UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KARL MASEK, : 

 : 

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 22-03574 (RC)

 : 

 v. : Re Document Nos.: 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 

 : 23, 27, 28 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

RECUSAL, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OTHER MOTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Karl Masek, proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint against many defendants 

including Defendant United States (“Defendant”), for “past stalking,” seeking an injunction for 

“future stalking,” and for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3). 

Defendant has moved to dismiss Mr. Masek’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mr. Masek has also filed a series of motions and other 

filings, including a motion for recusal, motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, motion to 

issue summons, motion for peremptory writ of mandate, motion for reconsideration, and two

motions to take judicial notice. The Court will, for the reasons explained below, (1) grant 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, (2) deny Mr. Masek’s motion for recusal, and (3) deny Mr. 

Masek’s other motions. 
2 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Masek alleges a sprawling and often unclear fact pattern of conspiracy and 

misconduct by federal and state government officials.

1

 Amended Complaint (“Amend. 

Compl.”), ECF No. 20-3.2 From what the Court can understand from the allegations, Mr. Masek

claims that between 2001 and 2023, California state and other government officials stalked and 

harassed him in the state of California and followed him out of the state. Id. ¶¶ 3–5, at 3.3 Mr. 

Masek alleges that he feared “for his safety” due to unnamed defendants’ “verbal threats.” Id. 

¶ 5, at 4. Further, Mr. Masek alleges that he made numerous demands that the officials stop their 

stalking, yet “defendants persisted in their pattern of conduct.” Id. ¶¶ 7–8, at 4. He is seeking an 

injunction for future stalking because he “is informed and believes . . . that defendant will 

continue in the future the pattern of conduct as described in this complaint unless restrained and 

enjoined by this [C]ourt.” Id. ¶ 11, at 5. He also alleges that federal government officials

conspired to interfere with his litigation by “attempt[ing] to dissuade, interfere, and harass 

plaintiff from performing his duties, as civil prosecution” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3). Id. ¶¶ 1, 7, 8, at 6–7. 

Mr. Masek filed his initial complaint in November 2022. Complaint, ECF No. 1. Mr. 

Masek’s complaint named a large number of defendants, but only Defendant, the United States, 

1

 Mr. Masek’s original complaint made additional legal claims and contained additional 

facts. However, for the purposes of this motion to dismiss, “the Court is limited to the Amended 

Complaint, which supersedes the facts or claims stated in Plaintiff's Complaint[.]” Allen v. 

Mnuchin, No. 18-cv-1214, 2019 WL 2581323, at *1 n.3 (D.D.C. June 24, 2019) (internal 

citations omitted). As such, the Court will only consider the contents of the amended complaint 

in ruling on the motion to dismiss. 2

 Mr. Masek’s amended complaint was originally filed as ECF No. 19; however, ECF 

No. 19 is missing pages of the amended complaint due to a clerical error. Defendant has 

attached the complete copy it received to its motion to dismiss as ECF No. 20-3. 

3

 The amended complaint repeats paragraph numbers in different sections, so the Court 

refers to both paragraph number and page number for clarity. 
3 

was properly served and made an appearance in the case. See Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 5. 

Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss; however, before the Court decided the motion, 

Mr. Masek filed an amended complaint in September 2023. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 10; see Amend. Compl. Defendant 

filed a new motion to dismiss in response to Mr. Masek’s amended complaint. Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 20; 

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot. Dismiss”), ECF No. 

20-1. Mr. Masek opposes Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants [sic] 

Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 29. 

While this case has been pending, Mr. Masek has filed a series of motions including a 

motion for recusal, motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, motion to issue summons, 

motion for peremptory writ of mandate, motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(6), and two motions for judicial notice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal and 

Disqualification (“Pl.’s Mot. Recusal”), ECF No. 13; Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis (“Pl.’s Mot. in Forma Pauperis”), ECF No. 18; Plaintiff’s Motion to Issue Summons 

(“Pl.’s Mot. Summons”), ECF No. 21; Plaintiff’s Motion for Peremptory Writ of Mandate (“Pl.’s 

Mot. Writ Mandate”), ECF No. 23; Plaintiff’s Motion for Catch All Provisions Pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (“Pl.’s Mot. Reconsideration”), ECF No. 27; Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial 

Notice (“Pl.’s First Mot. Judicial Notice”), ECF No. 14; Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice 

(“Pl.’s Second Mot. Judicial Notice”), ECF No. 28. 

