FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION: ALLEGED REGULATORY LAPSES IN 

THE CERTIFICATION AND MANUFACTURE OF THE ECLIPSE EA-500 

(110–169) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

N ADMINISTRATION AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION: ALLEGED REGU

S IN THE CERTIFICATION AND MANUFACTURE OF THE ECLIPSE 

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45–108 PDF 2008

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION: 

ALLEGED REGULATORY LAPSES 

IN THE CERTIFICATION AND MANUFACTURE OF THE ECLIPSE EA500 

(110–169) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

BOB FILNER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York, Vice Chair 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

TESTIMONY 

Billson, Peg, President and General Manager, Manufacturing Division, 

Eclipse Aviation Corporation .............................................................................. 76 

Broyles, Maryetta, Technical Program Management Specialist, Aircraft Certification Service, Southwest Region Rotorcraft Directorate, Manufacturing 

Inspection Office, Federal Aviation Administration .......................................... 27 

DiPaolo, Tomaso, Aircraft Certification National Representative, National Air 

Traffic Controllers Association ............................................................................ 27 

Downey, David A., Vice President, Flight Safety, Bell Helicopter-Textron ........ 27 

Haueter, Tom, Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation 

Safety Board ......................................................................................................... 47 

Kizer, Clyde, Retired Aerospace Executive ........................................................... 76 

Lauer, III, Ford J., Manager, San Antonio Manufacturing Inspection District 

Office, Federal Aviation Administration ............................................................ 27 

Sabatini, Nicholas J., Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Aviation 

Administration, accompanied by John J. Hickey, Director, Aircraft Certification Service, and Ronald Wojnar, Senior Advisor, Aircraft Maintenance 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service .............................................................. 47 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, United States Department 

of Transportation ................................................................................................. 10 

Wallace, Dennis, Software Engineer, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration .............................................. 27 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 84 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 85 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 94 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 95 

Richardson, Hon. Laura A., of California .............................................................. 100 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Billson, Peg ............................................................................................................... 103

Broyles, Maryetta .................................................................................................... 125 

DiPaolo, Tomaso ...................................................................................................... 133 

Downey, David A. .................................................................................................... 142 

Haueter, Tom ........................................................................................................... 162 

Kizer, Clyde .............................................................................................................. 170 

Lauer, III, Ford J. .................................................................................................... 183 

Sabatini, Nicholas J. ................................................................................................ 198 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L. ...................................................................................... 280 

Wallace, Dennis ....................................................................................................... 322 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Billson, Peg, President and General Manager, Manufacturing Division, 

Eclipse Aviation Corporation: 

Response to request for information from Rep. Costello ................................... 110 

Letter to the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General .................... 115 

Response to request for information from Rep. Hayes ..................................... 118 

Response to request for information from Rep. Mica ........................................ 122 

Page

VI 

Downey, David A., Vice President, Flight Safety, Bell Helicopter-Textron, 

Federal Aviation memorandum from Dorenda D. Baker, Deputy Director, 

Aircraft Certification Service, to Mr. Downey, titled ‘‘Mid-Year Performance 

Discussion Follow-Up’’ ......................................................................................... 156 

Haueter, Tom, Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation 

Safety Board, response to request for information from Rep. Costello ............ 167 

Kizer, Clyde, Retired Aerospace Executive, response to request for information from Rep. Mica ............................................................................................. 176 

Sabatini, Nicholas J., Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Aviation 

Administration: 

Response to request for information from Rep. Costello ................................... 213 

Response to request for information from Rep. Mica ........................................ 274 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, United States Department 

of Transportation, responses to questions from Rep. Costello .......................... 318 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Patrick Forrey, President, written statement ....................................................................................................... 326 

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(1) 

HEARING ON FAA AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION: 

ALLEGED REGULATORY LAPSES IN THE 

CERTIFICATION AND MANUFACTURE OF 

THE ECLIPSE EA-500 

Wednesday, September 17, 2008, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry F. 

Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

The Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone to turn electronic devices off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on FAA 

Aircraft Certification: Alleged Regulatory Lapses in the Certification and Manufacture of the Eclipse EA-500. The Chair will give 

an opening statement, recognize the Ranking Member for an opening statement, and as you will note from the witness list, we have 

a number of witnesses. So what we intend to do is give opening 

statements from the Chair and Ranking Member and go directly to 

the witnesses. After my statement, I will, as I said, recognize the 

Ranking Member. 

I welcome everyone to our Subcommittee hearing on FAA Aircraft Certification: Alleged Regulatory Lapses in the Certification 

and Manufacture of the Eclipse EA-500. 

For the past few years, I have asked the question, does the FAA 

have adequate resources to accomplish its mission, and in turn, are 

they relying too heavily on its safety record in order to demonstrate 

its ability to keep a safe system? Over these past two years, our 

hearings in the Aviation Subcommittee and the Full Committee 

have demonstrated an agency that is short on resources, low on 

morale and has major problems overseeing its critical safety programs. 

Today, the Department of Transportation Inspector General reports that he will detail alarming problems within the FAA. I am 

extremely disappointed that the FAA, again, lacks the ability to 

oversee its programs, in this case, its certification programs. Unfortunately, this hearing will show an agency that is as interested in 

promoting aviation and befriending manufacturers as it is in carrying out its number one responsibility of protecting the safety of 

the flying public. 

2 

It is inexcusable and unacceptable to ignore rules, regulations 

and standard practices to accommodate those you have a responsibility to regulate, especially when you have peoples’ lives in your 

hands. This Subcommittee and the Congress and the American 

people entrust the FAA to uphold the highest level of safety. Unfortunately, the FAA’s conduct regarding the certification of the EA500 makes one lose confidence in the agency. 

The aircraft certification and production process is complicated, 

requiring very technical expertise and understanding. When trying 

to do so on an emerging new class of very light jets, like the Eclipse 

EA-500, one would expect the FAA to provide an appropriate 

amount of time and resources to make sure we get it right. However, questions have been raised by the IG and by current and 

former FAA employees that corners were cut during the certification and manufacturing process, deficiencies were overlooked and 

this new type of aircraft was pushed through the process in order 

to meet internal agency goals. 

As a result, the hearing today focuses on two central questions. 

One, did the FAA follow its regulations when certifying the Eclipse 

EA-500 and in the production of this aircraft? And two, was safety 

compromised? The IG, Mr. Calvin Scovel, will provide testimony 

which details very serious issues with the FAA’s certification and 

manufacturing of the Eclipse EA-500. 

One of the most disturbing findings to me in the IG’s report is 

that instead of mandating that problems be resolved, the FAA accepted IOUs from Eclipse to resolve the problems at a later date. 

In this case, an IOU was allowed on the avionics system that ran 

the plane. I question the practice of using IOUs in any instance. 

However, to use an IOU on the avionics system that is used to run 

the EA-500, which I understand has no standby instruments or 

backup systems, from a new manufacturer, who has no prior experience, and on a system so critical to the aircraft, is puzzling. 

Worse, according to the FAA’s own testimony on pages 10 and 

11, Eclipse delivered 11 of their EA-500 aircraft to customers prior 

to the completion of the IOU on this critical avionics system. In an 

exchange of letters which I will submit for the record, Eclipse was 

to ′′retain control of the aircraft’’ until the issue was closed. Clearly, 

that didn’t happen. 

The IG will also testify that 13 known deficiencies were unresolved when the FAA approved the production certificate. This is 

unprecedented and a direct violation of regulations and yet, the 

FAA allowed it. Eclipse repeatedly demonstrated an inability to 

replicate its approved aircraft design on the production process and 

the FAA let them get by with it. 

Further, we will hear testimony to suggest that the FAA developed an inappropriate relationship with Eclipse, forcing FAA employees to expedite the Eclipse EA-500 aircraft through the certification and production approval process, even though serious concerns were raised. I have said time and again, safety cannot be 

compromised. In this case, the FAA is treating manufacturers like 

customers, instructing its employees to ′′build relationships with 

our customers’’ instead of acting as regulators. For example, the 

FAA’s own test pilots said the EA-500 should not be certified as a 

single pilot plane because of in-flight concerns such as complexities 

3 

of the new software and a minimally effective autopilot system. 

And the FAA agreed. 

Eclipse filed a customer service complaint. The FAA and the 

agency immediately reversed course and certified the plane as a 

single pilot aircraft. In addition, the European Aviation Safety 

Agency refused to certify the EA-500 for operations. The FAA 

should be vigilant in ensuring the highest level of safety and be 

willing to slow down the certification process, and shut down production of such action as warranted to protect the flying public. 

Deadlines and goals should have been adjusted once deficiencies 

were found. 

Finally, we have seen a pattern at the FAA of an agency that is 

reactive, not proactive. Only after getting briefed by the IG on the 

Eclipse certification issue and on the IG’s recommendation did the 

Acting Administrator convene a review team to do an audit of the 

certification programs. The FAA seems to be on autopilot until 

pushed into action, either by this Subcommittee, the IG or the 

news media. It is not enough to have safety regulations in place. 

The FAA must enforce those regulations. This Subcommittee has 

made safety a top priority and the FAA and manufacturers must 

do the same. We cannot have the agency responsible for aviation 

safety rely on the past or overlook problems by rushing certification 

in an effort to meet self-imposed goals. We expect, and we deserve 

more. 

With that, I want to welcome all of our witnesses here today and 

I look forward to hearing their testimony. Before I recognize the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening statement, I ask unanimous consent to allow two weeks for all Members to revise and extend their remarks and to permit submission of additional statements and materials by Members and witnesses. Without objection, 

so ordered. 

The Chair at this time recognizes the distinguished Ranking 

Member, Mr. Petri, for his remarks or opening statement. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

calling this important hearing on the certification of the Eclipse 

500 very light jet. 

If I may just comment on the question of safety, while expressing 

concern, always trying to do better, we should note that this is the 

era of maximum safety in commercial and general aviation in the 

history of the world, really, and certainly in the history of the 

United States. So it is a time to celebrate as well as to try to do 

better. I think we should put this whole subject in that context. 

If we were confronted with catastrophes resulting from poor design and planes collapsing and people falling from the sky, that 

would be one thing. But the truth is, what we have been doing has 

been effective and American aviation is reasserting its leadership 

role in the world on many fronts. 

Perhaps because the Eclipse 500 is the first general aviation innovation to be manufactured in the United States in a long time, 

and other planes like it, the very light jets have generated a lot of 

excitement in the aviation industry. They offer accessibility into 

the jet class for some, should make economically feasible new air 

taxi services to connect tertiary airports, making good use of excess 

4 

airport capacity and further expanding the connectivity of our national aviation system. 

The Eclipse 500 is one model of a very light jet and it boasts a 

more fuel efficient design with the first integrated avionics system 

for this type of small jet aircraft. Because of these innovations, 

Eclipse garnered the attention of the media, industry, FAA and 

now us here in Congress. As we all know, aircraft certification is 

a very complex and difficult process, where deadlines and pressures 

are facts of life, much like the deadlines and pressures Members 

of Congress deal with when working on a reauthorization or appropriation bill. 

Because very light jets are a new innovation and Eclipse in particular incorporates cutting edge technology, the focus today should 

be on the FAA’s certification methods and procedures. We must ensure that the Federal aviation regulations are keeping up with innovations in the industry. Innovation is at the heart of innovation. 

As the Wright brothers well understood, acceptable risk is a central 

part of discovery and development. As we strive to make aircraft 

more fuel efficient, cost efficient and more technologically advanced, we must also maintain our historic safety record. Likewise, 

we must be careful not to erect unnecessary barriers to innovation. 

Minimum safety standards and alternative means of compliance 

provided for in Federal aviation regulations allow for innovative 

aircraft designs to be certified. The minimum safety standards provide the benchmarks for manufacturers to design around and alternative means of compliance allow the FAA and manufacturers to 

address an ever-evolving technological and manufacturing environment. FAA’s certification policies, widely recognized as the gold 

standard for safety worldwide, provide for appropriate safety oversight where written regulations cannot keep up with technological 

innovation. 

Today the Department of Aviation Inspector General will testify 

about irregularities in the certification of the Eclipse plane. The Inspector General will also testify that he is not drawing any conclusion about the safety of the Eclipse aircraft. 

While it is important for this Committee to hear about certification irregularities and FAA’s lessons learned analysis of the 

Eclipse certification process, we must be careful not to jump to any 

conclusions that these irregularities exist outside of this certification project. There is no evidence to suggest an industry-wide 

certification issue. In fact, the historic safety record stands to refute such a claim. 

The certification process in place today has contributed to the 

safest period in the history of manned flight. The safety record the 

system is enjoying today is the result of the hard work of many 

Government and industry partners and we must build on that success as we go forward. 

While the FAA must remain focused on its role as a regulator, 

we have to be careful not to turn the agency into a hammer looking 

for a nail. Much has been gained from the industry’s willingness 

to share mistakes with the Government regulators, and that professional give and take must continue to exist to ensure our very 

safe system stays that way. 

5 

While it is possible that some of the Federal aviation regulations 

for aircraft certification may need to be reviewed, and perhaps altered to accommodate new kinds of aircraft technology, it is important to remember that the foundation of that certification, based on 

collaboration, coordination and information sharing, has proved 

successful and should not be changed or stifled. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now 

recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee, 

Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and I 

want to thank our vigilant staff for doing superb work over many 

months on the issues that we will hear about today. Your constancy and oversight of safety in aviation is exemplary and I am 

delighted that you are taking up the challenge. 

Safety in aviation is always only one accident, one fatal accident 

away from unsafe. Vigilance and redundancy in every phase of 

aviation are vital to the essential element of safety. 

The issue here is not innovation versus safety, but the process 

by which we achieve safety, by which FAA carries out its responsibility, by which it establishes and sustains what I called years ago 

the gold standard in aviation safety worldwide. But as Chaucer 

wrote, if gold rusts, then what of iron? 

We are going to hear today how the FAA’s customer service initiative mistakenly treats those who are the subject of regulation as 

the customer of FAA. FAA has, if there is a customer, as we said 

in a previous hearing, it is the flying public. It is not the airlines. 

And in this case, it is not the manufacturer. I am very concerned. 

We have another example here that complacency has crept into the 

highest levels of FAA management, a pendulum swing away from 

rigorous enforcement of safety, rigorous enforcement of compliance 

to now a manufacturer. Previously we had an airline favorable, 

cozy relationship. 

There are significant risks posed by new aircraft and new technology. The 777, which is designed entirely by computer and whose 

first article was put in place without doing a prototype, but with 

all the computer technology being right on, and the FAA was very 

concerned that this would, could result in some slippage, was on 

the scene day after day, watching over Boeing’s technology when 

that first side of the hull was swung in place and came within a 

millimeter of exactitude. That is the kind of vigilance that we expect of FAA and of the manufacturer, of Airbus, of Boeing, of 

Cessna, of all the others. In this case, the EA-500, with advanced 

avionics, turbine engine technology, characteristics more akin to 

large transport aircraft, it was incumbent upon FAA to establish 

a very high level of vigilance. 

And yet they had the audacity to put in their performance plan 

that the Eclipse would be certified by September 30th, 2006. The 

FAA shouldn’t be setting a date by which it will compete a certification. The date by which you complete a certification is when it 

is ready, when it meets the standards, when FAA can say yes or 

no, not when the manufacturer wants it and not when some higher-up in the agency says it should be done. 

6 

I reviewed the documents and I looked at the type certificate 

signing exactly on September 30th, 2006, a Saturday. The end of 

fiscal year 2006, coincidentally. How could FAA possibly know that 

the aircraft was going to be ready for certification at that point? 

I have never heard of the agency assigning itself a date by which 

an aircraft is to be ready for certification. 

The burden of when an aircraft is ready to be certified falls upon 

the manufacturer, not upon the professionals in the FAA. They 

have to meet the standards set by the FAA, not the other way 

around. FAA should respond in a timely fashion. They should not 

set up impossible paper trails, they should not set up red tape obstacles. But they should not sign off until the aircraft is ready, not 

until a date is met. 

Now, as I further looked at the documentation, I saw the FAA 

Rotorcraft Certification Directorate in Fort Worth, Texas, which 

had the primary responsibility for certifying the EA-500, was, in 

my judgment, very diligent in adhering to established regulations 

for certification. And they, at least on the face of it, seem to have 

performed very well. But their decisions and their recommendations were routinely overruled by higher up FAA management, 

under the customer service rubric. 

So we are going to, in the course of this hearing, dig into the 

causes that led up to this system. The European Safety Agency has 

not signed off. And in May, when I addressed the ministers of 

transport of the European Union at their annual meeting, I was 

asked time and again, one after another, the 27 ministers, what is 

happening within your FAA? We are patterning our European 

Safety Agency after FAA, want to partner with FAA, we are now 

having second thoughts. They were aware of the Eclipse problem, 

they were aware of the customer service initiative. They were concerned, very deeply concerned. 

Let’s not just take the attitude, well, we haven’t had a fatal accident. That is what in the past what was characterized as graveyard mentality. FAA is above that and has to remain above that. 

The purpose of this hearing is to see that they do in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Chairman Oberstar. 

The Chair announced that myself and Mr. Petri had an agreement that we would go directly to the first panel, but I would ask 

Members to keep in mind the number of witnesses that we have, 

and keep that in consideration and enter your statements into the 

record. However, Mr. Hayes has indicated that he would like to 

comment. So at this time, I will recognize my friend from North 

Carolina. 

Mr. HAYES. I thank the Chairman, and I appreciate what he is 

trying to do. Passion runs high on this subject. I am sitting down 

here listening, I am getting ready to hit the eject button. Because 

my take on this is almost 180 degrees out of phase with my Chairman and my full Chairman. They are great people and I respect 

them tremendously. 

A couple of things. I am not a lawyer, but I heard a lawyer one 

time say, we are going to stipulate that safety is our primary concern. So let’s write that on the wall and not refer back to it, because everybody here is concerned about safety. No question. 

7 

The Government, Transportation, FAA has a function. It is to 

create an environment in which our citizens, our industry, our 

economy can function, under the safety banner at the highest possible level. Folks, the future of the aerospace industry is to some 

degree, a great degree at risk and in play here. Staff has been vigilant. I agree, but the conclusions, and I don’t know who they are 

that staff has reached, are simply wrong. The FAA is not perfect 

any more than this Committee, but they were diligent throughout 

this process. I am not here representing Eclipse, I am trying to represent the American aerospace industry. We are in competition 

with the whole world for innovation. 

I have been flying for 40 years. Everything is different now. 

When I walk out the door every morning, should I have a rain coat, 

a top coat, a short sleeved shirt, we are talking, at the risk of oversimplification, in the same thing here. Mr. Scovel is going to bring 

us a report, and he is a very thorough, good guy. But the issue is, 

how do we keep the American aerospace industry and our economy 

moving forward with the new technology, which by the way, is crucial for American jobs in America, fuel efficiency, saving energy 

and everything else, how do we translate that into the traditional 

role of the FAA, putting the safest product on the market? 

I say to you, this Committee can do a tremendous amount of 

damage with our European counterparts by coming out here and 

saying the FAA is not doing their job. The folks who were in Fort 

Worth, they were doing their job. I am not questioning them. But 

when I got, and Leonard is with me, remember our conversation 

on the 430, Leonard? I got a G1000 now. I had to get somebody 

to come in and help me, because I didn’t understand all the new 

innovations of the technology that was available. 

Well, what does the technology do? It makes a cipher, it gives 

you situational awareness, does all kinds of things. But it does not 

take away the need to fly the airplane and the basics were there. 

This is a good, solid airplane that can fly and help America and 

move us in the right direction. 

So to say that it is not safe I think is incorrect. I have looked 

at it very closely. There are three systems, we talked a little bit 

about this, that back up everything. They are all electronic. That 

is okay. Mechanical is not needed, one, two, three, there has never 

been a failure. Thirty-two thousand hours now in service without 

a problem. Five thousand hours of flight testing, 32,000 hours in 

service? Folks, we need to really be careful what we are doing here. 

In 2001, the process started. In 2006, we certified it. That is not 

rushing. How do we get our job done and stay safe? Please, everybody, take a deep breath, realize what is at stake here and don’t 

go down the wrong path of saying the FAA did it wrong. They 

didn’t do it wrong. Did they do it perfect? No. We’re not going to 

handle this hearing perfectly, but please focus on the fact that 

aerospace is important. We have a great system. I think it worked. 

I think there are issues that we can deal with, 13 deficiencies out 

of how many thousand? You can cover that, Mr. Scovel. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me. I have spent hours 

on this. I see it every day when I crank up. Thank you. Let’s get 

her done. 

8 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentleman for his comments. Let me, 

if I can, comment, because you and I have had conversations yesterday, and we have been talking about this subject. Is the purpose 

of the hearing to find out, one, did the FAA follow the regulations 

when certifying the EA-500, and two, throughout the whole production and the process? I think we are going to hear testimony today, 

at least testimony that I have read from the Inspector General and 

from other witnesses here that brings those questions into play. 

Secondly, I spent, not to get off on another subject, I am trying 

to get to Members too, so we can go to our witnesses, this past Saturday I spent half my day, four hours, with my senior Senator and 

my colleague John Shimkus in Marion, Illinois, in a VA hospital in 

my Congressional district, where employees two to three years ago 

complained to the administrator at the facility that there were 

things going on at the hospital that just didn’t seem right. Deaths 

were occurring. 

Long story short, because of oversight, because Congress stepped 

in and insisted that the Inspector General come in, it was determined that nine people died in that facility as a result of substandard care. 

Why do I bring that up? Our responsibility is to ask the tough 

questions. And I certainly understand that there is a balance you 

have to consider. The industry, you have to consider a number of 

factors. But our responsibility is to do a number of things. One of 

those things is oversight, and to ask the tough questions. That is 

why we are here today. 

If the administrator at the hospital in Marion would have listened to the employees who were complaining to him two and a 

half or three years ago, peoples’ lives may have been saved. But he 

didn’t listen. He said, we know how to handle it, we are handling 

it perfectly, until others stepped in, the Inspector General and others got involved. It is documented now, nine people died because 

of substandard care on the part of one surgeon and some others involved. 

So I feel very strongly, you have heard me say it many times, 

that we have a responsibility to provide oversight. That is exactly 

what we are doing today. We are looking for the facts, we are looking to find out what was done right, what was done wrong, and if 

we can improve upon this in the future. 

With that—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. COSTELLO. I would be happy to yield to Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I respect the gentleman from North Carolina, he 

is a long-time aviator, with his heart in the right place. But he 

would not be flying safely if FAA had not done its vigilance in 

years past. Our purpose here is to find out what they slipped up 

on, where did they come up short, and be sure that they fix it for 

the future. That is the purpose of this hearing. If you listen to the 

facts and read the record, you will see that there are shortcomings 

that are system shortcomings that we have to assure that FAA 

fixes for the future. That is the purpose of this hearing. 

It is not to condemn any aircraft, any manufacturer, it is to find 

out how FAA has come up short and how we can fix things for the 

future. 

9 

Mr. HAYES. Would the gentleman yield? I agree with you. I agree 

with you. My real concern was the way the issue was framed initially, the FAA is not wrong, the folks in Fort Worth weren’t 

wrong, Eclipse wasn’t wrong, but we can do it better and you are 

absolutely right, it is what we are here for. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I appreciate the gentleman’s comments. I don’t 

agree with you that the FAA was not wrong, I think that they were 

wrong, and I think that some testimony here will document that, 

but that is the reason we are here, is to find that out. 

We have a vote going on on the Floor, but before we do, I am 

going to recognize the final Member of the Subcommittee. We will 

then go to the Floor. We have, I understand, one vote, and then 

will not be interrupted for some time. We have three votes now I 

am told, but I am also told that we will not have votes for a few 

hours. But you never know around here. 

With that, I will recognize the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Boswell. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be short. 

I champion what you are doing and what Mr. Oberstar is doing 

in regard to oversight. I think we have not done as well as we 

could have done. I know, as I know the two of you, we are going 

to do better. 

At the same time, I feel, because I have cracked the throttle, as 

some of the rest of you in the room, on some pretty new stuff, fixed 

wing and rotor and so on. I had a lot of confidence that the checks 

were made. For example, Mohawk, Caribou and a couple of different helicopter series. 

So anyway, I think somebody said, I don’t know who said it in 

the earlier remarks, that around the world, we do have the gold 

standard. Now, that doesn’t mean we can’t make mistakes. I think 

the fact that we take the opportunity to review and do oversight 

is good. I also want us to remember that, as I think in terms, and 

I make no bones about it, I am an advocate for general aviation, 

and I want us to be very careful, and I will try to be here to remind 

us of that, that we do appreciate that we have done pretty darned 

good. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t check. I think that is 

what I heard from you, Mr. Chairman, and no one will ever object 

to that. 

But I don’t want us to think that we haven’t had, through, many, 

many, we all know that a few years ago we just about did away 

with the prop-driven airplane because of, I don’t know, I call them 

frivolous lawsuits in some cases. I don’t want us to go back and get 

into something like that. I think it is a big industry in our economy, we are selling around the world. And people around the world 

that I still have some contact with have a great respect for the way 

we go about it. 

But if we can make it better, there is nothing wrong with that. 

