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 Though Fabel also identifies an August 2006 search of the clubhouse in his motion, he does not

provide any further factual or legal argument related to that search. See Motion at p. 3. The Court,

therefore, does not address that search in this Order. 

ORDER DENYING FABEL’S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD ALLEN FABEL, 

RODNEY ROLLNESS, 

JOSHUA BINDER, and 

RICKY JENKS, and

PAUL FOSTER.

Defendants.

Case No. CR06-041L

ORDER DENYING FABEL’S MOTION

TO SUPPRESS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on defendant Fabel’s “Motion To Suppress

Evidence” (Dkt. #299). Fabel moves to suppress evidence seized during (1) the 1996 searches

of the Washington Nomads clubhouse in Spokane, Washington (the “clubhouse”) and of his

residence; (2) the October 2001 search of the clubhouse; (3) the December 2003 search of the

clubhouse; and (4) the February 2006 search of his residence and the clubhouse.1

 Fabel argues

that the warrants for these searches were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

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ORDER DENYING FABEL’S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

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II. DISCUSSION

A. 1996 and 2001 Searches

Agents conducted searches of both Fabel’s residence and the clubhouse in 1996 and

2001. Fabel argues that the Government has failed to turn over Rule 16 materials related to

these searches and that the evidence seized should therefore be suppressed. While the

Government acknowledges that copies of the warrants and accompanying affidavits from the

January 1996 and October 2001 searches of the clubhouse have not yet been turned over to

defendants, it maintains that the warrant and affidavit from the June 1996 of Fable’s home has

been delivered. Because defendant has either not yet had access to the underlying

documentation surrounding these searches or had the chance to adequately brief the issues

surrounding these searches, the Court will not address the arguments surrounding the

suppression of these searches at this time. 

B. December 2003 Search of the Clubhouse

On November 25, 2003, Magistrate Judge Cynthia Imbrogno signed a warrant authorizing

the search of the clubhouse. The warrant was based on an affidavit prepared by Special Agent

John Ciccone from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Agents executed the search

on December 3, 2003. 

Fabel argues that evidence obtained from the December 2003 search should be

suppressed for the following reasons: (1) the affidavit failed to provide sufficient facts to allow

the magistrate judge to find that there was probable cause to believe that evidence would be

found; (2) the affidavit was based on information from a confidential source that was neither

trustworthy nor obtained in a reliable way; (3) the affidavit was based on stale information; (4)

the warrant was overbroad; and (5) the seizure exceeded the scope of the warrant. For the

reasons discussed below, defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in the 2003 search is

denied. 

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ORDER DENYING FABEL’S

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1. Probable Cause

An affidavit for a search warrant must be “sufficient to justify a conclusion that the

property which is the object of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at the time

the warrant is issued.” United States v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1991). A

magistrate judge’s determination of probable cause is “accorded great deference and is reversed

only if that determination is clearly erroneous.” United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 275 (9th

Cir. 1990). As such, this Court need only determine that the magistrate judge “had a substantial

basis for finding probable cause.” United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.

2002). In making a probable cause determination, “[a] magistrate may ‘draw reasonable

inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the

type of offense.’” United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United

States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

In this instance, the affidavit of Special Agent Ciccone provided a substantial basis for the

magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Specifically, the affidavit explains why Ciccone’s

experience and investigation led him to believe that “notes, records, or minutes of meetings

dealing with the Laughlin incidence and the ongoing conflict with the Mongols” would be found

at the clubhouse. Ciccone Affidavit at ¶ 26. The affidavit also describes why Ciccone believed

financial information relevant to the investigation of “illegal activities, such as extortion, or

illegal gun sales” would also be found. Ciccone Affidavit at ¶ 22, 26-27. These contentions

were supported not just by the statements of confidential informants, but also by Ciccone’s

substantial experience in investigating the Hells Angels and recorded conversations of members

of the Hells Angels made at other clubhouses. In short, there was ample factual support for the

magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause in this instance regardless of any reliability

concerns related to confidential informants.

Nor was the information contained in the affidavit prohibitively “stale.” “‘The mere

lapse of substantial amounts of time is not controlling in a question of staleness.’” United States

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ORDER DENYING FABEL’S

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v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366,

1369 (9th Cir. 1993)). Further, information is not stale if “there is sufficient basis to believe,

based on a continuing pattern or other good reasons, that the items to be seized are still on the

premises.” United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States

v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 722 (9th Cir.1984)). Here, only 19 months had passed since the

Laughlin incident and the affidavit contained information detailing conversations made by other

Hells Angels just six months prior to the warrant being executed. Ciccone Affidavit at ¶ 25h. It

was therefore reasonable to conclude that evidence may still be found at the clubhouse. Fabel’s

staleness argument is rejected.

Defendant also argues that the 2003 warrant was overbroad because “the affidavit

contained no information establishing probable cause that anybody associated with the location

to be searched was involved with racketeering activity.” Motion at p. 9. In order to support the

seizure of broad associational evidence in a RICO investigation the affidavit must do more than

just establish that the suspect targeted by the warrant was associated with a particular enterprise. 

