Filed 8/17/20 In re D.G. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Cou rt Law. B301091

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

E.G.,

Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00605)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT)

THE COURT: The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on July 29,
2020 is modified :

On page 12 , the following sentence is deleted:

“ And in D.G.’s presence, Father stabbed furniture,
and broke the mother’s phone. ”2 That sentence is replaced with the following sentence :

Father also stabbed furniture and broke the mother’s phone.

This modification does not constitute a change in the judgment. The petition for rehearing filed on August 7, 2020 by appellant E. G

. is denied.

__________________________________________ __ ________________

__ ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. BENDIX , J.Filed 7/29/20 In re D.G. CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.G

., a Person Coming Under the Juv enile Court Law. B 301091

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

E.G

. ,

Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00605 )

APPEAL from order s of the S uperior Court of Los Angeles County, Steven E. Ipson , Juvenile Court Referee

. Affirmed.
Lisa A. Raneri , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy

, Acting Assistant County Counsel , a nd Jacklyn K. Lou ie

, Principal Deputy County Counsel , for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 E.G. (Father ) appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring his son

, D.G.

, a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdi visions (a) and ( b) (1)

, 1 and removing D.G. from Father’s custody

. Father also appeals from the permanent restraining order against him

. He contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to grant
his request for a continuance of the jurisdiction and di sposition hearing to allow him to retain private counsel and that the court should have excluded D.G. from the permanent r estraining order.
We disagree and affirm

.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND The family consists of Father, the m other, F.G. (the mother) , their chi ld

, D.G. (born in August 2018 ), and D.G.’s
half sibling, I.G. (born in 2 017)

. 2 The parents have never
been married or lived together. For the entirety of Father’s relationship with D.G.’s mother, he has been married to another

woman , and together they ha ve nine children. On July 11, 2019, the family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Servi ces (DCFS) based on allegations of Father’s ongoing physical abuse
of the mother while the children were present

. The la test abuse report ed was a June 21, 2019 incident

, alleging that Father, a former gang member, had punched the mother multiple times

1 All further sta tutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified

.
2 The children in this case have the same mother but different fathers. Father is D.G.’s biological father and I.G.’s father is A.A. Only Father and D.G. are parties t o this appeal.3

and had threatened to harm her and the maternal grandfather
if she reported the abuse

. On July 12, 2019, the family law cour t granted the

mot her a n emergency temporary restraining order against Father, p rohibiting him f rom any contac t with t he mother and
the children. When interviewed by the DCFS investigator

, the mother reported that after she obtained the restraining order

, she and
the chil dren left the state because she was afraid that Father
would find her and r etaliate against her

. She also disclosed that
she and Father had been in a r elationship for about two years, and although he did not live with her, he visited her apartment daily. She stated that he was very jealous and had been physic ally and verbally abusive to her throughout th eir relationship

. She disclosed that in January 2019 her neighbor had called the p olice after overhearing the mother screaming and

one o f the children cr ying

. Although Father had been abu sing
the mother at the time, when the police responded to the call, the
mother denied the abuse because she was afraid of Father

. As for the Ju ne 21, 2019 incident that resulted in the report to DCFS , the mother stated th at Father had accused her
of cheating on him , and he pushed and punched her several
times in the face and cursed at her. The children were present during th e incident

. The mother d id not initially call the police
after the incident becau se she was afraid that Father would follow through with his threat to hurt the maternal grandfather

, but after the mother observed two

- year

- old I.G. act out the
Ju ne 21 event by mimicking a punch and pain

, she decided to report Father. She stated that she planned to seek a permanent restraining order against him

.4 The m other’s coworker corroborated that the mother had
bruises. He also observed that when Father came to the mother’s workplace

, they would argue

, and the coworker stated that
the mother eventua lly disclosed the domestic violence in her relationship with Father.
When the so cial worker interviewed Father, he stated that
he and the mother had problems in their relationship because
he had refused to leave his marriage. He denied physically

or verba lly abusing the m other or threatening her with harm

. Father claimed that the mother had issues with jealously and that she engaged in self