And I do champion and I do appreciate the fact that we are willing 

to do oversight and ask the hard questions. But we have had a 

pretty good thing going and the record stands behind it. I just want 

us to keep that in mind. 

Thank you for giving me this opportunity. I will stop. I have 

more to say but I will stop there. Thank you. 

10 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and we will announce that the Subcommittee will stand in recess. We will return. 

We would ask everyone in the room to return by 11:00 o’clock, 25 

minutes from now. When we return, we will go directly to our first 

panel, to the Inspector General, Mr. Scovel. The Subcommittee 

stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

The Chair now recognizes our first witness, the Honorable Inspector General of the Department of Transportation, at this time 

you are recognized, General Scovel. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. SCOVEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I 

would like to take about ten minutes for my oral statement. 

Mr. COSTELLO. No problem. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri and Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding 

FAA’s certification of the Eclipse EA-500 Very Light Jet. Over the 

past several years, multiple manufacturers have designed a new 

class of aircraft called Very Light Jets, or VLJs. VLJs are small 

aircraft with advanced technologies that cost less than other business jets but operate at similar speed and altitude. In 2006, FAA 

certified the first VLJs, one of which was the Eclipse EA-500, a sixseat jet aircraft that featured advanced avionics and better fuel efficiency. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment and establish from 

the outset what this case is about and what it isn’t about. First, 

it isn’t about an unsafe aircraft that must be grounded immediately. This case isn’t about a certification process that is riddled 

with flaws and must be revamped from A to Z. My office has not 

examined the certification process at large. 

This case isn’t about the longstanding practice of FAA to recognize alternative means of compliance and equivalent levels of safety, a practice that is generally sound and makes sense. This case 

isn’t about an FAA field office run amok. While their bedside manner in dealing with the manufacturer could have been better, local 

FAA officials acquitted themselves well and honorably in making 

difficult technical and safety-related decisions. 

What this case is about is a strikingly accommodative approach 

to an effort by a new, untested manufacturer using new technology 

and a new business model to put a high-speed, high-altitude jet in 

the hands of relatively inexperienced private pilots. This case is 

also about an intensely calendar-driven, not event-driven, effort to 

certify an aircraft by a date that was selected a year before. 

It is also about a certification process that has a long history of 

success involving FAA and the industry, but in this case was removed from local officials and controlled, indeed driven by, officials 

in FAA headquarters. Finally, this case does raise questions about 

whether FAA focused exclusively on safety as its highest priority, 

as mandated by law. 

11 

We now turn to the specifics of our investigation. In March 2007, 

we received FAA inspector complaints that the Eclipse jet was 

pushed through the certification process too quickly. A significant 

issue overshadowing FAA’s certification of the EA-500 is that with 

the inherent risks associated with a new aircraft utilizing new 

technology, produced by a new manufacturer, and marketed with 

a new business model, FAA should reasonably have been expected 

to exercise heightened scrutiny in certifying this aircraft. 

In addition, because the EA-500 has advanced avionics and turbine engine technology typical of large transport aircraft but also 

is light in weight like smaller private aircraft, it did not fit easily 

into FAA’s existing certification framework. FAA chose to certify 

the EA-500 and other VLJs using certification requirements for 

general aviation aircraft, rather than the more rigorous certification requirements for larger transport aircraft. 

However, in a post-design certification lessons-learned, internal 

review of the Eclipse project, which is included in our handout, 

FAA managers acknowledged at page eight that the general aviation certification requirements were ′′inadequate to address the advanced concepts introduced on this aircraft.’’ 

In certifying the EA-500, FAA asserts that it met all pertinent 

certification regulations. However, the results of our investigation 

to date show a combination of actions and inactions on the part of 

FAA indicating that it expedited the certification processes for the 

Eclipse EA-500. First, during the design certification of the EA-500, 

Eclipse applied for and FAA approved alternative means of compliance for the aircraft’s avionics software and airspeed and altitude 

indicators. 

While FAA guidance concerning this process allows for deviation 

from normal accepted practices, we are concerned about the level 

of review that FAA conducted in certifying the software. For example, FAA did not require the software to be approved to the accepted industry standard before certification. Instead, FAA accepted an 

IOU from Eclipse that stated the aircraft would meet the accepted 

industry standard at a later date. However, when FAA issued the 

design certificate, Eclipse’s software supplier had only completed 

23 of the 65 required tests. 

The supplier subsequently completed all 65 tests by June 2007. 

However, EA-500 users continued to report problems with cockpit 

instrumentation as recently as May 2008. 

A June 2008, incident involving the EA-500 heightened attention 

regarding the aircraft’s design certification. The incident involved 

an EA-500 that was on approach to Chicago Midway Airport when 

it experienced throttle failure. After consulting the emergency procedures, the pilot shut down one of the engines. However, this action caused the second engine to roll back to idle power and be unresponsive to the throttle. The two pilots declared an emergency 

and were able to land the plane without injury to themselves or 

their two passengers. 

During its investigation into the incident, NTSB expressed concern about the reliability of an assembly that failed after accumulating only 238 hours and 192 cycles. NTSB also raised concerns 

that the problem could be due to flaws in the design logic for the 

software that controls the engines. As a result of this incident, FAA 

12 

engineers reexamined the software that controls the engines and 

discovered software logic flaws that should have been resolved before design certification. 

At the end of June 2008, the local FAA certification manager 

sent a memorandum to the manufacturer requiring Eclipse to develop an approach to bring the aircraft design into compliance for 

that system. Eclipse is currently addressing FAA’s requirement. 

Second, FAA awarded Eclipse a production certification, even 

though the Agency knew of deficiencies in the company’s supplier 

and quality control systems. To receive a production certificate, 

manufacturers are required to undergo FAA quality control reviews 

and an FAA production certification award review to determine if 

they have complied with all regulations. FAA’s quality control reviews, which began in July 2006, identified numerous deficiencies, 

with 42 serious deficiencies identified as late as February 2007. 

The production certification board completed its review on April 

2007, the same day the production certificate was granted, and 

identified two serious overarching deficiencies relating to Eclipse’s 

supplier and quality control systems. Despite the impact these 

issues could have on the production process, FAA awarded the production certification to Eclipse with 13 known production problems. 

Further, even after granting the production certificate, FAA audits of Eclipse supplier controls found significant deficiencies. In 

seven out of seven Eclipse suppliers audited, FAA investigators 

identified serious non-conformities involving issues such as nonconforming parts, uncalibrated tools, and supplier personnel using 

outdated manufacturing specifications. At the largest user of the 

EA-500, for example, mechanics found problems with Eclipse supplier-manufactured parts on 26 of the 28 EA-500 aircraft operated 

by that company. 

Finally, results of our investigation indicate that FAA’s desire to 

promote the use of VLJs may have contributed to its decision to accelerate the Eclipse certification process. A significant concern surrounding this issue, Mr. Chairman, is that FAA specifically designated the Eclipse VLJ as a priority project for certification. In its 

fiscal year 2006 performance plan, FAA’s aircraft certification service identified Eclipse as a priority, stating flatly that it would certify an Eclipse small jet by September 2006. Our handout includes 

a copy of the cover sheets of those performance plans. 

Although FAA met this deadline, this specific designation as a 

priority certification may have resulted in reduced vigilance on the 

Agency’s part during the aircraft’s design and production certification processes. We identified four other FAA actions that raise 

concern regarding the Agency’s safety oversight focus in this matter. First, FAA granted Eclipse authority to certify its own aircraft 

for airworthiness far earlier than other new VLS manufacturers, 

specifically, 4 years before Eclipse obtained a design certificate for 

its aircraft. However, it is not clear why FAA determined that 

Eclipse met the qualifications to perform its own inspections, since 

Eclipse was a new manufacturer with no history of manufacturing 

an aircraft or shepherding a design through the design certification 

process. 

In one instance, Eclipse presented an aircraft to FAA for airworthiness certification with approximately 20 airworthiness defiVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:27 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45108.TXT JASON
13 

ciencies, even though an FAA-approved company inspector had previously inspected the aircraft for airworthiness and found no nonconformities. Second, in response to a customer service complaint 

launched by Eclipse, FAA granted single-pilot operation certification for the EA-500 despite FAA Flight Standardization Board 

concerns. 

Third, FAA replaced the inspection team overseeing Eclipse and 

restricted the new team’s inspection activities. In a six-page letter 

of reprimand, FAA officials stated that the manager failed to meet 

expectations associated with meeting its customer service initiatives. Fourth, a former FAA engineer assigned to the Eclipse 

project took a position as director of certification for Eclipse immediately after leaving FAA without a cooling-off period. 

Mr. Chairman, at our recommendation, FAA established a special certification review team last month. The team completed its 

assessment last week and concluded that the design certification of 

the Eclipse was appropriate because it met FAA requirements for 

the focus areas reviewed. We received a copy of the team’s report 

on Saturday and are reviewing its findings and recommendations. 

However, based on the interim results of our own investigation, 

in which we have been assisted by independent contract aviation 

safety experts, we recommend that FAA take several immediate actions. Those include, one, verify that certification of the EA-500 for 

single-pilot use was appropriate; two, expedite its proposed rulemaking to clarify certification requirements for the expanding VLJ 

industry segment; and three, evaluate the propriety of granting 

new, inexperienced manufacturers authority to certify the airworthiness of their own aircraft prior to design certification. 

That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would now be 

happy to answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Scovel. I have a number of questions. On I think it is page 21 or 22 of your testimony, you indicate, 

actually page 20, the FAA granted Eclipse authority to certify its 

aircraft for airworthiness before proving the design far earlier than 

it has for other VLJ manufacturers. Then you state at the bottom 

of page 20, ‘‘Eclipse is the only operating VLJ manufacturer to receive its ODAR authorization before the aircraft design was approved by the FAA.’’ 

First, for the benefit of the record and those here, explain what 

the ODAR gives the authority of a manufacturer to do, and then 

I will have another question. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Yes, sir, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

ODAR stands for Organizational Designated Airworthiness Representative. It is a system employed by the FAA as part of its overall designee program, which enables it to maximize its own resources, by tapping into expertise in the industry, residing either 

at manufacturing or at maintenance organizations. A manufacturing organization must show that specific individuals in its employ have the experience and expertise to inspect aircraft owned, 

repaired, or being manufactured by the organization to FAA’s requirements. FAA will then grant that company an ODAR designation. The designated employees remain on the company’s payroll, 

14 

but are in a special status, almost as a deputy for FAA’s purposes 

in this regard. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And the ODAR was issued on, according to the 

chart on page 21, on September 3rd, 2002. The design certificate 

was not issued until September 30th, 2006, is that correct? 

Mr. SCOVEL. That is correct, sir. For the record, I want to make 

clear that our statement at the bottom of page 20, where we say 

Eclipse is the only operating manufacturer to receive its ODAR authorization before the aircraft design was approved, we are referring specifically to the VLJ manufacturers in table 3 at the top of 

page 21. 

Mr. COSTELLO. As a new manufacturer, do you think that Eclipse 

could have possibly demonstrated this level of expertise to receive 

that designation four years prior to the design certification? 

Mr. SCOVEL. In the experience of my staff and the aviation safety 

experts we are relying on, sir, it would be very difficult. Eclipse 

was founded in 1998. This particular aircraft that they were advancing at the time was their first production effort. For a brand 

new company like that to stand up, to find the expertise, to hire 

those employees, and then to successfully present that case to FAA 

would have been difficult, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So you question the certification of ODAR in this 

circumstance, is that correct? 

Mr. SCOVEL. In this circumstance, and I do want to make that 

clear. My office has been familiar for a long time with the designee 

program, the ODAR practice specifically. Our questions concern 

how it was applied in this case. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Another question concerning the IOUs. In other 

words, for the FAA to tell Eclipse that instead of meeting a particular standard for certification or satisfying a concern or a deficiency that you can just get back with us at a later date and tell 

us that this is addressed. I would like you to comment on the 

IOUs, because I know they have been used in the past. Is it commonplace in the certification program, and in this case, do you 

think it was appropriate? 

Mr. SCOVEL. IOUs are used by FAA, as you mentioned, sir. The 

requirement to meet FAA certification standards can be met flatout by an applicant. FAA also has authority under its regulations 

to grant a waiver from certain requirements, if the applicant can 

show that those requirements will not apply specifically to the aircraft held out for certification. An applicant can also request an 

equivalent level of safety finding, which is, simply put, an effort by 

an applicant to show FAA that is has another way to skin the cat. 

In other words, there may have been a generally prevalent method 

in the industry for applicants to satisfy specific technical requirements—but this particular applicant may have another way. 

In addition, a more informal practice has been the IOUs. It is not 

unusual for them to be granted. In our review here, both Boeing 

and Sino Swearingen have been afforded IOUs, but customarily, 

they are for non safety-related pieces of the airplane. This case, 

which involved the avionics software with a new model of aircraft 

that relies exclusively on the avionics for safe operation, calls into 

question the practice of an IOU. 

15 

Mr. COSTELLO. Does it disturb you, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, the fact that the manufacturer, Eclipse in this case, was 

granted the authority to deliver 11 of the EA-500s to their customers before deficiencies were addressed and IOUs were given on 

those deficiencies, is that standard practice? 

Mr. SCOVEL. It is not standard practice. That is frankly alarming 

to me, sir. Particularly since it appears that FAA attempted to 

limit the distribution of aircraft that may have been held subject 

to the IOU, that may have been a reasonable restriction at the 

time. However, it appears the company went beyond that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And they in fact did not retain control over those 

11 aircraft. They in fact delivered them to customers. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Yes, sir. My office is working to verify that information. 

Mr. COSTELLO. With deficiencies remaining? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Yes. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You heard Chairman Oberstar comment on the 

control of the aircraft as certified, almost exclusively in the control 

of the manufacturer, not the FAA. Would you say that it is highly 

unusual for the FAA to say internally, we are going to certify this 

aircraft by September 30th of 2006, or a specific date, driven by, 

internally within the FAA as opposed to the manufacturer? 

Mr. SCOVEL. It is unusual, and in this particular case, sir, it gave 

rise to our characterization of this certification process as a calendar-driven rather than an event-driven process. In our handout, 

which was made available to all the Members, there are copies of 

the pertinent pages from the business plans of the different FAA 

entities. The Members can follow the progression from an appropriately high-level statement of an initiative at the FAA Headquarters level through the aviation safety business plan, which 

states simply as a target to issue a type certificate for a new model 

aircraft by September 2006, and that characterization as a target 

may be appropriate. 

However, by the time you get to the bottom of the page, and here 

we are talking about the aircraft certification service performance 

plan, there was a specific reference, not only to issuing a type certification by September 2006, but a specific statement that Eclipse 

Aviation will obtain type certification for a small jet powered by a 

Pratt and Whitney 610 engine and using extensive new technology 

avionics. It appears to us, sir, to indicate a predetermined outcome. 

This performance plan would have been drafted a year in advance, 

because it would have been published at the beginning of the fiscal 

year. It looks like a self-fulfilling prophecy, sir. 

When our dedicated FAA employees read that, they know what 

their marching orders are, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So it was clear to you that they knew the certification date and they had to meet it? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Yes. It is a statement of the priority on which management attached this particular project. It appears to be, as I 

mentioned, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Certainly, while dedicated, 

ethical employees would have raised objections, I am sure, it becomes a goal and something that people are going to work very, 

very hard for. That was clearly the case here. 

16 

Mr. COSTELLO. Two final questions and then we will have an opportunity to come back. You mentioned that you have had a chance 

to review the FAA’s special certification review team’s report. You 

mentioned some of your views of that report. Can you elaborate for 

us? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Yes, sir. I mentioned that we had received the SCR 

report, the special certification report, over the weekend. We are 

currently reviewing it. We will be following up this testimony with 

a full audit report that we will discuss the SCR report in more detail. 

Let me pick up on what I started my oral statement with, about 

what it is and what it isn’t. Here is our initial take on the SCR 

report. It is a commendable response by the FAA to my agency’s 

strong recommendation in July that it undertake a special review 

of the Eclipse certification. 

The report is a comprehensive examination by a well-regarded 

team of aviation safety experts of several narrowly focused, highly 

technical questions that appear to be left open in the rush to issue 

a type certification, and I do emphasize type certification here, to 

Eclipse not later than September 30th, 2006. 

It appears to us, however, that this report is not, we know it is 

not, the last word. We know that this Committee will continue its 

work, as will my office. We also know that this report is not a review of the process leading up to the decision to issue the production certificate. It was limited to the type certification only, and 

that is a good thing, because the SCR’s objectivity on the production certification point could fairly be questioned. Mr. Ron Wojnar, 

who headed the final production certificate surge in March and 

April 2007 also served as a member of the SCR team. 

Our testimony also makes clear that the PC decision itself is difficult to defend or explain. For the record, sir, I would like to say 

that I had a conversation this morning with Mr. Sturgell, the Acting Administrator of FAA. He indicated to me that in the near future, the Agency intends to mount a review effort that is similar 

to this SCR but focused on the production certification side. 

One final remark, sir. The necessity for this review and its findings confirm for us that a ‘‘better late than never,’’ or a ‘‘fill in the 

blanks later’’ process was employed, first to make the decision to 

issue the type certificate and then to shore it up after FAA’s staff, 

with inside knowledge of the case, lodged complaints with my office 

and with this Committee. It is an outstanding report, but it should 

not be used as an ex post facto justification for the decision to issue 

the type certificate. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Scovel. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much. I am approaching this as a layman. I am not, like Mr. Hayes and some other colleagues, a licensed pilot. I use the services frequently, to keep this in context. 

Our Chairman took us to Everett, Washington a couple of 

months ago and we got to see the new Dreamliner, which has a lot 

of new technology. It is a whole new step in aviation, the first time 

a plane will be able to fly non-stop from London to Sydney, Australia and so on and so forth. The people who are building it said 

this is 50 year old technology, it is B1 bomber technology now getVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:27 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45108.TXT JASON
17 

ting its civilian iteration. There have been a lot of changes in military stuff in 50 years, so we will see an avalanche of new technology coming through to get the certification process going forward. 

How long did this certification take from beginning to end, do 

you know? 

Mr. SCOVEL. About 5 years, Mr. Petri. It began in 2001, as I understand it. It proceeded through, well, type certification September 2006, with ultimate production certification on April 26, 

2007. So, about 5 and a half, to 6 years. 

Mr. PETRI. If they hadn’t done things like, I guess they call these 

IOUs or other ways of trying to do concurrent review, do you have 

any idea how long it would have taken if they had done it sequentially? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Hard to say, and I don’t want to speculate. I can 

say that with the grant of type certification in September 2006 and 

the IOU specifically on the avionics software question, that avionics 

software question was not fully closed out using the accepted industry standard until June 2007. So it is safe to say that perhaps 

it would have been at least June 2007, and, if FAA had identified 

other items that required further work, it might have been longer 

than that. 

Mr. PETRI. Is any of this driven by personnel issues in the sense 

that they have a lot more new technology? We had 40 or 50 years 

because of liability issues and this sort of thing, when there was 

not that much real new innovation, new models, airplanes were not 

being domestically manufactured in the United States because of, 

I guess the liability crisis? Now we have solved that. Do you have 

any impression as to whether they could be overtaxed, or we should 

be doing more contracting out or trying to get more technical expertise into the certification process based on this particular thing? Or 

is everyone up to the job? 

I get some since that people are used to doing it the old way, a 

little slower pace, comfortable technology. Now a lot of things are 

new, and I am not going to approve it until I understand it and 

I don’t understand it and maybe some things I will never understand and yet the world goes on. We can’t really demand that the 

world revolve around Government inspectors. We have to figure out 

some way of striking a balance and allowing technology to go forward, or the world will go forward without us. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Most certainly, Mr. Petri, I couldn’t agree with you 

more. FAA has known for some time that VLJs were on the way. 

In this case, again, focusing on this case and noting clearly for the 

record, I hope, that my office has not undertaken any review of the 

certification process at large, it appears to us to have been working 

well for FAA and the industry. However, in looking at this case, 

we can say that FAA was somewhat off the mark in, well, frankly, 

it should have developed certification standards in advance of the 

advent of VLJ’s, so that it would have been prepared to inspect 

VLJs against the proper standard. 

That is one of the observations of FAA itself in the lessonslearned slide presentation, the Power Point presentation that I provided to each Member. At page 8, under observations, and this was 

a lessons learned meeting that was convened in November 2006, 

18 

FAA acknowledges that Part 23 regulations, those are the general 

aviation certification regulations, are inadequate to address the advanced concepts introduced on this aircraft. The special certification review that concluded last week also stated that Part 23 regulations were ′′not valid’’ for use in certifying VLJs. 

That is certainly one aspect of FAA operations that needs attention. Thankfully, the Agency itself recognizes that, and in our testimony we have urged the Agency to move as quickly as it can on 

this score. 

Mr. PETRI. One last quick question. When do you expect your 

final report? We have heard about deadlines and things. Have you 

set yourself a deadline for the report? Or would that be improper? 

Mr. SCOVEL. I have to be careful with deadlines, sir, especially 

in this setting. We are proceeding as fast as we can, and I regret 

that I can’t give you a date certain at this point. If I can get back 

to you, sir, as soon as we have a firmer picture, I would be happy 

to. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOVEL. You are welcome, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now 

recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee, 

Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Scovel, you have done a superb service to aviation with your 

report, your inquiry, the issues you have raised, the lessons learned 

that you have compiled and observations in the document you submitted to the Committee. When I look over the categories, if you 

will, avionics software issues, airspeed and altitude indicator problems, the pitot static systems problems, intermittent erroneous 

stall warnings, cockpit display failures, flap movement failures, 

service difficulty reports, there is a compendium of problems with 

this aircraft and with FAA’s oversight of this aircraft. Didn’t that 

trouble you as you went through, reviewed their process? 

Mr. SCOVEL. It does trouble me, sir, and I would like to put that 

in context. I am looking specifically at the decision of FAA to grant 

type certification on September 30, 2006. At that time, it was clear 

that the avionics software didn’t measure up. FAA chose to deal 

with it with an IOU. 

Regarding the pitot static system, which indicates airspeed and 

altitude and rate of climb information to the pilot, that was handled through an equivalent level of safety finding. It is noted in our 

testimony, and you may hear about it from witnesses in subsequent 

panels, that the equivalent level of safety finding was first requested of the certification office immediately responsible for the 

Eclipse project. The inspectors declined, based on their technical 

expertise, to grant the equivalent level of safety finding. It was 

then referred to another certification office. They did a review and 

determined that they could satisfy it. But, there was at least one 

office that hadn’t made this determination. 

Regarding the other problems that you mentioned, sir, those 

should have been squarely in FAA’s sights at the time. Because 

those had been highlighted during the function and reliability 

flight testing that was conducted over a span of about 2 weeks immediately before the September 30, 2006 decision. 

19 

In talking with my staff, I heard the well-known phrase, and you 

all remember it on this Committee, ‘‘what did they know and when 

did they know it?’’ Here, we are talking about FAA. What did FAA 

know and when did they know it? At September 30, 2006, they 

knew a lot. It strikes us, and it struck our contract safety experts, 

who are independent experts that a reasonable decision on September 30, 2006 might have been to defer the granting of the type 

certificate. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is what occurred to me when I read through 

the documentation. I know I discussed the matter with Chairman 

Costello, whose career before Congress included long-time service 

as a police investigator, with fine attention to detail. I have not 

known of any certification process in which FAA issued an IOU 

and then said, you are certified but you can come back and fix this 

later. They always insisted on fixing first what needs to be fixed. 

Are you aware of any other case like that? 

Mr. SCOVEL. I cannot answer that question, sir. We haven’t examined other certification processes, individual cases, or the certification process at large. So I really have no basis on which to answer, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. One of the issues is that the test pilots at FAA 

were opposed to approving the aircraft for single pilot operation. 

Yet the FAA overruled their own pilots. What was their justification for overruling the pilots? 

Mr. SCOVEL. This is an area that we intend to follow up on as 

we proceed with our advanced audit work. Because at this point, 

there certainly appears to have been a controversy. 

Let me run through the chronology. It is clear that the company 

wanted single-pilot designation, so as to market to individual buyers. This was part of the business model. 

The FAA’s Flight Standardization Board pilots had concerns 

based on their test flights and determined that the aircraft that 

they were flying would have presented an undue burden on one 

pilot. Some of those concerns were cockpit displays freezing up, discrepancies with the airspeed and altitude indicators, and a minimally effective autopilot system. It has been pointed out to us that 

the aircraft that Eclipse offered to the FAA test pilots was ‘‘a nonconforming aircraft.’’ We need to run that to ground, frankly. It is 

puzzling why the company whose business model depends greatly 

on single-pilot operations would make a non-conforming aircraft 

available to FAA for this critical test pilot run. We would like more 

detail on that. 

In any event, however, at the conclusion of its testing, on December 13, 2006, the Flight Standardization Board recommended a 

two-pilot crew. On December 15, 2006, the Chief Executive Officer 

of Eclipse initiated a customer service complaint. On December 21, 

the Director of the Flight Standards Service issued a letter back to 

Mr. Raburn, President and CEO of Eclipse, in which, and I apologize, if I may read into the record segments of the letter, and I can 

provide the complete letter for the record. 

