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42–947 PDF 2008

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 

FACILITY STAFFING 

(110–138) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 11, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

BOB FILNER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York, Vice Chair 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Conley, David, Vice President, FAA Managers Association, Inc. ........................ 4 

Dillingham, Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 4 

Forrey, Patrick, President, Air Traffic Controllers Association ........................... 4 

Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization, Federal 

Aviation Administration ...................................................................................... 4 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 4 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 50 

Cohen, Hon. Steve, of Tennessee ............................................................................ 52 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 53 

Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas .................................................................. 59 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 63 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 65 

Poe, Hon. Ted, of Texas ........................................................................................... 67 

Salazar, Hon. John T., of Colorado ........................................................................ 73 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Conley, David S. ...................................................................................................... 76 

Dillingham, Gerald L. ............................................................................................. 88 

Forrey, Patrick ......................................................................................................... 107 

Krakowski, Hank ..................................................................................................... 128 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L. ...................................................................................... 154 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization, Federal 

Aviation Administration: 

Response to request from Rep. Richardson ........................................................ 17 

Response to request from Rep. Richardson ........................................................ 19 

Response to request from Rep. Richardson ........................................................ 21 

Response to questions from Rep. Costello .......................................................... 139 

Response to questions from Rep. Kuhl, Jr. ........................................................ 142 

Response to questions from Rep. Mica ............................................................... 146 

Response to questions from Rep. Richardson .................................................... 150 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

Don Chapman, Federal Aviation Administration, Professional Controller, 

written statement ................................................................................................. 175 

Melvin S. Davis, Southern California TRACON, Facility Representative and 

Certified Professional Controller, written statement ........................................ 178 

Steven A. Wallace, Federal Aviation Administration, Certified Professional 

Controller, written statement ............................................................................. 184 

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(1) 

HEARING ON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 

FACILITY STAFFING 

Wednesday, June 11, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:17 p.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerry F. Costello 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. Obviously everyone knows now that we have been on the floor voting since 

about 1:30 and hopefully we will not be interrupted, but there are 

no guarantees on this end. You never know when we will get a 

vote. But we appreciate your patience. The Chair will ask all Members and staff at this time to turn 

their electronic devices off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on air traffic control facility staffing. I will summarize my opening statement, call on Mr. Petri to give an opening statement or his remarks, and then we will introduce our first panel of witnesses and 

under the 5-minute rule ask them to offer their testimony, and I 

am sure will have questions as well. 

I welcome everybody today on the Subcommittee hearing on air 

traffic control facility staffing. The public relies on our air traffic 

controllers every day to make sure runways operate safely, flight 

patterns are checked, systematic takeoffs and arrivals occur and, 

most importantly, that airplanes maintain separation. They do 

these activities 130,000 times every day, making air traffic the 

safest form of transportation in the United States. 

However, we are facing a serious problem, some believe a crisis, 

in the controller workforce. Because of the PATCO strike and subsequent firing of air traffic controllers in 1981, most of the air traffic controllers that we have today in the workforce were hired in 

the mid-1980s. As a result, most are eligible to retire and it is very 

clear, at least to me, that the FAA was not and is not ready to deal 

with the situation. As early as 2002, the Government Accountability Office warned of a controller retirement crisis. 

Further exasperating the problem has been the FAA’s imposition 

of a contract on the air traffic controllers. According to NATCA, the 

National Air Traffic Controllers Union, since the workforce rules 

were imposed on controllers, retirement and attrition numbers 

have increased. Fatigue and operational errors are at an all-time 

high and morale is very low. 

2 

Already in fiscal year 2008 the FAA has lost 954 experienced 

controllers, almost 5 controllers per day. According to NATCA, 

since the beginning of fiscal year 2007, 40,000 years of experience 

has been lost. This situation has some serious efficiency and safety 

consequences. Around the country, because of staffing shortages 

and misalignment between experienced personnel and new hires, 

more experienced controllers are being asked to work longer hours 

to handle increasingly congested runways and airspace. 

Fatigue is becoming an issue that must be addressed and is creating risk to the operational efficiency and safety of the air traffic 

control system. A good example is the rate of runway incursions. 

So far this year we have had 16 type A and B incursions. I believe 

controller fatigue and scheduling are factors in these incursions 

and they must be addressed. 

Though the FAA prides itself in reducing the time it takes to 

train a controller, there are many facilities where controllers are 

not receiving their training in a timely manner. I am concerned 

that unless this problem is dealt with, there will be an increase in 

the attrition rate of new hires, making a bad situation even worse. 

The numbers the FAA uses in the Controller Workforce Plans, the 

CWP, can be deceiving. While the CWP is accurate that the number of controllers has increased since 2004, the FAA does not differentiate between a certified controller and one still in training. 

This is a critical piece of information that must be reported to all 

stakeholders. According to the Department of Transportation Inspector General, the number of controllers in training has increased by 62 percent while the number of certified controllers has 

decreased by 11 percent. 

The FAA’s controller workforce is dramatically changing and it 

needs to acknowledge that and work with stakeholders and Congress to keep up with our air transportation system and make sure 

that it is running safely and efficiently. 

With that, I welcome our witnesses here today and before I recognize Mr. Petri for his opening statement or comments, I would 

ask unanimous consent to allow 2 weeks for all Members to revise 

and extend their remarks and to permit the submission of additional statements and materials by Members and witnesses. Without objection, so ordered. 

And at this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an important and timely hearing to discuss air traffic control facility 

staffing. The controller retirement bubble we have been discussing 

for years is beginning to burst. 

As we are all aware, following the PATCO strike in ’81 a large 

number of controllers were fired and an equally large number were 

hired. In the early ’80s the FAA hired over 12,000 controllers. During that time 80 percent of the Nation’s air traffic controllers were 

developmental controllers in training. Today 25 percent of the Nation’s controllers are developmental controllers. Now, not surprisingly, over 25 years later, the controllers hired in the ’80s are approaching or reaching retirement age. As they retire others begin 

their careers. 

Over the last several years FAA has pursued an aggressive recruitment and hiring plan. In 2007, the FAA hired some 1,800 conVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
3 

trollers and it plans to hire nearly 1,900 more in 2008. Ultimately 

the FAA plans to have 16,371 controllers on board by 2017. As this 

wave of retirements was anticipated, we would have been better off 

if this hiring had begun sooner to allow more transition time. 

While the FAA has had little trouble recruiting new controllers, the 

large number of developmental controllers is creating new challenges. 

The FAA must ensure that air traffic control facilities are properly staffed and that controllers receive all required training. Of 

particular concern to me is how the FAA will ensure the appropriate ratio of certified controllers to developmental controllers at 

each air traffic control facility. I realize that this involves a balancing act. However, the FAA needs to remain vigilant and keep 

it a priority. 

We also must be mindful that the needs of the air traffic control 

system are changing. With the transition to NextGen, the role of 

controllers is going to change. During the transition to NextGen 

the FAA must work closely with controllers to develop the best 

training and operational processes for the new air traffic management system. Likewise, it will be vital that we update our facilities 

and ensure that they are staffed appropriately. 

Finally, I would like to reiterate that everyone would be well 

served if the controllers union and FAA management can settle 

their outstanding labor issues. I understand that FAA sent NATCA 

a new settlement offer in the last day or so, and as I have done 

many times before, I would like to again encourage the parties to 

seriously pursue settlement discussions. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. I 

look forward to our witnesses, and I yield back the balance of my 

time, and I think Mr. Poe has a statement if you take them. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and 

would ask because of the delay in beginning the hearing if Members would consider submitting their opening statements for the 

record so that we could proceed to our witnesses. Is there any objection to that? If not, then the Chair appreciates your consideration and will now recognize the first panel of two today that we 

will be hearing from. Our first panel, I will introduce all of our witnesses: Mr. Hank Krakowski, who is the Chief Operating Officer of 

the Air Traffic Control Organization at the FAA; the Honorable 

Calvin Scovel, who is the Inspector General of the U.S. Department 

of Transportation; Dr. Gerald Dillingham is the Director of the 

Physical Infrastructure Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office; Mr. Patrick Forrey, who is the President of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association; and Mr. David Conley, 

who is the Vice President of the FAA Managers Association. 

Gentlemen, we welcome you before the Subcommittee. Again we 

apologize for the late start of the Subcommittee hearing. But we 

are anxious to hear your testimony and we would ask you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes which will allow Members the 

opportunity to ask questions. We of course will receive your testimony and ask questions of the first panel before we move on to the 

second panel. 

With that, Mr. Krakowski you are recognized under the 5-minute 

rule. 

4 

TESTIMONY OF HANK KRAKOWSKI, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; THE HON. CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; 

DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE; PATRICK FORREY, PRESIDENT, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; AND DAVID CONLEY, VICE PRESIDENT, FAA MANAGERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Okay and I intend to be brief. Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Sub- committee, it is an honor to be before you today to talk about air 

traffic controller staffing. I joined the FAA after a long career in 

safety and operations, and I came to FAA to focus on safety, efficiency, and to work to improve the labor relations atmosphere. The 

American people deserve nothing less. Aviation has experienced a decade of turbulence: the events of 9/ 

11, airline failures and bankruptcies, with unspeakable trauma on 

the private sector employees that work for those companies. Delays 

in soaring fuel prices are before us now. Yet over the last decade 

the safety of aviation in the United States continues to improve. 

We are now the best in the world. The employees of the FAA produced this record, the controllers, technicians, managers, scientists, 

inspectors, and staff all working together as a team. 

Serious runway incursions have been brought down by focused 

efforts in the past year. Significant operational errors are level but 

still above our targets by about one per day, and we do need to 

work harder on that. Yet the flying public does remain safe because 

a combination of training, teamwork and technology continues to 

provide the safety net when human error does occur. 

We will shortly be rolling out our first efforts to improve the 

safety culture within the ATO with NATCA in the Midwest, with 

our Air Traffic Safety Action Program. Both NATCA President 

Forrey and I are committed to make this work, and I thank him 

for his unwavering leadership in this critical safety initiative. 

Next week, FAA will be convening its first ever Fatigue Safety 

Summit, bringing together worldwide leaders in the science of understanding fatigue and human factors. Airlines, manufacturers, 

and the FAA will be represented as well with strong support from 

the National Transportation Safety Board. New techniques of 

science and scheduling technology will be presented and evaluated, 

and our hope is that there will be actionable strategies which can 

be understood and implemented for the 24 by 7 nature of the ATO 

workforce. 

It has taken a few years to smooth out our hiring and training 

efforts, but today we are solidly on target with our hiring plan. Better hiring processes and training are yielding greater stability to 

the plan in the efforts we have underway. This year we plan to hire 

2,000 controllers here in 2008 and right now we have 7,500 candidates for those opportunities. We will carefully watch the mix of 

new controllers with the established controllers as they enter the 

workforce. We are deploying 24 high fidelity tower simulators, 

which have already demonstrated a 25 to 50 percent reduction in 

training time. 

5 

In response to the Inspector General, we are also establishing a 

new Vice President of Technical Training to ensure that the national focus of our training efforts is understood and well managed. 

We have used retention incentives to retain retirement-eligible controllers, and we have hired seasonal controllers to work as instructors through our contract training program. 

Finally, the FAA is working diligently to craft solutions to our 

ongoing labor dispute. I will hold my management team accountable for being part of that solution as we operate the system with 

fiscal responsibility while setting our employees up for success. 

Leadership from labor will also be required to achieve that aspiration. We have an opportunity to do this, but it will demand focus 

and leadership from both sides. 

There is something unique about aviation professionals. While 

labor and management have inherent conflicts, professionalism always prevails. When people are working traffic, flying airplanes, or 

doing their jobs, their work continues to be stellar. As they continue to serve the traveling public with distinction this translates 

into a reliable and a safe system. We have many issues to address 

from refreshing the workforce to the transition to NextGen modernization. These efforts are too important to be attenuated by a 

continuing atmosphere of contentious labor relations. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Petri, and Members of the Committee, the 

dedicated employees of the Air Traffic Organization are proud to be 

providing a critical service to the American people. To enhance this 

mission we need to continue to find ways to work better together 

to keep our skies as safe as possible, and I very much look forward 

to working with the Committee as we proceed. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you Mr. Krakowski and now 

recognizes the Inspector General Mr. Scovel. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to 

testify today regarding key issues facing FAA’s controller workforce. FAA plans to hire and train nearly 17,000 new controllers to 

offset retirements over the next decade. Ensuring enough certified 

controllers at FAA’s more than 300 air traffic control facilities will 

remain a significant watch item for this Subcommittee. 

Since 2005, 3,300 controllers have left the workforce, 23 percent 

higher than FAA had projected. However, since 2005 FAA has 

hired 3,450 new controllers, 25 percent more than projected. FAA 

now faces a fundamental transformation in the composition of its 

controller workforce. New controllers represent 25 percent of the 

workforce, up from 15 percent in 2004. 

Addressing controller attrition will be FAA’s major challenge for 

at least the next 10 years, and the agency must focus its efforts on 

three key areas: First, FAA must improve controller facility training. Last week we issued our report on FAA’s Controller Facility 

Training Program, our second review of this program since 2004. 

FAA is taking actions at the national level to get this important 

program on track. For example, FAA is increasing the use of simulators and contractor training support. However, the program continues to be extremely decentralized and the efficiency and quality 

of the training vary from location to location. 