Defendant has opposed Mr. Masek’s motions. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motions for Disqualification, Recusal, and Judicial Notice (“Def.’s Opp’n Recusal and Judicial 

Notice”), ECF No. 15; Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Peremptory Writ of 
4 

Mandate (“Def.’s Opp’n Writ Mandate”), ECF No. 26; Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Reconsideration and Judicial Notice (“Def.’s Opp’n Reconsideration and Judicial 

Notice”), ECF No. 30. All of these motions are now before the Court.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Pro Se Plaintiff

The pleading of a pro se party is interpreted liberally and is held to “less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007). However, even pro se parties must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (“if plaintiff is asserting a claim for 

constitutional violations he should do so with the requisite specificity, so as to give defendants 

notice, plead the involvement of each defendant and clarify what constitutional right has been 

violated.”). A pro se complaint must contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for 

the court's jurisdiction . . . [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Johnson v. Cookson, No. 23-cv-01164, 2023 

WL 3433968, at *1 (D.D.C. May 9, 2023) (“When a ‘complaint contains an untidy assortment of 

claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold 

conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments,’ it does not fulfill the requirements of 

Rule 8.” (cleaned up) (quoting Jiggetts v. District of Columbia, 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 

2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. District of Columbia, No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. 

Cir. Nov. 1, 2017))); see also Utterback v. Geithner, 754 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(finding that pro se plaintiffs failed to “present a claim on which the court can grant relief”

because the complaint contains “disjointed, mostly incoherent, allegations.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Chandler v. Roche, 215 F. Supp. 2d 166, 168 (D.D.C. 2002))).
5 

B. Recusal

It is imperative that “federal judges . . . maintain the appearance of impartiality,” to foster 

“public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges.” United States v. Microsoft 

Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2001). “[T]o safeguard the integrity of judicial proceedings, 

the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, and codes of judicial conduct each outline 

standards for when a judge may—or, in some cases, must—remove herself from a case.” Stone 

v. U.S. Embassy Tokyo, No. 19-cv-3273, 2020 WL 5653699, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2020), aff’d, 

No. 20-5360, 2021 WL 2255016 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2021); see also Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 

113–15. Due process requires recusal “when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual 

bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” 

Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287 (2017) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 

The objective analysis, therefore, examines whether “the average judge” in such a position 

would be biased. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that the U.S. Constitution mandates recusal only in

“extraordinary situation[s]” or when there are “extreme facts.” See Caperton v. A.T. Massey 

Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009) (finding an extraordinary situation, such that recusal was 

warranted, where the chairman of defendant company donated $3 million to the judge’s 

campaign while the case was pending). More commonly, questions of recusal are statutory in 

nature. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (“these questions [about a judge’s 

ability to hear a case] are, in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the professional 

standards of the bench and bar.”). A judge’s duty to sit when not disqualified is equally strong as 
6 

his duty to recuse himself where disqualified. See SEC v. Bilzerian, 729 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 

(D.D.C. 2010). 

28 U.S.C. § 455 prioritizes the appearance of partiality and requires recusal in “any 

proceeding in which . . . impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 

Here, courts use an objective, “reasonable person” standard to ask, “whether a reasonable and 

informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality.” Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 114. 

Section 455(b)(3) delineates circumstances requiring recusal for a judge who previously “served 

in governmental employment,” including when a judge “participated as counsel, adviser or 

material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the 

particular case in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3); In re Hawsawi, 955 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. 

Cir. 2020); see also Stone, 2020 WL 5653699, at *2 (holding that a “previous position[] with the 

Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia” does not support 

recusal where the judge “never worked on this case.” (citation omitted)). 