′′Mr. Raburn, thank you for your letter dated December 15th. 

Specifically, Eclipse took exception to the FSB’s preliminary determination that the Eclipse 500 required a two-pilot crew to operate 

safely. In an effort to be responsive to your concerns, a teleconferVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:27 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45108.TXT JASON
20 

ence took place on December 18th between FAA and your staff. Addressing your main point of concern, I agree with the assertion 

made by Eclipse that the 500, as evaluated by the Aircraft Certification Service, is certificated as a single-pilot IFR airplane. Flight 

Standards,’’ and this is a separate office within FAA, ′′Flight Standards asserts that the proposed Eclipse aviation training program, 

as reviewed by the Flight Standardization Board is inadequate in 

preparing an applicant to pass a single-pilot type certification 

check. The FAA would like to work with Eclipse to determine the 

proper level of training, checking and currency requirements needed to support safe single-pilot operations in the 500. I am confident,’’ and I am jumping to a couple other sentences toward the 

bottom of the letter, ′′I am confident that both FAA and Eclipse will 

be positioned to complete the 500 certification process. I want to assure you that Flight Standards will do everything possible to work 

with Eclipse Aviation in assuring a successful conclusion to our efforts.’’ 

There is no mention of type non-conformity as one might expect 

in such a letter, if that were a fundamental source of disagreement 

between FAA and the applicant. We promise we will run that further to the ground. But it is clear, too, that what the company had 

done was come back to FAA strongly urging that this was a training program rather than a hardware program that a single pilot 

would find difficult to operate. And FAA was attempting to work 

that out. 

The ultimate result was January 27, 2007, after further work by 

the Flight Standardization Board, the two-pilot recommendation 

was set aside and the Eclipse was certified for single pilot. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. If that had been the case in the incident that you 

describe in your testimony that we discovered in our inquiry into 

this matter of the aircraft up at 41,000 feet, and trying to power 

down there and it didn’t work, at that point, isn’t a two-pilot situation safer? 

Mr. SCOVEL. It strikes me that it would be. I will defer to the 

NTSB expert who will follow on a panel after me. The NTSB, of 

course, specifically investigated the incident over Midway. It is 

clear that having two pilots in that aircraft, and that aircraft was 

at the time being operated by two pilots, was instrumental to the 

safe outcome of that event. Also, the incident occurred over an airport, and they had some lucky breaks on that one, so it worked 

well. 

The pilots on my own staff, if I may take just a moment, sir, on 

this two-pilot question, to point out—and they are recreational, 

kind of weekend warrior type pilots—if they were well-off enough 

to buy a VLJ and found themselves in an Eclipse 500, at night, at 

altitude, heavy weather, alone, and a cockpit display screen 

blanked out, they look to the other cockpit display screens, observe 

that altitude data differed between those two airscreens—and those 

are problems that had been identified with the avionics long before—they would consider themselves in a fine fix. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, safety in aviation should not depend on 

lucky breaks. And the expression, as we heard earlier, oh, FAA has 

done everything by the book, they haven’t. They clearly haven’t. 

They have made some major mistakes on this process. 

21 

One last one, for the moment, at any rate. FAA uses different 

standards for aircraft, certification for aircraft with fewer seats. 

Why should the number of seats be determinative? Why shouldn’t 

complexity of the operation of the aircraft be determinative of the 

depth and extent of the review? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Historically, the number of seats and the weight of 

the aircraft were useful measures for industry and FAA to determine which set of regulations an aircraft should be subject to. As 

a result of this case, and to its credit, FAA’s own efforts along these 

lines, they have recognized that specifically with respect to VLJs, 

those measures are no longer valid, in the words of the SCR team 

that just reported out last week. FAA is working to develop regulations that will apply specifically to this new VLJ segment of the industry. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Do you think FAA has learned the lessons of this 

experience with Eclipse? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Every lesson helps. We will see over time, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We will see over time is right. We will follow 

them over time as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

For the edification of the audience, Mr. Costello and Chairman 

Oberstar had a wonderful conversation, as we always do, on the 

Floor after our last conversation here. Mr. Chairman, I might suggest, taking up on that conversation, Mr. Boswell was involved, too, 

really important questions here. Mr. Scovel is a great inspector 

general. But his answers to certain questions need to be put side 

by side with the FAA’s answers on the same questions, and the 

aerospace industry answers to the same question. All of us have a 

perspective. 

What you just said about the weekend warrior being at 41,000 

feet in heavy weather, he is not going to be there. There is a firewall that nobody has mentioned here in this process. It is the insurance industry. Nobody is going to issue an insurance policy to 

someone that is totally unqualified. 

Now, things happen. People who are beyond their capabilities get 

in trouble. Again, for clarification, autopilots, AHARs, all this stuff, 

are nice conveniences for pilots. But it doesn’t change the basics of 

flying the airplane. So in the single-pilot thing, this airplane is so 

much simpler to fly than a typical piston twin, as a general statement, there is nothing wrong, there is everything right with this 

being a single-pilot program. 

Not a criticism of Mr. Scovel, but simply, there are a lot of perspectives that have to be applied to this as we search for the right 

answer. Again, I don’t think the FAA was wrong in all this. Type 

rating, you have to have a type rating if the airplane weighs more 

than 12,500 pounds. It weighs 6,000. So again, all these perspectives need to come into play. 

The issue, and Mr. Scovel, I have seven good questions here, and 

I would like to submit them to you for the record to get answered. 

I would also like to submit them to the other panelists so we can 

22 

again, side by side, put that information together as we evaluate. 

The first question is the important one. Is the Eclipse a safe airplane to fly, from your perspective? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Mr. Hayes, you are being gentle with me, I appreciate that. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SCOVEL. You have called me this Committee’s hired skeptic 

before. I thought you were going to change that to the Dr. 

Kevorkian of the aircraft industry, and I am glad that is not going 

to happen. 

Is the Eclipse 500 safe? My office has no evidence that it is unsafe, and I would like to put that—— 

Mr. HAYES. That is a very good way to answer the question. Because all of us have different levels to pug into this thing. I am trying to think, again, the redundancy here is remarkable. Back in the 

good old days, when Leonard and I were coming along, we didn’t 

need redundancy, because there wasn’t anything to fail. You had 

the needle ball and airspeed. That is still there, except now it is 

electronic. I got so many notes as we went along, issue of deadline. 

I think we should eliminate talking about deadlines. Everybody has 

a time line. Now, I am confident, it doesn’t always happen, everybody involved here, if we had reached the time line, whatever the 

date happened to be, 2006 in this case, if this airplane were unsafe, 

somebody at the lowest level, medium or high level, could say, stop 

the parade, this is not going on the marketplace. 

So again, I think it is important that that feature is there. Do 

we always apply it? If it weren’t for time lines, in the case of Congress, you have to say deadline, how would we ever get a bill to 

the Floor? Regardless of who is in charge, there is a certain business function to having a time line so that we can organize our priorities. 

So again, Mr. Chairman, your indulgence is much appreciated 

and your fine staff member, who I think the world of. As we look 

forward to ADS-B and next generation aircraft, as again, under the 

safety banner, we have to make sure that we as Congress and different departments have the ability to raise our sights and levels 

of expertise so that we can keep American industry ahead of foreign competitors, Japan, Brazil, Czechoslovakia and a number of 

other countries are working to beat us in this marketplace. We 

safely want to be out there ahead of them. 

But again, one last thing, the anomaly that occurred with the 

throttle, if you had sat down with the design team, that would 

never have come up. Physically, the pilot pushed, because of a goaround situation—it wasn’t 41,000 feet—the throttle, which is a 

piece of metal, into another piece of metal. If this metal had been 

harder than this metal, it wouldn’t have happened. But it went 

through the stop and it created a situation, it told the computer, 

we need to go to 80 percent, we need to go all the way. 

So you look back, and you are dealing with a situation that, I 

don’t know how you would have anticipated it, but it did happen, 

so now we deal with it in retrospect. But it was so unusual, a onepilot, two-pilot, the pilots did what they should have done. I have 

too much power, how am I going to get rid of it? Well, I have to 

shut one of them off. So again, it is not a remarkable situation, 

23 

they are trained pilots. If you are going to fly a light sport aircraft, 

and that is out there kind of competing with VLJs, you have to 

have the proper level of training. FAA is very much involved in a 

big part of that. 

Counterforces, we want to have new innovation that makes it 

safer, easier to fly, lots of gee whiz things, over here, safety of flying is still the basics. Aviate, communicate, navigate, aviate first. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentleman yield? It wasn’t a metal on 

metal problem. It was a software problem. 

Mr. HAYES. The software problem occurred after the human 

problem happened. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. No, there was a software problem and it was so 

admitted by FAA, so diagnosed by the Inspector General. That is 

the kind of thing that should have been fixed first before that aircraft went up. 

And I appreciate what the gentleman says about deadlines, but 

when the aircraft is not ready, the deadline should come last, not 

first. 

Mr. HAYES. I agree with the deadline last, not first. But reclaiming my time that I have, if a human being had not pushed a piece 

of metal through another piece of metal, the software would not 

have said what it said. He shouldn’t have been able to do that. He 

did it. Nobody would have thought, who is going to jam the throttle 

through the stop? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Okay. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Boswell. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I yield, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Hall. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this 

hearing. 

Mr. Scovel, thank you for your fine presentation, as usual. I am 

looking at one of your bullet points here about the FAA granting 

Eclipse authority to certify its own aircraft for airworthiness four 

years before obtaining a design certificate. That seems to me to be 

something that shouldn’t happen. I just don’t understand how that 

makes sense. 

During the last few years we have had more and more information come out before this Committee about the failure of FAA to 

perform adequate oversight over the companies the agency is supposed to be regulating. Too many other occasions, we have seen a 

cozy relationship between the agency and the airlines putting the 

safety of the American public at risk, and now we are seeing evidence of the same disturbing relationships developing between the 

agency and the airplane manufacturers, which is no less inappropriate. I think I can speak for this entire body and say that my belief is the FAA’s primary responsibility is and must always be to 

ensure the safety of the flying public. 

I am not a pilot. I am, however, thanks to my dad who taught 

me when I was five years old, a sailor. I have been dependent on 

different kinds of instrumentation. I like the redundancy of having 

analog gauges as well as digital displays. I am a little nervous 

about having only—and I am not up in the air, I am talking about 

24 

being on a body of water. I am a little bit nervous in only having 

the digital that can freeze up, until such time as it is proven to 

have all the bugs out of it. 

Let me ask you a couple of specific questions. We will hear testimony later on from an FAA manufacturing certification manager, 

who purchased professional liability insurance because of his concerns about his role in the certification program. Have you ever 

heard of a case of this occurring in the past? 

Mr. SCOVEL. I am not aware of one. None has come to my attention, sir. Again, we haven’t worked in that area. In my less than 

2 years as Inspector General, it hasn’t come to my attention before, 

sir. 

Mr. HALL. It appears FAA laid out approved methods for compliance, and in the case of the Eclipse, used workarounds or alternative means of compliance and found reason for equivalent levels 

of safety, et cetera. So do you think that such phrases, such means 

to get around a problem by finding a workaround, are they potentially things that can be abused? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Potentially; but I want to highly qualify that. Equivalent levels of safety have been used for a long time in the industry. I see them as a way to spark innovation. If FAA can determine 

that a new way to ‘‘skin the cat’’ will indeed get the job done, then 

why hold someone to what may have been the standard practice for 

a long time? Close scrutiny is required, however, and following just 

good common sense. But certainly it can be employed very successfully. 

Mr. HALL. Another question. Allegations have been made by current and former FAA engineers and inspectors that the former 

CEO of Eclipse had an unusual amount of influence on senior FAA 

management. Did your investigators find any evidence that this 

was the case? 

Mr. SCOVEL. We did not. I referred to the customer service initiative complaint regarding the single-pilot operation determination of 

FAA in December of 2006, January of 2007, and clearly there were 

communications at that point. There were communications from 

Eclipse to FAA headquarters immediately prior to the production 

certification decision, when FAA determined that the new team 

needed to be sent to Texas and New Mexico in order to accomplish 

production certification. 

However, we haven’t been aware of other aspects. 

Mr. HALL. That is good. And one last question, sir. We understand that DayJet, the largest commercial operation utilizing the 

EA-500, refuses to operate the aircraft so far with a single pilot. 

Is this accurate and why do you think so? 

Mr. SCOVEL. That is accurate, sir. DayJet, based in Florida, is 

the largest user of the EA-500. It does use two pilots. We understand that is part of their business model. 

It also reflects a very cautious and conservative approach on the 

part of the company to the aircraft. 

Mr. HALL. Okay, thank you so much. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

25 

I am not going to belabor, we have a lot of panelists coming up 

and we have kind of gone through everything, Mr. Scovel. But I 

would like to say though, I would appreciate it in the future when 

you present things that you present your facts and your investigation. When you use statements and throw them into the record 

from your people underneath you who are ′′weekend warriors,’’ 

finding themselves in heavy weather at 40,000 feet, and they would 

be in a real, what was your term? 

Mr. SCOVEL. In a fix, I think I said, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES. The fact of the matter is, if you are IFR trained, you 

train for just such an occurrence, with minimal instrumentation. 

And you assume that the worst is going to happen, whether it is 

looking at the copilot’s panel, looking at your own panel, doing 

whatever you have to do, stick and ball, as Mr. Hayes pointed out, 

and as I have been trained. I would appreciate that you didn’t 

bring those into this, because that is pure opinion and conjecture, 

and I don’t think it has any place in a Congressional hearing. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Iowa, Mr. Boswell. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the discussion that you had earlier, Mr. Chairman, 

with Mr. Scovel about delegation does not mean self-certification. 

I think you have to depend on delegation to get work done, or the 

Administration does, and it works well. All good things, there his 

always a possibility there is an exception. But I just want to make 

the point that delegation is important and properly supervised, it 

works well. I would assume that you would agree with that. 

Mr. SCOVEL. I would agree with that, sir. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Okay. I also would kind of share some of the 

thoughts just made by the previous speaker, that the Very Light 

Jet is designed, the training of the pilots is for single-pilot operation. I don’t want the public to get the idea this is a bad thing. 

Because they do have to go through some very stringent training, 

as you well know. 

Mr. SCOVEL. I do. 

Mr. BOSWELL. And they do practice for the worst case. At least 

that is what they did to me when I was going through, and I think 

that was a good thing. 

Mr. SCOVEL. They do, and I will note that Eclipse has its own 

training program for pilots buying its aircraft, and the company is 

working hard in that regard. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I appreciate that, and I don’t argue the point that 

two is better than one. I suppose that would be a foolish thing to 

argue that point. But an aircraft designed, as you said earlier, because the weight and all these different factors, then simplified 

procedure, then the training that goes with it, I don’t want the 

public to think that a single pilot can’t do that, because they can. 

I firmly believe that and I think you do, too. 

Mr. SCOVEL. I do. 

Mr. BOSWELL. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Mr. Scovel, I only have a couple more questions at this time. You 

indicate, page 11 of your testimony, that Eclipse aircraft users continue to report other post-design certification problems with the 

26 

EA-500, including erroneous stall warnings, flap movement failures 

and a high rate of tire failure. I wonder if you would comment on 

that. 

Mr. SCOVEL. These problems, at least the first two, were identified during the design certification phase, sir. They have been dealt 

with by the company and by FAA, largely satisfactorily, as the report of the special certification review team makes clear. However, 

in our review of the various safety reporting systems, to include the 

service difficulty reports, they have cropped up in months past. The 

tire failure question results from the intent of the company, the 

original intent at least, that the Eclipse 500 be used on grass runways, or at least non-paved runways. As it turns out, most of the 

aircraft are being used on paved runways, and because of the type 

of tire that is used—it is a softer tire—and also the angle at which 

it is placed on the landing gear, it is wearing unusually fast. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The final question, on page 17, table 2, you have 

a table that says manufacturing deficiencies found by the FAA inspectors after Eclipse inspectors certified the aircraft. And there is 

a whole list of deficiencies. Then you indicate that during the audits, the FAA inspectors identified serious non-conformities associated with aircraft parts, materials or manufacturing processes used 

for the EA-500 by Eclipse suppliers. Then you go on to list, these 

include receiving or accepting non-conforming parts or tools, parts 

not properly stored or marked, failure to follow manual procedures, 

uncalibrated tools, revision of tools and procedures without approval from Eclipse. And there are a number of other things. 

You say that additionally, at the largest user of the EA-500, FAA 

inspectors found problems with Eclipse supplier manufactured 

parts on 26 of the 28 EA-500 aircraft operated by the company. My 

question is, similar to my last question, have these issues been addressed by the FAA? 

Mr. SCOVEL. We understand FAA is in the process of addressing 

them with the company, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. There being no further questions, we would allow 

a second round if you have questions. Mr. Hayes or Mr. Boswell? 

Very good. 

Mr. Scovel, we thank you for your testimony before the Subcommittee today. I expect that some time in the not too distant future, we will be sitting down with the FAA, the company and your 

staff to discuss the matter further. Thank you. 

The Chair would ask the second panel of witnesses to come forward. 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, if I may, while they are coming forward, again, I didn’t mean to be soft on Mr. Scovel. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HAYES. I just think it is important that we acknowledge the 

professionalism of all the folks that come in today. It occurs to me, 

as I am thinking about this, and this is really important, and I am 

glad you are doing it, but you have the facts. The facts are where, 

when, who, how. But then you have the truth. The truth is, the significance and meaning of the facts. What you just said about getting folks together beyond the process which occurs here so they 

can respond directly to the significant questions I think is a wonVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:27 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45108.TXT JASON
27 

derful idea. That gets us to the truth, to the best degree we can 

find it and understand it. So thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, in my law enforcement days, I remember it is who, what, where and why. 

I thank you for your comments, Mr. Hayes. 

The Chair would ask the witnesses to come forward. I will introduce them as they are. 

The first witness is Mr. Tomaso DiPaolo, with the National Air 

Traffic Controllers Association, Aircraft Certification National Representative. Mr. David Downey is the Vice President of Flight Safety at Bell Helicopter-Textron. You all have the full titles and the 

companies that they are with. 

Mr. Dennis Wallace, who is a software engineer, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, with the FAA. Mr. Ford 

Lauer, Manager, San Antonio Manufacturing Inspection District 

Office for the FAA. Ms. Maryetta Broyles, Technical Program Management Specialist, Manufacturing Inspection Office, for the FAA. 

Gentlemen and lady, would you please stand? I would like to 

swear the witnesses on this panel in. 

Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the 

testimony you are about to give before this Subcommittee in the 

matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth 

and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. COSTELLO. Please have the record indicate that each of the 

witnesses on this panel responded in the affirmative. 

With that, the Chair will use the five-minute rule, as is customary for some of our witnesses with this panel. So I would ask 

you to try and summarize your testimony in five minutes, and that 

will give Members an opportunity to ask questions. 

Mr. DiPaolo. 

TESTIMONY OF TOMASO DIPAOLO, AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION 

NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; DAVID A. DOWNEY, VICE PRESIDENT, FLIGHT SAFETY, BELL HELICOPTER-TEXTRON; DENNIS WALLACE, SOFTWARE ENGINEER, ROTORCRAFT DIRECTORATE, AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICE, FEDERAL 

AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; FORD J. LAUER, III, MANAGER, 

SAN ANTONIO MANUFACTURING INSPECTION DISTRICT OFFICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; MARYETTA 

BROYLES, TECHNICAL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST, AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICE, SOUTHWEST 

REGION ROTORCRAFT DIRECTORATE, MANUFACTURING INSPECTION OFFICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. DIPAOLO. Good morning, Chairman and distinguished Members of the Aviation Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify before you today. 

I was asked here because in addition to nearly 20 years of service 

as an FAA aerospace certification engineer, I also serve as the aircraft certification national representative for NATCA. We represent 

aviation safety professionals, including aerospace certification engineers, flight test pilots and technical and administrative personnel, 

28 

approximately 20 of whom were involved in the type certification, 

or TC process for the Eclipse EA-500 aircraft. 

Since the summer of 2001, these employees witnessed the FAA 

acting in a way that was neglectful to their duty as industry regulators and irresponsible to the flying public. These employees were 

pressured to expedite the TC process, harassed by management 

and had their professional assessments ignored. As a result, an aircraft was allowed into the market without complying with Federal 

aircraft safety standards and regulations. NATCA filed a grievance 

over the FAA’s inappropriate behavior, which is still in arbitration. 

At the time of final certification, there were many outstanding 

problems that had been identified by the engineers and pilots. 

These problems included pitot tube drainage issues in the airspeed 

indicating system, which failed due to freezing condensation in 

service. Problems with the electronics suite caused a pilot’s screen 

to blank out and engines to operate in an uncontrollable manner. 

In some cases, FAA management allowed these concerns to fall 

through the cracks, while at other times it literally chose to ignore 

the technical reports that identified these problems in order to 

grant the TC without significant limitations. 

In the months following the TC issuance, the problems identified 

by the engineers manifested during aircraft operation, putting the 

public at risk. Why after front line engineers had been able to identify these problems did the FAA not act to ensure the concerns 

were addressed? The agency has faulty priorities that focus on the 

business goals of the private sector rather than protecting the safety of the flying public. 

During a meeting between engineers and FAA management, 

John Hickey, AIR-1, told the group, ′′We are here to save this company [Eclipse].’’ When one engineer responded that his job was to 

make sure the aircraft complied with the safety regulations, he was 

rebuked by Mr. Hickey, who then went on to intimidate and verbally attack each individual on the team. His focus was codified in 

the FAA’s 2006 business plan, which included the goal of certifying 

a Very Light Jet by the end of the fiscal year. The pay system work 

rules that were unilaterally imposed on the aircraft certification 

bargaining unit on July 10th of 2005 included a pay for performance system that rewarded managers for achieving goals outlined 

in the FAA’s business plan. In other words, managers would be 

given bonuses for certifying the Eclipse 500 before September 30th, 

2006. 

By September 29th, 2006, the Eclipse 500 jet had not yet been 

approved. With the fiscal year about to end, bargaining unit engineers were harassed and pressured to sign off on the TC. That day, 

engineers responsible for each aspect of the aircraft refused to sign, 

due to outstanding technical safety concerns. The following day, a 

Saturday, September 30th, the last day of the fiscal year, FAA 

management ordered the Eclipse project manager into work and 

convinced her to sign off on a document that approved all remaining aspects of the jet. This enabled FAA management to grant the 

TC before the end of the fiscal year, qualifying them for pay increases. 

29 

This same compensation plan created avenues for management 

to penalize employees who refused to change their technical opinions in order to meet the business time line for certification. 

Since filing the grievance, the union has been approached by employees who were prevented from receiving full raises as retribution for standing firm behind their safety findings during the 

Eclipse TC program. The FAA also relinquished its oversight responsibilities to the Eclipse program. As early as 2001, FAA committed to what they called optimal delegation, to the maximum extent practicable, meaning that whenever possible, individuals selected by the company would act as surrogates of the FAA to determine compliance to safety standards. 

NATCA would like to offer three recommendations to this Committee. First, amend Title 49 to allow the union to negotiate fair 

and professional pay procedures that encourage and reward compliance to the safety mission of the agency. Second, the FAA’s pay for 

performance system should only include goals that directly improve 

the safety of the flying public. And finally, delegation must be restricted to individuals who are reviewed and approved directly by 

the FAA. The core function of aircraft certification must remain an 

inherently governmental function, to be performed by Federal employees. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes Mr. 

Downey. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

Committee. 

My name is David Downey. I am the Vice President of Flight 

Safety for Bell Helicopter-Textron. I was the manager of the Rotorcraft Directorate in Fort Worth, Texas for seven years prior to assuming my new position at Bell Helicopter. 

The events leading to the Eclipse 500 problems are complicated. 

Eclipse was a brand new company trying to make a big splash in 

the aviation industry. The CEO, Vern Raburn, created a very public and well-documented awareness. 

This was a company that wanted to gain its type certificate, its 

production approval and start delivering aircraft all within 15 

days. No amount of FAA coaching would dissuade Eclipse executives that this feat was not practical and overly ambitious. The 

FAA was concerned with the turnover in Eclipse technical personnel. There were also technical setbacks including having to reengine the airplane. Eclipse rarely met its commitments to the 

FAA or submitted a report on time. 

On 14 September 2006, an FAA meeting was convened in an Albuquerque hotel. In attendance were FAA personnel and four FAA 

executives. Among the executives was the Service Director, Mr. 

Hickey. It was completely clear to all present that the current approach to the software certification was not going to meet the 

Eclipse calendar schedule or Mr. Hickey’s direction. In this meeting, the software engineer, Mr. Wallace, tried to convey to Mr. 

Hickey that the Eclipse approach would not meet the agency’s established and time-tested software certification procedures. Mr. 

Wallace was summarily subjected to a verbal barrage that conveyed that he was not able to think outside the box. 

30 

It was at this point I interjected myself between my employee 

and the Service Director. My taking up for him resulted in my 

dressing down and a humiliating verbal assault in front of my subordinates. In 35 years of public service as an Army officer and an 

FAA employee, I have never suffered an experience as denigrating 

or unwarranted. It was clear to those present that Mr. Hickey was 

passionately making the case for thinking outside the box. 