6 

We have identified several actions to improve this important program. First, FAA must establish realistic standards for the number 

of developmental controllers that facilities can accommodate. FAA 

plans to increase the number of developmental controllers to over 

30 percent of the total workforce, which would be the highest percentage of developmentals in 15 years. FAA estimates that the 

total controller workforce at each facility can include up to 35 percent developmentals. As of April 2008, 67 facilities nationwide, 21 

percent of all FAA air traffic control facilities, already exceeded 

that level which could significantly increase training times because 

the number of developmental controllers would surpass training capacity. Given the various sizes and complexities of FAA’s 300 facilities, FAA needs to identify by facility how many developmentals 

each facility can realistically accommodate. Next FAA must clarify 

responsibility for oversight and direction of the facility training 

program at the national level. Facility training is shared between 

four different ATO Vice Presidents. As a result of these overlapping 

responsibilities, we found significant confusion at the facility level 

over exactly who is in charge. In its statement today, FAA announced that it has created a new senior position responsible for 

training, a much-needed step. 

Second, FAA must address controller human factors. Addressing 

controller human factors such as fatigue and situational awareness 

is important for maintaining safe operations of the NAS. In its investigation of Comair Flight 5191, NTSB expressed concern that 

the lone controller on duty at the time of the accident had only 

slept about 2 hours before his shift. Training new controllers on 

human factor issues as well as technical aspects of air traffic control, such as airspace, phraseology, and procedures, will become increasingly important as FAA begins to address the large influx of 

new controllers. 

In April 2003, we reported that almost 90 percent of controller 

operational errors were due to human factor issues rather than 

procedural or equipment deficiencies. In May 2007, we again reported that FAA needed to focus on controller human factors and 

training in order to reduce the risk of runway incursions caused by 

controllers. At the time FAA had done little in this area. Since last 

year, however, FAA has made progress in addressing human factor 

training initiatives. 

Third, FAA must ensure consistency and accuracy in reporting 

and addressing controller operational errors. As FAA transitions to 

a new and relatively inexperienced controller workforce, it must investigate, mitigate and accurately report operational errors. In 

2004, we reported that FAA relied on an inaccurate self-reporting 

system to track operational errors. Only 20 of FAA’s more than 300 

air traffic control facilities had an automated system to identify 

operational errors. In response, FAA is developing an automated 

system, Traffic Analysis and Review Program, to identify when 

operational errors occur at TRACON facilities. FAA started deploying this system in fiscal year 2008 with an estimated completion 

date at all locations by the end of calendar year 2009. FAA must 

ensure that these programs are used to enhance safety and must 

protect a new voluntary disclosure program, the Air Traffic Safety 

Action Program, from potential misuse. 

7 

Our work on a similar program which grants immunity to airline 

employees who report safety problems found that safety information was either inaccessible or not used to resolve the cause of the 

reported safety issue. FAA must ensure that similar issues do not 

occur with ATSAP. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy 

to address your questions and those of the Subcommittee. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Scovel. And the Chair now recognizes Dr. Dillingham. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Chairman Costello, Mr. Petri, 

Members of the Subcommittee. My testimony this afternoon focuses 

on three air traffic controller workforce issues: First, the status of 

workforce attrition and hiring; second, facility staffing and its implications for the operation and safety of the Nation’s air traffic 

control system; and, third, controller training for current ATC operations and NextGen. 

With regard to attrition and hiring our analysis shows that experienced controllers are retiring faster than expected. For example, 

the proportion of controllers that are retiring within 2 years of becoming eligible has increased about from 33 percent in 2005 to 42 

percent in 2007. Although we have not seen a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the increased attrition, we do know that only 

a very small minority of it is because of mandatory retirement age. 

For example, in 2007 of the more than 1,600 attritions, only 17 

were mandatory retirements. This pattern continues into early 

2008. 

To address this attrition and increase its pool of candidates, FAA 

has undertaken several initiatives. As a result, FAA met retiring 

goals in 2006, 2007, and is on target for meeting its 2008 goals. 

With regard to my second issue, facility staffing, there are two 

key parts, the number of staff at a facility and the ratio of developmental controllers to fully certified controllers. In terms of staff 

numbers, we found that in May of 2008, 145 of 314 facilities were 

overstaffed and 12 were understaffed when compared with FAA 

staffing standards. According to FAA, it is deliberately overstaffing 

facilities with new hires so they will be trained and ready to replace retiring controllers over the next few years. Although we 

have some concerns about overstaffing as a concept, we think it 

makes sense. However, we are more concerned about the potential 

implications of understaffing for the safety and efficiency of the 

ATC system. 

The major implication of understaffing is greater use of overtime, 

which can lead to fatigue. We have previously reported that controllers at some of the Nation’s busiest airports are working 6 days 

a week because of staffing shortages. To its credit FAA is addressing this issue by establishing a group of stakeholders to work on 

solutions for this problem and offering incentives of up to $25,000 

for controllers to relocate to understaffed facilities. 

NTSB has also recommended that FAA take steps to mitigate air 

traffic controller fatigue, including working with NATCA to revise 

controller work scheduling policies. However, we are concerned because NATCA and FAA disagree on the level of cooperation that is 

taking place between them on these issues. 

8 

Regarding the ratio of developmental controllers to CPCs, historically trainees have accounted for less than 35 percent of the controller workforce. But because of the increase in retirements and 

hiring, these proportions are in flux. An imbalance between developmental and CPCs within facilities could have some potentially 

serious implications, including increased overtime, reduced system 

efficiency, and extended training time for developmental controllers. FAA is working to develop target ranges for facilities in light 

of these current circumstances. We think this is a positive development. 

Training, my last issue, according to FAA, it has reduced the 

time it takes to train controllers by about a year. Controller training took from 3 to 4 years in 2005. It took 2 to 3 years in 2007. 

We caution that it may not be prudent for FAA to base estimates 

of its future capacity for developing CPCs on these early results, 

which may not be sustainable over time. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, we have identified two additional training concerns that call for FAA’s immediate attention. First, the attrition rate for developmental controllers has increased from 6 percent in 2006 to 9 percent in 2007 and 

is expected to rise to 14 percent in 2008. The IG’s work suggested 

that even these figures may be low. This increase has serious budgetary implications since each time a trainee is lost, the government’s investment to date is also lost. 

A second training concern is related to NextGen. NextGen is a 

new paradigm that requires a new approach to training, including 

a focus on human factors and automation. Our work has shown 

that if human factors are not considered early in the development 

of systems, there will be delays in implementation and substantial 

cost increases. We are concerned that FAA has not obtained the expertise needed to conduct human factors research necessary for 

NextGen training, has not prioritized the needed research, and has 

not identified a funding source for it. 

We also emphasize the importance of including controllers and 

other key stakeholders in developmental activities associated with 

NextGen training since they will be participants in NextGen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Dr. Dillingham, and now 

recognizes Mr. Forrey. 

Mr. FORREY. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, my written testimony 

should be before you. In the interest of time I will try to summarize 

and keep my remarks short and answer any questions you may 

have. 

Let me begin by thanking you. Mr. Chairman, for your understanding and attention and commitment to the air traffic controller 

staffing levels and for holding this important hearing. Under your 

leadership the House passed a comprehensive bill to address the 

many issues facing the National Airspace System, including controller retention and staffing levels, which is the subject of today’s 

hearing. The men and women of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association hope that the Senate will follow suit and reconsider the FAA Reauthorization and Modernization Act that unforVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
9 

tunately fell victim to jurisdictional and procedural bickering last 

month. 

With the current authorization set to expire June 30 and with 

unmatched controller attrition rates approaching five per day, it 

has never been more imperative to address this issue than it is 

today. The National Airspace System is currently is experiencing 

an unprecedented and unsustainable loss of air traffic controllers, 

and those that have followed this issue know that NATCA attributes the current retirement wave to. 

Before I get into that portion of my testimony, I want to tell the 

Subcommittee that the men and women I represent are among the 

most dedicated and professional employees found in government. 

Every day I am reminded that their first commitment has always 

been and continues to be the safe operation of our National Airspace System. The safety of the flying public will always be the priority of the union and of all the safety-relocated professionals that 

work for the FAA. I worry that sometimes this fact may get lost 

on the Members of the Subcommittee because of the focus of our 

labor dispute with the agency. 

Let me be clear. This country is facing an air traffic control staffing crisis. The crisis is real, the crisis is serious, and the crisis is 

now. Those losses are leading to insufficient staffing levels across 

the country, requiring more use of overtime and leading to increased fatigue. All of this adds up to a burned out workforce and 

an unacceptable compromise to safety. 

The FAA touts that they are hiring enough trainees to make up 

for the retiring of veterans and they are certifying faster than before. However, between fiscal 2005 and the end of fiscal 2007, of 

the 3,450 trainees still employed by the FAA because many have 

left, only 538 have achieved full certification. That is fewer than 16 

percent. Of the 525 hired this year and still employed in the first 

6 months of fiscal 2008, only 4 have fully certified. 

Before the imposition of the work rules which the FAA continues 

to mislabel as a contract, the agency told Congress and the Subcommittee that there would not be a mass exodus of air traffic controllers. Unfortunately, the FAA was wrong. In June of 2006, the 

FAA predicted that 950 controllers would leave the workforce in 

fiscal 2007. The actual attrition numbers of controllers leaving in 

2007 was 1,622, 70 percent higher than the agency’s prediction. 

And halfway through fiscal 2008, we are down another 960 controllers and trainees, on a pace to break last year’s staggering losses. 

The FAA failed to plan for the retirement wave by hiring 13 controllers in 2004. They exacerbated that wave by prematurely cutting off contract negotiations in 2006 and causing an attrition tsunami that has seen nearly 2,700 controllers leave since they implemented that system. It is not by coincidence that delays, near 

misses, and runway incursions have all increased as the number of 

controllers has diminished. 

In facilities across the country, most notably in our busiest towers, centers and TRACONs, controllers are spending more time on 

position and work more airplanes with fewer certified controllers 

since 1992, resulting in a dangerously fatigued workforce. 

Aviation delays have increased since the work rules were imposed in 2006, and in our estimate this is no coincidence. Fiscal 

10 

year 2007 saw the number of delayed aircraft increase by more 

than 20,000 over the previous year, far outpacing the .2 percent increase in operations. Last month the Joint Economic Committee released a report that found that flight delays cost the U.S. economy 

an astounding $41 billion last year, while travelers lost a jaw-dropping 21 million hours in wasted time. Similarly, a recent association study by the Travel Industry Association determined that passengers concerned with delays have led them to bypass air travel 

altogether, costing the economy on additional $26 billion. 

The FAA’s response has been to unilaterally implement other 

misguided policies that work only to ensure that adequate staffing 

level targets continue to be missed. The FAA’s insistence on moving on with controversial consolidations, decombinations, and other 

realignments of facilities and service requires more, not less controllers, cost more per operation and results in more operation errors when compared to other split facilities. 

The agency also continues to sell NextGen as a cure-all for all 

aviation woes, from congestion to safety to efficient fuel use and 

even controller staffing. But I remind the Members of the Subcommittee that NextGen is at least 2 decades away. Before we 

hang our hat on a still conceptual program to take aviation to the 

next generation, let us fix the problems of the NowGen air traffic 

control system. And rather than taking a blind leap of faith, 

NATCA makes the following recommendations to help build a solid 

foundation that will safely bridge the gap between NowGen and 

NextGen. 

First, the FAA and NATCA must return to the bargaining table 

to complete contract negotiations. Doing so will help to retain the 

veteran controllers that are leaving the system at unsustainable 

record levels. These veteran controllers are responsible for on-thejob training that turns a trainee into a certified controller and their 

retention is essential to maintaining safe operations of the system. 

Second, the FAA must work with NATCA and the National Academy of Sciences or another independent third party to not only reestablish scientifically based staffing ranges for each facility, but 

also to establish concrete limits on training ratios at the facility 

level. These ratios, along with the current trainee to certified professional controller ratio breakdown of the workforce by a facility, 

must be published in the FAA’s annual workforce plan. 

Third, standardized training must continue to be the foundation 

for the development of skilled and capable air traffic controllers. 

The FAA must stop issuing blanket waivers on training to chronically understaffed facilities. 

And finally, in order to avoid such a crisis in the future, the FAA 

must work collaterally and cooperatively with NATCA on all issues 

affecting air traffic controllers or their operations. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer questions 

when you want them. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Forrey, and now recognizes Mr. Conley. 

Mr. CONLEY. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to 

testify before you today. I am the Vice President of the FAA ManVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
11 

agers Association. I am here on annual leave, and my comments 

do not represent the FAA. 

The FAA Managers Association’s mission is to promote excellence 

in public service and, in particular, represent the managers who 

ensure aviation safety and efficiency. Among those we represent 

are the front line managers who train and oversee the Nation’s air 

traffic controllers. It is critical that you know that to become a 

front line manager, each of our air traffic front line managers must 

have first served successfully as an air traffic controller. 

I would like to focus my comments on three areas. First, I would 

like to address new controllers; second, the need to increase the 

minimum number of supervisors within the FAA; and, third, our 

association’s views on how the system is functioning. 

It is undeniable that there is a need for additional controllers. 

However, it must be noted that with the hiring of new controllers, 

management and oversight is critical. Proper supervision is essential to a safe aviation system, and we believe that the best person 

to provide that oversight is a trained and dedicated front line manager. 

I have been hearing from managers across the United States 

that the new recruits are eager and enthusiastic. They are up for 

the challenge of an accelerated and rigorous training program. The 

main difficulty we foresee is that the abundance of training will 

cause a backlog of simulation time as they compete with other 

forms of recurrent or remedial training. Although there are naturally some exceptions, we have every reason to be optimistic about 

the new batch of air traffic controller recruits. Lack of front line 

managers’ oversight during training is a very big problem. Once 

training has been completed, oversight of these newly certified controllers is essential. 

I was hired by the FAA in 1983, assigned to Little Rock Tower 

and TRACON and completed training at the tower at the age of 19. 