Section 455(b) also requires recusal when a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). However, “bald allegations of bias or prejudice” do not 

justify recusal. Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 315 F. Supp. 3d 584, 591 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation 

omitted); see also In re Kaminski, 960 F.2d 1062, 1065 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that 

“conclusory, unsupported, or tenuous allegations” do not support recusal (citation omitted)). 

Instead, the movant must demonstrate “actual bias or prejudice based upon an extrajudicial 

source.” Tripp v. Exec. Off. of the President, 104 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2000). 

Alternatively, “in rare cases where no extrajudicial source is involved,” the movant must show a 
7 

“deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

C. Rule 12(b)(1) 

Federal district courts have “limited jurisdiction,” and, as such, “[t]hey possess only that 

power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “plaintiffs bear the 

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 176 (D.D.C. 

2004). With a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court will “assume the truth of all material 

factual allegations” and “grant[] [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived 

from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). However, when assessing a 

motion to dismiss under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, facts require “closer scrutiny” than in a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion because subject matter jurisdiction involves the power of the court to hear the 

case. Auleta v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 80 F. Supp. 3d 198, 201 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Aref v. Holder, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (D.D.C. 2011)). 

Moreover, the Court may invoke Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss complaints that are “‘patently 

insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Walsh v. Comey, 118 F. 

Supp. 3d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). A 

complaint is “patently insubstantial” if the allegations are “essentially fictitious,” or if a court 

finds the claims to be “wholly insubstantial or frivolous.” See id.; Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 

F. Supp. 2d 222, 232 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Accordingly, “bizarre conspiracy theories” and “fantastic government manipulations” are 
8 

examples of claims that could be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Best, 39 

F.3d at 330. 

Generally, the doctrine of sovereign immunity immunizes the United States from lawsuits 

for money damages unless Congress explicitly waives immunity. Maxberry v. Dep’t of the 

Army, Bd. of Corr. of Mil. Recs., 952 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50–51 (D.D.C. 2013). If sovereign 

immunity is not waived, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear “claims against federal 

defendants for monetary damages.” Bond v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 828 F. Supp. 2d 60, 74 (D.D.C. 

2011); see also Burkhart v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). 

The Federal Tort Claims (“FTCA”) is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity which 

allows plaintiffs to bring actions against the federal government for money damages. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(b)(1). Plaintiffs can use the FTCA to bring a claim when government employees, acting 

“within the scope” of their employment commit a “negligent or wrongful act.” Id. To bring a 

claim under the FTCA, plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2675(a). See Detar v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 3d 566, 569 (D.D.C. 2016). Failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies requires a court to dismiss the FTCA claim for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. See id.; Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 Fed. App’x 445, 445 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). 

D. Rule 12(b)(6) 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that plaintiffs submit a complaint that 

contains “a short and plain statement of the claim” that provides defendants with adequate 

notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 

308, 319 (2007). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is not to determine whether a claim is likely to 
9 

succeed, but only to determine if a claim has been properly stated. Fletcher v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Just., 17 F. Supp. 3d 89, 92 (D.D.C. 2014). A court must take the factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the facts liberally in favor of the plaintiff when considering a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 

(D.D.C. 2000). While the facts in the complaint should be liberally construed, “[t]o survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court need not accept as true 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements.” Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

Mr. Masek has seven motions that are ripe for consideration: (1) motion for recusal, (2) 

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (3) motion to issue summons, (4) motion for 

peremptory writ of mandate, (5) motion for reconsideration, and (6 & 7) two motions to take 

judicial notice. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is also ripe for consideration. For the reasons 

stated below, the Court will deny all of Mr. Masek’s motions. The Court will then grant 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss because Mr. Masek has neither established the Court’s 

jurisdiction nor alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. 

A. Mr. Masek’s Motion for Recusal

In the present case, Mr. Masek alleges judicial bias and partiality because the Court: (1) 

was affiliated with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia in the Civil Division 

prior to joining the bench; and (2) the Court’s “bias [sic] decision” in a previous case will lead to 
10 

“apparent or actual bias or prejudice” against Mr. Masek in the instant case.4

 Pl.’s Mot. Recusal 

¶ 1. The Court will address the contentions in turn. 

First, the Court’s prior work for the U.S. Attorney’s Office does not warrant recusal. 