- harm. He denied “ domestic violence ”
in the relationship with hi s wife and their children. On August 22, 2019, DCFS filed a section 300 petition

on behalf of 12

- month

- old D.G

., as well as his two

- year

- old
half sibling, I.G., based on the allegations of Father’s ongoing domestic violence against the mother in the children’s presence and the mother’s failure to protect t hem by allowing F ather to
h ave access to the children. The petition further alleged that
Father’s conduct endanger ed the children’s physical health and safety and place d them at substantial risk o f serious physical
harm

. A co py of the July 12, 2019 emerg ency protective o rder against Father was also attached to the petition

. The parents appeared at the detention hearing on August 2 3, 2019, and the court appointed Father counsel. Father’s counsel objected to the child ’s detention from Father ; alternatively , she asked for u nmonitored visitation. Father’s
counsel represented that Father deni ed any physical abuse in
the relationship and believed that the mother had inflicted
the injuries on he r self. The court found prima facie evidence

to detain D.G. from F ather and ordered the child released to5

the mother. The court ordered that Father have weekly
monitored visits

. The court also took jurisdiction of the restraining order proceedings, and on August 26, 2019, held a hearing on the mother’s request for a tem porary restrainin g order against Father. Father’s appointed coun sel appeared at that hearing,

oppose d the restraining order

, and asked the court to exclude
D.G. from the order . The court, however, granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) covering both children and sch eduled
the hearing for a permanent restraining order for September 23, 2019, the date of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
The j urisdiction/ d isposition r eport revealed that Father
had a criminal history including arrests for robber y, a conviction
f or battery and was arrested for inflicting corporal injury on the
mother on Jun e 21, 2019

. When t he dependency investigator re

- interviewed the mother, she described that Father attempted to control every aspect of her life

, including how s he dressed and wi th who m she interacted . The mother also reported multiple incidents of physical violence before and after D.G.’s birth. She disclosed that

once , while she was holdin g six

- month

- old D.G., Father struck her in the face causing her to bleed from the mouth. The mother further reported that Father “ stab[ ed ] ” furniture and broke
her phone after he learned that it contained photographs of her injuries

. Father also was re

- interviewed, and he continued to deny physically assau lting the mothe r; h e repeated that t he mother’s injuries were self

- inflicted. On September 23, 2019, the date set for the combined jurisdiction

, disposition , and restraining order hearings, Father6

and his counsel, the mother and her counsel , and counsel for
DCFS were present

. Before the hea ring began, Father asked

to replace his appointed counsel

, and the court conducted a
Marsden 3 hearing. At the hearing

, Father expressed that he

was unhappy with his appointed counsel because he did not
like her advice. The court denied F ather’ s request, expressing that it did not appear that his lawyer had been ineffective or that
the communication between them had broken down. 4 Father’s
counsel then in formed the court, “My client is requesting a
continuance for him to hi [ re] private cou nsel

, ” without sp ecifying how long a continuance he was requesting or providing any other information on the subject. The court denied the request
, commenting that this was the day scheduled for the hearings.
The court then asked all counsel if they were ready to proceed, and they all answered in the affirmative

. After the presentation of the evidence , which consisted solely of DCFS’s reports
, DCFS and the children’s counse l urged the court to
sustain the petition and remove D.G. from Father

. Father’s

co unsel argued that the court should di smiss the petition

, po inting to Father’s denials, the absence of evidence of domestic
violence in his long

- term marriage

, a nd the fact that no one witnessed the abuse

. His counsel also reiterated Father ’s position that the mother fabri cated the do mestic violence claims

. Father’s counsel also asked that the restr aining order request be
denied

, and in the alternat ive, the court not include D.G. as a protected person, n oting that if the court took jurisdiction, it

3 See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

4 On appeal

, Father has not challenged the trial court’s denial of his Marsden reques t.7

could p rotect the child by order ing monitore d visitation for
Father

. Th e court sustained the section 300 petition under subdivision ( b)(1), declared th e children dependents of the court,
and removed custody of D.G. from F ather

, and ordered that he

r emain place d w ith the mother

. The court also granted a three

year restraining order that included D.G. as a protected person
with a carve

- out for Father’s monitored visitation.
Father timely appeal ed

.