However, the box must still be within the bounds of proven 

methodology and appropriate risk management. What some would 

portray as passion, I would characterize it as an assault on our 

professionalism and our character. We left that meeting knowing 

that it was our responsibility, the FAA, not Eclipse, to find a compliance solution to the software issue. 

There are other issues that FAA personnel became aware of. The 

FAA became privy to a mis-sent email detailing an Eclipse strategy 

to use Mr. Hickey’s influence in the software certification issue. 

This Eclipse e-mail stated that Mr. Hickey would have to force us 

to accept this alternate approach. It would be fair to note that no 

evidence exists this email was ever sent to Washington. However, 

it did serve notice that no Eclipse tactic was out of bounds. When 

you couple all this together, the pattern of misinformation, missed 

dates and a willingness to go straight to Washington, D.C., that 

left the field FAA personnel trapped between Eclipse and Mr. Hickey and we knew it. 

Regarding the production program, Eclipse was trying to do too 

much with inadequate processes, poor controls and untrained personnel. In March, 2007, I received a phone call from Mr. Hickey. 

Vern Raburn had called to complain. An email had been sent from 

Mr. Lauer to Mr. Byars at Eclipse explaining expectations for the 

reinspection and records review of aircraft serial number 3. From 

that phone call, and I paraphrase, Vern wants to know why the 

FAA wants the blankety-blank sealant records? I told Mr. Hickey 

I would find out. It was on this telecon I was also informed that 

Mr. Ron Wojnar would assume oversight of the production and 

manufacturing issues and I was relieved. 

Back to the sealant records, after consulting with the experts, I 

learned the sealant records have to be examined to ensure the shelf 

life has not been exceeded. This was a properly conducted FAA reinspection and records review. There was an Eclipse production 

certification report generated by Mr. Wojnar to Ms. Baker. It portrays a story that is accurate in some regards but also has a slant 

and factual inaccuracies that would make the inspectors look overbearing and zealous. It also contains misleading statements regarding myself and the Rotorcraft Directorate staff. 

The issues detailed are but a few of the issues the employees 

dealt with. The bigger cultural issue was the demonstrated lack of 

confidence in field FAA employees by Mr. Hickey and others. You 

will hear a different story from your subsequent panel. In fact, I 

expect to be maligned, disparaged and at best displayed as incompetent. The record will speak for itself. 

The bigger concern is the tarnished reputation of field FAA employees involved, particularly the ones who tried to raise concerns. 

There are 250 other companies that the Directorate oversees. Nothing else comes close to this situation. 

31 

Integrity is something I learned at the feet of my father, a 28- 

year career Army officer, and he is our patriarch. There are three 

generations of military service. One of my brothers is a serving inspector general. I clearly understand the implications of these proceedings. 

My decision to leave the FAA was reached over a year ago. The 

Eclipse 500 program was the tipping point. It was clear to me that 

my value system and my leadership style were in conflict with senior leadership. It was time to close that chapter and move on. I 

have made mistakes in my career, but the handling of the Eclipse 

500 program was not one of them. 

Pending your questions, this completes my statement. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Downey. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. WALLACE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and honorable 

Members of this Committee. 

My name is Dennis Wallace. I am a software engineer employed 

by the FAA and I am currently assigned to the Rotorcraft Certification Office in Fort Worth, Texas, as the FAA’s software technical 

specialist. 

I have been employed by the FAA for the past 12 years. Prior 

to my employment with the FAA, I worked for the Department of 

Defense in various positions for 26 years. I am also a veteran of 

the United States Air Force, having served 4 years on active duty 

and 21 years on active reserve. 

I am here before you today to give an account of my recollection 

of the events in the final days leading up to the issuance of an FAA 

type certificate for the Eclipse 500 Very Light Jet airplane. My specific role in this project was to provide typical FAA certification 

oversight of Eclipse and its supplier’s development of airborne software for this aircraft to ensure that it satisfied the safety requirements defined in the applicable Federal aviation regulations. According to what the company submitted and FAA agreed to, Eclipse 

and its suppliers were to develop their software in accordance with 

the guidelines of RTCA DO-178B as a means to secure FAA approval for the digital computer software as a showing of compliance 

to 14 CFR 23.1301 and 14 CFR 23.1309. As there are no specific 

regulations that discuss how to certify software, these are the governing safety regulations and DO-178B is the standard, FAA-recommended approach for the certification aspects of airborne software. 

DO-178B was published in 1992 and has become the universally 

accepted governing procedure for such software certification efforts. 

DO-178B uses layers of checks and balances in an attempt to prevent errors from manifesting in the code. These include a defined 

and structured development process, independent peer reviews, 

quality assurance, configuration management and the rigor of testing that must be accomplished. 

On the morning of September 12th, 2006, while conducting a 

software review at one of Eclipse’s suppliers, I received a telephone 

call informing me that I needed to attend a meeting at a hotel in 

Albuquerque on September 13th and that I should be prepared to 

give a status report for the software being developed by that particular supplier. When I arrived for that meeting, I was prepared 

32 

to report the facts that the supplier had not yet completed final design review, had not entered test readiness review, and that the 

company was aware that dead code still needed to be removed. 

Most importantly, I was also going to report that in my opinion, 

only approximately one-third of the required objectives of DO-178B 

had been satisfied. 

Instead of support, what I received was a rather harsh line of 

questioning from the FAA AIR-1 and AIR-100 managers that basically questioned the validity and utility of the long-accepted DO178B software certification procedure. They also hopped on the fact 

that there were no airworthiness rules specifically related to software certification. I tried to explain to them that Eclipse had 

signed up to comply with DO-178B for themselves and their suppliers. I went on to state to them that while it is true that there 

are no Part 23 rules that are unique to software approval, DO178B is a traditionally and universally accepted means to secure 

FAA approval, which is applicable to all systems and equipment 

onboard the aircraft. 

Also, DO-178B provides a level playing field for all aircraft software developers and as such, it contributed to a standardized approach to the software aspects and certification. I was told by the 

AIR-1 manager in what I perceived to be a very direct, animated 

and threatening manner that my position on this constituted antiquated thinking and that I had best start thinking outside the box. 

He further stated that we were here to save a company and then 

looking directly at the then-Rotorcraft Directorate manager, said he 

′′should have to come to Albuquerque to do his job.’’ That was when 

I realized the supplier was not the problem, I was. 

On the following morning, I attended a meeting at Eclipse, along 

with other FAA personnel. In that meeting, the company proposed 

a mitigation strategy that the company wanted the FAA to accept 

as an alternative to the supplier having to satisfy software objectives of DO-178B. It is my continued opinion to this day that FAA 

management was strongly encouraging the FAA team to accept its 

proposed company mitigation strategy. 

The next week, I telephoned the supplier’s designated engineering representative and asked him to submit an FAA form 8110-3 

stating that the software satisfies DO-178B and complies with 

23.1301 and 23.1309. I received the requested 8110-3 stating that 

it was to the extent demonstrated by partial compliance with DO178B. This became part of the mitigation package which I was 

asked to sign off on. I did so on September 28th by stating only 

that I concurred that the software partially complies with DO178B. The clear implication here is that neither the designated engineering representative nor I concurred that the software was 

completely compliant. 

When I arrived at work on Monday October 2nd, I was surprised 

to hear that Eclipse had received its type certificate the previous 

Saturday, September 30th. 

This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

and honorable Members of this Committee. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Wallace. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lauer. 

33 

Mr. LAUER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my personal involvement in the Eclipse project spanned the period from 

July 2006 to March 2007. In the July through December time 

frame, I made several trips to the Eclipse facility to assist the FAA 

program manager in various tasks. These tasks included inspecting 

the first production airplane. 

The FAA program manager and I witnessed functional test procedures and inspected the airplane to verify it conformed to design 

drawings. The FAA program manager and I observed numerous instances where the airplane did not conform, yet had been signed 

off by Eclipse company inspectors and FAA designees as though it 

did conform. Eclipse company inspectors and FAA designees were 

repeatedly instructed by the FAA program manager that airplanes 

and functional test procedures should not be signed off and presented for FAA inspection unless everything conformed. 

It was my perception that Eclipse employees were under constant pressure from their management to deliver airplanes. I observed that Eclipse management would not hesitate to complain to 

FAA management when they perceived FAA inspectors were interfering with Eclipse’s ability to deliver airplanes. On numerous occasions when FAA inspectors told Eclipse personnel something they 

did not want to hear, the reply was to the effect that Eclipse could 

not live with that, and the issue would be elevated. 

To support the airplane delivery schedule, Eclipse expected an 

FAA inspector presence virtually around the clock and made this 

known to FAA management. As a result, I and several of the FAA 

inspectors worked a great deal of overtime at Eclipse, including 

weekends and holidays. 

In late January, Eclipse presented the second production airplane for FAA inspection and airworthiness certification. Eclipse 

had submitted signed FAA forms containing certifying statements 

that the airplane had been inspected by Eclipse, was found to be 

airworthy, conformed to its type certificate and was in condition for 

safe operation. The FAA inspector’s inspection of the airplane indicated that Eclipse had neglected to adequately inspect the airplane 

before making application for an airworthiness certificate and thus 

possibly violated FAA regulations by making an apparent false 

statement on the FAA forms. 

I consulted with the Rotorcraft Directorate Manufacturing Inspection office manager in Fort Worth and it was determined that 

an investigation should be initiated for a possible violation of Federal regulations. An investigation case was initiated in accordance 

with FAA policy. It should be noted here that FAA policy established that every apparent or alleged violation must be investigated 

and that the enforcement investigation report is the means for documenting an investigation. 

In mid-March, the FAA aircraft certification service director assigned a senior advisor from outside the Rotorcraft Directorate to 

assume responsibility for the Eclipse project. FAA inspectors were 

notified that they would report to the assigned senior advisor for 

all Eclipse production and airworthiness activities. 

I was informed by the Rotorcraft Directorate Manufacturing Inspection office manager that the senior advisor wanted the inprogress investigation suspended immediately and the case was to 

34 

be closed with no further action. The investigation was suspended 

and the case closed as directed. 

In mid-March, the senior advisor implemented a working agreement between Eclipse and the FAA, known as a project-specific certification plan. Language within the project-specific certification 

plan established that the FAA would recognize and utilize Eclipse’s 

FAA designees to the greatest extent possible in inspecting Eclipse 

airplanes. FAA inspector utilization of FAA designees has been a 

common FAA practice, but only after companies have been able to 

demonstrate that their inspectors and FAA designees were reliable. 

In order to streamline FAA inspection of Eclipse airplanes, a 

flowchart within the project-specific certification plan established a 

set amount of time for FAA inspection of each airplane. Language 

within the project-specific certification plan also established that 

the FAA would not require removal of airplane interiors, floorboards, et cetera when FAA inspections were performed. 

In mid to late March, I made the personal decision to obtain professional liability insurance. I want to emphasize that throughout 

the time of my involvement in the Eclipse project, management 

within the Rotorcraft Directorate never once pressured me to do 

anything that was contrary to FAA regulations. I have no personal 

reservations concerning any level of Rotorcraft Directorate management and consider them all to be high caliber people. 

This concludes my statement and I await the Committee’s questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Lauer, and recognizes 

Ms. Broyles. 

Ms. BROYLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am an aviation safety inspector in the Manufacturing Inspection Office of the FAA in Fort Worth, Texas. One of my duties as 

an ASI is to evaluate new and existing manufacturing companies 

that produce commercial aircraft and new replacement parts. I 

have worked for the FAA for 20 years, and during my tenure as 

an inspector, I have performed over 485 evaluations of aircraft 

manufacturing facilities and pride myself in being very thorough. 

July 2006, I was a team member of the preliminary district office 

audit at Eclipse Aviation for the issuance of approved production 

inspection system. Fifteen non-compliances of the system were documented. In September 2006, we returned to Eclipse to review the 

corrective actions from the July audit. Corrective actions were not 

presented, so we continued with the ongoing district office audit. 

Twenty additional non-compliances were identified. From the July 

and September audits, a total of 35 non-compliances were documented. 

In December 2006, I returned to Eclipse. Our management conveyed to us that we were to work on nothing but the airworthiness 

of the first production aircraft. Eclipse presented the aircraft to the 

FAA with a signed statement of conformity and we began conducting tests. Of the 28 tests performed, 11 passed. The official 

production certification district office audit was conducted February 

2007. Forty-two non-compliances were documented. Three audits of 

Eclipse’s quality system had been conducted. Seventy-seven noncompliances were documented. Thirty-five of those did not have 

verification of corrective action. 

35 

My impression was that Eclipse was controlling FAA’s schedules 

and managing our resources. For instance, our managers denied 

the request for us to return to Fort Worth due to weather conditions, although most of the Eclipse employees were told to leave 

due to hazardous weather. In April, Eclipse was preparing an aircraft for certification and told the FAA inspectors to go back to the 

hotel, but be ready for their call, even though it may be midnight 

before the aircraft was ready. 

March 2nd, 2007, an FAA aircraft certification director appointed 

an independent team to oversee airworthiness and the production 

certificate for Eclipse. The Rotorcraft Directorate manager, FAA 

principal inspector and the MIO, manufacturing inspection office 

inspector, were removed from the program. In April 2007, I was on 

the team for the production certification board. Sitting in the back 

of the room was the independent team appointed by Mr. John 

Hickey, which consisted of five managers. During the internal FAA 

in-brief, the independent team leader talked about how the company had improved since he had been appointed and stated that we 

should do a high level, or overview of the system because the company had already been audited numerous times. It was then stated, 

in other words, we need to only go an inch deep when conducting 

the audit. 

I was shocked when I heard this statement. FAA Order 8120.2D 

provides guidance for the issuance of a production certificate and 

states that the production certificate board is responsible for making a thorough evaluation of the applicant’s quality system and 

production facilities. Conducting an overview of the system when 

corrective actions were not verified and functional tests were failing was in conflict with our guidance. 

I began my evaluation of the manufacturing system and found 

issues for the horizontal stabilizer assembly and requested the 

drawings to evaluate the condition further. One drawing led to another. My Eclipse escort said to me, ′′Maryetta, you are going more 

than an inch deep. You are going too deep.’’ I was surprised that 

my escort had heard that statement. I do not know how he received 

the same information that was briefed only to the FAA. 

In all my years as an inspector for the FAA, I have never felt 

the pressure from FAA managers that I felt when Eclipse was trying to get their production certificate. We were being monitored on 

our performance and with the removal of managers and inspectors 

from the project, I was cautious about what I said and did. I have 

successfully approved several other companies for production and 

have never experienced this level of involvement or monitoring 

from Washington headquarters. We followed our guidance and regulations and spent enormous amounts of time coaching and providing assistance to Eclipse. Issues were identified to prevent safety problems. We were directed to get the job done and money and 

resources was no object. 

I am proud to represent the FAA and be a part of a world class 

organization in advancing aircraft safety. Our actions during this 

trying time were honest. 

One of the core values of AIR is to praise each other publicly and 

recognize and regard others for excellence. I feel the inspectors 

36 

were pressured and discredited when we were trying so hard to accomplish our job. 

This concludes my statement. I await the Committee’s questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Ms. Broyles. 

Let me begin, Mr. Downey, with you. You indicated that there 

was a meeting on September 14th, which you attended, and a 

meeting called by Mr. Hickey, where Mr. Hickey made a comment 

at the meeting that ′′we’re here to save a company.’’ What did that 

mean to you? Did it mean that whatever it takes, we are here to 

save the company? 

Mr. DOWNEY. It would be my opinion, sir, that there was a balance trying to be struck here between a company that was going 

to go under because they had made financial commitments and 

meeting all the requirements as outlined in our policy and in our 

rules. We were made aware that there were financial implications 

to a TC date tied to the issuance of the engine type certificate as 

well as when the company got their type certificate. 

Mr. COSTELLO. On page 6 of your testimony, you indicate that 

the FAA agreed to numerous IOUs, which of course we are aware 

of, from EAC, and that this is not uncommon, but the FAA personnel were under a great deal of pressure. From the testimony 

that we hear from everyone, let me draw a conclusion here, and if 

I am wrong, tell me that I am wrong, if anyone disagrees, is that 

you all believe that this whole process was driven by a calendar 

and a date of September, the end of September 2006. Is that correct? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Anyone disagree with that statement? 

Mr. Downey, if you would, explain to the Members of the Subcommittee what the purpose was of the meeting that you attended 

and what happened at that meeting? 

Mr. DOWNEY. The purpose of the meeting was a gathering of all 

the FAA inspectors, engineers, pilots and test pilots to basically determine where we were, since there was a meeting the following 

day, a ′′program review’’ called by Eclipse and Mr. Hickey. So it 

would be a precursor to a meeting on the following morning where 

we would basically walk through each of the major systems on the 

aircraft and the schedule for both production and for type certification. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you find that it was unusual that as the chief 

executive of the FAA’s certification organization that it was unusual for Mr. Hickey to take such a personal involvement, personal 

interest in the EA-500 certification program? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Can you either tell us why you believe that or 

speculate as to why you found it unusual? 

Mr. DOWNEY. My speculation, sir, would be that there were several programs that were highly visible and that the VLJ market 

was a new toy, if you will, on the aviation scene. Mr. Raburn, 

through numerous articles, numerous events, including the previous roll-out at Oshkosh with their provisional type certificate, 

had created a public spectacle, and we were going to be part and 

party to that and we weren’t going to miss that date. 

37 

Mr. COSTELLO. You mentioned in your testimony or suggest that 

the company intended to go straight to Washington, D.C. when 

they didn’t like how things were going at the office. Elaborate on 

that if you will. 

Mr. DOWNEY. The previous week to that September 14th meeting, we were attending, several of the executives were attending a 

meeting in Washington, and we were called in. That is when Mr. 

Hickey said, I want a program review, I want to know what is 

going on, I want to know why we are not going to make this. And 

it was completely out of left field for me to understand why we 

were going to be, the gain had been turned up on this to this level. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You also mentioned in your testimony that there 

was an email that was apparently intended, on August 31st of 

2006, an email from an Eclipse manager to senior Eclipse management, but it was accidentally sent to an FAA employee. Describe, 

if you will, what was in that email. 

Mr. DOWNEY. The email basically said, we have to get the following, Hickey has to make sure that the following gets done. And 

among them was, they have to accept our approach to the software. 

And there were three or four other things in there, sir, and I have 

the references I can submit to the Committee if you would like. 

But what it said to us is, if we don’t figure out a way of doing 

this, there will be hell to pay. And it was mentioned on numerous 

occasions. Vern Raburn made no mistake about dropping the Administrator’s name, Governor Richardson’s name, the Senatorial 

staff. And we knew that there would be political pressure applied 

to us. That can be done in a number of ways. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You also mentioned in your testimony that 

Eclipse was not qualified to receive a production certificate, in your 

opinion. Give us an explanation, if you would. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Well, as the members of this panel elaborated, sir, 

the number of hours that our employees spent going through the 

quality system to ensure the various elements of it, the supplier 

control, receiving inspection, the actual hands-on inspection of the 

aircraft, and I was over there numerous times. I even went back 

through my travel vouchers to look at it. And in fact, I remember 

a specific incident with inspectors where they went out to look at 

the aircraft and the aircraft just flat did not pass the test procedures that were outlined. Screens went blank. Fuel lines were chafing. Wiring was chafing. And this was not stuff that was like hunt 

and peck to find it, it was blatant and people saw it. 

So based on that, sir, and the fact that we in the directorate, to 

use a Texas phrase, this wasn’t our first rodeo—we had been 

through this before. And our folks knew what they were doing. 

They were professional, they were competent. I was very, very comfortable that the leadership team in place had a very good idea of 

what they needed to do. I learned a long time as a leader, you train 

your people, you turn them loose and you let them go do their job. 

They had never failed me or my staff in that regard. 

So I have no reason to believe that the issues that were being 

brought to bear at that point in time were malicious or inaccurate. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Wallace, why do you believe that senior management perceived you to be the problem? 

38 

Mr. WALLACE. Because I wasn’t going to approve the software. 

That is why I perceived that I was the problem. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you still stand by your decision today that you 

would not have approved the software that was in the condition 

that you saw it in September of 2006 on the aircraft? 

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I have some other questions. But at this time, the 

Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee for 

questions, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. I guess I am trying to figure out how to put this in 

context and what if anything we should be doing about it going forward to help the FAA do a good job of ensuring airworthiness for 

new, innovative craft. I know, I represent the EAA in Oshkosh, so 

I am very aware of how excited the aviation community, especially 

the general aviation community, has been about the new type of 

airplanes that Eclipse represented. I suspect there is a lot of pressure, not badly motivated, but people who wanted this thing to succeed. 

And then now our issue is, people aren’t saying the plane that 

is out there now is unsafe. They think it probably is airworthy. But 

there were a lot of steps along the way where things were not correctly managed or handled. There were personality conflicts as a 

result of that, in the effort to try to get this thing certified with 

a new manufacturer. 

Were you involved, also there were two other planes, similar 

planes, I think a Swearingen and a Cessna that were of this general type that were also going through the certification process at 

about the same time? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PETRI. They were certified before this one. If you were involved in both, could you describe, is it mainly that these were experienced manufacturers and teams that had regular relationships 

with the process and that this one with the Eclipse was a new 

team and they were having problems there? Is there some difference? Why were they able to go through this process without 

these, or were they able to go through this process without these 

problems? What would explain the Eclipse’s, the bumps in the 

road, so to speak, in the Eclipse certification process? Does anyone 

have any comments on all that? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Sir, I can speak to the Sino Swearingen SJ30, because that was a program under our responsibility as well. That 

company suffered from many of the same issues along the way. 

They suffered a very unfortunate fatal accident at Christmas time 

a couple of years prior to that, and I was intimately involved in 

that. And I can’t speak to the Cessna Mustang, although Cessna 

is a longstanding manufacturer. 

I would say the differences were, we did not provide the same 

level of resources to Sino. Sino suffered, like I said, from some of 

the same ills in terms of, they had problems with the fuel system 

along the way. They had problems with the conformal wing. They 

had other issues that were similar in terms of technical challenges. 

But we just didn’t see the same level of help from Washington, if 

you will. 

39 

Mr. DIPAOLO. Congressman, I would like to build on that as well. 

In talking to the NATCA representatives that worked on those programs, the differences that I was made aware of was the fact that 

when those airplanes did get their approval, they were approved 

with limitations. And sometimes those limitations are pretty harsh 

on the aircraft, it doesn’t allow the aircraft to do a lot. Maybe you 

can only fly in day time. 

That wasn’t the case with the Eclipse program. These IOUs were 

underhanded, to state it in one manner. If a limitation is necessary, as the engineers that is what we do. Sometimes at the end 

of the program there is a rush. We understand we don’t have all 

the testing done, and we put a hard limit on that airplane. What 

that does is that is the incentive. Because that aircraft manufacturer does not want to live with that limitation. They come back 

and we agree to further testing to try to remove that limitation. 

But I have never heard of an IOU being issued. 

Mr. PETRI. I have other questions, but I will wait submit them 

in writing. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now 

recognizes Mr. Boswell from Iowa. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Anybody who wants to 

can answer, I guess I’m thinking of Mr. Downey. Strong criticism. 

Nobody can question that. I just wonder if I could ask, have you 

experienced other instances wherein this type of pressure to push 

or rush the process in your experience with FAA? 

Mr. DOWNEY. None that I can recall first-hand, sir. I have to tell 

you, we were pretty well consumed by this one. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I appreciate that. I was hoping you would say 

that. But I wanted to hear it from you because of things that you 

probably heard me say earlier, some couple of hours ago. So this 

is not what you would refer to, and I am not trying to put words 

in your mouth, this is not a normal circumstance in your experience with FAA? 

Mr. DOWNEY. No, sir. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you. No more questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen and Ms. 

Boyles. Thank you for coming today. I know it is probably not 

something that you greatly looked forward to, so we appreciate 

your willingness to step up and give your view of the situation. 

An observation, there is an ongoing rift between the FAA and 

NATCA over various and sundry issues. That is reflected in some 

of the comments, in my opinion, that you have made today, and 

they don’t fit in this hearing. That is just an observation. 

Mr. Downey, I don’t know, unfortunately you have been called on 

to do a lot of talking. I want to spread out my questions to others, 

but several things that you said, and again, this is not in any way 

questioning your experience or loyalty or anything else. But looking 

at the process, there is management and those folks that work for 

management. I have been in the management position, I have had 

to terminate people and I have had to transfer people. I can’t remember too many instances where that person thought it was a 

great idea. But there comes a time when one has to manage. 

40 

Now, as a general question, and anybody, I would welcome your 

answer, over a period of five years, 2001 through 2006, the pressures that are normal in something this complicated, something 

this important, is it possible that there was a level of, my word, 

tiredness that developed between the inspection team and the manufacturer? Did that occur? A level of frustration equally applied 

both ways? Does that affect anything here? Mr. DiPaolo? 

Mr. DIPAOLO. Mr. Hayes, the program started, as you know, in 

2001. It was a complex program, and the FAA granted an extension. Because usually these programs take about three years, according to the regulations. Eclipse was granted an extension in 

2004. So they had until 2007 to complete the program, and if necessary, they could have applied and received another extension. 