Pursuant to Section 455(b)(3), prior government work can only support recusal if the Court

“participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an 

opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3); In re 

Hawsawi, 955 F.3d at 158, 160 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court has 

neither participated in the proceeding in a manner outlined by Section 455(b)(3) nor expressed 

any opinions about the merits of the case. See generally Pl.’s Mot. Recusal; see also McKee v.

U.S. Dep't of Just., 253 F. Supp. 3d 78, 81 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that recusal was not 

appropriate despite the judge’s previous employment at the Department of Justice because he 

“left the Department over fifteen years ago and had no involvement of any kind with this case or 

the predicate facts”), aff'd per curiam, 2018 WL 1388575 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 2018); see also

Allphin v. United States, 758 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“mere prior association does not 

form a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality” (cleaned up) (quoting Maier v. 

Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Therefore, recusal is not warranted based on the 

Court’s prior affiliation with the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Mr. Masek also argues that recusal is proper because an unfavorable ruling in a prior 

case creates the appearance of bias. Pl.’s Mot. Recusal ¶ 1–2; Masek v. Isonta, No. 22-cv-00575, 

2022 WL 19616212 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022); Masek v. Baldwin, No. 22-cv-00578. However, an 

4

 Mr. Masek also seeks in his complaint to have Judge Nichols, who presided over a 

different case that Mr. Masek brought, recused. Pl.’s Mot. Recusal ¶ 1; Masek v. Isonta, No. 22-

cv-00575, 2022 WL 19616212 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022). In this opinion, the Court will only be 

addressing the issues that relate to the present case. 
11 

unfavorable ruling alone “almost never constitute[s] a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”

because judicial rulings are not “extrajudicial” sources of bias. Stone, 2020 WL 5653699, at *2 

(quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Here, Mr. Masek fails to establish 

that recusal is necessary. In support of his assertion of bias, Mr. Masek included an email sent 

on March 10, 2023, notifying him of this Court’s order dismissing Masek v. Baldwin, No. 22-cv00578. See Pl.’s Mot. Recusal Exhibit C at 31, ECF 13-2. However, an unfavorable ruling can 

only support recusal if the decision “display[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 

would make fair judgment impossible.” Stone, 2020 WL 5653699, at *2 (quoting Liteky, 510 

U.S. at 555). Moreover, the Court did not preside over the other case that Mr. Masek mentioned 

in his motion. See Masek v. Isonta, 2022 WL 19616212; Pl.’s Mot. Recusal ¶ 1–2. An order 

issued by another court has no impact on this Court’s ability to be impartial. Overall, Mr. Masek

fails to allege sufficient facts of “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism,” and he relies on 

conclusory allegations to support his motion for recusal. Stone, 2020 WL 5653699, at *1 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tripp, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 34). Therefore, Mr. 

Masek’s motion for recusal is denied. 

B. Mr. Masek’s Other Motions

The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Motion to 

Issue Summons, Motion for Peremptory Writ of Mandate, Motion for Reconsideration, and both 

Motions to Take Judicial Notice. The Court will discuss each motion in turn. 

1. Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 

The Court will begin with Mr. Masek’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) states that a court may authorize a litigant to proceed “without 

prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a 
12 

statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give 

security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit has held that a 

litigant need not be “absolutely destitute” to proceed in forma pauperis. See McKelton v. Bruno, 

428 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the litigant 

must submit an affidavit with financial information for the court to consider whether they qualify 

to proceed in forma pauperis. See Allen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, No. 23-

03851, 2024 WL 539007, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2024) (reviewing plaintiff’s finances and 

finding the plaintiff had sufficient income and did not have significant debt, such that it would be 

improper to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis). Here, the only information Mr. Masek 

attached to his motion to proceed in forma pauperis were emails to unknown recipients regarding 

his allegations of stalking. See Pl.’s Mot. in Forma Pauperis at 3–5. Because of the absence of 

any financial information, the Court denies Mr. Masek’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

2. Motion to Issue Summons 

Next, the Court denies Mr. Masek’s Motion to Issue Summons for a similar reason. Mr. 

