NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 17

- 3156

_____________ ROY L. RAMBO

v. ADMINISTRATOR EAST JERSEY STATE PRISON; ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY , Appellants

______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the D istrict of New Jersey (District Court No. 3

- 14

- cv
- 0087 4 ) District Judge: Hon. Michael A. Shipp

______________ Argued on March 14, 2018 Before: McKEE, AMBRO , and RESTREPO , Circuit Judges

.

(Opinion filed: January 30, 2019 )

Richard T. Burke Kelly A. Shelton [ Argued ] Warren County Prosecutor’s Office 413 Second Street Belvidere, New Jersey 07823

Counsel for Appe llants Richard Coughlin [ Argued ] Federal Public Def

ender 800

- 840 Cooper Street , Suite 350 Camden, New Jersey 08102

Counsel for Appellee2 _______________________ OPINION *

______________________ McKEE, Circuit Judge

. The State of New Jersey appeals the District C ourt’s grant of habeas relief to Roy Rambo, who was convicted of the first degree murder of hi s wife. The court granted
Rambo relief based upon his claim that his murder conviction was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to hire defense counsel of his own choosing. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse. 1

I. Factual Background and Procedural Posture The background of this appeal is as tragic as it is unique. It involves not only Rambo’s criminal conviction for murdering his wife, but litigation in New Jersey Chancery Court arising out of a dispute over marital assets, Rambo’s individual assets , and a pp lication of New Jersey’s Slayer Act

. 2 However, inasmuch as we are writing only

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 The District Court has jurisdiction over habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 2 At the time of Rambo’s trial and conviction the relevant provisions of the New Jersey Sla yer Act were codified at N.J.S.A. 3B:7

- 1 (1982) (repealed 2004) (current version at N.J.S.A. 3B:7

- 1.l), and N.J.S.A. 3B:7

- 6 (1982) (amended 2004). N.J.S.A. 3B:7

- 1 provided: A surviving spouse . . . who criminally and intentionally kills the decedent is n ot entitled to any benefits under a testate or intestate estate and the estate of decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent.3

for the parties who are familiar with the intricate procedural history of this case, we need only note that the New Jersey Chancery Court froze all of Rambo’s individual asse ts as well as his interest in the marital estate in response to a petition that was filed by Rambo’s son in his capacity as administrato r of his late mother’s estate. Although Rambo was a dentist with considerable assets of his own, the Chancery
Court’s a ction prevented him from accessing any of his own assets to retain a lawyer of his own choosing to represent h im in the criminal prosecution. Rather than accept appointed counsel that was offered by the trial judge in the murder case , Rambo reluctantly ch ose to proceed pro se in that prosecution. He was convicted of the first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to 40 years ’ imprisonment. After his criminal appeals were denied, Rambo filed a habeas petition in District
C ourt alleging that his murder conviction must be vacated because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel. The District Court agreed and granted
habeas relief. 3 It reasoned that the Chancery Court erred in freezing assets that Rambo
owned outside of the marital es tate. Since those assets amounted to almost $300,000, the
District Court reasoned that Rambo could have hire d counsel of his own choosing. 4 The
District Court therefore concluded that the “choice” offered by the New Jersey Superior

And N.J.S.A. 3B:7

- 6 provided: “A final judgment of conviction of intentional killing is conclusive for purposes of this chapter. In the absence of a conviction of intentional killing the court may determine by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing was intentional for purposes of this chapter.” 3 See Rambo v. Nogan , No. CV 14

- 874 (MAS), 2017 WL 3835670, at *14 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2017). 4 Id . at *12, *14.4

Court of proceeding pr o se or accepting appointed counsel violated Rambo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Rambo was entitled to a new trial because his murder
conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. 5 The appeals that proceeded in state court included an appeal of the Chancery Court’s freezing of all of Rambo’s assets as well as a direct appeal of his murder conviction and post

- conviction relief proceedings

. After Rambo’s criminal appeals were denied, he filed the petition fo r habeas relief, which the District C ourt granted and which the State of New Jersey is appealing.
II. Discussion A habeas petitioner may obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if s/he “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United State s.” 6 The parties disagree about
whether our review of the state court decisions to freeze Rambo’s assets is de novo or whether we are restrained by the deferen ce provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 7 Under AEDPA, a fed eral court can only provide habeas relief if the state court ruling “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, ” or “ involved an unreasonable application of, ” clearly established f ederal law, as determined by the Supre me Court

. 8 This deferential standard is appropri ate when the state court s decide the underlying federal claim on the merits. W here “the state court has not reached t he merits

5 Id . at *14. 6 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 7 28 U.S.C. § 2244 et. seq

. 8 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).5

of a claim . . . pres ented to a federal habeas court, ” deferential review un der AEDPA is not appropriate; in stead, “we must conduct a de novo review over pure legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact, as a court would have done prior to the enactment of
AEDPA. ” 9 The New Jersey Appellate Division concluded that Rambo’s “ argument[]

. . . attacking the C hancery Division’ s decision as a denial of his right to co unsel under the
Sixth Amendment . . . lack [ed ] sufficient merit to warrant a discussion in a written opinion. ” 10 Rambo argues that this was not an adjudication on the merits . However, the Supreme Court has explained , “ [w] hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the st ate court adjudicated
the claim on the merits .” 11 In “ i nstances in which a state court . . . simply regard [s] a claim as too in substantial to merit discussion,” the same rebuttable presumption that the claim was adj udicated on the merits applies. 12 U nder the “look through” doctrine , “where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, l ater unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. ” 13 Nothing on this record rebuts that presumption. Accordingly, we must
presume that the Appellate Division’s rejection of Rambo’s Sixth Amendment claim rest s