So I can identify with the newer controllers. The difference between then and now is that in 1981 through 1983 we had approximately 2,600 front line managers and fully staffed training departments. Today these numbers have been diminished by hundreds. 

Unfortunately, we have walked into the situation with eyes wide 

open. 

It has come to our attention that there are some currently in the 

workforce disparaging our new hires. We believe these stories to be 

an unfortunate mischaracterization of our new recruits. The enthusiasm of today’s new recruits has enhanced the overall morale at 

a number of facilities. We appreciate their dedication and welcome 

them to the team. These new recruits have brought passion and a 

youthful energy back into a workforce that has been plagued by 

contractual disagreements and low morale. Our organization is 

very concerned that a lack of sufficient oversight and mentoring 

could lead them towards a path of failure. 

Essentially it is about providing support for the controllers. This 

is true whether a facility is fully staffed or severely understaffed. 

The oversight requirement is still the same, oversight is essential. 

As an association, increasing the number of air traffic front line 

managers has been and still remains our number one priority in 

pending FAA reauthorization legislation. The FAA’s statistics show 

12 

that there is clearly a link in the air traffic environment between 

the levels of supervision and safety. According to our research, the 

minimum number of front line managers needed to effectively supervise our air traffic control system is 2,060. We arrived at this 

number by conducting a facility-by-facility audit based on our collective experience of what the appropriate level should be. 

The FAA Managers Association has held firmly that the number 

of front line managers should not be based on a ratio to the number of controllers. FAA has long used ratios, but ratios clearly do 

not make sense. The job of a front line manager is not characterized by how many people they supervise. We believe that a rigidly 

fixed ratio system fails to recognize the operational significance of 

the supervisors’ duties. These men and women are not office managers. They are operational managers leading in the day-to-day delivery of safety and efficiency services to our customers. 

In a snapshot, we are currently understaffed. We see upcoming 

retirements in our ranks. Our employment pool of qualified applicants is diminishing with their own retirements and those we are 

charging with supervising our new. Managing oversight is more 

critical now than ever before. 

Finally, the air traffic control system is the safest and most efficient system in the world. Our goal is not only to keep it that way, 

but also to make it better. We have some stress points that present 

some management challenges, but we believe that together we can 

meet the challenges of both today and tomorrow. 

I would like to again thank this Committee for inviting me to 

testify, and I am available for your questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Conley, and I will ask 

a few questions and ask Mr. Petri and then get to the other Members. I know that we have several Members here who have questions as well. 

Mr. Krakowski, you are the guy here speaking for the FAA 

today, and realizing that you have been in your position, I guess, 

since October or November of last year and weren’t around to make 

these projections as to the number of controllers that would retire 

in 2006, 2007, and 2007, one, you heard in my opening statement, 

and you and I have talked about my concerns over the number of 

controllers that are retiring, the experienced controllers who are 

leaving at a much higher rate than the FAA anticipated or projected, the difference between the number of certified controllers 

versus the noncertified or those new hires that are in training, and 

of course the runway incursions that have taken place, 16 in I 

think the first quarter or first half of this year. I think there is a 

correlation between everything that is going on here. 

Do you share the same concern, not only the fact that there are 

more experienced controllers leaving, that there are fewer certified 

controllers on the job than the FAA anticipated, the fact that there 

are controllers who are working overtime? We heard the case in 

Washington where the controller was worked 8 hours, off 8 hours, 

had to come back 8 hours later and had about 2 hours sleep. While 

the unfortunate accident was not controller error, it was discovered 

that he only had 2 hours sleep in a 24-hour period. 

So those are genuine legitimate concerns that I think everyone 

has, and I just wonder are they concerns that you share as well. 

13 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, actually, for clarity let me answer the runway incursion piece first because—— 

Mr. COSTELLO. Can you move the microphone a little closer. 

Thank you. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes, sir. Of those 16 runway incursions, only six 

were operational errors by controllers. None that we know of had 

any fatigue aspects to them. The other eight were pilot deviations 

into a vehicle or pedestrian deviations on the surface of the airport. 

And in a couple of those cases, the controllers actually were really 

on the ball to prevent something from getting worse in those situations. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You probably saw the article in USA Today concerning pilot fatigue as well. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes. Let’s start there because I have been an 

airplane pilot for nearly 35 years. And since the early 1920s, in 

this business, fatigue has always been present, not just for controllers, but pilots, flight attendants, mechanics. I think there is something unique happening next week. Next week, the FAA will start 

their first ever global symposium on fatigue for all aviation workers, all those categories I just talked to. 

When I was at my previous employer, we actually talked to people, who are leading scientific technologies, who have developed 

techniques and software to allow companies to actually predict fatigue, look at what the cycle is, look at the recovery time after long 

duty days. This will all be discussed at this fatigue seminar. 

NTSB, it is one of their big recommendations, they are going to 

be there in force, and this is the first time that we have had the 

entire aviation community really looking at how do we handle this 

from a data-driven, scientific point of view, which I think is the 

right approach. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I am aware of that and I compliment the FAA, 

and I think that has been urged by both the IG and the GAO as 

well. So it is a step in the right direction and hopefully we will 

learn some things as a result. 

The number of controllers that are retiring, five per day, the 

most experienced controllers, that obviously is more than the agency anticipated. There probably are several reasons why, but in your 

opinion why is this happening? Why are so many experienced—and 

you heard Dr. Dillingham, his testimony, that only a handful of 

these controllers retired because of mandatory retirement. They 

chose to retire, and why is that? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. First of all, I would like to update you on the 

numbers that we see today because I think that is instructive. We 

have missed our projections over the past couple of years by around 

125 per year, 125 controllers more retired than we were planning. 

This year, we are at 10 over right now. We are planning at this 

point in time for a run rate of about 17 over. Eight hundred and 

nine retirees is what we were planning. The reasons for it, Mr. 

Chairman, some are clearly personal decisions, but I won’t deny 

that the labor atmosphere may have something to do with it. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You would agree that—I mean everyone that has 

testified before this Subcommittee in the last year or so has acknowledged there is a problem with morale within the controller 

14 

workforce and the relationship between the FAA and the controllers. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. That is one of the reasons I took the job, sir, is 

that I came from a background of a lot of experience with a lot of 

different labor unions in good times and bad times. We are trying 

to move it along a little bit. There is a little bit of thawing. The 

ATSAP program I think is a demonstration of that. It will be our 

first key test whether this workforce can work together between 

management and labor to handle those issues. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Since I have limited time and we have other 

Members that want to ask questions, I was out at the academy and 

I think it was in November, and it was interesting to me. It struck 

me that in talking to and looking at new recruits and trainees, that 

they were enrolled in the academy and taking training, the lack of 

experienced people coming into the profession as opposed to a time 

when many controllers who were entering the workforce had military experience or past experience. And is there a reason why that 

is happening, why we do not have the number of experienced controllers coming from the military side, retiring or leaving the military and coming into the FAA as a controller? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. The bulk of our hires last year did come either 

out of the military or what we call our CTI schools, which I know 

you are familiar with. 

Mr. COSTELLO. When you say coming out of the military, I spoke 

with some of your recruits and trainees that came out of the military but they were not controllers. They were in other positions 

within the military. I am speaking past experienced controllers in 

the military. Are you saying that most of your trainees had prior 

experience as a controller in the military? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. No. No. These are military people that are 

clearly good—— 

Mr. COSTELLO. Big difference. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I don’t deny that. But now we are actually running out of that pool of candidates as we do hiring for 2008. Most 

of the new hires, the 7,500 candidates I spoke to, will be people 

coming from the general population. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I have other questions for other members of the 

panel, but I have taken more time than I should have and I will 

now recognize Mr. Petri for his questions. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

First, I would like to ask Mr. Krakowski kind of a parochial 

question in a sense. In February, the Milwaukee air traffic control 

took over control from the Chicago Center of the Ripon airspace in 

central Wisconsin. Could you give us an update on how that transition has been going? There has been concern expressed by a number of people who have had 4 months of experience. And also could 

you discuss what preparations are needed or being planned for the 

EAA AirVenture this summer? It was sort of an annual but unique 

experience for the area and for the system? Concerns have been expressed to me about whether the controllers are ready or adequately trained for challenges they may face due to the increased 

traffic from this particular event. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Petri. The Milwaukee airspace 

transition went as planned, quite smoothly in our opinion. It apVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
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pears to be working well from everything that I have been able to 

determine. There have been some frequency problems, radio frequency problems, which actually were in existence prior to the 

transition, which we are working on. But the general read is it is 

going well. I am also getting good information relative to the Oshkosh event, which I always go to, being an aircraft owner myself, 

and I am being assured that the controllers that will be working 

on it will be adequately trained and ready for that event. I think 

one of the aspects of Oshkosh this year, which will be interesting, 

is with the increased cost fuel and insurance, we are receiving a 

dramatic, and I mean a dramatic, reduction in general aviation flying right now. So I am not quite sure what that means for Oshkosh. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. And also I referred in my opening statement to this, that there have been on again, off again negotiations 

to attempt to resolve the impasse that exists, and I wonder if you 

could tell me whether you in fact do currently have a new or revised settlement offer on the table and what it entails. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Mr. Petri, I wouldn’t characterize them as negotiations. There have been some settlement offers and concepts moving back and forth over the past few months. We refreshed one 

here this week which was presented to NATCA yesterday. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Forrey, if you have any comments. 

Mr. FORREY. Sure. I think first of all Mr. Krakowski is well 

underinformed about what is going on in Milwaukee. Let me tell 

you what is really going on in Milwaukee. They have terrible automation problems with the creation of the Ripon airspace. Their 

hand-offs are going to wrong sectors, going to wrong airports. By 

the way, all this documentation is documented at the facility level. 

They do have the statistics on this. The Ripon sector, those sectors, 

that airspace was designed to help the O’Hare modernization process. It is two sectors, a high and a low. They do not have enough 

staffing to decombine the position. So, therefore, they are now having to work that as one sector, working twice the capacity of traffic 

trying to go through there, and it is not working well at all. 

They have—this month as far as overtime, they have scheduled 

129 hours of 8-hour shifts, the controllers, to work this airspace. 

Sixty times they have used 10-hour days. So controllers have had 

to work sixty times 10-hour-long days. The month of July they 

have already scheduled 134 shifts of overtime. Several controllers 

there out of the last 30 weeks have worked 26 weeks 6-day weeks. 

Trainees are being assigned overtime for flight data. Flight data is 

processing flight plan information and stuff like that for the controllers. They currently have 37 certified professional controllers 

there. One is medical disqualified and will retire this year. One has 

been selected for the supervisor’s job, which, by the way, are 100 

percent staffed across the country, unlike the controller workforce. 

They have one mandatory retirement for this year for eligible by 

the year 2009. They currently have nine trainees. One of them 

probably will check out this year and certify fully, two possibly at 

the end of next year. 

So if that sounds like a rosy picture to you, I want to drink what 

you are drinking. That sounds like a serious problem going on in 

Milwaukee. As far as Oshkosh is concerned, they are going to have 

16 

more trouble with that kind of low staffing numbers. They don’t 

have enough people to open up those positions they just gave that 

airspace to. I don’t see that as a big—that is not going rosy, and 

that is just indicative of what is going on across the country. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Forrey, let me clarify so I understand what 

you just said before I go on. Repeat that. You said that what percentage of the controllers work 26 weeks, 6-day weeks? 

Mr. FORREY. I didn’t say a percentage, sir. They told me—I asked 

if that was indicative of what is going on in the facility for everybody and the reply back was yes. So I would say the majority of 

controllers have been working 6-day workweeks since January 

when that airspace went over. I don’t have the number, but I certainly can find out for you what the percentage is. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me start 

off with a comment. According to our notes here, the FAA, while 

hiring significant numbers, as you stated, sir, of new controllers, in 

terms of training, though that has really only taken place for the 

last 2 years significantly, most of these employees are still classified as developmental, and the data tells us that these are at 

alarming numbers. When I go to my next set of notes more specific 

to—we talked about today that the rate you feel is appropriate is 

35. However, there are several locations where it is well over that 

number. And according to our notes here, the DOT IG recommends 

that the FAA convene a working group to identify on a case-by-case 

basis the appropriate level of developmental controllers that should 

be assigned to each facility. Has that happened? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes. The working group has been established, 

and they have had a couple of meetings already. Moreover, one of 

the reasons I am establishing a Vice President of Technical Training is to put some real high-level executive focus on just these very 

types of issues. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Excuse me, sir. I am a young freshman here 

and I have got 3 minutes and 47 seconds. So I have got to cut to 

the chase because my Chairman here is going to cut me off. My 

question is has the group informed and have you developed appropriate levels on a case-by-case basis for each facility? Yes or no? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We don’t have the end product out there. The 

working group is working on that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Thank you. So when can we expect that 

to be done? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I will give you an update and send it to your 

office. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. To the whole Committee because I am sure 

they are all concerned. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. You bet. 

[Information follows:] 

17 


42947.010
18 

Ms. RICHARDSON. My next key point that I wanted to go over affects my area personally. Pre-2006 the controller contract pay levels have had no financial incentives to move to a new, more complicated and more demanding facility. Under the pay scales of the 

new contract, many of the controllers would actually have to take 

a reduction in pay to move to a new facility. There is a concern 

that this structural imbalance is creating a shortage of seasoned 

personnel at high-level demanding facilities. 

So my question is how many folks have actually been offered jobs 

at LAX and have turned them down? Do you know. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I will have to get that information for you specifically. I would like to say, however, that the FAA did recognize 

that issue, and we began offering relocation bonuses to the seasoned controllers. Right now we have had two rounds of those into 

key facilities like southern California TRACON, O’Hare, Dallas. We 

have had nearly 100 people accept those moves. We are into round 

three and four of those. So it looks like we have a tool that is starting to move people into the right locations. 