Masek filed the motion requesting that “the Court Marshals summons remaining defendants”

because he cannot afford to serve the remaining defendants. See Pl.’s Mot. Summons at 1. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d) requires service to be done by court officers for litigants proceeding in forma 

pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Thus, the Court sees this motion as duplicative of Mr. Masek’s 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and it will likewise be denied.

3. Motion for Peremptory Writ of Mandate

Mr. Masek also filed a Motion for Peremptory Writ of Mandate. From what the Court 

can glean from the filing, Mr. Masek seeks an unusual remedy that is predominantly found in 
13 

California state law. See Pl.’s Mot. Writ Mandate at 2–4. This remedy is, under very rare 

circumstances, also possible in federal court. The Supreme Court has stated that:

[t]he peremptory writ of mandamus has traditionally been used in the federal 

courts only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 

jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’ 

While the courts have never confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical 

definition of ‘jurisdiction,’ it is clear that only exceptional circumstances 

amounting to a judicial ‘usurpation of power’ will justify the invocation of this 

extraordinary remedy. 

Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (citations omitted). Mr. Masek has not explained 

why a peremptory writ of mandate would be appropriate here or what inferior court he asks this 

Court to supervise. See id.; Pl.’s Mot. Writ Mandate. Defendant understood Mr. Masek’s 

motion to request that the Court “rule on Plaintiff’s ongoing litigation in the D.C. Circuit” where 

he seeks a writ of mandamus to resurrect other cases he has filed. Def.’s Opp’n Writ Mandate at 

2. Evidently, this Court has no authority to enter a writ in a case pending before the D.C. Circuit, 

nor to supervise other cases before different judges in the district court.

The Court cannot discern any other coherent request in Mr. Masek’s motion, and the 

second half of the motion is more accurately classified as an opposition to Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss. See Pl.’s Mot. Writ Mandate at 4–10. Other parts of the motion discuss Privacy Act 

and Bivens claims that are not pleaded in Mr. Masek’s amended complaint.5

 See id.; Amend. 

Compl. Because Mr. Masek’s motion does not provide any explanation as to why the requested 

relief is warranted or even possible here, the Court denies Mr. Masek’s Motion for Peremptory 

Writ of Mandate. See Will, 389 U.S. at 96 (holding that the burden is on the person seeking a 

5

 Mr. Masek does allege that the federal official’s conspiracy to deter his success in 

litigation caused a “deprivation of [his] constitutional rights.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 10, at 7. 

However, Mr. Masek did not plead a Bivens claim, and even construing his pleadings liberally, 

he did not provide any support for his conclusory allegations of this conspiracy such that this 

Court could infer a violation of his constitutional rights.
14 

writ to show “its right to issuance . . . is clear and indisputable”) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

4. Motion for Reconsideration

Mr. Masek also filed a Motion for Catch All Provisions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), 

seeking reconsideration of a final judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. Reconsideration. As Defendant 

notes, Mr. Masek is seeking reconsideration without “expressly identifying the final judgment at 

issue.” Def.’s Opp’n Reconsideration and Judicial Notice at 1. There has not been any final 

judgment in this case. Instead, it appears that Mr. Masek may be asking the Court to reconsider 

the dismissal of Masek v. Isonta, No. 1:22-cv-00575, 2022 WL 19616212, at *1 (D.D.C. July 29, 

2022). If so, the D.C. Circuit has already heard his contentions and concluded that dismissal was 

appropriate. Masek v. Isonta, No. 22-5257, 2023 WL 3090753, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 26, 2023), 

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 148 (2023). In any event, this Court would have no role in reconsidering 

a judgment from a different case before a different judge. The Motion for Reconsideration is 

denied. 