Mr. HAYES. Well, that is not my question. Had a level of 

tiredness between the inspection team and the manufacturing team 

developed? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Sir, I will comment on that. 

Mr. HAYES. All right. 

Mr. DOWNEY. I don’t believe so. 

Mr. HAYES. Well, I definitely believe so, having heard from management, both on the manufacturer’s side and the FAA’s side. Neither right nor wrong, but at certain times, you are sick and you 

are in the hospital and you are not communicating with your team 

of doctors and you change teams. That is not necessarily a negative 

reflection. It is just time for a new look. 

So again, to keep this in perspective, I think it is important that 

that be a part of this discussion. 

Now, you mentioned, Mr. Downey, and I do take issue with this, 

the VLJ was a new toy on the aviation scene. Not a new toy. It 

is a new product, it is a new concept. As a salesman, nothing happens until somebody sells something. If you are going to the bank, 

whoever, and you have a business plan for some new device, 

whether it be a lawnmower or an airplane, you are going to have 

to tell the people loaning you the money, we expect to do this. So 

a lot of the things that you are pointing to, again from my perspective, critically, are part of doing business. And it is not a toy. It 

is an important concept in aviation. 

Again, it is not your obligation to keep the U.S. competitive, but 

we are all a team here, Congress and everybody else. I am frustrated at this moment with some FAA folks for a constituent who 

just can’t find the time to do what they need to do to conduct their 

business. So a lot of what we are talking about here is part of management, it is part of every day. 

Now, given where we are, what would you like to see us do, since 

we are in this, to make sure that the process works, that the public 

is safe and the United States economy is kept moving forward and 

those jobs stay here and we use less fuel and all the above? Anybody want to touch that one? 

Mr. DIPAOLO. I will take that one. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay, and please feel free to contact me after this 

hearing. I would welcome the opportunity to talk to you individually or as a group. I am sorry we don’t have much time, but go 

ahead. 

41 

Mr. DIPAOLO. Much appreciated, sir. We do have limited resources in aircraft certification. There is a limited number of people. You may hear the FAA say there is 1,100. But the actual number of engineers that are working these projects day in and day out 

is around 300 people. So to use those resources, we do need a little 

increase in the number of engineers. That would be helpful, and we 

know Congress has allowed us to do that in the past. 

Mr. HAYES. Thanks for the comment. Mr. Costello and I were 

just talking about that, that the management of FAA says they 

have enough people. Well, obviously they don’t. So you made your 

point, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I will be back in a little bit. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Hayes, and you are correct. We 

have asked that question over and over again. 

Before you leave, let me just point out, let me join Mr. Hayes in 

thanking you all for being here. We still have other questions. But 

I do think it is worth pointing out, and you correct me if I am 

wrong, Mr. Downey, all of your performance evaluations when you 

were with the FAA were either excellent, or did you ever receive 

a performance evaluation the entire time you were with the FAA 

that was substandard or below standards or critical of your work? 

Mr. DOWNEY. During my entire 13 years, sir, all of my end of 

year performance appraisals were successful. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And the day you left the FAA, and you did not 

leave, as you clarified in your testimony, you did not leave as a result of this project, you left for a number of other reasons, you went 

immediately and were hired as Vice President of Flight Safety for 

Bell Helicopter-Textron, is that correct? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank you. When Mr. Hayes comes back, I will 

make this point in his company. He makes a point about changing 

teams. And it may not be unusual to change teams if you are not 

getting the desired results or from time to time. We had a hearing 

of the Full Committee in April of this year where we found the 

same situation, where the FAA changed teams. So it is just not 

something that has happened in this instance. It is apparently part 

of a pattern at the FAA when they are not getting their desired results from their employees, they move a team out and put a team 

in place to achieve those results. So just for the record, I wanted 

to clarify that. 

And now the Chair will recognize the distinguished Chairman of 

the Full Committee, Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment this panel 

on their courage in coming forward and the professional integrity 

they have demonstrated in raising the concerns and the alarms 

that they have sounded for us, and for supplying the information 

that is important to understanding this process, the process of certification that is so troublesome. I thank each of you for your professional integrity and concern for safety and for a proper process 

of safety. 

Mr. DiPaolo, notwithstanding what Mr. Hayes was trying to do 

to undercut your testimony, I think he is wrong. NATCA and FAA 

have had differences on a different matter, totally different subject 

matter. NATCA represents a certain class of FAA employees here, 

42 

and you are representing them in their concern for what happened 

within the agency, not what happened on another case. 

Mr. DIPAOLO. Correct. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And I don’t, I can’t let the record go unchallenged; I can’t let those statements go unchallenged. I think it is 

totally inappropriate to have made that comment. 

Mr. DIPAOLO. I appreciate that, sir. I mean, we reached the tipping point during that program. I had never seen the level of harassment from FAA management, I had never seen the level of open 

safety concerns, and that all had come together. We used the only 

means we really had, which was a grievance, to protect our bargaining unit employees. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have done oversight work for 40 years in the 

Congress, as a staff and as a Member. I know integrity when I see 

it, and honesty and courage, and you have all demonstrated that. 

Mr. Downey, you said the FAA set the September 30th, 2006 goal 

for issuance of the TC, you said that, or you suggest that was the 

same date that Eclipse was tied to for their financial, for additional 

financial backing, is that correct? Have I stated that right? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I don’t know the exact particulars, but what we 

shared with the team and what was shared with me was that there 

were financial implications and backing tied to 30 days from the 

date that the Pratt and Whitney engine type certificate was validated through the FAA for them to get their type certificate. I have 

never seen anything in writing, sir, but that is what was shared 

with the team through the company. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. When did you learn all of this? 

Mr. DOWNEY. It would have been some time around the beginning of September, because all of a sudden the dates started becoming hypercritical. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Have you had experience before in the certification process where a date was set by which you had to accomplish something, rather than meeting a goal? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I would share with you, sir, that the marketing 

portions of most companies set dates, and we tend to put those in 

what we call jello. They are not going to be hard and fast, they are 

always a target. But sometimes you miss targets. There are certainly examples in the press today of a certain manufacturer that 

is going to miss it significantly. 

So my attitude about that was, it is a date, it is a Power Point 

slide, but much beyond that, we will do it right. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You also said that your training in software approval informed you or guided you that approval of the software 

should be event-driven, not calendar-driven. What did you mean by 

that? Explain that. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Well, sir, as I stated in my written submission, in 

the military I attended the Defense Department’s program managers course. That is a course obviously designed to help you run 

major military programs, products and it was actually a lawyer 

that was teaching that portion of it. What he said is, software becomes movable to the next event once it completes all of the 

verification and validation. As Mr. Wallace said in his testimony, 

there are certain gates that you go through to make sure that the 

software meets a level of certitude. And if you see it, as I state in 

43 

my written submission, if you see a calendar schedule, run the 

other way. IN other words, there is not a firm grasp of what software implications are in terms of running a program. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. Wallace, you are a software certification specialist for the 

certification service, correct? 

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And you teach the subject at the FAA Academy? 

Mr. WALLACE. I do. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. As you reviewed the Eclipse process, they had an 

alternative means of compliance for software certification. Was that 

adequate, inadequate? What was your judgment of it? 

Mr. WALLACE. I believed it to be inadequate to be presented at 

the eleventh hour. Usually when a company wants to do an alternate means, it is presented at the beginning of the program, not 

at the very end of the program. 

So in this particular case, there probably should have been an 

issue paper issued and processed and been reviewed by several people. But again, this came about at the very eleventh hour. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And did that software alternative approach have 

a connection with the software problem that occurred in the Eclipse 

aircraft at altitude? 

Mr. WALLACE. I couldn’t say for sure. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Is enough known about that software shortcoming, failure, glitch, as it has been variously described? Is 

enough known about that at the present time to make a judgment 

about whether there was a significant failure? 

Mr. WALLACE. Well, again, I think I would have to go back to the 

point in time you are referring to, which I really don’t know. Because there are different configurations of that software. If you are 

talking about at the time of the type certificate, there were a couple of software issues that it went into type certificate with that 

I was aware of. One of course was the, in my opinion, the incomplete development of the software from one particular supplier. The 

other one had to do with the AHARS, which was causing, there 

was a bug in the pit processor that was eventually causing the 

screen to freeze. They would have to reset through the watchdog 

timer. 

So it was a combination of both the AHARS and the primary 

flight display that was causing a problem. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In fly-by-wire technology, it seems to me those 

issues should be worked out thoroughly before they are allowed to 

go forward in an aircraft and allow that aircraft to be operational. 

Mr. WALLACE. Well, Congressman, this is not a fly-by-wire aircraft, but it is a highly automated aircraft. I would agree with you, 

yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You wouldn’t call it completely fly-by-wire? 

Mr. WALLACE. It is not fly-by-wire, no, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But the software is essential to its operation? 

Mr. WALLACE. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So at least that should have been fully vetted and 

fully tested. FAA is very good at that. They are often criticized in 

the air traffic control technology side by the industry, by users, oh, 

you took too much time to test this, your insistence on testing is 

44 

slowing down the process of modernization. And yet FAA has been 

very insistent, very good on that point of not putting something, 

not putting a piece of technology into operation until they are confident it is going to work 100 percent, the way they expect it to do. 

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And in this case, that didn’t happen. 

Mr. WALLACE. In my opinion, no. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Why was that? 

Mr. WALLACE. Because the process wasn’t allowed to work. We 

have an established process called DO-178B, and in this particular 

case, it wasn’t allowed to come to fruition before I could approve 

that software. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Who didn’t allow it to come to fruition? 

Mr. WALLACE. Well, I can only speak for myself, Mr. Congressman. I signed off that mitigation strategy by saying I concur that 

the software only partially complies to DO-178B. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But then after it left your hands? 

Mr. WALLACE. When it left my hands, sir, that was very shortly, 

within a few days, they received the TC. And I moved on to other 

projects. I had other projects, and as far as I was concerned, that 

was it for me, I was done on that particular project. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, you stand by your decision then not to sign 

off on it? 

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You referred to a book promoted by FAA management as a must read. You said, the bus had left the station, not 

only was I not on the bus, I felt I was being thrown under the bus. 

What does that mean? 

Mr. WALLACE. There was a book that was promoted by FAA 

management on management techniques. At that particular meeting on the 13th of September, I realized two things, one, that the 

supplier was not the problem, I was the problem because I was not 

going to approve that software. Then I realized also that the bus 

had already left the station and not only was I not on the bus, I 

felt I was being thrown under the bus, in other words, I was being 

overridden by management for technical decisions that I thought I 

was in a better position to make an assessment of. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And you have had a lot of professional experience. Have you been overridden before in your field of expertise? 

Mr. WALLACE. No, sir, I don’t recall having been overridden before. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So Mr. Hayes’ comment that oh, sometimes decisions have to be made, management decisions have to be made, 

people have to be moved, is irrelevant to this issue. 

Mr. Lauer, you testified that in March 2007, you made the decision to purchase professional liability insurance. I have never 

heard of anyone doing that within the FAA. Why did you feel that 

was necessary? 

Mr. LAUER. Principally because the project-specific certification 

plan I referenced in my oral summary, it limited our ability to inspect those airplanes, certain portions of it were off-limits. Timewise, we had roughly 12 hours to inspect those airplanes and no 

more. 

45 

Bottom line is, if I am not free to look at every part of the aircraft I need to, then I can’t be confident that it truly conforms and 

is in a condition for safe operation. Yet I am expected to sign and 

issue an airworthiness certificate for that aircraft. Forward thinking, if something were to happen down the road, NTSB comes 

knocking on my door, I was just wasn’t comfortable. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And you felt you needed some personal, professional protection? 

Mr. LAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In the form of insurance? 

Mr. LAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You also said, when Eclipse presented to FAA the 

second aircraft for airworthiness certification, you found that inspectors had not inspected a number of critical areas and may have 

violated Federal aviation regulations, with apparently false statements on the forms. Can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. LAUER. Yes, sir. The application form for airworthiness certificate contains a certifying statement above where the applicant 

signs. In essence it says the airplane has been inspected, it conforms to its type certificate and it is in a condition for safe operation. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, and earlier you said that when FAA inspectors told Eclipse something they weren’t particularly happy about 

hearing, their answer was, they can’t live with it, the issue would 

be elevated to Washington. What did they mean about that? 

Mr. LAUER. Yes, sir. The inspectors began to hear that quite 

often from the Eclipse, I suppose it is mid-management level people 

that were actually out on the floor, overseeing, trying to get these 

aircraft processed. They wouldn’t hesitate to pull that card, if the 

inspectors were asking to see too much, requiring too much, documenting too many things wrong. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And that was probably said with an intimidating 

tone or with an implication that your judgment would be bypassed? 

Mr. LAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is not a safety-compliant attitude, in my 

judgment. 

Mr. LAUER. No, sir. Like I said in my statement, I perceived 

there was heavy, heavy management pressure from Eclipse management to those people in the company to get those airplanes out 

the door. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And apparently, a relationship at some other 

level with Washington FAA personnel? 

Mr. LAUER. I was never privy to what went on at higher levels, 

sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. By Washington, you have to be in headquarters 

FAA. 

Mr. LAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are a number of these 

matters that we could pursue. I just want one more with Mr. 

DiPaolo. You said that you spoke to one of the certification engineers on September 29th, 2006 and you were told FAA was not 

going to sign off on the type certification of the Eclipse. Yet on a 

Saturday, that sign-off occurred. How did that happen? 

46 

Mr. DIPAOLO. You are asking me to interpret what the FAA 

managers were trying to do, and the only thing I can think of again 

was the pressure that they self-perceived about trying to get this 

airplane approved by the end of the fiscal year, that somehow that 

was linked to their performance plans. There is also another document called the partnership for safety plan that also tries to handcuff the engineers and force them to meet these time limits. These 

are documents that need to be reviewed by the Committee and possibly removed from the FAA’s policy. They are not mandatory documents. They should not have a role in when we certify an airplane. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It seems to me this process was driven by something other than safety within the FAA. 

Mr. DIPAOLO. I agree with you, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We will continue to probe to get to the bottom of 

that. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

Ms. Broyles, you were present, your testimony indicates you were 

present when Mr. Wojnar told a team that in other words, ‘‘we only 

need to go an inch deep when evaluating the quality system,’’ is 

that correct? 

Ms. BROYLES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. In your years of experience, have you ever been 

told such a thing before by a senior FAA manager? 

Ms. BROYLES. Never. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You also said that you consider yourself a very 

thorough auditor, and after you were told to look no more than an 

inch deep, you went back again and found numerous discrepancies 

that had already been signed off on by Eclipse FAA-designated inspectors, is that correct? 

Ms. BROYLES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And you were told by an employee of Eclipse, who 

I believe you say was your escort, that you were ′′looking more than 

an inch deep’’? 

Ms. BROYLES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. How did you take that? How do you think the 

Eclipse employee knew what FAA employees were told in an earlier meeting? 

Ms. BROYLES. I really don’t know how they found out what was 

told to us in an FAA internal meeting. I don’t know how they got 

that information. But I was surprised when he said that to me, because I do tend to go more than an inch deep. Quite a bit more. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I have other questions that we will submit in 

writing to you, to members of the panel. I would ask if there are 

any other questions by the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, at this 

time. Mr. Petri will have questions submitted in writing. 

Mr. Boswell, do you have further questions at this time? 

Mr. BOSWELL. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you. And let me say, reiterate 

what Mr. Oberstar said, we thank you for not only your testimony 

today but for your courage in coming here to tell us things that we 

need to know about what is going on with the FAA. And I also 

want you to know this, those of you who are still employed at the 

FAA, that I want to hear from you if in fact there is any retaliation 

at all. If there is any indication from employees or management at 

47 

the FAA, any retribution from your testimony here, I personally 

want to know about it. There are protections in place where we 

should and can protect you. 

It is a valuable tool for us in conducting our oversight. I don’t 

know if you were in the room earlier when I said a situation that 

resulted in nine deaths in my Congressional district was only discovered and revealed when employees came forward. Management 

wouldn’t listen to them. But once we got the inspector general involved and others, it was determined that it was substandard care 

on their part. But it originated with current employees at that facility. But for their courage in coming forward to give us the information that we needed, we would not have been able to do some 

of the things we have just done to put other management teams 

in place and to begin to try and deal with the families and to compensate them for their loss. 

So again, we thank you for your courage. We thank you for your 

testimony, and at this time, this panel is dismissed. Thank you. 

The Chair will now introduce panel three as they are coming forward. They will take their respective places. Mr. Nicholas Sabatini, 

who has testified before this Subcommittee several times, the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at the FAA. Mr. John J. 

Hickey, the Director of Aircraft Certification Service for the FAA. 

Mr. Ronald Wojnar, Senior Advisor, Aircraft Maintenance Division, 

Aircraft Certification Services at the FAA. And Mr. Tom Haueter, 

Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety 

Board. 

Mr. Sabatini, my understanding is that you will be offering testimony. Are there others from the FAA that will offer testimony or 

will they only be there to answer questions? 

In fairness to you, we allowed the Inspector General additional 

time and waived the five minute rule for him. The last panel, we 

kept them to five minutes. But in fairness to you, I think the Inspector General took about ten minutes and we certainly will be 

considerate of your time. Please, if you feel you need more than five 

minutes, please feel free to take that time. 

TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS J. SABATINI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN J. HICKEY, DIRECTOR, AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICE, AND RONALD WOJNAR, 

SENIOR ADVISOR, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE DIVISION, AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICE; TOM HAUETER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Mr. SABATINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate that. 

May I proceed? 

Thank you. Chairman Costello, Chairman Petri, Members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today on behalf of the FAA to discuss the certification of the 

Eclipse EA-500. With me today is John Hickey, Director of Aircraft 

Certification Service, and Ron Wojnar, a Senior Advisor in the 

Flight Standards Service. We have one submitted written statement and I will be summarizing our remarks for all three of us this 

morning. 

48 

With any major projects like Eclipse, there are really two stories. 

One is the technical story and the other is the human story. My 

written statement goes into great detail on the technical story, so 

I will not take this time to restate those issues. Rather, I would 

like to focus my remarks on the human story, because peoples’ perceptions are important, and they certainly played a role in what 

you have heard today. 

To state the obvious, the certification of an aircraft is an extremely complex process. No aircraft obtains certification without a 

great deal of trial and error, and the Eclipse aircraft was certainly 

no different in that respect. We encountered many, many problems 

throughout the process. But we worked them through to achieve 

resolution. Was it a perfect, painless process? Absolutely not. There 

is no such thing. 

But the bottom line is, I believe that the aircraft was properly 

certified. I believe that the aircraft meets FAA safety standards 

and I have the results from a special certification review team to 

back me up on that. What I want to address head-on are the allegations that we have heard here today that management at the 

FAA unduly pressured our regional certification teams. Was there 

undue or improper pressure? I would have to say no. Was there 

any kind of pressure at all? I would have to say yes. In every job, 

in every project, with every deadline, there is pressure. There is 

pressure to do the job safely, to do it right and to do it on time. 

So what did happen? What kind of pressure was there? There 

was pressure to follow the laws and the regulations governing the 

FAA. There was pressure to meet our standards. There was pressure to follow our national guidelines and policies. There was pressure to meet an agreed-to time line. And when management at 

headquarters had reason to believe that these obligations were not 

being met, Mr. Hickey took the appropriate steps to determine the 

best way forward to meet our obligations. 

This Committee has rightfully criticized FAA management for 

not intervening when it should have. This was not such a case. 

When the officials in charge of establishing and implementing national policy for engineering overruled a local office on how the aircraft could be type certified, were some people unhappy with that 

decision? When Mr. Wojnar was sent in with a team to refocus the 

efforts for Eclipse to obtain a production certificate, were some on 

the local team troubled? Were people genuinely upset and concerned at various points during this process? 

Obviously, you have just heard from some of them. And I regret 

that they felt devalued, because I respect every employee working 

in aviation safety. I know that they are just as committed to safety 

as I am. But leadership is often about making difficult decisions 

when necessary. It is about protecting your people when you can 

and calling on them to do better when you must. Pressure to work 

harder or be more creative or more responsive is not a bad thing. 

I truly regret if that pressure was interpreted as a direction to 

do anything other than follow applicable laws, regulations and established policies. I appreciate that the witnesses we have heard 

from believe that headquarters’ involvement was inappropriate or 

resulted in a less than thorough process. But I also know there are 

49 

other individuals who would not agree with that assessment. They 

just weren’t asked to testify today. 

I am not going to defend every action and decision in the very 

long and complicated certification of the Eclipse aircraft and the 

subsequent issuance of the production certificate, because I know 

there could have been better communication and documentation 

with respect to some of the disputed issues. The SCR noted those 

deficiencies and made some recommendations. But their recommendations were not revelations to us. We know there is always 

room for improvement and we are already working on how we can 

use the lessons learned from the Eclipse certification to make the 

certification process better. 

Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of things here today. We 

have heard a lot of allegations of undue pressure, of potential safety problems, of very human failures to communicate effectively. As 

I watched the testimony of the other witnesses in the other room, 

however, I am more convinced than ever that we have a dedicated 

workforce that only wants safety to improve. In that, we are in 

complete agreement. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your time and for inviting us here to testify. Mr. Hickey, Mr. Wojnar and I are happy to answer any of your 

questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I do want you to know, Mr. Sabatini, that I did 

hear your testimony in the adjoining room. 

Mr. SABATINI. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I have a number of questions to ask, obviously, 

but let me give you an opportunity to expand on your testimony. 

You submitted your written testimony in advance, before you 

heard—— 

Mr. PETRI. Is Mr. Haueter going to give an opening statement? 

Mr. COSTELLO. No other opening statements, is that correct? 

Mr. SABATINI. No, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Haueter, do you have testimony to present? 

I am sorry. Mr. Haueter is now recognized, and we will come back 

to you in a few minutes, Nick. 

Mr. HAUETER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri and Members of the 

Committee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to present 

testimony on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board 

regarding the Eclipse 500 airplane. It is a privilege to represent an 

agency that is dedicated to safety of the traveling public. 

Although the Safety Board is not involved in aircraft certification 

and manufacturing processes, the Board strives to improve aviation 

safety through detailed investigations and subsequent recommendations. To date, the Board has conducted investigations of 

two accidents and three incidents involving Eclipse 500 airplanes. 

Four of these events occurred since April 2008 and are still ongoing 

investigations. 

As a result of an event on June 5th, 2008, at Chicago Midway 

Airport, the Safety Board issued two urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration regarding the Eclipse 

500. In that event, the pilot reported that when crossing the runway threshold for landing the airplane encountered a wind shear 

50 

and developed a high sink rate. The pilot arrested the sink rate by 

moving both thrust levers to the maximum power position. After 

touchdown, the pilot found that the airplane was accelerating, although the thrust levers were at idle. Because the airplane was 

rapidly approaching the end of the runway and could not be 

slowed, the pilot decided to abort the landing. 

During the climb-out, the pilots found that the thrust lever positions had no effect on engine thrust, and noted that the airplane’s 

crew alerting system displayed that both the left and right engine 

full authority digital electronic controls, or FADECs, had failed. 

The pilots referenced the airplane’s quick reference handbook on 

emergency procedures for engine control failure, which contained 

instructions for a single engine control failure, but not for a dual 

engine control failure. 

The procedures advised that when one engine control failed, its 

respective engine should be shut down. In order to reduce the airspeed, the pilots shut down the right engine. However, shortly 

thereafter, they noted the left engine was idle and would not respond to thrust lever commands. Fortunately, the airplane had sufficient altitude to reach the runway for a successful landing. Without the resourcefulness of the pilots, the visual meteorological conditions that prevailed at the time, and the airplane’s proximity to 

the airport, the successful completion of this flight would have been 

unlikely. 

The findings of the investigation indicate that when the pilot advanced the thrust levers to the maximum power stops, it is likely 

that the thrust levers exceeded the normal maximum position 

which resulted in a dual channel failure in both thrust lever systems. Then because of program illogic in the FADEC software, the 

engines maintained the thrust level of the last valid thrust lever 

position. In this case, that position was or nearly at maximum 

power. 

When the flight crew shut down the right engine, the fault code 

for the engine cleared. However, because FADECs software was 

programmed so that the left engine would mirror the thrust lever 

position of the no-fault right engine, which was positioned at idle 

after shut-down, power in the left engine was reduced to idle. Thus, 

the pilots were flying with one engine that was shut down and another engine that would not advance past idle. 

On June 12th, one week after the incident, the Safety Board 

issued two urgent safety recommendations to the FAA. The first 

safety recommendation asked the FAA to require an immediate inspection of all Eclipse 500 airplane throttle quadrants to ensure 

that pushing the throttle levers against the maximum power stops 

would not result in an engine control failure and to require that 

any engines that failed the inspection be replaced. 

On the same day, the FAA issued an airworthiness directive to 

require Eclipse pilots to evaluate the throttle quadrants to see if 

a throttle fault could occur. The Eclipse has since developed an 

FAA-approved test procedure and issued an alert service bulletin 

that provided standardized procedures for testing the thrust levers. 

On August 2008, the FAA superseded its original airworthiness directive to mandate the Eclipse alert service bulletin which was to 

51 

be accomplished by a person who was authorized to perform maintenance. 

