NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CARLEEN CRENSHAW BRUCE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0788

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2010-112998-001 SE

The Honorable David B. Gass, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Colby Mills

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Carlos Daniel Carrion

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. BRUCE

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Carleen Crenshaw Bruce challenges her convictions for 

interfering with judicial proceedings, a Class 1 misdemeanor; resisting 

arrest, a Class 6 felony; and possession of dangerous drugs, a Class 4 felony. 

She claims that the trial court erred by: (1) conducting a suppression 

hearing in her absence and (2) denying a motion to suppress her statement 

to police prior to receiving Miranda1 warnings. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUD

¶2 Before trial, Bruce filed a motion to suppress statements that 

she made to a Mesa police officer after her arrest for interfering with judicial 

proceedings and resisting arrest. In her presence, the court set the motion 

for a hearing on November 4, 2011. The State subsequently learned of a 

conflict and, with no defense objection, the court moved the hearing to 

November 2 by minute entry.

¶3 Bruce did not appear for the rescheduled hearing. The trial 

court asked if the parties wanted to proceed. Bruce’s lawyer advised the 

court that he had left a message with his client of the change in schedule,

but did not know if she received the message. Counsel, however, told the 

court that he was ready to “go forward with the motion at this time,” and 

confirmed that he was not going to call Bruce to testify.

¶4 The hearing proceeded and the police officer, the sole witness,

testified. The court denied the motion to suppress. Bruce was subsequently 

convicted at a bench trial and sentenced.

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
STATE v. BRUCE

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

I.

¶5 Bruce argues on appeal that her rights under the Sixth 

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

were violated and the trial court committed reversible error by holding the

suppression hearing in her absence. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. 

2, § 14. We disagree because any error was invited and her argument is 

foreclosed by the invited error doctrine.

¶6 The invited error doctrine provides that a defendant who 

invites error at trial may not complain of that error on appeal. State v. 

Pandeli, 215 Ariz. 514, 528, ¶ 50, 161 P.3d 557, 571 (2007). The purpose of 

the doctrine is to prevent a party from creating or injecting error into a 

proceeding and then profiting from it on appeal. State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 

564, 566, ¶ 11, 30 P.3d 631, 633 (2001). Thus, if error is invited, we do not 

consider if the alleged error is fundamental because doing so would run 

contrary to the purposes of the doctrine. Id. at 565-66, ¶ 9, 30 P.3d at 632-

33.

¶7 Bruce argues that her presence at the hearing would have 

been helpful because she could have heard the officer’s testimony and been 

available to testify and contradict the officer’s testimony.2 Bruce’s trial 

lawyer, however, had the opportunity to ask the court to continue the 

hearing if he thought Bruce’s presence at the hearing would have been 

helpful to his interrogation of the officer. He apparently did not think her 

presence was necessary and specifically informed the court that he did not 

intend to call her to testify and wished to proceed without her. 

¶8 Although she may argue with his strategy, a defendant may 

be bound by her counsel’s “trial strategy, misconduct and mistakes of 

counsel so long as counsel’s assistance at trial was not reduced to a ‘mere 

farce or sham.’” State v. Levato, 186 Ariz. 441, 444 n.3, 924 P.2d 445, 448 n.3 

(1996) (quoting State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546, 550, 521 P.2d 978, 982 (1974)). 

Bruce’s lawyer thought he could proceed in her absence, and the record 

confirms that he was prepared to challenge the officer’s testimony. 

Consequently, because Bruce’s lawyer explicitly told the court that he 

 

2 Bruce has not specified on appeal how she could have assisted her lawyer 

at the hearing other than a generalized assertion of assistance. 
STATE v. BRUCE

Decision of the Court

4

wished to proceed in her absence, Bruce may not now assert her absence as 

error on appeal. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. at 528, ¶ 50, 161 P.3d at 571.

II.