5. Motions to Take Judicial Notice

Finally, the Court denies both of Plaintiff’s Motions to Take Judicial Notice. Pl.’s First 

Mot. Judicial Notice; Pl.’s Second Mot. Judicial Notice. In nearly identical motions, Mr. Masek 

asks the Court to take judicial notice of what he labels a “[w]rit of [m]andate,” a complaint from 

a different proceeding, and email communications. See Pl.’s First Mot. Judicial Notice; Pl.’s 

Second Mot. Judicial Notice. Defendant opposes both motions because the information is not 

relevant at the motion to dismiss stage. See Def.’s Opp’n Recusal and Judicial Notice; Def.’s 

Opp’n Reconsideration and Judicial Notice. 
15 

At the motion to dismiss stage, district courts may take judicial notice of facts from 

outside the complaint. See Whiting v. AARP, 637 F.3d 355, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A federal 

court may take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute” if it either “is 

generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Hurd v. D.C., 

Gov't, 864 F.3d 671, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). However, “the 

matters to be noticed must be relevant” to the motion to dismiss. Whiting, 637 F.3d at 364

(holding that materials supporting the facts asserted in the complaint were “irrelevant to 

disposition of the motion to dismiss, which turns on the adequacy of the well-pleaded factual 

allegations in the complaint, which are assumed to be true”). 

In his motions, Mr. Masek asks the Court to take judicial notice of pleadings filed in 

other lawsuits. See Pl.’s First Mot. Judicial Notice at 2–3; Pl.’s Second Mot. Judicial Notice at 

2–3. A court may take judicial notice of public records outside the proceedings, such as past 

filings. Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Co., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(permitting judicial notice of facts contained in public records of other proceedings). However, 

the decision to take judicial notice is within the discretion of the court. Youkelsone v. FDIC, 910 

F. Supp. 2d 213, 221 (D.D.C. 2012). Further, if a court decides to take judicial notice of 

“publicly filed pleadings,” the court cannot consider the factual matters within the pleadings as 

true. See Capitol Servs. Mgmt, Inc. v. Vesta Corp., 933 F.3d 784, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding 

that it was proper for the district court to take notice of pleadings for the fact that the plaintiff 

“believed those allegations to be true and viable as legal claims at the time they were made,” and 

not for the factual truth of the pleadings).
16 

Here, the Court agrees with Defendant that Mr. Masek’s allegations are irrelevant at the 

motion to dismiss stage. See Def.’s Opp’n Recusal and Judicial Notice at 3–4. The complaint, 

writ of mandate, and emails that Mr. Masek wants the Court to take judicial notice of, do not 

demonstrate that he pleaded sufficient factual allegations in his complaint. Furthermore, while 

the Court may take judicial notice of pleadings filed in other cases, it can only do so to the extent 

it establishes that Mr. Masek believed the information to be true when he filed the complaint. 

See Capitol Servs. Mgmt., 933 F.3d at 789. Because Mr. Masek fails to demonstrate the 

relevance of the attached information at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court denies his 

Motions to Take Judicial Notice, ECF Nos. 14 and 28. 

C. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant asserts multiple reasons that Mr. Masek’s claims may be dismissed. For the 

following reasons, the Court agrees with Defendant that it does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction in the present case. 

1. Mr. Masek’s Claims are Patently Insubstantial 

Mr. Masek’s amended complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) because it is “patently 

insubstantial” and does not present a “federal question suitable for decision.” Best, 39 F.3d at

330 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989)). He alleges a vague, decadeslong government conspiracy that involves several government officials and hundreds of 

unnamed defendants. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 3–5, at 3. 

Courts in this District have seen many suits alleging claims similar to Mr. Masek’s, and 

these complaints are routinely dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). See Walsh, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 27 

(citing similar cases); Bickford v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(dismissing a complaint that claimed “federal officials [] conspired and engaged in systematic 
17 

torture, harassment, and surveillance”); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (dismissing a complaint that alleged “the government launched a massive surveillance 

program” including “wiretaps,” “tracking devices,” and “an officer [being] stationed outside 

[plaintiff’s] house . . . .”); Williams v. Holiday Inn Washington, D.C. on the Hill, 295 F. Supp. 