The Safety Board’s second urgent safety recommendation asked 

the FAA to require Eclipse to immediately develop an emergency 

procedure for dual engine control failure and to incorporate the 

procedure into the airplane flight manual and quick reference 

handbook. Eclipse developed the emergency procedures for dual engine control failure and the FAA issued an airworthiness directive 

to incorporate these procedures into the flight manual and a quick 

reference handbook. 

Additionally, Eclipse reprogrammed the FADEC logic to limit the 

thrust lever out of range angle and not make it a hard fault, so 

that when the thrust levers retarded below the angled range, the 

FADECs would resume reading the thrust lever position. 

This concludes my prepared statement and I am happy to answer 

any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Haueter. 

Mr. Sabatini, you submitted your written testimony prior to your 

appearance here. You heard the witnesses testify on the previous 

panels, the IG and the former FAA employee and current employees. I wonder, is there anything that you want to add to the testimony that you submitted to the Committee based upon what you 

have heard? I have specific questions, but I want to give you the 

opportunity. These are some very serious allegations that have 

been made about a date and a calendar driving the project. You 

have heard the testimony. I don’t need to go over it, but I will get 

into specifics. Any statement you would like to make? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me begin by saying that the office manager who issued the type certificate stands by her decision back 

then that the aircraft met all applicable Federal aviation regulations. Secondly, we had a special certification review team that followed up, and these are people who are world renowned, respected 

in their own right, competent and qualified to make their own decisions, who have reviewed the data that was submitted for type certification, laboratory work, et cetera, and have determined independently that this aircraft is safe and has met the applicable Federal aviation regulations to be issued type certificates. 

I would also add, as I mentioned in my oral statement, there is 

much to be learned here in terms of the process. We are going to 

continue to improve that process. We take the recommendations 

that have been made by the IG and the special certification review 

team. A number of those recommendations were already underway. 

And we take it very seriously. I want to emphasize once again, 

there is no question in my mind or in the question of anyone in 

my organization or in the FAA that we work for the public. What 

we do is on behalf of the public. What we do is assure the safest 

possible system. And the safety data that we have today shows 

that we are living in unprecedented times. We are at the safest period ever with respect to both commercial aviation and general 

aviation. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We are indeed, and that is where we want to remain. That is one of the reasons why we take our oversight responsibilities very seriously with this Subcommittee. 

52 

You said there are things that we have learned here, meaning 

that the FAA has learned in the process, is that correct? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. What are some of the things that you have 

learned and that you would do differently in the future? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, as the Inspector General mentioned, while 

FAR Part 23 is the appropriate regulation to apply to airplanes of 

this nature, given the advancing technology, we recognize that we 

want to improve that regulation to put specific requirements in 

there for airplanes like the VLJ. 

I would also add that in the circumstances we have today, where 

the regulation has not yet been promulgated, there are tools that 

we can use and have used which are called special conditions. They 

call for special requirements that particular product, that particular technology must meet before we allow it to be certified. 

Again, we are looking at the structure of the Aircraft Certification Organization, determining whether or not that structure is 

proper for today’s environment and making certain that we provide 

the appropriate resources when faced with new technology such as 

the Eclipse. 

Mr. COSTELLO. As you heard the testimony and you are very 

much aware that the production certification was approved with 13 

outstanding deficiencies as was identified by the Inspector General, 

and it took a better part of the year after the approval was given 

to get these corrected. In retrospect, in the future, would you do 

that differently? 

Would you issue the production certification with these outstanding issues to be addressed with an IOU to say we are giving 

you a production certification and we will let you go forward and, 

at a later date, correct these or address these issues? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, certainly we always learn from past experiences, for one. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Have we learned from this experience? 

Mr. SABATINI. We certainly have, sir. The production certificate 

regulation is very broad in nature, and what was done was within 

the confines of what the particular rules allow. 

I would like to ask Mr. Ron Wojnar to further elaborate on those 

13 issues because it is—I wouldn’t say misrepresented—but there 

needs to be better understanding of what is being said here about 

13 outstanding. Those issues were already identified and were in 

various stages of revision, which is not uncommon. 

So I would like to ask Mr. Wojnar, with your permission, to continue and expand on that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask Mr. Wojnar the question then before 

he explains. 

Knowing what you know now, would you go forward with the 

production certification with those 13 outstanding deficiencies 

pending, knowing that it took up to a year and in some cases over 

a year to address those deficiencies? 

Mr. WOJNAR. Mr. Chairman, I think we have learned from the 

increased scrutiny that we need to reconsider how we do that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that a yes, that you have learned from that 

and that you would not allow certification with these 13 deficiencies in the future? 

53 

Mr. WOJNAR. Well, it depends. We don’t really look at them as 

deficiencies. The basic regulations were met. The production certification Board determined that the basic requirements were met. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So same case scenario happens a month from now 

or six months from now, the same 13 items are identified that need 

to be addressed, you would still go forward with the production certification? 

Mr. WOJNAR. I think we would improve our internal communications and decision-making. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it a yes or a no? 

Mr. WOJNAR. Yes. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I mean we can dance around all day, but there 

are answers that we need to have. 

Mr. WOJNAR. Yes. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Either it is a yes or a no. 

Mr. WOJNAR. Mr. Chairman, it is yes. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So you would give the production certificate in 

the future with these types of deficiencies. 

Let me ask another question. There were 11 of these planes that 

Eclipse was permitted to go forward and deliver to their customers 

with deficiencies and IOUs outstanding. 

Mr. WOJNAR. No, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. There were not, okay. 

The IG in his testimony indicates that 11 planes were delivered 

to their customers, and we have letters in exchange between the 

FAA and Eclipse on this issue, and you are saying that that is not 

true? 

Mr. WOJNAR. The 11 aircraft that were delivered prior to production certification conformed to all the FAA-approved data. The FAA 

inspectors ensured that they did. While I believe there maybe were 

some software revisions that were incorporated after the airworthiness certification, at the time of the airworthiness certification of 

all of those 11 airplanes, they definitely conformed to all the FAAapproved design data. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, I would just refer you to the IG’s testimony. 

Mr. Sabatini, you have a comment? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. What we know to be factual is that the office manager of the Fort Worth office that issued 

the type certificate issued it on the basis that that aircraft met the 

applicable regulations at that point in time. 

We also know that the special certification review team reviewed 

the data, competent in their own right to do that, well qualified to 

do that, and made the same determination. 

This IOU that exists is not cogent to the issue. It has no bearing 

on having issued the TC. That is an important distinction. It was 

an agreement that had no bearing on the issuance of the type certificate that was validated by the special certification review team. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And the issue of the avionics not being certified 

at that time on the 11 aircraft, address that if you will. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, those 11 aircraft were evaluated against the 

type certificate that was issued. That is the position of the office 

manager as well as the special certification review team. The aircraft met the requirements and the applicable regulations. 

54 

And, sir, there is an area of confusion that I would like to address if I may. The regulation that addresses the certification of an 

aircraft is FAR Part 21.305, and it provides options for certification, not alternate means or equivalent levels of safety. 

It provides options of how you may proceed with the certification 

of that product, one of which is type certification, which is very 

widely used and very common. Another alternative is a TSO. Another is under a parts manufacturing approval basis or any other 

means approved by the Administrator. 

The certification process began for the avionics under a TSO. It 

is perfectly fine and within the regulations to finalize certification 

using the type certificate option. It is already in the law and should 

not to be construed as an alternate means. It is a means that a 

manufacturer can choose to opt for. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You heard the Inspector General’s testimony, and 

again there are several other questions we are going to get to, 

about the IOUs. You are saying that is common practice, and it is 

really no big deal. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me say that for this particular project, 

the agreement that was made had no bearing on whether or not 

the type certificate was ready to be issued. The team that reviewed 

what we did determined that the aircraft was ready for type certification, that agreement notwithstanding. 

The office manager who signed that agreement will also tell you, 

which interestingly enough she has not been called to testify, will 

tell you that she made her decision on type certificate issuance on 

the basis of having met all applicable regulations. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You heard the previous testimony by the prior 

panel, and I just wonder what your comments are concerning Ms. 

Broyles where she says, Mr. Wojnar, that you told a team of people 

that were called into a meeting that, in other words, we only need 

to go an inch deep when evaluating the quality system. Is that a 

true statement by Ms. Broyles? 

Mr. WOJNAR. I don’t believe it is a true statement, Mr. Chairman. I don’t believe I have ever said that. I don’t. I know it doesn’t 

match FAA policy. It doesn’t match my own philosophy. 

I even checked in with some of the other people who were 

present in the room that day, and they assured me that I never 

said that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So where do you think she got this impression 

that she said you should only look an inch deep and later that her 

Eclipse escort said ‘‘you are looking more than an inch deep?’’ 

Mr. WOJNAR. That is a mystery to me, Mr. Chairman. 

I do remember talking about the context of the production certification Board audit. I am sure I did mention that we had to make 

a decision. The company had been audited numerous times, and 

this was an audit to make a decision and to draw a conclusion. I 

said that we were going to do a comprehensive audit and spot 

check to make decisions that week. 

So there may have been some misunderstanding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. It is a major misunderstanding, I would say, if 

she had the impression that you told her to only look an inch deep, 

and then an employee of Eclipse who escorted her said ‘‘you are 

looking more than an inch deep.’’ 

55 

That is your testimony for the record, is that right? 

Mr. WOJNAR. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and that makes me 

think maybe that came from somewhere else other than me because Eclipse was not with us at that meeting. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, she didn’t testify that they were with you 

at the meeting. That was a mystery to her. That was her testimony. 

She said that at the meeting you made the statement, you should 

only look an inch deep. Later, the Eclipse escort told her that she 

was looking ′′more than inch deep.’’ 

But that is your testimony for the record? 

Mr. WOJNAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I have other questions, but at this time the Chair 

will recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I feel a small obligation to ask Mr. Hickey. Your name has been 

mentioned a number of times, and you clearly have a lot of responsibility and are key player in this whole process. If you could just 

give us your view of the Eclipse certification, the kind of pressures 

or deadlines or how you managed this process from your point of 

view. 

Mr. HICKEY. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Petri. 

The Eclipse program was one of very high visibility. It , but not 

unlike what we see in other areas outside of Fort Worth. Boeing 

programs are always highly visible. Engine programs like the 

Genex that serve on Boeing airplanes are also high visibility. 

What was unique about this was that it was a highly visible program for an office that was unaccustomed to high visibility programs. 

The program had worked its way through the process. It was certainly a long program. As we said earlier, it lasted five years, two 

years longer than a normal program of that size. 

At the tail end of the program, when the process that had previously been set where the avionics company was seeking one approval, its TSO approval for its avionics software, it was learned 

by the company, the airplane company, Eclipse, that the avionics 

would not get a TSO approval in time. Eclipse made a decision to 

invoke a regulatory provision in Part 21 to approve the software in 

a different way. 

It is incorrect to make statements that FAA suddenly allowed 

the approval of the software that was different from the industry 

standard. That is an incorrect statement. 

The industry standard, D0-178B, is not required to be met in its 

entirety if the product is certified and approved under the type certificate. 

In mid-September, Eclipse offered a proposal of how to approve 

the software to the FAA team. The FAA team disagreed with that 

approach and, because the deadline or the milestones set for certification were September 30th, I was asked to get involved. 

At this point, I think it is very important to stress that the date 

of September 30th was not a date set by the FAA. The date of September 30th was a date set by the company. 

In almost every program I have ever been involved in, all dates 

are set by the company, not by the FAA. They propose the dates. 

56 

The FAA reviews the schedules and the things that lead up to that 

date and make determinations about whether or not they can meet 

the dates. In many, many cases, the date is never met. 

In fact, a previous goal was, in fact, September 22nd. The goal 

of September 22nd was not met. 

When I went down to Albuquerque, I brought with me the division manager with responsibility for the national policy for the applicable requirements for avionics software. During the meeting 

that we attended, it was decided that D0-178B was not required for 

certification. 

A different set of requirements was set. It was agreed to by the 

team, including one of the members of the previous panel. The 

company proceeded to go ahead and show compliance to those requirements. 

On the date of September 30th, the FAA team made two determinations. They determined the Eclipse 500 had complied with all 

the appropriate regulations and that it was in a condition for safe 

operation. In accordance with Part 21, when those two provisions 

are shown, the applicant is entitled to a type certificate. 

As a consequence, the manager of the office signed the TC and 

issued it to the company. 

Mr. PETRI. My time is expired, but I just have one follow-up after 

you have gone through this. There was an independent Special 

Certificate Review Team appointed. Was that because questions 

were raised about this internally and externally or why was it? 

You don’t have a review of every certification. So could you explain why you did that and what the conclusions, who was on that 

and what their conclusions were after reviewing? I assume they 

were professional, qualified people who had the vision of hindsight 

and of the criticism and reviewed what you did. 

Could you discuss the briefly? 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, Mr. Petri. 

First of all, we do have a provision in the certification processes 

that do allow for what we call a Special Certification Review. We 

invoke it from time to time. If I were to guess, I would say we use 

an SCR maybe every five years. We do it when the compliance of 

a certain aspect of the airplane comes into question. 

Most recently, I think an SLR looked at the MU-2. We did a Special Certification Review of that. 

We did several Special Certification Reviews of the 737 airplane 

back in the nineties when we were experiencing rudder issues associated with 2 accidents. 

So it is clearly a provision I have at my disposal, and I can invoke it when necessary. 

As a result of the allegations associated with the Eclipse, we decided it was best to call together a Special Certification Review to 

evaluate the specific areas being alleged by the witnesses that were 

alleged to be non-compliant at the time of the type certificate. 

Because of my involvement as director, I stepped out of that 

process. Mr. Sabatini, Associate Administrator, took responsibility 

for setting up the team. They created a team of some of the best 

and brightest specialists in my service. I can’t emphasize enough 

that these people are the best. They also share that they had nothing to do with the original Eclipse type certification. 

57 

They decided to head the team by someone outside the FAA, and 

they tapped a person named Jerry Mack who was a well-respected 

safety expert. He has been in the business for many, many years, 

and worked at Boeing. So, he came in with the team and conducted 

a 30-day review in the areas of the allegations. 

That team made two findings, that the airplane in the areas of 

the allegation were, in fact, compliant at the time of the issuance 

of the type certificate, and that the airplane is currently safe. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me clarify a couple of points here. Your testimony is that the manufacturer set the date of September, 2006, is 

that correct? 

Mr. HICKEY. That is correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The date was not a date that was established by 

the FAA, that is correct? 

Mr. HICKEY. That is correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Your Annual Performance Plan shows the date of 

September, 2006 in the FAA’s Annual Performance Plan, is that 

correct? 

Mr. HICKEY. That is correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. This is customary practice, the manufacturer tells 

the FAA, this is when we are going to have you certify either the 

design or the production, and you put in your plan to work off of 

what the manufacturer desires? 

Mr. HICKEY. Well, to be honest with you, Mr. Chairman, the fact 

that my performance plan called for September 30th was irrelevant 

to the fact that Eclipse had ultimately set September 30th, and I 

will explain why. 

When we set our business goals for, in this case, fiscal year 2006, 

they are set very early, well before fiscal year 2006. We knew we 

had three programs that were in the running for certification as a 

VLJ. In my business plan, I was going to select one VLJ and use 

that as my goal and my objective to satisfy my boss. That that was 

what I was going to accomplish that year. 

I typically set the end of the fiscal year to give me enough flexibility because I don’t control the certification of these programs. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I understand the point. 

Let me ask you then, so it is your testimony and Mr. Sabatini’s 

testimony and Mr. Wojnar’s testimony that the calendar did not 

drive this project at all. 

Mr. HICKEY. No, I don’t think I am saying that. 

The calendar was set by the company. The FAA agreed to that 

date. That is a normal process. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You heard the testimony of some of the current 

FAA employees who worked on the project, and their testimony is 

that corners were cut and things were overlooked in order to meet 

the deadline of certification of September, 2006. You heard that 

testimony. 

Mr. HICKEY. I did, sir, and I think I understand how you can 

draw that conclusion. But I think if you also looked at a previous 

deadline of September 22nd, corners were not cut to meet September 22nd. 

Mr. COSTELLO. How many times has the FAA issued a certification on a Saturday afternoon? 

58 

Mr. HICKEY. I don’t have that figure, but I will tell you it has 

happened before. 

Mr. COSTELLO. It has happened before? 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, it has. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I would like to have that information given to the 

Subcommittee. 

Mr. HICKEY. I will provide that for the record. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Hickey, since we are on a line of questioning 

here, let me ask you, you have heard from two different witnesses 

who sat at the same table, who testified under oath that you convened a meeting a few weeks before the TC was approved and that 

you made the statement: we are here to save a company. 

Is that an accurate statement? Did you make that statement in 

the meeting with these employees that they attended? 

Mr. HICKEY. No, Mr. Chairman, I did not make that statement. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You didn’t. So they just pulled this out of the thin 

air? 

Mr. HICKEY. I can’t tell you where they got that, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Okay. You also heard testimony from employees 

of the FAA under oath who said that they were reassigned. I would 

like you to address that, why you took the management team out, 

put a new team in and a new manager in. 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, sir. First of all, I only removed one person in 

the whole process. I removed no one during the type certification 

process. 

It was during the production certification process when I became 

aware of behavior, procedures and practices that some of my inspectors were following that felt very strongly were inappropriate 

for the conduct of FAA people that individuals were removed. 

As a result of that and as a result of the previous issues I had 

with the directorate manager during the type certification process, 

I concluded to myself that I had lost confidence in the senior executive management of that office. And when I lost confidence, I 

couldn’t accept the continuation of that program in that office until 

I had some level of confidence in the executive leadership. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Explain what led you to lose confidence in the executive leadership. 

Mr. HICKEY. During the type certification process, sir, I saw a 

number of cases, including the software case in mid-September, 

where I found the directorate manager insufficiently engaged in 

the program, so that when issues would arise like the software 

issue, I found that person very much in tune with his own office’s 

position. He but had virtually no contact with the applicant’s position to understand and evaluate what was the right resolution on 

an issue. 

I am a firm believer that when we engage in certification, it is 

very important to understand both sides of a technical issue. I 

didn’t find him adequately involved in doing that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask, this is the Inspector General’s testimony. He says: ′′FAA Headquarters officials also removed the Directorate Manager in charge of both the manufacturing inspection 

and design certification offices from the Eclipse project.’’ 

That was a decision that you made? 

Mr. HICKEY. Can I ask you to repeat that, sir? 

59 

Mr. COSTELLO. It says: ‘‘FAA Headquarters officials also removed 

the Directorate Manager in charge of both the manufacturing inspection and design certification offices from the Eclipse project.’’ 

Mr. HICKEY. That is not totally correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. It is not? 

Mr. HICKEY. It is not. 

Mr. COSTELLO. It goes on to say: ‘‘In a six-page letter of reprimand, FAA officials stated that the Directorate Manager failed to 

meet expectations associated with meeting its ‘customer service initiatives.’’’ 

Specifically, the letter stated that he needed to ‘‘build relationships with our customers to achieve operational results.’’ 

The letter further stated, ‘‘Your personal relationship with the 

Eclipse executives is deficient. As Eclipse is one of your major customers, we expect you to work to improve the relationship.’’ 

You are not aware of the reprimand or any reference to telling 

the manager to develop this relationship with management at 

Eclipse? 

Mr. HICKEY. I am well aware of the six-page document. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You did say that, ‘‘meet expectations associated 

with meeting its customer service initiatives,’’ and you also said 

that ‘‘your personal relationship with the Eclipse executives is deficient?’’ 

Mr. HICKEY. The nature of the six-page performance conversation, sir, is tied and correlates with the six qualities and skills that 

we have as an executive manager in the FAA. They are items like 

business acumen, and unfortunately today I guess customer is a 

bad name, but it was a terminology that we used at the time. 

If I might add, as an executive, it is important for an executive 

to understand technical issues which happen a lot in certification. 

There are disagreements. It is very important for an executive 

manager to understand the issues that the office has as well as the 

issues that are raised by the applicant. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I have further questions, but I have taken more 

time than I should. 

The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. [Remarks off microphone.] 

Mr. COSTELLO. Very good. The Chair would recognize the distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee, Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have been following your line of questioning 

while I was on Corps of Engineers business for the Committee in 

another room, meeting on other matters, and I think you have been 

pursuing a very appropriate and important line of inquiry. 

I want to come back to a few things and thank the witnesses for 

being here. 

The Inspector General testified—and you responded to this, but 

I want to hear it a little further—that the production certification 

was approved with 13 outstanding items identified as deficient. It 

took almost a year to get those corrected, and all that time the aircraft was being built and put into service. How can that be? 

Mr. Sabatini, how can that be? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, as we said earlier, Chairman Oberstar, those 

deficiencies were identified early on. 

60 

A type certificate is issued once there is a demonstration of meeting the regulations. This is unlike a production certificate, which, 

when issued, goes into what we call continuous oversight or certificate management. Our inspectors were engaged on an ongoing 

basis with assuring that progress was being made against those 13 

identified deficiencies. There were continuous checks on revisions 

that had to be made and other such things. 

So our folks, our inspectors, dedicated safety professionals were 

fully engaged with that manufacturer. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Before the aircraft was put into service, were 

they cleaned up? Our information says that aircraft were put into 

services with those deficiencies in place. 

Mr. SABATINI. So the production certificate, the quality control 

system, the infrastructure, the people, the 13 issues that had been 

identified are against that particular issue as opposed to the airframe itself. 

Those airplanes were being delivered in full compliance with the 

TC, and that was reaffirmed by the Special Review Team who concluded that the airplane met all applicable regulations and it was 

in condition for safe operation, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You maintain then that those 13 items identified 

as deficient were not safety of flight issues? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, those were production certificate. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The production certificate, not safety of flight 

issues. 

Mr. SABATINI. Right, and they didn’t relate specifically and directly to the airplane. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So in the production process, you are saying that 

the manufacturer was adjusting, was complying with those, correcting those deficiencies? 

Mr. SABATINI. It is my understanding that they were, and I 

would like to ask Mr. Ron Wojnar, who is an expert in that area, 

as to the progress that was being made on those 13. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. WOJNAR. If I may, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The production certification Board that convened to examine the 

company for its production certificate found that it met the two 

basic requirements in the rules: first of all, that Eclipse had established a quality system and, second, that it could maintain that 

quality control system. 

The 13 items, as Mr. Sabatini said, were identified in the course 

of final audit and earlier as items that we wanted to focus on. I 

would like to clarify that some of those 13 action items were not 

for the company or the company’s quality system. 

A couple were for FAA follow-up. For example, we would expect 

the company to schedule for FAA to review its procedures in certain areas, or check on revisions of existing procedures to improve 

them based on what FAA had seen in our previous evaluation. 

There would be an FAA follow up. 

The very last one of the thirteen items, was for the FAA to 

schedule a complete evaluation, periodic evaluation of the Eclipse 

quality system. That happens every 18 months or so. 

So those weren’t really all quality control system deficiencies. 

They were action items that we wanted to preserve and manage as 

61 

we moved from the certificate issuance into the certificate management phase. Some were long-term, acceptable long-term actions. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, the production certification is related to the 

ability to replicate the production of the article itself, the aircraft 

itself, and to assure that it can be replicated as they go through 

the production process. 

You are saying that you had no problems with their ability to 

replicate the production process, that these 13 items were not essential to that process. 

Mr. WOJNAR. That is correct. They were items we wanted to 

manage with the company, but we were assured that the airplanes 

that were being produced conformed to the approved design and 

were safe, and that is a separate process. 

The 13 actions were for the overall quality system and the FAA 

follow-up. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. How do you rate that system today? 

Mr. WOJNAR. Sir, I don’t have that information. I haven’t been 

involved with Eclipse since April 26 of 2007. So I have not been involved in the ongoing oversight. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Sabatini, how do you rate the system today, 

the production? 

Mr. SABATINI. I would have to get back to you on that, Mr. Chairman, since I don’t have that information readily at hand. We have 

the local office that is responsible for that certificate. 

I am certain, given the attention that has been given to Eclipse, 

had there been issues, if Eclipse is not making progress, I certainly 

would like to have been informed. So, at this point in time, I will 

say I would like to get back to you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, we would like to have that information. 

Now, in April at our earlier hearing, we recommended that you 

amend the so-called Customer Service Initiative to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest with your safety mandate, and it 

is apparent that the FAA has not been making adjustments to the 

Customer Service Initiative. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will tell you that I have 

personally visited every region and directorate and had audiences 

of hundreds of people, and I made it very clear that we work for 

the public, that what we do with the aviation community is on behalf of the public and that our first and most important mandate 

is safety. 

I have also put out highlights that go to every one of our employees and restated once again that our customer is the public. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Have you changed your fundamental document, 

the Customer Service Initiative, the written document itself? Have 

you changed that? 

Mr. SABATINI. That has not yet changed, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is what I am referring to. 

Mr. SABATINI. That has not yet changed, sir, and we are taking 

steps to address that. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You are going to do that? 

Mr. SABATINI. We are taking steps to address that, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Okay. In light of what we have been discussing, 

I won’t ask you for a deadline, but when do you expect to publish 

a new document? 

