

was pretty close.” He went on to recall,

And then it just went oX and everything was

black for a couple of seconds until my—I think I

just went into a—because of the G-force of the

grenade, it made me black out for a couple seconds

and then I came back to. Everything started

coming back and I started visualizing again.

As he came to, he realized the severity of the blast, and

knew his hand was burning. “I li]ed up my arm to see

what happened, and my hand was completely missing.

Were was just like ragged bone sticking out, with my

sleeves from my uniform black and red from blood.”101

As Corporal Alvarez lay injured, StaX Sergeant Homer,

also badly injured by shrapnel from insurgent grenades,

came to Corporal Alvarez’s aid, using a belt as a

tourniquet and continuing to return [re. He then brought

Alvarez to the casualty collection point in Building 4.

Despite his wounds, Corporal Alvarez continued to lead,

ordering Marines to individually pair up with a casualty

and provide medical treatment.

102

StaX Sergeant Homer crossed the [eld of [re four more

timesto rescue wounded Marines and get them to safety. At

this point, he learned that SecondLieutenantMcGlothlinhad

been killed in action inside Building 6. Homer informed

Company F commanderCaptainParrish ofthe situation, and

then returned to Building 6 where he directed the [nal

extrication of allMarines and allMarine equipmentfrom the

area. He then coordinated with Lieutenant Dowden’s tanks

as they engaged the insurgents’ stronghold. StaX Sergeant

Homerremained on the [eld until hewasforced to get onto

the last casualty evacuation vehicle.

103

Wroughout the [ght, Navy corpsmen provided critical

medical assistance to the wounded Marines. Corpsman

Wird Class Jesse P. Hickey, attached to Corporal Alvarez’s

squad, accompanied Alvarez and his Marines as they ran

across 75 meters of gun[re. Taking cover in Building 4,

Corpsman Hickey responded to calls for assistance at

Building 6, rushing 25 meters across the kill zone to the

insurgent stronghold. Hickey assisted a wounded ri\eman

from the [rst [re team that entered the building, helping him

back to the casualty collection point in Building 4. While

there, Hickey provided medical assistance and also helped

Marines perform “buddy aid” to injured comrades. Hickey

and the other platoon corpsman then responded to another

call for aid from Building 6, where wounded Marines had

gathered nearthe doorway.

104

AsHickey beganto treat a teamleaderfromthe platoon’s 3d

Squad, a grenade detonated nearby and ignited an incendiary

grenade within the leader’s pockets. We Marine’s leg burst

into \ames. Despite suXering from shrapnel wounds,

Corpsman Hickey disposed of the incendiary and then

extinguished the Marine’s burning leg. Helped by another

Marine, Hickey also treated and bandaged the shrapnel

wounds of a fellow corpsman. Surveying the situation, he

spotted more wounded Marines near Building 6’s door and

went to assist them. Pronouncing three of the Marines dead,

he designated them for routine evacuation and cleared

weapons and equipment from the doorway to prevent them

from being used by insurgent [ghters. Spotting a wounded

Marine just inside the doorway, Hickey carried him back to

Building 4. Inside the casualty collection point, Corpsman

Hickey continued to provide medical aid to the wounded

Marine he carried back from Building 6, despite losing the

use of hisright armfromshrapnel injuries.Hickeywould have

continued to provide assistance had he not been ordered to

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

The leader of 2d Platoon, Company F, Battalion Landing Team 2/1,

2dLt Donald R. McGlothlin, was mortally wounded when he put

himself in the line of fire to protect Marines wounded in an insurgent

ambush during the fight for New Ubaydi. He posthumously received

the Silver Star for his actions.

32 Battle for Al-Qaim
board anevacuationaircra].Onboard, he refused painkillers,

stating that his wounded comrades needed them more than

he did.

105

We [ghting lasted about an hour. Five Marines from

Battalion Landing Team 2/1 were killed in action during

the ambush: Second Lieutenant Donald R. McGlothlin,

Corporal JeXry A. Rogers, Corporal Joshua J. Ware, Lance

Corporal Roger W. Deeds, and Lance Corporal John A.

Lucente. Second Lieutenant McGlothlin posthumously

received the Silver Star Medal. Lance Corporal Deeds and

Lance Corporal Lucente posthumously earned the

Bronze Star Medal with Combat “V.” Corporal Rogers

and Corporal Ware received the Navy and Marine Corps

Commendation Medal with Combat“V.” Lance Corporal

Mooi received the Navy Cross. Corporal Alvarez, StaX

Sergeant Homer, and Corpsman Wird Class Hickey

received Silver Stars.

106

Ten other Marines were wounded. Following the [ght,

physician’s assistant Lieutenant James L. Anderson, USN,

recalled, “Some of them required surgery. Most of them

had minor shrapnel wounds. Some had fractures; we

actually had some that had an amputation.” We death toll

would have been substantially higher but for the actions

of the Marines and corpsmen who crossed open [elds of

[re multiple times, provided medical aid, and helped

bring their comradesto the casualty collection point. Also

Painting by CWO-2 Michael D. Fay

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, Triangle, VA

LCpl Joshua R. Mooi of 2d Platoon, Company F, Battalion 2/1,

posthumously received the Navy Cross.

Navy Cross Citation for

Lance Corporal Joshua R. Mooi

We President of the United States takes pleasure in

presenting the NAVY CROSS to

LANCE CORPORAL

JOSHUA R. MOOI

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following:

CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism as Grenadier, 2d Platoon,

Company F, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable),

Regimental Combat Team 2, 2d Marine Division, II Marine

Expeditionary Force (Forward), in support of Operation

Iraqi Freedom in New Ubaydi, Iraq, on 16 November 2005.

During Operation Steel Curtain, 21 enemy personnel

engaged Lance Corporal Mooi’s platoon with grenades and

automatic [re from several forti[ed buildings. Lance

Corporal Mooi repeatedly exposed himself to reinforce

engaged Marines in one of the heavily forti[ed buildings.

He attacked the enemy at close range with grenades and his

ri\e to personally recover four wounded Marines and

destroy [erce adversaries who were determined to [ght to

their death. On six occasions, Lance Corporal Mooi

willingly entered an ambush site to pursue the enemy and

extricate injured Marines. O]en alone in his eXorts, he

continued to destroy the enemy and rescue wounded

Marines until his ri\e was destroyed by enemy [re and he

was ordered to withdraw. Lance Corporal Mooi’s relentless

and courageous actions eliminated at least four insurgents

while permitting the immediate care and evacuation of

more than a dozen Marines who lay critically or mortally

wounded. His valiant eXorts were essential to saving the

lives of 10 Marines and inspired the Company to destroy 18

insurgents in the battle that ended further enemy resistance

during Operation Steel Curtain. Lance Corporal Mooi’s

outstanding display of decisive leadership, courageous

actions, and total devotion to duty re\ected great credit

upon him and were in keeping with the highest traditions of

the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

September 2005 – March 2006 33
decisive were the actions of the U.S. Army’s 571st Air

Ambulance Company, which provided crucial medical

evacuation support throughout Operation Steel Curtain.

When needed, one of the company’s UH-60 Blackhawks

arrived in the combat zone within 20-25 minutes to

evacuate injured Marines and soldiers. Evacuation

operations were also performed by Marine UH-1Ns and

CH-46Es. Captain Brian J. Gilbertson, Company F’s

forward air controller, received the Bronze Star with

combat “V” for his eXorts in both coordinating the

medical evacuation and coordinating the air strikes that

ultimately destroyed the insurgent strongholds southeast

of Ubaydi on 16 November.

107

By 20 November, Battalion Landing Team 2/1 had

successfully cleared the city and began to return to al Asad

Air Base, where it rejoined the 13th Marine Expeditionary

Unit. To provide security in the Ubaydi area, Task Force

3/6 established two more battle positions, Battle Position

Chapultepec and Battle Position Tripoli, alongside Battle

Position Belleau Wood. To man it, Lieutenant Colonel

Alford attached the 2d Platoon of Company I to his

battalion’s Weapons Company, creating a provisional ri\e

company designated “Whiskey” Company.

108

Wroughout Operation Steel Curtain, Regimental

Combat Team 2 relied on the full combat power of the

Marine ri\e battalion. Task Force 3/6 and Battalion

Landing Team 2/1 also relied on supporting M1A1 Main

Battle Tanks, LAV-25 Light Armored Vehicles, AAV-7A1

Assault Amphibian Vehicles, and close air support from

the 2d Marine Aircra] Wing, as well as the U.S. Air Force,

Army, and Navy. We Marines of Regimental Combat

Team 2 remained careful about how they utilized their

[repower. Nevertheless, Marines found many combat

arms associated with so-called “conventional” combat to

be useful in the counterinsurgency [ght in al-Qaim. As

First Lieutenant Dowden recalled, the presence of his

platoon’s M1A1 Abrams tanks could o]en calm a

situation down, as insurgents realized they had no

eXective means for battling them or for hiding from

them. Tanks provided Marines with a direct [re capability

up to 4,000 meters, thus allowing them to be precise in

their use of [res. Captain Pitchford, commander of Task

Force 3/6’s Company L, recalled, “Wey have a great

capability of keeping the enemy a little bit concerned.”109

During both Operations Iron Fist and Steel Curtain,

Marines made extensive use of close air support provided

by both [xed-wing and rotary-wing assets to destroy

Photo by Cpl Michael R. McMaugh

A U.S. Army Sikorsky HH-60M Black Hawk medical evacuation helicopter comes in for a landing outside Ubaydi on 14 November 2005.