2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing a complaint that claimed the defendant attempted to murder 

the plaintiff by serving him a hamburger that made the plaintiff ill). Even with the more lenient 

standard for pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs, the complaint must contain allegations more 

than “insubstantial and fictitious claims.” Parker v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-2523, 2023 

WL 4824732, at *5–6 (D.D.C. July 27, 2023) (dismissing a complaint written by a pro se

plaintiff because it solely includes “bizarre conspiracy theories” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Here, Mr. Masek’s complaint is merely his latest installment in a long string of lawsuits

alleging peculiar government misconduct and is the kind of “bizarre conspiracy” that could be 

categorized as being “essentially fictitious.” Walsh, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 22. Consistent with

general practice in this Circuit, the Court dismisses Mr. Masek’s complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). 

2. Mr. Masek Failed to Allege Why Sovereign Immunity is Waived

In addition, with respect to Mr. Masek’s stalking claims, “the Court may not exercise 

jurisdiction over the tort claims here unless there has been a clear waiver of sovereign 

immunity.” Gaskin v. May, 15-cv-0033, 2023 WL 2239349, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (citing 

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)). Not only has Mr. Masek failed to address waiver of 

sovereign immunity, his amended complaint also does not state what the cause of action is, such 

that a waiver could be inferred. See generally Amend. Compl. Defendant has viewed Mr. 
18 

Masek’s claim as arising under the FTCA, see Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 7–8, and the Court agrees 

this statute is the closest basis for jurisdiction here. See Epps v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 575 F. Supp. 2d 

232, 238 (D.D.C. 2008) (“When a plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a federal agency for 

certain torts committed by federal employees, the only possible basis for court jurisdiction would 

be the [FTCA].”). 

The FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity only after a plaintiff 

exhausts administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2675(a); see Norton v. United 

States, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2021) (“[E]xhaustion occurs once a claimant has presented 

the appropriate federal agency with a claim . . . and the agency has (1) denied the claim in 

writing or (2) failed to provide a final disposition within six months of the claim's filing.” 

(omission in original) (citation omitted)). Here, Mr. Masek has not provided any indication that 

he exhausted his administrative remedies. See generally Amend. Compl. Because exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is a jurisdictional requirement, this Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to evaluate Mr. Masek’s stalking claims under the FTCA and must dismiss these 

claims under Rule 12(b)(1).6

 See Abdurrahman, 168 Fed. App’x at 445. 

* * * 

Defendant also seeks dismissal of Mr. Masek’s amended complaint on the grounds that 

Mr. Masek has failed to state a claim for relief. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 4–5, 6–13. Courts in this 

6 Apart from the stalking claims, Mr. Masek’s opposition to the motion to dismiss and his 

motion for peremptory writ of mandate contain arguments defending Freedom of Information 

Act, Privacy Act, and Bivens claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11–14, 21–24; see also Pl.’s Mot. Writ 

Mandate at 6–10. But Mr. Masek does not plead any of these claims in the amended complaint, 

and “[a] plaintiff cannot amend his Complaint via an opposition brief to a motion to dismiss.” 

Gaines v. District of Columbia, 961 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225 (D.D.C. 2013). To the extent Mr. 

Masek raised any of these claims in one of the prior complaints in this action, those complaints 

have been superseded by the amended complaint. See Allen, 2019 WL 2581323, at *1 n.3. 

Consequently, these claims are not properly presented to the Court and need not be considered. 
19 

Circuit need not address a Rule 12(b)(6) motion after finding that dismissal is proper for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Ctr for Biological Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 

(D.D.C. 2011) (“Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), a court 

should first consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion because ‘once a court determines that it lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.’”(cleaned up) (quoting Sledge v. United 

States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2010))); see also United States ex rel. Settlemire v. 

District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 920–21 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“express[ing] no opinion on [the] 

merits” because dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(1) such that the court need not address 

the 12(b)(6) challenge). As discussed above, Mr. Masek’s complaint is patently insubstantial 

such that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (ECF No. 13) is DENIED, Plaintiff’s Motion to Take Judicial 

Notice (ECF No. 14) is DENIED, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 

(ECF No. 18) is DENIED, Plaintiff’s Motion to Issue Summons (ECF No. 21) is DENIED, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Peremptory Writ of Mandate (ECF No. 23) is DENIED, Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Catch All Provisions (ECF No. 27) is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Judicial 

Notice (ECF No. 28) is DENIED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is 

separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: March 22, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge