Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-681 | February 9, 2016 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Karen Celestino-Horseman 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General 

Lyubov Gore 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James Boggess, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

February 9, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1506-CR-681 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Lisa Borges 

Trial Court Cause No. 

49G04-1308-FB-57570 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-681 | February 9, 2016 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary 

[1] James Boggess appeals the trial court’s failure to award him credit for time 

served as well as good time credit for the ten months he served in pretrial home 

detention. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in failing to award Boggess these credits. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] Boggess and William Bowser have known each other for fifty years and live a 

block and a half away from each other on the east side of Indianapolis. On 

August 1, 2013, the two men were drinking alcohol together when they began 

to argue about an incident that occurred between them almost twenty-five years 

ago. The two men became involved in a fist fight, and Bowser knocked down 

Boggess, who went home and contacted the police. After the police left, 

Boggess telephoned his son, Justin, and told the young man to come to 

Boggess’ house. Justin and a friend arrived at Boggess’ house armed with two 

baseball bats and a hammer, and the three men drove to Bowser’s house. 

Bowser was in his bedroom when he heard screaming and the windows of his 

home being broken. He jumped out a window and ran towards a neighbor’s 

house. Boggess, Justin, and Justin’s friend ran after Bowser, caught him on the 

neighbor’s porch, and struck Boggess approximately thirty times before running 

off. Bowers sustained several facial fractures and the vision in his eye was 

permanently impaired. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-681 | February 9, 2016 Page 3 of 6

[3] On September 4, 2013, the State charged Boggess with aggravated battery as a 

class B felony. He was released on bond to electronic monitoring home 

detention on September 11, 2013. Boggess remained on home detention until 

his trial at the end of June 2014. According to Boggess, “[p]retrial home 

detention allowed [him] to continue working so he was able to pay the cost of 

his confinement and was also able to retain private counsel so no public 

defender was appointed to represent him until he was taken into custody and 

imprisoned.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5-6.1

 A jury convicted Boggess of the charged 

offense, and Boggess was taken into custody. The trial court sentenced him to 

twelve years, ten years executed and two years in community corrections. The 

trial court also suspended two years of the sentence to probation. The trial 

court awarded Boggess thirty-five days of credit time, which covered the 

periods from September 5 to September 11, 2013, when Boggess was released 

on bond, and June 24 to July 2, 2014, when Boggess was sentenced. The trial 

court did not award Boggess any credit time for his time spent on pretrial home 

detention. Boggess appeals the trial court’s failure to award him both credit for 

pretrial time served and good time credit. 

 

1

 Boggess cites “App. 132” as support for these facts; however, this page of his appendix contains no such 

facts. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-681 | February 9, 2016 Page 4 of 6

Discussion and Decision 

[4] At the outset, we note that there is a difference between credit for time served 

and good time credit. Specifically, credit for time served is the credit toward the 

sentence a prisoner receives for the time actually served. Purcell v. State, 721 

N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1999). Good time credit is the additional credit a 

prisoner receives for good behavior and educational attainment. Id. Boggess 

believes that the trial court should have awarded him both types of credit. 

[5] Under Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4, “[a] person who is not a credit restricted 

felon and who is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing 

is initially assigned to Class I” for the purposes of assigning credit. In Class I, a 

person “earns one (1) day of credit time for each day the person is imprisoned 

for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3. 

[6] Because pre-sentence jail-time credit is a matter of statutory right, trial courts 

generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying credit. Molden v. State, 

750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, those sentencing 

decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and 

will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse 

of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 

1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012). Because there is no statute that addresses credit for 

time served while on pretrial home detention, we will review the trial court’s 

decision for an abuse of discretion. Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 449. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-681 | February 9, 2016 Page 5 of 6

[7] In Purcell, 721 N.E.2d at 220, 224 n.6, the Indiana Supreme Court, while 

acknowledging that the issue was not directly before it, concluded that a trial 

court was within its discretion to deny a defendant credit toward his sentence 

for pretrial time served on home detention. The Court explained that absent 

legislative direction, a defendant is only entitled to credit toward a sentence for 

pretrial time served in a prison, jail, or other facility that imposes substantially 

similar restrictions upon personal liberty. Id.; see also Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 451 

(concluding that time spent in pretrial home detention is not equivalent to 

pretrial time served in a prison or jail and that pretrial home detainees are not 

entitled as a matter of law to receive credit for time served on home detention 

toward any eventual sentence). 

[8] Here, Boggess has not provided any evidence that the terms of his home 

detention imposed restrictions upon his personal liberty substantially similar to 

a prison. Rather, according to Boggess, the terms of his home detention 

allowed him to continue working. Appellant’s Br. p. 5. Because the terms of 

Boggess’ home detention did not impose substantial restrictions upon his 

personal liberty, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award 

him credit for time served on home detention.2, 3

 

2

 To the extent Boggess argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award him good time 

credit, we note that it is not possible for the trial court to award good time credit where there is no credit 

awarded for time actually served. This is because there is no initial credit on which to base the additional 

credit. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. 

3

 Boggess also asks us to “encourage the Indiana Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in State of Indiana 

v. Purcell, 721 N.E.2d 220, 224, n.6 (1993).” We are bound by the decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-681 | February 9, 2016 Page 6 of 6

[9] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur. 

 

until the law is either changed by that Court or by legislative enactment. Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103, 107 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. granted, then grant of trans. vacated.