[Information follows:] 

19 


42947.011
20 

Ms. RICHARDSON. How long do you intend upon continuing that 

program? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. As the workforce changes and as people retire 

and the makeup of the facility changes, I think this is going to be 

an ongoing process to get the right people in the right place. It is 

the right way to approach it. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. And then my last question is in September of 2004, the FAA determined in writing that safety required 

management to staff two more swing shifts per day. Why has the 

agency even with the average of 2.6 overtime shifts per day at LAX 

failed every day this year to staff the swing shifts at LAX with the 

required numbers? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We staff to traffic and when—that determination was made in 2004 you say? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. The FAA determined in 2004, September. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I am not sure what assumptions were made relative to that in 2004. What I would like to offer is let me take a 

look at that, take a look at our current staffing and how we are 

staffing to traffic and try to make some sense of that for you. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. And we expect it in writing back to this Committee because, as I said, it is my understanding that at an average of 2.6 overtime shifts per day, you fail to meet that every single 

day is what my understanding is. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We will get that information for you. 

[Information follows:] 

21 


42947.012
22 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, with a minute to 

spare. 

Mr. COSTELLO. With a minute to spare. We will keep that in 

mind the next time you go over. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman and now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all of you for being here today. There is no doubt that 

operational errors, that is when controllers allow airplanes to get 

too close together, and operational deviations, and that is when 

controllers allow airplanes to enter another controller’s airspace 

without permission, are all on the rise nationally. At the Houston 

TRACON at George Bush Intercontinental near my district in 

Houston, errors are up over 2,000 percent from last year, deviations are up over 900 percent, while staffing is down and overtime 

is up. 

As a matter of fact, the FAA added to Houston TRACON’s workload when they decided to transfer the Beaumont airspace to Houston back in April without providing extra staffing. For 2 years I 

have been discussing this with the FAA and have considered other 

people in the area and we all have said that this was going to 

occur. The FAA predicted there would be no staffing shortages, but 

in truth there are staffing shortages at the Houston TRACON. 

To me there is a clear nexus between the staffing shortages, 

overtime usage, operational errors, and deviations. And the FAA 

allows staffing levels at facilities across the country like Houston 

TRACON to plummet while even at this hearing saying things are 

going to be better. It seems to me that the FAA on predictions on 

staff are like predictions by the weather folks. Weather people are 

the only ones I know that can consistently be wrong and keep their 

jobs, and to me it seems like that is what is occurring with the 

FAA in their predictions. 

Mr. POE. As long as I have been on this Committee, the FAA 

says things are getting better, we have a hearing, we find out 

things are getting worse. 

I want to know when staffing shortages are going to stop and actually staffing will increase. And when is overtime, especially mandatory overtime, going to stop and overtime will be reduced? Can 

you tell me when that is going to occur? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We are staffing up each year for the next 10 

years. And, each year, we are adding more controllers. And we actually expect to have more people onboard year after year after 

year. So we are actually growing the controller workforce. As we 

do that, we expect the staffing situation to get measurably better. 

Now, we acknowledge—— 

Mr. POE. What does ′′measurably better′′ mean? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Well, so you have less—— 

Mr. POE. We have air traffic controllers retiring because they are 

working 6 days a week, they are working mandatory overtime. So 

when are things going to really get better? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. When we get the new workforce up and running 

and trained, Congressman. We are pedaling as fast as we can. 

One of the reasons I think we are a bit behind is the technology 

of training. I am used to flight simulators. From where I come 

from, that is how we train pilots. We are deploying 24 of those in 

23 

the next 2 years, 12 this year and 12 next year. We are already 

seeing 25 to 50 percent reductions in training times from these 

high-fidelity devices. 

So our ability to hire the workforce is not really an issue. We 

have 7,500 people competing for 2,000 positions this year. What I 

am really trying to focus on is how do we train them faster so they 

can become, full CPCs faster. 

Mr. POE. Aren’t you concerned about safety by cutting training 

time down by 1 year? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Actually, what we found out in the airline industry is, because of the use of simulators, we were able to reduce 

the footprint, which, actually, the students liked as well. So they 

can get out there and do their job faster and they are better 

trained. These are fantastic devices, and I would like to—— 

Mr. POE. Would you agree that morale is worse? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Morale is a challenge. I will not disagree with— 

Mr. POE. Do you agree that morale is worse, or is it better? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Well, since I am new here, I am not sure the 

what the reference point is. But it is—— 

Mr. POE. You have been there since November. Is it getting better or worse since November? Morale of air traffic controllers, people who work in the system. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. It doesn’t feel to me like it has changed measurably since I have been on the job. 

Mr. POE. I want to ask Mr. Forrey some questions. 

You have heard the answers. Why is morale—well, first of all, is 

it get better or getting worse? 

Mr. FORREY. I think it is getting worse. And that is why—— 

Mr. POE. Why? 

Mr. FORREY. Well, because people are being treated with very 

much disrespect. They are working a lot more time on position 

than they used to in the past. 

Mr. POE. Why are you working more time if you are getting more 

personnel? 

Mr. FORREY. Because the personnel we are getting are trainees. 

They are not certified to work traffic. 

Mr. POE. All right. That explains it. 

Mr. FORREY. And if you have to train someone, you are thinking 

for two people. You are thinking for yourself, and you are thinking 

for the person that is sitting in front of you, in front of the scope. 

I would like to address that issue about the simulator training. 

It is wonderful stuff, but it works for about 25 percent of our workforce, because we are talking about tower simulators. 75 percent of 

our workforce is in a radar environment. We have had simulators 

since I am came in the agency 24 years ago. 

So to tout this simulator stuff, that it is going to increase training, yeah, it will probably for the towers. 

Mr. POE. Excuse me for interrupting, but I am down to a few seconds. 

Mr. FORREY. Sure. 

Mr. POE. Why are air traffic controllers retiring at a record rate? 

Give me the first reason. 

Mr. FORREY. Because they have no labor contracts. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

24 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentleman. 

And, you know, I think it is worth noting, to follow up on Mr. 

Poe’s questions—and, again, it is before Mr. Krakowski’s time, but 

the GAO issued a report in 2002 and said that you may be facing 

a retirement crisis in 2002. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. 

Hirono. 

Ms. HIRONO. Thank you very much. 

I am intrigued by the number of retirements that are not due to 

requirements to retire. And, Mr. Forrey, you have said that it is 

because they don’t have a contract. 

Now, at the same time that FAA is trying to bring in new hires 

and it takes time to train them, what are you doing to keep the 

ones that you already have, presumably who are already trained, 

so that they don’t retire when they don’t have to? 

There are hundreds of them in that category. I would think that 

you would want to keep your trained people. 

What are you doing, Mr. Krakowski? Can you respond to that? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Sure. So one of the things that we are doing is 

we have retention bonuses for our key facilities right now, which 

create monetary rewards for people who are retirement-eligible not 

to retire. We have about 50 of those that have been accepted. We 

just started that program recently. 

Clearly, as I spoke to in my opening remarks, we would like to 

get the labor issues settled down and moving more productively as 

a team going forward. Pat and I are trying to figure out how we 

can work together better on some of the projects. And I think because of the history of the labor dispute that has been here for the 

past couple years, it is going to take a little time to thaw this out, 

but I can assure you I am going to work as hard as I can toward 

it. 

Ms. HIRONO. Probably the best way to resolve that labor situation is to go back into negotiations. Do you all have any intentions 

of doing that? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Well, as I said, we have forwarded a settlement 

offer to NATCA this week, and we are awaiting a response when 

they evaluate it. 

Ms. HIRONO. Mr. Forrey, would you like to respond to Mr. 

Krakowski’s statement? 

Mr. FORREY. Yes, thank you, ma’am. Apart from the fact that 

those discussions were confidential, which the agency has a problem keeping things confidential, the proposal that the FAA gave is 

nothing more than what they did last time or just a little bit extra. 

We will consider it, and we will take a look at it, and we will respond. But I think a couple things need to be made here. 

You know, here is a perfect example of an FAA that wants to 

work with us. The IG puts in a report and says you should work 

with NATCA, managers, with first-line supervisors to come up with 

ratios for training, yada, yada, yada. They concurred. NATCA 

hasn’t been told anything about it. And they already started that 

work group back on June 1st. So we have never been contacted. 

You would think you talk to the people that are actually doing the 

25 

training and the people that are actually working, that you would 

want to get their perspective on how to do this. 

That is indicative of what the FAA has been doing for the last 

2, 3 years. It is their way or the highway. And guess where they 

are going? The 2,200 controllers that can leave today are going to 

go for the highway. And I don’t care how many new people you 

bring in, the system is going to grind to a halt. And it is just a matter of time. 

Ms. HIRONO. Well, we have already had a number of hearings on 

the whole labor question. And it keeps coming up. And I am just 

waiting for some kind of breakthrough here, where the two sides, 

the management and the workers, can truly work together to come 

to a meeting of the minds. Because that is not how your so-called 

contract was arrived at right now. So we are going to continue to 

have, I think, these kinds of hearings. And it seems as though the 

fundamental issue here really is the willingness on both sides to 

sit down at the table. 

So right now I am hearing that you have made another offer, and 

that doesn’t seem to do the job. So that is just an expression of 

frustration on my part, that I am hoping for the time that you are 

able to sit down and get to what I think is a fundamental reason 

that these various problems are occurring with all your people retiring by the droves no matter what bonuses you put in there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes the 

gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am not quite sure how to do this. I have been to this hearing 

before. Having been here 10 years, it is deja vu all over again. 

Mr. Scovel and Dr. Dillingham, I want you all to put on the 

striped shirts and carry the whistle here. You have guys on both 

sides of you that are again guilty of verbal overkill. If I could ask 

you all to declare a truce and get right down to the heart of the 

matter—and I promised my distinguished Chairman, who is a dear 

friend, to talk about energy. 

Folks, we are going to solve this crisis of air traffic controllers 

because nobodyis going to be able to afford to fly. You said that, 

Mr. Krakowski. So hopefully this Congress will address the issue 

of energy and we can get on down the road. 

But after 10 years as a Member, 40 years of flying, we have the 

same problem. The gentlelady from Hawaii is right on the money. 

It is about morale. Single best source of controllers, best source of 

problem-solving is in this group of experienced folks. They are leaving every day. There is a huge morale problem. 

FAA refuses, for my 10 years, to address the staffing problem 

head-on. You talk about decombining. Decombining is an emergency caused by not meeting the staffing problem. You are doing 

something that you are forced to do because you are not doing it 

through the front door, you are trying to come through the back 

door. 

I have had a very positive experience, Mr. Chairman, members 

of the panel, having people from the FAA come to our office, go to 

the field, and talk directly to members of NATCA who are trying 

to get the job done. 

26 

Now, Pat, you alluded—excuse me, Mr. Forrey; I need to keep 

the proper title here—to the incredibly—and this is my opinion; I 

am not speaking from the dictionary—cumbersome mechanism that 

exists in this contract negotiation. This is supposed to be secret, 

that is supposed to be secret. 

We are trying to help get over the hump, get the job done. I 

would like to know how we are going to get that done. One, using 

the basketball analogy, says it is charging. The other one says, no, 

it is blocking. 

Referee Scovel, which is it here? 

Mr. SCOVEL. You are absolutely right, Mr. Hayes, it is a significant morale problem. It is a policy decision, of course, for the administration on the one hand, with the Congress’s help, to try to 

get the parties together. 

There are 101 different reasons why controllers today are choosing to retire. At the top of many controllers’ lists that we have spoken to has been the contract situation. Family considerations, other 

financial considerations, medical, they all enter into it. But for the 

most experienced controllers who see their retirement calculations 

essentially capped, that is a significant factor for them that they 

have to consider. 

Mr. HAYES. Dr. Dillingham, can you help us with this here? If 

people love what they are doing and they love to go do it, then 

other considerations sort of take a backseat. What would you suggest since we have been here before? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, Congressman Hayes, I think, as usual, 

there is probably enough blame to go around on both sides. I think 

what Mr. Forrey said about the conversation not taking place, in 

a number of different areas we found that to be true too. 

And I guess, from my perspective, everybody here appreciates 

aviation and knows what aviation is to this country. And I think, 

you know, we are starting to at least have some more conversation. 

My concern is that we don’t end up with a forensic kind of approach to this, as opposed to a prospective approach. And that is 

to say, if we are talking about controller fatigue, if we are talking 

about operational errors, if we are talking about runway incursions, then I think, you know, the seriousness of the issue is going 

to, you know, make the parties—we would hope, make the parties 

come together and address it before we really have a catastrophe 

that pushes us together. 

Mr. HAYES. I am convinced—and this is not necessarily in any 

order; pick your order—FAA, NATCA, NATCA, FAA, they want to 

solve the problem. Somehow you guys and ladies have got to declare a truce on whatever it is that is keeping you from talking constructively among yourselves. And once that truce is declared, then 

attack the problem, whatever they may be. Because we have got to 

keep these folks. Without controllers, NextGen doesn’t matter. Two 

decades for NextGen? FAA, you have to get some sales classes 

going here. You have a product that people need and want, but you 

are telling them you are going to impose it on them. 

Same thing with the contract. You are telling them, ′′Hey, you 

are not doing it right.′′ Okay, you all get in a room somewhere, secretly or publicly, and figure out how you are going to get this 

thing done. 

27 

Mr. FORREY. I am ready to go back to the table. 

I just would point out that we didn’t have these problems when 

we had a contract that was agreed to by the parties. We didn’t 

need retention bonuses. We didn’t have to go to retirees and say, 

′′Come on back to work.′′ We didn’t have to pay people to go to 

other facilities because it was built into the system under the career ladder that we had in the contract. All that was stripped and 

taken away, and that is why they are leaving. 