34 Battle for Al-Qaim
heavily forti[ed insurgent positions and also to provide

casualty evacuations from the battle[eld. During the [rst

three days of Operation Steel Curtain, over 6,000 pounds

of ordnance were dropped on targets in the Task Force

3/6 sector of operations alone. Support came from aircra]

from the Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air Force.

Rotary-wing assets included Marine Light Attack

Helicopter Squadron 369’s UH-1N Huey and Bell AH1W Cobra gunships, based at Camp Al Qaim. Other

rotary-wing support came from Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 266’s CH-46 Sea Knights and

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466’s CH-53 Super

Stallions. Fixed-wing support was provided by Boeing

F/A-18D Hornets from Marine All Weather Fighter

Attack Squadron 332 and Boeing AV-8B Harriers from

Marine Attack Squadron 223 and from Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 163 (Reinforced), the aviation

combat element of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Support also came from U.S. Navy Northrop Grumman

F-14 Tomcat [ghter bombers* and U.S. Air Force Boeing

F-15E Strike Eagle bombers and General Dynamics F-16

Fighting Falcon [ghters. To prevent confusion and delays,

four to [ve communications pathways were made

available to air oYcers in the [eld.

110

We system utilized for coordinating close air support

during the Second Battle of Fallujah the previous year

served as the basis for Operation Steel Curtain, and air

oYcers were briefed by veterans of that engagement.

Major Mark A. Lister, air oYcer for Regimental Combat

Team 2, was instrumental in coordinating the air support

operations. Forward air controllers utilized both Type I

and Type II close air support. In Type I strikes, the

forward air control can see both the target and the

attacking aircra]. In Type II strikes, air controllers need

to see either the target or the aircra] providing support

before directing an air strike. Battalion air oYcers

ensured that the aviation assets did not come into con\ict

with one another in order to insure that ordnance did not

fall on friendly targets.

111

We pilots encountered numerous challenges. Although

the Marines had made signi[cant eXorts to clear the city

of civilians, pilots nevertheless had to be careful about

Photo by Cpl James P. Aguilar

Close air support provided by Marine fixed and rotary aviation assets was critical to the success of both Operations Iron Fist and Steel Curtain.

In this image an AH-1W Super Cobra gunship from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 is prepared for takeoff from Camp Al-Qaim

during Operation Steel Curtain.

*Operation Steel Curtain would be one of the last combat missions for

the venerable aircraft.

September 2005 – March 2006 35
causing civilian casualties and also damaging buildings of

religious signi[cance such as mosques. We close-quarter

urban combat also meant that aviators needed to rely on

their equipment and contact with forward air controllers

to deliver their ordnance. As one noted, “Were were

explosions going oX everywhere. It looked like [reworks

on the ground. I didn’t know what was enemy, what was

friendly. All I knew was my [weapons systems oYcer] in

the back said, ‘Wat’s the target.’” Aviators utilized satellite

guided bombs, laser guided bombs, missiles, rockets, and

aircra] mounted machine guns.

112

As they had during the Second Battle of al-Fallujah,

Coalition forces warned civilians in al-Qaim of the

impending oXensive and strongly encouraged them to

evacuate the city. By the time Operation Steel Curtain

began, many had le] on their own accord to neighboring

towns. Nevertheless, a number remained in the city.

While Marines in the air and on the ground undertook

every eXort to avoid harming civilians, the close-quarter

nature of the [ght and the insurgent’s use of civilians as

human shields meant that civilian casualties did occur

throughout the battle for al-Qaim. A number of incidents

illustrate the challenge and diYculties of [ghting in such

an environment. We [rst occurred in Husaybah toward

the beginning of the operation. As Battalion Landing

Team 2/1 advanced through the southern area of the city,

one of its companies came under [re from insurgents

positioned in a steeple atop a building. We Marines of

the company called for support from First Lieutenant

Dowden’s tank platoon. One of the tanks [red on the

steeple and destroyed it. Dowden recalled,

As soon as I blew the top oX that building, I

look down and I see what look like 20 or 30 kids

start walking out of the bottom of the building,

one dude with a big old white \ag, and then a

couple other woman that were there, and I was

like ‘You’ve got to be kidding me!’ You know?

You just had me freaking shoot a school!’ I was

mad, I was livid, I was just shaken. And right

before I get on the radio to just start screaming at

these guys, I see this guy walk out, right behind

all the kids, with a freaking RPK on his shoulder

and a bunch of fatigues on, right behind the kids,

just walk right on by, and a freaking black ski

mask. And I was like...words probably not

[suitable] on your little recording there.

113

In another incident during the operations in Husaybah,

on 8 November 2005 an Iraqi man approached a force of

Marines and Iraqi Army soldiers asking them to help him

rescue civilians who were trapped in the rubble of a

building destroyed by a Coalition air strike the previous

day. Were they found two survivors, an adult male and a

young girl, who were quickly sent to Camp Al Qaim for

medical treatment. Five other bodies were found in the

rubble. We Iraqi who [rst alerted the Marines to the

trapped survivors informed them that insurgent forces

had stormed into the home, killed two of its occupants,

and then locked the remainder in a lower \oor. Wey then

used the house as a base to launch an attack against the

Photo by LCpl Sheila M. Brooks

A Marine F/A-18D fighter-bomber from Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 332 flies above Al-Asad Air Base in 2005. Hornets were

among several types of aircraft that provided close air support during Operation Steel Curtain.

36 Battle for Al-Qaim
Marines and Iraqi Army soldiers advancing through the

town. Unaware that civilians were trapped in the

building, the U.S. forces called in an air strike to destroy

the insurgent stronghold.

114

A similar incident to one faced by First Lieutenant

Dowden occurred on 15 November 2005. During the

morning, Marines from Battalion Landing Team 2/1

received [re from insurgents positioned in a building

during their assault on New Ubaydi. We Marines called

in an air strike against the position, though it had limited

impact. However, the shooting stopped following the

strike, and two men carrying white \ags ran out of the

building and entered another structure nearby. Fi]een

civilians, “including women, children, and elderly,”

subsequently exited the building formerly held by the

insurgent [ghters.

115

Many of al-Qaim’s inhabitants found themselves caught

in the middle of the [ght between the Coalition and the

insurgency, and even a single family could convey

divergent attitudes. In November, an al-Qaim resident

named Abdul Aziz told Washington Post reporter Ellen

Knickmeyer of an air strike that killed his daughter. He

told her, “I don’t blame the Americans. I blame Zarqawi

and his group, who were using my daughter’s house as a

shelter.” His grandson was more direct in assigning blame

to the Americans, however: “She was killed in the

bombing by the Americans.”116

Insurgents o]en killed civilians and blamed the deaths

on the U.S. forces. Townspeople were frequently pressured

and intimidated by insurgent [ghtersto blame Americans

for all civilian deaths. We Marines of both Battalion

Landing Team 2/1 and Task Force 3/6 were all too aware

that the eXorts to clear the district would come to naught

if they alienated and angered the local populace and

consequently, undertook every eXort to be discriminating

and careful with their use of [res. Tragically, the fog of

war, the battle’s urban setting, the close-quarter nature of

the [ghting, and the insurgents’ use of human shields

meant that civilians were killed during the operation.

117

Operation Steel Curtain came to conclusion on 22

November 2005. Some 200 insurgents were killed in

action over the course of the clearing operations. With

Battalion Landing Team 2/1 returning to al Asad, the task

of providing security in the region fell to Task Force 3/6

and its attached Iraqi forces. With the battalion stretched

to the limit across the al-Qaim District, the coming weeks

proved to be as decisive for the overall success of the alQaim campaign as the clearing operations conducted

during the opening weeks of November.

Securing the Gains of Steel Curtain

By the end of November 2005, Task Force 3/6’s battle

positions stretched from the Syrian border to Ubaydi.

Along with Camp Gannon at Husaybah and Camp Al

Qaim to the district’s south, the battalion also maintained

two positions in Husaybah (Beirut and Hue City), three

in Karabilah (Tarawa, Guadalcanal, and Chosin), two in

Sadah (Iwo Jima, Khe Sahn), and three in the Ubaydi

region (Tripoli, Belleau Wood, and Chapultepec). All

were manned by platoon-sized formations from the

battalion’s ri\e companies (I, K, L, and “Whiskey”). On

the other side of the Euphrates were three more positions

manned by light armored reconnaissance Marines and

assault amphibian Marines: Guam, Tinian, and Saipan.