62 

Mr. SABATINI. Can I get back to you on that, sir? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Of course. 

Mr. SABATINI. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. With great interest. 

Now we have come back to this issue of a deadline, a date set, 

a date specific. Why was a date specific set and why didn’t the FAA 

in this case adhere to its longstanding principle that the aircraft 

is safe when you say it is safe, not when a date is met? 

Mr. SABATINI. Is that directed to me, sir? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Of course. 

Mr. SABATINI. Okay. Several things, sir. There are many lessons 

learned here. For one, I would like to restate that date did not 

mean that, come hell or high water, we would just issue a type certificate. We simply will not do that. 

The time line from the first three-year window that we had with 

Eclipse slipped to the right an additional two years. 

So let me say that we are going to review this process completely, and we are going to change the way we do business to 

make it clear so that there isn’t even the appearance that an 

agreed-to time line on how one can expect to have a product certified is not misunderstood to mean that we will issue a certificate 

by that date. 

I can assure you, sir, that we will take every step necessary to 

adjust that so that we never have that appearance happen again. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I am delighted to hear you say that. That is establishing a spirit of compliance, oversight and of safety responsibility that I expect from the FAA and I expect from you. 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir, and you have it. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But how did that date come to be? Where did it 

come from? 

Mr. SABATINI. May I just provide a context and perspective, sir? 

It may take just a little bit of time. 

One of our goals is increased safety in our FAA Flight Plan. We 

know that over the many, many years that FAA has been in business, we have continuously improved the safety record. One of the 

goals is not only to improve on the commercial fatal accident rate 

but also in the general aviation accident rate. 

In that context, we recognize that industry is capable of producing new technology such as aircraft like a VLJ, which technically has no official standing or meaning. It is a term of art. 

We know that the introduction of turbine engines to a small aircraft like that will significantly improve safety because it has tremendous power, great climb performance, is able to fly higher than 

the weather, is the introduction of advanced integrated avionics, 

provides terrain avoidance capability, weather radar, and situational awareness, all at the fingertips of a pilot who is well trained. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is great context. You are leading to your 

point to answer my question. 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes. The point is that we have a responsibility to 

allow new technology to come into the system so that we can continue to improve on the general aviation safety record. 

If you go back in time, during that period when we were developing our Flight Plan which is agency-wide with the very broad 

goals, there were 24 such airplanes in various stages of application 

63 

or ideas that were brought to our attention. The one that was most 

prominent at that time was the Eclipse because they seemed to be 

ahead of most other manufacturers. 

In the Flight Plan, what we said is that we would type certificate 

a Very Light Jet. We didn’t name it at the high level nor at the 

AVS business level. 

John chose to, being a good manager, say, well we are making 

great progress with this VLJ. It seems like a likely candidate. And, 

for that reason, he specifically identified it. 

But it was in the context of being a federal agency acting on behalf of the public, and assuring them that we could safely bring 

into being and into operation the best technology that we could provide to the industry. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So, in that context, you decided that a deadline 

had to be set by which time you would complete that certification? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, if the manufacturer could complete the certificate. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So you are saying that date really came, sui generis, from within the organization. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, it came from the manufacturer who proposed 

that they could meet that date. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The manufacturer proposed the date, not you. 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, the manufacturer proposed it. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And then you embraced that date and said, okay, 

that is the date by which we will complete our work. 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, and it is dependent on us having the resources to do it. There is much that goes into agreeing to a time 

line. 

Mr. HICKEY. Mr. Chairman, if I can add a couple items in terms 

of setting dates, all certification programs, almost without exception, are set by the applicants’ dates. History is littered with cases 

where they are never met. The dates are not met because they fail 

to provide the necessary information for the agency. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In this case, you issued a provisional type certification by that date. 

Mr. HICKEY. This was back in July that they were shooting for 

a full type certificate. They failed to provide the information necessary to get a full type certificate, so we issued a provisional type 

certificate. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It seems to me that you shouldn’t have issued a 

provisional. If the FAA stamp of approval means something, then 

it means you meet our standard. We are not giving you an IOU. 

Mr. HICKEY. No. I am sorry, sir. A provisional is a very clearly 

delineated certificate in Part 21. It is not a secondary type certificate. It is a certificate in its own right. It, historically, is often used 

for an applicant to achieve that and then enable them to go out and 

market the airplane, et cetera. 

They elected to go for a provisional when they determined they 

could not get a full type certificate, and we issued the provisional 

when they met those standards. But with every provisional, it is 

loaded. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. What did that mean operationally for the company? Let me stop at that. What did it mean for Eclipse? 

64 

Mr. HICKEY. It was an airplane that was virtually unflyable. It 

had so many limitations, it was essentially worthless. It had more 

value from a marketing standpoint than it had from an operational 

standpoint. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In 2007, we had 491 general aviation aircraft fatalities. FAA’s work has brought that number down and so has 

AOPA’s education program for pilots, and a great deal of work has 

been done to bring it from 684 fatalities on average a year down 

to 491. 

But with that in mind, you have to maintain your continued vigilance especially at the start of a process, in the certification, the 

type certification process. That is what we are looking for. 

Mr. HICKEY. Sir, I couldn’t agree with you more. I think as we 

demonstrated by issuing the certificate at that time and as the 

SCR validated, that airplane was type certificated properly and 

was in a condition for safe operation. 

I must add to what you said. You have said an absolutely correct 

statement. 

For every one of these airplanes, like an Eclipse or a new Cessna 

or any one of these new airplanes with the fancy avionics, for every 

one of those airplanes that enters the airspace system, an older, 

more antique airplane leaves the system. That has an incremental 

improvement in safety. We are very, very mindful of that when we 

do these certification programs. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But here, we have the situation where the software problems led to engine freezing at full power and just narrowly avoiding an accident by very skilled pilots. 

Mr. HICKEY. May I comment on that, sir? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. HICKEY. That was not a software failure in that particular 

case. That was the design, it turns out. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Design of what? 

Mr. HICKEY. That was an intended design that when one engine 

had some form of an anomaly, that the other engine would go to 

full thrust. That is my understanding of the Eclipse design. I believe the following panel can elaborate on it. 

What they didn’t realize, what they didn’t envision at the time 

was that the scenario that actually occurred created more of a 

problem than it solved. 

But I don’t believe that this was a software failure that we 

should have uncovered during certification. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But it was a design. 

Mr. HICKEY. It was a design intended to solve one problem. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And that it was faulty is not a problem? That is 

what you are saying. 

Mr. HICKEY. It was faulty in another scenario, that is correct, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, that is what we are getting at. 

Mr. HICKEY. Okay. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Now Mr. Hayes earlier described that the pilot 

pushed the throttle forward, and there was metal that jammed, 

and that caused the problem. What we understand is that the software itself was faulty in its design. 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, sir. 

65 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And someone is supposed to pick that up ahead 

of time. 

Mr. HICKEY. We didn’t know what we didn’t know. You are right, 

sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Okay. Mr. Haueter, have you and NTSB reviewed 

this issue? 

Mr. HAUETER. Yes, we have. We looked at the investigation. 

The throttle levers did not jam full forward. By going full forward, they exceeded the software’s logic. They went past, say, the 

100 percent point. The software was designed that if you go outside 

a range, use the last valid piece of information which was full 

throttle. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Has that situation occurred in any other flight of 

this aircraft? 

Mr. HAUETER. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That it did occur was a signal that there was a 

big problem or was that software taken out of the aircraft and corrected in all other aircraft of that type? 

Mr. HAUETER. Eclipse has since gone back and changed the software logic, yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Did they ground the aircraft until it was done? 

Mr. HAUETER. No, they didn’t ground the airplanes. 

They inspected the throttle quadrant assemblies. FAA came out 

with several ADs, and then there was a change to the software 

logic. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. There were some 200 aircraft produced at that 

point. 

Mr. HAUETER. Yes, a little over 200. Yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. A little over 200, is that correct, Mr. Hickey? 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, roughly around 200, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Did FAA intercede at that point and say, ‘‘you 

have a problem here, you have to go back and fix it’’ and tell the 

owners of the aircraft ‘‘don’t fly until you get your software replaced?’’ 

Mr. HICKEY. Well, what we did is, I believe, issue the airworthiness directive on the day the NTSB issued the recommendation. It 

called for the pilots to do a check on the throttle quadrant to make 

sure that it didn’t exceed and engage that inadvertent software 

function. 

All the while, we are in the process, or Eclipse is in the process, 

of designing a fix for the software because, sir, the software itself 

did what it was intended to. 

But as we often see in certification, some designs are intended 

to do one thing, but they inadvertently cause problems in another 

thing, and that is what was the case here. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Chairman Oberstar. 

Let me clarify a point before I recognize my friend from North 

Carolina. 

Mr. Sabatini and Mr. Hickey both, you have referred and we 

heard from the Inspector General about the Special Certification 

Review Team, and you have indicated that immediately when these 

issues came to light the Acting Administrator put this review team 

together. 

66 

It is my understanding from talking to the Inspector General and 

the Acting Administrator that assembling the review team was actually a recommendation of the Inspector General, that he recommended that to the Acting Administrator. So I wanted to make 

that point. 

Secondly, I think at some point the IG may have suggested that, 

Mr. Wojnar, you were on the review team. Is that correct? 

Mr. WOJNAR. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. He questioned that maybe that could have been 

a conflict of interest with you reviewing the certification that you 

had basically been in charge of. But those are just items for the 

record that I think we should clarify. 

And, I think a very important point to make about the review 

team, and you correct me if I am wrong, but I am told that the review team did not look at any of the issues related to the approval 

of the production certificate. Is that correct? 

Mr. SABATINI. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. In much of the IG’s testimony today and his written testimony, he testifies about manufacturing problems that continue today. So my question is have you gone back, the review 

team, and conducted a review of the production process of the EA500? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me begin by saying, Mr. Chairman, that 

we cooperated fully with the Inspector General, and until the 11th 

hour there wasn’t a single word mentioned about issues around 

production certificates. So we focused on the issuance of the type 

certificate. 

But rest assured, Mr. Chairman, we are not narrowly focused. 

We are going to review this entire process. 

We are going to apply pretty much the same standard of oversight that we do with the issuance of an Air Carrier Certificate: 

Unless you satisfy a particular phase, the first phase, you are not 

going to go beyond that first phase until you satisfy everything that 

needs to be done. 

That is under review, and I can assure you that it is going to be 

completed in a timely fashion. So the approach that we are going 

to take with type certification is going to mirror a great deal of 

what we do with the air carrier world. 

Mr. COSTELLO. After the production certification went forward 

and was approved by the FAA, your own auditors, FAA auditors 

according to the Inspector General, of this aircraft, the suppliers of 

Eclipse found significant deficiencies occurring that should have 

been corrected. 

I mean your own people. After the production certificate was 

issued, your own inspectors found that there were deficiencies, 

things that should be, in fact, addressed. That took place. They 

were found between February and August of 2008. 

So I could go into a long list of them. You know what they are: 

Receiving or accepting nonconforming parts or tools, parts not 

properly stored or marked, failure to follow manual procedures, 

uncalibrated tools, revision to tooling and so on. I could go on and 

on. 

67 

The largest user of the EA-500, FAA inspectors found problems 

with Eclipse supplier-manufactured parts on 26 of the 28 aircraft 

operated by that company, the largest user. 

So my question is what have you done? What has the FAA done 

with the findings of those inspectors concerning the manufactured 

parts on 26 of those 28 planes? 

Mr. SABATINI. May I defer that question to Mr. Wojnar, please? 

Mr. COSTELLO. Sure. 

Mr. WOJNAR. Mr. Chairman, I think that shows that the certificate management is working as it should in the FAA in the oversight of Eclipse. I, personally, don’t have the information on those 

details. As I said, I have not been involved in the oversight of 

Eclipse since production certification. 

But it is a normal thing. We do not issue a production certificate 

and walk away. Our oversight continues indefinitely. So, while we 

will have to provide the details, I think it illustrates that our system is working. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, if it is a normal thing when 26 of the 28 

aircraft with the largest user, that your own people have identified 

problems with the manufactured parts, please tell me that you are 

doing something about this as we speak. 

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have that information at my 

fingertips. We are addressing that, but I don’t have the specifics, 

and I would like to get back to you on that, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I would say that if I were in your position, that 

would be a high priority for me to address those issues without 

delay. 

Mr. SABATINI. It is, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hayes from North 

Carolina. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wojnar, I missed something here. Just comment, if you will, 

on the review panel. You were on there. Was there anything inappropriate about that? 

Mr. WOJNAR. Thank you for the opportunity, sir, to make the 

clarification. 

I was not involved in any way with the Eclipse type certification. 

I was formerly an executive in Aircraft Certification, but by the 

time of the type certification, I had left Aircraft Certification to join 

the Flight Standards Organization in the FAA, and I had been 

gone approximately a year from Aircraft Certification. 

So there, in fact, really was no conflict for me. 

Mr. COSTELLO. If the gentleman would yield, just so I have a 

clear understanding here because maybe I am confused. Were you 

involved in the production certification? 

Mr. WOJNAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. For the Eclipse EA-500? 

Mr. WOJNAR. Yes, I was involved in the production certification 

which is a totally separate FAA decision. 

Mr. HAYES. You didn’t give me a chance to say, of course, I will 

yield. 

If there were a time line or if there were no time line, the moment of certification comes, is the FAA going to certify a plane that 

is unsafe? 

68 

Mr. SABATINI. Absolutely not. 

Mr. HAYES. Anybody else have a different answer to that? 

So I don’t think the issue here is the time line. 

Next question, if you look at the process now, being where we are 

today, what are the major issues that you think this panel should 

deal with going forward? 

What are the major issues? Again, remember on the top of our 

letterhead here is safety. 

Mr. Haueter, you are the Safety Board guy. 

Mr. HAUETER. I think one of the issues we see is and our certification study found that some of the assumptions you have in certification do not pan out as time goes by. 

Mr. HAYES. Explain which assumptions. 

Mr. HAUETER. Well, I think one of the assumptions here was to 

the throttle lever, that it would not go out of 100 percent range. 

Obviously, we had a pair of pilots who found, with normal force, 

it would. 

Mr. HAYES. So that means they pushed it right on into that 

panel, and it exceeded what the software said it would do. 

Mr. HAUETER. That is correct. 

Mr. HAYES. How do you plan for that? 

Mr. HAUETER. Well, it is something you have to consider, I think, 

during certification. I am surprised that wasn’t found during the 

certification process by the test pilots. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. Any others? 

Again, we have an issue and, Mr. Oberstar, you and I have 

talked about that. That is something. How do we prepare for the 

unexpected beyond any normal parameters? 

All right, Mr. Hickey? 

Mr. HICKEY. Mr. Hayes, I would like to offer a couple things that 

I think this Committee is certainly looking for us to say. I have 

spent a lot of time since this has come up thinking about what 

would I do differently and what we should do differently because 

I completely agree with this Committee. These problems should 

never happen again, I do believe. 

Mr. HAYES. Now this event should never happen again. What is 

the event that should never happen again? Let’s make sure we are 

on the same page. 

Mr. HICKEY. The event is an airplane was certificated, type certificated and production certificated, and there is a group of people 

who are very disappointed and disagree with those decisions. 

I consider that to be a failure. I take full responsibility for that 

as Director of Aircraft Certification. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. I think that is important. I didn’t understand 

that until you clarified. 

I hope the gentleman and the lady who are here understand because that is part of our responsibility, whatever department we 

are in, to make sure. The relationship between management and 

the folks that are being managed is crucial. 

All right, go ahead. 

Mr. HICKEY. Right. So, clearly, as I have been thinking about it. 

The fact that we place very high focus and attention on completion 

of a type certification program, whether it is an Eclipse or a Boeing 

or any other program, that can lead to problems. Especially when 

69 

certification is in many ways out of the control of the FAA. I think 

that is a lesson we learned and we are no longer doing that. 

When we build our Flight Plan and our AVS Performance Plan 

and my Aircraft Certification Plan, we create objectives that we 

clearly see are well within our control. So we don’t place undue 

pressure on individuals to meet certain deadlines when it is really 

out of their control. I think that is a lesson learned that we have 

had since then. 

Mr. HAYES. Well, I am a little confused by that. You can’t set the 

timetable for the company, whoever it is, and they can’t set the 

timetable for you. Your timetable is controlled in large measure by 

us, how many resources, how many people, but again there can 

only be so many people in one place at one time. 

I am not sure how we refine that down to a take-away from this 

discussion. 

Mr. HICKEY. Let me try this. The take-away I think we have is 

how we conclude agreements between the FAA and companies on 

certification programs. We develop these project plans where we 

are committing to each other to do certain things and meet certain 

deadlines. But those deadlines are only conditional upon the other 

group meeting their deadline. 

So our performance is being measured on our ability to meet the 

deadlines we have committed to, and that deadline could very well 

be noncompliance. It doesn’t necessarily mean we will find compliance or that the certificate will be issued. I think that is a very different thing from what occurred several years ago. 

Mr. HAYES. Maybe somebody who is not building airplanes, and 

somebody who is not inspecting airplanes but who has audit experience sits down at the beginning of the process and says, folks, your 

time line is realistic or it is not realistic. 

So, again, we have to be careful so that undue burden is not put 

on either one because those tensions do exist. 

Mr. HICKEY. I agree with you, sir. 

Mr. HAYES. The last thing, and I am trying to remember what 

it was. Again, looking forward to the ongoing discussion, I think 

this is the beginning, not the end of the process. 

A single pilot, in certification, you can certify an airplane, daylight/night, VFR/IFR, known icing/no ice. So it needs to be clear to 

anybody that doesn’t fully understand that a provisional certificate 

is not an anomaly. It is not escaping. 

That is just like you can put an incapable pilot—and we had that 

example earlier—in a capable airplane, and those don’t mix. The 

fact that there is a provisional certificate, assuming the provisions 

of the provisional are met, that is not a big deal. 

As someone pointed out earlier, DayJet has decided for marketing reasons, they will furnish 2 pilots for their Part 135 operation. This is fine. But again, with complete review, this airplane 

can easily and safely be flown by one well-trained, one qualified, 

well-qualified and current pilot. So let’s keep all that going. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Oberstar, I think, has a puzzled look. 

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. Chairman, if I may correct a statement I 

made? 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentleman. 

70 

Were you wanting him to yield? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Graves, has he been recognized? 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Graves is going to be recognized next. 

Mr. Sabatini, you wanted to clarify a point. 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, thank you. 

Early on in the conversations working with the Inspector General, in a Power Point presentation, I have learned that production 

certification issues were mentioned, but only recently did we have 

an opportunity begin to address those issues with them. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Missouri, Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Unfortunately, I have to go handle five bills on the floor here in 

a minute for the Committee, at least from our side. I haven’t been 

up here for which I apologize, but if I could yield to Mr. Hayes I 

would love to continue to hear this and sit here and listen. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. I think I pretty well completed unless there is an 

issue that any of you or all of you collectively would like to bring 

to our attention and make sure we are not missing an important 

take-away here. 

Okay, the customer service thing, I think we never put the finishing touches on the relationship there. Would any of you like to 

again clarify for all of us exactly what the approach is? 

I haven’t really seen it as customer service since day one, but 

what do you think it is now going forward? 

Mr. HICKEY. Mr. Hayes, I would like to address that from a type 

certification standpoint. 

Long before the CSI was implemented, I believe in 2002 or 2003, 

the type certification process has had what we call an appeal process. 

Engineering is very much not black and white but very gray. On 

dealing with compliance of any regulation, there are often very 

complicated and very technical debates over whether an airplane 

company is complying with a regulation. 

For the most part, it works fabulously. We write issue papers. 

We document the position that the FAA feels is appropriate for 

compliance to this regulation. The applicant writes the position 

that they would propose to do. 

For the most part, we come together. We have an agreement on 

how compliance can be shown. 

On occasion, there are issues where there are differences of opinion. The company feels that they would like to show compliance in 

this way. The FAA has a different nuance. The parties are a little 

bit concerned about this or a little bit concerned about that, and 

so they stress that. 

Keep in mind the regulation, quite frankly, is very performancebased. It gives flexibility to meet the requirement. 

For many years, what we have is, when the debate has ended, 

we have a process that has been well documented and it is reflected in the agreements we make. Disagreements get elevated to 

the next level. 

This is not a case of a customer getting some favorable treatment. This is a case of a different set of eyes, a more senior set 

71 

of eyes reviewing both sides, looking at the issue to see if we can 

come to resolution. 

If that fails, the resolution goes to another higher level, and it 

goes to a senior level until we reach resolution. That is a very common thing, and it happens, and it should have happened in this 

process with respect to the software certification. 

Unfortunately and regrettably, I must say it did not. There was 

not an issue paper written. I think there were decisions made without documentation, and it is not surprising that there are a number of the people who testified who felt that their position was inadequately conveyed and considered. 

I seriously regret that, and I take full responsibility for that. 

So one of the take-aways I have from this process is that I am 

going to strictly enforce this process of getting issue papers such 

that, again in the event of this type of issue, the people like Mr. 

Wallace, who had a very strong opinion, can have a vehicle for presenting that opinion where we have a very documented way of 

dispositioning it. 

Mr. HAYES. If he loses, how are you going to deal with it? And 

if you lose, how are you going to deal with it? 

Mr. HICKEY. Unfortunately, in our business, not everyone is in 

agreement with every issue. 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Graves, thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. GRAVES. I don’t know if it has already been asked, but how 

much time does it usually take to certify an aircraft? What is the 

average time? 

It took five years for Eclipse. Isn’t that a little long or is it not 

a little long? Am I mistaken there? 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, sir, Mr. Graves, it is a little long. 

The regulations create a nominal period of time, and it is largely 

based on the need for setting the certification basis. A company 

wants to know precisely what are the regulations they have to design their airplane to. 

If you don’t set that, regulations come and go and the airplane, 

when it is just about done, may have to comply with a new regulation, et cetera. 

The regulations call for, for a transport airplane like a Boeing, 

five years as the nominal period. 

For all other products, which would include the Eclipse 500, 

three years is the standard period. It turned out they needed over 

five years to do it. We granted an extension to them. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I wonder if you would yield to the Chair, Mr. 

Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. I will yield. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Just to clarify a point, when we are talking about 

five years and we haven’t gotten into this issue with this panel, but 

the ODAR was issued in 2002, about four years before the Design 

Certification was issued. 

So when we are talking about five years to get a time line and 

an understanding of this, the fact is that Eclipse was not going fullforce through the process. There were issues with an engine where 

they had to change course. There were issues with investors and 

other things. 

72 

It wasn’t that they were pressing the FAA or they were moving 

forward the entire time. They had some issues that they had to 

deal with externally as well. Is that an accurate statement, Mr. 

Hickey or Mr. Sabatini? 

Mr. HICKEY. I think it is accurate, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Hickey, I want to compliment you on accepting responsibility, and I accept your version of what FAA is going 

to do rather than Mr. Hayes who is trying to, I think, reword what 

you are saying. 

I think you are on the right course. You have found some shortcomings in this process, very serious shortcomings, and both you 

and Mr. Sabatini are committed to correcting those. That is the 

spirit of leadership that I expect from FAA, and we will watch very 

closely. 

To put the issue that you described earlier, a procedure in which 

those who are deeply involved in the certification process raise 

questions, raise issues and have concerns can be sure that they are 

fully responded to. It is not a question of he loses or you lose. The 

question is does the owner-pilot lose? 

Your job, the FAA’s, is to make sure that doesn’t happen. 

Mr. HICKEY. I agree, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So it is not who loses and who wins. The real 

issue is are there concerns raised by professionals—skilled, talented, seasoned professionals within the agency, fully respected, 

fully responded to, not deadlines that are arbitrarily or externally 

or even internally established. 

In this certification process, you are right. It takes at least five 

years for transport aircraft to reach certification, at least, longer if 

you go back into the engineering and design. 

It was at least five years before the Cirrus all-composite aircraft 

was certified, and they complained about this, that and the other 

and a whole host of things. But those strain gauges were essential 

to test that wing structure. Should it be two wings joined in the 

middle? Should it be a single wing? 

They went through a great deal of testing to make sure that the 

ultimate design, type certificated and production certificated by the 

FAA, was the right design. 

At 41,000 feet in the air, I have said it so many times, there is 

no curb to pull over and look under the hood and see what has 

gone wrong. 

Mr. HICKEY. I know. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You have to get it right on the ground, and that 

brings me to the question of the one-pilot versus two-pilot. 

The information we have is that FAA test pilots were opposed to 

approval of the aircraft for single-pilot operation, yet they were 

overruled. I want you, Mr. Sabatini or you, Mr. Hickey to respond 

to that. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, let me begin with how the process works, sir, 

if I may. 

Once an airplane has been demonstrated to meet type certificate 

and by design is approved for single-pilot operations because engiVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:27 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45108.TXT JASON
73 

neers have done the study to determine that the switches and the 

controllability of the aircraft is suited for that. 

Once that is done, it now needs to be determined how, operationally, we will introduce this aircraft. That is the job of the Flight 

Standardization Board. They make determinations as to what kind 

of training is required, what kind of type rating should be issued 

and a host of other responsibilities. 