We are willing to talk. I want to go back to the table. 

Mr. HAYES. You have good people, you have a heck of a challenge, great opportunity, wonderful system. Let’s get her done. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Hayes. 

As a side note, let me say, as Mr. Forrey and Mr. Krakowski 

knows, the Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Oberstar, and 

Mr. Mica and myself, Mr. Petri spent many hours in the room with 

both the FAA and NATCA. And I will offer my opinion, and my 

opinion I have shared with you privately and I will say again, is 

that I thought the controllers agreed to the provisions and the offer 

that the FAA laid on the table, and then the FAA upped the ante. 

And, frankly, I think it is over Mr. Krakowski’s pay grade. I think 

it was over Marion Blakey’s pay grade. I think it was over the Acting Administrator’s pay grade. And I think that the stopping point 

is the White House and OMB, frankly. And until it comes down 

from on top that they want to address this problem, we are going 

to be in a holding pattern. 

Mr. HAYES. So let’s forgive the past and remember what we got 

to do in the future. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Okay, let’s talk about the future. I would like each member of 

the panel to say what are the two steps they think that could be 

taken that would most directly address the problem we are confronted with here, the loss of experienced controllers, controller fatigue, increased numbers of errors because of all this mess. What 

two steps? 

Let’s go. Start with you, Mr. Krakowski. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Clearly, to make it attractive for controllers who 

are retirement-eligible not to retire. They are good at their work; 

they like doing it. 

And secondly, I think we have some opportunities to invest in 

training technologies and whole new approaches to do this much 

better, much faster. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Scovel? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Good afternoon, Mr. DeFazio. 

I would echo Mr. Krakowski’s comments on his first point. But 

I would offer as a second point to get on the ball with regard to 

facility training. 

When we see differential percentages in terms of certified professional controllers versus controllers in training at some facilities 

ranging into the 30s and 40 percent, even at one facility mentioned 

in our statement, 67 percent at the Rochester tower, clearly facility 

training is an urgently needed item, and FAA needs to pay attenVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
28 

tion to it. We commend their effort on the work group, but they 

need to kick that into high gear. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Dr. Dillingham? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, Mr. DeFazio, I think certainly we should 

do whatever we can to stop the exodus of experienced controllers. 

And also, with regard to the developmental controllers that are 

here, an increasing percentage of developmental controllers are 

being lost after they come out of the academy. Somehow that has 

to be addressed, because that is another leakage that stops from 

having adequate staffing. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. 

Mr. Forrey? 

Mr. FORREY. Mr. DeFazio, first of all, we need to stop the attrition of veteran controllers. And that means going back to the table. 

And that means negotiating an agreed-to and ratified agreement. 

If we don’t have that, we don’t have anything. 

Then we need to staff the system. And we need to staff the system based on scientific methods that determine what the system 

needs for staffing by facility. They haven’t done that. They are 

right now staffing the budget. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. 

Mr. Conley? 

Mr. CONLEY. Congressman, I believe that both sides are in love 

with the past, the pendulum swings of the past, and it makes it 

very difficult for both sides to come together. 

The association itself has no position on this issue. But, from my 

personal opinion, we need to move forward, clearly, with the labor 

disputes and move beyond these and get to the real issues of the 

safety of the air traffic control system and the services provided to 

the flying public. 

And I would have to echo what these other gentlemen have said, 

that the training program has to be streamlined to the point that 

we can restaff our facilities quickly enough to manage the rates of 

retirement that are coming. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. So we have agreement on attrition, we just 

have to figure out how to get there. I think the Chairman addressed that. 

And what about this developmental controller issue and the 

training issue? Mr. Forrey, why are we losing the developmental 

controllers? 

Mr. FORREY. I think there are a number of reasons. One, they 

are not getting training. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So what are they doing when they are not getting 

training? 

Mr. FORREY. Well, they twiddle their thumbs. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So they are basically a lost asset. They are sitting 

around and—— 

Mr. FORREY. Absolutely. Plus, too, they are not paid well enough, 

so they are out getting other jobs. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So as a developmental they are not paid very well. 

Is the pay lower than it used to be for developmentals? 

Mr. FORREY. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. How much? 

Mr. FORREY. At least 20, 30 percent. 

29 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thirty percent. Over what period of time, 3 years? 

Mr. FORREY. Well, they start at about less than $9 in Oklahoma 

City, and then they come out to about $31,000 a year or $32,000 

a year. And if they are sitting in somewhere, Miami, Oregon—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That takes us back to the contract issue, I believe. 

Mr. FORREY. Yes, absolutely, it does. 

Mr. FORREY. All right. 

Does anybody else have an opinion on the developmental controllers? 

Okay. One other issue, I had a briefing, a discussion on the simulators yesterday. Mr. Forrey, you seemed to say that you don’t believe they can address much of the problem. But it seems to me 

that some of the problem with developmental controllers could be 

addressed. 

Mr. FORREY. I think simulator training is a good thing. The problem, when you bring 24 tower simulators, that is going to help 24 

towers. Towers make up 25 percent to 30 percent of our controller 

workforce. The rest of our workforce is under radar control. And 

they have their own simulators. They have had simulators. That 

training has not speeded up at all. 

So it is great that we can speed up the controllers’ ability in the 

tower to get them certified quicker. We need do that, and we 

should continue to do that. But it not an end-all, be-all. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Do we need more than 24 simulators then? 

Mr. FORREY. Probably. We have a couple hundred towers. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Anybody else have an opinion on how many simulators we might need? Is 24 enough throughout the system? Can 

people train remotely, efficiently on these? I understand that the 

military decided people couldn’t use them really remotely. They 

needed to be on station. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Actually, we are deploying 12 of the 24 this 

year, the other 12 next year. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. And what percentage of the problem does 

that take care of, in terms of developmental controllers at towers? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Let’s say you have a simulator at O’Hare, you 

can also turn that very simulator into a Milwaukee control tower 

simulator. So, actually, it serves a lot of different functions other 

than just the O’Hare facility. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But if O’Hare is—I mean, there is so much 

down time, you are saying, that all these sites can share them, I 

mean, and access them efficiently remotely? Because, again, I understand the military had some problems with that, sort of, kind 

of, spoke system, that they went—they said, ′′No, gee, actually, we 

want to put one at each of these facilities.′′ 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yeah, I am not familiar with the military issue, 

but I will look into that. I would like to understand that. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You might check into that. That is my understanding anyway. I am not an expert on that. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. DeFazio, there is another aspect of losing 

the developmental controllers. We are talking about a candidate 

who has completed the academy and is now at their first duty station and, for one reason or another, they drop out. It would seem 

to me that, depending on why they drop out, some of this screening 

30 

can take place at the academy so that, if we are going to lose them, 

let’s lose them sooner rather than later. 

I think there used to be a test upon graduation. If you didn’t 

pass the test, you didn’t go on further. I am not sure that test is 

still in place in terms of once you complete the academy. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. One last quick question, Mr. Chairman. 

Are we doing some comprehensive attempts at exit surveys for 

all of these dropouts and asking them why? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Mr. DeFazio, if I may, my office is responding to a 

request from Chairman Costello to conduct an audit of new controller training failures. And we are looking at the rate of those 

failures and the reasons for those failures. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. That would be very helpful. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Ehlers. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize for being late. I was in a different meeting. And I will 

try to ask a semi-intelligent question anyway. 

Mr. Conley, just to direct something to you, you represent the 

FAA Managers Association, so your members or your colleagues 

are really there where the rubber hits the road or maybe I should 

say where the tires hit the runway. You are at the forefront of the 

action, right? 

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. EHLERS. And I am wondering, I have been in several towers 

and have watched the operations. Can you just—and I apologize 

again for covering ground that others may have covered here. The 

training program, how long is the training program for a typical 

controller before they actually get behind a mike? 

Mr. CONLEY. That question would actually be better asked of Mr. 

Krakowski. He has the facts and figures on that. It varies by facility. It varies by function. So I don’t have the specific answer for 

you. But I can research and get it back to you. 

Mr. EHLERS. Okay. Well, Mr. Krakowski, do you have it at the 

tip of your tongue? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes. Good to see you again, sir. 

We have controllers checking out in under a year right now at 

some facilities, to as long as 3, 3 1/2 years to become fully qualified. 

It depends upon the complexity, the size of the facility, the background of the student. 

It is one of the actual strengths of the training program that 

when you have people who can qualify and come to you with innate 

skill sets—they call them ′′naturals′′ out there—the training program is set up so they can certify faster. And, you know, when you 

certify faster, you also get the pay raises as you move through your 

certifications. So there is an incentive for the students to work 

hard as well. 

We have watched over the past 3 years the time of certification 

actually shorten, and we are putting more people out. So the numbers are looking good right now. I can give you any specific numbers you would like, though, sir. 

31 

Mr. EHLERS. All right. I am just trying to get the full picture. 

Generally, you start them out in a smaller tower and they work up 

to the more complex traffic situations, correct? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Not necessarily. We are in kind of a unique situation where we are actually putting new developmental controllers in some of the higher-level facilities. And that is somewhat of 

a first for the FAA. 

But, again, the training program is designed to make them successful. I assure you they are not put on position, either as a developmental or a CPC, until they are ready and qualified. 

Mr. EHLERS. And what educational requirements do they have to 

have before they beginning the training? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I believe it is just high school, sir. 

Mr. EHLERS. Just high school? And are they paid while they go 

through the training? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes, they are. They are paid throughout their 

training experience at Oklahoma City. And then when they show 

up at the facility, they actually become a developmental, and they 

get quite a pay raise at that point, pay bump. 

Mr. EHLERS. I see. Okay. 

Yes, I would be happy to yield to Mr. Diaz-Balart. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I actually have a question for the FAA about this. Supposedly the 

FAA intends to decombine the Miami tower and the TRACON in 

the near future. And it is something that has some of us a little 

bit concerned. 

And the question really is, has a controller staffing study been 

conducted to date on both the tower and TRACON? 

Because it is my understanding that the risk—or whatever it is 

called, the safety risk management plan that was scheduled for 

earlier this week was postponed. And if that is the case, is there 

a plan to reschedule it in the near future? 

Does the FAA plan to hold off efforts to decombine until a proper 

staffing study and risk management plan has been conducted and 

those results have been reviewed? And if not, you know, what data 

was used by the FAA to make decisions to separate the two facilities? And when does the FAA intend, if, in fact, they are going to 

continue to do that, to bring the process of decombining to happen? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Okay. Congressman, I would like to offer to give 

you a detailed briefing on the specifics of the entire approach at 

that facility. I can assure you, though, we would never actually pull 

the trigger on something like that until the staffing effects are understood through the study and that we have done the safety risk 

management study as well. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair would tell the gentleman from Michigan that his time has expired. And if that is agreeable, if he can 

give you a private briefing. 

The Chair now recognizes—let me say that we have two votes on 

the floor. We have about less than 5 minutes to get to the floor. 

But, however, Mr. Hall has been here the entire time, and I want 

to recognize Mr. Hall from New York. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

32 

I just quickly wanted to ask Mr. Krakowski, you commented that 

you were working to improve labor relations, and I assume that is 

not just with NATCA. Because I remember a hearing last year— 

I am not sure if you—I guess you probably weren’t on board then— 

but we had not just the controllers, but the airline pilots, the flight 

attendants, the mechanics, and even the attorneys from the FAA 

who had joined unions because they were complaining that they 

couldn’t be heard, that their concerns were not being addressed 

when they dealt with them as individuals. 

So I assume it is agency-wide? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yeah. Actually, that is a very good point, and 

I appreciate your bringing it up, because I have over 40 unions in 

my organization. And because NATCA is the big elephant, like the 

pilots union was where I came from were the big elephant, they get 

the most attention. But I don’t want to proceed with a labor strategy that is just focused on one labor group either. We really do, as 

a management team, want to look at and treat all the labor organizations equally. And that certainly is my passion, sir. 

Mr. HALL. Equally and fairly, I assume. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Always. 

Mr. HALL. And I just quickly would ask Mr. Scovel, you mentioned a significant confusion over who is in charge at certain towers, I believe? Could you describe quickly what that means? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Sir, I apologize if I was misunderstood on that. I 

didn’t mean to say that there was a confusion over who was in 

charge at towers, but rather confusion in the field and even on the 

part of some headquarters officials over who was in charge of facility training. 

Mr. HALL. Got it. Okay. 

Mr. SCOVEL. There had been four different vice presidents at the 

ATO who had a hand in it. Mr. Krakowski is attempting to solve 

that now with his senior vice president for training. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you. You answered my question already. 

And, Mr. Forrey, if I may just ask you, what is the effect on the 

experienced controllers’ work in a tower when 30 to 35 percent of 

the staffing are developing trainees who may be needing coaching 

or calling on some of the more experienced controllers for advice or 

instruction? 

Mr. FORREY. First of all, when you have that many trainees in 

a facility, in a tower, that means you have probably a very serious 

staffing problem to begin with, because you have fewer certified 

controllers. So you are now training more often. You are working 

a position behind the person that is a novice, in most cases, or very 

limited experience. And it is very fatiguing. It is very hard to not 

say anything while this person tries to work traffic and learn the 

job as they are going along without interfering into that. 

So it is very fatiguing. That means they are working longer time 

on position. They are double-thinking for themselves and for the 

person they are watching. And it is very fatiguing. It has an impact 

where someone is going to make a mistake. And that is what we 

are concerned about. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

33 

We have a little less than 3 minutes to get to the floor. So let 

me dismiss the first panel. 

I do have some other questions. I will submit them to you in 

writing. 