We battalion’s primary objective was to ensure that the

15 December national parliamentary elections took place

in a safe and secure environment. Achieving a lasting

solution to the security problems in the region meant that

clearing the district, as diYcult and as costly as those

operations had been, would not be enough. We district

would have to be held using constant patrols, forward

battle positions, and partnering with both the Iraqi Army

and local police forces. We battalion’s resources were

limited however, and by stretching his platoons over so

large a region, Lieutenant Colonel Alford faced the

possibility that one of his unit’s formations could be

overrun by a focused insurgent attack. Provisioning the

battle positions would require, in the battalion

commander’s own words, acts of “sheer willpower.”118

As noted above, the battle positions were located within

the major population centers of the district. We key to

their success was forging working partnerships with Iraqi

forces. “I was death if I caught a lieutenant that had a

squad out without Iraqis with them,” Colonel Alford

recalled. Iraqi Army units had fought alongside both 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines, and Battalion Landing Team 2/1 as

they advanced through the al-Qaim District. We Iraqis

fought hard and did not run, as had happened during the

First Battle for al-Fallujah. However, the fact that the

soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, were

predominantly Shi’a Iraqis presented an obstacle to

providing security to the majority Sunni region during the

[nal phases of the al-Qaim campaign. Since the American

invasion, Iraqis in al-Anbar Province had perceived the

United States as an occupying power seeking to

disenfranchise the country’s Sunni populace and allow

them to be placed under the domination of the country’s

majority Shi’a. We presence of the predominantly Shi’a

army in al-Anbar only reinforced this perception. For

many in the province, the presence of the Iraqi Army did

September 2005 – March 2006 37
not necessarily place an “Iraqi” face on operations but a

“Shi’a” face, creating the impression that two occupying

armies were present, the American and the Shi’a.

119

Realizing this state of aXairs, Alford and his cultural

advisor, Major Edwin O. Rueda, set about incorporating

Sunnis in security operations in the region. To accomplish

this they pursued two interconnected courses of action.

First, the overall Coalition commander in Iraq, General

George M. Casey Jr., USA, authorized the creation of a new

Iraqi brigade. Second, Alford forged an alliance with the

tribes of the region. Doing so meant that Alford would be

able to draw on Sunni recruits for the brigade, paramilitary

organizations raised by U.S. Army Special Forces known as

the Desert Protectors, and the local police force.

120

As noted earlier, [ve tribal groups dominated the alQaim region: the Albu Mahal, the Karbuli, the

al-Jurghafe, the Ubaidi, and the al-Salmani. “What

Saddam always did was give all the money to one tribe,

usually the Albu Mahal, and they’d oppress the other

ones,” Alford recalled. “So we treated all the tribes the

same. Wat was new, that was [Major Rueda’s] suggestion

to me.” Shortly a]er the completion of Operation Steel

Curtain, Alford and the leaders of 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines began to meet with the local sheikhs. However,

the battalion leadership committed itself to the goal of

only forging an agreement with all [ve tribes, thus

avoiding the mistake of repeating Ba’athist policies of

pitting diXerent tribes against one another. At the [rst

meeting however, representatives of only three of the

tribes attended. In Alford’s words, “I picked my shit up

and I walked out.” He subsequently told the district

mayor “when you get all [ve tribes, call me.” At another

meeting held the following week, four of the [ve tribes

sent representatives. Once again, Alford refused to deal

unless all [ve attended. We following week,

representatives of all [ve tribes attended a meeting and

subsequently forged a cooperative arrangement with the

Marines of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines.

121

Among the most notable outcomes of the tribal alliance

was the 3d Brigade, 7th Division. We unit was comprised

largely of Iraqis from the Albu Mahal. Furthermore,

General Casey guaranteed that the force would remain in

al-Qaim for two years and would not be deployed to

another part of Iraq, as had been the norm with other

units of the Iraqi Army. We approach marked a general

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

By December 2005 Task Force 3/6 had spread its units in battle positions throughout the al-Qaim District. Company L manned positions in

Husaybah while Company I manned positions in eastern Karabilah. Company K manned positions in western Karabilah and Sadah. “Whiskey”

Company manned the positions in and around Ubaydi. Meanwhile, a company of light armored reconnaissance Marines patrolled the north

bank of the Euphrates.

38 Battle for Al-Qaim
shi] in how the Coalition had been [ghting the Iraq War

since the eruption of the insurgency in 2003.

Since the fall of the Ba’ath regime in April of 2003, a

tension had existed in America’s postwar policies in Iraq.

L. Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority sought

to dissolve all remnants of the Ba’athist state, a vision best

represented by the sweeping measures to dismiss

Ba’athists from government organizations and dissolve

the Iraqi Army.

122 Almost from the beginning, however,

U.S. commanders in the [eld found themselves having to

modify this approach and adapt to realities on the

ground. In Mosul, the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division

commanded by Major General David H. Petraeus,

reinitiated local governance as quickly as possible, with

little change to the local social structure of the region.

Following the First Battle of al-Fallujah, Lieutenant

General James T. Conway stood up the paramilitary

Fallujah Brigade, against Bremer’s wishes, as a means of

providing local security. While the eXort ultimately failed

to provide a lasting solution in al-Fallujah, it nevertheless

demonstrated that the new state structures being created

to take the place of the old regime were largely inadequate

in the face of the aggressive insurgency. Consequently,

both Marines and soldiers looked for alternative means to

bring stability and [ght the insurgent forces. Frequently,

this required looking for assistance from traditional tribal

leaders who were answerable neither to state institutions

nor the government in Baghdad.

123

Doing so ran a multitude of risks. Many of the tribal

leaders represented anti-modernist, o]en anti-democratic

elements within Iraqi political culture. Sheikh Sabah of the

Albu Mahal tribe frankly told Marines during an interview

in 2009, “We are not a democratic nation, and democracy

does not suit us at present. It’s going to take 10, 15, to 20

years for the people to understand the meaning of

democracy.”124 Despite these attitudes, the Marines in alAnbar began to realize that stability could not be achieved

unless they worked to empower these local forces and

divide them from the insurgents. “I knew that we were

[ghting this war wrong,” Alford noted. By creating an Iraqi

Army unit that would be posted in the region, made up

predominantly of individuals from that region, 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines, and the Coalition command created

a force that could potentially strengthen local and regional

interests at the expense of national unity. However, in doing

so, both Alford and Casey demonstrated a keen

understanding of the cultural and social elements of alAnbari society and how those elements could be utilized

to provide better security and defeat al-Qaeda forces in the

region. Locals noticed outsiders, provided intelligence, and

helped build trust between Iraqis and Americans.

125

Creating army and police units also allowed the Marines

of Task Force 3/6 to weaken the informal militias and other

independent security organizations operating within alQaim District. While organizations such as the Katab

al-Hamsa were opposed to al-Qaeda in Iraq, they

nevertheless represented a source of instability and were

unaccountable to the local government in the region.

Furthermore, the mistrust that existed among the tribal

groups in al-Qaim was only exacerbated by the presence of

armed elements loyal to speci[c tribes, in particular the

powerful Albu Mahals. Tribal leaders frequently moved

about the district with armed escorts brandishing weapons,

o]en in pickups laden with heavy weapons. We armed

groups also aggravated tribal feuds. For example, in

Decemberthe leader of the Salmani tribe accused the Katab

al-Hamsa of threatening and targeting him and his tribe.

126

Shortly a]erthe completion of Operation Steel Curtain,

Lieutenant Colonel Alford declared, “We will not allow a

militia to operate in this area. If you are not a part of the

Iraqi Army or the U.S. Marines, you will not be allowed

on the streets with weapons.” He went on to state to a

reporter, “I’m going to stomp on their livers here in a

couple of days if they don’t cut it out.” Marinesrecognized

that local rivalries, local interests, and local customs

played a signi[cant role in shaping the insurgency. Alford

also recognized that the tribes held the key to authority in

the district. At the same time though, he knew that a

lasting solution could only come if oYcial, statesanctioned organizations held a monopoly on the use of

force and the ability to provide security.

127

Many ofthe sheikhswhowould later align themselveswith

the Coalition in 2006 and 2007 noted that the initial

inspiration forwhatwould be called the “AnbarAwakening”

could be traced to the eventsthat occurred in al-Qaim in fall

of 2005 and winter of 2006. “At the beginning of 2006, the

AlbuMahaltribe inal-Qaim,thatwasthe[rstspark, between

Albu Mahal and al-Qaeda,” noted Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd alRazzaq Ali al-Sulayman al-Assa[, head of the National

Salvation Front political party.

128 In 2009, the vice chairman

of the Anbar Provincial Council, Kamis Ahmad Abban alAlwani,noted thattheAwakening’s origins could be traced to

al-Qaim.“We [rsttime they started killing the terroristswas

in the al-Qaim area, in the Albu Mahal and Karabla tribes.

Wese tribesresisted and killed the terroristsin that area only.

Wey had supportfrom the national guard and the army over

there.”129 Colonel Said Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi,

director general of Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics

concurred with this assessment: “Going back to the

Awakening—to be honest and for history—the Awakening

started in al-Qaim in the middle of 2005. We Albu Mahal

tribe revolted and started to awaken.”130

September 2005 – March 2006 39
We Marines laid out their battle positions in order to

better align themselves with the particular tribal groups

in al-Qaim District. Lieutenant Colonel Alford

subsequently partnered one of his companies with each of

the [ve major tribes. Company L aligned itself with the

Albu Mahal in the Husaybah area. Company I was

coupled with the Karbulis in Karabilah. Company K was

given responsibility for the al-Salmani tribe in Sadah.

