NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANDREW KWASI DONKOR,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 17

- 55705
D.C. No. 5:15

- cv - 01712

- GW

- DTB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 16, 2018 **
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Andrew Kwasi Donko r appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from a wage garnishment. We review de novo a district court ’ s dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civi l Procedure 12(b)(6)

. Doe v. Abbott Labs. ,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# F ILED

JAN 23 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 55705

571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s Fifth Amend ment claims
because defendants are not federal government actor s and because defendants did not impose any criminal punishments on Donkor

. See Hudson v. United States , 522 U.S. 93, 98

- 99 (1997) (Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits only the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same
of fense); Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001) (“ T he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection component thereof apply only to actions of the federal government

— not to those of state or local governments. ” (c itation omitted))

. The district court properly dismissed Donkor’ s Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process claim s because Donkor failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that defendants ’ conduct was egregious and shocks the
conscienc e , or that Donkor did not receive an ad equate opportunity to be heard.
See Brittain v. Hansen , 451 F.3d 982, 99 1 (9th Cir. 2006) (substantive due process claim requires allegation of “egregious” official conduct that “shocks the conscience” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)) ; Raditch v. United
States , 929 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) ( procedural due process requires “notice and an opportunity to respond in some manner” ).
The district c ourt properly dismissed Donkor’s Fourteenth Amendment3 17

- 55705

equal protection cla im because Donkor failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated individuals, or discriminated against based on his membership in a protected class

. See Village of
Willow brook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) ( setting forth elements of an equal protection “class of one” claim); Barren v. Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

- 95 (9th Cir. 1998) ( setting forth elements of an equal protection claim based on membership in a protec ted class).
The di strict court properly dismissed Donkor’s Sixth and Eighth
Amendment claims because Donkor f ailed to allege facts sufficient to state a ny plausible claim s for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler , 627 F.3d 338, 341

- 42 (9th Ci r. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n.16 (1960) (the Sixth Ame ndment “is specifically limited to criminal prosecutions” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Schwenk v. Hartford , 204 F.3d 1 187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) ( an Eighth
Amendment claim requires punishment which is “offensive to human dignity” (citation omitted ) )

. The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s claims against the County of Riverside and the individual defendants in their official capacit ies because Donkor failed to allege facts sufficient to show any constitutional violation. See Dougherty4 17

- 55705

v. City of Covina , 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements for municipal liability). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
i n the opening brief

, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal

. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.