United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 794 (9th Cir. 1984). Instead, the affidavit “must also

provide probable cause to believe that the subject has conducted the affairs of the enterprise, at

least in part, through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. The Court concludes that the 2003

affidavit established probable cause to believe that the Hells Angels were involved in

racketeering, that the members of the Washington Nomads were involved in the fight at

Laughlin, and that this was part of the methods and means of the enterprise and evidence of its

racketeering activity. Ciccone Affidavit at ¶ 21. As such, the Court concludes that the affidavit

identified a sufficient nexus between the evidence sought and the alleged RICO violation to

satisfy a finding of probable cause.

2. The Scope of the Warrant

Fabel also alleges, without great specificity, that agents seized evidence outside the scope

of the warrant, particularly his personal documents. Motion at p. 11. Without more detail, the

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ORDER DENYING FABEL’S

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Court cannot conclude that these personal documents fell outside of the warrant’s scope,

especially given Fabel’s role as the President of the Washington Nomads. 

3. Franks Hearing

Fabel contends that he is entiteld to an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the affidavit. 

A defendant is entitled to such a hearing only if he makes a “substantial preliminary showing

that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was

included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary

to the finding of probable cause.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). The Court

does not believe that defendant has made a substantial preliminary showing that Special Agent

Ciccone made “intentionally or recklessly false statements.” Nor does the Court believe that the

omission of the allegedly false statements or inclusion of the alleged omissions would

undermine the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Defendant’s request for a Franks hearing

is therefore denied.

C. February 2006 Searches

On February 10, 2006, Magistrate Judge Imbrogno signed a warrant authorizing the

search of the clubhouse and Fabel’s residence in Spokane, Washington. These warrants were

supported by an affidavit prepared and signed by Special Agent Stanley Meador of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Fabel seeks to suppress evidence obtained in these searches for reasons similar to those

described above. Fabel’s request to suppress evidence obtained during these searches is also

denied. 

1. Probable Cause

As with the 2003 warrant, Fabel argues that the Meador affidavit fails to provide any

factual basis to support a conclusion that incriminating evidence would be found at either

location. The Court again disagrees. The affidavit contains a sufficient factual background on

Fabel’s role in the Hells Angels and his alleged ties to the Laughlin incident, Michael Walsh’s

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ORDER DENYING FABEL’S

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murder and the trafficking of stolen motorcycles for the magistrate judge to have concluded that

probable cause existed to issue the search warrants. See e.g. Meador Affidavit at ¶ 46. 

Defendant also alleges, without providing additional details, that the information

provided by the confidential source in the affidavit was not trustworthy, reliable or corroborated. 

A review of the affidavit demonstrates that Magistrate Judge Imbrogno had a sizeable amount of

information on which to make a credibility determination. In addition to numerous citations to

information that corroborated the source’s version of events, the affidavit also details the

informant’s criminal background, the benefits he received for his cooperation, and instances

where he had not been accurate. Given the amount of corroboration contained in the affidavit,

the Court will not second guess Magistrate Judge Imbrogno’s probable cause determination.

The Court also cannot conclude that the information in the 2006 affidavit was “stale.” As

the Government explains in its memorandum, the evidence sought concerned matters that were

ongoing in nature. If “there is sufficient basis to believe, based on a continuing pattern or other

good reasons, that the items to be seized are still on the premises” then a staleness argument

must fail. United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.

Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, the evidence sought concerned the operation of

an allegedly ongoing criminal enterprise. There was a reasonable basis to conclude that the

records and evidence being sought, such as records and patches, would be generated and

retained on an ongoing basis.

For the same reasons described with regard to the 2003 warrant, the Court finds that the

Meador affidavit established a sufficient nexus between racketeering activities of the Hells

Angels and the activities of Fabel. Defendant’s overbreadth argument is also rejected.

2. The Seizure of the Motorcycle

Fabel argues that the motorcycle seized should be suppressed because it was seized

without probable cause. The Government agues that the seizure falls under the plain view

exception. “To fall within the plain view exception, two requirements must be met: the officers

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2

 Detective Liburdi’s good faith and reasonable belief at the time of the seizure that motorcycle

parts had been illegally altered is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the plain view exception, even

though his conclusion was later determined to be incorrect. See United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d

1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2005) (seizure of “grenade launcher” was justified under plain view exception,

even though it was later determined that the device was actually used to propel flares, because the officer

had probable cause to believe that the object was associated with criminal activity when it was seized.)

ORDER DENYING FABEL’S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

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must be lawfully searching the area where the evidence is found and the incriminatory nature of

the evidence must be immediately apparent.” Roe v. Sherry, 91 F.3d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir.

1996). The Court agrees. Agents were lawfully searching Fabel’s property pursuant to the

search warrant and Detective Liburdi reasonably believed that the illegal alteration of the

motorcycle was immediately apparent.2

 The seizure was therefore valid.

3. Franks Hearing

As with the 2003 warrant, the Court concludes that a Franks hearing is not appropriate at

this time. The Court does not believe that the defendant has made an adequate preliminary

showing that Agent Meador’s alleged omissions were intentional or that they undermined the

magistrate judge’s conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Fabel’s motion to suppress (Dkt. 299) is DENIED.

 DATED this 6th day of February, 2007.

A

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

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