“Whiskey” Company was linked with the Ubaidi tribe in

the towns of Ubaydi. We al-Jurghafe tribe, predominant

in the area linking Sadah and Ubaydi, was placed under

the responsibility of Task Force 3/6’s assault amphibian

platoon. Wis division did not align perfectly, as no one

area of al-Qaim District was homogenous, and members

of all the diXerent tribes lived side by side. Wus, the

platoons at the various battle positions throughout the

district were tasked with representing the interests of the

various tribes within the larger areas of responsibilities of

each ri\e company.

131

We results of partnering and living among the Iraqis

in al-Qaim became apparent fairly quickly. For example,

the platoons of Company K worked so closely with the

local Iraqis that they began to identify themselves with

the concerns, issues, and attitudes of the dominant tribe

near their particular battle position. We company’s 3d

Platoon was given responsibility for the Karbulis; 1st

Platoon for the Albu Mahal in Sadah; and Weapons

Platoon, operating from Battle Position Iwo Jima, was

responsible for the Salmoni tribe. Captain Heatherman

recalled, “We cool thing was that [my platoon

commanders] started to argue amongst each other in

defense of their tribe . . . it was perfect, exactly what I

wanted.” As a result, the company was able to acquire a

detailed and accurate picture of the social relationships

within its area of responsibility. Ultimately, the constant

presence of Marines in the district’s towns restricted the

insurgents’ freedom of movement and their ability to

impose their will upon the region’s populace. As more

time passed, insurgents could no longer know who in the

districts they could trust to support them and who in the

area would turn them over to the Marines.

132

On 15 December, Iraqis went to the polls to vote in the

[rst national elections to be held under the new

constitution. To prepare, the Iraqi government declared 13–

15 December a national holiday, closed the borders to all

traYc, save vehicles shipping in food, fuel, and medical

supplies, and instituted a curfew from 13–17 December.

We turnout was far more substantial than it had been

during the referendum vote held two months before. An

oYcial in eastern Karabilah estimated there were over 3,000

Photo by LCpl Sheila M. Brooks

Iraqi citizens line up at a polling site in Husaybah for the national parliamentary elections on 15 December 2005.

40 Battle for Al-Qaim
voters, though the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, believed this

number to be a little high. Wroughout al-Anbar Province,

Sunni turnout was nevertheless far greater than in previous

polls, with 75 percent of the electorate, or some 12 million

Iraqis, casting a vote. We numbers were so high that

reserve ballots had to be utilized. We election ultimately

produced a Coalition government led by Nouri al-Maliki.

133

We battalion remained in al-Qaim until its relief in place

by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. We months were marked by

continuous patrols, joint operations alongside Iraqi Army

and local security forces, and constant interaction with the

district’s population. While this period focused on stability

operations, the region nevertheless remained a dangerous

place. On 14 February 2006, Corporal Rusty L. Washam

and Lance Corporal Matthew R. Barnes were killed in a

roadside bombing. We two Marines, serving with

Headquarters and Service Company on a battalion

personnel security detail, were killed when their Humvee

was destroyed by a suicide bomber.

134

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, began its return to the United

States in mid-March as elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, relieved its companies. Company L returned to

Camp Lejeune on 20 March and Company I returned the

following day. We remainder of the battalion returned to

the United States on 23 March. In the words of the

battalion’s command chronology, “We Marines were very

much torn between getting home to friends and loved ones

as soon as possible, and leaving the city that they had put so

much eXort into for the previous seven months.”135

Conclusion

Following its fall 2005 deployment to al-Qaim, the 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines, declared that “TF 3/6 was able to

eradicate the insurgency in their AO.* We al Qaim region

is no longer a stronghold forinsurgents orforeign [ghters

in Iraq. We actions of TF 3/6 from October to December

of 2005 have made it possible for security and stability

operations (SASO) to take place in the al Anbar Province

for the [rst time since the end of the war.”136

It is diYcult to determine exact Coalition casualty

[gures for the operations in al-Qaim. Coalition casualty

cards o]en did not specify the speci[c location where

soldiers were killed. Wus, Marines killed in al-Qaim were

frequently listed as having been killed in “al-Anbar

Province.” We reporting information also listed the

ultimate place of death (such as Bethesda Naval Medical

Hospital) and not the place where a mortal wound had

been in\icted. Nevertheless, the al-Qaim operations

sparked a general downward trend in Coalition deaths in

the area following 2005. In 2004, a little over a dozen

Coalition soldiers were killed in action serving in alQaim. In 2005, over 30 were killed in action in one of the

towns of the al-Qaim District. In 2006, fewer than 10

were killed in action. When the 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, relieved 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in March

2006 the region was signi[cantly more stable and secure

in comparison to the preceding two years.

137

We Marine Corps’ operations in the al-Qaim District

from the fall of 2005 into the winter of 2006 would prove

signi[cant for a number ofreasons. First and foremost, they

successfully established a secure environment throughout

the region and disrupted the insurgency’s ability to use the

area as a logistical hub. Neither Operation Iron Fist nor

Operation Steel Curtain destroyed the insurgency, but they

certainly delivered it a severe blow and the security

operations conducted from Decemberinto the [rst months

of 2006 prevented the region from once again reverting to

insurgent control. Signi[cantly, LieutenantColonelNicholas

F. Marano, commander of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,

pursued the same overall approach to security operations as

Lieutenant Colonel Alford did with his own battalion,

deploying his forces throughout the battle positions

established the previous year. From these, the battalion’s

Marines continued to conduct foot patrols and ensure that

they interactedwith the local populace. One example of the

eXectiveness of this particular approach was in the high

number of improvised explosives detected and detonated by

Marines. We majority of these were uncovered due to

phoned-in intelligence from al-Qaim locals.

138

Beyond establishing security in the region, the

operations in al-Qaim served as a model for future

Marine Corps operations throughout the rest of al-Anbar

Province. In late 2006, the Marines of 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel

William M. Jurney, confronted the rapidly collapsing

situation in ar-Ramadi, al-Anbar’s capital city. In

preparing for his battalion’s deployment, Jurney used 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines’ al-Qaim operations as a model.

Sitting together on Alford’s front porch at Camp Lejeune,

the two discussed Alford’s experiences in western Iraq. It

was a testament to how lessons and experiences could be

quickly transmitted across the Marine Corps’ close-knit

organization. As Alford himself commented later, “Our

families, our friends, we’ve spent many, many hours over

the last twenty years drinking beer together and, on

occasion, sipping a glass of whiskey talking about this

stuX . . . that’s a unique thing about the Marine Corps that

you need to understand.”139

*Area of Operations

September 2005 – March 2006 41
Lieutenant Colonel Jurney utilized many of the same

tactics and techniques as Alford had. He was aXorded

considerable latitude and \exibility by his commander,

Colonel Sean B. MacFarland, USA, of the 1st Brigade

Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. Like Lieutenant

Colonel Alford, Jurney believed that the “key terrain is

the population and in securing the population, i.e.,

improving the security and stability.” Jurney also

integrated Iraqi soldiers within his own battalion at the

platoon level, creating what he termed a “combined

action battalion.” Marines lived in ar-Ramadi itself in an

array of combat outposts from which they conducted

constant foot patrols. Furthermore, 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines, demonstrated to the residents of ar-Ramadi that

the Marines would not be leaving the city.

140

Another approach developed by 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, in al-Qaim also had long-reaching consequences:

cooperation with the local tribes. In surveying the cultural

landscape of al-Qaim District, the Marines of Alford’s

battalion quickly discerned that important [ssures existed

within what were believed to be insurgent forces. It soon

became apparent that the “red-on-red” [ghting was

between the jihadist insurgent forces and local militias

aYliated with the tribes of the region. Upon discovering

this, the Marines of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, successfully

exploited the divisions between local tribal [ghters and

foreign [ghters to their advantage. Able to draw on local

intelligence and then build security forces using local

Iraqis, the Marines succeeded in isolating the insurgent

forces and winning the trust of the populace. In short, the

Marines transformed al-Qaim into an environment

hostile to the insurgency.

Wis approach, carried out on a much larger scale,

would form the foundation forthe U.S. campaign to defeat

the insurgency throughout al-Anbar Province. As noted

above, many of the leaders of the al-Anbar Awakening

movement cited al-Qaim and the Albu Mahal tribe as the

initial inspiration for their own decisions to enlist with the

Marines and [ght al-Qaeda in Iraq. Between 2006 and

2008, both I MEF (Forward) under Major General

Richard C. Zilmer and II MEF (Forward) under Major

General Walter E. Gaskin Sr. would work alongside alAnbar’s tribes in a cooperative campaign against al-Qaeda

in Iraq. As in al-Qaim, tribal sheiks encouraged their

members to enlist in the police forces, insuring that Iraqis

from the communities of al-Anbar would be given

responsibility for security and acquiring intelligence.

We keys to the Marines’ success in al-Qaim lay in the

critical thinking skills of their leaders, and their common

sense, patience, and persistence as they discerned a more

accurate picture of the [ghting in the region. At the same

time, the Marines at al-Qaim demonstrated an aggressive

stance toward the insurgents and did not hesitate to utilize

the full combat power of the Marine Corps’ ri\e battalion

to defeat them in battle. While the Marines focused on

minimizing civilian casualties and protecting the populace,

they were also aware of the consequences that could ensue

if they relied on the indiscriminate use of [repower in a

cramped urban environment. Still, they readily drew upon

close air support, heavy armor, and [repower in the battles

against the insurgent forces. We al-Qaim campaign thus

attests to the adaptability and eXectiveness of Marine Corps

forces in counterinsurgency operations.