As Mr. Hickey mentioned and I will reiterate, this process that 

we have observed here lacked much in terms of project management and communication. 

What happened with the beginning of the Flight Standardization 

Board is Eclipse went directly to the Flight Standardization Board. 

That will not happen again. In doing that, Eclipse presented to the 

Flight Standardization Board an aircraft that had not been demonstrated to conform to type design, which is unusual. 

We ended up with three phases of the Flight Standardization 

Board. Phase one was terminated because the airplane could not 

demonstrate, based on the kind of training that our Flight Standardization people were receiving, to determine that they could safely operate this aircraft as a single pilot. 

They deconvened, and at that point in time is when the single 

pilot issue arose. They met again, and other issues arose. It wasn’t 

until the third time that they got together that the Flight Standardization Board determined that the work load for a single pilot 

was now acceptable, that the training that was being delivered was 

appropriate for that kind of operation. 

I know that pilots have been interviewed who have said that it 

is a high work load. Well, these are the very same pilots who have 

been tested and have demonstrated they are capable and competent of operating these airplanes as a single pilot. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That latter point, the testing level, is extremely 

important. 

Mr. SABATINI. Absolutely. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. If you are going to be operating this very hightech aircraft, you really have to know. You have to go through a 

much more rigorous regime. 

Are you saying then that within the FAA this issue of one versus 

two pilots was vigorously debated and resolved in the favor of a 

single pilot? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, the Flight Standardization Board made that 

determination. The Board alone made the determination. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Certainly, from the standpoint of the manufacturer, they would much rather sell an aircraft whose operational 

cost was lower because you only have one pilot, not two. 

Mr. SABATINI. That is true. But operationally, the Flight Standardization Board made recommendations for two types of rating for 

that airplane. One is for a single pilot and the appropriate training. 

Testing and qualification is required. 

The other is for a multi-crew. It has been mentioned that DayJet 

operates as a crew of two. 

I recall long before DayJet even existed, Mr. Iacobucci came in 

and visited with us and told us about his business plan. I spoke 

to him just the other day to verify my recollection. He never intended to ever operate as a single pilot. 

74 

It has always been his business model for customer reasons to 

operate with a crew of two even though his pilots are being issued 

single-pilot certificates. Their business plan requires them to operate as a multi-crew. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. What is the basis for distinction between singlepilot and multi-pilot? 

I will rephrase my question. What are the FAA-established distinctions between those two ratings? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, of course, the training is essential, appropriate to the aircraft. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But it is for the same aircraft. 

Mr. SABATINI. For the same aircraft. Then there must be, for single-pilot, you must have a headset and a couple of other things that 

escape me right now that are mentioned in the Airplane Flight 

Manual and must be available for that kind of operation so that 

it eases the burden on the pilot. 

But let me just say, airplanes are built with many systems. I 

have started in this business as an FAA Inspector. I have administered many flight checks. 

I am also a pilot, and I have been given many flight checks. I 

have never had the luxury of operating an airplane during those 

conditions with everything working. You always test or are tested 

when most of the systems fail to determine your ability to operate 

that airplane safely with whatever condition exists at that point in 

time. 

The FAA requirements are very clear in the practical test standards, whether it is for an operating rule for Part 135 or any other 

operation. The pilot must demonstrate that he is competent and 

qualified to operate that aircraft alone with systems inoperative. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Does that also require recurrent training? 

Mr. SABATINI. Absolutely, sir, particularly under 135. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, I look forward to the commitment you have 

made to reprinting the Customer Service Initiative, unless we abolish it altogether in a future legislation, and to the interim corrections from lessons learned that Mr. Hickey has described and I 

think with quite earnestness. 

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate either to have an 

in camera review or a Committee review at a later date to assess 

the follow-up compliance with our own standards. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I think that is an excellent suggestion. 

I had mentioned earlier in the hearing that we expect in the not 

too distant future that we will have the FAA, Eclipse and others, 

other stakeholders here involved come back, sit down and discuss 

what progress has been made relative to future action on the part 

of the FAA and pending issues with the aircraft. 

I only have one remaining question, and it is for Mr. Haueter. 

You heard Chairman Oberstar’s question on certifying the aircraft for a single pilot. Given the complexities of the aircraft and 

the fact that the FAA test pilots recommended or wanted it not to 

be certified as single-pilot but two-pilot, do you agree with the 

FAA’s decision to certify it as a single-pilot? 

Mr. HAUETER. I don’t think I have enough information. Certainly 

the Cessna Citation was certified for single-pilot operation. It is not 

75 

that greatly different than the Eclipse necessarily. I don’t know all 

the facts here. 

Mr. COSTELLO. All right, good. Thank you. 

Mr. Hayes, any closing comment? 

If not, let me thank this panel, and let me restate what Chairman Oberstar said, Mr. Hickey. We appreciate the fact oftentimes 

people come before the Subcommittee and Full Committee and we 

are used to hearing people deny and push responsibility and blame 

on other people. 

We are pleased to hear you take responsibility for some of the 

things that you think the FAA needs to correct in the future regarding when there are people who are objecting internally. So we 

appreciate your honesty. 

I also want to mention, as I mentioned at the earlier panel, we 

had, as you know, current FAA employees who had the courage to 

come here and to speak with us and testify about their opinions. 

There is one former FAA employee and the current employees who 

testified. 

We will be following very closely to make sure that there is no 

retribution towards those employees. I have asked them specifically 

to contact me personally if, in fact, they feel that there is retribution, if there is a job reassignment, if there is any retribution whatsoever. 

So I believe and I hope that you believe that it is healthy for people to come forward and to state their opinions regardless if you 

agree with them or not. I think it strengthens the operation, in this 

case, at the FAA. I hope you will respect the fact, as we do, that 

they had the courage to come forward and discuss their differences 

of opinions with you and to state their opinions on the record. 

With that, we again thank you for your testimony, and this panel 

is dismissed. We would ask the next panel to come forward, please. 

Members of this next panel are coming forward to be seated. I 

will introduce them: Ms. Peg Billson, President and General Manager, Manufacturing Division, Eclipse Aviation Corporation, accompanied by Mr. Roel Pieper, the Chief Executive Officer, Eclipse 

Aviation Corporation; and Mr. Clyde Kizer, retired aerospace executive. 

Lady and gentleman, if you will come forward, I would ask you 

to remain standing and I will administer the oath, if you will. 

We have all three. Is Roel Pieper here? 

Ms. BILLSON. He had to leave. 

Mr. COSTELLO. He had to leave. Okay. 

If you will raise your right hand please, do you solemnly swear 

that the testimony you give before this Committee in the matters 

now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth and 

nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

For the record, please show that both witnesses answered in the 

affirmative. 

First, we thank you for your indulgence here in listening to all 

of the testimony. I am quite certain that you wanted to be here, 

but we had hoped to get to this panel sooner. 

With that, I will recognize Ms. Billson for your testimony. 

76 

TESTIMONY OF PEG BILLSON, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL 

MANAGER, MANUFACTURING DIVISION, ECLIPSE AVIATION 

CORPORATION; CLYDE KIZER, RETIRED AEROSPACE EXECUTIVE 

Ms. BILLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Committee. I am Peg Billson. I am currently the President and General Man- ager of Eclipse Aviation’s Manufacturing Division. Over the previous three years, I was the Chief Operating Officer of Eclipse 

Aviation, responsible for the type certification and production certificate of the Eclipse 500 jet. My background is that I have a Bachelor’s and Master’s in Aero- space Engineering. I am a private pilot, and I have had 25 years 

in the industry at McDonnell Douglas, Honeywell and now at 

Eclipse, designing, building and certifying airplanes. In fact, I am also an instrument-rated pilot, and I have about 80 

hours in the Eclipse 500. 

Mr. Roel Pieper, as we stated, was here just until about five min- utes ago, and he is our current Chairman and CEO of Eclipse. I would like to address some of the things that I have heard here today and read, so I can clear up some misconceptions or our perspective of how we believe the process went. 

The first is with the Inspector General’s report. I think it is important to highlight that Eclipse Aviation has not been interviewed 

by the Inspector General. So as we look forward to that opportunity, we also are not knowledgeable of what the March, 2007 

complaint refers to. We have never been shown that. We don’t 

know the basis of that. 

We look forward over the coming months to be able to participate 

in that process, so we can clear up what I have heard today as a 

lot of misstatements, misconceptions, misunderstandings in the 

data that I have heard today. 

Specifically, it is not accurate to state that EASA, the European 

certifying agency, has denied certification of this airplane. In fact, 

we are in the middle of the process, and we expect it to be completed in the next few weeks. 

When that is completed, it will verify that this airplane has been 

demonstrated to comply with not only the FAA’s requirements but 

all of the European Union’s requirements as well, demonstrating 

this airplane is safe to fly in not only the United States but the 

European Union nations. 

But the next point I would like to make is that Eclipse cooperated fully with all levels of the FAA management through our certification processes and through the approval of our pilot training 

program. That would be the type certification process, the production certification process and the Flight Standards Board. 

Yes, we had challenges. We have been at this for a long time. Occasionally, we did encounter lack of understandings, disagreements 

on what the process was going forward. So, when we would run 

into those situations, we would work up the layers of levels within 

the FAA until we could agree or reach agreement to both of us that 

this was the right process to go forward. 

I think the most significant or prominent area where this was 

highlighted was during the production certificate. We believe it is 

very rare that new production certificates are granted, and so the 

77 

experience level within the FAA on how to accomplish this process 

is limited. 

And so, throughout the process, there are numerous instances 

where there was different direction, misdirection, change in direction on what was required to achieve our production certificate. It 

was only after my inability to get that clarity with the head of the 

Fort Worth certification office at that time did we elevate our concerns to the Washington headquarters and asked for assistance. 

After they evaluated the situation, they decided to convene an 

independent board of experienced people to work with the Fort 

Worth office and Eclipse Aviation and lead us through the process 

of certifying this airplane or helping us attain our production certificate. In fact, it did take eight months after we received our type 

certificate to earn our production certificate. 

I certainly respect and appreciate the perspectives of the FAA inspectors that are here today and had the courage to come forward. 

It was a very confusing, frustrating time where everybody played 

different roles at different periods of time. 

And so, I think that frustration level that I even experienced personally supports the decision to let’s bring in an independent group 

of experienced people to help lead all of us through this process, 

which is what they did. 

Let me also talk then briefly about the Flight Standards Board 

and the confusion around the Flight Standards Board who ultimately made the single-pilot evaluation determination and approved our pilot training program. 

I gave them an immature airplane twice. I won’t do that again. 

I am experienced several times in certifying airplanes. This was 

the first time I went through a Flight Standards Board process, 

and it is perfectly logical that I needed to give them a type design 

compliant airplane, so they could cleanly and clearly effect their 

evaluation. 

We had some false starts. It was an inefficient process. 

So I would really characterize today’s hearing as a lot of people 

are trying to resurrect years of work by a lot of hard people. We 

are not all remembering it exactly correct. 

But the results were effective. We have a compliant airplane, we 

have a safe airplane, and I am proud of my role on the Eclipse 500 

program. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

Mr. Kizer. 

Mr. KIZER. Chairman Costello and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

My name is Clyde Richard Kizer, and my statements reflect observations, facts and opinions garnered over a 44-year technical career in the aerospace industry. 

I realize that the focus of these hearings is on the certification 

of the Eclipse EA-500. My statements today relate for the requisite 

requirement for the concept of alternative method of compliance to 

assume a vibrant environment of innovative engineering and technology development for the aerospace industry. 

Absent the application of technical vision and the exploration of 

new materials, concepts and processes, our Nation will rapidly fall 

behind in this globally critical industry. My comments relate speVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:27 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45108.TXT JASON
78 

cifically to the need for a methodology that allows consideration of 

alternate means of compliance within the regulatory process. 

My experience and training relate predominantly to the arena of 

airline aircraft continued airworthiness, and I will focus my comments to that position, but the concepts that I discuss have value 

for all venues of technical development albeit with differing practical priorities, frequencies of application and regulatory oversight 

requirements. 

Equally important to the success of the aerospace industry as the 

alternate method of compliance is the development of and adherence to minimum standards for regulatory compliance to ensure 

the safety of the aircraft, the public and the national airspace system. 

The remarkable safety record of the U.S. air transport industry 

is the result of the robust process of communications, coordination 

and exchange of technical information that exists between the operators, the manufacturers and the regulatory agency. No single entity within these constituents can assure the desired level of safety 

independently. 

The success of the endeavor depends on effective collaboration. 

The free exchange of technical information provides a venue for innovative alternative technical resolution of potential problems from 

differing perspectives of responsibility. 

Over time, the process allows a variety of methods for technical 

problem resolution from which it is possible to develop a best practices resolution for standardization, effectiveness and efficiency. 

Absent such approach, standardization might potentially be 

achieved by forced adherence to the least effective methodology. 

Over decades of commercial air travel, many new technologies 

have been developed to improve the safety and efficiency for the 

traveling public. Emerging technologies demand a conservative approach for application, operation and regulatory control to assure 

that the safety of the system is not compromised. That conservative 

approach results in the establishment of minimum standards of 

performance that protect the industry while allowing flexibility in 

the development of the new technologies. 

Unfortunately, the term, minimum standards, occasionally connotes an atmosphere of laxity when in fact it is just the opposite— 

restrictive set of requirements that must be met in a very conservative approach to develop new technologies and/or methods for resolution of technical problems. 

It is a general truth that no two aircraft leave the manufacturer’s production line in exactly the same configuration. Additionally, 

once an aircraft enters service, no two aircraft of similar type are 

in exactly the same configuration within a given airline or between 

the airline fleets. 

The responsibility of the airlines is to maintain their aircraft so 

that they conform to type design and type certification requirements that were established to assure airworthiness for the certification and production of commercial aircraft. This requirement for 

conformance is termed continued airworthiness. 

The continued airworthiness process includes incorporation of 

methods to address any action that modifies the original type certification requirements such as airworthiness directives, suppleVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:27 May 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45108.TXT JASON
79 

mental type certificates and so on. The industry dedicates considerable technical resources for maintenance and engineering activities 

to meet this responsibility. 

When technical problems are defined and addressed by manufacturer service bulletins or regulatory requirements, the specified 

means of corrective action frequently requires variations due to 

configuration differences, material applications or other considerations. 

When corrective actions are mandated by the FAA, generally by 

issuance of an airworthiness directive, such actions frequently include a means to employ differing methods, materials and/or timing 

to accomplish the mandatory action. These alternatives are allowed 

only after approval by the FAA Aircraft Certification Office designated in the AD. FAA approval for alternative methods must be 

obtained prior to the required date for completion of the action defined in the AD. 

This approach is described as the Alternative Method of Compliance or AMOC process. The AMOC process allows accommodation 

for alternatives that might not have been known or considered at 

the time the AD was written. The primary requisite for this process 

rests with determination that the alternative provides an acceptable level of safety that is equivalent to that required by the AD. 

As a comparison of the viability of the alternative methodology, 

a similar process is allowed during certification by longstanding 

regulation 14 CR 21.21. Now we won’t go on that because that is 

the certification process, but it is a similar process and it is Equivalent Level of Safety or ELOS. 

It is obvious that the AMOC and the Equivalent Level of Safety 

or ELOS processes allow consideration for differing technical expertise, varying operational experiences, new technologies and innovative methodologies while protecting the safety and efficacy of the 

air transport system and not compromising the responsibility or 

prerogatives of the regulatory authority. 

The intent of the AMOC/ELOS process is to maintain or improve 

the safety of the aircraft and the industry while allowing the employment of technical innovation and new technologies to resolve 

technical problems. 

Over many years, the concept of alternative methods of compliance has proven to be a safe and effective approach for regulatory 

compliance. The AMOC/ELOS process has provided creative alternatives that are crucial to the air transport industry, and in my experience it is that these processes are equally essential for general 

aviation. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank you, Mr. Kizer. 

The Chair would recognize the Ranking Member for any questions that you may have. I only have a few and then a statement 

to make, but I would recognize Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Well, I want to thank both of you for your testimony 

and for so patiently waiting through the day until we reach this 

point. 

This was a five, almost six-year process for Eclipse, and it was 

a new learning experience, I think, for that organization. This is 

the first certification that you went through, is this correct? 

80 

Ms. BILLSON. This is the first certification that the Eclipse Aviation Company went through. It is the fifth certification that I have 

personally been through. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Kizer, you have over 40 years of experience in 

this whole process, and you obviously know a lot more about it 

than certainly I ever will. 

My concern is we are having to figure out here, and this is a kind 

of small example of it, how to have some standards, make sure that 

we don’t get people who are irresponsible into the system as suppliers or assemblers or whatever and, at the same time, have a 

very dynamic system that allows new innovation into it. 

In that connection, a fellow I had the opportunity to listen to give 

lectures about this named Burt Rutan who is way out. 

Mr. KIZER. He is outside the box. 

Mr. PETRI. The greatest aviation designer probably, one of them 

in world history, if not. 

He was pleading at the meeting I was at when he was entering 

the competition for this new space vehicle, that it be classified not 

as an airplane but as a spaceship because then it wouldn’t have to 

be certified. They don’t certify spaceships. 

His reason wasn’t he wanted to escape any regulation or anything. It was that he felt the psychology of defending a particular 

design was exactly opposite of what he was trying to build in his 

organization, which was that every day he wanted people to assume that the worst could happen and figure out a better and safer 

way of doing it. 

So they are constantly making what they hope are improvements, refinements. It is a very dynamic process. 

He felt once they were trying to define and defend a particular 

design, it changes your mind. You are trying to defend why it is 

safe rather than question how to make it safer. 

That would end up stifling innovation and be counterproductive 

to true safety. We would end up with some safety innovations that 

would not be made because of that. 

I don’t know if that is worth commenting or not. But what we 

want, don’t we, is to have a collaborative where people are conspiring to be as innovative and have a safe product at the end of 

the day rather than just playing games on each other and not communicating and pretending to meet standards. How do we do that? 

Does that make any sense at all to you? 

Mr. KIZER. I would just like to make a general statement in that 

regard. 

The people in this industry who bear the responsibility for 

human lives, whether it is in the military side or the commercial 

side, I have never met anyone who did not bear that responsibility 

with great commitment. No one that has the responsibility for safety or for personal lives would make decisions that would put those 

things in jeopardy. 

So, consequently, when we are exploring new technologies, we 

know there is great promise, but we also know that lacking a history with those new technologies we have to take a very conservative approach to the development of the technologies. 

That sometimes means that we use things in different applications other than aircraft and we garner some experience with it, 

81 

but it frequently means that we use the technology in lesser modes 

instead of the primary modes until we develop enough history that 

we can explore the full potential of the technology. 

And, we have to demonstrate ahead of time minimum safety 

standards, sometimes in terms of inspection periods and things like 

that, until we garner the experience or limitations on the application until we have the experience to take those technologies and 

fully explore their potential. 

Everyone, be it an engineer or a pilot or a mechanic or a production guy on the line, all know that when they are working with 

new technology they have to do so in a step by step process in 

order to fully exploit that new technology. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Petri and now recognizes my friend from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. 

You have been here a long time. You have heard a lot of things. 

Some are observations. Some are accusations. Some were opinions. 

Some were facts. 

Kind of sum up again, as I asked the last panel, where we are 

with this process and what it means to you as a manufacturer in 

how you would like to see the process proceed, again, because the 

confidence that the world has in our aviation and in our regulatory 

agencies, among other things, must come out of this process as 

being unscathed and still the gold standard. 

So just let me offer you time to generalize on what do you think 

we need to do to make sure that this process has been most effective today. 

Ms. BILLSON. Sir, today, a lot of what I have heard is confusion 

between a type certification, a production certificate, putting a certificate of airworthiness on an airplane and getting approval of a 

pilot training program. So I think that is a lot of the confusion that 

has come out today. 

One of the other things that has been highlighted is I will offer 

up two thoughts. One, the FAA and industry have to work together 

to drive closure on certifying product. We have to work together. 

The FAA, right now, appears to have a very effective process 

where it is the obligation of the manufacturer to come forward and 

say, this is how long I think it is going to take, given these sort 

of assumptions. The FAA comes forward and says, given everything 

I have to do, this is what I can do to support you on the time line 

you want. And you work together to negotiate a time line that you 

are trying to achieve. 

There is always an understanding if something changes, if there 

is a risk, if a test doesn’t pass the way you thought it was going 

to do, that is going to affect your time line and you are going to 

adjust it appropriately. 

I think what needs to be highlighted is that there are different 

sets of experiences. So there are some people that are experts in 

Part 25 Certification, some in Part 23, some that know how to do 

production certificates. 

If I would offer up anything, it is maybe the FAA wants to approach these types of projects based on pools of experienced people, 

not just assigning them by region. 

82 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Kizer? 

Mr. KIZER. Well, we are at a state where in many cases the 

knowledge and the experience and the training of the people that 

are required to regulate the industry is frequently behind the technology. 

That is not a condemnation of the FAA. That is a reality, that 

the technology moves so fast, that unless you are continually being 

reeducated in universities and self-training, it can get ahead of 

you. 

It is vitally essential that we have a methodology, I think, that 

draws upon the best expertise in the industry, wherever it comes 

from, to help develop the technology. 

If the FAA needs help in the field from a higher level or from 

the engineering group that exceeds their capability, they ought to 

have that authority to seek that assistance. And, if it takes bringing people in from the industry or from the universities to educate 

the process, we need to have that as well because we quickly, both 

in the area of composite materials and in digital avionics and electronics, are moving ahead faster than we can stay educated. 

Mr. HAYES. A quick question, I don’t think we touched on it 

today. In a certified repair shop, you have an employee who is designated as the Chief Inspector. In the manufacturing and production process, do you have a similar employee? 

Mr. KIZER. The big aircraft manufacturers do. I don’t know about 

Part 23. 

Mr. HAYES. Do you know, Ms. Billson? 

Ms. BILLSON. I don’t have somebody per se that is designated as 

the Chief Inspector in my production line. I do have the people that 

are the Chief DAR and then leaders throughout my quality organization. 

Mr. HAYES. For a minute, I think it would be helpful. There have 

been some specific actions cited: the throttle issue, the dual versus 

single pilot issue, the static port issue. Those are the three that 

come to mind. 

As a follow-on for this, Mr. Chairman, if you would just address 

a letter to the Chairman and a copy to me, what the issue was 

from your perspective from the beginning, how it was handled at 

the time and how it has been ultimately satisfied. Again, I think 

it is good for the product and for the process. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, that pretty well wraps me up unless 

you all would like to add anything else. 

Ms. BILLSON. We would be more than pleased to do that, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I would agree, Mr. Hayes. As I said, we are going 

to revisit as a result of our discussion to talk about what progress 

has been made. 

You made the statement, Ms. Billson, that the IG has not spoken 

with you. 

This whole hearing and the investigation conducted by the Inspector General was about the FAA and the process that the FAA 

is using in the certification process. They obviously received complaints from employees and others internally within the FAA, and 

they responded and conducted an investigation. 

This hearing is not about Eclipse. It is about the FAA and the 

process that they use. You just happen to be the product that was 

83 

in the shop at the time, and there are serious allegations that were 

made here at the witness table. You heard them yourself. 

It is our goal to provide aggressive oversight to make certain that 

the FAA, in fact, is doing their job. We have seen in other areas 

of the economy what the lack of oversight can result. 

It is our hope that, as Mr. Sabatini said today in his testimony, 

that they are going to go back, reassess some of the things that 

they had done, establish a procedure for certification in the future, 

for a new type of aircraft that is coming online like the Very Light 

Jet, to develop procedures to get out in front as opposed to reacting. 

So I appreciate your testimony here today. We have some other 

issues that we will be addressing in writing, and I would ask if you 

would comply with Congressman Hayes’ request to address some of 

these issues in writing to us. We would appreciate that. 

I would give you and Mr. Kizer an opportunity, if you would like, 

for any closing remarks. I would be happy to offer you that opportunity. 

Ms. BILLSON. Well, I think I reinforce and support your objective, 

but I think the purpose of the Inspector General’s investigation is 

to get to the facts. And so, Eclipse offers to talk with the IG to help 

clear some of the misstatements and the mis-facts that are in the 

current testimony as I have heard it today. So I think that is the 

most important thing to highlight, 

I think the other point we would like to emphasize is that we are 

very proud of the certification of the Eclipse 500 program and the 

hard work of the FAA employees. I mean they just did a fantastic 

job on this program. They worked hard, and I think in the light 

of day they are proud of the product that they certified and the airplane that is out there right now. 

Of the data we have looked at, we have the best safety record 

of a general aviation that has entered service in the last two decades. That doesn’t mean we ever acquiesce our accountability to 

continue to drive and improve and react rapidly when issues occur. 

It is a complex process executed by a lot of humans. You are 

never going to get it right. So you have the obligation to continue 

to follow up, analyze, work with your customers, understand how 

your airplane is performing and improve it. That is what we are 

committed we will continue to do. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you. 

Mr. Kizer. 

Mr. KIZER. No further comments, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Very good. 

Mr. Petri, unless you have further questions or comments, we 

thank both of you, Ms. Billson and Mr. Kizer, for testifying, and 

this concludes the hearing. 

The Subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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