DISCUSSION Father asserts that the court erred in failing to grant

a continuance of t he hearing s to allow him to retain private
counsel and that the court should have excluded D.G. from
the permanent restraining order. We disagree.

A. Trial Court D id N ot Abuse its Discretion by Denying Father’s Request for a C ontinuance A juvenile court ’s order denying a continuance is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. ( In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1366.) The test for abuse of discretion is “ ‘ “ ‘ whether the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
in ferences can reas onably be deducted from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court. ’ ” [Citation s .] ’ [Citation.] The abuse
of discretion standard warrants that [appellate courts] apply

a very high degree of de ference to the decision of the juvenile
court.” ( In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.)
T he jurisdiction hearing on a section 300 petition must be
held within 30 days of the filing of the pet itio n. ( § 334 [“ [u] pon the filing of th e petition, the c lerk of the juvenile court shall8

set the same for hearing within 30 days . . . from the date of
the order of th e court directing such detention”] ; see also In re
Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4 th 903, 913

– 914 .)
T he court, however, may cont inue the hearing beyond
30 days if the conti nuance is not contrary to the interest
of the child

. (§ 352, subd.(a) (1) [“ the court may continue any hearing

. . . beyond the time limit within which the hearing
is otherwise required to be held, provided that a continuance
sha ll not be granted that is contrary to the interest of the
minor ”].) T he hearing may be continued beyond 60 days only
in exceptional circumstances

, but in no case beyond six months

. ( § 352, subd. (b) .)
In considering the child ’ s interest s , the court shall giv e substantial weight to the child’s need for prompt resolution
of the child’s custody status, the need to provide a child with

a stable environm ent, and where there is a temporary placement, the damage to a child of such a placement. (§ 352, subd. (a) (1) .)
Father asserts that he demonstrated good cause for his request for a continuance to retain private counsel because such
counsel was critical to the preservation of his parental right s and would not have prejudiced D.G. because the ch ild remained plac ed with the mother. Although we agree with Father that
the facts do not show extreme prejudice to the child because
he remained with his custodial parent, prompt resolution of a
child’s status is in a child’s best interest , as evidenced b y the
code sectio ns limiting the time period for granting continuances. Further, the denial of a continuance may be justified if it would cause disruption to the proceedings. (See , e .g., In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4 th 392, 398; see also In re Giovanni F. ( 2010)
184 Cal .App.4th 594, 603

– 604 ( Giovanni F. ) .) That is the case9

here. F ather made his Mardsen motion and request for a continuance on the date of the hearings without earlier notice

to the court or the parties

. Further, Father was, or should hav e been, aware tha t his request to rep lace his counsel might not
be granted, but made no showing that he had even explored retaining private counsel

. The inconvenience to all counsel
in having to return at a later date and again prepare for the hearings, a s well as the cou rt’s need to manage its calendar
in an extremely busy court, justified denial. We find support for our opinion in Giovanni F., where the father sought a continuance to substitute his at torney after the jurisdictional hearing had begun

. Th e juvenile court “denied
the request, citing s ection 352 and noting the [adjudication] had commenced, there had been ample time for [the father] to hire

an attorney and, given [the child]’ s age, it would not be in his
best interests to continue the hearing .” ( Giovanni F.

, supra , 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 603

– 604.) The appellate court held that refusing a continuance was no t abuse of discretion, stressing
that continuances are discouraged in dependency cases and
that no continuance may be grante d that is cont rary to the child ’ s interest s

. ( Id. at p. 604.) Prior to the jurisdictional hearing the child was detained with the grandmother and remained placed
with her afterwards. The court concluded that the child was entitled to a timely resolution of his custod y status and that
the father waited more than a month from setting this hearing

to request the substitution of counsel

. ( Id. at p. 605 .)
The factual differences between this case and Giovanni F. are not legally significant. In both cases the child was l iving with
a rela tive and thus would not have suffered serious prejudice
from a continuance. And although here, unlike in Giovanni F.,10

the hearings had not yet begun, all parties were present and ready to proceed, making the inconvenience to parties and

c ourt comparable t o Giovanni F. Under these circumstances,
Father has not convinced us that the court abused its di scretion in denying his request for a continuance

.