¶9 Bruce also argues that the court committed reversible error by

denying her motion to suppress. We review a ruling on a motion to 

suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 7, 

202 P.3d 528, 532 (App. 2009). “We defer to the court’s factual 

determinations; however, to the extent its ultimate ruling is a conclusion of 

law, we review de novo.” Id. (citation omitted). And in reaching our 

decision we only consider the evidence presented at the suppression 

hearing and view that evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, in the 

light most favorable to upholding the ruling. State v. May, 210 Ariz. 452, 

454, ¶ 4, 112 P.3d 39, 41 (App. 2005) (citation omitted).

¶10 After Bruce was arrested, she was transported to the police 

station for booking. After pulling into the sally port of the garage, Officer 

Christopher Colburn testified that he asked Bruce a “routine” question that

he asks all arrestees “for safety purposes;” namely, “if she had anything 

hidden on her person that she shouldn’t have.” Bruce replied that she “had 

a bag of meth in her left bra.” The information was relayed to a female 

detention officer who searched Bruce prior to booking her into jail and 

found in Bruce’s bra “a baggie containing a crystalline substance [that] 

tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.” Bruce was 

subsequently Mirandized and voluntarily spoke to Colburn about the 

matters she was arrested for and possession of a dangerous drug.

¶11 At the suppression hearing, Bruce, by counsel, argued that 

Colburn’s question constituted custodial interrogation meant to elicit 

incriminating evidence and because she answered before she was 

Mirandized, her answer had to be suppressed. In denying the motion, the 

court found that the “single question asked before Miranda warnings were 

given was not for investigative purposes” but simply a “routine question[] 

asked for booking purposes.” In reaching its decision, the court relied on 

United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 378 (11th Cir. 1983), which held that 

“requesting ‘routine’ information for booking purposes is not an 

interrogation under Miranda, even though that information turns out to be 

incriminating.” In fact, the trial court stated: 

I’m persuaded there was just one question and 

I also find persuasive and a heavy factor that 

[defendant] was not suspected of meth 
STATE v. BRUCE

Decision of the Court

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possession. The suspicion of the offenses were 

violating the order of protection and resisting 

arrest, so the fact that the generic question was 

asked do you have anything on you does not 

concern the Court that [defendant] should have 

been Mirandized prior to that single question

being asked, so the statement made is 

admissible at trial.

¶12 Bruce contends the court abused its discretion in finding that 

the question was a routine booking question rather than a question meant 

to elicit incriminating statements. She points out that the booking questions 

in Sims and the related cases were different in kind because those questions

involved only identification information. See id. at 379 (address and 

telephone number secured in port-arrest interview). See also State v. Jeney, 

163 Ariz. 293, 297, 787 P.2d 1089, 1093 (App. 1989) (ownership of residence 

searched proved through booking information). 

¶13 Although even seemingly innocuous information may, in 

retrospect, turn out to be incriminating, the answer to an innocuous 

question should not be suppressed so long as the purpose for which the 

information is obtained is a routine booking purpose and “not an 

interrogation under Miranda.” Sims, 719 F.2d at 378. Here, the court was 

persuaded that the officer routinely asked all arrestees this question solely 

for officer safety reasons. And the court was also persuaded that the 

question was “routine” because the charges that Bruce was arrested for, 

violation of an order of protection and resisting arrest, do not necessarily 

give rise to a suspicion of drug possession. Because we give deference to 

the finder of fact who hears the live testimony and has to judge credibility, 

Matter of Pima County Juvenile Action No. 63212-2, 129 Ariz. 371, 375, 631 P.2d 

526, 530 (1981), the denial of the motion to suppress was not an abuse of 

discretion.3

 

3 We also find that even if there was any error, it was harmless because the 

drugs would have been found in her bra during the search prior to booking. 

“Error is harmless only if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it 

‘did not contribute to or affect the verdict.’” State v. Green, 200 Ariz. 496, 

501, ¶ 21, 29 P.3d 271, 276 (2001) (quoting State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588, 

858 P.2d 1152, 1191 (1993)). Therefore, even without her statement, the 

drugs in her bra would have been admitted and supports the conviction. 
STATE v. BRUCE

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CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions 

and sentences.