We have a second panel that some of them, I believe, have flights 

out that we need to get to. 

So let me thank all of you for your testimony. It has been very 

informative. And I thank all of you on behalf of the Members of the 

Subcommittee. 

The Subcommittee will stand in recess for 15 minutes. And hopefully those of you want to take a break will take a quick break and 

be here before 15 minutes, so that when we come back from our 

recess we can immediately go to the second panel. 

Again, the Chair thanks all of you for your testimony. 

And the Subcommittee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

And the Subcommittee would ask the second panel to come forward. And as you are being seated, let me introduce the second 

panel. 

Mr. Don Chapman is the Philadelphia International Airport facility representative from the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, FAA certified professional controller; Mr. Melvin Davis, 

Southern California TRACON facility representative, NATCA, FAA 

certified professional controller; and Mr. Steven Wallace, Miami 

Center facility representative, NATCA, FAA certified professional 

controller. 

Gentlemen, again, we appreciate your patience. We understand 

that some of you may have a flight to catch, so we will immediately 

go to you for your testimony. We would ask that you summarize 

your testimony. Your entire statement will appear in the record. 

And under the 5-minute rule, the Chair now recognizes Mr. Chapman. 

TESTIMONY OF DON D. CHAPMAN, PHILADELPHIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION, FAA 

CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL CONTROLLER; MELVIN S. DAVIS, 

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TRACON, FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION, 

FAA CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL CONTROLLER; STEVEN A. 

WALLACE, MIAMI CENTER, FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION, FAA 

CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL CONTROLLER 

Mr. CHAPMAN. Good afternoon, Chairman Costello and Ranking 

Member Petri. And I would be remiss if I did not thank you for 

holding these hearings to bring this issue to the forefront, so thank 

you. 

My name is Don Chapman. I am a controller at the Philadelphia 

tower and TRACON, and I have been a certified controller for over 

18 years. I have served as a union representative for nearly my entire career. I am a qualified instructor and a controller in charge. 

Understaffing is a serious issue that has affected the entire air 

traffic system. Many facilities, such as the New York TRACON, 

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Miami Center, the Southern California TRACON, are outright dangerous in terms of their low staffing. Others are facing different 

kinds of issues, all as a result of the controller staffing crisis. 

Philadelphia Tower and TRACON is one of 137 combined facilities within the FAA inventory. Controllers certify in both the control tower and radar approach control. Combined facilities like 

Philadelphia enjoy the lowest operational cost and lowest error 

rates of any type facility within the FAA system. 

Prior to September 2006, 109 controllers were authorized at 

Philadelphia. In March of 2007, the FAA implemented a staffing 

range, reducing the number to a minimum of 71 controllers, approximately a 35 percent reduction in authorized staffing. In contrast, when I arrived at Philadelphia in 1993, there were approximately eight trainees and few, if any, eligible for retirement. Philadelphia Tower and TRACON currently has 69 certified controllers 

and 18 trainees. Fifteen controllers are eligible to retire by the end 

of the year. 

In an FAA staff study dated June of 2007, the FAA itself noted 

that Philadelphia Tower TRACON is faced with the possibility of 

a severe staffing shortage of certified professional controllers due 

to the number of controller retirements. The study went on to say, 

′′The loss of qualified controllers, supervisors and support staff is 

creating a strain on the required operational staffing and the training of developmental controllers assigned to the facility.′′ 

Traditionally, high-density terminal facilities have always recruited experienced controllers from lower-density facilities to fill 

vacancies. Due to the staffing shortage, the FAA has begun introducing newly hired controllers with no experience into these toptier facilities, creating an extreme burden on facility training as 

well as a drastic reduction in experience level. 

At Philadelphia, for example, a typical crew of seven controllers 

manning the tower had an average combined total of 40 to 50 

years’ experience. Today the tower cab may be staffed with controllers with only 1 to 2 years of experience each. 

Because of the staffing crisis, the FAA announced its intent to 

split Philadelphia Tower and TRACON into two separate facilities 

in January 2009. The FAA also intends to separate Miami, Orlando, Memphis, Charlotte and more facilities after that. 

The FAA itself admits that separating the facility will actually 

require increasing the number of controllers and management necessary to staff the facility. This action will allow the FAA to 

misleadingly report that they have more certified controllers, when 

they will have only changed the structure of the facility. 

Decombining facilities will remove the optimal seamless environment and efficiencies that have existed for approximately 40 years 

and also provide the FAA an excuse to further cut salary levels of 

controllers. 

The FAAis compounded staffing problems rather than easing 

them. Instead of allowing the controller ranks to become healthier, 

the FAA has continually reduced the active controller staffing levels in favor of moving controllers to management or other noncontrolling positions. 

While controller staffing levels remain inadequate, management 

positions have been increased. In Philadelphia, in the past 4 years, 

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16 certified controllers have been transferred to noncontrolling positions. For example, in 2004, Philadelphia had nine supervisors, 

four second- or third-level managers, and approximately 89 controllers, and worked 475,000 operations. In 2007, Philadelphia has 

seven second-level managers, 12 supervisors, and as few as 82 controllers, and we worked 516,000 operations. 

Additionally, the FAA has made questionable management decisions regarding staffing. Earlier this year, a certified veteran controller who was also a qualified instructor was given an incentive 

bonus of $20,000 under the FAA’s incentive program to transfer 

from Philadelphia to Chicago. Shortly thereafter, the FAA offered 

a new incentive bonus of $20,000 to attract controllers to transfer 

to Philadelphia. In other words, the FAA paid $20,000 to attract 

a replacement for the controller the agency just paid $20,000 to 

leave. 

Staffing shortages have created a situation where it is nearly impossible to allow current certified controllers to have meaningful 

participation in the development of vital procedures and equipment, leading to either the development of unsafe changes or 

equipment deployment delays and cost overruns. 

Due to staffing shortages, controllers routinely work 10-hour 

shifts. As a result, scheduled time between shifts is shortened, resulting in exacerbated fatigue issues that would not otherwise exist 

or be as acute. Tired controllers work slower. And often, when controllers are worn out, they tend to slow down in the interest of 

safety. 

The act of providing training can itself be extremely fatiguing. 

Live training requires an instructor to have to try to anticipate 

what a trainee will say or do and be able to instantaneously override or correct the trainee if they make a mistake. In the fast-paced 

environment of air traffic control, this can be extremely taxing. 

Many times, the instructor must slow operations to maintain an 

adequate safety margin, adding to delays. 

Controller training has also been detrimentally impacted by the 

staffing shortage. Training debriefs are rushed because instructors 

are needed to staff other positions. This has reduced the quality of 

instruction the next generation is receiving. 

These are but a sample of the myriad of issues facing the air 

traffic control system today. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chapman, the Chair thanks you, and now 

recognizes Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. WALLACE. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Mr. Petri, 

and Members of the Aviation Subcommittee, my name is Steven 

Wallace, and I am an air traffic controller at Miami Center. We are 

located in Miami, Florida. 

I started my career with the FAA in November 1991, and in addition to my duties as an air traffic controller, I have had the honor 

and the privilege of representing my co-workers since 1996. 

When I began air traffic controller training at Miami Center, 

there were 196 fully certified controllers, 108 trainees, and we handled 1.5 million operations a year. Today there are 192 controllers 

that are certified, 84 trainees, and we post an annual number exceeding 2.5 million operations. 

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Our target staffing number has always been 279 controllers. Fifteen years ago, a busy day at Miami Center meant that we would 

handle 5,000 aircraft in a day. Today that number is 10,000. Years 

ago, on a busy day it was mandated that the busiest positions be 

staffed with three controllers. Five years ago, that number was 

two. Now it is not uncommon to have no one to help you when you 

are working 10,000 operations in a day. 

When controllers get two airplanes too close together, it is called 

an operational error. Fifteen years ago, 12 operational errors in a 

year at Miami Center was a big deal. Now the agency believes that 

25 is okay. In 2007, the FAA adopted the term ′′proximity event′′ 

for minor errors and then quit tracking those. As a result, the real 

number of errors that we make is not known. But in the FAA’s 

eyes, safety was never compromised. 

The last thing that anyone wants is for two aircraft to get too 

close to each other. It is my job to ensure that never happens, and 

my co-workers and I meet that challenge every day with passion 

and professionalism. Each of us is dedicated to seeing that passengers get from point A to point B safely, not 99.5 percent of the 

time, but 100 percent of the time. I do not want my family on an 

aircraft that is protected by less than a 100 percent fully certified, 

competent air traffic controller. 

Constantly working in this manner wears on you, though. As the 

numbers of controllers in Miami and the rest of the country have 

dwindled, the level of stress and fatigue endured by controllers has 

continued to rise. 

The FAA likes to say that they are managing resources better 

than they used to. They use programs with cute names like Snowbird to hide the real staffing crisis. The better resource management that they speak of means mandatory 6-day work weeks comprised of 10-hour days for me and my colleagues. When we signed 

up for this job, we knew that we would be giving up many holidays 

with our families, time with our friends at neighborhood cookouts, 

and soccer games with our children on the weekends. It was a commitment that we made. We did not want to make a commitment 

to give up our lives, though. 

With no hope in sight and the horizon getting farther away, 

many of my fellow co-workers have retired as soon as they were 

able, because they didn’t want to spend the rest of their lives working this way. 

The current working conditions, coupled with the increased 

stress of working at your highest performance level while not making a mistake, has taken its toll on many of my co-workers. I have 

watched as many of them have become so stressed out, so fatigued, 

so preoccupied with not making a fatal mistake that they have quit 

rather than run the risk of being the person on position when an 

accident occurs. 

Two years ago, Miami Center was designated as a focus facility 

by the FAA due to our staffing shortage. Developmental controllers 

report into the facility. Then, this past year, the FAA implemented 

the functional training program at Miami Center and eliminated 

the seasoning that used to be a prerequisite to advancement. As a 

result of the new training program, many of those developmental 

controllers have sat doing nothing for the past year and a half. 

37 

Many of the trainees may still check out within the usual 4 years, 

but under the new program it will take that much time to certify 

because of delays, not because they are gaining valuable seasoning 

time. 

The developmental controllers that are being hired are leaving in 

record numbers because they do not want to make the same kind 

of commitment that I made. And why should they? Their pay has 

been cut by 30 percent, and their working conditions are not acceptable. 

At Miami Center, 14 developmental controllers have resigned 

since July of last year. That is 14 more than in all of the other 

years that I have worked for the FAA. They see the same thing 

that I see. There is no quick fix to the problem. 

This last year, four developmental controllers failed the training 

program. I also watched as 12 of my co-workers left due to mental 

or physical illness, from stress and fatigue. 

While our numbers have been depleted due to unexpected attrition, the FAA has also taken many supervisors and moved others 

to jobs outside of that of talking to airplanes. We have supervisors 

who are responsible for as few as four controllers. Ten years ago, 

they used to have to watch eight or nine. We have managers that 

supervise two. It is obvious that the number of chiefs has grown 

proportionately with the number of errors. 

Without including the expected retirements for supervisors and 

staff assignments, the stress-related losses, the training failures, 

and the resignations at Miami Center represent 16 percent of 

workforce loss. At the end of this year, there will be 19 more controllers eligible to retire at Miami Center, and more next year, and 

still more the next. 

While airspace changes and technological advances have enabled 

me to handle more airplanes, there is a breaking point. Air traffic 

control is a very unique occupation, and not everyone can be an air 

traffic controller. It takes time to train someone to do the job. 

The current staffing level at my facility, like many major facilities across the country, cannot adequately sustain the level of safety that the flying public expects and that air traffic controllers demand if something doesn’t change. Because the FAA has failed to 

take the necessary steps to fix the air traffic controller staffing crisis that has been 2 1/2 decades in the making, we are asking Congress to step in and bring the system some much-needed relief. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity you have given me 

today, and I look forward to questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Wallace, and now recognizes Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Petri, again, 

thank you also for the opportunity to speak. And I am honored to 

be here. 

My name, again, is Melvin S. Davis, air traffic controller at the 

Southern California TRACON. And I worked there 9 years. And 

then prior to that I worked 10 years at the Los Angeles International Airport. I got my training in the United States Marine 

Corps, and I am proud of that. 

The FAA will tell that you staffing does not affect safety, and 

that is simply not true. In 1991, there was a scenario that develVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
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oped, there was a controller that had been certified for less than 

a few months and had been in the FAA for just a couple of years, 

was working position. It was at night. She did not have an assist. 

And she cleared an aircraft to land on an occupied runway. And, 

as a result, 34 people died that night. 

That is the exact same thing that is happening at facilities across 

the country today. It happens at mine every day. 

With the training, as the developmentals come in, they are certified, they are making mistakes, and there isn’t anybody there to 

help catch them. We had one situation where a controller came in, 

was certified on their first sector, made a mistake, and it resulted 

in three aircraft coming too close together over the skies of Burbank. She went immediately to the psychiatrist’s office, hasn’t been 

back yet. 

We had another situation where a young man, certified on position less than a month, first position, he has got six or seven to go, 

puts two aircraft on a collision course, same altitude, doesn’t recognize it. The TCAS takes over, the flight crews intervene, and they 

saved the situation. 

Again, those types of things are happening on a daily basis. 

As our veteran workforce reaches retirement eligibility, the effort 

to pass the baton has just begun too late. My facility handles 2.2 

million operations a year. It is the busiest of its kind in the world. 

In the past 4 years, there has been 261 controllers 4 years ago; 

there is 160 today. That is a 40 percent reduction. There was 

$250,000 spent in overtime 4 years ago. We spent $4 million last 

year. That is a 1,600 percent increase. There was 10 operational errors 4 years ago. This year we are on a pace to hit 40. That would 

be a 400 percent increase. 