B. The Court D id N ot Err in Including D.G. as a Protected P erson in the Permanent Restrain ing Order The dep endency court has broad discretion to issue restraining orders protecting a dependent child and any caregiver during the pendency o f a case (§ 213.5, subd. (a))

. Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5 does not require evidenc e that the restra ined person has previously harmed the child

. ( In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) Instead , a court

may , under section 213.5, issue a restraining order in favor of

a child if a failure to make the order might jeopardize the safet y of the child. ( In re B.S.

, supra , at p p

. 193

– 194.) Courts have applied both substantial evidence and
abuse of discret ion standards of review to restraining orders. ( In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466.) On appeal, however, there is no practi cal difference be tween the two
standards since “ ‘we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile court ’ s determination. If there is substantial evidence support ing the order, th e court ’ s issuance of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” ( Ibid .) Father argues that including D.G. as a protected person
in the restraining order was unnecessary because there was

no evidence that Father would harm the child

. We disagree.11 Fa ther relies on In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355,
where the court reversed a restraining order against the father

, which included three children (ages 11, 12, and 16 ) , and where
the facts showed that domestic violence did not occur in the children’s pr esence

. ( Id. at p. 357 .) Father also relies on
In re N

. L., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, where the trial court exercised jurisdiction over a six

- year

- old child based on sustained allegations that the mother abused drugs and had made false allegations that the father had sexually abused the child. ( Id.

at. p. 1462.) The only evidence in the case regarding the mother’s possible danger to the child was that she had threatened the
father. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the father’s re quest for a TRO p rotecting himself as well the child. T he appellate

court reversed the order protecting the child because there

was no evidence that the mother had engaged in any violent or dangerous conduct towa rd the child , made any threats of such
cond uct, or that the mother ’ s violent conduct or threats to the
father occurred in the child’s presence

. ( Id. at p. 1469.)
These cases do not persuade us

. D.G

. is significantly younger than the children involved in In re C.Q. and In re N.L.
And

, because the children in thos e cases were older, they could summon help if their parent s engaged in dangerous or harmful
behavior. In contrast, D.G. is a preverbal toddler , entirely dependent on adults for care . Moreover, unlike the children in
the cases on which Fa ther relies, D.G. was present when Father physical ly assaulted the mother

. Father’s other violent and erratic behavior in D.G.’s presence distinguishes this case from
those cases where the appellate court s have reversed restraining
orders which includ ed c hildren.12 Father’s case is more comparable to In re B.S.

, supra , 172 Cal.App.4th 183, where the court affirmed the inclusion of

an infant in a restraining order. There, the court concluded that
the father ’ s “tendency to resort to violence” and “lack of imp ulse control” pos ed a risk to the child ’ s safet y even in the mother’ s absence. ( Id . at p. 194.) A lthough Father argues that he never harmed or threatened the child, as in In re B.S., “ [ s ] uch a threat
could arise

, even in the mother’s absence if the fathe r got angry with another adult or with [the child].” ( Ibid

. ) Here, Father ’s lack of impulse control and violent tendenc ies are shown by his

numerous physical assaul ts on the mother, including at least
once while she was holding D.G. And in D.G.’s presen ce, Father
stabbe d furniture, and broke the mother’s phone

. As in In re B.S.

, Father’s lack of control and violent tendencies endangered
D.G. even absent the mother’s presence. Consequently, t he juvenile cou rt reasonably conclude d th at Father jeopardize d
the safety of D. G. It therefore did not abuse its discretion in including D.G. in the restraining order.13 D ISPOSITION

The order s are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.