42 Battle for Al-Qaim
September 2005 – March 2006 43

Photo by Cpl Ken Melton

A Marine from 2d Platoon, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance, breaks down a door while on patrol in Husaybah during Operation Steel Curtain.
44 Battle for Al-Qaim

APPENDIX A

We Battle of Al-Qaim

September 2005 – March 2006

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (Multinational Force-West)

MajGen Stephen T. Johnson

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

Col James K. LaVine

2d Marine Division

MajGen Richard A. Huck

2d Marines (Regimental Combat Team 2) Col Stephen W. Davis

3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Task Force 3/6) LtCol Julian D. Alford

2d Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 2/1)* LtCol Robert G. Oltman

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion LtCol Robert R. Kosid

3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) LtCol Larry Swi], USA

4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry (U.S. Army) LtCol Mark A. Freitag, USA

2d Marine Aircra& Wing (Forward)

BGen Robert E. Milstead

Marine Aircra] Group 26 Col David J. Mollahan

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 LtCol Womas D. Weidley

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (Reinforced)** LtCol JeXrey K. Mosher

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 LtCol Joseph E. George

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 LtCol John H. Celigoy

Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 332 LtCol David A. Wilbur

Marine Attack Squadron 223 LtCol Andrew G. Shorter

571st Air Ambulance Company (U.S. Army) Maj Eric J. Rude, USA

2d Force Service Support Group (Forward)

BGen Ronald S. Coleman

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 LtCol Bruce E. Nickle

*Under operational control of Regimental Combat Team 2, from 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

**Under operational control of 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, from 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). Squadron was

reinforced with AV-8B Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron 211.
September 2005 – March 2006 45

APPENDIX B

3d Battalion, 6th Marines StaX List

September 2005 – March 2006

Commanding O%cer

LtCol Julian D. Alford

Executive O%cer

Maj Toby D. Patterson

Sergeant Major

SgtMaj Scott L. Weakston

Principal StaX OYcers

Administrative OYcer (S-1) 2dLt Jeremy M. Nelson

Intelligence OYcer (S-2) Capt Eric D. Marshall

Operations OYcer (S-3) Maj Christopher P. O’Connor

Air OYcer Capt Scott A. Cormier

Logistics OYcer (S-4) Capt Kirk M. Spangenberg

Communications OYcer (S-6) 1stLt Eric J. Muckin

Subordinate Unit Commanders

Headquarters and Service Company Capt Justin J. Ansel, Jr.

Company I Capt Conlon D. Carabine

Company K Capt Brendan G. Heatherman

Company L Capt Richard H. Pitchford

Weapons Company Capt Clinton A. Culp
46 Battle for Al-Qaim

APPENDIX C

Battalion Landing Team 2/1 StaX List

September 2005 – March 2006

Commanding O%cer

LtCol Robert G. Oltman

Executive O%cer

Maj John W. Hatala

Sergeant Major

SgtMaj Sylvester D. Daniels

Principal StaX OYcers

Administrative OYcer (S-1) 1stLt James G. Van Zant

Intelligence OYcer (S-2) Capt Daniel M. Buckland

Operations OYcer (S-3) Maj Kyle M. Stoddard

Air OYcer Capt Erik J. Bartelt

Logistics OYcer (S-4) Capt Womas D. Parmiter

Communications OYcer (S-6) 1stLt Kevin G. Graves

Subordinate Unit Commanders

Headquarters and Service Company Capt Ronald L. Lobato

Company E Maj Ramon J. Mendoza Jr. (KIA 14Nov05)

1stLt Nathan B. Chandler

Capt Kemper A. Jones

Company F Capt Ross A. Parrish

Company G Maj Edward C. Greeley

Weapons Company Capt Dale A. Highberger

Combined Anti-Armor Team Red 2dLt Richard W. Mott

Combined Anti-Armor Team Blue 2dLt Daniel E. Grainger

81mm Platoon 1stLt Benjamin P. Wagner

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines Capt Richard A. Royse

1st Platoon, Company E, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion 1stLt John T. Bidwell

2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Light Armored Recon Battalion 1stLt Duncan T. Varda

1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion 1stLt Daniel J. Ponzo

2d Platoon, Company D, 1st Tank Battalion 1stLt. Matthew D. Dowden

3d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reonnaissance Battalion 1stLt Brad N. Fultz
September 2005 – March 2006 47

APPENDIX D

Chronology of Major Events

Al-Qaim Campaign

April–May 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom: Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime collapses in the face of

a rapid Coalition assault into Iraq.

12 May 2003 We United States establishes the Coalition Provisional Authority to administer a

post-Saddam Iraq and lay the foundation for a new democratic state.

20 March 2004 I Marine Expeditionary Force is stood up as the Multinational Force-West (al-Anbar

Province) in western Iraq.

31 March–30 April 2004 First Battle of al-Fallujah.

14 April 2004 Elements of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, ambushed by insurgents in the al-Qaim

District. Corporal Jason L. Dunham sacri[ces himself to save the lives of fellow

Marinesin the [ghting, an act for which he will be posthumously awarded the Medal

of Honor.

16 October 2004 A car bomb kills a Marine, two soldiers, and their translator in the al-Qaim District.

8 November–23 December 2004 Second Battle of al-Fallujah.

27 March 2005 II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) relieves I Marine Expeditionary Force as

the Multinational Force-West.

11 April 2005 Suicide bombers attack a U.S. facility in al-Qaim.

7 May–14 May 2005 A task force from Regimental Combat Team 2 conducts Operation Matador to

neutralize insurgent activity in the al-Qaim District.

17 June–22 June 2005 Regimental Combat Team 2 conducts Operation Spear against insurgent forces in

al-Qaim.

23 August–10 September 2005 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, relieves 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, as the principal Marine

Corps unit posted to the al-Qaim District. We reinforced battalion is designated

Task Force 3/6.

1 October–5 October 2005 Task Force 3/6 conducts Operation Iron Fist to clear the towns of Sadah and eastern

Karabilah of insurgent activity.

October 2005 Task Force 3/6 establishes battle positions in Sadah and eastern Karabilah.

15 October 2005 Task Force 3/6 provides security during the referendum for the new Iraqi

constitution.

1 November–2 November 2005 Battalion Landing Team 2/1 (ground combat element of the 13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit) is placed under operational control of Regimental Combat

Team 2 and deploys to al-Qaim.
48 Battle for Al-Qaim

5 November–9 November 2005 First Phase of Operation Steel Curtain: Task Force 3/6 and Battalion Landing Team

2/1 clear and secure Husaybah.

10 November–13 November 2005 Second Phase of Operation Steel Curtain: Task Force 3/6 and Battalion Landing

Team 2/1 clear and secure western Karabilah.

14 November–22 November 2005 Final Phase of Operation Steel Curtain: Battalion Landing Team 2/1 and the U.S.

Army’s 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment clear Old Ubaydi and New

Ubaydi.

16 November 2005 2d Platoon, Company F, Battalion Landing Team 2/1 ambushed by insurgents in

New Ubaydi. Five Marines are killed in action during the attack. Lance Corporal

Joshua R. Mooi crosses the ambush zone six times to rescue fellow Marines. He

receives the Navy Cross for his actions. Four other Marines receive the Silver Star for

their actions during the engagement.

20 November 2005 Battalion Landing Team 2/1 returns to the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

16 November 2005–24 March 2006 Task Force 3/6 conducts security and stability operations from battle positions

arrayed across the al-Qaim District.

15 December 2005 Task Force 3/6 provides security during the Iraqi parliamentary elections.

5 January 2006 General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, visits Task

Force 3/6 in al-Qaim.

29 January 2006 Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, visits Task Force 3/6 and observes

operations in al-Qaim.

24 March 2006 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, completes relief in place with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,

and returns to the United States.
September 2005 – March 2006 49

Notes

1. See Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes, U.S. Marines

in Iraq, 2004–2005: Into the Fray (Washington DC:

History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2011),

1–4, herea]er Estes, Into the Fray; Intvw with

Lieutenant General James T. Conway, 21 June 2005 and

7 July 2005, herea]er Conway intvw, in Chief Warrant

OYcer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant

Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, eds., Al-Anbar Awakening,

Volume I: American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and

Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009, (Quantico:

Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 42–43, herea]er

cited as Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume I.

2. Estes, Into the Fray, 19. Austin G. Long, “We Anbar

Awakening,” herea]er Long, “We Anbar Awakening,”

in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and

Annotated Bibliography, ed. Nicholas J. Schlosser

(Washington DC: History Division, United States

Marine Corps, , 2010), 179–93, herea]er U.S. Marines in

Iraq 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography;

Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency

in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006),

herea]er Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency.

3. Intvw with General James N. Mattis, 17 June 2009,

herea]er Mattis intvw, in Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume

I, 22–28; Conway intvw, 43; Womas E. Ricks, Fiasco:

Ke American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York:

Penguin Books, 2006), 313–20, herea]er Ricks, Fiasco.