These mistakes will eventually result in a catastrophe. The fact 

that they haven’t at this point is amazing to me. 

We are totally mission-oriented. We are committed as controllers 

to getting the job done. We will to do what the agency asks us to 

do. But they continue to ask us to do more with less. 

Unlike my counterparts explained earlier, at our facility we have 

actually consolidated work. We have assigned more sectors to fewer 

people. So it is the exact opposite response to the problem that they 

are doing elsewhere in the country, and it makes no sense. 

As the staffing decreases, the automatic reaction is to reduce the 

amount of time controllers are assigned to the assistant controller 

position. This eliminates the redundancy provided by the extra set 

of eyes and ears, and, again, it does reduce safety. 

The further reductions of staffing have required the FAA to combine the sectors. This leads to increased fatigue. I see people walk 

by my office—I am actually a controller, but I spend some time in 

the office a couple days a week—and the have bags under their 

eyes, third or fourth cup of coffee, and they are completely losing 

it. 

One career veteran, he is 22 years in, he has 5 years until he 

is mandatory retirement, walked into my office about 2 weeks ago, 

said, ′′I have lost it.′′ He just had a situation where it was the 

breaking point, tears in his eyes, again, leaves, goes directly to the 

psychiatrist’s office, he will never work airplanes again. 

39 

These are statistics when you look at a whole, but they are tragedies individually. 

Two weeks ago at the Southern California TRACON, Bruce Johnson, the FAA ATO vice president for terminal operations, sat and 

said, ′′You know, I am afraid that if we reverse course now, things 

will only get worse. Why don’t we just wait another year and see 

what happens?′′ Those are the type of people leading this organization. They have completely lost track of the stresses and strains 

that we deal with on a daily basis because their experience is so 

far back. Their hearts have just grown cold. And it is extremely 

frustrating to say, what is it going to take to wake them up and 

respond to the problem? 

Again, I just thank you for the opportunity to testify. Thank you 

for the time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Davis, thank you. 

And I thank all three of you for being here and offering very 

thoughtful testimony concerning not only your experiences but 

what you have experienced on the job, dealing with some of your 

colleagues. 

A couple of questions and to clarify a point or two, Mr. Davis. 

You mentioned that, at your facility, fully qualified controllers went 

from 261 to 160. And that was due to retirements. 

You were here, I think, for the earlier testimony with Mr. 

Krakowski and the Inspector General and the GAO. Mr. Krakowski 

would give us a list of reasons why controllers have been retiring. 

But if you had to identify the two main reasons why we are seeing 

so many experienced controllers leave the workforce and take their 

retirement, what would the two reasons be? 

Mr. DAVIS. The two main reasons are fatigue. It is a downward 

spiral. It is a never-ending cycle. 

It is a small window where we are eligible to retire and then 

where we are mandatorily retired. It is usually about 5 years. So 

you are thinking about it the day you come into the agency. You 

are thinking, ′′Okay, I am going to go at this date,′′ and then you 

are forced out 5 years later. Well, now these people are going. They 

look at somebody around them and say, ′′Okay, I am leaving because I don’t want to stay the extra 2 years or 3 years.′′ 

It is fatigue. And the more people that leave, the worse the problem gets. And that is the main reason. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You were here when I asked Mr. Krakowski why 

we are having such a difficult time recruiting experienced controllers at the FAA. In previous years, we were able to recruit many 

military controllers, such as yourself. When you entered the workforce, when you left the military, you went to the FAA and became 

a civilian controller. 

Why are we having such a difficult time recruiting experienced 

controllers over at the FAA? 

Mr. DAVIS. I believe that what Mr. Forrey said earlier was the 

reduction in pay. There is competition out there for those jobs now 

that there wasn’t before. There is private contractors that have air 

traffic control jobs. And there is Department of Defense that has 

air traffic control jobs, civilian Department of Defense jobs. And 

they are paying more. 

40 

So they are being attracted to those other locations. The work 

isn’t as intense, and the pay is better. So it is a relatively simple 

equation. I think that that is a huge factor in our inability to attract the most qualified people. 

Mr. COSTELLO. For the record again, you gave the figures as to 

what the FAA has spent in overtime at your facility in comparison 

to previous years. Would you restate that for the record? 

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. In 2004, we used $250,000 in overtime. And in 

the last 12 months, we have used $4 million in overtime. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So $4 million in overtime in the last 12 months. 

Mr. DAVIS. Correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Just at your facility. 

Mr. DAVIS. Correct. I have seen 2,000 years of experience walk 

out the door. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask a question for all of you, and it deals 

with the issue of fatigue. It is an alarming problem to me. We have 

heard testimony both from the Inspector General, the GAO. The 

agency continues to, kind of, play fatigue down and say that, ′′It 

is a concern of ours, we are looking into it, we are having input, 

and we are having a gathering of many people, academic people 

and so on, coming in to look at the issue.′′ 

I wonder, in dealing with the new recruits, the new hires—we 

know why the most experienced controllers are leaving. I mean, 

you have detailed that, and we have heard that from others. Why 

are the new hires leaving? 

When they come out of the academy and they come into the job, 

there is a much higher attrition rate with new hires than the FAA 

ever anticipated. I wonder if you would talk about that. And does 

it deal with stress and fatigue? 

Mr. DAVIS. I would say that the way the system was set up in 

the past, that you would test at the academy, and you would see 

a 75 percent or 80 percent attrition rate there. There was very 

stringent hiring practices and a huge amount of the attrition. And 

then when an individual finally made it through that and got to 

a facility, he is a better candidate. 

What they are doing now is they are just shotgun-hiring, and 

they are running them through the academy without those hurdles 

that they have to jump over to get to the facility. They show up. 

And we are just experiencing the same amount of attrition, it is 

just happening at a different location. It is happening at the facility, where it used to be happening at the academy. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At Miami Center, the primary cause of the developmental departure is pay—pay and their working conditions. 

They report to Miami Center, they are told that you will get pay 

progression when you complete certain portions of your training. In 

the past, those types of classes, the upgrade classes were scheduled 

out every 9 months, 10 months or so. Classes would last about a 

month and a half to 2 months. They would come downstairs to the 

floor, and they would then certify on a position or two, and they 

would get a pay raise. 

You have moved developmental controllers, brand-new hires who 

have $75,000 worth of college debt, into high-cost living areas, such 

41 

as southern California, south Florida, Philadelphia, and you are 

paying them 30 percent less. You take them to facilities such as 

Miami Center, you change the training program on them, and then 

don’t let them have a chance for any upgrade training for upwards 

of 2 years. We have folks that have sat at Miami Center for a year 

and a half. 

It doesn’t take long for the next group, the group that is in there, 

after a certain portion, realizes that they have made such a commitment now, they have to see a portion of it through. But the people that have just come in sit and look and say, ′′Well, if I am going 

to be a year and a half, I might as well go to work for Lockheed 

Martin or another competitor somewhere, or, better yet, go back to 

flying airplanes, which is what I was doing before, what I was 

trained to do out of college. And then maybe I can make some 

money, instead of sitting around doing nothing to only end up making less.′′ 

And to actually tag onto that, the FAA just changed the hiring 

requirements. The kids that are here now—and forgive me for calling them kids; they are very young, very dedicated professionals, 

some of the hardest-working folks that I have seen. 

Those folks come into the facility, and they have been told, ′′You 

must have a 2- or 4-year degree from a select number of universities.′′ It has cost them $75,000. They walk in the first day, they 

get there, and 3 to 6 months later they are told, ′′You no longer 

have to have this type of education. We are going to hire anybody 

off the street to come do the job.′′ Well, they just made that group 

of people very upset, and they are not helping them pay for their 

school. That is why you are seeing them leave. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chapman? 

Mr. CHAPMAN. To go specifically to your question, the FAA has 

turned air traffic control from what used to be a career occupation 

that you felt you had a future in, to an uncertain occupation. It is 

as if they are working at McDonald’s or 7/11. 

They have no trust in the agency that they will have a future. 

The agency has no more structure left where you can work in a 

smaller facility and progress up the ladder. They don’t have any assurance of where their pay will be, where their career will be. They 

can’t trust their families to the occupation anymore, because the 

agency has decimated it with both mistrust and what they have 

done with the pay system, quite frankly. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Final question, and then I will turn to Mr. Petri. 

We have heard some of the new hires, because of the reduction in 

the entry-level pay, that they are actually out working second jobs 

in order to pay their college tuition, in order to live in very expensive areas, as you detailed, Mr. Wallace, in the country. 

Mr. COSTELLO. [Continuing.] I just wonder from your experience 

with the new hires in the facilities where you are, are you seeing 

that? Are you seeing new hires that are working other jobs other 

than on the job as a controller. 

Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, sir. We have a few. I have one who worked 

as a computer engineer, and he is still doing freelance work. He is 

lucky because he has the skills to do that without actually working 

and he can still earn additional money. 

42 

One thing I would add to that is a lot of them are hanging on 

to see what will happen and they have all given us the impression 

of, look, if this isn’t fixed within a year or two, I am working on 

a college degree in another area. I am going to do something else. 

But they are hopeful that there will be a correction and they want 

this to be their career. They are just not comfortable that it will 

be their career. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you. A lot of the developmentals that we 

have now wait a very long time to get hired by the FAA and they 

are very committed and, as Mr. Chapman said, they are committed 

enough to go get a second job to try to make it work. There are 

developmentals at Miami Center that are still trying to find second 

jobs that will allow them the latitude to have a rotating shift or 

that will allow them latitude to be gone during certain days of the 

weeks so that they can eventually get into a training class. The difficulty they are having in doing that, they have a career. They have 

a career choice. It is very hard to explain to someone at a restaurant or at a hotel, for instance, that you are an air traffic controller and you need a second job. Most of the time they feel that 

you are not going to be committed to that and if you take the second job the FAA will turn it around on you, or if you try to better 

yourself through going through school—this just happened with 

one of our developmentals who is having a little bit of difficulty in 

his training—they will turn it right back around on you and say 

you are not committed to the FAA and you are not committed to 

your training. And if they have a single hiccough in their training, 

then the FAA will use that as a means to try to separate them. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. I am not specifically aware of individuals that 

have two jobs, but I do see the type of coping mechanisms that are 

associated with that type of a scenario. They are living together. 

They are grouping together, pooling their resources and those types 

of things. But like Mr. Wallace said, it takes an incredible amount 

of commitment to absorb the information that you have to do the 

job on a daily basis. I don’t have any specific knowledge of second 

job people, but I do have definitely people that are struggling. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Maybe I could 

expand on some of the questions that you asked. I think, Mr. 

Davis, you mentioned what is astounding to me and I think to 

some others, the number of $4 million overtime. Do you know how 

much of that was voluntary and how much was not, or is that an 

important distinction? 

Mr. DAVIS. I think it is an important distinction. There is a list 

of individuals in the facility where they will say do you want to 

work overtime? And then there is a list that says I don’t want to 

work overtime, but I will work it if you have me do it. Sixty-five 

percent of the people at the facility are on the ′′yes′′ list. But we 

are all being assigned overtime because the agency has to do that 

to accomplish the mission. 

So I am not sure if I have answered your question. We know the 

agency has a right to assign us overtime and they are doing that 

43 

and they have to do that to accomplish the mission. That is the 

only way the airplanes can move through the airspace at this point. 

So it is in my mind irrelevant whether I am on the ′′yes′′ list or 

the ′′no′′ list. If I have 2 days off I get four calls for overtime every 

weekend, in the morning, in the evening, in the morning, in the 

evening, and I am on the ′′no′′ list. 

Mr. PETRI. In our area that I am familiar with sometimes people 

look forward to getting overtime and other times they have had 

enough or it is very inconvenient for them. So they have a way of 

allocating it or working it. Is that done or is it basically people are 

doing overtime whether they want to or not? 

Mr. DAVIS. What has happened at our facility specifically with 

the 40 percent reduction in staffing, there is no option. The majority of us of are timed out where you can only work 6 days a week 

and you can only work 10 hours a day. There isn’t anybody to trade 

it to where there was in the past when, say, the staffing was down 

10 or 15 or 20 percent. There are no options. So there is an increase in the use of sick leave. That is one coping mechanism, is 

to say I am burned out and need a day off, but there isn’t anybody 

to turn it to and trade it to because the staffing has gotten so bad. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Wallace, in your written statement and your summary you also mentioned change in the definition of operational 

error by the FAA. Could you expand on that or describe exactly 

what that means in practice? 

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir. Our accepted standard for separation is 

5 miles and 1,000 feet. There is a severity classification for operational errors, category A, B, C, D. Minor errors, which are 80 percent, 90 percent is that total separation or more, meaning it is not 

quite 100 percent but it is greater than 90 percent or greater than 

80 percent, have always been considered to be minor errors. It still 

occurs. But the FAA recently changed the category from classifying 

those minor errors as operational errors, which are carefully 

tracked. They are put into the FAA Administrator’s handbook that 

is distributed at the beginning of every quarter. That classification 

was changed to proximity event, and proximity events, while they 

were intended in some degree to allow some latitude for air traffic 

controllers to run airplanes a little bit tighter together in areas 

where maybe there is a lot of congestion and maybe it was just a 

slight mistake, those types of situations are no longer tracked. It 

is still an error. It is still a mistake. The safety standard did not 

change. And the fact that the airplanes were not 5 miles apart, not 

1,000 feet separated, that did not change, only the name and we 

don’t count those anymore. And as a result of that I can’t tell you 

how many operational errors we have had at Miami Center this 

year. I just know we had 25 more, which is a 67 percent increase 

in the number of errors over the last ′′X′′ number of years, and we 

are working a million airplanes more. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee Mr. Oberstar and congratulates the Chairman on what I think is a historic 

day here in the Congress in passing rail legislation that really puts 

this country on the right track and did it by not only passing the 

legislation but by an overwhelming margin. 