9 Thomas v. Horn , 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009), as corrected (July 15, 2009). 10 In re Estate of Rambo , No. A

- 5308

- 09T2, 2012 WL 1969954, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 4, 2012). 11 Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 99 (201 1). 12 Johnson v. Williams , 568 U.S. 289, 299 (2013). 13 Ylst v. Nunnemaker , 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).6

upon the same grounds as the Chancery Court’s and afford that ruling AEDPA
deference

. 14 When a District C ourt adjudicates a § 2254 petition, the relevant Supreme
Court precedent is the law at the time the s tate court renders its decision

. 15 Here, the District C ourt based its conclusion that Rambo was entitled to relief on three Supreme Court decisions: Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States , 16 United
States v. Monsanto , 17 and Luis v. United States

. 18 However, since Caplin and Monsanto were the only cases that had been decided before Rambo was convicted, only those
decisions are relevant here. 19
In Caplin , the Court had to determine whether a federal statute that authorized pre

trial forfeiture of prope rty acquired as a result of drug trafficking with no exemption for property that could be used to pay defense counsel violated the Sixth Amendment. 20

14 See Rambo v. Nogan , 2017 WL 3835670, at *3 (“[A]lthough there is a Sixth Amendm ent right, that right is not . . . a[n] absolute right. Obviously the [Petitioner] wi ll have . . . an opportun ity to have counsel, whether it’ s a counsel that he pays for or whether [it is] cou nsel that is provided to him. . . . In the circumstances of this case[,] I conclude that th e fund s from the sale of the . . . farm are to be held in trust and a re not available to [Petitioner] for purposes of his defense in the criminal matter.”) (quoting Chancery Court Judge Kumpf). 15 See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster , 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (“State

- court decisions are measured against this Court’s precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision.”) (internal quotations omitted). 16 491 U.S. 617 (1989). 17 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 18 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 19 See Greene v. Fisher , 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (citing Cullen , 563 U.S. at 182) (“As we explained, § 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to ‘focu[s] on what a state court knew and did,’ and to me asure state

- court decisions against this Court’s precedents as of ‘ the time the state court ren ders its decision .’”) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. 20 Caplin , 491 U.S. at 619.7

The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was limited , circumscribed by the defendant’ s ability to pay: “ A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person ’ s money for services rendered by an attorney even if those funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to re tain the attorney of his
choice.” 21
T he Court did not have any reason to address whether a separate contemporaneous civil court order freezing a defendant’s untainted assets , and thereby precluding him from being able to afford counsel of his choosing , violated the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Similarly, in Monsanto the Court granted the Government’s request to freeze certain assets that the Government alleged the defendant had acquired as a result of a criminal enterprise. 22 In rejecting the Sixth Amendment claim , the Court explained that
upon commission of the crime, the forfeiture statute “vest[ed] . . . all right, title and
interest” in the subject property “ in the United States.” 23 T he Court refused to permit “ a defendant

. . . use [of] assets for his private purposes that, under this provis ion, will become the property of the United States if a convict ion occurs.” 24 The Court thus held
that “ the Government may

— without offending the Fifth or Sixth Amendment

— obtain forfeiture of property that a defendant might have wished to use to pay his att orney. ” 25

21 Id. at 626. 22 Monsanto , 491 U.S. at 602. 23 Id. at 613. 24 Id

. 25 Id. at 616

.8

Here, the District C ourt reasoned that Rambo’s interest in the disputed assets
should not have been restrained before he was convicted of murder because he still enjoyed the presumption of innocence

. 26 Accordingly, the District Court believed that
the s tate court had erred in restraining him from accessing any portion of the marital assets (or his individual assets) to retain counsel of his own choice. 27 Rambo’s purported Sixth Amendment right , however, is different than the right at
issue in Caplin and in Monsanto

. Rambo’s claim had nothi ng to do with an interest in property that was subject to Governmental seizure because of its nexus to alleged illegal activity

. The issue here

– whether the state court’s freezing of an ind ividual’s assets
under a slayer statute could violate the Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel

– had not been addressed by the Supreme Court when the District Court granted relief.
The District C ourt also relied on Luis , but because Luis was decided nearly seven years af ter the state court rendered its decision under review , it was irrelevant under
AEDPA. 28 AEDPA “does not require state courts to extend

. . . precedent or license
federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.” 29

26 Rambo v. Nogan , 2017 WL 3835670, at *13

. 27 Id

. (“[A]bsent a determination as to whether any portion of the marital assets was untainted, Petitioner was improperly precluded from accessing his untainted portion of the marital assets prior to his conviction.”). 28 Cullen , 563 U.S. at 182 (“State

- court de cisions are measured against this Court’s precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision.”). 29 White v. Woodall , 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (emphasis in original).9 III. Conclusion
For the reasons set fo r th above, we will vacate the District C ourt’s grant of habeas
relief and remand for that c ourt to consider other poten tially meritorious arguments (if any) that Rambo may have raised in his petition. 30

30 In his habeas petition, Rambo alleged violations of his Fifth, Eighth, a nd Fourteenth Amendment rights, and rights guaranteed under th e New Jersey State Constitution. He claimed also , among other things, that the Slayer Statute is invalid and unconstitutional, the Chancery Court misconstrued the Slayer Statute, that his waiver of counsel was not valid, that the trial court erred in refusing to charge passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser included offense, and ineffective assistance of his in itial court

- appointed counsel.