4. Estes, Into the Fray, 31–52; Major Alfred B. Connable,

“We Massacre Wat Wasn’t,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq,

2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 75–

81; Conway intvw, 49–54; Mattis intvw, 34–37; Bing

West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for

Fallujah (New York: Bantam Books, 2005), herea]er

West, No True Glory; Carter A. Malkasian, “Signaling

Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of

Fallujah,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (June 2006):

423–52; Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser

in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: Harper Collins,

2008), 333.

5. Estes, Into the Fray, 53–78; West, No True Glory; Jason

Burke, “Hidden War on Border with Syria: As Scores

Are Killed in Northern Town and Fallujah Cease[re is

Strained, Jostling for Power Intensi[es,” Ke Observer,

25 April 2004; Lieutenant General John F. Sattler and

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Wilson, “Al Fajr: We

Battle of Fallujah, Part II,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–

2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 95–103;

Jonathon F. Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?,”

in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and

Annotated Bibliography, 105–109.

6. Estes, Into the Fray, 87–104; David Cloud and Greg

JaXe, Ke Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle

for the Future of the United States Army (New York:

Crown Publishers, 2009); Carter A. Malkasian,

“Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May 2003–January 2007,”

herea]er Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” in

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and

Annotated Bibliography, 15–27; Malkasian, “A Win Blue

Line in the Sand,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 5

(Summer 2007), 48–58.

7. Estes, Into the Fray, 93; Captain Scott Cuomo, “We

Wild, Wild West: Iraqi Lessons for Afghanistan,” Marine

Corps Gazette 93 (2009): 22–30, herea]er Cuomo, “We

Wild, Wild West.”

8 Colonel Stephen W. Davis intvw with Lieutenant

Colonel David A. BenhoX, 20 May 2005, Marine Corps

Historical Center (MCHC), herea]er Davis intvw.

9. Bing West, Ke Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the

Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008), 98–

102; Peter Spiegel, “‘Oil Spot’ Replaces ‘Whack-a-Mole’

Strategy,” Financial Times, 30 November 2005; Mark

Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from

the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press,

2009), 233–34, herea]er Moyar, A Question of

Command; Ricks, Fiasco, 419–24; Major Brendan G.

Heatherman, intvw with author, 28 June 2011, herea]er

Heatherman intvw.

10. Cuomo, “We Wild, Wild West,” 22–24.

11. For a description of Camp Gannon and for quotation,

see Major Richard H. Pitchford intvw with the author,

23 August 2011, herea]er Pitchford intvw. See also

Sergeant B.J.C. Bookwalter intvw with Lieutenant

Colonel Craig H. Covert, 19 November 2005 (MCHC),

herea]er Bookwalter intvw.

12. Edwin O. Rueda, “Tribalism in the Al-Anbar Province,”

Marine Corps Gazette 90 (2006): 11.

13. Faleh Abdul Jabar,“Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction

and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial
50 Battle for Al-Qaim

Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968–1998,” in Tribes and Power:

Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, ed. Faleh

Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: Saqi, 2003), 69–

109; Hosham Dawood,“We ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and

the Tribalization of the State:We Case of Iraq,” in Tribes and

Power, 110–35; Rueda,“Tribalism in the Al Anbar Province”;

Norman Cigar, Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government:

Lessons and Prospects forIraq’s Unstable Triangle (Quantico:

Marine Corps University Press, 2011), herea]er Cigar, Al

Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government.

14. Ibid.

15. Rueda, “Tribalism in the Al Anbar Province.” See as well

Long, “We Anbar Awakening,” and John A. McCary,

“We Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Ke

Washington Quarterly 32 (2009): 43–59.

16. Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency.

For the discussion on “netwar” see Bruce HoXman,

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica,

CA: RAND Corporation, 2004). See as well Michael

Eisenstadt and JeXrey White, Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab

Insurgency, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

Policy Focus no. 50, December 2005.

17. See Francis X. Kozlowski, U.S. Marines in Battle: AnNajaf, August 2004 (Washington DC: History Division,

United States Marine Corps, 2009) for an account of

Sadr’s uprising in August 2004. For information on alZarqawi, see Hashim, Insurgency and

Counter-Insurgency, 142–44; David Aaron, ed., In Keir

Own Words: Voices of Jihad (Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corporation, 2008), 243; Mary Anne Weaver, “We

Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Ke

Atlantic, July/August 2006; Benjamin Bahney, Howard

T. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny McPherseon, Barbara

Sude, with Sarah Beth Elson, and Ghassan Schbley, An

Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in

Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 13,

herea]er Bahney et al, An Economic Analysis of the

Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in Iraq.

18. Letter by Musab al-Zarqawi, February 2004, accessed at

Air University website, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/state/31694.htm.

19. See Cigar, Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and the Government, 9–

22 for an overview of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s attempts to

reshape al-Anbar.

20. II Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action,

Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation, in U.S.

Marines in Iraq 2004-2008: Anthology and Annotated

Bibliography, 112; Bahney et al, An Economic Analysis of

the Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, 21; Long, “We

Anbar Awakening,” 184–86; Heatherman intvw;

Pitchford intvw; Sabrina Tavernise, “Marines See Signs

Iraq Rebels Are Battling Foreign Fighters,” New York

Times, 21 June 2005.

21. 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Command Chronology,

April 2004, Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia,

herea]er 3/7 ComdC, 2004. All command chronologies

cited in this work can be found at the Gray Research

Center (GRC); Major George C. SchreZer III interview

with Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, 1 June 2004

(MCHC), herea]er SchreZer intvw; “Silver Star

Citation for Lieutenant Colonel Matthew A. Lopez,” in

Ke Silver Star: Navy and Marine Corps Gallantry in Iraq,

Afghanistan, and Other ConMicts, ed. James E. Wise Jr.

and Scott Baron (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,

2008), 107–12.

22. 3/7 ComdC, April 2004; SchreZer intvw; Medal of

Honor Citation for Corporal Jason L. Dunham, 12

January 2007, MCHC Reference Branch.

23. SchreZer intvw; 3/7 ComdC, April 2004; “Five Marines

Killed in Battle Near Syria,” St. Petersburg Times 18 April

2004; Patrick Cockburn, “Five U.S. Marines Are Killed

A]er Ambush Near Syrian Border,” Ke Independent, 19

April 2004; Wise and Baron, Ke Silver Star, 109–12.

24. Neil MacFarquhar, “At Tense Syria-Iraq Border,

American Forces Are Battling Insurgents Every Day,”

New York Times, 26 October 2004.

25. “3 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq Car Bombings,” Ke

Statesman (India), 17 October 2004.

26. “Suicide Blasts Hit U.S. Iraq Base,” BBC, 11 April 2005,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4432009.stm.

27. “Police Find 20 Shot Dead in Iraq,” BBC, 20 March

2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/

4331597.stm.

28. Interview with Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam EXan Fahran alShurji al-Aziz, in Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II: Iraqi

Perspectives, ed. Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and

Chief Warrant OYcer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams

(Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2010), 144,

herea]er Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II.

29. Ibid., 141.
September 2005 – March 2006 51

30. We account of Operation Matador is based on Estes,

Into the Fray, 97–98.

31. Ibid. Department of Defense Military Casualty

Information: Operation Iraqi Freedom, accessed at

http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/oif

_list_of_names.pdf.

32. Estes, Into the Fray, 97–100; Long, “We Anbar

Awakening,” 185.

33. “Abducted Iraq Governor Found Dead,” BBC, 31 May

2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/

4595879.stm.

34. Andy Mosher, “17 Bodies Discovered in Northwestern

Iraq; Insurgents Sweep into Nearby Town,” Washington

Post, 11 June 2005; “Iraq Bomb Kills Five U.S. Marines,”

BBC, 10 June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

middle_east/4081606.stm; Mohammed al Dulaimy and

Hannah Allam, “A U.S. Ally in Iraq is Murdered,”

McClathy Newspapers, 25 June 2007,

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staX/hannah_allam/

story/17347.html.

35. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Al-Zarqawi’s Forces Take Over Key

Iraqi City,” Washington Post, 6 September 2005; Estes,

Into the Fray, 97–99; Long, “We Anbar Awakening,”

185; II Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of

Action, 112; Cuomo, “We Wild Wild West,” footnote

no. 7; Heatherman intvw.

36. 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, Command Chronology, Jan–

Dec 2004, herea]er 3/6 ComdC, Jan–Dec 2004.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. We concept was introduced by Marine Corps

Commandant General Charles C. Krulak in “We

Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Wree Block War,”

Marines Magazine, January 1999.

41. See 3/6 ComdC, Jan–Dec 2004; Colonel Julian D.

Alford intvw with the author, 19 October 2010,

herea]er Alford intvw (Schlosser).

42. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Command,

Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms,

California, (herea]er Twentynine Palms) Command

Chronology 2004, herea]er Twentynine Palms ComdC,

2004; Twentynine Palms Command Chronology, 2005,

herea]er Twentynine Palms ComdC, 2005; “Exercise

Mojave Viper,” Marine Corps Gazette, 90 (2006): 48–52;

Heatherman intvw; Pitchford intvw.

43. Colonel Julian D. Alford intvw with Lieutenant Colonel

Kurtis P. Wheeler and Chief Warrant OYcer-4 Timothy

S. McWilliams, 1 October 2010 (MCHC), herea]er

Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); Pitchford

intvw.