44 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for those comments and 

for his vote and I thank all the colleagues on the Committee. We 

had an overwhelming vote: 87 Republicans voted with all of the 

Democrats in passing Amtrak legislation. We are not quite going 

to put aviation out of business, but we are improving the quality 

of surface transportation, high-speed inner-city passenger rail. 

What does the FAA tell you the time it takes to become an FPL, 

full performance level controller? What is their standard now? 

Mr. DAVIS. At my facility it is roughly 2 years. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Two years. But that is checking out on how many 

positions? 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, what they have done with the consolidation recently, what used to be an average of six or seven sectors it has 

gone to eight or nine now. So it has definitely extended at my facility, the time it takes to certify. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It seems to me the FAA has changed the standard for definition of FPL over the last 15 years or so. 

Mr. DAVIS. I would say that the definition is still—it is now CPC 

versus FPL. The definition seems to me to be about the same but 

the requirements of the time it takes to become that have increased now definitely. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is sleight of hand. It is manipulation of the 

reality of the workplace. When they have a staffing standard for a 

facility, whether it is a tower, TRACON, or other facility, if they 

say the staffing standard for this facility is 150 controllers and they 

include in the count, in the actual count developmentals but don’t 

include first line supervisors who are actually working controls, 

then the number is skewed. If they weed out the developmentals 

and count the first line supervisors, they are counting people who 

are under the rules supposed to be performing—working at controls 

only 10 percent of the time, not full time. 

So what this panel has told me, what the testimony, which I read 

last night because I was going to be on the floor today for the Amtrak bill—I knew I would miss the early part of this hearing. But 

I hear your saying developmental controllers. Three controllers at 

this position down to two controllers today, 297 at our facility down 

to 197, 6-day workweeks, 10-hour days. You didn’t talk about leave 

time or respite time. You didn’t talk about time away from controls 

after continuous work at the boards. And now you are saying in at 

least one situation they are saying an FPL status in 2 years? It 

used to be 5 for a FPL to check out at all three major positions. 

And you are saying that in Miami the same number of controllers 

as in 1992. 

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And you are talking about the stress you are experiencing and your colleagues have expressed and experienced. 

Some of you may know this, but from the mid-1970s to the mid1980s, FAA conducted 27 different studies of stress on controllers. 

Every one of them came back with a report controllers are overstressed, putting in too many hours at controls, too many continuous hours at controls, not enough leave time, not enough respite 

time in the course of the workday, not enough training and retraining opportunities, and the FAA rejected every one of those reports. 

That was under different Administrators, under different adminisVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
45 

trations. And then all that came to a head in 1981 and we have 

a strike and the firing and well over a billion dollars of Federal 

funds to rebuild the air traffic control workforce. And what we 

heard from one after another Administrator in this hearing room 

was we are getting a better quality controller, more experienced, 

more savvy with work stations. They know more than the Nintendo 

generation and they are better prepared and they are not going to 

be cry babies because that is what they said about controllers who 

complained about the factors I just cited. 

So where are we today? This is what we are hearing. This could 

be the transcript of 1981. This could be the transcript of 1985. This 

could be the script I heard in 1990. And still this FAA wants to 

shove down your throat or has done already a contract that no one 

in the private sector would accept. No one is going to say we will 

work for 5 years at 2 years ago pay and then renegotiate our contract 5 years out in the future based on 5- or 6-year-old pay. No 

one will do that except Members of Congress. We don’t get any increases either, but we ask for it. And that is the problem. But it 

is the same problem resurfacing all over again. And I have been 

through it for 25 years and I am exasperated at what is happening. 

And I am further exasperated that the other body, as we affectionately call that crowd over 200 meters away from here, hasn’t 

moved our aviation bill that has a pathway to at least partial resolution of the problem you are citing today. 

I find it astonishing that there is no recognition of history repeating itself on the part of the managerial echelon at FAA. And I am 

sorry you have to be here, but I am glad you are here to tell us 

this story. I am sorry for your having to experience it. I have been 

in towers, at TRACONs, in contract facilities, in every imaginable 

FAA facility. I have seen controllers at work. I have seen a situation where a controller has 27 aircraft in her section. And in this 

particular situation, there was a KC-135 that had a fire on board, 

and that controller had to move 27 aircraft out of the airspace to 

give that tanker room to dump fuel so he could get on the ground 

before the plane blew up. And the other FPLs all gathered around 

and supported this woman, and the first line supervisor was 

skilled, capable, did the same. She got that aircraft on the ground, 

no incident. She and the other five coworkers were etched in sweat. 

You believe in what you are doing. You know you have lives at 

stake. You know you have the safety of helpless people in your 

hands dependent upon your skill and your level of alertness and 

your ability to be at your top edge every moment of the day. We 

need to respect that. We need to do better than this system, than 

the FAA is doing for you today. And we are trying. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, and the Chair now recognizes the 

gentlewoman from West Virginia, Mrs. Capito. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the gentlemen 

for their testimony here today. I have one quick question and then 

one sort of wish list question. 

What is the starting salary for a developmental, range-wise now? 

Mr. WALLACE. I can speak for Miami Center. Right now when 

someone arrives at Miami Center that beginning salary is $37,500. 

46 

Mrs. CAPITO. And it can go up after 6 months, did you say, or 

is it not until 2 years? 

Mr. WALLACE. It goes up predicated on how many positions a 

person certifies on. And in the past, trainees that reported to 

Miami Center would immediately be put into certain upgrade 

training, and it would take anywhere from 3 to 4 months they 

would see their first raise. Then about 9 months to a year later, 

they would see another raise and it was incremental. But it also 

went with the seasoning time that they gained in between checking 

out on certain categories of positions, whether it was a manual assistant over here or a radar controller over here. 

And that has changed now with the new functional training program where they come in and they sit and they do nothing for a 

year and a half, and then they begin what should be a 3-month 

training session. The last big training session at Miami center that 

was scheduled for 3 months lasted for 9 because the FAA repeatedly changed the training program on the fly. They changed the 

training program and the requirements twice 2 weeks before 

Christmas to try to facilitate the class and make it a little bit better. As a result, the class continued to get lengthened and the students became very disinterested and very disheartened. Many of 

them—there were several that left from that class. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you. I think all three of you have lined out, 

and I have heard also from my constituents who are air traffic controllers and I am proud of their service, the issues—less pay, more 

work, shorthandedness. I was a little alarmed when you mentioned—more than a little alarmed when you mentioned the reclassifying of the operational errors and how they have—what was acceptable at 12 is now acceptable at 25, the number of aircraft that 

you are dealing with every day. I guess my question to each one 

of you is how do we solve this problem? What is the answer? Is it 

higher pay? Is it better training? 

So I will give you a chance to give me a top two, each one of you. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHAPMAN. I will go first. The answer to each one of your 

questions is a collective bargaining agreement because each one of 

those elements is contained within the collective bargaining agreement, probably much more so for us than traditional occupations. 

Everything within the air traffic system, technology development, 

improvements, procedures, along with the labor issues, are all 

under the umbrella of the collective bargaining agreement. Without 

that nothing works. 

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you. And I have to echo what Mr. Chapman says, that is first and foremost to resolving the problems. The 

collective bargaining agreement is the absolute foundation for resolving most of the issues. As far as the developmentals and their 

maybe unique situation with respect to training, we need to go 

back to the old tried and true method for training air traffic controllers. You have got an air traffic controller done in the same 

length of time that they are going to get it done with this functional training program, but you got it done with a lot of experience 

along the way. 

47 

Mr. DAVIS. I actually have three if that is okay. The first one is 

we are very rule oriented. Clearly we live and die by the rules, and 

that is that is why the contract is so important. It is critical. 

The second one would be to decriminalize operational errors. 

What happens right now is if I make one mistake a year I will be 

fired. One. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Is that a new development or is that something 

that has always been that way? 

Mr. DAVIS. It has always been that way, but it is a disincentive 

to be honest about what is really going on. If I have three errors 

in less than 30 months, I can be terminated. 

Mrs. CAPITO. But you are not necessarily terminated. 

Mr. DAVIS. I have seen it. 

Mrs. CAPITO. There is probably some judgmental decision. 

Mr. DAVIS. Downgrades and separations and those things. At the 

facilities that are hurting the worst, there has to be some support 

for the traffic management initiatives to work a realistic amount 

of traffic. In 1981 after the strike, they set up a general aviation 

reservation system. They set up a slot program to recognize the 

fact that we can’t continue handling the same level of traffic with 

a significantly reduced amount of people. We can’t do it. We are 

going to hurt somebody. 

Mrs. CAPITO. All right. I thank you for your answers. Thank you 

for your service. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman and now recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this 

hearing and we often say that as a matter of pro forma, politeness 

I suppose. But in this instance I think it is especially important 

that Congress continue to be engaged in this issue. Every time we 

hear testimony, every report I have from visiting with air traffic 

controllers continues to outline the significant challenges that the 

air traffic control system faces, and I really do want to see this 

Committee, our Congress, and especially the administration realize 

what significant problems we face today and how much more difficult this becomes over time in the absence of resolution of staffing 

issues, which perhaps in large part relate to reaching an agreement in regard to collective bargaining. 

I appreciate your testimony here today. I think this issue is serious. I think it is one that affects lives. I have great regard for air 

traffic controllers who I think face tremendous stresses, challenges, 

and perform admirably under very difficult circumstances. 

So when I say thank you for holding the hearing I am sincere 

in that regard. I appreciate you and the Ranking Member making 

certain that this issue is not forgotten. 

I have just a couple of questions. Is there any evidence that the 

collective bargaining agreement process is on track? Is there any 

evidence that there is a desire to see this issue resolved? Are we 

still perhaps in a holding pattern? 

Mr. CHAPMAN. I don’t know that we would be the appropriate 

people to answer that question with detail. Obviously Mr. Forrey 

would be the person to take that question. From our knowledge out 

in the field, no. To be quite honest, there is no movement by the 

agency to make a sincere effort. 

48 

Mr. MORAN. Which I assume has an effect upon morale as far as 

retention and recruit many. Is that accurate? 

Mr. CHAPMAN. It tells everybody there is no respect for them as 

employees is the clearest answer. 

Mr. MORAN. Is there any place within the system that is a role 

model for recruitment and retention? Is there any place, any location geographically or any particular program that is working to recruit or retain air traffic controllers within the system? 

Mr. DAVIS. I can tell you in the past there was. There was in the 

late 1980s; there was a system set up where they were having trouble staffing 11 facilities. They rolled out a program called up-pay 

demonstration project to say, listen, this is going to be an extra pay 

incentive to go and commit yourself to solving the problem at those 

facilities, high-density facilities, high cost of living areas. It lasted 

5 years and I responded to that. I went to L.A. As opposed to staying out where I was and became committed to solving the problem, 

and that was the reason. 

So I would say that is something that worked in the past that 

can work now. But I don’t know any place I—if there is one I 

haven’t heard about it. 

Mr. MORAN. So the answer to my question is you have to look 

historically, nothing in the present. 

And then one of the features that is true in a congressional district like mine that is so rural is the prevalence of contract towers. 

Do you have any sense or knowledge about recruitment, retention 

or transfer of traffic controllers between the two systems? Are they 

better able to recruit/retain, or do they face the same challenges? 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I would say I do have some experience with it. 

I was the representative for one of the facilities that was contracted out. So it converted one day with FAA. The next day it was 

a contractor. Those facilities that have been contracted out are the 

lowest level, the bottom level, or the bottom rung; so they are not 

as intense. They are not as—— 

Mr. MORAN. It is apples and oranges? 

Mr. DAVIS. I believe so. 

Mr. MORAN. And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would ask your permission to submit a question in writing to the earlier panel for 

their response. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection. 

Mr. MORAN. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. Thanks to all of you for testifying. I 

know it has been a long day for you on a hearing that was supposed to start much earlier and was delayed because of votes on 

the floor. 

Let me just say, as I have said before and I will say again after 

hearing the testimony today from our first panel as well as the 

three of you gentlemen, I am very concerned about where we are 

today, about the staffing levels, about the ratio between certified 

controllers and new hires and trainees, the rate of attrition not 

only with the most experienced controllers. In my opening statement I mentioned in fiscal year 2008 we have already seen 954 

controllers leave. There is no question and there has been testimony in this room, every one involved in the air traffic control sysVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:08 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42947 JASON
49 

tem recognizes that there is a major problem with fatigue. There 

is a major problem with morale, and that is a recipe for disaster 

in the future unless it is rectified and addressed immediately. Unfortunately, the FAA shares concerns, but there is little action, in 

my judgment, being taken to address these problems. 

Finally, I will say that—as I think and hope that the three of you 

know, that in H.R. 2881, in the legislation that we passed out of 

the House, we try to address some of these issues, not only the contract situation between the FAA and NATCA but in providing 

funds and additional things in the bill that we think will help with 

the current situation. 

But again we thank you for being here. I know you are not used 

to coming up and testifying before Congressional Committees and 

Subcommittees. You are union representatives. Your President, Mr. 

Forrey, who was on the earlier panel, they normally are the ones 

who are testifying and do a very good job in presenting the views. 

But it is good for this Committee and its Members to hear directly 

from those who are on the job and what you are seeing firsthand, 

what you are experiencing. 

So again we thank you for taking the time to offer your testimony here today. We wish you well and would ask that you continue to talk to your colleagues and anyone that you can and ask 

them to call on their United States Senators to move legislation 

that is pending in the Senate that passed the House with bipartisan support. 

Again, thank you, and that concludes the Subcommittees hearing. The Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:04 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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