44. Galula’s most notable studies on the subject of counterinsurgency are Counterinsurgency Warfare: Keory and

Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964) and PaciLcation in

Algeria, 1956–1958, foreword by Bruce HoXman (Santa

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006).

45. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); “An Infantry

Battalion in Irregular Warfare,” 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines Brie[ng, 2006, MCHC, Field History Branch,

herea]er Brie[ng: “An Infantry Battalion in Irregular

Warfare.”

46. Material based on Alford intvw (Schlosser), Alford

intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams), and Lieutenant

Colonel Julian D. Alford intvw with Lieutenant Colonel

Craig H. Covert, 22 November 05 (MCHC), herea]er

Alford intvw (Covert); Galula, PaciLcation in Algeria

1956–1958. See as well Bing West, Ke Village (New

York: Pocket Books, 2003) and U.S. Marine Corps,

Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government

Printing OYce, 1940).

47. Quotation from Alford intvw (Schlosser). See also 3/6

ComdC, Jan–Dec 2004 and 3/6 Command Chronology,

Jul–Dec 2005, herea]er 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005 for

the battalion command and staX lists. Lieutenant

Colonel Alford also had a close working relationship

with his commanding oYcer, Regimental Combat Team

2 commander Colonel Stephen W. Davis, having served

with him in 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and at Parris

Island.

48. “Brie[ng ‘An Infantry Battalion in Irregular Warfare.’”

49. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Cuomo,“We Wild, Wild, West.”

50. Combat Logistics Battalion-2 Command Chronology

Sep–Dec 2005, herea]er CLB-2 ComdC, Sep–Dec 2005;

Major Conlon D. Carabine intvw with author, 9

December 2011, herea]er Carabine intvw.
52 Battle for Al-Qaim

51. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec2005; Cuomo, “We Wild, Wild,

West”; 1st Tank Battalion, Command Chronology, Jul–

Dec 2005, herea]er 1st Tank Battalion, ComdC, Jul-Dec

2005; Alford intvw (Schlosser); Pitchford intvw.

52. Ibid.

53. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

54. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Corporal Fabricio D.

Drummond intvw with Lieutenant Colonel Craig H.

Covert, 15 November 2005 (MCHC), herea]er

Drummond intvw; Heatherman intvw; Sergeant Jeremy

R. Riddle intvw with Lieutenant Colonel Timothy M.

Crowley, 15 November 2005 (MCHC), herea]er Riddle

intvw.

55. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec2005; Drummond intvw; Riddle

intvw; Corporal Matthew B. Kocher intvw with

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Crowley, 15 November

2005 (MCHC), herea]er Kocher intvw; Sergeant James

N. Sawyer intvw with Lieutenant Colonel Craig H.

Covert, 15 November 2005 (MCHC), herea]er Sawyer

intvw.

56. Drummond intvw; Sawyer intvw.

57. In Keir Own Words, 235.

58. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Riddle intvw

59. Both quotations from Heatherman intvw.

60. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Alford intvw (Covert);

Major Toby D. Patterson intvw with Lieutenant Colonel

Craig H. Covert, 16 November 2005 (MCHC), herea]er

Patterson intvw.

61. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Alford intvw (Covert);

Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); Cuomo, “We

Wild, Wild West,” Gunnery Sergeant Kenneth K.

Wertman Jr. intvw with Lieutenant Colonel Craig H.

Covert, 17 November 2005 (MCHC); Patterson intrvw.

62. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, 92–99;

Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 17–23;

Malkasian, “Will Iraqization Work?,” 161–77; Ibrahim

Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces: An

Analytical History (New York: Routledge, 2008), 199–

224, herea]er Al-Marashi, Iraq’s Armed Forces; West, No

True Glory; Estes, Into the Fray, 35. For the Coalition

Provisional Authority orders dissolving the old Iraqi

Army and creating a new Iraqi Army see Coalition

Provisional Authority No. 2: Dissolution of Entities (23

May 2003) accessed at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/

regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Ent

ities_with_Annex_A.pdf and Coalition Provisional

Authority Order no. 22: Creation of a New Iraqi Army

(7 August 2003) accessed at

http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CP

AORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf.

63. Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces; Anthony

H. Cordesman and Patrick Baetjer, Iraqi Security Forces:

A Strategy for Success (Washington, DC: Center for

Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 228–29. See

as well Cordesman and Adam Mausner, Iraqi Force

Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences of

Failure: A Report of the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in

Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and

International Studies, 2006), 39–71.

64. Cuomo, “Wild, Wild, West,” 25; Alford intvw (Wheeler

and McWilliams); Alford intvw (Schlosser).

65. Carabine intvw; Alford intvw (Schlosser); Alford intvw

(Wheeler and McWilliams). Quotation taken from

Francis J. “Bing” West, Colonel David J. Furness,

Colonel William M. Jurney, and Colonel Julian D.

Alford, “We Art of Battalion Command in Counterinsurgency: A Discussion,” in Counterinsurgency

Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, ed.

Nicholas J. Schlosser and James M. Caiella (Quantico:

Marine Corps University Press, 2011), 70.

66. Riddle intvw.

67. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Lieutenant James L.

Anderson, USN intvw with Lieutenant Colonel Craig

H. Covert, 21 November 2005 (MCHC), herea]er

Anderson intvw; Sergeant Major Scott L. Weakston

intvw with Lieutenant Colonel Craig H. Covert, 22

November 2005 (MCHC), herea]er Weakston intvw;

Summary of Action on 16 October 2005 for Lance

Corporal Norman W. Anderson III, Awards Branch,

United States Marine Corps.

68. Heatherman intvw.

69. Estes, Into the Fray, 123–25; 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

70. Heatherman intvw.

71. Ibid.
September 2005 – March 2006 53

72. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); Major Sean

M. Hurley intvw with Lieutenant Colonel Decker, 25

February 2006 (MCHC), herea]er Hurley intvw.

76. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); Cuomo, “We

Wild, Wild, West,” 26–28.

77. Estes, Into the Fray, 49–52; Battalion Landing Team 2/1

Command Chronology, herea]er BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul–

Dec 2005; Colonel Robert G. Oltman intvw with

author, 29 August 2011, herea]er Oltman intvw.

78. BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Oltman intvw.

79. Ibid.

80. Alford intvw (Schlosser); Estes, Into the Fray, 126; 3/6

ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005;

CLB-2 ComdC, Sep–Dec 2005; Marine Light Attack

Helicopter Squadron 369 Command Chronology, Oct–

Nov 2005; Marine All Weather Fight Attack Squadron

332 Command Chronology, herea]er VMFA(AW)-332

ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

81. BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec

2005; CLB-2 ComdC, Sep–Dec 2005; Major Erik J.

Bartelt intvw with author, 20 May 2011, herea]er

Bartelt intvw; Patterson intvw.

82. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul–Dec

2005; Bartelt intvw; CLB-2 ComdC, Sep–Dec 2005.

83. Patterson intvw; Sawyer intvw; Heatherman intvw;

Dowden intvw; Pitchford intvw; 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec

2005.

84. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Tania Valdemoro, “Marine

from Boca Killed in Iraq Battle,” Palm Beach Post, 9

November 2005; Dowden intvw.

85. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; “N.C. Based Marine Dies in

Iraq,” 10 November 2005, http://militarytimes.com/

valor/marine-lance-cpl-daniel-f-swaim/1304747/aq.

86. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

87. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); 3/6 ComdC,

Jul–Dec 2005 (GRC); Cuomo, “We Wild, Wild West,”

26.

88. Bookwalter intvw; CLB-2 ComdC, Sep–Dec 2005.

89. BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul-Dec 2005; Captain Matthew

Dowden intvw with author 28 June 2011, herea]er

Dowden intvw.

90. For ambush tactics, see Dowden intvw. For the engagement, see Summary of Action between 5–14 November

2005 for Lance Corporal Christopher M. McCracken,

Awards Branch, United States Marine Corps.

91. Summary of Action between 5–14 November 2005 for

Corporal John M. Longoria, Awards Branch, United

States Marine Corps; Summary of Action on 14

November 2005 for Lance Corporal Michael S.

Rodriguez, Awards Branch, United States Marine Corps.

92. Dowden intvw; Summary of Action on 16 November

2005 for StaX Sergeant Robert W. Homer, Awards

Branch, United States Marine Corps, herea]er Homer

summary; Summary of Action on 16 November 2005

for Second Lieutenant Donald R. McGlothlin, Awards

Branch, United States Marine Corps, herea]er

McGlothlin summary; Summary of Action on 16

November 2005 for Lance Corporal Joshua R. Mooi,

Awards Branch, United States Marine Corps, herea]er

Mooi summary; Summary of Action on 16 November

2005 for Corporal JeXrey A. Rogers, Awards Branch,

United States Marine Corps, herea]er Rogers

summary; Summary of Action on 16 November 2005

for Corporal Joshua J. Ware, Awards Branch, United

States Marine Corps, herea]er Ware summary;

Summary of Action on 16 November 2005 for Lance

Corporal Roger W. Deeds, Awards Branch, United

States Marine Corps, herea]er Deeds summary. Kevin

Baron, “Joshua Mooi: I Had Exceptionally Good Luck,”

Stars and Stripes, 14 June 2009, herea]er Baron, “Joshua

Mooi.”

93. Homer summary; McGlothlin summary.

94. Rogers summary; Mooi summary.

95. Mooi summary; Deeds summary.

96. Mooi summary; Rogers summary; Summary of Action

from 5-16 November 2005 for Lance Corporal John A.

Lucente, Awards Branch, United States Marine Corps,

herea]er Lucente summary.
54 Battle for Al-Qaim

97. Mooi summary; McGlothlin summary; Baron, “Joshua

Mooi.”

98. Mooi summary; Baron, “Joshua Mooi.”

99. Ibid.

100. Homer summary; Summary of Action on 16 November

2005 for Corporal Javier Alvarez, Awards Branch,

United States Marine Corps, herea]er Alvarez

summary.

101. Quotations from Corporal Alvarez come from Kevin

Baron, “Javier Alvarez: ‘My Hand Was Completely

Missing,” Stars and Stripes, 14 June 2009; Alvarez

summary.

102. Homer summary; Alvarez summary.

103. Homer summary.

104. Summary of Action on 16 November 2005 for Hospital

Corpsman Wird Class Jesse P. Hickey, USN, Awards

Branch, United States Marine Corps, herea]er Hickey

summary.

105. Hickey summary.

106. Deeds summary; McGlothlin summary; Mooi

summary; Alvarez summary; Homer summary; Hickey

summary.

107. Anderson intvw; BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005;

Department of Defense Military Casualty Information:

Operation Iraqi Freedom, accessed at

http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/oif

_list_of_names.pdf. Information on the 571st

Ambulance Company from Bartelt intvw; Dick Camp,

“Eyewitness to Combat: Fire[ght at New Ubaydi, Iraq,

95, November 2005,” Leatherneck 94 (2011): 30–35,

herea]er Camp, “Fire[ght at New Ubaydi.”

108. BLT 2/1 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Alford intvw (Wheeler

and McWilliams); Bartelt intvw; 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec

2005.

109. Dowden intvw; Pitchford intvw.

110. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Estes Into the Fray, 120;

Bartelt intvw; Marine Attack Squadron 223 Command

Chronology, Nov 2005; Marine Heavy Helicopter

Squadron 466 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2005;

VMFA(AW)-332, ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

111. Ibid; Major Eric J. Bartelt comments on dra]

manuscript, 27 January 2012 (MCHC), herea]er Bartelt

dra] comments.

112. Bartelt intvw and Bartelt dra] comments. Quotation

comes from David Axe, “Wild West: Marine Corps

Aviators Support the Ground Troops in Iraq’s Explosive

Al-Anbar Province,” Leatherneck, 89 (2006): 23.

113. Dowden intvw.

114. Captain JeXrey A. Pool, “Operation Steel Curtain

Civilian Casualties,” press release, 2d Marine Division, 9

November 2005, accessed 4 January 2012 at

http://www.marines.mil/unit/2ndmardiv/Pages/news/2

005/Operation%20Steel%20Curtain%20civilian%20cas

ualties.aspx; Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Airstrikes Take

Toll on Civilians; Eyewitnesses Cite Scores Killed in

Marine OXensive in Western Iraq,” Ke Washington Post,

24 December 2005.

115. Captain JeXrey S. Pool, “Operation Steel Curtain

Update” press release, 2d Marine Division, 15

November 2005; accessed 4 January 2012 at

http://www.marines.mil/unit/2ndmardiv/Pages/news/2

005/Operation%20Steel%20Curtain%20update%20(No

v.%2015).aspx; Knickmeyer, “U.S. Airstrikes Take Toll

on Civilians.”

116. For Abdul Aziz’s account, see Knickmeyer, “U.S.

Airstrikes Take Toll on Civilians.”

117. A report from the Congressional Research Service

published in 2008 highlights the diYculties of [nding

accurate numbers for civilian casualties. One study

conducted by Johns Hopkins University and Baghdad’s

Al-Mustansiriya University in 2004 estimated that there

were between 8,000 and 194,000 civilian casualties as a

result of the war. A second study conducted by the same

institutions two years later reassessed the number of

casualties up to that point at between 426,369 and

793,663. Such widely divergent numbers attest to the

challenges of extracting accurate statistics with regard

to the Iraq War. Hannah Fischer, Iraqi Civilian Deaths

Estimate (Washington, DC: Congressional Research

Service, 2011), 4. For the original reports see Les

Roberts, Ridyah La]a, Richard Gar[eld, Jamal

Khudhairi, and Gilbert Burnham, “Mortality Before

and A]er the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample

Survey,” Ke Lancet 364 (2004): 1857–64 and Gilbert

Burnham, Riyadh La]a, Shannon Doocy, and Les

Roberts, “Mortality A]er the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A

Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey,” Ke Lancet, 368

(2006): 1421–29.
September 2005 – March 2006 55

118. Quotation from Moyar, A Question of Command, 236.

119. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); Malkasian,

“Will Iraqization Work?”; Cuomo, “We Wild, Wild

West.”

120. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); Malkasian,

“Will Iraqization Work?,” 170.

121. Wis account is related by Alford in Alford intvw

(Wheeler and McWilliams).

122. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams); Gordon W.

Rudd, Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner,

and the ORHA Story (Lawrence: University of Kansas

Press, 2011); L. Paul Bremer and Malcolm McConnell,

My Year in Iraq: Ke Struggle to Build a Future of Hope

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); Malkasian,

“Counterinsurgency in Iraq”; Malkasian, “Will

Iraqization Work?”; Michael S. Groen, With the 1st

Marine Division in Iraq 2003: No Greater Friend, No

Worse Enemy, Marine Corps History Division

Occasional Paper (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History

Division, 2006).

123. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 17–19; Estes,

Into the Fray, 39–40.

124. Interview with Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam EXan Fahran alShurji al-Aziz, in Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II, 146.

125. Alford intvw (Wheeler and McWilliams).

126. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

127. Quotations from Andrew Tilghman, “Marines

Entangled in Disarming Situation in Husaybah,” Stars

and Stripes, 21 November 2005, accessed at

http://www.stripes.com/news/marines-entangled-indisarming-situation-in-husaybah-1.41370.

128. Interview with Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali alSulayman al-Assa[ in Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II,

107.

129. Interview with Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani, in AlAnbar Awakening, Volume II, 163.

130. Interview with Colonel Said Muhammed Muad alFahadawi, in Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II, 204.

131. Cuomo, “We Wild, Wild West,” 22; Heatherman intvw.

132. Heatherman intvw; Carabine intvw.

133. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; Estes, Into the Fray, 129–30.

134. 3/6 ComdC, Jan–Jun 2006; “Two N.C.-based Marines

killed in suicide attack,” Associated Press, 14 February

2006, http://militarytimes.com/valor/marine-lance-cplmatthew-r-barnes/1540660/.

135. 3/6 ComdC, Jan–Jun 2006.

136. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005.

137. 3/6 ComdC, Jul–Dec 2005; 3/6 ComdC, Jan–Jun 2006;

Department of Defense Military Casualty Information:

Operation Iraqi Freedom, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/

personnel/CASUALTY/oif_list_of_names.pdf.

138. Colonel Nicholas F. Marano intvw with Chief Warrant

OYcer-4 William Hutson, 2 December 2010 (MCHC).

139. Alford and Jurney’s conversation can be found in

Moyar, A Question of Command, 241. Quotation from

Alford is in Counterinsurgency Leadership, 69.

140. Quotation from interview with Lieutenant Colonel

William M. Jurney, 17 February 2007 in Al-Anbar

Awakening: Volume I, 187–99. See as well 1st Battalion,

6th Marines Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2006;

Andrew Lubin, “Ramadi: From Caliphate to

Capitalism,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq 2004–2008:

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 205–9; Major

Niel Smith USA and Colonel Sean B. MacFarland USA,

“Anbar Awakens: We Tipping Point,” in U.S. Marines in

Iraq 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography,

195–203.
The logotype reproduced on the back cover has as its major element the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first

appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine

Corps buttons to the present day.
About the Author and Acknowledgments

Nicholas J. Schlosser is a historian at the Marine Corps History Division. He received his doctorate from the

University of Maryland in 2008. He is the editor and compiler of the History Division publication U.S. Marines in Iraq

2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, published in 2010, and co-editor of Counterinsurgency Leadership

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond, published in 2011 by the Marine Corps University Press.

Wis project could not have been completed and published without the invaluable and professional eXorts of the

History Division staX. We manuscript was edited by Andrea L. Connell and Wanda J. Renfrow. Layout and design

was created by Vincent J. Martinez. We author would also like to thank Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, whose preliminary

research on this topic helped provide a strong foundation on which to build this study. We following individuals also

provided helpful advice and assistance with the manuscript: chief historian Charles D. Melson; senior editor Kenneth

H. Williams; managing editor Shawn H. Vreeland; and historians Paul D. Westermeyer, Womas M. Baughn, Fred H.

Allison, Annette D. Amerman, and Chief Warrant OYcer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams. Finally, the author would like

to thank the staX of the Marine Corps Archives at the Gray Research Center.

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC

2013

PCN 10600009200

A UH-1N “Huey” helicopter from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 flies above

the city of Ubaydi on 16 November 2005. The Marine pictured is Cpl Caleb Love.

Photo by Cpl James P. Aguilar